Radionuclide observables during the Integrated Field Exercise of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burnett, Jonathan L.; Miley, Harry S.; Milbrath, Brian D.

2016-01-01

In 2014 the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) undertook an Integrated Field Exercise (IFE14) in Jordan. The exercise consisted of a simulated 0.5–2 kT underground nuclear explosion triggering an On-site Inspection (OSI) to search for evidence of a Treaty violation. This research paper evaluates two of the OSI techniques used during the IFE14, laboratory-based gamma-spectrometry of soil samples and in-situ gamma-spectrometry, both of which were implemented to search for 17 OSI relevant particulate radionuclides indicative of nuclear explosions. The detection sensitivity is evaluated using real IFE and model data. It indicates that higher sensitivity laboratory measurements are the optimum technique during the IFE and within the Treaty/Protocol-specified OSI timeframes. - Highlights: • The 2014 Integrated Field Exercise occurred in Jordan. • The detection sensitivity for two On-site Inspection techniques was evaluated. • The techniques search for 17 particulate radionuclides indicative of nuclear explosions. • Laboratory-based gamma-spectrometry of soil samples was the optimum technique.

On-Site inspections as a tool for nuclear explosion monitoring in the framework of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Science.gov (United States)

Arndt, R.; Gaya-Pique, L.; Labak, P.; Tanaka, J.

2009-04-01

On-site inspections (OSIs) constitute the final verification measure under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). OSIs are launched to establish whether or not a nuclear explosion has been carried out, thus they are conducted to verify States' compliance with the Treaty. During such an inspection, facts are gathered within a limited investigation area of 1000 Km2 to identify possible violators of the Treaty. Time scale (referring both to the preparation of the inspection as well as to the conduct of an OSI itself) is one of the challenges that an inspection team has to face when conducting an OSI. Other challenges are the size of the team - which is limited to 40 inspectors - and political limitations imposed by the Treaty in the use of allowed techniques. The Integrated Field Exercise 2008 (IFE08) recently conducted in Kazakhstan was the first large-scale, as well as the most comprehensive, on site inspection exercise ever conducted by the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). The exercise took place in a deserted area south east of Kurchatov, within the former Soviet Union's Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. In this paper we will provide an overview of the technical activities conducted by the inspection team during IFE08 in order to collect evidence for a hypothetical nuclear explosion test. The techniques applied can be distributed in four different blocks: visual observation (to look for man-made changes in the geomorphology as well as anthropogenic features related to an underground nuclear explosion, UNE); passive seismic monitoring (to identify possible aftershocks created by the UNE); radionuclide measurements (to collect evidence for radionuclide isotopes related to a nuclear explosion); and finally geophysical surveys (to identify geophysical signatures related to an UNE in terms of changes in the geological strata, to the hydrogeological regime, and in terms of the shallow remains of the

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Graham, Thomas Jr. [7609 Glenbrook Rd., Bethesda, MD 20814 (United States)

2014-05-09

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

Statement to the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Vienna, 3 September 2003

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2003-01-01

Full text: The Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is being held at a time of major challenges to the nuclear arms control and disarmament regime. A verified, permanent, global ban on all types of nuclear explosive tests has been a key item on the international security agenda for nearly half a century. More than 2,000 nuclear explosive detonations have taken place since 1945, with the most recent ones in 1998. The CTBT has been characterized as the longest sought, hardest fought prize in the history of arms control. The Treaty, when implemented, will prohibit all nuclear explosions, in all environments, for all time. It will curb the development and testing of new, more advanced and more dangerous nuclear weapons, and will limit the possibilities for further nuclear proliferation. The Treaty will lead to the establishment of a comprehensive International Monitoring System to provide independent, impartial verification of compliance. The CTBT, along with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and a future Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices (FMCT), forms an essential element of a network of negotiated, global treaties that will strengthen international efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear disarmament leading in time hopefully to a world without nuclear weapons. In the meantime, with the early entry into force of the CTBT, it would indeed be a significant achievement if this new century were to remain free of any nuclear test explosions. In this context, I encourage all signatory States to ratify the CTBT, and all those States that have yet to sign to do so and to ratify the Treaty, as soon as possible - so that another crucial pillar can be raised to support the edifice of global nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament norms. (IAEA)

Policy issues facing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and prospects for the future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sweeney, J.

1999-01-01

This report is divided into the following 5 sections: (1) Background; (2) Major Issues Facing Ratification of CTBT; (3) Current Status on CTBT Ratification; (4) Status of CTBT Signatories and Ratifiers; and (5) CTBT Activities Not Prohibited. The major issues facing ratification of CTBT discussed here are: impact on CTBT of START II and ABM ratification; impact of India and Pakistan nuclear tests; CTBT entry into force; and establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization

Policy issues facing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and prospects for the future

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sweeney, J.

1999-04-01

This report is divided into the following 5 sections: (1) Background; (2) Major Issues Facing Ratification of CTBT; (3) Current Status on CTBT Ratification; (4) Status of CTBT Signatories and Ratifiers; and (5) CTBT Activities Not Prohibited. The major issues facing ratification of CTBT discussed here are: impact on CTBT of START II and ABM ratification; impact of India and Pakistan nuclear tests; CTBT entry into force; and establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

Measurement of 37Ar to support technology for On-Site Inspection under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty

Science.gov (United States)

Aalseth, C. E.; Day, A. R.; Haas, D. A.; Hoppe, E. W.; Hyronimus, B. J.; Keillor, M. E.; Mace, E. K.; Orrell, J. L.; Seifert, A.; Woods, V. T.

2011-10-01

On-Site Inspection (OSI) is a key component of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Measurements of radionuclide isotopes created by an underground nuclear explosion are a valuable signature of a Treaty violation. Argon-37 is produced by neutron interaction with calcium in soil, 40Ca( n, α) 37Ar. For OSI, the 35-day half-life of 37Ar provides both high specific activity and sufficient time for completion of an inspection before decay limits sensitivity. This paper presents a low-background internal-source gas proportional counter with an 37Ar measurement sensitivity level equivalent to 45 mBq/SCM in wholeair.

Australia: Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Model Treaty text

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1996-02-01

The scope of the proposed Treaty includes the following: Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control; each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon tests explosion or any other nuclear explosion

National security and the comprehensive test ban treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Landauer, J.K.

1980-08-01

For nearly three years now, the US, UK, and USSR have been working on the draft of a treaty that would ban all nuclear explosions (both peaceful applications and weapon tests) and institute verification and monitoring provisions to ensure compliance with the treaty. The status of the draft treaty is summarized. The question, Is a CTBT really in the interest of US national security. is analyzed with arguments used by both proponents and opponents of the CTBT. It is concluded that there are arguments both for and against a CTBT, but, for those whose approach to national security can be expressed as peace through preparedness, the arguments against a CTBT appear persuasive

The Limited Test Ban Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Loeb, B.S.

1991-01-01

This paper discusses the Limited Test Ban Treaty which came at the end of nearly five years of frustrated efforts to obtain a comprehensive test ban. Negotiations toward that end had begun in October 1958. At the same time a voluntary, informal moratorium on tests was initiated. The negotiations soon stalled over the Soviet Union's resistance to internationally supervised inspections on its soil. In April 1959 a phased ban that was to be limited at first to atmospheric tests conducted below an altitude of 50 kilometers. Such tests were thought to be easily verifiable. The Soviets rejected this idea and continued to insist that a complete test ban need not require numerous inspections. The two sides nevertheless appeared to be nearing agreement on a treaty to ban all but relatively small underground tests when, in May 1960, an U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over Soviet territory. After a thorough review of the U.S. position, the Kennedy administration proposed in April 1961 a draft treaty that made several concessions toward the Soviet position. Nevertheless, the Soviets, still disagreeing with the provisions for verification and with the makeup of the control organization, rejected it

Machine learning for radioxenon event classification for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stocki, Trevor J., E-mail: trevor_stocki@hc-sc.gc.c [Radiation Protection Bureau, 775 Brookfield Road, A.L. 6302D1, Ottawa, ON, K1A 1C1 (Canada); Li, Guichong; Japkowicz, Nathalie [School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa, 800 King Edward Avenue, Ottawa, ON, K1N 6N5 (Canada); Ungar, R. Kurt [Radiation Protection Bureau, 775 Brookfield Road, A.L. 6302D1, Ottawa, ON, K1A 1C1 (Canada)

2010-01-15

A method of weapon detection for the Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) consists of monitoring the amount of radioxenon in the atmosphere by measuring and sampling the activity concentration of {sup 131m}Xe, {sup 133}Xe, {sup 133m}Xe, and {sup 135}Xe by radionuclide monitoring. Several explosion samples were simulated based on real data since the measured data of this type is quite rare. These data sets consisted of different circumstances of a nuclear explosion, and are used as training data sets to establish an effective classification model employing state-of-the-art technologies in machine learning. A study was conducted involving classic induction algorithms in machine learning including Naive Bayes, Neural Networks, Decision Trees, k-Nearest Neighbors, and Support Vector Machines, that revealed that they can successfully be used in this practical application. In particular, our studies show that many induction algorithms in machine learning outperform a simple linear discriminator when a signal is found in a high radioxenon background environment.

Machine learning for radioxenon event classification for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stocki, Trevor J.; Li, Guichong; Japkowicz, Nathalie; Ungar, R. Kurt

2010-01-01

A method of weapon detection for the Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) consists of monitoring the amount of radioxenon in the atmosphere by measuring and sampling the activity concentration of 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe by radionuclide monitoring. Several explosion samples were simulated based on real data since the measured data of this type is quite rare. These data sets consisted of different circumstances of a nuclear explosion, and are used as training data sets to establish an effective classification model employing state-of-the-art technologies in machine learning. A study was conducted involving classic induction algorithms in machine learning including Naive Bayes, Neural Networks, Decision Trees, k-Nearest Neighbors, and Support Vector Machines, that revealed that they can successfully be used in this practical application. In particular, our studies show that many induction algorithms in machine learning outperform a simple linear discriminator when a signal is found in a high radioxenon background environment.

Cosmic veto gamma-spectrometry for Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty samples

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burnett, J.L.; Davies, A.V.

2014-01-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is supported by a global network of monitoring stations that perform high-resolution gamma-spectrometry on air filter samples for the identification of 85 radionuclides. At the UK CTBT Radionuclide Laboratory (GBL15), a novel cosmic veto gamma-spectrometer has been developed to improve the sensitivity of station measurements, providing a mean background reduction of 80.8% with mean MDA improvements of 45.6%. The CTBT laboratory requirement for a 140 Ba MDA is achievable after 1.5 days counting compared to 5–7 days using conventional systems. The system consists of plastic scintillation plates that detect coincident cosmic-ray interactions within an HPGe gamma-spectrometer using the Canberra Lynx TM multi-channel analyser. The detector is remotely configurable using a TCP/IP interface and requires no dedicated coincidence electronics. It would be especially useful in preventing false-positives at remote station locations (e.g. Halley, Antarctica) where sample transfer to certified laboratories is logistically difficult. The improved sensitivity has been demonstrated for a CTBT air filter sample collected after the Fukushima incident

Cosmic veto gamma-spectrometry for Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty samples

Science.gov (United States)

Burnett, J. L.; Davies, A. V.

2014-05-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is supported by a global network of monitoring stations that perform high-resolution gamma-spectrometry on air filter samples for the identification of 85 radionuclides. At the UK CTBT Radionuclide Laboratory (GBL15), a novel cosmic veto gamma-spectrometer has been developed to improve the sensitivity of station measurements, providing a mean background reduction of 80.8% with mean MDA improvements of 45.6%. The CTBT laboratory requirement for a 140Ba MDA is achievable after 1.5 days counting compared to 5-7 days using conventional systems. The system consists of plastic scintillation plates that detect coincident cosmic-ray interactions within an HPGe gamma-spectrometer using the Canberra LynxTM multi-channel analyser. The detector is remotely configurable using a TCP/IP interface and requires no dedicated coincidence electronics. It would be especially useful in preventing false-positives at remote station locations (e.g. Halley, Antarctica) where sample transfer to certified laboratories is logistically difficult. The improved sensitivity has been demonstrated for a CTBT air filter sample collected after the Fukushima incident.

Cosmic veto gamma-spectrometry for Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty samples

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Burnett, J.L., E-mail: jonathan.burnett@awe.co.uk; Davies, A.V.

2014-05-21

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is supported by a global network of monitoring stations that perform high-resolution gamma-spectrometry on air filter samples for the identification of 85 radionuclides. At the UK CTBT Radionuclide Laboratory (GBL15), a novel cosmic veto gamma-spectrometer has been developed to improve the sensitivity of station measurements, providing a mean background reduction of 80.8% with mean MDA improvements of 45.6%. The CTBT laboratory requirement for a {sup 140}Ba MDA is achievable after 1.5 days counting compared to 5–7 days using conventional systems. The system consists of plastic scintillation plates that detect coincident cosmic-ray interactions within an HPGe gamma-spectrometer using the Canberra Lynx{sup TM} multi-channel analyser. The detector is remotely configurable using a TCP/IP interface and requires no dedicated coincidence electronics. It would be especially useful in preventing false-positives at remote station locations (e.g. Halley, Antarctica) where sample transfer to certified laboratories is logistically difficult. The improved sensitivity has been demonstrated for a CTBT air filter sample collected after the Fukushima incident.

The 2014 Integrated Field Exercise of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty revisited: the case for data fusion

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Burnett, Jonathan L.; Miley, Harry S.; Bowyer, Theodore W.; Cameron, Ian M.

2018-04-18

The International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) uses a global network of radionuclide monitoring stations to detect evidence of a nuclear explosion. The two radionuclide technologies employed—particulate and noble gas (radioxenon) detection—have applications for data fusion to improve detection of a nuclear explosion. Using the hypothetical 0.5 kT nuclear explosive test scenario of the CTBTO 2014 Integrated Field Exercise, the intrinsic relationship between particulate and noble gas signatures has been examined. This study shows that, depending upon the time of the radioxenon release, the particulate progeny can produce the more detectable signature. Thus, as both particulate and noble gas signatures are inherently coupled, the authors recommend that the sample categorization schemes should be linked.

Subcritical tests - nuclear weapon testing under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Subkritiske tester - kjernevaapentesting under avtalen om fullstendig proevestans

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hoeibraaten, S

1998-10-01

The report discusses possible nuclear weapons related experiments and whether these are permitted under the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The term ''subcritical experiments'' as used in the United States includes experiments in which one studies fissile materials (so far only plutonium) under extreme conditions generated by conventional high explosives, and in which a self-sustained chain reaction never develops in the fissile material. The known facts about the American subcritical experiments are presented. There is very little reason to doubt that these experiments were indeed subcritical and therefore permitted under the CTBT. Little is known about the Russian efforts that are being made on subcritical experiments.

Verifying the nuclear-test ban. CTBTO: For a safer and more secure world [videorecording

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in September 1996. In March 1997, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization started work in Vienna, Austria. This film depicts the Commission's activities in establishing the Treaty's verification regime to monitor adherence to the global ban on nuclear explosions. It presents the challenging work at some of the global monitoring facilities, and at the International Data Centre in Vienna, where the data generated by the facilities are received, processed and analysed

The 2014 Integrated Field Exercise of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty revisited: The case for data fusion.

Science.gov (United States)

Burnett, Jonathan L; Miley, Harry S; Bowyer, Theodore W; Cameron, Ian M

2018-09-01

The International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) uses a global network of radionuclide monitoring stations to detect evidence of a nuclear explosion. The two radionuclide technologies employed-particulate and noble gas (radioxenon) detection-have applications for data fusion to improve detection of a nuclear explosion. Using the hypothetical 0.5 kT nuclear explosive test scenario of the CTBTO 2014 Integrated Field Exercise, the intrinsic relationship between particulate and noble gas signatures has been examined. This study shows that, depending upon the time of the radioxenon release, the particulate progeny can produce the more detectable signature. Thus, as both particulate and noble gas signatures are inherently coupled, the authors recommend that the sample categorization schemes should be linked. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is of critical importance for the future of arms limitation and disarmament. As the 1980 report of the Secretary-General concluded, a comprehensive nuclear test ban is regarded as the first and most urgent step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and, in particular, of its qualitative aspects. It could serve as an important measure for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertical and horizontal. It would have a major arms limitation impact in that it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to develop new designs of nuclear weapons and would also place constraints on the modification of existing weapon designs. The permanent cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests has long been sought by the world community and its achievement would be an event of great international significance

Automated radioxenon monitoring for the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in two distinctive locations: Ottawa and Tahiti

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stocki, T.J.; Blanchard, X.; D'Amours, R.; Ungar, R.K.; Fontaine, J.P.; Sohier, M.; Bean, M.; Taffary, T.; Racine, J.; Tracy, B.L.; Brachet, G.; Jean, M.; Meyerhof, D.

2005-01-01

In preparation for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty, automated radioxenon monitoring is performed in two distinctive environments: Ottawa and Tahiti. These sites are monitored with SPALAX (Systeme de Prelevement d'air Automatique en Ligne avec l'Analyse des radioXenons) technology, which automatically extracts radioxenon from the atmosphere and measures the activity concentrations of 131m,133m,133,135 Xe. The resulting isotopic concentrations can be useful to discern nuclear explosions from nuclear industry xenon emissions. Ambient radon background, which may adversely impact analyser sensitivity, is discussed. Upper concentration limits are reported for the apparently radioxenon free Tahiti environment. Ottawa has a complex radioxenon background due to proximity to nuclear reactors and medical isotope facilities. Meteorological models suggest that, depending on the wind direction, the radioxenon detected in Ottawa can be characteristic of the normal radioxenon background in the Eastern United States, Europe, and Japan or distinctive due to medical isotope production

Automated radioxenon monitoring for the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in two distinctive locations: Ottawa and Tahiti.

Science.gov (United States)

Stocki, T J; Blanchard, X; D'Amours, R; Ungar, R K; Fontaine, J P; Sohier, M; Bean, M; Taffary, T; Racine, J; Tracy, B L; Brachet, G; Jean, M; Meyerhof, D

2005-01-01

In preparation for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty, automated radioxenon monitoring is performed in two distinctive environments: Ottawa and Tahiti. These sites are monitored with SPALAX (Systeme de Prelevement d'air Automatique en Ligne avec l'Analyse des radioXenons) technology, which automatically extracts radioxenon from the atmosphere and measures the activity concentrations of (131m,133m,133,135)Xe. The resulting isotopic concentrations can be useful to discern nuclear explosions from nuclear industry xenon emissions. Ambient radon background, which may adversely impact analyser sensitivity, is discussed. Upper concentration limits are reported for the apparently radioxenon free Tahiti environment. Ottawa has a complex radioxenon background due to proximity to nuclear reactors and medical isotope facilities. Meteorological models suggest that, depending on the wind direction, the radioxenon detected in Ottawa can be characteristic of the normal radioxenon background in the Eastern United States, Europe, and Japan or distinctive due to medical isotope production.

About the treaty of complete nuclear test ban: the USA between unilateralism and multilateralism

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sur, S.

2000-01-01

This article analyses the possible reasons that have led the US Senate to reject the treaty of comprehensive nuclear test ban. Even if this decision did not retained the attention of the international public opinion, it appears as surprising because the USA have worked a lot for the elaboration of this treaty and were considered as the main beneficiaries of it. Three interpretations are proposed by the author: some purely internal disputes inside Clinton's administration, a real will of the USA to abandon the arms control policy, or an intermediate attitude which allows the USA to act on different levels and to get rid of common rules. (J.S.)

Surface coatings as xenon diffusion barriers on plastic scintillators : Improving Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification

OpenAIRE

Bläckberg, Lisa

2011-01-01

This thesis investigates the ability of transparent surface coatings to reduce xenon diffusion into plastic scintillators. The motivation for the work is improved radioxenon monitoring equipment, used with in the framework of the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. A large part of the equipment used in this context incorporates plastic scintillators which are in direct contact with the radioactive gas to be detected. One problem with such setup is that radioxenon...

Inverse transport for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

J.-P. Issartel

2003-01-01

Full Text Available An international monitoring system is being built as a verification tool for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Forty stations will measure on a worldwide daily basis the concentration of radioactive noble gases. The paper introduces, by handling preliminary real data, a new approach of backtracking for the identification of sources of passive tracers after positive measurements. When several measurements are available the ambiguity about possible sources is reduced significantly. The approach is validated against ETEX data. A distinction is made between adjoint and inverse transport shown to be, indeed, different though equivalent ideas. As an interesting side result it is shown that, in the passive tracer dispersion equation, the diffusion stemming from a time symmetric turbulence is necessarily a self-adjoint operator, a result easily verified for the usual gradient closure, but more general.

India and the nuclear test ban

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Singh, J.

1998-01-01

India has sought a nuclear-test ban for the last 42 years bur is now unable to sign the Comprehensive Test ban Treaty (CTBT) when it is in its final form and moved to block its transmittal from the Conference on Disarmament to the UN General assembly. The negotiating mandate for the CTBT required it to effectively contribute to the process of disarmament. It is towards this end that India proposed amendments. Nuclear disarmament is fundamental for India's strategic and security interests. The only viable solution to India's security concerns related to nuclear weapons is in pursuing total elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals

Towards a nuclear-test ban

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-01-01

In 1986 and again in 1987 the General Assembly adopted resolutions by which it called on States conducting nuclear-test explosions to notify the Secretary-General, within one week of each explosion, of the time, place, yield and site characteristics of the test and also invited all other States to provide any such data on nuclear explosions that they might have. Over the years, in the Conference on Disarmament, members of the Group of 21 (mostly neutral and non-aligned countries) have continued to attach the utmost importance to the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons as well as of reversing the nuclear-arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. In 1995 a conference will be convened to decide whether the non-proliferation Treaty will continue in force indefinitely, or will be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. Many States support the view that a comprehensive test ban would be a significant contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; and some believe that, without a cessation of nuclear testing, it may not be possible to extend the NPT well beyond 1995. Other States, however, are of the opinion that the NPT, independently, offers benefits for the security of all States and, by its extension, will continue to do so

Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shinohara, Nobuo; Kokaji, Lisa; Ichimasa, Sukeyuki

2010-01-01

In Global Center of Excellence Program of The University of Tokyo, Non- Proliferation Study Committee by the members of nuclear industries, electricity utilities, nuclear energy institutes and universities has initiated on October 2008 from the viewpoints of investigating a package of measures for nuclear non-proliferation and bringing up young people who will support the near-future nuclear energy system. One of the non-proliferation issues in the Committee is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Objective of this treaty is to cease all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosion. This purpose should be contributed effectively to the political stability of the Asian region by continuous efforts to eliminate the nuclear weapons. In the Committee, by extracting several issues related to the CTBT, conception of 'Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation' has been discussed with the aim of the nuclear-weapon security in Asian region, where environmental nuclear-test monitoring data is mainly treated and utilized. In this paper, the conception of the 'network' is presented in detail. (author)

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Verification research in support of non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Linger, D.

1997-01-01

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits nuclear weapons testing at any yield. The detection and positive identification of any evasive test presents a challenge to the technical community, however. Low yield testing can be masked by normal background seismic noise or permissible chemical explosions for mining or other purposes. Cavity decoupling can reduce the seismic signal from the nuclear explosion by a factor of 50 or more. The combination of decoupling and high explosive masking represents a particular technical challenge for positive identification. To address this problem, a technical program in cooperation with the Kazakhstan National Nuclear Center has been initiated to conduct a series of tests in the Balapan area of the Semipalatinsk Test Site to provide fundamental data on the depth of burial effects on seismic signals emanating from an explosion. If the depth of burial can be positively determined from the characteristics of the seismic waveform, near-surface mining blasts can be distinguished from deep underground evasive nuclear explosions, thus eliminating the capability to easily mask the nuclear event. This paper will briefly describe the basic concepts of some evasive nuclear testing options and discuss the cooperative test program that is being carried out to improve the capability to positively identify such tests. The paper will also discuss possible additional cooperative tests that might be done in 1998 to further improve the identification capability

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring station operating regime influence on radionuclide detection sensitivity

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Williams, D.L.

1999-01-01

International Monitoring System (IMS) stations are being deployed worldwide in support of the Comprehensive [Nuclear] Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The highly sensitive radionuclide monitoring stations regularly sample airborne radionuclide particulates to determine whether fission products are present in the atmosphere that may be indicative of a nuclear weapons test. Standards have been set for these stations regarding their operation regime and the minimum detectable concentrations (MDCs) for specific radionuclides likely to be present after a nuclear weapons test. This study uses actual CTBT monitoring data to relate a subset of the specified operational standards with the listed MDC limits. It is determined that a relationship exists between the specified operational regime and the MDC values. Since the background radioactivity is largely a function of the radon and thoron progeny, longer decay operational regimes allow for a reduction in the background. For longer lived radionuclides, this corresponds to a reduction in MDC. (author)

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty research and development: plans and accomplishments ...from signature to entry into force

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

1998-06-01

This brochure describes the high-priority R&D that is being pursued in the DOE Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) R&D Program and how it will support effective CTBT monitoring. Monitoring challenges, sensor systems, signal analysis, resolution of ambiguities, and the timeline for CTBT history and program milestones are covered.

The International Data Centre of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty: vision and progress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bratt, S.R.

2001-01-01

The mission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty International Data Centre (IDC) is to: (a) acquire data over a Global Communications Infrastructure from a global network of 337 facilities of the International Monitoring Systems (IMS), (b) to process and analyze these data, and (c) to provide the IMS data, IDC products and services to Member States. In effect, the IDC symbolizes a new brand of arms control for the information age, leveraging Internet communications, knowledge-based data fusion, graphical decision support systems and Web-based user interfaces to achieve its mission. During 2000, the IDC was disseminating products based on data from about 90 seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide stations of the future network. The number of events in the reviewed seismo-acoustic bulletins ranged from 40 to 360 each day. On average, some 200 radionuclide spectra were processed and analysed each month. Users from 45 Member States received an average of close to 18,000 data and product deliveries per month from the IDC. As the IDC continues to prepare for entry-into-force of the CTBT, it will continue to integrate the state-of-the-art in science and technology in order to meet the demands of the increasing volume of new types of IMS data, expanded IDC services, and a growing base of users. (orig.) [de

Automated aerosol sampling and analysis for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miley, H.S.; Bowyer, S.M.; Hubbard, C.W.; McKinnon, A.D.; Perkins, R.W.; Thompson, R.C.; Warner, R.A.

1998-01-01

Detecting nuclear debris from a nuclear weapon exploded in or substantially vented to the Earth's atmosphere constitutes the most certain indication that a violation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has occurred. For this reason, a radionuclide portion of the International Monitoring System is being designed and implemented. The IMS will monitor aerosols and gaseous xenon isotopes to detect atmospheric and underground tests, respectively. An automated system, the Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer (RASA), has been developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to meet CTBT aerosol measurement requirements. This is achieved by the use of a novel sampling apparatus, a high-resolution germanium detector, and very sophisticated software. This system draws a large volume of air (∼ 20,000 m 3 /day), performs automated gamma-ray spectral measurements (MDC( 140 Ba) 3 ), and communicates this and other data to a central data facility. Automated systems offer the added benefit of rigid controls, easily implemented QA/QC procedures, and centralized depot maintenance and operation. Other types of automated communication include pull or push transmission of State-Of-Health data, commands, and configuration data. In addition, a graphical user interface, Telnet, and other interactive communications are supported over ordinary phone or network lines. This system has been the subject of a USAF commercialization effort to meet US CTBT monitoring commitments. It will also be available to other CTBT signatories and the monitoring community for various governmental, environmental, or commercial needs. The current status of the commercialization is discussed

A treaty banning nuclear weapons and its implications for the Netherlands

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Güven, O.; van der Meer, S.

2015-01-01

International support for a new multilateral treaty banning nuclear weapons is increasing. What implications would such a treaty have for the Netherlands? This policy brief describes the legal and political context of such a treaty and examines the implications of two scenarios: one in which the

Achieving a nuclear weapons ban treaty is possible. United Nations have proposed it, we can obtain it

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nivet, Roland

2017-01-01

As member of an activist association, the author shows that, after the adoption of a UN resolution in favour of the elaboration of a nuclear weapons ban treaty, reaching such a treaty is possible. The action of the civil society and the mobilization of the public opinion seems necessary. In appendix, the resolution adopted by the UN general assembly on December 23, 2016 is attached. It summarizes the advances of multilateral negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear disarmament and expresses some recommendations

Towards a nuclear-test ban

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

A survey of international efforts from the partial test-ban Treaty (in atmosphere, in outer space and under water) in 1963 to the Soviet-USA negotiations on verification measures for the threshold test-ban Treaty is given. As was the case in the bilateral and trilateral negotiations, the question of adequate verification procedures has remained one of the major problems in the multilateral considerations on a comprehensive test ban. Over the years, a number of proposals have been made in order to solve the issue, in particular by Sweden and by the Soviet Union. In 1988, the four experimental data centres, situated in Canberra, Moscow, Stockholm and Washington, carried out separate and joint experiments in analysis methodology. Communication techniques between the four international data centres and a number of national seismological stations were also tested. In addition, a global data-gathering experiment was conducted, resulting in the creation of an initial research data base at the experimental data centre in Canberra. Further technical experiments are planned for 1989, an in 1990 a large-scale experiment in data exchange and analysis, involving up to a hundred seismological stations globally and lasting several months, is foreseen

Mine seismicity and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chiappetta, F. [Blasting Analysis International, Allentown, PA (United States); Heuze, F.; Walter, W. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Hopler, R. [Powderman Consulting Inc., Oxford, MD (United States); Hsu, V. [Air Force Technical Applications Center, Patrick AFB, FL (United States); Martin, B. [Thunder Basin Coal Co., Wright, WY (United States); Pearson, C. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Stump, B. [Southern Methodist Univ., Dallas, TX (United States); Zipf, K. [Univ. of New South Wales (Australia)

1998-12-09

Surface and underground mining operations generate seismic ground motions which are created by chemical explosions and ground failures. It may come as a surprise to some that the ground failures (coal bumps, first caves, pillar collapses, rockbursts, etc.) can send signals whose magnitudes are as strong or stronger than those from any mining blast. A verification system that includes seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide sensors is being completed as part of the CTBT. The largest mine blasts and ground failures will be detected by this system and must be identified as distinct from signals generated by small nuclear explosions. Seismologists will analyze the seismic records and presumably should be able to separate them into earthquake-like and non earthquake-like categories, using a variety of so-called seismic discriminants. Non-earthquake essentially means explosion- or implosion-like. Such signals can be generated not only by mine blasts but also by a variety of ground failures. Because it is known that single-fired chemical explosions and nuclear explosion signals of the same yield give very similar seismic records, the non-earthquake signals will be of concern to the Treaty verification community. The magnitude of the mine-related events is in the range of seismicity created by smaller nuclear explosions or decoupled tests, which are of particular concern under the Treaty. It is conceivable that legitimate mining blasts or some mine-induced ground failures could occasionally be questioned. Information such as shot time, location and design parameters may be all that is necessary to resolve the event identity. In rare instances where the legitimate origin of the event could not be resolved by a consultation and clarification procedure, it might trigger on On-Site Inspection (OSI). Because there is uncertainty in the precise location of seismic event as determined by the International Monitoring System (IMS), the OSI can cover an area of up to 1

Airborne radionuclides of concern and their measurement in monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perkins, R.W.; Miley, H.S.; Hensley, W.K.; Abel, K.H.

1995-01-01

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is conducting radioanalytical developmental programs with the goal of providing near-real-time analysis technology for airborne signature radionuclides which are indicative of a nuclear weapons test in any of the earth's environments. If a test were conducted in the atmosphere or above the atmosphere, then the full spectrum of fission and activation products, together with residues from the device would be dispersed in the atmosphere. However, if a nuclear test were conducted underground or under water, the emission could range from a major to a very minor vent, and the material released would likely consist mainly of noble gas radionuclides and the radioiodines. Since many of the noble gases decay to form particulate radionuclides, these may serve as the more sensitive signatures. For example, Ba-140 is a daughter of Xe-140 (13.6 s), and Cs-137 is a daughter of Xe-137 (3.82 min). Both of these have been observed in large amounts relative to other fission products in dynamic venting of U.S. underground nuclear detonations. Large amounts of radionuclides are produced from even a comparatively small nuclear detonation. For example, a 10-KT fission device will produce approximately a megacurie of Ba-140 and of several other radionuclides with half-lives of days to weeks. If such a device were detonated in the atmosphere at midlatitude, it would easily be observable at downwind monitoring sites during its first and subsequent circumnavigations of the earth. Efficient and practical methods for the near-real-time analysis of both particulate and gaseous radionuclides are important to an effective monitoring and attribution program in support of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); methods for this purpose are being pursued

In pursuit of a nuclear test ban treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schmalberger, T.

1991-01-01

The objective of this guide is to focus on the political issues in the test ban debate in the conference of Disarmament, and to produce a guide providing diplomats, researchers, and the interested public with background information. Such a complex negotiating process requires a selection of proposals, comments and technical details. The criterion from selecting material was based upon the importance for present negotiations. The first part of this guide provides a historical perspective on the arguments used for and against nuclear testing, and on the record of negotiating activities on this subject. The second part examines the test ban debate in the Conference on Disarmament during the past ten years. Figs

Report made on behalf of the commission of foreign affairs about the project of law, adopted by the senate, authorizing the approval of the agreement between the French government and the preliminary commission of the organization of the nuclear test ban treaty, about the conduct of the activities relative to the international control facilities, including the post-certification activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cazenave, R.

2003-12-01

France and the preliminary commission of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty organization (CTBTO) concluded on July 13, 2001, an agreement about the conduct of the activities relative to the international surveillance facilities. This agreement aims at organizing the modalities of implementation of the surveillance activities carried out by the technical secretariat of the preliminary committee of CTBTO in the French territory. This document is the report of the French national assembly about the project of law for the approval of this agreement. It presents the difficult implementation of an international test ban system, the French commitment in the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), and the main dispositions of the agreement of July 13, 2001. (J.S.)

The NPT and nuclear testing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Howlett, D.; Simpson, J.

1992-01-01

One of the oldest unachieved aims of international nuclear disarmament and arms limitation negotiations is a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The history of the international negotiations, their outcomes and the consequences of Test Ban for the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states is discussed. The linkage between a CTBT and the Non-Proliferation Treaty is examined. Two strategies for moving towards a CTBT are compared; one a direct one, the other an incremental route. Both have several alternatives which are considered. (UK)

Proceedings of the 22nd Annual DoD/DOE Seismic Research Symposium: Planning for Verification of and Compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nichols, James W., LTC [Editor

2000-09-15

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 22nd Annual DoD/DOE Seismic Research Symposium: Planning for Verification of and Compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), held 13-15 September 2000 in New Orleans, Louisiana. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Department of Defense (DoD), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

Proceedings of the Symposium on the Non-Proliferation Experiment: Results and Implications for Test Ban Treaties, Rockville, Maryland, April 19-21, 1994

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Denny, Marvin D

1994-01-01

To address a critical verification issue for the current Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and for a possible future Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Department of Energy sought to measure certain differences between an underground nuclear test and a chemical test in the same geology, so that other explosions could be identified. This was done in a field experiment code-named the NonProliferation Experiment (NPE).This comprehensive experiment was designed to determine the signatures of chemical explosions for a broad range of phenomena for comparison with those of previous nuclear tests. If significant differences can be measured, then these measures can be used to discriminate between the two types of explosions. In addition, when these differences are understood, large chemical explosions can be used to seismically calibrate regions to discriminate earthquakes from explosions. Toward this end, on-site and off-site measurements of transient phenomena were made, and on-site measurements of residual effects are in progress.Perhaps the most striking result was that the source function for the chemical explosion was identical to that of a nuclear one of about twice the yield. These proceedings provide more detailed results of the experiment.

Xenon monitoring and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bowyer, Theodore W. [Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Program, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington 99352 (United States)

2014-05-09

How do you monitor (verify) a CTBT? It is a difficult challenge to monitor the entire world for nuclear tests, regardless of size. Nuclear tests 'normally' occur underground, above ground or underwater. Setting aside very small tests (let's limit our thinking to 1 kiloton or more), nuclear tests shake the ground, emit large amounts of radioactivity, and make loud noises if in the atmosphere (or hydroacoustic waves if underwater)

Application of the nuclide identification system SHAMAN in monitoring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aarnio, P.A.; Ala-Heikkilae, J.J.; Hakulinen, T.T.; Nikkinen, M.T.

1998-01-01

SHAMAN is an expert for qualitative and quantitative radionuclide identification in gamma spectrometry. SHAMAN requires as input the calibrations, peak search, and fitting results from reliable spectral analysis software, such as SAMPO. SHAMAN uses a comprehensive reference library with 2600 radionuclides and 80 000 gamma-lines, as well as a rule base consisting of sixty inference rules. Identification results are presented both via an interactive graphical interface and in the form of configurable text reports. An organization has been established for monitoring the recent Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. For radionuclide monitoring, 80 stations will be set up around the world. Air-filter gamma-spectra will be collected from these stations on a daily basis and they will need to be reliably analyzed with minimum turnaround time. SHAMAN is currently being evaluated within the prototype monitoring system as an automated radionuclide identifier, in parallel with existing radionuclide identification software. In air-filter monitoring, very low concentrations of radionuclides are measured from bulky sources in close geometry and with long counting time. In this case true coincidence summing and self-absorption become important factors. SHAMAN is able to take into account these complicated phenomena, and the results it produces have been found to be very reliable and accurate. (author)

Proceedings of the symposium on the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE): Results and implications for test ban treaties

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Denny, M.D.; Stull, S.P. [eds.

1994-12-31

The large amounts of chemical explosives used worldwide in mining, quarrying, and civil engineering projects presents a challenge for policy makers molding a test ban, since their use could provide the necessary cover for a clandestine nuclear test. The Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) seeks to measure certain differences between an underground nuclear test and a chemical explosion in the same geology. Two chemical explosions were detonated at the Nevada Test Site to compare their signatures with previous nuclear tests. This conference presents results of these tests and discusses implications for test ban treaties. Conference papers are divided into the following sections: Background; Test preparations; EOS and code simulations; Rainier Mesa structure; Ground motion measurements; Non-seismic technologies; On-site inspection technologies; and a panel discussion. Selected papers are indexed separately for inclusion in the Energy Science and Technology Database.

Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Science.gov (United States)

2007-11-30

reference/legal_resources/prepcom_resolution.pdf]. 75 Of these amounts, $47.077 million and 48.564 million are financed by contributions from states...and associated plutonium. Another SCE, “ Unicorn ,” was conducted in a “down-hole” or vertical shaft configuration similar to an underground nuclear...2006: Krakatau (jointly with U.K.), February 23; Unicorn , August 30. NNSA’s FY2006 request stated that, for pit certification, “The major activities in

Sensing the danger. Can tsunami early warning systems benefit from test ban monitoring?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zerbo, L.

2005-01-01

An editorial in the February 2005 edition of the Magazine for European Research pointed to the very issue of responsibility: Improvements are always possible, of course, but the very nature of a 'natural disaster' is that while not entirely absolving humans of responsibility it surpasses our means to deal with and even understand the forces at work. But science can help enhance our knowledge. For if there is one subject that the Asian tragedy has highlighted, it is the importance of putting in place coordinated early warning systems for earthquakes and, in particular, the absence of effective monitoring of tsunamis in the Indian Ocean. A concerted effort is now being made to develop a coordinated system of systems - bringing together organizations and initiatives that together can put in place an early warning system. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), set-up to monitor adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, is one organization seen to contribute to a coordinated early warning system

Integrated Optimization of Long-Range Underwater Signal Detection, Feature Extraction, and Classification for Nuclear Treaty Monitoring

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Tuma, M.; Rorbech, V.; Prior, M.; Igel, C.

2016-01-01

We designed and jointly optimized an integrated signal processing chain for detection and classification of long-range passive-acoustic underwater signals recorded by the global geophysical monitoring network of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Starting at the level of raw

Use of Geophysical and Remote Sensing Techniques During the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization's Integrated Field Exercise 2014

Science.gov (United States)

Labak, Peter; Sussman, Aviva; Rowlands, Aled; Chiappini, Massimo; Malich, Gregor; MacLeod, Gordon; Sankey, Peter; Sweeney, Jerry; Tuckwell, George

2016-04-01

The Integrated Field Exercise of 2014 (IFE14) was a field event held in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (with concurrent activities in Austria) that tested the operational and technical capabilities of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's (CTBT) on-site inspection (OSI). During an OSI, up to 40 inspectors search a 1000km2 inspection area for evidence of a nuclear explosion. Over 250 experts from ~50 countries were involved in IFE14 (the largest simulation of an OSI to date) and worked from a number of different directions, such as the Exercise Management and Control Teams to execute the scenario in which the exercise was played, to those participants performing as members of the Inspection Team (IT). One of the main objectives of IFE14 was to test Treaty allowed inspection techniques, including a number of geophysical and remote sensing methods. In order to develop a scenario in which the simulated exercise could be carried out, a number of physical features in the IFE14 inspection area were designed and engineered by the Scenario Task Force Group (STF) that the IT could detect by applying the geophysical and remote sensing inspection technologies, as well as other techniques allowed by the CTBT. For example, in preparation for IFE14, the STF modeled a seismic triggering event that was provided to the IT to prompt them to detect and localize aftershocks in the vicinity of a possible explosion. Similarly, the STF planted shallow targets such as borehole casings and pipes for detection by other geophysical methods. In addition, airborne technologies, which included multi-spectral imaging, were deployed such that the IT could identify freshly exposed surfaces, imported materials and other areas that had been subject to modification. This presentation will introduce the CTBT and OSI, explain the IFE14 in terms of goals specific to geophysical and remote sensing methods, and show how both the preparation for and execution of IFE14 meet those goals.

Objectives and Activities. Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-04-01

The Treaty provides for a comprehensive global verification regime, which consists of an International Monitoring System (IMS), consultation and clarification procedures, provisions for requesting on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. The present verification regime is the result of many years of negotiations led by an international Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to ensure that non-compliance with the provisions of the Treaty can be detected in a timely manner. The 337 IMS monitoring facilities (170 seismic, 11 hydroacoustic, 60 infrasound, 80 radionuclide stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories) are located all over the world including in some of the most remote regions such as the Arctic and Antarctica. The seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide monitoring technologies are designed to register sound and energy vibrations underground, in the sea and in the air, and to detect radionuclides released into the atmosphere. IMS data is collected and transmitted via the state-of-the-art, satellite-based Global Communications Infrastructure (GCI) to the International Data Centre (IDC) at the Commission's headquarters in Vienna. Here the data are processed and, together with IDC products such as Reviewed Event Bulletins and other event screening services, released to Member States for final analysis.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

Science.gov (United States)

2013-06-10

response, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States warned of consequences if North Korea conducted a test; South Korea expressed “deep regret and... Unicorn ,” was conducted in a “down-hole” or vertical shaft configuration similar to an underground nuclear test...26; 2003: Piano, September 19; 2004: Armando, May 25; 2006: Krakatau (jointly with UK), February 23; Unicorn , August 30; 2010: Bacchus, September 15

Change Detection for Remote Monitoring of Underground Nuclear Testing: Comparison with Seismic and Associated Explosion Source Phenomenological Data

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Canty, M.; Jahnke, G.; Nielsen, Allan Aasbjerg

2005-01-01

The analysis of open-source satellite imagery is in process of establishing itself as an important tool for monitoring nuclear activities throughout the world which are relevant to disarmament treaties, like e. g. the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, the detection of anthrop......The analysis of open-source satellite imagery is in process of establishing itself as an important tool for monitoring nuclear activities throughout the world which are relevant to disarmament treaties, like e. g. the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, the detection...... of conventional multispectral satellite platforms with moderate ground resolution (Landsat TM, ASTER) to detect changes over wide areas.We chose the Nevada Test Site (NTS), USA, for a case study because of the large amount of available ground truth information. The analysis is based on the multivariate alteration...

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kunju, N.

1997-01-01

The notion that defence issues are incomprehensible to common man and should be left to the government, is mistaken and dangerous. The belief that only specialists can understand nuclear issues is also wrong. One need not be nuclear scientist to know of the havoc an atom bomb can cause. Even the hawkish defence analysts agree that nuclear is no weapon of war,- it is only a deterrent. This book gives a solution as how to avoid such a catastrophe, and how people will have to evolve a sane nuclear weapon policy and make the Government to follow that pragmatic path

Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Okko, O [ed.

2012-07-01

The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Okko, O. (ed.)

2012-07-01

The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty: relevant radionuclides

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Geer, L.E. de

2001-01-01

With the first version of the IDC software all known radionuclides, less the natural ones and one 'naturalised' man-made one, caused a spectrum measured in the IMS network to be characterised as interesting from a CTBT point of view. But this is really not true for the majority of nuclides, so a change has been made to let only nuclides from a limited set of so called CTBT relevant nuclides have an impact on the characterization scheme. In the present paper the concept of CTBT relevance is analysed and a set of 96 relevant nuclides are defined. Out of these 51 are fission products and 41 are neutron activation products. There are also 4 nuclides which are residues from the nuclear fuel itself or added tracers. (orig.) [de

The CTBT Verification Regime: Monitoring the Earth for nuclear explosions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-03-01

The Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear weapon tests. Its unique verification regime is designed to detect nuclear explosions anywhere on the planet - in the oceans, underground and in the atmosphere. once complete, the international Monitoring system (iMs) will consist of 337 facilities located in 89 countries around the globe. The iMs is currently operating in test mode so that data are already transmitted for analysis from monitoring facilities to the international Data Centre (iDC) at the headquarters of the preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in Vienna. Data and analysis results are shared with Member states.

Preventing nuclear explosive testing. Submitted to the House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1985-01-01

H.J. Resolution 3 banning the testing of nuclear weapons over 150 kilotons seeks to slow the arms race by urging Congress to ratify the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and urging the President to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union. The House Foreign Affairs Committee report supports the concept after a series of hearings with verification experts and the weapons and intelligence establishments. Verification and weapons reliability were the key issues of concern, but the committee concluded that politics rather than technology prevented a comprehensive test ban. The report also includes the reminder in the minority view that talks were suspended after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and that scientists need further testing to make weapons safer and less vulnerable to terrorist action

Assuring the success of the non-proliferation treaty extension conference. Excerpts from the panel discussions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This publication presents excerpts from a conference organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament Inc., in cooperation with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, and covers the following issues: status of the comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations, fissile cut-off and ending production of nuclear weapons, how should nuclear weapons states pursue disarmament under Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), NPT extension: problems and prospects

Elements of a system for verifying a Comprehensive Test Ban

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hannon, W.J.

1987-01-01

The paper discusses the goals of a monitoring system for a CTB, its functions, the challenges to verification, discrimination techniques, and some recent developments. It is concluded technical, military and political efforts are required to establish and verify test ban treaties which will contribute to stability in the long term. It currently appears there will be a significant number of unidentified events

Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Annual report 2007

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haemaelaeinen, M.; Karhu, P.

2008-04-01

Regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold our part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). Nuclear safeguards are applied to all materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and reporting. The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2007 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of two licence holders in 2007, setting required actions for them to correct their reporting and to update the descriptions of their procedures. Neither the IAEA nor the European Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections. By their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards

Problems in future negotiations for a treaty on the cut-off of fissile material for nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schaper, A.

1999-01-01

A treaty to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the so-called cutoff, is one of the most important next steps on the disarmament agenda.' But meanwhile, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is deadlocked, and confidence in negotiations taking place in the near future is replaced by bewilderment at the inaction. The underlying conflict of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations can be summarized as nuclear disarmament versus nuclear nonproliferation. The same conflict is now blocking progress with negotiations in the CD on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Nevertheless, the cut-off would be the major policy driver to insert transparency and irreversibility into the disarmament process,' and we need to harness all our efforts to overcome the current difficulties. The CTBT can be regarded as a tool to cap the qualitative nuclear arms race, for example to hinder the future development of qualitatively new nuclear explosives, and an FMCT can be seen as its quantitative counterpart, capping the amount of material available for new nuclear weapons. The complex questions involve political, technical, legal, and economic aspects and constitute a challenge for diplomats and decision makers

Selected Examples of LDRD Projects Supporting Test Ban Treaty Verification and Nonproliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jackson, K. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Al-Ayat, R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Walter, W. R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

2015-02-23

The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program at the DOE National Laboratories was established to ensure the scientific and technical vitality of these institutions and to enhance the their ability to respond to evolving missions and anticipate national needs. LDRD allows the Laboratory directors to invest a percentage of their total annual budget in cutting-edge research and development projects within their mission areas. We highlight a selected set of LDRD-funded projects, in chronological order, that have helped provide capabilities, people and infrastructure that contributed greatly to our ability to respond to technical challenges in support of test ban treaty verification and nonproliferation.

Geophysics, Remote Sensing, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Integrated Field Exercise 2014

Science.gov (United States)

Sussman, A. J.; Macleod, G.; Labak, P.; Malich, G.; Rowlands, A. P.; Craven, J.; Sweeney, J. J.; Chiappini, M.; Tuckwell, G.; Sankey, P.

2015-12-01

The Integrated Field Exercise of 2014 (IFE14) was an event held in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (with concurrent activities in Austria) that tested the operational and technical capabilities of an on-site inspection (OSI) within the CTBT verification regime. During an OSI, up to 40 international inspectors will search an area for evidence of a nuclear explosion. Over 250 experts from ~50 countries were involved in IFE14 (the largest simulation of a real OSI to date) and worked from a number of different directions, such as the Exercise Management and Control Teams (which executed the scenario in which the exercise was played) and those participants performing as members of the Inspection Team (IT). One of the main objectives of IFE14 was to test and integrate Treaty allowed inspection techniques, including a number of geophysical and remote sensing methods. In order to develop a scenario in which the simulated exercise could be carried out, suites of physical features in the IFE14 inspection area were designed and engineered by the Scenario Task Force (STF) that the IT could detect by applying the geophysical and remote sensing inspection technologies, in addition to other techniques allowed by the CTBT. For example, in preparation for IFE14, the STF modeled a seismic triggering event that was provided to the IT to prompt them to detect and localize aftershocks in the vicinity of a possible explosion. Similarly, the STF planted shallow targets such as borehole casings and pipes for detection using other geophysical methods. In addition, airborne technologies, which included multi-spectral imaging, were deployed such that the IT could identify freshly exposed surfaces, imported materials, and other areas that had been subject to modification. This presentation will introduce the CTBT and OSI, explain the IFE14 in terms of the goals specific to geophysical and remote sensing methods, and show how both the preparation for and execution of IFE14 meet those goals.

Can the deterrence survive to nuclear tests ban

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gaffney, F.J. Jr.

1996-01-01

The problem of the soundness of the nuclear tests stopping is discussed here. The safety, the durability of nuclear weapons need nuclear tests. So, unless other means able to guarantee the deterrence, it is prejudicial to stop nuclear tests and to sign a non proliferation treaty with the option of zero nuclear explosion. (N.C.)

Nuclear deterrence and diplomacy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Singh, Jasjit; Sethi, Manpreet

2004-01-01

Nuclear diplomacy worldwide is in a state of flux. Nuclear deterrence is being overhauled to accommodate missile defence, and arms control is facing an unprecedented challenge. Treaties such as the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), strategic arms reductions treaty (START), anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, etc. that had attempted, however imperfectly, to place certain restrictions on the horizontal or vertical development of nuclear weapons, are facing a crisis of legitimacy as the present status of each is very distant from what was intended. This book explores the changes taking place in nuclear deterrence and diplomacy at the beginning of the 21st century, especially as they relate to India and its security

ASEAN and the commitment to end nuclear testing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-02-01

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional political and economic organization. It was established on 8 August 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, Viet Nam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. ASEAN aims to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in its Member States and to promote regional peace and stability. All ASEAN States are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, and to further the goal of nuclear disarmament. It also promotes international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The ten ASEAN countries are all Member States of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). They all signed the CTBT early on, some on the very first day that it opened for signature on 24 September 1996. But four have yet to ratify the Treaty: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Myanmar and Thailand. Indonesia's ratification is particularly important as it is one of those States whose ratification is required for the Treaty's entry into force.

Ongoing research experiments at the former Soviet nuclear test site in eastern Kazakhstan

Science.gov (United States)

Leith, William S.; Kluchko, Luke J.; Konovalov, Vladimir; Vouille, Gerard

2002-01-01

Degelen mountain, located in EasternKazakhstan near the city of Semipalatinsk, was once the Soviets most active underground nuclear test site. Two hundred fifteen nuclear tests were conducted in 181 tunnels driven horizontally into its many ridges--almost twice the number of tests as at any other Soviet underground nuclear test site. It was also the site of the first Soviet underground nuclear test--a 1-kiloton device detonated on October 11, 1961. Until recently, the details of testing at Degelen were kept secret and have been the subject of considerable speculation. However, in 1991, the Semipalatinsk test site became part of the newly independent Republic of Kazakhstan; and in 1995, the Kazakhstani government concluded an agreement with the U.S. Department of Defense to eliminate the nuclear testing infrastructure in Kazakhstan. This agreement, which calls for the "demilitarization of the infrastructure directly associated with the nuclear weapons test tunnels," has been implemented as the "Degelen Mountain Tunnel Closure Program." The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, in partnership with the Department of Energy, has permitted the use of the tunnel closure project at the former nuclear test site as a foundation on which to support cost-effective, research-and-development-funded experiments. These experiments are principally designed to improve U.S. capabilities to monitor and verify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but have provided a new source of information on the effects of nuclear and chemical explosions on hard, fractured rock environments. These new data extends and confirms the results of recent Russian publications on the rock environment at the site and the mechanical effects of large-scale chemical and nuclear testing. In 1998, a large-scale tunnel closure experiment, Omega-1, was conducted in Tunnel 214 at Degelen mountain. In this experiment, a 100-ton chemical explosive blast was used to test technologies for monitoring the

Nuclear Testing and Comprehensive Test Ban: Chronology Starting September 1992

Science.gov (United States)

2006-12-18

unless the Secretary determines that a different number of months is preferable. 09/00/03 — A conference on facilitating the CTBT’s entry into force was... Unicorn ,” at the Nevada Test Site. 09/20/06 — Fifty-nine foreign ministers called on states that have not done so to ratify the treaty. 09/28/06

Politics of motherhood: the case of Women Strike for Peace and the test ban treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Swerdlow, A.G.

1984-01-01

This dissertation is a narrative history and organizational study of the formative years of Women Strike for Peace (1961-1963) and its campaign for a nuclear test ban treaty. WSP, a grass roots, participatory movement of American Women, was born on November 1, 1961 when an estimated 50,000 women in 60 communities across the nation walked out of their kitchens and off their jobs in a one day protest against Russian and American nuclear policies. In the process of transforming this one day strike into a national woman's movement, WSP developed a feminine political style characterized by an anti-heirarchical, anti-organizational format, simple, womanly rhetoric, and spontaneous, innovative national and international direct action. At a time when foreign policy dissenters were dismissed by the press and the public either as commies or kooks, the image that WSP projected to respectable middle-class, middle-aged peace mothers wearing white gloves and flowered hats while picketing the White House to save their children from nuclear holocaust caught the favorable attention of large sections of the media, the public, and even the President. Through an investigation of the program, internal debates, rhetoric, organizational structure, and tactics of WSP, along with the backgrounds of its leaders and members, this study uncovers the political and gender consciousness of the women who joined the movement

How to strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eklund, S.

1975-01-01

NPT consists of a complex set of undertakings and obligations, each of which represents in its own right a highly desirable objective that should be pursued whether or not the Treaty itself existed, and irrespective of the success (or lack of it) achieved in pursuit of the other objectives. These objectives are: (a) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries other than the five that possessed them at the end of 1966. Obviously, this is the main purpose of the Treaty. It provides the substance of the first three articles and gives the Treaty its name (Arts. I, II, III); (b) to promote international co-operation in developing the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and particularly to help developing countries in this regard (Art. IV); (c) to afford all parties whatever benefits may be derived from the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions (Art. V); (d) to pursue negotiations towards the cessation of the arms race, nuclear disarmament and eventually a treaty on general and complete disarmament, 'under strict and effective international control'. Although this is not actually said in the relevant article (Article VI), it is generally considered that this obligation falls particularly upon those parties of the Treaty that are 'Nuclear Weapon States'. (Art. VI) The preambular paragraph regarding the 'determination expressed' by the parties to the Moscow Test Ban Treaty to seek a complete and perpetual discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons, is also relevant to the objective of arms control and disarmament. (Art. VI) Since consummation of each of these objectives is 'devoutly to be wished', in Hamlet's words, there should be no question of bargaining or horse-trading between them. Despite some specious arguments to the contrary, history shows that the possession of superior weapons has never prevented war and a further spread of nuclear weapons must inevitably increase, perhaps in geometrical progression, the likelihood of a nuclear conflict

Obsolete treaties

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodionov, S.

1999-01-01

The proliferation of ballistic missile technologies (as opposed to nuclear ones) is not limited actually by any international treaty, there are no treaties of that kind. It is hardly imaginable that the international community could succeed in getting any agreements in the near future that would ban (or seriously limit) missile technology proliferation, similar to Non-proliferation Treaty or CTBT. An optimum option would permit the declared nuclear powers to have intercontinental ballistic missiles until the transition to a nuclear-weapon-free world, while any space activity would be under strict international control

To test for ever and one day?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Solms, F.

1990-01-01

The existing treaties are no substitutes for a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. As for the time being such a treaty appears to be unattainable a low-Threshold Treaty as an interim step should become the aim of the scheduled bilateral as well as the on-going multilateral negotiations. Since in the view of experts low yields have no or only little military significance such a treaty may serve in the meantime as a provisional means both to prohibit as much as possible the development of new nuclear weapons and to prevent circumvention of the NPT by rewarding compliance with the treaty. Provided that the UN quest for general and complete disarmament continues to be the ultimate goal in international politics, peoples will then have to reinforce their efforts to claim the ultimate conclusion of a comprehensive test ban even against the lack of political will of the big powers. (orig./HSCH) [de

Ensuring the CTBT's implementation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoffmann, W.

1997-01-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear-weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions. It was opened for signature on 24 September 1996 at the United Nations in New York. Two weeks earlier, on 10 September 1996 it was endorsed by 158 votes to 3, with 5 abstentions in the United Nations General Assembly. As of October 1997, the Treaty has been signed by 148 States, including China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. It has been ratified by seven States. History and the future of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is discussed

A history of US nuclear testing and its influence on nuclear thought, 1945-1963

CERN Document Server

Blades, David M

2014-01-01

As states continue to pursue nuclear weaponry, nuclear testing remains an important political issue in the twenty-first century. This survey examines how and why the U.S. conducted nuclear tests from 1945 through 1963 and the resulting influence on key questions from normalization and de-normalization up to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

General discrimination technique to determine between earthquake and nuclear test with seismic data

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bashillah Baharuddin; Alawiah Musa; Roslan Mohd Ali

2007-01-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was developed to ban of any nuclear weapon test explosion moreover will restrict the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and end the development of advanced new types of these weapons. The Treaty provides for a comprehensive global verification regime, which includes an International Monitoring System (IMS). The IMS comprises a network of 321 monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories that monitor the Earth for evidence of nuclear explosions, which cover underground, underwater and atmosphere environments. Presently, Malaysia receives seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide data from the International Data Centre (IDC) of the CTBT. In order to maximise the use of the data for the purposes of the CTBT, the Malaysian Nuclear Agency is developing capability to analyse the data in order to detect nuclear weapon test, with an initial focus on the seismic data. Through the CTBT IMS, seismic data is constantly being obtained to monitor and detect nuclear explosions. However, in the process, other natural and man-made activities that generate seismic waves, especially earthquakes and large man-made explosions, are also detectable through the IMS, and need to be differentiated and discriminated before any nuclear explosions can be identified. The detection capability by using seismological methods was proven through simulated explosion tests at selected nuclear weapon test sites. This is supported by data previously collected from a total of 2089 nuclear weapon tests that have been carried out globally, out of which 1567 were underground, 514 in the atmosphere, including outer space, and 8 underwater. The discrimination of seismic data to detect nuclear explosions from natural earthquake and explosions can be undertaken through the identification of the epicentre location, hypocentre depth, magnitude and short-period discrimination of the seismic events. (Author)

Arms Control and nonproliferation technologies: Technology options and associated measures for monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban, Second quarter

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Casey, Leslie A.

1994-01-01

This newsletter contains reprinted papers discussing technology options and associated measures for monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These papers were presented to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in May and June 1994. An interagency Verification Monitoring Task Force developed the papers. The task force included participants from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Intelligence Community, the Department of Interior, and the Department of State. The purpose of this edition of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies is to share these papers with the broad base of stakeholders in a CTBT and to facilitate future technology discussions. The papers in the first group discuss possible technology options for monitoring a CTBT in all environments (underground, underwater, atmosphere, and space). These technologies, along with on-site inspections, would facilitate CTBT monitoring by treaty participants. The papers in the second group present possible associated measures, e.g., information exchanges and transparency measures, that would build confidence among states participating in a CTBT.

Soviet nuclear testing: The Republics say no

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carter, L.J.

1990-01-01

Massive protests are taking place in Russia against nuclear weapons testing. Efforts have been mounted to stop all testing at Kazakhstan test site near the town of Semipalatinsk, site of the first nuclear detonation in 1949 and of more than 500 test conducted since. Boris Yeltsin proposed just after his election as president of the federation the elimination of testing grounds for nuclear and biological weapons on Russian territory. The central government in Moscow has announced that it is considering closing the Semipalatinsk site. Reaction has also been strong to testing at the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya, and severe constraints, such as Arctic cold, frozen rocks, high winds, difficult access, and protests by Greenpeace activists and USSR's Nordic neighbors do not make this site attractive. The author feels that this movement in the USSR has set in motion a politically dynamic situation that makes for the best chance for a comprehensive test ban treaty yet witnessed

A nuclear-weapon-free world. Report on working group 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The stages of nuclear material management are reviewed in respect to dismantlement of nuclear weapons, disposal of weapon-grade fissile materials and cut-off of their production as well as START I and II reduction which are underway. Separate chapters are dealing with the comprehensive test ban treaty, verification, control and regulation in this matter, and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, Canberra Commission, the ABM USA-Soviet Treaty

South Pacific nuclear free zone treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-01-01

The Treaty of Rarotonga creates a ''nuclear-free'', rather than a ''nuclear-weapon-free'', zone. The former term was chosen for a number of reasons. It was the intention of the signatories to the Treaty to keep the region free of the stationing of nuclear weapons, nuclear testing and environmental pollution by radioactive waste. Moreover, they wished to prohibit all types of nuclear explosions. Accordingly, the operative articles of the Treaty refer consistently to ''nuclear explosive devices'', a term which is interpreted to cover all such devices, irrespective of the purpose (military or peaceful) stated for their use. The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, unanimously adopted by the Assembly in 1978, states that nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and taking into account the region's characteristics, and that the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. The members of the South Pacific Forum concluded the Treaty of Rarotonga as a step in that process

Characterizing noise in the global nuclear weapon monitoring system

Science.gov (United States)

Schultz, Colin

2013-03-01

Under the auspices of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, a worldwide monitoring system designed to detect the illegal testing of nuclear weaponry has been under construction since 1999. The International Monitoring System is composed of a range of sensors, including detectors for hydroacoustic and seismic signals, and when completed, will include 60 infrasound measurement arrays set to detect low-frequency sound waves produced by an atmospheric nuclear detonation.

Multi-Use seismic stations offer strong deterrent to clandestine nuclear weapons testing

Science.gov (United States)

Hennet, C. B.; Van der Vink, G. E.; Richards, P. G.; Adushkin, V. V.; Kopnichev, Y. F.; Geary, R.

As the United States and other nations push for the signing of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, representatives are meeting in Geneva this year to develop an International Seismic Monitoring System to verify compliance with the treaty's restrictions. In addition to the official monitoring system, regional networks developed for earthquake studies and basic research can provide a strong deterrent against clandestine testing. The recent release of information by the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) on previously unannounced nuclear tests provides an opportunity to assess the ability of multi-use seismic networks to help monitor nuclear testing across the globe.Here we look at the extent to which the formerly unannounced tests were recorded and identified on the basis of publicly available seismographic data recorded by five seismic networks. The data were recorded by networks in southern Nevada and northern California at stations less than 1500 km from the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and two networks in the former Soviet Union at stations farther than 1500 km from the NTS.

The role of inertial containment fusion in replacing nuclear tests

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Schaper, Annette [Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Frankfurt am Main (Germany)

2008-07-01

Nuclear weapon physicists need to understand the process of a nuclear explosion, and their major experimental tools had been nuclear tests. Since a couple of years, the established nuclear weapon states observe a testing moratorium. Nevertheless, they still want to keep their nuclear arsenals, and consequently to ensure the reliability, safety, and security of their nuclear warheads. For this purpose, they use experimental tools that replace nuclear tests, among them ICF. ICF plays a central role in the so-called ''stockpile stewardship program'' that the U.S. has implemented when it participated in the negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Several questions arise and are discussed in the presentation: Does ICF allow to simulate the extreme conditions of a nuclear explosion? Which are the functions of nuclear testing that ICF can replace and which are beyond its capabilities? Would ICF be a useful tool for the design of new nuclear warheads? Why are so huge sums spent on ICF in a military context although the usefulness for nuclear weapons seems rather limited?.

Africa's contribution to putting an end to nuclear explosions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-09-01

African States play an important role in worldwide efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. All 53 African States are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which aims at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, advancing nuclear disarmament, and facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Of Africa's 53 States, 51 have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and 38 have also ratified it as of September 2010. Mauritius and Somalia are the only two States still to sign the Treaty. The States that have signed but not yet ratified are: Angola, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Egypt's ratification is of particular importance as it is one of those States whose ratification is required for the Treaty's entry into force.

Yesterday's, today's and tomorrow's nuclear tests of India and Pakistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duval, M.; Le Guelte, G.

1998-01-01

This paper presents the historical aspects that led India and Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons and to perform nuclear weapon tests: weapons acquisition: today's military capacity, help from foreign countries; motivations: nuclear programs, geo-political aspects; results and potentialities; consequences for the non-proliferation systems and for the cut-off convention and test-ban treaties; and the geo-strategic consequences of todays's military nuclear capacity of India and Pakistan. (J.S.)

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

Science.gov (United States)

Middleton, Tiffany Willey

2010-01-01

In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chang Yenchiang

2009-01-01

This paper examines international treaties in relation to the threat or use of nuclear weapons including the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It can be concluded that the effect of the aforesaid international treaties is still in doubt without explicit enforcement mechanisms and penalty for non-compliance. This paper also reviews the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and comments that a clear explanation on the legality of use of nuclear weapons in 'extreme circumstances of self-defence' is required. Examples from current state practice in relation to nuclear non-proliferation efforts are also provided, with special attention to China, North Korea and Iran. This paper suggests that China as a leader of developing countries should extend its efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and conduct communication between North Korea and Iran and other nuclear weapons states to reduce or prohibit nuclear weapons.

Energy and technology review

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-05-01

Six articles are included: the test ban treaties (verifying compliance), negotiating with the Soviets (on nuclear testing), the regional seismic test network, peaceful nuclear explosions in Soviet gas condensate fields, ionospheric detection of explosives, and seismic verification of a comprehensive test ban

Measurement of anthropogenic radionuclides in the atmosphere with a radionuclide monitoring network for nuclear tests

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yonezawa, Chushiro; Yamamoto, Yoichi

2011-01-01

A worldwide radionuclide monitoring network for nuclear tests has detected the anthropogenic radioactive materials released in the atmosphere due to the accident of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant impacted by the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011. After four months have passed since the accident occurred, most overseas stations do not detect the radionuclides of Fukushima origin any more. The Takasaki station in Japan, however, is still detecting them every day. This paper describes radionuclide monitoring stations and the network of them as part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as well as the measurement results of radionuclide particulates and radioactive isotopes of xenon released from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant with the monitoring network. (J.P.N.)

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-06

111 Of these amounts, $47.077 million and €48.564 million are financed by contributions from states that...up to 500 pounds of explosive and associated plutonium. Another SCE, “ Unicorn ,” was conducted in a “down-hole” or vertical shaft configuration similar...September 19; 2004: Armando, May 25; 2006: Krakatau (jointly with U.K.), February 23; Unicorn , August 30. NNSA’s FY2006 request stated that, for pit

North Korea’s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-02

inspections as prima facie evidence of a violation. One generally-accepted means of evading detection of nuclear tests, especially low-yield tests...In an attempt to extend these bans to cover all nuclear tests, negotiations on the CTBT were completed in 1996. The treaty’s basic obligation is to...Verification refers to determining whether a nation is in compliance with its treaty obligations , which in this case means determining whether a suspicious

IAEA Director General welcomes Cuba's intention to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed Cuba's announcement to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. He expressed the hope that Cuba will conclude soon a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, as required under Article III of the NPT. 'With Cuba's intention to become party to the NPT, we have come a step closer to a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime,' Mr. ElBaradei said. Only three countries worldwide with significant nuclear activities now remain outside the NPT. With 188 countries party to the Treaty, the NPT is the most adhered to international agreement after the United Nations Charter and the most widely adhered to multilateral arms control treaty. The NPT makes it mandatory that all non-nuclear-weapon States conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus put all of their nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. The Director General also welcomed Cuba's ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which completes the process of having all countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean as members of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Mr. ElBaradei said that, 'the Tlatelolco Treaty provides a good model for other regional nuclear-weapon-free zones to follow'. He added that 'universal adherence of all countries in regions having nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements is important to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime'. (IAEA)

Seismic verification of underground explosions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Glenn, L.A.

1985-06-01

The first nuclear test agreement, the test moratorium, was made in 1958 and lasted until the Soviet Union unilaterally resumed testing in the atmosphere in 1961. It was followed by the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. In 1974 the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed, limiting underground tests after March 1976 to a maximum yield of 250 kt. The TTBT was followed by a treaty limiting peaceful nuclear explosions and both the United States and the Soviet Union claim to be abiding by the 150-kt yield limit. A comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), prohibiting all testing of nuclear weapons, has also been discussed. However, a verifiable CTBT is a contradiction in terms. No monitoring technology can offer absolute assurance that very-low-yield illicit explosions have not occurred. The verification process, evasion opportunities, and cavity decoupling are discussed in this paper

History of Nuclear India

Science.gov (United States)

Chaturvedi, Ram

2000-04-01

India emerged as a free and democratic country in 1947, and entered into the nuclear age in 1948 by establishing the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), with Homi Bhabha as the chairman. Later on the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was created under the Office of the Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru. Initially the AEC and DAE received international cooperation, and by 1963 India had two research reactors and four nuclear power reactors. In spite of the humiliating defeat in the border war by China in 1962 and China's nuclear testing in 1964, India continued to adhere to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On May 18, 1974 India performed a 15 kt Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). The western powers considered it nuclear weapons proliferation and cut off all financial and technical help, even for the production of nuclear power. However, India used existing infrastructure to build nuclear power reactors and exploded both fission and fusion devices on May 11 and 13, 1998. The international community viewed the later activity as a serious road block for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; both deemed essential to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. India considers these treaties favoring nuclear states and is prepared to sign if genuine nuclear disarmament is included as an integral part of these treaties.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the position of India

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sijde, B. van der

1998-01-01

Pugwash must maintain the gradual progress that nuclear disarmament appears to demand: in this case, monitoring the progress of CTBT. In the long run, opposition such as India's is counter-productive, even if the reasons behind are understandable. Pugwash as many other Non-Government Organisations (NGO) must work hard towards a Nuclear Weapons Convention

LLNL's Regional Model Calibration and Body-Wave Discrimination Research in the Former Soviet Union using Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bhattacharyya, J.; Rodgers, A.; Swenson, J.; Schultz, C.; Walter, W.; Mooney, W.; Clitheroe, G.

2000-01-01

Long-range seismic profiles from Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) provide a unique data set to investigate several important issues in regional Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring. The recording station spacing (∼15 km) allows for extremely dense sampling of the propagation from the source to ∼ 3300 km. This allows us to analyze the waveforms at local, near- and far-regional and teleseismic distances. These data are used to: (1) study the evolution of regional phases and phase amplitude ratios along the profile; (2) infer one-dimensional velocity structure along the profile; and (3) evaluate the spatial correlation of regional and teleseismic travel times and regional phase amplitude ratios. We analyzed waveform data from four PNE's (m b = 5.1-5.6) recorded along profile KRATON, which is an east-west trending profile located in northern Sibertil. Short-period regional discriminants, such as P/S amplitude ratios, will be essential for seismic monitoring of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at small magnitudes (m b o and 10 o , respectively

The Non-Proliferation Treaty increases security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kahiluoto, K.

1995-01-01

Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely was a historic decision. The Treaty is the most extensive international agreement on security policy to date; now its obligations have become a permanent part of international justice. Moreover, the NPT represents a political and moral obligation. Through the NPT, the international community has made a permanent commitment to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Increasing pressures will be applied to the few countries still outside the NPT, making it more likely that these countries will eventually change their views. The likelihood of regional bans on nuclear weapons in the Middle East and in Asia, too, will increase. The Treaty promotes the establishment of new nuclear-free zones. The nuclear-free zone in Latin America - the countries covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty - is already very close to its full implementation. Finland is firmly committed to the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT Conference of 1995 was among the first international meetings in which Finland participated, and took an active role, as a Member State of the European Union. (orig.)

Nuclear Explosions 1945-1998

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bergkvist, Nils-Olov; Ferm, Ragnhild

2000-07-01

The main part of this report is a list of nuclear explosions conducted by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, China, India and Pakistan in 1945-98. The list includes all known nuclear test explosions and is compiled from a variety of sources including officially published information from the USA, Russia and France. The details given for each explosion (date, origin time, location, yield, type, etc.) are often compiled from more than one source because the individual sources do not give complete information. The report includes a short background to nuclear testing and provides brief information on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the verification regime now being established to verify compliance with the treaty. It also summarizes nuclear testing country by country. The list should be used with some caution because its compilation from a variety of sources means that some of the data could be incorrect. This report is the result of cooperation between the Defence Research Establishment (FOA) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Nuclear deterrence and disarmament: France in a corner

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gautier, L.

2010-01-01

The author comments the implications and consequences of the recent Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference which drew a line between emerging actors and non-aligned countries on one side, and nuclear states on the other. As the United States got some benefits from this review conference, France, because of its involvement on the Iranian issue and of its clumsy reaction to the Brazil's and Turkey's initiative, found itself in an uncomfortable position. The author stresses that nuclear weapon proliferation is presently the biggest threat against peace, and that negotiations on nuclear disarmament must be resumed. He describes France's position and orientations on this issue: to restore the NPT authority, to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to implement the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). He also discusses the importance of talks about nuclear deterrence in Europe, and more particularly about the role and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons and missiles present on the European soil

Global radioxenon emission inventory based on nuclear power reactor reports.

Science.gov (United States)

Kalinowski, Martin B; Tuma, Matthias P

2009-01-01

Atmospheric radioactivity is monitored for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, with xenon isotopes 131mXe, 133Xe, 133mXe and 135Xe serving as important indicators of nuclear explosions. The treaty-relevant interpretation of atmospheric concentrations of radioxenon is enhanced by quantifying radioxenon emissions released from civilian facilities. This paper presents the first global radioxenon emission inventory for nuclear power plants, based on North American and European emission reports for the years 1995-2005. Estimations were made for all power plant sites for which emission data were unavailable. According to this inventory, a total of 1.3PBq of radioxenon isotopes are released by nuclear power plants as continuous or pulsed emissions in a generic year.

Test ban treaty verification with regional data: a review

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pomeroy, P.W.; Best, W.J.; McEvilly, T.V.

1982-01-01

This paper summarizes the use of regional (Δ ≤ 30 0 ) seismic data in a test ban context for detecting, locating, identifying, and determining the yield of underground nuclear explosions. In many areas of the world (Eastern North America, Africa, Eastern USSR), Lg is the largest amplitude wave recorded on standard seismograph systems and thus is the most appropriate phase for monitoring small magnitude events. Excellent location capability for near-regional events has been demonstrated at the Norwegian small aperture array (NORESS) using Lg and P waves. Lg and other regional phases may contain information on source depth, but such information has not been exploited to date. Fifteen classes of regional discriminants are listed. Most have been tested only on limited data, usually from one geographic region and only one or two recording stations. No systematic analyses have been done to determine the best individual discriminant or combination of them. Preliminary evaluation of the use of Lg for yield determination suggests that regional waves hold promise in this application. Theoretical studies have contributed significantly to the understanding of propagation characteristics of regional waves but further studies are required emphasizing modeling for realistic anisotropic sources. The major conclusion of this study is that a systematic and comparative evaluation of all the proposed regional discriminants is now required, utilizing a common data base derived from all present-day test sites. This evaluation would suggest the optimal discrimination procedure using regional waves, and would also define areas of needed research. Without such an integrated evaluation, it is still possible to speculate, using existing results, on the most promising regional discriminants

Study on the seismic monitoring system development against the adjacent countries nuclear test

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Min, Kyung Sik; Ahn, Jong Sung; Lee, Jong Wook; Chang, In Soon; Seo, In Seok; Kwak, Eun Ho

1995-12-01

The project was carried out to construct foundation for the monitoring of the neighboring countries's nuclear test by seismic method. For this, we collected, organized and analyzed the information about the Comparative Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and investigated theoretical backgrounds of the elastic wave generation by the Nuclear test and the identification of the nuclear tests from the natural earthquakes. And the computer system was setup to obtain realtime data from the broadband seismograph in Inchon of the Korean Meteorological Agency. 15 refs. (Author)

Consideration of impact of atmospheric intrusion in subsurface sampling for investigation of suspected underground nuclear explosions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lowrey, J.D.; Bowyer, T.W.; Haas, D.A.; Hayes, J.C.; Biegalski, S.R.

2016-01-01

Radioactive noble gases radioxenon and radioargon constitute the primary smoking gun of an underground nuclear explosion. The aim of subsurface sampling of soil gas as part of an on-site inspection (OSI) is to search for evidence of a suspected underground nuclear event. It has been hypothesized that atmospheric gas can disturb soil gas concentrations and therefore potentially add to problems in civilian source discrimination verifying treaty compliance under the comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty. This work describes a study of intrusion of atmospheric air into the subsurface and its potential impact on an OSI using results of simulations from the underground transport of environmental xenon (UTEX) model. (author)

The US National Resources Defense Council/Soviet Academy of Sciences Nuclear Test Ban Verification Project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cochran, T.B.

1989-01-01

The first week in September 1987 was an extraordinary one for arms control verification. As part of the co-operative Test Ban Verification Project of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Soviet Academy of Sciences, fourteen American scientists from the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (at the University of California- San Diego), University of Nevada-Reno and the University of Colorado went to the region of the Soviet's principal nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk. Together with their Soviet counterparts from the Institute of Physics of the Earth (IPE) in Moscow, they fired off three large chemical explosions. The purpose of these explosions was to demonstrate the sensitivity of the three seismic stations surrounding the test site, to study the efficiency with which high-frequency seismic waves propagate in the region, and to study differences between chemical explosions, nuclear explosions and earthquakes in order more firmly to establish procedures for verification of a nuclear test ban. This paper presents a review of the results of these experiments, an update on the status of the joint project, and a review of the significance of high frequency seismic data to test ban verification

Accuracy analysis of the CTBTO nuclear test detection scale and Improvement

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ryu, Young Kwang [Seoul National Univ., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

2014-10-15

CTBTO (Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization) is charge of nuclear test monitoring for nuclear non-proliferation. CTBTO has 170 seismic stations in operation in 76 countries in order to detect the artificial earthquake that was caused by an underground nuclear test. Korea use formula that is based on the equations that are used by the IMS (International Monitoring System) of CTBTO for analysis of explosive scale, and reflect the nature of the terrain, such as rock. But the expression for calculating the exact scale explosive is still un-established state. And generally CTBTO doesn't care about artificial explosive that is being received low-yield in accordance with the criteria of nuclear detection. But, at the time that North Korea conduct a nuclear test, it should not be overlooked that the scale of the earthquake detection criteria below. Because DPRK is trying to conceal their nuclear development capability, there are possibility of low-yield nuclear test or possibility of install a buffer to hide actual explosive scale. These radionuclide observations were consistent with a DPRK low-yield nuclear test on May 2010, even though no seismic signals from such a test have been detected. But there were a few times of low-yield (magnitude 1.39-1.93) occurred around DPRK nuclear test site at that time.

Military nuclear activities. The simulation program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Delpuech, A.

2000-01-01

The durability of the French nuclear weapon dissuasion has to integrate two kind of problems: the geopolitical situation with the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) and the aging of weapons. The replacement of decayed weapons requires a complete safety and reliability validation of the new weapons which is performed using simulation. This paper gives a brief presentation of the simulation program and of the technical means developed by the military division of the French atomic energy commission (CEA-DAM): the Airix X-ray radiography installation and the 'megajoule' laser facility. (J.S.)

Application of Geophysical Techniques in Identifying UNE Signatures at Semipalatinsk Test Site (for OSI Purposes)

Science.gov (United States)

Belyashov, A.; Shaitorov, V.; Yefremov, M.

2014-03-01

This article describes geological and geophysical studies of an underground nuclear explosion area in one of the boreholes at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan. During these studies, the typical elements of mechanical impact of the underground explosion on the host medium—fracturing of rock, spall zones, faults, cracks, etc., were observed. This information supplements to the database of underground nuclear explosion phenomenology and can be applied in fulfilling on-site inspection tasks under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Brazil and Mexico in the Nonproliferation Regime, Common Structures and Divergent Trajectories in Latin America

OpenAIRE

Sotomayor, Arturo C.

2014-01-01

Chapter 8 There are multiple options Latin American countries to support and comply with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the global level, states can decide to ratify the core treaties and join their supporting institutions such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime, the...

Structure and behavior as determinants: United States nuclear test ban and chemical and biological arms control policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reich, J.C.

1991-01-01

US efforts to control chemical and biological warfare and nuclear testing are examined with the aim of explaining the paucity of US backed agreements in these areas. Two theoretical perspectives, the behavioral and structural approaches, are used to explore US arms control outcomes. In the behavioral approach, the effects of governmental organization and the bargaining dynamics of policy-making elites with different cognitive styles are posited as important influences on US nuclear test ban and chemical and biological arms control policy outcomes. The behavioral perspective accounts for the timing of all US failed and successful entries (with one exception) into nuclear test bans and chemical and biological warfare restraints. A shortcoming of the behavior approach, however, is that it tends to overemphasize the chances for successful US entry into nuclear test and chemical and biological warfare limitations. Analysis of the same events from the structural perspective helps to correct for expectations generated by behavioral variables for a higher success rate than ultimately resulted. In the structural approach, the focus is on the effect of the organization of international politics on US nuclear test ban and chemical and biological arms control policy outcomes

A rapidly negotiable first-stage nuclear freeze

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1988-01-01

This paper reports on the objective of a nuclear freeze which is to slow down or stop the so-far inexorable development and deployment of more and more (read destructive and deadly) nuclear warheads. The essential notion is not new. The proposed treaty for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests that was very nearly negotiated in 1959 was perhaps the first serious effort to obtain a nuclear freeze, albeit a partial one. Growing concern about the nuclear arms race has led to greatly increased interest in much broader and more effective freezes. A comprehensive nuclear freeze, one that would stop all stages in the manufacture, testing, and deployment of nuclear warheads, would clearly be very desirable and have a great impact. It would not, however, deal with the other worrisome aspects of nuclear weapons, which is the very large number of such weapons that already exist

Nuclear danger in the modern world

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sulejmenov, O.O.

2000-01-01

It is noted, that nowadays a nuclear danger proceeds from nuclear depositions of countries having own nuclear weapons. Since Kazakhstan is one of the first country in the world which fulfilled regulations of Lisbon Protocol and liquidated own nuclear potential, author regards that Kazakhstan have moral right for initiating process of attachment to Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by countries having nuclear weapon. Now for Kazakhstan there are urgent problems: financing of post-conversion processes; re-cultivation of territory contaminated by residuals from nuclear weapons test; rehabilitation of population health, damaged from test of mass destruction weapon. Scientists of Kazakhstan estimated damage from nuclear test on Kazakstan territory in 10 billion dollars. It is necessary international efforts of all public organizations of the world for all world sites. One of the financing source could be means from reduction of nuclear arms production

Documents of the first committee. Note by the Secretariat. Addendum

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-01-01

The document contains agenda items, concerning in particular the following issues: verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification; amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, in South Asia; conclusion of effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; general and complete disarmament; prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes; convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons; nuclear-arms freeze; consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco; implementation of the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa

Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

2013-01-01

The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

The ban on reprocessing as seen from the perspective of European law

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hanenburg, E.; Warg, G.

1999-01-01

The plan of the German federal government to opt out of the peaceful uses of nuclear power for electricity generation initially was to incorporate also a ban on reprocessing spent fuel elements. On February 22, 1999, Federal Minister for the Environment Trittin finally announced that his revised draft for the time being would contain no ban on reprocessing. That ban, as originally planned, raises a number of issues of European law which are analyzed in the article by Hanenburg and Warg, especially the question whether the ban on reprocessing constitutes a violation of the principles and objectives of the Common Market. The legal principles underlying the Common Market, especially the Euratom Treaty among the member countries, constitute the basis of the analysis in which, inter alia, aspects such as cross-border reprocessing and secondary European law or the legal consequences of the Euratom Treaty for the opting-out policy of the German federal government are dealt with. The analysis arrives at the finding that a final opt-out as planned by the German federal government in the amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, and the complete substitution of nuclear electricity by other sources of energy, violate the purpose of the Euratom Treaty at least to keep open the structural possibility of generating electricity by nuclear power. (orig.) [de

Role reversal and problem solving in international negotiations: the Partial Nuclear Test Ban case

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

King, T.D.

1978-01-01

To facilitate finding bargaining space and to reinforce cooperative potential, a number of analysts have promoted the use of role reversal and problem solving. Role reversal involves restating the positions of one's adversary to demonstrate understanding and to develop empathy, while problem solving involves searching for alternatives that promote joint interests. The case of the negotiations in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference from 1962--1963 leading to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty provided the context for examining bargaining relationships involving role reversal and problem solving. Interactions among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, as recorded in transcripts of 112 sessions, were coded using Bargaining Process Analysis II, a content analysis instrument used to classify negotiation behaviors. Role reversal was measured by the frequency of paraphrases of the adversary's positions. Problem solving was measured by the frequency of themes promoting the exploration of alternatives and the search for mutually beneficial outcomes. The findings on the use of paraphrasing suggest that it can be used to restrict exploration as well as to promote it. The exploratory focus of problem solving was somewhat limited by its use in association with demands, suggesting that problem solving was interpreted as a sign of weakness

Nuclear proliferation in South Asia; La proliferation nucleaire en Asie du Sud

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lamballe, A

2007-07-15

Neither India nor Pakistan has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.By carrying out tests in 1998, they therefore violated no international agreement but dealt a severe blow to non-proliferation by inciting other countries, including Iran, to develop nuclear weapons. The purpose of India strike force is to deter China; Pakistan hopes that with a credible strike force it will be able to deter any major attack by India. The nuclear phenomenon is now firmly entrenched in the minds of all those on the subcontinent, where the arms race continues without let-up on all fronts: witness the many launches of ballistic and cruise missiles by both countries. And now that radical Islamist movements are showing an interest in nuclear weapons systems there is a risk of tipping from the rational to the irrational world, with all its attendant dangers. (author)

Nuclear weapons non proliferation treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1969-01-01

Taking into account the devastation that a nuclear war would inflict upon mankind, and the resulting need to do all that is in our power to keep such a tragedy from occuring, as well as to implement measures to safeguard all the peoples' safety, each State that owns nuclear weapons and that is a part of the Treaty pledges not to trade nuclear weapons, other explosive devices nor the control over such instruments to any other entity whatsoever, wether directly or indirectly. Likewise, all States that does not posses any nuclear weaponry and that are part of the Treaty, in turn pledge not to receive from any other entity nuclear weaponry or other explosive devices in trade, wether directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire this fashion of weaponry and not to request or accept any help whatsoever in the manufacturing of nuclear weaponry or related devices. The present Treaty remains open to the subscription of other countries, on July 26, 1968, with Mexico as one of the signatory countries

Stakeholder engagement for promoting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): Malaysia’s experience

Science.gov (United States)

Rashid, F. I. A.; Zolkaffly, M. Z.; Jamal, N.

2018-01-01

In order to keep abreast on issues related to CTBT in Malaysia, Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuklear Malaysia), as the CTBT National Authority in Malaysia, has collaborated with local partners to implement various stakeholder engagement programme. This paper aims at highlighting Malaysia’s approach in promoting CTBT through stakeholder engagement programme targeted at multilevel stakeholders, both national and international. Such programmes includes participation in the international forums, inter-agency meetings, awareness seminars, training courses, technical visits to IMS station, promoting civil and scientific application of International Monitoring System (IMS) data and International Data Centre (IDC) products using Virtual Data Exploitation Center (vDEC), inviting youth groups to participate in the CTBTO Youth Group, and publications of CTBT-related topics. This approach has successfully fortify Malaysia’s commitments at the international level, enhanced national awareness of global multilateral framework, increased stakeholders awareness and their roles related to CTBT, as well as building domestic capacity on CTBT matters. In conclusion, stakeholder engagement is crucial in promoting and enhancing stakeholders understanding on CTBT. Continuous engagement with relevant stakeholders will enable effective dissemination and smooth implementation of CTBT related matters that will eventually support global universalization of CTBT.

Working Group 3: Broader Perspectives on Non-proliferation and Nuclear Verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dreicer, M.; Pregenzer, A.; Stein, G.

2013-01-01

This working group (WG) focused on the technical topics related to international security and stability in global nonproliferation and arms control regimes and asked how nonproliferation tools and culture might facilitate verification of future nuclear treaties. The review of existing and future nonproliferation and disarmament regimes (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - CTBT, UNSC Resolution 1540, UK/Norway/VERTIC exercise, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - FMCT) offered a view on challenges, possibilities, and limitations for future initiatives. The concepts that the WG considered, with potential use in implementing future nuclear verification treaties, are: Triple S Culture (Safety, Security, Safeguards), State-Level Approach, Safeguards-by-Design, risk-based approaches, managed access, inspections, and protection of sensitive information. Under these concepts, many existing tools, considered by the WG could be used for nuclear verification. Export control works to control sensitive technology and expertise. Global implementation is complicated and multi-faceted and would benefit from greater consistency and efficiency. In most cases, international cooperation and development international capability would supplement efforts. This document is composed of the slides and the paper of the presentation. (A.C.)

A framework for nuclear agreement and verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ali, A.

1991-01-01

This chapter assesses the prospects for a nuclear agreement between India and Pakistan. The chapter opens with a review of past and present political environments of the two countries. The discussion proceeds to describe the linkage of global arms control agreements, prospects for verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the role of nuclear power in any agreements, the intrusiveness of verification, and possible post-proliferation agreements. Various monitoring and verification technologies are described (mainly satellite oriented). The chapter concludes with an analysis of the likelihood of persuading India and Pakistan to agree to a nonproliferation arrangement

Nuclear Stockpile Management: A Technical and Political Assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sitt, Bernard; Grand, Camille

2009-10-01

Managing the nuclear arsenals (whether strategic or non-strategic ones) belonging to States that possess nuclear weapons is quintessentially based on the objective of maintaining security, safety and the reliability of their weapons. Since the early stages of military nuclear armaments, it has hinged on an approach that has been altogether scientific, technical and industrial, where nuclear tests have played a key role in acquiring and checking knowledge, while advancing the research and development of new weapons. It has experienced important evolutions, particularly linked to the interruption of nuclear tests since the early 1990's, and to the gradual multilateral evolution towards the total banning of such tests, enforced thanks to moratorium agreements and later by the rounds of talks leading to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), its adoption and opening for signature in September 1996. The situation of de facto nuclear states is a different one, in that their strategic posture and the development of their arsenals are placed in specific regional contexts; yet, compared with the five nuclear weapons States according to the definition of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), their objectives in terms of reliability, safety and security are, of necessity, of the same nature, even though the technological capabilities placed at their disposal to meet their goals may vary considerably from one country to the next. One determining context is the ban on nuclear weapon tests. As decades went by, four successive treaties were signed: PTBT (1963), TTBT (1974), PNET (1976), CTBT (1996). Even though a complete, legally binding test ban still remains to be fully implemented, for more than ten years, there has existed a political norm of renunciation of testing, and a quasi-universal one too. Indeed the CTBT has had, and will continue to have, more remarkable results than the previous treaties, and it is bound to impose further serious constraints on the Stockpile

The nonproliferation treaty and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ehrlich, Thomas [School of Law, Stanford University, CA (United States)

1970-05-01

In the past, nuclear arms control and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives were seen by many proponents of each as competing - if not opposing - interests. At one extreme, some viewed peaceful uses as an annoying irritant on the way to general and complete disarmament. At the other extreme, some considered arms-control arrangements - particularly those limiting nuclear testing - as bothersome barriers to realizing the full benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. Most people found themselves somewhere between those extremes. But most also felt a continuing tension between essentially opposing forces. This polarity has been significantly altered by the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is believed that the future use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes will depend in large measure on the international arrangements worked out under the treaty. I also believe that the success of the treaty in checking proliferation of nuclear weapons is contingent, in substantial part, on those peaceful-uses arrangements. In the areas covered by the treaty, therefore, one could view an active development of peaceful uses for nuclear explosives as complementing rather than conflicting with nuclear arms control. The treaty is primarily a security agreement. It is aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war by establishing permanency in the current separation of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon nations. By its terms, each nuclear-weapon state agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient, and each non-nuclear-weapon state agrees not to receive such weapons or devices. The non-nuclear- weapon parties are also obligated to negotiate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency covering peaceful-uses activities. And all signatories agree not to transfer fissionable material to those parties unless they are subject to such agreements. These provisions are all part of a scheme to limit the

The nonproliferation treaty and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehrlich, Thomas

1970-01-01

In the past, nuclear arms control and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives were seen by many proponents of each as competing - if not opposing - interests. At one extreme, some viewed peaceful uses as an annoying irritant on the way to general and complete disarmament. At the other extreme, some considered arms-control arrangements - particularly those limiting nuclear testing - as bothersome barriers to realizing the full benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. Most people found themselves somewhere between those extremes. But most also felt a continuing tension between essentially opposing forces. This polarity has been significantly altered by the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is believed that the future use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes will depend in large measure on the international arrangements worked out under the treaty. I also believe that the success of the treaty in checking proliferation of nuclear weapons is contingent, in substantial part, on those peaceful-uses arrangements. In the areas covered by the treaty, therefore, one could view an active development of peaceful uses for nuclear explosives as complementing rather than conflicting with nuclear arms control. The treaty is primarily a security agreement. It is aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war by establishing permanency in the current separation of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon nations. By its terms, each nuclear-weapon state agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient, and each non-nuclear-weapon state agrees not to receive such weapons or devices. The non-nuclear- weapon parties are also obligated to negotiate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency covering peaceful-uses activities. And all signatories agree not to transfer fissionable material to those parties unless they are subject to such agreements. These provisions are all part of a scheme to limit the

Nuclear deterrence and disarmament: France in a corner; Dissuasion et desarmement nucleaire: la France dans un corner

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gautier, L. [Lyon-3 Univ., 69 (France)

2010-07-15

The author comments the implications and consequences of the recent Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference which drew a line between emerging actors and non-aligned countries on one side, and nuclear states on the other. As the United States got some benefits from this review conference, France, because of its involvement on the Iranian issue and of its clumsy reaction to the Brazil's and Turkey's initiative, found itself in an uncomfortable position. The author stresses that nuclear weapon proliferation is presently the biggest threat against peace, and that negotiations on nuclear disarmament must be resumed. He describes France's position and orientations on this issue: to restore the NPT authority, to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to implement the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). He also discusses the importance of talks about nuclear deterrence in Europe, and more particularly about the role and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons and missiles present on the European soil

Surface Coatings as Xenon Diffusion Barriers for Improved Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Explosions

OpenAIRE

Bläckberg, Lisa

2014-01-01

This thesis investigates surface coatings as xenon diffusion barriers on plastic scintillators. The motivation for the work is improved radioxenon detection systems, used within the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). One type of radioxenon detection systems used in this context is the Swedish SAUNA system. This system uses a cylindrical plastic scintillator cell to measure the beta decay from radioxenon isotopes. The detector cell also acts as a container...

Seismic Discrimination

Science.gov (United States)

1979-09-30

were presumed nuclear explosions announced by ERDA. Of the last, 11 were at the Semipalatinsk test site , 2 at the Western Kazakh test site , 2 in Novaya...which will fulfill U.S. ob- ligations that may be incurred under a possible future Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This report includes 9 contributions...which could assume U.S. seismic-data-management responsibilities in the event that international agreement is reached on a Comprehensive Test Ban

UK National Data Centre archive of seismic recordings of (presumed) underground nuclear tests 1964-1996

Science.gov (United States)

Young, John; Peacock, Sheila

2016-04-01

The year 1996 has particular significance for forensic seismologists. This was the year when the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed in September at the United Nations, setting an international norm against nuclear testing. Blacknest, as a long time seismic centre for research into detecting and identifying underground explosions using seismology, provided significant technical advice during the CTBT negotiations. Since 1962 seismic recordings of both presumed nuclear explosions and earthquakes from the four seismometer arrays Eskdalemuir, Scotland (EKA), Yellowknife, Canada (YKA), Gauribidanur, India (GBA), and Warramunga, Australia (WRA) have been copied, digitised, and saved. There was a possibility this archive would be lost. It was decided to process the records and catalogue them for distribution to other groups and institutions. This work continues at Blacknest but the archive is no longer under threat. In addition much of the archive of analogue tape recordings has been re-digitised with modern equipment, allowing sampling rates of 100 rather than 20 Hz.

Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

The Treaty of Tlatelolco enhances the security of the countries of the region by reducing the risk of a nuclear-arms race among them, with all the danger and cost that it would entail, and, as a contribution to the world-wide nuclear non-proliferation regime, it constitutes an important confidence-building measure by ensuring, through its control and verification system, that parties to the Treaty do not posses and will not acquire nuclear weapons. List of parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as of 31 July 1989: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil (not full party), Chile (not full party), Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. (Argentina and Dominica have signed the Treaty)

Disaster warning and promoting human welfare - the civil and scientific uses of CTBTO data

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-12-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions. Its verification will be assured by the global alarm system currently being established by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). The 337 facilities of the International Monitoring System (IMS), which span the entire globe, ensure that no nuclear explosion escapes detection. The IMS uses four technologies - radionuclide, seismic, infrasound and hydroacoustic. More than 85% of this system has already been established (as of December 2011). Apart from detecting nuclear explosions, this one billion dollar investment by the CTBTO's more than 180 Member States can be put to a wide range of civil and scientific uses, thereby contributing to sustainable development, knowledge expansion and saving lives. However, to a large extent, these benefits are still untapped. Examples of civil and scientific uses:Detection and real time warning of - Earthquakes and tsunamis, Radiation dispersal from nuclear accidents, Volcanic eruptions; Research on - The Earth's core, Climate change, Meteorology, Break-up of ice shelves and the creation of icebergs, Oceans and marine life, Worldwide background radiation.

Field test of the PNNL Automated Radioxenon Sampler/Analyzer (ARSA)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lagomarsino, R.J.; Ku, E.; Latner, N.; Sanderson, C.G.

1998-07-01

As part of the requirements of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Automated Radioxenon/Sampler Analyzer (ARSA) was designed and engineered by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The instrument is to provide near real-time detection and measurement of the radioxenons released into the atmosphere after a nuclear test. Forty-six field tests, designed to determine the performance of the ARSA prototype under simulated field conditions, were conducted at EML from March to December 1997. This final report contains detailed results of the tests with recommendations for improvements in instrument performance

Field test of the PNNL Automated Radioxenon Sampler/Analyzer (ARSA)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lagomarsino, R.J.; Ku, E.; Latner, N.; Sanderson, C.G.

1998-07-01

As part of the requirements of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Automated Radioxenon/Sampler Analyzer (ARSA) was designed and engineered by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The instrument is to provide near real-time detection and measurement of the radioxenons released into the atmosphere after a nuclear test. Forty-six field tests, designed to determine the performance of the ARSA prototype under simulated field conditions, were conducted at EML from March to December 1997. This final report contains detailed results of the tests with recommendations for improvements in instrument performance.

Nuclear Energy and the Environment.

Science.gov (United States)

International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria).

"Nuclear Energy and the Environment" is a pocket folder of removable leaflets concerned with two major topics: Nuclear energy and Nuclear Techniques. Under Nuclear Energy, leaflets concerning the topics of "Radiation--A Fact of Life,""The Impact of a Fact: 1963 Test Ban Treaty,""Energy Needs and Nuclear Power,""Power Reactor Safety,""Transport,"…

Preliminary code development for seismic signal analysis related to test ban treaty questions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brolley, J.E.

1977-01-01

Forensic seismology, from a present day viewpoint, appears to be divided into several areas. Overwhelmingly important, in view of current Complete Test Ban (CTB) discussions, is the seismological study of waves generated in the earth by underground nuclear explosions. Over the last two decades intensive effort has been devoted to developing improved observational apparatus and to the interpretation of the data produced by this equipment. It is clearly desirable to extract the maximum amount of information from seismic signals. It is, therefore, necessary to quantitatively compare various modes of analysis to establish which mode or combination of modes provides the most useful information. Preliminary code development for application of some modern developments in signal processing to seismic signals is described. Applications of noncircular functions are considered and compared with circular function results. The second portion of the discussion concerns maximum entropy analysis. Lastly, the multivariate aspects of the general problem are considered

Communication of 7 February 1996 received from the Permanent Mission of Australia to the International Atomic Energy Agency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

On 7 February 1996, the Director General received a communication of 6 February 1996 from the Resident Representative of Australia transmitting Statements made by the Prime Minister of Australia on 28 January 1996 about the sixth nuclear test by France at Fangataufa and on 30 January 1996 about the subsequent announcement of France's commitment to sign the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996

Proliferation of massive destruction weapons: fantasy or reality?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duval, M.

2001-01-01

This article evaluates the threat of massive destruction weapons (nuclear, chemical, biological) for Europe and recalls the existing safeguards against the different forms of nuclear proliferation: legal (non-proliferation treaty (NPT), comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), fissile material cut off treaty (FMCT) etc..), technical (fabrication of fissile materials, delays). However, all these safeguards can be overcome as proven by the activities of some countries. The situation of proliferation for the other type of massive destruction weapons is presented too. (J.S.)

The IMS radionuclide network of the CTBT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Medici, Fausto

2001-01-01

A world-wide radionuclide network consisting of 80 stations is under establishment in the framework of the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT). These monitoring stations are essential for the verification regime of the treaty and they will be able to monitor the airborne particulate as well as xenon isotopes that are produced by nuclear tests. The equipment, the operation and the locations of these stations are chosen in such a way to provide a very high confidence of the compliance of the treaty.

Verification arrangements for the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bragin, V.

2001-01-01

Since the mid-1950's, an agreement to terminate the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons has been on the agenda. On December 16, 1993, the UNGA adopted Resolution A/RES/48/75/L which recommends ''the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices''. The proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is still one of the most important items on the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. Successful achievement of the FMCT would be an important step towards the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. (author)

Nuclear Legislation in OECD and NEA Countries. Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Activities - Australia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

This country profile provide comprehensive information on the regulatory and Institutional Framework governing nuclear activities as well as a detailed review of a full range of nuclear law topics, including: mining regime; radioactive substances; nuclear installations; trade in nuclear materials and equipment; radiation protection; radioactive waste management; non-proliferation and physical protection; transport; and nuclear third party liability. The profile is complemented by reproductions of the primary legislation regulating nuclear activities in the country. Content: I) - General Regulatory Regime: 1. Introduction; 2. Mining regime; 3. Radioactive substances and equipment; 4. Nuclear installations (Licensing and inspection, including nuclear safety; Protection of the environment against radiation effects); 5. Trade in nuclear materials and equipment; 6. Radiation protection; 7. Radioactive waste management; 8. Non-proliferation and physical protection (Bilateral safeguards agreements; International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreement; The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Act; The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Act; The Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act); 9. Transport; 10. Nuclear third party liability; II) - Institutional Framework: 1. Regulatory and supervisory authorities (Minister for Health and Ageing; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts; Minister for, Resources, Energy and Tourism); 2. Advisory bodies (Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council; Advisory Committees); 3. Public and semi-public agencies (Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA); Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office; Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO); Supervising Scientist)

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-03-01

The document contains the 3 Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (INFCIRC-331) adopted by the South Pacific Forum at its 17th session in Suva on 8 August 1986. The treaty entered into force on 11 December 1986

India's nuclear energy programme and future power need

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pal, M.K.

2010-01-01

Critics of the recently negotiated 123 Nuclear Agreement between India and the United States of America often cite its retrograde effects on India's longstanding policy of non-alignment in foreign relations. The major part of this article will, therefore, is devoted to various aspects of DAE's performance, areas and problems that need more attention, their future plan on stepping up the production of nuclear energy by a big factor beyond their indigenous reach, and the consequent imperative and compulsion of opening the doors to the international market for bulk purchases. India's access to the international market for nuclear energy was barred because of our refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). Hence, when George Bush, ex-President of U.S.A., offered to sign a bilateral treaty with India, opening the door for nuclear and other strategic co-operation, the offer was welcome by the DAE and the Government of India with open arms. However, obligations under the rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), of which India is a member, still required applying to the Body for their approval so that India could approach the Consortium of nuclear supplier countries for their agreement to do business with India without raising any hindrance arising from NPT and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Radioactive and Other Effects of Nuclear Explosion

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ilijas, B.; Cizmek, A.; Prah, M.; Medakovic, S.

2008-01-01

As a result of long lasting efforts of international community to definitely ban all test nuclear explosions, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in New York on 24 September 1996, when it was signed by 71 states, including Croatia. The State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS) which, as an independent state regulatory authority has a responsibility for activities relating to nuclear safety, including the national authority over this Treaty, is actively engaged in CTBTO activities. The nuclear explosion causes a lot of effects (blast, thermal, radioactive, electromagnetic) which differs a lot in its nature, reach, lasting and other. The longest lasting aftermath is from the radioactive effects that cause a radioactive fallout and a lot of radioactive elements in the environment, created by the influence of a primary beam of radiation. Fission and fusion are the main source of radionuclide created by the nuclear explosion, and the longest lasting aftermaths are by the fission products, namely their offspring in natural disintegration chains. This can make contaminated areas inappropriate for life for very long periods. Even in the case of underground nuclear explosion (when underground cavity is formed with no effects on the surface), a leakage of radioactive gases through cracks is possible. A number of radionuclide is created by the neutron activation of elements naturally present in an environment, because a very strong neutron radiation appears in the moment of nuclear explosion. The abundance of particular radionuclide is a very much dependent of a place of performing nuclear explosion and a composition of soil or water in the vicinity.(author)

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) in Europe and the dissemination of nuclear war

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mongnet, J.

1997-01-01

The problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is of great concern to physician because of their professional interest in the life and heals of the population.It for the reason that we have studied and published articles on the effects of nuclear weapons, the consequences of nuclear weapon production and testing and demanded their abolition. Unfortunately we can at present observe their dissemination, both vertical and horizontal, in Europe and the world. July 2 nd marked the beginning of a series of nuclear tests in Nevada in direct violation of Article 6 of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation. IPPNW is part of the Abolition 2000 campaign which is working towards the abolition of nuclear weapons for the year 2000. The American and European initiative regarding the extension of NATO will ruin all hopes of this. Although public opinion was greatly influenced by the decision taken by the President of the French Republic to resume nuclear testing in the Pacific in 1995, it is not yet aware of the danger of the extension of NATO and has been lulled into a false sense of well-being by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed in New York in 1996. It is therefore the duty of physicians all over Europe to preserve the population from these new threats and the vast military expenditure they represent to the detriment of health and education

Nuclear Explosion Monitoring History and Research and Development

Science.gov (United States)

Hawkins, W. L.; Zucca, J. J.

2008-12-01

Within a year after the nuclear detonations over Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Baruch Plan was presented to the newly formed United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (June 14, 1946) to establish nuclear disarmament and international control over all nuclear activities. These controls would allow only the peaceful use of atomic energy. The plan was rejected through a Security Council veto primarily because of the resistance to unlimited inspections. Since that time there have been many multilateral, and bilateral agreements, and unilateral declarations to limit or eliminate nuclear detonations. Almost all of theses agreements (i.e. treaties) call for some type of monitoring. We will review a timeline showing the history of nuclear testing and the more important treaties. We will also describe testing operations, containment, phenomenology, and observations. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which has been signed by 179 countries (ratified by 144) established the International Monitoring System global verification regime which employs seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide monitoring techniques. The CTBT also includes on-site inspection to clarify whether a nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of the Treaty. The US Department of Energy (DOE) through its National Nuclear Security Agency's Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring R&D Program supports research by US National Laboratories, and universities and industry internationally to detect, locate, and identify nuclear detonations. This research program builds on the broad base of monitoring expertise developed over several decades. Annually the DOE and the US Department of Defense jointly solicit monitoring research proposals. Areas of research include: seismic regional characterization and wave propagation, seismic event detection and location, seismic identification and source characterization, hydroacoustic monitoring, radionuclide monitoring, infrasound monitoring, and

Symposium on nuclear doctrines

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The world is cold-war free for a decade, but there is a growing concern about continued reliance by the most powerful military states on nuclear weapons of inconceivable mass destructive capacity. Question revolve around not only the amount of nuclear weapons deployed and in storage, but also the reasons why stets need to retain military doctrines that include the possible use of their awesome power. NATO adopted a new strategic concept at the Washington summit in April 1999, at the heart of which still is nuclear deterrence. The US Senate rejected ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in October 1999. The Russian Federation draft nuclear doctrine is increasing reliance on nuclear weapons. The nuclear test in South Asia in May 1998 challenged the viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Earlier in 1999, India floated a nuclear doctrine in draft that includes reliance on a minimum nuclear deterrent. This publication aimed to extend the insights and opinions on the disarmament and real effectiveness of nuclear deterrence

International arrangements against nuclear terrorism

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bunn, G.

1987-01-01

International efforts to show the spread of nuclear weapons have created an international norm of nonproliferation, backed by a variety of enforcement mechanisms. Together they are often referred to as the nonproliferation regime. This regime is reviewed, starting with the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. The centerpiece of the regime, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968, now has 135 parties, including most of the advanced industrial nuclear countries. Results of the 1985 NPT Review Conference are briefly discussed; the 86 NPT parties that attended reaffirmed the treaty's value, pledged continued support for the IAEA safeguards system, and called upon nonsigners to renounce nuclear weapons and accept IAEA safeguards. A section is devoted to the physical protection of nuclear materials, facilities, and weapons. Finally, recommendations are presented to improve international arrangements against nuclear terrorists

International law and arms control: Soviet Union and Russia’s stance on nuclear test ban treaties

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Renata Hessmann Dalaqua

2013-12-01

Full Text Available The long-lasting struggle against nuclear tests can be examined through different perspectives. In this paper, the focus will be on the part played by the USSR and Russia in the international efforts aimed at establishing legal instruments to outlaw nuclear explosions in space, underground, under water and in the atmosphere.  A luta contra os testes nucleares pode ser examinada sob diferentes perspectivas. Aqui, o foco recairá sobre o papel desempenhado pela União Soviética e Rússia na criação de instrumentos legais para proibir explosões nucleares no espaço, no subsolo, debaixo da água e na atmosfera.

Technology Advancement and the CTBT: Taking One Step Back from the Nuclear Brink

Science.gov (United States)

Perry, W. J.

2016-12-01

Technology plays a pivotal role in international nuclear security and technological advancement continues to support a path toward stability. One near-term and readily-obtainable step back from the nuclear brink is the Comprehensive Nuclear-test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The technology to independently verify adherence to the CTBT has matured in the 20 years since the Treaty was opened for signature. Technology has also improved the safety and reliability of the US nuclear stockpile in the absence of testing. Due to these advances over the past two decades neither verification nor stockpiles effectiveness should be an impediment to the Treaty's entry into force. Other technical and geo-political evolution in this same period has changed the perceived benefit of nuclear weapons as instruments of security. Recognizing the change technology has brought to deliberation of nuclear security, nations are encouraged to take this one step away from instability.This presentation will reflect on the history and assumptions that have been used to justify the build-up and configuration of nuclear stockpiles, the changes in technology and conditions that alter the basis of these original assumptions, and the re-analysis of security using current and future assumptions that point to the need for revised nuclear policies. The author has a unique and well informed perspective as both the most senior US Defense Official and a technologist.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones: Pursuing security, region by region. Conference of States Parties and Signatories of treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2005-01-01

The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, over the past four decades, is a testament to what nations can do, region by region, to achieve common security objectives. In fact, when considering the history of nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it might be said that here in Mexico City is w here it all began . The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first multilateral treaty to establish a region free of nuclear weapons and a requirement for comprehensive IAEA safeguards for its parties - and clearly gave impetus to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones provide tangible security benefits. They help to reassure the larger international community of the peaceful nuclear intentions of countries in these regions. They provide their members with security assurances against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons by a nuclear-weapon State. They include control mechanisms for dealing with non-compliance in a regional setting. And in all cases, they prohibit the development, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in their respective regions. An important benefit of these zones is that they open a forum for expanded regional dialogue on issues of security. Because the causes of insecurity vary from region to region, security solutions do not come in a 'one-size-fits-all' package. It is for this reason that regional dialogues, as we see in the nuclear-weapon-free zones, are so beneficial. It is clear that such treaties, and such security dialogues, would be invaluable in other areas of the world, such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. Since the end of the Cold War, the international security landscape has undergone dramatic changes. For example, the rise in terrorism, the discovery of clandestine nuclear programmes, and the emergence of covert nuclear procurement networks have heightened our awareness of vulnerabilities in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This statement focuses on two issues

On-site inspections under the INF Treaty. A post-mortem

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Russell, J.

2001-01-01

Midnight on 31 May 2001 marked the end of all on-site inspections (OSIs) under the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Signed by the US and the Soviet Union in 1987, the treaty has now come of age and must survive for the rest of its indefinite duration without the security of regular OSIs. The ending of OSIs provides an opportunity to assess the success of this aspect of the verification regime and how the treaty is to be verified without them. The INF Treaty banned all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. It was the first treaty to eliminate a whole class of nuclear weapons and the first nuclear arms control agreement to provide for OSIs. All 2,692 INF missiles were eliminated by May 1991, within the three-year time limit. A further 10 years of OSIs helped provide reassurance of continuing compliance. The treaty will continue to be verified by so-called national technical means, primarily satellites. The Special Verification Commission, set up under the treaty to resolve issues relating to treaty implementation and compliance, will continue to meet when requested by a treaty party. Universal opinion is that the treaty has been successfully verified to date. However, a number of problems were encountered and lessons learned from the experience. In particular, the treaty negotiators proved to have been overly cautious in envisaging how inspections would actually be conducted. One of the main achievements of OSIs under the INF Treaty has been to create a basic model and procedures for inspections which have been adopted in the more complex arms control and disarmament treaties that have followed

Information report on the behalf of the foreign affairs, defence and armed forces Commission on France security, nuclear disarmament and non proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

This report first gives an overview of nuclear disarmament and non proliferation twenty years after the end of Cold War: evolution and status of Russia's and United States' nuclear weapon arsenals, France's and United Kingdom's trend to reduce their nuclear armament, reinforcement of China's nuclear armament, effects and limitations of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It notices that the new international context gave birth to some expectations and may lead to a lower nuclear pressure, notably with the influence of START negotiations between Russia and the United States, provided that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is ratified by more countries, and that negotiations promote a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The report also outlines the importance of the promotion of better controlled peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It discusses the relationship between maintaining the world nuclear order and the reduction of international and regional tensions, and the importance of struggle against all forms of proliferation. It analyses the French nuclear posture in terms of security requirements, and in front of the zero nuclear option, in a context of ballistic missile proliferation, and in relationship with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

On-site inspection for the radionuclide observables of an underground nuclear explosion

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burnett, J.L.

2015-01-01

Under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty an on-site inspection (OSI) may be undertaken to identify signatures from a potential nuclear explosion. This includes the measurement of 17 particulate radionuclides ( 95 Zr, 95 Nb, 99 Mo, 99m Tc, 103 Ru, 106 Rh, 132 Te, 131 I, 132 I, 134 Cs, 137 Cs, 140 Ba, 140 La, 141 Ce, 144 Ce, 144 Pr, 147 Nd). This research provides an assessment of the potential to detect these radionuclides during an OSI within 1 week to 2 years after a nuclear explosion at two locations. A model has been developed that simulates the underground detonation of a 1 kT 235 U nuclear weapon with 1 % venting. This indicates a requirement to minimise the time since detonation with accurate determination of the test location. (author)

Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Technology Roadmap

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Casey, Leslie A.

2014-01-01

This GNDD Technology Roadmap is intended to provide guidance to potential researchers and help management define research priorities to achieve technology advancements for ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring science being pursued by the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team within the Office of Nuclear Detonation Detection in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Four science-based elements were selected to encompass the entire scope of nuclear monitoring research and development (R&D) necessary to facilitate breakthrough scientific results, as well as deliver impactful products. Promising future R&D is delineated including dual use associated with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Important research themes as well as associated metrics are identified along with a progression of accomplishments, represented by a selected bibliography, that are precursors to major improvements to nuclear explosion monitoring.

Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Technology Roadmap

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Casey, Leslie A.

2014-01-13

This GNDD Technology Roadmap is intended to provide guidance to potential researchers and help management define research priorities to achieve technology advancements for ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring science being pursued by the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team within the Office of Nuclear Detonation Detection in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Four science-based elements were selected to encompass the entire scope of nuclear monitoring research and development (R&D) necessary to facilitate breakthrough scientific results, as well as deliver impactful products. Promising future R&D is delineated including dual use associated with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Important research themes as well as associated metrics are identified along with a progression of accomplishments, represented by a selected bibliography, that are precursors to major improvements to nuclear explosion monitoring.

The purposes, achievements, and priorities of arms control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brown, P.S.

1987-09-01

Arms control purposes include strengthening the framework of deterrence and reducing the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, reducing the dangers of attack and accidental nuclear war, and allowing more resources for the civilian economy. The paper briefly describes achievements in arms control since World War II. These include the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT)-SALT I, SALT II, Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), and Nuclear-Free Zones treaties. The author also discusses his views on what the priorities of arms control activities should be

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-03-01

On 8 August 1986 the Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty were adopted by the South Pacific Forum at its 17 th session, in Suva. The attached texts of the Protocols were formally communicated to the Director General by the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (SPEC) and are herewith being circulated to all Member States for their information pursuant to a request made by the Director of SPEC. Following the deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty entered into force on 11 December 1986 [es

Assessment of the announced North Korean nuclear test using long-range atmospheric transport and dispersion modelling.

Science.gov (United States)

De Meutter, Pieter; Camps, Johan; Delcloo, Andy; Termonia, Piet

2017-08-18

On 6 January 2016, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced to have conducted its fourth nuclear test. Analysis of the corresponding seismic waves from the Punggye-ri nuclear test site showed indeed that an underground man-made explosion took place, although the nuclear origin of the explosion needs confirmation. Seven weeks after the announced nuclear test, radioactive xenon was observed in Japan by a noble gas measurement station of the International Monitoring System. In this paper, atmospheric transport modelling is used to show that the measured radioactive xenon is compatible with a delayed release from the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. An uncertainty quantification on the modelling results is given by using the ensemble method. The latter is important for policy makers and helps advance data fusion, where different nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty monitoring techniques are combined.

The third-world response to anti-nuclear proliferation strategy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Poulose, T.T.

1978-01-01

The discriminatory aspect of the NPT and its implications for the nuclear have-nots are discussed. India's refusal to sign the NPT and misgivings it has created in the 'Nuclear haves' are explained. It is emphasised that India should retain the nuclear option, even though the option at present stands renounced voluntarily, in order to bargain with the nuclear weapons powers for nuclear disarmament. India may even give up PNEs as a price in return for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It has also been pointed out that the nuclear weapons powers and other nuclear suppliers are using the NPT as a political weapon, to deny technical details to the developing nations. The approach of the nuclear haves to the NPT is technical and that of the nuclear have-nots is political. Third world's demand is that nuclear proliferation must be differentiated from the dissemination of nuclear technology. (M.G.B.)

Sandia technology. Volume 13, number 2 Special issue: verification of arms control treaties

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

Nuclear deterrence, a cornerstone of US national security policy, has helped prevent global conflict for over 40 years. The DOE and DoD share responsibility for this vital part of national security. The US will continue to rely on nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future. In the late 1950s, Sandia developed satellite-borne nuclear burst detection systems to support the treaty banning atmospheric nuclear tests. This activity has continued to expand and diversify. When the Non-Proliferation Treaty was ratified in 1970, we began to develop technologies to protect nuclear materials from falling into unauthorized hands. This program grew and now includes systems for monitoring the movement and storage of nuclear materials, detecting tampering, and transmiting sensitive data securely. In the late 1970s, negotiations to further limit underground nuclear testing were being actively pursued. In less than 18 months, we fielded the National Seismic Station, an unattended observatory for in-country monitoring of nuclear tests. In the mid-l980s, arms-control interest shifted to facility monitoring and on-site inspection. Our Technical On-site Inspection Facility is the national test bed for perimeter and portal monitoring technology and the prototype for the inspection portal that was recently installed in the USSR under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces accord. The articles in the special issue of Sundiu Technology describe some of our current contributions to verification technology. This work supports the US policy to seek realistic arms control agreements while maintaining our national security.

The Atomic Testing Museum: Presenting the History and Preservation of a 50 Year Journey

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Troy E, Wade II

2009-01-01

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is one of the premier test and evaluation sites belonging to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a part of the Department of Energy. Founded in 1950, it is a major domestic location for the testing of nuclear components and nuclear weapons destined for the stockpile, the nuclear deterrent of the United States. From 1951 until 1992 there were 100 atmospheric and 828 underground nuclear tests conducted at the NTS. Those tests resulted in the development of a nuclear deterrent that helped prevent a world war and played a major role in the final defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Those tests lead to the development of yield measurement techniques that allowed the United States Government to take the lead in the negotiations of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which took effect in 1992, ending the requirement to do routine nuclear tests. This paper describes the walk through the history of the NTS' Cold War battlefield. (authors)

Scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre - ARSRITP and arms control and nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avrorin, E.N.; Andrusenko, B.A.; Voznyuk, R.I.; Voloshin, N.P.

1994-01-01

The activity of scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre (RFNC) -ARSRITP in the field of nuclear disarmament control for the period of 1974 -1993 is discussed. RFNC - ARSRITP scientists in collaboration with american specialists have developed and employed in practice the techniques and equipment to control the bilateral Treaty on the limitation of Nuclear -Weapon Test. Experience of control over nuclear tests of threshold power and realization of new RFNC - ARSRITP scientific and technical projects have made a basis for development of measures and means of possible control methods to observe complete nuclear test ban

Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, Harald

2011-01-01

The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the statement of the Director General of the IAEA to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 24 April 2000. The speech focus on the IAEA activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty, namely: verification through the IAEA safeguards, peaceful nuclear co-operation in the field of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental pollution monitoring, training

The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilmshurst, M.J.

1983-01-01

The author discusses the reasons of criticism and even rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, dealing in particular with the alledged discriminating nature of the Treaty and with the statement that the Treaty is not apt to prevent proliferation on a vertical plane. He further discusses the motives behind the efforts of potential nuclear weapons states to get nuclear weapons. The system of worldwide and bilateral safeguards and controls covering the transfer of nuclear technologies is explained. In conclusion the author suggests to pay more attention to article IV, sub-section (2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as this might offer a suitable approach to restricting the dissemination of nuclear explosives. (HP) [de

Reassessing nuclear nonproliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, G.; Rathjens, G.

1981-01-01

Unresolved proliferation problems are as serious issues for the Reagan Administration as East-West relations and dependence on imported oil. The linkage of nuclear weapons to power reactors is debatable, but developing and industrialized countries alike feel that nuclear power is an important option. A review of Carter policies finds them flawed in several respects. Although they heightened worldwide concern about proliferation, they fell short because (1) most governments and the nuclear industry reacted negatively; (2) they offered no way to deal with countries which construct only weapons facilities; (3) they did not help the US image as a reliable supplier; (4) no realistic fuel-cycle alternatives emerged; and (5) little has been done about fuel assurances and international spent-fuel storage. Past policies need to be restructured under new premises to deal effectively with the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. The effort should stress collective rather than unilateral action and a renewed effort for a comprehensive test ban treaty. 10 references

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Control in the Republic of Croatia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Valcic, I.; Prah, M.; Mikec, N.

2006-01-01

In accordance with its internationally accepted obligations, the Republic of Croatia is actively implementing principles of non-proliferation and export control of nuclear materials and/or equipment. The article deals with treaties, conventions, agreements and other international arrangements that are creating certain obligation for Republic of Croatia related to nuclear non-proliferation. The most important are the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards with Protocol, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the NSG Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology and NSG Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology. In addition the article describes a national regulative framework, the basis for conducting activities in nuclear material control, export control of dual-use items as well as non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Details are given about the Nuclear Safety Act, the Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Act on Export of Dual-Use Items, the Decree on the List of Dual-Use Items, the Law on Production, Repair and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment and the Decree specifying goods subject to export and import licenses. (author)

Trends in Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Research & Development - A Physics Perspective

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Maceira, Monica [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Blom, Philip Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Maccarthy, Jonathan K. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marcillo, Omar Eduardo [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Euler, Garrett Gene [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Begnaud, Michael Lee [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ford, Sean R. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Pasyanos, Michael E. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Orris, Gregory J. [Naval Research Laboratory; Foxe, Michael P. [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; Arrowsmith, Stephen J. [Sandia National Laboratory; Merchant, B. John [Sandia National Laboratory; Slinkard, Megan E. [Sandia National Laboratory

2017-06-01

This document entitled “Trends in Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Research and Development – A Physics Perspective” reviews the accessible literature, as it relates to nuclear explosion monitoring and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT, 1996), for four research areas: source physics (understanding signal generation), signal propagation (accounting for changes through physical media), sensors (recording the signals), and signal analysis (processing the signal). Over 40 trends are addressed, such as moving from 1D to 3D earth models, from pick-based seismic event processing to full waveform processing, and from separate treatment of mechanical waves in different media to combined analyses. Highlighted in the document for each trend are the value and benefit to the monitoring mission, key papers that advanced the science, and promising research and development for the future.

Nuclear Testing: Arms Control Opportunities. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, Second Session, June 28, 1988

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1988-01-01

The results of this hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science that had a three-fold purpose are recorded. The three-fold purpose was: (1) to examine the nuclear testing policy of the USA and how that policy fits into a larger USA arms control and national security strategy; (2) to discuss the status of the USA-Soviet Nuclear Testing Talks in Geneva, i.e. what is the status of the protocols of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET)? and what is the next step in the US negotiating strategy after the protocols are completed?; and (3) to examine the conclusions of a 139 page report completed by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) on 'Seismic Verification of Nuclear Testing Treaties'. The OTA report addressed two key questions: (1) down to what size explosion can underground testing be seismically monitored with high confidence; and (2) how accurately can the yields of underground explosions be measured seismically? The answers to these questions are featured in the hearings

Nuclear test ban verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chun, Kin-Yip

1991-07-01

This report describes verification and its rationale, the basic tasks of seismic verification, the physical basis for earthquake/explosion source discrimination and explosion yield determination, the technical problems pertaining to seismic monitoring of underground nuclear tests, the basic problem-solving strategy deployed by the forensic seismology resarch team at the University of Toronto, and the scientific significance of the team's research. The research carried out at the Univeristy of Toronto has two components: teleseismic verification using P wave recordings from the Yellowknife Seismic Array (YKA), and regional (close-in) verification using high-frequency L g and P n recordings from the Eastern Canada Telemetered Network. Major differences have been found in P was attenuation among the propagation paths connecting the YKA listening post with seven active nuclear explosion testing areas in the world. Significant revisions have been made to previously published P wave attenuation results, leading to more interpretable nuclear explosion source functions. (11 refs., 12 figs.)

Which future for nuclear counter-proliferation?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duval, M.

2010-01-01

Dealing with the case of nuclear weapons possessed by nuclear states (but not eventually by terrorists), the author first identifies the constants of counter-proliferation: it is linked to interest conflicts between those who try to preserve their monopoly and those who try to acquire a new weapon either because of a threat or for reasons of regional prestige, the evolution from use to deterrence, the appearance of new actors after the USA and Russia, the role of nuclear tactical weapons, and the future of Russian weapons and know-how. He presents the international counter-proliferation context: the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA and its controls, the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), the nuclear-free zones, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). He describes how and why proliferation occurs: uranium enrichment and plutonium technology, political reasons in different parts of the world. Then, he gives an overview of the proliferation status by commenting the cases of Israel, Iraq, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. He discusses the future of proliferation (involved countries, existence of a nuclear black market) and of counter-proliferation as far as Middle-East and North Korea are concerned. He tries finally to anticipate the consequences for nuclear deterrence strategy, and more particularly for Europe and France

Banning nuclear power at sea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Handler, J.

1993-01-01

This article argues that now that the East-West conflict is over, nuclear-powered vessels should be retired. Nuclear-powered ships and submarines lack military missions, are expensive to build and operate, generate large amounts of long-lived deadly nuclear waste from their normal operations and when they are decommissioned, and are subject to accidents or deliberate attack which can result in the sinking of nuclear reactors and the release of radiation. With the costs of nuclear-powered vessels mounting, the time has come to ban nuclear power at sea. (author)

Conference urges States to ratify nuclear test ban

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-12-01

Article XIV of the CTBT deals with the treaty's entry into force. The article foresees a mechanism of regular conferences to promote the treaty's entry into force, if this has not taken place three years after its opening for signature. The first such Conference took place in Vienna in 1999. Subsequent Conferences were held in new y ork in 2001 and in 2005, and in Vienna in 2003 and in 2007. The Secretary-general of the United nations convenes the conference at the request of States that have ratified the treaty. Representatives of ratifying States are invited to participate in the deliberations. Signatory States, non-signatory States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations are invited to attend as observers.

The de-nuclearization of Latin America: 40 years of the Tlatelolco Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ornstein, Roberto M.

2007-01-01

The 14 of February of 1967, in the Palace of Tlatelolco, the brand-new seat of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, significantly located in the Square of the Three Cultures in Mexico City, was carried out the solemn approval and the opening to the signature of the 'Treaty for the De-nuclearization of Latin America' (later 'and of the Caribbean') known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Treaty is the binding international legal instrument that created the first zone free of nuclear weapons in the world, with the exception of the inhabited Antarctica It is recognized for this reason by the international community as a milestone in the matter of non proliferation of nuclear weapons (it preceded the 'Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty' or NPT) and has been the example and inspiration for the other de-nuclearized zones in the planet. The present paper tries to rescue the ups and downs of the arduous negotiation and to analyze the distinctive characteristics of the Treaty and their later evolution. The successive position assumed by our country in relation to the Treaty are also analyzed. (author) [es

Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. Summary of a United Nations study

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-01-01

In December 1988, by resolution 43/75N, the United Nations General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to carry out a comprehensive update of a 1980 study on nuclear weapons. The study was to take into account recent relevant studies, and consider the political, legal and security aspects of: (a) nuclear arsenals and pertinent technological developments; (b) doctrines concerning nuclear weapons; (c) efforts to reduce nuclear weapons; (d) physical, environmental, medical and other effects of the use of nuclear weapons and of nuclear testing; (e) efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban; (f) efforts to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and their horizontal and vertical proliferation; and (g) the question of verification of compliance with nuclear-arms limitation agreements. The Group's report is presented in nine chapters, eight of which are summarized here; chapter 9, entitled ''Conclusions'', is included in its entirety. In his foreword to the report, the Secretary-General observes that the study represents the most comprehensive review of the relevant developments in the field over the last decade and was carried out during a period of ''far-reaching changes in international relations'' and an ''unprecedented evolution in the relationship between East and West''. This period experienced for the first time the initiation of an effective process of reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles

Law 16.597 approve correction to Treaty for the proscription of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

Approve it the amendments to the Treaty for the Proscription of the Nuclear Weapons in the Latin America (Treaty of TLATELOLCO), adopted for the General Conference of the Organism for the Proscription of the Nuclear Weapons in the Latin America and the Caribbean in their seventh extraordinary period of Sessions, in Mexico D:F., August of 1992, resolution 26 Not. 290(VII) [es

Wide area change detection with satellite imagery for locating underground nuclear testing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Canty, M.J.; Jasani, B.; Schlittenhardt, J.

2001-01-01

With the advent of high resolution optical imagery from commercial earth observation satellites, the use of remote sensing data for verification of nuclear non-proliferation agreements is becoming increasingly attractive. Non-governmental organizations are routinely publishing high-quality imagery of sensitive nuclear installations round the world, and international verification authorities, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), will also want to make use, directly or indirectly, of this additional open source of information. Exact location of the sites of underground nuclear explosions is a task eminently suited to satellite imagery. Here both moderate resolutions for detecting signals in very large testing ranges as well as high resolution images for exact interpretation play important roles. We describe in our paper a particularly sensitive change detection procedure for bitemporal, multispectral satellite imagery which can be used to locate the spall zone of underground nuclear explosions with commercial satellite imagery. The method is based on the multivariate alteration detection (MAD) technique of Nielsen et al. Linear combinations of the spectral channels in two images of the same scene are chosen so as to minimize their positive correlation. This leads to a series of difference images - the so-called MAD components - which are mutually orthogonal (uncorrelated) and ordered according to decreasing variance in their pixel intensities. Since interesting changes in man-made structures may contribute minimally to the overall variance (as the latter may be dominated for instance by seasonal vegetation differences) it is often the case that such changes turn up in a higher order MAD component. This is because they will be uncorrelated with seasonal vegetation changes, stochastic image noise or other major contributions to the overall change signal. This in fact is one of the

US monitoring and verification technology: on-site inspection experience and future challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gullickson, R.L.; Carlson, D.; Ingraham, J.; Laird, B.

2013-01-01

The United States has a long and successful history of cooperation with treaty partners in monitoring and verification. For strategic arms reduction treaties, our collaboration has resulted in the development and application of systems with limited complexity and intrusiveness. As we progress beyond New START (NST) along the 'road to zero', the reduced number of nuclear weapons is likely to require increased confidence in monitoring and verification techniques. This may place increased demands on the technology to verify the presence of a nuclear weapon and even confirm the presence of a certain type. Simultaneously, this technology must include the ability to protect each treaty partner's sensitive nuclear weapons information. Mutual development of this technology by treaty partners offers the best approach for acceptance in treaty negotiations. This same approach of mutual cooperation and development is essential for developing nuclear test monitoring technology in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Our ability to detect low yield and evasive testing will be enhanced through mutually developed techniques and experiments using laboratory laser experiments and high explosives tests in a variety of locations and geologies. (authors)

Characteristics of acoustic wave from atmospheric nuclear explosions conducted at the USSR Test Sites

Science.gov (United States)

Sokolova, Inna

2015-04-01

Availability of the acoustic wave on the record of microbarograph is one of discriminate signs of atmospheric (surface layer of atmosphere) and contact explosions. Nowadays there is large number of air wave records from chemical explosions recorded by the IMS infrasound stations installed during recent decade. But there is small number of air wave records from nuclear explosions as air and contact nuclear explosions had been conducted since 1945 to 1962, before the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963 (the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water) by the Great Britain, USSR and USA. That time there was small number of installed microbarographs. First infrasound stations in the USSR appeared in 1954, and by the moment of the USSR collapse the network consisted of 25 infrasound stations, 3 of which were located on Kazakhstan territory - in Kurchatov (East Kazakhstan), in Borovoye Observatory (North Kazakhstan) and Talgar Observatory (Northern Tien Shan). The microbarograph of Talgar Observatory was installed in 1962 and recorded large number of air nuclear explosions conducted at Semipalatinsk Test Site and Novaya Zemlya Test Site. The epicentral distance to the STS was ~700 km, and to Novaya Zemlya Test Site ~3500 km. The historical analog records of the microbarograph were analyzed on the availability of the acoustic wave. The selected records were digitized, the database of acoustic signals from nuclear explosions was created. In addition, acoustic signals from atmospheric nuclear explosions conducted at the USSR Test Sites were recorded by analogue broadband seismic stations at wide range of epicentral distances, 300-3600 km. These signals coincide well by its form and spectral content with records of microbarographs and can be used for monitoring tasks and discrimination in places where infrasound observations are absent. Nuclear explosions which records contained acoustic wave were from 0.03 to 30 kt yield for

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty: a critical assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hamel-Green, Michael.

1990-01-01

The study commences with a brief analysis of the nuclear free zone concept (NFZ) as it has evolved internationally, particularly in the UN context. The historical development, internationally-perceived objectives, definition, and key attributes of the regional NFZ concept, are discussed with the aim of developing a systematic framework and departure point for analysing the provisions and features of the Rarotonga Treaty. The Rarotonga Treaty is then analysed according to five key NFZ attributes: scope, domain, control system, implementation, and relation to collateral measures. It is argued that the treaty is highly selective in its scope, limited in its geographical application, less stringent in its control system than the Tlatelolco Treaty, and rigid in its amendment provisions, and that the implementation process does not envisage follow-on stages or collateral measures oriented to further denuclearization of the region. The ensuing chapters examine the motivation of the Australian Government in initiating and negotiating the treaty, and the nature of the United States, Soviet Union and regional state responses to it. The final chapter critically examines the various claims made for the treaty's contribution to regional and global security, argues that the treaty represented a regional consolidation of US and ANZUS nuclear interests at a time of strategic expansion in the Pacific, and considers some of the consequences and implications of the treaty, regionally and globally. 545 refs

India and the CTBT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Singh, Jasjit

1996-01-01

In trying to understand the Indian position with regard to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), it is necessary to note that this is a position for which extensive widespread consensus exists in the country. Two factors have been responsible for the evolution of this consensus. One concerns some core fundamental issues where nuclear disarmament is central to the Indian position; and the second relates to the technical and operational aspects of the treaty in terms of its comprehensiveness and verification means and methods. India's position that it will not sign the treaty in its present form is based on what it sees as central issues related to both aspects, although the issue of binding commitments to nuclear disarmament is more central. 15 refs

Tlatelolco treaty for the proscription of nuclear armaments in Latin America

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Espiell, H G

1981-03-01

The Tlateloco Treaty has established in Latin America the first and hitherto only zone free from nuclear armament existing in the inhabited world. This Latin American example guarantees not only the Continent's security from a future nuclear war, but it might also motivate the possible, though difficult, creation of other zones free from nuclear armament in other regions of the world. The Tlateloco system includes three instruments: a Treaty, open to signature and ratification by the Latin American States and two additional protocols. The Treaty includes regime of duties regarding military denuclearization, a control system, the creation of an organism (OPANAL) and the regime that governs pacific use of nuclear energy. The Treaty has been signed by 25 Latin American States (excepting Cuba, Guyana, Dominica and Santa Lucia), and ratified by 24 (excepting Argentine). There are 22 States members of OPANAL (all the rest, excepting Brazil and Chile). Additional Protocol I applies the military denuclearization regime to territories owned by non-Latin American States located in the Treaty zone. England and the Low Countries are Parts in the Additional Protocol I which has been signed, but not ratified, by the United States and France. Additional Protocol II establishes the duties of the powers possessing nuclear armaments with respect to the denuclearized Latin American zone. It has been signed and ratified by the United States, France, Great Britian, China, and the USSR.

Present status of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Netchaev, B.

1976-01-01

The Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons plays an important role in enhancing the security of all States. It is essential to maintain in the implementation of the Treaty an acceptable balance of the mutual responsibilities and obligations of all the countries Party to the Treaty wether or not nuclear weapon States. These questions were discussed during the Conference on the operation of the Treaty held in Geneva in May 1975. It was emphasized at the Conference that the first five years of application of the Treaty had shown a consistent increase in the number of ratifications and in the safeguards agreements concluded on the basis of the Agreement. (N.E.A.) [fr

WOSMIP II- Workshop on Signatures of Medical and Industrial Isotope Production

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matthews, Murray; Achim, Pascal; Auer, M.; Bell, Randy; Bowyer, Ted W.; Braekers, Damien; Bradley, Ed; Briyatmoko, Budi; Berglund, Helena; Camps, Johan; Carranza, Eduardo C.; Carty, Fitz; DeCaire, Richard; Deconninck, Benoit; DeGeer, Lars E.; Druce, Michael; Friese, Judah I.; Hague, Robert; Hoffman, Ian; Khrustalev, Kirill; Lucas, John C.; Mattassi, G.; Mattila, Aleski; Nava, Elisabetta; Nikkinin, Mika; Papastefanou, Constantin; Piefer, Gregory R.; Quintana, Eduardo; Ross, Ole; Rotty, Michel; Sabzian, Mohammad; Saey, Paul R.; Sameh, A. A.; Safari, M.; Schoppner, Michael; Siebert, Petra; Unger, Klaus K.; Vargas, Albert

2011-11-01

Medical and industrial fadioisotopes are fundamental tools used in science, medicine and industry with an ever expanding usage in medical practice where their availability is vital. Very sensitive environmental radionuclide monitoring networks have been developed for nuclear-security-related monitoring [particularly Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) compliance verification] and are now operational.

The United Nations and disarmament since 1945

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-01-01

Since the beginning of the United Nations, the combined efforts of Governments at global, regional and bilateral levels have led to a body of important agreements, treaties and conventions committing their parties to various arms limitation and disarmament measures. The multilateral instruments concluded so far are as follows: The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Test in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (partial test-ban Treaty); The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (outer space Treaty); The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (non-proliferation Treaty); The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (sea-bed Treaty); The Antarctic Treaty of 1959, for the demilitarization of Antarctica; The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga); The Vienna Document 1990 on confidence- and security-building measures, and a number of bilateral agreements, including: The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests; The Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes; The Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pomper, Miles A.

2010-01-01

Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Moreover, progress on disarmament measures under Obama has been slower than hoped, as he faces considerable scepticism in Washington about his strategy. (author)

Indonesia ratifies the treaty on non proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moendi Poernomo

1979-01-01

By Act no. 8 of 1978 Indonesia ratified the treaty on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons. This means that Indonesia became a party to the treaty. Ratification does not guarantee that Indonesia will automatically obtain assistance in developing its nuclear technology capability, but in this way at least Indonesia demonstrates its intention to promote world peace as clearly stated in the Main Guide Lines of State Policy. Development of nuclear technology can be achieved through international cooperation with advanced countries without being suspected of having intention other than peace. (author)

Impact of contributions of Glenn T. Seaborg on nuclear science

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoffman, Darleane C.

2000-01-01

Glenn Theodore Seaborg (1912-199) was a world-renowned nuclear chemist, a Nobel Laureate in chemistry in 1951, co-discoverer of plutonium and nine other transuranium elements, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission from 1961-71, scientific advisor to ten U.S. presidents, active in national and international professional societies, an advocate for nuclear power as well as for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, a prolific writer, an avid hiker, environmentalist, and sports enthusiast. He was known and esteemed not only by chemists and other scientists throughout the world, but also by lay people, politicians, statesmen, and students of all ages. This memorial includes a brief glimpse of Glenn Seaborg's early life and education, describes some of his major contributions to nuclear science over his long and fruitful career, and highlights the profound impact of his contributions on nuclear science, both in the U.S. and in the international community

Impact of contributions of Glenn T. Seaborg on nuclear science

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hoffman, Darleane C.

2000-12-26

Glenn Theodore Seaborg (1912-199) was a world-renowned nuclear chemist, a Nobel Laureate in chemistry in 1951, co-discoverer of plutonium and nine other transuranium elements, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission from 1961-71, scientific advisor to ten U.S. presidents, active in national and international professional societies, an advocate for nuclear power as well as for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, a prolific writer, an avid hiker, environmentalist, and sports enthusiast. He was known and esteemed not only by chemists and other scientists throughout the world, but also by lay people, politicians, statesmen, and students of all ages. This memorial includes a brief glimpse of Glenn Seaborg's early life and education, describes some of his major contributions to nuclear science over his long and fruitful career, and highlights the profound impact of his contributions on nuclear science, both in the U.S. and in the international community.

CTBT calibration explosions at the Semipalatinsk test site (1997-2000)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leith, W.; Kluchko, L.J.; Knowles, C.P.; Linger, D.A.; Gabriel, L.; Belyashova, N.N.; Tukhvatulin, Sh.T.; Demin, V.N.; Konovalov, V.E.

2000-01-01

The article shows the results of experiments, conducted together by American and Kazakhstan researchers at the Semipalatinsk test site during 6 chemical calibration explosions and preparation of the seventh between 1997 and 2000. The main goal of the experiments is calibration of International Monitoring System for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and development of understanding of explosions as seismic sources. (author)

Director`s series on proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bailey, K.C. [ed.

1993-09-07

Two essays are included in this booklet. Their titles are ``The Dynamics of the NPT Extension Decision`` and ``North Korea`s Nuclear Gambit.`` The first paper discusses the conference to be held in 1995 to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which will decide whether the treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. Topics relevant to this discussion are: Arms control issues, the nuclear test ban, the limited test ban treaty, the French nuclear testing moratorium, former Soviet nuclear weapons, Iraq, North Korea, nuclear-weapon-free zones, security, controls on nuclear weapon materials, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, safeguards, politics, and organizational and procedural issues. The second paper examines short, medium, and long term issues entailed in Korea`s nuclear proliferation. Topics considered include: Korean unification, North Korean politics, the nuclear issue as leverage, and the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty.

Treaties against nuclear terrorism. The global legal framework can make a difference

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, L.D.

2002-01-01

Two international treaties, one being drafted and the other already on the books, specifically address nuclear terrorism. The first Treaty known as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was adopted in 1980 under auspices of the IAEA. The second Treaty for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism is being drafted as part of the UN global campaign against terrorism. Both could require that specific measures be taken worldwide to protect and secure nuclear facilities from terrorist attack and sabotage. But neither one does. Efforts to include such requirements, before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, have not borne fruit. Now, in the wake of lessons learned, is the time to revive and support them

Towards the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xie Zhiqiong

1998-01-01

For 40 years, the Pugwash Conference on Science and world affairs has been making unremitting efforts to achieve it main objectives the struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons, the elimination of wars and maintenance of world peace. The end of the Cold War vigorously encouraged world efforts in arms control and disarmament. On the day of exploding her first nuclear bomb in October 1964, China declared solemnly that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time under any circumstances. China has also committed unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear free zones. China is the sole nuclear weapon state that has made this commitment, and she has kept her word. China is in favour of comprehensive nuclear test ban in the move towards complete nuclear disarmament, taking an active part in the CTBT negotiations in Geneva and contributing to the conclusion of a fair, reasonable, verifiable treaty of universal adherence and unlimited duration within this year

Better to detect nuclear explosions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

North, Bob

1987-01-01

In a 150 km 2 reserve just west of Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories, three GSC employees operate one of the most sensitive seismic arrays in existence for locating ground movement around the world. The array station is staffed year round despite the harsh climate. Since 1963 the Yellowknife seismic array has contributed data which will significantly aid international efforts to achieve a nuclear test ban treaty

Fifty years after Hiroshima

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Imai, R.

1997-01-01

Any discussion of the nuclear-proliferation regime in the post-Cold War era, its present role and expected function in the future must take into account the outcome of the New York Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference held in 1995, and the four factors that shaped the twentieth century: fascism and communism, nuclear energy and environmental concerns, as well as the interaction between them. none of the factors can be handled within the boundaries of a single state. After fifty years of nuclear competition both for military and energy generation purposes, international conferences on disarmament, Non-proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, START negotiations and agreements, there are still remaining nuclear issues. Population growth, energy demands and supplies, all related to global environmental changes must be taken into account

International co-operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

In this part the are reviewed: Co-operation with IAEA; Participation of the Slovakia on the 41 st session of the General Conference; The comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization; Co-operation with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; co-operation with the European Commission; Fulfillment of obligations resulting from the international contracting documents

Communication received from the Permanent Mission of Thailand regarding the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-03-04

The document reproduces the text of the Note Verbale dated 25 September 1997 received by the Agency from the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the Agency concerning the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), and as attachment the text of the above mentioned Treaty

Communication received from the Permanent Mission of Thailand regarding the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Note Verbale dated 25 September 1997 received by the Agency from the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the Agency concerning the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), and as attachment the text of the above mentioned Treaty

Between Shadow and Light: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Forty Years On

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Abdelwahab, Biad

2010-01-01

The NPT was negotiated during the Cold War period to prevent the emergence of new nuclear players by distinguishing between 'nuclear-weapon states' (NWS) which had carried out nuclear testing before 1 January 1967, that is the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China, and 'non-nuclear-weapon states' (NNWS). Under the NPT, the two groups of states commit to comply with a series of commitments formulated around 'three pillars': 1 - Non-proliferation: the NWSs undertake under Article I not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over such weapons and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any NNWS to acquire them, while the NNWSs are bound under Article II to neither develop or acquire nuclear weapons or 'other nuclear explosive devices' nor to receive any assistance in that connection. 2 - Peaceful use of nuclear energy: Article IV guarantees the 'inalienable right' to 'develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination'. 3 - Nuclear disarmament: each state party to the treaty undertakes under Article VI 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'. The treaty entered in force in March 1970 and has since become universal, with 189 states parties in May 2010. At five-year intervals, parties to the treaty convene review conferences in order to review the operation of the treaty, Article VIII(3). The 1975, 1985 and 2000 review conferences culminated in the adoption of a final declaration and the 1995 review conference decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. The preparatory committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 review conference, which met from April 2007 to May 2009, did not adopt any recommendations, in absence of a consensus on essential issues concerning the operation of the treaty. Hence the importance of this 8. review conference of the parties held in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010 in a

Verification of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): The Potential Role of the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chung, Jin Ho

2016-01-01

The objective of a future verification of a FMCT(Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) is to deter and detect non-compliance with treaty obligations in a timely and non-discriminatory manner with regard to banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has already established the IAEA safeguards as a verification system mainly for Non -Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs), it is expected that the IAEA's experience and expertise in this field will make a significant contribution to setting up a future treaty's verification regime. This paper is designed to explore the potential role of the IAEA in verifying the future treaty by analyzing verification abilities of the Agency in terms of treaty verification and expected challenges. Furthermore, the concept of multilateral verification that could be facilitated by the IAEA will be examined as a measure of providing a credible assurance of compliance with a future treaty. In this circumstance, it is necessary for the IAEA to be prepared for playing a leading role in FMCT verifications as a form of multilateral verification by taking advantage of its existing verification concepts, methods, and tools. Also, several challenges that the Agency faces today need to be overcome, including dealing with sensitive and proliferative information, attribution of fissile materials, lack of verification experience in military fuel cycle facilities, and different attitude and culture towards verification between NWSs and NNWSs

Verification of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): The Potential Role of the IAEA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chung, Jin Ho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-05-15

The objective of a future verification of a FMCT(Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) is to deter and detect non-compliance with treaty obligations in a timely and non-discriminatory manner with regard to banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has already established the IAEA safeguards as a verification system mainly for Non -Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs), it is expected that the IAEA's experience and expertise in this field will make a significant contribution to setting up a future treaty's verification regime. This paper is designed to explore the potential role of the IAEA in verifying the future treaty by analyzing verification abilities of the Agency in terms of treaty verification and expected challenges. Furthermore, the concept of multilateral verification that could be facilitated by the IAEA will be examined as a measure of providing a credible assurance of compliance with a future treaty. In this circumstance, it is necessary for the IAEA to be prepared for playing a leading role in FMCT verifications as a form of multilateral verification by taking advantage of its existing verification concepts, methods, and tools. Also, several challenges that the Agency faces today need to be overcome, including dealing with sensitive and proliferative information, attribution of fissile materials, lack of verification experience in military fuel cycle facilities, and different attitude and culture towards verification between NWSs and NNWSs.

Safeguarding arms control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Flanagan, S.J.

1988-01-01

This essay reviews the evolution of various safeguards concepts associated with U.S. Soviet arms control negotiations over the past twenty-five years. It explore in some detail the origins, nature, and effectiveness of the safeguards packages associated with six agreements: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the SALT I Interim Agreement (1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) and the SALT II Treaty (1979). Finally, the implications of this historical record for developing future nuclear and conventional arms control accords and for shoring up existing pacts, such as the ABM Treaty, are assessed with a view towards practicable prescriptions for Western policymakers. The treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) incorporates several verification safeguards, and it is very likely that analogous measures would be attached to any accord constraining conventional forces in Europe

A treaty on the cutoff of fissile material for nuclear weapons - What to cover? How to verify?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schaper, A.

1998-01-01

international controls of any of the military categories beyond national legislations. Some variations of a potential FMCT scope with different degrees of obligations are: 1. The original approach which bans just future production without measures on existing materials. 2. The good-will-approach which strives for reductions of the amount of military material. It would also ban the transfer of material back to military uses, once it has become civilian, and it would register upper limits that are allowed for undeclared material. 3. The one--way-approach which would make sure that the amount of military material is not increased. 4. The disarmament approach which would create mechanisms for reduction. It would oblige the members to adjust the upper limits of undeclared material to future nuclear disarmament treaties, e.g. a START-III treaty and others that might come. 5. The Indian approach which would be a time-bound framework for comprehensive nuclear disarmament. This demand is the reason for the current deadlock in the CD. As there are many variations of scope, also many verification scenarios are possible. Even in case of an FMCT with the most limited scope, the verification must cover not only non production but also non-diversion at least of civilian materials produced later. This is identical to what is already being verified in NNWS under full scope safeguards, with the only exception that NNWS are not allowed the possession of unsafe guarded materials from earlier production. For the NPT, the trust into the NNWS is not high enough to renounce full scope safeguards. Why should NWS be more trusted not to divert fissile materials for nuclear explosive purposes than NWS? But so far, full scope safeguards are still difficult to accept for NWS. Safeguards must be designed in a way that they are capable of detecting any of the procurement strategies with sufficient probability. The total verification costs of a comprehensive verification system are estimated in the range of

Fissile material ban: global and non-discriminatory?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Datt, Savita

1995-01-01

With the indefinite and unconditional extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) now out of the way, the next issue on the non-proliferation agenda is that of the existing stocks and further production of plutonium and weapons grade uranium. More than the existing stocks and the surplus fissile materials made available through arms control and disarmament measures, it is the further production of such materials which is sought to be tackled urgently. Of prime concern are the nuclear programmes of threshold countries like India, Pakistan and Israel (countries out of the NPT fold) which need to be capped at all costs. The best method of achieving this, it is believed can be through a global ban on the production of fissile materials. 15 refs

Which future for nuclear counter-proliferation?; Quel avenir pour la contre-proliferation nucleaire?

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Duval, M.

2010-07-15

Dealing with the case of nuclear weapons possessed by nuclear states (but not eventually by terrorists), the author first identifies the constants of counter-proliferation: it is linked to interest conflicts between those who try to preserve their monopoly and those who try to acquire a new weapon either because of a threat or for reasons of regional prestige, the evolution from use to deterrence, the appearance of new actors after the USA and Russia, the role of nuclear tactical weapons, and the future of Russian weapons and know-how. He presents the international counter-proliferation context: the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA and its controls, the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), the nuclear-free zones, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). He describes how and why proliferation occurs: uranium enrichment and plutonium technology, political reasons in different parts of the world. Then, he gives an overview of the proliferation status by commenting the cases of Israel, Iraq, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. He discusses the future of proliferation (involved countries, existence of a nuclear black market) and of counter-proliferation as far as Middle-East and North Korea are concerned. He tries finally to anticipate the consequences for nuclear deterrence strategy, and more particularly for Europe and France

Pump testing in the nuclear industry: The comprehensive test and other considerations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoyle, T.F.

1992-01-01

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operations and Maintenance Working Group on Pumps and Valves is working on a revision to their pump testing Code, ISTB-1990. This revision will change the basic philosophy of pump testing in the nuclear industry. Currently, all pumps are required to be tested quarterly, except those installed in dry sumps. In the future standby pumps will receive only a start test quarterly to ensure the pump comes up to speed and pressure or flow. Then, on a biennial basis all pumps would receive a more extensive test. This comprehensive test would require high accuracy test gauges to be used, and the pumps would be required to be tested near pump design flow. Testing on minimum flow loops would not be permitted except in rare cases. Additionally. during the comprehensive test, measurements of vibration, flow, and pressure would all be taken. The OM-6 standard (ISTB Code) will also require that reference values of flow rate and differential pressure be taken at several points instead of just one point, which is current practice. The comprehensive test is just one step in ensuring the adequacy of pump testing in the nuclear industry. This paper also addresses other concerns and makes recommendations for increased quality of testing of certain critical pumps and recommendations for less stringent or no tests on less critical pumps

Nuclear weapon race does not stop; Le nucleaire ne desarme pas

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Vahe Ter, Minassian

2005-04-01

60 years after Hiroshima, the race for nuclear weaponry keeps on. The comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), signed in 1996 by the 5 official nuclear-weapon-owning states (Usa, Russia, China, U.K. and France), has not yet been implemented because its implementation requires the ratification of 44 states that harbour on their territories industrial or research nuclear reactors. Till now only 33 such states have ratified CTBT. CTBT aims at prohibiting any nuclear test whatever the amount of energy released in it. Countries like Usa, North-Korea, Russia, soon Iran... are suspected to develop new types of nuclear warfare. For 2005 the American Congress have decided to freeze the funding of programmes dedicated to the development of 'mini-nukes' like the bunker-burster. The international network of monitoring stations will soon cover all the world and will be able to detect and locate, in an almost automated way, any test involving an energy greater than 1 kiloton. 321 stations have been settled and their efficient detection systems are based on seismic or infra-sound or radioactivity or hydro-acoustic analysis. (A.C.)

TOWARDS FULFILLMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

s. Bagheri

2016-01-01

Full Text Available The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT is an international treaty that should be implemented during both peace and wartime. However, the obligations included in the treaty are dependent upon states' attitudes regarding other issues. Non-use of nuclear weapons is directly related to negotiations done for the purpose of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, non-production or accumulation by other means and disarmament. In our day, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the issues of international law.The present study is of crucial significance due to its endeavor to clarify the general principles of Humanitarian Law in a relationship to the threat of nuclear weapons' up to now, a special norm; significantly limiting or completely prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, has not been accepted in international law. However, customary international humanitarian law regarding the use of nuclear weapons holds great value because of its purpose in eliminating nuclear weapons as a means of war through ascertaining their non-use and also appeasing the importance of nuclear ascendancy. In this respect, the NPT regime and its relationship with international humanitarian law will be discussed. Firstly, the NPT background, formation, main objectives and principles will be analyzed. In order to evaluate the relationship between the NPT and humanitarian law, the humanitarian obligations in general, humanitarian obligations in the context of the NPT and fulfillmen t of these obligations under the NPT should be studied. One of the main parts of the study is nuclear disarmament obligation included in the NPT. In this section, nuclear disarmament obligation in the context of the NPT and the legal framework of possible, general and comprehensive disarmament will be examined.

France and disarmament from one century to the other

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grand, C.

2010-01-01

The author comments the position adopted by France with respect to different disarmament initiatives. While noticing that France has always been a key actor in disarmament and possesses a real expertise in this domain, the author also notices that this country is often perceived as an opponent to disarmament because of its rather conservative position with respect to its own nuclear weapons. However, France has signed several international conventions and treaties dealing with disarmament. France finally joined the Non Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and became extremely active on these issues. But now, its disarmament policy is linked to the European Union framework. Its conservative position on nuclear weapons has to be related to the relationship it perceives between disarmament and security

France and disarmament from one century to the other; La France et le desarmement d'un siecle a l'autre

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Grand, C. [Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique (FRS), 75 - Paris (France)

2010-07-15

The author comments the position adopted by France with respect to different disarmament initiatives. While noticing that France has always been a key actor in disarmament and possesses a real expertise in this domain, the author also notices that this country is often perceived as an opponent to disarmament because of its rather conservative position with respect to its own nuclear weapons. However, France has signed several international conventions and treaties dealing with disarmament. France finally joined the Non Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and became extremely active on these issues. But now, its disarmament policy is linked to the European Union framework. Its conservative position on nuclear weapons has to be related to the relationship it perceives between disarmament and security

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-02-01

The full text of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty with its Annexes endorsed on 6 August 1985 by the South Pacific Forum (a body comprising the independent and self-governing countries of the South Pacific, namely Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Nive, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa) is presented

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-02-01

On 6 August 1985 the South Pacific Forum, a body comprising the independent and self-governing countries of the South Pacific (Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa), endorsed the text of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and opened it for signature [es

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-02-01

On 6 August 1985 the South Pacific Forum, a body comprising the independent and self-governing countries of the South Pacific (Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa), endorsed the text of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and opened it for signature [ru

Radionuclide Site Survey Report Sacramento, California (RN-70)

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Walker, Frank

1999-01-01

The purpose of this report is to validate that the Sacramento, CA, site will fulfill treaty requirements as set forth by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization...

Radionuclide Site Survey Report Salchaket (Eielson), Alaska (RN-76)

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Walker, Frank

1999-01-01

The purpose of this report is to validate that the Eielson, Alaska, site will fulfill treaty requirements as set forth by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization...

Amendments to the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-01-01

The document reproduces the amendments to the Tlatelolco Treaty approved on 26 August 1992 by the Special Session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

Information report on the behalf of the foreign affairs, defence and armed forces Commission on France security, nuclear disarmament and non proliferation; Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires etrangeres, de la defense et des forces armees (1) sur le desarmement, la non-proliferation nucleaires et la securite de la France

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2010-07-01

This report first gives an overview of nuclear disarmament and non proliferation twenty years after the end of Cold War: evolution and status of Russia's and United States' nuclear weapon arsenals, France's and United Kingdom's trend to reduce their nuclear armament, reinforcement of China's nuclear armament, effects and limitations of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It notices that the new international context gave birth to some expectations and may lead to a lower nuclear pressure, notably with the influence of START negotiations between Russia and the United States, provided that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is ratified by more countries, and that negotiations promote a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The report also outlines the importance of the promotion of better controlled peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It discusses the relationship between maintaining the world nuclear order and the reduction of international and regional tensions, and the importance of struggle against all forms of proliferation. It analyses the French nuclear posture in terms of security requirements, and in front of the zero nuclear option, in a context of ballistic missile proliferation, and in relationship with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Arms and the ban

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hassard, J.

1992-01-01

A critique of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is presented. While five nations known to have openly tested nuclear weapons (the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and India) have agreed, at least at present, to observe a moritorium on testing nuclear weapons, only China dissenting, there are many other ''threshold'' nations interested in nuclear weapons, but not bound by Treaty restrictions. Double standards by the NPT nations do nothing to encourage threshold nations to hold back their nuclear programs. The threshold nations, including Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Syria, Pakistan, India, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Algeria, North Korea and the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, four Soviet Republics, have been stockpiling weapons material or reactor technology and many see themselves as threatened by traditional political opponents. The author urges conformity to Rajv Gandhi's the former Indian prime minister, three-stage set of proposals aimed at producing a worldwide end to nuclear proliferation. (UK)

UTEX modeling of xenon signature sensitivity to geology and explosion cavity characteristics following an underground nuclear explosion

Science.gov (United States)

Lowrey, J. D.; Haas, D.

2013-12-01

Underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) produce anthropogenic isotopes that can potentially be used in the verification component of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Several isotopes of radioactive xenon gas have been identified as radionuclides of interest within the International Monitoring System (IMS) and in an On-Site Inspection (OSI). Substantial research has been previously undertaken to characterize the geologic and atmospheric mechanisms that can drive the movement of radionuclide gas from a well-contained UNE, considering both sensitivities on gas arrival time and signature variability of xenon due to the nature of subsurface transport. This work further considers sensitivities of radioxenon gas arrival time and signatures to large variability in geologic stratification and generalized explosion cavity characteristics, as well as compares this influence to variability in the shallow surface.

Evaluation of gamma-spectrometry equipment for on-site inspection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burnett, J.L.; Milbrath, B.D.; Mueller, W.F.

2017-01-01

An On-site Inspection (OSI) is an important component of the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), with the objective of gathering evidence of a possible Treaty violation. This includes the use of gamma-spectrometry equipment to identify 17 particulate radionuclides that are indicative of a nuclear explosion. This research provides an evaluation of high- (germanium), medium- (cadmium zinc telluride) and low-resolution (sodium iodide and lanthanum bromide) detectors using modelled radionuclide signatures from a nuclear explosion and Monte Carlo simulations of a detector response. The complex radionuclide signatures are shown to only be distinguishable using a high-resolution system for 1 week and 1 year post-detonation cases. (author)

Exclusive Interview with Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the CTBTO

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hautecouverture, Benjamin

2013-01-01

Dr Lassina Zerbo, the new Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), was invited to speak at the Foundation for Strategic Research on 19 December 2013. Before the event, Dr. Zerbo spoke to Non-Proliferation Monthly, outlining the major axes of his strategy for the CTBTO over the coming years, his thoughts on the prospects for the Treaty's entry into force and on the role that he believes this instrument should fulfil in the political inter-State dialogue and in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic negotiation processes

IAEA safeguards related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons- T.N.P. and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America-Tlatelolco

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodrigues, M.D.F.

1978-04-01

The application of safeguards, focusing mainly the causes that gave origin to this type of control, is studied. The safeguard procedures used by the IAEA are also given, relative to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - Tlatelolco, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons - T.N.P. and the Euratom safeguards. Some consideration is given to the organizations related to safeguards application such as IAEA, OPANAL and Euratom, their functions and aims. (F.E.) [pt

Welcome address

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Donowaki, Mitsuro

1992-01-01

Recent dramatic changes in the international environment had great influence on the process of arms control and disarmament. The need for improving and strengthening the Non-proliferation Treaty proposed examination of the possibility to activate special inspection mechanism of IAEA. With regard to the nuclear tests ban, the US and Russia have already brought into effect the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. Within these circumstances it is inevitable to stress the importance of solving regional disputes and conflicts in South-East Asia which is strongly supported by Japan which hosted this meeting

Prospects for a fissile material cut-off: Achieving a successful NPT review process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kalinowski, M.

1999-01-01

Finding new and creative ways to overcome the current deadlock in progress in nuclear arms control became the most important question in the past year. For a long time it had been expected that after the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the next step would be to ban production of fissile materials for weapon purposes. Three strategies are proposed for reaching relevant cut-off agreements. First suggests possible fore for achievement of relevant agreements, second is the proposal to begin with international register of inventories and production capabilities for all relevant nuclear materials, and the third one is ti identify equivalent steps obligatory for all the parties involved

Communication of 24 April 2000 received from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Atomic Energy Agency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Communication of 24 April 2000 received from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Atomic Energy Agency, including a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in connection with the ratification by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Act 1986 - No. 140 of 1986

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-01-01

The purpose of this Act is to give effect to Australia's obligations as a Party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 6 August 1985. The Act is supplemented by the provisions of the Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 as amended in 1986 as regards dumping of radioactive material into the sea. The Act repeats the substantive provisions of the Treaty and lays down prohibitions in relation to nuclear explosive devices. (NEA) [fr

The treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

In a letter of 28 January 1994, the Director General was informed that on 18 January 1994, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American and the Caribbean entered into force for the Argentine Republic

The nuclear dissuasion without tests

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-02-01

Since the signature of the french treaty against the nuclear tests (Tice) in 1995, the french engineers must used the simulation to warrant the performance and the safety of weapons. This paper recalls the historical aspects of the french nuclear tests and presents the technological and scientific resources to simulate a nuclear weapon operating. a special interest is given to the computer TERA. (A.L.B.)

Fundamental deterrence and START III

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Johnson, K.D.

1998-12-31

The public`s brief respite from the specter of nuclear holocaust abruptly ended in May 1998 when India, 24 years after its only successful nuclear weapon test, detonated five more just sixty miles from its border with Pakistan. Pakistan quickly declared itself a nuclear power and threatened tests of its own. Various capitals issued condemnations and an assortment of largely symbolic political and economic sanctions. India then proclaimed a moratorium on further testing and announced its willingness to accede to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as a declared nuclear power. Inevitably, India`s tests will prompt Pakistan and China to accelerate their own nuclear programs, to the detriment of regional stability in South Asia.

Authentication of data for monitoring a comprehensive test ban treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Craft, R.L.; Draelos, T.J.

1996-05-01

The important issue of data integrity in the CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS) is discussed and a brief tutorial on data authentication techniques is offered. The utilization of data authentication as a solution to the data integrity problem is evaluated. Public key data authentication is recommended for multilateral monitoring regimes such as the CTBT. The ramifications and system considerations of applying data authentication at various locations in the IMS, or not at all, are reviewed in a data surety context. The paper concludes with a recommendation of authenticating data at all critical monitoring stations

Seismological analysis of the fourth North Korean nuclear test

Science.gov (United States)

Hartmann, Gernot; Gestermann, Nicolai; Ceranna, Lars

2016-04-01

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has conducted its fourth underground nuclear explosions on 06.01.2016 at 01:30 (UTC). The explosion was clearly detected and located by the seismic network of the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Additional seismic stations of international earthquake monitoring networks at regional distances, which are not part of the IMS, are used to precisely estimate the epicenter of the event in the North Hamgyong province (41.38°N / 129.05°E). It is located in the area of the North Korean Punggye-ri nuclear test site, where the verified nuclear tests from 2006, 2009, and 2013 were conducted as well. The analysis of the recorded seismic signals provides the evidence, that the event was originated by an explosive source. The amplitudes as well as the spectral characteristics of the signals were examined. Furthermore, the similarity of the signals with those from the three former nuclear tests suggests very similar source type. The seismograms at the 8,200 km distant IMS station GERES in Germany, for example, show the same P phase signal for all four explosions, differing in the amplitude only. The comparison of the measured amplitudes results in the increasing magnitude with the chronology of the explosions from 2006 (mb 4.2), 2009 (mb 4.8) until 2013 (mb 5.1), whereas the explosion in 2016 had approximately the same magnitude as that one three years before. Derived from the magnitude, a yield of 14 kt TNT equivalents was estimated for both explosions in 2013 and 2016; in 2006 and 2009 yields were 0.7 kt and 5.4 kt, respectively. However, a large inherent uncertainty for these values has to be taken into account. The estimation of the absolute yield of the explosions depends very much on the local geological situation and the degree of decoupling of the explosive from the surrounding rock. Due to the missing corresponding information, reliable magnitude-yield estimation for the

JPRS Report, Arms Control, Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

1990-01-01

... and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests of July 3, 1974, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, convinced of the necessity to ensure effective...

World hazards and nuclear weapons: right and wrong answers. To reach a treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons is possible

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Durand, Daniel; Nivet, Roland

2017-01-01

A first article notices that modernisation of nuclear weapons are resumed with the emergence of new nuclear temptations: ambitious modernisation programme in the USA, catching-up race by Russia to be able to pierce antimissile defences, Chinese modernisation, renewal of the British Trident programme, doubling of nuclear military budgets in France, developments in India and Pakistan. However, the author discusses the possible emergence of new opportunities for a nuclear disarmament: humanitarian ICAN campaign for a treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons. He highlights the need of a debate in France on these issues even though no politician dares to take a strong position in favour of nuclear disarmament. In a third article, a member of an activist association shows that, after the adoption of a U N resolution on favour of the elaboration of a treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons, reaching such a treaty is possible. The action of civil society seems necessary

An Evaluation of North Korea’s Nuclear Test by Belbasi Nuclear Tests Monitoring Center-KOERI

Science.gov (United States)

Necmioglu, O.; Meral Ozel, N.; Semin, K.

2009-12-01

Bogazici University and Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute (KOERI) is acting as the Turkish National Data Center (NDC) and responsible for the operation of the International Monitoring System (IMS) Primary Seismic Station (PS-43) under Belbasi Nuclear Tests Monitoring Center for the verification of compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) since February 2000. The NDC is responsible for operating two arrays which are part of the IMS, as well as for transmitting data from these stations to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna. The Belbasi array was established in 1951, as a four-element (Benioff 1051) seismic array as part of the United States Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS). Turkish General Staff (TGS) and U.S. Air Force Technical Application Center (AFTAC) under the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) jointly operated this short period array. The station was upgraded and several seismometers were added to array during 1951 and 1994 and the station code was changed from BSRS (Belbasi Seismic Research Station) to BRTR-PS43 later on. PS-43 is composed of two sub-arrays (Ankara and Keskin): the medium-period array with a ~40 km radius located in Ankara and the short-period array with a ~3 km radius located in Keskin. Each array has a broadband element located at the middle of the circular geometry. Short period instruments are installed at depth 30 meters from the surface while medium and broadband instruments are installed at depth 60 meters from surface. On 25 May 2009, The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) claimed that it had conducted a nuclear test. Corresponding seismic event was recorded by IMS and IDC released first automatic estimation of time (00:54:43 GMT), location (41.2896°N and 129.0480°E) and the magnitude (4.52 mb) of the event in less than two hours time (USGS: 00:54:43 GMT; 41.306°N, 129.029°E; 4.7 mb) During our preliminary analysis of the 25th May 2009 DPRK

Study of secondhand smoke levels pre and post implementation of the comprehensive smoking ban in Mumbai

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Deshpande Aditi

2010-01-01

Full Text Available Objectives: This research was undertaken with the aim of assessing the indoor air quality in popular hospitality venues, as also to evaluate the effectiveness of the nationwide comprehensive public smoking ban. The analysis was split into two halves - baseline study taken up prior to implementation of the said ban on 2 nd October 2008, and the follow-up study after it came into effect. Materials and Methods: Twenty-five venues including five restaurants, fourteen resto-bars, two hookah (smoking water-pipe cafes and four pubs were selected using a mix of random, convenience and purposeful sampling. Particulate matter (PM 2.5 measurements at these venues were made using TSI SidePak AM510 Personal Aerosol Monitor. Results: The average PM 2.5 level in venues where smoking was permitted prior to implementation of ban was found to be 669.95 ΅g/m 3 in the baseline study. Post ban, the average PM 2.5 level in same test venues reduced to 240.8 ΅g/m 3 . The hookah cafes were an exception as the average PM 2.5 levels exceeded the permissible limits before as well as post ban. Conclusion: The baseline study showed that the hospitality venues had hazardous levels of PM 2.5 particles arising from second-hand smoke prior to smoking ban. These decreased by a maximum of 64% after the law took effect. A substantial improvement in air quality at these venues post implementation of the smoking ban indicated the effectiveness of the law.

Numerical model of electromagnetic scattering off a subterranean 3-dimensional dielectric

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dease, C.G.; Didwall, E.M.

1983-08-01

As part of the effort to develop On-Site Inspection (OSI) techniques for verification of compliance to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a computer code was developed to predict the interaction of an electromagnetic (EM) wave with an underground cavity. Results from the code were used to evaluate the use of surface electromagnetic exploration techniques for detection of underground cavities or rubble-filled regions characteristic of underground nuclear explosions

UK ignores treaty obligations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roche, P.

1995-01-01

A detailed critique is offered of United Kingdom (UK) political policy with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an interim agreement valid while nuclear disarmament was supposed to occur, by a representative of Greenpeace, the anti-nuclear campaigning group. The author argues that the civil and military nuclear programmes are still firmly linked, and emphasises his opinions by quoting examples of how UK politicians have broken treaty obligations in order to pursue their own political, and in some cases financial, goals. It is argued that the treaty has failed to force nuclear countries to disarm because of its promoted civil nuclear power programmes. (U.K.)

Security and disarmament in Northeast Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sung-Joo Han

1995-01-01

The new international environment embodies several characteristics: multi-polarisation of the international order, political reconciliation and cooperation between nation-states; the rising importance of economic relations; the wider dissemination of liberal democracy and market economy; and increasing interdependence and globalization. The Northeast Asian region is also undergoing transformation. Despite repeated assurances to the contrary USA's ability and willingness to maintain a significant military in the region is often called into question. The danger of arms proliferation in the region calls for arms control and eventual elimination. Related to this Korea strongly supports efforts to stop nuclear proliferation beyond 1995 through the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and supports the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards as the primary device to ensure the effectiveness of the Treaty. At the same time Korea urges the nuclear-weapon states not only to accelerate their efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenal but to realise a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The INF Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nolan, J.E.

1991-01-01

The U.S.-Soviet agreement to eliminate intermediate-range (500-5,000 kilometers) nuclear weapons, known as the INF Treaty, was signed on December 8, 1987, and ratified by the Senate on May 27, 1988. Although the actual negotiation of the agreement has a long and fractious history, its ratification was swift and won the support of all but five members of the U.S. Senate. As the first agreement between the two sides to eliminate --- rather than simply reduce or constrain --- an entire class of weapons, the INF Treaty is popularly believed to be a major arms control success story. It was the first U.S.-Soviet arms control treaty to be ratified by the Senate since 1972, when the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was approved. This paper discusses the INF Treaty which owes its genesis to a decision taken by the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) alliance in the last months of the Carter administration to deploy new nuclear weapons in Europe

Detection of nuclear testing from surface concentration measurements: Analysis of radioxenon from the February 2013 underground test in North Korea

Science.gov (United States)

Kurzeja, R. J.; Buckley, R. L.; Werth, D. W.; Chiswell, S. R.

2018-03-01

A method is outlined and tested to detect low level nuclear or chemical sources from time series of concentration measurements. The method uses a mesoscale atmospheric model to simulate the concentration signature from a known or suspected source at a receptor which is then regressed successively against segments of the measurement series to create time series of metrics that measure the goodness of fit between the signatures and the measurement segments. The method was applied to radioxenon data from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) collection site in Ussuriysk, Russia (RN58) after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) underground nuclear test on February 12, 2013 near Punggye. The metrics were found to be a good screening tool to locate data segments with a strong likelihood of origin from Punggye, especially when multiplied together to a determine the joint probability. Metrics from RN58 were also used to find the probability that activity measured in February and April of 2013 originated from the Feb 12 test. A detailed analysis of an RN58 data segment from April 3/4, 2013 was also carried out for a grid of source locations around Punggye and identified Punggye as the most likely point of origin. Thus, the results support the strong possibility that radioxenon was emitted from the test site at various times in April and was detected intermittently at RN58, depending on the wind direction. The method does not locate unsuspected sources, but instead, evaluates the probability of a source at a specified location. However, it can be extended to include a set of suspected sources. Extension of the method to higher resolution data sets, arbitrary sampling, and time-varying sources is discussed along with a path to evaluate uncertainty in the calculated probabilities.

Understanding the seismic wave propagation inside and around an underground cavity from a 3D numerical survey

Science.gov (United States)

Esterhazy, Sofi; Schneider, Felix; Perugia, Ilaria; Bokelmann, Götz

2017-04-01

Motivated by the need to detect an underground cavity within the procedure of an On-Site-Inspection (OSI) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which might be caused by a nuclear explosion/weapon testing, we aim to provide a basic numerical study of the wave propagation around and inside such an underground cavity. One method to investigate the geophysical properties of an underground cavity allowed by the Comprehensive Nuclear-test Ban Treaty is referred to as "resonance seismometry" - a resonance method that uses passive or active seismic techniques, relying on seismic cavity vibrations. This method is in fact not yet entirely determined by the Treaty and so far, there are only very few experimental examples that have been suitably documented to build a proper scientific groundwork. This motivates to investigate this problem on a purely numerical level and to simulate these events based on recent advances in numerical modeling of wave propagation problems. Our numerical study includes the full elastic wave field in three dimensions. We consider the effects from an incoming plane wave as well as point source located in the surrounding of the cavity at the surface. While the former can be considered as passive source like a tele-seismic earthquake, the latter represents a man-made explosion or a viborseis as used for/in active seismic techniques. Further we want to demonstrate the specific characteristics of the scattered wave field from a P-waves and S-wave separately. For our simulations in 3D we use the discontinuous Galerkin Spectral Element Code SPEED developed by MOX (The Laboratory for Modeling and Scientific Computing, Department of Mathematics) and DICA (Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering) at the Politecnico di Milano. The computations are carried out on the Vienna Scientific Cluster (VSC). The accurate numerical modeling can facilitate the development of proper analysis techniques to detect the remnants of an

Secretary-General's report 1995

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Calogero, F.

1997-01-01

The annual reports covers the activities, initiatives and related statements and publications of Pugwash Council. During the Cold War period, nuclear weapons were considered as great equalizer that enabled western capitals to deal with numerically larger eastern Bloc forces. Today, after dramatic change of circumstances, with the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact this role has disappeared. By 1995, over 170 countries have confirmed their commitment never to acquire nuclear weapons (unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty) and some countries which had acquired a nuclear weapon arsenal decided to get altogether rid of them (South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine). Nuclear weapons are now excluded from a fair portion of the earth and its environment, through treaties which are largely or fully in force: Latin America, South Pacific, Antarctica... The creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones is arising (Africa). All five nuclear weapon states are committed to achieve a Comprehensive test ban treaty by 1996, although the intention to eliminate nuclear weapons completely is not yet wholeheartedly supported by the leaders of the nuclear-weapon countries

New Horizons and New Strategies in Arms Control

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brown, J. editor

1998-12-04

In the last ten years, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, remarkable progress in arms control and disarmament has occurred. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Chemical Weapons Treaty (CWC) are indicative of the great strides made in the non- proliferation arena. Simultaneously, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe (CFE), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), all associated with US-Soviet Union (now Russia) relations have assisted in redefining European relations and the security landscape. Finally, it now appears that progress is in the offing in developing enhanced compliance measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In sum, all of these achievements have set the stage for the next round of arms control activities, which may lead to a much broader, and perhaps more diffused multilateral agenda. In this new and somewhat unpredictable international setting, arms control and disarmament issues will require solutions that are both more creative and innovative than heretofore.

Numerical study of wave propagation around an underground cavity: acoustic case

Science.gov (United States)

Esterhazy, Sofi; Perugia, Ilaria; Schöberl, Joachim; Bokelmann, Götz

2015-04-01

Motivated by the need to detect an underground cavity within the procedure of an On-Site-Inspection (OSI) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which might be caused by a nuclear explosion/weapon testing, we aim to provide a basic numerical study of the wave propagation around and inside such an underground cavity. The aim of the CTBTO is to ban all nuclear explosions of any size anywhere, by anyone. Therefore, it is essential to build a powerful strategy to efficiently investigate and detect critical signatures such as gas filled cavities, rubble zones and fracture networks below the surface. One method to investigate the geophysical properties of an underground cavity allowed by the Comprehensive Nuclear-test Ban Treaty is referred to as 'resonance seismometry' - a resonance method that uses passive or active seismic techniques, relying on seismic cavity vibrations. This method is in fact not yet entirely determined by the Treaty and there are also only few experimental examples that have been suitably documented to build a proper scientific groundwork. This motivates to investigate this problem on a purely numerical level and to simulate these events based on recent advances in the mathematical understanding of the underlying physical phenomena. Here, we focus our numerical study on the propagation of P-waves in two dimensions. An extension to three dimensions as well as an inclusion of the full elastic wave field is planned in the following. For the numerical simulations of wave propagation we use a high order finite element discretization which has the significant advantage that it can be extended easily from simple toy designs to complex and irregularly shaped geometries without excessive effort. Our computations are done with the parallel Finite Element Library NGSOLVE ontop of the automatic 2D/3D tetrahedral mesh generator NETGEN (http://sourceforge.net/projects/ngsolve/). Using the basic mathematical understanding of the

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Review conference of the States Parties Geneva 1985

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-01-01

The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1985 with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. The Treaty, commonly referred to as the non-proliferation Treaty, is the fundamental instrument to avert the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons and is, perhaps, the most important multilateral arms regulation agreement of our time. It was negotiated in the 1960s in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and in the United Nations General Assembly. The Treaty was opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington on July 1, 1968. On that date, it was signed by the three Depositary Governments - the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States - and by 58 other States. As of December 31, 1983 the number of States parties to the Treaty had risen to 119

2017 Guralp Affinity Digitizer Evaluation.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Merchant, Bion J.

2018-03-01

Sandia National Laboratories has tested and evaluated two Guralp Affinity digitizers. The Affinity digitizers are intended to record sensor output for seismic and infrasound monitoring applications. The purpose of this digitizer evaluation is to measure the performance characteristics in such areas as power consumption, input impedance, sensitivity, full scale, self- noise, dynamic range, system noise, response, passband, and timing. The Affinity digitizers are being evaluated for potential use in the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

CATS, continuous automated testing of seismological, hydroacoustic, and infrasound (SHI) processing software.

Science.gov (United States)

Brouwer, Albert; Brown, David; Tomuta, Elena

2017-04-01

To detect nuclear explosions, waveform data from over 240 SHI stations world-wide flows into the International Data Centre (IDC) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), located in Vienna, Austria. A complex pipeline of software applications processes this data in numerous ways to form event hypotheses. The software codebase comprises over 2 million lines of code, reflects decades of development, and is subject to frequent enhancement and revision. Since processing must run continuously and reliably, software changes are subjected to thorough testing before being put into production. To overcome the limitations and cost of manual testing, the Continuous Automated Testing System (CATS) has been created. CATS provides an isolated replica of the IDC processing environment, and is able to build and test different versions of the pipeline software directly from code repositories that are placed under strict configuration control. Test jobs are scheduled automatically when code repository commits are made. Regressions are reported. We present the CATS design choices and test methods. Particular attention is paid to how the system accommodates the individual testing of strongly interacting software components that lack test instrumentation.

National Data Center Preparedness Exercise 2015 (NPE 2015): MY-NDC Preliminary Analysis Result

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Faisal Izwan Abdul Rashid; Muhammed Zulfakar Zolkaffly

2016-01-01

Malaysia has established the CTBT National Data Centre (MY-NDC) in December 2005. MY-NDC is tasked to perform Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) data management as well as provide information for Treaty related events to Nuclear Malaysia as CTBT National Authority. In 2015, MY-NDC has participated in the National Data Centre Preparedness Exercise 2015 (NPE 2015). This paper aims at presenting MY-NDC preliminary analysis result of NPE 2015. In NPE 2015, MY-NDC has performed five different analyses, namely, radionuclide, atmospheric transport modelling (ATM), data fusion, seismic analysis and site forensics. The preliminary findings show the hypothetical scenario in NPE 2015 most probably is an uncontained event resulted high release of radionuclide to the air. (author)

The Brazilian position during the final transactions the treaty for the proscriptions of nuclear weapons in Latin America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fonseca Costa, C.E.S.C. da.

1979-02-01

The Brazilian position during the final transactions on the treaty for the proscription of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is presented. An analysis of the main clauses of this treaty is given, well as a comparative study between the principle points of Tlatelolco Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty [pt

Nuclear weapon-free zone, non-proliferation treaty and South Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jayaramu, P.S.

1980-01-01

Emergence of and the motivations behind the concept of nuclear weapon free zone, the conceptual linkage between the nuclear weapon free zone and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the problems involved in the implementation of nuclear weapon free zone proposals put forward from time to time are discussed. Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, motivations behind the proposal, and India's response to it are examined. It is pointed out that both the NPT and nuclear weapon free zone indirectly grant a certain amount of legitimacy to the use of nuclear weapons. (M.G.B.)

Preparation of radioxenon and radioargon mixed sources for IFE14

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biegalski, S.R.; Tipping, T.N.; Klingberg, F.J.

2016-01-01

The Integrated Field Exercise (IFE14) was conducted from November 3, 2014 through December 9, 2014 in Jordan. This was an exercise to test the capabilities for On-Site Inspection (OSI) as part of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. One important OSI technology is the measurement of noble gasses that are produced within a nuclear explosion. To support IFE14, radioxenon samples and radioargon samples were created at The University of Texas at Austin TRIGA reactor facility. The goal was to produce a mixed sample containing 131m Xe, 133 Xe, and 37 Ar in activity ratios consistent with the nuclear explosion scenario defined for the exercise. (author)

Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle; Nukleare Abruestung. Optionen fuer den kommenden Ueberpruefungszyklus des NVV

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mueller, Harald

2011-07-01

The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

Statement to Second Conference of States Parties to African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, 12 November 2012, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Amano, Y.

2012-01-01

It is a great pleasure for me to address this Second Conference of States Parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba. I compliment the countries of Africa for their tenacity in pursuing the goal of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone for decades, until the Treaty finally entered into force in 2009. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are a highly effective means of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. The five nuclear-weapon-free zones in existence today cover a total of 113 countries. Each has its own special characteristics, but they also have many important elements in common. All nuclear-weapon-free zones prohibit the development, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in their respective regions. They all cover large inhabited areas. They provide for IAEA verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material. Nuclear-weapon-free zones have brought real security benefits, both regionally and to the whole world. The Treaty of Pelindaba incorporates a number of special features, including some measures which go beyond undertakings assumed by States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) . For example, it makes provision for the dismantling and destruction of nuclear explosive devices manufactured by a Party to the Treaty before the Treaty entered into force. It prohibits attacks on nuclear installations in the nuclear-weapon-free zone. It bars the dumping of radioactive waste within the zone. In addition, the Treaty of Pelindaba contains a commitment to promote the use of nuclear science and technology for economic and social development. Parties are encouraged to make use of the assistance of the IAEA. They also pledge to maintain the highest standards of security and physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment. In the Preamble to the Treaty, the Parties recognise that the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in the Middle East, would enhance their security. Last November, I hosted an

The EU Seal Products Ban – Why Ineffective Animal Welfare Protection Cannot Justify Trade Restrictions under European and International Trade Law

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Martin Hennig

2015-03-01

Full Text Available In this article, the author questions the legitimacy of the general ban on trade in seal products adopted by the European Union. It is submitted that the EU Seal Regime, which permits the marketing of Greenlandic seal products derived from Inuit hunts, but excludes Canadian and Norwegian seal products from the European market, does not ensure a satisfactory degree of animal welfare protection in order to justify the comprehensive trade restriction in place. It is argued that the current ineffective EU ban on seal products, which according to the WTO Appellate Body cannot be reconciled with the objective of protecting animal welfare, has no legal basis in EU Treaties and should be annulled.

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2005-01-01

The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

Proceedings of the 2011 Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wetovsky, Marvin A.; Patterson, Eileen F.; Sandoval, Marisa N.

2011-01-01

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the Monitoring Research Review 2011: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 13-15 September, 2011 in Tucson, Arizona. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), National Science Foundation (NSF), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States' capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

Proceedings of the 2011 Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wetovsky, Marvin A. [Editor; Patterson, Eileen F. [Editor; Sandoval, Marisa N. [Editor

2011-09-13

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the Monitoring Research Review 2011: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 13-15 September, 2011 in Tucson, Arizona. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), National Science Foundation (NSF), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States' capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

Proceedings of the 30th Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wetovsky, Marv A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Aguilar-chang, Julio [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Arrowsmith, Marie [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Arrowsmith, Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Baker, Diane [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Begnaud, Michael [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Harste, Hans [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Maceira, Monica [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Patton, Howard [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Phillips, Scott [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Randall, George [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Revelle, Douglas [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rowe, Charlotte [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stead, Richard [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Steck, Lee [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Whitaker, Rod [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Yang, Xiaoning [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2008-09-23

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 30th Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 23-25 September, 2008 in Portsmouth, Virginia. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States’ capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

Proceedings of the 2010 Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wetovsky, Marvin A [Editor; Patterson, Eileen F [Editor

2010-09-21

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the Monitoring Research Review 2010: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 21-23 September, 2010 in Orlando, Florida,. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, National Science Foundation (NSF), Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

Proceedings of the 23rd Seismic Research Symposium: Worldwide Monitoring of Nuclear Explosions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Warren, N. Jill; Chavez, Francesca C.

2001-01-01

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 23rd Seismic Research Review: Worldwide Monitoring of Nuclear Explosions, held 2-5 October, 2001 in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

Proceedings of the 2010 Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wetovsky, Marvin A.; Patterson, Eileen F.

2010-01-01

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the Monitoring Research Review 2010: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 21-23 September, 2010 in Orlando, Florida,. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, National Science Foundation (NSF), Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

Preparation for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in 1995

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chrzanowski, P.L.

1993-01-01

About 30 specialists in non-proliferation participated in a workshop to explore ideas for US Government preparatory steps leading to the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. To that end, workshop sessions were devoted to reviewing the lessons learned from previous Review Conferences, discussing the threats to the non-proliferation regime together with ways of preserving and strengthening it, and examining the management of international nuclear commerce. A fundamental premise shared by workshop participants was that extension of the NPT is immensely important to international security. The importance of stemming proliferation and, more specifically, extending the Treaty, is growing as a result of the significant changes in the world. If the conferees of the Extension Conference decide on no extension or extension for a short limited duration, some technically advanced states that have foregone development of nuclear weapons may begin to rethink their options. Also, other arms control measures, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, could start to unravel. The US must provide strong international leadership to ensure that the Extension Conference is a success, resulting in Treaty extension, perhaps through successive terms, into the indefinite future. Workshop participants were struck by the urgent need for the US to take organizational steps so that it is highly effective in its advance preparations for the Extension Conference. Moreover, the Extension Conference provides both a challenge and an opportunity to mold a cohesive set of US policy actions to define the future role of nuclear weapons and combat their proliferation

Memory Effects Study of Measuring Radioactive Xenon Isotopes With β-γ Coincidence Method

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jia Huaimao; Wang Shilian; Wang Jun; Li Qi; Zhao Yungang; Fan Yuanqing; Zhang Xinjun

2010-01-01

The β-γ coincidence technique is a kind of the key important method to detect radioactive xenon isotopes for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). This paper describes noble gases memory effects of β-γ coincidence detector. Xenon memory effects were measured and its influence on detector's minimum detectable activity (MDA) was evaluated. The methods of reducing xenon memory effects were studied. In conclusion, aluminium coated plastic scintillator and YAP scintillator can remarkably decrease xenon memory effects. (authors)

Preliminary report on LLNL mine seismicity deployment at the Twentymile Coal Mine

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walter, W.R.; Hunter, S.L.; Glenn, L.A.

1996-01-01

This report summarizes the preliminary results of a just completed experiment at the Twentymile Coal Mine, operated by the Cyprus Amax Coal Company near Oak Creek, CO. The purpose of the experiment was to obtain local and regional seismic data from roof caves associated with long-wall mining activities and to use this data to help determine the effectiveness with which these events can be discriminated from underground nuclear explosions under a future Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

International cooperation workshop on CTBTO international cooperation and national implementation for states from East and Southern Africa

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-09-01

In pursuant to its 2002 programme of work, the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization organized a workshop on CTBTO international cooperation and national implementation for states from East and Southern Africa in Nairobi, Kenya, from 18 to 20 June 2002. The summary report on the workshop has been provided, covering ways and means of promoting regional cooperation. The list of participants and the programme outline are annexed thereto

Evidence for a meteoritic origin of the September 15, 2007, Carancas crater

OpenAIRE

Le Pichon, A.; Antier, K.; Cansi, Y.; Hernandez, B.; Minaya, E.; Burgoa, B.; Drob, D.; Evers, L. G.; Vaubaillon, J.

2008-01-01

On September 15th, 2007, around 11:45 local time in Peru, near the Bolivian border, the atmospheric entry of a meteoroid produced bright lights in the sky and intense detonations. Soon after, a crater was discovered south of Lake Titicaca. These events have been detected by the Bolivian seismic network and two infrasound arrays operating for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, situated at about 80 and 1620 km from the crater. The localization and origin time ...

International cooperation workshop on CTBTO international cooperation and national implementation for states from East and Southern Africa

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-09-01

In pursuant to its 2002 programme of work, the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization organized a workshop on CTBTO international cooperation and national implementation for states from East and Southern Africa in Nairobi, Kenya, from 18 to 20 June 2002. The summary report on the workshop has been provided, covering ways and means of promoting regional cooperation. The list of participants and the programme outline are annexed thereto.

Web Application Design Using Server-Side JavaScript

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hampton, J.; Simons, R.

1999-02-01

This document describes the application design philosophy for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Research & Development Web Site. This design incorporates object-oriented techniques to produce a flexible and maintainable system of applications that support the web site. These techniques will be discussed at length along with the issues they address. The overall structure of the applications and their relationships with one another will also be described. The current problems and future design changes will be discussed as well.

US Air Force 1989 Research Initiation Program. Volume 2.

Science.gov (United States)

1992-06-25

Since acpwc is constant with height, (26) can be rewritten as + a ! t - Ecrit ) - - • (27) In the above, following Hack etai. (1984), we are using a to...zt Mp(zm) - Jacpa(q - Ecrit )dz, Zm where Mp(zm) denotes the vertical large-scale flux of precipitation falling through the level z - zm; and the...of the basic problems associated with monitoring a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty is that of discriminating between small explosions and

Sherlock Holmes for radionuclides

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schmitzer, C.

2002-01-01

At the end of 2001 ARC Seibersdorf research has taken the management of the first worldwide certified laboratory to control the realization of the international Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Altogether there will be 16 CTBT certified laboratories worldwide; therefore a global network of radionuclides measurements stations and test laboratories as well as seismic, radiation and hydroacustic measurements stations is necessary . In the future air samples will be taken from these stations and analyzed in one of these certified laboratories, when appears the suspicion that an atomic test was carried out. (nevyjel)

Nuclear disarmament and the verification role of the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duarte, Carlos S.

2008-01-01

At the height of the cold war, nuclear arsenals reached a peak of some 70000 weapons. Although these numbers have since come down significantly, some 27000 weapons remain. The fact that decades go by and nuclear disarmament is not realised contributes to a deep sense of concern and disappointment. So do other factors, such as the persistence of nuclear doctrines that admit first use; the lack of binding negative assurances; the ongoing research on nuclear explosives including subcritical tests, and the maintaining readiness to resume full-scale testing. The sense of insufficient or outright lack of progress in nuclear disarmament is even more disturbing if measured against existing legal obligations. First and foremost among those is of course Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to the ICJ's Advisory Opinion, the obligation contained in Article VI is an obligation to achieve results in nuclear disarmament. Bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force is still missing, as well as negotiating a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Despite significant unilateral reductions in nuclear arsenals, these have not been done within an international process that includes the commitment to total elimination. The notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for their security is simply unworkable. For achieving nuclear disarmament verification objectives, the IAEA clearly would have a major role to play. Under Article III.A.5 of its Statute, the Agency is allowed to apply, at the request of a State, safeguards to any of that State's nuclear activities. The Agency's capabilities and experience make it the international institution best suited to eventually perform nuclear disarmament verification tasks. In order to perform nuclear disarmament verification activities, the Agency would of course need to

Investigation of CTBT OSI Radionuclide Techniques at the DILUTED WATERS Nuclear Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Baciak, James E.; Milbrath, Brian D.; Detwiler, Rebecca S.; Kirkham, Randy R.; Keillor, Martin E.; Lepel, Elwood A.; Seifert, Allen; Emer, Dudley; Floyd, Michael

2012-11-01

Under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a verification regime that includes the ability to conduct an On-Site Inspection (OSI) will be established. The Treaty allows for an OSI to include many techniques, including the radionuclide techniques of gamma radiation surveying and spectrometry and environmental sampling and analysis. Such radioactivity detection techniques can provide the “smoking gun” evidence that a nuclear test has occurred through the detection and quantification of indicative recent fission products. An OSI faces restrictions in time and manpower, as dictated by the Treaty; not to mention possible logistics difficulties due to the location and climate of the suspected explosion site. It is thus necessary to have a good understanding of the possible source term an OSI will encounter and the proper techniques that will be necessary for an effective OSI regime. One of the challenges during an OSI is to locate radioactive debris that has escaped an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) and settled on the surface near and downwind of ground zero. To support the understanding and selection of sampling and survey techniques for use in an OSI, we are currently designing an experiment, the Particulate Release Experiment (PRex), to simulate a small-scale vent from an underground nuclear explosion. PRex will occur at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The project is conducted under the National Center for Nuclear Security (NCNS) funded by the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). Prior to the release experiment, scheduled for Spring of 2013, the project scheduled a number of activities at the NNSS to prepare for the release experiment as well as to utilize the nuclear testing past of the NNSS for the development of OSI techniques for CTBT. One such activity—the focus of this report—was a survey and sampling campaign at the site of an old UNE that vented: DILUTED WATERS. Activities at DILUTED WATERS included vehicle-based survey

The text of the Cairo declaration. Adopted on the occasion of the signing of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) Cairo, 11 April 1996

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

As requested by the Resident Representative of Egypt to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the document reproduces the text of the 'Cairo Declaration' which was adopted by the African States signatories of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) on the occasion of the signature of the Treaty on 11 April 1996 in Cairo

Proceedings of the 29th Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wetovsky, Marvin A. [Editor; Benson, Jody [Editor; Patterson, Eileen F. [Editor

2007-09-25

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 29th Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 25-27 September, 2007 in Denver, Colorado. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

Proceedings of the 29th Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wetovsky, Marvin A.; Benson, Jody; Patterson, Eileen F.

2007-01-01

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 29th Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 25-27 September, 2007 in Denver, Colorado. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

Proceedings of the 28th Seismic Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wetovsky, Marvin A. [Editor; Benson, Jody [Editor; Patterson, Eileen F. [Editor

2006-09-19

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 28th Seismic Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 19-21 September, 2006 in Orlando, Florida. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

Proceedings of the 28th Seismic Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wetovsky, Marvin A.; Benson, Jody; Patterson, Eileen F.

2006-01-01

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 28th Seismic Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 19-21 September, 2006 in Orlando, Florida. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

The legal points at issue concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty and the verification agreement of EURATOM with the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zieger, G.

1975-01-01

An excellent and comprehensive but very juridicial contribution on: Development and content of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the problems which this Treaty poses for EURATOM (a common market, common supply, joint enterprises, Non-proliferation Treaty and France), the compatibility of the Non-proliferation Treaty with the EURATOM Treaty, verification agreement EURATOM - IAEA (the IAEA as the supervisory authority, the control system of the IAEA, guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements, national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material IAEA supervision as a secondary control, principles of IAEA supervision, secrecy, conflict management), conclusion of the verification agreement, deviations from the guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements legal reflexions (verification agreement and Non-proliferation Treaty, reservations concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty, questions of competence between EURATOM and member states without nuclear weapons, problems of equal treatment). (HP/LN) [de

Nuclear electric power and the proliferation of nuclear weapon states

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walske, C.

1977-01-01

Control and elimination of the strategic nuclear weapons held by the nuclear weapon states remains the central problem in the arms control and disarmament field. Whether the proliferation of nations with nuclear weapons can be stopped is dubious. A sovereign nation will launch a nuclear weapons program if it has the motivation and resource. Motivation depends on military and political considerations. The necessary resources are economic and technological. Conditions in some sovereign states explain this issue. A survey of commercial nuclear power programs outside the USA lists 45 countries using or planning to use nuclear reactors for power generation. There are currently 112 reactors now operating outside the United States, 117 more under construction, 60 on order, and 180 planned. The U. S. as of December 1976 has 64 operating reactors, 72 under construction, 84 on order, and 8 planned. Nuclear trade and export policies are discussed. In this article, Mr. Walske says that American industry is convinced that the need for nuclear energy abroad is more urgent than in the United States; that in the long run, the breeder reactor must be developed to enable the supply of nuclear fuel to last for centuries; and that the experience of American industry abroad has convinced it that emphasis on restrictive, denial type policies will almost certainly fail--a collapse of what has been gained through the test ban treaty and the nonproliferation treaty

Nuclear non-proliferation: Revisiting the basics. Carnegie international non-proliferation conference 2002. Washington, D.C., 14 November 2002

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2002-01-01

The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with 188 States party, represents the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament effort - and despite recent challenges, it has never been more relevant than it is today. But the international community has to move forward, it is essential that a number of the basic assumptions should be revisited, and a number of new approaches reconsidered. A key assumption at the core of the NPT was that the asymmetry between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would gradually disappear. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has overall been successful - but with some shortcomings. Efforts to end nuclear weapons development achieved an important milestone with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, but the pace of progress has been sluggish among the 44 countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force - and the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate in 1999 was a distinct setback. Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) continues to languish in Geneva, more than seven years after agreement was reached on a mandate. The 2000 NPT Review Conference, building on the package of decisions and resolutions that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, resulted in a number of encouraging commitments, not least the 'unequivocal undertaking' by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. But a scant two years later, we have moved sharply away from those commitments, with a number of the '13 steps' toward nuclear disarmament - such as 'irreversibility,' 'START II, START III and the ABM Treaty,' further 'unilateral' reductions in nuclear arsenals, 'increased transparency,' 'further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,' and 'regular reports' on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT - left without concrete follow-up actions and in

The text of the Agreement of 22 February 1978 between Paraguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-08-01

The full text of the agreement between Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America is presented

GSETT-3: testing the experimental international seismic monitoring system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ringdal, Frode

1995-01-01

Global seismic monitoring system has been developed by the Conference on Disarmaments (CDs) ad hoc group of scientific experts to consider international cooperative measures to detect and identify seismic events (the GSE), based in Geneva. In the course of its work, the GSE has conducted two large-scale global technical tests, Global Seismic Events Technical Test-1 (GSETT-1) in 1984 and GSETT-2 in 1991. The GSE has now embarked upon its third and most ambitious technical test, GSETT-3, which will encompass the development, testing and evaluation of a working prototype of the eventual Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) seismic monitoring system

Treaty implementation applied to conventions on nuclear safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Montjoie, Michel

2015-01-01

Given that safety is the number one priority for the nuclear industry, it would seem normal that procedures exist to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the conventions on nuclear safety, as already exist for numerous international treaties. Unfortunately, these procedures are either weak or even nonexistent. Therefore, consideration must be given to whether this weakness represents a genuine deficiency in ensuring the main objective of these conventions, which is to achieve a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. But, before one can even address that issue, a prior question must be answered: does the specific nature of the international legal framework on nuclear safety automatically result in a lack of non-compliance procedures in international conventions on the subject? If so, the lack of procedures is justified, despite the drawbacks. The specific nature of the international law on nuclear safety, which in 1994 shaped the content of the CNS by notably not 'allowing' (even today) the incorporation of precise international rules have been taken into account. The next step is to examine whether the absence of non-compliance procedures (which could have been integrated into the text) is a hindrance in ensuring the objectives of the conventions on nuclear safety, and to examine the procedures that could have been used, based on existing provisions in other areas of international law (environmental law, financial law, disarmament law, human rights, etc.). International environmental law will be the main source of this study, as it has certain similarities with the international law on nuclear safety due to the sometimes vague nature of its obligations and irrespective of the fact that one of the purposes of nuclear safety is in particular to protect the environment from radiological hazards. Indeed, the provisions of the law on nuclear safety are mainly technical and designed to guarantee the normal operation of nuclear facilities

Proceedings of the 2009 Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wetovsky, Marv A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Aguilar - Chang, Julio [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Anderson, Dale [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Arrowsmith, Marie [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Arrowsmith, Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Baker, Diane [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Begnaud, Michael [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Harste, Hans [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Maceira, Monica [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Patton, Howard [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Phillips, Scott [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Randall, George [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rowe, Charlotte [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stead, Richard [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Steck, Lee [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Whitaker, Rod [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Yang, Xiaoning ( David ) [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-09-21

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the Monitoring Research Review 2009: Ground -Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 21-23 September, 2009 in Tucson, Arizona,. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States’ capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-12-13

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

Evaluation of Two Guralp Preamplifiers for GS13 Seismometer Application.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Merchant, Bion J. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2017-09-01

Sandia National Laboratories has tested and evaluated a new preamplifier, the Guralp Preamplifier for GS13, manufactured by Guralp. These preamplifiers are used to interface between Guralp digitizers and Geotech GS13 Seismometers. The purpose of the preamplifier evaluation was to measure the performance characteristics in such areas as power consumption, input impedance, sensitivity, full scale, self-noise, dynamic range, system noise, response, passband, and timing. The Guralp GS13 Preamplifiers are being evaluated for potential use in the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

EUROATOM-treaty and intergovernmental conference

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thomas, S.

2007-01-01

On June 26, 2007 the European Council decided under the chairmanship of the Head of State of the German Government, Angela Merkel, to work out a ''Reform Treaty'' for the European Union. The current version of the ''Reform Treaty'' and the Intergovernmental Conference are a successful result of the German and French policy for Europe. The process will be continued under the Portuguese chairmanship of the European Union. The ''Reform Treaty'' includes a special separate energy chapter. The chapter includes targets for an EU-energy policy as well as targets for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Furthermore special technical topics of a revision of the EURATOM-Treaty are mentioned. General revisions of the EURATOM-Treaty or a special Intergovernmental Conference on the EURATOM-Treaty are not expected. Maybe, the European Parliament will get more competence in some parts of decision making processes. Due to the differing views on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the EU member states a revision of the EUROATOM-Treaty is more unlikely expected. (orig.)

Preliminary study of 7Be, 137Cs and 131I activity concentration distribution rule in Beijing aerosol

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fan Yuanqing; Wang Shilian; Zhang Xinjun; Li Qi; Jia Huaimao; Zhao Yungang; Chen Zhanying; Chang Yinzhong; Liu Shujiang; Li Huijuan

2013-01-01

The process of aerosol sampling and measuring of Beijing Radionuclide Station and Beijing Radionuclide Laboratory of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) International Monitoring System (IMS) was described. Long time aerosol monitoring data of the station and the laboratory were analyzed through statistic method and the characteristic and rule of the concentration distribution of nuclides 7 Be, 137 Cs and 131 I were obtained. The foundation was formed for further studying the rule of the radionuclide distribution in atmosphere. (authors)

From Regional Hazard Assessment to Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Support - InSAR Ground Motion Services

Science.gov (United States)

Lege, T.; Kalia, A.; Gruenberg, I.; Frei, M.

2016-12-01

There are numerous scientific applications of InSAR methods in tectonics, earthquake analysis and other geologic and geophysical fields. Ground motion on local and regional scale measured and monitored via the application of the InSAR techniques provide scientists and engineers with plenty of new insights and further understanding of subsurface processes. However, the operational use of InSAR is not yet very widespread. To foster the operational utilization of the Copernicus Sentinel Satellites in the day-to-day business of federal, state and municipal work and planning BGR (Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources) initiated workshops with potential user groups. Through extensive reconcilement of interests and demands with scientific, technical, economic and governmental stakeholders (e.g. Ministries, Mining Authorities, Geological Surveys, Geodetic Surveys and Environmental Agencies on federal and state level, SMEs, German Aerospace Center) BGR developed the concept of the InSAR based German National Ground Motion Service. One important backbone for the nationwide ground motion service is the so-called Persistent Scatterer Interferometry Wide Area Product (WAP) approach developed with grants of European research funds. The presentation shows the implementation of the ground motion service and examples for product developments for operational supervision of mining, water resources management and spatial planning. Furthermore the contributions of Copernicus Sentinel 1 radar data in the context of CTBT are discussed. The DInSAR processing of Sentinel 1 IW (Interferometric Wide Swath) SAR acquisitions from January 1st and 13th Jan. 2016 allow for the first time a near real time ground motion measurement of the North Korean nuclear test site. The measured ground displacements show a strong spatio-temporal correlation to the calculated epicenter measured by teleseismic stations. We are convinced this way another space technique will soon contribute even

核軍縮交渉義務事件と核軍縮へのアプローチ： マーシャル諸島共和国対英国事件を手掛かりに

OpenAIRE

山田, 寿則

2016-01-01

　2015 NPT Review Conference ended without any concrete outcomes. Now several approaches to nuclear disarmament are contested each other: step-by-step, comprehensive, building-block, humanitarian consequences, humanitarian pledges, NWC, or BAN treaty approach. Common focus has been placed on “effective measures” relating to nuclear disarmament in Article VI of NPT during its last Review cycle. Obligations concerning negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmame...

The CTBT : New Zealand's involvement in the international monitoring system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Matthews, M.

1998-01-01

The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), to which most countries are now signatories, is seen as a major step towards the curtailment of nuclear weapons production and eventual disarmament. The Treaty can only be effectively implemented, however, if there is a monitoring system in place to verify that weapons testing is not taking place and, if it does occur, to identify the violator. The diesign of the International Monitoring System (IMS) has therefore been a significant part of the Treaty negotiations. This article focuses o New Zealand's involvement in the IMS, in atmospheric radioactivity and infrasound monitoring. Because of its history of involvement in environmental monitoring, National Radiation Laboratory (NRL) has been providing expert input into Treaty negotiations concerning the radionucled component of the IMS. The Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences (IGNS) monitors seismic activity at a number of locations in New Zealand and the South Pacific, and has also provided expert input to the design of the global seismic component of the IMS. The New Zealand government has offered the monitoring facilities of NRL and IGNS for inclusion in the global IMS. (author)

Quality management for noble gas trace analysis; Qualitaetssicherung bei der Edelgasspurenanalyse

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Schmid, S.; Konrad, M.; Kumberg, T.; Schlosser, C. [Bundesamt fuer Strahlenschutz (BfS), Freiburg (Germany); Gohla, H. [Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Vienna International Centre, Vienna (Austria). Preparatory Commission

2014-01-20

The Federal Office for Radiation Protection operates measurement systems to determine the activity concentrations of Krypton-85 and Xenon-133 in air samples since the early 70s. Certified standards with stable noble gas admixtures are still missing for quality assurance (certified activity concentrations). The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is currently establishing a global noble gas monitoring network for the verification of compliance with the Treaty. In cooperation with CTBTO the BfS currently develops concepts of quality assurance for noble gas measurements. Opportunities for quality assurance without using certified standards are discussed by comparisons between individual laboratories and internal audits. The results from the first CTBTO laboratory intercomparison with synthetic radioxenon samples look very promising.

Twenty years of the Non-proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldblat, Jozef.

1990-01-01

The report assesses the achievements of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and discusses ways in which the non-proliferation regime could be strenghtened. It recommends a series of measures to be taken by the parties of the Treaty, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, with a view to reinforcing the Treaty and achieving its universality. 198 refs

Referendum 1978 - Nuclear power plant ban Act 1978 - legal consequences

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Staudinger, F.

1981-10-01

This paper discusses the legal consequences of the 1978 Act banning nuclear power production. It provides a summary outline of the relevant rules of the Austrian Constitution and reviews the legal basis for the organisation of the national electricity system. (NEA) [fr

The Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

In a note verbale of 10 June 1994, the Agency was informed that, on 30 May 1994, the instruments necessary to bring the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American and the Caribbean into force for the Federative Republic of Brazil had been deposited. As requested by the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the International Organizations in Vienna, the text of the note is attached hereto for the information of Member States

Get SMART: the case for a strategic materials reduction treaty, and its implementation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Numark, N.J.

1996-01-01

Inventories of weapons plutonium removed from nuclear warheads should be reduced as quickly as possible to prevent large-scale rearmament by the United States or Russia and to minimize the risk of theft or sabotage by a sub-national group. The U.S. and Russia should agree to a Strategic Materials Reduction Treaty (SMART) establishing an aggressive timetable for manual reduction of national security needs and schedule the final disposition of this material. An aggressive disarmament timetable will require an aggressive implementation program. This should take advantage of available resources within the U.S. and Russia as well as in third countries, including potentially both reactor and immobilization options, as long as stringent safeguards and security can be guaranteed at all participating facilities. Many existing light water reactors in the U.S. are well suited to the purpose, and several private operators of these plants have formally expressed interest to the U.S. government in providing such service. Russian fast and light water reactors appear to be less readily available to burn weapons plutonium. Russia, the United States and other G-7 countries should develop international programs to facilitate the most rapid possible reduction in weapons plutonium inventories, consistent with SMART. Such international co-operation would add credibility and transparency to the nuclear disarmament process in the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and could add momentum toward the conclusion of both a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a Fissile Material Production Cut-off Treaty. This international program should take advantage of existing global infrastructure for the use of plutonium fuel as well as other capability (e.g., in the U.S. and Canada) that could supplement existing civilian Pu use plans, as well as vitrification or other immobilization facilities. In combination, it is reasonable to forecast a global capability to disposition at least 10 tons of weapons

Nuclear weapon testing and the monkey business

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Murthy, M.S.S.

1978-01-01

Reasons for India's total ban on the export of rhesus monkeys to U.S. have been explained. The major reason is that some of the animals were used in nuclear weapon related radiation experiments. This was a clear violation of a stricture in the agreement about supply of monkeys. The stricture prohibited the use of animals for research concerning military operations, including nuclear weapon testing. It is pleaded that a strict enforcement of strictures rather than a total ban on the export of monkeys would be better in the interest of advancement of knowledge in human medicine and disease control. (M.G.B.)

Discrimination of non-radiation backgrounds in the proportional counter of MARDS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Na, Liang [Institute of Nuclear Physics and Chemistry, China Academy of Engineering Physics, Mianyang 621900 (China); Xiaofeng, Guo [Institute of Nuclear Physics and Chemistry, China Academy of Engineering Physics, Mianyang 621900 (China); Department of Engineering Physics, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084 (China); Fei, Luo; Fanhua, Hao; RenDe, Ze [Institute of Nuclear Physics and Chemistry, China Academy of Engineering Physics, Mianyang 621900 (China); Qingpei, Xiang, E-mail: xiangqingpei@163.com [Institute of Nuclear Physics and Chemistry, China Academy of Engineering Physics, Mianyang 621900 (China); Chengsheng, Chu; Yongchun, Xiang; Zhaotong, Yan; Wei, Li [Institute of Nuclear Physics and Chemistry, China Academy of Engineering Physics, Mianyang 621900 (China)

2017-03-11

The Movable {sup 37}Ar Rapid Detection System (MARDS) was developed by the Institute of Nuclear Physics and Chemistry of the China Academy of Engineering Physics in 2006 for on-site inspections under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is a small and portable system that can quickly acquire data at suspected nuclear test sites. In this work, digital pulse shape discrimination (PSD) was used to process data from test samples to reduce electronic noise. The experimental results demonstrate that PSD combined with principal component analysis can classify and reject many noise sources. Thus, the threshold for the signal can be set low, expanding MARDS valid data acquisition capability, especially in very low-level and low-energy counting situations.

International Cooperation of the Republic of Croatia in the Field of Nuclear Safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Novosel, N.; Rosandic, L.

2010-01-01

International cooperation of the Republic of Croatia in the field of nuclear safety can be divided in two parts - political part, for which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration is responsible, and technical part, for which the State Office for Nuclear Safety is responsible, in cooperation with other state administration bodies, where applicable. According to the Nuclear Safety Act (OG 73/2003) the State Office for Nuclear Safety: 'coordinates technical cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency for all participants from the Republic of Croatia'; 'fulfills the obligations which the Republic of Croatia has assumed through international conventions and bilateral agreements concerning nuclear safety and the application of protective measures aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons' and 'cooperates with international organizations and associations in the area of nuclear safety, and appoints its own expert representatives to take part in the work of such organizations and associations or to monitor their work'. In this paper various aspects of the technical cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as international conventions and bilateral agreements in the field of nuclear safety, will be presented. Also, cooperation with other international organizations and associations in the nuclear area, such as Nuclear Suppliers Group, Zangger Committee, Wassenaar Arrangement, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Euratom and certain civil expert groups of NATO, will be described.(author).

Behavioral aspects of negotiations on mutual security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Druckman, D.; Hopmann, P.T.

1989-01-01

This article surveys theory and research about the process of international negotiation. The goal, of this paper is to apply behavioral science research to find ways to negotiate an improved mutual security regime between the nuclear superpowers that would make nuclear war less likely in the years ahead. When President John F. Kennedy presented the first nuclear arms control agreement, the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, to the U.S. public in 1963 he noted the ancient Chinese proverb: A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step. Just as the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty represented for Kennedy the first step on the road to nuclear arms control, so the research reviewed here represents at best the first few steps in a long journey to a better understanding of how to negotiate a regime of mutual security between the nuclear superpowers

Reflection processing of the large-N seismic data from the Source Physics Experiment (SPE)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Paschall, Olivia C. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2016-07-18

The purpose of the SPE is to develop a more physics-based model for nuclear explosion identification to understand the development of S-waves from explosion sources in order to enhance nuclear test ban treaty monitoring.

Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

Sweden goes back on its decision to ban nuclear energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

2009-01-01

At the beginning of 2009 the centre-right Swedish government has announced that the law on the progressive banning of nuclear energy and the law on the interdiction of building new nuclear power plants are going to be abolished. Moreover licenses will be given for the replacement of current operating reactors when they reach their time limit. The center party has not changed its mind concerning nuclear energy but is now deeply convinced that nuclear energy will be indispensable in the energy mix of tomorrow. A recent opinion poll has showed that almost half of the population favor the construction of new nuclear power plants. (A.C.)

Agreement of 12 July 1973 between Costa Rica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Regulatory control of nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 1997

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tossavainen, K.

1998-08-01

The report describes regulatory control of the use of nuclear energy by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in Finland in 1997. Nuclear regulatory control ascertained that the operation of Finnish NPPs was in compliance with the conditions set out in operating licences and current regulations. In addition to NPP normal operation, STUK oversaw projects at the plant units relating to power uprating and safety improvements. STUK prepared statements for the Ministry of Trade and Industry about the applications for renewing the operating licenses of Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs. The most important items of supervision in nuclear waste management were studies relating to the final disposal of spent fuel from NPPs and the review of the licence application for a repository for low- and intermediate-level reactor waste from Loviisa NPP. Preparation of general safety regulations for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel, to be published in the form of a Council of State Decision, was started. By safeguards control, the use of nuclear materials was verified to be in compliance with current regulations and that the whereabouts of every batch of nuclear material were always known. Nuclear material safeguards were stepped up to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials. In co-operation with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Institute of Seismology (University of Helsinki), preparations were undertaken to implement the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). For enforcement of the Treaty and as part of the international regulatory approach, STUK is currently developing laboratory analyses relating to airborne radioactivity measurements. The focus of co-operation funded by external sources was as follows: improvement of the safety of Kola and Leningrad NPPs, improvement of nuclear waste management in North-West Russia, development of the organizations of nuclear safety authorities in Eastern Europe and development

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1970-04-22

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [fr

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-10-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depositary Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [ru

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [es

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-04-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

The Indo-American Nuclear Treaty: Challenges and Controversies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gutmann, Raphael

2008-01-01

In September 2008 India signed a co-operation agreement on civil nuclear energy with the United States. So doing, it got rid of an embargo that lasted for several decades, due to India's refusal to sign the NPT. This agreement has triggered many political debates in India and in the United States as well. Though the treaty is part of a new general design of the Indian diplomacy, it is very likely that it does not mean that New Delhi has radically changed its views on Washington

FMCT status and verification challenges... also for ESARDA and INMM

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pellaud, B.

2013-01-01

The Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would be the logical follow-up to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; it would focus on the nuclear materials that end up in nuclear weapons. Their production would be forbidden. In Geneva, the FMCT negotiations are stalled, probably for another three years. The diplomats cannot move. The political negotiations when they come will turn around half-a- dozen options on 'definitions/production' issues (from an NPT mirror, to the Russian simplified approach, through the Australian model, partial stocks, etc.). The selection of a suitable option will be a negotiated political decision, a process that will be dominated by disarmament politics and costs. One can only hope that the FMCT negotiations will free from the 'Conference on Disarmament' deadlock and move forward. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

Implications of mining practices in an open-pit gold mine for monitoring of a comprehensive test-ban treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jarpe, S.P.; Moran, B.; Goldstein, P.; Glenn, L.A.

1996-01-01

This report summarizes the results of an experiment at the Gold Quarry pit, operated by the Newmont Gold Company at Carlin, NV The purpose of the experiment was to obtain local and regional seismic data, together with ''ground truth'', from conventional surface blasting activity and to use these data to help determine the effectiveness with which conventional mining blasts can be discriminated from underground nuclear explosions

The impact of tobacco advertising bans on consumption in developing countries.

Science.gov (United States)

Blecher, Evan

2008-07-01

Tobacco advertising bans have become commonplace in developed nations but are less prevalent in developing countries. The importance of advertising bans as part of comprehensive tobacco control strategies has been emphasised by the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control which calls for comprehensive bans on tobacco advertising. The empirical literature suggests that comprehensive advertising bans have played a role in reducing consumption in developed countries but that limited policies have not. This paper extends this analysis to include 30 developing countries and finds that bans do play an important role in reducing tobacco consumption in these countries. It finds that both comprehensive as well as limited policies are effective in reducing consumption although comprehensive bans have a far greater impact than limited ones. Furthermore, it finds that advertising bans may be even more effective in the developing world than they are in the developed world.

Further limitations on nuclear testing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brown, P.S.

1991-11-01

This document addresses a number of subjects related to further constraints on nuclear testing, briefly discussing each of the following topics: the current political situation, the kinds of steps that might next be taken in test limitations and the impacts of further testing limits, the need for a test ban readiness program, some issues related to verification, and the possibility of confidence building measures as alternative, or near-term, steps to further test limitations

Establishment of a clean laboratory for ultra trace analysis of nuclear materials in safeguards environmental samples

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hanzawa, Yukiko; Magara, Masaaki; Watanabe, Kazuo

2003-01-01

The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute has established a cleanroom facility with cleanliness of ISO Class 5: the Clean Laboratory for Environmental Analysis and Research (CLEAR). It was designed to be used for the analysis of nuclear materials in environmental samples mainly for the safeguards, in addition to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification and research on environmental sciences. The CLEAR facility was designed to meet conflicting requirements of a cleanroom and for handling of nuclear materials according to Japanese regulations, i.e., to avoid contamination from outside and to contain nuclear materials inside the facility. This facility has been intended to be used for wet chemical treatment, instrumental analysis and particle handling. A fume-hood to provide a clean work surface for handling of nuclear materials was specially designed. Much attention was paid to the selection of construction materials for use to corrosive acids. The performance of the cleanroom and analytical background in the laboratory are discussed. This facility has satisfactory specification required for joining the International Atomic Energy Agency Network of Analytical Laboratories. It can be concluded that the CLEAR facility enables analysis of ultra trace amounts of nuclear materials at sub-pictogram level in environmental samples. (author)

Text of the Agreement of 2 March 1978 between Peru and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-09-01

The text of the Agreement of 2 March 1978 between Peru and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 1 August 1979.

Joint experiment on verification of the treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and its value in nuclear disarmament problem

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mikhailov, V.N.

1998-01-01

This conference commemorates the 10th anniversary of the Joint Verification Experiment. The experiment was performed in order to specify methods controlling yield of underground explosions in the USA and the USSR. Basic of the the experiment were coordinated and formulated in the Agreement signed by Heads of departments of foreign policies in Moscow on 31 May 1988. The tasks can be briefly revealed the following way: - each of the parties can measure (on mutual basis) the explosion yield in the course of the experiment performed on the test site of the other party using tele seismic and hydrodynamic methods; - each party also makes tele seismic measurement of both explosions of the experiment with the help of its national net of seismic stations; - each party makes hydrodynamic measurements of explosion yield in the course of the experiment in a special additional borehole; - each party performs tele-seismic measurements of both explosions' yield at its five seismic stations with which the parties exchanged data on the explosions made earlier. In the course of the experiment the parties exchanged the data obtained in the same volume. The analysis showed: 1. The experiment conformed to all the requirements of the Agreement in spite of all the complexity of the procedures and differences in conditions of the experiment performance. 2. The experiment became an example of an unprecedented level of cooperation between two countries in one of the most significant for national security fields of defense activity. 3. The experiment gave the basis for concrete coordination of underground test yield control measures. It also considerable advanced the elaboration of protocols to treaties of 1974 and 1976. 4. In the course of the experiment there appeared an opportunity to compare scientific-technical level of hydrodynamic and seismic measurements and safety provision for nuclear tests of both countries. Cooperative development of anti intrusive devices for hydrodynamic method

The Text of the Agreement between Suriname and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-04-01

The text of the Agreement of 2 February 1979 and of the Protocol thereto between Suriname and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 February 1979. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article III thereof.

Monitoring non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Can regional CBMs play a role?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sood, R.

1994-01-01

The experience of regional Confidence Building Measures (CBM), has only limited applicability for tackling proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Where the international norm has developed as in the case of biological and chemical weapons, through international disarmament treaties, regional initiatives can strengthen this norm. Where a norm is less well-founded, regional initiatives are not likely to succeed. Specifically, with regard to nuclear weapons, consensus on negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty and a convention for prohibition of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes and explosive devices is a positive development. Successful conclusion of these universal and verifiable treaties will go a long way to strengthening the international norm against proliferation. Two other measures are critical - a development of a non-use assurance and commencement of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations among all five nuclear weapon States. If the international community witnesses improvement in these areas, regional negotiations will be stimulated. Therefore, the primary focus should be on developing an international norm to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Regional efforts will take their cue from these international norms and would result in CBMs that are consistent with the international norm

Prospects for the U.S. Ratification of the CTBT and it's entry into force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hyuing, Sang Cheol; Kim, Jae San

2008-01-01

On September 24, 1996, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature and leaders from 179 countries, including the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China, have signed the CTBT until today. But the U.S. Senate rejected the CTBT in October 1999. In response to U.S. CTBT policy, key states that have signed the CTBT, such as China and Israel, have delayed their ratification. Other states including India and Pakistan have yet to sign the treaty and it is highly unlikely they will do unless the United States, China finally ratify. Consequently the goal of CTBT entry into force remains unfulfilled, and about a dozen nuclear tests have been conducted after the CTBT was opened for signature. Yet, recent situations and circumstances will give the next U.S. president an opportunity to ratify the CTBT and initiate sweeping changes in U.S. nuclear weapons and arms control policies

The third review conference of the parties of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recent developments concerning international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Canty, M.J.; Richter, B.; Schlupp, C.; Stein, G.

1986-11-01

The non-proliferation activities and instruments are listed in a table. The two main instruments are the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Safeguards, which are supplemented by treaties of regional restricted effects, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the EURATOM treaty. The two-tier structure of the treaties, i.e. to provide for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and at the same time foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, has proven to have a particularly stabilizing effect, which was confirmed by the last Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. The conference members were particularly satisfied with the results of the IAEA Safeguards. Future developments towards improving international safeguards will concentrate on operator-friendly and financially reasonable safeguards measures, such as safeguards effectiveness evaluations and near-real-time accountancy. The results of the CAS discussions on the definition of principles and goals of co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are of importance also to the PUNE conference. The PUNE conference will be held in 1987 and is expected to yield points of orientation for further embedding the non-proliferation principle in the international co-operative activities and the nuclear business in the 1980s. (orig./HP) [de

Ambient Noise Analysis from Selected CTBTO (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization) Sites

Science.gov (United States)

2015-02-11

depending on location) up to 10+ years. The sites are under the National control of the countries Australia, Canada, Chile, France, Mexico , Portugal, UK...Canada HA03 Juan Fernandez Island Chile HA04 Crozet Islands France HA05 Guadeloupe France Co HA06 Socorro Island Mexico HA07 Flores Portugal...addition, Jennifer Miksis-Olds, an ARL colleague, has independentiy, via an ONR TYP, been working with Division 322, Marine Mammals & Biology

Legal Implications of Nuclear Propulsion for Space Objects

Science.gov (United States)

Pop, V.

2002-01-01

This paper is intended to examine nuclear propulsion concepts such as "Project Orion", "Project Daedalus", NERVA, VASIMIR, from the legal point of view. The UN Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space apply to nuclear power sources in outer space devoted to the generation of electric power on board space objects for non-propulsive purposes, and do not regulate the use of nuclear energy as a means of propulsion. However, nuclear propulsion by means of detonating atomic bombs (ORION) is, in principle, banned under the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water. The legality of use of nuclear propulsion will be analysed from different approaches - historical (i.e. the lawfulness of these projects at the time of their proposal, at the present time, and in the future - in the light of the mutability and evolution of international law), spatial (i.e. the legal regime governing peaceful nuclear explosions in different spatial zones - Earth atmosphere, Earth orbit, Solar System, and interstellar space), and technical (i.e, the legal regime applicable to different nuclear propulsion techniques, and to the various negative effects - e.g. damage to other space systems as an effect of the electromagnetic pulse, etc). The paper will analyse the positive law, and will also come with suggestions "de lege ferenda".

Range estimates of whale signals recorded by triplets of hydrophones.

Science.gov (United States)

Le Bras, R. J.; Nielsen, P.

2017-12-01

The International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization includes a hydroacoustic network as one of the monitoring technologies. The underwater part of this network includes six stations and is now complete with the recent installation of the HA04 station located in the Southern Ocean island of Crozet (France). A large number of calls emanating from marine mammals are recorded by the hydrophones, and we present examples where the animals are sufficiently close that a range estimate can be attempted. We also present examples of scattered arrivals and related interpretations.

How to square the CTBT circle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Balachandran, G.

2001-01-01

The US pressure on India to at least sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), if not ratify it, continues, and is unlikely to diminish. Those in India who suggest an unconditional acceptance of the CTBT, base it on the argument that having demonstrated its nuclear capability and thereby ensured its national security, India can sign the CTBT without holding out for the gains that may accrue from the act of signing. Those who are opposed to India signing the treaty base their objections on their doubts about the existence/reliability of the Indian nuclear deterrent. The third group comprises those who believe that India's current nuclear deterrent capability is satisfactory and India should sign the CTBT subject to certain gains in return. What is needed is a consensus in the country on signing the CTBT and the time is now appropriate for laying the groundwork for a national consensus without sacrificing the national interests. This article analyses the issues involved in India's signing the CTBT. (author)

National data centre preparedness exercise 2015 (NPE2015): MY-NDC progress result and experience

Science.gov (United States)

Rashid, Faisal Izwan Abdul; Zolkaffly, Muhammed Zulfakar

2017-01-01

Malaysia has established the National Data Centre (MY-NDC) in December 2005. MY-NDC is tasked to perform the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) data management as well as providing relevant information for Treaty related events to the Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuclear Malaysia) as the CTBT National Authority. In the late 2015, MY-NDC has participated in the National Data Centre Preparedness Exercise 2015 (NPE 2015) which aims to access the level of readiness at MY-NDC. This paper aims at presenting the progress result of NPE 2015 as well as highlighting MY-NDC experience in NPE 2015 compared to previous participation in NPE 2013. MY-NDC has utilised available resources for NPE 2015. In NPE 2015, MY-NDC has performed five type of analyses compared with only two analyses in NPE 2013. Participation in the NPE 2015 has enabled MY-NDC to assess its capability and identify rooms for improvement.

The Indian nuclear test in a global perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Subrahmanyam, K.

1974-01-01

A peaceful nuclear explosion test was carried out by India on 18 May, 1974 at Pokharan in the Rajasthan Desert. The test was carried out as a part of India's steady programme to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and there was no diversion of resources from development as is charged by some nations. The test has broken the monopoly of the nuclear superpowers to conduct nuclear tests for which they are entiltled by the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and at the same time, sharply focussed the attention on the discriminatory character of the NPT which does not allow non-nuclear states to carry out nuclear tests even for peaceful purposes. It is argued that India's going nuclear may prove, in the long run, beneficial to the cause of disarmament. (M.G.B.)

Nuclear: agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Slovak Republic for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (with annexes). Treaty series 1996/30

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

Canada and the Slovak Republic are both non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and as such have undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that each Party has concluded an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty

The (new) cooling of U.S./Russian relations and the INF Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sitt, Bernard

2014-07-01

The issue of Ukraine is not the only current cause of tension between the United States and the Russian Federation. This publication stated four months ago that, 'the time for confidence and transparency between Moscow and Washington is over', and bilateral relations have become increasingly strained. This fact is currently manifesting itself by a certain degree of questioning of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This disarmament treaty is a symbolic instrument of the prosperous period that arms control experienced in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, as much multilateral as bilateral, at the end of the 1980's, at the time of progress in the strategic dialogue between Regan and Gorbachev and the quest for parity between the two powers. This commitment by the two parties to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals, which was the first of its kind, helped to eliminate all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 km and 5500 km along with their delivery systems in Europe over the course of three years. The United States has since May 2013 accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty by testing (from 2008 onwards according to a press source) a land-based cruise missile (GLCM) covered by the ban, with the objective of developing its capabilities in this field. Yet Washington has not given any indication of the identity of the incriminated Russian missile. Russia denies any wrongdoing, stating that this allegation is baseless and that Russia is in compliance with its commitments under the Treaty. Moscow has also counter-attacked by accusing the United States of developing, in the framework of the U.S. missile de-fence programme in Europe, a ground-based version of the MK-41 sea-based missile defence launch system, which Russia deems to be a violation of the Treaty. The language used in managing this disagreement between the two capitals is inconclusive in establishing the actual existence of a violation of the terms of the

The Text of the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-02-21

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 11 October 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 11 October 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

IDC Re-Engineering Phase 2 System Specification Document Version 1.5

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Satpathi, Meara Allena [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Burns, John F. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Harris, James M. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2017-01-01

This document contains the system specifications derived to satisfy the system requirements found in the IDC System Requirements Document for the IDC Re-Engineering Phase 2 project. This System Specification Document (SSD) defines waveform data processing requirements for the International Data Centre (IDC) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). The routine processing includes characterization of events with the objective of screening out events considered to be consistent with natural phenomena or non-nuclear, man-made phenomena. This document does not address requirements concerning acquisition, processing and analysis of radionuclide data but does include requirements for the dissemination of radionuclide data and products.

Low-frequency electromagnetic measurements as a zero-time discriminant of nuclear and chemical explosions - OSI research final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sweeney, J.J.

1996-12-01

This is the final report on a series of investigations of low frequency (1-40 Hz) electromagnetic signals produced by above ground and underground chemical explosions and their use for confidence building under the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. I conclude that low frequency electromagnetic measurements can be a very powerful tool for zero-time discrimination of chemical and nuclear explosions for yields of 1 Kt or greater, provided that sensors can be placed within 1-2 km of the suspected detonation point in a tamper-proof, low noise environment. The report includes descriptions and analyses of low frequency electromagnetic measurements associated with chemical explosions carried out in a variety of settings (shallow borehole, open pit mining, underground mining). I examine cavity pressure data from the Non-Proliferation Experiment (underground chemical explosion) and present the hypothesis that electromagnetic signals produced by underground chemical explosions could be produced during rock fracturing. I also review low frequency electromagnetic data from underground nuclear explosions acquired by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory during the late 1980s. (author)

Challenges for effective WMD verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andemicael, B.

2006-01-01

Effective verification is crucial to the fulfillment of the objectives of any disarmament treaty, not least as regards the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The effectiveness of the verification package depends on a number of factors, some inherent in the agreed structure and others related to the type of responses demanded by emerging challenges. The verification systems of three global agencies-the IAEA, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO, currently the Preparatory Commission), and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-share similarities in their broad objectives of confidence-building and deterrence by assuring members that rigorous verification would deter or otherwise detect non-compliance. Yet they are up against various constraints and other issues, both internal and external to the treaty regime. These constraints pose major challenges to the effectiveness and reliability of the verification operations. In the nuclear field, the IAEA safeguards process was the first to evolve incrementally from modest Statute beginnings to a robust verification system under the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The nuclear non-proliferation regime is now being supplemented by a technology-intensive verification system of the nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT), a product of over three decades of negotiation. However, there still remain fundamental gaps and loopholes in the regime as a whole, which tend to diminish the combined effectiveness of the IAEA and the CTBT verification capabilities. He three major problems are (a) the lack of universality of membership, essentially because of the absence of three nuclear weapon-capable States-India, Pakistan and Israel-from both the NPT and the CTBT, (b) the changes in US disarmament policy, especially in the nuclear field, and (c) the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty. The world is

Reviving nuclear disarmament, 26 February 2008, Oslo, Norway

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2008-01-01

powers. Otherwise it would fail to win the confidence of countries on the receiving end, who would perceive it as yet again perpetuating a nuclear order of 'haves and have-nots'. The first step towards disarmament should be significant reductions in nuclear arsenals. Second, the operational status of nuclear weapons systems needs to be changed. There is no reason for nuclear weapons to be on permanent high alert - ready to be launched at perhaps 30 minutes' notice. Russia and the U.S. should introduce 'mutually agreed and verified physical barriers in the command-and-control sequence'. Third, multilateral disarmament negotiations must be resumed without further delay. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty must be implemented and work should be resumed on a verifiable Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The CTBT - signed more than a decade ago and seen by some as the longest sought, hardest fought arms control agreement - must be brought into force as soon as possible. And pending the early start of negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty, there should be a universal moratorium on the production of fissile material. Fourth, we must develop a new framework for the utilization of nuclear energy. Fifth, we need to improve the security of nuclear materials. Sixth, we must strengthen the verification authority and capability of the IAEA. The measures I have outlined would undoubtedly help to make the world a safer place. But in order to address the threat posed by nuclear weapons in the long term, we should take a hard look at the reasons why countries are tempted to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Whether the reason is insecurity - the need to acquire a shield or insurance policy - or the desire to seek stature, prestige, or dominance, we need to re-visit our collective security system to address these various drivers. This means engaging in negotiations to re-engineer our global

TLATELOLCO treaty today

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Instituto Matias Romero de Estudios Diplomaticos.

1996-01-01

The 30 th. Anniversary of the opening to sign of Tlatelolco Treaty it is reached in an undeniable fact: the benefit and full standing upon a free nuclear weapons zone in Latin America and the Carib. The Instituto Matias Romero de Estudios Diplomaticos (IMRED) convoked an expertise group in safety affairs and disarmament, mexicans and foreigners, diplomatics and academics, to think over the present importance of Tlatelolco Treaty. The assays included in this number of the Revista Mexicana de Politica Exterior to bring out the transcendency of the such legal instrument and the way to fortify the regime created by itself, the relevance of integration attempts for the free nuclear weapons zones and the obstacles that its confronts, as soon as, the possibilities and the potential of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Annual banned-substance review: analytical approaches in human sports drug testing.

Science.gov (United States)

Thevis, Mario; Kuuranne, Tiia; Geyer, Hans; Schänzer, Wilhelm

2017-01-01

There has been an immense amount of visibility of doping issues on the international stage over the past 12 months with the complexity of doping controls reiterated on various occasions. Hence, analytical test methods continuously being updated, expanded, and improved to provide specific, sensitive, and comprehensive test results in line with the World Anti-Doping Agency's (WADA) 2016 Prohibited List represent one of several critical cornerstones of doping controls. This enterprise necessitates expediting the (combined) exploitation of newly generated information on novel and/or superior target analytes for sports drug testing assays, drug elimination profiles, alternative test matrices, and recent advances in instrumental developments. This paper is a continuation of the series of annual banned-substance reviews appraising the literature published between October 2015 and September 2016 concerning human sports drug testing in the context of WADA's 2016 Prohibited List. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Recent status of research activities for development of CTBT-related technologies in JAERI

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hirota, Naoki; Houkida, Takanori; Inoue, Yoji

2003-08-01

This report describes research activities of the R and D Group for Non-Proliferation Technology related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification regime. The main subjects of this report are (1) an overview of the CTBT verification regime, (2) preparation of the National Data Center for radionuclide data, (3) construction and operation of the radionuclide monitoring stations at Takasaki and Okinawa and the certified radionuclide laboratory at Tokai in Japan. We have participated in an intercomparison test internationally organized for the certified laboratories and the test results are given here. Scientific application of the CTBT-related technologies to environmental researches is also depicted. (author)

Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC) Treaty Status Dataset

Data.gov (United States)

National Aeronautics and Space Administration — The Socioeconomic Data and Application Center (SEDAC) Treaty Status Dataset contains comprehensive treaty information for multilateral environmental agreements,...

Flaws in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leventhal, P.

1986-01-01

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nucler Weapons has the twin objectives of stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons and ending the nuclear arms race on the one hand, and promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy on the other. In quantitative and symbolic terms the NPT is a huge success. More than two-thirds of the world's nations have signed on, making this the most popular arms control agreement on earth. Not a single nation has declared itself to be a nuclear-weapons state beyond the original five members of the ''nuclear club'' who qualified for weapons status under the terms of the Treaty itself: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. No party to the Treaty has exercised the permitted option to drop out, and none has been found by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to have diverted nuclear material from civil to weapons purposes. Nor has any party been known to have violated NPT prohibitions on developing or assisting other nations to develop nuclear weapons

The IAEA nuclear safety conventions: an example of successful ''treaty management''?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Handl, G.

2003-01-01

The nuclear safety conventions represent an advance in bringing national nuclear power activities within the ambition of international legal safety norms. They introduce a novel measure of international legal accountability for the safety of commercial nuclear power operations. But whether this system represents a successful example of treaty management defies an easy answer. Certainly, it is beyond doubt that the peer review process combines aspects of law application(enforcement/control of implementation and compliance) with lawmaking. The nuclear safety convention bear the characteristics of a political compromise that affects effectiveness. For the time being it remains unclear whether this compromise will prove acceptable in the long run or how the tension between the two contending perspectives is likely to resolve itself. (N.C.)

Verification lessons learned and CTBT's contribution to disarmament and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zerbo, L.

2013-01-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all nuclear tests for any purposes. The CTBT is essential for peace and security; it is a core element of the nonproliferation regime. It limits the ability of countries to develop advanced nuclear weapons technology. It is enforced through the extensive International Monitoring System designed to detect and deter nuclear explosions in atmosphere, underwater and underground. In the process of monitoring and detecting a potential nuclear test - the system registers over 30,000 events a year - the vast majority of them are earthquakes. The civil and scientific applications of the CTBT data can be used to gain better understanding of the earth, of climate change, of volcanic ash clouds, of the tsunamis, of the movements of whales and much more. The CTBT sets a new legal and verification standard for nuclear weapons. It is a non-discriminatory Treaty with the same rights and obligations for all Member States. Its verification regime is equally nondiscriminatory and provides equal access for all Member States to CTBTO data. We are driving to achieve 160 ratifications by the end of the year, and this will provide additional momentum towards entry into force (EIF) and universality. (A.C.)

Ethical principles in international nuclear trade and the role of international treaties and agreements in their implementation. Reflections on the future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cavalanti, C. de A.

1992-01-01

The growing importance of nuclear energy (on the threshold of the twenty-first century) and of its ethical uses is considered, including major political events in recent years, their social and economic consequences in the world scene. International Nuclear Law is seen as the most adequate instrument to promote the ethical uses of nuclear energy on a worldwide basis, so that mankind can benefit safely and properly and improving their living conditions in general. Problems associated with access to nuclear technology, plants, equipments and materials are addressed. Basic principles of international agreements ruling nuclear trade, ethical aspects are also covered. The different markets involved in international nuclear trade and their specific requirements are described. Certain international treaties on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are discussed such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Tlatelolco Treaty as are international conventions on matters related to the use of nuclear energy, such as the environment and protection of personnel. The author concludes by debating whether ethical uses of nuclear energy are a possible reality or merely utopia. Prospects on the future of international nuclear trade are considered. (author)

OSI Passive Seismic Experiment at the Former Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sweeney, J J; Harben, P

2010-11-11

On-site inspection (OSI) is one of the four verification provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Under the provisions of the CTBT, once the Treaty has entered into force, any signatory party can request an on-site inspection, which can then be carried out after approval (by majority voting) of the Executive Council. Once an OSI is approved, a team of 40 inspectors will be assembled to carry out an inspection to ''clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I''. One challenging aspect of carrying out an on-site inspection (OSI) in the case of a purported underground nuclear explosion is to detect and locate the underground effects of an explosion, which may include an explosion cavity, a zone of damaged rock, and/or a rubble zone associated with an underground collapsed cavity. The CTBT (Protocol, Section II part D, paragraph 69) prescribes several types of geophysical investigations that can be carried out for this purpose. One of the methods allowed by the CTBT for geophysical investigation is referred to in the Treaty Protocol as ''resonance seismometry''. This method, which was proposed and strongly promoted by Russia during the Treaty negotiations, is not described in the Treaty. Some clarification about the nature of the resonance method can be gained from OSI workshop presentations by Russian experts in the late 1990s. Our understanding is that resonance seismometry is a passive method that relies on seismic reverberations set up in an underground cavity by the passage of waves from regional and teleseismic sources. Only a few examples of the use of this method for detection of underground cavities have been presented, and those were done in cases where the existence and precise location of an underground cavity was known. As is the case with many of the geophysical methods allowed during an OSI under the Treaty, how