WorldWideScience

Sample records for atomic weapons establishment

  1. Atomic Weapons Establishment Bill

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clark, Alan; Dalyell, Tam; Haynes, Frank

    1990-01-01

    The Bill debated concerns the government's proposal for the future organisations of the atomic weapons establishment in the United Kingdom. The proposals arise from a full review carried out in 1989 and include points raised by the Select Committee on the Trident programme. Studies of productivity, pay and conditions, information systems and long term manufacturing strategy have been started to enable recommendations of the reorganisation of the establishments to be made. The details of the Bill were debated for just over two hours. The debate is reported verbatim. The main issues were over the principle of contractorisation, possible staff redundancies, conditions of employment, safety and security. The proposal that the Bill be read a second time was carried. (UK)

  2. Atomic Weapons Establishment Bill [Money

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, A.F.; Cryer, Bob; Carlisle, Kenneth; Dean, Paul.

    1990-01-01

    The debate concerns the authorisation of payment of the money required to reorganise the atomic weapons establishment in the United Kingdom provided for in the Atomic Weapons Establishment Bill in progress through Parliament. In the Bill the contractorisation of the establishment is recommended and some sort of Government owned company operated scheme set up. The debate lasted about half an hour and is reported verbatim. The issues raised concerned the actual sums likely to be incurred in the formation of a Company to carry out the designated activities of the Bill. These are connected with the research, development, production or maintenance of nuclear devices and the premises needed. The government spokesman suggested the sums required to support the Bill would not be large and the resolution was agreed to without a vote. (UK)

  3. AWRE: Atomic Weapons Research Establishment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-01-01

    This reviews the work of AWRE at Aldermaston and Foulness. The main programme is nuclear and is concerned with the design and development of warheads for strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for the British nuclear deterrent, including those for the Royal Navy's missile carrying submarine fleet. The work is described grouped as design physics, development and materials. Services to these groups and to the whole establishment are provided by Engineering, Safety and Administration. The work ranges from long-term fundamental research, the development of technology, design, prototype development to the environmental testing of engineered products. In materials research the emphasis is on plutonium, uranium and beryllium, on high explosives and a wide range of inorganic and organic materials. The physics of the earth's crust is studied to aid detection of underground nuclear explosions. Reactor research facilities include the two reactors, Herald and Viper. (U.K.)

  4. The management of health and safety at Atomic Weapons Establishment premises. Pt. 2: Detailed findings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-10-01

    A review of the management of health and safety and the standards of risk control at premises run by Atomic Weapons Establishment plc (AWE) in the United Kingdom was completed in January 1994. This second volume of the review report records the findings relating to the eight health and safety topics chosen as the focus of the review because they provide evidence from AWE's key areas of activity. The topics are: Layard identification and risk assessment; operations; maintenance; research and experimentation; new facilities and modifications; decommissioning and waste; emergency preparedness; and health and safety specialist function. The Health and Safety Executive review team spent time at each of the four main AWE sites and observed an emergency exercise at Aldermaston. A report on the emergency exercise is included as an appendix. (UK)

  5. The control of the exposure of the general public to radioactive materials in the environs of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) Aldermaston

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gallop, R.G.C.; Warren, B.B.; Hannan, A.M.; Saxby, W.N.

    1987-01-01

    The Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) at Aldermaston discharges very small amounts of radioactive materials to the local environment. Calculations based on source information indicate that the resultant dose to the general public is less than 0.1% of the local natural radiation background. This conclusion is confirmed by the detailed and extensive environmental monitoring programme carried out by AWRE in the surrounding locality. (author)

  6. Atomic Energy Authority (Weapons Group) Act 1973

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    This Act, which came into force on 6th March 1973 and modified Section 2 of the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954 in respect of the Authority's power to do work on explosive nuclear devices, made provision for the transfer to the Secretary of State for Defence of the Weapons Group of the Atomic Energy Authority. (NEA) [fr

  7. News UK public libraries offer walk-in access to research Atoms for Peace? The Atomic Weapons Establishment and UK universities Students present their research to academics: CERN@school Science in a suitcase: Marvin and Milo visit Ethiopia Inspiring telescopes A day for everyone teaching physics 2014 Forthcoming Events

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-05-01

    UK public libraries offer walk-in access to research Atoms for Peace? The Atomic Weapons Establishment and UK universities Students present their research to academics: CERN@school Science in a suitcase: Marvin and Milo visit Ethiopia Inspiring telescopes A day for everyone teaching physics 2014 Forthcoming Events

  8. Nuclear power and atomic weapons. Chapter 7

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    Following a brief historical introduction the concept of proliferation, vertical horizontal and subnational, is presented, and its relationship to nuclear power discussed. The risk of nuclear weapon proliferation, based on political decision, motivation and costs, is related to access to enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium 233. The possibilities for diversion and theft from nuclear facilities are discussed. International measures to prevent proliferation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)and the IAEA safeguards system, are described and discussed. Measures which may be enacted against countries which break the NPT are discussed. Restrictions on international nuclear trude, both multilateral and unilateral, are also discussed, especially those at present, or shortly to be, enforced by USA, Canada and Australia. The International Nuclear Feel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) is briefly presented. The physical protection of nuclear materials is also discussed. Finally the basc principles of nuclear weapons are briefly presented. (JIW)

  9. Nuclear power and atomic weapons. Chapter 7

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    Following a brief historical introduction the concept of proliferation, vertical and horizontal and subnational, is presented, and its relationship to nuclear power discussed. The risk of nuclear weapon proliferation, based on political decision motivation and costs, is related to access to enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium 233. The possibilities for diversion and theft from nuclear facilities are discussed. International measures to prevent proliferation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the IAEA safeguards system, are described and discussed. Measures which may be enacted against countries which break the NPT are discussed. Restrictions on international nuclear trade, both multilateral and unilateral, are also discussed, especially those at present, or shortly to be, enforced by USA, Canada and Australia. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) is briefly presented. The physical protection of nuclear materials is also discussed. Finally the basic principles of nuclear weapons are briefly presented. (JIW)

  10. Manhattan Project redux: Canada and the first atomic weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Arsenault, J.E

    2008-09-15

    Only three nuclear weapons produced by the Manhattan Project (MP) were used during World War II: Trinity Test, New Mexico on 16 July 1945, Hiroshima, Japan, on 6 August 1945, and Nagasaki, Japan, on 9 August 1945. Several sources and authors, including EM and RL (1967), Stacey (1970), Sanger (1981), and Buckley (2000), have written that it is unlikely that any Canadian uranium was used in the atomic weapons that ended WW II. These sources offer no detailed justification for their conclusion, nevertheless, after analysis of data contained in numerous sources, this article reaches a similar conclusion. (author)

  11. Manhattan Project redux: Canada and the first atomic weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arsenault, J.E.

    2008-01-01

    Only three nuclear weapons produced by the Manhattan Project (MP) were used during World War II: Trinity Test, New Mexico on 16 July 1945, Hiroshima, Japan, on 6 August 1945, and Nagasaki, Japan, on 9 August 1945. Several sources and authors, including EM and RL (1967), Stacey (1970), Sanger (1981), and Buckley (2000), have written that it is unlikely that any Canadian uranium was used in the atomic weapons that ended WW II. These sources offer no detailed justification for their conclusion, nevertheless, after analysis of data contained in numerous sources, this article reaches a similar conclusion. (author)

  12. The singular weapon. What remains from the atomic age?; Die Singulaere Waffe. Was bleibt vom Atomzeitalter?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eisenbart, Constanze (ed.) [Forschungsstaette der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft (FEST), Heidelberg (Germany)

    2012-07-01

    The book contains the following contributions: Why do we talk about the atomic age? The language of the atomic myth - comments to a protestant debate. Nuclear singularity between fiction and reality. Only one can get through: military singularity of nuclear weapons. Physical singularity of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons test and fall-out. Quantitative disarmament and qualitative rearmament. Do mini nukes neutralize the singularity? The vulnerability of the industrial society by the nuclear electromagnetic momentum. Nuclear weapons as national status symbol - the example of India. The general regulations of international laws and the singularity of nuclear weapons. The construction of normative singularity - development and change of the nuclear taboo.

  13. Establishment of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okazaki, Toshio

    2006-01-01

    A goal of the 21. century is for society to pursue 'sustainable economic development and prosperous life by recycling resources', thus rejecting 'development based on the waste of resources'. For Japan, which has limited energy resources, it is important to secure safe, inexpensive, environmentally friendly energy resources having long-term availability. To contribute to long-term energy security and solve global environmental issues, and to create advanced competitive science and technology, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) was established by integrating the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) in October 2005. JAEA is endeavoring to establish nuclear fuel cycles, to contribute to social improvement through hydrogen production initiated by atomic energy, and to pursue research and development of thermonuclear fusion and quantum beam technology. This paper reviews the main R and D activities of JAEA. The structure of the paper is the following: 1. Introduction; 2. Japan Atomic Energy Agency; 3. Efforts to Commercialize the Fast Reactor Cycle; 4. Monju Progress; 5. Geological Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste R and D; 6. High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor System R and D; 7. Fusion Research and Development; 8. LWR Spent Fuel Reprocessing Technology; 9. Quantum Beam Technologies; 10. Nuclear Safety Research and Regulatory Applications; 11. Basic Science and Engineering Research; 12. Contribution to the Enhanced International Nonproliferation Regimes; 13. Conclusions. To summarize, JAEA will promote the above R and D activities, addressing the following commitments: - On problems that atomic energy faces, we shall extend technical assistance in response to the government and the industrial sectors. - We shall produce technical options to attain political goals to secure medium to long-term stable energy supplies and to solve global environmental issues. - With the high potentials of atomic

  14. The Swedish National Defence Research Establishment and the plans for Swedish nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonter, Thomas

    2001-03-01

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish Government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid 50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the Parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the Parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The Government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue. During this period

  15. Principles of establishing a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hammad, F.H.; Ali, Adel M.

    2001-01-01

    The Middle East is one of the most dangerous regions in the world. It has suffered conflicts and wars - with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) implications - at higher frequency and intensity than any other region during the last 60 years. The Middle East was the largest importer of conventional weapons in the world since the second gulf war and the UNSCR 687, which aimed at destroying the Iraqi WMD capabilities and capacity. This arms race is fueled by stockpiles of nuclear and other WMD. In addition several countries remain outside the global nonproliferation and disarmament regimes such as the NPT, CWC and BWC. The situation is further complicated by the serious problems facing the Middle East peace process, which is not only threatening peace and security in the region but also in the world. This unstable risky situation cannot continue like this and cannot be handled step by step any more. The establishing of a MEWMDFZ in the context of a regional security system is the only way out. It is a difficult and remote objective but a tenable one. It is essential to work out the technical, legal and political framework of the envisaged system. This paper deals with efforts undertaken to establish a MEWMDFZ and the development of the underlying principles, based on lessons learnt from the evolution of NWFZs as well as regional and global nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament (NPACD) developments

  16. Act of 20 July 1978 establishing provisions enabling the International Atomic Energy Agency to undertake inspections and verifications on Belgian territory, in implementation of the International Agreement of 5 April 1973 made in application of 1 and 4 paragraphs of Article III of the Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Belgium concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA which enables the latter to verify the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by Belgium in accordance with the NPT, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All non-nuclear weapon States party to the NPT enter into such agreements. (NEA) [fr

  17. A survey of the Maralinga atomic weapons testing range for residual plutonium contamination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellis, W.R.

    1979-06-01

    Residual plutonium levels in soil, flora, fauna and the air of the Maralinga (South Australia) Atomic Weapons Testing Range are presented and discussed. It is shown that only on rare occasions (and possibly never) would the plutonium concentration in air from wind resuspended dust exceed the maximum allowable concentration for continuous exposure of the general public. In the case of artificially resuspended dust, this maximum concentration could be exceeded for short periods, but the accompanying dust level would be such that working conditions would be uncomfortable, if not intolerable. Potential hazards from other possible exposure routes are so low that they are of no consequence

  18. Nuclear-weapon-free zones: Pursuing security, region by region. Conference of States Parties and Signatories of treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, over the past four decades, is a testament to what nations can do, region by region, to achieve common security objectives. In fact, when considering the history of nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it might be said that here in Mexico City is w here it all began . The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first multilateral treaty to establish a region free of nuclear weapons and a requirement for comprehensive IAEA safeguards for its parties - and clearly gave impetus to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones provide tangible security benefits. They help to reassure the larger international community of the peaceful nuclear intentions of countries in these regions. They provide their members with security assurances against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons by a nuclear-weapon State. They include control mechanisms for dealing with non-compliance in a regional setting. And in all cases, they prohibit the development, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in their respective regions. An important benefit of these zones is that they open a forum for expanded regional dialogue on issues of security. Because the causes of insecurity vary from region to region, security solutions do not come in a 'one-size-fits-all' package. It is for this reason that regional dialogues, as we see in the nuclear-weapon-free zones, are so beneficial. It is clear that such treaties, and such security dialogues, would be invaluable in other areas of the world, such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. Since the end of the Cold War, the international security landscape has undergone dramatic changes. For example, the rise in terrorism, the discovery of clandestine nuclear programmes, and the emergence of covert nuclear procurement networks have heightened our awareness of vulnerabilities in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This statement focuses on two issues

  19. A brief history of people and events related to atomic weapons testing in the Marshall Islands.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Simon, S L

    1997-07-01

    The events related to nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands began at the end of WWII when the U.S. began an initiative to determine the effect of nuclear weapons on naval vessels and on the performance of military personnel. The first tests took place in 1946 even though the area known as Micronesia was not entrusted to the U.S. by the United Nations until 1947. Beginning with the first relocation of the Bikini people to Rongerik Atoll in 1946, the saga of the Marshall Islands involvement in the atomic age began. Although the testing program was limited to the years 1946 through 1958, many of the consequences and events related to the testing program continued over the decades since. That story is still ongoing with programs currently underway to attempt to resettle previously displaced communities, remediate contaminated islands, and to settle claims of damages to individuals and communities. The history of the years subsequent to 1958 are a mixed chronicle of a few original scientific investigations aimed at understanding the coral atoll environment, continued surveillance of the acutely exposed Marshallese, some efforts at cleanup and remediation, numerous monitoring programs and many studies repeated either for credibility purposes, to satisfy international demands or because the changing state of knowledge of radiation protection has necessitated us to rethink earlier beliefs and conclusions about late health effects and social consequences. The objective of this paper is to briefly note many of the historical and political events, scientific studies, persons and publications from 1946 to the present that relate to atomic weapons testing in the Marshall Islands.

  20. Establishment of 'Japan Atomic Energy Agency'. Its role and expectation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakahara, Toru; Itakura, Shuichiro; Shiozawa, Shusaku; Hino, Ryutaro; Fujii, Yasuhiko; Sakurada, Michio; Kimura, Itsuro; Kikuyama, Kaoru

    2005-01-01

    In October 2005, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) was established as an independent administrative institution with the integration of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). JAEA is the only institute in Japan dedicated to comprehensive research and development in the field of nuclear energy. This paper put together a special article on its role and expectation. Firstly the essentials of comprehensive nuclear research and its future perspective were discussed mainly based on 'Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy' of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan. Eight articles were followed on specific items such as quantum beams utilization, hydrogen production with nuclear heat, neutron science and ITER project, and put stress on joint works and smooth transfer of related technology to the private sector. (T. Tanaka)

  1. Effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    The present study of the path to a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the Middle East has been made in a spirit of ''realistic optimism''. There clearly is no instant solution to the problem. In the end, the co-operation of the international community as a whole points to a central role for the United Nations. The present study lists a number of measures to build mutual confidence and prepare the way for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. They are not arranged in order of priority or importance. Some of these measures can be implemented unilaterally by States of the region or outside it. Others may require agreement among groups of States. When it will become possible to arrange a negotiating conference involving all the core States in the region, together with some outside States at some point, a major breakthrough in confidence-building will have occurred. NPT parties with relatively advanced nuclear programmes, involving, for example, the construction of research or power reactors, can arrange those programmes to minimize suspicions that they might also serve a military objective. The programmes can avoid any use of weapon-grade fissionable material and they can invite inspection of any facilities that use significant quantities of nuclear material. Stocks of natural uranium, heavy water and tritium can be declared

  2. Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  3. Act of 20 July 1978 establishing provisions enabling the International Atomic Energy Agency to undertake inspections and verifications on the Belgian territory in execution of the International Agreement of 5 April 1973 made in implementation of paragraph 1 and 4 of Article III of the Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The purpose of this Act is to authorise representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out inspections and verifications in installations in Belgium where source materials and special fissionable materials are produced, stored or used. These inspections are organised in the frame of the Agreement on verification of safeguards concluded between that Agency and Euratom. (NEA) [fr

  4. A Physicist in the Corridors of Power: P. M. S. Blackett's Opposition to Atomic Weapons Following the War

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nye, M. J.

    1999-06-01

    . Blackett had been a naval officer during the First World War, a veteran of Ernest Rutherford's Cavendish Laboratory and head of the physics department at Manchester in the interwar years, and he was a founder of operational research during the Second World War. Vilified in the British and American press in the 1940s and 1950s, he continued to contest prevailing nuclear weapons strategy, finding a more favorable reception for his arguments by the early 1960s. This paper examines the publication and reception of Blackett's views on atomic weapons, analyzing the risks to a physicist who writes about a subject other than physics, as well as the circumstances that might compel one to do so.

  5. The Swedish National Defence Research Establishment and the plans for Swedish nuclear weapons; Foersvarets forskningsanstalt och planerna paa svenska kaernvapen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonter, Thomas [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of History

    2001-03-01

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish Government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid 50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the Parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the Parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The Government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue

  6. Report on Greece. Establishment of an atomic centre

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1959-07-15

    An IAEA mission was informed of the present and planned activities of the Greek AEC at the Democritus Nuclear Centre and outside this Centre, in particular at the Alexandra Hospital in Athens. Created in 1954, the Greek AEC deals with all atomic energy matters in the country, including research, education, safety, isotope applications and prospecting. The main project of the Commission is the establishment of the Democritus Nuclear Centre, which will have a research reactor and a number of supplementary laboratories. Following an agreement with the US Government, a site has been chosen for the Centre on the outskirts of Athens. The reactor will be of the swimming pool type, with a maximum thermal output of 1 mw. The construction of the reactor building is being carried out under the responsibility of the Greek AEC. The laboratories at the Nuclear Centre will consist of buildings for physics, chemistry, technology, biology, a hot laboratory and a decontamination unit. At the time of the mission's visit, the reactor building and a temporary laboratory were under construction. A certain amount of atomic energy research is also carried out at the Physics Institute of the University of Athens. Since 1956, a radioisotope laboratory has been in operation at the Department of Clinical Therapeutics of Athens University; the laboratory is located at the Alexandra Hospital. The members of the IAEA mission discussed the country's needs of technical assistance with the members of the Greek AEC and with its scientific staff. The AEC wishes to ensure the effective execution of their projects for the setting up of a nuclear research centre and for the development of a sound and balanced research programme, as well as for the establishment of adequate health and safety measures in work with ionizing radiations throughout the country. It is also intended to promote the use of radioisotopes in medicine, which is already being done at the Alexandra Hospital. The Greek AEC requested

  7. Report on Greece. Establishment of an atomic centre

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1959-01-01

    An IAEA mission was informed of the present and planned activities of the Greek AEC at the Democritus Nuclear Centre and outside this Centre, in particular at the Alexandra Hospital in Athens. Created in 1954, the Greek AEC deals with all atomic energy matters in the country, including research, education, safety, isotope applications and prospecting. The main project of the Commission is the establishment of the Democritus Nuclear Centre, which will have a research reactor and a number of supplementary laboratories. Following an agreement with the US Government, a site has been chosen for the Centre on the outskirts of Athens. The reactor will be of the swimming pool type, with a maximum thermal output of 1 mw. The construction of the reactor building is being carried out under the responsibility of the Greek AEC. The laboratories at the Nuclear Centre will consist of buildings for physics, chemistry, technology, biology, a hot laboratory and a decontamination unit. At the time of the mission's visit, the reactor building and a temporary laboratory were under construction. A certain amount of atomic energy research is also carried out at the Physics Institute of the University of Athens. Since 1956, a radioisotope laboratory has been in operation at the Department of Clinical Therapeutics of Athens University; the laboratory is located at the Alexandra Hospital. The members of the IAEA mission discussed the country's needs of technical assistance with the members of the Greek AEC and with its scientific staff. The AEC wishes to ensure the effective execution of their projects for the setting up of a nuclear research centre and for the development of a sound and balanced research programme, as well as for the establishment of adequate health and safety measures in work with ionizing radiations throughout the country. It is also intended to promote the use of radioisotopes in medicine, which is already being done at the Alexandra Hospital. The Greek AEC requested

  8. Morality of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    34 Paul C. Szasz , “The International Law Concerning Weapons of Mass...downloaded 18 October 2009. Szasz , Paul C., “The International Law Concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction.” In Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction

  9. Australia - a nuclear weapons testing ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dobbs, Michael.

    1993-01-01

    Between 1952 and 1958 Britain conducted five separate nuclear weapons trials in Australia. Australia had the uninhabited wide open spaces and the facilities which such tests need and Britain was able to use its special relationship with Australia to get agreement to conduct atomic tests in Australia and establish a permanent test site at Maralinga. Other non-nuclear tests were conducted between 1953-1963. The story of Britain's involvement in atomic weapons testing in Australia is told through its postal history. Both official and private covers are used to show how the postal communications were established and maintained throughout the test years. (UK)

  10. 76 FR 51065 - Florida Power & Light Company; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-08-17

    ... & Light Company; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Pursuant to delegation by the... hereby given that an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) is being established to preside over the following proceeding: Florida Power & Light Company (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1) This proceeding involves a...

  11. 75 FR 54400 - Florida Power and Light Company; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-07

    ...] Florida Power and Light Company; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Pursuant to delegation..., notice is hereby given that an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) is being established to preside over the following proceeding: Florida Power & Light Company (Turkey Point Units 6 and 7) This...

  12. The Russian effort in establishing large atomic and molecular databases

    Science.gov (United States)

    Presnyakov, Leonid P.

    1998-07-01

    The database activities in Russia have been developed in connection with UV and soft X-ray spectroscopic studies of extraterrestrial and laboratory (magnetically confined and laser-produced) plasmas. Two forms of database production are used: i) a set of computer programs to calculate radiative and collisional data for the general atom or ion, and ii) development of numeric database systems with the data stored in the computer. The first form is preferable for collisional data. At the Lebedev Physical Institute, an appropriate set of the codes has been developed. It includes all electronic processes at collision energies from the threshold up to the relativistic limit. The ion -atom (and -ion) collisional data are calculated with the methods developed recently. The program for the calculations of the level populations and line intensities is used for spectrical diagnostics of transparent plasmas. The second form of database production is widely used at the Institute of Physico-Technical Measurements (VNIIFTRI), and the Troitsk Center: the Institute of Spectroscopy and TRINITI. The main results obtained at the centers above are reviewed. Plans for future developments jointly with international collaborations are discussed.

  13. Characteristics of plutonium and americium contamination at the former U.K. atomic weapons test ranges at Maralinga and Emu

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burns, P.A.; Cooper, M.B.; Lokan, K.H.; Wilks, M.J.; Williams, G.A.

    1995-01-01

    Physico-chemical studies on environmental plutonium are described, which provide data integral to an assessment of dose for the inhalation of artificial actinides by Australian Aborigines living a semi-traditional lifestyle at Maralinga and Emu, sites of U.K. atomic weapons tests between 1953 and 1963. The most significant area, from a radiological perspective, is the area contaminated by plutonium in a series of ''one point'' safety trials in which large quantities of plutonium were dispersed explosively at a location known as Taranaki. The activity distribution of plutonium and americium with particle size is quite different from the mass distribution, as a considerably higher proportion of the activity is contained in the finer (inhalable) fraction than of the mass. Except in areas which were disturbed through ploughing during a cleanup in 1967, most the activity remains in the top 1 cm of the surface. Much of the activity is in particulate form, even at distances > 20 km from the firing sites, and discrete particles have been located even at distances beyond 100 km. Data are presented which permit the assessment of annual committed doses through the inhalation pathway, for Aborigines living a semi-traditional lifestyle in the areas affected by the Taranaki firings in particular. (author)

  14. What one should know about radiation. Comparison of radiation burden from the Chernobyl accident and the atomic weapons test

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Burtscher, A

    1986-01-01

    The natural radiation burden, that due to the Chernobyl accident and the atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in Austria are compared. The overall Chernobyl burden is estimated at 50-70% of the annual natural burden and thus less than the burden from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. (G.Q.).

  15. 75 FR 16869 - Areva Enrichment Services, LLC; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-02

    ... Enrichment Services, LLC; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Pursuant to delegation by the... following proceeding: Areva Enrichment Services, LLC (Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility) This Board is being established pursuant to a Notice of Hearing and Commission Order regarding the application of Areva Enrichment...

  16. Australian Atomic Energy Commission: A new energy research establishment at Lucas Heights

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moyal, A [Sydney Univ. (Australia). Dept. of Government and Public Administration

    1980-02-01

    A review of the role of the Atomic Energy Commission has recommended that the Lucas Heights establishment should engage in research on energy sources in general, rather than nuclear only as at present, and that certain of its present functions (regulatory and manufacturing) should be handled by other organisations.

  17. Establishment of Japan Atomic Energy Agency and strategy for nuclear non-proliferation studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Senzaki, Masao; Kurasaki, Takaaki; Inoue, Naoko

    2005-01-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) was established on October 1, 2005, after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute. JAEA is the only governmental nuclear research and development institute in Japan. It will engage in research activities ranging from basic research to practical applications in the nuclear field and will operate research laboratories, reactors, a reprocessing plant and a fuel fabrication plant. At the same time, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) was also established inside of JAEA to conduct the studies on the strategy for nuclear nonproliferation studies. Five roles that JAEA should play for nuclear nonproliferation were identified and four offices were established in the center to carry out those five roles effectively. To conduct the research and development for nuclear nonproliferation efficiently, the center aims to be a 'Research Hub' based on Partnership' with other organizations. (author)

  18. Establishing and storing of deterministic quantum entanglement among three distant atomic ensembles.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yan, Zhihui; Wu, Liang; Jia, Xiaojun; Liu, Yanhong; Deng, Ruijie; Li, Shujing; Wang, Hai; Xie, Changde; Peng, Kunchi

    2017-09-28

    It is crucial for the physical realization of quantum information networks to first establish entanglement among multiple space-separated quantum memories and then, at a user-controlled moment, to transfer the stored entanglement to quantum channels for distribution and conveyance of information. Here we present an experimental demonstration on generation, storage, and transfer of deterministic quantum entanglement among three spatially separated atomic ensembles. The off-line prepared multipartite entanglement of optical modes is mapped into three distant atomic ensembles to establish entanglement of atomic spin waves via electromagnetically induced transparency light-matter interaction. Then the stored atomic entanglement is transferred into a tripartite quadrature entangled state of light, which is space-separated and can be dynamically allocated to three quantum channels for conveying quantum information. The existence of entanglement among three released optical modes verifies that the system has the capacity to preserve multipartite entanglement. The presented protocol can be directly extended to larger quantum networks with more nodes.Continuous-variable encoding is a promising approach for quantum information and communication networks. Here, the authors show how to map entanglement from three spatial optical modes to three separated atomic samples via electromagnetically induced transparency, releasing it later on demand.

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002 [fr

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002 [es

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin-America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in Guatemala City on 14 December 2001

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007

  4. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007 [es

  6. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  7. Agreement of 18 April 1975 between Honduras and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Honduras to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 18 April 1975 between the Republic of Honduras and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  8. Hope over fear. The establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forland, A.

    1995-01-01

    President Eisenhower's ''Atoms for Peace'' speech in 1953 started a process that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This study analyses the negotiations of the Statute of the Agency. It focuses on how the Agency's scope of action regarding safeguards was negotiated. The Statute is seen as a reflection of the dual purpose of the new Agency to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to control that peaceful nuclear activities receiving IAEA assistance are not diverted to military purposes. On one hand, the countries receiving assistance from the Agency accepted a degree of international control that represented a breakthrough in international relations. On the other hand, many countries strongly resented controls. Consequently, compromises had to be made in the course of the negotiations in order to reach a consensus. Thus, although the IAEA was established as a competent and technical body, the underlying compromises meant that its scope of actions was restricted. 6 refs

  9. An investigation into radiological health and safety at the Ministry of Defence (Procurement Executive) Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pochin, E.

    1978-01-01

    The report is in sections, as follows: introduction; radiation exposure (sources of radiation exposure, monitoring methods, protection criteria, plutonium, uranium, americium, tritium, external exposure, environmental releases, general); problems of staffing; buildings; conclusions. (U.K.)

  10. Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Republic of Slovenia on 1 September 2006 [es

  11. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for the Republic of Estonia on 1 December 2005 [es

  12. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Czech Republic on 1 October 2009 [es

  13. Uranium mining, atomic weapons testing, nuclear waste storage: A global survey. World Uranium Hearing grey book 1992

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krumbholz, E.; Kressing, F.

    1992-09-01

    The first edition of the 'World Uranium Hearing Grey Book' for the World Uranium Hearing in Salzburg, 13-19 September 1992 is meant to be a reference for people involved in the World Uranium Hearing. It is mostly made up to country by country surveys giving background information on the testimonies presented at the Hearing, and on many more cases. Included are two short articles: One on 'nukespeak' to make the reader aware of how the language of the nuclear industry influences our speaking and thinking; and an article on the wastes produced by uranium mines. Due to limited time and resources this documentation is not complete. Many questions remain. For example, information is rare about conditions in Eastern Europe. Also, some countries are given much more space than others, which does not indicate importance or seriousness of implications of uranium mining, weapons testing or nuclear waste storage in this particular country. (orig./HP)

  14. Hope over fear. The establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, A.

    1995-12-01

    President Eisenhower`s ``Atoms for Peace`` speech in 1953 started a process that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This study analyses the negotiations of the Statute of the Agency. It focuses on how the Agency`s scope of action regarding safeguards was negotiated. The Statute is seen as a reflection of the dual purpose of the new Agency to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to control that peaceful nuclear activities receiving IAEA assistance are not diverted to military purposes. On one hand, the countries receiving assistance from the Agency accepted a degree of international control that represented a breakthrough in international relations. On the other hand, many countries strongly resented controls. Consequently, compromises had to be made in the course of the negotiations in order to reach a consensus. Thus, although the IAEA was established as a competent and technical body, the underlying compromises meant that its scope of actions was restricted. 6 refs.

  15. Communication dated 30 May 2014 received from the Permanent Mission of Uzbekistan to the Agency regarding the implementation of the initiative of the President of Uzbekistan on Establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 30 May 2014 from the Permanent Mission of Uzbekistan to the Agency regarding the implementation of the initiative of the President of Uzbekistan, HE Mr Islam Karimov, on Establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The note verbale and its attachment are circulated herewith for information, as requested by the Permanent Mission

  16. Agreement between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocols thereto) between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 21 March 2000 by the representative of the Government of the French Republic and the Director General of the IAEA, and on 26 September 2000 by the representative of the European Atomic Energy Community. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 26 October 2007, one month after the Agency has received notification from both France and the European Atomic Energy Community that their respective internal requirements for entry into force have been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocols, the Protocols entered into force on the same date

  17. Special Weapons

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — Supporting Navy special weapons, the division provides an array of engineering services, technical publication support services, logistics support services, safety...

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 1 October 1999

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Peru and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Peru and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 December 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 22 March 2000

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria [es

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-07-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001 [es

  5. Nuclear weapons free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stahl, K.

    1990-01-01

    The article analyses the concept and problems of the two nuclear weapons free zones in Latin America and in the South Pacific established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga. So far the nuclear weapons states except China have refused to sign the additional protocols of the Treaties or have signed them only with considerable provisos. Therefore they don't fully recognize the nuclear weapons free status of those zones, or they don't recognize it at all. Both Treaties contain no provisions to regulate the transit of nuclear weapons through the zones. This allows de facto the stationing of nuclear weapons in the military bases of the US which are located within the nuclear weapons free zone of Latin America. The Treaty of Tlatelolco contains also the right of the states, party to the Treaty, to explode nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. Since peaceful and military nuclear explosions cannot be distinguished technically, this right could also undermine the nuclear weapons free status of the region. Important nuclear threshold countries like Argentina and Brazil have furthermore refrained from putting the Treaty into force. (orig.) [de

  6. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-01-01

    In the grand scheme of things we are a little more than halfway through the cycle of splitting the atom for weapons purposes. If we visualize this historic cycle as the full sweep of a clockface, at zero hour we would find the first nuclear chain reaction by Enrico Fermi, followed immediately by the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the first atomic bombs. From two o`clock until five, the United States built and ran a massive industrial complex that produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At half past, the Cold War ended, and the United States shut down most of its nuclear weapons factories. The second half of this cycle involves dealing with the waste and contamination from nuclear weapons production - a task that had, for the most part, been postponed into the indefinite future. That future is now upon us. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War is in many ways as big a challenge for us today as the building of the atomic bomb was for the Manhattan Project pioneers in the 1940s. Our challenges are political and social as well as technical, and we are meeting those challenges. We are reducing risks, treating wastes, developing new technologies, and building democratic institutions for a constructive debate on our future course.

  7. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    In the grand scheme of things we are a little more than halfway through the cycle of splitting the atom for weapons purposes. If we visualize this historic cycle as the full sweep of a clockface, at zero hour we would find the first nuclear chain reaction by Enrico Fermi, followed immediately by the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the first atomic bombs. From two o'clock until five, the United States built and ran a massive industrial complex that produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At half past, the Cold War ended, and the United States shut down most of its nuclear weapons factories. The second half of this cycle involves dealing with the waste and contamination from nuclear weapons production - a task that had, for the most part, been postponed into the indefinite future. That future is now upon us. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War is in many ways as big a challenge for us today as the building of the atomic bomb was for the Manhattan Project pioneers in the 1940s. Our challenges are political and social as well as technical, and we are meeting those challenges. We are reducing risks, treating wastes, developing new technologies, and building democratic institutions for a constructive debate on our future course

  8. Towards Establishing Capacity for Biological Dosimetry at Ghana Atomic Energy Commission.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Achel, Daniel Gyingiri; Achoribo, Elom; Agbenyegah, Sandra; Adaboro, Rudolph M; Donkor, Shadrack; Adu-Bobi, Nana A K; Agyekum, Akwasi A; Akuamoa, Felicia; Tagoe, Samuel N; Kyei, Kofi A; Yarney, Joel; Serafin, Antonio; Akudugu, John M

    2016-01-01

    The aim of this study was not only to obtain basic technical prerequisites for the establishment of capacity of biological dosimetry at the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC) but also to stimulate interest in biological dosimetry research in Ghana and Sub-Saharan Africa. Peripheral blood from four healthy donors was exposed to different doses (0-6 Gy) of gamma rays from a radiotherapy machine and lymphocytes were subsequently stimulated, cultured, and processed according to standard protocols for 48-50 h. Processed cells were analyzed for the frequencies of dicentric and centric ring chromosomes. Radiation dose delivered to the experimental model was verified using GafChromic® EBT films in parallel experiments. Basic technical prerequisites for the establishment of capacity of biological dosimetry in the GAEC have been realized and expertise in the dicentric chromosome assay consolidated. We successfully obtained preliminary cytogenetic data for a dose-response relationship of the irradiated blood lymphocytes. The data strongly indicate the existence of significant linear (α) and quadratic (β) components and are consistent with those published for the production of chromosome aberrations in comparable absorbed dose ranges.

  9. Making weapons, talking peace

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    York, H.F.

    1987-01-01

    The memoirs of the author traces his life from his first-year graduate studies in physics at the University of Rochester in 1942 to his present position as Director of the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. The part of his life involved in making weapons extends from 1942 to 1961. During this period, he worked with E.O. Lawrence on the Manhattan Project and served as director of Livermore after it became the Atomic Energy Commission's second nuclear weapons laboratory. He also served on many government advisory boards and commissions dealing with nuclear and other weapons. In 1961, the combination of a heart attack and changes in administration in Washington led York too return to the University of California for the talking peace portion of his life. He has since become a public exponent of arms control and disarmament and the futility of seeking increased security through more and better nuclear weapons. York's explanation of his move from making weapons to talking peace leaves the reader with a puzzle

  10. Density functional theory calculations establish the experimental evidence of the DX center atomic structure in CdTe.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lany, Stephan; Wolf, Herbert; Wichert, Thomas

    2004-06-04

    The In DX center and the DX-like configuration of the Cd host atom in CdTe are investigated using density functional theory. The simultaneous calculation of the atomic structure and the electric field gradient (EFG) allows one to correlate the theoretically predicted structure of the DX center with an experimental observable, namely, the EFG obtained from radioactive 111In/111Cd probe atoms in In doped CdTe. In this way, the experimental identification of the DX center structure is established.

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [fr

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998 [fr

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003 [fr

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria [es

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003 [es

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria [es

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997 [es

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-09-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 6 July 2000

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (TLATELOLCO) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 29 November 2001. It was signed in the City of Panama on 11 December 2001

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

  2. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [es

  4. The Text of the Agreement of 6 September 1976 between The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1978-10-15

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  5. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  6. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-05-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000.

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-10-25

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000.

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-10-29

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999.

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-10-29

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date.

  10. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-07-28

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000.

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-09-14

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000.

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-06-20

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000.

  13. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-04-18

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000.

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-10-25

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000.

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-02-16

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998 and signed in Vienna on 4 December 1998. The Protocol entered into force on 16 December 1998.

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Amendment of Article 17

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document reproduces the amendment to the Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The amendment was approved by the Board of Governors in June 1999, and entered into force on 10 September 1999

  5. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2010. It was signed on 7 October 2011 in Banjul, The Gambia, and on 18 October 2011 in Vienna, Austria

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 2005

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 14 September 2004. It was signed on 9 December 2004 in Vienna

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 September 2001. It was signed in Vienna on 5 December 2001

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997

  12. Protocol between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)1 is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 9 April 2003

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna [es

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna [es

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010 [es

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria [es

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997 [fr

  18. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Additional Protocol entered into force on 28 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Armenia written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna [es

  20. The Text of the Agreement of 6 September 1976 between The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-10-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  1. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000

  2. Agreement of 30 September 1993 between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 September 1993 and signed in Vienna on 30 September 1993. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 5 May 1994

  3. Agreement of 22 September 1994 between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-10-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 22 September 1994

  4. Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-03-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 2 December 1993 and signed in Vienna on 6 December 1993 and in Riga on 21 December 1993

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999

  6. Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-04-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994

  7. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-05-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000

  9. Agreement of 18 November 1993 between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-02-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 February 1975 and signed in Vienna on 31 October 1990 and in Nuku'Alofa on 18 November 1993

  10. Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-04-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994.

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998 and signed in Vienna on 4 December 1998. The Protocol entered into force on 16 December 1998

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article 111(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, pursuant to the first sentence of Article 25(a) thereof, on 21 February 1977 [es

  16. Amendment of the atomic energy basic law and other related laws and establishment of the nuclear safety commission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ochi, Kenji

    1978-01-01

    The Atomic Energy Basic Law and related several laws were amended in the recent diet session. The amendment of the laws was requested after the radiation leakage from nuclear-powered ship ''Mutsu''. The reform of administrative system of atomic energy development and utilization are consisted of two important points: one is to establish the Nuclear Safety Commission for strengthening nuclear safety administration, and the other is to give an authority to each ministry or agency to regulate nuclear power reactor from the establishment to operation according to its original mission. (author)

  17. Antisatellite weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garwin, R.L.; Gottfried, K.; Hafner, D.L.

    1984-01-01

    The authors take issue with the assessment that the advent of antisatellite weapons implies that the beneficial role of satellites in arms control, confidence building, and conflict resolution has been judged less important than their ability to support actual military operations. They argue that there is still an opportunity to negotiate a militarily significant and verifiable constraint on the growth of antisatellite technology that would be in the security interest of the US and the world as a whole. They base their opinion on an assessment of the roles of the existing military satellites and their vulnerability to antisatellite weapons and the probable impact of antisatellite weapons on various kinds of crisis and conflict. 10 figures, 1 table

  18. 78 FR 9945 - Crow Butte Resources, Inc.; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-02-12

    ... petitioners comprised of Antonia Loretta Afraid of Bear Cook, Bruce McIntosh, Debra White Plume, Western... Panel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; Dr. Thomas J. Hirons, Atomic...

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-03-28

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 19 March 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Jamaica and the Agency, i.e. on 19 March 2003.

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2004-08-18

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  1. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-03-11

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 18 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Nicaragua written notification that Nicaragua's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  3. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 15 September 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Paraguay written notification that Paraguay's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 18 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Nicaragua written notification that Nicaragua's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  5. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 2002. It was signed on 5 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 May 2004, the date on which Agency received from El Salvador written notification that El Salvador's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  6. Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  7. Agreement of 23 August 1974 between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-02-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 25 September 1973. It was signed in Vienna on 30 April 1974 and in La Paz on 23 August 1974. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 6 February 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

  8. Agreement of 23 August 1974 between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-02-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 September 1973. It was signed in Vienna on 30 April 1974 and in La Paz on 23 August 1974. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 6 February 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 19 March 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Jamaica and the Agency, i.e. on 19 March 2003

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Mexican States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Mexican States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 4 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the United Mexican States written notification that Mexico's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  11. Chemical analysis of Zam Zam water of Saudi Arabia and drinking water supplies of Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Bangladesh

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khan, M.A.; Sharif, A.K.M.; Idriss A, K.M.; Alamgir, M.

    1991-01-01

    The quality of water plays an important role to the living beings. Chemical analysis have been performed on Zam Zam water of Saudi Arabia and drinking water of the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Bangladesh. Quantitative measurements of some essential elements (Ca, Mg, Na, K, Fe, Cu, Zn, Co and Ni) and toxic elements (Pb and Cd) were carried out using atomic absorption spectrometric method. Tests indicate that all three samples (Zam Zam, tap and solar pump water) are drinkable and palatable. pH measurements show that Zam Zam water is alkaline whereas both tap and solar pump water are slightly acidic

  12. Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Azerbaijan to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 6 November 1998, and entered into force on 29 April 1999. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  13. Summary and statistical analysis of environmental monitoring data in the Oarai Research Establishment, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tamura, Katsuhiro; Kitano, Kyoshiro; Sibanuma, Yukio; Takasaki, Koichi; Ohhata, Tsutomu

    1998-03-01

    In the Oarai Research Establishment, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), the environmental monitoring has been conducted for about 29 years since April 1968. The results are discussed for evaluation of long-term and short-term fluctuation in the radiological conditions in the Oarai area. This report summarises the data of the environmental monitoring in Oarai, and statistical analyses were made of the data collected from 1985 through 1994. (author)

  14. Flexible weapons architecture design

    OpenAIRE

    Pyant, William C.

    2015-01-01

    Present day air-delivered weapons are of a closed architecture, with little to no ability to tailor the weapon for the individual engagement. The closed architectures require weaponeers to make the target fit the weapon instead of fitting the individual weapons to a target. The concept of a flexible weapons aims to modularize weapons design using an open architecture shell into which different modules are inserted to achieve the desired target fractional damage while reducing cost and civilia...

  15. Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-05-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1991 and signed in Vienna on 30 January 1992. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 10 April 1992 [fr

  16. Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 5 June 2012. It was signed on 6 June 2012 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 4 April 2013, the date on which the Agency received from Bosnia and Herzegovina written notification that Bosnia and Herzegovina's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Additional Protocol), the Additional Protocol, which had been applied provisionally from 17 February 2010, entered into force on 10 October 2012, the date upon which the Agency received written notification from Iraq that Iraq's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Madagascar and the Agency, i.e., on 18 September 2003

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

  1. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-12-23

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Madagascar and the Agency, i.e., on 18 September 2003.

  2. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-12-23

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Iceland and the Agency, i.e., on 12 September 2003.

  3. Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 13 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of South Africa and the Agency, i.e. on 13 September 2002

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  6. Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-05-04

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001.

  7. Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-03-28

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001.

  8. Agreement between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 13 June 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 27 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 27 September 2007, upon signature by the representatives of Burundi and the Agency. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  9. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 19 July 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 July 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Afghanistan and the Agency

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 16 April 2014 in Basseterre, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and on 19 May 2014 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 May 2014, upon signature by the representatives of Saint Kitts and Nevis and the Agency

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 13 June 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 27 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 27 September 2007, upon signature by the representatives of Burundi and the Agency

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 22 March 2013, upon signature by the representatives of the Denmark and the Agency.

  13. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 September 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Mali and the Agency, i.e. on 12 September 2002

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [fr

  15. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Additional Protocol, which was applied provisionally from 12 June 1998, entered into force on 11 June 2004, the date upon which the Agency received written notification from Ghana that Ghana's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. The text of the Additional Protocol is reproduced in document INFCIRC/226/Add.1

  16. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Iceland and the Agency, i.e., on 12 September 2003

  17. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  18. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 28 November 2002. It was signed on 24 April 2003 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 12 July 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Malta written notification that Malta's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  19. Agreement of 5 April 1995 between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-06-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 26, on 5 April 1995

  20. Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 3 May 2005 in New York. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of the Marshall Islands and the Agency

  1. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 January 2006, the date on which the Agency received from Ukraine written notification that Ukraine's constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  2. Agreement of 7 May 1996 between the Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and protocol thereof) between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Basseterre on 7 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  3. Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-08-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 26 June 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 26 June 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

  4. Agreement of 14 April 1995 between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 November 1994 and in Minsk on 14 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 August 1995

  5. Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-08-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 26 June 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 26 June 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  6. Agreement of 20 April 1995 between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 20 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 20 April 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

  7. Agreement of 8 October 1994 between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-05-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 21 February 1994 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1994 and in Tashkent on 8 October 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 8 October 1994.

  8. Agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  9. Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-02-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 9 June 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 19 January 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

  10. Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereof) between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Roseau, Dominica on 3 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 3 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  11. Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992, It was signed on 28 July 1992 in Vienna and on 26 August 1992 in Geneva. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2005. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  12. Agreement of 7 May 1996 between the Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and protocol thereof) between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Basseterre on 7 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

  13. Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-02-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 9 June 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 19 January 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  14. Agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 21 September 2000. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 August 2002. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  15. Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereof) between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Roseau, Dominica on 3 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 3 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

  16. Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  17. Agreement of 5 April 1995 between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-06-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 26, on 5 April 1995.

  18. Agreement of 20 April 1995 between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 20 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 20 April 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  19. Agreement of 14 April 1995 between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 November 1994 and in Minsk on 14 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 August 1995.

  20. Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 20 March 2001. It was signed on 11 June 2002 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 16 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Niger written notification that Niger's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  1. Agreement of 8 October 1994 between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-05-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 February 1994 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1994 and in Tashkent on 8 October 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 8 October 1994

  2. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992. It was signed on 21 May 1992 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  3. Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001

  4. Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  5. Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-05-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1991 and signed in Vienna on 30 January 1992. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 10 April 1992 [es

  6. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 25 November 2004. It was signed in Vienna on 11 May 2005. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 5 March 2009, the date on which the Agency received from Colombia written notification that Colombia's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  7. Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-05-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1991 and signed in Vienna on 30 January 1992. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 10 April 1992

  8. Atoms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fuchs, Alain; Villani, Cedric; Guthleben, Denis; Leduc, Michele; Brenner, Anastasios; Pouthas, Joel; Perrin, Jean

    2014-01-01

    Completed by recent contributions on various topics (atoms and the Brownian motion, the career of Jean Perrin, the evolution of atomic physics since Jean Perrin, relationship between scientific atomism and philosophical atomism), this book is a reprint of a book published at the beginning of the twentieth century in which the author addressed the relationship between atomic theory and chemistry (molecules, atoms, the Avogadro hypothesis, molecule structures, solutes, upper limits of molecular quantities), molecular agitation (molecule velocity, molecule rotation or vibration, molecular free range), the Brownian motion and emulsions (history and general features, statistical equilibrium of emulsions), the laws of the Brownian motion (Einstein's theory, experimental control), fluctuations (the theory of Smoluchowski), light and quanta (black body, extension of quantum theory), the electricity atom, the atom genesis and destruction (transmutations, atom counting)

  9. Ionitriding of Weapon Components

    Science.gov (United States)

    1974-01-01

    and documented tho production sequences required for the case- hardening of AISI 4140 and Nitralloy 13514 steels. Determination of processina...depths were established experimentally for Nitralloy 135M and for AISI 4140 steels. These steels are commonly used for the manufacture of nitrlded...weapons components. A temperature of 050F, upper limit for lonitrlding, was selected for the Nitralloy 135M to keep treatment times short. Since AISI 4140

  10. Protocol between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 June 1999, signed in Vienna on 11 June 1999, and entered into force on 7 July 2000

  11. Protocol between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-07-28

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 June 1999, signed in Vienna on 11 June 1999, and entered into force on 7 July 2000.

  12. Measurement of the residual radiation intensity at the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb sites. Penetration of weapons radiation: application to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki studies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pace, N; Smith, R E; Ritchie, R H; Hurst, G S

    1959-01-01

    This document contains 2 reports. The first is on the measurement of residual radiation intensity at the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bomb sites, the second is on the penetration of weapons radiation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Separate abstracts have been prepared for each report for inclusion in the Energy Database. (DMC)

  13. Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Panama to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 March 1984 between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

  14. Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Panama to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 March 1984 between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  15. 78 FR 2295 - Charlissa C. Smith; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-01-10

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 55-23694-SP; ASLBP No. 13-925-01-SP-BD01] Charlissa C... (Board) is being established to preside over the following proceeding: Charlissa C. Smith, (Denial of Senior Reactor Operator License). This proceeding concerns a hearing request from Charlissa C. Smith...

  16. 76 FR 56242 - Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC; Southern Nuclear Operating Company; Establishment of Atomic Safety...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-09-12

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket Nos. 52-018-COL, 52-019-COL, 52-025-COL, 52-026-COL; ASLBP No. 11-913-01-COL-BD01] Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC; Southern Nuclear Operating Company; Establishment... following captioned cases: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, (William States Lee III Nuclear Station, Units 1 and...

  17. Agreement between Mexico and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in relation to the Latin America nuclear weapons non proliferation Treaty and the nuclear weapons non proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    Mexico hereby pledges to accept the application of safeguarding means to all basic or fissionable special materials in all nuclear activities carried out with peaceful purposes within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere. This comprises solely the purpose of verifying that these materials are not diverted to applications of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All safeguards stipulated within this Agreement are to be implemented in such a way that they do not impair the economic or technologic development of Mexico, or international cooperation regarding all nuclear activities with peaceful purposes, including the international exchange of nuclear materials, avoiding all unjustified intervention in the nuclear activities with peaceful goals in Mexico. That is particularly specific in the exploitation of the nuclear facilities, additionally promoting the fact that they adjust to the cautious practices necessary to develop nuclear activities in an economical as well as safe fashion

  18. Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna [es

  19. Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna

  20. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1957-06-01

    This handbook prepared by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant government agencies and published by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, is a comprehensive summary of current knowledge on the effects of nuclear weapons. The effects information contained herein is calculated for yields up to 20 megatons and the scaling laws for hypothetically extending the calculations beyond this limit are given. The figure of 20 megatons however is not be taken as an indication of capabilities or developments.

  1. Atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Auffray, J.P.

    1997-01-01

    The atom through centuries, has been imagined, described, explored, then accelerated, combined...But what happens truly inside the atom? And what are mechanisms who allow its stability? Physicist and historian of sciences, Jean-Paul Auffray explains that these questions are to the heart of the modern physics and it brings them a new lighting. (N.C.)

  2. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1964-02-01

    This book is a revision of "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" which was issued in 1957. It was prepared by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant governmental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomc Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the combined judgment of a number of the most competent scientists working the problem. There is a need for widespread public understanding of the best information available on the effects of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible, within the limits of national security, a comprehensive summary of this information.

  3. Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Ukraine to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1995, signed in Vienna on 21 September 1995, and entered into force on 22 January 1998

  4. Transfer of Sr-90 in the environment to human bone, and radiation dose due to the atomic bomb and weapons testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawamura, H.; Shiraishi, K.; Igarashi, Y.; Sakurai, Y.

    1988-01-01

    The major source of artificial radioactivities in Japan has been the atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. Some results obtained for activities of Sr-90 in bone, particulary in Japanese, are mentioned, including trends in levels, distribution in bone, transfer from diet to bone and absorbed doses. Some litterature data on pathways of Sr-90 from environment to man are referred to, that is on contribution of different foods to the ingestion intake and transfer of Sr-90 from soil to crops. Recent topics of radioecological studies on soil-plant relationships are shortly introduced

  5. Flexible weapons architecture design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pyant, William C., III

    Present day air-delivered weapons are of a closed architecture, with little to no ability to tailor the weapon for the individual engagement. The closed architectures require weaponeers to make the target fit the weapon instead of fitting the individual weapons to a target. The concept of a flexible weapons aims to modularize weapons design using an open architecture shell into which different modules are inserted to achieve the desired target fractional damage while reducing cost and civilian casualties. This thesis shows that the architecture design factors of damage mechanism, fusing, weapons weight, guidance, and propulsion are significant in enhancing weapon performance objectives, and would benefit from modularization. Additionally, this thesis constructs an algorithm that can be used to design a weapon set for a particular target class based on these modular components.

  6. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 30 April 2004, the date on which the Agency received written notification that the European Atomic Energy Community and the United Kingdom had met their respective internal requirements for entry into force

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 13 June 2007. It was signed on 26 May 2008 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 4 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Montenegro written notification that Montenegro's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  8. Agreement between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 13 June 2007. It was signed on 26 May 2008 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 4 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Montenegro written notification that Montenegro's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  9. Agreement Between the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 22 February 1989. It was signed in Vienna on 22 November 1991. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on the date upon which the Agency received from Laos written notification that Laos' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 5 April 2001. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  10. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional, the Protocol entered into force on 13 October 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Seychelles written notification that the Republic of Seychelles's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  11. Protocol additional to the agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 23 September 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 7 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from the United Republic of Tanzania written notification that the United Republic of Tanzania's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-03-12

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 29 July 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2003, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Cyprus written notification that Cyprus' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

  14. Protocol additional to the agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2005-03-07

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 23 September 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 7 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from the United Republic of Tanzania written notification that the United Republic of Tanzania's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  15. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-12-23

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 September 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 19 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 November 2003, the date on which the Agency received from Chile written notification that Chile's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  16. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2005-03-11

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 16 June 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 February 2005, the date upon which the Agency received from the Swiss Confederation written notification that the Swiss Confederation's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  17. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2005-02-23

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 December 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Tajikistan written notification that the Republic of Tajikistan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  18. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 29 July 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2003, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Cyprus written notification that Cyprus' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  19. Agreement between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 11 September 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 19 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 10 May 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the Kingdom of Bahrain written notification that Bahrain's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  20. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 28 September 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from the Czech Republic written notification that the Czech Republic's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 1 July 2002

  1. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 5 July 2000. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Azerbaijan written notification that Azerbaijan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 29 November 2000

  2. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Canada written notification that Canada's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 8 September 2000

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 22 November 2007. It was signed on 23 June 2010 in Lisbon, Portugal, and on 8 July 2010 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Mozambique written notification that Mozambique's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 13 December 2005. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 January 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the Union of the Comoros written notification that Comoros' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [fr

  6. Agreement between the State of Qatar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the State of Qatar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 24 September 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 19 January 2009. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 21 January 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the State of Qatar written notification that Qatar's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  7. Agreement between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 22 November 2007. It was signed on 23 June 2010 in Lisbon, Portugal, and on 8 July 2010 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Mozambique written notification that Mozambique's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 16 June 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 February 2005, the date upon which the Agency received from the Swiss Confederation written notification that the Swiss Confederation's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. [es

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

  15. Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 12 September 1995. It was signed on 27 September 1995 in Vienna and 14 June 1996 in Chisinau. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 May 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Moldova written notification that Moldova's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  16. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 December 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Tajikistan written notification that the Republic of Tajikistan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  17. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 September 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 19 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 November 2003, the date on which the Agency received from Chile written notification that Chile's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  18. Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 1999. It was signed on 28 June 2001 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 5 September 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Oman written notification that Oman's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force the same date

  19. Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Safeguards Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Abu Dhabi on 15 December 2002. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 9 October 2003, the date upon which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  20. Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 19 July 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Seychelles written notification that Seychelles' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  1. Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 16 June 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 16 June 2005. 2. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 January 2009, the date upon which the Agency received from Saudi Arabia written notification that Saudi Arabia's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  2. The text of the amended Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the amended Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  3. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kristensen, Hans M. [Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC (United States)

    2014-05-09

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  4. Space weapon technology and policy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hitchens, Theresa

    2017-11-01

    The military use of space, including in support of nuclear weapons infrastructure, has greatly increased over the past 30 years. In the current era, rising geopolitical tensions between the United States and Russia and China have led to assumptions in all three major space powers that warfighting in space now is inevitable, and possible because of rapid technological advancements. New capabilities for disrupting and destroying satellites include radio-frequency jamming, the use of lasers, maneuverable space objects and more capable direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons. This situation, however, threatens international security and stability among nuclear powers. There is a continuing and necessary role for diplomacy, especially the establishment of normative rules of behavior, to reduce risks of misperceptions and crisis escalation, including up to the use of nuclear weapons. U.S. policy and strategy should seek a balance between traditional military approaches to protecting its space assets and diplomatic tools to create a more secure space environment.

  5. Chemical Weapons Convention

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1997-01-01

    On April 29, 1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC...

  6. The weapons effect.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Benjamin, Arlin James; Bushman, Brad J

    2018-02-01

    In some societies, weapons are plentiful and highly visible. This review examines recent trends in research on the weapons effect, which is the finding that the mere presence of weapons can prime people to behave aggressively. The General Aggression Model provides a theoretical framework to explain why the weapons effect occurs. This model postulates that exposure to weapons increases aggressive thoughts and hostile appraisals, thus explaining why weapons facilitate aggressive behavior. Data from meta-analytic reviews are consistent with the General Aggression Model. These findings have important practical as well as theoretical implications. They suggest that the link between weapons and aggression is very strong in semantic memory, and that merely seeing a weapon can make people more aggressive. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  7. Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 July 2006, upon signature by the representatives of the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the Agency

  8. Global Fall Out of 239,240Pu and 241Am in The Environment of Serpong Atomic Energy Research Establishment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syarbaini; Yatim Sofyan

    2000-01-01

    Determination of 239 , 240 Pu and 241 Am in the Cisadane river sediment and surface soil samples collected in 1996 from the environment of Atomic Energy Research Establishment (PPT A) of Serpong has been carried out. The objective of research was to evaluate the existence of 239 , 240 Pu and 241 Am in the environment as impact of nuclear activities in the PPT A Serpong. Surface soils were collected from 3 locations and each of location consists of 4 sampling sites. Cisadane river sediment consists of 3 sampling sites. The results showed that the average concentration were founded to be 17.03 ± 2.49 mBq/kg for 239 , 240 Pu and 9.20 ± 2.93 mBq/kg for 241 Am. The observed 239 , 240 Pu 241 Am concentration are low compared to the reported values for some other areas of the world. The Activity ratios of 241 Am/ 239 , 24O Pu and 239 , 240 PU/ 137 Cs in surface soils were found to be in the narrow range 0.32 to 0.53 with a mean value of 0.43 ± 0.09 and 0.017 to 0.029 with a mean value of 0.024 ± 0.005 respectively. This ratio is in excellent agreement with the value of global fallout

  9. Military Technology and Conventional Weapons Export Controls: The Wassenaar Arrangement

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Grimmett, Richard F

    2006-01-01

    This report provides background on the Wassenaar Arrangement, which was formally established in July 1996 as a multilateral arrangement aimed at controlling exports of conventional weapons and related...

  10. The weapons effect

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Benjamin, Arlin James; Bushman, Brad J.

    In some societies, weapons are plentiful and highly visible. This review examines recent trends in research on the weapons effect, which is the finding that the mere presence of weapons can prime people to behave aggressively. The General Aggression Model provides a theoretical framework to explain

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Bulgaria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement [es

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Bulgaria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement [fr

  13. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Estonia and the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement [es

  14. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Slovenia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement [es

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Bulgaria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Cyprus

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Slovenia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Estonia and the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  19. International agreements on nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dombey, N.

    1982-01-01

    The satellite detection of a nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic and Israel's destruction of a research reactor in Iraq make it essential to strengthen existing monitoring and enforcement programs to prevent proliferation. While there was no reliable evidence that either South Africa or Iraq was violating non-proliferation agreements, worst case scenarios can demonstrate to unfriendly countries that South Africa had diverted fuel to test a nuclear weapon and that Iraq is intending to produce weapons-grade plutonium 239. The situation can be improved by formulating better terms and conditions for internationalizing access to materials. Nuclear suppliers need to agree on terms that will assure their customers that contracts for civil programs will be honored. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which includes both nuclear suppliers and customers, could achieve stronger agreements that take into account recent technological advances that will expand enrichment and reprocessing activities. 23 references, 1 figure

  20. Identification of nuclear weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

    1987-04-10

    A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

  1. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-02-21

    of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons and eliminate many of them. These 1991 announcements, coming after the abortive coup in Moscow in July 1991...of these weapons. The abortive coup in Moscow in August 1991 had also caused alarms about the strength of central control over nuclear weapons...assure other allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, but these assurances do not necessarily include legally binding commitments to retaliate

  2. Chemical and biological weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, E.D.

    1991-01-01

    This paper discusses the prospects of the multilateral negotiations aimed at achieving a complete and total ban on chemical weapons the Chemical Weapons convention (CWC). The control of the proliferation of chemical weapons is no longer just on East-West issue; it is also an issue of concern in Third World Countries, and in some of the wealthier middle eastern nations, such as Kuwait

  3. Reconversion of nuclear weapons

    CERN Document Server

    Kapitza, Sergei P

    1992-01-01

    The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

  4. Security with nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karp, R.C.

    1991-01-01

    Recent improvements in East-West relations and the process of dramatic political change in Europe may result in unprecedented opportunities to reduce the global arsenal of nuclear weapons. Despite these welcome developments, the prospects for effectively controlling the spread of nuclear capability in the Third World have remained much less encouraging. The possibility of large reductions in nuclear weapons poses fundamental questions about their purpose. Why have some states chosen to acquire nuclear weapons? How and why have these decisions been maintained over time? Why have some states elected to approach, but not cross, the nuclear threshold? This book examines the commonalities and differences in political approaches to nuclear weapons both within and between three groups of states: nuclear, non-nuclear and threshold. The chapters explore the evolution of thinking about nuclear weapons and the role these weapons play in national security planning, and question the official security rationales offered by the nuclear weapon states for the maintenance of nuclear capabilities. For the non-nuclear weapon states, the book presents an analysis of alternative ways of assuring security and foreign policy effectiveness. For the threshold states, it examines the regional contexts within which these states maintain their threshold status. This book transcends traditional East-West approaches to analysis of nuclear issues by giving equal prominence to the issues of nuclear proliferation and non-nuclearism. The book also provides a comprehensive analysis of how current approaches to nuclear weapons have evolved both within and among the groups of countries under study

  5. Hitler's bomb: the secret story of Germans' attempts to get the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karlsch, Rainer

    2007-01-01

    In this historical book, the author claims to have evidence concerning the development and testing of a possible 'nuclear weapon' by Nazi Germany in 1945. The 'weapon' in question is not alleged to be a standard nuclear weapon powered by nuclear fission, but something closer to either a radiological weapon (a so-called 'dirty bomb') or a hybrid-nuclear fusion weapon. Its new evidence is concerned primarily with the parts of the German nuclear energy project (an attempted clandestine scientific effort led by Germany to develop and produce atomic weapons during World War II) under Kurt Diebner, a German nuclear physicist who directed and administrated the project

  6. FORMULA ESTABLISHMENT OF COLORLESS Pb(II COMPLEX WITH N-BENZOYL-N-PHENYL HYDROXYLAMINE (BPA USING ATOMIC ABSORPTION SPECTROSCOPY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dhananjay B Sarode

    2012-02-01

    Full Text Available A new method for determination of stoichiometry of colorless complexes by using atomic absorption spectrophotometric technique in continuous variation method and slope ratio method was described here. This method can be used in same manner as that of mole ratio method and slope ratio method. In this method atomic absorption spectroscopy was used instead of UV-Vis spectrophotometry. Atomic absorption spectrophotometric technique is superior to UV-Vis spectrophotometry as it can be applied to colorless soluble complexes. Pb(II and n-benzoyl-n-phenyl hydroxylamine react to form colorless complex at pH 6.5, which can be easily determined by this method. It was found that Pb(II forms 1:2 complex with n-benzoyl-n-phenyl hydroxylamine and is quantitatively extracted back to aqueous solution for AAS analysis.

  7. Recommendations regarding problems of research policy relating to the establishment and operation of atomic power stations in Denmark

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1976-01-01

    This report, which was submitted by the Danish Planning Council for Research to the Parliamentary Committee on Scientific Research, is based on reports from the DANISH Atomic Energy Commission. and on a sub-committee appointed by the Planning Council, as well as on the comments of the Danish Research Council on these reports. The Planning Council submit that: (1) the question of the introduction and scope of Danish utilization of atomic energy should be considered as a link in setting up a total plan for energy policy elucidating the possibilities in the energy field from both aspects of supply and demand, (2) that there is a continuous interaction between energy policy and research policy in the subject field, (3) that the total resources for energy research and development should be considerably increased, (4) that investigations into the economy of atomic power should be intensified, and (5) that investigations of possibilities for long-term storage of radioactive waste in Denmark should be speeded up. Further, the Planning Council points out the need for research in areas such as (a) wind and solar energy, (b) the environmental impact of utilizing atomic power in relation to that of utilizing other forms of power, (c) economic and social effects of different forms of energy supply, as well as the problems of siting, decision taking and public information and participation and finally, (d) the utilization of the energy raw materials found in Greenland.

  8. Recommendations regarding problems of research policy relating to the establishment and operation of atomic power stations in Denmark

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    This report, which was submitted by the Danish Planning Council for Research to the Parliamentary Committee on Scientific Research, is based on reports from the DANISH Atomic Energy Commission. and on a sub-committee appointed by the Planning Council, as well as on the comments of the Danish Research Council on these reports. The Planning Council submit that: 1) the question of the introduction and scope of Danish utilization of atomic energy should be considered as a link in setting up a total plan for energy policy elucidating the possibilities in the energy field from both aspects of supply and demand, 2) that there is a continuous interaction between energy policy and research policy in the subject field 3) that the total resources for energy research and development should be considerably increased, 4) that investigations into the economy of atomic power should be intensified, and 5) that investigations of possibilities for long-term storage of radioactive waste in Denmark should be speeded up. Further, the Planning Council points out the need for research in areas such as a) wind and solar energy, b) the environmental impact of utilizing atomic power in relation to that of utilizing other forms of power, c) economic and social effects of different forms of energy supply, as well as the problems of siting, decision taking and public information and participation and finally, d) the utilization of the energy raw materials found in Greenland. (B.P.)

  9. Data Evaluation and the Establishment of a Standard Library of Atomic, Molecular and Plasma-Material Interaction Data for Fusion. Summary Report of an IAEA Consultants' Meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Braams, B.J.

    2012-08-01

    Seven experts in the field of atomic, molecular and plasma-material interaction (A+M+PMI) data and data evaluation for fusion plasma physics met with IAEA A+M Data Unit staff at IAEA Headquarters to provide advice towards the establishment of an evaluated and recommended library of A+M+PMI data for fusion. The proceedings and conclusions of the meeting are summarized here. (author)

  10. What Happens to Deterrence as Nuclear Weapons Decrease Toward Zero?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Drell, Sidney

    2011-04-01

    Steps reducing reliance on deployed nuclear weapons en route to zero will be discussed. They include broadly enhancing cooperation and transparency agreements beyond the provisions for verifying limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems in the New START treaty. Two questions that will be addressed are: What conditions would have to be established in order to maintain strategic stability among nations as nuclear weapons recede in importance? What would nuclear deterrence be like in a world without nuclear weapons?

  11. Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-08-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Exchange of Letters with the Commonwealth of Dominica in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean, which constitutes an agreement confirming that the Safeguards Agreement of 3 May 1996 (IAEA-INFCIRC-513) concluded between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica) and the IAEA pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) satisfies the obligation of Dominica under Article 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA

  12. Igniting the Light Elements: The Los Alamos Thermonuclear Weapon Project, 1942-1952

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fitzpatrick, Anne C. [Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ. (Virginia Tech), Blacksburg, VA (United States)

    1999-07-01

    The American system of nuclear weapons research and development was conceived and developed not as a result of technological determinism, but by a number of individual architects who promoted the growth of this large technologically-based complex. While some of the technological artifacts of this system, such as the fission weapons used in World War II, have been the subject of many historical studies, their technical successors--fusion (or hydrogen) devices--are representative of the largely unstudied highly secret realms of nuclear weapons science and engineering. In the postwar period a small number of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's staff and affiliates were responsible for theoretical work on fusion weapons, yet the program was subject to both the provisions and constraints of the US Atomic Energy Commission, of which Los Alamos was a part. The Commission leadership's struggle to establish a mission for its network of laboratories, least of all to keep them operating, affected Los Alamos's leaders' decisions as to the course of weapons design and development projects. Adapting Thomas P. Hughes's ''large technological systems'' thesis, I focus on the technical, social, political, and human problems that nuclear weapons scientists faced while pursuing the thermonuclear project, demonstrating why the early American thermonuclear bomb project was an immensely complicated scientific and technological undertaking. I concentrate mainly on Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's Theoretical, or T, Division, and its members' attempts to complete an accurate mathematical treatment of the ''Super''--the most difficult problem in physics in the postwar period--and other fusion weapon theories. Although tackling a theoretical problem, theoreticians had to address technical and engineering issues as well. I demonstrate the relative value and importance of H-bomb research over time in the postwar era to

  13. The medical consequences of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Humphrey, J.; Hartog, M.; Middleton, H.

    1982-01-01

    A pamphlet has been produced by the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (MCANW) and by the Medical Association for the Prevention of War (MAPW) to bring the catastrophic effects that the use of nuclear weapons would entail to the attention of the general public, politicians and members of the medical profession. It describes the medical consequences of the effects of blast, heat and ionizing radiation from nuclear weapons, including details from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings. The medical consequences of a nuclear attack including consideration of the casualties, care of the injured, psychological effects and the outcome are also discussed. It is concluded that if for none other than purely medical reasons, nuclear warfare must never be allowed to happen. (UK)

  14. OIL AS POLITICAL WEAPON

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mariana, BUICAN

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available Oil (called by some black gold has not always been as coveted and used, but only in the last hundred years has established itself as a highly sought after as an indispensable proper functioning of modern economic activity that an important factor in international politics. International oil regime has changed in the last decades. In 1960, oil regime was a private oligopol which had links with governments main consuming countries. By then the price of a barrel of oil was two U.S. dollars and seven major transnational oil companies decided the amount of oil that will be produced. Meanwhile the world region with the largest oil exports were more strongly expressed nationalism and decolonization. Result, it was so in the late 60s in the region occur independent states. They have created an organization aim of this resource to their advantage - OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Thus since 1973 there have been changes in the international regime governing oil field, namely producing countries were fixed production rate and price. After this time the oil weapon has become increasingly important in the management of international relations. Oil influenced the great powers to Middle East conflicts that occurred in the last century, but their attitude about the emergence of new sources of oil outside OPEC. In the late 90's, Russia has become a major supplier of oil to the West.

  15. Agreement of 17 February 1989 between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-05-01

    The document reproduces the full text of the Agreement of 17 February 1989 between the United States of America and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within United States Protocol I Territories for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

  16. Global strike hypersonic weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lewis, Mark J.

    2017-11-01

    Beginning in the 1940's, the United States has pursued the development of hypersonic technologies, enabling atmospheric flight in excess of five times the speed of sound. Hypersonic flight has application to a range of military and civilian applications, including commercial transport, space access, and various weapons and sensing platforms. A number of flight tests of hypersonic vehicles have been conducted by countries around the world, including the United States, Russia, and China, that could lead the way to future hypersonic global strike weapon systems. These weapons would be especially effective at penetrating conventional defenses, and could pose a significant risk to national security.

  17. Nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rezendes, V.S.

    1992-04-01

    In addition to long-standing safety and environmental problems plaguing the nuclear weapons complex, this paper reports that the Department of Energy (DOE) faces a major new challenge-how to reconfigure the weapons complex to meet the nation's defense needs in the 21st century. Key decisions still need to be made about the size of the complex; where, if necessary, to relocate various operations; what technologies to use for new tritium production; and what to do with excess weapons-grade material. The choices confronting DOE and Congress are difficult given the conflicting demands for limited resources

  18. The text of the agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Finland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. On 18 September 1995 the Agency received in respect of the European Atomic Energy Community and Finland the notifications required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement. For practical accounting purposes as proposed in the notifications, the Agreement came into force for Finland on 1 October 1995

  19. The text of the agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Latvia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. The Agreement and the Protocol thereto, which came into force for the above-mentioned original signatories on 21 February 1977, have also entered into force for Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. The Agency received from the Republic of Latvia on 17 March 2008 and from the European Atomic Energy Community on 1 October 2008, the notifications required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement. Accordingly, the Agreement entered into force for Latvia on 1 October 2008

  20. The real value of nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carasales, J.

    1998-01-01

    The international community has greeted the establishment of two new nuclear weapon-free zones with praise. Africa and South Asia are the regions which will join, once the respective treaties are ratified and in force, Latin America and the South Pacific to ensure that extensive areas of the earth remain free of nuclear weapons. The usual reaction to these accomplishments is to hail them as important contributions to international peace and security, and as meaningful steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon-free zones have their value but this value relates mainly to the countries within the zone. The interest of nuclear-weapon states are not really affected, or, if they are, the influence is not significant. One should bear in mind that the really important and meaningful nuclear weapon-free zones have yet to be achieved

  1. Structural adaptations to diverse fighting styles in sexually selected weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McCullough, Erin L; Tobalske, Bret W; Emlen, Douglas J

    2014-10-07

    The shapes of sexually selected weapons differ widely among species, but the drivers of this diversity remain poorly understood. Existing explanations suggest weapon shapes reflect structural adaptations to different fighting styles, yet explicit tests of this hypothesis are lacking. We constructed finite element models of the horns of different rhinoceros beetle species to test whether functional specializations for increased performance under species-specific fighting styles could have contributed to the diversification of weapon form. We find that horns are both stronger and stiffer in response to species-typical fighting loads and that they perform more poorly under atypical fighting loads, which suggests weapons are structurally adapted to meet the functional demands of fighting. Our research establishes a critical link between weapon form and function, revealing one way male-male competition can drive the diversification of animal weapons.

  2. Virtual nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  3. Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-01-01

    Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands , Mongolia, Panama, and St. Vin- cent and the Grenadines, according to a State Department summary available...1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. As such, NBC weapons represent a group of weapons that the...Development, Produc- tion and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction contains two references to WMD

  4. SU-C-BRC-05: Monte Carlo Calculations to Establish a Simple Relation of Backscatter Dose Enhancement Around High-Z Dental Alloy to Its Atomic Number

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Utsunomiya, S; Kushima, N; Katsura, K; Tanabe, S; Hayakawa, T; Sakai, H; Yamada, T; Takahashi, H; Abe, E; Wada, S; Aoyama, H [Niigata University, Niigata (Japan)

    2016-06-15

    Purpose: To establish a simple relation of backscatter dose enhancement around a high-Z dental alloy in head and neck radiation therapy to its average atomic number based on Monte Carlo calculations. Methods: The PHITS Monte Carlo code was used to calculate dose enhancement, which is quantified by the backscatter dose factor (BSDF). The accuracy of the beam modeling with PHITS was verified by comparing with basic measured data namely PDDs and dose profiles. In the simulation, a high-Z alloy of 1 cm cube was embedded into a tough water phantom irradiated by a 6-MV (nominal) X-ray beam of 10 cm × 10 cm field size of Novalis TX (Brainlab). The ten different materials of high-Z alloys (Al, Ti, Cu, Ag, Au-Pd-Ag, I, Ba, W, Au, Pb) were considered. The accuracy of calculated BSDF was verified by comparing with measured data by Gafchromic EBT3 films placed at from 0 to 10 mm away from a high-Z alloy (Au-Pd-Ag). We derived an approximate equation to determine the relation of BSDF and range of backscatter to average atomic number of high-Z alloy. Results: The calculated BSDF showed excellent agreement with measured one by Gafchromic EBT3 films at from 0 to 10 mm away from the high-Z alloy. We found the simple linear relation of BSDF and range of backscatter to average atomic number of dental alloys. The latter relation was proven by the fact that energy spectrum of backscatter electrons strongly depend on average atomic number. Conclusion: We found a simple relation of backscatter dose enhancement around high-Z alloys to its average atomic number based on Monte Carlo calculations. This work provides a simple and useful method to estimate backscatter dose enhancement from dental alloys and corresponding optimal thickness of dental spacer to prevent mucositis effectively.

  5. Atomic evidence that modification of H-bonds established with amino acids critical for host-cell binding induces sterile immunity against malaria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patarroyo, Manuel E.; Cifuentes, Gladys; Pirajan, Camilo; Moreno-Vranich, Armando; Vanegas, Magnolia

    2010-01-01

    Based on the 3D X-ray crystallographic structures of relevant proteins of the malaria parasite involved in invasion to host cells and 3D NMR structures of High Activity Binding Peptides (HABPs) and their respective analogues, it was found that HABPs are rendered into highly immunogenic and sterile immunity inducers in the Aotus experimental model by modifying those amino acids that establish H-bonds with other HABPs or binding to host's cells. This finding adds striking and novel physicochemical principles, at the atomic level, for a logical and rational vaccine development methodology against infectious disease, among them malaria.

  6. Atomic evidence that modification of H-bonds established with amino acids critical for host-cell binding induces sterile immunity against malaria

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Patarroyo, Manuel E., E-mail: mepatarr@mail.com [Fundacion Instituto de Inmunologia de Colombia (FIDIC), Bogota (Colombia); Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogota (Colombia); Cifuentes, Gladys [Fundacion Instituto de Inmunologia de Colombia (FIDIC), Bogota (Colombia); Universidad del Rosario, Bogota (Colombia); Pirajan, Camilo; Moreno-Vranich, Armando [Fundacion Instituto de Inmunologia de Colombia (FIDIC), Bogota (Colombia); Vanegas, Magnolia [Fundacion Instituto de Inmunologia de Colombia (FIDIC), Bogota (Colombia); Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogota (Colombia); Universidad del Rosario, Bogota (Colombia)

    2010-04-09

    Based on the 3D X-ray crystallographic structures of relevant proteins of the malaria parasite involved in invasion to host cells and 3D NMR structures of High Activity Binding Peptides (HABPs) and their respective analogues, it was found that HABPs are rendered into highly immunogenic and sterile immunity inducers in the Aotus experimental model by modifying those amino acids that establish H-bonds with other HABPs or binding to host's cells. This finding adds striking and novel physicochemical principles, at the atomic level, for a logical and rational vaccine development methodology against infectious disease, among them malaria.

  7. Weapons of mass destruction, WMD

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vogel, H.

    2007-01-01

    Purpose: Since the invasion into Iraq in 2003, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), have come to general notice; they include today chemical, biological, and atomic/nuclear weapons, (CW, BW, and AW). Radiological findings shall be described. Material and methods: X-ray findings of victims of WMD are described. From CW, own observations are reported. Examples of (possible) X-ray findings of victims of BW are described. AW may induce radiation disease. Results: Exposure to sulfur-lost induces severe bronchitis; if the radiograph shows pulmonary infiltrations, the prognosis is bad; a late consequence maybe bronchiectasis. BW can be based on bacteria, virus or toxins. An approach of the X-ray findings for BW victims is based on the assumption that the disease induced by BW has the same (or a similar) clinic and radiology as that induced by the original microorganism or by the unchanged toxism. This approximation may have its limits, if the germ or toxin has been modified. In survivors of AW, the radiology is probably that of victims of thermal radiation and blast. Conclusion: WMD seem to be a real or a possible threat. They can be used in war, in terrorist attacks, in crime, and in action of secret services. In case that WMD are employed, X-ray diagnostic will be used to evaluate the prognosis (triage) and the risk of infection

  8. Weapons of mass destruction, WMD

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vogel, H. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, D-20099 Hamburg (Germany)], E-mail: Hermann.vogel@ak-stgeorg.lbk-hh.de

    2007-08-15

    Purpose: Since the invasion into Iraq in 2003, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), have come to general notice; they include today chemical, biological, and atomic/nuclear weapons, (CW, BW, and AW). Radiological findings shall be described. Material and methods: X-ray findings of victims of WMD are described. From CW, own observations are reported. Examples of (possible) X-ray findings of victims of BW are described. AW may induce radiation disease. Results: Exposure to sulfur-lost induces severe bronchitis; if the radiograph shows pulmonary infiltrations, the prognosis is bad; a late consequence maybe bronchiectasis. BW can be based on bacteria, virus or toxins. An approach of the X-ray findings for BW victims is based on the assumption that the disease induced by BW has the same (or a similar) clinic and radiology as that induced by the original microorganism or by the unchanged toxism. This approximation may have its limits, if the germ or toxin has been modified. In survivors of AW, the radiology is probably that of victims of thermal radiation and blast. Conclusion: WMD seem to be a real or a possible threat. They can be used in war, in terrorist attacks, in crime, and in action of secret services. In case that WMD are employed, X-ray diagnostic will be used to evaluate the prognosis (triage) and the risk of infection.

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Hungary and Malta

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. The Agreement and the Protocol thereto, which came into force for the above-mentioned original signatories on 21 February 1977, have also entered into force for Austria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden

  10. Arrangement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Health Organization concerning the establishment and operation of a network of Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Health Organization (WHO), recognizing that they have been co-operating in the operation of a network of Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratories (the Network), established pursuant to a Working Arrangement, dated 5 April 1976; and desiring to continue this co-operation in accordance with Article V of the relationship agreement concluded by IAEA and WHO in 1959; hereby enter a new arrangement to guide their work in operating the Network and providing assistance, when needed, to individual Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratories (SSDLs). The purpose of this Arrangement is to set forth responsibilities of IAEA and WHO in the operation and support of the Network and to establish criteria for SSDLs

  11. [Chemical weapons and chemical terrorism].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nakamura, Katsumi

    2005-10-01

    Chemical Weapons are kind of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They were used large quantities in WWI. Historically, large quantities usage like WWI was not recorded, but small usage has appeared now and then. Chemical weapons are so called "Nuclear weapon for poor countrys" because it's very easy to produce/possession being possible. They are categorized (1) Nerve Agents, (2) Blister Agents, (3) Cyanide (blood) Agents, (4) Pulmonary Agents, (5) Incapacitating Agents (6) Tear Agents from the viewpoint of human body interaction. In 1997 the Chemical Weapons Convention has taken effect. It prohibits chemical weapons development/production, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verification regime contributes to the chemical weapons disposal. But possibility of possession/use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist group represented in one by Matsumoto and Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack, So new chemical terrorism countermeasures are necessary.

  12. Nuclear weapons research in Sweden. The co-operation between civilian and military research, 1947 - 1972

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonter, Thomas

    2002-05-01

    The Swedish nuclear weapons research began as early as 1945, shortly after the first atomic bombs fell over Japan. The assignment to look into the new weapon of mass destruction went to the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). Admittedly, the main aim of the research initiated at that time was to find out how Sweden could best protect itself against a nuclear weapon attack. However, from the outset FOA was interested in investigating the possibilities of manufacturing what was then called an atomic bomb. A co-operation between FOA and AB Atomenergi (AE), which was created in 1947 in order to be responsible for the industrial development of civilian nuclear energy, was initiated. AE made several technical investigations within this co-operation regarding choice of reactors and preconditions for a production of weapons-grade plutonium. The first purpose of this report is therefore to investigate how this co-operation emerged and what consequences it had for the project to produce basic information for the Swedish manufacture of nuclear weapons. In general terms, the finding of this report is that FOA was responsible for the overall nuclear weapons research. For this reason, FOA was in charge of the construction of the nuclear device and the studies of its effects. Additionally, AE should deliver basic information of a possible production of weapons-grade plutonium and investigate the possibilities of a production or a procurement of inspection-free heavy water (i.e. without inspections by the supplying country). AE should also build a reprocessing plant and manufacture fuel elements to be used in the reactors for a production of weapons-grade plutonium. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that both FOA and AE conducted plutonium research. The reason why FOA conducted this research was that the plutonium had to be in metallic form in order to be used in a nuclear weapons device. Therefore, FOA carried out research with the purpose of producing

  13. Nuclear weapons research in Sweden. The co-operation between civilian and military research, 1947 - 1972

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonter, Thomas [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of History

    2002-05-01

    The Swedish nuclear weapons research began as early as 1945, shortly after the first atomic bombs fell over Japan. The assignment to look into the new weapon of mass destruction went to the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). Admittedly, the main aim of the research initiated at that time was to find out how Sweden could best protect itself against a nuclear weapon attack. However, from the outset FOA was interested in investigating the possibilities of manufacturing what was then called an atomic bomb. A co-operation between FOA and AB Atomenergi (AE), which was created in 1947 in order to be responsible for the industrial development of civilian nuclear energy, was initiated. AE made several technical investigations within this co-operation regarding choice of reactors and preconditions for a production of weapons-grade plutonium. The first purpose of this report is therefore to investigate how this co-operation emerged and what consequences it had for the project to produce basic information for the Swedish manufacture of nuclear weapons. In general terms, the finding of this report is that FOA was responsible for the overall nuclear weapons research. For this reason, FOA was in charge of the construction of the nuclear device and the studies of its effects. Additionally, AE should deliver basic information of a possible production of weapons-grade plutonium and investigate the possibilities of a production or a procurement of inspection-free heavy water (i.e. without inspections by the supplying country). AE should also build a reprocessing plant and manufacture fuel elements to be used in the reactors for a production of weapons-grade plutonium. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that both FOA and AE conducted plutonium research. The reason why FOA conducted this research was that the plutonium had to be in metallic form in order to be used in a nuclear weapons device. Therefore, FOA carried out research with the purpose of producing

  14. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION FROM WEAPON TESTS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    none

    1958-10-01

    The program of the Atomic Energy Commission on environmental contamination from weapons tests is designed for the overall evaluation of the hazard to humans from test operations. It is limited to studies of the deposition of activity at long range rather than the problems associated with immediate, close-in fallout. The program has largely been a study of Sr{sup 90}, since considerations based on experience and measurement indicate that it is the isotope of greatest potential hazard. Data are presented pertinent to the monitoring of long-range fallout, particularly Sr{sup 90} and Cs{sup 137}. Values are tabulated for the fallout deposition, air concentrations, water concentrations, and the amounts in foods and human bone. In addition, results are given for some experimental investigations. The report of these results is not interpretative although certain papers that do attempt to interpret the present situation with respect to Sr{sup 90} in particular are reprinted. Bibliographies are presented covering the period since the 1957 hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy concerning the nature of radioactive fallout and its effects on man. A document list of submissions to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation is given to illustrate the work done in other countries. Several papers on the subject, which have not been generally available, are reprinted.

  15. Present state of the monitoring for internal contamination at Tokai Research Establishment, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Akaishi, J.; Fukuda, H.; Mizushita, S.

    1980-01-01

    At Tokai Research Establishment, JAERI, over one thousand people work in hot areas such as reactors, accelerators, chemical laboratories and waste treatment plants. The monitoring for internal contamination of this personnel is presented. Routine and special monitoring are carried out. The object of the former is to check for the presence of significant contamination, and that of the latter is to estimate body burden and committed dose equivalent, if necessary. Heavy shield and shadow shield whole body counters, a low energy lung counter and a wound monitor are used to detect the internal contamination due to γ or chi ray emitters, and bioassay technique is used for α or β emitters and uranium. The results of the monitoring until now are presented. (H.K.)

  16. Present state of the monitoring for internal contamination at Tokai Research Establishment, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Akaishi, J.; Fukuda, H.; Mizushita, S.

    1980-01-01

    Results are presented of internal contamination surveys carried out since 1969 at Tokai Research Establishment. Routine monitoring sometimes revealed significant internal contamination for tritium workers, but almost never for others. The number of subjects for special monitoring varied according to the activities. In 1965, the number of subjects for special monitoring was nearly 300, due to a reactor repair that year. In recent years, the number or special monitoring has been several tens or so. With regard to special monitoring, the workers with significant internal contamination were less than 50%. The internal dose (50 years) estimated for the majority of subjects was of mrem order. During the past 15 years, only several cases of exposure of rem order were found. The highest dose experienced was about 4 rems ( 131 I thyroid) (U.K.)

  17. Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Croatia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 26 May 2008, the date on which the Agency received from Croatia written notification that Croatia's internal requirements for entry into force had been fulfilled

  18. Agreement Between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with New Zealand to Amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Prolilferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 24 February 2014, the date on which the Agency received New Zealand's affirmative reply

  19. Wounds and weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vogel, H. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)], E-mail: Hermann.vogel@ak-stgeorg.lbk-hh.de; Dootz, B. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)

    2007-08-15

    Purpose: X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. Material and method: The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Results: Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Conclusion: Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports.

  20. Wounds and weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vogel, H.; Dootz, B.

    2007-01-01

    Purpose: X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. Material and method: The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Results: Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Conclusion: Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports

  1. Communication of 7 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the IAEA concerning the establishment of the oversight Board to monitor the implementation of Pakistan's export control on goods, technologies, materials and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and their Delivery Systems Act (Act No.V) 2004

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a Note Verbale dated 7 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan enclosing a copy of the Gazette of Pakistan S.R.O. No.693(I)/2007, dated 11 July 2007, regarding the establishment of the Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of Pakistan's Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Materials and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act (Act No.V) 2004, including the formation and functioning of Strategic Export Control Division. As requested in the Note Verbale, the Note Verbale and the enclosure thereto are circulated for the information of Member States

  2. Inquiry relating to safety due to modification of usage of nuclear fuel material (establishment of waste safety testing facility) in Tokai Laboratory, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    Application was made to the director of the Science and Technology Agency (STA) for the license relating to the modification of usage of nuclear fuel material (the establishment of waste safety testing facility) from the director of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute on November 30, 1978. After passing through the safety evaluation in the Nuclear Safety Bureau of STA, inquiry was conducted to the head of the Atomic Energy Safety Commission (AESC) on June 6, 1979, from the director of the STA. The head of AESC directed to conduct the safety examination to the head of the Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Specialist Committee on June 7, 1979. The content of the modification of usage of nuclear fuel material is the establishment of waste safety testing facility to study and test the safety relating to the treatment and disposal of high level radioactive liquid wastes due to the reprocessing of spent fuel. As for the results of the safety examination, the siting of the waste safety testing facility which is located in the Tokai Laboratory, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), and the test plan of the glass solidification of high level radioactive liquid are presented as the outline of the study plan. The building, main equipments including six cells, the isolation room and the glove box, the storage, and the disposal facilities for gas, liquid and solid wastes are explained as the outline of the facilities. Concerning the items from the viewpoint of safety, aseismatic design, slightly vacuum operation, shielding, decay heat removal, fire protection, explosion protection, criticality management, radiation management and environmental effect were evaluated, and the safety was confirmed. (Nakai, Y.)

  3. Safeguarding nuclear weapon: Usable materials in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cochran, T.

    1998-01-01

    Both the United States and Russia are retaining as strategic reserves more plutonium and HEU for potential reuse as weapons, than is legitimately needed. Both have engaged in discussions and have programs in various stages of development to dispose of excess plutonium and HEU. These fissile material disposition programs will take decades to complete. In the interim there will be, as there is now, hundreds of tons of separated weapon-usable fissile material stored in tens of thousands of transportable canisters, each containing from a few to several tons of kgs of weapon-usable fissile material. This material must be secured against theft and unauthorized use. To have high confidence that the material is secure, one must establish criteria against which the adequacy of the protective systems can be judged. For example, one finds such criteria in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) regulations for the protection of special nuclear materials

  4. Bioterrorism: toxins as weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Peter D

    2012-04-01

    The potential for biological weapons to be used in terrorism is a real possibility. Biological weapons include infectious agents and toxins. Toxins are poisons produced by living organisms. Toxins relevant to bioterrorism include ricin, botulinum, Clostridium perfrigens epsilson toxin, conotoxins, shigatoxins, saxitoxins, tetrodotoxins, mycotoxins, and nicotine. Toxins have properties of biological and chemical weapons. Unlike pathogens, toxins do not produce an infection. Ricin causes multiorgan toxicity by blocking protein synthesis. Botulinum blocks acetylcholine in the peripheral nervous system leading to muscle paralysis. Epsilon toxin damages cell membranes. Conotoxins block potassium and sodium channels in neurons. Shigatoxins inhibit protein synthesis and induce apoptosis. Saxitoxin and tetrodotoxin inhibit sodium channels in neurons. Mycotoxins include aflatoxins and trichothecenes. Aflatoxins are carcinogens. Trichothecenes inhibit protein and nucleic acid synthesis. Nicotine produces numerous nicotinic effects in the nervous system.

  5. Weapons and hope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dyson, F.

    1984-01-01

    The British-born physicist presents a full-blown critique of US weapons policy. His careful evaluation of opposing views leads him to endorse a live-and-let-live concept of arms control, which would reject both assured destruction and first use of nuclear weapons in favor of abolishing them. Dyson's faith in the humane progress of military technology and his tolerance of dangerous conventional weapons will not please dovish readers, while his denunciation of military idolatry and his support of a nuclear freeze will disappoint some hawks. Along with moving personal memories of war and pacifism, the most original sections of the book are the author's insightful comments about the Soviet Union and the issue of verification

  6. The Text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977 between Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1978-03-15

    The text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between Japan and the Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced for the information of all Members.

  7. Agreement of 8 January 1992 between the Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-08-01

    The document reproduces the text of an agreement by exchange of letters with Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1997 and entered into force on that date

  8. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-08-01

    The document reproduces the text of an agreement by exchange of letters with Belize in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1997 and entered into force on that date

  9. Agreement of 2 February 1990 between Saint Lucia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-10-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Exchange of Letters of 6 November 1995 and 24 April 1996 with Saint Lucia in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean ('the Tlatelolco Treaty'). The agreement reflected in the Exchange of Letters was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 1996

  10. The Text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977 between Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-03-01

    The text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between Japan and the Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced for the information of all Members

  11. Nuclear weapons in Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pierre, A.J.

    1984-01-01

    In this introduction to ''Nuclear Weapons in Europe'', the author summarized the views of two Americans and two Europeans, whose articles make up the volume. The introduction explains the different assumptions of the four authors before discussing their views on the military and political rationales for a nuclear force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the debate over battlefield nuclear weapons, conventional defense, and arms control proposals and talks. The four contributors whose views are analyzed are William G. Hyland, Lawrence D. Freeman, Paul C. Warnke, and Karstan D. Voight. The introduction notes that the agreements and differences do not fall strictly on American versus European dividing lines

  12. Beyond the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quinlan, M.

    2001-01-01

    Since the end of the cold war, many people called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. That this decision seems difficult to realize because of the world political environment. Meanwhile the reduction of the nuclear weapons costs and risks believes more than ever a challenge of the international relations and more particularly in the proliferation domain. In this perspective the proliferation fight strategies need to be studied with a special interest in the domain of the alternatives and the possibilities of synergy. (A.L.B.)

  13. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaughen, V.C.A.

    1983-01-01

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described

  14. Foreign trade legislation, war weapons control legislation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hucko, E.M.

    1993-01-01

    The volume contains, in addition to an introduction into the matter, the texts of the Foreign Trade Act (FTA), the War Weapons Control Act and all relevant ordinances. Foreign trade transactions of the Federal Republic of Germany are essentially, but not exclusively, governed by the FTA. They are strongly influenced by the legislation of the European Communities which in the form of directives are immediately effective here, and in the form of guidelines oblige the German lawgiver or ordinance giver to translate them into practice, mostly by appropriate modifications of the foreign trade ordinance, the import and export lists. It is not the war weapons which are the problem, but the so-called dual-use goods, namely articles, technologies and knowledge which, as a rule, serve civil purposes, which, however, may be used also to produce weapons, in particular ABC weapons or rockets. Nowadays we are concerned about several third-world states which are obsessed by the wish to build their own atomic bomb. (orig./HSCH) [de

  15. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  16. A nuclear-weapon-free world and true disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salvini, G.

    1999-01-01

    This preliminary note about is important to consider when discussing hopes of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. Without a serious effort to establish intelligent, powerful bodies to control and judge the behavior of the nations on Earth, whatever they future weapons may be, the objective to reach a nuclear-weapon-free world may even succeed, but it is not enough to stop wars and death. Even more than that: if taken alone, as the 'Great Way', it could prove negative, for it could slow down the general effort to achieve peace on out planet. A nuclear-weapon-free world is of course a very good idea but two points must be discussed: how to achieve the nuclear-weapon-free world; and what will happen afterwards. Some considerations on the second point are made

  17. Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An agreement by exchange of letters of 6 November 1995 and 17 November 2003 with the Republic of Panama in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. This Exchange of Letters constitutes an agreement confirming that: the Safeguards Agreement of 23 March 1984, concluded between the Republic of Panama and the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty), also satisfies the obligation of Panama under Article III of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA; the safeguards set forth in the Safeguards Agreement shall also apply, as regards Panama, in connection with the NPT; the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply as long as Panama is party to the NPT or the Tlatelolco Treaty or both. The agreement reflected in the Exchange of Letters was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 November 2003, and pursuant to its terms, entered into force on that date

  18. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-11-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Antigua and Barbuda to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  19. Agreement between the co-operative republic of Guyana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-12-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Guyana to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguard provisions of Part I.

  20. Agreement between the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-12-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Bahamas to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguard provisions of Part I.

  1. Agreement between the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-12-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Bahamas to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguard provisions of Part I

  2. Agreement of 4 November 1992 between the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Trinidad and Tobago to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities with its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  3. Agreement of 23 July 1996 between Grenada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-10-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Grenada to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory , under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

  4. Agreement between the co-operative republic of Guyana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-12-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Guyana to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguard provisions of Part I

  5. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-11-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Antigua and Barbuda to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

  6. Agreement of 14 August 1996 between the Government of Barbados and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-11-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Barbados to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

  7. Agreement of 23 July 1996 between Grenada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-10-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Grenada to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory , under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  8. Agreement of 14 August 1996 between the Government of Barbados and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-11-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Barbados to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  9. Psychological markers underlying murder weapon profile: a quantitative study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kamaluddin, M R; Othman, A; Ismail, K H; Mat Saat, G A

    2017-12-01

    The horrific nature of murder using different types of weapons has been an important focal point of many criminological studies. Weapons that are used in murders seem to play dominant roles in murder investigations as they may provide information leading to arrest. The established factors for weapon usage include environmental context, demography and availability of weapons. However, there is insufficient research attention on the psychological functioning of murderers for particular weapon usage. In light of this, the current study seeks to narrow this gap of information by identifying the influences of psychological traits on weapon usage among a sample of male murderers. The present cross-sectional study was conducted among 71 male murderers incarcerated in 11 prisons within Peninsular Malaysia. The selection of the sample was based on predetermined selection criteria using a purposive sampling method. A guided self-administered questionnaire comprising sociodemography variables and four Malay validated psychometric instruments: Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire-40-Cross-Culture, Self-control Scale, "How I Think" Questionnaire and Aggression Questionnaire; was used. Independent sample t-test was performed to establish the mean score differences of psychological traits between the murderers who used single and multiple weapons while Kruskal-Wallis tests were carried out to ascertain the differences between the specific types of weapons used among the murderers. Following this, one-way ANOVA was carried out to ascertain the psychological trait differences among the murderers according to the different sources of weapon. Results indicated specific psychological traits influenced the number(s), source(s) and type(s) of weapon used in committing murder. The findings have implications for the psychological profiling of unknown murderers within the Malaysian context.

  10. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-03-01

    The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  11. Does Britain need nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, C.R.; Pease, R.S.; Peierls, R.E.; Rotblat, J.

    1995-01-01

    This report from the British Pugwash Group follows up a detailed international study of the desirability and feasibility of a world free from nuclear weapons with an analysis of issues particular to British nuclear weapons and the associated defense policies. United Kingdom nuclear weapons are reviewed historically, as are the nuclear weapons policies of other countries. A critique of present government policy is presented, with alternative uses for nuclear weapons in the post-Cold war world. The document concludes with a summary of the text and suggests how a British government could move towards global nuclear disarmament. (UK)

  12. Agreement of 2 February 1990 between Saint Lucia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-05-01

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Saint Lucia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activity within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part 1

  13. Agreement of 25 February 1992 between the government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-07-01

    The document contains two parts. The first one stipulates the agreement of the Syrian Arab Republic to accept Safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  14. Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

  16. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

  17. Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-25

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

  18. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-25

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-25

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

  20. Agreement between the Republic of San Marino and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of San Marino and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Agreement was signed in Vienna on 3 March 1995 and in San Marino on 7 September 1998. It entered into force on 15 September 1998. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  1. Agreement of 30 March 1996 between the People`s Democratic Republic of Algeria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-01-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Algeria to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

  2. Protocol additional to the agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-02-09

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement (INFCIRC/217) concluded between Australia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of the Additional Protocol was authorized by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997 and signed in Vienna on the same date. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 12 December 1997.

  3. Agreement of 2 October 1989 between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-03-01

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Viet Nam to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  4. Agreement of 13 June 1996 between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-10-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Principality of Monaco to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  5. Agreement of 13 June 1996 between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-10-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Principality of Monaco to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

  6. Protocol additional to the agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement (INFCIRC/217) concluded between Australia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of the Additional Protocol was authorized by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997 and signed in Vienna on the same date. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 12 December 1997

  7. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-08-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/258) concluded between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1998 and it entered into force on 28 july 1998

  8. Agreement of 30 March 1996 between the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Algeria to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  9. Agreement of 28 March 1991 between the Government of Solomon Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    The document contains two parts. The first one stipulates the agreement of Solomon Islands to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part two specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  10. Agreement of 3 August 1992 between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-09-01

    The document contains two parts. The first one stipulates the agreement of Malawi to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  11. Agreement of 15 March 1991 between the Republic of Tuvalu and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-05-01

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Tuvalu to accept safeguards on all sources or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory under his jurisdiction or carried on under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  12. Agreement of 16 September 1991 between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-10-01

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of South Africa to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  13. Is there any future for nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heisbourg, F.

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear weapons occupy a paradoxal place both in the collective imagination and in the historical reality: on the one hand everybody dreads the apocalypse horror, and on the other hand, dissuasion appears as an unchanging and quite comfortable situation. However, the world has become multipolar in this domain as well. The geopolitical map is reconstructing. Doctrinal revisions, initiatives against nuclear weapons proliferation, and nuclear disarmament measures are now on the agenda. The best foreign and French experts examine for the first time the consequences of these evolutions. They analyse in particular the split up risks and the potential consequences of a nuclear conflict in regions where atomic arms have become a key-component of the strategic landscape: Middle-Est, Far-East, Southern Asia. The choices France and its allies will have to face are examined as well. (J.S.)

  14. Statement to Conference for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World, 12 October 2011, Astana, Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amano, Y.

    2011-01-01

    Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and underscores the principles of the NPT. By constraining further development of nuclear weapons, these measures to bring nuclear tests to a halt and to bring the test sites to closure are important steps towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Recently, Kazakhstan has offered to provide a location for an IAEA low enriched uranium bank. I am grateful to the Government of Kazakhstan for its offer. Ensuring that nuclear science and technology are used exclusively for peaceful purposes is the basic pillar upon which the IAEA was established more than five decades ago. A central Agency function is to verify that States are fully complying with their non-proliferation obligations and to confirm that nuclear material is being used for peaceful purposes. This is our main contribution to achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. Non-Nuclear-Weapon States party to the NPT are required to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, under which we conduct regular inspections of their nuclear material and activities. The additional protocol to these safeguards agreements, greatly enhances the IAEA's verification capability by giving us expanded access to information and to relevant locations. It enables us to provide credible assurance not only about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material - that is, material about which a country has notified us - but also about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Such credible assurances are highly effective tools of international and regional confidence building. They can contribute decisively to forestalling the spread of threat perceptions and thus to reducing the risk of the further spread of nuclear weapons. So far, 110 countries have brought additional protocols into force. Last year, at the Nagasaki Peace Ceremony marking the 65 anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, I made my own Nagasaki Commitment to work for a world free of

  15. A year-by-year record of 236-U/238-U in coral as a step towards establishing 236-U from nuclear weapons testing fall-out as oceanic tracer

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Winkler, Stephan; Steier, Peter [University of Vienna, Faculty of Physics, Vienna (Austria); Carilli, Jessica [Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Lucas Heights (Australia)

    2012-07-01

    Since uranium is known to behave conservatively in ocean waters, 236-U has great potential in application as oceanic tracer. 236-U (t1/2=23.4 Ma) was introduced into the oceans by atmospheric nuclear weapon testing with amount estimates ranging from 700 kg to 1500 kg. Thus a resulting initial average 236-U/238-U ratio of at least 5e-9 is expected for an oceanic mixed layer depth of 100 m. This ratio is already higher than the natural pre-nuclear background, which is expected to be at 10e-14 levels. Even the elevated ratios of global stratospheric fall-out are beyond the capabilities of ICPMS and TIMS methods. However, the exceptional sensitivity and ultra-low background for 236-U of the Vienna Environmental Research Accelerator's Accelerator Mass Spectrometry system allows us to measure down to 10-13 detection limits. We present a year-by-year record of 236-U/238-U for a Caribbean coral core covering years 1944 to 2006, thus allowing to us put constraints on the oceanic input of 236-U by atmospheric testing. Moreover modeling of the results also demonstrates the capabilities of 236-U as oceanic tracer.

  16. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.; Journe, V.

    2010-01-01

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  17. Imprecise Probability Methods for Weapons UQ

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Picard, Richard Roy [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Vander Wiel, Scott Alan [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-05-13

    Building on recent work in uncertainty quanti cation, we examine the use of imprecise probability methods to better characterize expert knowledge and to improve on misleading aspects of Bayesian analysis with informative prior distributions. Quantitative approaches to incorporate uncertainties in weapons certi cation are subject to rigorous external peer review, and in this regard, certain imprecise probability methods are well established in the literature and attractive. These methods are illustrated using experimental data from LANL detonator impact testing.

  18. Dangerous deterrent: nuclear weapons proliferation and conflict in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paul Kapur, S.

    2008-01-01

    This book discusses the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan and its effect on security of the South Asian region. The author uses quantitative analysis to establish the relationship between nuclearization and conventional stability in the region between 1971 and 2002. He shows a positive correlation between nuclear proliferation and conventional instability during these three decades. Thus, this study affirms that nuclear weapons have failed to prevent conflict in South Asia. In fact, they have escalated tensions

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of the Czech Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of the Czech Republic [es

  20. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/226) concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998, and signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998. Pending entry into force, the Protocol is being applied provisionally as from the date of signature, i.e. 12 June 1998

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Armenia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997, and it will enter into force on the date the Agency receives written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Pending entry into force, this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature, i.e., 29 September 1997

  2. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-25

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/226) concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998, and signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998. Pending entry into force, the Protocol is being applied provisionally as from the date of signature, i.e. 12 June 1998

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-12-24

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Armenia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997, and it will enter into force on the date the Agency receives written notification that Armenia`s statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Pending entry into force, this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature, i.e., 29 September 1997

  4. Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-05-01

    The document contains two parts. The first one stipulates the agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provision of Part I

  5. Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-08-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  6. Agreement between the Republic of Namibia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Republic of Namibia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 17 March 1998, signed in Vienna on 19 March 1998, and entered into force on 15 April 1998

  7. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-12-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Czech Republic to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 9 September 1996, signed in Vienna on 18 September 1996 and entered into force on 11 September 1997

  8. Agreement of 8 January 1992 between the Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-04-01

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  9. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Transformation - A Sustainable Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Brien, K H

    2005-01-01

    Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this process of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start

  10. The morality of weapons research.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Forge, John

    2004-07-01

    I ask whether weapons research is ever justified. Weapons research is identified as the business of the engineer. It is argued that the engineer has responsibility for the uses to which the tools that he designs can be put, and that responsibility extends to the use of weapons. It is maintained that there are no inherently defensive weapons, and hence there is no such thing as 'defensive' weapons research. The issue then is what responsibilities as a professional the engineer has in regard to such research. An account is given to ground the injunction not to provide the means to harm as a duty for the engineers. This account is not, however, absolutist, and as such it allows justifiable exceptions. The answer to my question is thus not that weapons research is never justified but there must be a strong assurance that the results will only be used as a just means in a just cause.

  11. Nuclear power and weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greenwood, T.; Rathjens, C.W.; Ruina, J.

    1977-01-01

    The relationship between nuclear weapons development and nuclear electric power is examined. A brief description of nuclear weapons design is first given. This is then followed by a discussion of various aspects of nuclear power technology and of how they affect a nuclear weapon programme. These include fuel cycles, chemical reprocessing of spent fuel, uranium enrichment, and the control of dissemination of nuclear technology. In conclusion there is a discussion of possible political and institutional controls for limiting nuclear proliferation. (U.K.)

  12. Standards for transport and storage components established by The Atomic Energy Society of Japan and The Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirose, M.; Aritomi, M.; Saegusa, T.; Hayashi, T.; Takeda, T.; Onishi, K.; Kawakami, K.

    2004-01-01

    Since June 1997 the standards/specifications and inspection/certification of various products in Japan have been reviewed by Ministries and Agencies, with the aim of reducing direct government intervention to a necessary minimum and creating a free and fair socio-economic system that is fully opened to the international community and based on the rules of self-responsibility and market principles. Reflecting this policy the administrative regulations which prescribe technical standards as specific requirements have been revised by degrees into performance prescriptions. Detailed provisions in ordinances and notices have been abolished gradually to utilize voluntary standards and rules. In the nuclear energy field voluntary standards are being developed to make up statutory performance requirements by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) and the Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers (JSME) together with other organizations such as the Japan Electric Association, the Thermal and Nuclear Power Engineering Society. These voluntary standards and rules by these organizations have been established in order to maintain openness, transparency, fairness, professionalism and promptness and to promote development and globalization

  13. Ultrasound-assisted extraction technique for establishing selenium contents in breast cancer biopsies by Zeeman-electrothermal atomic absorption spectrometry using multi-injection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lavilla, I.; Mosquera, A.; Millos, J.; Cameselle, J.; Bendicho, C.

    2006-01-01

    A solid-liquid extraction method is developed to establish the contents of selenium in breast cancer biopsies. The method is based on the ultrasound-assisted extraction of selenium from pretreated biopsies prior to Se determination by atomic absorption spectrometry with longitudinal-Zeeman background correction. Fifty-one breast biopsies were collected from the Cies Hospital (Vigo, Spain), 32 of which correspond to tumor tissue and 19 to normal tissue (parenchyma). Difficulties arising from the samples analyzed, i.e. small samples mass (50-100 mg), extremely low Se contents and sample texture modification including tissue hardening due to formaldehyde preservation are addressed and overcome. High intensity sonication using a probe together with addition of hydrogen peroxide succeeded in completely extracting Se from biopsies. The multiple injection technique was useful to tackle the low Se contents present in some biopsies. The detection limit was 25 ng g -1 of Se and the precision, expressed as relative standard deviation, was less than 10%. Se contents ranged from 0.08 to 0.4 μg g -1 for parenchyma samples and from 0.09 to 0.8 μg g -1 for tumor samples. In general, Se levels in tumor biopsies were higher as compared with the adjacent normal tissue in 19 patients by a factor of up to 6. Analytical data confirmed Se accumulation in the breast tumors

  14. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-03-01

    The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one.

  15. Political accountability and autonomous weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    James Igoe Walsh

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available Autonomous weapons would have the capacity to select and attack targets without direct human input. One important objection to the introduction of such weapons is that they will make it more difficult to identify and hold accountable those responsible for undesirable outcomes such as mission failures and civilian casualties. I hypothesize that individuals can modify their attribution of responsibility in predicable ways to accommodate this new technology. The results of a survey experiment are consistent with this; subjects continue to find responsible and hold accountable political and military leaders when autonomous weapons are used, but also attribute responsibility to the designers and programmers of such weapons.

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2004-06-10

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999 and signed in Vienna on 21 June 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Korea written notification that the Republic of Korea's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999 and signed in Vienna on 21 June 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Korea written notification that the Republic of Korea's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  18. Nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rezendes, V.S.

    1991-03-01

    In this book, GAO characterizes DOE's January 1991 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study as a starting point for reaching agreement on solutions to many of the complex's safety and environmental problems. Key decisions still need to be made about the size of the complex, where to relocate plutonium operations, what technologies to use for new tritium production, and what to do with excess plutonium. The total cost for reconfiguring and modernizing the complex is still uncertain, and some management issues remain unresolved. Congress faces a difficult task in making test decisions given the conflicting demands for scarce resources in a time of growing budget deficits and war in the Persian Gulf

  19. Nuclear weapons industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bertsch, K.A.; Shaw, L.S.

    1984-01-01

    This unique study was written specifically as a reference source for institutional investors concerned about the threat posed to their stock portfolios by the debate over nuclear arms production. The authors focus their analysis on the 26 leading companies in the field. The perspective is neutral and refreshing. Background information on strategic policy, arms control and disarmament, and the influence of the industry on defense policy and the economy is presented rationally. The study also discusses the economic significance of both the conversion from military to civilian production and nuclear freeze initiatives. An appendix contains a fact-filled guide to nuclear weapon systems

  20. From weapons to waste: The future of the nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wasserman Goodman, Sherri

    1992-01-01

    This paper examines how decision-making power has shifted within the nuclear weapons complex, from the federal government operating agency, in which power was originally vested by the Atomic Energy Act, to the states and to regulatory authorities. Additionally, when the original operating agency, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), was abolished in the 1970s, substantial decision-making power shifted from Washington to the field sites. This paper identifies the needs for future materials and weapons production, and recommends that restart of old plants be abandoned as no longer militarily necessary. Instead, the U. S. should take advantage of what may be a unique opportunity to 'leapfrog' to new, smaller, technologically-advanced plants that will meet the needs of the nuclear arsenal in the post-Cold War world. This paper then looks at the current state of DOE's environmental restoration/waste management program, and the technological, legal and political problems it faces in trying to accomplish its mission of cleaning up all nuclear weapons sites. This paper argues that the U. S. government no longer has the exclusive authority to make and carry out critical decisions affecting a cleanup program that will cost the U. S. over $200 billion over the next 20-40 years. Moreover, there are competing theories about the principles that should guide the cleanup program. Finally, the author examines alternative futures for the DOE'S environmental restoration/waste management program. (author)

  1. Effects of the use of ABC weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karl-Rueckert, E.

    1980-01-01

    The effects of ABC-weapons are presented. The various classes of chemical weapons and their effects are discussed. It is pointed out that there is hardly a means of protection against these weapons. (MG) [de

  2. Arms Control: US and International efforts to ban biological weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1992-12-01

    The Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, the treaty that bans the development, production, and stockpiling and acquisition of biological weapons was opened for signature in 1972 and came into force in 1975 after being ratified by 22 governments, including the depository nations of the USA, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union. In support of the Convention, the USA later established export controls on items used to make biological weapons. Further, in accordance with the 1990 President`s Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, actions were taken to redefine and expand US export controls, as well as to encourage multilateral controls through the Australia Group. Thus far, the Convention has not been effective in stopping the development of biological weapons. The principal findings as to the reasons of the failures of the Convention are found to be: the Convention lacks universality, compliance measures are effective, advantage of verification may outweigh disadvantages. Recommendations for mitigating these failures are outlined in this report.

  3. The use of neutron scattering in nuclear weapons research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Juzaitis, R.J.

    1995-01-01

    We had a weapons science breakout session last week. Although it would have been better to hold it closer in time to this workshop, I think that it was very valuable. it may have been less of a 'short-sleeve' workshop environment than we would have liked, but as the first time two communities-the weapons community and the neutron scattering community- got together, it was a wonderful opportunity to transfer information during the 24 presentations that were made. This report contains discussions on the fundamental analysis of documentation of the enduring stockpile; LANSCE's contribution to weapons; spallation is critical to understanding; weapons safety assessments; applied nuclear physics requires cross section information; fission models need refinement; and establishing teams on collaborative projects

  4. Agreement between the government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-02-19

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of Republic of Estonia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 24 February 1992, signed in Vienna on 18 November 1997 and in Tallinn on 24 November 1997, and entered into force on 24 November 1997.

  5. Agreement between the government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of Republic of Estonia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 24 February 1992, signed in Vienna on 18 November 1997 and in Tallinn on 24 November 1997, and entered into force on 24 November 1997

  6. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-12-01

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Czech Republic to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 9 September 1996, signed in Vienna on 18 September 1996 and entered into force on 11 September 1997.

  7. After fifty years of the nuclear age: Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or elimination of them?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sugie, Ei-Ichi

    1997-01-01

    Ever since the first test of the atomic bomb and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, mankind lived with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were inevitably connected with the Cold War, with its end new opportunity has come concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Steps are to be undertaken in order to eliminate the nuclear weapons. First, would be the prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. By excluding the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, the world could be closer to nuclear disarmament than ever. The prohibition of the use of some type of weapons could be a breakthrough towards the elimination of such weapons. While the negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons would be difficult, as were those to ban chemical weapons, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons would eventually lead to their elimination. During the Cold War, the imminent goal of disarmament was to stop the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. But in the post-Cold War era an opportunity has developed for further steps towards nuclear disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons

  8. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Kerr, Paul; Nikitin, Mary B

    2007-01-01

    Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles...

  9. Rays as weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vogel, H.

    2007-01-01

    Purpose: Ionizing radiation is being regarded as life threatening. Therefore, accidents in nuclear power plants are considered equal threatening as nuclear bomb explosions, and attacks with dirty bombs are thought as dangerous as nuclear weapon explosions. However, there are differences between a nuclear bomb explosion, the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and an attack with a dirty bomb. It is intended to point them out. Method: The processes are described, which damage in a nuclear bomb explosion, in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and in an attack with a dirty bomb. Their effects are compared with each other, i.e. explosion, heat, shock wave (blast), ionizing radiation, and fallout. Results: In the center of the explosion of a nuclear bomb, the temperature rises to 100 Mio deg.C, this induces damaging heat radiation and shock wave. In the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant and in the conventional explosion of a dirty bomb, the temperature may rise up to 3000 deg. C, heat radiation and blast are limited to a short distance. In nuclear power plants, explosions due to oxyhydrogen gas or steam may occur. In nuclear explosions the dispersed radioactive material (fall out) consists mainly of isotopes with short half-life, in nuclear power plants and in dirty bomb attacks with longer half-life. The amount of fall out is comparable in nuclear bomb explosions with that in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, it is smaller in attacks with dirty bombs. An explosion in a nuclear power plant even in the largest imaginable accident is not a nuclear explosion. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were 200,000 victims nearly all by heat and blast, some 300 died by ionizing radiation. In Chernobyl, there have been less than 100 victims due to ionizing radiation up till now. A dirty bomb kills possibly with the explosion of conventional explosive, the dispersed radioactive material may damage

  10. Open-area concealed-weapon detection system

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pati, P.; Mather, P.

    2011-06-01

    Concealed Weapon Detection (CWD) has become a significant challenge to present day security needs; individuals carrying weapons into airplanes, schools, and secured establishments are threat to public security. Although controlled screening, of people for concealed weapons, has been employed in many establishments, procedures and equipment are designed to work in restricted environments like airport passport control, military checkpoints, hospitals, school and university entrance. Furthermore, screening systems do not effectively decipher between threat and non-threat metal objects, thus leading to high rate of false alarms which can become a liability to daily operational needs of establishments. Therefore, the design and development of a new CWD system to operate in a large open area environment with large numbers of people reduced incidences of false alarms and increased location accuracy is essential.

  11. Nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peach, J.D.

    1991-02-01

    In this paper, GAO provides its views on DOE's January 1991 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study. GAO believes that DOE's new reconfiguration study provides a starting point for reaching agreement on solutions to many of the complex's problems. Key decisions still need to be made about the size of the complex, where to relocate plutonium operations, what technologies should be used for new tritium production, and what to do with excess plutonium. The total cost for reconfiguring and modernizing is still uncertain and some management issues remain unresolved. Congress faces a difficult task in making these decisions given the conflicting demands for scare resources in a time of growing budget deficits and war in the Persian Gulf

  12. Weapon of the Weak?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Amber, Van der Graaf; Otjes, Simon; Rasmussen, Anne

    2016-01-01

    able to reinvigorate democratic processes by changing inequalities in the landscape of political representation among interest groups. The level of resources held by the interest groups acts as the single most consistent predictor of both the range and volume of their social media use. Interest groups......Social media have the potential to offset existing inequalities in representation among interest groups and act as a ‘weapon of the weak’ by providing a technological infrastructure that allows even groups with limited resources to create content and interact across the globe. We expand...... on the sparse existing literature on interest groups and social media in a quantitative, structural analysis of both the range and volume of social media use examining a data set of groups active in European Union lobbying. Despite the positive expectations, we find limited evidence that social media have been...

  13. Verification of Chemical Weapons Destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.

    2010-01-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention is the only multilateral treaty that bans completely an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under international verification arrangements. Possessor States, i.e. those that have chemical weapons stockpiles at the time of becoming party to the CWC, commit to destroying these. All States undertake never to acquire chemical weapons and not to help other States acquire such weapons. The CWC foresees time-bound chemical disarmament. The deadlines for destruction for early entrants to the CWC are provided in the treaty. For late entrants, the Conference of States Parties intervenes to set destruction deadlines. One of the unique features of the CWC is thus the regime for verifying destruction of chemical weapons. But how can you design a system for verification at military sites, while protecting military restricted information? What degree of assurance is considered sufficient in such circumstances? How do you divide the verification costs? How do you deal with production capability and initial declarations of existing stockpiles? The founders of the CWC had to address these and other challenges in designing the treaty. Further refinement of the verification system has followed since the treaty opened for signature in 1993 and since inspection work was initiated following entry-into-force of the treaty in 1997. Most of this work concerns destruction at the two large possessor States, Russia and the United States. Perhaps some of the lessons learned from the OPCW experience may be instructive in a future verification regime for nuclear weapons. (author)

  14. Nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Asia Pacific region

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamada, Eiji

    1997-01-01

    The Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty decided on the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and adopted two documents 'principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament' and 'Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty'. In the former document, the Conference encourages the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the conviction that such zones will enhance global and regional peace and security. Besides the Rarotonga Treaty, ASEAN countries plan to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South-East Asia

  15. Verifying a nuclear weapon`s response to radiation environments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dean, F.F.; Barrett, W.H.

    1998-05-01

    The process described in the paper is being applied as part of the design verification of a replacement component designed for a nuclear weapon currently in the active stockpile. This process is an adaptation of the process successfully used in nuclear weapon development programs. The verification process concentrates on evaluating system response to radiation environments, verifying system performance during and after exposure to radiation environments, and assessing system survivability.

  16. Re-examining the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion: Concerning the Legality of Nuclear Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jasjit Singh

    2012-10-01

    Full Text Available The primary objections raised against total elimination of nuclear weapons are built around a few arguments mostly of non-technical nature.Nuclear weapons and the strategies for their use have resulted in the establishment of a vicious circle within which the international community is trapped.The argument that the world will be unsafe without nuclear weapons is only meant to further the narrow self-interest of the nuclear weapon states and their allies.The World Court’s far-reaching 1996 advisory opinion concluded that almost any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would violate international humanitarian law and law applicable in armed conflict, undermining most claims of nuclear weapon states regarding the legitimacy of possession, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The next logical step would be an initiative for a nuclear convention banning the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons in Asia and the adjoining oceans. But as long as the dominant elites in society and the nation-state believe in the utility of nuclear weapons for national security or as the currency of power, abolition of nuclear weapons will remain a mirage.

  17. Youths Carrying a Weapon or Using a Weapon in a Fight: What Makes the Difference?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-Andre; Berchtold, Andre; Akre, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were…

  18. Non-Lethal Chemical Weapons

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Weilacher, Lester A

    2003-01-01

    Little more than a month after terrorists took control of four passenger aircraft in the United States and unleashed the horror of 9/11, 50 Chechen terrorists armed with automatic weapons and carrying...

  19. USAF Weapon System Evaluation Program

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1999-01-01

    During this task period, Schafer Corporation provided engineering services and analysis to the USAF at Eglin AFB, Florida in direct support of the USAF Air-to-Surface Weapon System Evaluation Program (WSEP...

  20. Islamic State and Chemical Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lukáš Rafay

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available The article deals with topic of Islamic State and chemical weapons. The issue is analysed in three dimensions: origin of used chemical weapons and possibility of independent production; known chemical attacks and tactical regularities in their execution; and traits of future chemical terrorist attacks. By providing a thorough examination of the problem, the article aims at predicting the future development of the group’s chemical program as well as describing any prospective chemical terrorist attacks in Europe

  1. The return of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Calvez, Jean-Yves

    2005-01-01

    Written after the 2005 NPT review conference, this article first recalls the early stages of nuclear proliferation: acquisition of nuclear weapons by Great-Britain, USSR, France and China, and creation of the NPT in 1970. The author briefly evokes some weaknesses and violations of this treaty: emergence of new nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, Israel) and of nuclear weapon programmes (Iran, North Korea). He outlines the lack of true rules to impede countries to develop nuclear weapons, and then states that the only solution seems to be a simple abolition of these weapons. This option is notably supported by the Catholic Church as outlined and recalled here. The author discusses the situation of this abolition option, and notices that, even though NPT members committed themselves on this way, some also decided to develop new and smaller weapons. Then, it becomes always more difficult to persuade countries not to possess these weapons. The author finally discusses the issues of terrorism threat in relationship to the miniaturisation process, and regrets the lack of commitment in an abolition process

  2. International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Challenge and response

    Science.gov (United States)

    Spector, Leonard S.

    2017-11-01

    This article provides a critical review of the nuclear accounting and inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), known as "IAEA safeguards." The article focuses on the multiple challenges the Agency confronts in verifying that all nuclear activities in the countries under its safeguards system are being pursued for exclusively peaceful purposes. The principal challenges noted are those posed by: undeclared facilities, the development of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, illicit procurement activities, denial of inspector access, difficulties in verifying absence of weaponization activities, and difficulties in establishing that all nuclear-relevant activities in a state are peaceful. The article is in the form of annotated PowerPoint briefing slides.

  3. You've asked us about nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robins, S.

    1987-11-01

    Judging from its name alone, the Atomic Energy Control Board would seem a logical place to get information on nuclear weapons. If we are involved in the control of atomic energy, we must know something about its military uses. In actual fact, however, our regulatory activities are restricted to the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and our safeguards - an international audit system to discourage the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment from peaceful applications to the production of explosive devices. Not being the best source of information on the subject of weapons, we have prepared this fact sheet to assist your research. Simply look for the topic heading that interests you, to find out where to go for more information. The publications listed under the various headings are available to the public free of charge, upon request. A bibliography of books and periodicals is also attached for your reference

  4. IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material in the Russian Federation and the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The Secretary of Energy of the United States, Spencer Abraham, Minister of the Russian Federation on Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, and Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, met in Vienna on 18 September 2001 to review progress on the Trilateral Initiative. The Initiative was launched in 1996 to develop a new IAEA verification system for weapon-origin material designated by the United States and the Russian Federation as released from their defence programmes. The removal of weapon-origin fissile material from the defence programmes of the Russian Federation and the United States is in furtherance of the commitment to disarmament undertaken by the two States pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA verification under this Initiative is intended to promote international confidence that fissile material made subject by either of the two States to Agency verification remains irreversibly removed from nuclear weapon programmes

  5. Safeguards for a nuclear weapon convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1999-01-01

    An NDT presupposes a fundamental commitment by all parties to its final objective and hence requires a high and sustained level of confidence amongst all states concerned. The appropriate format for an Nuclear Disarmament Treaty (NDT) would probably be a multilateral treaty open to all states. The treaty must necessarily include the five nuclear weapon states and a procedure would have to be found for securing the ratification of the threshold states without conferring upon them the status of nuclear weapon states. While the IAEA may well be able to carry out the safeguards tasks required by an NDT it would probably be necessary to establish a new international organization to verify the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The experience of UNSCOM and the IAEA in Iraq, and of the IAEA in the DPRK, have shown how difficult the verification of international obligations is in the absence of a commitment to disarm, while the experience of the INF and START treaties, and of the IAEA in South Africa have shown how much simpler it is when the parties concerned are fully committed to the process. Verifying and safeguarding an NDT would be largely an extrapolation of activities already carried out by the nuclear weapon states under the INF and START treaties and by the IAEA in the routine application of safeguards as well as in its less routine work in Iraq, South Africa and the DPRK. Both the verification and safeguarding tasks would be made very much easier if it were possible to bring down to a few hundred the number of nuclear warheads remaining in the hands of any avowed nuclear weapon state, and to conclude a cutoff convention. Experience is needed to show whether the additional safeguards authority accorded to the IAEA by 'programme 93+2' will enable it to effectively safeguard the facilities that would be decommissioned as a result of an NDT and those that would remain in operation to satisfy civilian needs. Subject to this rider and on condition that the IAEA

  6. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy

    Science.gov (United States)

    2007-01-03

    December 23, 2006. P. A12. Many of Kim Jong-il’s luxury goods purchases have been in Europe. They include Mercedes Benz and BMW automobiles, expensive...small scale atomic bomb. Most believed that North Korea had not reached the technology level to test the prototype of a small nuclear warhead.1 The...and possibly other weapons technology to Iran. There are known divisions within the Chinese government and Communist Party over the issue of support

  7. Nuclear weapons proliferation problem: can we lead without leadership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stathakis, G.J.

    1977-01-01

    The immediate problem facing us with respect to proliferation and nuclear power involves reprocessing and the availability of plutonium from reprocessing plants. One solution supported by the Atomic Industrial Forum is that reprocessing centers be restricted to locations in those industrial nations already having weapons capability and that the energy of the reprocessed plutonium be returned to the user nation in the form of low enriched uranium. Thus, the plutonium would remain where it would not add to problems of proliferation

  8. Hitlers' bomb. The secret story of Germanys' nuclear weapon tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karlsch, R.

    2005-01-01

    This book reveals a sensation: Under supervision of the SS German scientists tested 1944/45 nuclear bombs on Ruegen and in Thuringia. During this period several hundred prisoners of war and prisoners died. Besides proofs for nuclear weapon testing the author also found a draft for a patent on plutonium bombs and discovered the first functioning German atom reactor in the environs of Berlin. (GL) [de

  9. Summary of fifty years research on the late effects of atomic bomb irradiation in Japan with special reference to possible similar late effects by nuclear weapons tests in Semipalatinsk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tomonaga, M.

    2000-01-01

    The investigation clearly demonstrated statistically significant increases of risks for acute myeloid and lymphoid leukemia, chronic myeloid leukemia, and solid tumors including thyroid cancer, gastrointestinal cancers, lung cancer, hepatoma and skin cancer. The excess relative risks was highest for acute lymphoid leukemia, followed by chronic myeloid leukemia, acute myeloid leukemia, and solid cancer. The increased risk for leukemia has almost completely disappeared after 50 years, whereas the risks for cancers are apparently persisting giving a great threat to general health of atomic bomb survivors. These observations can be directly referred to the possible late effects of the acute and chronic exposure to irradiation caused by nuclear tests in Semipalatinsk region. Recent dose-estimation efforts by Kazakhstan, US and Japanese scientists indicated that there had been Hiroshima/Nagasaki atomic bomb equivalent high-dose exposure in some residents around the test sites. Some researchers suggested increased risks for malignant diseases such as leukemia and cancers. Unfortunately there was a lack of high-quality statistics in the Semipalatinsk survey, providing a considerable difficulty in interpreting the estimated incidences of such malignant diseases

  10. Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Agreement by exchange of letters of 6 November 1995 and 25 June 1996 with the Republic of Chile in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The document reproduces the Agreement by exchange of letters with the Republic of Chile on Safeguards Agreement of 5 April 1995 concluded between Chile and the IAEA, in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty). The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 1996. The texts of letters of 6 November 1995 and 25 June 1996 are also included

  11. UFOs and nukes. Extraordinary encounters at nuclear weapons sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hastings, Robert L.

    2015-01-01

    Everyone knows about the reported recovery of a crashed alien spaceship near Roswell, New Mexico in July 1947. However, most people are unaware that, at the time of the incident, Roswell Army Airfield was home to the world's only atomic bomber squadron, the 509th Bomb Group. Was this merely a coincidence? During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built thousands of the far more destructive hydrogen bombs, some of them a thousand times as destructive as the first atomic bombs dropped on Japan. If the nuclear standoff between the superpowers had erupted into World War III, human civilization - and perhaps the very survival of our species - would have been at risk. Did this ominous state of affairs come to the attention of outside observers? Was there a connection between the atomic bomber squadron based at Roswell and the reported crash of a UFO nearby? Did those who pilot the UFOs monitor the superpowers' nuclear arms race during the dangerous Cold War era? Do they scrutinize American and Russian weapons sites even now? UFOs and Nukes provides the startling and sometimes shocking answers to these questions. Veteran researcher Robert Hastings has investigated nuclear weapons-related UFO incidents for more than three decades and has interviewed more than 120 ex-US Air Force personnel, from former Airmen to retired Colonels, who witnessed extraordinary UFO encounters at nuclear weapons sites. Their amazing stories are presented here.

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Estonia and the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    Article 17.a. of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Additional Protocol shall come into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the Community and the Signatory States written notification that their respective requirements for entry into force have been met. Article 23(a) of INFCIRC/193 provides the means for non-signatory States of the Additional Protocol to express their consent to be bound by the Additional Protocol

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Estonia and the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    Article 17.a. of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Additional Protocol shall come into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the Community and the Signatory States written notification that their respective requirements for entry into force have been met. Article 23(a) of INFCIRC/193 provides the means for non-signatory States of the Additional Protocol to express their consent to be bound by the Additional Protocol [es

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Slovenia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    Article 17.a. of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Additional Protocol shall come into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the Community and the Signatory States written notification that their respective requirements for entry into force have been met. Article 23(a) of Inference/193 provides the means for non-signatory States of the Additional Protocol to express their consent to be bound by the Additional Protocol [es

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Slovenia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    Article 17.a. of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Additional Protocol shall come into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the Community and the Signatory States written notification that their respective requirements for entry into force have been met. Article 23(a) of INFCIRC/193 provides the means for non-signatory States of the Additional Protocol to express their consent to be bound by the Additional Protocol

  17. Environmental Restoration Strategic Plan. Remediating the nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-08-01

    With the end of the cold war, the US has a reduced need for nuclear weapons production. In response, the Department of Energy has redirected resources from weapons production to weapons dismantlement and environmental remediation. To this end, in November 1989, the US Department of Energy (DOE) established the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (renamed the Office of Environmental Management in 1994). It was created to bring under a central authority the management of radioactive and hazardous wastes at DOE sites and inactive or shut down facilities. The Environmental Restoration Program, a major component of DOE's Environmental Management Program, is responsible for the remediation and management of contaminated environmental media (e.g., soil, groundwater, sediments) and the decommissioning of facilities and structures at 130 sites in over 30 states and territories

  18. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL's Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents

  19. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1992-12-31

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL`s Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents.

  20. 2006, REMOTE SENSING AND GIS IN THE REMEDIATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTAMINATION IN AN URBAN LANDSCAPE

    Science.gov (United States)

    This presentation will document the use of historical imagery, GIS, photogrammetry and hyperspectral remote sensing in locating and removing chemical weapons such as Mustard Gas, Phosgene, Ricin, and Lewisite from the environment and establishing a risk assessment methodology for...

  1. What transformations in the international system are prerequisites for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsipis, K.

    1993-01-01

    The author reviews prerequisites for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons (NW), among which are: symmetry of NW possession; stopping the NW tests; establishment of a multinational nuclear deterrent force; common security regional arrangements aimed at denuclearization

  2. Implementation of a Cost-Accounting System for Visibility of Weapon Systems Life-Cycle Costs

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Ugone, Mary

    2001-01-01

    .... The DoD Acquisition Reform Goal 10 required DoD to define requirements and establish an implementation plan for a cost-accounting system that provides routine visibility into weapon system life-cycle...

  3. Civil nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-04-01

    The issue of whether civil nuclear programmes contribute to the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons has been discussed since civil programmes were first considered, and has always complicated public attitudes to civil nuclear energy. This paper seeks to define the extent to which there is such ''linkage''. It does not deal with the linkages that exist between nuclear weapons and other industries and activities - for example, those involved in weapons delivery systems -since these are not within the Uranium Institute's area of competence. Linkage concerns regarding civil nuclear programmes arise primarily over the possibility of their being used to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium for use in weapons. The technologies which can give rise directly to these materials are therefore ''sensitive'' in proliferation terms. Linkage may also arise through the relevant experience of the trained workforce. Such linkage is, however, limited by institutional, technical and economic factors. First, important institutional constraints on using a civil programme for military purposes exist in the form of a network of bilateral agreements and international treaties - most particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - and the international safeguards inspections. Secondly, without access to the technologies of enrichment or reprocessing, the fissile material needed for an explosive cannot be obtained from any plant or process used to produce electricity. Finally, establishing a civil programme - with equipment whose design is optimized for electricity production - in order to develop weapons is an expensive route compared to specialized facilities. (author)

  4. Atom Skimmers and Atom Lasers Utilizing Them

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hulet, Randall; Tollett, Jeff; Franke, Kurt; Moss, Steve; Sackett, Charles; Gerton, Jordan; Ghaffari, Bita; McAlexander, W.; Strecker, K.; Homan, D.

    2005-01-01

    Atom skimmers are devices that act as low-pass velocity filters for atoms in thermal atomic beams. An atom skimmer operating in conjunction with a suitable thermal atomic-beam source (e.g., an oven in which cesium is heated) can serve as a source of slow atoms for a magneto-optical trap or other apparatus in an atomic-physics experiment. Phenomena that are studied in such apparatuses include Bose-Einstein condensation of atomic gases, spectra of trapped atoms, and collisions of slowly moving atoms. An atom skimmer includes a curved, low-thermal-conduction tube that leads from the outlet of a thermal atomic-beam source to the inlet of a magneto-optical trap or other device in which the selected low-velocity atoms are to be used. Permanent rare-earth magnets are placed around the tube in a yoke of high-magnetic-permeability material to establish a quadrupole or octupole magnetic field leading from the source to the trap. The atoms are attracted to the locus of minimum magnetic-field intensity in the middle of the tube, and the gradient of the magnetic field provides centripetal force that guides the atoms around the curve along the axis of the tube. The threshold velocity for guiding is dictated by the gradient of the magnetic field and the radius of curvature of the tube. Atoms moving at lesser velocities are successfully guided; faster atoms strike the tube wall and are lost from the beam.

  5. The American atom: A documentary history of nuclear policies from the discovery of fission to the present

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, R.C.; Cantelon, P.L.

    1984-01-01

    In selecting these historical documents the authors have applied three general tests: first, does the document help tell the story of the development of American nuclear policy in a nontechnical way; second, is the source primary rather than secondary, written by an actor in the drama rather than by a member of the audience; third, does the document provide coverage of the major chapters in the story? The Manhattan Project was America's $2 billion secret project to build an atomic bomb. Many documents associated with the project have come to light only in recent years. In Section II they use the letters of J. Robert Oppenheimer and the recently declassified minutes of policy committees to tell the story of how the bomb was designed and built and how the decision was made to drop the first uranium and plutonium devices on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. How did a weapon of war become the key to a peacetime industry? In considering atomic energy after World War II, they focus in Section III on the legislative enabling acts that established the Atomic Energy Commission, the short-lived dream of international control of nuclear weapons under the Baruch Plan, and the ''atoms for peace'' program of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. By 1954 the highly classified work on nuclear weapons paralleled a new development of nuclear energy and power reactors. Knowledge was shared with both private industry and other countries. The fruits of this program are considered in the later section on nuclear power

  6. Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs Consistent Policies and Clear Processes to Address the Survivability of Weapon Systems Against Chemical and Biological Threats

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    2006-01-01

    DOD, joint, and military service weapon system acquisition policies inconsistently address and do not establish a clear process for considering and testing system chemical and biological survivability...

  7. Project Increase of infrastructure: 'Establishment of a laboratory for studies of pollutants in air, water and soil through atomic and nuclear techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aldape U, F.

    1993-10-01

    In this report there are the guidelines of this project as well as the goals, activities and costs. The general objectives were: 1. A laboratory that allows to analyze with efficiency samples of air, water and soil pollutants using atomic and nuclear origin techniques as PIXE (Proton Induced X-ray Emission, NRA (Nuclear Reaction Analysis) and RBS (Rutherford Backscattering) as well as auxiliary and/or complementary techniques. 2. To obtain indicators of the influence of the pollution of the Valley of Mexico about the ecology and the health of the inhabitants of Mexico City with perspectives of carrying out studies in other cities. 3. To develop an appropriate technology for the realization of those studies and to generate human resources in this area. (Author)

  8. Weapons engineering tritium facility overview

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Najera, Larry [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-20

    Materials provide an overview of the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) as introductory material for January 2011 visit to SRS. Purpose of the visit is to discuss Safety Basis, Conduct of Engineering, and Conduct of Operations. WETF general description and general GTS program capabilities are presented in an unclassified format.

  9. Biological effects of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frischauf, H.

    1983-01-01

    Prompt and delayed biological effects of nuclear weapons are discussed. The response to excess pressure on man is estimated, the acute radiation syndrome caused by different radiation doses and cancerogenous and genetic effects are described. Medical care after a nuclear explosion would be difficult and imperfect. (M.J.)

  10. Non-Lethal Weapons Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sheets Frequently Asked Questions Non-Lethal Weapons FAQs Active Denial System FAQs Human Electro -Muscular Incapacitation FAQs Related Links Business Opportunities Contact JNLWD Congressional Engagement , Wednesday, Sept 20, 2017. The Active Denial System, blunt-impact munitions, dazzling lasers, LRAD 100X

  11. Nuclear weapons complex: What went wrong?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, J.E.

    1991-01-01

    The nuclear weapons complex has generated significant volumes of radioactive wastes dating back to the 1940s. Such wastes included transuranic radioisotopes-for example, plutonium-generated as byproducts of the operations. Most of these wastes at the major disposal site were not classified in the same way nuclear wastes are classified today; the definitions of high- and low-level wastes have changed over time, and, in the case of the latter, different classes have been established that determine methods for disposal and handling. Waste disposal was not a high priority during World War II. After the war, however; resources were not committed to either waste-disposal research or the development of a national waste management policy. AEC's failure to develop a national policy on radioactive waste disposal is easier to understand than to excuse. The disposal problem parallels the chemical waste disposal situation, where there were no federal and few state laws regulating chemical waste disposal until 1976, following publicity about Love Canal. This same story has been repeated for radioactive and mixed wastes and facility safety at the nation's nuclear weapon sites

  12. Electrothermal atomic absorption spectrometry: contribution to the establishment of a rational method for the determination of trace elements in natural media

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoenig, Michel

    1990-01-01

    This research thesis aimed at extending, rationalising, simplifying and accelerating opportunities initially offered by electrothermal atomic absorption spectroscopy (ETAAS), more particularly in the marine, estuarine, rural or urban environment. Thus, this work mainly focused on the various aspects of this technique. The author first addresses the electrothermal atomisation process by presenting the atomiser, the platform, the sample insertion, ETAAS properties and use, the electrothermal program, and a comparison of ETAAS with other spectroscopic methods. She reports the study of spectral, ionisation and chemical perturbations, and of their correction. She introduces matrix and analyte modifiers, and presents refractory elements (effect of carbon surface, problems faced with molybdenum, barium, chromium and vanadium). She presents and discusses aspects related to sample preparation: problems related to trace dosing, methods of preparation of solutions, analyte concentration or separation, examples of applications to plants, to animal tissues, to geological materials, to soils and sediments, to atmospheric particles and matters in suspension in natural waters, and to blood and urine. She finally addresses the analysis of solid samples with a description of the apparatus and of the adopted methodology in the case of slurries [fr

  13. Bill authorizing the ratification of the protocol amending the Protocol on transitional provisions annexed to the Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    After an indication of the European Parliament composition, this text describes the transitional provisions adopted as the Lisbon Treaty did not come into effect before the European elections held in June 2009. The document also provides the protocol text signed by the Members States and which amended the protocol on transitional provisions annexed to the Treaty on the European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. The last part of the document discusses the administrative and legal consequences of this protocol. It also recalls the history of the negotiations and indicates the present status of signatures and ratifications

  14. First fusion neutrons from a thermonuclear weapon device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1976-01-01

    An account of the first observation of thermonuclear neutrons from a hydrogen weapon, the George shot, is presented. A personal narrative by the researchers J. Allred and L. Rosen includes such topics as the formation of the experimental team, description of the experimental technique, testing the experimental apparatus, testing the effects of a blast, a description of the test area, and the observation of neutrons from fusion. Excerpts are presented from several chapters of the Scientific Director's report on the atomic weapons tests of 1951. Also included is a brief description of the basic design of the hydrogen bomb, a recounting of subsequent developments, and short scientific biographies of the researchers. 21 figures, 2 tables

  15. Prerequisites for a nuclear weapons convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liebert, W.

    1999-01-01

    A Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) would prohibit the research, development, production, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and would serve their total elimination.' In this fashion it follows the model laid out by the biological and chemical weapons conventions. The NWC would encompass a few other treaties and while replacing them should learn from their experiences. The Nuclear Weapons Convention should at some given point in the future replace the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and so resolve its contradictions and shortcomings. The main objectives of an NWC Would be: reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the 'five' nuclear weapons powers down to zero within a set of fixed periods of time; elimination of stockpiles of weapons-usable materials and, where existent, nuclear warheads in de-facto nuclear weapon and threshold states; providing assurance that all states will retain their non-nuclear status forever

  16. Disposition of excess weapons plutonium from dismantled weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.J.

    1997-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War and the implementation of various nuclear arms reduction agreements, US and Russia have been actively dismantling tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. As a result,large quantities of fissile materials, including more than 100 (tonnes?) of weapons-grade Pu, have become excess to both countries' military needs. To meet nonproliferation goals and to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, this excess weapons Pu must be placed in secure storage and then, in timely manner, either used in nuclear reactors as fuel or discarded in geologic repositories as solid waste. This disposition in US and Russia must be accomplished in a safe, secure manner and as quickly as practical. Storage of this Pu is a prerequisite to any disposition process, but the length of storage time is unknown. Whether by use as fuel or discard as solid waste, disposition of that amount of Pu will require decades--and perhaps longer, if disposition operations encounter delays. Neither US nor Russia believes that long-term secure storage is a substitute for timely disposition of excess Pu, but long-term, safe, secure storage is a critical element of all excess Pu disposition activities

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Protocolo Adicional Al Acuerdo Entre La Republica De Ghana Y El Organismo Internacional De Energia Atomica Para La Aplicacion De Salvaguardias En Relacion Con El Tratado Sobre La No Proliferacion De Las Armas Nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-27

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [Spanish] Se transcribe en el presente documento, para informacion de todos los Estados Miembros, el texto del Protocolo adicional al Acuerdo de salvaguardias concertado entre la Republica de Ghana y el Organismo Internacional de Energia Atomica para la aplicacion de salvaguardias en relacion con el Tratado sobre la no proliferacion de las armas nucleares (TNP). El Protocolo adicional fue aprobado por la Junta de Gobernadores el 11 de junio de 1998 y firmado en Viena el 12 de junio de 1998.

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Texto del Acuerdo Concertado Entre Belgica, Dinamarca, La Republica Federal De Alemania, Irlanda, Italia, Luxemburgo, Los Paises Bajos, La Comunidad Europea De Energia Ato Mica Y El Organismo En Relacion Con El Tratado Sobre La No Proliferacion De Las Armas Nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-09-14

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [Spanish] Para informacion de todos los Estados Miembros, en el presente documento se transcribe el texto del Acuerdo concertado entre Belgica, Dinamarca, la Republica Federal de Alemania, Irlanda, Italia, Luxemburgo, los Paises Bajos, la Comunidad Europea de Energia Atomica y el Organismo en ejecucion de lo dispuesto en los parrafos 1 y 4 del articulo III del Tratado sobre la no proliferacion de las armas nucleares, asi como el del Protocolo que acompana a dicho Acuerdo.

  19. Responding To Changes in the Decommissioning Plans for Demolition of a Former Active Handling Building at The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Establishment Winfrith

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, N.; Parkinson, S.J.; Cornell, R.M.; Staples, A.T.

    2006-01-01

    The full decommissioning of the former Active Handling Building A59 at Winfrith in Dorset is being carried out by RWE NUKEM Limited under contract from the site owners and nuclear site licence holder, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). Following recent government changes, the United Kingdom's Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) has now set up contracts with UKAEA for delivery of the site clean-up programme. The building contains two heavily shielded suites of caves originally used to carry out remote examination of irradiated nuclear fuel elements together with other supporting facilities. The original intention was to demolish the caves ahead of the building but after detailed consideration it was concluded that demolition of the building in advance of the caves was more operationally effective. As a result, the original decommissioning plan had to be reworked to reflect these changes. The paper briefly explains how this situation arose and the means by which the problems experienced were overcome by a complete revision to the decommissioning programme. The updated plan has been adopted by UKAEA and work is now proceeding apace to clear the building of redundant items, to complete decontamination of all remaining areas and facilities and to carry out detailed radiological surveys to confirm that the building structure is clean and ready for demolition. Both cave lines have been completely decontaminated to low residual levels of activity and are essentially ready for controlled demolition. This paper describes some of the significant tasks undertaken during the past year with particular reference to the decommissioning techniques that gave the greatest success and the limitations of others originally considered. Some of these processes were aimed at minimising the volume of low level waste (LLW) generated by using standard off-the-shelf equipment to remove contamination from ∼5 Ton concrete blocks recovered from both cave line structures. A

  20. Effects of Directed Energy Weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    1994-01-01

    S. Feld, Ronald E. McNair, and Stephen R. Wilk, “The Physics of Karate,” Scientific American 240, 150 (April, 1979). 103. See Kittel (note 18...References 1. Figure 4–1 was adapted from Stephen Cheung and Frederic H. Levien, Microwaves Made Simple: Principles and Applications. (Dedham, MA: Artech...Physics (New York: MC- Graw Hill, 1965). Effects of Directed Energy Weapons 258 16. The physical meaning of this integral is that the propagation path

  1. Physical effects of thermonuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rotblat, J.

    1984-01-01

    The detonation of nuclear weapons gives rise to the following: blast wave; thermal wave; initial radiation (neutrons and gamma-rays); local radioactive fallout; global radioactive fallout; electromagnetic pulse; atmospheric disturbances. Some of these phenomena became known only as a result of the use or testing of bombs and are not as yet fully understood. They produce physical or biological effects or both, almost all of which are directly detrimental to human health. Some are likely to damage the environment

  2. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, with special reference to East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prawitz, J.

    1997-01-01

    The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zone, as it has developed from political deliberation since mid-1950s, today covers a spectrum of arrangements, geographically ranging from whole continent like Latin America to a corridor in central Europe, and functionally serving the purposes of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and avoiding nuclear war. Among the nuclear-weapon-free zones proposed but not established, one is now being negotiated and two are subject to investigations published in official reports. These are the proposed zones in ASEAN area, The Middle East and Nordic Europe

  3. Proposal for a resolution of the Council on establishing new regulations on chapter VI ''supply'' of the contract on the foundation of the European Atomic Community

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-01-01

    The nuclear fuel cycle industry of the Community has been fully developed new and established a structure which facilitates the application of marketing rules to the initiatives of the economic subjects with regard to nuclear materials supply. For this reason the Community is no longer dependent of interventionistic mechanisms like the monopoly and the confrontation of supply and demand. Still the market for nuclear materials shall be characterized by numerous interventions of public authorities also in the future. Indeed there is a risk that the nuclear materials trade, in the absence of a common discipline, is made subject to always more numerous one-sided fuctual constraints and also such constraints which are in complete opposition to the regular and impartial supply of all consumers of the Community as well as to the existence of the common nuclear market. The present proposal tries to cope with that risk. It aims at keeping nuclear materials supply compatible with the protection of common interests. (orig./HSCH) [de

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Latvia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    Article 17.a. of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Additional Protocol shall come into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the Community and the Signatory States written notification that their respective requirements for entry into force have been met. Article 23(a) of INFCIRC/193 provides the means for non-signatory States of the Additional Protocol to express their consent to be bound by the Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol which came into force for the above-mentioned original signatories (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Community and the Agency) on 30 April 2004, has also entered into force for Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The Agency received from the Republic of Latvia on 17 March 2008 and from the European Atomic Energy Community on 1 October 2008, notification that their respective requirements had been met. Accordingly, the Additional Protocol came into force for Latvia on 1 October 2008

  5. Civil nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-04-01

    The issue of whether civil nuclear programmes contribute to the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons has been discussed since civil programmes were first considered, and has always complicated public attitudes to civil nuclear energy. This paper seeks to define the extent to which there is such 'linkage'. Linkage concerns arise primarily over the possibility of their being used to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium for use in weapons. Linkage may also arise through the relevant experience of the trained workforce. Such linkage is, however, limited by institutional, technical and economic factors. First important institutional constraints on using a civil programme for military purposes exist in the form of a network of bilateral agreements and international treaties - most particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - and the international safeguards inspections. Secondly, without access to the technologies of enrichment or reprocessing, the fissile material needed for an explosive cannot be obtained from any plant or process used to produce electricity. Even enrichment and reprocessing, as normally used in electricity programmes, do not give rise to the materials used in weapons. Finally, establishing a civil programme - with equipment whose design is optimized for electricity production - in order to develop weapons is an expensive route compared to specialized facilities. (Author)

  6. Atomic Energy Control Act

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    This act provides for the establishment of the Atomic Energy Control Board. The board is responsible for the control and supervision of the development, application and use of atomic energy. The board is also considered necessary to enable Canada to participate effectively in measures of international control of atomic energy

  7. Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on behalf of the Board of Governors to all members of the Agency on the Non-Compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (INFCIRC/403) and on the Agency's inability to verify the non-diversion of material required to be safeguarded

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The document contains the following items: Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on behalf of the Board of Governors to all members of the Agency on the non-compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of Safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the Agency's inability to verify the non-diversion of material required to be safeguarded; resolution adopted by the Board on 1 April 1993 (Annex 1); Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Annex 2); resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 25 February 1993 (Annex 3); Communications from the Director General of the IAEA to the Minister for Atomic Energy of DPRK or from the Minister for Atomic Energy of the DPRK of the Director General of the IAEA (Annexes 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12); statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pyongyang, 12 March 1993 (Annex 7); resolution adopted by the Board on 18 March 1993 (Annex 10)

  8. The text of the Agreement between Turkey and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-02-01

    The full text of the agreement between Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  9. India's tryst with the atom: unfolding the nuclear story

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sabherwal, O.P.

    2004-01-01

    India's tryst with the atom is the story of a nuclear dream come true. All nuclear weapons states (as per NPT definition) launched their nuclear programmes by acquiring weapon capacity first, and later moved on to peaceful nuclear technologies. India took the reverse route: First building capacity for nuclear power generation and other areas of peaceful application, then having built a nuclear infrastructure and R and D base, moving on to nuclear weapon deterrence. Spectacular results followed. As this book notes: That India with minuscule investment in the weapon programme had jumped into the league of nuclear weapon powers-all of whom had years been throwing a good chunk of their fortune into nuclear weapon making was amazing

  10. For a convention for nuclear weapon elimination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-03-01

    This document contains two texts linked with the project of an international convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons (the text of this project has been sent to the UN General Secretary and is part of an international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, ICAN). These two texts are contributions presented in London at the Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-free World. The first one calls into question the deterrence principle and the idea of a nuclear weapon-based security. It calls for different forms of action to promote a nuclear weapon-free world. The second text stresses the role and the responsibility of states with nuclear weapons in nuclear disarmament and in the reinforcement of the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT)

  11. The nuclear policy and the way to atomic weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosa, L.P.

    1985-01-01

    The Brazilian Nuclear Policy that culminated with the polemical Brazil-West Germany Nuclear Agreement, in 1975, during the Geisel government, is one of the most evident and negative results of the military regime which was imposed to the nation during 21 years, from March 31, 1964 to March 15, 1985. This book presents the point of view of the author about the reasons that conducted to the bilateral agreement, the problems that occured during its execution, the possibility of damage to the environment, the so called 'parallel nuclear programme' developed by the army and the perspective of changes due to the 'New Republic' after 1985. (E.O.)

  12. Types and effects of radiation coming from nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Messerschmidt, O.

    1974-01-01

    The article shows which effects can be expected from an atomic explosion, such as neutron and gamma rays, pressure surge, thermal radiation and at which KT-values and at which distance from the centre influence the individual noxious substances is most pronounced. Combined effects and delayed effects are discussed. The results of the numerous studies on the effects of the A-bomb dropping on Hiroshima and Nagazaki are shown. Results of animal experiments are used for explanation. Furthermore, the effect of radioactive fallout is described. As an example, the author points out the Marshall islands on which radioactive fallout was noticed after a nuclear weapon test by the Americans. (MG) [de

  13. Defense Special Weapons Agency Advisory Panel on the Nuclear Weapon Effects Program

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1998-01-01

    We performed the audit in response to allegations made to the Defense Hotline concerning conflicts of interest among members of the Defense Special Weapons Agency Advisory Panel on the Nuclear Weapon Effects Program...

  14. Neutron weapons. War prevention by credible deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-11-01

    The neutron bomb has prompted fierce and controversial public discussions which are more emotional than based on facts. Unaware of the factual repercussions this weapon has, it has been described as the most inhumane weapon ever. By saying so, the public is wrongly informed and is made feel insecure. The following contributions made by competent authorities may be used for getting to the point, pointing out that the neutron bomb is primarily a defensive weapon. (orig.) [de

  15. New Weapons and the Arms Race

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tsipis, Kosta

    1983-10-01

    In speaking about technologies that could further animate the weapons competition between the United States and the U.S.S.R., it would be useful to distinguish between technologies that have already been incorporated into specific weapons systems, and new technologies that are of a generic nature, can be used in a variety of applications, adn can best be described by the tasks that they can perform rather than any specific weapons application. Let me begin with the latter class.

  16. The text of the Agreement of 22 February 1978 between Paraguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-08-01

    The full text of the agreement between Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America is presented

  17. US and Russia face urgent decisions on weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hileman, B.

    1994-01-01

    Surplus plutonium poses a ''clear and present danger to national and international security,'' warns a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study released in January, titled ''The Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium.'' Over the past few years, many different methods of disposing of plutonium have been proposed. They range from shooting it into the Sun with missiles, to deep-seabed disposal, to fissioning it within a new generation of nuclear reactors. The NAS report rejects most of the methods suggested so far, but does recommend pursuing two of the options. One is to incorporate the plutonium in mixed-oxide fuel, a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides, and use it to fuel commercial nuclear reactors. The other is to mix the plutonium with high-level waste and molten glass and mold the resulting material into large glass logs for eventual geologic disposal. Both are discussed here. The panel that wrote the NAS study is a standing committee called the Committee on International Security ampersand Arms Control. It suggests steps that should be taken now to guard supplies of plutonium removed from weapons. One step is bilateral US-Russian monitoring of warhead dismantlement. Others include setting up secure interim storage for the fissile materials and establishing an international monitoring system to verify the stockpiles and ensure that materials are not withdrawn for use in new weapons. The panel also urges Russia to stop producing fissile weapons materials and both countries to commit a very large fraction of their plutonium and highly enriched uranium from dismantled weapons to nonaggressive uses. The US and Russia have already made initial moves to accomplish these goals but have not fully implemented any of them

  18. Microfabricated Waveguide Atom Traps.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jau, Yuan-Yu [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2017-09-01

    A nanoscale , microfabricated waveguide structure can in - principle be used to trap atoms in well - defined locations and enable strong photon-atom interactions . A neutral - atom platform based on this microfabrication technology will be prealigned , which is especially important for quantum - control applications. At present, there is still no reported demonstration of evanescent - field atom trapping using a microfabricated waveguide structure. We described the capabilities established by our team for future development of the waveguide atom - trapping technology at SNL and report our studies to overcome the technical challenges of loading cold atoms into the waveguide atom traps, efficient and broadband optical coupling to a waveguide, and the waveguide material for high - power optical transmission. From the atomic - physics and the waveguide modeling, w e have shown that a square nano-waveguide can be utilized t o achieve better atomic spin squeezing than using a nanofiber for first time.

  19. Do Weapons Facilitate Adolescent Delinquency? An Examination of Weapon Carrying and Delinquency Among Adolescents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Emmert, Amanda D; Hall, Gina Penly; Lizotte, Alan J

    2018-03-01

    This article examines whether weapon carrying influences the frequency and variety of violent, property, and drug delinquency adolescents commit through fixed-effects analyses of data from the Rochester Youth Development Study (RYDS). We conclude that weapon carrying contributes to violent, substance, and property delinquency, and delinquent behaviors learned during weapon carrying continue to affect substance and property delinquency long after carrying has ceased.

  20. Atom and Society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The object of this colloquium is a thought about the means, for a democracy to adapt the process of decisions and the methods of communication with public opinion in order that the profits derived from atom go on to be larger than the risks. The questions of low doses, the nuclear safety, the underground laboratories for radioactive wastes, are studied in relation with public opinion, the question itself of public opinion is studied, the history of nuclear energy in France through the weapons and the nuclear power plants is evoked and gives an explanation of the situation of nuclear controversy. (N.C.)

  1. Amendment of Atomic Ordinance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-10-01

    This amendment to the 1984 Ordinance on definitions and licences in the atomic energy field aims essentially to ensure that the commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are complied with in Switzerland. The goods and articles involving uranium enrichment by the gas centrifuge process and nuclear fuel reprocessing as specified by the competent international bodies, are henceforth included in the goods subject to notification or licensing listed in the Annex to the Ordinance. Also, it is provided that a construction and an operating licence for a nuclear installation may be granted simultaneously in cases where safe operating conditions can be fully assessed. (NEA) [fr

  2. Nuclear weapons non proliferation treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1969-01-01

    Taking into account the devastation that a nuclear war would inflict upon mankind, and the resulting need to do all that is in our power to keep such a tragedy from occuring, as well as to implement measures to safeguard all the peoples' safety, each State that owns nuclear weapons and that is a part of the Treaty pledges not to trade nuclear weapons, other explosive devices nor the control over such instruments to any other entity whatsoever, wether directly or indirectly. Likewise, all States that does not posses any nuclear weaponry and that are part of the Treaty, in turn pledge not to receive from any other entity nuclear weaponry or other explosive devices in trade, wether directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire this fashion of weaponry and not to request or accept any help whatsoever in the manufacturing of nuclear weaponry or related devices. The present Treaty remains open to the subscription of other countries, on July 26, 1968, with Mexico as one of the signatory countries

  3. The Spear: The Main Weapon in Iranian Martial Tradition

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Manouchehr Moshtagh Khorasani

    2012-07-01

    Full Text Available In martial tradition, spears and lances have always played a very important role as main weapons on the battlefield, as exemplified through Iranian military history. Its reach and cheap production were important factors for establishing formations of soldiers equipped with spears and lances. Additionally, the combat techniques of spears and lances were relatively easy and one could learn the techniques of spearfighting and lancefighting much easier than other weapons, such as swords. The first part of the article describes some types of spears and lances that were used in the Islamic period of Iran. Then the method of carrying a spear/lance is analyzed and additionally some offensive techniques, feinting techniques, attacking techniques to the animal carrying the opponent, and defensive techniques using spears/lances are described as documented by Persian manuscripts.

  4. Report on the atom what you should know about atomic energy

    CERN Document Server

    Dean, Gordon

    1954-01-01

    The American approach to the atom ; Uranium is where you find it ; the production line: ore to bombs ; the expanding programme ; the headaches ; the pay-off: weapons ; the military and the atoms ; power: the peaceful goals, first phase ; power: the peaceful goals, second goals ; radioisotopes: servants of man ; the quest for knowledge ; secrecy, security and spies ; the international atom ; behind the Iron Curtain ; the way ahead.

  5. Weapons material and the commercial fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steyn, J.J.

    1993-01-01

    In 1991, the United States and the former USSR had arsenals of ∼18,000 and 27,200 nuclear weapons, respectively. Approximately 10,000 of the US and 13,000 of the former USSR weapons were in the strategic category, and the remainder were tactical weapons. The dramatic changes in the political climate between the United States and the republics of the former USSR have resulted in the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and II), agreements to substantially reduce nuclear weapons arsenals. Tactical weapons have already been collected in Russia, and strategic weapons are to be collected by the end of 1994. The major issues in accomplishing the treaty reductions appear to be funding, transport safety, storage capacity, and political issues between Russia and Ukraine because the latter seems to be using its weapons for political leverage on other matters. Collectively, the US and former USSR warhead stockpiles contain tremendous inventories of high-enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium which if converted to light water reactor fuel would equate to an enormous economic supply of natural uranium, conversion services, and enrichment separative work. The potential for this material entering the light water reactor fuel marketplace was enhanced in July 1992, when the two US industrial companies, Nuclear Fuel Services and Allied-Signal, announced that they had reached a preliminary agreement with the Russian ministry, Minatom, and the Russian Academay of Sciences to convert Russian high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium

  6. Overview of surplus weapons plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rudy, G.

    1996-05-01

    The safe disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium is a very important and urgent task. While the functions of long term storage and disposition directly relate to the Department`s weapons program and the environmental management program, the focus of this effort is particularly national security and nonproliferation.

  7. Color image fusion for concealed weapon detection

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Toet, A.

    2003-01-01

    Recent advances in passive and active imaging sensor technology offer the potential to detect weapons that are concealed underneath a person's clothing or carried along in bags. Although the concealed weapons can sometimes easily be detected, it can be difficult to perceive their context, due to the

  8. Enforcement agreement between the French atomic energy commission and the federal atomic energy agency for the implementation of the framework-agreement dispositions related to the environmental multilateral program in the nuclear domain in Russian Federations during the nuclear cooperation in the framework of the G8 world partnership against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their related materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    In order to give assistance to the Russian Federations, the G8 partners have agreed to carry on joint actions in the following domains: dismantling of out-of-service nuclear submarines of the Russian navy, management of the spent fuels and wastes generated by this dismantlement, rehabilitation of fuel storage and waste management facilities, management of nuclear materials and safety of facilities or sites with a potential radiological risk. This document defines the domain of cooperation between France (CEA) and the Russian federal atomic energy agency: creation of a coordination parity technical committee, financing conditions and conclusion of contracts for joint actions, access to sites, exchange of informations, intellectual property, nuclear safety and radioprotection, changes and amendments to the agreement, enforcement and duration. A protocol relative to the access of French representatives to Russian work sites is attached. (J.S.)

  9. After the world court opinion: Towards a world without nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roche, D.

    1998-01-01

    With the World Court advisory opinion on the treat or use of nuclear weapons, a new moment has arrived in the 51-year history of atomic bomb. The highest legal body in the world has said that governments must not only pursue but conclude negotiations leading to total nuclear disarmament. Both a sharp focus and a comprehensive action are required in developing public support and political action towards a safer, more peaceful world. Three-pronged interrelated course of action is proposed: a Nuclear Weapon Convention; reduction in conventional arms and control of arms trade; and new spending priorities or sustainable development

  10. Consequences of the Use of Neutron Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ilijas, B.

    1998-01-01

    In modern conceptions of the use of nuclear weapons there is a significant role of so called enhanced radiation weapons, also known as neutron weapons. Its most important feature is that all other effects (blast, thermal) are minimized in favour of neutron radiation. Because of the great penetrative capability and biological efficiency, neutron beam is ideal weapon against people in shelters and armoured vehicles. Material goods stay saved and also there is no significant long- term radioactive contamination. After the use of this weapons, which is possible even for tactical tasks on limited area, one must count with great number of people irradiated with doses in wide range - from those enough for instantaneous incapacitation to those which cause only long-term effects. For the purpose of maximal efficiency in this situation, it is necessary to work out plans for dosimetric control, first aid, transport and medical treatment of irradiated people (soldiers and civilians) in war conditions. (author)

  11. Nuclear experts and nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1979-01-01

    In Germany the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation has attracted scant attention. Most potential nuclear weapon states are important trade partners of the FRG and, since further proliferation of nuclear weapons could worsen conflicts involving these, it should be in the FRG's interest to limit proliferation. The security of the FRG is also dependent on the common interest of the great powers to avoid nuclear war. The contradictory positions of Usa and the USSR on nuclear weapons policy regarding themselves and non-nuclear weapon states encourages less developed countries to see nuclear weaponry as useful. The NPT and IAEA safeguards have only limited inhibiting effect. The nuclear export policy of the FRG has been dominated by short term economic advantage, neglecting the negative long term effects of decreased political stability. The FRG should formulate a policy based on self-restraint, positive stimuli and extension of controls, using its economic strength to deter proliferation. (JIW)

  12. Weapons barrel life cycle determination

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Nebojša Pene Hristov

    2013-10-01

    Full Text Available This article describes the dynamic processes within the gun barrel during the firing process in exploitation. It generally defines the basic principles of constructing tube elements, and shows the distortion of the basic geometry of the tube interior due to wear as well as the impact it causes during exploitation. The article also defines basic empirical models as well as a model based on fracture mechanics for the calculation of a use-life of the barrel, and other elements essential for the safe use of the barrel as the basic weapon element. Erosion causes are analysed in order to control and reduce wear and prolong the lifetime of the gun barrel. It gives directions for the reparation of barrels with wasted resources. In conclusion, the most influential elements of tube wear are given as well as possible modifications of existing systems, primarily propellant charges, with a purpose of prolonging lifetime of gun barrels. The guidelines for a proper determination of the lifetime based on the barrel condition assessment are given as well. INTRODUCTION The barrel as the basic element of each weapon is described as well as the processes occurring during the firing that have impulsive character and are accompanied by large amounts of energy. The basic elements of barrel and itheir constructive characteristics are descibed. The relation between Internal ballistics, ie calculation of the propellant gas pressure in the firing process, and structural elements defined by the barrel material resistance is shown. In general, this part of the study explains the methodology of the gun barrel structural elements calculation, ie. barrel geometry, taking into account the degrees of safety in accordance with Military Standards.   TUBE WEAR AND DEFORMATIONS The weapon barrel gradually wears out during exploitation due to which it no longer satisfies the set requirements. It is considered that the barrel has experienced a lifetime when it fails to fulfill the

  13. Non proliferation of nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Le Guelte, Georges

    2015-10-01

    After having evoked the behaviour of nuclear countries regarding the development of nuclear weapons and uranium procurement, or nuclear programmes after the Second World War until nowadays, the author presents the non proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a construction at the service of super-powers. He comments and discusses the role of the IAEA control system and its evolutions: a control limited to declared installations, an export control with the spectre of plutonium, a control system thwarted by some technological innovations, information systems coming in, and an additional protocol related to the application of guarantees. He comments the evolution of the context from a bipolar world to a world without pole which raises the issue of how to have commitments respected: description of the role and practice of non proliferation during the Cold War, after the Cold War, and in a world without governance

  14. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robertson, J.A.L.

    1983-06-01

    We all want to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The issue before us is how best to achieve this objective; more specifically, whether the peaceful applications of nuclear energy help or hinder, and to what extent. Many of us in the nuclear industry are working on these applications from a conviction that without peaceful nuclear energy the risk of nuclear war would be appreciably greater. Others, however, hold the opposite view. In discussing the subject, a necessary step in allaying fears is understanding some facts, and indeed facing up to some unpalatable facts. When the facts are assessed, and a balance struck, the conclusion is that peaceful nuclear energy is much more part of the solution to preventing nuclear war than it is part of the problem

  15. Atoms for peace: thirtieth anniversary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramey, J.T.

    1983-01-01

    This paper was prepared for the thirtieth anniversary of President Eisenhower's programme: ''Atoms for Peace''. The author wants to demonstrate that nuclear power has made major contributions to reduction of oil imports and that at the same time, despite repeated predictions of unbridled proliferation, the fact is that proliferation has proceeded at a dramatically slower pace than foreseen by some. To date no country has employed plutonium derived from the nuclear power fuel cycle to initiate its nuclear explosion program. The author concludes that the ''Atoms for Peace'' programme, from the viewpoint of its goal of reducing the spread of nuclear weapons, has been a successful policy. (NEA) [fr

  16. Biological consequences of atomic explosions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Messerschmidt, O.

    1984-01-01

    After an introductory chapter of the development and properties of nuclear weapons and the events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this books shows the effects of atomic explosions for man: effects of the pressure wave, thermal radiation, initial nuclear radiation alone or in conjunction and possible medical help. In addition the less massive damage caused by induced radioactivity and fallout, their prevention resp. treatment and the malignant/nonmalignant late effects are discussed. A further chapter deals with the psychological and epidemiological effects of atomic explosions, the consequences for food and water supply, and the construction of shetters. The last chapter is concerned with the problem of organising medical help. (MG) [de

  17. Characterising the online weapons trafficking on cryptomarkets.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rhumorbarbe, Damien; Werner, Denis; Gilliéron, Quentin; Staehli, Ludovic; Broséus, Julian; Rossy, Quentin

    2018-02-01

    Weapons related webpages from nine cryptomarkets were manually duplicated in February 2016. Information about the listings (i.e. sales proposals) and vendors' profiles were extracted to draw an overview of the actual online trafficking of weapons. Relationships between vendors were also inferred through the analysis of online digital traces and content similarities. Weapons trafficking is mainly concentrated on two major cryptomarkets. Besides, it accounts for a very small proportion of the illicit trafficking on cryptomarkets compared to the illicit drugs trafficking. Among all weapon related listings (n=386), firearms only account for approximately 25% of sales proposal since the proportion of non-lethal and melee weapons is important (around 46%). Based on the recorded pseudonyms, a total of 96 vendor profiles were highlighted. Some pseudonyms were encountered on several cryptomarkets, suggesting that some vendors may manage accounts on different markets. This hypothesis was strengthened by comparing pseudonyms to online traces such as PGP keys, images and profiles descriptions. Such a method allowed to estimate more accurately the number of vendors offering weapons across cryptomarkets. Finally, according to the gathered data, the extent of the weapons trafficking on the cryptomarkets appear to be limited compared to other illicit goods. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  18. Weapon container catalog. Volumes 1 & 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brown, L.A.; Higuera, M.C.

    1998-02-01

    The Weapon Container Catalog describes H-gear (shipping and storage containers, bomb hand trucks and the ancillary equipment required for loading) used for weapon programs and for special use containers. When completed, the catalog will contain five volumes. Volume 1 for enduring stockpile programs (B53, B61, B83, W62, W76, W78, W80, W84, W87, and W88) and Volume 2, Special Use Containers, are being released. The catalog is intended as a source of information for weapon program engineers and also provides historical information. The catalog also will be published on the SNL Internal Web and will undergo periodic updates.

  19. Excess Weapons Plutonium Immobilization in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.; Borisov, G.B.

    2000-01-01

    The joint goal of the Russian work is to establish a full-scale plutonium immobilization facility at a Russian industrial site by 2005. To achieve this requires that the necessary engineering and technical basis be developed in these Russian projects and the needed Russian approvals be obtained to conduct industrial-scale immobilization of plutonium-containing materials at a Russian industrial site by the 2005 date. This meeting and future work will provide the basis for joint decisions. Supporting R and D projects are being carried out at Russian Institutes that directly support the technical needs of Russian industrial sites to immobilize plutonium-containing materials. Special R and D on plutonium materials is also being carried out to support excess weapons disposition in Russia and the US, including nonproliferation studies of plutonium recovery from immobilization forms and accelerated radiation damage studies of the US-specified plutonium ceramic for immobilizing plutonium. This intriguing and extraordinary cooperation on certain aspects of the weapons plutonium problem is now progressing well and much work with plutonium has been completed in the past two years. Because much excellent and unique scientific and engineering technical work has now been completed in Russia in many aspects of plutonium immobilization, this meeting in St. Petersburg was both timely and necessary to summarize, review, and discuss these efforts among those who performed the actual work. The results of this meeting will help the US and Russia jointly define the future direction of the Russian plutonium immobilization program, and make it an even stronger and more integrated Russian program. The two objectives for the meeting were to: (1) Bring together the Russian organizations, experts, and managers performing the work into one place for four days to review and discuss their work with each other; and (2) Publish a meeting summary and a proceedings to compile reports of all the

  20. The chemical and biological weapon terrorism by the Aum Shnirikyo

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furukawa, K.

    2009-01-01

    The Aum Shinrikyo, an obscure cult religious group, attacked the Tokyo subways employing sarin gas in March 1995, which was viewed as a mark of a new era in terrorism. The Aum Shinrikyo remains the one empirical example of a religiously motivated cult with an affluent amount of financial and human resources and motivations to use unconventional weapons. The Aum Shinrikyo's leaders included the scientific elite of a young generation as well as former Yakuza members who had close ties with organized crime networks. Aum succeeded in establishing an extensive network to procure weapons, material, and drug, primarily in Russia but also other countries including the United States and even North Korea. Despite the fact that the law enforcement authority had already obtained various pieces of information that reasonably indicated that Aum was producing sarin by late 1994, the law enforcement authority became too cautious to advance its investigation to arrest Aum members until it was too late. Japan's experience with the Aum Shinrikyo's threats provides valuable insights for democratic governments seeking to thwart the deadly plans of religiously motivated non-state actors. It reveals the tremendous difficulties for a democratic society to confront the terrorists who were willing to pursue their deadly 'divine' objectives, especially when the society had no experience to encounter such a threat. This presentation will explain the chemical and biological weapon programs of the Aum Shinrikyo, especially focusing on the following elements: Intention and capability of the Aum Shinrikyo; Weapon systems and mode of attacks, including their target selections; The lessons learned from this case for the prevention and crisis/consequence management n the event of CBW terrorism. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the Research Institute for Science and Technology for Society or its research sponsors.(author)