WorldWideScience

Sample records for base nuclear weapons

  1. Philippine Bases and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy

    OpenAIRE

    Schirmer, Daniel Boone

    1983-01-01

    In 1947, when the newly independent Philippine government granted the United States the right to use military bases at Subic Bay and Clark Air Field, the United States government saw to it that the terms included the right of the U.S. to install on these bases "any type of weapons." From the very beginning the Pentagon insisted on establishing the right to relate U.S. bases in the Philippines to possible plans for nuclear war. Also, from the very beginning many Filipinos opposed U.S. bases th...

  2. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described

  3. Reconversion of nuclear weapons

    CERN Document Server

    Kapitza, Sergei P

    1993-01-01

    The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

  4. Virtual nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  5. Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sartori, Leo

    1983-01-01

    Fundamental principles governing nuclear explosions and their effects are discussed, including three components of a nuclear explosion (thermal radiation, shock wave, nuclear radiation). Describes how effects of these components depend on the weapon's yield, its height of burst, and distance of detonation point. Includes effects of three…

  6. Nuclear Weapons and Schools.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Howie, David I.

    1984-01-01

    The growing debate on nuclear weapons in recent years has begun to make inroads into school curricula. Elementary and secondary school teachers now face the important task of educating their students on issues relating to nuclear war without indoctrinating them to a particular point of view. (JBM)

  7. Nuclear weapons in Europe

    CERN Document Server

    Calogero, F

    1981-01-01

    Information speech given by Prof. Calogero from the university of Roma to describe the actual situation of nuclear weapons in Europe, the strategical reasons or justifications for this deployment, the prospects of negociations, and what scientists could do and do on this issue.

  8. Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bing, G.F.

    1991-08-20

    This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

  9. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We all want to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The issue before us is how best to achieve this objective; more specifically, whether the peaceful applications of nuclear energy help or hinder, and to what extent. Many of us in the nuclear industry are working on these applications from a conviction that without peaceful nuclear energy the risk of nuclear war would be appreciably greater. Others, however, hold the opposite view. In discussing the subject, a necessary step in allaying fears is understanding some facts, and indeed facing up to some unpalatable facts. When the facts are assessed, and a balance struck, the conclusion is that peaceful nuclear energy is much more part of the solution to preventing nuclear war than it is part of the problem

  10. The B61-based "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator:" Clever retrofit or headway towards fourth-generation nuclear weapons?

    CERN Document Server

    Gsponer, A

    2005-01-01

    It is scientifically and technically possible to build an earth penetrating device that could bury a B61-7 warhead 30 meters into concrete, or 150 meters into earth, before detonating it. The device (based on knowledge and technology that is available since 50 years) would however by large and cumbersome. Better penetrator materials, components able to withstand larger stresses, higher impact velocities, and/or high-explosive driven penetration aids, can only marginally improve the device. It is conclude that the robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP) program may be as much motivated by the development of new technology directly applicable to next generation nuclear weapons, and by the political necessity to periodically reasses the role and utility of nuclear weapons, then by the perceived military need of a weapon able to destroy deeply buried targets.

  11. No first use of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper reports that at present, nuclear weapons are considered legitimate, if terrible, weapons, usable as other weapons are for national purposes. In the West and in the East, strategy, military forces, readiness posture, all are based fundamentally on the threat and, ultimately, the use of nuclear weapons. In the West this threat is directed not only against a nuclear attack against the US or its allies, but also against conventional, non-nuclear operations beyond our ability to hold. The term for such nuclear deterrence of non-nuclear hostilities is extended deterrence. It has been at the heart of US and NATO policy for a generation. In the East, the Soviet Union has declared a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons, a declaration, that is to say, that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in any future hostilities, that they would fire them only in retaliation against nuclear attack. To make that declaration a sure control over Soviet and Warsaw Pact decisions and actions in crisis, however, and to make it so convincing to others that they can, cautiously, rely on it, the governmental announcement of the No First Use must be supplemented by a host of implementing and indoctrinating measures that are yet to be taken. Nuclear preemption, first use, has not yet by any means been eliminated from Soviet doctrine, force structures and weapons programmes

  12. Nuclear weapons and the law.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Murray, R K

    1999-01-01

    The history of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is summarized, with a discussion of some of its earlier Advisory Opinions. The Advisory Opinion on the legality of nuclear arms is considered in the light of the principles of international humanitarian law and a review of nuclear weapons effects. The present government's position on nuclear weapons as outlined in the Strategic Defence Review (which ignores the issue of legality) is examined critically. PMID:10371869

  13. Nuclear Weapons and Science Education.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wellington, J. J.

    1984-01-01

    Provides suggestions on how science teachers can, and should, deal with the nuclear weapons debate in a balanced and critical way. Includes a table outlining points for and against deterrence and disarmament. (JN)

  14. Reframing the debate against nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    recent years has been all but negated; consensus-based agreements are rejected just a few years after being reached. Despite the threats posed by State or non-State proliferation, an increasing likelihood of a return to nuclear testing and the development of new nuclear weapons, a handful of powerful people continue to view these weapons as a legitimate source of security. All States Parties and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should approach the seventh NPT Review Conference in May 2005 as a major opportunity to reinvigorate the nuclear disarmament regime and transform it into an effective tool by which a true collective security can be ensured. First, however, we must reclaim the ground that has been eroded in recent years by the vertical and horizontal proliferation threats stemming from various corners of the globe

  15. Neutrino Counter Nuclear Weapon

    CERN Document Server

    Tang, Alfred

    2008-01-01

    Radiations produced by neutrino-antineutrino annihilation at the Z0 pole can be used to heat up the primary stage of a thermonuclear warhead and can in principle detonate the device remotely. Neutrino-antineutrino annihilation can also be used as a tactical assault weapon to target hideouts that are unreachable by conventional means.

  16. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1964-02-01

    This book is a revision of "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" which was issued in 1957. It was prepared by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant governmental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomc Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the combined judgment of a number of the most competent scientists working the problem. There is a need for widespread public understanding of the best information available on the effects of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible, within the limits of national security, a comprehensive summary of this information.

  17. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1957-06-01

    This handbook prepared by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant government agencies and published by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, is a comprehensive summary of current knowledge on the effects of nuclear weapons. The effects information contained herein is calculated for yields up to 20 megatons and the scaling laws for hypothetically extending the calculations beyond this limit are given. The figure of 20 megatons however is not be taken as an indication of capabilities or developments.

  18. Broken Arrows: Radiological hazards from nuclear warhead accidents (the Minot USAF base nuclear weapons incident)

    CERN Document Server

    Liolios, Theodore

    2009-01-01

    According to numerous press reports, in 2007 at Minot US Air Force Base six AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles mistakenly armed with W80-1 thermonuclear warheads were loaded on a B-52H heavy bomber in place of six unarmed AGM-129 missiles that were awaiting transport to Barksdale US Air Force Base for disposal. The live nuclear missiles were not reported missing, and stood unsecured and unguarded while mounted to the aircraft for a period of 36 hours. The present work investigates the radiological hazards associated with a worst-case postulated accident that would disperse the nuclear material of the six warheads in large metropolitan cities. Using computer simulations approximate estimates are derived for the ensuing cancer mortality and land contamination after the accident. Health, decontamination and evacuation costs are also estimated in the framework of the linear risk model.

  19. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War. Papers Based on a Symposium of the Forum on Physics and Society of the American Physical Society, (Washington, D.C., April 1982).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Morrison, Philip; And Others

    Three papers on nuclear weapons and nuclear war, based on talks given by distinguished physicists during an American Physical Society-sponsored symposium, are provided in this booklet. They include "Caught Between Asymptotes" (Philip Morrison), "We are not Inferior to the Soviets" (Hans A. Bethe), and "MAD vs. NUTS" (Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky).…

  20. Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons: Military effectiveness and collateral effects

    OpenAIRE

    Gsponer, Andre

    2005-01-01

    The paper begins with a general introduction and update to Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons (FGNW), and then addresses some particularly important military aspects on which there has been only limited public discussion so far. These aspects concern the unique military characteristics of FGNWs which make them radically different from both nuclear weapons based on previous-generation nuclear-explosives and from conventional weapons based on chemical-explosives: yields in the 1 to 100 tons rang...

  1. Nuclear weapons non proliferation treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taking into account the devastation that a nuclear war would inflict upon mankind, and the resulting need to do all that is in our power to keep such a tragedy from occuring, as well as to implement measures to safeguard all the peoples' safety, each State that owns nuclear weapons and that is a part of the Treaty pledges not to trade nuclear weapons, other explosive devices nor the control over such instruments to any other entity whatsoever, wether directly or indirectly. Likewise, all States that does not posses any nuclear weaponry and that are part of the Treaty, in turn pledge not to receive from any other entity nuclear weaponry or other explosive devices in trade, wether directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire this fashion of weaponry and not to request or accept any help whatsoever in the manufacturing of nuclear weaponry or related devices. The present Treaty remains open to the subscription of other countries, on July 26, 1968, with Mexico as one of the signatory countries

  2. Nuclear Weapons, Psychology, and International Relations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dougherty, James E.

    1976-01-01

    Fear of nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and nuclear was is widespread among the peoples of the world. However, to what extent do the fears (both rational and irrational) of policy-making elites and political masses produce actual effects upon the behavior of governments (who, after all, control the use of nuclear weapons)? (Author/RK)

  3. Nuclear weapons and the World Court ruling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    based on the initiatives by non-governmental organizations, the World Health Organisation (WHO) Assembly asked the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion in 1993 whether, considering the environmental and health consequences, the use of nuclear weapons by a state in war or other armed conflict would be a breach of its obligations under international law. The World Court decided that it was not able to give an advisory opinion as requested, because of the fact that questions of use of force and such like were beyond the scope of specialized agencies like the WHO. The Court has ruled that the international community, especially the five nuclear weapon states have not only an obligation to negotiate a treaty for total nuclear disarmament, but also have an obligation to conclude such treaty. We may expect that the nuclear weapon states will cynically disregard the ruling of the World Court as they have been doing to the basic obligation itself in pursuit of nuclear hegemony. But the remaining 150 countries or so also bear a responsibility to keep nudging the recalcitrant states into implementing their commitments to disarm

  4. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Immele, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wagner, Richard L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in

  5. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  6. Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maaranen, S.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). Center for International Security Affairs

    1996-09-01

    Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures and dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.

  7. Health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report briefly reviews previous WHO work on the health consequences of nuclear war and concentrates on current information about the effects of nuclear weapons on health, and related environmental problems. 15 refs

  8. Examining the discourse on nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Ghafele, Roya

    2000-01-01

    Nuclear weapons and language - is there a connection? Linguistics is an established science, but what has it got to do with nuclear weapons? This article was inspired by several international disarmament negotiations where I noticed that diplomats work in a communicative reality related to the nuclear arms issue. But is anyone involved in this highly political process aware of the activity of that process of talking? Observations showed that the political problem around the issue of nuclear a...

  9. Economic Analysis of Investment in Nuclear Weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Martínková, Hana

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear weapons are a rather marginal issue in economics as opposed to the political realm where it is an ever-present topic concerning global security. This thesis argues that economics can make a valuable contribution to the nuclear weapons debate in several ways and aims to present those in a comprehensive manner. First, a cost-benefit approach is employed to show that costs and benefits go beyond counting dollars directly spent on nuclear arsenals. Second, market investment in nuclear wea...

  10. China's mixed signals on nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ultimately, it is nuclear whether the Chinese leadership has made up its collective mind on practical nuclear weapons. It is known from Chinese official sources, including articles in Communist Party and military publications and histories of the Chinese nuclear program, that an internal debate has proceeded for more than two decades, punctuated by occasional nuclear exercises or low-yield warhead tests. But China presumably has less reason now to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons than in previous decades: relations with the Soviet Union have improved and military confrontation has eased; China's relations with India and Vietnam are also improving. The decision may already have been made, however, and the weapons built. The mystery surrounding Chinese tactical nuclear weapons is itself interesting, but it is also symbolic of the difficulty of understanding China's nuclear weapons program and policies. The West has accumulated a considerable body of knowledge about China's nuclear forces, especially historical material. But important aspects of China's nuclear behavior and its future as a nuclear power are hard to discern. A key question is China's future role in the spread of nuclear-capable weapons to other countries. China might add to international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear related technology, or it might become the world's missile merchant. It could make a constructive contribution to arms control efforts in general, or it could act as a spoiler

  11. Iran's nuclear program - for power generation or nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report addresses the development of a nuclear infrastructure in Iran, and assessments are made on the near-term potential this infrastructure might yield of either nuclear power or nuclear arms production. The most significant facilities are treated in a more elaborate fashion, as these are assumed to have key roles in either a true civilian programme, or in the prospect of weapons-grade fissile material production. The future potential capacity for the latter is calculated under certain presumptions, both in the case that Iran focuses its efforts on uranium-based nuclear weapons, and in the case that it should choose the plutonium path to nuclear weapons. All the conclusions and findings in this report are based on technological considerations. This means that social or political assessments have not prevailed, rather the picture of Iran's nuclear programme is drawn through descriptions and assessments of facilities and systems, and their role in the bigger context. Definite conclusions have not been made as to whether Iran's nuclear programme currently is aimed towards nuclear arms or nuclear power. The secrecy surrounding some of the most prominent nuclear sites together with more or less credible allegations of purely weapons-related activities in the past, make it hard not to conclude that Iran until the disclosures in 2002 made as great an effort as it could on its way on developing nuclear weapons covertly. The scope of today's nuclear programme seems, on the other hand, most likely to be in part to help relieve the ever-increasing need for energy, although considerable deficits to this strategy are identified, at the same time as the Iranian people are united in a giant, high-prestige project in defiance of massive international pressure. Adding to this is a much-feared ability to rapidly being able to redirect their nuclear efforts, and develop nuclear arms in perhaps as little as one year. This so-called break-out scenario, where Iran presumably

  12. Democracy, public opinion, and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    To the degree that people's fears of nuclear war are deep and pervasive, they become subject to manipulation by cynical or politically utopian promises, whether those promises be to abolish nuclear weapons from the earth or to create a leakproof peace shield (SDI). But the basic yearning for protection could also be mobilized to support serious arms reduction and arms control agreements. Nuclear weapons provide the basis for a vivid form of symbolic politics, perhaps equivalent in foreign policy considerations to the Korean and Vietnam wars during their durations, and in similar ways (although not necessarily as severe) as unemployment does among domestic policy issues. This paper presents survey research directed specifically at the role of public opinion on nuclear imagery (difference between expectation of nuclear war versus any kind of weapon war; willingness to spend on nuclear weapons versus conventional ones or general defense spending) can help in understanding these phenomena

  13. Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons: Military effectiveness and collateral effects

    CERN Document Server

    Gsponer, A

    2005-01-01

    The paper begins with a general introduction and update to Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons (FGNW), and then addresses some particularly important military aspects on which there has been only limited public discussion so far. These aspects concern the unique military characteristics of FGNWs which make them radically different from both nuclear weapons based on previous-generation nuclear-explosives and from conventional weapons based on chemical-explosives: yields in the 1 to 100 tons range, greatly enhanced coupling to targets, possibility to drive powerful shaped charged jets and forged fragments, enhanced prompt radiation effects, reduced collateral damage and residual radioactivity, etc.

  14. Pantex: safety in nuclear weapons processing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johannesen, R E; Farrell, L M

    2000-11-01

    The Pantex Plant, located in the Texas panhandle near Amarillo, is a major Department of Energy (DOE) participant in maintaining the safety of the nation's nuclear weapons resources and protecting the employees, public, and environment. With more than 168,000 person-years of operations involving nuclear materials, explosives, and hazardous chemicals, Pantex has maintained a notable safety record. This article overviews the nuclear weapon activities at Pantex and describes their safety culture. PMID:11045518

  15. Nuclear Weapons Effects (Self-Teaching Materials).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Developed by the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, this autoinstructional text deals with nuclear weapons effects. The destructive effects of an atomic blast are first introduced, and then long-term radioactive consequences are stressed. (CP)

  16. Computational Challenges in Nuclear Weapons Simulation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McMillain, C F; Adams, T F; McCoy, M G; Christensen, R B; Pudliner, B S; Zika, M R; Brantley, P S; Vetter, J S; May, J M

    2003-08-29

    After a decade of experience, the Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons. The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) program was established to provide leading edge, high-end simulation capabilities needed to meet the program's assessment and certification requirements. The great challenge of this program lies in developing the tools and resources necessary for the complex, highly coupled, multi-physics calculations required to simulate nuclear weapons. This paper describes the hardware and software environment we have applied to fulfill our nuclear weapons responsibilities. It also presents the characteristics of our algorithms and codes, especially as they relate to supercomputing resource capabilities and requirements. It then addresses impediments to the development and application of nuclear weapon simulation software and hardware and concludes with a summary of observations and recommendations on an approach for working with industry and government agencies to address these impediments.

  17. Canadians, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War security dilemma

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This dissertation provides a history of Canadian ideas about nuclear weapons from the late 1950s until the end of the Trudeau era in 1984. Throughout this period, Canadians reacted to the insecurity they felt in the world around them by expressing many conflicting, often irreconcilable views about a range of nuclear weapon issues, including Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads in 1963, the U.S. ABM program in the 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Canadian nuclear technology in the development of India's first nuclear explosion, and the Trudeau government's decision to allow the U.S. military to test cruise missiles in northern Canada The dissertation concludes with an examination of the emergence of a broadly-based, increasingly mainstream and influential anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s, the clearest manifestation of the insecurity Canadians experienced at the time. .The nuclear debates examined in this dissertation reveal that Canadians were divided over nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the arms race, proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, they came to fundamentally different conclusions about how Canada's nuclear weapon policies, and its support for the nuclear policies of its alliances, would contribute to international stability and order. Some believed that their security rested on the maintenance of a strong Western nuclear deterrent and supported Canada contributing to its credibility; others believed that the constant modernisation of nuclear arsenals fuelled by the superpower arms race posed a serious threat to their security. This conceptual dilemma-the security through nuclear strength argument versus the fear that the quest for security through quantitative and qualitative improvements of nuclear stockpiles increased the likelihood of nuclear war-left Canadians divided over the value and utility of nuclear weapons and the strategies developed around them. At the same time, Canadians' ideas about nuclear weapons

  18. Some mathematics of nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: In the many decades since the first demonstration of the power of nuclear weapons we have created a 'data set' that we may analyze to see if simple principles account for the observed history. There was initial fear that the proliferation of weapons would be exponential, driven by the principle that each nation would desire to have weapons to deter each other nuclear-armed nation. The doubling time could be taken as four years, between the tests of the US in 1945 and the USSR in 1949. By 1985, with ten doubling times, we would have had 1024 nuclear weapons states, far from the data. If we make a different hypothesis, that each nation is deterred from seeking nuclear weapons by each existing nuclear state, we obtain a differential equation leading to an expression for a much slower rate of increase, which is indeed found to be closely followed. If we have an understanding of the processes that lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we can be better at strengthening the barriers to further growth. The mathematical equations and relevant plots will be used to illustrate these observations. (author)

  19. Cognitive Consistency in Beliefs about Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nelson, Linden

    The paper details a study supporting the hypothesis that people's opinions about nuclear arms control are influenced by their logically relevant beliefs about nuclear weapons, nuclear war, and the Soviet Union. The hypothesis should not be construed to imply that these beliefs are the only influences or the most powerful influences on arms control…

  20. Emerging nuclear energy systems and nuclear weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Generally when considering problems of proliferation of nuclear weapons, discussions are focused on horizontal proliferation. However, the emerging nuclear energy systems currently have an impact mainly on vertical proliferation. The paper indicates that technologies connected with emerging nuclear energy systems, such as fusion reactors and accelerators, enhance the knowledge of thermonuclear weapon physics and will enable production of military useful nuclear materials (including some rare elements). At present such technologies are enhancing the arsenal of the nuclear weapon states. But one should not forget the future implications for horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons as some of the techniques will in the near future be within the technological and economic capabilities of non-nuclear weapon states. Some of these systems are not under any international control. (orig.)

  1. Principles of Guided Missiles and Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Naval Personnel Program Support Activity, Washington, DC.

    Fundamentals of missile and nuclear weapons systems are presented in this book which is primarily prepared as the second text of a three-volume series for students of the Navy Reserve Officers' Training Corps and the Officer Candidate School. Following an introduction to guided missiles and nuclear physics, basic principles and theories are…

  2. Nuclear Weapons: Concepts, Issues, and Controversies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reardon, Betty; And Others

    1983-01-01

    The schools must confront and deal with the issues of the nuclear weapons controversy on pain of ceasing to be relevant to the critical needs of the rising generation. Every aspect of the nuclear arms controversy needs to be discussed in secondary and university classrooms. (RM)

  3. Nuclear weapon race does not stop

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    60 years after Hiroshima, the race for nuclear weaponry keeps on. The comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), signed in 1996 by the 5 official nuclear-weapon-owning states (Usa, Russia, China, U.K. and France), has not yet been implemented because its implementation requires the ratification of 44 states that harbour on their territories industrial or research nuclear reactors. Till now only 33 such states have ratified CTBT. CTBT aims at prohibiting any nuclear test whatever the amount of energy released in it. Countries like Usa, North-Korea, Russia, soon Iran... are suspected to develop new types of nuclear warfare. For 2005 the American Congress have decided to freeze the funding of programmes dedicated to the development of 'mini-nukes' like the bunker-burster. The international network of monitoring stations will soon cover all the world and will be able to detect and locate, in an almost automated way, any test involving an energy greater than 1 kiloton. 321 stations have been settled and their efficient detection systems are based on seismic or infra-sound or radioactivity or hydro-acoustic analysis. (A.C.)

  4. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Transformation - A Sustainable Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this process of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start

  5. The influence of the Lop Nor Nuclear Weapons Test Base to the population of the Republic of Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The method of electron spin resonance (ESR) dosimetry was applied to human tooth enamel to obtain estimates of individual absorbed dose for residents of Makanchi, Urdzhar and Taskesken settlements located near the Kazakhstan-Chinese border (about 400 km to the South-East, from the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS) and about 1000 km from the Lop Nor Nuclear Weapons Test Base, China). Since the ground and atmospheric nuclear tests (1964-1981) at Lop Nor, the people residing in these settlements are believed to have been heavily exposed to radioactive fallout. Tooth samples had been extracted for medical reasons during the course of ordinary dental treatment. The village of Kokpekty, located 400 km to the South-east of the SNTS, was chosen as the control group since it has not been subjected to any radioactive contamination. The mean excess doses in tooth enamel obtained after subtraction of the contribution of natural background radiation do not exceed 62 ± 28 mGy, 64 ± 30 mGy, 49 ± 27 mGy and -19 ± 36 mGy for all ages of the residents of Makanchi, Urdzhar, Taskesken and the control village of Kokpekty, respectively.

  6. Effects of nuclear weapons. Third edition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, S.; Dolan, P.J.

    1977-01-01

    Since the last edition of ''The Effects of Nuclear Weapons'' in 1962 much new information has become available concerning nuclear weapon effects. This has come in part from the series of atmospheric tests, including several at very high altitudes, conducted in the Pacific Ocean area in 1962. In addition, laboratory studies, theoretical calculations, and computer simulations have provided a better understanding of the various effects. A new chapter has been added on the electromagnetic pulse. The chapter titles are as follows: general principles of nuclear explosions; descriptions of nuclear explosions; air blast phenomena in air and surface bursts; air blast loading; structural damage from air blast; shock effects of surface and subsurface bursts; thermal radiation and its effects; initial nuclear radiation; residual nuclear radiation and fallout; radio and radar effects; the electromagnetic pulse and its effects; and biological effects. (LTN)

  7. Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kemp, R. Scott

    2016-06-01

    Environmental sensing of nuclear activities has the potential to detect nuclear weapon programs at early stages, deter nuclear proliferation, and help verify nuclear accords. However, no robust system of detection has been deployed to date. This can be variously attributed to high costs, technical limitations in detector technology, simple countermeasures, and uncertainty about the magnitude or behavior of potential signals. In this article, current capabilities and promising opportunities are reviewed. Systematic research in a variety of areas could improve prospects for detecting covert nuclear programs, although the potential for countermeasures suggests long-term verification of nuclear agreements will need to rely on methods other than environmental sensing.

  8. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP)

  9. The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the later years the risks of nuclear proliferation have again become a major topic of interest. This is primarily due to the acute problems caused by Iraq, North Korea, and the 3 new states of the former USSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Analysis shows that security problems and prestige are the two most important motives, when the risks of proliferation are considered. But motives are not enough. To produce nuclear weapons a number of technological requirements must also be fulfilled. The country must be able to produce almost pure fissile material, i.e. 235U or 239Pu. It must also be able to solve a number of metallurgical, explosive, ignition, physics and other problems. These are in particular non-trivial, if a implosion weapon is to be designed. A review is made of the nuclear facilities in a number of the countries which have been suggested as possible future nuclear weapons countries. In particular facilities which can produce almost pure fissile materials, 235U and 239Pu, are considered. The possibility of nuclear terrorists have often been discussed in the media. However, it seems very unlikely that even a major terrorist or mafia organization will be able to solve all the weapons design problems, even if they could steal the fissile material. It is finally discussed what can be done to reduce the risk of further nuclear proliferation. Political pressure can be brought to bear on countries outside the NPT to join it, but it can be counter-productive, and sometimes the countries that are able to exert such pressure, are not willing to do so for other political reasons. The problem of countries which are party to the NPT, but which are believed to acquire nuclear weapons capability in violation of the treaty, can be countered by unannounced inspections of non-declared facilities. However, such inspections can only be meaningfully performed if the necessary intelligence is available. (EG)

  10. Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Stephen J. Cimbala

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia threatens nuclear deterrence and crisis stability in the region and o!ers unique challenges to United States and allied security. The article contrasts two possible futures for nuclear Asia: a relatively more constrained proliferation regime with tiered levels of agreed deployment ceilings among states; and an unconstrained nuclear arms race in Asia. Not only regional tensions, but also the overlap between regional and global antagonisms and ambitions might upset nuclear deterrence stability in Asia.

  11. Managing nuclear weapons in the United States

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miller, G.

    1993-03-16

    This report discusses the management and security of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war United States. The definition of what constitutes security is clearly changing in the US. It is now a much more integrated view that includes defense and the economy. The author tries to bring some semblance of order to these themes in this brief adaptation of a presentation.

  12. What Do Americans Know about Nuclear Weapons?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zweigenhaft, Richard L.

    1984-01-01

    Reports on a survey of knowledge of and attitudes toward nuclear weapons. Respondents (N=938) were students and adults aged 15 to 89 who completed a 51-item questionnaire. Also reports on an experiment in which college students (N=166) were given the survey under one of four different conditions. (JN)

  13. Europium-155 in Debris from Nuclear Weapons

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Aarkrog, Asker; Lippert, Jørgen Emil

    1967-01-01

    The lithium-drifted germanium detector enables determination of europium-155 on a routine basis in environmental samples contaminated with debris from nuclear weapons. From measurements of europium-155, cesium-144, and strontium-90 in air filters collected between 1961 and 1966, the yield...

  14. On the reduction of nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Bacher, Robert F.

    1981-01-01

    The United States, in 1946, proposed that an international authority be formed to control the dangerous parts of atomic energy. The proposal met with very little success, except to lead to the conclusion that there was no apparent reason why it was not technically feasible. Discussions on nuclear weapons testing, initiated in 1958, reached some agreement on test restrictions in Subsequent years.

  15. Is there any future for nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons occupy a paradoxal place both in the collective imagination and in the historical reality: on the one hand everybody dreads the apocalypse horror, and on the other hand, dissuasion appears as an unchanging and quite comfortable situation. However, the world has become multipolar in this domain as well. The geopolitical map is reconstructing. Doctrinal revisions, initiatives against nuclear weapons proliferation, and nuclear disarmament measures are now on the agenda. The best foreign and French experts examine for the first time the consequences of these evolutions. They analyse in particular the split up risks and the potential consequences of a nuclear conflict in regions where atomic arms have become a key-component of the strategic landscape: Middle-Est, Far-East, Southern Asia. The choices France and its allies will have to face are examined as well. (J.S.)

  16. Manhattan project II: Abolishing nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Most people seem to think that the era of nuclear danger is over, that it ended along with the Cold War. Whatever residual problems remain in terms of proliferation or possible terrorism, they believe, are being dealt urgently and adequately by their national leaders. Unfortunately, they are wrong on both counts. Although the risk of nuclear war between the NATO and former Warsaw Pact powers has virtually vanished, the chance that some nuclear weapons will kill many people, may be higher than before. The elimination of nuclear weapons, meaning rejection of terrorism, must be accomplished by multilateral collaboration. To recover fundamental moral bearings, as well as to preserve life and civilization, the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, India and Pakistan must cease to be terrorist states

  17. Nuclear weapons, a danger for our world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is about an exhibition about the danger of the increasing amount of nuclear-weapons and was presented in the occasion of the second special meeting of the UN General Assembly (1982). This report describes the causes of a nuclear-war and analyses the causes of the bomb-drop of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as possible causes of a bombing of New York City and long-term-consequences of nuclear radiation. Furthermore it lists problems with a higher priority than the armament of nuclear-arms. (kancsar)

  18. The future of nuclear weapons in Europe workshop summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A summary is presented of a workshop that addressed the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. The workshop topics included the evolving European security environment; the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and nuclear weapons; the United States, NATO, and nuclear weapons; and Western Europe and nuclear weapons. The workshop, held at Los Alamos July 26, 1991, was sponsored by the Center for National Security Studies of the Los Alamos National Laboratory

  19. Nuclear Weapon and Military Equipment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    N. Natarajan

    1985-10-01

    Full Text Available Military equipment must survive a, nuclear attack if enough personnel required to operate them remain combat effective. To achieve this goal, the criteria that determine equipment survivability should be established and any new design should incorporate these criteria to evolve a hardened design. An analysis of the overall response by considering the response to each individual nuclear environment can result in a balanced overall hardened system. The paper discusses the criteria required to be known.

  20. To make a national based historical survey of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Experiences from the example of Sweden

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    procedures. 3. A description and analysis of the nuclear-related materials and activities since 1945 (this is especially important when the state in question has had extended plans to acquire nuclear weapons capability, as in the case of Sweden). This part of the project lists the international inspections of nuclear materials and reactor facilities in the specific State (an important aim is to show how the early inspection routines were designed, and how it was developed later on, especially in the sense of co-operation with other States and the Agency). Questions like the following have to be answered: How were the plans intended to be worked out in theory and practice? Who were involved in the programmes/projects and what sorts of experiments were carried out? Where were the laboratories located, which and how much nuclear-related material was used and how did the decommissioning of the activities take part? Are there any materials or facilities left over from the programmes/experiments? In addition to this task, there is another important enumeration to be made: i. e. the national archives (and perhaps foreign archives as well) that comprise documentation related to both civil and military nuclear energy activities. An important aim is to show what each archive contains, especially about nuclear materials, facilities and equipment that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. It is also important to investigate whether the archives in question are available for the public and/or researchers. 4. An estimation of a State's capability to produce nuclear weapons? Several models can, of course, be practicable in terms of evaluating a certain State 's latent capability to produce nuclear weapons. In the survey of the Swedish nuclear activities, a model from the American political scientist Stephen M Meyer's The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation was used. (author)

  1. Nuclear weapons and NATO-Russia relations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cornwell, G.C.

    1998-12-01

    Despite the development of positive institutional arrangements such as Russian participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council, the strategic culture of Russia has not changed in any fundamental sense. Russian strategic culture has not evolved in ways that would make Russian policies compatible with those of NATO countries in the necessary economic, social, technological, and military spheres. On the domestic side, Russia has yet to establish a stable democracy and the necessary legal, judicial, and regulatory institutions for a free-market economy. Russia evidently lacks the necessary cultural traditions, including concepts of accountability and transparency, to make these adaptations in the short-term. Owing in part to its institutional shortcomings, severe socioeconomic setbacks have afflicted Russia. Russian conventional military strength has been weakened, and a concomitant reliance by the Russians on nuclear weapons as their ultimate line of defense has increased. The breakdown in the infrastructure that supports Russian early warning and surveillance systems and nuclear weapons stewardship defense, coupled with a tendency towards has exacerbated Russian anxiety and distrust toward NATO. Russia`s reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate line of defense, coupled with a tendency toward suspicion and distrust toward NATO, could lead to dangerous strategic miscalculation and nuclear catastrophe.

  2. Examination of Economic Feasibility of Nuclear Weapons in the Republic of Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This observation implies that the popular view on nuclear weapons amongst Korean public is in part due to lack of knowledge about overall implications of possessing nuclear weapons. In this regard, pros and cons of nuclear weapons development need to be better characterized and understood by the public to support nuclear nonproliferation culture development. Noting lack of literature on characterizing the economics of nuclear weapons development, this study aims at performing economic feasibility analysis of nuclear weapons development in the ROK. For this purpose, an approach called Index technique based on the US experiences was applied to Korean historical data along with cost-benefit analysis and Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis. In this study, the scenario of nuclear weapons development against North Korean nuclear threat was compared with conventional weapons-based defense strategy. The comparison was based on cost benefit analysis and qualitative multi-criteria decision analysis. Results indicate that nuclear weapons development is not a desirable option. However, as this work was a rather simplistic academic exercise, further work is needed to support the outcome of the study. Outcome of these investigations would be useful for communication with the public regarding the need for nuclear weapons for national defense and to develop nuclear nonproliferation culture in the ROK

  3. Examination of Economic Feasibility of Nuclear Weapons in the Republic of Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suh, Young A; Yim, Man Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    This observation implies that the popular view on nuclear weapons amongst Korean public is in part due to lack of knowledge about overall implications of possessing nuclear weapons. In this regard, pros and cons of nuclear weapons development need to be better characterized and understood by the public to support nuclear nonproliferation culture development. Noting lack of literature on characterizing the economics of nuclear weapons development, this study aims at performing economic feasibility analysis of nuclear weapons development in the ROK. For this purpose, an approach called Index technique based on the US experiences was applied to Korean historical data along with cost-benefit analysis and Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis. In this study, the scenario of nuclear weapons development against North Korean nuclear threat was compared with conventional weapons-based defense strategy. The comparison was based on cost benefit analysis and qualitative multi-criteria decision analysis. Results indicate that nuclear weapons development is not a desirable option. However, as this work was a rather simplistic academic exercise, further work is needed to support the outcome of the study. Outcome of these investigations would be useful for communication with the public regarding the need for nuclear weapons for national defense and to develop nuclear nonproliferation culture in the ROK.

  4. The effects of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    At least 40% of the population of Hiroshima and 26% of that of Nagasaki were killed in the nuclear attacks. The early and late effects in these two cities and in relation to present weaponry are briefly discussed. The effects of blast, heat and initial and delayed radiation are outlined. Neutron and gamma doses as functions of slant distances for bombs of various specified yields are presented. Dose rates for fallout at various times after explosions in terms of wind velocity and various cloud formations are also outlined. In Western Europe there are only 145 cities with populations of over 200,000. It is concluded that the destruction of these cities would kill in a short time more than one third of the population of Western Europe, and in a nuclear world war, not only would a fair part of the urban population in the Northern Hemisphere be killed by fire and blast, and most of the survivors by radiation, but much of the rural population would be killed by radiation from fallout. Many millions in the Southern Hemisphere would also be killed by fallout radiation. (U.K.)

  5. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the last century, the rapid progress in science and technology enabled richer and more comfortable lives, but the other side of this double-edged sword is that science and technology have also been used to develop and improve high-tech weaponry. Due to this fact, deployed around the world are tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and detonation of only a few of them would kill some hundreds of million of people and destroy out civilization. The human race stands at a crossroad. What should be done? It is a crucially important responsibility for the Japanese government to work for peace in which there will be no fear or threat of nuclear weapons

  6. Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, and the Arms Race.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hollander, Jack, Ed.

    A symposium was organized to reexamine the realities of vertical proliferation between the United States and the Soviet Union and to place into perspective the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world, including the possible role of commercial nuclear power in facilitating proliferation. The four invited symposium…

  7. North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Implications for future policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    , making it the only state ever to do so, and in February 2005 it declared that it possessed nuclear weapons. It attempted long-range missile launches in July 2006 and April 2009, conducted nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009, and since late 2008 has claimed status as a nuclear weapons state outside the NPT. The shortcomings and outright failures in nuclear diplomacy with the DPRK have a long lineage. Under the Agreed Framework of October 1994, the Clinton Administration bought time by freezing North Korea's plutonium production capabilities, but a comprehensive resolution of controversies that triggered the first nuclear crisis was deferred indefinitely. The Bush Administration was openly contemptuous of the arrangements negotiated under its predecessor and walked away from the Agreed Framework, but it lacked a credible fallback plan when Pyongyang resumed its plutonium-based activities. Some senior Bush Administration officials, moreover, were convinced that North Korea would wilt under pressure or even collapse outright, but the DPRK defied such expectations, and moved quickly toward an avowed weapons capability. The DPRK's long pursuit of strategic autonomy, however, remains at the center of this story, and starkly contradicts the North's claims that it is intent on a non-nuclear future. North Korea signed various agreements that, at least in theory, invalidated pursuit of nuclear weapons. These agreements included Pyongyang's assent to basic non-proliferation documents; an inter-Korean accord that entered into force in 1992; bilateral agreements with the United States; and multilateral declarations negotiated at the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in 2005 and 2007. But negotiated agreements failed to eliminate the North Korea's pursuit of the technologies and expertise necessary for a weapons program. By walking away from these agreements, Pyongyang compelled Washington and other capitals to undertake reassessments of previous policies. (author)

  8. Nuclear energy in a nuclear weapon free world

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, Joseph [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    The prospect of a nuclear renaissance has revived a decades old debate over the proliferation and terrorism risks of the use of nuclear power. This debate in the last few years has taken on an added dimension with renewed attention to disarmament. Increasingly, concerns that proliferation risks may reduce the prospects for realizing the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world are being voiced.

  9. Nuclear weapons issues in South Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Joeck, N.

    1993-07-02

    This report discusses how the US can play a productive mediating role in South Asia by engaging India and Pakistan in an international forum to manage nuclear weapons, as Edward Teller advocated. India and Pakistan have developed their nuclear capabilities because they fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten the US. The appropriate response for the US, therefore, is diplomatic engagement and negotiations. In addition to the international approach, encouragement and facilitation of regional and bilateral interactions will also be important. Formal arms control agreements have been reached, but less formal confidence-building measures, and unilateral security pledges may well be combined to form a more secure strategic environment in South Asia than a nuclear armed confrontation across the porous South Asian border.

  10. The real value of nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The international community has greeted the establishment of two new nuclear weapon-free zones with praise. Africa and South Asia are the regions which will join, once the respective treaties are ratified and in force, Latin America and the South Pacific to ensure that extensive areas of the earth remain free of nuclear weapons. The usual reaction to these accomplishments is to hail them as important contributions to international peace and security, and as meaningful steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon-free zones have their value but this value relates mainly to the countries within the zone. The interest of nuclear-weapon states are not really affected, or, if they are, the influence is not significant. One should bear in mind that the really important and meaningful nuclear weapon-free zones have yet to be achieved

  11. Report of the Canberra commission. Eliminating nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book was originally published in Australia under the title: 'Report of the Canberra commission on the elimination of nuclear weapons'. The aim of this report in to convince any reader that the elimination of nuclear weapons has become a necessary goal at the end of this century. After a summary of the political conclusions of the commission, a first part presents the debate about nuclear weapons while a second part describes the different steps that must be followed to completely eliminate the nuclear weapons worldwide. Details about verification, legal aspects and actions are given in appendixes. (J.S.)

  12. UFOs and nukes. Extraordinary encounters at nuclear weapons sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Everyone knows about the reported recovery of a crashed alien spaceship near Roswell, New Mexico in July 1947. However, most people are unaware that, at the time of the incident, Roswell Army Airfield was home to the world's only atomic bomber squadron, the 509th Bomb Group. Was this merely a coincidence? During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built thousands of the far more destructive hydrogen bombs, some of them a thousand times as destructive as the first atomic bombs dropped on Japan. If the nuclear standoff between the superpowers had erupted into World War III, human civilization - and perhaps the very survival of our species - would have been at risk. Did this ominous state of affairs come to the attention of outside observers? Was there a connection between the atomic bomber squadron based at Roswell and the reported crash of a UFO nearby? Did those who pilot the UFOs monitor the superpowers' nuclear arms race during the dangerous Cold War era? Do they scrutinize American and Russian weapons sites even now? UFOs and Nukes provides the startling and sometimes shocking answers to these questions. Veteran researcher Robert Hastings has investigated nuclear weapons-related UFO incidents for more than three decades and has interviewed more than 120 ex-US Air Force personnel, from former Airmen to retired Colonels, who witnessed extraordinary UFO encounters at nuclear weapons sites. Their amazing stories are presented here.

  13. Constraining potential nuclear-weapons proliferation from civilian reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cessation of the Cold War and renewed international attention to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are leading to national policies aimed at restraining nuclear-weapons proliferation that could occur through the nuclear-fuel cycle. Argonne, which has unique experience, technology, and capabilities, is one of the US national laboratories contributing to this nonproliferation effort

  14. Nuclear Weapons--A Suitable Topic for the Classroom?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Eijkelhof, Harrie; And Others

    1984-01-01

    Describes the development and implementation of curriculum materials that discuss nuclear weapons and the evaluation of those materials by administrators, teachers, and students. Also discusses the place of the study of nuclear weapons in the curriculum and aims of the materials. Suggested student activities are included. (JM)

  15. Cancer in People Exposed to Nuclear Weapons Testing

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... Compensation Programs for People Exposed to Radiation as Part of Nuclear Weapons Testing Between 1945 and 1962, the United States ... involving about 200,000 people were conducted as part of many of these tests. ... several nuclear weapons plant sites were exposed to radiation and other ...

  16. DOE Nuclear Weapon Reliability Definition: History, Description, and Implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wright, D.L.; Cashen, J.J.; Sjulin, J.M.; Bierbaum, R.L.; Kerschen, T.J.

    1999-04-01

    The overarching goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapon reliability assessment process is to provide a quantitative metric that reflects the ability of the weapons to perform their intended function successfully. This white paper is intended to provide insight into the current and long-standing DOE definition of nuclear weapon reliability, which can be summarized as: The probability of achieving the specified yield, at the target, across the Stockpile-To-Target Sequence of environments, throughout the weapon's lifetime, assuming proper inputs.

  17. Is a nuclear weapon-free world desirable?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this article, the author shows that a nuclear weapon-free world would probably be more dangerous than today's world because benefits of the existence of nuclear weapons are probably more important that the risks related to their existence. He outlines that nuclear deterrence has been very efficient for these last 65 years. He states that the disappearance of nuclear weapons could be envisaged only after a large transformation of safety conditions, but that such transformations are actually not at all under way. It would indeed require peaceful and democratic world governance

  18. The Problem Of Prohibition On The Use Of Nuclear Weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Ayse Nur Tutuncu

    2004-01-01

    As a result of United States’bombing of two Japanese cities in 1945, the Soviet Union, by setting fire of a weapon competition, became the second State which has developed nuclear weapons and has global interest in the nuclear division. The general nuclear weapons are not the only risk. The September 11th incident has been increased concerns about the world’s nuclear power stations and means that could be target of the terrorists. After the Second World War, an increasing trend of prolife...

  19. Can we stop the spread of nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In his address to the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, IAEA Director General Hans Blix reviewed the world's non-proliferation regime and the role of IAEA safeguards in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. He emphasized that the first and fundamental barrier to proliferation is the political will and determination of individual States not to acquire nuclear weapons, other barriers being legal obligations under treaties or agreements and the acceptance of safeguards inspections to verify peaceful uses of nuclear facilities

  20. Japan's nuclear weapons options and U.S. Security interests

    OpenAIRE

    Sharman, Christopher H.

    1998-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Japan is a virtual nuclear weapons power. It has the scientific and technical ability to produce hundreds or even thousands of nuclear weapons, but has chosen not to do so for political reasons. This thesis examines the historical development of Japan's nuclear energy and aerospace programs since the mid-1950s and considers the possibility that at various points in its history, Japan used these programs as a cover to insure that its nu...

  1. Book review: Nuclear weapons in the information age

    OpenAIRE

    Diskaya, Ali

    2013-01-01

    Far from being obsolete in today’s information age, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have not only survived, but have become weapons for states that face security threats, including perceived threats of nuclear blackmail, or expectation of conflicts. This study focuses on this unplanned coexistence of two distinct arts of war, including the possibility that states like the U.S. may be held hostage to nuclear blackmail by “outlier” regimes or terrorists, such as Nor...

  2. How to Make Historical Surveys of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonter, Thomas [Stockholm Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Economic History

    2003-05-01

    In 1998 SKI initiated a project in order to make a historical survey of the Swedish nuclear weapons research during the period 1945-2000. The survey is now fulfilled and contains of three reports. IAEA became interested in the project and accepted it in 2000 as a support program to increase transparency and to support the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Sweden. In the eyes of IAEA, the most important aim is to create knowledge and refine tools to enhance the means to strengthen the Safeguard System within the Additional Protocol. Other countries have now showed interest to follow the Swedish example and to make their own reviews of the nuclear energy and nuclear weapons research of their pasts. A co-operation between Sweden, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania and Latvia has now been initiated in order to make such historical reviews. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate is the initiator and financial supporter of the project. The cooperation project has three comprehensive goals: a. to create transparency in the nuclear energy field of the past. The intention is that the results of the conducted studies could be attached to the State Declaration according to the Additional Protocol in order to enhance transparency b. to account for the nuclear material traffic of the past and; c. to develop the competence in nuclear energy matters in general, and in particular, to extend the knowledge regarding each participating State's nuclear experience in the past. The first purpose of this paper is to describe the project and its aims. The second purpose is to present a general model of how a historical review of a State's nuclear related activities and nuclear weapons research can be designed. The model has been created in order to serve as a guide for other countries strengthening of their safeguards systems in the framework of the Additional Protocol. The third purpose is to present the pedagogy that has been used as a teaching method in order to train

  3. Perfection and the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Teleology, and Motives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brummett, Barry

    1989-01-01

    Uses Kenneth Burke's theory of perfection to explore the vocabularies of nuclear weapons in United States public discourse and how "the Bomb" as a God term has gained imbalanced ascendancy in centers of power. (MS)

  4. A Conceptual Framework for Teaching about Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jacobson, Willard; And Others

    1983-01-01

    Concepts which represent the minimal conceptual essentials for the study of nuclear weapons in secondary level social studies classes are discussed, and issues and controversies which may rise during such a study are examined. (RM)

  5. North Korea has the means to develop a nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For a long time already, North Korea has been developing technology that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon. Progress of the nuclear weapons programme has been monitored by means of satellites, and proof of the programme has been obtained, for instance, from a diplomat who defected and when unauthorized exports have been revealed. Led by the United States, the international community has wanted to bring the nuclear weapons programme to an end, but the exceptional negotiating skills of North Korean representatives and sudden turns of events have made the task the difficult one. North Korea has been threatened with economic sanctions, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has decided to cease all technical assistance to North Korea. North Korea could hardly benefit from the use of a nuclear weapon: instead, giving up the programme might help the country economically. The death of the country's dictatorial leader Kim Il Sung seems to have increased the willingness to give up the programme. However, not the slightest information has yet been received as to the destiny of the plutonium already produced. In the end, North Korea may not be required to cancel the entire nuclear weapons programme; freezing the programme may be enough. Thus there would eventually be silent approval of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. (orig.)

  6. A legal framework for a nuclear weapon convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The political possibility of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world has, since the Gulf War, at last come into view. This is mainly because serious numbers of the people from the national security establishment in the USA (a country that no longer has a rival to race against) have concluded that the elimination of nuclear weapons would best serve the country's interests. The crucial requirement for a nuclear-weapon-free world is a firm and serious policy by the main nuclear weapon states to achieve the goal of elimination. This political commitment must be backed by agreed (and inviolable) procedures for continually establishing new targets and deadlines, which drive the process relentlessly towards that ultimate objective, to be achieved at the earliest possible time. These words were incorporated into the final paragraph of the 1996 'Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons'. Even before the Canberra Commission was established, the Pugwash Council had proposed that the General Assembly of the United Nations should ask the Conference on Disarmament to initiate a study on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons. This paper considers some of the major aspects of such an instrument

  7. The role of nuclear weapons in the year 2000

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-01-01

    This publication presents the proceedings for the workshop, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Year 2000, held on October 22--24, 1990. The workshop participants considered the changing nature of deterrence and of our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, the impact of nuclear proliferation on regional conflicts, and ways that the nuclear forces might be restructured to reflect new political circumstances.

  8. Nuclear Weapons and Communication Studies: A Review Essay.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Taylor, Bryan C.

    1998-01-01

    Reviews the body of work inspired by the late Cold War period, where nuclear weapons briefly became a compelling object for communication scholars. Considers the prospects for nuclear communication scholarship in post-Cold War culture. Discusses "nuclear criticism" and issues regarding the bomb in communication. (SC)

  9. Virtual enterprise model for the electronic components business in the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ferguson, T.J.; Long, K.S.; Sayre, J.A. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hull, A.L. [Sandia National Labs., Livermore, CA (United States); Carey, D.A.; Sim, J.R.; Smith, M.G. [Allied-Signal Aerospace Co., Kansas City, MO (United States). Kansas City Div.

    1994-08-01

    The electronic components business within the Nuclear Weapons Complex spans organizational and Department of Energy contractor boundaries. An assessment of the current processes indicates a need for fundamentally changing the way electronic components are developed, procured, and manufactured. A model is provided based on a virtual enterprise that recognizes distinctive competencies within the Nuclear Weapons Complex and at the vendors. The model incorporates changes that reduce component delivery cycle time and improve cost effectiveness while delivering components of the appropriate quality.

  10. Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper examines international treaties in relation to the threat or use of nuclear weapons including the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It can be concluded that the effect of the aforesaid international treaties is still in doubt without explicit enforcement mechanisms and penalty for non-compliance. This paper also reviews the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and comments that a clear explanation on the legality of use of nuclear weapons in 'extreme circumstances of self-defence' is required. Examples from current state practice in relation to nuclear non-proliferation efforts are also provided, with special attention to China, North Korea and Iran. This paper suggests that China as a leader of developing countries should extend its efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and conduct communication between North Korea and Iran and other nuclear weapons states to reduce or prohibit nuclear weapons.

  11. Nuclear weapon states: Their roles, responsibilities and management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Four issues concerning the role of nuclear-weapon sates are briefly analyzed. The first is related to the importance of responsibilities that nuclear weapon states should take in order to improve the existing mechanisms for non-proliferation. Nuclear weapon states should cease further nuclear armament immediately and should unanimously agree to implement a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is both legal and moral obligation stipulated in the Non-proliferation Treaty. Second, an international plutonium management system needs to be established. The third issue is related to the need for IAEA special inspections (problem of North Korea). Difficulties could be overcome by strengthening the IAEA negotiation powers. Fourth, the IAEA and the international community could indicate their appreciation to states like South Korea that voluntarily abandon nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment in order to contribute to regional and global peace and stability

  12. Why are U.S. nuclear weapon modernization efforts controversial?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Acton, James

    2016-03-01

    U.S. nuclear weapon modernization programs are focused on extending the lives of existing warheads and developing new delivery vehicles to replace ageing bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. These efforts are contested and controversial. Some critics argue that they are largely unnecessary, financially wasteful and potentially destabilizing. Other critics posit that they do not go far enough and that nuclear weapons with new military capabilities are required. At its core, this debate centers on three strategic questions. First, what roles should nuclear weapons be assigned? Second, what military capabilities do nuclear weapons need to fulfill these roles? Third, how severe are the unintended escalation risks associated with particular systems? Proponents of scaled-down modernization efforts generally argue for reducing the role of nuclear weapons but also that, even under existing policy, new military capabilities are not required. They also tend to stress the escalation risks of new--and even some existing--capabilities. Proponents of enhanced modernization efforts tend to advocate for a more expansive role for nuclear weapons in national security strategy. They also often argue that nuclear deterrence would be enhanced by lower yield weapons and/or so called bunker busters able to destroy more deeply buried targets. The debate is further fueled by technical disagreements over many aspects of ongoing and proposed modernization efforts. Some of these disagreements--such as the need for warhead life extension programs and their necessary scope--are essentially impossible to resolve at the unclassified level. By contrast, unclassified analysis can help elucidate--though not answer--other questions, such as the potential value of bunker busters.

  13. The future of nuclear weapons: Proliferation in South Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kamal, N. [Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabada (Pakistan)

    1992-12-31

    The signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987, followed by the dramatic changes in East-West relations since 1989 and the more recent Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreement, have greatly eased public concerns about the danger of nuclear war. The context has also changed for the Nonaligned Movement, which had made nuclear disarmament and condemnation of the concept of nuclear deterrence the primary themes of its multilateral disarmament diplomacy. More important would be the interrelationship among the states possessing nuclear weapons (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). In any case, there is little risk of a revival of nuclear competition. Both France and China have decided to sign the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); they are the only two nuclear-weapon states that have stayed outside the regime. Meanwhile, Brazil and Argentina have moved further down the nonproliferation road by engaging in confidence-building measures and moving closer to joining the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free zone established under the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967. South Africa has also agreed to embrace the NPT as well as a nuclear-weapons-free zone regime for the entire African continent, while North Korea has agreed to sign a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thereby allowing in principle international inspection of its nuclear facilities. In the third world regions, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and competitive nuclear buildup are most pronounced in South Asia, a region where a variety of complicating problems exist: acute threat perceptions, historical emity, religious and sectarian animosity, ethnic antagonism, territorial disputes, ambitions for regional dominance, and domestic political instability. This chapter will focus primarily on South Asia, although references will also be made to other regions, where relevant. 17 refs.

  14. Nuclear Weapons and the Future: An "Unthinkable" Proposal.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tyler, Robert L.

    1982-01-01

    The author looks ahead 30 or 40 years to see what might come of the nuclear weapons predicament. As a minimal first step in the campaign against nuclear warfare, he suggests a unilateral and complete disarmament by the United States. (AM)

  15. Psychology and Nuclear Weapon Issues: Topics, Concepts, and Bibliography.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nelson, Linden, Comp.

    The document outlines 15 topics, each with concepts and selected references, to illustrate the relevance of psychology for understanding and coping with the threat of nuclear war. Awareness of the literature is intended to encourage psychologists to become more active in applying psychological concepts to nuclear weapons issues. The articles and…

  16. Changing Our Ways of Thinking: Health Professionals and Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Neal, Mary

    1984-01-01

    Outlines the issues raised by health professionals concerned about the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, including epidemics, civil defense, arms costs, psychosocial aspects, and ethical responsibility. Appendixes include lists of antinuclear organizations, medical professional associations, and 160 references. (SK)

  17. Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jenkins-Smith, H.C.; Herron, K.G. [Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States). Institute for Public Policy; Barke, R.P. [Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA (United States). School of Public Policy

    1994-04-01

    This report summarizes the findings of a nationwide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories. A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-cold war security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust and official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons; (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons, and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4) preventing nuclear terrorism. Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-cold war security environment.

  18. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1992-12-31

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL`s Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents.

  19. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL's Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents

  20. Joseph A. Burton Forum Award: Some Nuclear Weapons Dilemmas

    Science.gov (United States)

    May, Michael

    2014-03-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a combination of political and ethical dilemmas the solution to which has not been found. On one hand, in the view of both US government leaders and US allies, nuclear deterrence continues to play an essential part in the US role as the ultimate source of military strength for the alliances among the major democratic countries. It also continues to be in demand by countries that believe themselves to be isolated and threatened. On the other hand, nuclear weapons, besides being effective deterrents, can cause unprecedented loss of life and risk the demise of civilizations. No ban or technical precaution could prevent the rebuilding of nuclear weapons in a crisis. No diplomatic arrangement to date has erased the threat of invasion and war in the world. Only the abandonment of war and the threat of war as instruments of policy can make nuclear weapons obsolete. The slow, halting, risky road to that end remains the only hope for a world in which lasting solutions to the nuclear dilemmas are possible.

  1. Proliferation: does the peaceful use of nuclear energy have to lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The question of whether the proliferation of nuclear weapons is promoted by an increasing use of peaceful nuclear energy can be answered with a well-founded no. Even a regional renouncing of the peaceful use of nuclear energy would not reduce the worldwide problem of nuclear weapons' proliferation. Therefore, joint efforts must be aimed at promoting trust between peoples in the nuclear sphere and the political reasons for the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be reduced in order also to promote international harmony

  2. The use of neutron scattering in nuclear weapons research

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Juzaitis, R.J. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1995-10-01

    We had a weapons science breakout session last week. Although it would have been better to hold it closer in time to this workshop, I think that it was very valuable. it may have been less of a {open_quotes}short-sleeve{close_quotes} workshop environment than we would have liked, but as the first time two communities-the weapons community and the neutron scattering community- got together, it was a wonderful opportunity to transfer information during the 24 presentations that were made. This report contains discussions on the fundamental analysis of documentation of the enduring stockpile; LANSCE`s contribution to weapons; spallation is critical to understanding; weapons safety assessments; applied nuclear physics requires cross section information; fission models need refinement; and establishing teams on collaborative projects.

  3. Hitler's bomb: the secret story of Germans' attempts to get the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this historical book, the author claims to have evidence concerning the development and testing of a possible 'nuclear weapon' by Nazi Germany in 1945. The 'weapon' in question is not alleged to be a standard nuclear weapon powered by nuclear fission, but something closer to either a radiological weapon (a so-called 'dirty bomb') or a hybrid-nuclear fusion weapon. Its new evidence is concerned primarily with the parts of the German nuclear energy project (an attempted clandestine scientific effort led by Germany to develop and produce atomic weapons during World War II) under Kurt Diebner, a German nuclear physicist who directed and administrated the project

  4. Thermal radiation from a nuclear weapon burst

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The different methods and correlations used to calculate the propagation of thermal radiation are reviewed and compared. A simple method to account for radiation enhancement by reflection from a superior cloud deck or snow cover, as well as attenuation of radiation by cloud cover below the burst is presented. The results show that the thermal reach may vary considerably. Additional calculation show that a significant fraction of the thermal energy may be incident after the arrival of the shock wave. Results for a range of weapon yields are presented, and the implications for blast-induced (secondary) fire starts are discussed

  5. Your Career and Nuclear Weapons: A Guide for Young Scientists and Engineers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Albrecht, Andreas; And Others

    This four-part booklet examines various issues related to nuclear weapons and how they will affect an individual working as a scientist or engineer. It provides information about the history of nuclear weapons, about the weapons industry which produces them, and about new weapons programs. Issues are raised so that new or future graduates may make…

  6. Nuclear myths and social discourse: the U.S. decision to pursue nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Williams, David L.

    1996-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Why do countries want nuclear weapons? This question has plagued non- proliferation and U.S. intelligence experts since the beginning of the nuclear era. Motivations for nuclear weapons typically are viewed as the product of external variables (perceived insecurity, prestige, etc.). This thesis asserts that a different level of analysis is appropriate. It is a society's beliefs about nuclear technology that at least partially explains ...

  7. The origin of Iraq's nuclear weapons program: Technical reality and Western hypocrisy

    CERN Document Server

    Erkman, S; Hurni, J P; Klement, S; Erkman, Suren; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre; Klement, Stephan

    2005-01-01

    This report is based on a series of papers written between 1980 and 2005 on the origin of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, which was known to one of the authors in the late 1970s already, as well as to a number of other physicists, who independently tried without success to inform their governments and the public. It is concluded that at no point did the Western governments effectively try to stop Iraq's nuclear weapons program, which suggests that its existence was useful as a foreign policy tool, as is confirmed by its use as a major justification to wage two wars on Iraq.

  8. Public distrust and hazard management success at the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Based on experience gained while serving a public oversight commission appointed by the governor of Colorado, hazard management at the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant is reviewed. Specific reference is made to the plant's history of controversy, its defense-in-depth strategy of hazard control, occupational health issues, public exposure to plutonium, and the assessment of low-probability, high-consequence risks. This leads to the conclusion that Rocky flats is, by any objective standard, a hazard management success. It follows that public distrust of Rocky Flats arises as much from fear and loathing of nuclear weapons themselves as from the manufacturing process by which they are made

  9. Nuclear weapons and the Korean Peninsula: A Chinese perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1991, North and South Korea issued a joint declaration on the denuclearisation of the peninsula. Such denuclearisation will undoubtedly be conductive to the security, stability and development of the region. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone relies, in the first place, on the efforts of the countries in the region. China does not advocate, nor support nuclear proliferation. China's basic position concerning nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is to seek to maintain peace and stability and to promote realisation of denuclearisation

  10. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

    Science.gov (United States)

    Middleton, Tiffany Willey

    2010-01-01

    In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

  11. After fifty years of the nuclear age: Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or elimination of them?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ever since the first test of the atomic bomb and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, mankind lived with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were inevitably connected with the Cold War, with its end new opportunity has come concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Steps are to be undertaken in order to eliminate the nuclear weapons. First, would be the prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. By excluding the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, the world could be closer to nuclear disarmament than ever. The prohibition of the use of some type of weapons could be a breakthrough towards the elimination of such weapons. While the negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons would be difficult, as were those to ban chemical weapons, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons would eventually lead to their elimination. During the Cold War, the imminent goal of disarmament was to stop the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. But in the post-Cold War era an opportunity has developed for further steps towards nuclear disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons

  12. City mayors on the march. Hiroshima leading citizen campaign to ban nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Led on our tragic experience 58 years ago, Hiroshima has continually called for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the realization of genuine and lasting world peace. Unfortunately, despite our efforts, this planet still bristles with enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons, and today we face an increasingly perilous nuclear crisis. We see States that have nuclear weapons taking more rigid positions regarding disarmament, and non-nuclear-weapon States frightened into seeking their own nuclear bombs. The global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). the pivotal international agreement regarding nuclear weapons, is teetering on the brink of collapse. The world's leading superpower, the United States, for example, has refused to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and is resuming research into small nuclear weapons. These steps run contrary to the enshrined commitment of nuclear powers to reduce atomic arsenals and move toward a nuclear-weapon free world. We cannot sit quietly as the world plunges toward unspeakable violence and misery. We must let our leaders know, first and foremost, that we demand immediate freedom from the nuclear threat. Nuclear weapons are heinous, cruel, inhumane weapons that threaten our entire species. In 1996, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion declaring them illegal. At the Meeting of the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference held in April 2003 in Geneva the president of the World Conference of Mayors for Peace, a non-governmental organization (NGO) that now has 554 member cities in 107 countries and regions, the following demands, were made: A complete and total ban on all nuclear weapons everywhere; Removal of all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert immediately and withdrawal of all nuclear weapons deployed on foreign territory; It is high time for all recognized nuclear-weapon States to join in a multilateral process of nuclear disarmament and for de-facto nuclear-weapon States

  13. Public opinion, commitment traps and nuclear weapons policy

    OpenAIRE

    Center on Contemporary Conflict

    2015-01-01

    Performer: CISAC, Stanford University Principal Investigator: Scott D. Sagan Cost: $100,000 Fiscal Year(s): 2014-2015 Policymakers and scholars widely believe that there is a deep public aversion to nuclear weapons. But there is no empirical evidence on the strength of “antinuclear instincts” and the conditions under which they operate in the United States and other countries. This is especially relevant in light of current debates over “red lines” for military inte...

  14. DOE's management and oversight of the nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DOE's nuclear weapons complex is virtually shut-down today due to a multitude of serious environmental, safety, and operational problems. These include deteriorated facilities, contaminated soil and groundwater, and disposal of radioactive waste that has been in temporary storage for decades. This report discusses these ongoing problems, as well as longstanding management problems, recent DOE management and oversight initiatives, and GAO's views on DOE's efforts and implications for the future management of the complex

  15. Techniques to evaluate the importance of common cause degradation on reliability and safety of nuclear weapons.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Darby, John L.

    2011-05-01

    As the nuclear weapon stockpile ages, there is increased concern about common degradation ultimately leading to common cause failure of multiple weapons that could significantly impact reliability or safety. Current acceptable limits for the reliability and safety of a weapon are based on upper limits on the probability of failure of an individual item, assuming that failures among items are independent. We expanded the current acceptable limits to apply to situations with common cause failure. Then, we developed a simple screening process to quickly assess the importance of observed common degradation for both reliability and safety to determine if further action is necessary. The screening process conservatively assumes that common degradation is common cause failure. For a population with between 100 and 5000 items we applied the screening process and conclude the following. In general, for a reliability requirement specified in the Military Characteristics (MCs) for a specific weapon system, common degradation is of concern if more than 100(1-x)% of the weapons are susceptible to common degradation, where x is the required reliability expressed as a fraction. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon subsystem if more than 0.1% of the population is susceptible to common degradation. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon component or overall weapon system if two or more components/weapons in the population are susceptible to degradation. Finally, we developed a technique for detailed evaluation of common degradation leading to common cause failure for situations that are determined to be of concern using the screening process. The detailed evaluation requires that best estimates of common cause and independent failure probabilities be produced. Using these techniques, observed common degradation can be evaluated for effects on reliability and safety.

  16. Verifying the transition from low levels of nuclear weapons to a nuclear weapon-free world. VERTIC research report no. 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The process of verifying the complete elimination of nuclear warheads in national stockpiles can be divided, conceptually, into four stages: first, comprehensive declarations of warhead and material inventories, as a base-line from which verified disarmament can proceed; second, the transfer of all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissile material into bonded store; third, demilitarisation measures, such as to render warheads unusable without disassembly and refabrication; fourth, dismantlement of warheads and disposition of fissile material. Many of the technologies and technologies and techniques needed for verifying the elimination of nuclear warheads have been worked out at a general level, largely in US studies. While it is essential that these techniques are refined and improved, what is most important now, if disarmament is to proceed expeditiously, is for each of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) themselves to study the central verification problems and requirements in order to identify particular techniques and approaches that meet their needs. As yet there is no system of integrated data exchange and verification that any of the NWS is willing to endorse. Each of the NWS should give detailed consideration to the logistics of dismantling the warheads in their respective stockpiles, including, for example, the practicalities of accommodating international verification at their potential dismantlement facilities. Each of the NWS might usefully review exactly which details of warhead design and construction have to remain secret in the course of the disarmament process, in the first place from one another, and second from the IAEA or any other international body that might be involved in international disarmament arrangements. Introducing transparency and verification into national nuclear weapons programmes might have a significant financial cost. Research and ingenuity might reduce this cost, however, and early investments in these fields, with sharing of

  17. Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Principle of Unnecessary Suffering : The Use of Nuclear Weapons in an Armed Conflict

    OpenAIRE

    Krasny, Jaroslav; Kawano, Noriyuki

    2015-01-01

    This research is concerned with the use of nuclear weapons against combatants in an armed conflict and whether such a use violates or would violate the principle of unnecessary suffering as codified in St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 and the Hague Conventions. In order to analyze what constitutes unnecessary suffering the method chosen for this research is comparison of the effects of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons on the human body. The reason for choosing this method is the abh...

  18. From the lab to the battlefield? Nanotechnology and fourth generation nuclear weapons

    CERN Document Server

    Gsponer, A

    2002-01-01

    The paper addresses some major implications of microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) engineering and nanotechnology for the improvement of existing types of nuclear weapons, and the development of more robust versions of these weapons, as well as for the development of fourth generations nuclear weapons in which nanotechnology will play an essential role.

  19. Re-examining the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion: Concerning the Legality of Nuclear Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jasjit Singh

    2012-10-01

    Full Text Available The primary objections raised against total elimination of nuclear weapons are built around a few arguments mostly of non-technical nature.Nuclear weapons and the strategies for their use have resulted in the establishment of a vicious circle within which the international community is trapped.The argument that the world will be unsafe without nuclear weapons is only meant to further the narrow self-interest of the nuclear weapon states and their allies.The World Court’s far-reaching 1996 advisory opinion concluded that almost any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would violate international humanitarian law and law applicable in armed conflict, undermining most claims of nuclear weapon states regarding the legitimacy of possession, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The next logical step would be an initiative for a nuclear convention banning the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons in Asia and the adjoining oceans. But as long as the dominant elites in society and the nation-state believe in the utility of nuclear weapons for national security or as the currency of power, abolition of nuclear weapons will remain a mirage.

  20. The role of nuclear weapon ban in the peace keeping laws of the United Nations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The thesis includes a comparison of bilateral and multilateral nuclear weapon banning contracts and treaties (nuclear test ban treaty, nuclear weapon-free zones, nuclear disarmament etc.) and voluntary nuclear weapon abandonment declarations in view of legal aspects, their verification, ratification, included exceptions, and potential penalties. In the second part an eventual stabilization of the nuclear weapon ban and the non-proliferation treaty as customary international law and ''ius congens'' is discussed. The third part is concerned with possible measures and sanctions in connections with these laws. The fourth part discusses military measures for justifiable enforcement of the non-proliferation treaty and their legitimization.

  1. Aum Shinrikyo’s Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Development Efforts

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Andrea A. Nehorayoff

    2016-03-01

    Full Text Available This article details the terrorist activities of the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, from the perspective of its complex engineering efforts aimed at producing nuclear and chemical weapons. The experience of this millenarian organization illustrates that even violent non-state actors with considerable wealth and resources at their disposal face numerous obstacles to realizing their destructive aspirations. Specifically, Aum’s attempts at complex engineering were stymied by a combination of unchecked fantastical thinking, self-imposed ideological constraints, and a capricious leadership. The chapter highlights each of these mechanisms, as well as the specific ways in which they constrained the decision-making process and the implementation of the complex engineering tasks associated with their unconventional weapons development.

  2. SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY SINCE THE TERMINATION OF ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jo-Ansie Van Wyk

    2014-05-01

    Full Text Available This article reports on an analysis of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy since the country terminated its nuclear weapons programme, and explains why it has not retracted on this position. Through the skilful use of strategies typically used by middle powers in their conduct of nuclear diplomacy as niche diplomacy, South Africa has succeeded in norm construction, identity formation, and securing a niche role for itself, which resulted in material and non-material advantages for post-apartheid and post-nuclear weapons South Africa.

  3. International humanitarian law, nuclear weapons and the prospects for nuclear disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The author first recalls the general principles of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and outlines its main gaps (application of the notion of protected person, classification between own territory and occupied territory). Then and in this respect, he comments the various characteristics of nuclear weapons considered as explosive devices, and notably as they are thus addressed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). He comments the legal status of the ICJ advisory opinions, and more particularly the relationship between the ICJ advisory opinion on nuclear weapons and the IHL. Different aspects are addressed and discussed: the principle of distinction, the prohibition of the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. The author then comments NATO's nuclear policy in the international environment, and discusses the status and condition of nuclear deterrence. In order to address prospects for nuclear disarmament, the author notably compares differences between the arms control and non-proliferation approach, and the humanitarian disarmament approach

  4. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1994-03-01

    The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, seeks to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) that will extend from the US-Mexican border to Antarctica`s territorial boundaries, including large areas of open ocean. Under the treaty, signatory states pledge not to test, use, produce, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons; to use nuclear materials and facilities {open_quotes}exclusively for peaceful purposes;{close_quotes} and not to permit the stationing or development of nuclear weapons on their territories.

  5. Comparison of methodologies for assessing the risks from nuclear weapons and from nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    There are important differences between the safety principles for nuclear weapons and for nuclear reactors. For example, a principal concern for nuclear weapons is to prevent electrical energy from reaching the nuclear package during accidents produced by crashes, fires, and other hazards, whereas the foremost concern for nuclear reactors is to maintain coolant around the core in the event of certain system failures. Not surprisingly, new methods have had to be developed to assess the risk from nuclear weapons. These include fault tree transformations that accommodate time dependencies, thermal and structural analysis techniques that are fast and unconditionally stable, and parameter sampling methods that incorporate intelligent searching. This paper provides an overview of the new methods for nuclear weapons and compares them with existing methods for nuclear reactors. It also presents a new intelligent searching process for identifying potential nuclear detonation vulnerabilities. The new searching technique runs very rapidly on a workstation and shows promise for providing an accurate assessment of potential vulnerabilities with far fewer physical response calculations than would be required using a standard Monte Carlo sampling procedure

  6. On the U.S.-Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons Cut as a Path toward a Nuclear-free World

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Shi; Jianbin

    2015-01-01

    Complete destruction of nuclear weapons and realization of a world free from nuclear weapons are the common aspiration of mankind in the atomic era.To achieve the goal,the international community has proposed a series of steps and measures,which include calling for a deep reduction of the U.S.and Russian nuclear arsenals,promoting ratification of the CTBT,initiating negotiation of the FMCT,reducing the role of nuclear weapons

  7. A Preliminary study on attitudes toward nuclear weapons and nuclear tests of the residents of Kurchatov, Kazakhstan

    OpenAIRE

    Matsuo, Masatsugu; Bektorov, Yerzhan; Muldagaliyev, Talgat; Apsalikov, Kazbek; Hirabayashi, Kyoko; Kawano, Noriyuki

    2006-01-01

    The town of Kurchatov was a secret city newly built in the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site as the headquarters of the nuclear tests. The present paper is a pilot study, first, to explore how the current Kurchatov residents think and feel about nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, and secondly, to compare the results of the survey with those of the similar survey near Semipalatinsk. Though the present study is based upon a small and limited survey conducted in the city, it is hoped that it will ...

  8. Carrot, stick, or sledgehammer: U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Orcutt, Daniel J.

    2004-01-01

    Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons has shaken the foundations of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia. Because of North Korea's record of state-sponsored terrorism, illicit activities, human rights violations, arms sales, and fiery rhetoric, its development of operational nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing. Although most agree North Korea should not possess nuclear weapons, nobody has a solution. This thesis evaluates three U.S. polic...

  9. The Changing Strategic Context of Nuclear Weapons and Its Implications for the New Nuclear World Order

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2005-01-01

    Ever since the nuclear bombing at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear weapons have become one of the defining elements in shaping the world strategic situation for better or worse. The end of the Cold War has led to dramatic changes in the world security landscape. The international

  10. Nuclear weapons and conflict transformation: the case of India-Pakistan. - Pbk ed.

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    S. Khan

    2010-01-01

    Introduction Part 1: Theory 1. Studies on Conflict Transformation 2. Scholarship on Ramifications of Nuclear Weapons Acquisition 3. Elucidating Conflict Transformation with Nuclear Weapons Part 2: The India-Pakistan Protracted Conflict 4. Life of the Protracted Conflict 5. Introduction of Nuclear We

  11. Proliferation dangers associated with nuclear medicine: getting weapons-grade uranium out of radiopharmaceutical production.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Williams, Bill; Ruff, Tilman A

    2007-01-01

    Abolishing the threat of nuclear war requires the outlawing of nuclear weapons and dismantling current nuclear weapon stockpiles, but also depends on eliminating access to fissile material (nuclear weapon fuel). The near-universal use of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce radiopharmaceuticals is a significant proliferation hazard. Health professionals have a strategic opportunity and obligation to progress the elimination of medically-related commerce in HEU, closing one of the most vulnerable pathways to the much-feared 'terrorist bomb'.

  12. From the nuclear stalemate to a nuclear-weapon free world. In memory of Klaus Fuchs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The following topics were dealt with: The first soviet atomic bomb and Klaus Fuchs, in illusory worlds of Andrei Sakharov, Edward Teller, and Klaus Fuchs, Klaus Fuchs as grandfather of the hydrogen bomb, memories of and thinking about Klaus Fuchs, the Scottish years of Klaus Fuchs 1937-1941, Klaus Fuchs in the mirror of the Venona documents, Gernot Zippe and the ultracentrifuge or east-west technology transfer in the cold war, secret impulses for the soviet nuclear project, responsibility of knowledge with anti-facism, philosophy, and science as well as peace as the first human right in the work of Klaus Fuchs, the request of Klaus Fuchs for a lasting peace, Klaus Fuchs in Daniel Granin's roman ''Escape to Russia'', ways to a nuclear-weapon free world, Otto Hahn and the declarations of Mainau and Goettingen, nuclear winter, initiatives of the GDR for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons in negative entropy, militarism and antimilitarism of the nuclear age, contributions of the young Klaus Fuchs to statistical physics, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the responsibility of the scientists for a socially effective and efficient energy change, Berlin-Bucher contributions to a world free of biological weapons. (HSI)

  13. Implications of a North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lehman, R.F. II

    1993-07-01

    The Democratic People`s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the Cold War`s last remaining totalitarian regimes. Rarely has any society been as closed to outside influences and so distant from political, economic, and military developments around the globe. In 1991 and in 1992, however, this dictatorship took a number of political steps which increased Pyongyang`s interaction with the outside world. Although North Korea`s style of engagement with the broader international community involved frequent pauses and numerous steps backward, many observers believed that North Korea was finally moving to end its isolated, outlaw status. As the end of 1992 approached, however, delay and obstruction by Pyongyang became intense as accumulating evidence suggested that the DPRK, in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it would not accept additional inspections proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve concerns about possible violations and instead would withdraw from the Treaty. Pyongyang`s action raised the specter that, instead of a last act of the Cold War, North Korea`s diplomatic maneuvering would unravel the international norms that were to be the basis of stability and peace in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the discovery that North Korea was approaching the capability to produce nuclear weapons suggested that the nuclear threat, which had been successfully managed throughout the Cold War era, could increase in the post-Cold War era.

  14. A nuclear-weapon-free world and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It is not a matter of dispute that the technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy can be used for development of nuclear explosives, although this was not the path followed by five nuclear-weapon states. Specific proliferation-sensitive technologies are uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. In spite of the Non-Proliferation treaty, there are now 12 countries apart from five nuclear-weapon states known to possess these technologies and thus the technologies for producing nuclear explosives (South Africa, India, Pakistan, North Korea, suspected installations in Iraq destroyed by United Nations military action). If the nuclear energy is to play a significant role in the production of electricity on the global scale, more reactors would be needed than the present 440 units. Reprocessing of the spent fuel and the recycling of plutonium would be a necessity, thus the traffic of plutonium would become a part of standard power plant operation. From ecological point of view it cannot be ignored that nuclear fission is the only available energy process capable of producing great amount of energy without carbondioxide emission. Accepting that peaceful use of nuclear energy is present to stay, for economic and ecological reasons, the conclusion follows that national enrichment and reprocessing would not be compatible with a nuclear-weapon free world. The solution of the problem is in fact rather obvious: international nuclear fuel cycle centres should replace the national installations

  15. Towards a world free from nuclear weapons: Why South Africa gave up the nuclear option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    South Africa is the first country in history that has voluntarily dismantled its nuclear weapons capability. All six nuclear devices and a seventh incomplete device were ordered destroyed in 1989. South Africa joined the NPT in 1991 and signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA the same year. In 1993, the IAEA confirmed that there was no indication that there remained 'any sensitive components of the nuclear weapons programme that have not been rendered useless or converted to commercial nonnuclear applications or peaceful nuclear usage'. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seemed obvious that the world was shifting rapidly towards a new world order; internal changes were taking place in South Africa and the costs of maintaining a nuclear weapons programme were becoming prohibitive. South Africa's decision was a challenge to the world to take firm steps towards the objective of the total firm steps towards the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It underlines the need to promote vigorously the benefit that disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control hold for international peace and security

  16. Nuclear weapons decision-making; an application of organization theory to the mini-nuke case

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kangas, J.L.

    1985-01-01

    This dissertation addresses the problem of constructing and developing normative theory responsive to the need for improving the quality of decision-making in the nuclear weapons policy-making. Against the background of a critical evaluation of various paradigms in the literature (systems analysis and opposed-systems designed, the bureaucratic politics model, and the cybernetic theory of decision) an attempt is made to design an alternative analytic framework based on the writings of numerous organization theorists such as Herbert Simon and Kenneth Arrow. The framework is applied to the case of mini-nukes, i.e., proposals in the mid-1970s to develop and deploy tens of thousands of very low-yield (sub-kiloton), miniaturized fission weapons in NATO. Heuristic case study identifies the type of study undertaken in the dissertation in contrast to the more familiar paradigmatic studies identified, for example, with the Harvard Weapons Project. Application of the analytic framework developed in the dissertation of the mini-nuke case resulted in an empirical understanding of why decision making concerning tactical nuclear weapons has been such a complex task and why force modernization issues in particular have been so controversial and lacking in policy resolution.

  17. Removing the relevance of nuclear weapons: A legal perspective on the UN system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This presentation refers to the relevance of nuclear weapons in the United Nations system, nuclear deterrence doctrine under military alliances. Arms control treaties including the Non-Proliferation Treaty are discussed, and special sessions of the United Nations general Assembly devoted to disarmament are described related to new philosophy of security. New circumstances like dissolution of Soviet Union, North-South relations influence the relevance of nuclear weapons It is noted that the development of the regulations on global environmental harm as well as the international protection of human rights have further deprived nuclear weapons of their legal validity. Means for regulating nuclear weapons are described, including positive and negative security assurance mechanisms, no-first-use commitment, conventional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

  18. Anti-nuclear weapons activism in the United States and Great Britain: a comparative analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sussman, G.

    1987-01-01

    This study is a response to the lacuna in empirical research into political activism and the nuclear issue and seeks to ascertain the social and value characteristics, political attitudes, and political behavior of activists in the United States and Great Britain. Consideration is also given to gender differences in light of evidence of an emerging gender gap in these two countries. The study investigates the common forces cited in two sets of literature - post-industrialism and anti-nuclear weapons movements - which provide a framework for analysis. Survey research data is employed to assess cross-national similarities and differences. The findings obtained indicate that while American and British activists exhibit common social and value characteristics, British activists appear more integrated in their political opposition to nuclear weapons compared with their American counterparts. Survey results indicate that the political-action repertoire of these activists is quite diverse, suggesting a new style of politics in advanced industrial democracies. Gender-based analysis reveals two important findings. First, activist American men differ significantly from the other three social groups in their attitudes towards nuclear weapons. Second, activist women in both national settings participate at a level equal to or exceeding that of activist men.

  19. Atmospheric nuclear weapons test history narrated by carbon-14 in human teeth

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons since 1945 caused a significant increase in the concentration of atmospheric 14C. The 14C concentration in plants that assimilate 14C directly by photosynthesis reflects the atmospheric 14C concentration. Carbon-14 is then transferred into the human body through the food chain. Based on animal experiments, the collagen in human teeth is metabolically inert after its formation. This implies that the collagen of each tooth retains the 14C concentration which reflects the 14C concentration in the blood at the time collagen metabolism ceased. The distribution of the 14C concentration in the collagen of teeth from subjects of various ages would follow a pattern similar to that shown by soft tissues. In this paper the authors elucidate the relationship between the number of nuclear weapon tests and the distribution of 14C concentration in teeth

  20. Plus c`est la meme chose: The future of nuclear weapons in Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-07-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, the United States perhaps more than any other nuclear weapon state has deeply questioned the future role of nuclear weapons, both in a strategic sense and in Europe. It is probably the United States that has raised the most questions about the continuing need for and efficacy of nuclear weapons, and has expressed the greatest concerns about the negative consequences of continuing nuclear weapons deployment. In the US, this period of questioning has now come to a pause, if not a conclusion. In late 1994 the United States decided to continue to pursue reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons as well as other changes designed to reduce the dangers associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. But at the same time the US concluded that some number of nuclear forces would continue to be needed for national security for the foreseeable future. These necessary nuclear forces include a continuing but greatly reduced stockpile of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe under NATO`s New Strategic Concept. If further changes to the US position on nuclear weapons in Europe are to occur, it is likely to be after many years, and only in the context of dramatic additional improvements in the political and geo-political climate in and around Europe. The future role of nuclear weapons in Europe, as discussed in this report, depends in part on past and future decisions by the United States. but it must also be noted that other states that deploy nuclear weapons in Europe--Britain, France, and Russia, as well as the NATO alliance--have shown little inclination to discontinue their deployment of such weapons, whatever the United States might choose to do in the future.

  1. Abdus Salam: A Reappraisal. Part II Salam's Part in the Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Programme

    CERN Document Server

    Dombey, Norman

    2011-01-01

    Salam's biographies claim that he was opposed to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. This is somewhat strange given that he was the senior Science Advisor to the Pakistan government for at least some of the period between 1972 when the programme was initiated and 1998 when a successful nuclear weapon test was carried out. I look at the evidence for his participation in the programme.

  2. The Superpowers: Nuclear Weapons and National Security. Teacher's Guide. National Issues Forums in the Classroom.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Levy, Tedd

    This teacher's guide is designed to accompany the National Issues Forums'"The Superpowers: Nuclear Weapons and National Security." Activities and ideas are provided to challenge students to debate and discuss the United States-Soviet related issues of nuclear weapons and national security. The guide is divided into sections that describe: (1)…

  3. Teaching with the News: North Korea and Nuclear Weapons. Choices for the 21st Century.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brown Univ., Providence, RI. Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Inst. for International Studies.

    In October 2002 North Korea admitted that it had been operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of international treaties and the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea also appeared to be taking steps to begin production of nuclear weapons and, according to U.S. officials, may have a missile that can hit…

  4. Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department's first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department's legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle

  5. Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-01-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department`s first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department`s legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle.

  6. Worldwide fallout of plutonium from nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Measurements of 238Pu and /sup 239,240/Pu fallout from nuclear weapons tests and the SNAP-9A navigational satellite burnup are presented for the years through 1980. Data abstracted from the literature were taken from the stratosphere, atmosphere, and from deposition and surface soil. Over 7300 data entries are included in the 23 tables. The tables are sorted by medium (stratosphere, atmosphere, and deposition near the surface and soil, nuclide, hemisphere, and longitude going from west to east, and are arranged in chronological order. Latitudes are also provided. Fallout levels in SI units (becquerels), calculated from the original readings, and the references from which the original data were taken are given in the report. The appendix is a map showing the various sites from which data were obtained

  7. Frederic Joliot-Curie and the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The author describes the attitude and action of Pierre Joliot-Curie after the explosion of the first nuclear bomb in Hiroshima and during the following years. He notably describes the creation of the French CEA (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique), the commitment of Joliot-Curie for the creation of a scientist movement, the atomic negotiation within the United Nations, the creation and actions of the Mouvement de la Paix (from April 1949 until the Stockholm Appeal) within the Cold War context, the commitment of Joliot-Curie against weapons of mass destruction and its difficult relationship with his communists friends, his participation to the elaboration of the Einstein-Russel Appeal, and the Pugwash conference in 1957

  8. Nuclear Weapon Systems Today: A Unit Curriculum for Liberal Arts Students.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shanebrook, J. Richard

    1988-01-01

    Described is a unit of study on nuclear weapons from a course on nuclear technology. Provided are the elements of first strike attack designed for invoking students' interest and an explanation of each. (YP)

  9. Germany and the role of nuclear weapons: between prohibition and revival

    OpenAIRE

    Meier, Oliver

    2016-01-01

    "Never since the end of the Cold War have the international community and Europe been so deeply divided over the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. There is disagreement within the United Nations over whether to begin negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapons. At the same time, Russia's aggression against Ukraine and Moscow's associated nuclear threats have triggered a new discussion in NATO about enhancing its nuclear deterrent. Both debates are difficult and uncomfortable fo...

  10. Nuclear-weapon-free zones: Pursuing security, region by region. Conference of States Parties and Signatories of treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, over the past four decades, is a testament to what nations can do, region by region, to achieve common security objectives. In fact, when considering the history of nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it might be said that here in Mexico City is where it all began. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first multilateral treaty to establish a region free of nuclear weapons and a requirement for comprehensive IAEA safeguards for its parties - and clearly gave impetus to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones provide tangible security benefits. They help to reassure the larger international community of the peaceful nuclear intentions of countries in these regions. They provide their members with security assurances against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons by a nuclear-weapon State. They include control mechanisms for dealing with non-compliance in a regional setting. And in all cases, they prohibit the development, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in their respective regions. An important benefit of these zones is that they open a forum for expanded regional dialogue on issues of security. Because the causes of insecurity vary from region to region, security solutions do not come in a 'one-size-fits-all' package. It is for this reason that regional dialogues, as we see in the nuclear-weapon-free zones, are so beneficial. It is clear that such treaties, and such security dialogues, would be invaluable in other areas of the world, such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. Since the end of the Cold War, the international security landscape has undergone dramatic changes. For example, the rise in terrorism, the discovery of clandestine nuclear programmes, and the emergence of covert nuclear procurement networks have heightened our awareness of vulnerabilities in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This statement focuses on two issues

  11. Development of nuclear technologies and conversion of nuclear weapon testing system infrastructure in Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The article gives a brief description of the work done by the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan in development of nuclear technology and conversion of nuclear weapon testing infrastructure in Kazakhstan. Content and trends of works are as follows: 1. Peaceful use of all physical facilities, created earlier for nuclear tests in Kazakhstan; 2. Development of methods and technologies for safe nuclear reactors use; 3. Examination of different materials in field of great neutron flow for thermonuclear reactor's first wall development; 4. Liquidation of all wells, which were formed in the results of underground nuclear explosions in Degelen mountain massif of former Semipalatinsk test site; 5. Study of consequences of nuclear tests in West Kazakhstan (territory of Azgir test site and Karachaganak oil field); 6. Study of radiological situation on the Semipalatinsk test site and surrounding territories; 7. Search of ways for high-level radioactive wastes disposal; 8. Construction of safe nuclear power plants in Kazakhstan

  12. A nuclear-weapon-free zone from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1995, at the Extension and Review Conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Belarus introduced the new idea of establishing the nuclear-weapon-free zone 'in the center of Europe', as an alternative to a military and nuclear expansion eastwards by the Western military alliance NATO. The geographical scope of the zone from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea could encompass the former Warsaw pact territory west of Russian federation including: the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), four Visegrad states (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), newly independent states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova), Romania and Bulgaria. The success of nuclear-weapon-free zone is dependent on how it would be accepted by the nuclear-weapon powers and the surrounding world. There would be four measures of central importance for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in general and in European case: non-possession of nuclear weapons by zonal states; non-stationing of nuclear weapons within the zone by any state; non-use or no-threat of use of nuclear weapons throughout the zone or against targets within the zone; and verification that parties comply with their treaty obligations

  13. “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”Conception and Regional Practice---Analysis Based on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone%“无核世界”构想及其区域性实践--基于东南亚无核区的分析

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    程晓勇

    2014-01-01

    “A world free of nuclear weapons”is a political conception based on limiting nuclear proliferation, which strictly control and gradually destroyed existing nuclear weapons,and final totally eliminate nuclear weap-ons to make international society return to a world without nuclear weapons.For more than half a century,“a world free of nuclear weapons”conception plays an important role in shaping global politics security environment, cultivating the concept of peace,and promoting nuclear disarmament.Although“a world free of nuclear weapons”is not achieved by now,nuclear free zone in the district level realized the conception in the certain significance. The Southeast Asia nuclear weapon free zone is the first nuclear free zone in Asia after the cold war in stern nucle-ar nonproliferation situation,which has played a positive role in easing Asia nuclear proliferation situation.%“无核世界”构想是一种要求在限制核武器扩散的基础上,对已有核武器进行严格控制并逐步销毁,最终彻底消灭核武器,使国际社会回归到没有核武器的世界的政治主张。半个多世纪以来,“无核世界”构想在塑造全球政治安全环境、培育和平理念、推动核裁军方面发挥了重要作用。虽然当前“无核世界”构想尚难以实现,但在地区层面,无核区在一定意义上实现了“无核世界”构想。东南亚无核区是冷战后核扩散形势严峻的亚洲地区建立的首个无核区,对缓和亚洲地区的核扩散形势起到了积极的作用。本文认为,在国际政治现实下,无核区的建立必将成为实现无核世界的重要路径选择。

  14. Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. Summary of a United Nations study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In December 1988, by resolution 43/75N, the United Nations General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to carry out a comprehensive update of a 1980 study on nuclear weapons. The study was to take into account recent relevant studies, and consider the political, legal and security aspects of: (a) nuclear arsenals and pertinent technological developments; (b) doctrines concerning nuclear weapons; (c) efforts to reduce nuclear weapons; (d) physical, environmental, medical and other effects of the use of nuclear weapons and of nuclear testing; (e) efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban; (f) efforts to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and their horizontal and vertical proliferation; and (g) the question of verification of compliance with nuclear-arms limitation agreements. The Group's report is presented in nine chapters, eight of which are summarized here; chapter 9, entitled ''Conclusions'', is included in its entirety. In his foreword to the report, the Secretary-General observes that the study represents the most comprehensive review of the relevant developments in the field over the last decade and was carried out during a period of ''far-reaching changes in international relations'' and an ''unprecedented evolution in the relationship between East and West''. This period experienced for the first time the initiation of an effective process of reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles

  15. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the insertion of the Brazilian State in its regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The issue of nuclear weapons continues to appear as a focal point of International Relations. The efforts and concrete actions on disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear arms control are still issues that generate recurring tensions between States. However, in Brazil, there is little analysis of an academic nature about these issues and, with respect to current and prospective position of the Brazilian State in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime, studies and analysis are even more scarce, or incipient. The present dissertation has as its object of study to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Regime arisen from NPT, and the Brazilian State insertion process in this Regime. Therefore our research work is structured in three areas: the first one is about the role of nuclear weapons in States security perception, the second is about NPT and its Regime, the third runs over the insertion of the Brazilian state in this regime. So, in summary, the research performed included the reasons that make a State to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT genesis and evolution of the perception of the meaning of that Treaty by the States, and the process and the degree of insertion of Brazil in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime. The inquiry sought to place this object of study in the broader debate on Foreign Relations, based on the approaches of the discipline devoted to the question of managing the security of States, id est, the two approaches that constitute the mainstream of the discipline: the perspective theoretical liberal (and neoliberal variants) and realistic thinking (and neo-realist). Thus, we have used different theoretical lenses, which we think necessary for understanding the specific parts and causal connections between these parts of a complex issue. (author)

  16. Symbolic representations of weapons and preparations for conflict: The nuclear arms race

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This study investigates the process through which actors acquire weapons in preparation for a confrontation with some rival. A theory is developed to account for those preparations rooted in two social psychological perspectives; social exchange theory and symbolic interactionism. The empirical aspect of the study deals with the nuclear arms race between the US and Soviet Union. The first portion involves a qualitative analysis to uncover the meaning system. The second portion involves a quantitative test of the theory. Data cover all 53 long range strategic missile systems ever deployed by the US or USSR. Results lend support for the idea of a meaning-based theory of preparation for conflict. By operationalizing weapons as actors perceive the objects in their environment, the results of this study provide a higher level of fit than found in earlier arms race research

  17. Elimination of ballistic missiles: An important step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty preamble emphasises 'the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control', the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not further specify how this ultimate goal could be achieved for delivery systems. Delivery systems are an important and costly part of nuclear weapons which should be sophisticated, therefore the control of nuclear-capable delivery systems would be an important step to make nuclear weapons useless and reduce the threat od their use. This is especially true for ballistic missiles, which represent effective and powerful means to deploy nuclear weapons

  18. Progress to a nuclear-weapon-free world through tactical nuclear arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    At a time when, after some years of passivity, nuclear disarmament is becoming more of an urgent item on the international agenda and receiving accordingly more attention on the part of politicians and non-governmental experts. This is partly reflected in the Report of the Canberra Commission, and the statement on nuclear weapons by international generals and admirals. At the same time some developments such as uncertainties with START II ratification and the process of NATO enlargement make the task of nuclear arms control even more demanding. What is needed now is to pursue at last without any further delay negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. And these effective measures must include both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Only a sustained commitment at the highest political level will legitimate serious discussions of the elimination option and ensure that resources and personnel are devoted to finding solutions to the problems associated with moving to zero, and to crafting appropriate transition strategies. In the absence of such a commitment, the nations of the world may never reach the point at which the desirability and feasibility of a nuclear-free world can be evaluated with greater certainty. This Pugwash Conference is trying to make a modest contribution in helping to make possible such a vitally important commitment

  19. Chinese perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons. Prospects and potential problems in disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Obama administration is putting nuclear disarmament back on the agenda. In a major speech in Prague in April 2009, he envisioned a world free of nuclear weapons and called on nations to work toward that end. Reversing years of setbacks and stagnation, Washington and Moscow agreed on renewing negotiation on extending the START I Treaty last year and concluded the New START treaty in March 2010. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review indicates a shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine in that Washington pledges not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The prospects of nuclear disarmament look much promising as the momentum generated could also exert pressure on the second-tier nuclear-weapon States: Britain, France, and China. Beijing's responses to these developments have been favorable, viewing them as positive contribution to international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In particular China endorses President Obama's call for securing global nuclear materials and safeguarding vulnerable nuclear facilities to prevent nuclear terrorism. However, Chinese perspectives and policies on important international nuclear arms control and disarmament, and on the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence remain largely declaratory and less specific on its own commitments and participation. Chinese analyses, at the same time, point out the difficulties ahead on the road toward a nuclear weapons free world. Indeed, rhetoric notwithstanding, Beijing continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal to develop a secure and reliable second-strike deterrence capability. This paper takes a careful look at China's perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in its national security policy and defense posture. This is important because China is perceived to be the only country among the five original nuclear-weapon States that is actually expanding its nuclear arsenal, as indicated by the recent deployment of the long

  20. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons; Armes de terreur. Debarrasser le monde des armes nucleaires, biologiques et chimiques - Commission sur les armes de destruction massive

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blix, H.; Journe, V.

    2010-07-01

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  1. Proceedings: 17th Asilomar conference on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hickman, R.G.; Meier, C.A. (eds.)

    1983-01-01

    The objective of the 1983 conference was to provide for the technical exchange of ideas relating to the science and technology of the immediate effects of nuclear weapon explosions. Separate abstracts were prepared for 39 of the papers.

  2. Magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) nuclear weapons effects on submarine cable systems. Volume 1. Experiments and analysis. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1987-06-01

    This report presents a study of the nuclear weapons magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) effects on submarine communications cables. The study consisted of the analysis and interpretation of currently available data on submarine cable systems TAT-4, TAT-6, and TAT-7. The primary result of the study is that decrease of the effective resistivity with frequency over the available experimental range, coupled with the model results, leads to quite small effective resistivities at the MHD characteristic frequencies, and hence small earth potential differences. Thus, it appears that submarine cable systems are less susceptible to an MHD threat than their land-based counter-parts.

  3. Analyses of mortality among workers at the Pantex nuclear weapons facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An analysis of mortality among white males employed at the Pantex Plant nuclear weapons facility did not reveal any unusual patterns of total or cause-specific mortality. Significantly fewer deaths were observed than were expected based on US rates for all causes, all cancers, digestive cancers, lung cancer, arteriosclerotic heart disease, and digestive diseases. No cause of death occurred significantly more often than expected. Similar results were observed when duration of employment, time since first employment, and radiation exposure greater than 1 rem were examined. There was no evidence that mortality from any cause was increased by employment at Pantex

  4. A nuclear-weapon-free world. Report on working group 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The stages of nuclear material management are reviewed in respect to dismantlement of nuclear weapons, disposal of weapon-grade fissile materials and cut-off of their production as well as START I and II reduction which are underway. Separate chapters are dealing with the comprehensive test ban treaty, verification, control and regulation in this matter, and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, Canberra Commission, the ABM USA-Soviet Treaty

  5. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

  6. Understanding Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: A Guide to the Issues. New Edition.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mayers, Teena

    Intended for secondary and college level students and teachers, this guide discusses the nuclear arms control issue. There are four sections. Section I discusses U.S. nuclear strategy from 1945 to the present, strategic nuclear weapons competition between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), U.S.…

  7. Between Shadow and Light: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Forty Years On

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The NPT was negotiated during the Cold War period to prevent the emergence of new nuclear players by distinguishing between 'nuclear-weapon states' (NWS) which had carried out nuclear testing before 1 January 1967, that is the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China, and 'non-nuclear-weapon states' (NNWS). Under the NPT, the two groups of states commit to comply with a series of commitments formulated around 'three pillars': 1 - Non-proliferation: the NWSs undertake under Article I not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over such weapons and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any NNWS to acquire them, while the NNWSs are bound under Article II to neither develop or acquire nuclear weapons or 'other nuclear explosive devices' nor to receive any assistance in that connection. 2 - Peaceful use of nuclear energy: Article IV guarantees the 'inalienable right' to 'develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination'. 3 - Nuclear disarmament: each state party to the treaty undertakes under Article VI 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'. The treaty entered in force in March 1970 and has since become universal, with 189 states parties in May 2010. At five-year intervals, parties to the treaty convene review conferences in order to review the operation of the treaty, Article VIII(3). The 1975, 1985 and 2000 review conferences culminated in the adoption of a final declaration and the 1995 review conference decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. The preparatory committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 review conference, which met from April 2007 to May 2009, did not adopt any recommendations, in absence of a consensus on essential issues concerning the operation of the treaty. Hence the importance of this 8. review conference of the parties held in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010 in a

  8. Civil Defense, U. S. A.: A Programmed Orientation to Civil Defense. Unit 2. Nuclear Weapons Effects and Shelter.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Basic information about nuclear weapons is presented so that their effects can be meaningfully related to the defensive countermeasures which will be most effective against them. Major topics include: (1) Explosive power of nuclear weapons, (2) Major effects of nuclear explosions, (3) Two basic types of nuclear explosions, (4) Contrast between air…

  9. International safeguards to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The ever-expanding use of atomic energy not only promotes the welfare of mankind but also leads to the accumulation of nuclear materials which can be employed for building weapons of mass destruction. Certain progress has recently been made towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the main barrier against the diversion of nuclear materials for the production of nuclear explosive devices. The factors essential for strengthening non-proliferation are accession to the Treaty by all countries, above all those engaged in nuclear activities, effective national systems of control of and accounting for nuclear materials, and an effective system of IAEA safeguards, as envisaged by the Treaty. Substantial nuclear activities are being carried out in States not party to the Treaty, and it is in these cases that effective control by an international organization is particularly important. The paper considers ways and means of implementing measures which would further enhance the universal character of non-proliferation and improve its effectiveness. It also discusses the features of the IAEA safeguards system and the factors governing its effectiveness. It is concluded that the essential conditions for improving effectiveness are application of control to the entire fuel cycle in non-nuclear-weapon States, the perfecting of the IAEA safeguards system, including automatic processing of nuclear materials accounting data, and effective physical protection of nuclear materials. (author)

  10. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization - the Stockpile Life Extension Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cook, Donald

    2016-03-01

    Underground nuclear testing of U.S. nuclear weapons was halted by President George H.W. Bush in 1992 when he announced a moratorium. In 1993, the moratorium was extended by President Bill Clinton and, in 1995, a program of Stockpile Stewardship was put in its place. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Twenty years have passed since then. Over the same time, the average age of a nuclear weapon in the stockpile has increased from 6 years (1992) to nearly 29 years (2015). At its inception, achievement of the objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) appeared possible but very difficult. The cost to design and construct several large facilities for precision experimentation in hydrodynamics and high energy density physics was large. The practical steps needed to move from computational platforms of less than 100 Mflops/sec to 10 Teraflops/sec and beyond were unknown. Today, most of the required facilities for SSP are in place and computational speed has been increased by more than six orders of magnitude. These, and the physicists and engineers in the complex of labs and plants within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) who put them in place, have been the basis for underpinning an annual decision, made by the weapons lab directors for each of the past 20 years, that resort to underground nuclear testing is not needed for maintaining confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S stockpile. A key part of that decision has been annual assessment of the physical changes in stockpiled weapons. These weapons, quite simply, are systems that invariably and unstoppably age in the internal weapon environment of radioactive materials and complex interfaces of highly dissimilar organic and inorganic materials. Without an ongoing program to rebuild some components and replace other components to increase safety or security, i.e., life extending these weapons, either underground testing would again be

  11. Proliferation concerns in the Russian closed nuclear weapons complex cities : a study of regional migration behavior.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Flores, Kristen Lee

    2004-07-01

    The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the legacy of the USSR weapons complex with an estimated 50 nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons cities containing facilities responsible for research, production, maintenance, and destruction of the weapons stockpile. The Russian Federation acquired ten such previously secret, closed nuclear weapons complex cities. Unfortunately, a lack of government funding to support these facilities resulted in non-payment of salaries to employees and even plant closures, which led to an international fear of weapons material and knowledge proliferation. This dissertation analyzes migration in 33 regions of the Russian Federation, six of which contain the ten closed nuclear weapons complex cities. This study finds that the presence of a closed nuclear city does not significantly influence migration. However, the factors that do influence migration are statistically different in regions containing closed nuclear cities compared to regions without closed nuclear cities. Further, these results show that the net rate of migration has changed across the years since the break up of the Soviet Union, and that the push and pull factors for migration have changed across time. Specifically, personal and residential factors had a significant impact on migration immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but economic infrastructure and societal factors became significant in later years. Two significant policy conclusions are derived from this research. First, higher levels of income are found to increase outmigration from regions, implying that programs designed to prevent migration by increasing incomes for closed city residents may be counter-productive. Second, this study finds that programs designed to increase capital and build infrastructure in the new Russian Federation will be more effective for employing scientists and engineers from the weapons complex, and consequently reduce the potential for emigration of

  12. Nuclear weapons, scientists, and the post-Cold War challenge selected papers on arms control

    CERN Document Server

    Drell, Sidney D

    2007-01-01

    This volume includes a representative selection of Sidney Drell's recent writings and speeches (circa 1993 to the present) on public policy issues with substantial scientific components. Most of the writings deal with national security, nuclear weapons, and arms control and reflect the author's personal involvement in such issues dating back to 1960. Fifteen years after the demise of the Soviet Union, the gravest danger presented by nuclear weapons is the spread of advanced technology that may result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of most concern would be their acquisition by hostile governments and terrorists who are unconstrained by accepted norms of civilized behavior. The current challenges are to prevent this from happening and, at the same time, to pursue aggressively the opportunity to escape from an outdated nuclear deterrence trap.

  13. The India-Pakistan-China strategic triangle and the role of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper presents the Asian landscape with its regional balances and imbalances and its changes after September 11 and subsequent events. The nuclear posture and the role of nuclear weapons inside the China-India-Pakistan triangle is analyzed with respect to the US non-proliferation policy and its expanding military presence over the Asian continent. (J.S.)

  14. Controlling the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Study Guide for Teachers and Students

    Science.gov (United States)

    United States Institute of Peace, 2005

    2005-01-01

    The objectives of this teaching guide are: (1) to increase student understanding of the prevalence and spread of nuclear weapons; (2) to familiarize students with historic and contemporary measures to control nuclear proliferation and stimulate their thinking of potential strategies for doing so in the future; (3) to develop students' analytical…

  15. Health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons; Helse- og miljoevirkninger av atomvaapen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-08-01

    Since 1981 WHO has been studying and reporting on the effects of nuclear war on health and health services. This report provides information on the subject and refers to earlier related work of WHO. It forms the basis for a request from WHO to the International Court of Justice regarding the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. 15 refs.

  16. "Fat Man and Little Boy": The Cinematic Representation of Interests in the Nuclear Weapons Organization.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Taylor, Bryan C.

    1993-01-01

    Examines the ironic "problems" of the 1989 Hollywood film "Fat Man and Little Boy" (portraying the construction of the atomic bomb at the Los Alamos Laboratory during World War II) to demonstrate the ideological operations of nuclear texts, and the role of the nuclear weapons organization as a symbolic form in cultural discourse. (SR)

  17. Coping With Nuclear Weapons Policy: How Expert Do You Have To Be?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ruina, Jack

    1983-01-01

    Points out that policy decisions about nuclear weapons evolve from politics, bureaucracy, and technology, indicating that intelligent people can learn enough about technology to make judgments about policy issues. Suggests, however, that much more thinking is necessary to arrive at a coherent perspective about what constitutes nuclear weapons…

  18. The India-Pakistan-China strategic triangle and the role of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chellaney, B

    2002-07-01

    This paper presents the Asian landscape with its regional balances and imbalances and its changes after September 11 and subsequent events. The nuclear posture and the role of nuclear weapons inside the China-India-Pakistan triangle is analyzed with respect to the US non-proliferation policy and its expanding military presence over the Asian continent. (J.S.)

  19. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. Proceedings of the forty-fifth Pugwash conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the fiftieth year after the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Council of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, rededicates itself to the goals of the Russel-Einstein Manifesto of 1955 that initiated the Pugwash movement, to the abolition of nuclear weapons and abolition of war. Under dramatic changes in the post Cold War period, and the difficulties that United Nations are facing, it is concluded that United Nations role is indispensable. Within the framework of achieving a nuclear weapon-free world, the Conference Working group dealt with the implementation of START talks, dismantlement and disposition of nuclear weapons, international control, elimination of the relevance of nuclear weapons in military policies and international relations. Another major topic was related to reducing proliferation risks including Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, expanding and internationalizing the verification and control regime, IAEA safeguards, managing proliferation risks from civilian and weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium. An important topic was the security in the Asia-Pacific region

  20. The nuclear industry: a new weapon for the Kremlin?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    After having noticed the recent evolution of the Russian policy which tends to concentrate the economical and political power with a limited democratic pluralism, the author describes the re-structuring policy adopted for the energy sector, and notably the nuclear sector, in order to become a major international actor. First, she analyses the evolution of the hydrocarbon sector with a better management of tax incomes, and a stronger control of the industries of this sector based on a State capitalism development. She outlines that Russia now uses energy as a diplomatic arm, particularly in its relationship with the European Union. She states that Russia may want to follow the same kind of policy for nuclear energy as for the hydrocarbon sector by developing partnership with other countries, by regrouping the concerned activities within a single holding company (Atomenergoprom) and a federal agency (Rosatom). Russia increased its uranium production and became a powerful actor who challenges other international companies (Areva, Westinghouse, Toshiba). The author discusses the strategy defined by the Kremlin to reach supremacy in the nuclear sector

  1. DOE/LLNL verification symposium on technologies for monitoring nuclear tests related to weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The rapidly changing world situation has raised concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the ability to monitor a possible clandestine nuclear testing program. To address these issues, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Treaty Verification Program sponsored a symposium funded by the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Arms Control, Division of Systems and Technology. The DOE/LLNL Symposium on Technologies for Monitoring Nuclear Tests Related to Weapons Proliferation was held at the DOE's Nevada Operations Office in Las Vegas, May 6--7,1992. This volume is a collection of several papers presented at the symposium. Several experts in monitoring technology presented invited talks assessing the status of monitoring technology with emphasis on the deficient areas requiring more attention in the future. In addition, several speakers discussed proliferation monitoring technologies being developed by the DOE's weapons laboratories

  2. Program to develop and codify urban nuclear weapon effects. Final report September 1982-June 1983

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Northrop, J.A.; Freeman, B.E.; Duff, R.E.

    1983-06-24

    A program is developed which, if implemented, would assess those effects of a detonation of a terrorist nuclear weapon located in a highly built-up urban area which are unique to the environment, and consider possible techniques for damage limitation. It is assumed that the weapon is of low-yield, that its hiding place can be located, and that there is sufficient time before its detonation for the application of mitigation techniques. A series of radiation-hydrodynamic, hydrodynamic, radiation transport, and fallout calculations are defined which would provide insight into the modification to classic nuclear phenomenology produced by unique urban hiding locations, possible mitigating of the blast and thermal threats by materials deliberately placed around the weapon, and changes in the propagation of blast, fallout, and thermal radiation due to surrounding buildings. It is anticipated that, were such a theoretical study program to be implemented, it would provide useful guidance to nuclear emergency response planners.

  3. The Feed Materials Program of the Manhattan Project: A Foundational Component of the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reed, B. Cameron

    2014-12-01

    The feed materials program of the Manhattan Project was responsible for procuring uranium-bearing ores and materials and processing them into forms suitable for use as source materials for the Project's uranium-enrichment factories and plutonium-producing reactors. This aspect of the Manhattan Project has tended to be overlooked in comparison with the Project's more dramatic accomplishments, but was absolutely vital to the success of those endeavors: without appropriate raw materials and the means to process them, nuclear weapons and much of the subsequent cold war would never have come to pass. Drawing from information available in Manhattan Engineer District Documents, this paper examines the sources and processing of uranium-bearing materials used in making the first nuclear weapons and how the feed materials program became a central foundational component of the postwar nuclear weapons complex.

  4. The nuclear weapons complex: Management for health, safety, and the environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Department of Energy (DOE) operates 17 major facilities to develop and produce nuclear weapons. The facilities, which together are termed the ''weapons complex,'' include laboratores that design and test the weapons and components; materials for use in weapons; and weapons production facilities that either produce various components or assemble them into completed weapons, or both. This report, which was requested of the National Research Council by DOE at the direction of Congress, sets out an assessment of various management, environmental, health, and safety issues melting to the operation of the complex. An examination of the weapons complex is an immense undertaking. The facilities are located throughout the United States, and each of the major facilities is a huge and sophisticated operation. The total budget of the complex for FY 1990 amounts to some $10 billion and involves a staff of some 80,000 people working for the Department and its contractors. The Department confronts a variety of problems in connection with its stewardship of the complex. Many of the facilities are old, and maintenance over the years has been inadequate. There is a legacy of environmental contamination that must be addressed. Moreover, DOE must be prepared to operate under close public scrutiny and in compliance with environmental and safety standards that have become increasingly stringent over time. 42 refs., 8 figs., 4 tabs

  5. Prediction of ground motion from underground nuclear weapons tests as it relates to siting of a nuclear waste storage facility at NTS and compatibility with the weapons test program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report assumes reasonable criteria for NRC licensing of a nuclear waste storage facility at the Nevada Test Site where it would be exposed to ground motion from underground nuclear weapons tests. Prediction equations and their standard deviations have been determined from measurements on a number of nuclear weapons tests. The effect of various independent parameters on standard deviation is discussed. That the data sample is sufficiently large is shown by the fact that additional data have little effect on the standard deviation. It is also shown that coupling effects can be separated out of the other contributions to the standard deviation. An example, based on certain licensing assumptions, shows that it should be possible to have a nuclear waste storage facility in the vicinity of Timber Mountain which would be compatible with a 700 kt weapons test in the Buckboard Area if the facility were designed to withstand a peak vector acceleration of 0.75 g. The prediction equation is a log-log linear equation which predicts acceleration as a function of yield of an explosion and the distance from it

  6. The evolution of legal approaches to controlling nuclear and radiological weapons and combating the threat of nuclear terrorism

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    J. Herbach

    2015-01-01

    This chapter traces the evolution of international law related to the weaponization of nuclear and other radioactive materials, focusing in particular on the law pertaining to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism. International efforts to control atomic energy have evolved substantially since the on

  7. Numerical Analysis of Residual Radiation Pollution from Air Explosion of Nuclear Weapons Based on Gray System Theory%灰色系统理论的空爆核武剩余放射性污染数值分析

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    刘晓红; 王伟力

    2013-01-01

    Residual nuclear radiation from air explosion of nuclear weapons is affected by several complex factors such as terrain. Aiming at the above problem, a method is provided to analyse the residual nuclear radiation in Geography Information System. This method uses the terrain analysis to correct the existing experial formula of nuclear contamination on ground. And then this method uses the raster data anakysis method to analyse the pollution of nuclear radiation.This method provides a new thinking for analysis of residual nuclear radiation from air explosion of nuclear weapon.%空爆核武器的剩余核辐射受到地形等复杂因素的影响,针对上述问题,提出利用地理信息系统的相关功能实现空爆核武的剩余核辐射数值分析的方法.该方法利用数字地形模型分析受到核沾染地形的坡度状况,对现有的经验公式进行修正;结合灰色系统理论并利用栅格分析方法对剩余核辐射造成的大气污染进行了分析.该方法为空爆核武器剩余放射性污染的分析提供了一种新的思路.

  8. Project of law relative to the sanitary consequences of French nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In order to make easy the indemnifications and to include the persons having participate to nuclear weapons tests (Sahara and French Polynesia) and populations leaving in the concerned areas, the project of law relative to the repair of sanitary consequences of nuclear weapons tests proposes to create a right to integral repair of prejudices for the persons suffering of a radioinduced disease coming from these tests. The American example and the British example are given for comparison. The modalities of financing are detailed as well as the social economic and administrative impacts. (N.C.)

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  10. UFOs and nukes. Extraordinary encounters at nuclear weapons sites; UFOs und Atomwaffen. Unheimliche Begegnungen in der Naehe von Nuklearwaffendepots

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hastings, Robert L.

    2015-07-01

    Everyone knows about the reported recovery of a crashed alien spaceship near Roswell, New Mexico in July 1947. However, most people are unaware that, at the time of the incident, Roswell Army Airfield was home to the world's only atomic bomber squadron, the 509th Bomb Group. Was this merely a coincidence? During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built thousands of the far more destructive hydrogen bombs, some of them a thousand times as destructive as the first atomic bombs dropped on Japan. If the nuclear standoff between the superpowers had erupted into World War III, human civilization - and perhaps the very survival of our species - would have been at risk. Did this ominous state of affairs come to the attention of outside observers? Was there a connection between the atomic bomber squadron based at Roswell and the reported crash of a UFO nearby? Did those who pilot the UFOs monitor the superpowers' nuclear arms race during the dangerous Cold War era? Do they scrutinize American and Russian weapons sites even now? UFOs and Nukes provides the startling and sometimes shocking answers to these questions. Veteran researcher Robert Hastings has investigated nuclear weapons-related UFO incidents for more than three decades and has interviewed more than 120 ex-US Air Force personnel, from former Airmen to retired Colonels, who witnessed extraordinary UFO encounters at nuclear weapons sites. Their amazing stories are presented here.

  11. The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Garaizar, Xabier [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2009-07-02

    In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

  12. DOE (Department of Energy) nuclear weapon R and T (research, development, and testing): Objectives, roles, and responsibilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Otey, G.R.

    1989-07-01

    An overview of the DOE nuclear weapons research, development, and testing program is given along with a description of the program objectives and the roles and responsibilities of the various involved organizations. The relationship between the DoD and DOE is described and the division of responsibilities for weapon development as well as the coordinated planning and acquisition activities are reviewed. Execution of the RD T program at the nuclear weapons laboratories is outlined. 24 refs., 3 figs.

  13. Low Prevalence of Chronic Beryllium Disease among Workers at a Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Arjomandi, M; Seward, J P; Gotway, M B; Nishimura, S; Fulton, G P; Thundiyil, J; King, T E; Harber, P; Balmes, J R

    2010-01-11

    To study the prevalence of beryllium sensitization (BeS) and chronic beryllium disease (CBD) in a cohort of workers from a nuclear weapons research and development facility. We evaluated 50 workers with BeS with medical and occupational histories, physical examination, chest imaging with HRCT (N=49), and pulmonary function testing. Forty of these workers also underwent bronchoscopy for bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) and transbronchial biopsies. The mean duration of employment at the facility was 18 yrs and the mean latency (from first possible exposure) to time of evaluation was 32 yrs. Five of the workers had CBD at the time of evaluation (based on histology or HRCT); three others had evidence of probable CBD. These workers with BeS, characterized by a long duration of potential Be exposure and a long latency, had a low prevalence of CBD.

  14. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: The road ahead. London, 15 January 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 15 January 2001. The Director General points out that for over five decades since the summer of 1945, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. In his view, the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world will crucially depend on a fundamental change in that concept of 'security'. Besides the historical perspectives the paper focuses on the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament strategies. The Director General also states that to achieve the main goal of universal non-proliferation and disarmament it is indispensable to re-evaluate nuclear weapon states status; challenge the doctrine of nuclear deterrence; develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence; and engage in constructive dialogue. In conclusion it is re-emphasized that there remain both the difficulties and the opportunities of the road towards nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out that construction of a non-proliferation regime with near-universal participation has been successful and some progress towards nuclear disarmament has been achieved, but several goals must be pursued to maintain and build upon achievements

  15. Review of nuclear fuel cycle alternatives including certain features pertaining to weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Largely as a result of concerns over nuclear weapon proliferation, the U.S. program to develop and commercialize the plutonium-fueled breeder reactor has been slowed down; interest in alternative fuel cycles has increased. The report offers an informal review of the various nuclear fuel cycle options including some aspects relevant to weapon proliferation, although no complete review of the latter subject is attempted. Basic principles governing breeding, reactor safety, and efficient utilization of fission energy resources (thorium and uranium) are discussed. The controversial problems of weapon proliferation and its relation to fuel reprocessing (which is essential for efficient fuel cycles) are reviewed and a number of proposed approaches to reducing proliferation risks are noted. Some representative specific reactor concepts are described, with emphasis on their development status, their potentials for resource utilization, and their implications for proliferation

  16. Sweden and the bomb. The Swedish plans to acquire nuclear weapons, 1945 - 1972

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid-50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The prime minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue. During this period

  17. The Swedish National Defence Research Establishment and the plans for Swedish nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish Government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid 50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the Parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the Parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The Government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue. During this period

  18. Еstablishing the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Is a Step Towards Global Nuclear Security

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    S. M. Adilkhodzhaeva

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The article is devoted to an actual problem of guaranteeing global security and promoting an idea of nuclear-free world. The article provides some data on the history of establishing, the key stages of formation and consolidation of international legal agreements of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. The author considers peculiarities and distinguishing features of a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia.

  19. North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and No Good Options?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Cohen, Michael David

    2013-01-01

    senior military associates to experience fear of imminent nuclear war or conventional regime change. I show that the effect of such fear would depend on whether or not Kim believes that he has control over the occurrence of these events. I argue that if he experiences fear and believes that he has some...... control over whether these extreme events actually happen, he will moderate his nuclear threats and behave more like other experienced nuclear powers. But if he experiences fear and believes that he has no control, he will likely pursue policies that could cause nuclear war. I use this insight...

  20. Safety issues in robotic handling of nuclear weapon parts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robotic systems are being developed by the Intelligent Systems and Robotics Center at Sandia National Laboratories to perform automated handling tasks with radioactive weapon parts. These systems will reduce the occupational radiation exposure to workers by automating operations that are currently performed manually. The robotic systems at Sandia incorporate several levels of mechanical, electrical, and software safety for handling hazardous materials. For example, tooling used by the robot to handle radioactive parts has been designed with mechanical features that allow the robot to release its payload only at designated locations in the robotic workspace. In addition, software processes check for expected and unexpected situations throughout the operations. Incorporation of features such as these provides multiple levels of safety for handling hazardous or valuable payloads with automated intelligent systems

  1. FMCT after South Asia's tests. A view from a nuclear-weapon state

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Proposals to negotiate an international treaty to cutoff the production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons have been on the international nuclear agenda for many decades. Hopes in the early 1990s that it would be possible finally to negotiate a FMCT, however, have not been borne out. Instead, a deadlock had ensued at the Geneva CD. It remains to be seen whether the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan will contribute to breaking that deadlock - or only to foreclosing any prospects for negotiating cutoff in the foreseeable future. The key lies in the attitudes of Delhi and Islamabad - influenced to the extent possible by the efforts of the international community to convince both countries' leaders to stop short of an escalating nuclear war in the region. Regardless, there are a variety of other initiatives aimed at heightening transparency and controls over the nuclear weapons materials in the five NPT nuclear weapon states that could be pursued as part of broader ongoing efforts to roll back the Cold War nuclear legacies

  2. The Dangers of Dualism as a World View in the Age of Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Groner, Cary

    1984-01-01

    People's conceptual ordering of the universe has traditionally taken the form of dualism, "good and evil" and "us against them." In this age of nuclear weapons, this is highly dangerous thinking. We must rid ourselves of nationalism and commit ourselves to peace in all our dealings. (CS)

  3. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Every year since 1974 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the subject ''Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East''. By that resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, taking into account the circumstances and characteristics of the Middle East, as well as the views and the suggestions of the parties of the region, and to submit this study to the General Assembly. The study was carried out between July 1989 and August 1990. The study discusses a number of steps and measures that could ease the process leading to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Those measures could be undertaken independently or in conjunction with each other, as well as by individual States or jointly by several, and also on a reciprocal basis; each of them would move the States concerned closer to their ultimate objective - the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons

  4. Argumentation in the Canadian House of Commons on the Issue of Nuclear Weapons for Canada.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jones, John Alfred

    The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 forced the Canadian House of Commons to consider whether Canadian forces in NORAD and NATO were effective without nuclear warheads on special weapons systems. This paper provides an overview of the debates and their milieu, identifies the issues involved, and analyzes the effects of the argumentation. The…

  5. Materials characterization capabilities at DOE Nuclear Weapons Laboratories and Production Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The materials characterization and analytical chemistry capabilities at the 11 DOE Nuclear Weapons Laboratories or Production Plants have been surveyed and compared. In general, all laboratories have similar capabilities and equipment. Facilities or capabilities that are unique or that exist at only a few laboratories are described in detail

  6. A new computed tomography X-ray system to image nuclear weapon components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A new computed tomography x-ray system developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory of the United States, the Confined Large Optical Scintillator Screen and Imaging System (CoLOSSIS), can be used to image nuclear weapon components. After describing the development background, outline, working principle and key technology of the system, the application and prospects of the system are discussed. (authors)

  7. Is there any future for nuclear weapons?; Les armes nucleaires ont-elles un avenir?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heisbourg, F.

    2011-07-01

    Nuclear weapons occupy a paradoxal place both in the collective imagination and in the historical reality: on the one hand everybody dreads the apocalypse horror, and on the other hand, dissuasion appears as an unchanging and quite comfortable situation. However, the world has become multipolar in this domain as well. The geopolitical map is reconstructing. Doctrinal revisions, initiatives against nuclear weapons proliferation, and nuclear disarmament measures are now on the agenda. The best foreign and French experts examine for the first time the consequences of these evolutions. They analyse in particular the split up risks and the potential consequences of a nuclear conflict in regions where atomic arms have become a key-component of the strategic landscape: Middle-Est, Far-East, Southern Asia. The choices France and its allies will have to face are examined as well. (J.S.)

  8. The international law of nuclear weapons. Le droit international des armes nucleaires

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sur, S. (Universite Pantheon-Assas, 75 - Paris (France). Centre de Recherches Internationales)

    1998-01-01

    The first chapter concerns the questions of non proliferation and non dissemination. Then, the problems bound to nuclear testing are examined in the second chapter. The process of destruction and restriction of weapons are treated in the third chapter. Then, the fourth chapter analyzes the conditions and the perspectives of a negotiation on the cessation of fissile matter production for military uses and more broadly, an obligation to negotiate a nuclear disarmament. (N.C.)

  9. The international law of nuclear weapons; Le droit international des armes nucleaires

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sur, S. [Universite Pantheon-Assas, 75 - Paris (France). Centre de Recherches Internationales

    1998-12-31

    The first chapter concerns the questions of non proliferation and non dissemination. Then, the problems bound to nuclear testing are examined in the second chapter. The process of destruction and restriction of weapons are treated in the third chapter. Then, the fourth chapter analyzes the conditions and the perspectives of a negotiation on the cessation of fissile matter production for military uses and more broadly, an obligation to negotiate a nuclear disarmament. (N.C.)

  10. Under fire: Is the world's treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons strong enough?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fifteen years into the 'atoms for peace' era, Ireland in 1968 took the historic first step to sign the global treaty against tile spread of nuclear weapons. Since then, more than 180 other countries without nuclear weapons have joined the pact, most of them during the cold war period. They see their security in not having (lie bomb, and bind themselves to work for nuclear disarmament everywhere. Their shared commitments make the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) the most accepted arms-control agreement in history, a cornerstone of nuclear cooperation, countries that join it renounce the military atom, and they must accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities to verify it. But the Treaty is under fire, and some critics think it no longer fits the times. They say it cannot prevent Treaty countries from breaking out at will, or ensure that those having nuclear ambitions or arsenals are actually honouring their pledges. Neither has it attracted three key countries - India and Pakistan, which have tested atomic bombs, and Israel, which is suspected of having them - to its ranks of members. Not everyone agrees that the NPT is outdated. But it is clear that the Treaty and its associated regime are under stress, and that its fragile condition needs urgent care. The debate is important and timely - the Treaty comes up for international review in 2005 and countries already are preparing for it. A major question today is whether the NPT is strong enough to keep the lid on nuclear weapons in the world's changed security environment. A former senior official at the IAEA looks at the challenging picture

  11. The perils of proliferation: Organization theory, deterrence theory, and the spread of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sagan, S.D. (Stanford Univ., CA (United States))

    What is missing in the literature on nuclear proliferation is an alternative theory of the consequences of nuclear proliferation; the effects of nuclear weapons on the likelihood of war. This article presents such an alternative, rooted in organizational theory, which leads to a more pessimistic assessment of the future prospects for peace. Professional military organizations display strong proclivities toward organizational behaviors that lead to deterrence failures. Such organizational proclivities can be effectively countered only by tight and sustained civilian control of the military. There are strong reasons to believe that future nuclear-armed states will lack such positive mechanisms of civilian control.

  12. Report to Congress on stockpile reliability, weapon remanufacture, and the role of nuclear testing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miller, G.H.; Brown, P.S.; Alonso, C.T.

    1987-10-01

    This report analyzes two issues: (1) ''whether past warhead reliability problems demonstrate that nuclear explosive testing is needed to identify or to correct stockpile reliability,'' or (2) ''whether a program of stockpile inspection, nonnuclear testing, and remanufacture would be sufficient to deal with stockpile reliability problems.'' Chapter 1 examines the reasons for nuclear testing. Although the thrust of the request from Congressman Aspin et al., has to do with the need for nuclear testing as it relates to stockpile reliability and remanufacture, there are other very important reasons for nuclear testing. Since there has been increasing interest in the US Congress for more restrictive nuclear test limits, we have addressed the overall need for nuclear testing and the potential impact of further nuclear test limitations. Chapter 1 also summarizes the major conclusions of a recent study conducted by the Scientific and Academic Advisory Committee (SAAC) for the President of the University of California; the SAAC report is entitled, ''Nuclear Weapon Tests: The Role of the University of California-Department of Energy Laboratories.'' Chapter 2 presents a brief history of stockpile problems that involved post-deployment nuclear testing for their resolution. Chapter 3 addresses the problems involved in remanufacturing nuclear weapons, and Chapter 4 discusses measures that should be taken to prepare for possible future restrictive test limits.

  13. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A TOOL OF NORTH KOREAN FOREING POLICY

    OpenAIRE

    Ovšonka, Pavol

    2011-01-01

    In 1990's, the North Korean leaders opened the military nuclear program in order to avoid the collapsing trend which affected many totalitarian regimes at that time. Thanks to the specific geographical position, Inter-Korean dispute became a very important issue of foreign policy of many great powers such as United States of America, People's Republic of China, Japan, or Russian Federation. This nuclear program is generally considered as a tool of threatening in order to maintain the regime a...

  14. Foreseeable medical consequences of use of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hiatt, H.H.

    1982-01-01

    An editorial discussion of the environmental impacts of nuclear warfare is presented. It is expected that the bulk of the urban population in the northern hemisphere would be killed. Long-term consequences mentioned include changes in global climate and weather patterns, destruction of the ozone shield and genetic damage. Efforts are underway to provide the public with a realistic understanding of potential problems in the event of a nuclear holocaust. (JMT)

  15. Weapons-grade nuclear material - open questions of a safe disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    There are suitable technologies available for destruction of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Weapons-grade uranium, consisting to 90% of the isotope U-235, can be diluted with the uranium isotope U-238 to make it non-weapons-grade, but it will then still be a material that can be used as a fuel in civil nuclear reactors. For safe plutonium disposal, several options are under debate. There is for instance a process called ''reverse reprocessing'', with the plutonium being blended with high-level radioactive fission products and then being put into a waste form accepted for direct ultimate disposal. The other option is to convert weapons-grade plutonium into MOX nuclear fuel elements and then ''burn'' them in civil nuclear power reactors. This is an option favoured by many experts. Such fuel elements should stay for a long time in the reactor core in order to achieve high burnups, and should then be ready for ultimate disposal. This disposal pathway offers essential advantages: the plutonium is used up or depleted as a component of reactor fuel, and thus is no longer available for illegal activities, and it serves as an energy source for power generation. (orig./HP)

  16. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, final report, 'Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms', Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are rightly called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Designed to terrify as well as destroy, they have the potential to kill thousands and thousands of people in a single attack, and their effects may persist in the environment and in our bodies, in some cases indefinitely. Many efforts have been made to free the world from the threat of these weapons and some progress has been made. Paradoxically, despite the end of the Cold War, the past decade has seen more setbacks than successes. States have failed to comply with their disarmament and non-proliferation commitments, and terrorist groups have emerged that recognize no restraints. In September 2005, the United Nations World Summit was unable to agree on a single recommendation on disarmament and non-proliferation. It is time for all to wake up to the awesome reality that many of the old threats continue to hang over the world and that many new ones have emerged. It is time for all governments to revive their cooperation and to breathe new life into the disarmament work of the United Nations. Efforts to eradicate poverty and to protect the global environment must be matched by a dismantling of the world's most destructive capabilities. The gearshift now needs to be moved from reverse to drive. Biological and chemical weapons have been comprehensively outlawed through global conventions, but these need to be universally accepted and fully implemented. Nuclear weapons must also be outlawed. Before this aim is realized, there must be new initiatives to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and the threat posed by them. It is equally urgent to prevent proliferation and to take special measures to ensure that terrorists do not acquire any weapons of mass destruction. This report presents ideas and recommendations on what the world community - including national governments and civil society - can and should do

  17. Second report on British nuclear weapons safety: a response to the Oxburgh report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Ministry of Defence's (MoD) report on nuclear weapons safety by Professor Sir Ronald Oxburgh fails to examine fundamental issues raised by the US Drell report concerning Trident, Chevaline and WE177. There has been a failure to make proper diagnosis, and where diagnosis has been made to offer appropriate treatment. Oxburgh states that he cannot give a definitive view on whether the Trident warhead meets the crucial ''one-point safety'' standard; that nuclear weapons are inherently hazardous; that they can produce accidental detonations and the release of plutonium; that contractorisation of Aldermaston may erode safety standards; that management must be improved; and that there is no complete record of nuclear accidents. This British American Security Information Council (BASIC) report asserts that the publicly available evidence indicates that all three British nuclear weapons could produce accidental nuclear detonations or the dispersal of plutonium as a result of fire or shock or both. Such accidents could occur, for example, during a road accident with a petrochemical truck, a submarine fire, a submarine loading accident or in an aircraft crash. Oxburgh states that WE177 and Chevaline are one-point safe, although it appears that the MoD have only used tests which Drell regarded as inferior and misleading. He also states that ''a major concern'' is the inability to be able to analyze the safety of the whole Trident system but no solution is offered. The Oxburgh report does not address the problem of fire when discussing the hazards associated with missiles and nuclear weapons. This was the central point of Drell's concerns about Trident. Oxburgh does not examine the problems and alternatives associated with the lack of safety features in the Trident warhead and its proximity to explosive fuel in the missile, nor did he examine the procedures for accident response even though these are of concern to many local authorities. (Author)

  18. Nuclear weapons and the Arab-Israeli conflict

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The implications of the clandestine Israeli nuclear arsenal for the conflict in the Middle East are studied in the light of emerging Arab reactions to it. The opportunities for European influence on the policy and programmes of this threshold state are described

  19. Public views on multiple dimensions of security: nuclear weapons, terrorism, energy, and the environment: 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We analyze and compare findings from identical national surveys of the US general public on nuclear security and terrorism administered by telephone and Internet in mid-2007. Key areas of investigation include assessments of threats to US security; valuations of US nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence; perspectives on nuclear proliferation, including the specific cases of North Korea and Iran; and support for investments in nuclear weapons capabilities. Our analysis of public views on terrorism include assessments of the current threat, progress in the struggle against terrorism, preferences for responding to terrorist attacks at different levels of assumed casualties, and support for domestic policies intended to reduce the threat of terrorism. Also we report findings from an Internet survey conducted in mid 2007 that investigates public views of US energy security, to include: energy supplies and reliability; energy vulnerabilities and threats, and relationships among security, costs, energy dependence, alternative sources, and research and investment priorities. We analyze public assessments of nuclear energy risks and benefits, nuclear materials management issues, and preferences for the future of nuclear energy in the US. Additionally, we investigate environmental issues as they relate to energy security, to include expected implications of global climate change, and relationships among environmental issues and potential policy options.

  20. Plutonium and uranium contamination in soils from former nuclear weapon test sites in Australia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Child, D.P., E-mail: dpc@ansto.gov.au [Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Locked Bag 2001, Kirrawee DC, NSW 2232 (Australia); Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Macquarie University, NSW 2109 (Australia); Hotchkis, M.A.C. [Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Locked Bag 2001, Kirrawee DC, NSW 2232 (Australia)

    2013-01-15

    The British government performed a number of nuclear weapon tests on Australian territory from 1952 through to 1963 with the cooperation of Australian government. Nine fission bombs were detonated in South Australia at Emu Junction and Maralinga, and a further three fission weapons were detonated in the Monte Bello Islands off the coast of Western Australia. A number of soil samples were collected by Australian Radiation Laboratories in 1972 and 1978 during field surveys at these nuclear weapon test sites. They were analysed by gamma spectrometry and, for a select few samples, by alpha spectrometry to measure the remaining activities of fission products, activation products and weapon materials. We have remeasured a number of these Montebello Islands and Emu Junction soil samples using the ANTARES AMS facility, ANSTO. These samples were analysed for plutonium and uranium isotopic ratios and isotopic concentrations. Very low {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu ratios were measured at both sites ({approx}0.05 for Alpha Island and {approx}0.02 for Emu Field), substantially below global fallout averages. Well correlated but widely varying {sup 236}U and plutonium concentrations were measured across both sites, but {sup 233}U did not correlate with these other isotopes and instead showed correlation with distance from ground zero, indicating in situ production in the soils.

  1. Interim storage of dismantled nuclear weapon components at the U.S. Department of Energy Pantex Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Following the events of 1989 and the subsequent cessation of production of new nuclear weapons by the US, the mission of the Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Weapons Complex has shifted from production to dismantlement of retired weapons. The sole site in the US for accomplishing the dismantlement mission is the DOE Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. Pending a national decision on the ultimate storage and disposition of nuclear components form the dismantled weapons, the storage magazines within the Pantex Plant are serving as the interim storage site for pits--the weapon plutonium-bearing component. The DOE has stipulated that Pantex will provide storage for up to 12,000 pits pending a Record of Decision on a comprehensive site-wide Environmental Impact Statement in November 1996

  2. Long-term worldwide effects of multiple nuclear weapons detonations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The NAS report, issued in 1975 shocked the scientific community by suggesting that detonation of a fraction of the world's nuclear arsenal (104 megatons) could produce a major, 30-70%, reduction in stratospheric ozone, lasting a year or more. The consequences of such a reduction in the natural barrier to solar ultraviolet radiation include the potential extinction of mammalian life. The summary section of the 1975 report is reprinted here

  3. Guarding the guardians: Civilian control of nuclear weapons in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book has three separate complementary goals. First, it develops a model to explain how the command and control of nuclear weapons evolves over time. Second, it tells the story of the evolution of one critical aspect of the nuclear command system, the custody of nuclear weapons. Finally, it assesses the general problem of ensuring civilian control over nuclear operations. The focus is on the formation of operational policy. Where to deploy a weapon and at what state of alertness is an operational decision. Part I, The Theory of Civilian Control is divided into three chapters: Civilian control: Principles and problems; Civilian Control: From alerts to war termination; and Explaining changes in civilian control. Part II, The Evolution of Custody Policy has seven chapters: The Atomic Energy Act and the origin of assertive control, 1945-1947; The first test of assertive civilian control, 1948-1949; The breach in assertive control, 1950-1952; Assertive control becomes delegative control, 1953-1958; The resurgence of assertive control, 1959-1962; The cycle continues, 1963-1990; and Conclusion: The future of civilian control

  4. Mode Research on Space Weapons Systems Innovation Based Quality Function Deployment

    OpenAIRE

    Wang Xiuhong

    2011-01-01

    in the aviation industry, experts are enthusiastic over the research of sophisticated weapons. Little specialist pays attention to the innovation modes and methods. Up to now little quantization method suitable for aviation weapon systems innovation is presented. Base on the deep analysis and study on features of aviation weapon systems innovation and different innovation mode from the mass production, we have designed process model and quality chain model of aviation weapon systems innovatio...

  5. Estimating Attributes of Nuclear Weapon and Other Fissile Material Configuration Using Features Of Nuclear Materials Identification Signatures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This brief describes a strategy that, when implemented, will allow the attributes, i.e., the physical properties, of nuclear weapon and other configurations of fissile material to be estimated from Nuclear Material Identification System (NMIS) signatures for arms control, treaty verification, and transparency purposes. Attributes are estimated by condensing measured NMIS signatures into ''features'' that approximately represent physical characteristics of the measurement such as gamma-ray transmission, induced fission, etc. The features are obtained from NMIS signatures to estimate quantities related to gamma and neutron transmission through the inspected item and gamma and neutron scattering and production via induced fission within the inspected item. Multivariate, i.e., multiple-feature, linear models have been successfully employed to estimate attributes, and multivariate nonlinear models are currently under investigation. Attributes estimated employing this strategy can then be examined to test the supposition that the inspected item is in fact a nuclear weapon

  6. Present status of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons plays an important role in enhancing the security of all States. It is essential to maintain in the implementation of the Treaty an acceptable balance of the mutual responsibilities and obligations of all the countries Party to the Treaty wether or not nuclear weapon States. These questions were discussed during the Conference on the operation of the Treaty held in Geneva in May 1975. It was emphasized at the Conference that the first five years of application of the Treaty had shown a consistent increase in the number of ratifications and in the safeguards agreements concluded on the basis of the Agreement. (N.E.A.)

  7. Japan's anti-nuclear weapons policy misses its target, even in the war on terrorism.

    Science.gov (United States)

    DiFilippo, Anthony

    2003-01-01

    While actively working to promote the abolition of all nuclear weapons from the world since the end of the cold war, Japan's disarmament policies are not without problems. Promoting the elimination of nuclear weapons as Japan remains under the US nuclear umbrella creates a major credibility problem for Tokyo, since this decision maintains a Japanese deterrence policy at the same time that officials push for disarmament. Tokyo also advocates a gradual approach to the abolition of nuclear weapons, a decision that has had no effect on those countries that have been conducting sub-critical nuclear testing, nor stopped India and Pakistan from carrying out nuclear tests. Consistent with Article 9 of the Constitution, the Japanese war-renouncing constitutional clause, Tokyo toughened Japan's sizeable Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme in the early 1990s. Because of the anti-military guidelines included in Japan's ODA programme, Tokyo stopped new grant and loan aid to India and Pakistan in 1998 after these countries conducted nuclear tests. However, because of the criticism Japan faced from its failure to participate in the 1991 Gulf War, Tokyo has been seeking a new Japanese role in international security during the post-cold war period. Deepening its commitment to the security alliance with the US, Tokyo has become increasingly influenced by Washington's global polices, including the American war on terrorism. After Washington decided that Pakistan would be a key player in the US war on terrorism, Tokyo restored grant and loan aid to both Islamabad and New Delhi, despite the unequivocal restrictions of Japan's ODA programme.

  8. Literature survey of blast and fire effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The American literature of the past 30 years on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas has been surveyed. The relevant work is briefly sketched and areas where information is apparently lacking are noted. This report is intended to provide the basis for suggesting research priorities in the fire and blast effects area for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It is also intended to provide entry into the literature for researchers. over 850 references are given

  9. Literature survey of blast and fire effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reitter, T.A.; McCallen, D.B.; Kang, S.W.

    1982-06-01

    The American literature of the past 30 years on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas has been surveyed. The relevant work is briefly sketched and areas where information is apparently lacking are noted. This report is intended to provide the basis for suggesting research priorities in the fire and blast effects area for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It is also intended to provide entry into the literature for researchers. over 850 references are given.

  10. Is force ever justified in preventing a State from acquiring nuclear weapons?

    OpenAIRE

    Dobra, Alexandra

    2010-01-01

    In order to provide a grounded argument, the present paper asks the following questions. Why do States acquire nuclear weapons? Why do finally States tend to prevent this acquisition? What does the use of force imply? This logical structure adduces the argument sustaining the avoidance of the use of force as a viable preventive tool. It concentrates exclusively on States instituting a threat and on the force-led circumventive strategies’ implications used by non-threatening States to prevent ...

  11. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  12. Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  13. Accelerator-based conversion (ABC) of reactor and weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An accelerator-based conversion (ABC) system is presented that is capable of rapidly burning plutonium in a low-inventory sub-critical system. The system also returns fission power to the grid and transmutes troublesome long-lived fission products to short lived or stable products. Higher actinides are totally fissioned. The system is suited not only to controlled, rapid burning of excess weapons plutonium, but to the long range application of eliminating or drastically reducing the world total inventory of plutonium. Deployment of the system will require the successful resolution of a broad range of technical issues introduced in the paper

  14. Russia’s Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Their Current Configuration and Posture: A Strategic Asset or Liability?

    OpenAIRE

    Saradzhyan, Simon

    2010-01-01

    Russia's military-political leadership envisions a formidable range of uses for the country's arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). In the eyes of Russian leaders, these weapons play a critical role in the nation's defense and security posture as part of the country's overall nuclear arsenal and as an equalizer for the weakness of the nation's conventional forces vis-a-vis NATO and China. Russia's military-political leadership and policy influentials also assign a number of specif...

  15. Nuclear weapons tests and short-term effects on atmospheric ozone

    Science.gov (United States)

    Miller, A. J.; Krueger, A. J.; Prabhakara, C.; Hilsenrath, E.

    1974-01-01

    Observations made when Nimbus 4 passed over a nuclear cloud about three hours after the bomb exploded are presented. Infrared and BUV measurements indicated that the atmospheric ozone level in the area of cloud was significantly less than in areas directly north and south of the cloud. It is noted, however, that it is not possible to state definitively that the ozone depletion was caused by nitrogen oxides released in the nuclear weapons test, and that further observations must be made to clarify the situation.

  16. Polycythemia vera among participants of a nuclear weapons test

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sobell, J.L.; Codd, M.B.; Silverstein, M.N.; Kurland, L.T.

    1987-03-06

    Three letters-to-the-editors discuss the finding of a statistically significant excess of polycythemia vera cases among participants in the Smoky detonation. Had population-based incidence rates from Rochester been used to derive an expected incidence, and had only bona fide polycythemia vera cases been considered, as is the rule in most epidemiologic studies, the observed frequency of polycythemia vera among participants in the Smoky test would have been found to be well within chance expectations.

  17. North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moon, Duk-ho (Korean Consulate General in New York)

    2003-12-01

    A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.

  18. Disposal of SNL-designed electronics assemblies associated with the nuclear weapons program - challenges and progress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    One of the common waste streams generated throughout the nuclear weapon complex is 'hardware' originating from the nuclear weapons program. The activities associated with this hardware at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) include design and development, environmental testing, reliability and stockpile surveillance testing, and military liaison training. SNL-designed electronic assemblies include radars, arming/fusing/firing systems, power sources, and use-control and safety systems, Waste stream characterization using process knowledge is difficult due to the age of some components and lack of design information oriented towards hazardous constituent identification. Chemical analysis methods such as the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) are complicated by the inhomogeneous character of these components and the fact that many assemblies have aluminum or stainless steel cases, with the electronics encapsulated in a foam or epoxy matrix. In addition, some components may contain explosives, radioactive materials, toxic substances (PCBs, asbestos), and other regulated or personnel hazards which must be identified prior to handling and disposal. In spite of the above difficulties, we have succeeded in characterizing a limited number of weapon components using a combination of process knowledge and chemical analysis. For these components, we have shown that if the material is regulated as RCRA hazardous waste, it is because the waste exhibits one or more hazardous characteristics; primarily reactivity and/or toxicity (Pb, Cd). (author)

  19. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Clarence Payne

    2011-08-01

    Full Text Available Constructivism challenges the prevailing approaches to international relations and security. It attempts to explain, inter alia, how actors acquire their identities, and how these identities shape actors’ material and non-material interests. These constructed identities and interests further define mutually constructed rules, norms and institutions, which enable states and other actors to act accordingly. For constructivists, actors approach social facts in terms of the meaning, significance, value and beliefs these actors ascribe to such facts. Once an actor has constructed the social purpose (i.e. its identity and/or interests of a particular social fact, the actor ascribes new meaning to this fact. The next step for the actor and others would then be to construct social practices based on mutually constructed norms, rules and institutions to engage with this social fact. States, therefore, could have different identities and varying interests at different times (Barnett, 2005:251-270.

  20. Sweden and the bomb. The Swedish plans to acquire nuclear weapons, 1945 - 1972

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonter, T [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of History

    2001-09-01

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid-50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The prime minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue

  1. Sustained nuclear energy without weapons or reprocessing using accelerator-driven systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Accelerator-driven thermal-spectrum molten-salt nuclear technology can greatly simplify nuclear energy technology by eliminating reprocessing and greatly enhancing once-through burn-up. In effect the accelerator may be employed as a substitute for frequent reprocessing and recycle. The accelerator makes possible reduction in plutonium and minor actinides from current LWRs by a factor of more than ten without reprocessing while converting the plutonium remnant to a non-weapons-useful isotopic composition. The accelerator also enhances the once-through energy production from fertile material by a factor of ten without reprocessing compared to once-through LWR technology. This technology would eliminate the need to deploy plutonium production indefinitely, and reprocessing and recycle for at least several hundred years. The energy production technology proposed here operates primarily on the Th-U cycle with a minor contribution from the U-Pu cycle to eliminate the weapons-usefulness of 233U. There are two key innovations in addition to the accelerator. One is the use of liquid fuel flowing once through a pool of material undergoing fission thereby allowing high burn-up concurrently with continuous removal of fission product without reprocessing. The second is the unanticipated low capture cross section of fission product nuclides which substantially enhances the neutron economy in this type of system. The supplement of neutrons from the accelerator, the reduced fission product neutron capture, and the continuously flowing fuel are the enablers for the performance described here. This technology allows an essentially complete decoupling of nuclear energy from nuclear weapons (orig.)

  2. Sovereignty and Nuclear Weapons: The Need for Real Sovereign Authority Rooted in the People’s Global Expectations about Survival, Peace and Security

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Winston P. Nagan

    2012-10-01

    Full Text Available The current international security framework is based on an incomplete, anachronistic conception of sovereignty shaped largely by historical circumstance rather than principles of universal justice. Evolution of the global community over the past half century necessitates a reformulation of the concept to justly represent the rights of individual citizens and the global community as a whole. The reconceptualization of sovereignty is an essential condition for the elimination of major threats to global security, most especially those arising from the continued existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

  3. Weapon carrying and psychopathic-like features in a population-based sample of Finnish adolescents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Saukkonen, Suvi; Laajasalo, Taina; Jokela, Markus; Kivivuori, Janne; Salmi, Venla; Aronen, Eeva T

    2016-02-01

    We investigated the prevalence of juvenile weapon carrying and psychosocial and personality-related risk factors for carrying different types of weapons in a nationally representative, population-based sample of Finnish adolescents. Specifically, we aimed to investigate psychopathic-like personality features as a risk factor for weapon carrying. The participants were 15-16-year-old adolescents from the Finnish self-report delinquency study (n = 4855). Four different groups were formed based on self-reported weapon carrying: no weapon carrying, carrying knife, gun or other weapon. The associations between psychosocial factors, psychopathic-like features and weapon carrying were examined with multinomial logistic regression analysis. 9% of the participants had carried a weapon in the past 12 months. Adolescents with a history of delinquency, victimization and antisocial friends were more likely to carry weapons in general; however, delinquency and victimization were most strongly related to gun carrying, while perceived peer delinquency (antisocial friends) was most strongly related to carrying a knife. Better academic performance was associated with a reduced likelihood of carrying a gun and knife, while feeling secure correlated with a reduced likelihood of gun carrying only. Psychopathic-like features were related to a higher likelihood of weapon carrying, even after adjusting for other risk factors. The findings of the study suggest that adolescents carrying a weapon have a large cluster of problems in their lives, which may vary based on the type of weapon carried. Furthermore, psychopathic-like features strongly relate to a higher risk of carrying a weapon. PMID:25986501

  4. Nuclear Weapons in Regional Contexts: The Cases of Argentina and Brazil

    CERN Document Server

    Junior, Olival Freire; Moreira, Ildeu C; Barros, Fernando de Souza

    2015-01-01

    South America is a region which is free from nuclear weapons. However, this was not an inevitable development from the relationships among its countries. Indeed, regional rivalries between Brazil and Argentina, with military implications for both countries, lasted a long time. After WWII these countries took part in the race to obtain nuclear technologies and nuclear ambitions were part of the game. In the mid 1980s, the end of military dictatorships and the successful establishing of democratic institutions put an end to the race. Thus regional and national interests in addition to the establishment of democracies in Latin America have been responsible for the building of trust between the two countries. Meaningful international initiatives are once again needed in the framework of worldwide cooperation. This cooperation is better developed when democratic regimes are in place.

  5. The bishops and nuclear weapons: The catholic pastoral letter on war and peace

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dougherty, J.E.

    1984-01-01

    This is a contribution to the Catholic debate over nuclear weapons, by an international relations scholar who teaches at a Catholic college. Dougherty is critical of the 1983 pastoral letter, arguing that it focuses too much on the dangers of nuclear war and the inadequacies of deterrence while giving insufficient attention to Soviet expansionism and the need for stable deterrence through a judicious mixture of military modernization and arms control. He is concerned by an increase in ''Catholic nuclear pacifism,'' fearing that the pastoral letter could become a theological rationalization for neo-isolationism in the United States. The European bishops, he notes, take a more moderate view.

  6. Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Treaty of Tlatelolco enhances the security of the countries of the region by reducing the risk of a nuclear-arms race among them, with all the danger and cost that it would entail, and, as a contribution to the world-wide nuclear non-proliferation regime, it constitutes an important confidence-building measure by ensuring, through its control and verification system, that parties to the Treaty do not posses and will not acquire nuclear weapons. List of parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as of 31 July 1989: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil (not full party), Chile (not full party), Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. (Argentina and Dominica have signed the Treaty)

  7. New Wine in Old Bottles? The New Salience of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Assessing continuity and change in the world's nuclear landscape is no small task. Since the end of the fierce East-West ideological and political conflict, escalating arms race, and brinkmanship, known as the Cold War, and mainly as a result of its end, the global strategic environment has fundamentally changed, and continues to change. Yet as one French scholar has written, 'We may know that the world is being transformed, but we do not know what the world is being transformed into... What this will look like is as imaginable to us now as the Treaties of Westphalia, which closed the Thirty Years War in 1648-49 would have been to a European of 1618'. There are various, often contradictory interpretations of basic trends and alternative hypothesis about their driving forces. In particular, some analysts still believe that after the Cold War the world is moving toward a democratic reconciliation and hence the 'end of history'. If that is the case then nuclear weapons are becoming less important. However, there is an increasing body of evidence to support Jean Baudrillard's theory that current geopolitical convulsions are the initial manifestations of a fourth world war. If so, the questions, as yet unanswered, are what the fundamental nature of this war is; what political and social actors are colliding with each other; and what the role of nuclear weapons will be in the conflicts and confrontations that may be pushing us toward another global conflagration. (author)

  8. Statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the following statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, statements on behalf of the depository Governments and statements on behalf of other Governments (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Western Samoa and Nordic Countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden)

  9. The treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the statement, made by Ambassador Carlos Portales Cifuentes, Director General for Foreign Policy of the Ministry of External Relations of Chile, during the VIII. Special Session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) on the occasion of Chile's becoming a Contracting Party to the Tlatelolco Treaty, is being circulated for the information of all Member States of the Agency at the request of the Alternate to the Resident Representative of Chile

  10. International safeguards in nuclear weapon states - Status and look into the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper shall recall the framework for the application of international safeguards in the 5 Nuclear Weapons States (USA, Russia, China, United-Kingdom and France) and give an overview on their implementation. It shall then discuss some reasons for an evolution of those States and IAEA's commitments to apply its safeguards and suggests ideas for an increased but efficient involvement of IAEA in those States fully taking into account the specificities of those States within the State Level Approach.The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  11. Environmental radiation at the Monte Bello Islands from nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1952 and 1956

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The results from the 1962 and 1968 surveys of environmental radiation at the Monte Bello Islands are presented. These were the first of the series of surveys of radioactive contamination of the Islands to be carried out following nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1952 and 1956. Detailed comparison is made with the results obtained in the subsequent surveys in 1972 and 1978. For more than 20 years, no area at the Monte Bello Islands has presented an acute hazard due to external exposure to environmental radiation

  12. Radioactive fallout from Chinese nuclear weapons test of March 15, 1978

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has measured the radionuclide concentration of short-lived debris from a radioactive cloud, produced by a nuclear weapons test conducted by the People's Republic of China on March 15, 1978. Analysis with a 40 cfm Sierra impactor showed that a large portion of the radioactivity was associated with relatively large particles. Surface air samples showed significant concentrations of 124Sb. Samples of rain water from New York State showed that radioactivity arrived on the east coast at about the same time as peak debris levels were observed on the west coast. Highest concentrations of 131I occurred along the Washington State--Canadian border

  13. Residual radioactive contamination of the test site at Emu from nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1953

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The detailed distributions and soil concentrations of long-lived radionuclides remaining from nuclear weapons trials conducted at Emu in October 1953, are presented. Significant radiation levels due to long-lived neutron activation products in soil, 60Co and 152Eu, occur only in the immediate vicinity of the ground zeros of TOTEM 1 and TOTEM 2. It is shown that the levels of contamination due to fallout products in the soil are well below those which would constitute a health hazard to occupants of the area

  14. Deterrence and engagement U.S. and North Korean interactions over nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War

    OpenAIRE

    Kwak, Geunho.

    2008-01-01

    The North Korea nuclear crisis needs to be understood comprehensively, taking into account both international relations and the domestic political dynamics of the countries involved. Thus, this thesis analyzes North Korean and U.S. policies by examining their policies in the two nuclear crises (1993-94) and (2002-present) and proposing an improved option for reaching a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. This thesis finds that North Korea has pursued nuclear weapons with a unique historical,...

  15. Vulnerability of populations and the urban health care systems to nuclear weapon attack – examples from four American cities

    OpenAIRE

    Dallas Cham E; Bell William C

    2007-01-01

    Abstract Background The threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within the United States has grown significantly in recent years, focusing attention on the medical and public health disaster capabilities of the nation in a large scale crisis. While the hundreds of thousands or millions of casualties resulting from a nuclear weapon would, in and of itself, overwhelm our current medical response capabilities, the response dilemma is further exacerbated in that these resourc...

  16. Cooperative measures to support the Indo-Pak Agreement Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mishra, Sitakanta; Ahmed, Mansoor

    2014-04-01

    In 2012, India and Pakistan reaffirmed the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. Despite a history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two countries, this agreement derives strength from a few successful nuclear confidence building measures that have stood the test of time. It also rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear holocaust from an accidental nuclear weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of a weapon by the other side. This study brings together two emerging strategic analysts from South Asia to explore measures to support the Agreement and further develop cooperation around this critical issue. This study briefly dwells upon the strategic landscape of nuclear South Asia with the respective nuclear force management structures, doctrines, and postures of India and Pakistan. It outlines the measures in place for the physical protection and safety of nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, and command and control mechanisms in the two countries, and it goes on to identify the prominent, emerging challenges posed by the introduction of new weapon technologies and modernization of the respective strategic forces. This is followed by an analysis of the agreement itself leading up to a proposed framework for cooperative measures that might enhance the spirit and implementation of the agreement.

  17. Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.; Shuh, D. K.; Knight, K. B.; Eppich, G. R.; Holliday, K. S.

    2016-05-01

    Nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. We find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. The resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.

  18. Los Alamos neutron science center nuclear weapons stewardship and unique national scientific capabilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schoenberg, Kurt F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-12-15

    This presentation gives an overview of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and its contributions to science and the nuclear weapons program. LANSCE is made of multiple experimental facilities (the Lujan Center, the Weapons Neutron Research facility (WNR), the Ultra-Cold Neutron facility (UCN), the proton Radiography facility (pRad) and the Isotope Production Facility (IPF)) served by the its kilometer long linear accelerator. Several research areas are supported, including materials and bioscience, nuclear science, materials dynamics, irradiation response and medical isotope production. LANSCE is a national user facility that supports researchers worldwide. The LANSCE Risk Mitigation program is currently in progress to update critical accelerator equipment to help extend the lifetime of LANSCE as a key user facility. The Associate Directorate of Business Sciences (ADBS) plays an important role in the continued success of LANSCE. This includes key procurement support, human resource support, technical writing support, and training support. LANSCE is also the foundation of the future signature facility MARIE (Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes).

  19. History, framework and perspectives of international policy for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The study analyses the framework conditions, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the international non-proliferation regime and their interlacement with international nuclear energy policies, and evaluates the results achieved so far on an international level by the efforts directed towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conclusion to be drawn as stated by the author is that the classical tool of non-proliferation policy - denial of technology transfer - will lose in importance and give way to enhanced, controlled cooperation between countries of the Third World and the industrialised countries. Another instrument that will maintain its value for non-proliferation policy is cooperation for political stabilisation in those parts of the world where regional conflicts might aggravate. (orig./HP)

  20. Health consequences and health systems response to the Pacific U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Palafox, Neal A; Riklon, Sheldon; Alik, Wilfred; Hixon, Allen L

    2007-03-01

    Between 1946 and 1958, the United States detonated 67 thermonuclear devices in the Pacific as part of their U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program (USNWTP). The aggregate explosive power was equal to 7,200 Hiroshima atomic bombs. Recent documents released by the U.S. government suggest that the deleterious effects of the nuclear testing were greater and extended farther than previously known. The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) government and affected communities have sought refress through diplomatic routes with the U.S. government, however, existing medical programs and financial reparations have not adequately addressed many of the health consequences of the USNWTP. Since radiation-induced cancers may have a long latency, a healthcare infrastructure is needed to address both cancer and related health issues. This article reviews the health consequences of the Pacific USNWTP and the current health systems ability to respond. PMID:19772154

  1. (236)U and (239,)(240)Pu ratios from soils around an Australian nuclear weapons test site.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tims, S G; Froehlich, M B; Fifield, L K; Wallner, A; De Cesare, M

    2016-01-01

    The isotopes (236)U, (239)Pu and (240)Pu are present in surface soils as a result of global fallout from nuclear weapons tests carried out in the 1950's and 1960's. These isotopes potentially constitute artificial tracers of recent soil erosion and sediment movement. Only Accelerator Mass Spectrometry has the requisite sensitivity to measure all three isotopes at these environmental levels. Coupled with its relatively high throughput capabilities, this makes it feasible to conduct studies of erosion across the geographical extent of the Australian continent. In the Australian context, however, global fallout is not the only source of these isotopes. As part of its weapons development program the United Kingdom carried out a series of atmospheric and surface nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga, South Australia in 1956 and 1957. The tests have made a significant contribution to the Pu isotopic abundances present in the region around Maralinga and out to distances ∼1000 km, and impact on the assessment techniques used in the soil and sediment tracer studies. Quantification of the relative fallout contribution derived from detonations at Maralinga is complicated owing to significant contamination around the test site from numerous nuclear weapons safety trials that were also carried out around the site. We show that (236)U can provide new information on the component of the fallout that is derived from the local nuclear weapons tests, and highlight the potential of (236)U as a new fallout tracer.

  2. Mission possible: Nuclear weapons inspections in Iraq - 7 March 2003. Essay, published in the Wall Street Journal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For the past three months, a cadre of highly trained inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been on a focused mission: to verify, through intrusive inspection, the existence or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. Nuclear weapons inspections in Iraq are making marked progress. To date, no substantiated evidence was found of the revival in Iraq of a nuclear weapons programme - the most lethal of the weapons of mass destruction. No verification programme can provide absolute guarantees that every facility or piece of equipment has been seen; there is always some degree of risk - and for that reason we need to continue to maintain a monitoring and verification presence in Iraq well into the future. For the present, we intend to continue our programme of intrusive inspection, making use of all the authority granted to us by the Security Council and all the information provided by other States. Barring any unforeseen circumstances, and provided that the level of co-operation by Iraq accelerates and support by other States continues, the IAEA should be able, in the near future, to provide the Security Council with credible assurance regarding the presence or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq

  3. (236)U and (239,)(240)Pu ratios from soils around an Australian nuclear weapons test site.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tims, S G; Froehlich, M B; Fifield, L K; Wallner, A; De Cesare, M

    2016-01-01

    The isotopes (236)U, (239)Pu and (240)Pu are present in surface soils as a result of global fallout from nuclear weapons tests carried out in the 1950's and 1960's. These isotopes potentially constitute artificial tracers of recent soil erosion and sediment movement. Only Accelerator Mass Spectrometry has the requisite sensitivity to measure all three isotopes at these environmental levels. Coupled with its relatively high throughput capabilities, this makes it feasible to conduct studies of erosion across the geographical extent of the Australian continent. In the Australian context, however, global fallout is not the only source of these isotopes. As part of its weapons development program the United Kingdom carried out a series of atmospheric and surface nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga, South Australia in 1956 and 1957. The tests have made a significant contribution to the Pu isotopic abundances present in the region around Maralinga and out to distances ∼1000 km, and impact on the assessment techniques used in the soil and sediment tracer studies. Quantification of the relative fallout contribution derived from detonations at Maralinga is complicated owing to significant contamination around the test site from numerous nuclear weapons safety trials that were also carried out around the site. We show that (236)U can provide new information on the component of the fallout that is derived from the local nuclear weapons tests, and highlight the potential of (236)U as a new fallout tracer. PMID:26141189

  4. Toward a more rigorous application of margins and uncertainties within the nuclear weapons life cycle : a Sandia perspective.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Klenke, Scott Edward; Novotny, George Charles; Paulsen Robert A., Jr.; Diegert, Kathleen V.; Trucano, Timothy Guy; Pilch, Martin M.

    2007-12-01

    This paper presents the conceptual framework that is being used to define quantification of margins and uncertainties (QMU) for application in the nuclear weapons (NW) work conducted at Sandia National Laboratories. The conceptual framework addresses the margins and uncertainties throughout the NW life cycle and includes the definition of terms related to QMU and to figures of merit. Potential applications of QMU consist of analyses based on physical data and on modeling and simulation. Appendix A provides general guidelines for addressing cases in which significant and relevant physical data are available for QMU analysis. Appendix B gives the specific guidance that was used to conduct QMU analyses in cycle 12 of the annual assessment process. Appendix C offers general guidelines for addressing cases in which appropriate models are available for use in QMU analysis. Appendix D contains an example that highlights the consequences of different treatments of uncertainty in model-based QMU analyses.

  5. A comparison of delayed radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre; Vitale, Bruno

    2002-01-01

    It is shown that the radiological burden due to the battlefield use of circa 400 tons of depleted-uranium munitions in Iraq (and of about 40 tons in Yugoslavia) is comparable to that arising from the hypothetical battle-field use of more than 600 kt (respectively 60 kt) of high-explosive equivalent pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclear weapons. Despite the limited knowledge openly available on existing and future nuclear weapons, there is sufficient published information on their physical pri...

  6. New Wine in Old Bottles? The New Salience of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fedorov, Y.E.

    2007-07-01

    Assessing continuity and change in the world's nuclear landscape is no small task. Since the end of the fierce East-West ideological and political conflict, escalating arms race, and brinkmanship, known as the Cold War, and mainly as a result of its end, the global strategic environment has fundamentally changed, and continues to change. Yet as one French scholar has written, 'We may know that the world is being transformed, but we do not know what the world is being transformed into... What this will look like is as imaginable to us now as the Treaties of Westphalia, which closed the Thirty Years War in 1648-49 would have been to a European of 1618'. There are various, often contradictory interpretations of basic trends and alternative hypothesis about their driving forces. In particular, some analysts still believe that after the Cold War the world is moving toward a democratic reconciliation and hence the 'end of history'. If that is the case then nuclear weapons are becoming less important. However, there is an increasing body of evidence to support Jean Baudrillard's theory that current geopolitical convulsions are the initial manifestations of a fourth world war. If so, the questions, as yet unanswered, are what the fundamental nature of this war is; what political and social actors are colliding with each other; and what the role of nuclear weapons will be in the conflicts and confrontations that may be pushing us toward another global conflagration. (author)

  7. American perspectives on security : energy, environment, nuclear weapons, and terrorism : 2010.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Herron, Kerry Gale (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK); Jenkins-Smith, Hank C. (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK); Silva, Carol L. (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK)

    2011-03-01

    We report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2010 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public perceptions shaping the context for debate about a comprehensive national energy policy, and what levels of importance are assigned to various prospective energy technologies. Additionally, we investigate how public views on global climate change are evolving, how the public assesses the risks and benefits of nuclear energy, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and public trust in sources of scientific and technical information. We also report findings from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2010 on public views of the relevance of US nuclear weapons today, support for strategic arms control, and assessments of the potential for nuclear abolition. Additionally, we analyze evolving public views of the threat of terrorism, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and tolerance for intrusive antiterror policies. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.

  8. What can Iran gain by having a nuclear weapons program that threatens to destabilize security in the Middle East?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nielsen, Thomas Galasz

    In this paper, Iran’s nuclear aspiration to destabilise power in the Middle East is analysed. Iran is attempting to develop a nuclear energy program, and perhaps even a nuclear weapons program, despite assurances of the opposite. An Iranian nuclear weapon would be a game changer in the region...... and a lot of neigh- bouring countries fear such a development for security reasons. But why is Iran following a nuclear path that may further destabilise the fragile security situation in the Middle East? It is to do with Iran’s own perception of security risks, its desire for greatness in the region...... in its brinkmanship and the outcome could be the lifting of the UN sanctions, international recognition, improved security, and even a possible end to internal political power struggles due to likely economic reforms post-sanctions. Much is at stake for Iran, but, if it succeeds, it could shift...

  9. ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of thermonuclear-fusion energy

    CERN Document Server

    Gsponer, A; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre

    2004-01-01

    This paper contains two parts: (I) A list of "points" highlighting the strategic-political and military-technical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (II) A technical analysis of the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showing that while full access to the physics of thermonuclear weapons is the main implication of ICF, full access to large-scale tritium technology is the main proliferation impact of MCF. The conclusion of the paper is that siting ITER in a country such as Japan, which already has a large separated-plutonium stockpile, and an ambitious laser-driven ICF program (comparable in size and quality to those of the United States or France) will considerably increase its latent (or virtual) nuclear weapons proliferation status, and fo...

  10. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  11. Disarmament and control of nuclear weapons: Russian positions and their national and international determining factors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In a context where Russia seems to come back to some key principles which guided its international action since the end of Cold War, and relationships between Russia and the USA have been degraded since the US intervention in Iraq (2003), the author examines whether these new Russian postures also concern strategic disarmament, whether Russia is loosing its interest in traditional arrangements of strategic stability, and what are Moscow's priorities within the perspective of expiry of the START 1 Treaty. Thus, the author discusses the role of nuclear weapons in the Russian defence policy, outlines the paradoxes of Russian negotiation positions in the fields of disarmament and arms control, and highlights indirect approaches adopted by Russia on these issues

  12. Dose reconstruction studies at selected nuclear weapons facilities in the USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is involved in dose reconstructions at six nuclear weapons facilities in the United States. CDC is directly responsible for the conduct of four of these studies, and it provides technical support for the other two. We expect that the two most recently initiated studies will be conducted in five phases: retrieval and assessment of data, initial source term development and pathway analysis, screening dose and exposure calculations, development of methods for assessing environmental dose, and calculation of environmental doses and exposures. In addition to these technical phases of the studies, significant public involvement will be an integral part of the dose reconstruction process. In this paper, we review the status of the current dose reconstructions and discuss CDC's approach to dose reconstruction. (author). 8 refs, 1 fig., 2 tabs

  13. The Politics of Security: Protests against nuclear weapons, the IAEA, and the early Cold War

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    My paper explores the debates about nuclear energy in the British and West German protests against nuclear weapons from the mid-1950s into the early 1960s. Curiously, there was no engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, although there was some discussion about the peaceful uses of atomic agency. My paper is concerned with using this absence of discussions about a regulatory regime for nuclear energy and the relevant agency to highlight more general features about the discussions about ‘the atomic age’ in the early Cold War. I argue that this absence can be explained with the specific politics of security that was at work here: this was a politics of security that had the mass violence of the Second World War as its reference point, while at the same time propagating a program of modernization linked to the ‘peaceful’ uses of nuclear energy. As the IAEA was concerned with managing the controllable risks of nuclear energy more generally and as protesters focused on the uncontrollable dangers of the nuclear arms race, the IAEA did not matter for the protest movements. This highlights a key feature of the structure of the Cold War international system during this crucial period for the construction of peace in Europe: there emerged, for West European NATO member countries, a system of security swaps: West European governments abrogated their military sovereignty to NATO (which effectively meant to a US-controlled system) and organized military violence was internationalized. Within this system, the US guaranteed economic affluence which stood for social security and material abundance. Apocalypse and peaceful atoms could therefore go hand in hand. (author)

  14. Historical Exposures to Chemicals at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant: A Pilot Retrospective Exposure Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Janeen Denise Robertson

    1999-02-01

    In a mortality study of white males who had worked at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant between 1952 and 1979, an increased number of deaths from benign and unspecified intracranial neoplasms was found. A case-control study nested within this cohort investigated the hypothesis that an association existed between brain tumor death and exposure to either internally deposited plutonium or external ionizing radiation. There was no statistically significant association found between estimated radiation exposure from internally deposited plutonium and the development of brain tumors. Exposure by job or work area showed no significant difference between the cohort and the control groups. An update of the study found elevated risk estimates for (1) all lymphopoietic neoplasms, and (2) all causes of death in employees with body burdens greater than or equal to two nanocuries of plutonium. There was an excess of brain tumors for the entire cohort. Similar cohort studies conducted on worker populations from other plutonium handling facilities have not yet shown any elevated risks for brain tumors. Historically, the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant used large quantities of chemicals in their production operations. The use of solvents, particularly carbon tetrachloride, was unique to Rocky Flats. No investigation of the possible confounding effects of chemical exposures was done in the initial studies. The objectives of the present study are to (1) investigate the history of chemical use at the Rocky Flats facility; (2) locate and analyze chemical monitoring information in order to assess employee exposure to the chemicals that were used in the highest volume; and (3) determine the feasibility of establishing a chemical exposure assessment model that could be used in future epidemiology studies.

  15. The Brazilian position during the final transactions the treaty for the proscriptions of nuclear weapons in Latin America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Brazilian position during the final transactions on the treaty for the proscription of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is presented. An analysis of the main clauses of this treaty is given, well as a comparative study between the principle points of Tlatelolco Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty

  16. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons : The law of arms control and the international non-proliferation regime

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Coppen, T.

    2016-01-01

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a severe threat to international peace, security and stability. In order to counter this threat, the international community has taken numerous measures, legal and otherwise, resulting in a global framework of treaties and political agreements known as th

  17. The role of nuclear suppliers group in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The non-proliferation regime today is a pretty heterogeneous system of measures and different ways of control of nuclear material production, transport and use, as well as nuclear activities and technology in general. In its basis are the Statute of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Non-proliferation Treaty. However, the development of a nuclear technology and technological progress in the world in general, poses the need for more efficient and much more concrete systems of control of nuclear material and activities. One of organizations which cover these issues is Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), founded in 1991 with goal to assemble all states suppliers, regardless are they signatories of Non-proliferation Treaty or not. The important thing is that NSG do not rely only to the list of limitations for traffic of the equipment which is directly related to nuclear activities, but also to so call dual use equipment, i.e. equipment which could be, besides its primary purpose, converted to some nuclear activities. Concerning continuous technological development, and also the actual political situation in the world, these lists are continuously amended. In this presentation the principles and methods of work of NSG are analyzed, together with the role of the Republic of Croatia as its member.(author)

  18. Radiological Weapons Control: A Soviet and US Perspective. Occasional Paper 29.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Issraelyan, Victor L.; Flowerree, Charles C.

    Two international diplomats from the Soviet Union and the United States focus on the need for a treaty to ban the use of radiological weapons. Radiological weapons are those based on the natural decay of nuclear material such as waste from military or civilian nuclear reactors. Such devices include both weapons and equipment, other than a nuclear…

  19. Inaccurate Prediction of Nuclear Weapons' Effects and Possible Adverse Influences on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness

    OpenAIRE

    Harney, Robert C.

    2009-01-01

    This article appeared in Homeland Security Affairs (September 2009), v.5 no.3 The primary purpose of this paper is to discuss the accuracy of common effects estimates and describe how more realistic estimates might affect nuclear terrorism preparedness.[...].The likelihood of an attack [nuclear] has prompted considerable public debate about what are the best steps to prevent such an attack. In many of these discussions estimates of the number of casualties or the size of the area that woul...

  20. Multi-attribute analysis of nuclear fuel cycle resistance to nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Calculation study has been carried out to analyze the proliferation resistance of different scenarios of nuclear fuel cycle organization. Scenarios of stable and developing nuclear power were considered with involvement of thermal and fast reactors. The attention was paid mainly to the cycle with extended plutonium breeding on the basis of fast reactor technology, and to the schemes of fuel cycle organization allowing to minimize the proliferation risk

  1. Microcontroller based ground weapon control system(Short Communication)

    OpenAIRE

    M. Sankar Kishore

    2001-01-01

    Armoured vehicles and tanks generally consist of high resolution optical (both infrared and visible) and display systems for recognition and identification of the targets. Different weapons/articles to engage the targets may be present. A fire control system (FCS) controls all the above systems, monitors the status of the articles present and passes the information to the display system. Depending upon the health and availability of the articles, the FCS selects and fires the articles....

  2. Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker - a physicist and philosopher in the shade of the nuclear bomb. A conversation on nuclear weapons and the responsibility of nuclear scientists

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The 50th anniversary of the first nuclear explosion (16th July 1945) prompted the editor of this collection to look again at the part played by German physicists in the nuclear weapons issue. Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, one of the last surviving witnesses of this period, kindly agreed to give a comprehensive interview on the German nuclear programme and the responsibility of physicists. The interview is published here for the first time and forms the central part of this brochure. It is complemented by two statements by Edward Teller and two historical letters. The author, in preparing this compilation, had in mind to contribute towards science-historical discussion and to give younger colleagues a graphic idea of the conflict surrounding nuclear research. (orig.)

  3. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

  4. The assessment of radiation exposures in native American communities from nuclear weapons testing in Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Native Americans residing in a broad region downwind from the Nevada Test Site during the 1950s and 1960s received significant radiation exposures from nuclear weapons testing. Because of differences in diet, activities, and housing, their radiation exposures are only very imperfectly represented in the Department of Energy dose reconstructions. There are important missing pathways, including exposures to radioactive iodine from eating small game. The dose reconstruction model assumptions about cattle feeding practices across a year are unlikely to apply to the native communities as are other model assumptions about diet. Thus exposures from drinking milk and eating vegetables have not yet been properly estimated for these communities. Through consultations with members of the affected communities, these deficiencies could be corrected and the dose reconstruction extended to Native Americans. An illustration of the feasibility of extending the dose reconstruction is provided by a sample calculation to estimate radiation exposures to the thyroid from eating radio-iodine-contaminated rabbit thyroids after the Dedan test. The illustration is continued with a discussion of how the calculation results may be used to make estimates for other tests and other locations

  5. A comparison of delayed radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons

    CERN Document Server

    Gsponer, A; Vitale, B; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre; Vitale, Bruno

    2002-01-01

    It is shown that the radiological burden due to the battle-field use of circa 400 tons of depleted-uranium munitions in Iraq (and of about 40 tons in Yugoslavia) is comparable to that arising from the hypothetical battle-field use of more than 600 kt (respectively 60 kt) of high-explosive equivalent pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclear weapons. Despite the limited knowledge openly available on existing and future nuclear weapons, there is sufficient published information on their physical principles and radiological effects to make such a comparison. In fact, it is shown that this comparison can be made with very simple and convincing arguments so that the main technical conclusions of the paper are undisputable -- although it would be worthwhile to supplement the hand calculations presented in the paper by more detailed computer simulations in order to consolidate the conclusions and refute any possible objections.

  6. Mode Research on Space Weapons Systems Innovation Based Quality Function Deployment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wang Xiuhong

    2011-06-01

    Full Text Available in the aviation industry, experts are enthusiastic over the research of sophisticated weapons. Little specialist pays attention to the innovation modes and methods. Up to now little quantization method suitable for aviation weapon systems innovation is presented. Base on the deep analysis and study on features of aviation weapon systems innovation and different innovation mode from the mass production, we have designed process model and quality chain model of aviation weapon systems innovation. Compared with the process model of large-scale innovation, the process models are more complex including many feedbacks and adding five steps: task decomposition, analysis of knowledge gap, accumulation of key knowledge, outsourcing selection, system integration. Meanwhile manufacturing process and R&D process are preformed simultaneously, and are involved in the process of module development. Technology application and diffusion are preformed with delivering the final innovation product to user. Quality function deployment and quality house are adopted to deal with the quality transfer among nodes. Quality demands of one node are converted into the technique features of another node in the quality house. We designed the top-down technique features transfer model and bottom-up demands transfer model to solve the quality transfer problems among nodes. At last an example is given to illustrate that this approach can accelerate to blaze the aviation weapon systems trails more than the existing methods and effectively reach quality management of aviation weapon systems innovation.

  7. ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of thermonuclear-fusion energy systems

    OpenAIRE

    Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre

    2004-01-01

    This report contains two parts: (1) A list of "points" highlighting the strategic-political and military-technical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (2) A technical analysis of the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showin...

  8. The nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty and terrorism: the consequences of 11 september 2001 on the treaty review process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The evolution of the terrorism makes the future uncertain, in such a context, the objective of universality of the Ntp and the construction of a comprehensive regime for protecting nuclear materials, technologies, sites, weapon and information may be postponed indefinitely or, on the contrary, become achievable. Should the latter be the case, this would be an unprecedented contribution to consolidating the international security system. Events could overtake political procrastination.But the price to pay risks being a high one. (N.C.)

  9. A comparison of delayed radiological effects of depleted-uranium ammunitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It is shown that the radiological burden due to the battle-field use of circa 400 tons of depleted-uranium ammunitions in Iraq (and of about 40 tons in Yugoslavia) is comparable to that arising from the hypothetical battle-field use of more than 600 kt (respectively 60 kt) of high-explosive equivalent pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclear weapons. Despite the limited knowledge openly available on existing and future nuclear weapons, there is sufficient published information on their physical principles and radiological effects to make such a comparison. In fact, it is shown that this comparison can be made with very simple and convincing arguments so that the main technical conclusions of the paper are undisputable - although it would be worthwhile to supplement the hand calculations presented in the paper by more detailed computer simulations in order to consolidate the conclusions and refute any possible objections. From a strategic perspective, the breaking of the taboo against the intentional battle-field use of radioactive materials, which lasted from 1945 to 1991, can therefore be interpreted as a preparation for the progressive introduction of fourth-generation nuclear weapons whose battle-field use will cause a low (but non-negligible) radioactive environment. It can therefore be argued that besides its military function, the use of depleted-uranium in Iraq and Yugoslavia may have served a political purpose: to soften the opposition of the Western public opinion to the induction of radioactivity on the battle-field, and to get the World population accustomed to the combat use of depleted-uranium and fourth-generation nuclear weapons. (author)

  10. Trends in childhood leukaemia in the Nordic countries in relation to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

    OpenAIRE

    Darby, S. C.; Olsen, J. H.; Doll, R.; Thakrar, B.; Brown, P. D.; Storm, H H; Barlow, L.; Langmark, F.; Teppo, L; H. Tulinius

    1992-01-01

    OBJECTIVE--To obtain further information about the risks of childhood leukaemia after exposure to ionising radiation at low doses and low dose rates before or after birth or to the father's testes shortly before conception. DESIGN--Observational study of trends in incidence of childhood leukaemia in relation to estimated radiation exposures due to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing during the 1950s and 1960s. SETTING--Nordic countries. SUBJECTS--Children aged under 15 years. MAI...

  11. Microcontroller based ground weapon control system(Short Communication

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    M. Sankar Kishore

    2001-10-01

    Full Text Available Armoured vehicles and tanks generally consist of high resolution optical (both infrared and visible and display systems for recognition and identification of the targets. Different weapons/articles to engage the targets may be present. A fire control system (FCS controls all the above systems, monitors the status of the articles present and passes the information to the display system. Depending upon the health and availability of the articles, the FCS selects and fires the articles. Design and development of ground control unit which is the heart of the FCS, both in hardware and software, has been emphasised. The system has been developed using microcontroller and software developed in ASM 51 language. The system also has a facility to test all the systems and articles as initial power on condition. From the safety point of view, software and hardware interlocks have been provided in the critical operations, like firing sequence. "

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  13. Ethical Reflections on the Tactical Nuclear Weapons%对战术核武器的几点伦理思考

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    艾书周

    2011-01-01

    随着核武器出现和不断发展,核伦理的也随着出现和发展起来。但战术核武器的不断发展对传统核伦理造成了不可忽视的冲击,它使得传统的核伦理处于尴尬境地。故使用战术核武器是否道德和如何规范战术核武器的使用成为了新的核伦理问题。%With the emerging and development of nuclear weapons the ethics of nuclear weapon is also brought along at the same time. While the continuous progress of tactical nuclear weapons has an inevitable impact on the traditional ethics of nuclear weapon, leadi

  14. Statement by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the twentieth anniversary of Iraq's ratification of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the full text of the statement made by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the twentieth anniversary of Iraq's ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  16. Reduced fertility after the crash of a U.S. bomber carrying nuclear weapons?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Juel, K

    1995-01-01

    A register-based study was performed to elucidate whether workers employed on the Thule air base in the clean-up period after the crash of a U.S. B-52 bomber carrying nuclear bombs had reduced fertility, as measured by the numbers of liveborn children. The highest birth rates were among 25-34-year...

  17. A Weapon Target Assignment Model Based on Weapon Utility%一种基于武器效用的武器目标分配模型

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    王金山; 李伟兵

    2015-01-01

    为解决武器优化分配中存在的2个问题,提出一种基于武器效用的武器目标分配模型。通过两类武器的效用分析,把目标达到期望毁伤概率作为武器效用最大的起点,设置两类武器的效用函数,以最大武器效用为准则,建立武器分配的线性整数规划模型,并对比2种模型的结果。实践结果证明:新模型求解分配的速度快耗时短,可满足战场需求,且结果更加合理。%In order to overtake two problems in weapon optimal assignment, propose a weapon target assignment model based on weapon utility. By two type weapons utility analysis, set expected kill probability as the start point of maximum weapon utility, and set utility function of two type weapons, takes maximum weapon utility as rule, establish linear integer planning model, and compare the results of two models. The practice results show that the new model has fast speed on solution distribution and use less time. It meets the battlefield requirements and has more reasonable results.

  18. Concepts and Strategies for Transparency Monitoring of Nuclear Materials at the Back End of the Fuel/Weapons Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Representatives of the Department of Energy, the national laboratories, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and others gathered to initiate the development of broad-based concepts and strategies for transparency monitoring of nuclear materials at the back end of the fuel/weapons cycle, including both geologic disposal and monitored retrievable storage. The workshop focused on two key questions: ''Why should we monitor?'' and ''What should we monitor?'' These questions were addressed by identifying the range of potential stakeholders, concerns that stakeholders may have, and the information needed to address those concerns. The group constructed a strategic framework for repository transparency implementation, organized around the issues of safety (both operational and environmental), diversion (assuring legitimate use and security), and viability (both political and economic). Potential concerns of the international community were recognized as the possibility of material diversion, the multinational impacts of potential radionuclide releases, and public and political perceptions of unsafe repositories. The workshop participants also identified potential roles that the WIPP may play as a monitoring technology development and demonstration test-bed facility. Concepts for WIPP'S potential test-bed role include serving as (1) an international monitoring technology and development testing facility, (2) an international demonstration facility, and (3) an education and technology exchange center on repository transparency technologies

  19. A Novel Two-Staged Decision Support based Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment Algorithm, Asset-based Dynamic Weapon Scheduling using Artificial Intelligence Techinques

    CERN Document Server

    Naeem, Huma; Hussain, Mukhtar; Khan, Shoab A

    2009-01-01

    Surveillance control and reporting (SCR) system for air threats play an important role in the defense of a country. SCR system corresponds to air and ground situation management/processing along with information fusion, communication, coordination, simulation and other critical defense oriented tasks. Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment (TEWA) sits at the core of SCR system. In such a system, maximal or near maximal utilization of constrained resources is of extreme importance. Manual TEWA systems cannot provide optimality because of different limitations e.g.surface to air missile (SAM) can fire from a distance of 5Km, but manual TEWA systems are constrained by human vision range and other constraints. Current TEWA systems usually work on target-by-target basis using some type of greedy algorithm thus affecting the optimality of the solution and failing in multi-target scenario. his paper relates to a novel two-staged flexible dynamic decision support based optimal threat evaluation and weapon assignment...

  20. The Swedish National Defence Research Establishment and the plans for Swedish nuclear weapons; Foersvarets forskningsanstalt och planerna paa svenska kaernvapen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonter, Thomas [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of History

    2001-03-01

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish Government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid 50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the Parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the Parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The Government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue

  1. Global Security Rule Sets An Analysis of the Current Global Security Environment and Rule Sets Governing Nuclear Weapons Release

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mollahan, K; Nattrass, L

    2004-09-30

    America is in a unique position in its history. In maintaining its position as the world's only superpower, the US consistently finds itself taking on the role of a global cop, chief exporter of hard and soft power, and primary impetus for globalization. A view of the current global situation shows an America that can benefit greatly from the effects of globalization and soft power. Similarly, America's power can be reduced significantly if globalization and its soft power are not handled properly. At the same time, America has slowly come to realize that its next major adversary is not a near peer competitor but terrorism and disconnected nations that seek nuclear capabilities. In dealing with this new threat, America needs to come to terms with its own nuclear arsenal and build a security rule set that will establish for the world explicitly what actions will cause the US to consider nuclear weapons release. This rule set; however, needs to be established with sensitivity to the US's international interests in globalization and soft power. The US must find a way to establish its doctrine governing nuclear weapons release without threatening other peaceful nations in the process.

  2. Deterring war or courting disaster: an analysis of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean

    OpenAIRE

    Wueger, Diana Beth

    2015-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited One of the core assumptions of nuclear strategy is that submarine-based deterrent assets stabilize deterrent relationships by providing an assured second-strike capability. As India progresses toward an operational sea-based deterrent, this thesis seeks to qualify this foundational assumption by exploring the empirical conditions under which this principle operated during the Cold War. It then examines whether these conditions—and by e...

  3. A high resolution record of chlorine-36 nuclear-weapons-tests fallout from Central Asia

    Science.gov (United States)

    Green, J.R.; Cecil, L.D.; Synal, H.-A.; Santos, J.; Kreutz, K.J.; Wake, C.P.

    2004-01-01

    The Inilchek Glacier, located in the Tien Shan Mountains, central Asia, is unique among mid-latitude glaciers because of its relatively large average annual accumulation. In July 2000, two ice cores of 162 and 167 meters (m) in length were collected from the Inilchek Glacier for (chlorine-36) 36Cl analysis a part of a collaborative international effort to study the environmental changes archived in mid-latitude glaciers worldwide. The average annual precipitation at the collection site was calculated to be 1.6 m. In contrast, the reported average annual accumulations at the high-latitude Dye-3 glacial site, Greenland, the mid-latitude Guliya Ice Cap, China, and the mid-latitude Upper Fremont Glacier, Wyoming, USA, were 0.52, 0.16 and 0.76 m, respectively. The resolution of the 36Cl record in one of the Inilchek ice cores was from 2 to 10 times higher than the resolution of the records at these other sites and could provide an opportunity for detailed study of environmental changes that have occurred over the past 150 years. Despite the differences in accumulation among these various glacial sites, the 36Cl profile and peak concentrations for the Inilchek ice core were remarkably similar in shape and magnitude to those for ice cores from these other sites. The 36Cl peak concentration from 1958, the year during the mid-1900s nuclear-weapons-tests period when 36Cl fallout was largest, was preserved in the Inilchek core at a depth of 90.56 m below the surface of the glacier (74.14-m-depth water equivalent) at a concentration of 7.7 ?? 105 atoms of 36Cl/gram (g) of ice. Peak 36Cl concentrations from Dye-3, Guliya and the Upper Fremont glacial sites were 7.1 ?? 105, 5.4 ?? 105 and 0.7 ?? 105 atoms of 36Cl/g of ice, respectively. Measurements of 36Cl preserved in ice cores improve estimates of historical worldwide atmospheric deposition of this isotope and allow the sources of 36Cl in ground water to be better identified. ?? 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.

  4. United States population dose estimates for 131I in the thyroid after the Chinese atmospheric nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Analysis of samples collected within the United States after the Chinese atmospheric nuclear weapons tests of 26 September and 17 November 1976 indicates that the radiation dose to the thyroid from iodine-131 in milk was predominant. A U.S. population dose to the thyroid of 68,000 man-rads was calculated for the iodine-131 fallout. The four excess thyroid cancers that are estimated to occur as a result of the September test during the next 45 years will be masked by the 380,000 cases of thyroid cancer which are expected to occur in the United States from all causes during the same interval

  5. Vulnerability of populations and the urban health care systems to nuclear weapon attack – examples from four American cities

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dallas Cham E

    2007-02-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background The threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD within the United States has grown significantly in recent years, focusing attention on the medical and public health disaster capabilities of the nation in a large scale crisis. While the hundreds of thousands or millions of casualties resulting from a nuclear weapon would, in and of itself, overwhelm our current medical response capabilities, the response dilemma is further exacerbated in that these resources themselves would be significantly at risk. There are many limitations on the resources needed for mass casualty management, such as access to sufficient hospital beds including specialized beds for burn victims, respiration and supportive therapy, pharmaceutical intervention, and mass decontamination. Results The effects of 20 kiloton and 550 kiloton nuclear detonations on high priority target cities are presented for New York City, Chicago, Washington D.C. and Atlanta. Thermal, blast and radiation effects are described, and affected populations are calculated using 2000 block level census data. Weapons of 100 Kts and up are primarily incendiary or radiation weapons, able to cause burns and start fires at distances greater than they can significantly damage buildings, and to poison populations through radiation injuries well downwind in the case of surface detonations. With weapons below 100 Kts, blast effects tend to be stronger than primary thermal effects from surface bursts. From the point of view of medical casualty treatment and administrative response, there is an ominous pattern where these fatalities and casualties geographically fall in relation to the location of hospital and administrative facilities. It is demonstrated that a staggering number of the main hospitals, trauma centers, and other medical assets are likely to be in the fatality plume, rendering them essentially inoperable in a crisis. Conclusion Among the consequences of this

  6. Vulnerability of populations and the urban health care systems to nuclear weapon attack – examples from four American cities

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bell, William C; Dallas, Cham E

    2007-01-01

    Background The threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within the United States has grown significantly in recent years, focusing attention on the medical and public health disaster capabilities of the nation in a large scale crisis. While the hundreds of thousands or millions of casualties resulting from a nuclear weapon would, in and of itself, overwhelm our current medical response capabilities, the response dilemma is further exacerbated in that these resources themselves would be significantly at risk. There are many limitations on the resources needed for mass casualty management, such as access to sufficient hospital beds including specialized beds for burn victims, respiration and supportive therapy, pharmaceutical intervention, and mass decontamination. Results The effects of 20 kiloton and 550 kiloton nuclear detonations on high priority target cities are presented for New York City, Chicago, Washington D.C. and Atlanta. Thermal, blast and radiation effects are described, and affected populations are calculated using 2000 block level census data. Weapons of 100 Kts and up are primarily incendiary or radiation weapons, able to cause burns and start fires at distances greater than they can significantly damage buildings, and to poison populations through radiation injuries well downwind in the case of surface detonations. With weapons below 100 Kts, blast effects tend to be stronger than primary thermal effects from surface bursts. From the point of view of medical casualty treatment and administrative response, there is an ominous pattern where these fatalities and casualties geographically fall in relation to the location of hospital and administrative facilities. It is demonstrated that a staggering number of the main hospitals, trauma centers, and other medical assets are likely to be in the fatality plume, rendering them essentially inoperable in a crisis. Conclusion Among the consequences of this outcome would be the probable loss

  7. Statement to the review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, New York, 17 April 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Statement presents the following issues: IAEA safeguards system; lessons from the case of Iraq, South Africa, Democratic People's Republic of Korea; strengthening of safeguards; trafficking; nuclear-weapon-free zones; cooperation to further the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

  8. Difficulties in Determining If Nuclear Training of Foreigners Contributes to Weapons Proliferation. Report by the Comptroller General of the United States.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Congress of the U.S., Washington, DC. House Committee on Appropriations.

    The General Accounting Office (GAO) conclusion that it is impossible to determine the contribution of U.S. nuclear training of foreigners to the spread of nuclear weapons is presented. The GAO position is that there is no way to ascertain the true intentions of foreign nationals being trained or the motivations of their countries. Issues…

  9. Leveraging U.S. nuclear weapons policy to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals : implications of major theories of international relations.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Walter, Andrew

    2009-06-01

    National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

  10. Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  11. Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Dominican Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007

  14. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  15. Experience of an ex (De Facto) nuclear weapon state with the application of post-Iraq safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Following the discovery of uranium as a by-product of the gold mining industry during the Second World War, South Africa became interested in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the late 1960s - amongst these being peaceful nuclear explosions. The character of this part of the nuclear R and D programme changed to that of developing a nuclear deterrent capability over the ensuing two decades as a result of military considerations and resulted in the production of six complete gun assembled devices. Towards the end of the 1980s the national and international political scene changed dramatically for the better, leading to a decision to abandon this programme, dismantle the devices and destroy the non-nuclear parts, accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and conclude a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. All the highly enriched uranium recovered from the devices was declared and placed under safeguards. The conclusion of the Agreement occurred at the height of the Iraq crisis and, given the speculation about South Africa's nuclear capability, it was not surprising that the IAEA was asked to ''verify the completeness of South Africa's declaration of nuclear material and facilities''. A special team was appointed for this unprecedented task. Owing to South Africa's new commitment to non-proliferation and its declared policy of transparency the team was allowed to co-opt nuclear weapons experts from outside the IAEA, and access was provided to all records, key personnel and facilities, some of which were non-nuclear on private or military sites. The South African team involved in the verification exercise over a period of more than two years made some observations which the paper presents in the interest of promoting non-proliferation - especially in those States which may wish to follow South Africa's example of 'de-proliferation'. (author)

  16. Study on Emergency Measures for Nuclear Accident of Missile Nuclear Weapon%导弹核武器核事故应急有关问题研究

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    高桂清; 毕义明

    2001-01-01

    The major task, characteristics, organizing and commending, and resource manipulation of the emergency measures for nuclear accident of missile nuclear weapon are probed into. The measures may be considered as a complex system engineering involving system of organization, personnel, equipment, technique and scientific theory, so on. Relevant problems of emergency measures are deliberately studied referring the practical situations. The results could provide the theoretical guidance to emergency measures for nuclear accident of missile nuclear weapon.%对导弹核武器核事故应急的主要任务、特点、组织指挥以及力量运用等问题进行了探讨,导弹核武器核事故的应急问题是一项涉及体制、人员、装备、技术、科学理论等方面的复杂系统工程,笔者结合实际,有针对性的研究了事故应急有关的问题,可为导弹核武器核事故应急提供理论指导。

  17. The text of the Agreement between Egypt and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Egypt to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  18. Systems engineering analysis of kinetic energy weapon concepts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Senglaub, M.

    1996-06-01

    This study examines, from a systems engineering design perspective, the potential of kinetic energy weapons being used in the role of a conventional strategic weapon. Within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, strategic weapon experience falls predominantly in the nuclear weapons arena. The techniques developed over the years may not be the most suitable methodologies for use in a new design/development arena. For this reason a more fundamental approach was pursued with the objective of developing an information base from which design decisions might be made concerning the conventional strategic weapon system concepts. The study examined (1) a number of generic missions, (2) the effects of a number of damage mechanisms from a physics perspective, (3) measures of effectiveness (MOE`s), and (4) a design envelope for kinetic energy weapon concepts. With the base of information a cut at developing a set of high-level system requirements was made, and a number of concepts were assessed against these requirements.

  19. APSTNG: Neutron interrogation for detection of nuclear and CW weapons, explosives, and drugs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rhodes, E.; Dickerman, C.E.; De Volpi, A. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Peters, C.W. [Nuclear Diagnostic Systems, Inc., Springfield, VA (United States)

    1992-07-01

    A recently developed neutron diagnostic probe system has the potential to satisfy a significant number of van-mobile and fixed- portal requirements for nondestructive verification of sealed munitions and detection of contraband explosives and drugs. The probe is based on a unique associated-particle sealed-tube neutron generator (APSTNG) that interrogates the object of interest with a low-intensity beam of 14-MeV neutrons generated from the deuterium-tritium reaction and that detects the alpha-particle associated with each neutron. Gamma-ray spectra of resulting neutron inelastic scattering and fission reactions identify nuclides associated with all major chemicals in chemical warfare agents, explosives, and drugs, as well as many pollutants and fissile and fertile special nuclear material. Flight times determined from determined from detection times of the gamma-rays and alpha-particles yield a separate tomographic image of each identified nuclide. The APSTNG also forms the basis for a compact fast-neutron transmission imaging system that can be used along with or instead of the emission imaging system; a collimator is not required since scattered neutrons are removed by ``electronic collimation`` (detected neutrons not having the proper flight time to be uncollided are discarded). The small and relatively inexpensive APSTNG exhibits high reliability and can be quickly replaced. Proof-of-concept experiments have been performed under laboratory conditions for simulated nuclear and chemical warfare munitions and for explosives and drugs.

  20. APSTNG: Neutron interrogation for detection of nuclear and CW weapons, explosives, and drugs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rhodes, E.; Dickerman, C.E.; De Volpi, A. (Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)); Peters, C.W. (Nuclear Diagnostic Systems, Inc., Springfield, VA (United States))

    1992-01-01

    A recently developed neutron diagnostic probe system has the potential to satisfy a significant number of van-mobile and fixed- portal requirements for nondestructive verification of sealed munitions and detection of contraband explosives and drugs. The probe is based on a unique associated-particle sealed-tube neutron generator (APSTNG) that interrogates the object of interest with a low-intensity beam of 14-MeV neutrons generated from the deuterium-tritium reaction and that detects the alpha-particle associated with each neutron. Gamma-ray spectra of resulting neutron inelastic scattering and fission reactions identify nuclides associated with all major chemicals in chemical warfare agents, explosives, and drugs, as well as many pollutants and fissile and fertile special nuclear material. Flight times determined from determined from detection times of the gamma-rays and alpha-particles yield a separate tomographic image of each identified nuclide. The APSTNG also forms the basis for a compact fast-neutron transmission imaging system that can be used along with or instead of the emission imaging system; a collimator is not required since scattered neutrons are removed by electronic collimation'' (detected neutrons not having the proper flight time to be uncollided are discarded). The small and relatively inexpensive APSTNG exhibits high reliability and can be quickly replaced. Proof-of-concept experiments have been performed under laboratory conditions for simulated nuclear and chemical warfare munitions and for explosives and drugs.

  1. "A Hedge against the Future": The Post-Cold War Rhetoric of Nuclear Weapons Modernization

    Science.gov (United States)

    Taylor, Bryan C.

    2010-01-01

    Rhetoric has traditionally played an important role in constituting the nuclear future, yet that role has changed significantly since the declared end of the Cold War. Viewed from the perspectives of nuclear criticism and postmodern theories of risk and security, current rhetoric of US nuclear modernization demonstrates how contingencies of voice…

  2. Weapons of mass destruction - current security threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This publication brings a complex and comprehensive view of the weapons of mass destruction phenomenon in the context of present military and political situation. It emphasizes the threat posed by proliferation of these destructive devices and their carriers as well as the threat present in their possession by unpredictable totalitarian regimes or terrorist groups. The publication is structured into four basic parts: Introduction Into The Topic, Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons. The Introduction reflects the latest developments on the field of military technologies, which lead to the development of new destructive devices with characteristics comparable to basic types of WMDs - nuclear, chemical and biological. Based on the definition of WMD as 'weapon systems with enormous impact causing mass destruction, population, equipment and material losses', the modern mass destruction devices are assorted here, such as ecological, radiological and beam weapons, aerosol and container intelligent ammunition, the outburst of dangerous chemical substances from infrastructure, non-conventional weapons and military devices. The Nuclear Weapons part depicts the most destructive device of mass destruction mankind ever invented in close detail. It maps the history of most significant discoveries in nuclear physics, development and construction of the first nuclear weapons, accumulation of nuclear warheads and their carriers in the Cold war era, attempts of nuclear disarmament and reducing the number of nuclear weapons in possession of superpowers and their proliferation in the world's crisis regions including North Korea and Iran. The chapters devoted to theoretical grounds and physical principles of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons' functioning, the main categories and types, as well as destructive effects and consequences of use contain an adequate mathematical apparatus. This chapter's conclusion brings the overview of nuclear armament of states that

  3. Religious perspectives on the nuclear weapons debate: excerpts from the bishops' pastoral letter on war and peace, proposed third draft

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    The text of the third draft, issued in April 1983 and approved by the bishops on 3 May 1983, focuses on the morality of the use of nuclear weapons in a first strike, the threat to use them, and their use as a deterrent to war, but it also includes discussions of the just war theory, nonviolence, and peacemaking. Viewed in the context of the traditional modes of accommodation between religion and the state, and in the light of contemporary disharmony between more fundamentalist sects and modern science, the document affords an interesting point for discussion of the moral bases of the uses of technology. More than simply a dogmatic statement of one religious organization, the pastoral letter represents a vigorous new current in moral discretion and responsibility. 114 references.

  4. Radiological Closure of a Nuclear Weapon Accident Site with Plutonium Contamination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An explosion and fire in a BOMARC-missile launching pad in June 1960 resulted in the direct release of weapons grade plutonium (WGP) within the confines of an Air Force site in central New Jersey. The site had undergone a large-scale remediation and final status survey (FSS) in 2002 to 2004 that resulted in over 20,000 cubic yards (yd3) of plutonium-contaminated soil being excavated. However, it was later discovered that the prior investigation did not address all impacted areas of the site. Several years after the initial remediation project was completed, plutonium contamination in the form of discrete particles was discovered at the site in areas excluded from the previous investigation. Emergency response activities following the fire, while following standard practices of the day, resulted in the initial spread of contamination beyond the expected fate and transport pathways that were addressed during the initial project. Routine maintenance and site operational activities at the site also contributed to further spread of contamination beyond what was expected. Cabrera Services, Inc. (CABRERA) completed several phases of site characterization, radiological remediation, and final status survey (FSS) at the site in accordance with the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) to address the discrete particle issues at the site. CABRERA also conducted a thorough plutonium particle speciation study in coordination with the University of Nevada at Las Vegas as part of the development of a radiological conceptual site model. Details of this study are being presented in a separate publication. The WGP contamination throughout the site presented unique challenges in terms of site characterization and remediation. Specific technical challenges included the field detection of discrete high-activity plutonium particles over a 200-acre site and designing survey and sampling approaches to ensure compliance with the protocols outlined in the

  5. Collection and use of individual behavioral and consumption rate data to improve reconstruction of thyroid doses from nuclear weapons tests in Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Historical behavioral and consumption rate data were collected from residents of Kazakhstan exposed to nuclear weapons testing fallout using a focus group data collection strategy. These data will enable improved thyroid dose estimation in a radiation epidemiological study being carried out the U.S. National Cancer Institute. The study on the relationship of radiation exposure from weapons testing fallout and thyroid disease in a cohort of 2,994 subjects is now in a stage of improving earlier dose estimates based on individual information collected from a basic questionnaire administered to the study population in 1998. The study subjects of both Kazakh and Russian origin were exposed during childhood to radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons tests conducted at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site between 1949 and 1962. Due to the long time since exposure, a well developed strategy is necessary to encourage accurate memory recall. Limitations of the data collected in 1998 suggested the need to obtain reliable information that is tailored specific to the requirements of the dose reconstruction algorithm and to the evaluation of individual dose uncertainties. Focus group data collection in Kazakhstan in 2007 involved four 8-person focus groups (three of women and one of men) in each of four exposed settlements where thyroid disease screening was conducted in 1998. Age-specific data on relevant childhood behaviour, including time spent indoors and consumption of milk and other dairy products from cows, goats, horses, and sheep, were collected from women's groups. Men's focus groups were interviewed about construction materials of houses and schools as well as animal grazing patterns and supplemental feed to animals. Information obtained from the focus groups are being used to derive the settlement-, ethnicity-, age-, and gender-specific (where appropriate) probability density distributions on individual consumption rates of milk and dairy products

  6. Escalation of terrorism? On the risk of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons or materials; Eskalation des Terrors? Ueber das Anschlagsrisiko mit chemischen, biologischen, radiologischen und nuklearen Waffen oder Stoffen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nass, Jens

    2010-07-01

    The report on the risk of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons or materials covers the following topics: the variety of terrorism: ethnic-nationalistic, politically motivated, social revolutionary, political extremism, religious fanaticism, governmental terrorism; CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) weapons and materials: their availability and effectiveness in case of use; potential actor groups; prevention and counter measures, emergency and mitigating measures.

  7. A Study of New Method for Weapon System Effectiveness Evaluation Based on Bayesian Network

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    YAN Dai-wei; GU Liang-xian; PAN Lei

    2008-01-01

    As weapon system effectiveness is affected by many factors, its evaluation is essentially a multi-criterion decision making problem for its complexity. The evaluation model of the effectiveness is established on the basis of metrics architecture of the effectiveness. The Bayesian network, which is used to evaluate the effectiveness, is established based on the metrics architecture and the evaluation models. For getting the weights of the metrics by Bayesian network, subjective initial values of the weights are given, gradient ascent algorithm is adopted, and the reasonable values of the weights are achieved. And then the effectiveness of every weapon system project is gained. The weapon system, whose effectiveness is relative maximum, is the optimization system. The research result shows that this method can solve the problem of AHP method which evaluation results are not compatible to the practice results and overcome the shortcoming of neural network in multilayer and multi-criterion decision. The method offers a new approaeh for evaluating the effectiveness.

  8. Opportunities for Russian Nuclear Weapons Institute developing computer-aided design programs for pharmaceutical drug discovery. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-09-23

    The goal of this study is to determine whether physicists at the Russian Nuclear Weapons Institute can profitably service the need for computer aided drug design (CADD) programs. The Russian physicists` primary competitive advantage is their ability to write particularly efficient code able to work with limited computing power; a history of working with very large, complex modeling systems; an extensive knowledge of physics and mathematics, and price competitiveness. Their primary competitive disadvantage is their lack of biology, and cultural and geographic issues. The first phase of the study focused on defining the competitive landscape, primarily through interviews with and literature searches on the key providers of CADD software. The second phase focused on users of CADD technology to determine deficiencies in the current product offerings, to understand what product they most desired, and to define the potential demand for such a product.

  9. The association betweeen cancers and low level radiation: An evaluation of the epidemiological evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cancer has traditionally been linked to exposure to high doses of radiation, but there is considerable controversy regarding the carcinogenicity of low doses of ionizing radiation in humans. Over the past 30 years there have been 14 studies conducted on employees at the Hanford nuclear weapons facility to investigate the relationship between exposure to low doses of radiation and mortality due to cancer (1-14). Interest in this issue was originally stimulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which was trying to determine whether the linear extrapolation of health effects from high to low dose exposure was accurate. If the risk has been underestimated, then the maximum permissible occupational radiation exposure in the United States had been set too high. Because the health risk associated with low level radiation are unclear and controversial it seems appropriate to review the studies relating to Hanford at this time

  10. Subcritical tests - nuclear weapon testing under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Subkritiske tester - kjernevaapentesting under avtalen om fullstendig proevestans

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hoeibraaten, S

    1998-10-01

    The report discusses possible nuclear weapons related experiments and whether these are permitted under the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The term ''subcritical experiments'' as used in the United States includes experiments in which one studies fissile materials (so far only plutonium) under extreme conditions generated by conventional high explosives, and in which a self-sustained chain reaction never develops in the fissile material. The known facts about the American subcritical experiments are presented. There is very little reason to doubt that these experiments were indeed subcritical and therefore permitted under the CTBT. Little is known about the Russian efforts that are being made on subcritical experiments.

  11. 是导弹还是导弹核武器?%The Missiles or Missile Nuclear Weapon?

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    赵俊

    2014-01-01

    对人教版初中历史八年级下册教材中关于“1966年……我国有了可用于实战的导弹”的表述提出质疑,并进行了详尽的论证,建议将此处表述调整为“1966年……我国有了可用于实战的导弹核武器”。%The Chinese in junior middle school history teaching material of grade eight Questioning expression about“1966...Our country can be used to combat missile”,carried out a detailed argument, suggestions will be expressed here as“1966...Our country can be used for actual combat missile nuclear weapons.”

  12. Frederic Joliot-Curie and the nuclear weapon; Frederic Joliot-Curie et l'arme atomique

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pinault, M.

    2000-07-01

    The author describes the attitude and action of Pierre Joliot-Curie after the explosion of the first nuclear bomb in Hiroshima and during the following years. He notably describes the creation of the French CEA (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique), the commitment of Joliot-Curie for the creation of a scientist movement, the atomic negotiation within the United Nations, the creation and actions of the Mouvement de la Paix (from April 1949 until the Stockholm Appeal) within the Cold War context, the commitment of Joliot-Curie against weapons of mass destruction and its difficult relationship with his communists friends, his participation to the elaboration of the Einstein-Russel Appeal, and the Pugwash conference in 1957

  13. The association betweeen cancers and low level radiation: An evaluation of the epidemiological evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Britton, J. [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States). School of Public Health]|[Lawrence Berkeley National Lab., CA (United States)

    1993-05-01

    Cancer has traditionally been linked to exposure to high doses of radiation, but there is considerable controversy regarding the carcinogenicity of low doses of ionizing radiation in humans. Over the past 30 years there have been 14 studies conducted on employees at the Hanford nuclear weapons facility to investigate the relationship between exposure to low doses of radiation and mortality due to cancer (1-14). Interest in this issue was originally stimulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which was trying to determine whether the linear extrapolation of health effects from high to low dose exposure was accurate. If the risk has been underestimated, then the maximum permissible occupational radiation exposure in the United States had been set too high. Because the health risk associated with low level radiation are unclear and controversial it seems appropriate to review the studies relating to Hanford at this time.

  14. Who holds the stakes? A case study of stakeholder identification at two nuclear weapons production sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Traditional risk assessments, including those involving the United States Department of Energy (USDOE), are often criticized for producing useless or noncredible management responses because they did not meaningfully involve the public. The first step to involve the public is to identify appropriate active participants (stakeholders). This study was done to understand the processes used to identify stakeholders to serve on advisory boards established at the two largest remediation sites in the United States: the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington state and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The Hanford stakeholder identification process produced an interest- based board whereas the Savannah River Site strategy produced population-based representation. The basic goals of the stakeholder advisory groups were similar. However, different processes were used to identify the participants for the groups in part because of distinctly different social and cultural conditions in the areas affected by the operations of the two facilities, and in part because of the different level of trust of the USDOE and their contractors at Hanford compared with Savannah River. The discussion analyzes their different needs and potential for successful citizen participation. 41 refs., 3 figs., 2 tabs

  15. Radioactive fallout: an overview of internal emitter research in the era of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is a review of the literature on the radiobiology of internal emitters. Its purpose is to consider what has become known about the radiobiology of internally deposited radionuclides over the last four decades. The primary emphasis is the progression of radiobiological information through the 1950s and early 1960s, when atmospheric testing of atomic weapons was occurring with increasing regularity. We also consider information on fission products that are biologically important, specifically, isotopes of iodine, strontium, and cesium. We also examine data for plutonium and uranium. For each of the radionuclides discussed, we consider environmental pathways that are available for the eventual exposure to human populations and the metabolic pathways that determine the tissues at risk following exposure. We also consider the radiobiological effects of exposure given at high levels, and, when appropriate, the risks accompanying low-level exposures

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  17. Tests of nuclear weapons and the beginning of radioactivity monitoring using the example of Switzerland; Die Kernwaffenversuche und der Beginn der Radioaktivitaetsueberwachung am Beispiel der Schweiz

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Voelkle, Hansruedi [Univ. Chemin du Musee 3, Fribourg (Switzerland). Physikdept.

    2016-05-01

    A historical survey is given on the development and the tests of nuclear weapons including the consequences for humans and the environment, as well as on the generation of measuring networks for radioactivity in the environment in the same time. Some results of the measurements are shown exemplarily for Switzerland.

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Nepal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Nepal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  19. Brief history of the nuclear weapon - Between proliferation and disarmament; Breve histoire de l'arme nucleaire - Entre proliferation et desarmament

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chagnollaud, Jean-Paul

    2011-05-24

    During the hardest times of the Cold War, like in October 1962 with the Cuba crisis, the World lived in the fear of a nuclear confrontation between the USA and the USSR. If this time seems far away now, the risks of a nuclear conflict are probably greater today because no serious progress has bee done during the last ten years and because, from now on, nine, and maybe ten states possess nuclear weapons. In April 2009, US President Barack Obama, gave a talk in Prague (Czech Republic) in which he stressed again on the enormous risks that this situation was running on humanity and urged the world to get rid of nuclear weapons. The aim of this book is to present the main steps of this process, which started in the 1960's, and the arguments which justify its necessity. (J.S.)

  20. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  1. Nuclear dawn F. E. Simon and the race for atomic weapons in World War II

    CERN Document Server

    McRae, Kenneth D

    2014-01-01

    This book provides a rounded biography of Franz (later Sir Francis) Simon, his early life in Germany, his move to Oxford in 1933, and his experimental contributions to low temperature physics approximating absolute zero. After 1939 he switched his research to nuclear physics, and is credited with solving the problem of uranium isotope separation by gaseous diffusion for the British nuclear programme Tube Alloys. The volume is distinctive for its inclusion of source materials not available to previous researchers, such as Simon's diary and his correspondence with his wife, and for a fresh, well-informed insider voice on the five-power nuclear rivalry of the war years. The work also draws on a relatively mature nuclear literature to attempt a comparison and evaluation of the five nuclear rivals in wider political and military context, and to identify the factors, or groups of factors, that can explain the results.

  2. A treaty on the cutoff of fissile material for nuclear weapons - What to cover? How to verify?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since 1946, a cutoff has been proposed. In 1993, the topic was placed on the agenda of the CD. The establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee in the CD with a mandate to negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty struggled with difficulties for more than a year. The central dispute was whether the mandate should refer to existing un-safeguarded stockpiles. The underlying conflict of the CTBT negotiations can be summarized as nuclear disarmament versus nuclear nonproliferation The same conflict is now blocking progress with FMCT negotiations in the CD. At the center of technical proliferation concerns is direct use material that can be used for nuclear warheads without any further enrichment or reprocessing. Those materials are plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). A broader category of materials is defined as all those containing any fissile isotopes, called special fissionable materials. In order ta verify that no direct use materials are abused for military purposes, also special fissionable materials must be controlled. An even broader category is simply called nuclear materials. Pu and HEU can be distinguished into the following categories of utilisation: 1. military direct use material in operational nuclear weapons and their logistics pipeline, 2. military direct use material held in reserve for military purposes, in assembled weapons or in other forms, 3. military direct use material withdrawn from dismantled weapons, 4. military direct use material considered excess and designated for transfer into civilian use, 5. military direct use material considered excess and declared for transfer into civilian use, 6. direct use material currently in reactors or their logistics pipelines and storages, and 7. irradiated Pu and HEU in spent fuel from reactors, or in vitrified form for final disposal. Large quantities of materials are neither inside weapons nor declared excess. So far, there are no legal obligations for NWS for limitations, declarations, or

  3. A treaty on the cutoff of fissile material for nuclear weapons - What to cover? How to verify?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schaper, A. [Peace Research Inst., Frankfurt (Germany)

    1998-07-01

    Since 1946, a cutoff has been proposed. In 1993, the topic was placed on the agenda of the CD. The establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee in the CD with a mandate to negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty struggled with difficulties for more than a year. The central dispute was whether the mandate should refer to existing un-safeguarded stockpiles. The underlying conflict of the CTBT negotiations can be summarized as nuclear disarmament versus nuclear nonproliferation The same conflict is now blocking progress with FMCT negotiations in the CD. At the center of technical proliferation concerns is direct use material that can be used for nuclear warheads without any further enrichment or reprocessing. Those materials are plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). A broader category of materials is defined as all those containing any fissile isotopes, called special fissionable materials. In order ta verify that no direct use materials are abused for military purposes, also special fissionable materials must be controlled. An even broader category is simply called nuclear materials. Pu and HEU can be distinguished into the following categories of utilisation: 1. military direct use material in operational nuclear weapons and their logistics pipeline, 2. military direct use material held in reserve for military purposes, in assembled weapons or in other forms, 3. military direct use material withdrawn from dismantled weapons, 4. military direct use material considered excess and designated for transfer into civilian use, 5. military direct use material considered excess and declared for transfer into civilian use, 6. direct use material currently in reactors or their logistics pipelines and storages, and 7. irradiated Pu and HEU in spent fuel from reactors, or in vitrified form for final disposal. Large quantities of materials are neither inside weapons nor declared excess. So far, there are no legal obligations for NWS for limitations, declarations, or

  4. Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The letter informs on transmission to the Disarmament Commission of the text of a speech delivered by the State President of South Africa, Mr. F.W. de Klerk, to a joint session of Parliament on 24 March 1993, announcing developments relating to South Africa's nuclear capability and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  5. Bill related to the struggle against proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their vectors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This bill indicates the modifications brought to different French laws and codes (penal code, defence code, custom code) and defines provisions and penalties within the frame of struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear weapons, biological weapons and toxin-based weapons, chemical weapons), and against the proliferation of their vectors. These modifications, provisions and penalties also concern double-use products. The bill also defines the modifications brought to the French penal procedure code. It finally addresses offenses related to these proliferations which can be considered as an act of terrorism

  6. A Study of Aviation Weapon Equipment Maintenance Based on the Semi-Markov Model

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2007-01-01

    Based on the Semi-Markov mathematical description, the multiple states of maintenance processes for aviation weapon equipment are studied. Six kinds of maintenance states are determined and the Semi-Markov model of the maintenance process is given. According to maintenance characteristic, the multiple states maintenance processes are divided into the wait, use and alternate stages.Through using the mathematical model for the different stages, the probability in different states and effective index on different stages are obtained. These results are available to the maintenance practice.

  7. A framework for verifying the dismantlement and abandonment of nuclear weapons. A policy implication for the denuclearization of Korea Peninsula

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula has been a serious security issue in the North East Asian region. Although the Six-Party Talks has been suspended since North Korea declared a boycott in 2008, aims of denuclearizing North Korea has still been discussed. For instance, the recent Japan and the U.S. '2+2' dialogue affirmed its importance to achieve complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, including scrutinizing its uranium enrichment program, through irreversible steps under the Six Party process. In order to identify effective and efficient framework for denuclearization of North Korea, this paper examines 5 major denuclearization methods including (1) the Nunn-Luger Method, (2) the Iraqi Method, (3) the South African Method, (4) the Libyan Method and (5) the denuclearization method shown in the Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), while referring to the recent developments of the verification studies for nuclear disarmament, such as a joint research conducted by the United Kingdom and Norway and any other arguments made by disarmament experts. Moreover, this paper argues what political and security conditions will be required to make North Korea to accept intrusive verification for its denuclearization. Conditions for successful denuclearization talks among the Six-Party member states and a realistic approach of verifiable denuclearization will be also examined. (author)

  8. Dose reduction through automation of nuclear weapons dismantlement and storage procedures at the Department of Energy's Pantex Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent break up of the Soviet Union, the number of weapons in the nuclear stockpile now greatly exceeds any foreseeable future need. To compensate for this excess an estimated 20,000 nuclear warheads have been earmarked for dismantlement and storage at the Department of Energy's Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. It is anticipated that the majority of these warheads will arrive at the Pantex facility by the year 2000. At that time, it is estimated that current dismantlement and inventory procedures will not be adequate to control worker radiation exposure within administrative and federal dose limits. To control these exposures alternate approaches to dismantlement and inventory must be developed. One attractive approach is to automate as many activities as possible, thus reducing worker exposure. To facilitate automation of dismantlement and storage procedures, current procedures were investigated in terms of collective dose to workers, time to completion, ease of completion, and cost of automation for each task. A cost-benefit comparison was then performed in order to determine which procedures would be most cost-effective to automate

  9. Classification of hot particles from the Chernobyl accident and nuclear weapons detonations by non-destructive methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Both after the Chernobyl accident and nuclear weapon detonations, agglomerates of radioactive material, so-called hot particles, were released or formed which show a behaviour in the environment quite different from the activity released in gaseous or aerosol form. The differences in their characteristic properties, in the radionuclide composition and the uranium and actinide contents are described in detail for these particles. While nuclear bomb hot particles (both from fission and fusion bombs) incorporate well detectable trace amounts of 60Co and 152Eu, these radionuclides are absent in Chernobyl hot particles. In contrast, Chernobyl hot particles contain 125Sb and 144Ce which are absent in atomic bomb HPs. Obvious differences are also observable between fusion and fission bombs' hot particles (significant differences in 152Eu/155Eu, 154Eu/155Eu and 238Pu/239Pu ratios) which facilitate the identification of HPs of unknown provensence. The ratio of 239Pu/240Pu in Chernobyl hot particles could be determined by a non-destructive method at 1:1.5. A non-destructive method to determine the content of non-radioactive elements by Kα-emission measurements was developed by which inactive Zr, Nb, Fe and Ni could be verified in the particles

  10. From the nuclear stalemate to a nuclear-weapon free world. In memory of Klaus Fuchs; Vom atomaren Patt zu einer von Atomwaffen freien Welt. Zum Gedenken an Klaus Fuchs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Flach, Guenter; Fuchs-Kittowski, Klaus (eds.)

    2012-07-01

    The following topics were dealt with: The first soviet atomic bomb and Klaus Fuchs, in illusory worlds of Andrei Sakharov, Edward Teller, and Klaus Fuchs, Klaus Fuchs as grandfather of the hydrogen bomb, memories of and thinking about Klaus Fuchs, the Scottish years of Klaus Fuchs 1937-1941, Klaus Fuchs in the mirror of the Venona documents, Gernot Zippe and the ultracentrifuge or east-west technology transfer in the cold war, secret impulses for the soviet nuclear project, responsibility of knowledge with anti-facism, philosophy, and science as well as peace as the first human right in the work of Klaus Fuchs, the request of Klaus Fuchs for a lasting peace, Klaus Fuchs in Daniel Granin's roman ''Escape to Russia'', ways to a nuclear-weapon free world, Otto Hahn and the declarations of Mainau and Goettingen, nuclear winter, initiatives of the GDR for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons in negative entropy, militarism and antimilitarism of the nuclear age, contributions of the young Klaus Fuchs to statistical physics, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the responsibility of the scientists for a socially effective and efficient energy change, Berlin-Bucher contributions to a world free of biological weapons. (HSI)

  11. Nuclear weapons and civil defense. The influence of the medical profession in 1955 and 1983

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kornfeld, H.

    1983-02-01

    The issue of nuclear war and its medical consequences is discussed from a historical perspective. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has proposed a multi-billion dollar program designed to relocate the population over a period of several days to help residents find protection from lethal fallout. The American Medical Association is called on to make a clear statement to the government that adequate preparation for a nuclear holocaust is impossible and that the medical problems would be awesome and without precedent. Forty-seven references are included. (JMT)

  12. Nuclear weapons and civil defense. The influence of the medical profession in 1955 and 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The issue of nuclear war and its medical consequences is discussed from a historical perspective. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has proposed a multi-billion dollar program designed to relocate the population over a period of several days to help residents find protection from lethal fallout. The American Medical Association is called on to make a clear statement to the government that adequate preparation for a nuclear holocaust is impossible and that the medical problems would be awesome and without precedent. Forty-seven references are included

  13. Waging peace: a handbook for the struggle to abolish nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wallis, J. (ed.)

    1982-01-01

    Forty-seven essays by religious thinkers make up a grassroot handbook of moral arguments and strategies for intervenors in the arms race. The book is arranged in three sections: Part I deals with the current peril of the nuclear arms race; Part II with Biblical, historical, and theological responses of faith; and Part III outlines a realistic program for collective action on the part of the Christians. This includes enlisting the help of like-minded citizens. There are lists of publications, organizations, research groups, and others as well as the locations of US nuclear facilities to help the reader. 125 references, 2 figures, 1 table. (DCK)

  14. Dose assessment studies at former nuclear weapons test sites in Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Field and laboratory measurements are described and data presented which enable a dose assessment for the inhalation of artificial radionuclides at Maralinga and Emu, the sites of United kingdom atomic weapons tests between 1953 and 1963. Dose assessments for the inhalation of artificial radionuclides are presented for all remaining contaminated areas at Maralinga and Emu. In the case of Aborigines, these doses are estimated assuming inhalable dust loadings of 1 mg/m3 for adults and 1.5 mg/m3 for children and infants. Particle size is taken to be 5 μm AMAD. Plutonium and americium are taken to be represented by solubility Class Y for major trial sites and 25% Class W and 75% Class Y for all minor trial sites. For other radionuclides, where no data are available, the most conservative dose intake conversion factor values are used. All calculations of dose assume 100% occupancy. The results indicate that doses to children are higher than doses to adults and infants. This is a consequence of children being subjected to higher dust concentrations than adults because of their play activities and because of generally higher dose intake conversion factor values than adults, which more than offset their smaller breathing rates. Thus children form the critical group. With the exception of one site which is contaminated with uranium, at all other sites it is only the inhalation of plutonium and americium that contributes significantly to the dose, and of these 239Pu is the largest contributor. Therefore, having regard to the long half lives of the radionuclides concerned, the inhalation problems highlighted by this dose assessment will not diminish significantly within any reasonable period of time and hence management strategies must be developed to deal with them. (author). 35 refs, 1 fig., 2 tabs

  15. A microstructural analysis of solder joints from the electronic assemblies of dismantled nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vianco, P.T.; Rejent, J.A. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States). Materials Joining Dept.

    1997-05-01

    MC1814 Interconnection Boxes from dismantled B57 bombs, and MC2839 firing Sets from retired W70-1 warheads were obtained from the Pantex facility. Printed circuit boards were selected from these components for microstructural analysis of their solder joints. The analysis included a qualitative examination of the solder joints and quantitative assessments of (1) the thickness of the intermetallic compound layer that formed between the solder and circuit board Cu features, and (2) the Pb-rich phase particle distribution within the solder joint microstructure. The MC2839 solder joints had very good workmanship qualities. The intermetallic compound layer stoichiometry was determined to be that of Cu6Sn5. The mean intermetallic compound layer thickness for all solder joints was 0.885 mm. The magnitude of these values did not indicate significant growth over the weapon lifetime. The size distribution of the Pb-rich phase particles for each of the joints were represented by the mean of 9.85 {times} 10{sup {minus}6} mm{sup 2}. Assuming a spherical geometry, the mean particle diameter would be 3.54 mm. The joint-to-joint difference of intermetallic compound layer thickness and Pb-rich particle size distribution was not caused by varying thermal environments, but rather, was a result of natural variations in the joint microstructure that probably existed at the time of manufacture. The microstructural evaluation of the through-hole solder joints form the MC2839 and MC1814 components indicated that the environmental conditions to which these electronic units were exposed in the stockpile, were benign regarding solder joint aging. There was an absence of thermal fatigue damage in MC2839 circuit board, through-hole solder joints. The damage to the eyelet solder joints of the MC1814 more likely represented infant mortality failures at or very near the time of manufacture, resulting from a marginal design status of this type of solder joint design.

  16. Studying the Effects of Nuclear Weapons Using a Slide-Rule Computer

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shastri, Ananda

    2007-01-01

    This paper describes the construction of a slide-rule computer that allows one to quickly determine magnitudes of several effects that result from the detonation of a nuclear device. Suggestions for exercises are also included that allow high school and college-level physics students to explore scenarios involving these effects. It is hoped that…

  17. Agreement of 4 November 1992 between the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Trinidad and Tobago to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities with its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  18. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Antigua and Barbuda to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  19. Agreement of 23 July 1996 between Grenada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Grenada to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory , under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  20. Agreement of 14 August 1996 between the Government of Barbados and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Barbados to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  1. The text of the Agreement of 23 June 1978 between Venezuela and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Venezuela to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  2. Agreement between the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Bahamas to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguard provisions of Part I

  3. Agreement between the co-operative republic of Guyana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Guyana to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguard provisions of Part I

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  6. "Securing our survival (SOS": non-state actors and the campaign for a nuclear weapons convention through the prism of securitisation theory

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Renata H. Dalaqua

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available This article analyses the security practices of the anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold War period through the prism of securitisation theory. By exploring Buzan and Wæver's conceptual developments on macrosecuritisations, the practices involved in the struggle against the Bomb are interpreted as securitising moves, in which the anti-nuclear movement is the leading securitiser. In the capacity of securitising actors, nuclear abolition activists argue that nuclear disarmament, under a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC, would be the only way to protect humankind from the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. The empirical analysis of these non-state actors and their campaign for a NWC shows that, despite uttering security, the anti-nuclear movement has so far failed to achieve the proposed security measure, that is, nuclear disarmament. Nonetheless, securitisation has been instrumental for these non-state actors as a way of raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action.

  7. The future of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation : the case of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    ABOUL-ENEIN, Sameh

    2013-01-01

    A constructive approach towards engaging will all countries in the region of the Middle East is required in order to guarantee full participation in the conference on the subject of a Middle East zone. The conference toward the establishment of such a Zone and the process that follows should be inclusive to allow for a more genuine, candid, and necessary interaction on the critical issues of nuclear disarmament, dismantlement, nuclear roll-back, transparency, accountability, and verification....

  8. Special Weapons

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — Supporting Navy special weapons, the division provides an array of engineering services, technical publication support services, logistics support services, safety...

  9. Nuclear weapons at 70: reflections on the context and legacy of the Manhattan Project

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reed, B. Cameron

    2015-08-01

    August 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These bombs, the products of the United States Army’s Manhattan Project, helped to end World War II and had enormous long-term effects on global political strategies by setting the stage for the Cold War and nuclear proliferation. This article explores the context and legacy of the Manhattan Project. The state of the war in the summer of 1945 is described, as are how the target cities came to be chosen, deliberations surrounding whether the bombs should be used directly or demonstrated first, and the long-term effects of the Project on individual scientists, the relationship between scientists and society, the subsequent development of nuclear arsenals around the world, and the current status of these arsenals and how they might evolve in the future.

  10. Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Ukraine to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1995, signed in Vienna on 21 September 1995, and entered into force on 22 January 1998

  11. 20 Years of Success: Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None, None

    2015-10-22

    On Oct. 22, 2015, NNSA celebrated the proven success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program at a half-day public event featuring remarks by Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator Lt. Gen. (retired) Frank G. Klotz. The event also featured remarks by Deputy Secretary of Energy Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall and NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator Madelyn Creedon.

  12. Pollution of the Marine Environment by Dumping: Legal Framework Applicable to Dumped Chemical Weapons and Nuclear Waste in the Arctic Ocean

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lott, Alexander

    2016-06-01

    Full Text Available The Arctic seas are the world’s biggest dumping ground for sea-disposed nuclear waste and have served among the primary disposal sites for chemical warfare agents. Despite of scientific uncertainty, the Arctic Council has noted that this hazardous waste still affects adversely the Arctic marine environment and may have implications to the health of the Arctic people. The purpose of this manuscript is to establish the rights and obligations of the Arctic States in connection with sea-dumped chemical weapons and nuclear material under international law of the sea, international environmental law and disarmament law. Such mapping is important for considering options to tackle the pollution to the Arctic ecosystems and because there seems to be yet no such analysis across the legal fields carried out. This paper aims first at identifying the scale and approximate locations of sea-disposed nuclear waste and chemical weapons in the Arctic Ocean. The analysis will further focus on ascertaining the possibilities to minimize their adverse effects on the Arctic marine environment under the applicable legal framework. It will be argued in this manuscript that due to the corrosion of the chemical weapons and nuclear material containers, recovering, rather than confining this hazardous waste might be counterproductive as it might cause a sudden and widespread release of chemical agents or radionuclides when surfacing. In this regard, carrying out an environmental impact assessment prior to each such remediation operation would be necessary to determine the most suitable technique for minimizing or eliminating pollution.

  13. Pollution of the Marine Environment by Dumping: Legal Framework Applicable to Dumped Chemical Weapons and Nuclear Waste in the Arctic Ocean

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lott, Alexander

    2015-06-01

    Full Text Available The Arctic seas are the world’s biggest dumping ground for sea-disposed nuclear waste and have served among the primary disposal sites for chemical warfare agents. Despite of scientific uncertainty, the Arctic Council has noted that this hazardous waste still affects adversely the Arctic marine environment and may have implications to the health of the Arctic people. The purpose of this manuscript is to establish the rights and obligations of the Arctic States in connection with sea-dumped chemical weapons and nuclear material under international law of the sea, international environmental law and disarmament law. Such mapping is important for considering options to tackle the pollution to the Arctic ecosystems and because there seems to be yet no such analysis across the legal fields carried out. This paper aims first at identifying the scale and approximate locations of sea-disposed nuclear waste and chemical weapons in the Arctic Ocean. The analysis will further focus on ascertaining the possibilities to minimize their adverse effects on the Arctic marine environment under the applicable legal framework. It will be argued in this manuscript that due to the corrosion of the chemical weapons and nuclear material containers, recovering, rather than confining this hazardous waste might be counterproductive as it might cause a sudden and widespread release of chemical agents or radionuclides when surfacing. In this regard, carrying out an environmental impact assessment prior to each such remediation operation would be necessary to determine the most suitable technique for minimizing or eliminating pollution.

  14. Assessing Expected Fractional Damage of Above-ground Buildings from Air-to-surface Weapons based on Indirect Fire Concept

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jong Yil Park

    2010-08-01

    Full Text Available For the expected fractional damage of building targets from air-to-surface weapons, the US has used the JMEM/AS method, which is based on the direct-fire concept. However, the damage redistribution assumption in the direct-fire concept could induce serious errors in damage estimation of building targets. In this paper, a method for the expected fractional damage of building targets is proposed based on the indirect-fire concept. From the proposed model, it is shown that the joint munitions effectiveness manuals/air-to-surface (JMEM/AS method is not appropriate for building targets, especially for attacks with multiple aiming points. It is recommended that the indirect-fire concept should be adopted for weaponeering even for air-to-surface weapons. fire concept could induce serious errors in damage estimation of building targets. In this paper, a method for the expected fractional damage of building targets is proposed based on the indirect-fire concept. From the proposed model, it is shown that the JMEM/AS method is not appropriate for building targets, especially for attacks with multiple aiming points. It is recommended that the indirect-fire concept should be adopted for weaponeering even for air-to-surface weapons.Defence Science Journal, 2010, 60(5, pp.491-496, DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.14429/dsj.60.571

  15. Moruroa and us: Experiences of Polynesian people during the thirty years of nuclear weapons tests in the South Pacific (Ocean)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is separated in nine chapters. In the chapters 2 and 3 we find the results of an inquiry got from 737 ancient workers of the sites. The chapter 4 studies the case of the Island of Mangareva in the Gambier archipelago, island situated at 500 km from Moruroa, the economical, sociological and cultural effects of nuclear weapons tests are analyzed. The chapter number 5 shows the different points of view got from institutions or government officials. In the chapter 6, the elements of public debate on the situation of the CEP ( Pacific study center) and the tests are analyzed in a chronological order on giving a particular importance to the way whom Polynesian people have been informed. The chapter 7 examines the evolution of the scientific debate related to the marine fauna poisoning, the radioactive contamination and the ciguatera. The chapter 8 is centered on the risks perception by the Polynesian society and on the different kinds of resistance at the CEP. In the last chapter, a certain number of conclusions and recommends are given. (N.C.)

  16. [Cyclotron based nuclear science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report contains papers on the following topics: Heavy ion reactors, nuclear structure and fundamental interactions; atomic and materials studies; nuclear theory; and superconducting cyclotron and instrumentation

  17. Youths Carrying a Weapon or Using a Weapon in a Fight: What Makes the Difference?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-Andre; Berchtold, Andre; Akre, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were…

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In accordance with Protocol Number II to the Agreement of 29 February 1972 between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this Agreement has been replaced by the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency, which entered into force on 21 February 1977

  19. Final environmental impact statement for the continued operation of the Pantex Plant and associated storage of nuclear weapon components. Volume 3 -- Comment response

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the continued operation of Pantex Plant was published in March 1996. The document assessed the alternatives of no action, relocation of the storage of plutonium components resulting from nuclear weapon disassemble activities at Pantex Plant to another site, and the proposed action (preferred alternative) of continuing operations and increasing the quantity of pits in interim storage at Pantex Plant. This report contains the comments and responses received on the Draft EIS

  20. Pakistan's national legislation entitled: 'Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Director General has received a letter from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan, dated 4 November 2004, concerning Pakistan's national legislation entitled 'Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004'. As requested by the Permanent Mission of Pakistan, the letter and the Export Control Act of 2004, are reproduced herein for the information of the Member States

  1. Principles for reforming the nuclear order

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The creation of a rules-based regime for managing nuclear technology and preventing its proliferation for weapons purpose is a historically remarkable achievement. Its foundation is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system established in the late 1950's, which reflected the recognition that nuclear material and technology needed to be closely monitored with common standards if the benefits of atomic energy were to be widely and safely shared. The cornerstone of this regime is the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which recognized that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons required the provision of major incentives to states that might otherwise seek these weapons. These incentives were security - agreement by 'your' neighbors not to acquire nuclear weapons, and by the established nuclear-weapon states to protect you - technological cooperation, and the promise of a more equitable nuclear future when no one possesses nuclear weapons. (author)

  2. The text of the Agreement of 14 July 1980 between Indonesia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The full text of the agreement between Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  3. Long-range tropospheric transport of uranium and plutonium weapons fallout from Semipalatinsk nuclear test site to Norway.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wendel, Cato Christian; Fifield, L Keith; Oughton, Deborah H; Lind, Ole Christian; Skipperud, Lindis; Bartnicki, Jerzy; Tims, Stephen G; Høibråten, Steinar; Salbu, Brit

    2013-09-01

    A combination of state-of-the-art isotopic fingerprinting techniques and atmospheric transport modelling using real-time historical meteorological data has been used to demonstrate direct tropospheric transport of radioactive debris from specific nuclear detonations at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan to Norway via large areas of Europe. A selection of archived air filters collected at ground level at 9 stations in Norway during the most intensive atmospheric nuclear weapon testing periods (1957-1958 and 1961-1962) has been screened for radioactive particles and analysed with respect to the concentrations and atom ratios of plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U) using accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS). Digital autoradiography screening demonstrated the presence of radioactive particles in the filters. Concentrations of (236)U (0.17-23nBqm(-3)) and (239+240)Pu (1.3-782μBqm(-3)) as well as the atom ratios (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.0517-0.237) and (236)U/(239)Pu (0.0188-0.7) varied widely indicating several different sources. Filter samples from autumn and winter tended to have lower atom ratios than those sampled in spring and summer, and this likely reflects a tropospheric influence in months with little stratospheric fallout. Very high (236)U, (239+240)Pu and gross beta activity concentrations as well as low (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.0517-0.077), (241)Pu/(239)Pu (0.00025-0.00062) and (236)U/(239)Pu (0.0188-0.046) atom ratios, characteristic of close-in and tropospheric fallout, were observed in filters collected at all stations in Nov 1962, 7-12days after three low-yield detonations at Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan). Atmospheric transport modelling (NOAA HYSPLIT_4) using real-time meteorological data confirmed that long range transport of radionuclides, and possibly radioactive particles, from Semipalatinsk to Norway during this period was plausible. The present work shows that direct tropospheric transport of fallout from atmospheric nuclear detonations periodically may have

  4. Multidisciplinary model-based-engineering for laser weapon systems: recent progress

    Science.gov (United States)

    Coy, Steve; Panthaki, Malcolm

    2013-09-01

    We are working to develop a comprehensive, integrated software framework and toolset to support model-based engineering (MBE) of laser weapons systems. MBE has been identified by the Office of the Director, Defense Science and Engineering as one of four potentially "game-changing" technologies that could bring about revolutionary advances across the entire DoD research and development and procurement cycle. To be effective, however, MBE requires robust underlying modeling and simulation technologies capable of modeling all the pertinent systems, subsystems, components, effects, and interactions at any level of fidelity that may be required in order to support crucial design decisions at any point in the system development lifecycle. Very often the greatest technical challenges are posed by systems involving interactions that cut across two or more distinct scientific or engineering domains; even in cases where there are excellent tools available for modeling each individual domain, generally none of these domain-specific tools can be used to model the cross-domain interactions. In the case of laser weapons systems R&D these tools need to be able to support modeling of systems involving combined interactions among structures, thermal, and optical effects, including both ray optics and wave optics, controls, atmospheric effects, target interaction, computational fluid dynamics, and spatiotemporal interactions between lasing light and the laser gain medium. To address this problem we are working to extend Comet™, to add the addition modeling and simulation capabilities required for this particular application area. In this paper we will describe our progress to date.

  5. Security cooperation as a way to stop the spread of nuclear weapons? : Nuclear nonproliferation policies of the United States towards the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel, 1945-1968

    OpenAIRE

    Lahti, Makreeta

    2009-01-01

    In my dissertation on 'Security Cooperation as a Way to Stop the Spread of Nu-clear Weapons? Nuclear Nonproliferation Policies of the United States towards the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel, 1945-1968', I study the use of security assistance as nonproliferation policy. I use insights of the Structural Realist and the Rational Institutionalist theories of International Relations to explain, respectively, important foreign policy goals and the basic orientation of policies, on the one ...

  6. Statement to 2010 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 3 May 2010, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA works to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and technical cooperation. The IAEA also has a role to play in verifying nuclear disarmament. As all of these activities are relevant to the work of the NPT Review Conference, I would like to provide you with a brief overview of recent developments. As you know, reliable supplies of energy are vital to ensure continued prosperity and sustained development. Nuclear power is enjoying growing acceptance as a stable and clean source of energy that can help to mitigate the impact of climate change. More than 60 countries are considering introducing nuclear power to generate electricity. It is expected that between 10 and 25 new countries will bring their first nuclear power plants online by 2030. Certainly, it is for each sovereign State to decide whether or not to use nuclear power, but the IAEA assists interested countries in establishing a reliable nuclear infrastructure. Nuclear power must be accessible not only for developed countries but also for developing countries. Nuclear power needs to be efficient, sustainable and profitable. Any expansion in its use must be done safely and securely, and without increasing the proliferation risk.A successful NPT Review Conference is indispensable because it will enhance confidence in the non-proliferation regime, which in turn will provide the Agency with a stronger basis for our work in all areas

  7. Risk in the Weapons Stockpile

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Noone, Bailey C [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-14

    When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

  8. Study on effectiveness evaluation of weapon systems based on grey relational analysis and TOPSIS

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Gu Hui; Song Bifeng

    2009-01-01

    To evaluate the effectiveness of weapon systems, the advantages and disadvantages of grey relational analysis and TOPSIS for multiattribute decision-making is pointed out, and an effectiveness evaluation model of weapon systems by combining grey relational analysis and TOPSIS is proposed. The model aggregates the grey relational grade and the distance to a new integrated closeness and reflects not only the trend but also the situation of the alternative. The example illuminates that the model is effective for the effectiveness evaluation of weapon systems.

  9. Accelerator-based conversion (ABC) of weapons plutonium: Plant layout study and related design issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In preparation for and in support of a detailed R and D Plan for the Accelerator-Based Conversion (ABC) of weapons plutonium, an ABC Plant Layout Study was conducted at the level of a pre-conceptual engineering design. The plant layout is based on an adaptation of the Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) detailed conceptual design that was completed in the early 1070s. Although the ABC Plant Layout Study included the Accelerator Equipment as an essential element, the engineering assessment focused primarily on the Target; Primary System (blanket and all systems containing plutonium-bearing fuel salt); the Heat-Removal System (secondary-coolant-salt and supercritical-steam systems); Chemical Processing; Operation and Maintenance; Containment and Safety; and Instrumentation and Control systems. Although constrained primarily to a reflection of an accelerator-driven (subcritical) variant of MSBR system, unique features and added flexibilities of the ABC suggest improved or alternative approaches to each of the above-listed subsystems; these, along with the key technical issues in need of resolution through a detailed R ampersand D plan for ABC are described on the bases of the ''strawman'' or ''point-of-departure'' plant layout that resulted from this study

  10. Environmental assessment for the purchase of Russian low enriched uranium derived from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-01-01

    The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF{sub 6}) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons (referred to as ``transparency),`` and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed.

  11. Environmental assessment for the purchase of Russian low enriched uranium derived from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF6) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons (referred to as ''transparency),'' and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed

  12. Rays as weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vogel, H. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)], E-mail: Hermann.vogel@ak-stgeorg.lbk-hh.de

    2007-08-15

    Purpose: Ionizing radiation is being regarded as life threatening. Therefore, accidents in nuclear power plants are considered equal threatening as nuclear bomb explosions, and attacks with dirty bombs are thought as dangerous as nuclear weapon explosions. However, there are differences between a nuclear bomb explosion, the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and an attack with a dirty bomb. It is intended to point them out. Method: The processes are described, which damage in a nuclear bomb explosion, in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and in an attack with a dirty bomb. Their effects are compared with each other, i.e. explosion, heat, shock wave (blast), ionizing radiation, and fallout. Results: In the center of the explosion of a nuclear bomb, the temperature rises to 100 Mio deg.C, this induces damaging heat radiation and shock wave. In the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant and in the conventional explosion of a dirty bomb, the temperature may rise up to 3000 deg. C, heat radiation and blast are limited to a short distance. In nuclear power plants, explosions due to oxyhydrogen gas or steam may occur. In nuclear explosions the dispersed radioactive material (fall out) consists mainly of isotopes with short half-life, in nuclear power plants and in dirty bomb attacks with longer half-life. The amount of fall out is comparable in nuclear bomb explosions with that in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, it is smaller in attacks with dirty bombs. An explosion in a nuclear power plant even in the largest imaginable accident is not a nuclear explosion. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were 200,000 victims nearly all by heat and blast, some 300 died by ionizing radiation. In Chernobyl, there have been less than 100 victims due to ionizing radiation up till now. A dirty bomb kills possibly with the explosion of conventional explosive, the dispersed radioactive material may damage

  13. Germany and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this article, an expert from the former GDR and an expert from the FRG attempt a joint analysis of history and a prediction of future development. Since differences in ways of viewing things are unavoidable, particularly in retrospect, parts three and four are written by each author separately, for the then part-nation. The other parts are jointly written. Subjects discussed are: the European security system before the turnround (part 2), the non-proliferation policy of the GDR (part 3), that of the FRG (part 4), German non-proliferation policy under changed circumstances (part 5) and recommendations for the German non-proliferation policy of the future (part 6). In the final part (7) the authors deal with the non-proliferation policy as a component of transnational security policy. (HP)

  14. Chinese Nuclear Science Basic Data Base (CNSBDB)

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2002-01-01

    A new research project on "Development of the Chinese Nuclear Science Basic Database (CNSBDB)for Fundamental Researches of Nuclear Physics and Interrelated Subjects, and Requirements of NuclearPower and Nuclear Technologies Application" has been commenced. The CNSBDB contains thefollowing eight segments: 1) Information on Nuclear Science (INFO); 2) Nuclear Structure Data Base(NSDB); 3) Nuclear Decay Data Base (NDDB); 4) Nuclear Reaction Data Base (NRDB); 5) Nuclear

  15. The nuclear problem in Northeast Asia and ways to resolve it: A North Korean perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The end of the Cold War worldwide has added new momentum to the process of nuclear disarmament. However, vestiges of the Cold War have yet to be removed from Northeast Asia, where the nuclear threat has snowballed. This chapter examines potential nuclear dangers in Northeast Asia - a region which has the greatest concentration of nuclear weapons bases and nuclear weapons in the world

  16. Preliminary results of calculations for heavy-water nuclear-power-plant reactors employing 235U, 233U, and 232Th as a fuel and meeting requirements of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ioffe, B. L.; Kochurov, B. P.

    2012-02-01

    A physical design is developed for a gas-cooled heavy-water nuclear reactor intended for a project of a nuclear power plant. As a fuel, the reactor would employ thorium with a small admixture of enriched uranium that contains not more than 20% of 235U. It operates in the open-cycle mode involving 233U production from thorium and its subsequent burnup. The reactor meets the conditions of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons: the content of fissionable isotopes in uranium at all stages of the process, including the final one, is below the threshold for constructing an atomic bomb, the amount of product plutonium being extremely small.

  17. Characterization of U/Pu particles originating from the nuclear weapon accidents at Palomares, Spain, 1966 and Thule, Greenland, 1968.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lind, O C; Salbu, B; Janssens, K; Proost, K; García-León, M; García-Tenorio, R

    2007-04-15

    Following the USAF B-52 bomber accidents at Palomares, Spain in 1966 and at Thule, Greenland in 1968, radioactive particles containing uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) were dispersed into the environment. To improve long-term environmental impact assessments for the contaminated ecosystems, particles from the two sites have been isolated and characterized with respect to properties influencing particle weathering rates. Low (239)Pu/(235)U (0.62-0.78) and (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.055-0.061) atom ratios in individual particles from both sites obtained by Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS) show that the particles contain highly enriched U and weapon-grade Pu. Furthermore, results from electron microscopy with Energy Dispersive X-ray analysis (EDX) and synchrotron radiation (SR) based micrometer-scale X-ray fluorescence (micro-XRF) 2D mapping demonstrated that U and Pu coexist throughout the 1-50 microm sized particles, while surface heterogeneities were observed in EDX line scans. SR-based micrometer-scale X-ray Absorption Near Edge Structure Spectroscopy (micro-XANES) showed that the particles consisted of an oxide mixture of U (predominately UO(2) with the presence of U(3)O(8)) and Pu ((III)/(IV), (IV)/(V) or (III), (IV) and (V)). Neither metallic U or Pu nor uranyl or Pu(VI) could be observed. Characteristics such as elemental distributions, morphology and oxidation states are remarkably similar for the Palomares and Thule particles, reflecting that they originate from similar source and release scenarios. Thus, these particle characteristics are more dependent on the original material from which the particles are derived (source) and the formation of particles (release scenario) than the environmental conditions to which the particles have been exposed since the late 1960s. PMID:17336369

  18. Daisaku Ikeda Analysis on the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons%池田大作废除核武器思想探析

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    吕爽

    2013-01-01

      随着军事技术的急速发达,战争已成为全然脱离了现实及人们的感情的行为,能于瞬间夺去无数宝贵生命,将人们热爱的乡土破坏殆尽,连顾及牺牲者及家属的余地也都不容许。在以核武器为巅峰的巨大暴力体系支配下,人不被当作有生命的存在,而只不过是可以任意摆布的物件罢了。以池田大作先生1982发表的“关于裁军和销毁核武器的建议”来探析其废除核武器的缘由及实际行动。%  With the rapid military technology developed , the war has become completely detached from reality and people's emotional behavior ,countless precious lives can be taken away in an instant , and the people who love the country destroyed ,even taking into account the room Victims and their families are alsodoes not allow . Under the control of nuclear weapons as the pinnacle of the huge system of violence ,not be treated as the existence of life , but simply because the objects that can be at the mercy of Bale . In this paper ,Daisaku Ikeda 1982 recommendations on disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons ,” Analysis of the reason of the abolition of nuclear weapons and practical action .

  19. Towards the nuclear holocaust. 2. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The subject is discussed under the headings: introduction; nuclear war ((a) the weapons (size, number, type, range); (b) how nuclear war will start (accident or intention, superpowers or others, first strike); (c) the effects of nuclear war); the nuclear industry ((a) nuclear power (relevance to energy needs; alternatives; economics); (b) nuclear weapons (production of Pu)); the military-industrial complex; the USA (US bases in UK and US-UK cooperation); obtaining public support; a return to democracy. (U.K.)

  20. Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  1. Agreement of 23 August 1974 between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 September 1973. It was signed in Vienna on 30 April 1974 and in La Paz on 23 August 1974. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 6 February 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  2. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 2002. It was signed on 5 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 May 2004, the date on which Agency received from El Salvador written notification that El Salvador's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  3. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 15 September 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Paraguay written notification that Paraguay's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 18 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Nicaragua written notification that Nicaragua's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  6. Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An agreement by exchange of letters of 6 November 1995 and 17 November 2003 with the Republic of Panama in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. This Exchange of Letters constitutes an agreement confirming that: the Safeguards Agreement of 23 March 1984, concluded between the Republic of Panama and the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty), also satisfies the obligation of Panama under Article III of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA; the safeguards set forth in the Safeguards Agreement shall also apply, as regards Panama, in connection with the NPT; the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply as long as Panama is party to the NPT or the Tlatelolco Treaty or both. The agreement reflected in the Exchange of Letters was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 November 2003, and pursuant to its terms, entered into force on that date

  7. International conference on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in central Asia, 15-16 September 1997 Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Building an integral part of the global nuclear security system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This Conference is the first fruit of the joint effort by the Central Asian States to counter external threats and challenges. The decision to declare Central Asia a nuclear-weapon-free zone is a further manifestation of the Central Asian States' shared interest in ensuring security, stability and peace for all the inhabitants of the region and in creating the necessary -indeed, the essential- conditions for its sustainable development and prosperity

  8. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of Safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

  9. Weapons test seismic investigations at Yucca Mountain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yucca Mountain, located on and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site, is being characterized as part of an ongoing effort to identify a potential high-level nuclear waste repository. This site will be subjected to seismic ground motions induced by underground nuclear explosions. A knowledge of expected ground motion levels from these tests will enable the designers to provide for the necessary structural support in the designs of the various components of the repository. The primary objective of the Weapons Test Seismic Investigation project is to develop a method to predict the ground motions expected at the repository site as a result of future weapons tests. This paper summarizes the data base presently assembled for the Yucca Mountain Project, characteristics of expected ground motions, and characterization of the two-dimensional seismic properties along paths between Yucca Mountain and the testing areas of the Nevada Test Site

  10. The risk of leukaemia in young children from exposure to tritium and carbon-14 in the discharges of German nuclear power stations and in the fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wakeford, Richard

    2014-05-01

    Towards the end of 2007, the results were published from a case-control study (the "KiKK Study") of cancer in young children, diagnosed nuclear power stations in western Germany. The study found a tendency for cases of leukaemia to live closer to the nearest nuclear power station than their matched controls, producing an odds ratio that was raised to a statistically significant extent for residence within 5 km of a nuclear power station. The findings of the study received much publicity, but a detailed radiological risk assessment demonstrated that the radiation doses received by young children from discharges of radioactive material from the nuclear reactors were much lower than those received from natural background radiation and far too small to be responsible for the statistical association reported in the KiKK Study. This has led to speculation that conventional radiological risk assessments have grossly underestimated the risk of leukaemia in young children posed by exposure to man-made radionuclides, and particular attention has been drawn to the possible role of tritium and carbon-14 discharges in this supposedly severe underestimation of risk. Both (3)H and (14)C are generated naturally in the upper atmosphere, and substantial increases in these radionuclides in the environment occurred as a result of their production by atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons during the late 1950s and early 1960s. If the leukaemogenic effect of these radionuclides has been seriously underestimated to the degree necessary to explain the KiKK Study findings, then a pronounced increase in the worldwide incidence of leukaemia among young children should have followed the notably elevated exposure to (3)H and (14)C from nuclear weapons testing fallout. To investigate this hypothesis, the time series of incidence rates of leukaemia among young children nuclear weapons testing, or that incidence rates are related to level of exposure to fallout, is apparent from these

  11. Nuclear weapons and the search for security. 6 October 2004, Seoul, Republic of Korea. Statement at the 54th Pugwash conference on science and world affairs: 'Bridging a divided world through international cooperation and disarmament'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the global anchor for humanity's efforts to curb nuclear proliferation and move towards nuclear disarmament. There is no doubt that the implementation of the NPT continues to provide important security benefits - by providing assurance that, in the great majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear energy is not being misused for weapon purposes. The NPT is also the only binding agreement in which all five of the nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to move forward on disarmament. Although the NPT is sometimes mis-perceived as a Western project, its benefits extend across any North-South or East-West geopolitical divide. Still, for those who have worked as 'custodians' of the Treaty for over three decades, it is clear that the events of the past few years have placed the NPT and the regime supporting it under unprecedented stress, exposing some of its limitations and pointing to areas that need to be strengthened and adjusted. This statement discusses some of the lessons that can be taken from the experience of the IAEA in verifying undeclared nuclear programmes in Iraq, Iran, Libya and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. And, since the audience shares my conviction that international peace and security cannot be achieved without effective arms control, I will share a few ideas on the roles each of us can play - as scientists, policy makers and other members of civil society

  12. An investigation of the feasibility of building a harbor on the West coast of South America using explosive power of nuclear weapons, a preliminary report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zodtner, H. H.

    1971-12-31

    There is an interest in discovering the various peace time uses of nuclear explosives. One of the proposals is the building of harbors. There are several ports along the west coast of South America where lighterage is necessary. This implies a need for expanded harbor facilities. The problem is to find a good location for creating a harbor, and the feasibility of accomplishing this with the use of nuclear force. Feasibility includes blast effects, radiation hazards, the number of weapons needed, and economic considerations. Economic considerations include the cost of treating a harbor of sufficient depth and area, the building of harbor facilities, and the estimated savings and advantages of the new harbor. Several meetings were held with naval personnel of the Military Liaison group at UCRL to discuss the general problems of harbors. Thirty-three different ports were given a preliminary investigation.

  13. [Cyclotron based nuclear science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The period 1 April 1992--31 March 1993 saw the initial runs of three new spectrometers, which constitute a major portion of the new detection capabilities developed for this facility. These devices are the Proton Spectrometer (PSP) (data from which are shown on the cover of this document), the Mass Achroniat Recoil Mass Spectrometer (MARS), and the Multipole Dipole Multipole (MDM) Particle Spectrometer. The ECR-K500 cyclotron combination operated 5,849 hours. The beam was on target 39% of this time. Studies of nuclear dynamics and nuclear thermodynamics using the neutron ball have come to fruition. A critical re-evaluation of the available data on the giant monopole resonance indicated that the incompressibility is not specified to a range smaller than 200--350 MeV by those data. New systematic experiments using the MDM spectrometer are now underway. The MEGA collaboration obtained the first data on the μ → eγ decay rate and determination of the Michel parameter in normal μ decay. Experiments appear to confirm the existence of monoenergetic pair peaks even for relatively low Zprojectile -- Ztarget combinations. Studies of the (α,2α) knockout reaction indicate that this reaction may prove to be a valuable tool for determination of reaction rates of astrophysical interest. Theoretical work reported in this document ranges from nuclear structure calculations using the IBM-2 model to calculations of kaon production and the in-medium properties of the rho and phi mesons. Nuclear dynamics and exotic shapes and fragmentation modes of hot nuclei are also addressed. New measurements of x-ray emission from highly ionized ions, of molecular dissociation and of surface interactions are reported. The research is presented in nearly 50 brief summaries usually including data and references

  14. The nuclear industry: a new weapon for the Kremlin?; L'industrie nucleaire: nouvelle arme du Kremlin?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Du Castel, V.

    2010-07-01

    After having noticed the recent evolution of the Russian policy which tends to concentrate the economical and political power with a limited democratic pluralism, the author describes the re-structuring policy adopted for the energy sector, and notably the nuclear sector, in order to become a major international actor. First, she analyses the evolution of the hydrocarbon sector with a better management of tax incomes, and a stronger control of the industries of this sector based on a State capitalism development. She outlines that Russia now uses energy as a diplomatic arm, particularly in its relationship with the European Union. She states that Russia may want to follow the same kind of policy for nuclear energy as for the hydrocarbon sector by developing partnership with other countries, by regrouping the concerned activities within a single holding company (Atomenergoprom) and a federal agency (Rosatom). Russia increased its uranium production and became a powerful actor who challenges other international companies (Areva, Westinghouse, Toshiba). The author discusses the strategy defined by the Kremlin to reach supremacy in the nuclear sector

  15. Dictionary of nuclear engineering

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sube, R.

    1985-01-01

    Ralf Sube, an experienced compiler of three wellknown four-language reference works has now prepared this glossary of nuclear engineering terms in English, German, French and Russian. Based on the proven lexicography of the Technik-Worterbuch series, it comprises about 30,000 terms in each language covering the following: Nuclear and Atomic Physics; Nuclear Radiation and Isotopes; Nuclear Materials; Nuclear Facilties; Nuclear Power Industry; Nuclear Weapons.

  16. [Cyclotron based nuclear science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report contains descriptions of research programs carried out by Institute staff, in nuclear physics as well as progress on new instrumentation during the period April 1, 1989, to July 31, 1990. During this year the ECR source was completed and beams were injected into the cyclotron. In November, 1989 experiments began with beams from the ECR + K500 cyclotron. To date, the highest velocity beam accelerated has been 43 MeV/nucleon 14N, and the highest energy beam has been 1.57 GeV 63Cu. Heavy ion reaction experiments and cyclotron operation and instrumentation are briefly described in this paper

  17. Agreement of 28 March 1991 between the Government of Solomon Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first one stipulates the agreement of Solomon Islands to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part two specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  18. The text of the Agreement of 5 July 1980 between Sri Lanka and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Sri Lanka to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  19. Agreement of 13 June 1996 between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Principality of Monaco to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  20. Agreement of 30 March 1996 between the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Algeria to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  1. Agreement of 16 September 1991 between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of South Africa to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  2. Communication dated 11 September 2006 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan regarding the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia signed on 8 September 2006

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Secretariat has received a Note Verbale, dated 11 September 2006, from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the IAEA regarding the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia signed on 8 September 2006 in Semipalatinsk by the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The Note Verbale and, as requested therein, the enclosed information regarding the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, is reproduced herewith for the information of Member States

  3. Weapon target assignment problem satisfying expected damage probabilities based on ant colony algorithm

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Wang Yanxia; Qian Longjun; Guo Zhi; Ma Lifeng

    2008-01-01

    A weapon target assignment (WTA) model satisfying expected damage probabilities with an ant colony algorithm is proposed.In order to save armament resource and attack the targets effectively,the strategy of the weapon assignment is that the target with greater threat degree has higher priority to be intercepted.The effect of this WTA model is not maximizing the damage probability but satisfying the whole assignment result.Ant colony algorithm has been successfully used in many fields,especially in combination optimization.The ant colony algorithm for this WTA problem is described by analyzing path selection,pheromone update,and tabu table update.The effectiveness of the model and the algorithm is demonstrated with an example.

  4. The vulnerability of laser warning systems against guided weapons based on low power lasers

    OpenAIRE

    Al-Jaberi, Mubarak

    2006-01-01

    Laser assisted weapons, such as laser guided bombs, laser guided missiles and laser beam-riding missiles pose a significant threat to military assets in the modern battlefield. Laser beam-riding missiles are particularly hard to detect because they use low power lasers. Most laser warning systems produced so far can not detect laser beam-riding missiles because of their weak emissions which have signals less than 1% of laser range finder power . They are even harder to defeat because current ...

  5. Assessing Expected Fractional Damage of Above-ground Buildings from Air-to-surface Weapons based on Indirect Fire Concept

    OpenAIRE

    Jong Yil Park

    2010-01-01

    For the expected fractional damage of building targets from air-to-surface weapons, the US has used the JMEM/AS method, which is based on the direct-fire concept. However, the damage redistribution assumption in the direct-fire concept could induce serious errors in damage estimation of building targets. In this paper, a method for the expected fractional damage of building targets is proposed based on the indirect-fire concept. From the proposed model, it is shown that the joint munitions ef...

  6. Accelerated Clean-up of the United States Department of Energy, Mound Nuclear Weapons Facility in Miamisburg, Ohio

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CH2M HILL is executing a performance-based contract with the United States Department of Energy to accelerate the safe closure of the nuclear facilities at the former Mound plant in Miamisburg, Ohio. The contract started in January 2003 with a target completion date of March 31, 2006. Our accelerated baseline targets completion of the project 2 years ahead of the previous baseline schedule, by spring 2006, and for $200 million less than previous estimates. This unique decommissioning and remediation project is located within the City of Miamisburg proper and is designed for transfer of the property to the Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation for industrial reuse. The project is being performed with the Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation and their tenants co-located on the site creating significant logistical, safety and stakeholder challenges. The project is also being performed in conjunction with the United States Department of Energy, United States Environmental Protection Agency, and the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency under the Mound 2000 regulatory cleanup process. The project is currently over 95% complete. To achieve cleanup and closure of the Mound site, CH2M HILL's scope includes: - Demolition of 64 nuclear, radiological and commercial facilities - Preparation for Transfer of 9 facilities (including a Category 2 nuclear facility) to the Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation for industrial reuse - Removal of all above ground utility structures and components, and preparation for transfer of 9 utility systems to Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation - Investigation, remediation, closure, and documentation of all known Potential Release Sites contaminated with radiological and chemical contamination (73 identified in original contract) - Storage, characterization, processing, packaging and shipment of all waste and excess nuclear materials - Preparation for Transfer of the 306 acre site to the

  7. Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Agreement by exchange of letters of 6 November 1995 and 25 June 1996 with the Republic of Chile in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the Agreement by exchange of letters with the Republic of Chile on Safeguards Agreement of 5 April 1995 concluded between Chile and the IAEA, in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty). The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 1996. The texts of letters of 6 November 1995 and 25 June 1996 are also included

  8. Verification of Chemical Weapons Destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Chemical Weapons Convention is the only multilateral treaty that bans completely an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under international verification arrangements. Possessor States, i.e. those that have chemical weapons stockpiles at the time of becoming party to the CWC, commit to destroying these. All States undertake never to acquire chemical weapons and not to help other States acquire such weapons. The CWC foresees time-bound chemical disarmament. The deadlines for destruction for early entrants to the CWC are provided in the treaty. For late entrants, the Conference of States Parties intervenes to set destruction deadlines. One of the unique features of the CWC is thus the regime for verifying destruction of chemical weapons. But how can you design a system for verification at military sites, while protecting military restricted information? What degree of assurance is considered sufficient in such circumstances? How do you divide the verification costs? How do you deal with production capability and initial declarations of existing stockpiles? The founders of the CWC had to address these and other challenges in designing the treaty. Further refinement of the verification system has followed since the treaty opened for signature in 1993 and since inspection work was initiated following entry-into-force of the treaty in 1997. Most of this work concerns destruction at the two large possessor States, Russia and the United States. Perhaps some of the lessons learned from the OPCW experience may be instructive in a future verification regime for nuclear weapons. (author)

  9. Army requirements for micro and nanotechnology-based sensors in weapons health and battlefield environmental monitoring applications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ruffin, Paul; Brantley, Christina; Edwards, Eugene; Hutcheson, Guilford

    2006-03-01

    The Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) and the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) have initiated a joint advanced technology demonstration program entitled "Prognostics/Diagnostics for the Future Force (PDFF)" with a key objective of developing low or no power embedded sensor suites for harsh environmental monitoring. The most critical challenge of the program is to specify requirements for the embedded sensor suites which will perform on-board diagnostics, maintain a history of sensor data, and forecast weapon health. The authors are currently collaborating with the PDFF program managers and potential customers to quantify the requirements for remotely operated, micro/nano-technology-based sensors for a host of candidate weapon systems. After requirements are finalized, current micro/nanotechnology-based temperature, humidity, g-shock, vibration and chemical sensors for monitoring the out-gassing of weapons propellant, as well as hazardous gaseous species on the battlefield and in urban environments will be improved to meet the full requirements of the PDFF program. In this paper, performance requirements such as power consumption, reliability, maintainability, survivability, size, and cost, along with the associated technical challenges for micro/nanotechnology-based sensor systems operating in military environments, are discussed. In addition, laboratory results from the design and testing of a wireless sensor array, which was developed using a thin film of functionalized carbon nanotube materials, are presented. Conclusions from the research indicate that the detection of bio-hazardous materials is possible using passive and active wireless sensors based on monitoring the reflected phase from the sensor.

  10. PRex: An Experiment to Investigate Detection of Near-field Particulate Deposition from a Simulated Underground Nuclear Weapons Test Vent.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Keillor, Martin E; Arrigo, Leah M; Baciak, James E; Chipman, Veraun; Detwiler, Rebecca S; Emer, Dudley F; Kernan, Warnick J; Kirkham, Randy R; MacDougall, Matthew R; Milbrath, Brian D; Rishel, Jeremy P; Seifert, Allen; Seifert, Carolyn E; Smart, John E

    2016-05-01

    A radioactive particulate release experiment to produce a near-field ground deposition representative of small-scale venting from an underground nuclear test was conducted to gather data in support of treaty capability development activities. For this experiment, a CO2-driven "air cannon" was used to inject (140)La, a radioisotope of lanthanum with 1.7-d half-life and strong gamma-ray emissions, into the lowest levels of the atmosphere at ambient temperatures. Witness plates and air samplers were laid out in an irregular grid covering the area where the plume was anticipated to deposit based on climatological wind records. This experiment was performed at the Nevada National Security Site, where existing infrastructure, radiological procedures, and support personnel facilitated planning and execution of the work. A vehicle-mounted NaI(Tl) spectrometer and a polyvinyl toluene-based backpack instrument were used to survey the deposited plume. Hand-held instruments, including NaI(Tl) and lanthanum bromide scintillators and high purity germanium spectrometers, were used to take in situ measurements. Additionally, three soil sampling techniques were investigated and compared. The relative sensitivity and utility of sampling and survey methods are discussed in the context of on-site inspection.

  11. PRex: An Experiment to Investigate Detection of Near-field Particulate Deposition from a Simulated Underground Nuclear Weapons Test Vent.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Keillor, Martin E; Arrigo, Leah M; Baciak, James E; Chipman, Veraun; Detwiler, Rebecca S; Emer, Dudley F; Kernan, Warnick J; Kirkham, Randy R; MacDougall, Matthew R; Milbrath, Brian D; Rishel, Jeremy P; Seifert, Allen; Seifert, Carolyn E; Smart, John E

    2016-05-01

    A radioactive particulate release experiment to produce a near-field ground deposition representative of small-scale venting from an underground nuclear test was conducted to gather data in support of treaty capability development activities. For this experiment, a CO2-driven "air cannon" was used to inject (140)La, a radioisotope of lanthanum with 1.7-d half-life and strong gamma-ray emissions, into the lowest levels of the atmosphere at ambient temperatures. Witness plates and air samplers were laid out in an irregular grid covering the area where the plume was anticipated to deposit based on climatological wind records. This experiment was performed at the Nevada National Security Site, where existing infrastructure, radiological procedures, and support personnel facilitated planning and execution of the work. A vehicle-mounted NaI(Tl) spectrometer and a polyvinyl toluene-based backpack instrument were used to survey the deposited plume. Hand-held instruments, including NaI(Tl) and lanthanum bromide scintillators and high purity germanium spectrometers, were used to take in situ measurements. Additionally, three soil sampling techniques were investigated and compared. The relative sensitivity and utility of sampling and survey methods are discussed in the context of on-site inspection. PMID:27023040

  12. Communication of 19 January 2006 from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the Agency concerning 'Control Lists of Goods, Technologies, Materials and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems' adopted by Pakistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Director General has received a letter from the Resident Representative of Pakistan, dated 19 January 2006, attaching a statutory regulatory order containing the 'Control Lists of Goods, Technologies, Materials and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems' adopted by Pakistan. As requested in the letter, the letter and its attachment are herewith circulated for the information of Member States

  13. The technical results of the Swedish nuclear weapons programme - a compilation of FOAs annual reports 1945-1972; Det svenska kaernvapenprogrammets tekniska resultat - en sammanstaellning av FOAs aarsrapporter 1945-1972

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oliver, L.; Stenholm, L

    2002-02-01

    The aim with this report is to summarise FOAs nuclear weapons related research that was performed 1945-1972. The report is a compilation of FOAs annual reports that originally were in a classified form but have now - mostly - been declassified. References to separate reports in the different research areas are included in the report.

  14. Communication dated 30 May 2014 received from the Permanent Mission of Uzbekistan to the Agency regarding the implementation of the initiative of the President of Uzbekistan on Establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 30 May 2014 from the Permanent Mission of Uzbekistan to the Agency regarding the implementation of the initiative of the President of Uzbekistan, HE Mr Islam Karimov, on Establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The note verbale and its attachment are circulated herewith for information, as requested by the Permanent Mission

  15. The text of the agreement of 5 December 1974 between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 5 December 1974, and the Protocol thereto, between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agreement entered into force on 21 February 1978

  16. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of an agreement by exchange of letters with Belize in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1997 and entered into force on that date

  17. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the grand scheme of things we are a little more than halfway through the cycle of splitting the atom for weapons purposes. If we visualize this historic cycle as the full sweep of a clockface, at zero hour we would find the first nuclear chain reaction by Enrico Fermi, followed immediately by the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the first atomic bombs. From two o'clock until five, the United States built and ran a massive industrial complex that produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At half past, the Cold War ended, and the United States shut down most of its nuclear weapons factories. The second half of this cycle involves dealing with the waste and contamination from nuclear weapons production - a task that had, for the most part, been postponed into the indefinite future. That future is now upon us. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War is in many ways as big a challenge for us today as the building of the atomic bomb was for the Manhattan Project pioneers in the 1940s. Our challenges are political and social as well as technical, and we are meeting those challenges. We are reducing risks, treating wastes, developing new technologies, and building democratic institutions for a constructive debate on our future course

  18. The Text of the Agreement between New Zealand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between New Zealand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  19. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-01-01

    In the grand scheme of things we are a little more than halfway through the cycle of splitting the atom for weapons purposes. If we visualize this historic cycle as the full sweep of a clockface, at zero hour we would find the first nuclear chain reaction by Enrico Fermi, followed immediately by the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the first atomic bombs. From two o`clock until five, the United States built and ran a massive industrial complex that produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At half past, the Cold War ended, and the United States shut down most of its nuclear weapons factories. The second half of this cycle involves dealing with the waste and contamination from nuclear weapons production - a task that had, for the most part, been postponed into the indefinite future. That future is now upon us. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War is in many ways as big a challenge for us today as the building of the atomic bomb was for the Manhattan Project pioneers in the 1940s. Our challenges are political and social as well as technical, and we are meeting those challenges. We are reducing risks, treating wastes, developing new technologies, and building democratic institutions for a constructive debate on our future course.

  20. Final environmental impact statement for the continued operation of the Pantex Plant and associated storage of nuclear weapon components. Volume 1 -- Main report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This document assesses the potential environmental impacts over approximately 10 years of continued operation of Pantex Plant, including foreseeable projects and activities. For Pantex Plant, this document assesses the alternatives of No Action, Relocation of the storage of plutonium components (pits) resulting from nuclear weapon disassembly activities at Pantex Plant to another site, and the Proposed Action (Preferred Alternative) of continuing operations and increasing the quantity of pits in interim storage at Pantex Plant. For the Pit Storage Relocation Alternative, this document also assesses the potential environmental impacts to three DOE candidate sites and one Department of Defense candidate site that could be selected for the relocation of the nuclear component storage activities from Pantex Plant. Evaluations of site infrastructure, land resources, geology and soils, water resources, air quality, acoustics, biotic resources, cultural resources, socio-economic resources, intrasite transportation, waste management, human health, aircraft accidents, and environmental justice for Pantex Plant and the candidate sites are included in the assessment. The intersite transportation of nuclear and hazardous materials is also assessed

  1. Armouring facility? Nuclear-weapon and reactor reseach at the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Physics; Eine Waffenschmiede? Kernwaffen- und Reaktorforschung am Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut fuer Physik

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hachtmann, R. (ed.); Walker, M.

    2005-07-01

    The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics is best known as the place where Werner Heisenberg worked on nuclear weapons for Hitler. Although this is essentially true, there is more to the story. At the start of World War II this institute was taken over by the German Army Ordnance to be the central, but not exclusive site for a research project into the economic and military applications of nuclear fission. The Army physicist Kurt Diebner was installed in the institute as its commissarial director. Heisenberg was affiliated with the institute as an advisor at first, and became the director in 1942. Heisenberg and his colleagues, including in particular Karl-Heinz Hoecker, Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, and Karl Wirtz, worked on nuclear reactors and isotope separation with the clear knowledge that these were two different paths to atomic bombs [Atombomben]. However, they were clearly ambivalent about what they were doing. New documents recently returned from Russian archives shed new light on this work and the scientists' motivations. (orig.)

  2. Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Azerbaijan to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 6 November 1998, and entered into force on 29 April 1999. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  3. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  4. Nuclear weapons and European interests : Discussions in the Assembly of the Western European Union, 1955–1975

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Megens, C.M

    2011-01-01

    In the 1950s and 1960s the Defence Committee of the Western European Union (WEU) Assembly submitted a series of conspicuous reports on nuclear control issues, culminating in a plea for an Atlantic nuclear force. The article analyses the reports and discussions in the Assembly in the field of defence

  5. The use of depleted uranium ammunition under contemporary international law: is there a need for a treaty-based ban on DU weapons?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Borrmann, Robin

    2010-01-01

    This article examines whether the use of Depleted Uranium (DU) munitions can be considered illegal under current public international law. The analysis covers the law of arms control and focuses in particular on international humanitarian law. The article argues that DU ammunition cannot be addressed adequately under existing treaty based weapon bans, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, due to the fact that DU does not meet the criteria required to trigger the applicability of those treaties. Furthermore, it is argued that continuing uncertainties regarding the effects of DU munitions impedes a reliable review of the legality of their use under various principles of international law, including the prohibition on employing indiscriminate weapons; the prohibition on weapons that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment; and the prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. All of these principles require complete knowledge of the effects of the weapon in question. Nevertheless, the author argues that the same uncertainty places restrictions on the use of DU under the precautionary principle. The paper concludes with an examination of whether or not there is a need for--and if so whether there is a possibility of achieving--a Convention that comprehensively outlaws the use, transfer and stockpiling of DU weapons, as proposed by some non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

  6. PREX: AN EXPERIMENT TO INVESTIGATE DETECTION OF NEAR-FIELD PARTICULATE DEPOSITION FROM A SIMULATED UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST VENT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Keillor, Martin E.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Baciak, James E.; Chipman, Veraun D.; Detwiler, Rebecca S.; Emer, Dudley; Kernan, Warnick J.; Kirkham, Randy R.; MacDougall, Matthew R.; Milbrath, Brian D.; Rishel, Jeremy P.; Seifert, Allen; Seifert, Carolyn E.; Smart, John E.

    2016-05-01

    An experiment to release radioactive particles representative of small-scale venting from an underground nuclear test was conducted to gather data in support of treaty capability development activities. For this experiment, a CO2-driven “air cannon” was used to release lanthanum-140 at ambient temperatures. The radioisotope 140La was chosen as a representative fission fragment with a short half-life and prominent gamma-ray emissions; the choice was also influenced by the successful production and use of 140La with low levels of radioactive contaminants in the Defence Research and Development Canada Field Trials. The source was created through activation of high-purity lanthanum oxide at the TRIGA research reactor of Washington State University, Pullman, Washington. Witness plates and air samplers were laid out in an irregular grid covering the area for which the plume was anticipated to deposit based on climatological wind records. A vehicle-mounted spectrometer, and handheld and backpack instruments ranging from polyvinyl toluene to high purity germanium, were used to survey the plume. Additionally, three soil sampling techniques were investigated. The relative sensitivity and utility of sampling and survey methods are discussed in the context of On-Site Inspection.

  7. Measurement techniques for the verification of excess weapons materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The end of the superpower arms race has resulted in an unprecedented reduction in stockpiles of deployed nuclear weapons. Numerous proposals have been put forward and actions have been taken to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, including unilateral initiatives such as those made by President Clinton in September 1993 to place fissile materials no longer needed for a deterrent under international inspection, and bilateral and multilateral measures currently being negotiated. For the technologist, there is a unique opportunity to develop the technical means to monitor nuclear materials that have been declared excess to nuclear weapons programs, to provide confidence that reductions are taking place and that the released materials are not being used again for nuclear explosive programs. However, because of the sensitive nature of these materials, a fundamental conflict exists between the desire to know that the bulk materials or weapon components in fact represent evidence of warhead reductions, and treaty commitments and national laws that require the protection of weapons design information. This conflict presents a unique challenge to technologists. The flow of excess weapons materials, from deployed warheads through storage, disassembly, component storage, conversion to bulk forms, and disposition, will be described in general terms. Measurement approaches based on the detection of passive or induced radiation will be discussed along with the requirement to protect sensitive information from release to unauthorized parties. Possible uses of measurement methods to assist in the verification of arms reductions will be described. The concept of measuring attributes of items rather than quantitative mass-based inventory verification will be discussed along with associated information-barrier concepts required to protect sensitive information

  8. Creating an educational consortium to support the recruitment and retention of expertise for the nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From FY 02-05 IAC has been a part of the DOE Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative and its predecessor organization Advanced Accelerator Applications. In the IAC program effort has been divided into three parts; Student Research, Accelerator Driven Nuclear Research and Materials Science. Within the three parts specific research and development activities have been undertaken in Student Research, which supported undergraduate and graduate students, post-docs, engineering staff, program administration, project infrastructure, visiting and summer faculty appointments, visiting scientists, and support of students and faculty at the University of Michigan, Texas A and M University, University of Texas and UNLV; Accelerator Driven Nuclear Research included the use of electron accelerators to study driven sub-critical nuclear systems (ADS) and to provide practical methods of monitoring and assaying nuclear materials for accountancy in non proliferation applications (Materials Accountability and Control, MA and C); and Materials Science research at IAC supported all AFC national technical areas

  9. Estimates of fallout in the continental U.S. from Nevada weapons testing based on gummed-film monitoring data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During periods of weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) between 1951 and 1958, the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) monitored daily fallout at about 100 sites in the U.S. using gummed-film collectors. These gummed-film data represent the only comprehensive set of actual measurements of fallout during this period for areas outside the immediate vicinity of the NTS. The measured beta activities originally reported by EML have been reviewed and reevaluated. This reevaluation corrected a number of errors in the original data set and allowed fairly accurate estimates to be made of specific radionuclide depositions from individual NTS shots. Estimates of the geographical and temporal variations in cumulative 137Cs and 131I depositions from all NTS shots through 1957 are presented, as well as estimates of the relative impact of particular shots and test series. The revised gummed-film estimates of total NTS fallout depositions are compared with estimates based on contemporary and historical soil sample analyses. These reevaluated gummed-film fallout deposition estimates are being extensively utilized in a number of ongoing programs to reconstruct the radiation exposure of the U.S. population from Nevada weapons testing

  10. The relationship of thyroid cancer in the people of the Marshall Islands to potential exposure to radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The US atomic weapons testing programme in the Pacific conducted between 1946 and 1958 resulted in radioactive contamination of a number of atolls in the Marshall Islands to various degrees. The largest weapon named BRAVO was tested in 1954 and resulted in high exposures to residents living on three atolls immediately downwind of the test site. Between 1993 and 1997, as part of the Nationwide Radiological Study of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, we examined 4767 Marshallese for all forms of thyroid disease, benign and malignant. Those examined had residences at the time of the test on all inhabited atolls of the nation and were born before the end of the nuclear testing period and thus potentially exposed to radioiodines from bomb test fallout. This group includes more than 60% of the alive population at risk. We diagnosed 38 thyroid cancers and found 23 other study participants who had been operated for thyroid cancer before. These findings indicate that 1 in 100 Marshallese had thyroid cancer or had been diagnosed with thyroid cancer before the investigation. Thyroid cancer rates varied little throughout the country, which suggests that thyroid cancer is endemic to the Marshallese population. However, the highest prevalence (1.8%) was found among women who were alive at the time of the BRAVO test. We derived crude estimates of thyroid dose for each study participant, using age-specific dose estimates on Utirik as estimated by Lessard et al. and adjusting those for location on the basis of contemporary measurements of Cs-137 at their island of residence in 1954. Prevalence of thyroid cancer generally increased with estimated dose to the thyroid, but the trend was not statistically significant. In view of these data, more precise individual thyroid dose reconstruction becomes an essential task for future work. (author)

  11. Bill related to the struggle against proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their vectors; Projet de Loi relatif a la lutte contre la proliferation des armes de destruction massive et de leurs vecteurs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-07-01

    This bill indicates the modifications brought to different French laws and codes (penal code, defence code, custom code) and defines provisions and penalties within the frame of struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear weapons, biological weapons and toxin-based weapons, chemical weapons), and against the proliferation of their vectors. These modifications, provisions and penalties also concern double-use products. The bill also defines the modifications brought to the French penal procedure code. It finally addresses offenses related to these proliferations which can be considered as an act of terrorism

  12. A historical application of social amplification of risk model: Economic impacts of risk events at nuclear weapons facilities?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Metz, W.C.

    1996-12-31

    Public perceptions of risk have proven to be a critical barrier to the federal government`s extensive, decade-long, technical and scientific effort to site facilities for the interim storage and permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The negative imagery, fear, and anxiety that are linked to ``nuclear`` and ``radioactive`` technologies, activities, and facilities by the public originate from the personal realities and experiences of individuals and the information they receive. These perceptions continue to be a perplexing problem for those responsible for making decisions about federal nuclear waste management policies and programs. The problem of understanding and addressing public perceptions is made even more difficult because there are decidedly different opinions about HLW held by the public and nuclear industry and radiation health experts.

  13. Controlling Weapons-Grade Fissile Material

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rotblat, J.

    1977-01-01

    Discusses the problems of controlling weapons-grade fissionable material. Projections of the growth of fission nuclear reactors indicates sufficient materials will be available to construct 300,000 atomic bombs each containing 10 kilograms of plutonium by 1990. (SL)

  14. Strengthening of nuclear weapon non-proliferation by means of International cooperation: the role of BN-350 reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beginning from 1996 US Department of Energy jointly with National Laboratories is working with Kazakhstan on non-proliferation problems and nuclear safety related to the BN-350 reactor. The first cooperative work has included the modernization of system for nuclear materials accounting and control on the reactor as well as creation of the Centre of Nuclear Technologies Safety for coordination of jobs related with the reactor and the others issues of safety. Hereupon fulfillment of two joint project were began. The first one includes safety provision for spent fuel in the dry safe depository. At present joint teams have completed the fuel package procedures. The second project is a irreversible withdrawal of the BN-350 reactor and it transfer into safe disposal condition for 50 years. This prevents a possibility of nuclear material production at the reactor those would be used for an unforeseen aims. The paper shows, that USA and Kazakhstan are working out the second project and it gives presentation about of status of conducting jobs. An especial attention was paid to cooperation between Kazakhstan and USA which is the part of works on the BN-350 reactor decommissioning

  15. Toxicological issues after depleted uranium weapons attacked

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Depleted Uranium (DU) is a byproduct of the uranium enrichment for producing nuclear reactor or nuclear weapon. DU is used in the military as an armor-piercing projectile due to its hardness, strength, and density. A lot of DU weapons were fired in the Gulf War, and bring about critical environmental and internal contamination. Therefore, DU becomes suddenly a hot issue. Some toxicological problems after DU weapons attacked have been reviewed, which include features of internal DU contamination. Hazard of wound contamination and inhalation with insoluble uranium, and other urgent toxicological issues. The healthy effects of implanted with depleted uranium pellets were illustrated in particular

  16. Agreement between the Republic of Namibia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Republic of Namibia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 17 March 1998, signed in Vienna on 19 March 1998, and entered into force on 15 April 1998

  17. Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  18. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Czech Republic to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 9 September 1996, signed in Vienna on 18 September 1996 and entered into force on 11 September 1997

  19. Nuclear weapons test detection: Ensuring a verifiable treaty. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty research and development program 1995 progress report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-12-31

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) has an active program to provide technologies for monitoring and verifying a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). DOE technologies will significantly increase the nation`s capability to identify potential nuclear explosions with high confidence and with minimal false alarms. This report presents the highlights of the first year of this program. The primary objectives of the CTBT monitoring system are to deter nuclear explosions in all environments (underground, underwater, or in the atmosphere) and, if such an explosion does occur, to detect, locate, and identify its source. The system is designed to provide credible evidence to national authorities to aid in resolving ambiguities and to serve as the basis for appropriate action. To collect this evidence, one must develop technologies that can detect and identify the signals from a nuclear test against a background of hundreds of thousands of benign events. The monitoring system must have high sensitivity to detect the events of interest and, to minimize false alarms, it must identify those events with a high level of confidence.

  20. 33 CFR 334.1380 - Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, Island of Oahu, Hawaii-Ulupau Crater Weapons...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ...), Kaneohe Bay, Island of Oahu, Hawaii-Ulupau Crater Weapons Training Range; danger zone. 334.1380 Section... Bay, Island of Oahu, Hawaii—Ulupau Crater Weapons Training Range; danger zone. (a) The danger zone...″ W Point C: Latitude 21°25′01.79″ N, Longitude 157°40′33.70″ W (b) The regulations. (1)...

  1. Nuclear control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yoon, Wan Kee [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1995-02-01

    International cooperation in nuclear industries requires nuclear control as prerequisites. The concept of nuclear control is based on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays central role in implementing nuclear control. Nuclear control consists of nuclear safeguards, physical protection, and export/import control. Each member state of NPT is subject to the IAEA`s safeguards by concluding safeguards agreements with the IAEA. IAEA recommends member states to implement physical protection on nuclear materials by `The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material` and `The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material` of IAEA. Export/Import Control is to deter development of nuclear weapons by controlling international trade on nuclear materials, nuclear equipments and technology. Current status of domestic and foreign nuclear control implementation including recent induction of national inspection system in Korea is described and functions of recently set-up Technology Center for Nuclear Control (TCNC) under the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) are also explained. 6 tabs., 11 refs. (Author).

  2. Analysis of the possibility of applying a condition-based maintenance model on an example of tank weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Igor J. Epler

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available For any modern army it is very important to continuously maintain a high degree of operational (combat readiness (availability in order to maximize the effectiveness of the use of technical systems. Since determination and prediction of technical states and failures of technical systems in engineering, especially in armament, are difficult due to the impossibility of continuous condition monitoring with appropriate measuring equipment there is a need for a maintenance model that would be most helpful in taking timely action maintenance. In this paper, the subject of research is a model of maintenance of the M-84 tank  weapoons systems.   IntroductionThe M-84 tank is one of the most promising technical systems in the Serbian Army. Its use and modifications are foreseen in the next ten years. The  M-84 is characterized by good tactical and technical characteristics. It has a powerful 125 mm cannon, coupled 7.62 mm machine gun and 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine gun. The M-84 tank has an automatic battery charger and a fire control system. The fire control system enables fast target tracking and stabilization of the cannon barrel, which is a prerequisite for timely and favorable effect on the target. There are certain ambiguities in the existing model of maintenance of tank weapons.   Technical diagnostics Technical diagnostics, as a part of the process of condition-based maintenance, should determine technical conditions of components or technical systems with certain accuracy at a point in time.   Maintenance strategy A maintenance strategy can be defined as a variant of a maintenance system determined by a concept, organization and character of maintenance procedures, as well as the relationship between the various levels at which maintenance is performed. It is defined for technical system parts, individual technical systems and for system maintenance as a whole. The basic maintenance strategies implemented today are: -      corrective

  3. Nuclear reactions video (knowledge base on low energy nuclear physics)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The NRV (nuclear reactions video) is an open and permanently extended global system of management and graphical representation of nuclear data and video-graphic computer simulation of low energy nuclear dynamics. It consists of a complete and renewed nuclear database and well known theoretical models of low energy nuclear reactions altogether forming the 'low energy nuclear knowledge base'. The NRV solves two main problems: 1) fast and visualized obtaining and processing experimental data on nuclear structure and nuclear reactions; 2) possibility for any inexperienced user to analyze experimental data within reliable commonly used models of nuclear dynamics. The system is based on the realization of the following principal things: the net and code compatibility with the main existing nuclear databases; maximal simplicity in handling: extended menu, friendly graphical interface, hypertext description of the models, and so on; maximal visualization of input data, dynamics of studied processes and final results by means of real three-dimensional images, plots, tables and formulas and a three-dimensional animation. All the codes are composed as the real Windows applications and work under Windows 95/NT

  4. The AIDA-MOX program. French-Russian study on peaceful use of plutonium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yegorov, N.; Kudriavtsev, E. [Minatom, Moscow (Russian Federation); Poplavsky, V.; Ouin, X.; Camarcat, N.; Sicard, B.; Bernard, H.

    1997-12-31

    The French-Russian studies conducted from 1993 to 1996 under AIDA/MOX 1 Program established the advantages and technical feasibility of the W-Pu MOX option in certain existing Russian nuclear reactors. The Program includes joint R and D on W-Pu conversion to PuO{sub 2}, PWR- and FR-MOX fuel fabrication technics, MOX-VVER and MOX-BN reactor safety studies as well as W-Pu consumption rate. Preliminary design study was done for semi-industrial MOX-fabrication facility to be constructed in Russian Federation for W-Pu utilization. (author)

  5. Radioecological transfer of {sup 137}Cs from ground deposition to man from Chernobyl debris and from nuclear weapons fallout in different Swedish populations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Raeaef, C.L. [Malmoe Univ. Hospital, Lund Univ., Dept. of Radiation Physics, Malmoe (Sweden)

    2005-07-01

    A comparison of the estimated committed effective dose per unit activity deposition on ground was made between different critical groups in Sweden. The time-integrated aggregate transfer of {sup 137}Cs for the global fallout was 2-3 times higher than from Chernobyl debris for Swedish urban populations. For reindeer herders this difference is even more marked, with a factor of three to four higher time-integrated transfer factor of nuclear weapons fallout. Considering the transfer of Chernobyl {sup 137}Cs debris the time-integrated transfer factor appears to be more than 25 times higher for reindeer herders in Sweden than for the urban reference groups. An even more pronounced relative difference between the time integrated aggregate transfer was observed between reindeer herders and urban reference populations for the pre-Chernobyl fallout (a factor of 30). The projected committed effective dose from internal contamination of Chernobyl {sup 137}Cs per unit activity deposition is observed to be 2030 {mu}Sv/kBq m{sup -2}. The highest values in Sweden are obtained for reindeer herders with an estimated radioecological transfer of 0.5 mSv/kBq m{sup -2}. (au)

  6. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article 111(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, pursuant to the first sentence of Article 25(a) thereof, on 21 February 1977

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  18. Agreement of 18 November 1993 between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 February 1975 and signed in Vienna on 31 October 1990 and in Nuku'Alofa on 18 November 1993

  19. Agreement of 22 September 1994 between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 22 September 1994

  20. Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 2 December 1993 and signed in Vienna on 6 December 1993 and in Riga on 21 December 1993

  1. Agreement of 30 September 1993 between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 September 1993 and signed in Vienna on 30 September 1993. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 5 May 1994

  2. Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994

  3. Agreement between the Republic of San Marino and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of San Marino and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Agreement was signed in Vienna on 3 March 1995 and in San Marino on 7 September 1998. It entered into force on 15 September 1998. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000

  5. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000

  6. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  7. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

  10. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000

  12. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/258) concluded between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1998 and it entered into force on 28 july 1998

  13. Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria

  15. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000

  16. Protocol additional to the agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement (INFCIRC/217) concluded between Australia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of the Additional Protocol was authorized by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997 and signed in Vienna on the same date. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 12 December 1997

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998 and signed in Vienna on 4 December 1998. The Protocol entered into force on 16 December 1998

  20. Nuclear Archeology in a Bottle: Evidence of Pre-Trinity U.S. Weapons Activities from a Waste Burial Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During World War II, the Hanford Site in Washington was chosen for plutonium production. In 2004, a bottle containing a sample of plutonium was recovered from a Hanford waste trench. Isotopic age dating indicated the sample was separated from the fuel pellet 64 ± 2.8 years earlier. Detectable products of secondary nuclear reactions, such as 22Na, proved useful as (1) a detectable analog for alpha emitting actinides, (2) an indicator of sample splitting, and (3) a measure of the time since sample splitting. The sample origin was identified as the X-10 reactor, Oak Ridge, TN. Corroborated by historical documents, we concluded this sample was part of the first batch of Pu separated at T-Plant, Hanford, the world's first industrial-scale reprocessing facility, on December 9, 1944