WorldWideScience

Sample records for base nuclear weapons

  1. Philippine Bases and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy

    OpenAIRE

    Schirmer, Daniel Boone

    1983-01-01

    In 1947, when the newly independent Philippine government granted the United States the right to use military bases at Subic Bay and Clark Air Field, the United States government saw to it that the terms included the right of the U.S. to install on these bases "any type of weapons." From the very beginning the Pentagon insisted on establishing the right to relate U.S. bases in the Philippines to possible plans for nuclear war. Also, from the very beginning many Filipinos opposed U.S. bases th...

  2. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kristensen, Hans M. [Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC (United States)

    2014-05-09

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  3. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described

  4. Reconversion of nuclear weapons

    CERN Document Server

    Kapitza, Sergei P

    1993-01-01

    The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

  5. Virtual nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  6. The nuclear weapons legacy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    On the 50th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, two new reports from the US DOE shed light on nuclear weapons production and its aftermath. This article summarizes and comments on the two reports: Closing the Circle on the Splitting of the Atom: the Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Production in the United States and What the Department of Energy is Doing About it; and Estimating the Cold War Mortgage: the 1995 Baseline Environmental Management Report

  7. Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sartori, Leo

    1983-01-01

    Fundamental principles governing nuclear explosions and their effects are discussed, including three components of a nuclear explosion (thermal radiation, shock wave, nuclear radiation). Describes how effects of these components depend on the weapon's yield, its height of burst, and distance of detonation point. Includes effects of three…

  8. Beyond the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since the end of the cold war, many people called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. That this decision seems difficult to realize because of the world political environment. Meanwhile the reduction of the nuclear weapons costs and risks believes more than ever a challenge of the international relations and more particularly in the proliferation domain. In this perspective the proliferation fight strategies need to be studied with a special interest in the domain of the alternatives and the possibilities of synergy. (A.L.B.)

  9. US nuclear weapons policy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    May, M.

    1990-12-05

    We are closing chapter one'' of the nuclear age. Whatever happens to the Soviet Union and to Europe, some of the major determinants of nuclear policy will not be what they have been for the last forty-five years. Part of the task for US nuclear weapons policy is to adapt its nuclear forces and the oganizations managing them to the present, highly uncertain, but not urgently competitive situation between the US and the Soviet Union. Containment is no longer the appropriate watchword. Stabilization in the face of uncertainty, a more complicated and politically less readily communicable goal, may come closer. A second and more difficult part of the task is to deal with what may be the greatest potential source of danger to come out of the end of the cold war: the breakup of some of the cooperative institutions that managed the nuclear threat and were created by the cold war. These cooperative institutions, principally the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the US-Japan alliance, were not created specifically to manage the nuclear threat, but manage it they did. A third task for nuclear weapons policy is that of dealing with nuclear proliferation under modern conditions when the technologies needed to field effective nuclear weapons systems and their command and control apparatus are ever more widely available, and the leverage over some potential proliferators, which stemmed from superpower military support, is likely to be on the wane. This paper will make some suggestions regarding these tasks, bearing in mind that the unsettled nature of that part of the world most likely to become involved in nuclear weapons decisions today must make any suggestions tentative and the allowance for surprise more than usually important.

  10. Nuclear weapons identification system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A nuclear weapons identification system (NWIS) has been under development at the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant since 1984. NWIS employs active neutron interrogation to obtain a variety of time and frequency analysis signature to identify nuclear weapons in containers. Advantages of NWIS are (1) high sensitivity (small changes in configurations produce large changes in signatures); (2) insensitivity of some signatures to background radiation, (useful for storage configurations or for tracking of secondaries through the first stage of dismantlement since the presence of the primary on the assembled system does not affect some signatures for the secondary); (3) nonintrusive (does not reveal design information, which makes it useful for bilateral treaties or by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)); and (4) very difficult to deceive

  11. Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bing, G.F.

    1991-08-20

    This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

  12. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We all want to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The issue before us is how best to achieve this objective; more specifically, whether the peaceful applications of nuclear energy help or hinder, and to what extent. Many of us in the nuclear industry are working on these applications from a conviction that without peaceful nuclear energy the risk of nuclear war would be appreciably greater. Others, however, hold the opposite view. In discussing the subject, a necessary step in allaying fears is understanding some facts, and indeed facing up to some unpalatable facts. When the facts are assessed, and a balance struck, the conclusion is that peaceful nuclear energy is much more part of the solution to preventing nuclear war than it is part of the problem

  13. The legacy of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It could be argued that discussion of the legacy of nuclear weapons should be strictly limited to the effects of the use of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in 1945. However, it seems reasonable also to include the activities related to the potential use of nuclear weapons, these being: testing of nuclear weapons, which was carried out principally by the USA and the USSR, but also by the United Kingdom, France and China; the military fuel cycle associated with the production of nuclear weapons, including uranium mining, reactors, fuel reprocessing, waste disposal and transport of nuclear weapons. Estimates of collective effective dose commitments arising from the most important human made sources of radiation that result in environmental releases of radioactive materials are presented 27 refs, 2 tabs

  14. Areas free of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In fact there is considerable disagreement about the concept of zones free of nuclear weapons, but the different angles from which countries see this idea, conditions of entry into force and assess of their effectiveness in achieving objectives contributed to the lack of final formulation of one specific definition and not to develop an integrated aspects concept. There is a necessity to try to find a clear definition of zones free of nuclear weapons to address in a second phase to the basic purposes of the establishment. The article addressed the following points: the definition of zones free from nuclear weapons; international conventions establishing the zones free of nuclear weapons; advantages of treaties on the areas free of nuclear weapons, which can be summarized mainly in two basic goals: ensuring not to give birth to new nuclear states and achieving regional security and stability.

  15. Nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this paper, GAO provides its views on DOE's January 1991 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study. GAO believes that DOE's new reconfiguration study provides a starting point for reaching agreement on solutions to many of the complex's problems. Key decisions still need to be made about the size of the complex, where to relocate plutonium operations, what technologies should be used for new tritium production, and what to do with excess plutonium. The total cost for reconfiguring and modernizing is still uncertain and some management issues remain unresolved. Congress faces a difficult task in making these decisions given the conflicting demands for scare resources in a time of growing budget deficits and war in the Persian Gulf

  16. No first use of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper reports that at present, nuclear weapons are considered legitimate, if terrible, weapons, usable as other weapons are for national purposes. In the West and in the East, strategy, military forces, readiness posture, all are based fundamentally on the threat and, ultimately, the use of nuclear weapons. In the West this threat is directed not only against a nuclear attack against the US or its allies, but also against conventional, non-nuclear operations beyond our ability to hold. The term for such nuclear deterrence of non-nuclear hostilities is extended deterrence. It has been at the heart of US and NATO policy for a generation. In the East, the Soviet Union has declared a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons, a declaration, that is to say, that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in any future hostilities, that they would fire them only in retaliation against nuclear attack. To make that declaration a sure control over Soviet and Warsaw Pact decisions and actions in crisis, however, and to make it so convincing to others that they can, cautiously, rely on it, the governmental announcement of the No First Use must be supplemented by a host of implementing and indoctrinating measures that are yet to be taken. Nuclear preemption, first use, has not yet by any means been eliminated from Soviet doctrine, force structures and weapons programmes

  17. Nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and international stability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The National Energy Plan included as one of its key components a revision of this country's long-standing policy on the development of civilian nuclear power. The proposed change, which would have the effect of curtailing certain aspects of the U.S. nuclear-power program and of placing new restrictions on the export of nuclear materials, equipment, and services, was based explicitly on the assumption that there is a positive correlation between the worldwide spread of nuclear-power plants and their associated technology on the one hand, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear war on the other. The authors advance here the heretical proposition that the supposed correlation may go the other way, and that the recent actions and statements of the U.S. Government have taken little account of this possibility. In brief, they suggest that if the U.S. were to forgo the option of expanding its nuclear-energy supply, the global scarcity of usable energy resources would force other countries to opt even more vigorously for nuclear power and, moreover, to do so in ways that would tend to be internationally destabilizing. Thus, actions taken with the earnest intent of strengthening world security would ultimately weaken it. They believe further that any policy that seeks to divide the world into nuclear ''have'' and ''have not'' nations by attempting to lock up the assets of nuclear technologywill lead to neither a just nor a sustainable world society but to the inverse. In any event the technology itself probably cannot be effectively contained. They believe that the dangers of nuclear proliferation can be eliminated only by building a society that sees no advantage in having nuclear weapons in the first place. Accordingly, they view the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an important issue not just in the context of nuclear power but in a larger context

  18. Nuclear weapons and the law.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Murray, R K

    1999-01-01

    The history of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is summarized, with a discussion of some of its earlier Advisory Opinions. The Advisory Opinion on the legality of nuclear arms is considered in the light of the principles of international humanitarian law and a review of nuclear weapons effects. The present government's position on nuclear weapons as outlined in the Strategic Defence Review (which ignores the issue of legality) is examined critically. PMID:10371869

  19. Reframing the debate against nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    recent years has been all but negated; consensus-based agreements are rejected just a few years after being reached. Despite the threats posed by State or non-State proliferation, an increasing likelihood of a return to nuclear testing and the development of new nuclear weapons, a handful of powerful people continue to view these weapons as a legitimate source of security. All States Parties and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should approach the seventh NPT Review Conference in May 2005 as a major opportunity to reinvigorate the nuclear disarmament regime and transform it into an effective tool by which a true collective security can be ensured. First, however, we must reclaim the ground that has been eroded in recent years by the vertical and horizontal proliferation threats stemming from various corners of the globe

  20. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1964-02-01

    This book is a revision of "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" which was issued in 1957. It was prepared by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant governmental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomc Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the combined judgment of a number of the most competent scientists working the problem. There is a need for widespread public understanding of the best information available on the effects of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible, within the limits of national security, a comprehensive summary of this information.

  1. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1957-06-01

    This handbook prepared by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant government agencies and published by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, is a comprehensive summary of current knowledge on the effects of nuclear weapons. The effects information contained herein is calculated for yields up to 20 megatons and the scaling laws for hypothetically extending the calculations beyond this limit are given. The figure of 20 megatons however is not be taken as an indication of capabilities or developments.

  2. Why new nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For the first time since twenty years the US government intenses to produce an advanced nuclear head for bombs. The project raises many questions taking into account political and martial facts on the globe. (GL)

  3. Broken Arrows: Radiological hazards from nuclear warhead accidents (the Minot USAF base nuclear weapons incident)

    CERN Document Server

    Liolios, Theodore

    2009-01-01

    According to numerous press reports, in 2007 at Minot US Air Force Base six AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles mistakenly armed with W80-1 thermonuclear warheads were loaded on a B-52H heavy bomber in place of six unarmed AGM-129 missiles that were awaiting transport to Barksdale US Air Force Base for disposal. The live nuclear missiles were not reported missing, and stood unsecured and unguarded while mounted to the aircraft for a period of 36 hours. The present work investigates the radiological hazards associated with a worst-case postulated accident that would disperse the nuclear material of the six warheads in large metropolitan cities. Using computer simulations approximate estimates are derived for the ensuing cancer mortality and land contamination after the accident. Health, decontamination and evacuation costs are also estimated in the framework of the linear risk model.

  4. Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons: Military effectiveness and collateral effects

    OpenAIRE

    Gsponer, Andre

    2005-01-01

    The paper begins with a general introduction and update to Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons (FGNW), and then addresses some particularly important military aspects on which there has been only limited public discussion so far. These aspects concern the unique military characteristics of FGNWs which make them radically different from both nuclear weapons based on previous-generation nuclear-explosives and from conventional weapons based on chemical-explosives: yields in the 1 to 100 tons rang...

  5. Nuclear weapons non proliferation treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taking into account the devastation that a nuclear war would inflict upon mankind, and the resulting need to do all that is in our power to keep such a tragedy from occuring, as well as to implement measures to safeguard all the peoples' safety, each State that owns nuclear weapons and that is a part of the Treaty pledges not to trade nuclear weapons, other explosive devices nor the control over such instruments to any other entity whatsoever, wether directly or indirectly. Likewise, all States that does not posses any nuclear weaponry and that are part of the Treaty, in turn pledge not to receive from any other entity nuclear weaponry or other explosive devices in trade, wether directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire this fashion of weaponry and not to request or accept any help whatsoever in the manufacturing of nuclear weaponry or related devices. The present Treaty remains open to the subscription of other countries, on July 26, 1968, with Mexico as one of the signatory countries

  6. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A summary of the report dispatched in the middle of 1978 by the Atlantic Council of United States, organized by North American citizens, is presented. The report considers the relation between the production of nucleoelectric energy and the capacity of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The factors which affect the grade of proliferation risk represented by the use of nuclear energy in the world comparing this risk with the proliferation risks independently of nuclear energy, are examined. (M.C.K.)

  7. The German Debate on Tactical Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report analyses the debate in Germany about tactical nuclear weapons deployments in Europe. It is mainly based on interviews conducted with senior officials from the German Federal Foreign Ministry, the Federal Ministry of Defence, senior members of Parliament as well as experts from research institutes and think-tanks. The interviews focused on the more recent past in the German debate as well as the future of tactical nuclear weapon deployments in Germany and Europe. The report concludes that while a change of Germany's position on tactical nuclear weapons is unlikely to change in the short-term, several developments will make it unlikely that the continued involvement of Germany in NATO nuclear sharing will have to be debated in the medium term. Should the next Parliamentary elections, which will take place in 2009 at the latest, result in a Social Democrat-led government, a push for a reduction of Germany's involvement in NATO nuclear sharing appears possible. A conservative-led government is likely to maintain the nuclear status quo within NATO

  8. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  9. Nuclear weapons and the World Court ruling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    based on the initiatives by non-governmental organizations, the World Health Organisation (WHO) Assembly asked the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion in 1993 whether, considering the environmental and health consequences, the use of nuclear weapons by a state in war or other armed conflict would be a breach of its obligations under international law. The World Court decided that it was not able to give an advisory opinion as requested, because of the fact that questions of use of force and such like were beyond the scope of specialized agencies like the WHO. The Court has ruled that the international community, especially the five nuclear weapon states have not only an obligation to negotiate a treaty for total nuclear disarmament, but also have an obligation to conclude such treaty. We may expect that the nuclear weapon states will cynically disregard the ruling of the World Court as they have been doing to the basic obligation itself in pursuit of nuclear hegemony. But the remaining 150 countries or so also bear a responsibility to keep nudging the recalcitrant states into implementing their commitments to disarm

  10. Mobile Pit verification system design based on passive special nuclear material verification in weapons storage facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A mobile 'drive by' passive radiation detection system to be applied in special nuclear materials (SNM) storage facilities for validation and compliance purposes has been designed through the use of computational modeling and new radiation detection methods. This project was the result of work over a 1 year period to create optimal design specifications to include creation of 3D models using both Monte Carlo and deterministic codes to characterize the gamma and neutron leakage out each surface of SNM-bearing canisters. Results were compared and agreement was demonstrated between both models. Container leakages were then used to determine the expected reaction rates using transport theory in the detectors when placed at varying distances from the can. A 'typical' background signature was incorporated to determine the minimum signatures versus the probability of detection to evaluate moving source protocols with collimation. This established the criteria for verification of source presence and time gating at a given vehicle speed. New methods for the passive detection of SNM were employed and shown to give reliable identification of age and material for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). The finalized 'Mobile Pit Verification System' (MPVS) design demonstrated that a 'drive-by' detection system, collimated and operating at nominally 2 mph, is capable of rapidly verifying each and every weapon pit stored in regularly spaced, shelved storage containers, using completely passive gamma and neutron signatures for HEU and WGPu. This system is ready for real evaluation to demonstrate passive total material accountability in storage facilities. (authors)

  11. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Immele, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wagner, Richard L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in

  12. The radiation effects of nuclear weapons explosions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The energy resulting from nuclear weapons explosions consists of thermal energy (heat radiation), shock waves, initial radiation (nuclear ray flash, gamma and neutron flash), and nuclear radiation of the fission products (fallout). The contribution of the different energy components depends on the energy amounts produced by fission or fusion reactions (A-weapon, H-weapon), on the components used for conversion to helium-4 (deuterium, tritium, lithium), the weapon design (radiation absorption and induced activity in auxiliaries), and on the type of employment (atmospheric, ground, or underground explosion). The damaging effects vary accordingly, consisting of thermal damage, blast effects, and radiation injuries. The effects are explained and compared. (orig.)

  13. Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maaranen, S.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). Center for International Security Affairs

    1996-09-01

    Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures and dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.

  14. Health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report briefly reviews previous WHO work on the health consequences of nuclear war and concentrates on current information about the effects of nuclear weapons on health, and related environmental problems. 15 refs

  15. Examining the discourse on nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Ghafele, Roya

    2000-01-01

    Nuclear weapons and language - is there a connection? Linguistics is an established science, but what has it got to do with nuclear weapons? This article was inspired by several international disarmament negotiations where I noticed that diplomats work in a communicative reality related to the nuclear arms issue. But is anyone involved in this highly political process aware of the activity of that process of talking? Observations showed that the political problem around the issue of nuclear a...

  16. China's mixed signals on nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ultimately, it is nuclear whether the Chinese leadership has made up its collective mind on practical nuclear weapons. It is known from Chinese official sources, including articles in Communist Party and military publications and histories of the Chinese nuclear program, that an internal debate has proceeded for more than two decades, punctuated by occasional nuclear exercises or low-yield warhead tests. But China presumably has less reason now to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons than in previous decades: relations with the Soviet Union have improved and military confrontation has eased; China's relations with India and Vietnam are also improving. The decision may already have been made, however, and the weapons built. The mystery surrounding Chinese tactical nuclear weapons is itself interesting, but it is also symbolic of the difficulty of understanding China's nuclear weapons program and policies. The West has accumulated a considerable body of knowledge about China's nuclear forces, especially historical material. But important aspects of China's nuclear behavior and its future as a nuclear power are hard to discern. A key question is China's future role in the spread of nuclear-capable weapons to other countries. China might add to international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear related technology, or it might become the world's missile merchant. It could make a constructive contribution to arms control efforts in general, or it could act as a spoiler

  17. Iran's nuclear program - for power generation or nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report addresses the development of a nuclear infrastructure in Iran, and assessments are made on the near-term potential this infrastructure might yield of either nuclear power or nuclear arms production. The most significant facilities are treated in a more elaborate fashion, as these are assumed to have key roles in either a true civilian programme, or in the prospect of weapons-grade fissile material production. The future potential capacity for the latter is calculated under certain presumptions, both in the case that Iran focuses its efforts on uranium-based nuclear weapons, and in the case that it should choose the plutonium path to nuclear weapons. All the conclusions and findings in this report are based on technological considerations. This means that social or political assessments have not prevailed, rather the picture of Iran's nuclear programme is drawn through descriptions and assessments of facilities and systems, and their role in the bigger context. Definite conclusions have not been made as to whether Iran's nuclear programme currently is aimed towards nuclear arms or nuclear power. The secrecy surrounding some of the most prominent nuclear sites together with more or less credible allegations of purely weapons-related activities in the past, make it hard not to conclude that Iran until the disclosures in 2002 made as great an effort as it could on its way on developing nuclear weapons covertly. The scope of today's nuclear programme seems, on the other hand, most likely to be in part to help relieve the ever-increasing need for energy, although considerable deficits to this strategy are identified, at the same time as the Iranian people are united in a giant, high-prestige project in defiance of massive international pressure. Adding to this is a much-feared ability to rapidly being able to redirect their nuclear efforts, and develop nuclear arms in perhaps as little as one year. This so-called break-out scenario, where Iran presumably

  18. Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons: Military effectiveness and collateral effects

    CERN Document Server

    Gsponer, A

    2005-01-01

    The paper begins with a general introduction and update to Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons (FGNW), and then addresses some particularly important military aspects on which there has been only limited public discussion so far. These aspects concern the unique military characteristics of FGNWs which make them radically different from both nuclear weapons based on previous-generation nuclear-explosives and from conventional weapons based on chemical-explosives: yields in the 1 to 100 tons range, greatly enhanced coupling to targets, possibility to drive powerful shaped charged jets and forged fragments, enhanced prompt radiation effects, reduced collateral damage and residual radioactivity, etc.

  19. Democracy, public opinion, and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    To the degree that people's fears of nuclear war are deep and pervasive, they become subject to manipulation by cynical or politically utopian promises, whether those promises be to abolish nuclear weapons from the earth or to create a leakproof peace shield (SDI). But the basic yearning for protection could also be mobilized to support serious arms reduction and arms control agreements. Nuclear weapons provide the basis for a vivid form of symbolic politics, perhaps equivalent in foreign policy considerations to the Korean and Vietnam wars during their durations, and in similar ways (although not necessarily as severe) as unemployment does among domestic policy issues. This paper presents survey research directed specifically at the role of public opinion on nuclear imagery (difference between expectation of nuclear war versus any kind of weapon war; willingness to spend on nuclear weapons versus conventional ones or general defense spending) can help in understanding these phenomena

  20. Pantex: safety in nuclear weapons processing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johannesen, R E; Farrell, L M

    2000-11-01

    The Pantex Plant, located in the Texas panhandle near Amarillo, is a major Department of Energy (DOE) participant in maintaining the safety of the nation's nuclear weapons resources and protecting the employees, public, and environment. With more than 168,000 person-years of operations involving nuclear materials, explosives, and hazardous chemicals, Pantex has maintained a notable safety record. This article overviews the nuclear weapon activities at Pantex and describes their safety culture. PMID:11045518

  1. Siamese twins - nuclear weapons and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The historical development of nuclear weapons and civil nuclear power is summarized. The initiative by President Eisenhower in launching the 'atoms for peace' programme is mentioned, and the intentions and shortcomings of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are outlined. The developments in individual countries are discussed under the headings: who has the bomb (query); nuclear flashpoints; the nuclear state; BNFL's involvement. (U.K.)

  2. Maintaining non-nuclear weapon status

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Among the some 170 sovereign states in the world, five are legally recognized as nuclear weapon states (NWS) under the terms of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Six countries (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa) are counted as threshold states: they possess sizeable unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or have passed the brink of a nuclear test or of clandestine weapon production. Six other countries (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Taiwan, and North and South Korea) have been suspected periodically of either considering the nuclear weapon option or of working secretly on the development of weapons. Thus, about 150 non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain which neither possess nuclear weapons nor strive to acquire them. These states are distributed throughout the globe and encompass highly industrialized as well as underdeveloped countries, liberal democracies, socialist states, sheikdoms and dictatorships. Some NNWS face acute military threats; other are far removed from the quarrels of the world, as in the case of some remote fortunate islands. Furthermore, NNWS may be members of nuclear-umbrella alliances or may have opted for a policy of neutrality or non-alignment

  3. Computational Challenges in Nuclear Weapons Simulation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McMillain, C F; Adams, T F; McCoy, M G; Christensen, R B; Pudliner, B S; Zika, M R; Brantley, P S; Vetter, J S; May, J M

    2003-08-29

    After a decade of experience, the Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons. The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) program was established to provide leading edge, high-end simulation capabilities needed to meet the program's assessment and certification requirements. The great challenge of this program lies in developing the tools and resources necessary for the complex, highly coupled, multi-physics calculations required to simulate nuclear weapons. This paper describes the hardware and software environment we have applied to fulfill our nuclear weapons responsibilities. It also presents the characteristics of our algorithms and codes, especially as they relate to supercomputing resource capabilities and requirements. It then addresses impediments to the development and application of nuclear weapon simulation software and hardware and concludes with a summary of observations and recommendations on an approach for working with industry and government agencies to address these impediments.

  4. Nuclear Weapons Effects (Self-Teaching Materials).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Developed by the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, this autoinstructional text deals with nuclear weapons effects. The destructive effects of an atomic blast are first introduced, and then long-term radioactive consequences are stressed. (CP)

  5. Responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The responsibilities of Nuclear Weapon States are presented by a straightforward analysis together with the ways in which they could fulfill them. The complete undertaking of all the commitments by the Nuclear Weapon States may take a long time. However they do not have a single excuse to neglect such a historic opportunity to do their best to provide a genuinely secure world environment for the international community, of which they too are members

  6. Canadians, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War security dilemma

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This dissertation provides a history of Canadian ideas about nuclear weapons from the late 1950s until the end of the Trudeau era in 1984. Throughout this period, Canadians reacted to the insecurity they felt in the world around them by expressing many conflicting, often irreconcilable views about a range of nuclear weapon issues, including Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads in 1963, the U.S. ABM program in the 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Canadian nuclear technology in the development of India's first nuclear explosion, and the Trudeau government's decision to allow the U.S. military to test cruise missiles in northern Canada The dissertation concludes with an examination of the emergence of a broadly-based, increasingly mainstream and influential anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s, the clearest manifestation of the insecurity Canadians experienced at the time. .The nuclear debates examined in this dissertation reveal that Canadians were divided over nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the arms race, proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, they came to fundamentally different conclusions about how Canada's nuclear weapon policies, and its support for the nuclear policies of its alliances, would contribute to international stability and order. Some believed that their security rested on the maintenance of a strong Western nuclear deterrent and supported Canada contributing to its credibility; others believed that the constant modernisation of nuclear arsenals fuelled by the superpower arms race posed a serious threat to their security. This conceptual dilemma-the security through nuclear strength argument versus the fear that the quest for security through quantitative and qualitative improvements of nuclear stockpiles increased the likelihood of nuclear war-left Canadians divided over the value and utility of nuclear weapons and the strategies developed around them. At the same time, Canadians' ideas about nuclear weapons

  7. Some mathematics of nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: In the many decades since the first demonstration of the power of nuclear weapons we have created a 'data set' that we may analyze to see if simple principles account for the observed history. There was initial fear that the proliferation of weapons would be exponential, driven by the principle that each nation would desire to have weapons to deter each other nuclear-armed nation. The doubling time could be taken as four years, between the tests of the US in 1945 and the USSR in 1949. By 1985, with ten doubling times, we would have had 1024 nuclear weapons states, far from the data. If we make a different hypothesis, that each nation is deterred from seeking nuclear weapons by each existing nuclear state, we obtain a differential equation leading to an expression for a much slower rate of increase, which is indeed found to be closely followed. If we have an understanding of the processes that lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we can be better at strengthening the barriers to further growth. The mathematical equations and relevant plots will be used to illustrate these observations. (author)

  8. Pathways to the acquisition of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Countries desirous of acquiring nuclear weapons may follow a number of different paths. Some of the decisions that must be made along the way include: the type of fissile material used (plutonium or high enriched uranium), fuel cycle processes employed, weapon design, degree and type of foreign assistance, and whether the program is covert or overt. Although obtaining special fissionable material has traditionally been the most difficult step in the process of creating a nuclear weapon, other steps in the process can also be quite formidable. As there is no 'one size fits all' model for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, all possible means of obtaining materials and technologies must be considered to effectively combat their spread

  9. Peaceful uses of nuclear weapon plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1993, the U.S.A. and the CIS signed Start 2 (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) in which they committed themselves the reduce their nuclear weapon arsenals to a fraction of that of 1991. For forty-five years the antagonism between the superpowers had been a dominating factor in world history, determining large areas of social life. When Start 2 will have been completed in 2003, some 200 t of weapon grade plutonium and some 2000 t of highly enriched uranium (Heu) will arise from dismantling nuclear weapons. In the absence of the ideological ballast of the debate about Communism versus Capitalism of the past few decades there is a chance of the grave worldwide problem of safe disposal and utilization of this former nuclear weapon material being solved. Under the heading of 'swords turned into plowshares', plutonium and uranium could be used for peaceful electricity generation. (orig.)

  10. Emerging nuclear energy systems and nuclear weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Generally when considering problems of proliferation of nuclear weapons, discussions are focused on horizontal proliferation. However, the emerging nuclear energy systems currently have an impact mainly on vertical proliferation. The paper indicates that technologies connected with emerging nuclear energy systems, such as fusion reactors and accelerators, enhance the knowledge of thermonuclear weapon physics and will enable production of military useful nuclear materials (including some rare elements). At present such technologies are enhancing the arsenal of the nuclear weapon states. But one should not forget the future implications for horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons as some of the techniques will in the near future be within the technological and economic capabilities of non-nuclear weapon states. Some of these systems are not under any international control. (orig.)

  11. The influence of the Lop Nor Nuclear Weapons Test Base to the population of the Republic of Kazakhstan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zhumadilov, Kassym, E-mail: kassym@hiroshima-u.ac.j [Research Institute for Radiation Biology and Medicine, Hiroshima University, 1-2-3, Kasumi, Minami-ku, Hiroshima 734-8553 (Japan); Ivannikov, Alexander [Medical Radiological Research Center, Korolev str. 4, Obninsk 249036 (Russian Federation); Zharlyganova, Dinara [Astana Medical University, Astana 010000 (Kazakhstan); Stepanenko, Valeriy [Medical Radiological Research Center, Korolev str. 4, Obninsk 249036 (Russian Federation); Zhumadilov, Zhaxybay [Nazarbayev University, Life Science Center, Astana 010000 (Kazakhstan); Apsalikov, Kazbek [Kazakh Scientific-Research Institute for Radiation Medicine and Ecology, Semey 071400 (Kazakhstan); Toyoda, Shin [Department of Applied Physics, Faculty of Science, Okayama University of Science, 1-1 Ridai, Okayama 700-0005 (Japan); Endo, Satoru [Department of Quantum Energy Applications, Graduate School of Engineering, Hiroshima University, 1-4-1 Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima 739-8527 (Japan); Tanaka, Kenichi [Division of Physics, Department of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Center of Medical Education, Sapporo Medical University, South 1, West 17, Chuo-ku, Sapporo 060-8556 (Japan); Miyazawa, Chuzou [School of Dentistry, Ohu University, 31-1, Aza-Misumido, Tomita-machi, Koriyama-shi, Fukushima Pref. 963-8611 (Japan); Okamoto, Tetsuji [Department of Molecular Oral Medicine and Maxillofacial Surgery, Division of Frontier Medical Sciences, Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences, Hiroshima University (Japan); Hoshi, Masaharu [Research Institute for Radiation Biology and Medicine, Hiroshima University, 1-2-3, Kasumi, Minami-ku, Hiroshima 734-8553 (Japan)

    2011-04-15

    The method of electron spin resonance (ESR) dosimetry was applied to human tooth enamel to obtain estimates of individual absorbed dose for residents of Makanchi, Urdzhar and Taskesken settlements located near the Kazakhstan-Chinese border (about 400 km to the South-East, from the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS) and about 1000 km from the Lop Nor Nuclear Weapons Test Base, China). Since the ground and atmospheric nuclear tests (1964-1981) at Lop Nor, the people residing in these settlements are believed to have been heavily exposed to radioactive fallout. Tooth samples had been extracted for medical reasons during the course of ordinary dental treatment. The village of Kokpekty, located 400 km to the South-east of the SNTS, was chosen as the control group since it has not been subjected to any radioactive contamination. The mean excess doses in tooth enamel obtained after subtraction of the contribution of natural background radiation do not exceed 62 {+-} 28 mGy, 64 {+-} 30 mGy, 49 {+-} 27 mGy and -19 {+-} 36 mGy for all ages of the residents of Makanchi, Urdzhar, Taskesken and the control village of Kokpekty, respectively.

  12. The influence of the Lop Nor Nuclear Weapons Test Base to the population of the Republic of Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The method of electron spin resonance (ESR) dosimetry was applied to human tooth enamel to obtain estimates of individual absorbed dose for residents of Makanchi, Urdzhar and Taskesken settlements located near the Kazakhstan-Chinese border (about 400 km to the South-East, from the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS) and about 1000 km from the Lop Nor Nuclear Weapons Test Base, China). Since the ground and atmospheric nuclear tests (1964-1981) at Lop Nor, the people residing in these settlements are believed to have been heavily exposed to radioactive fallout. Tooth samples had been extracted for medical reasons during the course of ordinary dental treatment. The village of Kokpekty, located 400 km to the South-east of the SNTS, was chosen as the control group since it has not been subjected to any radioactive contamination. The mean excess doses in tooth enamel obtained after subtraction of the contribution of natural background radiation do not exceed 62 ± 28 mGy, 64 ± 30 mGy, 49 ± 27 mGy and -19 ± 36 mGy for all ages of the residents of Makanchi, Urdzhar, Taskesken and the control village of Kokpekty, respectively.

  13. Nuclear weapon race does not stop

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    60 years after Hiroshima, the race for nuclear weaponry keeps on. The comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), signed in 1996 by the 5 official nuclear-weapon-owning states (Usa, Russia, China, U.K. and France), has not yet been implemented because its implementation requires the ratification of 44 states that harbour on their territories industrial or research nuclear reactors. Till now only 33 such states have ratified CTBT. CTBT aims at prohibiting any nuclear test whatever the amount of energy released in it. Countries like Usa, North-Korea, Russia, soon Iran... are suspected to develop new types of nuclear warfare. For 2005 the American Congress have decided to freeze the funding of programmes dedicated to the development of 'mini-nukes' like the bunker-burster. The international network of monitoring stations will soon cover all the world and will be able to detect and locate, in an almost automated way, any test involving an energy greater than 1 kiloton. 321 stations have been settled and their efficient detection systems are based on seismic or infra-sound or radioactivity or hydro-acoustic analysis. (A.C.)

  14. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Transformation - A Sustainable Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this process of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start

  15. Effects of nuclear weapons. Third edition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, S.; Dolan, P.J.

    1977-01-01

    Since the last edition of ''The Effects of Nuclear Weapons'' in 1962 much new information has become available concerning nuclear weapon effects. This has come in part from the series of atmospheric tests, including several at very high altitudes, conducted in the Pacific Ocean area in 1962. In addition, laboratory studies, theoretical calculations, and computer simulations have provided a better understanding of the various effects. A new chapter has been added on the electromagnetic pulse. The chapter titles are as follows: general principles of nuclear explosions; descriptions of nuclear explosions; air blast phenomena in air and surface bursts; air blast loading; structural damage from air blast; shock effects of surface and subsurface bursts; thermal radiation and its effects; initial nuclear radiation; residual nuclear radiation and fallout; radio and radar effects; the electromagnetic pulse and its effects; and biological effects. (LTN)

  16. Nuclear weapon testing and the monkey business

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reasons for India's total ban on the export of rhesus monkeys to U.S. have been explained. The major reason is that some of the animals were used in nuclear weapon related radiation experiments. This was a clear violation of a stricture in the agreement about supply of monkeys. The stricture prohibited the use of animals for research concerning military operations, including nuclear weapon testing. It is pleaded that a strict enforcement of strictures rather than a total ban on the export of monkeys would be better in the interest of advancement of knowledge in human medicine and disease control. (M.G.B.)

  17. Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kemp, R. Scott

    2016-06-01

    Environmental sensing of nuclear activities has the potential to detect nuclear weapon programs at early stages, deter nuclear proliferation, and help verify nuclear accords. However, no robust system of detection has been deployed to date. This can be variously attributed to high costs, technical limitations in detector technology, simple countermeasures, and uncertainty about the magnitude or behavior of potential signals. In this article, current capabilities and promising opportunities are reviewed. Systematic research in a variety of areas could improve prospects for detecting covert nuclear programs, although the potential for countermeasures suggests long-term verification of nuclear agreements will need to rely on methods other than environmental sensing.

  18. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP)

  19. The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the later years the risks of nuclear proliferation have again become a major topic of interest. This is primarily due to the acute problems caused by Iraq, North Korea, and the 3 new states of the former USSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Analysis shows that security problems and prestige are the two most important motives, when the risks of proliferation are considered. But motives are not enough. To produce nuclear weapons a number of technological requirements must also be fulfilled. The country must be able to produce almost pure fissile material, i.e. 235U or 239Pu. It must also be able to solve a number of metallurgical, explosive, ignition, physics and other problems. These are in particular non-trivial, if a implosion weapon is to be designed. A review is made of the nuclear facilities in a number of the countries which have been suggested as possible future nuclear weapons countries. In particular facilities which can produce almost pure fissile materials, 235U and 239Pu, are considered. The possibility of nuclear terrorists have often been discussed in the media. However, it seems very unlikely that even a major terrorist or mafia organization will be able to solve all the weapons design problems, even if they could steal the fissile material. It is finally discussed what can be done to reduce the risk of further nuclear proliferation. Political pressure can be brought to bear on countries outside the NPT to join it, but it can be counter-productive, and sometimes the countries that are able to exert such pressure, are not willing to do so for other political reasons. The problem of countries which are party to the NPT, but which are believed to acquire nuclear weapons capability in violation of the treaty, can be countered by unannounced inspections of non-declared facilities. However, such inspections can only be meaningfully performed if the necessary intelligence is available. (EG)

  20. Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Stephen J. Cimbala

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia threatens nuclear deterrence and crisis stability in the region and o!ers unique challenges to United States and allied security. The article contrasts two possible futures for nuclear Asia: a relatively more constrained proliferation regime with tiered levels of agreed deployment ceilings among states; and an unconstrained nuclear arms race in Asia. Not only regional tensions, but also the overlap between regional and global antagonisms and ambitions might upset nuclear deterrence stability in Asia.

  1. The monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Garwin, Richard L., E-mail: RLG2@us.ibm.com [IBM Fellow Emeritus, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center, P.O. Box 218, Yorktown Heights, NY 10598 (United States)

    2014-05-09

    This paper partially reviews and updates the potential for monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons, including verification of their destruction. Cooperative monitoring with templates of the gamma-ray spectrum are an important tool, dependent on the use of information barriers.

  2. Europium-155 in Debris from Nuclear Weapons

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Aarkrog, Asker; Lippert, Jørgen Emil

    1967-01-01

    The lithium-drifted germanium detector enables determination of europium-155 on a routine basis in environmental samples contaminated with debris from nuclear weapons. From measurements of europium-155, cesium-144, and strontium-90 in air filters collected between 1961 and 1966, the yield of...

  3. Europium-155 in Debris from Nuclear Weapons

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Aarkrog, Asker; Lippert, Jørgen Emil

    1967-01-01

    The lithium-drifted germanium detector enables determination of europium-155 on a routine basis in environmental samples contaminated with debris from nuclear weapons. From measurements of europium-155, cesium-144, and strontium-90 in air filters collected between 1961 and 1966, the yield...

  4. Managing nuclear weapons in the United States

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miller, G.

    1993-03-16

    This report discusses the management and security of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war United States. The definition of what constitutes security is clearly changing in the US. It is now a much more integrated view that includes defense and the economy. The author tries to bring some semblance of order to these themes in this brief adaptation of a presentation.

  5. On the reduction of nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Bacher, Robert F.

    1981-01-01

    The United States, in 1946, proposed that an international authority be formed to control the dangerous parts of atomic energy. The proposal met with very little success, except to lead to the conclusion that there was no apparent reason why it was not technically feasible. Discussions on nuclear weapons testing, initiated in 1958, reached some agreement on test restrictions in Subsequent years.

  6. Is there any future for nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons occupy a paradoxal place both in the collective imagination and in the historical reality: on the one hand everybody dreads the apocalypse horror, and on the other hand, dissuasion appears as an unchanging and quite comfortable situation. However, the world has become multipolar in this domain as well. The geopolitical map is reconstructing. Doctrinal revisions, initiatives against nuclear weapons proliferation, and nuclear disarmament measures are now on the agenda. The best foreign and French experts examine for the first time the consequences of these evolutions. They analyse in particular the split up risks and the potential consequences of a nuclear conflict in regions where atomic arms have become a key-component of the strategic landscape: Middle-Est, Far-East, Southern Asia. The choices France and its allies will have to face are examined as well. (J.S.)

  7. Manhattan project II: Abolishing nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Most people seem to think that the era of nuclear danger is over, that it ended along with the Cold War. Whatever residual problems remain in terms of proliferation or possible terrorism, they believe, are being dealt urgently and adequately by their national leaders. Unfortunately, they are wrong on both counts. Although the risk of nuclear war between the NATO and former Warsaw Pact powers has virtually vanished, the chance that some nuclear weapons will kill many people, may be higher than before. The elimination of nuclear weapons, meaning rejection of terrorism, must be accomplished by multilateral collaboration. To recover fundamental moral bearings, as well as to preserve life and civilization, the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, India and Pakistan must cease to be terrorist states

  8. Factors influencing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Although predicting that there will be more nuclear weapons in the future is safe enough, predicting how many more countries over what period of time, which ones under what circumstances, and how much more of what kind of nuclear-weapons capability for each is more difficult. Predicting what effect more will have is a related question that is even more difficult. This chapter identifies some of the factors that will determine the answers: including the supply policies of nuclear-exporting counties, the international nuclear-fuel cycle, superpower security policies, the health of the non-proliferation regime, cataclysmic events and international reaction, and preventive and preemptive strikes. The author concludes that more proliferation will only be better if we accept the greater probability of catastrophic wars in exchange for less frequent conventional conflicts, but he tempers this with the observation that the policies of governments can influence the course of proliferation

  9. To make a national based historical survey of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Experiences from the example of Sweden

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    procedures. 3. A description and analysis of the nuclear-related materials and activities since 1945 (this is especially important when the state in question has had extended plans to acquire nuclear weapons capability, as in the case of Sweden). This part of the project lists the international inspections of nuclear materials and reactor facilities in the specific State (an important aim is to show how the early inspection routines were designed, and how it was developed later on, especially in the sense of co-operation with other States and the Agency). Questions like the following have to be answered: How were the plans intended to be worked out in theory and practice? Who were involved in the programmes/projects and what sorts of experiments were carried out? Where were the laboratories located, which and how much nuclear-related material was used and how did the decommissioning of the activities take part? Are there any materials or facilities left over from the programmes/experiments? In addition to this task, there is another important enumeration to be made: i. e. the national archives (and perhaps foreign archives as well) that comprise documentation related to both civil and military nuclear energy activities. An important aim is to show what each archive contains, especially about nuclear materials, facilities and equipment that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. It is also important to investigate whether the archives in question are available for the public and/or researchers. 4. An estimation of a State's capability to produce nuclear weapons? Several models can, of course, be practicable in terms of evaluating a certain State 's latent capability to produce nuclear weapons. In the survey of the Swedish nuclear activities, a model from the American political scientist Stephen M Meyer's The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation was used. (author)

  10. Nuclear weapons, a danger for our world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is about an exhibition about the danger of the increasing amount of nuclear-weapons and was presented in the occasion of the second special meeting of the UN General Assembly (1982). This report describes the causes of a nuclear-war and analyses the causes of the bomb-drop of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as possible causes of a bombing of New York City and long-term-consequences of nuclear radiation. Furthermore it lists problems with a higher priority than the armament of nuclear-arms. (kancsar)

  11. The future of nuclear weapons in Europe workshop summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A summary is presented of a workshop that addressed the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. The workshop topics included the evolving European security environment; the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and nuclear weapons; the United States, NATO, and nuclear weapons; and Western Europe and nuclear weapons. The workshop, held at Los Alamos July 26, 1991, was sponsored by the Center for National Security Studies of the Los Alamos National Laboratory

  12. The Belgium debate on tactical nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This publication proposes a discussion about the opinions and positions of the various Belgium political actors and authorities regarding nuclear weapons. After a synthesis of several interviews with different actors, the author analyses the debate content, and more precisely the positions of peace movements, of the government, and of political parties. Several documents are proposed in appendix: a presentation of the evolution on Belgium nuclear missions, a government's answer to parliamentary resolutions regarding non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and a working paper submitted by Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands in the perspective of the 2005 Conference of Parties on the Non-Proliferation Treaty

  13. Nuclear obligations: Nuremberg law, nuclear weapons, and protest

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Burroughs, J.R.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear weapons use and deployment and nonviolent anti-nuclear protests are evaluated. Use of nuclear weapons would constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in both the Nuremberg Charter and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and applied by the International Military Tribunal and other Nuremberg courts. Strategic and atomic bombing during World War 2 did not set a precedent for use of nuclear weapons. The consequentialist argument for World War 2 bombing fails and the bombing has also been repudiated by codification of the law of war in Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The legality of deploying nuclear weapons as instruments of geopolitical policy is questionable when measured against the Nuremberg proscription of planning and preparation of aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and the United Nations Charter's proscription of aggressive threat of force. While states' practice of deploying the weapons and the arms-control treaties that regulate but do not prohibit mere possession provide some support for legality, those treaties recognize the imperative of preventing nuclear war, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits nuclear-armed states to good-faith negotiation of nuclear disarmament.

  14. Nuclear obligations: Nuremberg law, nuclear weapons, and protest

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons use and deployment and nonviolent anti-nuclear protests are evaluated. Use of nuclear weapons would constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in both the Nuremberg Charter and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and applied by the International Military Tribunal and other Nuremberg courts. Strategic and atomic bombing during World War 2 did not set a precedent for use of nuclear weapons. The consequentialist argument for World War 2 bombing fails and the bombing has also been repudiated by codification of the law of war in Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The legality of deploying nuclear weapons as instruments of geopolitical policy is questionable when measured against the Nuremberg proscription of planning and preparation of aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and the United Nations Charter's proscription of aggressive threat of force. While states' practice of deploying the weapons and the arms-control treaties that regulate but do not prohibit mere possession provide some support for legality, those treaties recognize the imperative of preventing nuclear war, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits nuclear-armed states to good-faith negotiation of nuclear disarmament

  15. Nuclear weapons and NATO-Russia relations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cornwell, G.C.

    1998-12-01

    Despite the development of positive institutional arrangements such as Russian participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council, the strategic culture of Russia has not changed in any fundamental sense. Russian strategic culture has not evolved in ways that would make Russian policies compatible with those of NATO countries in the necessary economic, social, technological, and military spheres. On the domestic side, Russia has yet to establish a stable democracy and the necessary legal, judicial, and regulatory institutions for a free-market economy. Russia evidently lacks the necessary cultural traditions, including concepts of accountability and transparency, to make these adaptations in the short-term. Owing in part to its institutional shortcomings, severe socioeconomic setbacks have afflicted Russia. Russian conventional military strength has been weakened, and a concomitant reliance by the Russians on nuclear weapons as their ultimate line of defense has increased. The breakdown in the infrastructure that supports Russian early warning and surveillance systems and nuclear weapons stewardship defense, coupled with a tendency towards has exacerbated Russian anxiety and distrust toward NATO. Russia`s reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate line of defense, coupled with a tendency toward suspicion and distrust toward NATO, could lead to dangerous strategic miscalculation and nuclear catastrophe.

  16. The effects of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    At least 40% of the population of Hiroshima and 26% of that of Nagasaki were killed in the nuclear attacks. The early and late effects in these two cities and in relation to present weaponry are briefly discussed. The effects of blast, heat and initial and delayed radiation are outlined. Neutron and gamma doses as functions of slant distances for bombs of various specified yields are presented. Dose rates for fallout at various times after explosions in terms of wind velocity and various cloud formations are also outlined. In Western Europe there are only 145 cities with populations of over 200,000. It is concluded that the destruction of these cities would kill in a short time more than one third of the population of Western Europe, and in a nuclear world war, not only would a fair part of the urban population in the Northern Hemisphere be killed by fire and blast, and most of the survivors by radiation, but much of the rural population would be killed by radiation from fallout. Many millions in the Southern Hemisphere would also be killed by fallout radiation. (U.K.)

  17. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the last century, the rapid progress in science and technology enabled richer and more comfortable lives, but the other side of this double-edged sword is that science and technology have also been used to develop and improve high-tech weaponry. Due to this fact, deployed around the world are tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and detonation of only a few of them would kill some hundreds of million of people and destroy out civilization. The human race stands at a crossroad. What should be done? It is a crucially important responsibility for the Japanese government to work for peace in which there will be no fear or threat of nuclear weapons

  18. Examination of Economic Feasibility of Nuclear Weapons in the Republic of Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This observation implies that the popular view on nuclear weapons amongst Korean public is in part due to lack of knowledge about overall implications of possessing nuclear weapons. In this regard, pros and cons of nuclear weapons development need to be better characterized and understood by the public to support nuclear nonproliferation culture development. Noting lack of literature on characterizing the economics of nuclear weapons development, this study aims at performing economic feasibility analysis of nuclear weapons development in the ROK. For this purpose, an approach called Index technique based on the US experiences was applied to Korean historical data along with cost-benefit analysis and Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis. In this study, the scenario of nuclear weapons development against North Korean nuclear threat was compared with conventional weapons-based defense strategy. The comparison was based on cost benefit analysis and qualitative multi-criteria decision analysis. Results indicate that nuclear weapons development is not a desirable option. However, as this work was a rather simplistic academic exercise, further work is needed to support the outcome of the study. Outcome of these investigations would be useful for communication with the public regarding the need for nuclear weapons for national defense and to develop nuclear nonproliferation culture in the ROK

  19. Examination of Economic Feasibility of Nuclear Weapons in the Republic of Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suh, Young A; Yim, Man Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    This observation implies that the popular view on nuclear weapons amongst Korean public is in part due to lack of knowledge about overall implications of possessing nuclear weapons. In this regard, pros and cons of nuclear weapons development need to be better characterized and understood by the public to support nuclear nonproliferation culture development. Noting lack of literature on characterizing the economics of nuclear weapons development, this study aims at performing economic feasibility analysis of nuclear weapons development in the ROK. For this purpose, an approach called Index technique based on the US experiences was applied to Korean historical data along with cost-benefit analysis and Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis. In this study, the scenario of nuclear weapons development against North Korean nuclear threat was compared with conventional weapons-based defense strategy. The comparison was based on cost benefit analysis and qualitative multi-criteria decision analysis. Results indicate that nuclear weapons development is not a desirable option. However, as this work was a rather simplistic academic exercise, further work is needed to support the outcome of the study. Outcome of these investigations would be useful for communication with the public regarding the need for nuclear weapons for national defense and to develop nuclear nonproliferation culture in the ROK.

  20. Nuclear weapons: new threats, new challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    After a brief history of the Iranian nuclear crisis since 2003, the author discusses the four aspects of this crisis which make it a textbook case: a country which wants to control the whole nuclear process and therefore may reach the capacity to produce military-grade uranium (this raises the question of the relationship between nuclear energy and disarmament), the validity and efficiency of international controls is at stake, divergence may appear on the ways to have international treaties respected (different approaches between Europe and the USA), a country which is looking for nuclear weapon for matters of regional security and power (this raises the issue of a new approach to security). Then, the author describes the new nuclear threats: proliferating states, terrorist groups, and states with nuclear weapons (attitude of the USA, China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, perspective of a nuclear disarmament of Europe). He gives an overview of the current status of disarmament and of treaties (START, NPT), and discusses the opportunities to save the non proliferation treaty from collapsing in 2005

  1. Nuclear weapons in the India-Pakistan context

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This thesis deals with the possible employment of nuclear weapons in the ongoing confrontation between India and Pakistan. After reviewing the nuclear capabilities of both Indian and Pakistan and assessing their possible delivery systems, this dissertation explores the emerging picture regarding the Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrines. It is argued that, after exploring the current structure of the armed forces in both countries and after analyzing the theatres of operations, it is highly unlikely that either country seeks to employ nuclear weapons in a tactical, battlefield role. It is also argued that neither India or Pakistan is making an effort to evolve a nuclear war-fighting doctrine. Moreover, it is shown that nuclear weapons have simply led to a re-thinking of military tactics on the part of India so as to minimize the chance of a nuclear strike by limiting the aims and objectives of any Indian military action. In stark contrast, it is shown that South Asian cities present far more lucrative targets for nuclear strikes. As a result of this and the geographic and tactical limitations of South Asian battlefields, it is argued that both India and Pakistan have based their fledgling nuclear strategies around a 'city-busting' concept. The existing command and control systems in both countries are examined and found to be adequate if both countries adopt a strict 'second-strike' approach to the employment of nuclear weapons. It is further argued that nuclear weapons, while limiting the scale of any future India-Pakistan war, will not play a major role in preventing a conflict between the two countries. Rather, the basic operational parity that exists between the two countries in terms of their conventional forces is responsible for preventing the outbreak of war. The thesis also briefly explores the rationale behind the acquisition of nuclear weapons in both countries and on their basic security perceptions. The issue of confidence building measures and the

  2. Nuclear electric power and the proliferation of nuclear weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Control and elimination of the strategic nuclear weapons held by the nuclear weapon states remains the central problem in the arms control and disarmament field. Whether the proliferation of nations with nuclear weapons can be stopped is dubious. A sovereign nation will launch a nuclear weapons program if it has the motivation and resource. Motivation depends on military and political considerations. The necessary resources are economic and technological. Conditions in some sovereign states explain this issue. A survey of commercial nuclear power programs outside the USA lists 45 countries using or planning to use nuclear reactors for power generation. There are currently 112 reactors now operating outside the United States, 117 more under construction, 60 on order, and 180 planned. The U. S. as of December 1976 has 64 operating reactors, 72 under construction, 84 on order, and 8 planned. Nuclear trade and export policies are discussed. In this article, Mr. Walske says that American industry is convinced that the need for nuclear energy abroad is more urgent than in the United States; that in the long run, the breeder reactor must be developed to enable the supply of nuclear fuel to last for centuries; and that the experience of American industry abroad has convinced it that emphasis on restrictive, denial type policies will almost certainly fail--a collapse of what has been gained through the test ban treaty and the nonproliferation treaty

  3. North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Implications for future policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    , making it the only state ever to do so, and in February 2005 it declared that it possessed nuclear weapons. It attempted long-range missile launches in July 2006 and April 2009, conducted nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009, and since late 2008 has claimed status as a nuclear weapons state outside the NPT. The shortcomings and outright failures in nuclear diplomacy with the DPRK have a long lineage. Under the Agreed Framework of October 1994, the Clinton Administration bought time by freezing North Korea's plutonium production capabilities, but a comprehensive resolution of controversies that triggered the first nuclear crisis was deferred indefinitely. The Bush Administration was openly contemptuous of the arrangements negotiated under its predecessor and walked away from the Agreed Framework, but it lacked a credible fallback plan when Pyongyang resumed its plutonium-based activities. Some senior Bush Administration officials, moreover, were convinced that North Korea would wilt under pressure or even collapse outright, but the DPRK defied such expectations, and moved quickly toward an avowed weapons capability. The DPRK's long pursuit of strategic autonomy, however, remains at the center of this story, and starkly contradicts the North's claims that it is intent on a non-nuclear future. North Korea signed various agreements that, at least in theory, invalidated pursuit of nuclear weapons. These agreements included Pyongyang's assent to basic non-proliferation documents; an inter-Korean accord that entered into force in 1992; bilateral agreements with the United States; and multilateral declarations negotiated at the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in 2005 and 2007. But negotiated agreements failed to eliminate the North Korea's pursuit of the technologies and expertise necessary for a weapons program. By walking away from these agreements, Pyongyang compelled Washington and other capitals to undertake reassessments of previous policies. (author)

  4. Nuclear weapons issues in South Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Joeck, N.

    1993-07-02

    This report discusses how the US can play a productive mediating role in South Asia by engaging India and Pakistan in an international forum to manage nuclear weapons, as Edward Teller advocated. India and Pakistan have developed their nuclear capabilities because they fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten the US. The appropriate response for the US, therefore, is diplomatic engagement and negotiations. In addition to the international approach, encouragement and facilitation of regional and bilateral interactions will also be important. Formal arms control agreements have been reached, but less formal confidence-building measures, and unilateral security pledges may well be combined to form a more secure strategic environment in South Asia than a nuclear armed confrontation across the porous South Asian border.

  5. Nuclear weapons complex: What went wrong?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The nuclear weapons complex has generated significant volumes of radioactive wastes dating back to the 1940s. Such wastes included transuranic radioisotopes-for example, plutonium-generated as byproducts of the operations. Most of these wastes at the major disposal site were not classified in the same way nuclear wastes are classified today; the definitions of high- and low-level wastes have changed over time, and, in the case of the latter, different classes have been established that determine methods for disposal and handling. Waste disposal was not a high priority during World War II. After the war, however; resources were not committed to either waste-disposal research or the development of a national waste management policy. AEC's failure to develop a national policy on radioactive waste disposal is easier to understand than to excuse. The disposal problem parallels the chemical waste disposal situation, where there were no federal and few state laws regulating chemical waste disposal until 1976, following publicity about Love Canal. This same story has been repeated for radioactive and mixed wastes and facility safety at the nation's nuclear weapon sites

  6. Contributions concerning the effects of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The radiation fields resulting from the nuclear explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been re-assessed and re-evaluated, so that a new approach was possible for assessing the effects of neutrons on man, also of other than military neutron sources, but particularly the effects of neutron weapons on man and mammals. The other main topic of the contributions is protection of the population against neutron radiation environments by buildings such as shelters, or by ordinary basement rooms. There also is a glossary with terms and definitions. (DG)

  7. The real value of nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The international community has greeted the establishment of two new nuclear weapon-free zones with praise. Africa and South Asia are the regions which will join, once the respective treaties are ratified and in force, Latin America and the South Pacific to ensure that extensive areas of the earth remain free of nuclear weapons. The usual reaction to these accomplishments is to hail them as important contributions to international peace and security, and as meaningful steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon-free zones have their value but this value relates mainly to the countries within the zone. The interest of nuclear-weapon states are not really affected, or, if they are, the influence is not significant. One should bear in mind that the really important and meaningful nuclear weapon-free zones have yet to be achieved

  8. Nuclear energy in a nuclear weapon free world

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, Joseph [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    The prospect of a nuclear renaissance has revived a decades old debate over the proliferation and terrorism risks of the use of nuclear power. This debate in the last few years has taken on an added dimension with renewed attention to disarmament. Increasingly, concerns that proliferation risks may reduce the prospects for realizing the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world are being voiced.

  9. Protection of the population against radiation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The papers include: information on the physical principles of several nuclear weapons; their radiation; long term effects of nuclear test; biological effects; shelter design and construction, and the management of major nuclear events in Switzerland. (G.Q.)

  10. Report of the Canberra commission. Eliminating nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book was originally published in Australia under the title: 'Report of the Canberra commission on the elimination of nuclear weapons'. The aim of this report in to convince any reader that the elimination of nuclear weapons has become a necessary goal at the end of this century. After a summary of the political conclusions of the commission, a first part presents the debate about nuclear weapons while a second part describes the different steps that must be followed to completely eliminate the nuclear weapons worldwide. Details about verification, legal aspects and actions are given in appendixes. (J.S.)

  11. UFOs and nukes. Extraordinary encounters at nuclear weapons sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Everyone knows about the reported recovery of a crashed alien spaceship near Roswell, New Mexico in July 1947. However, most people are unaware that, at the time of the incident, Roswell Army Airfield was home to the world's only atomic bomber squadron, the 509th Bomb Group. Was this merely a coincidence? During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built thousands of the far more destructive hydrogen bombs, some of them a thousand times as destructive as the first atomic bombs dropped on Japan. If the nuclear standoff between the superpowers had erupted into World War III, human civilization - and perhaps the very survival of our species - would have been at risk. Did this ominous state of affairs come to the attention of outside observers? Was there a connection between the atomic bomber squadron based at Roswell and the reported crash of a UFO nearby? Did those who pilot the UFOs monitor the superpowers' nuclear arms race during the dangerous Cold War era? Do they scrutinize American and Russian weapons sites even now? UFOs and Nukes provides the startling and sometimes shocking answers to these questions. Veteran researcher Robert Hastings has investigated nuclear weapons-related UFO incidents for more than three decades and has interviewed more than 120 ex-US Air Force personnel, from former Airmen to retired Colonels, who witnessed extraordinary UFO encounters at nuclear weapons sites. Their amazing stories are presented here.

  12. Constraining potential nuclear-weapons proliferation from civilian reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cessation of the Cold War and renewed international attention to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are leading to national policies aimed at restraining nuclear-weapons proliferation that could occur through the nuclear-fuel cycle. Argonne, which has unique experience, technology, and capabilities, is one of the US national laboratories contributing to this nonproliferation effort

  13. Nuclear weapons and NATO operations: Doctrine, studies, and exercises

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A listing of papers is presented on the doctrine, studies, and exercises dealing with nuclear weapons and NATO operations for the period 1950-1983. The papers deal with studies on massive retaliation, sword and shield, and flexible response. Some of the enduring issues of nuclear weapons in NATO are listed

  14. Cancer in People Exposed to Nuclear Weapons Testing

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... Compensation Programs for People Exposed to Radiation as Part of Nuclear Weapons Testing Between 1945 and 1962, the United States ... involving about 200,000 people were conducted as part of many of these tests. ... several nuclear weapons plant sites were exposed to radiation and other ...

  15. Combating the terrorist use of mass destruction weapons, particularly nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The risks of mass destruction weapons vary and also forms of damages resulting therefrom. While the effects of nuclear weapons are focused, sudden and comprehensive, the chemical weapons have limited impacts relatively unless used intensively severe prejudice to the element of surprise, and thus impaired the efficacy of their influences,especially that they affect exceptionally the individuals in the area of injury and biological weapons do not announce themselves except through their effect that appears later than the time of use as they affect exceptionally the organisms in the area of injury.The mass destruction weapons have turned from being a purely military means in the early twentieth century and have now become the means of violence against governments and countries that they should prepare themselves for and respond in ways of successful and effective countermeasures. Despite the fact that the acquisition of mass destruction weapons can be considered as a priority objective, which terrorist groups and organizations steadily seek but their accessibility is flanked by a lot of difficulties. Addressing the risk of further spread of nuclear weapons, and especially after doubling the power of those high-risk weapons, the international community has an approach to take a number of arrangements that complement each other to control and resist nuclear proliferation, either for the states or for terrorist groups.

  16. Source options for nuclear weapons identification system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mihalczo, J.T.; Koehler, P.E.; Valentine, T.E.; Phillips, L.D.

    1995-07-01

    This report briefly presents the advantages and disadvantages of two timed sources of neutrons that can be used with the source-driven noise analysis method: (1) {sup 252}Cf in an ionization chamber and (2) an associated-particle sealed tube neutron generator (APSTNG). These sources can be used with frequency and time analysis methods for nuclear weapons identification, quality assurance in production, special nuclear materials assay, criticality safety, and provision of measured data for verification of neutron and gamma ray transport calculational methods. The advantages of {sup 252}Cf for a nuclear materials identification system are that it is simple, reliable, and small and that all source events are detected. The disadvantages are that it cannot be turned off, leads to small radiation doses in handling, and produces more than one neutron per fission event. The advantages of APSTNG are that it is directional, can be turned off, and has one particle per deuterium-tritium reaction. The disadvantages are that it is large and complicated compared to {sup 252}Cf.

  17. Dismantlement and destruction of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The safe destruction and dismantling of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons is of fundamental importance to the security of all countries represented in this volume. Expertise in the field is not confined to one country or organisation: all can benefit from each other. There is an ever present danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: approximately two dozen countries have ongoing programmes to develop or acquire such weapons, and many are also gaining the capability to build air-surface delivery systems. But much can be done to prevent proliferation by reducing leakage of materials and know-how and by solving the problems of the destruction of surplus weapons systems, which has now come to be a key issue. In 13 sessions of the workshop attention was paid to (1) Dismantlement and Destruction of Chemical, Nuclear and Conventional Weapons; (2) Status of Implementation of Arms Control Treaties and Voluntary Commitments; (3) National Perspectives on Cooperation in Disarmament; (4) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Chemical Weapons; (5) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Nuclear Weapons; (6) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Conventional Weapons. Session; (7) Experience with Currently Employed Chemical Destruction Technologies; (8) Alternative Chemical Destruction Technologies; (9) Deactivation, Dismantlement and Destruction of Delivery Systems and Infrastructure for Nuclear Weapons; (10) Storage, Safeguarding and Disposition of Fissile Materials; (11) Technologies for Conversion and Civil Use of Demilitarized Materials; (12) International Organizations; and (13) Environmental Challenges Posed by Chemical and Nuclear Disarmament

  18. DOE Nuclear Weapon Reliability Definition: History, Description, and Implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wright, D.L.; Cashen, J.J.; Sjulin, J.M.; Bierbaum, R.L.; Kerschen, T.J.

    1999-04-01

    The overarching goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapon reliability assessment process is to provide a quantitative metric that reflects the ability of the weapons to perform their intended function successfully. This white paper is intended to provide insight into the current and long-standing DOE definition of nuclear weapon reliability, which can be summarized as: The probability of achieving the specified yield, at the target, across the Stockpile-To-Target Sequence of environments, throughout the weapon's lifetime, assuming proper inputs.

  19. Is a nuclear weapon-free world desirable?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this article, the author shows that a nuclear weapon-free world would probably be more dangerous than today's world because benefits of the existence of nuclear weapons are probably more important that the risks related to their existence. He outlines that nuclear deterrence has been very efficient for these last 65 years. He states that the disappearance of nuclear weapons could be envisaged only after a large transformation of safety conditions, but that such transformations are actually not at all under way. It would indeed require peaceful and democratic world governance

  20. The Problem Of Prohibition On The Use Of Nuclear Weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Ayse Nur Tutuncu

    2004-01-01

    As a result of United States’bombing of two Japanese cities in 1945, the Soviet Union, by setting fire of a weapon competition, became the second State which has developed nuclear weapons and has global interest in the nuclear division. The general nuclear weapons are not the only risk. The September 11th incident has been increased concerns about the world’s nuclear power stations and means that could be target of the terrorists. After the Second World War, an increasing trend of prolife...

  1. Nuclear deterrence in second tier nuclear weapon states: a case study of India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear deterrence today anchors the national security of all states that possess nuclear weapons. Certain principles or requirements of nuclear deterrence are the same for all such countries. For instance, the ability to threaten with unacceptable damage, or the ability to raise the costs of an action that an adversary might want to take by threatening punishment that would make the act seem meaningless and even regrettable. But must every nuclear nation indulge in an exercise of large-scale warhead accumulation or yield refinements through nuclear testing, or creation of elaborate nuclear war fighting plans in order to claim credible deterrence? Can the practice of deterrence in the second tier states follow a different course? The study examines the manner in which India is engaged in constructing a credible and stable deterrence relationship with two of its nuclear armed adversaries, Pakistan and China with an arsenal much smaller, and command and control structures far simpler than in any of the P-5 nations. Does this difference impact the nature of its nuclear deterrence? In its efforts at creating and sustaining credible nuclear deterrence should India necessarily be expected to follow the same path and rules as those of the P-5? Would it be compelled to build hundreds of warheads and a huge weapons infrastructure? Would a deterrence based on anything less not be credible or stable? The study concludes that even countries with small nuclear arsenals behave no differently from states that possess several thousands of such weapons. The assumption that small nuclear arsenals and rudimentary command and control lend themselves to temptations of easy nuclear use is misplaced. Credible nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan or India and China would hold on the same bases it has held elsewhere - fear of nuclear destruction, imposition of unacceptable damage, and the ability to rationally calculate and weigh the benefits against the costs of use of nuclear

  2. For a convention for nuclear weapon elimination; Pour une convention d'elimination des armes nucleaires

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2008-03-15

    This document contains two texts linked with the project of an international convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons (the text of this project has been sent to the UN General Secretary and is part of an international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, ICAN). These two texts are contributions presented in London at the Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-free World. The first one calls into question the deterrence principle and the idea of a nuclear weapon-based security. It calls for different forms of action to promote a nuclear weapon-free world. The second text stresses the role and the responsibility of states with nuclear weapons in nuclear disarmament and in the reinforcement of the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT)

  3. Japan's nuclear weapons options and U.S. Security interests

    OpenAIRE

    Sharman, Christopher H.

    1998-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Japan is a virtual nuclear weapons power. It has the scientific and technical ability to produce hundreds or even thousands of nuclear weapons, but has chosen not to do so for political reasons. This thesis examines the historical development of Japan's nuclear energy and aerospace programs since the mid-1950s and considers the possibility that at various points in its history, Japan used these programs as a cover to insure that its nu...

  4. Can we stop the spread of nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In his address to the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, IAEA Director General Hans Blix reviewed the world's non-proliferation regime and the role of IAEA safeguards in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. He emphasized that the first and fundamental barrier to proliferation is the political will and determination of individual States not to acquire nuclear weapons, other barriers being legal obligations under treaties or agreements and the acceptance of safeguards inspections to verify peaceful uses of nuclear facilities

  5. The immediate need for US universities to promote research related to a nuclear-weapon-free world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    If disarmament is a goal, then the requisite skills must be fostered in academic research. Too many students today view nuclear weapons as a non-issue. It is crucial that those people in positions of influence encourage more young people to explore in-depth the political, scientific, and social changes that a nuclear-weapon-free world will require. The data presented are based on a search of nuclear-weapons-related keywords in the UMI Dissertation Abstracts Database which includes work from over 1000 North American graduate schools and European Universities. The search was focused on US Phd dissertations between 1987 and 1996. There was no PhDs focused on issues such as: zero-level nuclear-weapons-free world; nuclear-weapons-free zones; decreasing nuclear alert status; a nuclear weapons convention; no-first-use or-no use against non-nuclear-weapons-states; START; French nuclear weapons; a possible 'Eurobomb'; peace groups outside the USA, UK, and Germany; nuclear-weapons secrecy; funding disarmament; the role od UN in a nuclear-weapons-free world; an so on

  6. Nuclear weapons tests detectable worldwide by means of seismographic recording

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The site and intensity of nuclear weapons tests can be reliably determined by measurement and suitable interpretation of seismic waves. A seismic focus is up to 20 times larger than the destruction zone of a comparably strong explosion, so that a seismic event will last longer by one order of magnitude than an explosion. Nuclear weapons tests induce much more high-frequency vibrations than a seismic event, and a seismic event normally proceeds in a series of subsequent shocks. Diaphragms applied in the range 10 to 30 Hz considerably improve the signal-to-noise ratio of systems for the detection of nuclear weapons tests. (orig./DG)

  7. How to Make Historical Surveys of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonter, Thomas [Stockholm Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Economic History

    2003-05-01

    In 1998 SKI initiated a project in order to make a historical survey of the Swedish nuclear weapons research during the period 1945-2000. The survey is now fulfilled and contains of three reports. IAEA became interested in the project and accepted it in 2000 as a support program to increase transparency and to support the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Sweden. In the eyes of IAEA, the most important aim is to create knowledge and refine tools to enhance the means to strengthen the Safeguard System within the Additional Protocol. Other countries have now showed interest to follow the Swedish example and to make their own reviews of the nuclear energy and nuclear weapons research of their pasts. A co-operation between Sweden, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania and Latvia has now been initiated in order to make such historical reviews. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate is the initiator and financial supporter of the project. The cooperation project has three comprehensive goals: a. to create transparency in the nuclear energy field of the past. The intention is that the results of the conducted studies could be attached to the State Declaration according to the Additional Protocol in order to enhance transparency b. to account for the nuclear material traffic of the past and; c. to develop the competence in nuclear energy matters in general, and in particular, to extend the knowledge regarding each participating State's nuclear experience in the past. The first purpose of this paper is to describe the project and its aims. The second purpose is to present a general model of how a historical review of a State's nuclear related activities and nuclear weapons research can be designed. The model has been created in order to serve as a guide for other countries strengthening of their safeguards systems in the framework of the Additional Protocol. The third purpose is to present the pedagogy that has been used as a teaching method in order to train

  8. How to Make Historical Surveys of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1998 SKI initiated a project in order to make a historical survey of the Swedish nuclear weapons research during the period 1945-2000. The survey is now fulfilled and contains of three reports. IAEA became interested in the project and accepted it in 2000 as a support program to increase transparency and to support the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Sweden. In the eyes of IAEA, the most important aim is to create knowledge and refine tools to enhance the means to strengthen the Safeguard System within the Additional Protocol. Other countries have now showed interest to follow the Swedish example and to make their own reviews of the nuclear energy and nuclear weapons research of their pasts. A co-operation between Sweden, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania and Latvia has now been initiated in order to make such historical reviews. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate is the initiator and financial supporter of the project. The cooperation project has three comprehensive goals: a. to create transparency in the nuclear energy field of the past. The intention is that the results of the conducted studies could be attached to the State Declaration according to the Additional Protocol in order to enhance transparency b. to account for the nuclear material traffic of the past and; c. to develop the competence in nuclear energy matters in general, and in particular, to extend the knowledge regarding each participating State's nuclear experience in the past. The first purpose of this paper is to describe the project and its aims. The second purpose is to present a general model of how a historical review of a State's nuclear related activities and nuclear weapons research can be designed. The model has been created in order to serve as a guide for other countries strengthening of their safeguards systems in the framework of the Additional Protocol. The third purpose is to present the pedagogy that has been used as a teaching method in order to train researchers

  9. Nuclear weapons and nuclear power stations: what is the connection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From the start of the nuclear age with the dropping of two atom bombs on Japan in 1945 it has been known that this new source of primary energy could be exploited for weapons or for replacing coal or oil in electricity-generating stations. Nuclear energy is made from two elements: naturally occurring uranium and man-made plutonium. Their processing differs according to the intended end-use. Great efforts have been and still are made to disguise the close connection between nuclear energy for war and for power stations. Two reasons are suggested for this: political conveniences in avoiding additional informed protests against nuclear weapon production and industrial convenience in carrying on without public protest what has become a very profitable industry. It is argued that medical doctors, because of their professional prestige, can speak and be listened to on the risks of continuing to exploit this newly discovered form of energy. Furthermore, this industry is uniquely hazardous to the health of its workers, to the public generally and possibly to the procreation and genetic health of future generations. (author)

  10. Perfection and the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Teleology, and Motives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brummett, Barry

    1989-01-01

    Uses Kenneth Burke's theory of perfection to explore the vocabularies of nuclear weapons in United States public discourse and how "the Bomb" as a God term has gained imbalanced ascendancy in centers of power. (MS)

  11. Nuclear Weapons Tests and Environmental Consequences: A Global Perspective

    OpenAIRE

    Prăvălie, Remus

    2014-01-01

    The beginning of the atomic age marked the outset of nuclear weapons testing, which is responsible for the radioactive contamination of a large number of sites worldwide. The paper aims to analyze nuclear weapons tests conducted in the second half of the twentieth century, highlighting the impact of radioactive pollution on the atmospheric, aquatic, and underground environments. Special attention was given to the concentration of main radioactive isotopes which were released, such as 14C, 137...

  12. A legal framework for a nuclear weapon convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The political possibility of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world has, since the Gulf War, at last come into view. This is mainly because serious numbers of the people from the national security establishment in the USA (a country that no longer has a rival to race against) have concluded that the elimination of nuclear weapons would best serve the country's interests. The crucial requirement for a nuclear-weapon-free world is a firm and serious policy by the main nuclear weapon states to achieve the goal of elimination. This political commitment must be backed by agreed (and inviolable) procedures for continually establishing new targets and deadlines, which drive the process relentlessly towards that ultimate objective, to be achieved at the earliest possible time. These words were incorporated into the final paragraph of the 1996 'Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons'. Even before the Canberra Commission was established, the Pugwash Council had proposed that the General Assembly of the United Nations should ask the Conference on Disarmament to initiate a study on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons. This paper considers some of the major aspects of such an instrument

  13. North Korea has the means to develop a nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For a long time already, North Korea has been developing technology that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon. Progress of the nuclear weapons programme has been monitored by means of satellites, and proof of the programme has been obtained, for instance, from a diplomat who defected and when unauthorized exports have been revealed. Led by the United States, the international community has wanted to bring the nuclear weapons programme to an end, but the exceptional negotiating skills of North Korean representatives and sudden turns of events have made the task the difficult one. North Korea has been threatened with economic sanctions, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has decided to cease all technical assistance to North Korea. North Korea could hardly benefit from the use of a nuclear weapon: instead, giving up the programme might help the country economically. The death of the country's dictatorial leader Kim Il Sung seems to have increased the willingness to give up the programme. However, not the slightest information has yet been received as to the destiny of the plutonium already produced. In the end, North Korea may not be required to cancel the entire nuclear weapons programme; freezing the programme may be enough. Thus there would eventually be silent approval of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. (orig.)

  14. Nuclear Weapons, Non-proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

    OpenAIRE

    Arundhati Ghose

    2009-01-01

    The nuclear issue has so far been handled in a compartmentalised form; India’s weapons programme has been so shrouded in secrecy that speculation and uninformed assertions are frequently taken as reflecting policy. At the same time, India’s articulation of her policy priorities were ambiguous at best, till fairly recently. Most challenging has been the break-down of the domestic consensus in Parliament on this vital security issue of India. There are some signs that there is greater coord...

  15. 2002-2003 Engineering Accomplishments: Unconventional Nuclear Weapons Detection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, DTRA, is a federal agency charged with safeguarding the nation from weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons such as crude devices, and radiological dispersal devices (RDD), also known as dirty bombs. Both of which could be delivered using unconventional means such as by transporting them by a car or boat. Two years ago DTRA partnered with NNSA to evaluate commercially available technologies that could be deployed quickly to defend against threats posed by unconventional nuclear weapons under a program called the Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense (UNWD) Program. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was one of several National laboratories that participated in this program, which consisted in developing, deploying, and demonstrating detection systems suitable for military base protection. Two key contributions to this program by the LLNL team were the development of two Radiation Detection Buoys (RDB) deployed at Naval Base in Kings Bay in Georgia, and the Detection and Tracking System (DTS) demonstrated at Fort Leonard Wood Missouri, headquarters for the Total Force's Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN). The RDB's were designed to detect the potential transportation of an unconventional nuclear or radiological weapon by a boat. The RDB's consisted of two commercial marine buoys instrumented with several types of detectors sensitive to gamma rays and neutrons, two key modes of energy emitted by radioactive materials. The engineering team selected a standard marine buoy as the overall system platform for this deployment since buoys are already designed to sustain the harsh marine environment, and also for their covertness, since once deployed, they look just like any other buoy on the water. Since this was the first time such a system was ever deployed, the team choose to instrument the buoys with a suite of different types of detectors with the goal to learn which detectors would be best suited for

  16. Virtual enterprise model for the electronic components business in the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ferguson, T.J.; Long, K.S.; Sayre, J.A. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hull, A.L. [Sandia National Labs., Livermore, CA (United States); Carey, D.A.; Sim, J.R.; Smith, M.G. [Allied-Signal Aerospace Co., Kansas City, MO (United States). Kansas City Div.

    1994-08-01

    The electronic components business within the Nuclear Weapons Complex spans organizational and Department of Energy contractor boundaries. An assessment of the current processes indicates a need for fundamentally changing the way electronic components are developed, procured, and manufactured. A model is provided based on a virtual enterprise that recognizes distinctive competencies within the Nuclear Weapons Complex and at the vendors. The model incorporates changes that reduce component delivery cycle time and improve cost effectiveness while delivering components of the appropriate quality.

  17. The role of nuclear weapons in the year 2000

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-01-01

    This publication presents the proceedings for the workshop, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Year 2000, held on October 22--24, 1990. The workshop participants considered the changing nature of deterrence and of our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, the impact of nuclear proliferation on regional conflicts, and ways that the nuclear forces might be restructured to reflect new political circumstances.

  18. Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper examines international treaties in relation to the threat or use of nuclear weapons including the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It can be concluded that the effect of the aforesaid international treaties is still in doubt without explicit enforcement mechanisms and penalty for non-compliance. This paper also reviews the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and comments that a clear explanation on the legality of use of nuclear weapons in 'extreme circumstances of self-defence' is required. Examples from current state practice in relation to nuclear non-proliferation efforts are also provided, with special attention to China, North Korea and Iran. This paper suggests that China as a leader of developing countries should extend its efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and conduct communication between North Korea and Iran and other nuclear weapons states to reduce or prohibit nuclear weapons.

  19. Nuclear weapon states: Their roles, responsibilities and management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Four issues concerning the role of nuclear-weapon sates are briefly analyzed. The first is related to the importance of responsibilities that nuclear weapon states should take in order to improve the existing mechanisms for non-proliferation. Nuclear weapon states should cease further nuclear armament immediately and should unanimously agree to implement a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is both legal and moral obligation stipulated in the Non-proliferation Treaty. Second, an international plutonium management system needs to be established. The third issue is related to the need for IAEA special inspections (problem of North Korea). Difficulties could be overcome by strengthening the IAEA negotiation powers. Fourth, the IAEA and the international community could indicate their appreciation to states like South Korea that voluntarily abandon nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment in order to contribute to regional and global peace and stability

  20. Why are U.S. nuclear weapon modernization efforts controversial?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Acton, James

    2016-03-01

    U.S. nuclear weapon modernization programs are focused on extending the lives of existing warheads and developing new delivery vehicles to replace ageing bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. These efforts are contested and controversial. Some critics argue that they are largely unnecessary, financially wasteful and potentially destabilizing. Other critics posit that they do not go far enough and that nuclear weapons with new military capabilities are required. At its core, this debate centers on three strategic questions. First, what roles should nuclear weapons be assigned? Second, what military capabilities do nuclear weapons need to fulfill these roles? Third, how severe are the unintended escalation risks associated with particular systems? Proponents of scaled-down modernization efforts generally argue for reducing the role of nuclear weapons but also that, even under existing policy, new military capabilities are not required. They also tend to stress the escalation risks of new--and even some existing--capabilities. Proponents of enhanced modernization efforts tend to advocate for a more expansive role for nuclear weapons in national security strategy. They also often argue that nuclear deterrence would be enhanced by lower yield weapons and/or so called bunker busters able to destroy more deeply buried targets. The debate is further fueled by technical disagreements over many aspects of ongoing and proposed modernization efforts. Some of these disagreements--such as the need for warhead life extension programs and their necessary scope--are essentially impossible to resolve at the unclassified level. By contrast, unclassified analysis can help elucidate--though not answer--other questions, such as the potential value of bunker busters.

  1. Solid Phase Microextraction for the Analysis of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chambers, D M

    2001-06-01

    This document is a compendium of answers to commonly asked questions about solid phase microextraction as it relates to the analysis of nuclear weapons. We have also included a glossary of terms associated with this analytical method as well as pertinent weapons engineering terminology. Microextraction is a new collection technique being developed to nonintrusively sample chemicals from weapon headspace gases for subsequent analysis. The chemicals that are being targeted outgas from the high explosives and other organic materials used in the weapon assembly. This technique is therefore a valuable tool to: (1) remotely detect and assess the aging of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and, in some cases, Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) organic materials; and (2) identify potential compatibility issues (i.e., materials interactions) that should be more carefully monitored during surveillance tear-downs. Microextraction is particularly attractive because of the practical constraints inherent to the weapon surveillance procedure. To remain transparent to other core surveillance activities and fall within nuclear safety guidelines, headspace analysis of the weapons requires a procedure that: (1) maintains ambient temperature conditions; (2) allows practical collection times of less than 20 min; (3) maintains the integrity of the weapon gas volume; (4) provides reproducible and quantitative results; and (5) can identify all possible targets.

  2. The future of nuclear weapons: Proliferation in South Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kamal, N. [Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabada (Pakistan)

    1992-12-31

    The signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987, followed by the dramatic changes in East-West relations since 1989 and the more recent Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreement, have greatly eased public concerns about the danger of nuclear war. The context has also changed for the Nonaligned Movement, which had made nuclear disarmament and condemnation of the concept of nuclear deterrence the primary themes of its multilateral disarmament diplomacy. More important would be the interrelationship among the states possessing nuclear weapons (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). In any case, there is little risk of a revival of nuclear competition. Both France and China have decided to sign the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); they are the only two nuclear-weapon states that have stayed outside the regime. Meanwhile, Brazil and Argentina have moved further down the nonproliferation road by engaging in confidence-building measures and moving closer to joining the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free zone established under the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967. South Africa has also agreed to embrace the NPT as well as a nuclear-weapons-free zone regime for the entire African continent, while North Korea has agreed to sign a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thereby allowing in principle international inspection of its nuclear facilities. In the third world regions, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and competitive nuclear buildup are most pronounced in South Asia, a region where a variety of complicating problems exist: acute threat perceptions, historical emity, religious and sectarian animosity, ethnic antagonism, territorial disputes, ambitions for regional dominance, and domestic political instability. This chapter will focus primarily on South Asia, although references will also be made to other regions, where relevant. 17 refs.

  3. Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jenkins-Smith, H.C.; Herron, K.G. [Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States). Institute for Public Policy; Barke, R.P. [Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA (United States). School of Public Policy

    1994-04-01

    This report summarizes the findings of a nationwide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories. A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-cold war security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust and official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons; (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons, and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4) preventing nuclear terrorism. Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-cold war security environment.

  4. The long shadow: nuclear weapons and security in 21st century Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The topics discussed in this book are: historical, strategic and conceptual perspectives; national nuclear policies and strategies; nuclear weapon states; aspirant states and non state actors; allies of nuclear weapon states and southeast Asia

  5. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1992-12-31

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL`s Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents.

  6. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL's Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents

  7. The use of neutron scattering in nuclear weapons research

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Juzaitis, R.J. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1995-10-01

    We had a weapons science breakout session last week. Although it would have been better to hold it closer in time to this workshop, I think that it was very valuable. it may have been less of a {open_quotes}short-sleeve{close_quotes} workshop environment than we would have liked, but as the first time two communities-the weapons community and the neutron scattering community- got together, it was a wonderful opportunity to transfer information during the 24 presentations that were made. This report contains discussions on the fundamental analysis of documentation of the enduring stockpile; LANSCE`s contribution to weapons; spallation is critical to understanding; weapons safety assessments; applied nuclear physics requires cross section information; fission models need refinement; and establishing teams on collaborative projects.

  8. Thermal radiation from a nuclear weapon burst

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The different methods and correlations used to calculate the propagation of thermal radiation are reviewed and compared. A simple method to account for radiation enhancement by reflection from a superior cloud deck or snow cover, as well as attenuation of radiation by cloud cover below the burst is presented. The results show that the thermal reach may vary considerably. Additional calculation show that a significant fraction of the thermal energy may be incident after the arrival of the shock wave. Results for a range of weapon yields are presented, and the implications for blast-induced (secondary) fire starts are discussed

  9. The year of the non-nuclear weapon States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ending what was described as 'The year of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States', the thirteenth session of the Agency's General Conference demonstrated that opinions among Member States are converging on some important problems. These include the review of the Statute to enlarge the Board of Governors, the possibility of using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, effects of the Non- Proliferation Treaty and the urgency of increasing resources for financing nuclear development. (author)

  10. Hitler's bomb: the secret story of Germans' attempts to get the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this historical book, the author claims to have evidence concerning the development and testing of a possible 'nuclear weapon' by Nazi Germany in 1945. The 'weapon' in question is not alleged to be a standard nuclear weapon powered by nuclear fission, but something closer to either a radiological weapon (a so-called 'dirty bomb') or a hybrid-nuclear fusion weapon. Its new evidence is concerned primarily with the parts of the German nuclear energy project (an attempted clandestine scientific effort led by Germany to develop and produce atomic weapons during World War II) under Kurt Diebner, a German nuclear physicist who directed and administrated the project

  11. Your Career and Nuclear Weapons: A Guide for Young Scientists and Engineers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Albrecht, Andreas; And Others

    This four-part booklet examines various issues related to nuclear weapons and how they will affect an individual working as a scientist or engineer. It provides information about the history of nuclear weapons, about the weapons industry which produces them, and about new weapons programs. Issues are raised so that new or future graduates may make…

  12. Nuclear weapons proliferation as a world order problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    World-order concerns have intensified recently in light of mounting evidence that a weapons capability will soon be within easy reach of more and more governments and of certain nongovernmental groupings as well. One reliable source estimates that by 1985 as many as fifty countries could ''produce enough plutonium each year for at least several dozen nuclear explosives.'' In an even more immediate sense, ''economic competition among nuclear suppliers today could soon lead to a world in which twenty or more nations are but a few months from a nuclear weapons force.'' Three developments have created this ''world order'' sense of concern: (1) increased pace of civilian nuclear power deployment globally as a consequence of rising oil prices, unreliability of oil supplies, and reality of dwindling oil reserves in any case; (2) actuality of India's nuclear explosion in May 1974 which demonstrated vividly how any state that pursues a ''civilian'' program can also develop its own weapons capability; and (3) the intensification of competition for international nuclear sales which makes it increasingly evident that nonproliferation goals are no longer compatible with the pursuit of national commercial advantage; essentially, this reality has emerged from a break in the American monopoly over civilian nuclear technology and the willingness of French and German suppliers to provide all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing facilities,to any nation that feels it can afford to buy them; the German-Brazilian deal (worth at least $4 billion) has proven to be the equivalent in the commercial realm of India's ''peaceful'' nuclear explosion. Such developments disclose the alarming prospect that easier access to nuclear technology will make it relatively simple and thus more likely for a beleaguered government or a desperate political actor of any sort to acquire and possibly use nuclear weapons

  13. Proliferation: does the peaceful use of nuclear energy have to lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The question of whether the proliferation of nuclear weapons is promoted by an increasing use of peaceful nuclear energy can be answered with a well-founded no. Even a regional renouncing of the peaceful use of nuclear energy would not reduce the worldwide problem of nuclear weapons' proliferation. Therefore, joint efforts must be aimed at promoting trust between peoples in the nuclear sphere and the political reasons for the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be reduced in order also to promote international harmony

  14. Brief history of the nuclear weapon - Between proliferation and disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the hardest times of the Cold War, like in October 1962 with the Cuba crisis, the World lived in the fear of a nuclear confrontation between the USA and the USSR. If this time seems far away now, the risks of a nuclear conflict are probably greater today because no serious progress has bee done during the last ten years and because, from now on, nine, and maybe ten states possess nuclear weapons. In April 2009, US President Barack Obama, gave a talk in Prague (Czech Republic) in which he stressed again on the enormous risks that this situation was running on humanity and urged the world to get rid of nuclear weapons. The aim of this book is to present the main steps of this process, which started in the 1960's, and the arguments which justify its necessity. (J.S.)

  15. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the statement of the Director General of the IAEA to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 24 April 2000. The speech focus on the IAEA activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty, namely: verification through the IAEA safeguards, peaceful nuclear co-operation in the field of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental pollution monitoring, training

  16. Nuclear myths and social discourse: the U.S. decision to pursue nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Williams, David L.

    1996-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Why do countries want nuclear weapons? This question has plagued non- proliferation and U.S. intelligence experts since the beginning of the nuclear era. Motivations for nuclear weapons typically are viewed as the product of external variables (perceived insecurity, prestige, etc.). This thesis asserts that a different level of analysis is appropriate. It is a society's beliefs about nuclear technology that at least partially explains ...

  17. Environmental Restoration Strategic Plan. Remediating the nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    With the end of the cold war, the US has a reduced need for nuclear weapons production. In response, the Department of Energy has redirected resources from weapons production to weapons dismantlement and environmental remediation. To this end, in November 1989, the US Department of Energy (DOE) established the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (renamed the Office of Environmental Management in 1994). It was created to bring under a central authority the management of radioactive and hazardous wastes at DOE sites and inactive or shut down facilities. The Environmental Restoration Program, a major component of DOE's Environmental Management Program, is responsible for the remediation and management of contaminated environmental media (e.g., soil, groundwater, sediments) and the decommissioning of facilities and structures at 130 sites in over 30 states and territories

  18. You've asked us about nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Judging from its name alone, the Atomic Energy Control Board would seem a logical place to get information on nuclear weapons. If we are involved in the control of atomic energy, we must know something about its military uses. In actual fact, however, our regulatory activities are restricted to the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and our safeguards - an international audit system to discourage the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment from peaceful applications to the production of explosive devices. Not being the best source of information on the subject of weapons, we have prepared this fact sheet to assist your research. Simply look for the topic heading that interests you, to find out where to go for more information. The publications listed under the various headings are available to the public free of charge, upon request. A bibliography of books and periodicals is also attached for your reference

  19. On the danger for nuclear non-proliferation from appearance of a specialist in the nuclear weapon devices in the non-nuclear weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Results of an investigation related to determining the minimal requirements to conditions, neede to produce a nuclear charge, are presented. It is ascertained that even the presence of a single person having certain khowledge in nuclear charge structure will allow one to reduce the terms of nuclear weapon development down to 1 year. Terms of weapon production are also affected by the basic charge characteristics (sufficient quantity of fissionable material, charge capacity and means of delivery to a target)

  20. The origin of Iraq's nuclear weapons program: Technical reality and Western hypocrisy

    CERN Document Server

    Erkman, S; Hurni, J P; Klement, S; Erkman, Suren; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre; Klement, Stephan

    2005-01-01

    This report is based on a series of papers written between 1980 and 2005 on the origin of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, which was known to one of the authors in the late 1970s already, as well as to a number of other physicists, who independently tried without success to inform their governments and the public. It is concluded that at no point did the Western governments effectively try to stop Iraq's nuclear weapons program, which suggests that its existence was useful as a foreign policy tool, as is confirmed by its use as a major justification to wage two wars on Iraq.

  1. Public distrust and hazard management success at the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Based on experience gained while serving a public oversight commission appointed by the governor of Colorado, hazard management at the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant is reviewed. Specific reference is made to the plant's history of controversy, its defense-in-depth strategy of hazard control, occupational health issues, public exposure to plutonium, and the assessment of low-probability, high-consequence risks. This leads to the conclusion that Rocky flats is, by any objective standard, a hazard management success. It follows that public distrust of Rocky Flats arises as much from fear and loathing of nuclear weapons themselves as from the manufacturing process by which they are made

  2. Nuclear weapons and the Korean Peninsula: A Chinese perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1991, North and South Korea issued a joint declaration on the denuclearisation of the peninsula. Such denuclearisation will undoubtedly be conductive to the security, stability and development of the region. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone relies, in the first place, on the efforts of the countries in the region. China does not advocate, nor support nuclear proliferation. China's basic position concerning nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is to seek to maintain peace and stability and to promote realisation of denuclearisation

  3. Techniques to evaluate the importance of common cause degradation on reliability and safety of nuclear weapons.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Darby, John L.

    2011-05-01

    As the nuclear weapon stockpile ages, there is increased concern about common degradation ultimately leading to common cause failure of multiple weapons that could significantly impact reliability or safety. Current acceptable limits for the reliability and safety of a weapon are based on upper limits on the probability of failure of an individual item, assuming that failures among items are independent. We expanded the current acceptable limits to apply to situations with common cause failure. Then, we developed a simple screening process to quickly assess the importance of observed common degradation for both reliability and safety to determine if further action is necessary. The screening process conservatively assumes that common degradation is common cause failure. For a population with between 100 and 5000 items we applied the screening process and conclude the following. In general, for a reliability requirement specified in the Military Characteristics (MCs) for a specific weapon system, common degradation is of concern if more than 100(1-x)% of the weapons are susceptible to common degradation, where x is the required reliability expressed as a fraction. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon subsystem if more than 0.1% of the population is susceptible to common degradation. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon component or overall weapon system if two or more components/weapons in the population are susceptible to degradation. Finally, we developed a technique for detailed evaluation of common degradation leading to common cause failure for situations that are determined to be of concern using the screening process. The detailed evaluation requires that best estimates of common cause and independent failure probabilities be produced. Using these techniques, observed common degradation can be evaluated for effects on reliability and safety.

  4. After fifty years of the nuclear age: Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or elimination of them?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ever since the first test of the atomic bomb and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, mankind lived with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were inevitably connected with the Cold War, with its end new opportunity has come concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Steps are to be undertaken in order to eliminate the nuclear weapons. First, would be the prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. By excluding the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, the world could be closer to nuclear disarmament than ever. The prohibition of the use of some type of weapons could be a breakthrough towards the elimination of such weapons. While the negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons would be difficult, as were those to ban chemical weapons, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons would eventually lead to their elimination. During the Cold War, the imminent goal of disarmament was to stop the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. But in the post-Cold War era an opportunity has developed for further steps towards nuclear disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons

  5. Science seeks [nuclear] weapons clean-up role

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    US scientists argue for funding to support basic research which would make the decommissioning of one of the world's nuclear stockpiles cheaper and more effective. This runs contrary to current popular and political thought, from citizens' groups and state governments, that the stockpile should be dismantled immediately and publicly due to their suspicion of scientists and fear that stockpiled weapons could still be used. This article examines the debate between the two opposing views. (UK)

  6. DOE's management and oversight of the nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DOE's nuclear weapons complex is virtually shut-down today due to a multitude of serious environmental, safety, and operational problems. These include deteriorated facilities, contaminated soil and groundwater, and disposal of radioactive waste that has been in temporary storage for decades. This report discusses these ongoing problems, as well as longstanding management problems, recent DOE management and oversight initiatives, and GAO's views on DOE's efforts and implications for the future management of the complex

  7. Nuclear weapons proliferation problem: can we lead without leadership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The immediate problem facing us with respect to proliferation and nuclear power involves reprocessing and the availability of plutonium from reprocessing plants. One solution supported by the Atomic Industrial Forum is that reprocessing centers be restricted to locations in those industrial nations already having weapons capability and that the energy of the reprocessed plutonium be returned to the user nation in the form of low enriched uranium. Thus, the plutonium would remain where it would not add to problems of proliferation

  8. City mayors on the march. Hiroshima leading citizen campaign to ban nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Led on our tragic experience 58 years ago, Hiroshima has continually called for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the realization of genuine and lasting world peace. Unfortunately, despite our efforts, this planet still bristles with enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons, and today we face an increasingly perilous nuclear crisis. We see States that have nuclear weapons taking more rigid positions regarding disarmament, and non-nuclear-weapon States frightened into seeking their own nuclear bombs. The global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). the pivotal international agreement regarding nuclear weapons, is teetering on the brink of collapse. The world's leading superpower, the United States, for example, has refused to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and is resuming research into small nuclear weapons. These steps run contrary to the enshrined commitment of nuclear powers to reduce atomic arsenals and move toward a nuclear-weapon free world. We cannot sit quietly as the world plunges toward unspeakable violence and misery. We must let our leaders know, first and foremost, that we demand immediate freedom from the nuclear threat. Nuclear weapons are heinous, cruel, inhumane weapons that threaten our entire species. In 1996, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion declaring them illegal. At the Meeting of the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference held in April 2003 in Geneva the president of the World Conference of Mayors for Peace, a non-governmental organization (NGO) that now has 554 member cities in 107 countries and regions, the following demands, were made: A complete and total ban on all nuclear weapons everywhere; Removal of all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert immediately and withdrawal of all nuclear weapons deployed on foreign territory; It is high time for all recognized nuclear-weapon States to join in a multilateral process of nuclear disarmament and for de-facto nuclear-weapon States

  9. Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Principle of Unnecessary Suffering : The Use of Nuclear Weapons in an Armed Conflict

    OpenAIRE

    Krasny, Jaroslav; Kawano, Noriyuki

    2015-01-01

    This research is concerned with the use of nuclear weapons against combatants in an armed conflict and whether such a use violates or would violate the principle of unnecessary suffering as codified in St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 and the Hague Conventions. In order to analyze what constitutes unnecessary suffering the method chosen for this research is comparison of the effects of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons on the human body. The reason for choosing this method is the abh...

  10. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

    Science.gov (United States)

    Middleton, Tiffany Willey

    2010-01-01

    In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

  11. Patenting the bomb: nuclear weapons, intellectual property, and technological control.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wellerstein, Alex

    2008-03-01

    During the course of the Manhattan Project, the U.S. government secretly attempted to acquire a monopoly on the patent rights for inventions used in the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. The use of patents as a system of control, while common for more mundane technologies, would seem at first glance to conflict with the regimes of secrecy that have traditionally been associated with nuclear weapons. In explaining the origins and operations of the Manhattan Project patent system, though, this essay argues that the utilization of patents was an ad hoc attempt at legal control of the atomic bomb by Manhattan Project administrators, focused on the monopolistic aspects of the patent system and preexisting patent secrecy legislation. From the present perspective, using patents as a method of control for such weapons seems inadequate, if not unnecessary; but at the time, when the bomb was a new and essentially unregulated technology, patents played an important role in the thinking of project administrators concerned with meaningful postwar control of the bomb. PMID:18505023

  12. Verifying the transition from low levels of nuclear weapons to a nuclear weapon-free world. VERTIC research report no. 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The process of verifying the complete elimination of nuclear warheads in national stockpiles can be divided, conceptually, into four stages: first, comprehensive declarations of warhead and material inventories, as a base-line from which verified disarmament can proceed; second, the transfer of all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissile material into bonded store; third, demilitarisation measures, such as to render warheads unusable without disassembly and refabrication; fourth, dismantlement of warheads and disposition of fissile material. Many of the technologies and technologies and techniques needed for verifying the elimination of nuclear warheads have been worked out at a general level, largely in US studies. While it is essential that these techniques are refined and improved, what is most important now, if disarmament is to proceed expeditiously, is for each of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) themselves to study the central verification problems and requirements in order to identify particular techniques and approaches that meet their needs. As yet there is no system of integrated data exchange and verification that any of the NWS is willing to endorse. Each of the NWS should give detailed consideration to the logistics of dismantling the warheads in their respective stockpiles, including, for example, the practicalities of accommodating international verification at their potential dismantlement facilities. Each of the NWS might usefully review exactly which details of warhead design and construction have to remain secret in the course of the disarmament process, in the first place from one another, and second from the IAEA or any other international body that might be involved in international disarmament arrangements. Introducing transparency and verification into national nuclear weapons programmes might have a significant financial cost. Research and ingenuity might reduce this cost, however, and early investments in these fields, with sharing of

  13. From the lab to the battlefield? Nanotechnology and fourth generation nuclear weapons

    CERN Document Server

    Gsponer, A

    2002-01-01

    The paper addresses some major implications of microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) engineering and nanotechnology for the improvement of existing types of nuclear weapons, and the development of more robust versions of these weapons, as well as for the development of fourth generations nuclear weapons in which nanotechnology will play an essential role.

  14. The history of Finnish nuclear non-proliferation policy during the cold war. What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This article is a summary of the Finnish historical survey during the Cold War. In the article, I try to show how the Finnish Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy during the Cold War is linked to the broader context of the Finnish foreign and security policy. In the research report I have focused on several questions. One of the most important is the following: What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons during the Cold War? And in this context scientific knowledge is meant by knowing something about nuclear weapons. Basically, the Finnish national based survey of nuclear non-proliferation policy attempted to investigate issues like the kind of research concerning Nuclear Technology in general, Nuclear weapons, and Nuclear weapon policies of super powers in Finland during the Cold War era. (author)

  15. North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and No Good Options?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Cohen, Michael David

    2013-01-01

    senior military associates to experience fear of imminent nuclear war or conventional regime change. I show that the effect of such fear would depend on whether or not Kim believes that he has control over the occurrence of these events. I argue that if he experiences fear and believes that he has some......How would Pyongyang’s development of the capability to target the United States with nuclear weapons influence North Korea’s foreign policy? I argue that it would cause more dangerous crises than those of the last decade, and predict that these crises would eventually cause Kim Jong Un and his...... control over whether these extreme events actually happen, he will moderate his nuclear threats and behave more like other experienced nuclear powers. But if he experiences fear and believes that he has no control, he will likely pursue policies that could cause nuclear war. I use this insight to...

  16. Radioactive fallout in the southern hemisphere from nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fallout in the southern hemisphere, and its origins in the national programs of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing in both hemispheres, are reviewed. Of the 390 nuclear tests conducted in the atmosphere to date, 53 were carried out in the southern hemisphere and it is the second phase of these, between 1966 and 1974, that is seen to have been responsible for the main fallout of short-lived fission products in the southern hemisphere. In contrast to this, the programs of atmospheric nuclear testing in the northern hemisphere up to 1962 are shown to have been the main source of long-lived fission products in fallout in the southern hemisphere. The course followed by this contamination through the environment of the southern hemisphere is traced for the national programs of nuclear testing after 1962 taken separately (France, China) and for the earlier national programs taken together (U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and U.K.). The impact on populations in the southern hemisphere of fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests to date is assessed

  17. Disposal of fissionable material from dismantled nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The reduction in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union has improved the prospects for nuclear disarmament, making it more likely that significant numbers of nuclear warheads will be dismantled by the United States and USSR in the foreseeable future. Thus, the question becomes more urgent as to the disposition of the weapons materials, highly enriched uranium and plutonium. It is timely, therefore, to develop specific plans for such disposal. The overall process for disposal of weapons materials by the burnup option involves the following steps: (1) removing the weapons material from the warheads, (2) converting the material to a fuel form suitable for power reactors, (3) burning it up as a power reactor fuel, and (4) removing the spent fuel and placing it in a permanent repository. This paper examines these four steps with the purpose of answering the following questions. What facilities would be appropriate for the disposal process? Do they need to be dedicated facilities, or could industrial facilities be used? What is the present projection of the economics of the burnup process, both the capital investment and the operating costs? How does one assure that fissionable materials will not be diverted to military use during the disposal process? Is the spent fuel remaining from the burnup process proliferation resistant? Would the disposal of spent fuel add an additional burden to the spent fuel permanent repository? The suggested answers are those of the author and do not represent a position by the Electric Power Research Institute

  18. Re-examining the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion: Concerning the Legality of Nuclear Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jasjit Singh

    2012-10-01

    Full Text Available The primary objections raised against total elimination of nuclear weapons are built around a few arguments mostly of non-technical nature.Nuclear weapons and the strategies for their use have resulted in the establishment of a vicious circle within which the international community is trapped.The argument that the world will be unsafe without nuclear weapons is only meant to further the narrow self-interest of the nuclear weapon states and their allies.The World Court’s far-reaching 1996 advisory opinion concluded that almost any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would violate international humanitarian law and law applicable in armed conflict, undermining most claims of nuclear weapon states regarding the legitimacy of possession, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The next logical step would be an initiative for a nuclear convention banning the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons in Asia and the adjoining oceans. But as long as the dominant elites in society and the nation-state believe in the utility of nuclear weapons for national security or as the currency of power, abolition of nuclear weapons will remain a mirage.

  19. The role of nuclear weapon ban in the peace keeping laws of the United Nations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The thesis includes a comparison of bilateral and multilateral nuclear weapon banning contracts and treaties (nuclear test ban treaty, nuclear weapon-free zones, nuclear disarmament etc.) and voluntary nuclear weapon abandonment declarations in view of legal aspects, their verification, ratification, included exceptions, and potential penalties. In the second part an eventual stabilization of the nuclear weapon ban and the non-proliferation treaty as customary international law and ''ius congens'' is discussed. The third part is concerned with possible measures and sanctions in connections with these laws. The fourth part discusses military measures for justifiable enforcement of the non-proliferation treaty and their legitimization.

  20. Virtual nuclear capabilities and deterrence in a world without nuclear weapons. VERTIC research report no. 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    'Virtual nuclear capabilities' (VNC) can be defined as the ability of a state not equipped wth nuclear weapons to produce them within a matter of months or years, using fissile material and/or technological skills and materials available to it. 'Virtual nuclear deterrence' (VND) would use these capabilities to a specific end. It could be a temporary posture adopted by former nuclear weapon states as a guarantee against nuclear weapon 'break out'. VND could hence reinforce a temporary security architecture, even if in this instance 'temporary' might mean up to around ten years. In the context of getting to 'zero', VND could not be an end in itself, but rather serve as an element of the security architecture of a world free of nuclear weapons. VND would only be adopted by the acknowledged nuclear weapon states (NWS) - China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America - after the commit to complete nuclear disarmament, sign the appropriate treaties and perceive the temporary adoption of this form of deterrence to be in their political and security interests. As with the NWS, VND will only be accepted as an interim form of security by the de facto nuclear weapon states (DFNWS) - India, Israel and Pakistan - when they can be assured that their virtual security interests would be guaranteed by other means after they sign a nuclear disarmament treaty. There are several alternative approaches to VND. These range from various types of precise or explicit virtual deterrence to more implicit or tacit forms. An explicit VND posture might allow materials and capabilities relevant to the construction of a nuclear weapon to be retained under verified arrangements for a limited time. This report explains why explicit VND would not be a reliable tool for reinforcing a nuclear disarmament treaty, as it could undermine the treaty's whole purpose. An implicit VND posture would not permit the retention of any weapons-related fissile material or

  1. International policy against the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Certainly in no other field of international policy has so much change taken place during the past few years as within the contradictory actions meant to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is not only true since India exploded her first nuclear device in the state of Rajasthan on May 18, 1974. In 1980, several decisions will be made which will be decisive on a worldwide scale and particularly in Germany. These discussions will be triggered by three events for which the date is already set: the INFCE accord, the termination of the waiting period given to the American President in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, and the supervisory conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. From the pen of Prof. Dr. Hans Michaelis a presentation of the present state of the controversy on Non-proliferation policy. (orig.)

  2. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and IAEA safeguards: A Chinese perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ever since embarking upon the path of reform and opening-up to the outside world in the late 1970s, China's nuclear nonproliferation policy has shaped considerably. As a result, China has become more integrated with and more accommodating of the international nonproliferation regime. China acceded to the NPT in 1992 and contributed positively to its indefinite extension in 1995. As a member state to the IAEA and a state party to the NPT, China has all along stood firm on nuclear nonproliferation. First, China does not advocate, encourage, or engage in nuclear weapons proliferation. Second, China does not help any other countries develop nuclear weapons. Third, China does not provide any assistance to any nuclear facilities outside IAEA safeguards. Against such a backdrop, China has enunciated and pursued the following principles with regard to nuclear export. 1) The export is used solely for peaceful purposes. 2) The export must be subject to IAEA safeguards. 3) The export should not transferred to a third country without China consent. As a stepping-stone, China has improved its export control systems on sensitive items and technologies, and has promulgated a series of laws and regulations in recent years. In this regard, the achievements are noteworthy. In May 1997, the Chinese Government unveiled a Circular on Strict Observations of National Nuclear Export Policy. The circular in explicit terms reiterated that, nuclear materials, equipment and related technologies, as well as non-nuclear materials to be used by reactors and nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials and related technologies, could not be provided to or used in nuclear facilities beyond IAEA safeguards in the event of export. In September 1997, the Chinese Government promulgated Regulations on Nuclear Control. Among the provisions contained in the Regulations, the following points are most outstanding. 1) Any assistance to nuclear facilities not subject to IAEA safeguards shall be prohibited

  3. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1994-03-01

    The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, seeks to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) that will extend from the US-Mexican border to Antarctica`s territorial boundaries, including large areas of open ocean. Under the treaty, signatory states pledge not to test, use, produce, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons; to use nuclear materials and facilities {open_quotes}exclusively for peaceful purposes;{close_quotes} and not to permit the stationing or development of nuclear weapons on their territories.

  4. International humanitarian law, nuclear weapons and the prospects for nuclear disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The author first recalls the general principles of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and outlines its main gaps (application of the notion of protected person, classification between own territory and occupied territory). Then and in this respect, he comments the various characteristics of nuclear weapons considered as explosive devices, and notably as they are thus addressed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). He comments the legal status of the ICJ advisory opinions, and more particularly the relationship between the ICJ advisory opinion on nuclear weapons and the IHL. Different aspects are addressed and discussed: the principle of distinction, the prohibition of the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. The author then comments NATO's nuclear policy in the international environment, and discusses the status and condition of nuclear deterrence. In order to address prospects for nuclear disarmament, the author notably compares differences between the arms control and non-proliferation approach, and the humanitarian disarmament approach

  5. Comparison of methodologies for assessing the risks from nuclear weapons and from nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    There are important differences between the safety principles for nuclear weapons and for nuclear reactors. For example, a principal concern for nuclear weapons is to prevent electrical energy from reaching the nuclear package during accidents produced by crashes, fires, and other hazards, whereas the foremost concern for nuclear reactors is to maintain coolant around the core in the event of certain system failures. Not surprisingly, new methods have had to be developed to assess the risk from nuclear weapons. These include fault tree transformations that accommodate time dependencies, thermal and structural analysis techniques that are fast and unconditionally stable, and parameter sampling methods that incorporate intelligent searching. This paper provides an overview of the new methods for nuclear weapons and compares them with existing methods for nuclear reactors. It also presents a new intelligent searching process for identifying potential nuclear detonation vulnerabilities. The new searching technique runs very rapidly on a workstation and shows promise for providing an accurate assessment of potential vulnerabilities with far fewer physical response calculations than would be required using a standard Monte Carlo sampling procedure

  6. Carrot, stick, or sledgehammer: U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Orcutt, Daniel J.

    2004-01-01

    Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons has shaken the foundations of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia. Because of North Korea's record of state-sponsored terrorism, illicit activities, human rights violations, arms sales, and fiery rhetoric, its development of operational nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing. Although most agree North Korea should not possess nuclear weapons, nobody has a solution. This thesis evaluates three U.S. polic...

  7. Why we must abolish nuclear weapons after the end of the Cold War

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The end of the Cold War has offered a great opportunity to reduce or even abolish nuclear weapons, but the international community seemed to lose interest in nuclear weapons issues. Today, however, there are a lot of other major menaces to the survival of the mankind: pollution, hunger, poverty, ethnic conflicts. So the nuclear weapons issue is merely one of the most pressing threats to survival

  8. On the U.S.-Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons Cut as a Path toward a Nuclear-free World

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Shi; Jianbin

    2015-01-01

    Complete destruction of nuclear weapons and realization of a world free from nuclear weapons are the common aspiration of mankind in the atomic era.To achieve the goal,the international community has proposed a series of steps and measures,which include calling for a deep reduction of the U.S.and Russian nuclear arsenals,promoting ratification of the CTBT,initiating negotiation of the FMCT,reducing the role of nuclear weapons

  9. A Preliminary study on attitudes toward nuclear weapons and nuclear tests of the residents of Kurchatov, Kazakhstan

    OpenAIRE

    Matsuo, Masatsugu; Bektorov, Yerzhan; Muldagaliyev, Talgat; Apsalikov, Kazbek; Hirabayashi, Kyoko; Kawano, Noriyuki

    2006-01-01

    The town of Kurchatov was a secret city newly built in the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site as the headquarters of the nuclear tests. The present paper is a pilot study, first, to explore how the current Kurchatov residents think and feel about nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, and secondly, to compare the results of the survey with those of the similar survey near Semipalatinsk. Though the present study is based upon a small and limited survey conducted in the city, it is hoped that it will ...

  10. The Changing Strategic Context of Nuclear Weapons and Its Implications for the New Nuclear World Order

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2005-01-01

    Ever since the nuclear bombing at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear weapons have become one of the defining elements in shaping the world strategic situation for better or worse. The end of the Cold War has led to dramatic changes in the world security landscape. The international

  11. Implications of a North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lehman, R.F. II

    1993-07-01

    The Democratic People`s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the Cold War`s last remaining totalitarian regimes. Rarely has any society been as closed to outside influences and so distant from political, economic, and military developments around the globe. In 1991 and in 1992, however, this dictatorship took a number of political steps which increased Pyongyang`s interaction with the outside world. Although North Korea`s style of engagement with the broader international community involved frequent pauses and numerous steps backward, many observers believed that North Korea was finally moving to end its isolated, outlaw status. As the end of 1992 approached, however, delay and obstruction by Pyongyang became intense as accumulating evidence suggested that the DPRK, in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it would not accept additional inspections proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve concerns about possible violations and instead would withdraw from the Treaty. Pyongyang`s action raised the specter that, instead of a last act of the Cold War, North Korea`s diplomatic maneuvering would unravel the international norms that were to be the basis of stability and peace in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the discovery that North Korea was approaching the capability to produce nuclear weapons suggested that the nuclear threat, which had been successfully managed throughout the Cold War era, could increase in the post-Cold War era.

  12. From the nuclear stalemate to a nuclear-weapon free world. In memory of Klaus Fuchs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The following topics were dealt with: The first soviet atomic bomb and Klaus Fuchs, in illusory worlds of Andrei Sakharov, Edward Teller, and Klaus Fuchs, Klaus Fuchs as grandfather of the hydrogen bomb, memories of and thinking about Klaus Fuchs, the Scottish years of Klaus Fuchs 1937-1941, Klaus Fuchs in the mirror of the Venona documents, Gernot Zippe and the ultracentrifuge or east-west technology transfer in the cold war, secret impulses for the soviet nuclear project, responsibility of knowledge with anti-facism, philosophy, and science as well as peace as the first human right in the work of Klaus Fuchs, the request of Klaus Fuchs for a lasting peace, Klaus Fuchs in Daniel Granin's roman ''Escape to Russia'', ways to a nuclear-weapon free world, Otto Hahn and the declarations of Mainau and Goettingen, nuclear winter, initiatives of the GDR for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons in negative entropy, militarism and antimilitarism of the nuclear age, contributions of the young Klaus Fuchs to statistical physics, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the responsibility of the scientists for a socially effective and efficient energy change, Berlin-Bucher contributions to a world free of biological weapons. (HSI)

  13. Nuclear weapons decision-making; an application of organization theory to the mini-nuke case

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This dissertation addresses the problem of constructing and developing normative theory responsive to the need for improving the quality of decision-making in the nuclear weapons policy-making. Against the background of a critical evaluation of various paradigms in the literature (systems analysis and opposed-systems designed, the bureaucratic politics model, and the cybernetic theory of decision) an attempt is made to design an alternative analytic framework based on the writings of numerous organization theorists such as Herbert Simon and Kenneth Arrow. The framework is applied to the case of mini-nukes, i.e., proposals in the mid-1970s to develop and deploy tens of thousands of very low-yield (sub-kiloton), miniaturized fission weapons in NATO. Heuristic case study identifies the type of study undertaken in the dissertation in contrast to the more familiar paradigmatic studies identified, for example, with the Harvard Weapons Project. Application of the analytic framework developed in the dissertation of the mini-nuke case resulted in an empirical understanding of why decision making concerning tactical nuclear weapons has been such a complex task and why force modernization issues in particular have been so controversial and lacking in policy resolution

  14. Nuclear weapons decision-making; an application of organization theory to the mini-nuke case

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kangas, J.L.

    1985-01-01

    This dissertation addresses the problem of constructing and developing normative theory responsive to the need for improving the quality of decision-making in the nuclear weapons policy-making. Against the background of a critical evaluation of various paradigms in the literature (systems analysis and opposed-systems designed, the bureaucratic politics model, and the cybernetic theory of decision) an attempt is made to design an alternative analytic framework based on the writings of numerous organization theorists such as Herbert Simon and Kenneth Arrow. The framework is applied to the case of mini-nukes, i.e., proposals in the mid-1970s to develop and deploy tens of thousands of very low-yield (sub-kiloton), miniaturized fission weapons in NATO. Heuristic case study identifies the type of study undertaken in the dissertation in contrast to the more familiar paradigmatic studies identified, for example, with the Harvard Weapons Project. Application of the analytic framework developed in the dissertation of the mini-nuke case resulted in an empirical understanding of why decision making concerning tactical nuclear weapons has been such a complex task and why force modernization issues in particular have been so controversial and lacking in policy resolution.

  15. Canadian--American relations and the nuclear weapons controversy, 1958--1963

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This study attempts to explain the nuclear weapons controversy as it developed between 1958 and 1963. The nuclear controversy centered around Canada's acceptance of a nuclear role, within the American alliance system, for the Canadian armed forces. In the period 1958-1959, when the critical weapons decisions were being taken, Canadian political authorities lost control of the policy-making process, permitting the Canadian and American military bureacracies to initiate nuclear plans suited to their common needs and objectives. Prime Minister Diefenbaker's reluctance to arm the systems acquired by transborder bureaucratic coalition is also re-examined. Previous analysts have regarded the government's hesitations over nuclear weapons as the product of Diefenbaker's personal antagonism towards President Kennedy or as a futile attempt to reverse the process of continental integration. The opening of the Kennedy papers reveals the degree to which Diefenbaker was committed to close Canadian-American cooperation and the effort he made to overcome the president's hostility towards him. This study emphasizes the importance of Diefenbaker's sensitivity to public, parliamentary, and cabinet opposition to nuclear arms. The secret U.S. demand for nuclear bases in Labrador and Newfoundland is revealed. Thus the question of nuclear storage in Canada for Canadian forces was complicated by U.S. insistence that Canada simultaneously provide nuclear storage for the strategic forces of the U.S. Finally, the extent of American responsibility for Diefenbaker's demise is re-assessed, and the conclusion is reached that the U.S., through Canadian-American military interaction and the initiative of the ambassador in Ottawa, did in fact help to bring down the government of Canada

  16. A nuclear-weapon-free world and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It is not a matter of dispute that the technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy can be used for development of nuclear explosives, although this was not the path followed by five nuclear-weapon states. Specific proliferation-sensitive technologies are uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. In spite of the Non-Proliferation treaty, there are now 12 countries apart from five nuclear-weapon states known to possess these technologies and thus the technologies for producing nuclear explosives (South Africa, India, Pakistan, North Korea, suspected installations in Iraq destroyed by United Nations military action). If the nuclear energy is to play a significant role in the production of electricity on the global scale, more reactors would be needed than the present 440 units. Reprocessing of the spent fuel and the recycling of plutonium would be a necessity, thus the traffic of plutonium would become a part of standard power plant operation. From ecological point of view it cannot be ignored that nuclear fission is the only available energy process capable of producing great amount of energy without carbondioxide emission. Accepting that peaceful use of nuclear energy is present to stay, for economic and ecological reasons, the conclusion follows that national enrichment and reprocessing would not be compatible with a nuclear-weapon free world. The solution of the problem is in fact rather obvious: international nuclear fuel cycle centres should replace the national installations

  17. Anti-nuclear weapons activism in the United States and Great Britain: a comparative analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sussman, G.

    1987-01-01

    This study is a response to the lacuna in empirical research into political activism and the nuclear issue and seeks to ascertain the social and value characteristics, political attitudes, and political behavior of activists in the United States and Great Britain. Consideration is also given to gender differences in light of evidence of an emerging gender gap in these two countries. The study investigates the common forces cited in two sets of literature - post-industrialism and anti-nuclear weapons movements - which provide a framework for analysis. Survey research data is employed to assess cross-national similarities and differences. The findings obtained indicate that while American and British activists exhibit common social and value characteristics, British activists appear more integrated in their political opposition to nuclear weapons compared with their American counterparts. Survey results indicate that the political-action repertoire of these activists is quite diverse, suggesting a new style of politics in advanced industrial democracies. Gender-based analysis reveals two important findings. First, activist American men differ significantly from the other three social groups in their attitudes towards nuclear weapons. Second, activist women in both national settings participate at a level equal to or exceeding that of activist men.

  18. Towards a world free from nuclear weapons: Why South Africa gave up the nuclear option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    South Africa is the first country in history that has voluntarily dismantled its nuclear weapons capability. All six nuclear devices and a seventh incomplete device were ordered destroyed in 1989. South Africa joined the NPT in 1991 and signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA the same year. In 1993, the IAEA confirmed that there was no indication that there remained 'any sensitive components of the nuclear weapons programme that have not been rendered useless or converted to commercial nonnuclear applications or peaceful nuclear usage'. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seemed obvious that the world was shifting rapidly towards a new world order; internal changes were taking place in South Africa and the costs of maintaining a nuclear weapons programme were becoming prohibitive. South Africa's decision was a challenge to the world to take firm steps towards the objective of the total firm steps towards the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It underlines the need to promote vigorously the benefit that disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control hold for international peace and security

  19. Removing the relevance of nuclear weapons: A legal perspective on the UN system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This presentation refers to the relevance of nuclear weapons in the United Nations system, nuclear deterrence doctrine under military alliances. Arms control treaties including the Non-Proliferation Treaty are discussed, and special sessions of the United Nations general Assembly devoted to disarmament are described related to new philosophy of security. New circumstances like dissolution of Soviet Union, North-South relations influence the relevance of nuclear weapons It is noted that the development of the regulations on global environmental harm as well as the international protection of human rights have further deprived nuclear weapons of their legal validity. Means for regulating nuclear weapons are described, including positive and negative security assurance mechanisms, no-first-use commitment, conventional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

  20. Gamma-ray identification of nuclear weapon materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    There has been an accelerating national interest in countering nuclear smuggling. This has caused a corresponding expansion of interest in the use of gamma-ray spectrometers for checkpoint monitoring, nuclear search, and within networks of nuclear and collateral sensors. All of these are fieldable instruments--ranging from large, fixed portal monitors to hand-held and remote monitoring equipment. For operational reasons, detectors with widely varying energy resolution and detection efficiency will be employed. In many instances, such instruments must be sensitive to weak signals, always capable of recognizing the gamma-ray signatures from nuclear weapons materials (NWM), often largely insensitive to spectral alteration by radiation transport through intervening materials, capable of real-time implementation, and able to discriminate against signals from commonly encountered legitimate gamma-ray sources, such as radiopharmaceuticals. Several decades of experience in classified programs have shown that all of these properties are not easily achieved and successful approaches were of limited scope--such as the detection of plutonium only. This project was originally planned as a two-year LDRD-ER. Since funding for 1997 was not sustained, this is a report of the first year's progress

  1. Atmospheric nuclear weapons test history narrated by carbon-14 in human teeth

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons since 1945 caused a significant increase in the concentration of atmospheric 14C. The 14C concentration in plants that assimilate 14C directly by photosynthesis reflects the atmospheric 14C concentration. Carbon-14 is then transferred into the human body through the food chain. Based on animal experiments, the collagen in human teeth is metabolically inert after its formation. This implies that the collagen of each tooth retains the 14C concentration which reflects the 14C concentration in the blood at the time collagen metabolism ceased. The distribution of the 14C concentration in the collagen of teeth from subjects of various ages would follow a pattern similar to that shown by soft tissues. In this paper the authors elucidate the relationship between the number of nuclear weapon tests and the distribution of 14C concentration in teeth

  2. Plus c`est la meme chose: The future of nuclear weapons in Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-07-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, the United States perhaps more than any other nuclear weapon state has deeply questioned the future role of nuclear weapons, both in a strategic sense and in Europe. It is probably the United States that has raised the most questions about the continuing need for and efficacy of nuclear weapons, and has expressed the greatest concerns about the negative consequences of continuing nuclear weapons deployment. In the US, this period of questioning has now come to a pause, if not a conclusion. In late 1994 the United States decided to continue to pursue reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons as well as other changes designed to reduce the dangers associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. But at the same time the US concluded that some number of nuclear forces would continue to be needed for national security for the foreseeable future. These necessary nuclear forces include a continuing but greatly reduced stockpile of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe under NATO`s New Strategic Concept. If further changes to the US position on nuclear weapons in Europe are to occur, it is likely to be after many years, and only in the context of dramatic additional improvements in the political and geo-political climate in and around Europe. The future role of nuclear weapons in Europe, as discussed in this report, depends in part on past and future decisions by the United States. but it must also be noted that other states that deploy nuclear weapons in Europe--Britain, France, and Russia, as well as the NATO alliance--have shown little inclination to discontinue their deployment of such weapons, whatever the United States might choose to do in the future.

  3. Plus c'est la meme chose: The future of nuclear weapons in Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since the end of the Cold War, the United States perhaps more than any other nuclear weapon state has deeply questioned the future role of nuclear weapons, both in a strategic sense and in Europe. It is probably the United States that has raised the most questions about the continuing need for and efficacy of nuclear weapons, and has expressed the greatest concerns about the negative consequences of continuing nuclear weapons deployment. In the US, this period of questioning has now come to a pause, if not a conclusion. In late 1994 the United States decided to continue to pursue reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons as well as other changes designed to reduce the dangers associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. But at the same time the US concluded that some number of nuclear forces would continue to be needed for national security for the foreseeable future. These necessary nuclear forces include a continuing but greatly reduced stockpile of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe under NATO's New Strategic Concept. If further changes to the US position on nuclear weapons in Europe are to occur, it is likely to be after many years, and only in the context of dramatic additional improvements in the political and geo-political climate in and around Europe. The future role of nuclear weapons in Europe, as discussed in this report, depends in part on past and future decisions by the United States. but it must also be noted that other states that deploy nuclear weapons in Europe--Britain, France, and Russia, as well as the NATO alliance--have shown little inclination to discontinue their deployment of such weapons, whatever the United States might choose to do in the future

  4. Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department's first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department's legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle

  5. Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-01-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department`s first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department`s legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle.

  6. Teaching with the News: North Korea and Nuclear Weapons. Choices for the 21st Century.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brown Univ., Providence, RI. Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Inst. for International Studies.

    In October 2002 North Korea admitted that it had been operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of international treaties and the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea also appeared to be taking steps to begin production of nuclear weapons and, according to U.S. officials, may have a missile that can hit…

  7. Abdus Salam: A Reappraisal. Part II Salam's Part in the Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Programme

    CERN Document Server

    Dombey, Norman

    2011-01-01

    Salam's biographies claim that he was opposed to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. This is somewhat strange given that he was the senior Science Advisor to the Pakistan government for at least some of the period between 1972 when the programme was initiated and 1998 when a successful nuclear weapon test was carried out. I look at the evidence for his participation in the programme.

  8. Frederic Joliot-Curie and the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The author describes the attitude and action of Pierre Joliot-Curie after the explosion of the first nuclear bomb in Hiroshima and during the following years. He notably describes the creation of the French CEA (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique), the commitment of Joliot-Curie for the creation of a scientist movement, the atomic negotiation within the United Nations, the creation and actions of the Mouvement de la Paix (from April 1949 until the Stockholm Appeal) within the Cold War context, the commitment of Joliot-Curie against weapons of mass destruction and its difficult relationship with his communists friends, his participation to the elaboration of the Einstein-Russel Appeal, and the Pugwash conference in 1957

  9. Worldwide fallout of plutonium from nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Measurements of 238Pu and /sup 239,240/Pu fallout from nuclear weapons tests and the SNAP-9A navigational satellite burnup are presented for the years through 1980. Data abstracted from the literature were taken from the stratosphere, atmosphere, and from deposition and surface soil. Over 7300 data entries are included in the 23 tables. The tables are sorted by medium (stratosphere, atmosphere, and deposition near the surface and soil, nuclide, hemisphere, and longitude going from west to east, and are arranged in chronological order. Latitudes are also provided. Fallout levels in SI units (becquerels), calculated from the original readings, and the references from which the original data were taken are given in the report. The appendix is a map showing the various sites from which data were obtained

  10. The gas centrifuge and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The gas centrifuge is a particularly challenging technology for the institutions of the existing nonproliferation regime. Centrifuge facilities can be reconfigured for the production of weapon-grade uranium in a comparatively short time-frame, while clandestine facilities are virtually impossible to detect with technical intelligence tools. A potential expansion in nuclear power and the natural maturing of states technical abilities suggest a world where centrifuge proliferation could become an even more serious threat to global security. This overview reviews the proliferation-relevant technical characteristics of the gas centrifuge and examines how effective control strategies must differ from traditional approaches. A well-informed policymaking process is needed to address these issues. We outline current gaps in understanding that ought to be closed in order to formulate robust nonproliferation policies. (authors)

  11. Germany and the role of nuclear weapons: between prohibition and revival

    OpenAIRE

    Meier, Oliver

    2016-01-01

    "Never since the end of the Cold War have the international community and Europe been so deeply divided over the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. There is disagreement within the United Nations over whether to begin negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapons. At the same time, Russia's aggression against Ukraine and Moscow's associated nuclear threats have triggered a new discussion in NATO about enhancing its nuclear deterrent. Both debates are difficult and uncomfortable fo...

  12. The relationship between uranium exports, the spread of nuclear weapons and the non-proliferation treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The evolution of the non-proliferation regime to the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is outlined. The current market for nuclear material, IAEA safeguards and bilateral undertakings are discussed. The risk of horizontal proliferation lies with non-nuclear weapon states outside the NPT which are not eligible to receive Australian origin nuclear material and to which the export of Australian and other origin equipment and technology is prohibited or controlled

  13. Nuclear-weapon-free zones: Pursuing security, region by region. Conference of States Parties and Signatories of treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, over the past four decades, is a testament to what nations can do, region by region, to achieve common security objectives. In fact, when considering the history of nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it might be said that here in Mexico City is where it all began. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first multilateral treaty to establish a region free of nuclear weapons and a requirement for comprehensive IAEA safeguards for its parties - and clearly gave impetus to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones provide tangible security benefits. They help to reassure the larger international community of the peaceful nuclear intentions of countries in these regions. They provide their members with security assurances against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons by a nuclear-weapon State. They include control mechanisms for dealing with non-compliance in a regional setting. And in all cases, they prohibit the development, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in their respective regions. An important benefit of these zones is that they open a forum for expanded regional dialogue on issues of security. Because the causes of insecurity vary from region to region, security solutions do not come in a 'one-size-fits-all' package. It is for this reason that regional dialogues, as we see in the nuclear-weapon-free zones, are so beneficial. It is clear that such treaties, and such security dialogues, would be invaluable in other areas of the world, such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. Since the end of the Cold War, the international security landscape has undergone dramatic changes. For example, the rise in terrorism, the discovery of clandestine nuclear programmes, and the emergence of covert nuclear procurement networks have heightened our awareness of vulnerabilities in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This statement focuses on two issues

  14. The non-proliferation policies of non-nuclear-weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eight countries are considered to be capable of producing nuclear weapons and highly suspect in their intentions to actually produce them. These are Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The policies of these suspect Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) are considered in this paper. The first part assesses the non-proliferation (or proliferation) policies of the eight suspect NNWS, the second part evaluates their differences in approach from the policies urged upon them by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and the third and final part attempts to understand the future evolution of NNWS policies in the nuclear military field. (U.K.)

  15. A nuclear-weapon-free zone from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1995, at the Extension and Review Conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Belarus introduced the new idea of establishing the nuclear-weapon-free zone 'in the center of Europe', as an alternative to a military and nuclear expansion eastwards by the Western military alliance NATO. The geographical scope of the zone from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea could encompass the former Warsaw pact territory west of Russian federation including: the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), four Visegrad states (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), newly independent states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova), Romania and Bulgaria. The success of nuclear-weapon-free zone is dependent on how it would be accepted by the nuclear-weapon powers and the surrounding world. There would be four measures of central importance for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in general and in European case: non-possession of nuclear weapons by zonal states; non-stationing of nuclear weapons within the zone by any state; non-use or no-threat of use of nuclear weapons throughout the zone or against targets within the zone; and verification that parties comply with their treaty obligations

  16. Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. Summary of a United Nations study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In December 1988, by resolution 43/75N, the United Nations General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to carry out a comprehensive update of a 1980 study on nuclear weapons. The study was to take into account recent relevant studies, and consider the political, legal and security aspects of: (a) nuclear arsenals and pertinent technological developments; (b) doctrines concerning nuclear weapons; (c) efforts to reduce nuclear weapons; (d) physical, environmental, medical and other effects of the use of nuclear weapons and of nuclear testing; (e) efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban; (f) efforts to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and their horizontal and vertical proliferation; and (g) the question of verification of compliance with nuclear-arms limitation agreements. The Group's report is presented in nine chapters, eight of which are summarized here; chapter 9, entitled ''Conclusions'', is included in its entirety. In his foreword to the report, the Secretary-General observes that the study represents the most comprehensive review of the relevant developments in the field over the last decade and was carried out during a period of ''far-reaching changes in international relations'' and an ''unprecedented evolution in the relationship between East and West''. This period experienced for the first time the initiation of an effective process of reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles

  17. Development of nuclear technologies and conversion of nuclear weapon testing system infrastructure in Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The article gives a brief description of the work done by the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan in development of nuclear technology and conversion of nuclear weapon testing infrastructure in Kazakhstan. Content and trends of works are as follows: 1. Peaceful use of all physical facilities, created earlier for nuclear tests in Kazakhstan; 2. Development of methods and technologies for safe nuclear reactors use; 3. Examination of different materials in field of great neutron flow for thermonuclear reactor's first wall development; 4. Liquidation of all wells, which were formed in the results of underground nuclear explosions in Degelen mountain massif of former Semipalatinsk test site; 5. Study of consequences of nuclear tests in West Kazakhstan (territory of Azgir test site and Karachaganak oil field); 6. Study of radiological situation on the Semipalatinsk test site and surrounding territories; 7. Search of ways for high-level radioactive wastes disposal; 8. Construction of safe nuclear power plants in Kazakhstan

  18. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the insertion of the Brazilian State in its regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The issue of nuclear weapons continues to appear as a focal point of International Relations. The efforts and concrete actions on disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear arms control are still issues that generate recurring tensions between States. However, in Brazil, there is little analysis of an academic nature about these issues and, with respect to current and prospective position of the Brazilian State in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime, studies and analysis are even more scarce, or incipient. The present dissertation has as its object of study to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Regime arisen from NPT, and the Brazilian State insertion process in this Regime. Therefore our research work is structured in three areas: the first one is about the role of nuclear weapons in States security perception, the second is about NPT and its Regime, the third runs over the insertion of the Brazilian state in this regime. So, in summary, the research performed included the reasons that make a State to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT genesis and evolution of the perception of the meaning of that Treaty by the States, and the process and the degree of insertion of Brazil in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime. The inquiry sought to place this object of study in the broader debate on Foreign Relations, based on the approaches of the discipline devoted to the question of managing the security of States, id est, the two approaches that constitute the mainstream of the discipline: the perspective theoretical liberal (and neoliberal variants) and realistic thinking (and neo-realist). Thus, we have used different theoretical lenses, which we think necessary for understanding the specific parts and causal connections between these parts of a complex issue. (author)

  19. Symbolic representations of weapons and preparations for conflict: The nuclear arms race

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bassin, E.L.

    1991-01-01

    This study investigates the process through which actors acquire weapons in preparation for a confrontation with some rival. A theory is developed to account for those preparations rooted in two social psychological perspectives; social exchange theory and symbolic interactionism. The empirical aspect of the study deals with the nuclear arms race between the US and Soviet Union. The first portion involves a qualitative analysis to uncover the meaning system. The second portion involves a quantitative test of the theory. Data cover all 53 long range strategic missile systems ever deployed by the US or USSR. Results lend support for the idea of a meaning-based theory of preparation for conflict. By operationalizing weapons as actors perceive the objects in their environment, the results of this study provide a higher level of fit than found in earlier arms race research.

  20. Symbolic representations of weapons and preparations for conflict: The nuclear arms race

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This study investigates the process through which actors acquire weapons in preparation for a confrontation with some rival. A theory is developed to account for those preparations rooted in two social psychological perspectives; social exchange theory and symbolic interactionism. The empirical aspect of the study deals with the nuclear arms race between the US and Soviet Union. The first portion involves a qualitative analysis to uncover the meaning system. The second portion involves a quantitative test of the theory. Data cover all 53 long range strategic missile systems ever deployed by the US or USSR. Results lend support for the idea of a meaning-based theory of preparation for conflict. By operationalizing weapons as actors perceive the objects in their environment, the results of this study provide a higher level of fit than found in earlier arms race research

  1. Elimination of ballistic missiles: An important step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty preamble emphasises 'the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control', the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not further specify how this ultimate goal could be achieved for delivery systems. Delivery systems are an important and costly part of nuclear weapons which should be sophisticated, therefore the control of nuclear-capable delivery systems would be an important step to make nuclear weapons useless and reduce the threat od their use. This is especially true for ballistic missiles, which represent effective and powerful means to deploy nuclear weapons

  2. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons; Armes de terreur. Debarrasser le monde des armes nucleaires, biologiques et chimiques - Commission sur les armes de destruction massive

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blix, H.; Journe, V.

    2010-07-01

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  3. Chinese perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons. Prospects and potential problems in disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Obama administration is putting nuclear disarmament back on the agenda. In a major speech in Prague in April 2009, he envisioned a world free of nuclear weapons and called on nations to work toward that end. Reversing years of setbacks and stagnation, Washington and Moscow agreed on renewing negotiation on extending the START I Treaty last year and concluded the New START treaty in March 2010. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review indicates a shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine in that Washington pledges not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The prospects of nuclear disarmament look much promising as the momentum generated could also exert pressure on the second-tier nuclear-weapon States: Britain, France, and China. Beijing's responses to these developments have been favorable, viewing them as positive contribution to international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In particular China endorses President Obama's call for securing global nuclear materials and safeguarding vulnerable nuclear facilities to prevent nuclear terrorism. However, Chinese perspectives and policies on important international nuclear arms control and disarmament, and on the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence remain largely declaratory and less specific on its own commitments and participation. Chinese analyses, at the same time, point out the difficulties ahead on the road toward a nuclear weapons free world. Indeed, rhetoric notwithstanding, Beijing continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal to develop a secure and reliable second-strike deterrence capability. This paper takes a careful look at China's perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in its national security policy and defense posture. This is important because China is perceived to be the only country among the five original nuclear-weapon States that is actually expanding its nuclear arsenal, as indicated by the recent deployment of the long

  4. Nuclear weapon relevant materials and preventive arms control. Uranium-free fuels for plutonium elimination and spallation neutron sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    technological challenges of nuclear non-proliferation, which are directly connected with the central role of weapon-relevant materials, and it is trying to present practical solutions on a technical basis: - Discover paths for the disposal of existing amounts of nuclear weapon-relevant materials elaborating on the example of technically-based plutonium disposal options: central technical questions of the possible use of uranium-free inert matrix fuel (IMF) in currently used light water reactors will be addressed in order to clarify which advantages or disadvantages do exist in comparison to other disposal options. The investigation is limited on the comparison with one other reactor-based option, the use of uranium-plutonium mixed-oxide (MOX) fuels. - Analysis of proliferation relevant potentials of new nuclear technologies (accessibility of weapon materials): Exemplary investigation of spallation neutron sources in order to improve this technology by a more proliferation resistant shaping. Although they are obviously capable to breed nuclear weapon-relevant materials like plutonium, uranium-233 or tritium, there is no comprehensive analysis of nonproliferation aspects of spallation neutron sources up to now. Both project parts provide not only contributions to the concept of preventive arms control but also to the shaping of technologies, which is oriented towards the criteria of proliferation resistance.

  5. Progress to a nuclear-weapon-free world through tactical nuclear arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    At a time when, after some years of passivity, nuclear disarmament is becoming more of an urgent item on the international agenda and receiving accordingly more attention on the part of politicians and non-governmental experts. This is partly reflected in the Report of the Canberra Commission, and the statement on nuclear weapons by international generals and admirals. At the same time some developments such as uncertainties with START II ratification and the process of NATO enlargement make the task of nuclear arms control even more demanding. What is needed now is to pursue at last without any further delay negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. And these effective measures must include both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Only a sustained commitment at the highest political level will legitimate serious discussions of the elimination option and ensure that resources and personnel are devoted to finding solutions to the problems associated with moving to zero, and to crafting appropriate transition strategies. In the absence of such a commitment, the nations of the world may never reach the point at which the desirability and feasibility of a nuclear-free world can be evaluated with greater certainty. This Pugwash Conference is trying to make a modest contribution in helping to make possible such a vitally important commitment

  6. Nuclear Weapons 60 Years On: Still a Global Public Health Threat

    OpenAIRE

    MacDonald, Rhona

    2005-01-01

    This year marks the 60-year anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Has the world learned anything about the threat of nuclear weapons? What role can the health community play in reducing it?

  7. Proceedings: 17th Asilomar conference on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hickman, R.G.; Meier, C.A. (eds.)

    1983-01-01

    The objective of the 1983 conference was to provide for the technical exchange of ideas relating to the science and technology of the immediate effects of nuclear weapon explosions. Separate abstracts were prepared for 39 of the papers.

  8. The treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In a letter of 28 January 1994, the Director General was informed that on 18 January 1994, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American and the Caribbean entered into force for the Argentine Republic

  9. Amendments to the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the amendments to the Tlatelolco Treaty approved on 26 August 1992 by the Special Session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

  10. Analyses of mortality among workers at the Pantex nuclear weapons facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An analysis of mortality among white males employed at the Pantex Plant nuclear weapons facility did not reveal any unusual patterns of total or cause-specific mortality. Significantly fewer deaths were observed than were expected based on US rates for all causes, all cancers, digestive cancers, lung cancer, arteriosclerotic heart disease, and digestive diseases. No cause of death occurred significantly more often than expected. Similar results were observed when duration of employment, time since first employment, and radiation exposure greater than 1 rem were examined. There was no evidence that mortality from any cause was increased by employment at Pantex

  11. The nuclear weapons fallout preparedness exercise LOTTA. A presentation and evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report contains a presentation and evaluation of an emergency preparedness exercise (LOTTA) that was carried out at FOA NBC Defense in May 1998. The exercise scenario was based on a nuclear weapons explosion in Norway and the paper describes the development of the scenario including weather prognosis for the simulation of dose rate-, laboratory- and field measurements made during the exercise. An evaluation of the different functions trained is also given. This is the main report in a series of reports concerning exercise LOTTA

  12. Building transparency in nuclear-weapon states: The political and technical dimensions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Peaceful nuclear programmes in non-nuclear-weapon states are fully transparent, largely because of the application of international safeguards administered by the IAEA. By contrast, military nuclear activities have traditionally been shrouded in secrecy. All aspects of fissile material production, warhead numbers, deployments and capabilities, were and continue to be closely guarded and classified as national secrets. The aim of this paper, which draws upon an on-going SIPRI study, is to discuss a range of technical and non-technical issues related to establishing transparency for nuclear warheads and associated materials in nuclear-weapon states, having in mind two overarching considerations: achieving deeper and irreversible nuclear reductions on the path to elimination. It reviews past proposed and implemented initiatives and assesses future challenges. Particular attention is paid on existing obstacles, as well as on the prospects of co-operation amongst nuclear-weapon states. (author)

  13. A nuclear-weapon-free world. Report on working group 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The stages of nuclear material management are reviewed in respect to dismantlement of nuclear weapons, disposal of weapon-grade fissile materials and cut-off of their production as well as START I and II reduction which are underway. Separate chapters are dealing with the comprehensive test ban treaty, verification, control and regulation in this matter, and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, Canberra Commission, the ABM USA-Soviet Treaty

  14. A open-quotes Newclose quotes regime for nuclear weapons and materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this paper, I discuss the principal ideas that I covered in my presentation on December 8, 1993, at the Future of Foreign Nuclear Materials Symposium held by the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. I was asked to discuss issues related to military inventories of plutonium, and I took this opportunity to describe a possible declaratory regime that could encompass military as well as civilian inventories of plutonium. The open-quote newclose quotes in the title does not imply that the regime discussed here is an original idea. Rather, the regime will be open-quotes new,close quotes when it is adopted. The regime proposed here and in other works is one in which all stocks of nuclear weapons and materials are declared. Originally, declarations were proposed as a traditional arms control measure. Here, declarations are proposed to support the prevention of misuse of nuclear weapons and materials, including support for the nonproliferation regime. In the following, I discuss: (1) Worldwide inventories of nuclear weapons and materials, including the fact that military plutonium must be viewed as part of that worldwide inventory. (2) Life cycles of nuclear weapons and materials, including the various stages from the creation of nuclear materials for weapons through deployment and retirement of weapons to the final disposition of the materials. (3) Mechanisms for making declarations. (4) Risks and benefits to be derived from declarations. (5) Possibilities for supporting evidence or verification

  15. Agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world. Report on working group 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the discussion of START considerable attention was devoted to the unfortunate emergence of political realities that are not conductive to vigorous progress and bold initiatives in arms control. There was considerable concern about the status and fate of arms control efforts. The internal politics od arms control are increasingly challenging in Russia and the USA. The international politics of arms control are increasingly difficult. There is a rather disappointing progress on a hopeful arms control agenda. In the framework of dismantlement and disposition of nuclear weapons, there is a short run problem of security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in Russia, and the long run problem of disposition of excess weapon grade plutonium. Steps to be undertaken for achievement of nuclear-weapon-free world are recommended

  16. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

  17. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization - the Stockpile Life Extension Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cook, Donald

    2016-03-01

    Underground nuclear testing of U.S. nuclear weapons was halted by President George H.W. Bush in 1992 when he announced a moratorium. In 1993, the moratorium was extended by President Bill Clinton and, in 1995, a program of Stockpile Stewardship was put in its place. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Twenty years have passed since then. Over the same time, the average age of a nuclear weapon in the stockpile has increased from 6 years (1992) to nearly 29 years (2015). At its inception, achievement of the objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) appeared possible but very difficult. The cost to design and construct several large facilities for precision experimentation in hydrodynamics and high energy density physics was large. The practical steps needed to move from computational platforms of less than 100 Mflops/sec to 10 Teraflops/sec and beyond were unknown. Today, most of the required facilities for SSP are in place and computational speed has been increased by more than six orders of magnitude. These, and the physicists and engineers in the complex of labs and plants within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) who put them in place, have been the basis for underpinning an annual decision, made by the weapons lab directors for each of the past 20 years, that resort to underground nuclear testing is not needed for maintaining confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S stockpile. A key part of that decision has been annual assessment of the physical changes in stockpiled weapons. These weapons, quite simply, are systems that invariably and unstoppably age in the internal weapon environment of radioactive materials and complex interfaces of highly dissimilar organic and inorganic materials. Without an ongoing program to rebuild some components and replace other components to increase safety or security, i.e., life extending these weapons, either underground testing would again be

  18. International safeguards to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The ever-expanding use of atomic energy not only promotes the welfare of mankind but also leads to the accumulation of nuclear materials which can be employed for building weapons of mass destruction. Certain progress has recently been made towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the main barrier against the diversion of nuclear materials for the production of nuclear explosive devices. The factors essential for strengthening non-proliferation are accession to the Treaty by all countries, above all those engaged in nuclear activities, effective national systems of control of and accounting for nuclear materials, and an effective system of IAEA safeguards, as envisaged by the Treaty. Substantial nuclear activities are being carried out in States not party to the Treaty, and it is in these cases that effective control by an international organization is particularly important. The paper considers ways and means of implementing measures which would further enhance the universal character of non-proliferation and improve its effectiveness. It also discusses the features of the IAEA safeguards system and the factors governing its effectiveness. It is concluded that the essential conditions for improving effectiveness are application of control to the entire fuel cycle in non-nuclear-weapon States, the perfecting of the IAEA safeguards system, including automatic processing of nuclear materials accounting data, and effective physical protection of nuclear materials. (author)

  19. Between Shadow and Light: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Forty Years On

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The NPT was negotiated during the Cold War period to prevent the emergence of new nuclear players by distinguishing between 'nuclear-weapon states' (NWS) which had carried out nuclear testing before 1 January 1967, that is the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China, and 'non-nuclear-weapon states' (NNWS). Under the NPT, the two groups of states commit to comply with a series of commitments formulated around 'three pillars': 1 - Non-proliferation: the NWSs undertake under Article I not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over such weapons and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any NNWS to acquire them, while the NNWSs are bound under Article II to neither develop or acquire nuclear weapons or 'other nuclear explosive devices' nor to receive any assistance in that connection. 2 - Peaceful use of nuclear energy: Article IV guarantees the 'inalienable right' to 'develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination'. 3 - Nuclear disarmament: each state party to the treaty undertakes under Article VI 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'. The treaty entered in force in March 1970 and has since become universal, with 189 states parties in May 2010. At five-year intervals, parties to the treaty convene review conferences in order to review the operation of the treaty, Article VIII(3). The 1975, 1985 and 2000 review conferences culminated in the adoption of a final declaration and the 1995 review conference decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. The preparatory committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 review conference, which met from April 2007 to May 2009, did not adopt any recommendations, in absence of a consensus on essential issues concerning the operation of the treaty. Hence the importance of this 8. review conference of the parties held in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010 in a

  20. Civil Defense, U. S. A.: A Programmed Orientation to Civil Defense. Unit 2. Nuclear Weapons Effects and Shelter.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Basic information about nuclear weapons is presented so that their effects can be meaningfully related to the defensive countermeasures which will be most effective against them. Major topics include: (1) Explosive power of nuclear weapons, (2) Major effects of nuclear explosions, (3) Two basic types of nuclear explosions, (4) Contrast between air…

  1. Weapons of mass destruction: Overview of the CBRNEs (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Prockop, Leon D

    2006-11-01

    The events of September 11, 2001, made citizens of the world acutely aware of disasters consequent to present-day terrorism. This is a war being waged for reasons obscure to many of its potential victims. The term "NBCs" was coined in reference to terrorist weapons of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical. The currently accepted acronym is "CBRNE" which includes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive weapons. Non-nuclear explosives are the most common terrorist weapon now in use. Nuclear and radiological weapons are beyond the scope of this publication, which focuses on the "CBEs", i.e. chemical, biological and explosive weapons. Although neurologists will not be the first responders to CBEs, they must know about the neurological effects in order to provide diagnosis and treatment to survivors. Neurological complications of chemical, biological and explosive weapons which have or may be used by terrorists are reviewed by international experts in this publication. Management and treatment profiles are outlined. PMID:16920155

  2. Building confidence and partnership through the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The cold war is behind us now. It was with us a long time and we came to know it well. It was a dangerous time, but it had familiar contours and predictable reference points. Now, the topography of the bipolar confrontation is gone. We face great uncertainty and, yes, danger is still our companion. It is close at hand in the deadly relics of the cold war-the thousands of nuclear weapons that have been left behind like mines buried in a battlefield long after the guns have fallen silent. Our challenge is to construct a new and safer framework for our mutual relations beyond the cold war, based not on suspicion and fear, but on confidence and partnership. In doing so, it would be well to reflect on the enormous resources that were devoted to building weapons as compared to the relatively modest resources that will be needed to invest in peace. From that comparison should emerge a sense of proportion as to what we are called upon to do. We have choices. We can idly 'sleepwalk through history' and, once again, allow nuclear weapons to generate suspicion, competition, tension, and arms races reminiscent of the cold war. If we allow that to happen, we will have failed in our duty to posterity, and future generations will and should-judge us harshly. This would truly be the 'march of folly'. But if we seize the moment to build a solid foundation of confidence and partnership, we will surely be celebrated for our legacy of wisdom and peace. This is that moment. Let us now be wise

  3. Doses from external irradiation to Marshall Islanders from Bikini and Enewetak nuclear weapons tests.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bouville, André; Beck, Harold L; Simon, Steven L

    2010-08-01

    Annual doses from external irradiation resulting from exposure to fallout from the 65 atmospheric nuclear weapons tests conducted in the Marshall Islands at Bikini and Enewetak between 1946 and 1958 have been estimated for the first time for Marshallese living on all inhabited atolls. All tests that deposited fallout on any of the 23 inhabited atolls or separate reef islands have been considered. The methodology used to estimate the radiation doses at the inhabited atolls is based on test- and location-specific radiation survey data, deposition density estimates of 137Cs, and fallout times-of-arrival provided in a companion paper (Beck et al.), combined with information on the radionuclide composition of the fallout at various times after each test. These estimates of doses from external irradiation have been combined with corresponding estimates of doses from internal irradiation, given in a companion paper (Simon et al.), to assess the cancer risks among the Marshallese population (Land et al.) resulting from exposure to radiation from the nuclear weapons tests. PMID:20622549

  4. Proliferation concerns in the Russian closed nuclear weapons complex cities : a study of regional migration behavior.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Flores, Kristen Lee

    2004-07-01

    The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the legacy of the USSR weapons complex with an estimated 50 nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons cities containing facilities responsible for research, production, maintenance, and destruction of the weapons stockpile. The Russian Federation acquired ten such previously secret, closed nuclear weapons complex cities. Unfortunately, a lack of government funding to support these facilities resulted in non-payment of salaries to employees and even plant closures, which led to an international fear of weapons material and knowledge proliferation. This dissertation analyzes migration in 33 regions of the Russian Federation, six of which contain the ten closed nuclear weapons complex cities. This study finds that the presence of a closed nuclear city does not significantly influence migration. However, the factors that do influence migration are statistically different in regions containing closed nuclear cities compared to regions without closed nuclear cities. Further, these results show that the net rate of migration has changed across the years since the break up of the Soviet Union, and that the push and pull factors for migration have changed across time. Specifically, personal and residential factors had a significant impact on migration immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but economic infrastructure and societal factors became significant in later years. Two significant policy conclusions are derived from this research. First, higher levels of income are found to increase outmigration from regions, implying that programs designed to prevent migration by increasing incomes for closed city residents may be counter-productive. Second, this study finds that programs designed to increase capital and build infrastructure in the new Russian Federation will be more effective for employing scientists and engineers from the weapons complex, and consequently reduce the potential for emigration of

  5. Nuclear weapons, scientists, and the post-Cold War challenge selected papers on arms control

    CERN Document Server

    Drell, Sidney D

    2007-01-01

    This volume includes a representative selection of Sidney Drell's recent writings and speeches (circa 1993 to the present) on public policy issues with substantial scientific components. Most of the writings deal with national security, nuclear weapons, and arms control and reflect the author's personal involvement in such issues dating back to 1960. Fifteen years after the demise of the Soviet Union, the gravest danger presented by nuclear weapons is the spread of advanced technology that may result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of most concern would be their acquisition by hostile governments and terrorists who are unconstrained by accepted norms of civilized behavior. The current challenges are to prevent this from happening and, at the same time, to pursue aggressively the opportunity to escape from an outdated nuclear deterrence trap.

  6. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Tlatelolco Treaty established the first area inhabited by man in which nuclear weapons are prohibited. Eighteen Latin American States party thereto undertake to use all nuclear material and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. Special features of the Treaty are outlined; attention is called to obligations resulting therefrom that may require the adoption of appropriate legislation by the countries concerned in relation to the establishment of a national system of material control, the prohibition of transit of nuclear weapons and the status of foreign facilities over which effective jurisdiction is not exercised by a State party to the Treaty. (author)

  7. Against the spread of nuclear weapons - international safeguards on fissile material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The problems of nuclear arms control, both in the form of great-power armaments and the spread of weapons to small and possibly irresponsible nations are presented. The International Atomic Energy Agency runs an inspection activity which monitors and audits the production, utilisation and movement of fissile material in states subscribing to the non-proliferation treaty. The coverage is not complete, but the Agency claims some credit for the fact that still only six nations have nuclear weapons, while the number of nuclear power stations continues to rise rapidly. (G.F.F.)

  8. Some aspects of a technology of processing weapons grade plutonium to nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The concept by Russia to use fissile weapons-grade materials, which are being recovered from nuclear pits in the process of disarmament, is based on an assessment of weapons-grade plutonium as an important energy source intended for use in nuclear power plants. However, in the path of involving plutonium excessive from the purposes of national safety into industrial power engineering there are a lot of problems, from which effectiveness and terms of its disposition are being dependent upon. Those problems have political, economical, financial and environmental character. This report outlines several technology problems of processing weapons-grade metallic plutonium into MOX-fuel for reactors based on thermal and fast neutrons, in particular, the issue of conversion of the metal into dioxide from the viewpoint of fabrication of pelletized MOX-fuel. The processing of metallic weapons-grade plutonium into nuclear fuel is a rather complicated and multi-stage process, every stage of which is its own production. Some of the stages are absent in production of MOX-fuel, for instance the stage of the conversion, i.e. transferring of metallic plutonium into dioxide of the ceramic quality. At this stage of plutonium utilization some tasks must be resolved as follows: I. As a result of the conversion, a material purified from ballast and radiogenic admixtures has to be obtained. This one will be applied to fabricate pelletized MOX-fuel going from morphological, physico-mechanical and technological properties. II. It is well known that metallic gallium, which is used as an alloying addition in weapons-grade plutonium, actively reacts with multiple metals. Therefore, an important issue is to study the effect of gallium on the technology of MOX-fuel production, quality of the pellets, as well as the interaction of gallium oxide with zirconium and steel shells of fuel elements depending upon the content of gallium in the fuel. The rate of the interaction of gallium oxide

  9. Scientists for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Transactions of international seminar

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This publication presents the results of the Second International Seminar 'Scientists for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. The Seminar took place from 11 to 14 October 1994 in Nakhabino Country Club near Moscow. More than 60 specialists from Russia, USA, France, Belgium as well as IAEA and CEU took part in the seminar. Problems of cooperation in the field of nuclear materials accounting, control and safeguards, physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear export regulations and disarmament control are discussed at the seminar

  10. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. Proceedings of the forty-fifth Pugwash conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the fiftieth year after the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Council of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, rededicates itself to the goals of the Russel-Einstein Manifesto of 1955 that initiated the Pugwash movement, to the abolition of nuclear weapons and abolition of war. Under dramatic changes in the post Cold War period, and the difficulties that United Nations are facing, it is concluded that United Nations role is indispensable. Within the framework of achieving a nuclear weapon-free world, the Conference Working group dealt with the implementation of START talks, dismantlement and disposition of nuclear weapons, international control, elimination of the relevance of nuclear weapons in military policies and international relations. Another major topic was related to reducing proliferation risks including Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, expanding and internationalizing the verification and control regime, IAEA safeguards, managing proliferation risks from civilian and weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium. An important topic was the security in the Asia-Pacific region

  11. Health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons; Helse- og miljoevirkninger av atomvaapen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-08-01

    Since 1981 WHO has been studying and reporting on the effects of nuclear war on health and health services. This report provides information on the subject and refers to earlier related work of WHO. It forms the basis for a request from WHO to the International Court of Justice regarding the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. 15 refs.

  12. The India-Pakistan-China strategic triangle and the role of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chellaney, B

    2002-07-01

    This paper presents the Asian landscape with its regional balances and imbalances and its changes after September 11 and subsequent events. The nuclear posture and the role of nuclear weapons inside the China-India-Pakistan triangle is analyzed with respect to the US non-proliferation policy and its expanding military presence over the Asian continent. (J.S.)

  13. The India-Pakistan-China strategic triangle and the role of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper presents the Asian landscape with its regional balances and imbalances and its changes after September 11 and subsequent events. The nuclear posture and the role of nuclear weapons inside the China-India-Pakistan triangle is analyzed with respect to the US non-proliferation policy and its expanding military presence over the Asian continent. (J.S.)

  14. The nuclear weapons complex: Management for health, safety, and the environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Department of Energy (DOE) operates 17 major facilities to develop and produce nuclear weapons. The facilities, which together are termed the ''weapons complex,'' include laboratores that design and test the weapons and components; materials for use in weapons; and weapons production facilities that either produce various components or assemble them into completed weapons, or both. This report, which was requested of the National Research Council by DOE at the direction of Congress, sets out an assessment of various management, environmental, health, and safety issues melting to the operation of the complex. An examination of the weapons complex is an immense undertaking. The facilities are located throughout the United States, and each of the major facilities is a huge and sophisticated operation. The total budget of the complex for FY 1990 amounts to some $10 billion and involves a staff of some 80,000 people working for the Department and its contractors. The Department confronts a variety of problems in connection with its stewardship of the complex. Many of the facilities are old, and maintenance over the years has been inadequate. There is a legacy of environmental contamination that must be addressed. Moreover, DOE must be prepared to operate under close public scrutiny and in compliance with environmental and safety standards that have become increasingly stringent over time. 42 refs., 8 figs., 4 tabs

  15. The nuclear industry: a new weapon for the Kremlin?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    After having noticed the recent evolution of the Russian policy which tends to concentrate the economical and political power with a limited democratic pluralism, the author describes the re-structuring policy adopted for the energy sector, and notably the nuclear sector, in order to become a major international actor. First, she analyses the evolution of the hydrocarbon sector with a better management of tax incomes, and a stronger control of the industries of this sector based on a State capitalism development. She outlines that Russia now uses energy as a diplomatic arm, particularly in its relationship with the European Union. She states that Russia may want to follow the same kind of policy for nuclear energy as for the hydrocarbon sector by developing partnership with other countries, by regrouping the concerned activities within a single holding company (Atomenergoprom) and a federal agency (Rosatom). Russia increased its uranium production and became a powerful actor who challenges other international companies (Areva, Westinghouse, Toshiba). The author discusses the strategy defined by the Kremlin to reach supremacy in the nuclear sector

  16. Can state-level safeguards be applied in nuclear weapon states?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Acquisition Path Analysis (APA) is a key element of IAEA's State-level concept. Currently, this process is mainly based on expert judgment. However, the requirements from the IAEA state that the process must be objective, reproducible, transparent, standardized, documented and as a result non-discriminatory. A formal approach fulfilling these requirements has been set up by the authors in the past. In this paper, the refined methodology is presented. Improvements have been made in the interface definition between the three stages, the general network model has been updated, and the automatic visualization of acquisition paths has been accomplished. Furthermore, a prototype implementation will be shown. Based on this methodology, a test case example is presented which models a hypothetic nuclear weapon State not having signed the NPT. For this case, it will be shown how APA can be implemented using the proposed methodology.

  17. Can state-level safeguards be applied in nuclear weapon states?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Listner, Clemens; Canty, Morton J. [Forschungszentrum Juelich (Germany); Rezniczek, Arnold [UBA GmbH, Herzogenrath (Germany); Stein, Gotthard

    2013-07-01

    Acquisition Path Analysis (APA) is a key element of IAEA's State-level concept. Currently, this process is mainly based on expert judgment. However, the requirements from the IAEA state that the process must be objective, reproducible, transparent, standardized, documented and as a result non-discriminatory. A formal approach fulfilling these requirements has been set up by the authors in the past. In this paper, the refined methodology is presented. Improvements have been made in the interface definition between the three stages, the general network model has been updated, and the automatic visualization of acquisition paths has been accomplished. Furthermore, a prototype implementation will be shown. Based on this methodology, a test case example is presented which models a hypothetic nuclear weapon State not having signed the NPT. For this case, it will be shown how APA can be implemented using the proposed methodology.

  18. DOE/LLNL verification symposium on technologies for monitoring nuclear tests related to weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The rapidly changing world situation has raised concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the ability to monitor a possible clandestine nuclear testing program. To address these issues, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Treaty Verification Program sponsored a symposium funded by the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Arms Control, Division of Systems and Technology. The DOE/LLNL Symposium on Technologies for Monitoring Nuclear Tests Related to Weapons Proliferation was held at the DOE's Nevada Operations Office in Las Vegas, May 6--7,1992. This volume is a collection of several papers presented at the symposium. Several experts in monitoring technology presented invited talks assessing the status of monitoring technology with emphasis on the deficient areas requiring more attention in the future. In addition, several speakers discussed proliferation monitoring technologies being developed by the DOE's weapons laboratories

  19. The Feed Materials Program of the Manhattan Project: A Foundational Component of the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reed, B. Cameron

    2014-12-01

    The feed materials program of the Manhattan Project was responsible for procuring uranium-bearing ores and materials and processing them into forms suitable for use as source materials for the Project's uranium-enrichment factories and plutonium-producing reactors. This aspect of the Manhattan Project has tended to be overlooked in comparison with the Project's more dramatic accomplishments, but was absolutely vital to the success of those endeavors: without appropriate raw materials and the means to process them, nuclear weapons and much of the subsequent cold war would never have come to pass. Drawing from information available in Manhattan Engineer District Documents, this paper examines the sources and processing of uranium-bearing materials used in making the first nuclear weapons and how the feed materials program became a central foundational component of the postwar nuclear weapons complex.

  20. The transportation of British nuclear weapons by road. Hiroshima is waiting to happen in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This leaflet describes the transportation of nuclear weapons on United Kingdom roads. The author seeks to question the safety and desirability of such activities, and points out the potential hazards to humans and the environment should convoy accidents occur. Correspondence is included between the author and various Government sources to illustrate the difficulty of obtaining full, accurate information on the design and safety of weapons transportation vehicles and the reasons and frequency of weapons convoys. The author contrasts these difficulties with the free available government information in the United States of America because of the Freedom of Information Act. Readers are urged to contribute to monitoring the routes and occurrence of UK weapons convoys to assist in data collection. (UK)

  1. Prediction of ground motion from underground nuclear weapons tests as it relates to siting of a nuclear waste storage facility at NTS and compatibility with the weapons test program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report assumes reasonable criteria for NRC licensing of a nuclear waste storage facility at the Nevada Test Site where it would be exposed to ground motion from underground nuclear weapons tests. Prediction equations and their standard deviations have been determined from measurements on a number of nuclear weapons tests. The effect of various independent parameters on standard deviation is discussed. That the data sample is sufficiently large is shown by the fact that additional data have little effect on the standard deviation. It is also shown that coupling effects can be separated out of the other contributions to the standard deviation. An example, based on certain licensing assumptions, shows that it should be possible to have a nuclear waste storage facility in the vicinity of Timber Mountain which would be compatible with a 700 kt weapons test in the Buckboard Area if the facility were designed to withstand a peak vector acceleration of 0.75 g. The prediction equation is a log-log linear equation which predicts acceleration as a function of yield of an explosion and the distance from it

  2. Building transparency in nuclear-weapon states: The political and technical dimensions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peaceful nuclear programmes in non-nuclear-weapon states are fully transparent, largely because of the application of international safeguards administered by the IAEA. By contrast, military nuclear activities have traditionally been shrouded in secrecy. All aspects of fissile material and warhead production, warhead numbers, deployments and capabilities, were and, to a great extent, continue to be closely guarded and classified as national secrets. The aim of this paper, which draws upon a recently completed SIPRI study, is to illustrate a range of technical and non-technical issues related to establishing transparency for nuclear warheads and associated materials in nuclear-weapon states, having in mind two overarching considerations: achieving deeper and irreversible nuclear reductions. (author)

  3. Project of law relative to the sanitary consequences of French nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In order to make easy the indemnifications and to include the persons having participate to nuclear weapons tests (Sahara and French Polynesia) and populations leaving in the concerned areas, the project of law relative to the repair of sanitary consequences of nuclear weapons tests proposes to create a right to integral repair of prejudices for the persons suffering of a radioinduced disease coming from these tests. The American example and the British example are given for comparison. The modalities of financing are detailed as well as the social economic and administrative impacts. (N.C.)

  4. Mortality and cancer incidence in UK participants in UK atmospheric nuclear weapon tests and experimental programmes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A brief report is given of a study by the NRPB on the mortality and cancer incidence in UK participants in UK atmospheric nuclear weapon tests and experimental programmes. The results of 22,347 participants were compared with a population of 22,326 controls. It was concluded that participation in the nuclear weapons tests had no detectable effect on the participants' expectation of life or on their total risk of developing cancer, apart possibly from an effect on the risks from developing multiple myeloma and leukaemia. (U.K.)

  5. Nuclear Weapons in Regional Contexts: The Cases of Argentina and Brazil

    OpenAIRE

    Junior, Olival Freire; Hurtado, Diego; Moreira, Ildeu C.; Barros, Fernando de Souza

    2015-01-01

    South America is a region which is free from nuclear weapons. However, this was not an inevitable development from the relationships among its countries. Indeed, regional rivalries between Brazil and Argentina, with military implications for both countries, lasted a long time. After WWII these countries took part in the race to obtain nuclear technologies and nuclear ambitions were part of the game. In the mid 1980s, the end of military dictatorships and the successful establishing of democra...

  6. Plutonium in the marine environment at Thule, NW-Greenland after a nuclear weapons accident

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Dahlgaard, H.; Eriksson, M.; Ilus, E.;

    2001-01-01

    In January 1968, a B52 plane carrying 4 nuclear weapon!: crashed on the sea ice similar to 12 km from the Thule Air Base, in northwest Greenland. The benthic marine environment in the 180-230 m deep Bylot Sound was then contaminated with similar to1.4 TBq Pu-239,Pu-240 (similar to0.5 kg). The site...... area outside Bylot Sound. The present data support an earlier quantification of the sedimentation rate as 2-4 mm per year, i.e. 5-12 cm during the 29 years since the accident. Biological activity has mixed accident plutonium much deeper down, to 20-30 cm, and the 5-12 cm new sediment has been...... lower concentrations in biota than in sediments. Some biota groups show a somewhat higher uptake of americium than of plutonium. Sediment samples with weapons plutonium from the accident show a significant variation in Pu-240/Pu-239 atom ratios in the range 0.027-0.057. This supports the hypothesis that...

  7. The evolution of legal approaches to controlling nuclear and radiological weapons and combating the threat of nuclear terrorism

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    J. Herbach

    2015-01-01

    This chapter traces the evolution of international law related to the weaponization of nuclear and other radioactive materials, focusing in particular on the law pertaining to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism. International efforts to control atomic energy have evolved substantially since the on

  8. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  10. UFOs and nukes. Extraordinary encounters at nuclear weapons sites; UFOs und Atomwaffen. Unheimliche Begegnungen in der Naehe von Nuklearwaffendepots

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hastings, Robert L.

    2015-07-01

    Everyone knows about the reported recovery of a crashed alien spaceship near Roswell, New Mexico in July 1947. However, most people are unaware that, at the time of the incident, Roswell Army Airfield was home to the world's only atomic bomber squadron, the 509th Bomb Group. Was this merely a coincidence? During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built thousands of the far more destructive hydrogen bombs, some of them a thousand times as destructive as the first atomic bombs dropped on Japan. If the nuclear standoff between the superpowers had erupted into World War III, human civilization - and perhaps the very survival of our species - would have been at risk. Did this ominous state of affairs come to the attention of outside observers? Was there a connection between the atomic bomber squadron based at Roswell and the reported crash of a UFO nearby? Did those who pilot the UFOs monitor the superpowers' nuclear arms race during the dangerous Cold War era? Do they scrutinize American and Russian weapons sites even now? UFOs and Nukes provides the startling and sometimes shocking answers to these questions. Veteran researcher Robert Hastings has investigated nuclear weapons-related UFO incidents for more than three decades and has interviewed more than 120 ex-US Air Force personnel, from former Airmen to retired Colonels, who witnessed extraordinary UFO encounters at nuclear weapons sites. Their amazing stories are presented here.

  11. Probabilistic consequence study of residual radiological effects from a hypothetical ten-ton inadvertent nuclear yield. Weapons Safety Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this paper we study the potential radiological consequences of a strategic bomber accident, in which one of the assumed on-board nuclear weapons explodes with an arbitrarily chosen 10-ton nuclear yield. The frequency of such an occurrence is infinitesimal. The safety design features in today s nuclear weapons' systems essentially forbid its occurrence. We have a chosen a military base which has the feature of being a representative combination of urban and rural populations. The assumed ''crash site'' is near the northwest comer of the military base, close to civilian housing located just across the street from the base. A worst case wind would be from the ESE (east south east). This would cause fission debris to be dispersed toward the largest population centers and, thus, would lead to the largest Pu ''collective'' doses (i.e., a dose integrated over time and summed over individuals). Also, if an ESE wind were blowing at accident time, some people in nearby housing could receive lethal gamma-ray doses from fallout before evacuation could occur. It is assumed only one weapon undergoes nuclear yield; the other on-board weapons would HE detonate and the Pu would be aerosolized and lofted. We assume an activity-size distribution and lofting similar to those used to predict fallout measured at NTS. The main thrust of our study is to provide estimates of probabilistic radiological risks to the population local to a strategic bomber crash site. The studied radiological consequences are: cloud-passage doses from Pu inhalation; doses from groundshine due to gamma-producing radionuclides; and areal contamination from Pu and the long-lived fission products Cs-137 and Sr-90

  12. DOE (Department of Energy) nuclear weapon R and T (research, development, and testing): Objectives, roles, and responsibilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Otey, G.R.

    1989-07-01

    An overview of the DOE nuclear weapons research, development, and testing program is given along with a description of the program objectives and the roles and responsibilities of the various involved organizations. The relationship between the DoD and DOE is described and the division of responsibilities for weapon development as well as the coordinated planning and acquisition activities are reviewed. Execution of the RD T program at the nuclear weapons laboratories is outlined. 24 refs., 3 figs.

  13. Low Prevalence of Chronic Beryllium Disease among Workers at a Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Arjomandi, M; Seward, J P; Gotway, M B; Nishimura, S; Fulton, G P; Thundiyil, J; King, T E; Harber, P; Balmes, J R

    2010-01-11

    To study the prevalence of beryllium sensitization (BeS) and chronic beryllium disease (CBD) in a cohort of workers from a nuclear weapons research and development facility. We evaluated 50 workers with BeS with medical and occupational histories, physical examination, chest imaging with HRCT (N=49), and pulmonary function testing. Forty of these workers also underwent bronchoscopy for bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) and transbronchial biopsies. The mean duration of employment at the facility was 18 yrs and the mean latency (from first possible exposure) to time of evaluation was 32 yrs. Five of the workers had CBD at the time of evaluation (based on histology or HRCT); three others had evidence of probable CBD. These workers with BeS, characterized by a long duration of potential Be exposure and a long latency, had a low prevalence of CBD.

  14. Scope for nuclear weapon-free zone in central and eastern Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The idea of a Central Europe free of nuclear weapons has its roots, of course, in the end of the cold war and the break-up of the former Union. These historical developments created the necessary conditions for the Lisbon Protocol, the successful withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan as well as these countries' accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is admitted that even before these steps had been achieved, Belarus had put forward the nuclear-free zone initiative at the United Nations General Assembly in 1991. Like all the other nuclear weapon-free zones, existing or potential, a proposal for such a zone entails that it be analysed in the context of its political environment, regional specificity as well as the role, and implications of the relevant outside powers. These include Warsaw Pact dissolution and its impact on control of tactical nuclear weapons as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO's) expansion eastwards. It is equally important to look at the issue in the context of its history, or, in other words, the past attempts

  15. The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Garaizar, Xabier [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2009-07-02

    In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

  16. The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

  17. Review of nuclear fuel cycle alternatives including certain features pertaining to weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Largely as a result of concerns over nuclear weapon proliferation, the U.S. program to develop and commercialize the plutonium-fueled breeder reactor has been slowed down; interest in alternative fuel cycles has increased. The report offers an informal review of the various nuclear fuel cycle options including some aspects relevant to weapon proliferation, although no complete review of the latter subject is attempted. Basic principles governing breeding, reactor safety, and efficient utilization of fission energy resources (thorium and uranium) are discussed. The controversial problems of weapon proliferation and its relation to fuel reprocessing (which is essential for efficient fuel cycles) are reviewed and a number of proposed approaches to reducing proliferation risks are noted. Some representative specific reactor concepts are described, with emphasis on their development status, their potentials for resource utilization, and their implications for proliferation

  18. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: The road ahead. London, 15 January 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 15 January 2001. The Director General points out that for over five decades since the summer of 1945, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. In his view, the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world will crucially depend on a fundamental change in that concept of 'security'. Besides the historical perspectives the paper focuses on the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament strategies. The Director General also states that to achieve the main goal of universal non-proliferation and disarmament it is indispensable to re-evaluate nuclear weapon states status; challenge the doctrine of nuclear deterrence; develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence; and engage in constructive dialogue. In conclusion it is re-emphasized that there remain both the difficulties and the opportunities of the road towards nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out that construction of a non-proliferation regime with near-universal participation has been successful and some progress towards nuclear disarmament has been achieved, but several goals must be pursued to maintain and build upon achievements

  19. Escalation of terrorism? On the risk of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons or materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The report on the risk of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons or materials covers the following topics: the variety of terrorism: ethnic-nationalistic, politically motivated, social revolutionary, political extremism, religious fanaticism, governmental terrorism; CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) weapons and materials: their availability and effectiveness in case of use; potential actor groups; prevention and counter measures, emergency and mitigating measures.

  20. The Swedish National Defence Research Establishment and the plans for Swedish nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish Government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid 50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the Parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the Parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The Government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue. During this period

  1. Sweden and the bomb. The Swedish plans to acquire nuclear weapons, 1945 - 1972

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid-50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The prime minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue. During this period

  2. Safety issues in robotic handling of nuclear weapon parts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robotic systems are being developed by the Intelligent Systems and Robotics Center at Sandia National Laboratories to perform automated handling tasks with radioactive weapon parts. These systems will reduce the occupational radiation exposure to workers by automating operations that are currently performed manually. The robotic systems at Sandia incorporate several levels of mechanical, electrical, and software safety for handling hazardous materials. For example, tooling used by the robot to handle radioactive parts has been designed with mechanical features that allow the robot to release its payload only at designated locations in the robotic workspace. In addition, software processes check for expected and unexpected situations throughout the operations. Incorporation of features such as these provides multiple levels of safety for handling hazardous or valuable payloads with automated intelligent systems

  3. Mode Research on Space Weapons Systems Innovation Based Quality Function Deployment

    OpenAIRE

    Wang Xiuhong

    2011-01-01

    in the aviation industry, experts are enthusiastic over the research of sophisticated weapons. Little specialist pays attention to the innovation modes and methods. Up to now little quantization method suitable for aviation weapon systems innovation is presented. Base on the deep analysis and study on features of aviation weapon systems innovation and different innovation mode from the mass production, we have designed process model and quality chain model of aviation weapon systems innovatio...

  4. Argumentation in the Canadian House of Commons on the Issue of Nuclear Weapons for Canada.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jones, John Alfred

    The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 forced the Canadian House of Commons to consider whether Canadian forces in NORAD and NATO were effective without nuclear warheads on special weapons systems. This paper provides an overview of the debates and their milieu, identifies the issues involved, and analyzes the effects of the argumentation. The…

  5. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Every year since 1974 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the subject ''Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East''. By that resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, taking into account the circumstances and characteristics of the Middle East, as well as the views and the suggestions of the parties of the region, and to submit this study to the General Assembly. The study was carried out between July 1989 and August 1990. The study discusses a number of steps and measures that could ease the process leading to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Those measures could be undertaken independently or in conjunction with each other, as well as by individual States or jointly by several, and also on a reciprocal basis; each of them would move the States concerned closer to their ultimate objective - the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons

  6. Materials characterization capabilities at DOE Nuclear Weapons Laboratories and Production Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The materials characterization and analytical chemistry capabilities at the 11 DOE Nuclear Weapons Laboratories or Production Plants have been surveyed and compared. In general, all laboratories have similar capabilities and equipment. Facilities or capabilities that are unique or that exist at only a few laboratories are described in detail

  7. Irradiation and contamination owed to nuclear weapons experimentations on the Kazakhstan Semipalatinsk polygon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan was one of the nuclear weapons polygon for atmospheric, excavation and underground tests. After a description of the actual state of the polygon, a dosimetric approach inside and outside the polygon is presented from 1949 to 1989. (A.B.). 5 refs., 3 figs., 5 tabs

  8. Tests of nuclear weapons and the beginning of radioactivity monitoring using the example of Switzerland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A historical survey is given on the development and the tests of nuclear weapons including the consequences for humans and the environment, as well as on the generation of measuring networks for radioactivity in the environment in the same time. Some results of the measurements are shown exemplarily for Switzerland.

  9. A new computed tomography X-ray system to image nuclear weapon components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A new computed tomography x-ray system developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory of the United States, the Confined Large Optical Scintillator Screen and Imaging System (CoLOSSIS), can be used to image nuclear weapon components. After describing the development background, outline, working principle and key technology of the system, the application and prospects of the system are discussed. (authors)

  10. FMCT after South Asia's tests. A view from a nuclear-weapon state

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Proposals to negotiate an international treaty to cutoff the production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons have been on the international nuclear agenda for many decades. Hopes in the early 1990s that it would be possible finally to negotiate a FMCT, however, have not been borne out. Instead, a deadlock had ensued at the Geneva CD. It remains to be seen whether the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan will contribute to breaking that deadlock - or only to foreclosing any prospects for negotiating cutoff in the foreseeable future. The key lies in the attitudes of Delhi and Islamabad - influenced to the extent possible by the efforts of the international community to convince both countries' leaders to stop short of an escalating nuclear war in the region. Regardless, there are a variety of other initiatives aimed at heightening transparency and controls over the nuclear weapons materials in the five NPT nuclear weapon states that could be pursued as part of broader ongoing efforts to roll back the Cold War nuclear legacies

  11. Is there any future for nuclear weapons?; Les armes nucleaires ont-elles un avenir?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heisbourg, F.

    2011-07-01

    Nuclear weapons occupy a paradoxal place both in the collective imagination and in the historical reality: on the one hand everybody dreads the apocalypse horror, and on the other hand, dissuasion appears as an unchanging and quite comfortable situation. However, the world has become multipolar in this domain as well. The geopolitical map is reconstructing. Doctrinal revisions, initiatives against nuclear weapons proliferation, and nuclear disarmament measures are now on the agenda. The best foreign and French experts examine for the first time the consequences of these evolutions. They analyse in particular the split up risks and the potential consequences of a nuclear conflict in regions where atomic arms have become a key-component of the strategic landscape: Middle-Est, Far-East, Southern Asia. The choices France and its allies will have to face are examined as well. (J.S.)

  12. Under fire: Is the world's treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons strong enough?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fifteen years into the 'atoms for peace' era, Ireland in 1968 took the historic first step to sign the global treaty against tile spread of nuclear weapons. Since then, more than 180 other countries without nuclear weapons have joined the pact, most of them during the cold war period. They see their security in not having (lie bomb, and bind themselves to work for nuclear disarmament everywhere. Their shared commitments make the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) the most accepted arms-control agreement in history, a cornerstone of nuclear cooperation, countries that join it renounce the military atom, and they must accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities to verify it. But the Treaty is under fire, and some critics think it no longer fits the times. They say it cannot prevent Treaty countries from breaking out at will, or ensure that those having nuclear ambitions or arsenals are actually honouring their pledges. Neither has it attracted three key countries - India and Pakistan, which have tested atomic bombs, and Israel, which is suspected of having them - to its ranks of members. Not everyone agrees that the NPT is outdated. But it is clear that the Treaty and its associated regime are under stress, and that its fragile condition needs urgent care. The debate is important and timely - the Treaty comes up for international review in 2005 and countries already are preparing for it. A major question today is whether the NPT is strong enough to keep the lid on nuclear weapons in the world's changed security environment. A former senior official at the IAEA looks at the challenging picture

  13. The practical experience with assistance programs: view from a non-nuclear weapons-state with a significant nuclear infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: In the area of nuclear energy utilization, the Republic of Kazakhstan follows international legislation standards. Since December 13, 1993 Kazakhstan has been a participant of the Nuclear Weapon Non-proliferation Treaty and does not have nuclear weapons. In the framework of this treaty, Kazakhstan provides measures to ensure the non-proliferation regime. The republic signed the agreement with IAEA on the guarantees, that were ratified by a presidential decree in 1995. Nuclear objects in Kazakhstan have the following characteristics: Ulba Metallurgical Plant, located in the eastern area of Kazakhstan, manufactures fuel pellets of uranium dioxide for heat release assemblies of RBMK and LWR reactor types. These pellets have an enrichment of U235 1.6-4.4 %. Ulba also has a radioactive waste disposal storage site; a power plant for heat and power supply, and water desalination is based at the BN-350 fast breeder reactor. This reactor is located in Aktau city on the Caspian Sea. Since April 1999, the reactor has been in the process of being decommissioned. There is a lot of spent fuel with highly radioactive and toxic weapon plutonium there. There are also research reactors of National Nuclear Centre, located in the north-eastern area of Kazakhstan, near Semipalatinsk city. These research reactors have nuclear materials of the first category, which are attractive to criminal groups: IVG.1 M - light-water heterogeneous reactor of vessel type on thermal neutrons, with light water moderator and coolant, maximum power is 35 MW; IGR - impulse homogeneous graphite reactor on thermal neutrons, with graphite reflector; RA - high temperature gas cooled reactor on thermal neutrons, 0.5 MW power. There is also a research reactor site near Almaty city, with LWR-K - light-water reactor, with 10 MW power, uses highly enriched uranium (up to 36 % of U-235). The following activity was accomplished in the framework of physical security modernization for nuclear objects and

  14. Accelerator-based conversion (ABC) of reactor and weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An accelerator-based conversion (ABC) system is presented that is capable of rapidly burning plutonium in a low-inventory sub-critical system. The system also returns fission power to the grid and transmutes troublesome long-lived fission products to short lived or stable products. Higher actinides are totally fissioned. The system is suited not only to controlled, rapid burning of excess weapons plutonium, but to the long range application of eliminating or drastically reducing the world total inventory of plutonium. Deployment of the system will require the successful resolution of a broad range of technical issues introduced in the paper

  15. Accelerator-based conversion (ABC) of reactor and weapons plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jensen, R.J.; Trapp, T.J.; Arthur, E.D.; Bowman, C.D.; Davidson, J.W.; Linford, R.K.

    1993-06-01

    An accelerator-based conversion (ABC) system is presented that is capable of rapidly burning plutonium in a low-inventory sub-critical system. The system also returns fission power to the grid and transmutes troublesome long-lived fission products to short lived or stable products. Higher actinides are totally fissioned. The system is suited not only to controlled, rapid burning of excess weapons plutonium, but to the long range application of eliminating or drastically reducing the world total inventory of plutonium. Deployment of the system will require the successful resolution of a broad range of technical issues introduced in the paper.

  16. American Physicists, Nuclear Weapons in World War II, and Social Responsibility

    Science.gov (United States)

    Badash, Lawrence

    2005-06-01

    Social responsibility in science has a centuries-long history, but it was such a minor thread that most scientists were unaware of the concept. Even toward the conclusion of the Manhattan Project, which produced the first nuclear weapons, only a handful of its participants had some reservations about use of a weapon of mass destruction. But the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki not only made society more aware of the importance of science, they made scientists more aware of their responsibility to society. I describe the development of the concept of social responsibility and its appearance among American scientists both before and after the end of World War II.

  17. Twelve theses on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NP is not only a scientific-technical but in particular a political task. For the Federal Republic of Germany this means a special responsibility, and thus the theses were formulated and recommendations derived thereof. The theses deal with the following subjects: The responsibility of the FRG - historical, geostrategic, infrastructural; prolongation of the NPT; international safeguards for civil nuclear technology, the role of the IAEA; regional NP policy; nuclear exports; economic aspects of nuclear energy; plutonium and highly-enriched uranium; research policy; radiological risks; nuclear criminal law; disarmament. There are dissenting votes on some theses. Sweeping political developments let some of the theses adopted by the Working Group in March 1990 become obsolete already. (HSCH)

  18. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A TOOL OF NORTH KOREAN FOREING POLICY

    OpenAIRE

    Ovšonka, Pavol

    2011-01-01

    In 1990's, the North Korean leaders opened the military nuclear program in order to avoid the collapsing trend which affected many totalitarian regimes at that time. Thanks to the specific geographical position, Inter-Korean dispute became a very important issue of foreign policy of many great powers such as United States of America, People's Republic of China, Japan, or Russian Federation. This nuclear program is generally considered as a tool of threatening in order to maintain the regime a...

  19. Foreseeable medical consequences of use of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hiatt, H.H.

    1982-01-01

    An editorial discussion of the environmental impacts of nuclear warfare is presented. It is expected that the bulk of the urban population in the northern hemisphere would be killed. Long-term consequences mentioned include changes in global climate and weather patterns, destruction of the ozone shield and genetic damage. Efforts are underway to provide the public with a realistic understanding of potential problems in the event of a nuclear holocaust. (JMT)

  20. The perils of proliferation: Organization theory, deterrence theory, and the spread of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sagan, S.D. (Stanford Univ., CA (United States))

    What is missing in the literature on nuclear proliferation is an alternative theory of the consequences of nuclear proliferation; the effects of nuclear weapons on the likelihood of war. This article presents such an alternative, rooted in organizational theory, which leads to a more pessimistic assessment of the future prospects for peace. Professional military organizations display strong proclivities toward organizational behaviors that lead to deterrence failures. Such organizational proclivities can be effectively countered only by tight and sustained civilian control of the military. There are strong reasons to believe that future nuclear-armed states will lack such positive mechanisms of civilian control.

  1. Weapons-grade nuclear material - open questions of a safe disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    There are suitable technologies available for destruction of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Weapons-grade uranium, consisting to 90% of the isotope U-235, can be diluted with the uranium isotope U-238 to make it non-weapons-grade, but it will then still be a material that can be used as a fuel in civil nuclear reactors. For safe plutonium disposal, several options are under debate. There is for instance a process called ''reverse reprocessing'', with the plutonium being blended with high-level radioactive fission products and then being put into a waste form accepted for direct ultimate disposal. The other option is to convert weapons-grade plutonium into MOX nuclear fuel elements and then ''burn'' them in civil nuclear power reactors. This is an option favoured by many experts. Such fuel elements should stay for a long time in the reactor core in order to achieve high burnups, and should then be ready for ultimate disposal. This disposal pathway offers essential advantages: the plutonium is used up or depleted as a component of reactor fuel, and thus is no longer available for illegal activities, and it serves as an energy source for power generation. (orig./HP)

  2. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, final report, 'Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms', Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are rightly called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Designed to terrify as well as destroy, they have the potential to kill thousands and thousands of people in a single attack, and their effects may persist in the environment and in our bodies, in some cases indefinitely. Many efforts have been made to free the world from the threat of these weapons and some progress has been made. Paradoxically, despite the end of the Cold War, the past decade has seen more setbacks than successes. States have failed to comply with their disarmament and non-proliferation commitments, and terrorist groups have emerged that recognize no restraints. In September 2005, the United Nations World Summit was unable to agree on a single recommendation on disarmament and non-proliferation. It is time for all to wake up to the awesome reality that many of the old threats continue to hang over the world and that many new ones have emerged. It is time for all governments to revive their cooperation and to breathe new life into the disarmament work of the United Nations. Efforts to eradicate poverty and to protect the global environment must be matched by a dismantling of the world's most destructive capabilities. The gearshift now needs to be moved from reverse to drive. Biological and chemical weapons have been comprehensively outlawed through global conventions, but these need to be universally accepted and fully implemented. Nuclear weapons must also be outlawed. Before this aim is realized, there must be new initiatives to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and the threat posed by them. It is equally urgent to prevent proliferation and to take special measures to ensure that terrorists do not acquire any weapons of mass destruction. This report presents ideas and recommendations on what the world community - including national governments and civil society - can and should do

  3. Controlling nuclear weapons at the source: Verification of a cutoff in the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The results of this survey encourage us to believe that-at the current levels of the superpower nuclear arsenals at least-adequate verification of an agreement to cut off the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons could be achieved. Of course, if and when nuclear disarmament proceeds to the point where the stockpiles have been greatly reduced, the task of adequate verification may become more difficult. In this ''first cut'' analysis, we cannot estimate how far such reductions might proceed before considerations of verifiability become a serious impediment. Such considerations of should not, however, delay the quite dramatic actions that could be taken immediately. Indeed, successful conclusion of a superpower fissile cutoff could create a more conducive atmosphere for the negotiations of drastic reductions

  4. Scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre - ARSRITP and arms control and nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The activity of scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre (RFNC) -ARSRITP in the field of nuclear disarmament control for the period of 1974 -1993 is discussed. RFNC - ARSRITP scientists in collaboration with american specialists have developed and employed in practice the techniques and equipment to control the bilateral Treaty on the limitation of Nuclear -Weapon Test. Experience of control over nuclear tests of threshold power and realization of new RFNC - ARSRITP scientific and technical projects have made a basis for development of measures and means of possible control methods to observe complete nuclear test ban

  5. Plutonium gamma-ray measurements for mutual reciprocal inspections of dismantled nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Koenig, Z.M.; Carlson, J.B.; Clark, D.; Gosnell, T.B.

    1995-07-01

    The O`Leary-Mikhailov agreement of March 1994 stated that the U.S. and the Russian Federation would engage in mutual reciprocal inspections (MRI) of fissile materials removed from dismantled nuclear weapons. It was decided to begin with the plutonium (Pu) removed from dismantled weapons and held in storage containers. Later discussions between U.S. and Russian technical experts led to the conclusion that, to achieve the O`Leary-Mikhailov objectives, Pu MRI would need to determine that the material in the containers has properties consistent with a nuclear-weapon component. Such a property is a {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu ratio consistent with weapons-grade material. One of the candidate inspection techniques under consideration for Pu MRI is to use a narrow region (630-670 keV) of the plutonium gamma-ray spectrum, taken with a high-purity germanium detector, to determine that it is weapons-grade plutonium as well as to estimate the minimum mass necessary to produce the observed gamma-ray intensity. We developed software (the Pu600 code) for instrument control and analysis especially for this purpose. In November 1994, U.S. and Russian scientists met at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for joint experiments to evaluate candidate Pu MRI inspection techniques. In one of these experiments, gamma-ray intensities were measured from three unclassified weapons-grade plutonium source standards and one reactor-grade standard (21% {sup 240}pu). Using our software, we determined the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu ratio of these standards to accuracies within {+-}10%, which is adequate for Pu MRI. The minimum mass estimates varied, as expected, directly with the exposed surface area of the standards.

  6. Nuclear weapons - Myths and realities; Les armes nucleaires - Mythes et realites

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Le Guelte, G

    2009-07-01

    This book presents a comprehensive survey, and a masterpiece in the debate, about one of the most controverted subject of the century, from the very first production of the absolute weapon to its recent comeback in force in the geopolitical scene, including the non-proliferation treaty and the difficulties to make it respected. The author has followed the international evolutions in this topic for more than 30 years and has gathered all existing facts about nuclear arsenals, governments declarations and actions, as well as the strategic, technological and ideological advances of the nuclear-military complex. Todays, the fear of nuclear weapons is omnipresent again and is exploited by both sides: those who claim for a complete dismantling of all types of nuclear weapons, and those who feel necessary to invest in the maintenance and renewal of existing arsenals together with fighting against proliferation. The central question is dissuasion: does it work in all circumstances, and from doing what nuclear arsenals dissuade today? (J.S.)

  7. Second report on British nuclear weapons safety: a response to the Oxburgh report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Ministry of Defence's (MoD) report on nuclear weapons safety by Professor Sir Ronald Oxburgh fails to examine fundamental issues raised by the US Drell report concerning Trident, Chevaline and WE177. There has been a failure to make proper diagnosis, and where diagnosis has been made to offer appropriate treatment. Oxburgh states that he cannot give a definitive view on whether the Trident warhead meets the crucial ''one-point safety'' standard; that nuclear weapons are inherently hazardous; that they can produce accidental detonations and the release of plutonium; that contractorisation of Aldermaston may erode safety standards; that management must be improved; and that there is no complete record of nuclear accidents. This British American Security Information Council (BASIC) report asserts that the publicly available evidence indicates that all three British nuclear weapons could produce accidental nuclear detonations or the dispersal of plutonium as a result of fire or shock or both. Such accidents could occur, for example, during a road accident with a petrochemical truck, a submarine fire, a submarine loading accident or in an aircraft crash. Oxburgh states that WE177 and Chevaline are one-point safe, although it appears that the MoD have only used tests which Drell regarded as inferior and misleading. He also states that ''a major concern'' is the inability to be able to analyze the safety of the whole Trident system but no solution is offered. The Oxburgh report does not address the problem of fire when discussing the hazards associated with missiles and nuclear weapons. This was the central point of Drell's concerns about Trident. Oxburgh does not examine the problems and alternatives associated with the lack of safety features in the Trident warhead and its proximity to explosive fuel in the missile, nor did he examine the procedures for accident response even though these are of concern to many local authorities. (Author)

  8. Nuclear weapons and the Arab-Israeli conflict

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The implications of the clandestine Israeli nuclear arsenal for the conflict in the Middle East are studied in the light of emerging Arab reactions to it. The opportunities for European influence on the policy and programmes of this threshold state are described

  9. Nuclear weapons proliferation: will US policy be counterproductive

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Atoms for Peace Program started in 1954 is first discussed. As a result of the Indian test and plans by France and Germany to export enrichment and reprocessing facilities, US policy has veered from the Atoms for Peace approach. US policy now emphasizes technical abstinence rather than technical leadership. Dr. Wolfe concludes that the US, in attempting to discourage nuclear technologies it believes inimical to its non-proliferation objectives, has instead accelerated their independent development abroad. He states that the meaningful issue that must be faced in today's world is not whether the US can delay promising, but sensitive, technologies such as laser enrichment and reprocessing; rather, it is whether the US can play a lead role in determining the future institutional framework in which such technologies will be deployed. US ability to take this lead depends largely on its ability to maintain technological leadership. Thus, it is ironic to find US nuclear power capacity weakened in the name of non-proliferation objectives. Dr. Wolfe feels that technical leadership by the US in exploiting the immense energy-supply potential of nuclear energy can, as in the past, provide a means to help determine how nuclear technologies are utilized internationally. As an incidental benefit, such technological leadership may in the future help to solve our own energy-supply problem. 20 references

  10. Prediction of ground motion from nuclear weapons tests at NTS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ground motion data from underground nuclear detonations during FY78 were added to data from earlier detonations; the data were used to formulate a tentative equation for predicting ground motion at the Nevada Test Site. Additional measurements to explore an unexplained seismic anomaly in Jackass Flats are described. Methods used in automatic processing of ground motion data are explained

  11. Plutonium and uranium contamination in soils from former nuclear weapon test sites in Australia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Child, D.P., E-mail: dpc@ansto.gov.au [Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Locked Bag 2001, Kirrawee DC, NSW 2232 (Australia); Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Macquarie University, NSW 2109 (Australia); Hotchkis, M.A.C. [Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Locked Bag 2001, Kirrawee DC, NSW 2232 (Australia)

    2013-01-15

    The British government performed a number of nuclear weapon tests on Australian territory from 1952 through to 1963 with the cooperation of Australian government. Nine fission bombs were detonated in South Australia at Emu Junction and Maralinga, and a further three fission weapons were detonated in the Monte Bello Islands off the coast of Western Australia. A number of soil samples were collected by Australian Radiation Laboratories in 1972 and 1978 during field surveys at these nuclear weapon test sites. They were analysed by gamma spectrometry and, for a select few samples, by alpha spectrometry to measure the remaining activities of fission products, activation products and weapon materials. We have remeasured a number of these Montebello Islands and Emu Junction soil samples using the ANTARES AMS facility, ANSTO. These samples were analysed for plutonium and uranium isotopic ratios and isotopic concentrations. Very low {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu ratios were measured at both sites ({approx}0.05 for Alpha Island and {approx}0.02 for Emu Field), substantially below global fallout averages. Well correlated but widely varying {sup 236}U and plutonium concentrations were measured across both sites, but {sup 233}U did not correlate with these other isotopes and instead showed correlation with distance from ground zero, indicating in situ production in the soils.

  12. Plutonium and uranium contamination in soils from former nuclear weapon test sites in Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The British government performed a number of nuclear weapon tests on Australian territory from 1952 through to 1963 with the cooperation of Australian government. Nine fission bombs were detonated in South Australia at Emu Junction and Maralinga, and a further three fission weapons were detonated in the Monte Bello Islands off the coast of Western Australia. A number of soil samples were collected by Australian Radiation Laboratories in 1972 and 1978 during field surveys at these nuclear weapon test sites. They were analysed by gamma spectrometry and, for a select few samples, by alpha spectrometry to measure the remaining activities of fission products, activation products and weapon materials. We have remeasured a number of these Montebello Islands and Emu Junction soil samples using the ANTARES AMS facility, ANSTO. These samples were analysed for plutonium and uranium isotopic ratios and isotopic concentrations. Very low 240Pu/239Pu ratios were measured at both sites (∼0.05 for Alpha Island and ∼0.02 for Emu Field), substantially below global fallout averages. Well correlated but widely varying 236U and plutonium concentrations were measured across both sites, but 233U did not correlate with these other isotopes and instead showed correlation with distance from ground zero, indicating in situ production in the soils.

  13. Interim storage of dismantled nuclear weapon components at the U.S. Department of Energy Pantex Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Following the events of 1989 and the subsequent cessation of production of new nuclear weapons by the US, the mission of the Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Weapons Complex has shifted from production to dismantlement of retired weapons. The sole site in the US for accomplishing the dismantlement mission is the DOE Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. Pending a national decision on the ultimate storage and disposition of nuclear components form the dismantled weapons, the storage magazines within the Pantex Plant are serving as the interim storage site for pits--the weapon plutonium-bearing component. The DOE has stipulated that Pantex will provide storage for up to 12,000 pits pending a Record of Decision on a comprehensive site-wide Environmental Impact Statement in November 1996

  14. Long-term worldwide effects of multiple nuclear weapons detonations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The NAS report, issued in 1975 shocked the scientific community by suggesting that detonation of a fraction of the world's nuclear arsenal (104 megatons) could produce a major, 30-70%, reduction in stratospheric ozone, lasting a year or more. The consequences of such a reduction in the natural barrier to solar ultraviolet radiation include the potential extinction of mammalian life. The summary section of the 1975 report is reprinted here

  15. West German alternatives for reducing reliance on nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear deterrence in general and the US doctrinal concept of mutual assured destruction as well as the common strategic understanding of mutual vulnerability, codified by the SALT process, and the nuclear first use option of NATO's flexible response strategy (MC14/3) have come under attack, both from official and unofficial circles, in the United States and Europe likewise. In spite of the general agreement, that the time may have come to search for alternatives, to move from MAD to MAS (mutual assured security), as President Reagan indicated in a New York Times interview or for a Common Security posture, as called for by the Palme Commission, nevertheless major disagreements and contradictions exist as to how European security could be enhanced with a defensive posture beyond deterrence. Two groups of alternatives are being distinguished in this paper: official efforts in the United States and in Europe, to use the anti-nuclear sentiment, to legitimate changes in the operative doctrine of the US and of NATO forces and to obtain funds both for a comprehensive buildup and modernization of conventional forces in Europe and for a Strategic (SDI) and probably soon also for a European Defence Initiative (EDI) or an extended air defence, and unofficial proposals by American, European and West German Experts for a non-provocative, inoffensive defence or for a gradual defensivity consisting of static and mobile components

  16. Public views on multiple dimensions of security: nuclear weapons, terrorism, energy, and the environment: 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We analyze and compare findings from identical national surveys of the US general public on nuclear security and terrorism administered by telephone and Internet in mid-2007. Key areas of investigation include assessments of threats to US security; valuations of US nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence; perspectives on nuclear proliferation, including the specific cases of North Korea and Iran; and support for investments in nuclear weapons capabilities. Our analysis of public views on terrorism include assessments of the current threat, progress in the struggle against terrorism, preferences for responding to terrorist attacks at different levels of assumed casualties, and support for domestic policies intended to reduce the threat of terrorism. Also we report findings from an Internet survey conducted in mid 2007 that investigates public views of US energy security, to include: energy supplies and reliability; energy vulnerabilities and threats, and relationships among security, costs, energy dependence, alternative sources, and research and investment priorities. We analyze public assessments of nuclear energy risks and benefits, nuclear materials management issues, and preferences for the future of nuclear energy in the US. Additionally, we investigate environmental issues as they relate to energy security, to include expected implications of global climate change, and relationships among environmental issues and potential policy options.

  17. Guarding the guardians: Civilian control of nuclear weapons in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book has three separate complementary goals. First, it develops a model to explain how the command and control of nuclear weapons evolves over time. Second, it tells the story of the evolution of one critical aspect of the nuclear command system, the custody of nuclear weapons. Finally, it assesses the general problem of ensuring civilian control over nuclear operations. The focus is on the formation of operational policy. Where to deploy a weapon and at what state of alertness is an operational decision. Part I, The Theory of Civilian Control is divided into three chapters: Civilian control: Principles and problems; Civilian Control: From alerts to war termination; and Explaining changes in civilian control. Part II, The Evolution of Custody Policy has seven chapters: The Atomic Energy Act and the origin of assertive control, 1945-1947; The first test of assertive civilian control, 1948-1949; The breach in assertive control, 1950-1952; Assertive control becomes delegative control, 1953-1958; The resurgence of assertive control, 1959-1962; The cycle continues, 1963-1990; and Conclusion: The future of civilian control

  18. Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone and the Collective Security Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In February 1997 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan decided to establish Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (CANWFZ). As a matter of fact, negotiations on establishing that zone started in 1998 when Kyrgyzstan proposed draft basic element of a treaty on CANWFZ. After almost two years rather successful work on drafting the treaty, since April 2000 no meetings take place between diplomats of the five Central Asian states. It is recognized by many experts that it is the Tashkent 1992 Collective Security Treaty (CST) which caused a deadlock. Usually CST is interpreted as allowing the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of the CST member states, for example, of Kazakhstan. However, more detailed analysis shows, that CST cannot a serious obstacle for creating CANWFZ

  19. Present status of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons plays an important role in enhancing the security of all States. It is essential to maintain in the implementation of the Treaty an acceptable balance of the mutual responsibilities and obligations of all the countries Party to the Treaty wether or not nuclear weapon States. These questions were discussed during the Conference on the operation of the Treaty held in Geneva in May 1975. It was emphasized at the Conference that the first five years of application of the Treaty had shown a consistent increase in the number of ratifications and in the safeguards agreements concluded on the basis of the Agreement. (N.E.A.)

  20. History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine and a Path Forward

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chyba, Christopher

    2007-04-01

    During the Cold War, the United States considered a number of approaches for living in a world with nuclear weapons, including disarmament, preventive war, the incorporation of nuclear weapons into military strategy, passive and active defense, and deterrence. With the failure of early approaches to disarmament, and the rejection of preventive war against the Soviet Union (and later, China), deterrence became central to key nuclear relationships, though arms control continued to play an important role. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty made preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons another central component of U.S. policy. The Bush Administration has tried to devise a new policy for the post-Cold War period. Their approach has three salient pillars. First, it is characterized by an overall skepticism toward multilateral agreements, on the grounds that bad actors will not obey them, that agreements can lead to a false sense of security, and that such agreements are too often a way for the Lilliputians of the world to tie down Gulliver. The March 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy declared that U.S. strength ``will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak, using international fora, judicial processes and terrorism.'' Second, the Bush Administration declared its intention to maintain a military dominance so great that other states simply would not try to catch up. The 2002 National Security Strategy states that ``Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.'' Third, the 2002 National Security Strategy (reaffirmed by the 2006 National Security Strategy) moved preventive war (which the strategies called ``preemptive war'') to a central position, rather than deterrence and nonproliferation. In part this was because of the claim that certain ``rogue'' states, and terrorist groups, were not deterrable. This talk

  1. To avoid catastrophe: a study in future nuclear weapons policy. [10 papers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hamilton, M.P. (ed.)

    1977-01-01

    The following topics are discussed: an unfinished history of the atomic age; the United States-Soviet Union arms competition; the competitive character of the nuclear policies in these countries; the proliferation of nuclear reactors and weapons; the method for acquiring the materials for the construction of bombs; the state of nuclear technology globally; energy and the conquest of fear; the merits of nuclear power for the generation of electric power; scenarios of disaster and hope; nuclear war comes to the Middle East; sabotage at a nuclear power plant; holocaust by accident; facts, morals, and the bomb; and what can be done: some practical steps. Actions which can be taken to reduce the likelihood of the fictional scenarios actually occurring are summarized. (MCW)

  2. American security perspectives: public views on energy, environment, nuclear weapons and terrorism: 2008

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We analyze and compare findings from matching national surveys of the US general public on US energy and environmental security administered by telephone and Internet in mid-2008. Key areas of investigation include: energy supplies and reliability; energy vulnerabilities and threats, and relationships among security, costs, energy dependence, alter-native sources, and research and investment priorities. We analyze public assessments of nuclear energy risks and benefits, nuclear materials management issues, and preferences for the future of nuclear energy in the US. Additionally, we investigate environmental issues as they relate to energy security, to include evolving perspectives on global climate change and relationships among environmental issues and potential policy options. We also report findings from an Internet survey of the general public conducted in mid-2008 that investigates assessments of threats to US security; valuations of US nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence; perspectives on nuclear proliferation; and support for investments in nuclear weapons capabilities. Our analysis of public views on terrorism include assessments of the current threat, progress in the struggle against terrorism, preferences for responding to terrorist attacks at different levels of assumed casualties, and support for domestic policies intended to reduce the threat of terrorism.

  3. Literature survey of blast and fire effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The American literature of the past 30 years on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas has been surveyed. The relevant work is briefly sketched and areas where information is apparently lacking are noted. This report is intended to provide the basis for suggesting research priorities in the fire and blast effects area for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It is also intended to provide entry into the literature for researchers. over 850 references are given

  4. Is force ever justified in preventing a State from acquiring nuclear weapons?

    OpenAIRE

    Dobra, Alexandra

    2010-01-01

    In order to provide a grounded argument, the present paper asks the following questions. Why do States acquire nuclear weapons? Why do finally States tend to prevent this acquisition? What does the use of force imply? This logical structure adduces the argument sustaining the avoidance of the use of force as a viable preventive tool. It concentrates exclusively on States instituting a threat and on the force-led circumventive strategies’ implications used by non-threatening States to prevent ...

  5. Literature survey of blast and fire effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reitter, T.A.; McCallen, D.B.; Kang, S.W.

    1982-06-01

    The American literature of the past 30 years on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas has been surveyed. The relevant work is briefly sketched and areas where information is apparently lacking are noted. This report is intended to provide the basis for suggesting research priorities in the fire and blast effects area for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It is also intended to provide entry into the literature for researchers. over 850 references are given.

  6. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  7. Fallout Deposition in the Marshall Islands from Bikini and Enewetak Nuclear Weapons Tests

    OpenAIRE

    Beck, Harold L.; Bouville, André; Moroz, Brian E.; Simon, Steven L.

    2010-01-01

    Deposition densities (Bq m-2) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides occurring in nuclear weapons testing fallout from tests conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls (1946-1958) have been estimated on a test-specific basis for all the 31 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. A complete review of various historical and contemporary data, as well as meteorological analysis, was used to make judgments regarding which tests deposited fallout in the Marshall Islands an...

  8. How to deter and coerce Iran into giving up its nuclear weapons program

    OpenAIRE

    Davis, Heyward H.

    2011-01-01

    The feud between the U.S. and Iran has smoldered for over thirty years. Recently, Iran has witnessed popular support for reformists decline while government support for hardliners has increased. President Ahmadinejad has increased his rhetoric against Israel and the U.S. even as the U.S. changed administrations. Though it all, Iran has continued to pursue nuclear weapons, despite six United Nations Security Council Resolutions and billions of Iran's dollars frozen. Each progressive round of a...

  9. Estimating Attributes of Nuclear Weapon and Other Fissile Material Configuration Using Features Of Nuclear Materials Identification Signatures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This brief describes a strategy that, when implemented, will allow the attributes, i.e., the physical properties, of nuclear weapon and other configurations of fissile material to be estimated from Nuclear Material Identification System (NMIS) signatures for arms control, treaty verification, and transparency purposes. Attributes are estimated by condensing measured NMIS signatures into ''features'' that approximately represent physical characteristics of the measurement such as gamma-ray transmission, induced fission, etc. The features are obtained from NMIS signatures to estimate quantities related to gamma and neutron transmission through the inspected item and gamma and neutron scattering and production via induced fission within the inspected item. Multivariate, i.e., multiple-feature, linear models have been successfully employed to estimate attributes, and multivariate nonlinear models are currently under investigation. Attributes estimated employing this strategy can then be examined to test the supposition that the inspected item is in fact a nuclear weapon

  10. IAEA safeguards related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons- T.N.P. and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America-Tlatelolco

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The application of safeguards, focusing mainly the causes that gave origin to this type of control, is studied. The safeguard procedures used by the IAEA are also given, relative to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - Tlatelolco, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons - T.N.P. and the Euratom safeguards. Some consideration is given to the organizations related to safeguards application such as IAEA, OPANAL and Euratom, their functions and aims. (F.E.)

  11. Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  12. Weapon carrying and psychopathic-like features in a population-based sample of Finnish adolescents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Saukkonen, Suvi; Laajasalo, Taina; Jokela, Markus; Kivivuori, Janne; Salmi, Venla; Aronen, Eeva T

    2016-02-01

    We investigated the prevalence of juvenile weapon carrying and psychosocial and personality-related risk factors for carrying different types of weapons in a nationally representative, population-based sample of Finnish adolescents. Specifically, we aimed to investigate psychopathic-like personality features as a risk factor for weapon carrying. The participants were 15-16-year-old adolescents from the Finnish self-report delinquency study (n = 4855). Four different groups were formed based on self-reported weapon carrying: no weapon carrying, carrying knife, gun or other weapon. The associations between psychosocial factors, psychopathic-like features and weapon carrying were examined with multinomial logistic regression analysis. 9% of the participants had carried a weapon in the past 12 months. Adolescents with a history of delinquency, victimization and antisocial friends were more likely to carry weapons in general; however, delinquency and victimization were most strongly related to gun carrying, while perceived peer delinquency (antisocial friends) was most strongly related to carrying a knife. Better academic performance was associated with a reduced likelihood of carrying a gun and knife, while feeling secure correlated with a reduced likelihood of gun carrying only. Psychopathic-like features were related to a higher likelihood of weapon carrying, even after adjusting for other risk factors. The findings of the study suggest that adolescents carrying a weapon have a large cluster of problems in their lives, which may vary based on the type of weapon carried. Furthermore, psychopathic-like features strongly relate to a higher risk of carrying a weapon. PMID:25986501

  13. The Plutonium Transition from Nuclear Weapons to Crypt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    With the end of the ''Cold War'' thousands of nuclear warheads are being dismantled. The National Academy of Sciences termed this growing stockpile of plutonium and highly enriched uranium ''a clear and present danger'' to international security. DOE/MD selected a duel approach to plutonium disposition--burning MOX fuel in existing reactors and immobilization in a ceramic matrix surrounded by HLW glass. MOX material will be pits and clean metal. The challenges come with materials that will be transferred to Immobilization--these range from engineered materials to residues containing < 30% Pu. Impurity knowledge range from guesses to actual data. During packaging, sites will flag ''out of the ordinary'' containers for characterized. If the process history is lost, characterization cost will escalate rapidly. After two step blending and ceramic precursor addition, cold press and sintering will form 0.5-kg ceramic pucks containing ≤50 g Pu. Pucks will be sealed in cans, placed into magazines, then into HLW canisters; these canisters will be filled with HLW glass prior to being transported to the HLW repository. The Immobilization Program must interface with DP, EM, RW, and NN. Overlaid on top of these interfaces are the negotiations with the Russians

  14. Russia’s Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Their Current Configuration and Posture: A Strategic Asset or Liability?

    OpenAIRE

    Saradzhyan, Simon

    2010-01-01

    Russia's military-political leadership envisions a formidable range of uses for the country's arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). In the eyes of Russian leaders, these weapons play a critical role in the nation's defense and security posture as part of the country's overall nuclear arsenal and as an equalizer for the weakness of the nation's conventional forces vis-a-vis NATO and China. Russia's military-political leadership and policy influentials also assign a number of specif...

  15. Peaceful uses of nuclear weapon plutonium; Friedliche Verwertung von Plutonium aus Kernwaffen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Burtak, F. [Siemens AG Bereich Energieerzeugung (KWU), Erlangen (Germany)

    1996-06-01

    In 1993, the U.S.A. and the CIS signed Start 2 (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) in which they committed themselves the reduce their nuclear weapon arsenals to a fraction of that of 1991. For forty-five years the antagonism between the superpowers had been a dominating factor in world history, determining large areas of social life. When Start 2 will have been completed in 2003, some 200 t of weapon grade plutonium and some 2000 t of highly enriched uranium (Heu) will arise from dismantling nuclear weapons. In the absence of the ideological ballast of the debate about Communism versus Capitalism of the past few decades there is a chance of the grave worldwide problem of safe disposal and utilization of this former nuclear weapon material being solved. Under the heading of `swords turned into plowshares`, plutonium and uranium could be used for peaceful electricity generation. (orig.) [Deutsch] 1993 unterzeichneten die USA und GUS das Start-2-Abkommen (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), in dem sie sich zur Verringerung der Anzahl ihrer Nuklearwaffen auf einen Bruchteil des Bestandes von 1991 verpflichten. 45 Jahre lang stellte die Auseinandersetzung der Supermaechte einen dominierenden Faktor der Weltpolitik dar und bestimmte weite Teile des gesellschaftlichen Lebens. Mit der geplanten Erfuellung von Start 2 im Jahr 2003 werden ca. 200 t waffengraediges Plutonium und ca. 2000 t highly enriched uranium (Heu) aus der Demontage der Kernwaffen anfallen. Ohne den ideologischen Ballast der vergangenen jahrezehntelangen Auseinandersetzung zwischen `Kommunismus` und `Kapitalismus` besteht die Chance, das gravierende weltweite Problem der sicheren Entsorgung und Verwertung dieses ehemaligen Kernwaffenmaterials zu loesen. Unter dem Motto `Schwerter zu Pflugscharen` koennte das Plutonium und Uran zur friedlichen Elektrizitaetserzeugung genutzt werden. (orig.)

  16. Nuclear weapons tests and short-term effects on atmospheric ozone

    Science.gov (United States)

    Miller, A. J.; Krueger, A. J.; Prabhakara, C.; Hilsenrath, E.

    1974-01-01

    Observations made when Nimbus 4 passed over a nuclear cloud about three hours after the bomb exploded are presented. Infrared and BUV measurements indicated that the atmospheric ozone level in the area of cloud was significantly less than in areas directly north and south of the cloud. It is noted, however, that it is not possible to state definitively that the ozone depletion was caused by nitrogen oxides released in the nuclear weapons test, and that further observations must be made to clarify the situation.

  17. Nuclear weapon tests on the testing ground near Semipalatinsk and health of communities of Altay region

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The comparative analysis of morbidity, mortality and invalidization of the population of Altay region and other regions of West Siberia. It was found that in recent years in spite of a more favorable ecologic situation in this area the level of morbidity (hematological disorders, cardiovascular disorders, urinary diseases), mortality from infectious, parasitic, pulmonary diseases and malignant tumors and invalidisation of the population increased. The main cause of this is supposed to be the consequences of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in 1949-1962 on the testing ground near Semipalatinsk at the border of Altay region. The data on repeated pollutions by the products of nuclear disintegration in Altay region are reported

  18. Polycythemia vera among participants of a nuclear weapons test

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sobell, J.L.; Codd, M.B.; Silverstein, M.N.; Kurland, L.T.

    1987-03-06

    Three letters-to-the-editors discuss the finding of a statistically significant excess of polycythemia vera cases among participants in the Smoky detonation. Had population-based incidence rates from Rochester been used to derive an expected incidence, and had only bona fide polycythemia vera cases been considered, as is the rule in most epidemiologic studies, the observed frequency of polycythemia vera among participants in the Smoky test would have been found to be well within chance expectations.

  19. Polycythemia vera among participants of a nuclear weapons test

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Three letters-to-the-editors discuss the finding of a statistically significant excess of polycythemia vera cases among participants in the Smoky detonation. Had population-based incidence rates from Rochester been used to derive an expected incidence, and had only bona fide polycythemia vera cases been considered, as is the rule in most epidemiologic studies, the observed frequency of polycythemia vera among participants in the Smoky test would have been found to be well within chance expectations

  20. A TLD dose algorithm for mixed fields at a nuclear weapons facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Personnel dosimetry at a nuclear weapons facility typically involves assessment of external dose from a wide range of beta, photon and neutron fields. The nature of the facility allows the possibility that a given radiation worker may receive dose from any mixture of fields during a single monitoring period. To further challenge the system, the specific exposure conditions for any given TLD are generally unknown to the processing group. While some facilities have chosen to issue multiple dosimeter types to each worker to monitor for the different fields, this paper describes a single dose algorithm implemented at Pantex Plant, designed to calculate external dose from an unknown mixture of these fields based on the readings of a single eight element TLD badge. The algorithm takes advantage of the different relative sensitivities provided by the four phosphor types and six filtration configurations, to isolate responses for the photon, beta, and neutron components. Results of synthetic testing as well as comparisons to field measurements are presented

  1. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Clarence Payne

    2011-08-01

    Full Text Available Constructivism challenges the prevailing approaches to international relations and security. It attempts to explain, inter alia, how actors acquire their identities, and how these identities shape actors’ material and non-material interests. These constructed identities and interests further define mutually constructed rules, norms and institutions, which enable states and other actors to act accordingly. For constructivists, actors approach social facts in terms of the meaning, significance, value and beliefs these actors ascribe to such facts. Once an actor has constructed the social purpose (i.e. its identity and/or interests of a particular social fact, the actor ascribes new meaning to this fact. The next step for the actor and others would then be to construct social practices based on mutually constructed norms, rules and institutions to engage with this social fact. States, therefore, could have different identities and varying interests at different times (Barnett, 2005:251-270.

  2. North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moon, Duk-ho (Korean Consulate General in New York)

    2003-12-01

    A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.

  3. Disposal of SNL-designed electronics assemblies associated with the nuclear weapons program - challenges and progress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    One of the common waste streams generated throughout the nuclear weapon complex is 'hardware' originating from the nuclear weapons program. The activities associated with this hardware at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) include design and development, environmental testing, reliability and stockpile surveillance testing, and military liaison training. SNL-designed electronic assemblies include radars, arming/fusing/firing systems, power sources, and use-control and safety systems, Waste stream characterization using process knowledge is difficult due to the age of some components and lack of design information oriented towards hazardous constituent identification. Chemical analysis methods such as the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) are complicated by the inhomogeneous character of these components and the fact that many assemblies have aluminum or stainless steel cases, with the electronics encapsulated in a foam or epoxy matrix. In addition, some components may contain explosives, radioactive materials, toxic substances (PCBs, asbestos), and other regulated or personnel hazards which must be identified prior to handling and disposal. In spite of the above difficulties, we have succeeded in characterizing a limited number of weapon components using a combination of process knowledge and chemical analysis. For these components, we have shown that if the material is regulated as RCRA hazardous waste, it is because the waste exhibits one or more hazardous characteristics; primarily reactivity and/or toxicity (Pb, Cd). (author)

  4. Sweden and the bomb. The Swedish plans to acquire nuclear weapons, 1945 - 1972

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonter, T [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of History

    2001-09-01

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid-50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The prime minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue

  5. Strategies for the disposition of high explosives resulting from dismantlement of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Many thousands of pounds of high quality main-charge explosives will result as surplus from the dismantlement of returns from the US nuclear weapons stockpile. The method most often employed for dealing with this surplus explosive is destruction by open burning. However, open burning as a means of treating excess explosives is losing favor because of environmental concerns associated with such an uncontrolled thermal destruction process. Thus, alternative processes for treatment of excess explosives from weapon dismantlement is discussed. These alternatives include: reformulation, crystalline component recovery, chemical conversion of the crystalline component to higher value products which may have civilian or military applications and, when necessary, treatment as waste in an environmentally benign fashion

  6. No conceivable injury. [Nuclear weapons tests in Australia, 1952-1957

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Milliken, R.

    1986-01-01

    Between 1952 and 1957 Britain conducted 12 nuclear tests in Australia in order to develop a nuclear weapon capability. At that time a special relationship existed between the two countries with Australians keen to help. However, an Australian Royal Commission investigating British nuclear tests in the mid-eighties gave attention to some aspects of the tests which had been kept secret, especially by Britain. In particular the contamination of the sites, especially at Maralinga, a sacred place of the Aborigines, is highlighted. The Royal Commission indeed recommended that Britain should decontaminate the site and Australia should compensate the Aborigines. Doing this, however, would acknowledge the responsibility of the tests for health problems of British and Australian servicemen due to radiation exposure. This was postponed while another report was commissioned from another body. The history of the nuclear tests and their consequences in both human and political terms is chronicled.

  7. Sustained nuclear energy without weapons or reprocessing using accelerator-driven systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Accelerator-driven thermal-spectrum molten-salt nuclear technology can greatly simplify nuclear energy technology by eliminating reprocessing and greatly enhancing once-through burn-up. In effect the accelerator may be employed as a substitute for frequent reprocessing and recycle. The accelerator makes possible reduction in plutonium and minor actinides from current LWRs by a factor of more than ten without reprocessing while converting the plutonium remnant to a non-weapons-useful isotopic composition. The accelerator also enhances the once-through energy production from fertile material by a factor of ten without reprocessing compared to once-through LWR technology. This technology would eliminate the need to deploy plutonium production indefinitely, and reprocessing and recycle for at least several hundred years. The energy production technology proposed here operates primarily on the Th-U cycle with a minor contribution from the U-Pu cycle to eliminate the weapons-usefulness of 233U. There are two key innovations in addition to the accelerator. One is the use of liquid fuel flowing once through a pool of material undergoing fission thereby allowing high burn-up concurrently with continuous removal of fission product without reprocessing. The second is the unanticipated low capture cross section of fission product nuclides which substantially enhances the neutron economy in this type of system. The supplement of neutrons from the accelerator, the reduced fission product neutron capture, and the continuously flowing fuel are the enablers for the performance described here. This technology allows an essentially complete decoupling of nuclear energy from nuclear weapons (orig.)

  8. Progress toward mutual reciprocal inspections of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In March 1994, the United States and the Russian Federation announced their intention to conduct mutual reciprocal inspections (MRI) to confirm inventories of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons. Subsequent interactions between the two countries have established the basis for an MRI regime, covering instrumentation, candidate sites for MRI, and protection of information deemed sensitive by the countries. This paper discusses progress made toward MRI, stressing measurement technologies and observables, as well as prospects for MRI implementation. An analysis is presented of observables that might be exploited to provide assurance that the material being measured could have come from a dismantled weapon rather than other sources. Instrumentation to exploit these observables will also be discussed, as will joint US/Russian efforts to demonstrate such instrumentation. Progress toward a so-called ''program of cooperation'' between the two countries in protecting each other's sensitive information will be reviewed. All of these steps are essential components of an eventual comprehensive regime for controlling fissile materials from weapons

  9. Progress toward mutual reciprocal inspections of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, M.W. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Gosnell, T.B. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1995-08-01

    In March 1994, the United States and the Russian Federation announced their intention to conduct mutual reciprocal inspections (MRI) to confirm inventories of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons. Subsequent interactions between the two countries have established the basis for an MRI regime, covering instrumentation, candidate sites for MRI, and protection of information deemed sensitive by the countries. This paper discusses progress made toward MRI, stressing measurement technologies and observables, as well as prospects for MRI implementation. An analysis is presented of observables that might be exploited to provide assurance that the material being measured could have come from a dismantled weapon rather than other sources. Instrumentation to exploit these observables will also be discussed, as will joint US/Russian efforts to demonstrate such instrumentation. Progress toward a so-called ``program of cooperation`` between the two countries in protecting each other`s sensitive information will be reviewed. All of these steps are essential components of an eventual comprehensive regime for controlling fissile materials from weapons.

  10. The AIDA-MOX 1 program: Results of the French-Russian study on peaceful use of plutonium from dismantled Russian Nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Intergovernmental Agreement signed on November 12, 1992, between the governments of France and the Russian Federation instituted cooperation between the two countries for the safe elimination of the excess Russian nuclear weapons. France has allocated 400 million francs to this program, covering transportation and dismantling of nuclear weapons, interim storage and subsequent commercial use of the nuclear materials from the dismantled weapons, nuclear materials accountancy and safeguards, and scientific research. The concept of loading commercial Russian reactors with fuel fabricated from the plutonium recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union is gaining widespread acceptance, and is at the heart of the French-Russian AIDA/MOX project

  11. Nuclear Weapons in Regional Contexts: The Cases of Argentina and Brazil

    CERN Document Server

    Junior, Olival Freire; Moreira, Ildeu C; Barros, Fernando de Souza

    2015-01-01

    South America is a region which is free from nuclear weapons. However, this was not an inevitable development from the relationships among its countries. Indeed, regional rivalries between Brazil and Argentina, with military implications for both countries, lasted a long time. After WWII these countries took part in the race to obtain nuclear technologies and nuclear ambitions were part of the game. In the mid 1980s, the end of military dictatorships and the successful establishing of democratic institutions put an end to the race. Thus regional and national interests in addition to the establishment of democracies in Latin America have been responsible for the building of trust between the two countries. Meaningful international initiatives are once again needed in the framework of worldwide cooperation. This cooperation is better developed when democratic regimes are in place.

  12. Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Treaty of Tlatelolco enhances the security of the countries of the region by reducing the risk of a nuclear-arms race among them, with all the danger and cost that it would entail, and, as a contribution to the world-wide nuclear non-proliferation regime, it constitutes an important confidence-building measure by ensuring, through its control and verification system, that parties to the Treaty do not posses and will not acquire nuclear weapons. List of parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as of 31 July 1989: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil (not full party), Chile (not full party), Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. (Argentina and Dominica have signed the Treaty)

  13. New Wine in Old Bottles? The New Salience of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Assessing continuity and change in the world's nuclear landscape is no small task. Since the end of the fierce East-West ideological and political conflict, escalating arms race, and brinkmanship, known as the Cold War, and mainly as a result of its end, the global strategic environment has fundamentally changed, and continues to change. Yet as one French scholar has written, 'We may know that the world is being transformed, but we do not know what the world is being transformed into... What this will look like is as imaginable to us now as the Treaties of Westphalia, which closed the Thirty Years War in 1648-49 would have been to a European of 1618'. There are various, often contradictory interpretations of basic trends and alternative hypothesis about their driving forces. In particular, some analysts still believe that after the Cold War the world is moving toward a democratic reconciliation and hence the 'end of history'. If that is the case then nuclear weapons are becoming less important. However, there is an increasing body of evidence to support Jean Baudrillard's theory that current geopolitical convulsions are the initial manifestations of a fourth world war. If so, the questions, as yet unanswered, are what the fundamental nature of this war is; what political and social actors are colliding with each other; and what the role of nuclear weapons will be in the conflicts and confrontations that may be pushing us toward another global conflagration. (author)

  14. A novel method for determining pulse counting circuitry dead time using the Nuclear Weapons Inspection System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A novel method for measuring dead time in nuclear pulse processing circuitry has been developed using the autocorrelation measurement capability of the Nuclear Weapons Inspection System (NWIS). Initially developed for active neutron interrogation of nuclear weapons and other fissile assemblies, NWIS employs a custom gallium arsenide application specific integrated circuit and a new signature analysis software package to simultaneously acquire and display the autocorrelation and cross-correlation spectra of up to five detector/electronics systems. The system operates at clock frequencies up to 1 GHz, permitting the collection of timing pulses in bins as narrow as 1 ns. In normal operation NWIS uses well characterized detectors and constant fraction discriminators, but it may also be configured to accept pulses from any circuit and to use the autocorrelation spectrum to accurately determine dead-time. Unlike traditional dead-time assessment techniques that typically require multiple sources and an assumed dead-time model, NWIS provides single-measurement assessment of circuit dead time and does not require an assumed dead-time model or a calibrated high count-rate source

  15. Testing times: A nuclear weapons laboratory at the end of the Cold War

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This dissertation focuses on the role of discursive and other practices in the construction of two alternative regimes of truth in regard to nuclear weapons, and in the cultural production of persons at the Livermore Laboratory and in the local anti-nuclear movement. In the 1980s the scientists' regime of truth was challenged by a heterogeneous anti-nuclear movement recruited largely from the humanistic middle class - a class fragment profoundly hostile to the policies of the Reagan Administration. The movement attacked the Laboratory in a number of ways, ranging from local ballot initiatives and lobbying in Washington to civil disobedience at the Laboratory. By the end of the 1980s this movement, in combination with Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union and a decade of internal scandals at the Laboratory, left the Laboratory weakened - though Laboratory scientists and managers are currently working to adapt the system of ideas and practices evolved during the Cold War to legitimate continued weapons work in a post-Cold War environment

  16. The treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the statement, made by Ambassador Carlos Portales Cifuentes, Director General for Foreign Policy of the Ministry of External Relations of Chile, during the VIII. Special Session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) on the occasion of Chile's becoming a Contracting Party to the Tlatelolco Treaty, is being circulated for the information of all Member States of the Agency at the request of the Alternate to the Resident Representative of Chile

  17. Environmental radiation at the Monte Bello Islands from nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1952 and 1956

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The results from the 1962 and 1968 surveys of environmental radiation at the Monte Bello Islands are presented. These were the first of the series of surveys of radioactive contamination of the Islands to be carried out following nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1952 and 1956. Detailed comparison is made with the results obtained in the subsequent surveys in 1972 and 1978. For more than 20 years, no area at the Monte Bello Islands has presented an acute hazard due to external exposure to environmental radiation

  18. Statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the following statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, statements on behalf of the depository Governments and statements on behalf of other Governments (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Western Samoa and Nordic Countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden)

  19. Military Participants at U.S. Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing— Methodology for Estimating Dose and Uncertainty

    OpenAIRE

    Till, John E.; Beck, Harold L.; Aanenson, Jill W.; Grogan, Helen A.; Mohler, H. Justin; Mohler, S. Shawn; Voillequé, Paul G.

    2014-01-01

    Methods were developed to calculate individual estimates of exposure and dose with associated uncertainties for a sub-cohort (1,857) of 115,329 military veterans who participated in at least one of seven series of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests or the TRINITY shot carried out by the United States. The tests were conducted at the Pacific Proving Grounds and the Nevada Test Site. Dose estimates to specific organs will be used in an epidemiological study to investigate leukemia and male breas...

  20. Residual radioactive contamination of the test site at Emu from nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1953

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The detailed distributions and soil concentrations of long-lived radionuclides remaining from nuclear weapons trials conducted at Emu in October 1953, are presented. Significant radiation levels due to long-lived neutron activation products in soil, 60Co and 152Eu, occur only in the immediate vicinity of the ground zeros of TOTEM 1 and TOTEM 2. It is shown that the levels of contamination due to fallout products in the soil are well below those which would constitute a health hazard to occupants of the area

  1. International safeguards in nuclear weapon states - Status and look into the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper shall recall the framework for the application of international safeguards in the 5 Nuclear Weapons States (USA, Russia, China, United-Kingdom and France) and give an overview on their implementation. It shall then discuss some reasons for an evolution of those States and IAEA's commitments to apply its safeguards and suggests ideas for an increased but efficient involvement of IAEA in those States fully taking into account the specificities of those States within the State Level Approach.The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  2. Radioactive fallout from Chinese nuclear weapons test of March 15, 1978

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has measured the radionuclide concentration of short-lived debris from a radioactive cloud, produced by a nuclear weapons test conducted by the People's Republic of China on March 15, 1978. Analysis with a 40 cfm Sierra impactor showed that a large portion of the radioactivity was associated with relatively large particles. Surface air samples showed significant concentrations of 124Sb. Samples of rain water from New York State showed that radioactivity arrived on the east coast at about the same time as peak debris levels were observed on the west coast. Highest concentrations of 131I occurred along the Washington State--Canadian border

  3. Dangers in the 1990s: Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missile proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The revolutionary political changes in Europe, coupled with the situation in Persian Gulf, have thrown into stark relief both the degree to which confidence building measures can create an effective basis for qualitative and quantitative arms limitation and the danger to regional and global peace and security which can arise from dissemination of modern weapons. The concept of proliferation remains never the less a sensitive topic in debates over international security. Attitudes to proliferation in the Asia Pacific region are discussed taking into account the future of the Non-proliferation Treaty and the role of the IAEA nuclear safeguards system

  4. Vulnerability of populations and the urban health care systems to nuclear weapon attack – examples from four American cities

    OpenAIRE

    Dallas Cham E; Bell William C

    2007-01-01

    Abstract Background The threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within the United States has grown significantly in recent years, focusing attention on the medical and public health disaster capabilities of the nation in a large scale crisis. While the hundreds of thousands or millions of casualties resulting from a nuclear weapon would, in and of itself, overwhelm our current medical response capabilities, the response dilemma is further exacerbated in that these resourc...

  5. Deterrence and engagement U.S. and North Korean interactions over nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War

    OpenAIRE

    Kwak, Geunho.

    2008-01-01

    The North Korea nuclear crisis needs to be understood comprehensively, taking into account both international relations and the domestic political dynamics of the countries involved. Thus, this thesis analyzes North Korean and U.S. policies by examining their policies in the two nuclear crises (1993-94) and (2002-present) and proposing an improved option for reaching a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. This thesis finds that North Korea has pursued nuclear weapons with a unique historical,...

  6. Cooperative measures to support the Indo-Pak Agreement Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mishra, Sitakanta; Ahmed, Mansoor

    2014-04-01

    In 2012, India and Pakistan reaffirmed the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. Despite a history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two countries, this agreement derives strength from a few successful nuclear confidence building measures that have stood the test of time. It also rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear holocaust from an accidental nuclear weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of a weapon by the other side. This study brings together two emerging strategic analysts from South Asia to explore measures to support the Agreement and further develop cooperation around this critical issue. This study briefly dwells upon the strategic landscape of nuclear South Asia with the respective nuclear force management structures, doctrines, and postures of India and Pakistan. It outlines the measures in place for the physical protection and safety of nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, and command and control mechanisms in the two countries, and it goes on to identify the prominent, emerging challenges posed by the introduction of new weapon technologies and modernization of the respective strategic forces. This is followed by an analysis of the agreement itself leading up to a proposed framework for cooperative measures that might enhance the spirit and implementation of the agreement.

  7. Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.; Shuh, D. K.; Knight, K. B.; Eppich, G. R.; Holliday, K. S.

    2016-05-01

    Nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. We find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. The resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.

  8. Los Alamos neutron science center nuclear weapons stewardship and unique national scientific capabilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schoenberg, Kurt F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-12-15

    This presentation gives an overview of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and its contributions to science and the nuclear weapons program. LANSCE is made of multiple experimental facilities (the Lujan Center, the Weapons Neutron Research facility (WNR), the Ultra-Cold Neutron facility (UCN), the proton Radiography facility (pRad) and the Isotope Production Facility (IPF)) served by the its kilometer long linear accelerator. Several research areas are supported, including materials and bioscience, nuclear science, materials dynamics, irradiation response and medical isotope production. LANSCE is a national user facility that supports researchers worldwide. The LANSCE Risk Mitigation program is currently in progress to update critical accelerator equipment to help extend the lifetime of LANSCE as a key user facility. The Associate Directorate of Business Sciences (ADBS) plays an important role in the continued success of LANSCE. This includes key procurement support, human resource support, technical writing support, and training support. LANSCE is also the foundation of the future signature facility MARIE (Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes).

  9. Creation of zone free nuclear weapon (ZFNW) in the Central Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Issues on non-proliferation of mass demolition weapons are of special importance for people of Kazakhstan. The whole damage brought to nature and people's health by nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site (STS) is not revealed yet. Kazakhstan contributed much to the matter of nuclear disarmament. More than six years ago for the first time in the world by RK President's resolution an operating nuclear test site closed. Kazakhstan was the first to fulfill obligations in accordance with Lisbon protocol. Kazakhstan liquidated the fourth nuclear potential in the world. It's time to undertake further steps in the field of non-proliferation. One of such steps is the creation of a ZFNW in the central Asia. The idea of ZFNW creation is being acknowledged more and more during last 30 years. All the four present zones include more than 100 countries. If the Antarctic Region is taken into account the zones cover more than 50% of dry land. Regional ZFNWs attract attention as a means of reflecting and rewarding general valuers in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and armament control. Such zones help tj narrow geographical sphere of military nuclear activity and to strengthen non-proliferation regime. The importance of ZFNW in the process of strengthening global and regional peace and safety is confirmed by the documents of Conference for countries joined the agreement on non-proliferation (AN) of 1995 and the first meeting of the Organizing Committee for Conference of 2000

  10. Health consequences and health systems response to the Pacific U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Palafox, Neal A; Riklon, Sheldon; Alik, Wilfred; Hixon, Allen L

    2007-03-01

    Between 1946 and 1958, the United States detonated 67 thermonuclear devices in the Pacific as part of their U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program (USNWTP). The aggregate explosive power was equal to 7,200 Hiroshima atomic bombs. Recent documents released by the U.S. government suggest that the deleterious effects of the nuclear testing were greater and extended farther than previously known. The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) government and affected communities have sought refress through diplomatic routes with the U.S. government, however, existing medical programs and financial reparations have not adequately addressed many of the health consequences of the USNWTP. Since radiation-induced cancers may have a long latency, a healthcare infrastructure is needed to address both cancer and related health issues. This article reviews the health consequences of the Pacific USNWTP and the current health systems ability to respond. PMID:19772154

  11. History, framework and perspectives of international policy for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The study analyses the framework conditions, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the international non-proliferation regime and their interlacement with international nuclear energy policies, and evaluates the results achieved so far on an international level by the efforts directed towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conclusion to be drawn as stated by the author is that the classical tool of non-proliferation policy - denial of technology transfer - will lose in importance and give way to enhanced, controlled cooperation between countries of the Third World and the industrialised countries. Another instrument that will maintain its value for non-proliferation policy is cooperation for political stabilisation in those parts of the world where regional conflicts might aggravate. (orig./HP)

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Suriname and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 2 February 1979 and of the Protocol thereto between Suriname and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 February 1979. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  13. Mission possible: Nuclear weapons inspections in Iraq - 7 March 2003. Essay, published in the Wall Street Journal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For the past three months, a cadre of highly trained inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been on a focused mission: to verify, through intrusive inspection, the existence or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. Nuclear weapons inspections in Iraq are making marked progress. To date, no substantiated evidence was found of the revival in Iraq of a nuclear weapons programme - the most lethal of the weapons of mass destruction. No verification programme can provide absolute guarantees that every facility or piece of equipment has been seen; there is always some degree of risk - and for that reason we need to continue to maintain a monitoring and verification presence in Iraq well into the future. For the present, we intend to continue our programme of intrusive inspection, making use of all the authority granted to us by the Security Council and all the information provided by other States. Barring any unforeseen circumstances, and provided that the level of co-operation by Iraq accelerates and support by other States continues, the IAEA should be able, in the near future, to provide the Security Council with credible assurance regarding the presence or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq

  14. (236)U and (239,)(240)Pu ratios from soils around an Australian nuclear weapons test site.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tims, S G; Froehlich, M B; Fifield, L K; Wallner, A; De Cesare, M

    2016-01-01

    The isotopes (236)U, (239)Pu and (240)Pu are present in surface soils as a result of global fallout from nuclear weapons tests carried out in the 1950's and 1960's. These isotopes potentially constitute artificial tracers of recent soil erosion and sediment movement. Only Accelerator Mass Spectrometry has the requisite sensitivity to measure all three isotopes at these environmental levels. Coupled with its relatively high throughput capabilities, this makes it feasible to conduct studies of erosion across the geographical extent of the Australian continent. In the Australian context, however, global fallout is not the only source of these isotopes. As part of its weapons development program the United Kingdom carried out a series of atmospheric and surface nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga, South Australia in 1956 and 1957. The tests have made a significant contribution to the Pu isotopic abundances present in the region around Maralinga and out to distances ∼1000 km, and impact on the assessment techniques used in the soil and sediment tracer studies. Quantification of the relative fallout contribution derived from detonations at Maralinga is complicated owing to significant contamination around the test site from numerous nuclear weapons safety trials that were also carried out around the site. We show that (236)U can provide new information on the component of the fallout that is derived from the local nuclear weapons tests, and highlight the potential of (236)U as a new fallout tracer. PMID:26141189

  15. Toward a more rigorous application of margins and uncertainties within the nuclear weapons life cycle : a Sandia perspective.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Klenke, Scott Edward; Novotny, George Charles; Paulsen Robert A., Jr.; Diegert, Kathleen V.; Trucano, Timothy Guy; Pilch, Martin M.

    2007-12-01

    This paper presents the conceptual framework that is being used to define quantification of margins and uncertainties (QMU) for application in the nuclear weapons (NW) work conducted at Sandia National Laboratories. The conceptual framework addresses the margins and uncertainties throughout the NW life cycle and includes the definition of terms related to QMU and to figures of merit. Potential applications of QMU consist of analyses based on physical data and on modeling and simulation. Appendix A provides general guidelines for addressing cases in which significant and relevant physical data are available for QMU analysis. Appendix B gives the specific guidance that was used to conduct QMU analyses in cycle 12 of the annual assessment process. Appendix C offers general guidelines for addressing cases in which appropriate models are available for use in QMU analysis. Appendix D contains an example that highlights the consequences of different treatments of uncertainty in model-based QMU analyses.

  16. Proposed nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel: Appendix A, environmental justice analysis. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This is Appendix A to a draft Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel. This appendix addresses environmental justice for the acceptance of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States. Analyses of environmental justice concerns are provided in three areas: (1) potential ports of entry, (2) potential transportation routes from candidate ports of entry to interim management sites, and (3) areas surrounding potential interim management sites. These analyses lead to the conclusion that the alternatives analyzed in this Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) would result in no disproportionate adverse effects on minority populations or low-income communities surrounding the candidate ports, transport routes, or interim management sites

  17. Microcontroller based ground weapon control system(Short Communication)

    OpenAIRE

    M. Sankar Kishore

    2001-01-01

    Armoured vehicles and tanks generally consist of high resolution optical (both infrared and visible) and display systems for recognition and identification of the targets. Different weapons/articles to engage the targets may be present. A fire control system (FCS) controls all the above systems, monitors the status of the articles present and passes the information to the display system. Depending upon the health and availability of the articles, the FCS selects and fires the articles....

  18. A comparison of delayed radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre; Vitale, Bruno

    2002-01-01

    It is shown that the radiological burden due to the battlefield use of circa 400 tons of depleted-uranium munitions in Iraq (and of about 40 tons in Yugoslavia) is comparable to that arising from the hypothetical battle-field use of more than 600 kt (respectively 60 kt) of high-explosive equivalent pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclear weapons. Despite the limited knowledge openly available on existing and future nuclear weapons, there is sufficient published information on their physical pri...

  19. New Wine in Old Bottles? The New Salience of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fedorov, Y.E.

    2007-07-01

    Assessing continuity and change in the world's nuclear landscape is no small task. Since the end of the fierce East-West ideological and political conflict, escalating arms race, and brinkmanship, known as the Cold War, and mainly as a result of its end, the global strategic environment has fundamentally changed, and continues to change. Yet as one French scholar has written, 'We may know that the world is being transformed, but we do not know what the world is being transformed into... What this will look like is as imaginable to us now as the Treaties of Westphalia, which closed the Thirty Years War in 1648-49 would have been to a European of 1618'. There are various, often contradictory interpretations of basic trends and alternative hypothesis about their driving forces. In particular, some analysts still believe that after the Cold War the world is moving toward a democratic reconciliation and hence the 'end of history'. If that is the case then nuclear weapons are becoming less important. However, there is an increasing body of evidence to support Jean Baudrillard's theory that current geopolitical convulsions are the initial manifestations of a fourth world war. If so, the questions, as yet unanswered, are what the fundamental nature of this war is; what political and social actors are colliding with each other; and what the role of nuclear weapons will be in the conflicts and confrontations that may be pushing us toward another global conflagration. (author)

  20. Public health impact of fallout from British nuclear weapons tests in Australia, 1952-1957

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the period 1952-1957, Britain conducted 12 full-scale nuclear weapons tests in Australia in five series, viz. Hurricane(1952), Totem(1953), Mosaic(1956), Buffalo(1956) and Antler(1957). Radioactive fallout from the tests reached many parts of Australia. This report reviews the pathways by which the radionuclides in the fallout could have irradiated the population. The methodology is presented for estimating the radiation doses and values are derived from the available data. The possible effect that the radiation exposure had on public health is assessed. Estimation of the radiation doses is approached in two parts: (a) the contributions from the Mosaic, Buffalo and Antler series which were monitored, and (b) the contributions from the Hurricane and Totem series for which there are few fallout data. In part (a), the activities of the radionuclides making up the measured fallout are established by calculation. Standard models are then used to derive the radiation doses for the population centres - from external radiation, from ingestion of radionuclides in food and from inhalation of radionuclides in air. A simple treatment is adopted to estimate radiation doses from drinking contaminated water. For Part (b), the data assembled in (a) provide the basis for developing statistical models for predicting radiation doses from weapon yields and trajectories of the radioactive clouds. The models are then applied to give the radiation doses to population centres following the tests in Hurricane and Totem, using their yields and trajectories. 71 refs., 20 tabs., 8 figs

  1. American perspectives on security : energy, environment, nuclear weapons, and terrorism : 2010.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Herron, Kerry Gale (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK); Jenkins-Smith, Hank C. (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK); Silva, Carol L. (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK)

    2011-03-01

    We report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2010 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public perceptions shaping the context for debate about a comprehensive national energy policy, and what levels of importance are assigned to various prospective energy technologies. Additionally, we investigate how public views on global climate change are evolving, how the public assesses the risks and benefits of nuclear energy, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and public trust in sources of scientific and technical information. We also report findings from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2010 on public views of the relevance of US nuclear weapons today, support for strategic arms control, and assessments of the potential for nuclear abolition. Additionally, we analyze evolving public views of the threat of terrorism, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and tolerance for intrusive antiterror policies. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.

  2. ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of thermonuclear-fusion energy

    CERN Document Server

    Gsponer, A; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre

    2004-01-01

    This paper contains two parts: (I) A list of "points" highlighting the strategic-political and military-technical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (II) A technical analysis of the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showing that while full access to the physics of thermonuclear weapons is the main implication of ICF, full access to large-scale tritium technology is the main proliferation impact of MCF. The conclusion of the paper is that siting ITER in a country such as Japan, which already has a large separated-plutonium stockpile, and an ambitious laser-driven ICF program (comparable in size and quality to those of the United States or France) will considerably increase its latent (or virtual) nuclear weapons proliferation status, and fo...

  3. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  4. Physical and Mathematical Description of Nuclear Weapons Identification System (NWIS) Signatures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mattingly, J.K.; Mihalczo, J.T.; Mullens, J.A.; Valentine, T.E.

    1997-09-26

    This report describes all time and frequency analysis parameters measured with the new Nuclear Weapons Identification System (NWIS) processor with three input channels: (1) the 252Cf source ionization chamber (2) a detection channel; and (3) a second detection channel for active measurements. An intuitive and physical description of the various functions is given as well as a brief mathematical description and a brief description of how the data are acquired. If the fill five channel capability is used, the number of functions increases in number but not in type. The parameters provided by this new NWIS processor can be divided into two general classes: time analysis signatures including multiplicities and frequency analysis signatures. Data from measurements with an 18.75 kg highly enriched uranium (93.2 wt 0/0, 235U) metai casting for storage are presented to illustrate the various time and frequency analysis parameters.

  5. The meteorological monitoring audit, preventative maintenance and quality assurance programs at a former nuclear weapons facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purposes of the meteorological monitoring audit, preventative maintenance, and quality assurance programs at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Site), are to (1) support Emergency Preparedness (EP) programs at the Site in assessing the transport, dispersion, and deposition of effluents actually or potentially released into the atmosphere by Site operations; and (2) provide information for onsite and offsite projects concerned with the design of environmental monitoring networks for impact assessments, environmental surveillance activities, and remediation activities. The risk from the Site includes chemical and radioactive emissions historically related to nuclear weapons component production activities that are currently associated with storage of large quantities of radionuclides (plutonium) and radioactive waste forms. The meteorological monitoring program provides information for site-specific weather forecasting, which supports Site operations, employee safety, and Emergency Preparedness operations

  6. Physical and mathematical description of Nuclear Weapons Identification System (NWIS) signatures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mihalczo, J.T.; Valentine, T.E.; Mullens, J.A.; Mattingly, J.K. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States)

    1997-09-26

    This report describes all time and frequency analysis parameters measured with the new Nuclear Weapons Identification System (NWIS) processor with three input channels: (1) the {sup 252}Cf source ionization chamber; (2) a detection channel; and (3) a second detection channel for active measurements. An intuitive and physical description of the various functions is given as well as a brief mathematical description and a brief description of how the data are acquired. If the full five channel capability is used, the number of functions increases in number but not in type. The parameters provided by this new NWIS processor can be divided into two general classes: time analysis signatures including multiplicities and frequency analysis signatures. Data from measurements with an 18.75 kg highly enriched uranium (93.2 wt%, {sup 235}U) metal casting for storage are presented to illustrate the various time and frequency analysis parameters.

  7. Disarmament and control of nuclear weapons: Russian positions and their national and international determining factors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In a context where Russia seems to come back to some key principles which guided its international action since the end of Cold War, and relationships between Russia and the USA have been degraded since the US intervention in Iraq (2003), the author examines whether these new Russian postures also concern strategic disarmament, whether Russia is loosing its interest in traditional arrangements of strategic stability, and what are Moscow's priorities within the perspective of expiry of the START 1 Treaty. Thus, the author discusses the role of nuclear weapons in the Russian defence policy, outlines the paradoxes of Russian negotiation positions in the fields of disarmament and arms control, and highlights indirect approaches adopted by Russia on these issues

  8. Key issues in preparing the nuclear weapons complex programmatic environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1988 the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) began to develop a plan for modernizing its nuclear weapons complex. As the former Soviet Union started to break up, the focus of this effort shifted toward reconfiguring or consolidating the complex. Since the program of reconfiguration is a major federal action, the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) are applicable, and a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) is being prepared. The reconfiguration PEIS is the first multisite, program-wide environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared by the DOE. The NEPA strategy for reconfiguration is to prepare a PEIS that analyzes the environmental consequences of alternative configurations to determine a smaller, less diverse, less costly complex, but one that can perform the mission for the first half of the 21st century

  9. Dose reconstruction studies at selected nuclear weapons facilities in the USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is involved in dose reconstructions at six nuclear weapons facilities in the United States. CDC is directly responsible for the conduct of four of these studies, and it provides technical support for the other two. We expect that the two most recently initiated studies will be conducted in five phases: retrieval and assessment of data, initial source term development and pathway analysis, screening dose and exposure calculations, development of methods for assessing environmental dose, and calculation of environmental doses and exposures. In addition to these technical phases of the studies, significant public involvement will be an integral part of the dose reconstruction process. In this paper, we review the status of the current dose reconstructions and discuss CDC's approach to dose reconstruction. (author). 8 refs, 1 fig., 2 tabs

  10. Fallout from Chernobyl and atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. Chernobyl in perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Some results and experience gained so far in Sweden after the Chernobyl accident are discussed in the light of knowledge obtained from the studies of fallout from the atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. Cesium-137, which was an important radionuclide in the bomb fallout, was still more important after Chernobyl. For most Swedes the external irradiation from deposited Cs-137 was the dominating source of irradiation. Studies of Chernobyl fallout have given new information in the fate of contamination in the forest environment, lakes, urban areas, on shielding factors for houses etc. The releases from Chernobyl gave relatively lower dietary doses than expected form the same amount of Cs-137, released through nuclear weapons testing. However lake fish, moose and forest products have shown to be of greater importance than earlier realized. The main reason for the lower dietary doses from Chernobyl was the seasonal distribution of the fallout with deposition just before the start of the growing season. The various actions taken also reduced the intake of Cs-137 and Cs-134. Otherwise, there are no radical differences in the behaviour of cesium in the environment after the bombs and after Chernobyl. Differences may exist, primarily during the first year, due to different fallout conditions, where also the physical-chemical form of the fallout might have been of some importance. The average Swede will have an effective dose commitment of around 1 mSv from Chernobyl, which is about the same as from the bomb fallout. The highest doses due to Chernobyl area received by people living in high deposition areas (>80 kBq/m2 of CS-137) and consuming larger amounts of game animals, lake fish and reindeer. (66 refs.)

  11. An estimate of Sandia resources for underground nuclear weapons effects testing.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bomber, Thomas M.; Zeuch, David Henry

    2003-11-01

    We conducted a study of the time and resources that would be required for Sandia National Laboratories to once again perform nuclear weapons effects experiments of the sort that it did in the past. The study is predicated on the assumptions that if underground nuclear weapons effects testing (UG/NWET) is ever resumed, (1) a brief series of tests (i.e., 2-3) would be done, and (2) all required resources other than those specific to SNL experiments would be provided by others. The questions that we sought to answer were: (1) What experiments would SNL want to do and why? (2) How much would they cost? (3) How long would they take to field? To answer these questions, we convened panels of subject matter experts first to identify five experiments representative of those that SNL has done in the past, and then to determine the costs and timelines to design, fabricate and field each of them. We found that it would cost $76M to $84M to do all five experiments, including 164 to 174 FTEs to conduct all five experiments in a single test. Planning and expenditures for some of the experiments needed to start as early as 5.5 years prior to zero-day, and some work would continue up to 2 years beyond the event. Using experienced personnel as mentors, SNL could probably field such experiments within the next five years. However, beyond that time frame, loss of personnel would place us in the position of essentially starting over.

  12. Historical Exposures to Chemicals at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant: A Pilot Retrospective Exposure Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Janeen Denise Robertson

    1999-02-01

    In a mortality study of white males who had worked at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant between 1952 and 1979, an increased number of deaths from benign and unspecified intracranial neoplasms was found. A case-control study nested within this cohort investigated the hypothesis that an association existed between brain tumor death and exposure to either internally deposited plutonium or external ionizing radiation. There was no statistically significant association found between estimated radiation exposure from internally deposited plutonium and the development of brain tumors. Exposure by job or work area showed no significant difference between the cohort and the control groups. An update of the study found elevated risk estimates for (1) all lymphopoietic neoplasms, and (2) all causes of death in employees with body burdens greater than or equal to two nanocuries of plutonium. There was an excess of brain tumors for the entire cohort. Similar cohort studies conducted on worker populations from other plutonium handling facilities have not yet shown any elevated risks for brain tumors. Historically, the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant used large quantities of chemicals in their production operations. The use of solvents, particularly carbon tetrachloride, was unique to Rocky Flats. No investigation of the possible confounding effects of chemical exposures was done in the initial studies. The objectives of the present study are to (1) investigate the history of chemical use at the Rocky Flats facility; (2) locate and analyze chemical monitoring information in order to assess employee exposure to the chemicals that were used in the highest volume; and (3) determine the feasibility of establishing a chemical exposure assessment model that could be used in future epidemiology studies.

  13. The Politics of Security: Protests against nuclear weapons, the IAEA, and the early Cold War

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    My paper explores the debates about nuclear energy in the British and West German protests against nuclear weapons from the mid-1950s into the early 1960s. Curiously, there was no engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, although there was some discussion about the peaceful uses of atomic agency. My paper is concerned with using this absence of discussions about a regulatory regime for nuclear energy and the relevant agency to highlight more general features about the discussions about ‘the atomic age’ in the early Cold War. I argue that this absence can be explained with the specific politics of security that was at work here: this was a politics of security that had the mass violence of the Second World War as its reference point, while at the same time propagating a program of modernization linked to the ‘peaceful’ uses of nuclear energy. As the IAEA was concerned with managing the controllable risks of nuclear energy more generally and as protesters focused on the uncontrollable dangers of the nuclear arms race, the IAEA did not matter for the protest movements. This highlights a key feature of the structure of the Cold War international system during this crucial period for the construction of peace in Europe: there emerged, for West European NATO member countries, a system of security swaps: West European governments abrogated their military sovereignty to NATO (which effectively meant to a US-controlled system) and organized military violence was internationalized. Within this system, the US guaranteed economic affluence which stood for social security and material abundance. Apocalypse and peaceful atoms could therefore go hand in hand. (author)

  14. The Brazilian position during the final transactions the treaty for the proscriptions of nuclear weapons in Latin America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Brazilian position during the final transactions on the treaty for the proscription of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is presented. An analysis of the main clauses of this treaty is given, well as a comparative study between the principle points of Tlatelolco Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty

  15. The technical results of the Swedish nuclear weapons programme - a compilation of FOAs annual reports 1945-1972

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The aim with this report is to summarise FOAs nuclear weapons related research that was performed 1945-1972. The report is a compilation of FOAs annual reports that originally were in a classified form but have now - mostly - been declassified. References to separate reports in the different research areas are included in the report

  16. Residual radioactive contamination of the Monte Bello Islands from nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1952 and 1956

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Distributions of long-lived radionuclides remaining from nuclear weapons trials conducted at the Monte Bello Islands in 1952 and 1956 are presented. These data are derived from a field survey carried out in 1978 and augmented with earlier data from a survey in 1972

  17. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons : The law of arms control and the international non-proliferation regime

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Coppen, T.

    2016-01-01

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a severe threat to international peace, security and stability. In order to counter this threat, the international community has taken numerous measures, legal and otherwise, resulting in a global framework of treaties and political agreements known as th

  18. The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The proceedings of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was held at Geneva from 5 to 30 May 1975, have since been published, and Members will doubtless have obtained copies from Geneva. The proceedings take the form of a Final Document in three separate parts.

  19. 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    On 19 July 1995, the Director General received a letter, addressed to him by the Alternate Resident Representative of Canada to the International Atomic Energy Agency, concerning 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

  20. Armouring facility? Nuclear-weapon and reactor reseach at the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics is best known as the place where Werner Heisenberg worked on nuclear weapons for Hitler. Although this is essentially true, there is more to the story. At the start of World War II this institute was taken over by the German Army Ordnance to be the central, but not exclusive site for a research project into the economic and military applications of nuclear fission. The Army physicist Kurt Diebner was installed in the institute as its commissarial director. Heisenberg was affiliated with the institute as an advisor at first, and became the director in 1942. Heisenberg and his colleagues, including in particular Karl-Heinz Hoecker, Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, and Karl Wirtz, worked on nuclear reactors and isotope separation with the clear knowledge that these were two different paths to atomic bombs [Atombomben]. However, they were clearly ambivalent about what they were doing. New documents recently returned from Russian archives shed new light on this work and the scientists' motivations. (orig.)

  1. Synergies across verification regimes: Nuclear safeguards and chemical weapons convention compliance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the implementation of all arms control agreements, accurate verification is essential. In setting a course for verifying compliance with a given treaty - whether the NPT or the CWC, one must make a technical comparison of existing information-gathering capabilities against the constraints in an agreement. Then it must be decided whether this level of verifiability is good enough. Generally, the policy standard of 'effective verification' includes the ability to detect significant violations, with high confidence, in sufficient time to respond effectively with policy adjustments or other responses, as needed. It is at this juncture where verification approaches have traditionally diverged. Nuclear safeguards requirements have taken one path while chemical verification methods have pursued another. However, recent technological advances have brought a number of changes affecting verification, and lately their pace has been accelerating. First, all verification regimes have more and better information as a result of new kinds of sensors, imagery, and other technologies. Second, the verification provisions in agreements have also advanced, to include on-site inspections, portal monitoring, data exchanges, and a variety of transparency, confidence-building, and other cooperative measures, Together these developments translate into a technological overlap of certain institutional verification measures such as the NPT's safeguards requirements and the IAEA and the CWC's verification visions and the OPCW. Hence, a priority of international treaty-implementing organizations is exploring the development of a synergistic and coordinated approach to WMD policy making that takes into account existing inter-linkages between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons issues. Specific areas of coordination include harmonizing information systems and information exchanges and the shared application of scientific mechanisms, as well as collaboration on technological developments

  2. Mode Research on Space Weapons Systems Innovation Based Quality Function Deployment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wang Xiuhong

    2011-06-01

    Full Text Available in the aviation industry, experts are enthusiastic over the research of sophisticated weapons. Little specialist pays attention to the innovation modes and methods. Up to now little quantization method suitable for aviation weapon systems innovation is presented. Base on the deep analysis and study on features of aviation weapon systems innovation and different innovation mode from the mass production, we have designed process model and quality chain model of aviation weapon systems innovation. Compared with the process model of large-scale innovation, the process models are more complex including many feedbacks and adding five steps: task decomposition, analysis of knowledge gap, accumulation of key knowledge, outsourcing selection, system integration. Meanwhile manufacturing process and R&D process are preformed simultaneously, and are involved in the process of module development. Technology application and diffusion are preformed with delivering the final innovation product to user. Quality function deployment and quality house are adopted to deal with the quality transfer among nodes. Quality demands of one node are converted into the technique features of another node in the quality house. We designed the top-down technique features transfer model and bottom-up demands transfer model to solve the quality transfer problems among nodes. At last an example is given to illustrate that this approach can accelerate to blaze the aviation weapon systems trails more than the existing methods and effectively reach quality management of aviation weapon systems innovation.

  3. A dialogue between the parties and non-parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In describing the mechanism of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences, the author stresses the necessity of the dialog between parties and non-parties to the Treaty which could allow the participants of the dialog to be better informed about the Treaty itself and on how to make it a more effective instrument, not only for prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but for promoting peaceful cooperation in the field of nuclear energy as well

  4. Microcontroller based ground weapon control system(Short Communication

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    M. Sankar Kishore

    2001-10-01

    Full Text Available Armoured vehicles and tanks generally consist of high resolution optical (both infrared and visible and display systems for recognition and identification of the targets. Different weapons/articles to engage the targets may be present. A fire control system (FCS controls all the above systems, monitors the status of the articles present and passes the information to the display system. Depending upon the health and availability of the articles, the FCS selects and fires the articles. Design and development of ground control unit which is the heart of the FCS, both in hardware and software, has been emphasised. The system has been developed using microcontroller and software developed in ASM 51 language. The system also has a facility to test all the systems and articles as initial power on condition. From the safety point of view, software and hardware interlocks have been provided in the critical operations, like firing sequence. "

  5. The nuclear car wash: A system to detect nuclear weapons in commercial cargo shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A concept for detecting the presence of special nuclear material (235U or 239Pu) concealed in intermodal cargo containers has been developed, studied, and recent performance results are described. It is based on interrogation with a pulsed beam of 3-7 MeV neutrons that produce fission events and subsequent detection of their β-delayed neutron emission or β-delayed high-energy γ-radiation reveals the presence of fissionable material. Fission product β-delayed γ-rays above 3 MeV are nearly 10 times more abundant than β-delayed neutrons and are distinct from natural radioactivity and from nearly all of the induced activity in a normal cargo. Detector backgrounds and potential interferences with the fission signature radiation have been identified and quantified. Their impact on detection sensitivity is relatively minor and can be addressed readily. Components of a simple laboratory prototype have been assembled, tested with the most challenging cargo threat scenarios, and results compared to computer simulations. Preliminary results will be presented

  6. Sustaining a verification regime in a nuclear weapon-free world. VERTIC research report no. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sustaining high levels of commitment to and enthusiasm for the verification regime in a nuclear weapon-free world (NWFW) would be a considerable challenge, but the price of failure would be high. No verification system for a complete ban on a whole of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) has been in existence long enough to provide a precedent or the requisite experience. Nevertheless, lessons from the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) nuclear safeguards system are instructive. A potential problem over the long haul is the gradual erosion of the deterrent effect of verification that may result from the continual overlooking of minor instances of non-compliance. Flaws in the verification system must be identified and dealt with early lest they also corrode the system. To achieve this the verification organisation's inspectors and analytical staff will need sustained support, encouragement, resources and training. In drawing attention to weaknesses, they must be supported by management and at the political level. The leaking of sensitive information, either industrial or military, by staff of the verification regime is a potential problem. 'Managed access' techniques should be constantly examined and improved. The verification organisation and states parties will need to sustain close co-operation with the nuclear and related industries. Frequent review mechanisms must be established. States must invest time and effort to make them effective. Another potential problem is the withering of resources for sustained verification. Verification organisations tend to be pressured by states to cut or last least cap costs, even if the verification workload increases. The verification system must be effective as knowledge and experience allows. The organisation will need continuously to update its scientific methods and technology. This requires in-house resources plus external research and development (R and D). Universities, laboratories and industry need incentives to

  7. The role of nuclear suppliers group in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The non-proliferation regime today is a pretty heterogeneous system of measures and different ways of control of nuclear material production, transport and use, as well as nuclear activities and technology in general. In its basis are the Statute of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Non-proliferation Treaty. However, the development of a nuclear technology and technological progress in the world in general, poses the need for more efficient and much more concrete systems of control of nuclear material and activities. One of organizations which cover these issues is Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), founded in 1991 with goal to assemble all states suppliers, regardless are they signatories of Non-proliferation Treaty or not. The important thing is that NSG do not rely only to the list of limitations for traffic of the equipment which is directly related to nuclear activities, but also to so call dual use equipment, i.e. equipment which could be, besides its primary purpose, converted to some nuclear activities. Concerning continuous technological development, and also the actual political situation in the world, these lists are continuously amended. In this presentation the principles and methods of work of NSG are analyzed, together with the role of the Republic of Croatia as its member.(author)

  8. The Role of Nuclear Suppliers Group in Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The non-proliferation regime today is a pretty heterogeneous system of measures and different ways of control of nuclear material production, transport and use, as well as nuclear activities and technology in general. In its basis are the Statute of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Non-proliferation Treaty. However, the development of a nuclear technology and technological progress in the world in general, poses the need for more efficient and much more concrete systems of control of nuclear material and activities. One of organizations which covers these issues is Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), founded in 1991 with goal to assemble all states suppliers, regardless are they signatories of Non-proliferation Treaty or not. The important thing is that NSG do not rely only to the list of limitations for traffic of the equipment which is directly related to nuclear activities, but also to so call dual use equipment, i.e. equipment which could be, besides its primary purpose, converted to some nuclear activities. Concerning continuous technological development, and also the actual political situation in the world, these lists are continuously amended. In this presentation the principles and methods of work of NSG are analyzed, together with the role of the Republic of Croatia as its member as from 2005.(author)

  9. Inaccurate Prediction of Nuclear Weapons' Effects and Possible Adverse Influences on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness

    OpenAIRE

    Harney, Robert C.

    2009-01-01

    This article appeared in Homeland Security Affairs (September 2009), v.5 no.3 The primary purpose of this paper is to discuss the accuracy of common effects estimates and describe how more realistic estimates might affect nuclear terrorism preparedness.[...].The likelihood of an attack [nuclear] has prompted considerable public debate about what are the best steps to prevent such an attack. In many of these discussions estimates of the number of casualties or the size of the area that woul...

  10. Multi-attribute analysis of nuclear fuel cycle resistance to nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Calculation study has been carried out to analyze the proliferation resistance of different scenarios of nuclear fuel cycle organization. Scenarios of stable and developing nuclear power were considered with involvement of thermal and fast reactors. The attention was paid mainly to the cycle with extended plutonium breeding on the basis of fast reactor technology, and to the schemes of fuel cycle organization allowing to minimize the proliferation risk

  11. Assessment of thyroid doses due to 131I from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    About 100 of the atmospheric nuclear weapons tests carried out at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) resulted in off-site detection of radioactive materials. These tests released about 5 EBq of 131I in the atmosphere, predominantly in 1952, 1953, 1955 and 1957. Radioiodine was deposited across the United States of America, with the highest values immediately downwind of the NTS and the lowest values of the west coast. In the 1980s, three major dose reconstruction studies were undertaken in order to address the assessment of thyroid doses due to 131I fallout from the NTS: (1) the ORERP study of the US Department of Energy; (2) the Utah thyroid cohort study; and (3) the NCI thyroid study. The first two studies are concerned with doses received by 'local' populations (less than 800 km from the NTS), while the third study deals with the estimation of thyroid doses received by populations across the continental USA. In all three studies, uncertainty estimates were attached to the calculated doses. The second and third studies specifically addressed the assessment of thyroid doses from radioiodines, whereas the first study has a much wider scope, in that it considers both external and internal irradiation of the main organs and tissues of the body from all radionuclides produced by nuclear weapons tests. The thyroid doses from NTS fallout resulted essentially from the ingestion of milk contaminated with 131I; other, usually less important, pathways of exposure are the consumption of leafy vegetables and eggs. Because children generally drink more milk than adults, and because of the smaller mass of their thyroid gland, children received higher doses than adults for a given deposition of 131I. The thyroid doses are estimated to have ranged up to a few grays for small children in south-western Utah who drank milk from a family owned goat. A preliminary estimate of the collective thyroid dose to the US population from NTS fallout is 4 x 106 man·Gy, corresponding to a per capita

  12. Radiation doses to local populations near nuclear weapons test sites worldwide.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Simon, Steven L; Bouville, André

    2002-05-01

    Nuclear weapons testing was conducted in the atmosphere at numerous sites worldwide between 1946 and 1980, which resulted in exposures to local populations as a consequence of fallout of radioactive debris. The nuclear tests were conducted by five nations (United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China) primarily at 16 sites. The 16 testing sites, located in nine different countries on five continents (plus Oceania) contributed nearly all of the radioactive materials released to the environment by atmospheric testing; only small amounts were released at a fewother minor testing sites. The 16 sites discussed here are Nevada Test Site, USA (North American continent), Bikini and Enewetak, Marshall Islands (Oceania); Johnston Island, USA (Oceania), Christmas and Malden Island, Kiribati (Oceania); Emu Field, Maralinga, and Monte Bello Islands, Australia (Australian continent); Mururoa and Fangataufa, French Polynesia (Oceania), Reggane, Algeria (Africa), Novaya Zemlya and Kapustin Yar, Russia (Europe), Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan (Asia), and Lop Nor, China (Asia). There were large differences in the numbers of tests conducted at each location and in the total explosive yields. Those factors, as well as differences in population density, lifestyle, environment, and climate at each site, led to large differences in the doses received by local populations. In general, the tests conducted earliest led to the highest individual and population exposures, although the amount of information available for a few of these sites is insufficient to provide any detailed evaluation of radiation exposures. The most comprehensive information for any site is for the Nevada Test Site. The disparities in available information add difficulty to determining the radiation exposures of local populations at each site. It is the goal of this paper to summarize the available information on external and internal doses received by the public living in the regions near each of the

  13. Fallout deposition in the Marshall Islands from Bikini and Enewetak nuclear weapons tests.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Beck, Harold L; Bouville, André; Moroz, Brian E; Simon, Steven L

    2010-08-01

    Deposition densities (Bq m(-2)) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides occurring in nuclear weapons testing fallout from tests conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls (1946-1958) have been estimated on a test-specific basis for 32 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. A complete review of various historical and contemporary data, as well as meteorological analysis, was used to make judgments regarding which tests deposited fallout in the Marshall Islands and to estimate fallout deposition density. Our analysis suggested that only 20 of the 66 nuclear tests conducted in or near the Marshall Islands resulted in substantial fallout deposition on any of the 23 inhabited atolls. This analysis was confirmed by the fact that the sum of our estimates of 137Cs deposition from these 20 tests at each atoll is in good agreement with the total 137Cs deposited as estimated from contemporary soil sample analyses. The monitoring data and meteorological analyses were used to quantitatively estimate the deposition density of 63 activation and fission products for each nuclear test, plus the cumulative deposition of 239+240Pu at each atoll. Estimates of the degree of fractionation of fallout from each test at each atoll, as well as of the fallout transit times from the test sites to the atolls were used in this analysis. The estimates of radionuclide deposition density, fractionation, and transit times reported here are the most complete available anywhere and are suitable for estimations of both external and internal dose to representative persons as described in companion papers. PMID:20622548

  14. Radiation doses to local populations near nuclear weapons test sites worldwide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons testing was conducted in the atmosphere at numerous sites worldwide between 1946 and 1980, which resulted in exposures to local populations as a consequence of fallout of radioactive debris. The nuclear tests were conducted by five nations (United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China) primarily at 16 sites. The 16 testing sites, located in nine different countries on five continents (plus Oceania) contributed nearly all of the radioactive materials released to the environment by atmospheric testing; only small amounts were released at a few other minor testing sites. The 16 sites discussed here are Nevada Test Site, USA (North American continent), Bikini and Enewetak, Marshall Islands (Oceania); Johnston Island, USA (Oceania), Christmas and Malden Island, Kiribati (Oceania); Emu Field, Maralinga, and Monte Bello Islands, Australia (Australian continent); Mururoa and Fangataufa, French Polynesia (Oceania), Reggane, Algeria (Africa), Novaya Zemlya and Kapustin Yar, Russia (Europe), Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan (Asia), and Lop Nor, China (Asia). There were large differences in the numbers of tests conducted at each location and in the total explosive yields. Those factors, as well as differences in population density, lifestyle, environment, and climate at each site, led to large differences in the doses received by local populations. In general, the tests conducted earliest led to the highest individual and population exposures, although the amount of information available for a few of these sites is insufficient to provide any detailed evaluation of radiation exposures. The most comprehensive information for any site is for the Nevada Test Site. The disparities in available information add difficulty to determining the radiation exposures of local populations at each site. It is the goal of this paper to summarize the available information on external and internal doses received by the public living in the regions near each of the

  15. Historical application of a social amplification of risk model: Economic impacts of risk events at nuclear weapons facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Public perception of risk is being cited as a documented reason to rethink a very contentious congressionally mandated process for siting interim storage and permanent disposal facilities for high-level radioactive waste. Rigorous survey research has shown that the public holds intense, negative images of open-quotes nuclearclose quotes and open-quotes radioactiveclose quotes technologies, activities, and facilities. Potential host states and opponents claim that these negative images, coupled with an amplification of negative risk events, will potentially stigmatize the area surrounding such facilities and result in significant economic losses. At issue is whether a supporting social amplification of risk model is applicable to communities hosting facilities that are part of the U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex. An initial assessment of high-profile discrete and cumulative key negative risk events at such nuclear facilities does not validate that there has been stigmatization or substantial social and economic consequences in the host areas. Before any changes to major national policy are implemented, additional research is required to determine if the nearby public's open-quotes pragmatic logic,close quotes based on practical knowledge and experience, attenuates the link between public opinion and demographic and economic behaviors. 40 refs

  16. A Novel Two-Staged Decision Support based Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment Algorithm, Asset-based Dynamic Weapon Scheduling using Artificial Intelligence Techinques

    CERN Document Server

    Naeem, Huma; Hussain, Mukhtar; Khan, Shoab A

    2009-01-01

    Surveillance control and reporting (SCR) system for air threats play an important role in the defense of a country. SCR system corresponds to air and ground situation management/processing along with information fusion, communication, coordination, simulation and other critical defense oriented tasks. Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment (TEWA) sits at the core of SCR system. In such a system, maximal or near maximal utilization of constrained resources is of extreme importance. Manual TEWA systems cannot provide optimality because of different limitations e.g.surface to air missile (SAM) can fire from a distance of 5Km, but manual TEWA systems are constrained by human vision range and other constraints. Current TEWA systems usually work on target-by-target basis using some type of greedy algorithm thus affecting the optimality of the solution and failing in multi-target scenario. his paper relates to a novel two-staged flexible dynamic decision support based optimal threat evaluation and weapon assignment...

  17. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the Asia and Pacific Region in the Context of Global Security

    OpenAIRE

    Żuber, Marian

    2011-01-01

    The author presents the idea of Nuclear-Wapon-Free Zones creation in the modern world. The main attention is dedicated to Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the Asia and Pacific region created on 20th and 21st century breakthrough. The author particularly describes the history of conclude and main principles of the treaties initiates by states of the region which estab-lished Asian non-nuclear zones – Treaty of Rarotonga, Treaty of Bangkok and Treaty of Semipalatinsk. Attention is also payed to a n...

  18. Effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The present study of the path to a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the Middle East has been made in a spirit of ''realistic optimism''. There clearly is no instant solution to the problem. In the end, the co-operation of the international community as a whole points to a central role for the United Nations. The present study lists a number of measures to build mutual confidence and prepare the way for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. They are not arranged in order of priority or importance. Some of these measures can be implemented unilaterally by States of the region or outside it. Others may require agreement among groups of States. When it will become possible to arrange a negotiating conference involving all the core States in the region, together with some outside States at some point, a major breakthrough in confidence-building will have occurred. NPT parties with relatively advanced nuclear programmes, involving, for example, the construction of research or power reactors, can arrange those programmes to minimize suspicions that they might also serve a military objective. The programmes can avoid any use of weapon-grade fissionable material and they can invite inspection of any facilities that use significant quantities of nuclear material. Stocks of natural uranium, heavy water and tritium can be declared

  19. Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker - a physicist and philosopher in the shade of the nuclear bomb. A conversation on nuclear weapons and the responsibility of nuclear scientists

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The 50th anniversary of the first nuclear explosion (16th July 1945) prompted the editor of this collection to look again at the part played by German physicists in the nuclear weapons issue. Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, one of the last surviving witnesses of this period, kindly agreed to give a comprehensive interview on the German nuclear programme and the responsibility of physicists. The interview is published here for the first time and forms the central part of this brochure. It is complemented by two statements by Edward Teller and two historical letters. The author, in preparing this compilation, had in mind to contribute towards science-historical discussion and to give younger colleagues a graphic idea of the conflict surrounding nuclear research. (orig.)

  20. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

  1. Antisatellite weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The authors take issue with the assessment that the advent of antisatellite weapons implies that the beneficial role of satellites in arms control, confidence building, and conflict resolution has been judged less important than their ability to support actual military operations. They argue that there is still an opportunity to negotiate a militarily significant and verifiable constraint on the growth of antisatellite technology that would be in the security interest of the US and the world as a whole. They base their opinion on an assessment of the roles of the existing military satellites and their vulnerability to antisatellite weapons and the probable impact of antisatellite weapons on various kinds of crisis and conflict. 10 figures, 1 table

  2. Statement to Second Conference of States Parties to African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, 12 November 2012, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It is a great pleasure for me to address this Second Conference of States Parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba. I compliment the countries of Africa for their tenacity in pursuing the goal of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone for decades, until the Treaty finally entered into force in 2009. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are a highly effective means of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. The five nuclear-weapon-free zones in existence today cover a total of 113 countries. Each has its own special characteristics, but they also have many important elements in common. All nuclear-weapon-free zones prohibit the development, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in their respective regions. They all cover large inhabited areas. They provide for IAEA verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material. Nuclear-weapon-free zones have brought real security benefits, both regionally and to the whole world. The Treaty of Pelindaba incorporates a number of special features, including some measures which go beyond undertakings assumed by States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) . For example, it makes provision for the dismantling and destruction of nuclear explosive devices manufactured by a Party to the Treaty before the Treaty entered into force. It prohibits attacks on nuclear installations in the nuclear-weapon-free zone. It bars the dumping of radioactive waste within the zone. In addition, the Treaty of Pelindaba contains a commitment to promote the use of nuclear science and technology for economic and social development. Parties are encouraged to make use of the assistance of the IAEA. They also pledge to maintain the highest standards of security and physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment. In the Preamble to the Treaty, the Parties recognise that the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in the Middle East, would enhance their security. Last November, I hosted an

  3. Migration studies of 137Cs from nuclear weapons fallout and the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The vertical migration of 137Cs originating from nuclear weapons fallout (NWF) and the Chernobyl accident has been studied at 27 reference sites in western Sweden. An attempt to describe the present depth distribution with an alternative solution of the Convection-Dispersion Equation (CDE) with a pulse-like fallout as initial condition was made. The actual depth profiles in the soil samples were fit to a sum of the CDE for both NWF and Chernobyl debris. The magnitudes of the fallouts were estimated from precipitation calculations and GIS-mapping, leaving two free parameters (convection velocity and effective dispersion constant) for performing the fit of the depth profiles. In some cases using only two parameters is not sufficient to achieve an accurate representation for the depth profile, indicating an over- or underestimate of the magnitude of the fallout. In these cases the magnitude of the fallout is also varied. The fitted depth profiles were used to correct in situ measurements from the same locations for the actual depth distribution, showing good agreement with the accumulated activities in soil samples

  4. The assessment of radiation exposures in native American communities from nuclear weapons testing in Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Native Americans residing in a broad region downwind from the Nevada Test Site during the 1950s and 1960s received significant radiation exposures from nuclear weapons testing. Because of differences in diet, activities, and housing, their radiation exposures are only very imperfectly represented in the Department of Energy dose reconstructions. There are important missing pathways, including exposures to radioactive iodine from eating small game. The dose reconstruction model assumptions about cattle feeding practices across a year are unlikely to apply to the native communities as are other model assumptions about diet. Thus exposures from drinking milk and eating vegetables have not yet been properly estimated for these communities. Through consultations with members of the affected communities, these deficiencies could be corrected and the dose reconstruction extended to Native Americans. An illustration of the feasibility of extending the dose reconstruction is provided by a sample calculation to estimate radiation exposures to the thyroid from eating radio-iodine-contaminated rabbit thyroids after the Dedan test. The illustration is continued with a discussion of how the calculation results may be used to make estimates for other tests and other locations

  5. The relationship of thyroid cancer with radiation exposure from nuclear weapon testing in the Marshall Islands

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The US nuclear weapons testing program in the Pacific conducted between 1946 and 1958 resulted in radiation exposure in the Marshall Islands. The potentially widespread radiation exposure from radioiodines of fallout has raised concerns about the risk of thyroid cancer in the Marshallese population. The most serious exposures and its health hazards resulted from the hydrogen-thermonuclear bomb test, the Castle BRAVO, on March 1, 1954. Between 1993 and 1997, we screened 3,709 Marshallese for thyroid disease who were born before the BRAVO test. It was 60% of the entire population at risk and who were still alive at the time of our examinations. We diagnosed 30 thyroid cancers and found 27 other study participants who had been operated for thyroid cancer before our screening in this group. Fifty-seven Marshallese born before 1954 (1.5%) had thyroid cancer or had been operated for thyroid cancer. Nearly all (92%) of these cancers were papillary carcinoma. We derived estimates of individual thyroid dose proxy from the BRAVO test in 1954 on the basis of published age-specific doses estimated on Utirik atoll and 137Cs deposition levels on the atolls where the participants came from. There was suggestive evidence that the prevalence of thyroid cancer increased with category of estimated dose to the thyroid. (author)

  6. A comparison of delayed radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons

    CERN Document Server

    Gsponer, A; Vitale, B; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre; Vitale, Bruno

    2002-01-01

    It is shown that the radiological burden due to the battle-field use of circa 400 tons of depleted-uranium munitions in Iraq (and of about 40 tons in Yugoslavia) is comparable to that arising from the hypothetical battle-field use of more than 600 kt (respectively 60 kt) of high-explosive equivalent pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclear weapons. Despite the limited knowledge openly available on existing and future nuclear weapons, there is sufficient published information on their physical principles and radiological effects to make such a comparison. In fact, it is shown that this comparison can be made with very simple and convincing arguments so that the main technical conclusions of the paper are undisputable -- although it would be worthwhile to supplement the hand calculations presented in the paper by more detailed computer simulations in order to consolidate the conclusions and refute any possible objections.

  7. Mortality and cancer incidence 1952-1990 in UK participants in the UK atmospheric nuclear weapon tests and experimental programmes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    To study long-term effects of participating in the United Kingdom's atmospheric nuclear weapon tests and experimental programmes which took place in Australia and the Pacific Ocean between 1952 and 1967, a total of 21,358 men who took part in the tests have been identified from archives of the Ministry of Defence and followed up to 1 January 1991. The mortality and incidence of cancer in these men were compared with those in 22,333 controls selected from the same archives. It is concluded that participant in the nuclear weapon testing programmes has not had a detectable effect on participants' expectation of life, or on their risk of developing cancer or other fatal diseases. (author)

  8. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Review conference of the States Parties Geneva 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1985 with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. The Treaty, commonly referred to as the non-proliferation Treaty, is the fundamental instrument to avert the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons and is, perhaps, the most important multilateral arms regulation agreement of our time. It was negotiated in the 1960s in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and in the United Nations General Assembly. The Treaty was opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington on July 1, 1968. On that date, it was signed by the three Depositary Governments - the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States - and by 58 other States. As of December 31, 1983 the number of States parties to the Treaty had risen to 119

  9. Proposal for health effects studies related to nuclear weapon testing at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Populations that resided and who now resid in and the Semipalatinsk Test Site have emained there for decades and experienced little in and out migration. Semipalatinsk City was literally a secret city until the dissolution of the USSR. The urban population of the city of Semipalatinsk has steadily grown from several hundred thousand to about 1 million people in the area. Although current urban and rural levels of exposure from environmental radiocontamination are not markedly increased beyond natural background, there are many villagers who resided near the Semipalatinsk Test Site whose cumulative lifetime doses are on the order of 0.8-2 Sv. Over the course of 40 years, more than 470 nuclear weapons were tested at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS) in the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan. From 1949 to 1963, 38 detonations occured on the ground and 128 in the air. Radionuclides emanating from there tests resulted in atmospheric and enviromental contamination leading to varios levels of acute and chronic radiation exposure. The medical, scientific and social ramifications of the nuclear testing pose serius challenges to the Kazakhstan Repubic and its scientific and health care systems. The release of radionuclides over a long period of time and their spread in the enveronment posed major problems to the Kazakhstan authorities. Efforts to study the association between fallout radiation and radiation-induced health effects were prevented by official decree until 1980. Initially, efforts to address the medical and scientific challenges of the radioactive contamination which was classified in the FSU. After the dissolution of the FSU, efforts to study populations aroud STS were hampered and further encumbered by the political and social changes that increased sharply in the FSU soon after test suspension

  10. ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of thermonuclear-fusion energy systems

    OpenAIRE

    Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre

    2004-01-01

    This report contains two parts: (1) A list of "points" highlighting the strategic-political and military-technical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (2) A technical analysis of the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showin...

  11. The nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty and terrorism: the consequences of 11 september 2001 on the treaty review process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The evolution of the terrorism makes the future uncertain, in such a context, the objective of universality of the Ntp and the construction of a comprehensive regime for protecting nuclear materials, technologies, sites, weapon and information may be postponed indefinitely or, on the contrary, become achievable. Should the latter be the case, this would be an unprecedented contribution to consolidating the international security system. Events could overtake political procrastination.But the price to pay risks being a high one. (N.C.)

  12. A comparison of delayed radiological effects of depleted-uranium ammunitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It is shown that the radiological burden due to the battle-field use of circa 400 tons of depleted-uranium ammunitions in Iraq (and of about 40 tons in Yugoslavia) is comparable to that arising from the hypothetical battle-field use of more than 600 kt (respectively 60 kt) of high-explosive equivalent pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclear weapons. Despite the limited knowledge openly available on existing and future nuclear weapons, there is sufficient published information on their physical principles and radiological effects to make such a comparison. In fact, it is shown that this comparison can be made with very simple and convincing arguments so that the main technical conclusions of the paper are undisputable - although it would be worthwhile to supplement the hand calculations presented in the paper by more detailed computer simulations in order to consolidate the conclusions and refute any possible objections. From a strategic perspective, the breaking of the taboo against the intentional battle-field use of radioactive materials, which lasted from 1945 to 1991, can therefore be interpreted as a preparation for the progressive introduction of fourth-generation nuclear weapons whose battle-field use will cause a low (but non-negligible) radioactive environment. It can therefore be argued that besides its military function, the use of depleted-uranium in Iraq and Yugoslavia may have served a political purpose: to soften the opposition of the Western public opinion to the induction of radioactivity on the battle-field, and to get the World population accustomed to the combat use of depleted-uranium and fourth-generation nuclear weapons. (author)

  13. Trends in childhood leukaemia in the Nordic countries in relation to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

    OpenAIRE

    Darby, S. C.; Olsen, J. H.; Doll, R.; Thakrar, B.; Brown, P. D.; Storm, H H; Barlow, L.; Langmark, F.; Teppo, L; H. Tulinius

    1992-01-01

    OBJECTIVE--To obtain further information about the risks of childhood leukaemia after exposure to ionising radiation at low doses and low dose rates before or after birth or to the father's testes shortly before conception. DESIGN--Observational study of trends in incidence of childhood leukaemia in relation to estimated radiation exposures due to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing during the 1950s and 1960s. SETTING--Nordic countries. SUBJECTS--Children aged under 15 years. MAI...

  14. The Text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  15. Statement by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the twentieth anniversary of Iraq's ratification of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the full text of the statement made by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the twentieth anniversary of Iraq's ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  20. Reduced fertility after the crash of a U.S. bomber carrying nuclear weapons?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Juel, K

    1995-01-01

    A register-based study was performed to elucidate whether workers employed on the Thule air base in the clean-up period after the crash of a U.S. B-52 bomber carrying nuclear bombs had reduced fertility, as measured by the numbers of liveborn children. The highest birth rates were among 25-34-year...

  1. Concepts and Strategies for Transparency Monitoring of Nuclear Materials at the Back End of the Fuel/Weapons Cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    COSTIN, LAURENCE; DAVIES, PETER; PREGENZER, ARIAN L.

    1999-10-01

    Representatives of the Department of Energy, the national laboratories, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and others gathered to initiate the development of broad-based concepts and strategies for transparency monitoring of nuclear materials at the back end of the fuel/weapons cycle, including both geologic disposal and monitored retrievable storage. The workshop focused on two key questions: ''Why should we monitor?'' and ''What should we monitor?'' These questions were addressed by identifying the range of potential stakeholders, concerns that stakeholders may have, and the information needed to address those concerns. The group constructed a strategic framework for repository transparency implementation, organized around the issues of safety (both operational and environmental), diversion (assuring legitimate use and security), and viability (both political and economic). Potential concerns of the international community were recognized as the possibility of material diversion, the multinational impacts of potential radionuclide releases, and public and political perceptions of unsafe repositories. The workshop participants also identified potential roles that the WIPP may play as a monitoring technology development and demonstration test-bed facility. Concepts for WIPP'S potential test-bed role include serving as (1) an international monitoring technology and development testing facility, (2) an international demonstration facility, and (3) an education and technology exchange center on repository transparency technologies.

  2. Concepts and Strategies for Transparency Monitoring of Nuclear Materials at the Back End of the Fuel/Weapons Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Representatives of the Department of Energy, the national laboratories, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and others gathered to initiate the development of broad-based concepts and strategies for transparency monitoring of nuclear materials at the back end of the fuel/weapons cycle, including both geologic disposal and monitored retrievable storage. The workshop focused on two key questions: ''Why should we monitor?'' and ''What should we monitor?'' These questions were addressed by identifying the range of potential stakeholders, concerns that stakeholders may have, and the information needed to address those concerns. The group constructed a strategic framework for repository transparency implementation, organized around the issues of safety (both operational and environmental), diversion (assuring legitimate use and security), and viability (both political and economic). Potential concerns of the international community were recognized as the possibility of material diversion, the multinational impacts of potential radionuclide releases, and public and political perceptions of unsafe repositories. The workshop participants also identified potential roles that the WIPP may play as a monitoring technology development and demonstration test-bed facility. Concepts for WIPP'S potential test-bed role include serving as (1) an international monitoring technology and development testing facility, (2) an international demonstration facility, and (3) an education and technology exchange center on repository transparency technologies

  3. The Swedish National Defence Research Establishment and the plans for Swedish nuclear weapons; Foersvarets forskningsanstalt och planerna paa svenska kaernvapen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonter, Thomas [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of History

    2001-03-01

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish Government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid 50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the Parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the Parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The Government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue

  4. Application of NEPA to nuclear weapons production, storage, and testing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirement of environmental impact statements for the testing of military equipment, specifically nuclear weapons, conflicts with national security objectives. The author examines NEPA and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in terms of the environmental effects of weapons testing and the relevant case law. The Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project sought to resolve the conflict by distinguishing between a project which is contemplated and one which is proposed. The classification scheme embodied in the FOIA exemption for national security may cause unwarranted frustration of NEPA's goals. The author outlines a new classification system and review mechanism that could curb military abuse in this area

  5. Excess weapons materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile continues to decline, dismantlement of nuclear weapons removed from the stockpile proceeds at an accelerated pace. From dismantlement of the weapons, the Department of Energy (DOE) receives uranium, plutonium, and many nonnuclear materials. The current and projected returns of enriched uranium from nuclear weapons have made it possible for DOE to shut down the top of the uranium enrichment plant at Portsmouth, Ohio. The Portsmouth Top is where highly enriched uranium was produced. Now, future needs for highly enriched uranium, at least for the foreseeable future, can be met with highly enriched uranium from retired nuclear weapons. Like enriched uranium, plutonium in large quantities is becoming available from weapons dismantlement. However, unlike enriched uranium, there are no firm needs for the plutonium from weapons. However, there are some potential needs, and the Department is reserving plutonium to meet them. These potential needs are for both weapons and nonweapons programs. While there is a nuclear weapons stockpile reduction, both in the United States and in the former Soviet Union, there is no assurance that future needs for plutonium for defense programs will never exceed the current projections. Just as prudent financial planning should not assume that peak years of savings or revenues or profits can be extended indefinitely, prudent defense planning should not assume that current years of zero or minimum demand for plutonium will be extended indefinitely. Thus, a reserve of plutonium for potential weapons use is maintained. Essentially, all available plutonium not in active use or reserved for weapons programs will be available for nonweapons programs. The paper discusses the grades of plutonium available, the categorization of the plutonium inventory, the forms in which the plutonium exists, the quantities available, and storage locations

  6. CRISPR-Based Technologies: Prokaryotic Defense Weapons Repurposed

    OpenAIRE

    Terns, Rebecca M.; Terns, Michael P.

    2014-01-01

    To combat potentially deadly viral infections, prokaryotic microbes enlist small RNA-based adaptive immune systems (CRISPR-Cas systems) that protect through sequence-specific recognition and targeted destruction of viral nucleic acids (either DNA or RNA depending on the system). Here, we summarize rapid progress made in redirecting the nuclease activities of these microbial immune systems to bind and cleave DNA or RNA targets of choice, by reprogramming the small guide RNAs of the various CRI...

  7. Global Security Rule Sets An Analysis of the Current Global Security Environment and Rule Sets Governing Nuclear Weapons Release

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mollahan, K; Nattrass, L

    2004-09-30

    America is in a unique position in its history. In maintaining its position as the world's only superpower, the US consistently finds itself taking on the role of a global cop, chief exporter of hard and soft power, and primary impetus for globalization. A view of the current global situation shows an America that can benefit greatly from the effects of globalization and soft power. Similarly, America's power can be reduced significantly if globalization and its soft power are not handled properly. At the same time, America has slowly come to realize that its next major adversary is not a near peer competitor but terrorism and disconnected nations that seek nuclear capabilities. In dealing with this new threat, America needs to come to terms with its own nuclear arsenal and build a security rule set that will establish for the world explicitly what actions will cause the US to consider nuclear weapons release. This rule set; however, needs to be established with sensitivity to the US's international interests in globalization and soft power. The US must find a way to establish its doctrine governing nuclear weapons release without threatening other peaceful nations in the process.

  8. Deterring war or courting disaster: an analysis of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean

    OpenAIRE

    Wueger, Diana Beth

    2015-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited One of the core assumptions of nuclear strategy is that submarine-based deterrent assets stabilize deterrent relationships by providing an assured second-strike capability. As India progresses toward an operational sea-based deterrent, this thesis seeks to qualify this foundational assumption by exploring the empirical conditions under which this principle operated during the Cold War. It then examines whether these conditions—and by e...

  9. A high resolution record of chlorine-36 nuclear-weapons-tests fallout from Central Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Green, J.R. E-mail: jaromy.green@gcccks.edu; Cecil, L.D.; Synal, H.-A.; Santos, J.; Kreutz, K.J.; Wake, C.P

    2004-08-01

    The Inilchek Glacier, located in the Tien Shan Mountains, central Asia, is unique among mid-latitude glaciers because of its relatively large average annual accumulation. In July 2000, two ice cores of 162 and 167 meters (m) in length were collected from the Inilchek Glacier for (chlorine-36) {sup 36}Cl analysis a part of a collaborative international effort to study the environmental changes archived in mid-latitude glaciers worldwide. The average annual precipitation at the collection site was calculated to be 1.6 m. In contrast, the reported average annual accumulations at the high-latitude Dye-3 glacial site, Greenland, the mid-latitude Guliya Ice Cap, China, and the mid-latitude Upper Fremont Glacier, Wyoming, USA, were 0.52, 0.16 and 0.76 m, respectively. The resolution of the {sup 36}Cl record in one of the Inilchek ice cores was from 2 to 10 times higher than the resolution of the records at these other sites and could provide an opportunity for detailed study of environmental changes that have occurred over the past 150 years. Despite the differences in accumulation among these various glacial sites, the {sup 36}Cl profile and peak concentrations for the Inilchek ice core were remarkably similar in shape and magnitude to those for ice cores from these other sites. The {sup 36}Cl peak concentration from 1958, the year during the mid-1900s nuclear-weapons-tests period when {sup 36}Cl fallout was largest, was preserved in the Inilchek core at a depth of 90.56 m below the surface of the glacier (74.14-m-depth water equivalent) at a concentration of 7.7 x 10{sup 5} atoms of {sup 36}Cl/gram (g) of ice. Peak {sup 36}Cl concentrations from Dye-3, Guliya and the Upper Fremont glacial sites were 7.1 x 10{sup 5}, 5.4 x 10{sup 5} and 0.7 x 10{sup 5} atoms of {sup 36}Cl/g of ice, respectively. Measurements of {sup 36}Cl preserved in ice cores improve estimates of historical worldwide atmospheric deposition of this isotope and allow the sources of {sup 36}Cl in ground

  10. Vulnerability of populations and the urban health care systems to nuclear weapon attack – examples from four American cities

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dallas Cham E

    2007-02-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background The threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD within the United States has grown significantly in recent years, focusing attention on the medical and public health disaster capabilities of the nation in a large scale crisis. While the hundreds of thousands or millions of casualties resulting from a nuclear weapon would, in and of itself, overwhelm our current medical response capabilities, the response dilemma is further exacerbated in that these resources themselves would be significantly at risk. There are many limitations on the resources needed for mass casualty management, such as access to sufficient hospital beds including specialized beds for burn victims, respiration and supportive therapy, pharmaceutical intervention, and mass decontamination. Results The effects of 20 kiloton and 550 kiloton nuclear detonations on high priority target cities are presented for New York City, Chicago, Washington D.C. and Atlanta. Thermal, blast and radiation effects are described, and affected populations are calculated using 2000 block level census data. Weapons of 100 Kts and up are primarily incendiary or radiation weapons, able to cause burns and start fires at distances greater than they can significantly damage buildings, and to poison populations through radiation injuries well downwind in the case of surface detonations. With weapons below 100 Kts, blast effects tend to be stronger than primary thermal effects from surface bursts. From the point of view of medical casualty treatment and administrative response, there is an ominous pattern where these fatalities and casualties geographically fall in relation to the location of hospital and administrative facilities. It is demonstrated that a staggering number of the main hospitals, trauma centers, and other medical assets are likely to be in the fatality plume, rendering them essentially inoperable in a crisis. Conclusion Among the consequences of this

  11. United States population dose estimates for 131I in the thyroid after the Chinese atmospheric nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Analysis of samples collected within the United States after the Chinese atmospheric nuclear weapons tests of 26 September and 17 November 1976 indicates that the radiation dose to the thyroid from iodine-131 in milk was predominant. A U.S. population dose to the thyroid of 68,000 man-rads was calculated for the iodine-131 fallout. The four excess thyroid cancers that are estimated to occur as a result of the September test during the next 45 years will be masked by the 380,000 cases of thyroid cancer which are expected to occur in the United States from all causes during the same interval

  12. Concentration of plutonium in placentas from the Nenetz autonomous district close to the Novaya Zemlaye nuclear weapons test site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The level of alpha radiation from 239,240Pu was measured in placentas from the Nenetz district south of the nuclear weapons test site at the Novaya Zemlaye archipelago in Russia. A sample of ten placentas was collected consecutively in 1993 from a maternity ward in Narjan Mar and analysed using standard chemical alpha spectrometry. The highest concentration was close to one mBq per kilo fresh placenta or an order of ten higher than previously reported from England. The study indicates that placentas could be used for biological monitoring of external pollution by plutonium. (Author)

  13. Statement to the review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, New York, 17 April 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Statement presents the following issues: IAEA safeguards system; lessons from the case of Iraq, South Africa, Democratic People's Republic of Korea; strengthening of safeguards; trafficking; nuclear-weapon-free zones; cooperation to further the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

  14. A Study of New Method for Weapon System Effectiveness Evaluation Based on Bayesian Network

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    YAN Dai-wei; GU Liang-xian; PAN Lei

    2008-01-01

    As weapon system effectiveness is affected by many factors, its evaluation is essentially a multi-criterion decision making problem for its complexity. The evaluation model of the effectiveness is established on the basis of metrics architecture of the effectiveness. The Bayesian network, which is used to evaluate the effectiveness, is established based on the metrics architecture and the evaluation models. For getting the weights of the metrics by Bayesian network, subjective initial values of the weights are given, gradient ascent algorithm is adopted, and the reasonable values of the weights are achieved. And then the effectiveness of every weapon system project is gained. The weapon system, whose effectiveness is relative maximum, is the optimization system. The research result shows that this method can solve the problem of AHP method which evaluation results are not compatible to the practice results and overcome the shortcoming of neural network in multilayer and multi-criterion decision. The method offers a new approaeh for evaluating the effectiveness.

  15. Leveraging U.S. nuclear weapons policy to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals: implications of major theories of international relations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

  16. Leveraging U.S. nuclear weapons policy to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals : implications of major theories of international relations.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Walter, Andrew

    2009-06-01

    National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

  17. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin-America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in Guatemala City on 14 December 2001

  19. Text of the Agreement of 2 March 1978 between Peru and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 2 March 1978 between Peru and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 1 August 1979.

  20. Agreement of 6 November 1978 between Jamaica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Jamaica to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  1. Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  2. Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Dominican Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007

  5. Systems engineering analysis of kinetic energy weapon concepts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Senglaub, M.

    1996-06-01

    This study examines, from a systems engineering design perspective, the potential of kinetic energy weapons being used in the role of a conventional strategic weapon. Within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, strategic weapon experience falls predominantly in the nuclear weapons arena. The techniques developed over the years may not be the most suitable methodologies for use in a new design/development arena. For this reason a more fundamental approach was pursued with the objective of developing an information base from which design decisions might be made concerning the conventional strategic weapon system concepts. The study examined (1) a number of generic missions, (2) the effects of a number of damage mechanisms from a physics perspective, (3) measures of effectiveness (MOE`s), and (4) a design envelope for kinetic energy weapon concepts. With the base of information a cut at developing a set of high-level system requirements was made, and a number of concepts were assessed against these requirements.

  6. Experience of an ex (De Facto) nuclear weapon state with the application of post-Iraq safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Following the discovery of uranium as a by-product of the gold mining industry during the Second World War, South Africa became interested in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the late 1960s - amongst these being peaceful nuclear explosions. The character of this part of the nuclear R and D programme changed to that of developing a nuclear deterrent capability over the ensuing two decades as a result of military considerations and resulted in the production of six complete gun assembled devices. Towards the end of the 1980s the national and international political scene changed dramatically for the better, leading to a decision to abandon this programme, dismantle the devices and destroy the non-nuclear parts, accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and conclude a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. All the highly enriched uranium recovered from the devices was declared and placed under safeguards. The conclusion of the Agreement occurred at the height of the Iraq crisis and, given the speculation about South Africa's nuclear capability, it was not surprising that the IAEA was asked to ''verify the completeness of South Africa's declaration of nuclear material and facilities''. A special team was appointed for this unprecedented task. Owing to South Africa's new commitment to non-proliferation and its declared policy of transparency the team was allowed to co-opt nuclear weapons experts from outside the IAEA, and access was provided to all records, key personnel and facilities, some of which were non-nuclear on private or military sites. The South African team involved in the verification exercise over a period of more than two years made some observations which the paper presents in the interest of promoting non-proliferation - especially in those States which may wish to follow South Africa's example of 'de-proliferation'. (author)

  7. Weapons of mass destruction - current security threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This publication brings a complex and comprehensive view of the weapons of mass destruction phenomenon in the context of present military and political situation. It emphasizes the threat posed by proliferation of these destructive devices and their carriers as well as the threat present in their possession by unpredictable totalitarian regimes or terrorist groups. The publication is structured into four basic parts: Introduction Into The Topic, Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons. The Introduction reflects the latest developments on the field of military technologies, which lead to the development of new destructive devices with characteristics comparable to basic types of WMDs - nuclear, chemical and biological. Based on the definition of WMD as 'weapon systems with enormous impact causing mass destruction, population, equipment and material losses', the modern mass destruction devices are assorted here, such as ecological, radiological and beam weapons, aerosol and container intelligent ammunition, the outburst of dangerous chemical substances from infrastructure, non-conventional weapons and military devices. The Nuclear Weapons part depicts the most destructive device of mass destruction mankind ever invented in close detail. It maps the history of most significant discoveries in nuclear physics, development and construction of the first nuclear weapons, accumulation of nuclear warheads and their carriers in the Cold war era, attempts of nuclear disarmament and reducing the number of nuclear weapons in possession of superpowers and their proliferation in the world's crisis regions including North Korea and Iran. The chapters devoted to theoretical grounds and physical principles of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons' functioning, the main categories and types, as well as destructive effects and consequences of use contain an adequate mathematical apparatus. This chapter's conclusion brings the overview of nuclear armament of states that

  8. Study on Emergency Measures for Nuclear Accident of Missile Nuclear Weapon%导弹核武器核事故应急有关问题研究

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    高桂清; 毕义明

    2001-01-01

    The major task, characteristics, organizing and commending, and resource manipulation of the emergency measures for nuclear accident of missile nuclear weapon are probed into. The measures may be considered as a complex system engineering involving system of organization, personnel, equipment, technique and scientific theory, so on. Relevant problems of emergency measures are deliberately studied referring the practical situations. The results could provide the theoretical guidance to emergency measures for nuclear accident of missile nuclear weapon.%对导弹核武器核事故应急的主要任务、特点、组织指挥以及力量运用等问题进行了探讨,导弹核武器核事故的应急问题是一项涉及体制、人员、装备、技术、科学理论等方面的复杂系统工程,笔者结合实际,有针对性的研究了事故应急有关的问题,可为导弹核武器核事故应急提供理论指导。

  9. A Study of Aviation Weapon Equipment Maintenance Based on the Semi-Markov Model

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2007-01-01

    Based on the Semi-Markov mathematical description, the multiple states of maintenance processes for aviation weapon equipment are studied. Six kinds of maintenance states are determined and the Semi-Markov model of the maintenance process is given. According to maintenance characteristic, the multiple states maintenance processes are divided into the wait, use and alternate stages.Through using the mathematical model for the different stages, the probability in different states and effective index on different stages are obtained. These results are available to the maintenance practice.

  10. The text of the Agreement between Egypt and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Egypt to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  11. Radiological Closure of a Nuclear Weapon Accident Site with Plutonium Contamination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An explosion and fire in a BOMARC-missile launching pad in June 1960 resulted in the direct release of weapons grade plutonium (WGP) within the confines of an Air Force site in central New Jersey. The site had undergone a large-scale remediation and final status survey (FSS) in 2002 to 2004 that resulted in over 20,000 cubic yards (yd3) of plutonium-contaminated soil being excavated. However, it was later discovered that the prior investigation did not address all impacted areas of the site. Several years after the initial remediation project was completed, plutonium contamination in the form of discrete particles was discovered at the site in areas excluded from the previous investigation. Emergency response activities following the fire, while following standard practices of the day, resulted in the initial spread of contamination beyond the expected fate and transport pathways that were addressed during the initial project. Routine maintenance and site operational activities at the site also contributed to further spread of contamination beyond what was expected. Cabrera Services, Inc. (CABRERA) completed several phases of site characterization, radiological remediation, and final status survey (FSS) at the site in accordance with the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) to address the discrete particle issues at the site. CABRERA also conducted a thorough plutonium particle speciation study in coordination with the University of Nevada at Las Vegas as part of the development of a radiological conceptual site model. Details of this study are being presented in a separate publication. The WGP contamination throughout the site presented unique challenges in terms of site characterization and remediation. Specific technical challenges included the field detection of discrete high-activity plutonium particles over a 200-acre site and designing survey and sampling approaches to ensure compliance with the protocols outlined in the

  12. APSTNG: Neutron interrogation for detection of nuclear and CW weapons, explosives, and drugs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rhodes, E.; Dickerman, C.E.; De Volpi, A. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Peters, C.W. [Nuclear Diagnostic Systems, Inc., Springfield, VA (United States)

    1992-07-01

    A recently developed neutron diagnostic probe system has the potential to satisfy a significant number of van-mobile and fixed- portal requirements for nondestructive verification of sealed munitions and detection of contraband explosives and drugs. The probe is based on a unique associated-particle sealed-tube neutron generator (APSTNG) that interrogates the object of interest with a low-intensity beam of 14-MeV neutrons generated from the deuterium-tritium reaction and that detects the alpha-particle associated with each neutron. Gamma-ray spectra of resulting neutron inelastic scattering and fission reactions identify nuclides associated with all major chemicals in chemical warfare agents, explosives, and drugs, as well as many pollutants and fissile and fertile special nuclear material. Flight times determined from determined from detection times of the gamma-rays and alpha-particles yield a separate tomographic image of each identified nuclide. The APSTNG also forms the basis for a compact fast-neutron transmission imaging system that can be used along with or instead of the emission imaging system; a collimator is not required since scattered neutrons are removed by ``electronic collimation`` (detected neutrons not having the proper flight time to be uncollided are discarded). The small and relatively inexpensive APSTNG exhibits high reliability and can be quickly replaced. Proof-of-concept experiments have been performed under laboratory conditions for simulated nuclear and chemical warfare munitions and for explosives and drugs.

  13. APSTNG: Neutron interrogation for detection of nuclear and CW weapons, explosives, and drugs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rhodes, E.; Dickerman, C.E.; De Volpi, A. (Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)); Peters, C.W. (Nuclear Diagnostic Systems, Inc., Springfield, VA (United States))

    1992-01-01

    A recently developed neutron diagnostic probe system has the potential to satisfy a significant number of van-mobile and fixed- portal requirements for nondestructive verification of sealed munitions and detection of contraband explosives and drugs. The probe is based on a unique associated-particle sealed-tube neutron generator (APSTNG) that interrogates the object of interest with a low-intensity beam of 14-MeV neutrons generated from the deuterium-tritium reaction and that detects the alpha-particle associated with each neutron. Gamma-ray spectra of resulting neutron inelastic scattering and fission reactions identify nuclides associated with all major chemicals in chemical warfare agents, explosives, and drugs, as well as many pollutants and fissile and fertile special nuclear material. Flight times determined from determined from detection times of the gamma-rays and alpha-particles yield a separate tomographic image of each identified nuclide. The APSTNG also forms the basis for a compact fast-neutron transmission imaging system that can be used along with or instead of the emission imaging system; a collimator is not required since scattered neutrons are removed by electronic collimation'' (detected neutrons not having the proper flight time to be uncollided are discarded). The small and relatively inexpensive APSTNG exhibits high reliability and can be quickly replaced. Proof-of-concept experiments have been performed under laboratory conditions for simulated nuclear and chemical warfare munitions and for explosives and drugs.

  14. APSTNG: Neutron interrogation for detection of nuclear and CW weapons, explosives, and drugs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A recently developed neutron diagnostic probe system has the potential to satisfy a significant number of van-mobile and fixed- portal requirements for nondestructive verification of sealed munitions and detection of contraband explosives and drugs. The probe is based on a unique associated-particle sealed-tube neutron generator (APSTNG) that interrogates the object of interest with a low-intensity beam of 14-MeV neutrons generated from the deuterium-tritium reaction and that detects the alpha-particle associated with each neutron. Gamma-ray spectra of resulting neutron inelastic scattering and fission reactions identify nuclides associated with all major chemicals in chemical warfare agents, explosives, and drugs, as well as many pollutants and fissile and fertile special nuclear material. Flight times determined from determined from detection times of the gamma-rays and alpha-particles yield a separate tomographic image of each identified nuclide. The APSTNG also forms the basis for a compact fast-neutron transmission imaging system that can be used along with or instead of the emission imaging system; a collimator is not required since scattered neutrons are removed by ''electronic collimation'' (detected neutrons not having the proper flight time to be uncollided are discarded). The small and relatively inexpensive APSTNG exhibits high reliability and can be quickly replaced. Proof-of-concept experiments have been performed under laboratory conditions for simulated nuclear and chemical warfare munitions and for explosives and drugs

  15. Religious perspectives on the nuclear weapons debate: excerpts from the bishops' pastoral letter on war and peace, proposed third draft

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    The text of the third draft, issued in April 1983 and approved by the bishops on 3 May 1983, focuses on the morality of the use of nuclear weapons in a first strike, the threat to use them, and their use as a deterrent to war, but it also includes discussions of the just war theory, nonviolence, and peacemaking. Viewed in the context of the traditional modes of accommodation between religion and the state, and in the light of contemporary disharmony between more fundamentalist sects and modern science, the document affords an interesting point for discussion of the moral bases of the uses of technology. More than simply a dogmatic statement of one religious organization, the pastoral letter represents a vigorous new current in moral discretion and responsibility. 114 references.

  16. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  17. Collection and use of individual behavioral and consumption rate data to improve reconstruction of thyroid doses from nuclear weapons tests in Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Historical behavioral and consumption rate data were collected from residents of Kazakhstan exposed to nuclear weapons testing fallout using a focus group data collection strategy. These data will enable improved thyroid dose estimation in a radiation epidemiological study being carried out the U.S. National Cancer Institute. The study on the relationship of radiation exposure from weapons testing fallout and thyroid disease in a cohort of 2,994 subjects is now in a stage of improving earlier dose estimates based on individual information collected from a basic questionnaire administered to the study population in 1998. The study subjects of both Kazakh and Russian origin were exposed during childhood to radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons tests conducted at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site between 1949 and 1962. Due to the long time since exposure, a well developed strategy is necessary to encourage accurate memory recall. Limitations of the data collected in 1998 suggested the need to obtain reliable information that is tailored specific to the requirements of the dose reconstruction algorithm and to the evaluation of individual dose uncertainties. Focus group data collection in Kazakhstan in 2007 involved four 8-person focus groups (three of women and one of men) in each of four exposed settlements where thyroid disease screening was conducted in 1998. Age-specific data on relevant childhood behaviour, including time spent indoors and consumption of milk and other dairy products from cows, goats, horses, and sheep, were collected from women's groups. Men's focus groups were interviewed about construction materials of houses and schools as well as animal grazing patterns and supplemental feed to animals. Information obtained from the focus groups are being used to derive the settlement-, ethnicity-, age-, and gender-specific (where appropriate) probability density distributions on individual consumption rates of milk and dairy products

  18. US policies on combating proliferation of nuclear weapons after the cold war

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Combating nuclear proliferation has been one of the top priorities for the international community in the post post-Cold War era, and the United States has been taking initiative for tackling the problems. The current Bush administration has placed value high on the effective and concrete actions - including the use of military forces - for such efforts. It is imperative that such actions should be taken in resolving the nuclear proliferation. However, the United States has been criticized that it has disregarded the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, and that its non-proliferation policy has given negative implications to the regime. Combating nuclear proliferation should be pursued in balanced approach with legitimacy, in consideration of the discriminately nature of the regime as well as of its three pillars - nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. (author)

  19. Escalation of terrorism? On the risk of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons or materials; Eskalation des Terrors? Ueber das Anschlagsrisiko mit chemischen, biologischen, radiologischen und nuklearen Waffen oder Stoffen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nass, Jens

    2010-07-01

    The report on the risk of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons or materials covers the following topics: the variety of terrorism: ethnic-nationalistic, politically motivated, social revolutionary, political extremism, religious fanaticism, governmental terrorism; CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) weapons and materials: their availability and effectiveness in case of use; potential actor groups; prevention and counter measures, emergency and mitigating measures.

  20. The association betweeen cancers and low level radiation: An evaluation of the epidemiological evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Britton, J. [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States). School of Public Health]|[Lawrence Berkeley National Lab., CA (United States)

    1993-05-01

    Cancer has traditionally been linked to exposure to high doses of radiation, but there is considerable controversy regarding the carcinogenicity of low doses of ionizing radiation in humans. Over the past 30 years there have been 14 studies conducted on employees at the Hanford nuclear weapons facility to investigate the relationship between exposure to low doses of radiation and mortality due to cancer (1-14). Interest in this issue was originally stimulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which was trying to determine whether the linear extrapolation of health effects from high to low dose exposure was accurate. If the risk has been underestimated, then the maximum permissible occupational radiation exposure in the United States had been set too high. Because the health risk associated with low level radiation are unclear and controversial it seems appropriate to review the studies relating to Hanford at this time.

  1. Frederic Joliot-Curie and the nuclear weapon; Frederic Joliot-Curie et l'arme atomique

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pinault, M.

    2000-07-01

    The author describes the attitude and action of Pierre Joliot-Curie after the explosion of the first nuclear bomb in Hiroshima and during the following years. He notably describes the creation of the French CEA (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique), the commitment of Joliot-Curie for the creation of a scientist movement, the atomic negotiation within the United Nations, the creation and actions of the Mouvement de la Paix (from April 1949 until the Stockholm Appeal) within the Cold War context, the commitment of Joliot-Curie against weapons of mass destruction and its difficult relationship with his communists friends, his participation to the elaboration of the Einstein-Russel Appeal, and the Pugwash conference in 1957

  2. Opportunities for Russian Nuclear Weapons Institute developing computer-aided design programs for pharmaceutical drug discovery. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-09-23

    The goal of this study is to determine whether physicists at the Russian Nuclear Weapons Institute can profitably service the need for computer aided drug design (CADD) programs. The Russian physicists` primary competitive advantage is their ability to write particularly efficient code able to work with limited computing power; a history of working with very large, complex modeling systems; an extensive knowledge of physics and mathematics, and price competitiveness. Their primary competitive disadvantage is their lack of biology, and cultural and geographic issues. The first phase of the study focused on defining the competitive landscape, primarily through interviews with and literature searches on the key providers of CADD software. The second phase focused on users of CADD technology to determine deficiencies in the current product offerings, to understand what product they most desired, and to define the potential demand for such a product.

  3. Subcritical tests - nuclear weapon testing under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Subkritiske tester - kjernevaapentesting under avtalen om fullstendig proevestans

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hoeibraaten, S

    1998-10-01

    The report discusses possible nuclear weapons related experiments and whether these are permitted under the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The term ''subcritical experiments'' as used in the United States includes experiments in which one studies fissile materials (so far only plutonium) under extreme conditions generated by conventional high explosives, and in which a self-sustained chain reaction never develops in the fissile material. The known facts about the American subcritical experiments are presented. There is very little reason to doubt that these experiments were indeed subcritical and therefore permitted under the CTBT. Little is known about the Russian efforts that are being made on subcritical experiments.

  4. The association betweeen cancers and low level radiation: An evaluation of the epidemiological evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cancer has traditionally been linked to exposure to high doses of radiation, but there is considerable controversy regarding the carcinogenicity of low doses of ionizing radiation in humans. Over the past 30 years there have been 14 studies conducted on employees at the Hanford nuclear weapons facility to investigate the relationship between exposure to low doses of radiation and mortality due to cancer (1-14). Interest in this issue was originally stimulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which was trying to determine whether the linear extrapolation of health effects from high to low dose exposure was accurate. If the risk has been underestimated, then the maximum permissible occupational radiation exposure in the United States had been set too high. Because the health risk associated with low level radiation are unclear and controversial it seems appropriate to review the studies relating to Hanford at this time

  5. The third review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was held in Geneva from 27 August to 21 September 1985, with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty were being realized. The Conference ended with the adoption by consensus of a Final Declaration, by which the States parties, among other things, solemnly declared their conviction that the Treaty was essential to international peace and security and expressed their support for its objectives. This Fact Sheet provides information on the preparations for the Conference, developments at the Conference and the main features of the Final Declaration. Te text of the Treaty is reproduced in Disarmament Fact Sheet No. 33, and its historical background is contained in Fact Sheet No. 41

  6. Radioactive fallout: an overview of internal emitter research in the era of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is a review of the literature on the radiobiology of internal emitters. Its purpose is to consider what has become known about the radiobiology of internally deposited radionuclides over the last four decades. The primary emphasis is the progression of radiobiological information through the 1950s and early 1960s, when atmospheric testing of atomic weapons was occurring with increasing regularity. We also consider information on fission products that are biologically important, specifically, isotopes of iodine, strontium, and cesium. We also examine data for plutonium and uranium. For each of the radionuclides discussed, we consider environmental pathways that are available for the eventual exposure to human populations and the metabolic pathways that determine the tissues at risk following exposure. We also consider the radiobiological effects of exposure given at high levels, and, when appropriate, the risks accompanying low-level exposures

  7. Who holds the stakes? A case study of stakeholder identification at two nuclear weapons production sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Traditional risk assessments, including those involving the United States Department of Energy (USDOE), are often criticized for producing useless or noncredible management responses because they did not meaningfully involve the public. The first step to involve the public is to identify appropriate active participants (stakeholders). This study was done to understand the processes used to identify stakeholders to serve on advisory boards established at the two largest remediation sites in the United States: the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington state and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The Hanford stakeholder identification process produced an interest- based board whereas the Savannah River Site strategy produced population-based representation. The basic goals of the stakeholder advisory groups were similar. However, different processes were used to identify the participants for the groups in part because of distinctly different social and cultural conditions in the areas affected by the operations of the two facilities, and in part because of the different level of trust of the USDOE and their contractors at Hanford compared with Savannah River. The discussion analyzes their different needs and potential for successful citizen participation. 41 refs., 3 figs., 2 tabs

  8. Bill related to the struggle against proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their vectors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This bill indicates the modifications brought to different French laws and codes (penal code, defence code, custom code) and defines provisions and penalties within the frame of struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear weapons, biological weapons and toxin-based weapons, chemical weapons), and against the proliferation of their vectors. These modifications, provisions and penalties also concern double-use products. The bill also defines the modifications brought to the French penal procedure code. It finally addresses offenses related to these proliferations which can be considered as an act of terrorism

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  10. The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Nepal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Nepal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  13. The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

  14. The Text of the Agreement between Denmark and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Denmark and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Mongolia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mongolia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Norway and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Norway and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Cyprus and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Cyprus and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  1. Tests of nuclear weapons and the beginning of radioactivity monitoring using the example of Switzerland; Die Kernwaffenversuche und der Beginn der Radioaktivitaetsueberwachung am Beispiel der Schweiz

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Voelkle, Hansruedi [Univ. Chemin du Musee 3, Fribourg (Switzerland). Physikdept.

    2016-05-01

    A historical survey is given on the development and the tests of nuclear weapons including the consequences for humans and the environment, as well as on the generation of measuring networks for radioactivity in the environment in the same time. Some results of the measurements are shown exemplarily for Switzerland.

  2. Communication received from the Permanent Mission of Thailand regarding the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Note Verbale dated 25 September 1997 received by the Agency from the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the Agency concerning the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), and as attachment the text of the above mentioned Treaty

  3. The legal basis of the non- proliferation of nuclear weapons and its influence on global governance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    After the appearance of the first experimental nuclear explosive 16 July 1945 5 in Alamogordo, non-proliferation has become the cornerstone of nuclear law, in vehicle safety and nuclear security since the London negotiations (1975-1976). By definition, nuclear law is the set of special legal norms formulated to regulate the conduct of legal and natural persons, engaged in activities relating to fissionable materials, to ionizing radiation, and exposure to natural sources of radiation . The primary objective of nuclear law is to create a legal framework allowing mankind to the peaceful use of fissile materials to ensure the protection of human health, property and the environment. To achieve this objective, it is essential to establish a system of control of all human activities related to nuclear, to avoid the use of fissile material for non-peaceful purposes. Originally nonproliferation, There are power situation related to ownership of nuclear fact and the panic provoked panic in the minds, the idea of nuclear war or accident major technological.

  4. Brief history of the nuclear weapon - Between proliferation and disarmament; Breve histoire de l'arme nucleaire - Entre proliferation et desarmament

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chagnollaud, Jean-Paul

    2011-05-24

    During the hardest times of the Cold War, like in October 1962 with the Cuba crisis, the World lived in the fear of a nuclear confrontation between the USA and the USSR. If this time seems far away now, the risks of a nuclear conflict are probably greater today because no serious progress has bee done during the last ten years and because, from now on, nine, and maybe ten states possess nuclear weapons. In April 2009, US President Barack Obama, gave a talk in Prague (Czech Republic) in which he stressed again on the enormous risks that this situation was running on humanity and urged the world to get rid of nuclear weapons. The aim of this book is to present the main steps of this process, which started in the 1960's, and the arguments which justify its necessity. (J.S.)

  5. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the process for its enhanced review on the eve of the 2000 review conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This article sets out the principle and essentials of the process for reviewing the operation of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970. In 1995 the NPT was extended. The 2000 review conference is of considerable importance for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly in the light of the fact that after the indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon states urged the nuclear-weapon states to take new steps towards nuclear disarmament. This article presents a review of the 30 year period of the application of NPT

  6. Nuclear dawn F. E. Simon and the race for atomic weapons in World War II

    CERN Document Server

    McRae, Kenneth D

    2014-01-01

    This book provides a rounded biography of Franz (later Sir Francis) Simon, his early life in Germany, his move to Oxford in 1933, and his experimental contributions to low temperature physics approximating absolute zero. After 1939 he switched his research to nuclear physics, and is credited with solving the problem of uranium isotope separation by gaseous diffusion for the British nuclear programme Tube Alloys. The volume is distinctive for its inclusion of source materials not available to previous researchers, such as Simon's diary and his correspondence with his wife, and for a fresh, well-informed insider voice on the five-power nuclear rivalry of the war years. The work also draws on a relatively mature nuclear literature to attempt a comparison and evaluation of the five nuclear rivals in wider political and military context, and to identify the factors, or groups of factors, that can explain the results.

  7. Assessing Expected Fractional Damage of Above-ground Buildings from Air-to-surface Weapons based on Indirect Fire Concept

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jong Yil Park

    2010-08-01

    Full Text Available For the expected fractional damage of building targets from air-to-surface weapons, the US has used the JMEM/AS method, which is based on the direct-fire concept. However, the damage redistribution assumption in the direct-fire concept could induce serious errors in damage estimation of building targets. In this paper, a method for the expected fractional damage of building targets is proposed based on the indirect-fire concept. From the proposed model, it is shown that the joint munitions effectiveness manuals/air-to-surface (JMEM/AS method is not appropriate for building targets, especially for attacks with multiple aiming points. It is recommended that the indirect-fire concept should be adopted for weaponeering even for air-to-surface weapons. fire concept could induce serious errors in damage estimation of building targets. In this paper, a method for the expected fractional damage of building targets is proposed based on the indirect-fire concept. From the proposed model, it is shown that the JMEM/AS method is not appropriate for building targets, especially for attacks with multiple aiming points. It is recommended that the indirect-fire concept should be adopted for weaponeering even for air-to-surface weapons.Defence Science Journal, 2010, 60(5, pp.491-496, DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.14429/dsj.60.571

  8. Special Weapons

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — Supporting Navy special weapons, the division provides an array of engineering services, technical publication support services, logistics support services, safety...

  9. A treaty on the cutoff of fissile material for nuclear weapons - What to cover? How to verify?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since 1946, a cutoff has been proposed. In 1993, the topic was placed on the agenda of the CD. The establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee in the CD with a mandate to negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty struggled with difficulties for more than a year. The central dispute was whether the mandate should refer to existing un-safeguarded stockpiles. The underlying conflict of the CTBT negotiations can be summarized as nuclear disarmament versus nuclear nonproliferation The same conflict is now blocking progress with FMCT negotiations in the CD. At the center of technical proliferation concerns is direct use material that can be used for nuclear warheads without any further enrichment or reprocessing. Those materials are plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). A broader category of materials is defined as all those containing any fissile isotopes, called special fissionable materials. In order ta verify that no direct use materials are abused for military purposes, also special fissionable materials must be controlled. An even broader category is simply called nuclear materials. Pu and HEU can be distinguished into the following categories of utilisation: 1. military direct use material in operational nuclear weapons and their logistics pipeline, 2. military direct use material held in reserve for military purposes, in assembled weapons or in other forms, 3. military direct use material withdrawn from dismantled weapons, 4. military direct use material considered excess and designated for transfer into civilian use, 5. military direct use material considered excess and declared for transfer into civilian use, 6. direct use material currently in reactors or their logistics pipelines and storages, and 7. irradiated Pu and HEU in spent fuel from reactors, or in vitrified form for final disposal. Large quantities of materials are neither inside weapons nor declared excess. So far, there are no legal obligations for NWS for limitations, declarations, or

  10. Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The letter informs on transmission to the Disarmament Commission of the text of a speech delivered by the State President of South Africa, Mr. F.W. de Klerk, to a joint session of Parliament on 24 March 1993, announcing developments relating to South Africa's nuclear capability and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  11. Joint US-Russian co-operation to enhance protection of weapons usable nuclear material in the Russian Federation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1995, the US Department of Energy (DOE) was assigned formal responsibility within the US government for directing the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) program under the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security. Improving the protection of nuclear material became the mutual goal of the United States and Russian Federation. Under the MPC and A program, assurances are required to provide evidence to the US Executive and Legislative personnel, oversight personnel, DOE, and the public that the program is cost-effective and meeting proliferation risk reduction goals. By building mutual trust and confidence with our Russian counterparts, progress has been made toward gaining access/assurances at a number of Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (MinAtom) sites. This progress has provided the required assurances at a large number of sites, primarily in the civilian sector of the Russian nuclear complex. However, the issue of access/assurances at a few sites, primarily in the weapons sector of the MinAtom complex, is still tentative. (author)

  12. Dose reduction through automation of nuclear weapons dismantlement and storage procedures at the Department of Energy's Pantex Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent break up of the Soviet Union, the number of weapons in the nuclear stockpile now greatly exceeds any foreseeable future need. To compensate for this excess an estimated 20,000 nuclear warheads have been earmarked for dismantlement and storage at the Department of Energy's Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. It is anticipated that the majority of these warheads will arrive at the Pantex facility by the year 2000. At that time, it is estimated that current dismantlement and inventory procedures will not be adequate to control worker radiation exposure within administrative and federal dose limits. To control these exposures alternate approaches to dismantlement and inventory must be developed. One attractive approach is to automate as many activities as possible, thus reducing worker exposure. To facilitate automation of dismantlement and storage procedures, current procedures were investigated in terms of collective dose to workers, time to completion, ease of completion, and cost of automation for each task. A cost-benefit comparison was then performed in order to determine which procedures would be most cost-effective to automate

  13. Support of the Russian Nuclear Safety Authority developing the regulatory basis for dealing with ex-weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In line with the framework of the AIDA/MOX program for utilizing excess Russian Weapons Plutonium in Russian reactors (WWER or fast-breeder reactor) under the form of MOX fuel, a collaboration has been launched under the leadership of the nuclear safety authority of Russia (Rostechnadzor) to develop a set of state regulation documents. Several organizations are involved in this project: ROSATOM, the SEC NRS, RAS IBRAE on the Russian side, the DOE, PNNL and the NRC for the USA, the European Commission, the French regulatory body (DGSNR), the CEA and a team of RISKAUDIT safety experts (coming from AVN, GRS and IRSN) on the European side. This collaboration started in 2001, and 42 documents have to be developed to give safety standards, rules, principles and requirements. They cover all safety issues (siting, content of the safety reports, waste management, radiation protection, internal and external hazards, transportation, emergency planning) for the fuel cycle and also for the MOX fuel to be used in Russian reactors. The US DOE (National Nuclear Security Administration - NNSA) and the European Commission (EU Joint Action Russia) have co-financed the writing of 31 documents in Russia and their review by western safety experts. The list of documents and their topics, the work plan and the main results of the collaboration between European experts and the Rostechnadzor are described in this presentation. (authors)

  14. Classification of hot particles from the Chernobyl accident and nuclear weapons detonations by non-destructive methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Both after the Chernobyl accident and nuclear weapon detonations, agglomerates of radioactive material, so-called hot particles, were released or formed which show a behaviour in the environment quite different from the activity released in gaseous or aerosol form. The differences in their characteristic properties, in the radionuclide composition and the uranium and actinide contents are described in detail for these particles. While nuclear bomb hot particles (both from fission and fusion bombs) incorporate well detectable trace amounts of 60Co and 152Eu, these radionuclides are absent in Chernobyl hot particles. In contrast, Chernobyl hot particles contain 125Sb and 144Ce which are absent in atomic bomb HPs. Obvious differences are also observable between fusion and fission bombs' hot particles (significant differences in 152Eu/155Eu, 154Eu/155Eu and 238Pu/239Pu ratios) which facilitate the identification of HPs of unknown provensence. The ratio of 239Pu/240Pu in Chernobyl hot particles could be determined by a non-destructive method at 1:1.5. A non-destructive method to determine the content of non-radioactive elements by Kα-emission measurements was developed by which inactive Zr, Nb, Fe and Ni could be verified in the particles

  15. A framework for verifying the dismantlement and abandonment of nuclear weapons. A policy implication for the denuclearization of Korea Peninsula

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula has been a serious security issue in the North East Asian region. Although the Six-Party Talks has been suspended since North Korea declared a boycott in 2008, aims of denuclearizing North Korea has still been discussed. For instance, the recent Japan and the U.S. '2+2' dialogue affirmed its importance to achieve complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, including scrutinizing its uranium enrichment program, through irreversible steps under the Six Party process. In order to identify effective and efficient framework for denuclearization of North Korea, this paper examines 5 major denuclearization methods including (1) the Nunn-Luger Method, (2) the Iraqi Method, (3) the South African Method, (4) the Libyan Method and (5) the denuclearization method shown in the Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), while referring to the recent developments of the verification studies for nuclear disarmament, such as a joint research conducted by the United Kingdom and Norway and any other arguments made by disarmament experts. Moreover, this paper argues what political and security conditions will be required to make North Korea to accept intrusive verification for its denuclearization. Conditions for successful denuclearization talks among the Six-Party member states and a realistic approach of verifiable denuclearization will be also examined. (author)

  16. Dose assessment studies at former nuclear weapons test sites in Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Field and laboratory measurements are described and data presented which enable a dose assessment for the inhalation of artificial radionuclides at Maralinga and Emu, the sites of United kingdom atomic weapons tests between 1953 and 1963. Dose assessments for the inhalation of artificial radionuclides are presented for all remaining contaminated areas at Maralinga and Emu. In the case of Aborigines, these doses are estimated assuming inhalable dust loadings of 1 mg/m3 for adults and 1.5 mg/m3 for children and infants. Particle size is taken to be 5 μm AMAD. Plutonium and americium are taken to be represented by solubility Class Y for major trial sites and 25% Class W and 75% Class Y for all minor trial sites. For other radionuclides, where no data are available, the most conservative dose intake conversion factor values are used. All calculations of dose assume 100% occupancy. The results indicate that doses to children are higher than doses to adults and infants. This is a consequence of children being subjected to higher dust concentrations than adults because of their play activities and because of generally higher dose intake conversion factor values than adults, which more than offset their smaller breathing rates. Thus children form the critical group. With the exception of one site which is contaminated with uranium, at all other sites it is only the inhalation of plutonium and americium that contributes significantly to the dose, and of these 239Pu is the largest contributor. Therefore, having regard to the long half lives of the radionuclides concerned, the inhalation problems highlighted by this dose assessment will not diminish significantly within any reasonable period of time and hence management strategies must be developed to deal with them. (author). 35 refs, 1 fig., 2 tabs

  17. A microstructural analysis of solder joints from the electronic assemblies of dismantled nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vianco, P.T.; Rejent, J.A. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States). Materials Joining Dept.

    1997-05-01

    MC1814 Interconnection Boxes from dismantled B57 bombs, and MC2839 firing Sets from retired W70-1 warheads were obtained from the Pantex facility. Printed circuit boards were selected from these components for microstructural analysis of their solder joints. The analysis included a qualitative examination of the solder joints and quantitative assessments of (1) the thickness of the intermetallic compound layer that formed between the solder and circuit board Cu features, and (2) the Pb-rich phase particle distribution within the solder joint microstructure. The MC2839 solder joints had very good workmanship qualities. The intermetallic compound layer stoichiometry was determined to be that of Cu6Sn5. The mean intermetallic compound layer thickness for all solder joints was 0.885 mm. The magnitude of these values did not indicate significant growth over the weapon lifetime. The size distribution of the Pb-rich phase particles for each of the joints were represented by the mean of 9.85 {times} 10{sup {minus}6} mm{sup 2}. Assuming a spherical geometry, the mean particle diameter would be 3.54 mm. The joint-to-joint difference of intermetallic compound layer thickness and Pb-rich particle size distribution was not caused by varying thermal environments, but rather, was a result of natural variations in the joint microstructure that probably existed at the time of manufacture. The microstructural evaluation of the through-hole solder joints form the MC2839 and MC1814 components indicated that the environmental conditions to which these electronic units were exposed in the stockpile, were benign regarding solder joint aging. There was an absence of thermal fatigue damage in MC2839 circuit board, through-hole solder joints. The damage to the eyelet solder joints of the MC1814 more likely represented infant mortality failures at or very near the time of manufacture, resulting from a marginal design status of this type of solder joint design.

  18. Nuclear weapons and civil defense. The influence of the medical profession in 1955 and 1983

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kornfeld, H.

    1983-02-01

    The issue of nuclear war and its medical consequences is discussed from a historical perspective. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has proposed a multi-billion dollar program designed to relocate the population over a period of several days to help residents find protection from lethal fallout. The American Medical Association is called on to make a clear statement to the government that adequate preparation for a nuclear holocaust is impossible and that the medical problems would be awesome and without precedent. Forty-seven references are included. (JMT)

  19. Nuclear weapons and civil defense. The influence of the medical profession in 1955 and 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The issue of nuclear war and its medical consequences is discussed from a historical perspective. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has proposed a multi-billion dollar program designed to relocate the population over a period of several days to help residents find protection from lethal fallout. The American Medical Association is called on to make a clear statement to the government that adequate preparation for a nuclear holocaust is impossible and that the medical problems would be awesome and without precedent. Forty-seven references are included

  20. Multidisciplinary model-based-engineering for laser weapon systems: recent progress

    Science.gov (United States)

    Coy, Steve; Panthaki, Malcolm

    2013-09-01

    We are working to develop a comprehensive, integrated software framework and toolset to support model-based engineering (MBE) of laser weapons systems. MBE has been identified by the Office of the Director, Defense Science and Engineering as one of four potentially "game-changing" technologies that could bring about revolutionary advances across the entire DoD research and development and procurement cycle. To be effective, however, MBE requires robust underlying modeling and simulation technologies capable of modeling all the pertinent systems, subsystems, components, effects, and interactions at any level of fidelity that may be required in order to support crucial design decisions at any point in the system development lifecycle. Very often the greatest technical challenges are posed by systems involving interactions that cut across two or more distinct scientific or engineering domains; even in cases where there are excellent tools available for modeling each individual domain, generally none of these domain-specific tools can be used to model the cross-domain interactions. In the case of laser weapons systems R&D these tools need to be able to support modeling of systems involving combined interactions among structures, thermal, and optical effects, including both ray optics and wave optics, controls, atmospheric effects, target interaction, computational fluid dynamics, and spatiotemporal interactions between lasing light and the laser gain medium. To address this problem we are working to extend Comet™, to add the addition modeling and simulation capabilities required for this particular application area. In this paper we will describe our progress to date.