WorldWideScience

Sample records for atomic weapons establishment

  1. AWRE: Atomic Weapons Research Establishment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This reviews the work of AWRE at Aldermaston and Foulness. The main programme is nuclear and is concerned with the design and development of warheads for strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for the British nuclear deterrent, including those for the Royal Navy's missile carrying submarine fleet. The work is described grouped as design physics, development and materials. Services to these groups and to the whole establishment are provided by Engineering, Safety and Administration. The work ranges from long-term fundamental research, the development of technology, design, prototype development to the environmental testing of engineered products. In materials research the emphasis is on plutonium, uranium and beryllium, on high explosives and a wide range of inorganic and organic materials. The physics of the earth's crust is studied to aid detection of underground nuclear explosions. Reactor research facilities include the two reactors, Herald and Viper. (U.K.)

  2. News UK public libraries offer walk-in access to research Atoms for Peace? The Atomic Weapons Establishment and UK universities Students present their research to academics: CERN@school Science in a suitcase: Marvin and Milo visit Ethiopia Inspiring telescopes A day for everyone teaching physics 2014 Forthcoming Events

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-05-01

    UK public libraries offer walk-in access to research Atoms for Peace? The Atomic Weapons Establishment and UK universities Students present their research to academics: CERN@school Science in a suitcase: Marvin and Milo visit Ethiopia Inspiring telescopes A day for everyone teaching physics 2014 Forthcoming Events

  3. Manhattan Project redux: Canada and the first atomic weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Only three nuclear weapons produced by the Manhattan Project (MP) were used during World War II: Trinity Test, New Mexico on 16 July 1945, Hiroshima, Japan, on 6 August 1945, and Nagasaki, Japan, on 9 August 1945. Several sources and authors, including EM and RL (1967), Stacey (1970), Sanger (1981), and Buckley (2000), have written that it is unlikely that any Canadian uranium was used in the atomic weapons that ended WW II. These sources offer no detailed justification for their conclusion, nevertheless, after analysis of data contained in numerous sources, this article reaches a similar conclusion. (author)

  4. Characterization and Detection of Biological Weapons with Atomic Force Microscopy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Malkin, A J; Plomp, M; Leighton, T J; McPherson, A

    2006-09-25

    Critical gaps exist in our capabilities to rapidly characterize threat agents which could be used in attacks on facilities and military forces. DNA-based PCR and immunoassay-based techniques provide unique identification of species, strains and protein signatures of pathogens. However, differentiation between naturally occurring and weaponized bioagents and the identification of formulation signatures are beyond current technologies. One of the most effective and often the only definitive means to identify a threat agent is by its direct visualization. Atomic force microscopy (AFM) is a rapid imaging technique that covers the size range of most biothreat agents (several nanometers to tens of microns), is capable of resolving pathogen morphology and structure, and could be developed into a portable device for biological weapons (BW) field characterization. AFM can detect pathogens in aerosol, liquid, surface and soil samples while concomitantly acquiring their weaponization and threat agent digital signatures. BW morphological and structural signatures, including modifications to pathogen microstructural architecture and topology that occur during formulation and weaponization, provide the means for their differentiation from crude or purified unformulated agent, processing signatures, as well as assessment of their potential for dispersion, inhalation and environmental persistence. AFM visualization of pathogen morphology and architecture often provides valuable digital signatures and allows direct detection and identification of threat agents. We have demonstrated that pathogens, spanning the size range from several nanometers for small agricultural satellite viruses to almost half micron for pox viruses, and to several microns for bacteria and bacterial spores, can be visualized by AFM under physiological conditions to a resolution of {approx}20-30 {angstrom}. We have also demonstrated that viruses from closely related families could be differentiated by AFM on

  5. The Swedish National Defence Research Establishment and the plans for Swedish nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish Government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid 50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the Parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the Parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The Government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue. During this period

  6. Principles of establishing a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Middle East is one of the most dangerous regions in the world. It has suffered conflicts and wars - with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) implications - at higher frequency and intensity than any other region during the last 60 years. The Middle East was the largest importer of conventional weapons in the world since the second gulf war and the UNSCR 687, which aimed at destroying the Iraqi WMD capabilities and capacity. This arms race is fueled by stockpiles of nuclear and other WMD. In addition several countries remain outside the global nonproliferation and disarmament regimes such as the NPT, CWC and BWC. The situation is further complicated by the serious problems facing the Middle East peace process, which is not only threatening peace and security in the region but also in the world. This unstable risky situation cannot continue like this and cannot be handled step by step any more. The establishing of a MEWMDFZ in the context of a regional security system is the only way out. It is a difficult and remote objective but a tenable one. It is essential to work out the technical, legal and political framework of the envisaged system. This paper deals with efforts undertaken to establish a MEWMDFZ and the development of the underlying principles, based on lessons learnt from the evolution of NWFZs as well as regional and global nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament (NPACD) developments

  7. Nuclear-weapon-free zones: Pursuing security, region by region. Conference of States Parties and Signatories of treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, over the past four decades, is a testament to what nations can do, region by region, to achieve common security objectives. In fact, when considering the history of nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it might be said that here in Mexico City is where it all began. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first multilateral treaty to establish a region free of nuclear weapons and a requirement for comprehensive IAEA safeguards for its parties - and clearly gave impetus to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones provide tangible security benefits. They help to reassure the larger international community of the peaceful nuclear intentions of countries in these regions. They provide their members with security assurances against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons by a nuclear-weapon State. They include control mechanisms for dealing with non-compliance in a regional setting. And in all cases, they prohibit the development, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in their respective regions. An important benefit of these zones is that they open a forum for expanded regional dialogue on issues of security. Because the causes of insecurity vary from region to region, security solutions do not come in a 'one-size-fits-all' package. It is for this reason that regional dialogues, as we see in the nuclear-weapon-free zones, are so beneficial. It is clear that such treaties, and such security dialogues, would be invaluable in other areas of the world, such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. Since the end of the Cold War, the international security landscape has undergone dramatic changes. For example, the rise in terrorism, the discovery of clandestine nuclear programmes, and the emergence of covert nuclear procurement networks have heightened our awareness of vulnerabilities in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This statement focuses on two issues

  8. Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  9. The Swedish National Defence Research Establishment and the plans for Swedish nuclear weapons; Foersvarets forskningsanstalt och planerna paa svenska kaernvapen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonter, Thomas [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of History

    2001-03-01

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish Government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid 50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the Parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the Parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The Government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue

  10. Establishment of carbon atomic composition analysis by proton backscattering

    CERN Document Server

    Gotoh, Y; Fujii, R; Tsuji, H; Ishikawa, J

    2003-01-01

    Transition metal nitride and carbide thin films are expected to serve as a cathode material for cold cathodes. Since the atomic compositions of nitrogen and carbon will strongly affect the properties of the electron emission surface, quantification of these elements are necessary. In this report, we tried to quantify the carbon atomic compositions in the transition metal carbide thin films by resonant nuclear reaction of sup 1 sup 2 C(p, p) sup 1 sup 2 C.

  11. Characteristics of plutonium and americium contamination at the former U.K. atomic weapons test ranges at Maralinga and Emu

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Physico-chemical studies on environmental plutonium are described, which provide data integral to an assessment of dose for the inhalation of artificial actinides by Australian Aborigines living a semi-traditional lifestyle at Maralinga and Emu, sites of U.K. atomic weapons tests between 1953 and 1963. The most significant area, from a radiological perspective, is the area contaminated by plutonium in a series of ''one point'' safety trials in which large quantities of plutonium were dispersed explosively at a location known as Taranaki. The activity distribution of plutonium and americium with particle size is quite different from the mass distribution, as a considerably higher proportion of the activity is contained in the finer (inhalable) fraction than of the mass. Except in areas which were disturbed through ploughing during a cleanup in 1967, most the activity remains in the top 1 cm of the surface. Much of the activity is in particulate form, even at distances > 20 km from the firing sites, and discrete particles have been located even at distances beyond 100 km. Data are presented which permit the assessment of annual committed doses through the inhalation pathway, for Aborigines living a semi-traditional lifestyle in the areas affected by the Taranaki firings in particular. (author)

  12. Operational research in weapon system

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    R. S. Varma

    1958-04-01

    Full Text Available "The paper is divided into three parts: (a The first part deals with what operational research is. (bThe second part gives what we mean by Weapon Systems and discusses considerations that determine the choice of a particular weapon system from a class weapon systems. (cThe third part deals with some aspects of weapon replacement policy.The effectiveness of a weapon system is defined as E=D/C where E is weapon effectiveness (a comparative figure of merit; D is total damage inflicted or prevented and C is total cost, D and C being reduced to common dimensions. During the course of investigations, criteria regarding to choice of weapon or weapons from a set of weapon systems are established through production function and military effect curves. A procedure is described which maximizes the expectation of military utility in order to select a weapon system from the class of weapon systems. This is done under the following simplifying assumptions: (a Non- decreasing utility function; (b Constant average cost for each kind of weapons; and (c Independence of the performance of each unit of weapon. Some of the difficulties which arises when any of these restrictions is relaxed are briefly mentioned. Finally, the policy of weapon replacement and the factors governing the same are described."

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007

  15. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  16. Salmonella Typhimurium utilizes a T6SS-mediated antibacterial weapon to establish in the host gut.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sana, Thibault G; Flaugnatti, Nicolas; Lugo, Kyler A; Lam, Lilian H; Jacobson, Amanda; Baylot, Virginie; Durand, Eric; Journet, Laure; Cascales, Eric; Monack, Denise M

    2016-08-23

    The mammalian gastrointestinal tract is colonized by a high-density polymicrobial community where bacteria compete for niches and resources. One key competition strategy includes cell contact-dependent mechanisms of interbacterial antagonism, such as the type VI secretion system (T6SS), a multiprotein needle-like apparatus that injects effector proteins into prokaryotic and/or eukaryotic target cells. However, the contribution of T6SS antibacterial activity during pathogen invasion of the gut has not been demonstrated. We report that successful establishment in the gut by the enteropathogenic bacterium Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium requires a T6SS encoded within Salmonella pathogenicity island-6 (SPI-6). In an in vitro setting, we demonstrate that bile salts increase SPI-6 antibacterial activity and that S Typhimurium kills commensal bacteria in a T6SS-dependent manner. Furthermore, we provide evidence that one of the two T6SS nanotube subunits, Hcp1, is required for killing Klebsiella oxytoca in vitro and that this activity is mediated by the specific interaction of Hcp1 with the antibacterial amidase Tae4. Finally, we show that K. oxytoca is killed in the host gut in an Hcp1-dependent manner and that the T6SS antibacterial activity is essential for Salmonella to establish infection within the host gut. Our findings provide an example of pathogen T6SS-dependent killing of commensal bacteria as a mechanism to successfully colonize the host gut. PMID:27503894

  17. Special Weapons

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — Supporting Navy special weapons, the division provides an array of engineering services, technical publication support services, logistics support services, safety...

  18. Communication dated 30 May 2014 received from the Permanent Mission of Uzbekistan to the Agency regarding the implementation of the initiative of the President of Uzbekistan on Establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 30 May 2014 from the Permanent Mission of Uzbekistan to the Agency regarding the implementation of the initiative of the President of Uzbekistan, HE Mr Islam Karimov, on Establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The note verbale and its attachment are circulated herewith for information, as requested by the Permanent Mission

  19. An investigation into radiological health and safety at the Ministry of Defence (Procurement Executive) Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The report is in sections, as follows: introduction; radiation exposure (sources of radiation exposure, monitoring methods, protection criteria, plutonium, uranium, americium, tritium, external exposure, environmental releases, general); problems of staffing; buildings; conclusions. (U.K.)

  20. Hope over fear. The establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    President Eisenhower's ''Atoms for Peace'' speech in 1953 started a process that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This study analyses the negotiations of the Statute of the Agency. It focuses on how the Agency's scope of action regarding safeguards was negotiated. The Statute is seen as a reflection of the dual purpose of the new Agency to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to control that peaceful nuclear activities receiving IAEA assistance are not diverted to military purposes. On one hand, the countries receiving assistance from the Agency accepted a degree of international control that represented a breakthrough in international relations. On the other hand, many countries strongly resented controls. Consequently, compromises had to be made in the course of the negotiations in order to reach a consensus. Thus, although the IAEA was established as a competent and technical body, the underlying compromises meant that its scope of actions was restricted. 6 refs

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  3. Agreement between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocols thereto) between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 21 March 2000 by the representative of the Government of the French Republic and the Director General of the IAEA, and on 26 September 2000 by the representative of the European Atomic Energy Community. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 26 October 2007, one month after the Agency has received notification from both France and the European Atomic Energy Community that their respective internal requirements for entry into force have been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocols, the Protocols entered into force on the same date

  4. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the grand scheme of things we are a little more than halfway through the cycle of splitting the atom for weapons purposes. If we visualize this historic cycle as the full sweep of a clockface, at zero hour we would find the first nuclear chain reaction by Enrico Fermi, followed immediately by the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the first atomic bombs. From two o'clock until five, the United States built and ran a massive industrial complex that produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At half past, the Cold War ended, and the United States shut down most of its nuclear weapons factories. The second half of this cycle involves dealing with the waste and contamination from nuclear weapons production - a task that had, for the most part, been postponed into the indefinite future. That future is now upon us. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War is in many ways as big a challenge for us today as the building of the atomic bomb was for the Manhattan Project pioneers in the 1940s. Our challenges are political and social as well as technical, and we are meeting those challenges. We are reducing risks, treating wastes, developing new technologies, and building democratic institutions for a constructive debate on our future course

  5. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-01-01

    In the grand scheme of things we are a little more than halfway through the cycle of splitting the atom for weapons purposes. If we visualize this historic cycle as the full sweep of a clockface, at zero hour we would find the first nuclear chain reaction by Enrico Fermi, followed immediately by the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the first atomic bombs. From two o`clock until five, the United States built and ran a massive industrial complex that produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At half past, the Cold War ended, and the United States shut down most of its nuclear weapons factories. The second half of this cycle involves dealing with the waste and contamination from nuclear weapons production - a task that had, for the most part, been postponed into the indefinite future. That future is now upon us. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War is in many ways as big a challenge for us today as the building of the atomic bomb was for the Manhattan Project pioneers in the 1940s. Our challenges are political and social as well as technical, and we are meeting those challenges. We are reducing risks, treating wastes, developing new technologies, and building democratic institutions for a constructive debate on our future course.

  6. City mayors on the march. Hiroshima leading citizen campaign to ban nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Led on our tragic experience 58 years ago, Hiroshima has continually called for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the realization of genuine and lasting world peace. Unfortunately, despite our efforts, this planet still bristles with enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons, and today we face an increasingly perilous nuclear crisis. We see States that have nuclear weapons taking more rigid positions regarding disarmament, and non-nuclear-weapon States frightened into seeking their own nuclear bombs. The global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). the pivotal international agreement regarding nuclear weapons, is teetering on the brink of collapse. The world's leading superpower, the United States, for example, has refused to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and is resuming research into small nuclear weapons. These steps run contrary to the enshrined commitment of nuclear powers to reduce atomic arsenals and move toward a nuclear-weapon free world. We cannot sit quietly as the world plunges toward unspeakable violence and misery. We must let our leaders know, first and foremost, that we demand immediate freedom from the nuclear threat. Nuclear weapons are heinous, cruel, inhumane weapons that threaten our entire species. In 1996, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion declaring them illegal. At the Meeting of the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference held in April 2003 in Geneva the president of the World Conference of Mayors for Peace, a non-governmental organization (NGO) that now has 554 member cities in 107 countries and regions, the following demands, were made: A complete and total ban on all nuclear weapons everywhere; Removal of all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert immediately and withdrawal of all nuclear weapons deployed on foreign territory; It is high time for all recognized nuclear-weapon States to join in a multilateral process of nuclear disarmament and for de-facto nuclear-weapon States

  7. Hope over fear. The establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, A.

    1995-12-01

    President Eisenhower`s ``Atoms for Peace`` speech in 1953 started a process that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This study analyses the negotiations of the Statute of the Agency. It focuses on how the Agency`s scope of action regarding safeguards was negotiated. The Statute is seen as a reflection of the dual purpose of the new Agency to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to control that peaceful nuclear activities receiving IAEA assistance are not diverted to military purposes. On one hand, the countries receiving assistance from the Agency accepted a degree of international control that represented a breakthrough in international relations. On the other hand, many countries strongly resented controls. Consequently, compromises had to be made in the course of the negotiations in order to reach a consensus. Thus, although the IAEA was established as a competent and technical body, the underlying compromises meant that its scope of actions was restricted. 6 refs.

  8. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander...

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article 111(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, pursuant to the first sentence of Article 25(a) thereof, on 21 February 1977

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  1. Agreement of 18 November 1993 between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 February 1975 and signed in Vienna on 31 October 1990 and in Nuku'Alofa on 18 November 1993

  2. Agreement of 22 September 1994 between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 22 September 1994

  3. Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 2 December 1993 and signed in Vienna on 6 December 1993 and in Riga on 21 December 1993

  4. Agreement of 30 September 1993 between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 September 1993 and signed in Vienna on 30 September 1993. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 5 May 1994

  5. Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000

  7. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000

  8. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999

  10. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000

  12. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998 and signed in Vienna on 4 December 1998. The Protocol entered into force on 16 December 1998

  16. Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  17. Agreement of 23 August 1974 between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 September 1973. It was signed in Vienna on 30 April 1974 and in La Paz on 23 August 1974. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 6 February 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  18. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 2002. It was signed on 5 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 May 2004, the date on which Agency received from El Salvador written notification that El Salvador's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 15 September 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Paraguay written notification that Paraguay's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  20. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 18 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Nicaragua written notification that Nicaragua's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  2. Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Azerbaijan to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 6 November 1998, and entered into force on 29 April 1999. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  3. Controlling Weapons-Grade Fissile Material

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rotblat, J.

    1977-01-01

    Discusses the problems of controlling weapons-grade fissionable material. Projections of the growth of fission nuclear reactors indicates sufficient materials will be available to construct 300,000 atomic bombs each containing 10 kilograms of plutonium by 1990. (SL)

  4. Nuclear Weapons Effects (Self-Teaching Materials).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Developed by the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, this autoinstructional text deals with nuclear weapons effects. The destructive effects of an atomic blast are first introduced, and then long-term radioactive consequences are stressed. (CP)

  5. Development of Air Sampling Technology by the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For many years the Health Physics and Medical Division of the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell, has pursued a vigorous programme of investigation and development in the field of air-sampling technology. The programme has made important contributions to the development of sampling media, the design of sampling equipment, the characterization of environmental airborne contamination and the interpretation of air-sampling data in terms of personal exposure. These developments form the basis for the present operational and research programmes in this field in the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (U.K.A.E.A). . This paper, which summarizes the advances made in the Harwell laboratories in the above fields, is divided into three sections: 1. Sampling techniques. The development and characterization of glass-fibre filter papers (Stevens and Hounam) with improved surface collection properties has simplified counting procedures and has made ' possible detailed autoradiographic examination of the dust collected. The problem of energy degradation of alpha radiation by absorption in particles and paper has been studied (Stevens and Toureau). Development of charcoal-impregnated papers (Stevens and Hounam) has facilitated the detection and measurement of airborne contamination by iodine vapour. The combination of these papers with granular characoal in the May Pack (May) has given a sampling device which is now in common use for the determination and characterization of atmospheric iodine contamination. The concept and development of the personal air sampler (Sherwood and Greenhalgh) led to a better appreciation of the uncertainties of conventional air sampling and to the first quantitative demonstration of the problems of interpreting air samples in terms of personal inhalation exposure. Work on the design of a size selective head for the personal air sampler has not yet resolved the difficulties. The drawbacks of the cascade impactor as a continuous size

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Additional Protocol), the Additional Protocol, which had been applied provisionally from 17 February 2010, entered into force on 10 October 2012, the date upon which the Agency received written notification from Iraq that Iraq's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  7. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992. It was signed on 21 May 1992 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  8. Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  9. Agreement of 5 April 1995 between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 26, on 5 April 1995

  10. Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 20 March 2001. It was signed on 11 June 2002 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 16 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Niger written notification that Niger's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  11. Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  13. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 19 July 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 July 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Afghanistan and the Agency

  14. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 January 2006, the date on which the Agency received from Ukraine written notification that Ukraine's constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  15. Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  16. Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereof) between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Roseau, Dominica on 3 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 3 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  17. Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 26 June 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 26 June 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  18. Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992, It was signed on 28 July 1992 in Vienna and on 26 August 1992 in Geneva. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2005. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  19. Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 3 May 2005 in New York. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of the Marshall Islands and the Agency

  20. Agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  1. Agreement of 8 October 1994 between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 February 1994 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1994 and in Tashkent on 8 October 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 8 October 1994

  2. Agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 21 September 2000. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 August 2002. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  3. Agreement of 14 April 1995 between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 November 1994 and in Minsk on 14 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 August 1995

  4. Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 9 June 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 19 January 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  5. Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1991 and signed in Vienna on 30 January 1992. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 10 April 1992

  6. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Madagascar and the Agency, i.e., on 18 September 2003

  7. Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  9. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 28 November 2002. It was signed on 24 April 2003 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 12 July 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Malta written notification that Malta's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  10. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1957-06-01

    This handbook prepared by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant government agencies and published by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, is a comprehensive summary of current knowledge on the effects of nuclear weapons. The effects information contained herein is calculated for yields up to 20 megatons and the scaling laws for hypothetically extending the calculations beyond this limit are given. The figure of 20 megatons however is not be taken as an indication of capabilities or developments.

  11. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1964-02-01

    This book is a revision of "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" which was issued in 1957. It was prepared by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant governmental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomc Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the combined judgment of a number of the most competent scientists working the problem. There is a need for widespread public understanding of the best information available on the effects of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible, within the limits of national security, a comprehensive summary of this information.

  12. Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Panama to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 March 1984 between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  13. Law project (no. 1329) adopted by the Senate and authorizing the ratification of the agreement between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency relative to the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of nuclear weapons prohibition in South America and the Caribbeans area (two protocols together)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The French Senate adopted on January 6, 2004 the project of law which authorizes the ratification of the agreement between France, the European atomic energy community and the IAEA about the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons in South America and in the Caribbean area signed in Vienna (Austria) on March 21, 2000. The text of this treaty is attached to this law. (J.S.)

  14. Protocol between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 June 1999, signed in Vienna on 11 June 1999, and entered into force on 7 July 2000

  15. Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna

  16. Summary and statistical analysis of environmental monitoring data in the Oarai Research Establishment, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tamura, Katsuhiro; Kitano, Kyoshiro [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment; Sibanuma, Yukio; Takasaki, Koichi; Ohhata, Tsutomu

    1998-03-01

    In the Oarai Research Establishment, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), the environmental monitoring has been conducted for about 29 years since April 1968. The results are discussed for evaluation of long-term and short-term fluctuation in the radiological conditions in the Oarai area. This report summarises the data of the environmental monitoring in Oarai, and statistical analyses were made of the data collected from 1985 through 1994. (author)

  17. Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Ukraine to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1995, signed in Vienna on 21 September 1995, and entered into force on 22 January 1998

  18. TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

    2013-07-16

    Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  19. Atoms

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    刘洪毓

    2007-01-01

    Atoms(原子)are all around us.They are something like the bricks (砖块)of which everything is made. The size of an atom is very,very small.In just one grain of salt are held millions of atoms. Atoms are very important.The way one object acts depends on what

  20. Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Safeguards Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Abu Dhabi on 15 December 2002. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 9 October 2003, the date upon which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  1. Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 1999. It was signed on 28 June 2001 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 5 September 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Oman written notification that Oman's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force the same date

  2. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 December 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Tajikistan written notification that the Republic of Tajikistan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 16 June 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 February 2005, the date upon which the Agency received from the Swiss Confederation written notification that the Swiss Confederation's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  7. Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 19 July 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Seychelles written notification that Seychelles' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  8. Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 12 September 1995. It was signed on 27 September 1995 in Vienna and 14 June 1996 in Chisinau. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 May 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Moldova written notification that Moldova's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  9. Protocol additional to the agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 23 September 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 7 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from the United Republic of Tanzania written notification that the United Republic of Tanzania's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  10. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional, the Protocol entered into force on 13 October 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Seychelles written notification that the Republic of Seychelles's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  11. The future of nuclear weapons: Proliferation in South Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kamal, N. [Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabada (Pakistan)

    1992-12-31

    The signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987, followed by the dramatic changes in East-West relations since 1989 and the more recent Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreement, have greatly eased public concerns about the danger of nuclear war. The context has also changed for the Nonaligned Movement, which had made nuclear disarmament and condemnation of the concept of nuclear deterrence the primary themes of its multilateral disarmament diplomacy. More important would be the interrelationship among the states possessing nuclear weapons (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). In any case, there is little risk of a revival of nuclear competition. Both France and China have decided to sign the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); they are the only two nuclear-weapon states that have stayed outside the regime. Meanwhile, Brazil and Argentina have moved further down the nonproliferation road by engaging in confidence-building measures and moving closer to joining the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free zone established under the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967. South Africa has also agreed to embrace the NPT as well as a nuclear-weapons-free zone regime for the entire African continent, while North Korea has agreed to sign a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thereby allowing in principle international inspection of its nuclear facilities. In the third world regions, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and competitive nuclear buildup are most pronounced in South Asia, a region where a variety of complicating problems exist: acute threat perceptions, historical emity, religious and sectarian animosity, ethnic antagonism, territorial disputes, ambitions for regional dominance, and domestic political instability. This chapter will focus primarily on South Asia, although references will also be made to other regions, where relevant. 17 refs.

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 30 April 2004, the date on which the Agency received written notification that the European Atomic Energy Community and the United Kingdom had met their respective internal requirements for entry into force

  13. Reconversion of nuclear weapons

    CERN Document Server

    Kapitza, Sergei P

    1993-01-01

    The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

  14. Examining the discourse on nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Ghafele, Roya

    2000-01-01

    Nuclear weapons and language - is there a connection? Linguistics is an established science, but what has it got to do with nuclear weapons? This article was inspired by several international disarmament negotiations where I noticed that diplomats work in a communicative reality related to the nuclear arms issue. But is anyone involved in this highly political process aware of the activity of that process of talking? Observations showed that the political problem around the issue of nuclear a...

  15. Operation GREENHOUSE. Scientific Director's report of atomic weapon tests at Eniwetok, 1951. Annex 6. 7. Contamination-decontamination studies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Werner, L.B.; Sinnreich, S.R.

    1951-08-01

    This 1951 NTPR report describes experiments conducted in Operation Greenhouse at Eniwetok on certain processes and materials associated with contamination and decontamination phenomena. For this type of contaminating event, in which surfaces are contaminated by being carried by aircraft through an atomic cloud, information was obtained which will assist in development of effective protective measures and recovery measures from contaminating atomic detonations. The contaminant which was deposited on surfaces mounted on drone planes was shown to be nonuniform under various contaminating conditions, both as to distribution and composition. Data have been obtained on the relative importance of such surface characteristics as roughness, porosity, retentivity, and contact angle. The relative behavior of various chemical agents as decontaminants was determined and use of industrial cleaning methods employing chemical additives to effect decontamination was investigated.

  16. Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 July 2006, upon signature by the representatives of the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the Agency

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Bulgaria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Cyprus

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Estonia and the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Slovenia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  1. The Text of the Agreement Between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Portugal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193) of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193/Add.2), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: i. Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and ii. Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  2. The Text of the Agreement Between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Greece

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193) of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: i. Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and ii. Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  3. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Lithuania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)2 provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  4. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  5. On the reduction of nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Bacher, Robert F.

    1981-01-01

    The United States, in 1946, proposed that an international authority be formed to control the dangerous parts of atomic energy. The proposal met with very little success, except to lead to the conclusion that there was no apparent reason why it was not technically feasible. Discussions on nuclear weapons testing, initiated in 1958, reached some agreement on test restrictions in Subsequent years.

  6. Operation greenhouse. Scientific director`s report of atomic weapon tests at Eniwetok, 1951. Annex 8.1. Blast effects on aircraft in flight. Nuclear explosion

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wayne, J.C.; Lehmkuhl, J.C.

    1951-10-01

    The primary objective of this report is to present data concerning the structural and aerodynamic loads as measured on various types of aircraft, in flight, in the vicinity of an atomic explosion. A secondary objective is to describe the instrumentation (installation, calibration, and operation) in order to provide for the future planning and conduct of similar tests. The data presented herein were obtained on Dog, Easy, and George shots of Operation Greenhouse. The airplanes used to collect these data were B-17`s, T-33`s, B-50D`s and one XB-47. These instrumented airplanes were arrayed at preassigned locations in the air space above the explosions. A total of approximately 250 channels of information were obtained which essentially consisted in wing bending, torsion, and shear at the root, mid-span, and outer panel; horizontal stabilizer bending at the root; normal accelerations at the nose, c.g., and tail; aerodynamic pressures at various locations on the airplanes; and temperatures experienced by various critical components of the airplane. The positions of the airplanes at the time of shock arrival were accurately determined by means of radar tracking. The measured data were correlated by means of time signals, every second, from a land based radio transmitter station, and with reference to time zero, by means of a photoelectric cell. The recorded data show that the loads produced by the shock wave were in general accord with theory. The loading experienced by an airplane while passing through the `puff` of the atomic cloud is shown to be considerably higher than that caused by the shock wave. For this reason the penetration of the puff should be avoided even by `sampling` drones.

  7. Computational Challenges in Nuclear Weapons Simulation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McMillain, C F; Adams, T F; McCoy, M G; Christensen, R B; Pudliner, B S; Zika, M R; Brantley, P S; Vetter, J S; May, J M

    2003-08-29

    After a decade of experience, the Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons. The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) program was established to provide leading edge, high-end simulation capabilities needed to meet the program's assessment and certification requirements. The great challenge of this program lies in developing the tools and resources necessary for the complex, highly coupled, multi-physics calculations required to simulate nuclear weapons. This paper describes the hardware and software environment we have applied to fulfill our nuclear weapons responsibilities. It also presents the characteristics of our algorithms and codes, especially as they relate to supercomputing resource capabilities and requirements. It then addresses impediments to the development and application of nuclear weapon simulation software and hardware and concludes with a summary of observations and recommendations on an approach for working with industry and government agencies to address these impediments.

  8. OIL AS POLITICAL WEAPON

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mariana, BUICAN

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available Oil (called by some black gold has not always been as coveted and used, but only in the last hundred years has established itself as a highly sought after as an indispensable proper functioning of modern economic activity that an important factor in international politics. International oil regime has changed in the last decades. In 1960, oil regime was a private oligopol which had links with governments main consuming countries. By then the price of a barrel of oil was two U.S. dollars and seven major transnational oil companies decided the amount of oil that will be produced. Meanwhile the world region with the largest oil exports were more strongly expressed nationalism and decolonization. Result, it was so in the late 60s in the region occur independent states. They have created an organization aim of this resource to their advantage - OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Thus since 1973 there have been changes in the international regime governing oil field, namely producing countries were fixed production rate and price. After this time the oil weapon has become increasingly important in the management of international relations. Oil influenced the great powers to Middle East conflicts that occurred in the last century, but their attitude about the emergence of new sources of oil outside OPEC. In the late 90's, Russia has become a major supplier of oil to the West.

  9. Hitler's bomb: the secret story of Germans' attempts to get the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this historical book, the author claims to have evidence concerning the development and testing of a possible 'nuclear weapon' by Nazi Germany in 1945. The 'weapon' in question is not alleged to be a standard nuclear weapon powered by nuclear fission, but something closer to either a radiological weapon (a so-called 'dirty bomb') or a hybrid-nuclear fusion weapon. Its new evidence is concerned primarily with the parts of the German nuclear energy project (an attempted clandestine scientific effort led by Germany to develop and produce atomic weapons during World War II) under Kurt Diebner, a German nuclear physicist who directed and administrated the project

  10. Virtual nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  11. Igniting the Light Elements: The Los Alamos Thermonuclear Weapon Project, 1942-1952

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anne C. Fitzpatrick

    1999-07-01

    The American system of nuclear weapons research and development was conceived and developed not as a result of technological determinism, but by a number of individual architects who promoted the growth of this large technologically-based complex. While some of the technological artifacts of this system, such as the fission weapons used in World War II, have been the subject of many historical studies, their technical successors--fusion (or hydrogen) devices--are representative of the largely unstudied highly secret realms of nuclear weapons science and engineering. In the postwar period a small number of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's staff and affiliates were responsible for theoretical work on fusion weapons, yet the program was subject to both the provisions and constraints of the US Atomic Energy Commission, of which Los Alamos was a part. The Commission leadership's struggle to establish a mission for its network of laboratories, least of all to keep them operating, affected Los Alamos's leaders' decisions as to the course of weapons design and development projects. Adapting Thomas P. Hughes's ''large technological systems'' thesis, I focus on the technical, social, political, and human problems that nuclear weapons scientists faced while pursuing the thermonuclear project, demonstrating why the early American thermonuclear bomb project was an immensely complicated scientific and technological undertaking. I concentrate mainly on Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's Theoretical, or T, Division, and its members' attempts to complete an accurate mathematical treatment of the ''Super''--the most difficult problem in physics in the postwar period--and other fusion weapon theories. Although tackling a theoretical problem, theoreticians had to address technical and engineering issues as well. I demonstrate the relative value and importance of H-bomb research over time in the postwar era to

  12. The real value of nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The international community has greeted the establishment of two new nuclear weapon-free zones with praise. Africa and South Asia are the regions which will join, once the respective treaties are ratified and in force, Latin America and the South Pacific to ensure that extensive areas of the earth remain free of nuclear weapons. The usual reaction to these accomplishments is to hail them as important contributions to international peace and security, and as meaningful steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon-free zones have their value but this value relates mainly to the countries within the zone. The interest of nuclear-weapon states are not really affected, or, if they are, the influence is not significant. One should bear in mind that the really important and meaningful nuclear weapon-free zones have yet to be achieved

  13. Performance calculation and simulation system of high energy laser weapon

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Pei; Liu, Min; Su, Yu; Zhang, Ke

    2014-12-01

    High energy laser weapons are ready for some of today's most challenging military applications. Based on the analysis of the main tactical/technical index and combating process of high energy laser weapon, a performance calculation and simulation system of high energy laser weapon was established. Firstly, the index decomposition and workflow of high energy laser weapon was proposed. The entire system was composed of six parts, including classical target, platform of laser weapon, detect sensor, tracking and pointing control, laser atmosphere propagation and damage assessment module. Then, the index calculation modules were designed. Finally, anti-missile interception simulation was performed. The system can provide reference and basis for the analysis and evaluation of high energy laser weapon efficiency.

  14. Wounds and weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Purpose: X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. Material and method: The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Results: Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Conclusion: Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports

  15. Bioterrorism: toxins as weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Peter D

    2012-04-01

    The potential for biological weapons to be used in terrorism is a real possibility. Biological weapons include infectious agents and toxins. Toxins are poisons produced by living organisms. Toxins relevant to bioterrorism include ricin, botulinum, Clostridium perfrigens epsilson toxin, conotoxins, shigatoxins, saxitoxins, tetrodotoxins, mycotoxins, and nicotine. Toxins have properties of biological and chemical weapons. Unlike pathogens, toxins do not produce an infection. Ricin causes multiorgan toxicity by blocking protein synthesis. Botulinum blocks acetylcholine in the peripheral nervous system leading to muscle paralysis. Epsilon toxin damages cell membranes. Conotoxins block potassium and sodium channels in neurons. Shigatoxins inhibit protein synthesis and induce apoptosis. Saxitoxin and tetrodotoxin inhibit sodium channels in neurons. Mycotoxins include aflatoxins and trichothecenes. Aflatoxins are carcinogens. Trichothecenes inhibit protein and nucleic acid synthesis. Nicotine produces numerous nicotinic effects in the nervous system.

  16. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION FROM WEAPON TESTS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    none

    1958-10-01

    The program of the Atomic Energy Commission on environmental contamination from weapons tests is designed for the overall evaluation of the hazard to humans from test operations. It is limited to studies of the deposition of activity at long range rather than the problems associated with immediate, close-in fallout. The program has largely been a study of Sr{sup 90}, since considerations based on experience and measurement indicate that it is the isotope of greatest potential hazard. Data are presented pertinent to the monitoring of long-range fallout, particularly Sr{sup 90} and Cs{sup 137}. Values are tabulated for the fallout deposition, air concentrations, water concentrations, and the amounts in foods and human bone. In addition, results are given for some experimental investigations. The report of these results is not interpretative although certain papers that do attempt to interpret the present situation with respect to Sr{sup 90} in particular are reprinted. Bibliographies are presented covering the period since the 1957 hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy concerning the nature of radioactive fallout and its effects on man. A document list of submissions to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation is given to illustrate the work done in other countries. Several papers on the subject, which have not been generally available, are reprinted.

  17. 20 CFR 30.212 - How does a claimant establish that the employee contracted cancer after beginning employment at a...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 20 Employees' Benefits 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false How does a claimant establish that the employee contracted cancer after beginning employment at a DOE facility, an atomic weapons employer facility or a RECA section 5 facility? 30.212 Section 30.212 Employees' Benefits OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR...

  18. The text of the agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Finland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. On 18 September 1995 the Agency received in respect of the European Atomic Energy Community and Finland the notifications required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement. For practical accounting purposes as proposed in the notifications, the Agreement came into force for Finland on 1 October 1995

  19. The text of the agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Latvia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. The Agreement and the Protocol thereto, which came into force for the above-mentioned original signatories on 21 February 1977, have also entered into force for Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. The Agency received from the Republic of Latvia on 17 March 2008 and from the European Atomic Energy Community on 1 October 2008, the notifications required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement. Accordingly, the Agreement entered into force for Latvia on 1 October 2008

  20. Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sartori, Leo

    1983-01-01

    Fundamental principles governing nuclear explosions and their effects are discussed, including three components of a nuclear explosion (thermal radiation, shock wave, nuclear radiation). Describes how effects of these components depend on the weapon's yield, its height of burst, and distance of detonation point. Includes effects of three…

  1. How to weaponize anthrax?

    OpenAIRE

    Dizer, Ufuk; Levent KENAR; ORTATATLI, Mesut; Karayılanoğlu, Turan

    2013-01-01

    Anthrax, a zoonotic disease caused by  Bacillusanthracis, occurs in domesticated and wild animals-primarily herbivores. Humans usually become infectedby contact with infected animals or their products.Anthrax is so easy to obtain that it could be weaponizedfor biological warfare if a laboratory area of 5 m2  isowned with 10.000$.Key words: Anthrax, weapon, spore, Bacillus anthracis

  2. Nuclear Weapons and Schools.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Howie, David I.

    1984-01-01

    The growing debate on nuclear weapons in recent years has begun to make inroads into school curricula. Elementary and secondary school teachers now face the important task of educating their students on issues relating to nuclear war without indoctrinating them to a particular point of view. (JBM)

  3. Neutrino Counter Nuclear Weapon

    CERN Document Server

    Tang, Alfred

    2008-01-01

    Radiations produced by neutrino-antineutrino annihilation at the Z0 pole can be used to heat up the primary stage of a thermonuclear warhead and can in principle detonate the device remotely. Neutrino-antineutrino annihilation can also be used as a tactical assault weapon to target hideouts that are unreachable by conventional means.

  4. Nuclear weapons in Europe

    CERN Document Server

    Calogero, F

    1981-01-01

    Information speech given by Prof. Calogero from the university of Roma to describe the actual situation of nuclear weapons in Europe, the strategical reasons or justifications for this deployment, the prospects of negociations, and what scientists could do and do on this issue.

  5. Open architecture applied to next-generation weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rose, Leo J.; Shaver, Jonathan; Young, Quinn; Christensen, Jacob

    2014-06-01

    The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) has postulated a new weapons concept known as Flexible Weapons to define and develop technologies addressing a number of challenges. Initial studies on capability attributes of this concept have been conducted and AFRL plans to continue systems engineering studies to quantify metrics against which the value of capabilities can be assessed. An important aspect of Flexible Weapons is having a modular "plug-n-play" hardware and software solution, supported by an Open Architecture and Universal Armament Interface (UAI) common interfaces. The modular aspect of Flexible Weapons is a means to successfully achieving interoperability and composability at the weapon level. Interoperability allows for vendor competition, timely technology refresh, and avoids costs by ensuring standard interfaces widely supported in industry, rather than an interface unique to a particular vendor. Composability provides for the means to arrange an open end set of useful weapon systems configurations. The openness of Flexible Weapons is important because it broadens the set of computing technologies, software updates, and other technologies to be introduced into the weapon system, providing the warfighter with new capabilities at lower costs across the life cycle. One of the most critical steps in establishing a Modular, Open Systems Architecture (MOSA) for weapons is the validation of compliance with the standard.

  6. The Optimum Replacement of Weapon

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    ZHANG Xiao; ZHANG Jin-chun

    2002-01-01

    The theory of LCC (Life Cycle Cost) is applied in this paper. The relation between the economic life of weapon and the optimum replacement is analyzed. The method to define the optimum replacement time of weapon is discussed.

  7. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described

  8. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  9. Communication of 7 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the IAEA concerning the establishment of the oversight Board to monitor the implementation of Pakistan's export control on goods, technologies, materials and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and their Delivery Systems Act (Act No.V) 2004

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Secretariat has received a Note Verbale dated 7 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan enclosing a copy of the Gazette of Pakistan S.R.O. No.693(I)/2007, dated 11 July 2007, regarding the establishment of the Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of Pakistan's Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Materials and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act (Act No.V) 2004, including the formation and functioning of Strategic Export Control Division. As requested in the Note Verbale, the Note Verbale and the enclosure thereto are circulated for the information of Member States

  10. Data Evaluation and the Establishment of a Standard Library of Atomic, Molecular and Plasma-Material Interaction Data for Fusion. Summary Report of an IAEA Consultants' Meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seven experts in the field of atomic, molecular and plasma-material interaction (A+M+PMI) data and data evaluation for fusion plasma physics met with IAEA A+M Data Unit staff at IAEA Headquarters to provide advice towards the establishment of an evaluated and recommended library of A+M+PMI data for fusion. The proceedings and conclusions of the meeting are summarized here. (author)

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Hungary and Malta

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. The Agreement and the Protocol thereto, which came into force for the above-mentioned original signatories on 21 February 1977, have also entered into force for Austria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden

  12. Bioterrorism: pathogens as weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Peter D; Bokor, Gyula

    2012-10-01

    Biowarfare has been used for centuries. The use of biological weapons in terrorism remains a threat. Biological weapons include infectious agents (pathogens) and toxins. The most devastating bioterrorism scenario would be the airborne dispersal of pathogens over a concentrated population area. Characteristics that make a specific pathogen a high-risk for bioterrorism include a low infective dose, ability to be aerosolized, high contagiousness, and survival in a variety of environmental conditions. The most dangerous potential bioterrorism agents include the microorganisms that produce anthrax, plague, tularemia, and smallpox. Other diseases of interest to bioterrorism include brucellosis, glanders, melioidosis, Q fever, and viral encephalitis. Food safety and water safety threats are another area of concern.

  13. Illegal Weapons Exports?

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2006-01-01

    Amnesty International, a human rights organization, released a report on June 11 accusing China of facilitating regional conflicts and human rights violations by exporting a large quantity of weapons to Sudan, Nepal, Myanmar and the Great Lakes countries of Africa. Responding to such charges, Teng Jianqun, a researcher with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, told the official Xinhua News Agency that China has always put its limited arms exports under strict control and surveillance, deno...

  14. Agreement Between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with New Zealand to Amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Prolilferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 24 February 2014, the date on which the Agency received New Zealand's affirmative reply

  15. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of an agreement by exchange of letters with Belize in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1997 and entered into force on that date

  16. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  17. Is there any future for nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons occupy a paradoxal place both in the collective imagination and in the historical reality: on the one hand everybody dreads the apocalypse horror, and on the other hand, dissuasion appears as an unchanging and quite comfortable situation. However, the world has become multipolar in this domain as well. The geopolitical map is reconstructing. Doctrinal revisions, initiatives against nuclear weapons proliferation, and nuclear disarmament measures are now on the agenda. The best foreign and French experts examine for the first time the consequences of these evolutions. They analyse in particular the split up risks and the potential consequences of a nuclear conflict in regions where atomic arms have become a key-component of the strategic landscape: Middle-Est, Far-East, Southern Asia. The choices France and its allies will have to face are examined as well. (J.S.)

  18. Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An agreement by exchange of letters of 6 November 1995 and 17 November 2003 with the Republic of Panama in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. This Exchange of Letters constitutes an agreement confirming that: the Safeguards Agreement of 23 March 1984, concluded between the Republic of Panama and the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty), also satisfies the obligation of Panama under Article III of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA; the safeguards set forth in the Safeguards Agreement shall also apply, as regards Panama, in connection with the NPT; the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply as long as Panama is party to the NPT or the Tlatelolco Treaty or both. The agreement reflected in the Exchange of Letters was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 November 2003, and pursuant to its terms, entered into force on that date

  19. Agreement of 4 November 1992 between the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Trinidad and Tobago to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities with its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  20. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Antigua and Barbuda to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  1. Agreement of 23 July 1996 between Grenada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Grenada to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory , under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  2. Agreement of 14 August 1996 between the Government of Barbados and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Barbados to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  3. Agreement between the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Bahamas to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguard provisions of Part I

  4. Agreement between the co-operative republic of Guyana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Guyana to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguard provisions of Part I

  5. Imprecise Probability Methods for Weapons UQ

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Picard, Richard Roy [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Vander Wiel, Scott Alan [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-05-13

    Building on recent work in uncertainty quanti cation, we examine the use of imprecise probability methods to better characterize expert knowledge and to improve on misleading aspects of Bayesian analysis with informative prior distributions. Quantitative approaches to incorporate uncertainties in weapons certi cation are subject to rigorous external peer review, and in this regard, certain imprecise probability methods are well established in the literature and attractive. These methods are illustrated using experimental data from LANL detonator impact testing.

  6. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  7. Weapons Neutron Research Facility (WNR)

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — The Weapons Neutron Research Facility (WNR) provides neutron and proton beams for basic, applied, and defense-related research. Neutron beams with energies ranging...

  8. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Transformation - A Sustainable Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this process of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start

  9. Agreement of 28 March 1991 between the Government of Solomon Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first one stipulates the agreement of Solomon Islands to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part two specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  10. Agreement of 13 June 1996 between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Principality of Monaco to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  11. Agreement of 30 March 1996 between the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Algeria to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  12. Agreement between the Republic of San Marino and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of San Marino and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Agreement was signed in Vienna on 3 March 1995 and in San Marino on 7 September 1998. It entered into force on 15 September 1998. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  13. Agreement of 16 September 1991 between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of South Africa to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  14. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

  16. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/258) concluded between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1998 and it entered into force on 28 july 1998

  17. Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

  18. Protocol additional to the agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement (INFCIRC/217) concluded between Australia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of the Additional Protocol was authorized by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997 and signed in Vienna on the same date. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 12 December 1997

  19. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This...

  20. A legal framework for a nuclear weapon convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The political possibility of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world has, since the Gulf War, at last come into view. This is mainly because serious numbers of the people from the national security establishment in the USA (a country that no longer has a rival to race against) have concluded that the elimination of nuclear weapons would best serve the country's interests. The crucial requirement for a nuclear-weapon-free world is a firm and serious policy by the main nuclear weapon states to achieve the goal of elimination. This political commitment must be backed by agreed (and inviolable) procedures for continually establishing new targets and deadlines, which drive the process relentlessly towards that ultimate objective, to be achieved at the earliest possible time. These words were incorporated into the final paragraph of the 1996 'Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons'. Even before the Canberra Commission was established, the Pugwash Council had proposed that the General Assembly of the United Nations should ask the Conference on Disarmament to initiate a study on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons. This paper considers some of the major aspects of such an instrument

  1. Rays as weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vogel, H. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)], E-mail: Hermann.vogel@ak-stgeorg.lbk-hh.de

    2007-08-15

    Purpose: Ionizing radiation is being regarded as life threatening. Therefore, accidents in nuclear power plants are considered equal threatening as nuclear bomb explosions, and attacks with dirty bombs are thought as dangerous as nuclear weapon explosions. However, there are differences between a nuclear bomb explosion, the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and an attack with a dirty bomb. It is intended to point them out. Method: The processes are described, which damage in a nuclear bomb explosion, in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and in an attack with a dirty bomb. Their effects are compared with each other, i.e. explosion, heat, shock wave (blast), ionizing radiation, and fallout. Results: In the center of the explosion of a nuclear bomb, the temperature rises to 100 Mio deg.C, this induces damaging heat radiation and shock wave. In the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant and in the conventional explosion of a dirty bomb, the temperature may rise up to 3000 deg. C, heat radiation and blast are limited to a short distance. In nuclear power plants, explosions due to oxyhydrogen gas or steam may occur. In nuclear explosions the dispersed radioactive material (fall out) consists mainly of isotopes with short half-life, in nuclear power plants and in dirty bomb attacks with longer half-life. The amount of fall out is comparable in nuclear bomb explosions with that in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, it is smaller in attacks with dirty bombs. An explosion in a nuclear power plant even in the largest imaginable accident is not a nuclear explosion. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were 200,000 victims nearly all by heat and blast, some 300 died by ionizing radiation. In Chernobyl, there have been less than 100 victims due to ionizing radiation up till now. A dirty bomb kills possibly with the explosion of conventional explosive, the dispersed radioactive material may damage

  2. Inquiry relating to safety due to modification of usage of nuclear fuel material (establishment of waste safety testing facility) in Tokai Laboratory, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Application was made to the director of the Science and Technology Agency (STA) for the license relating to the modification of usage of nuclear fuel material (the establishment of waste safety testing facility) from the director of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute on November 30, 1978. After passing through the safety evaluation in the Nuclear Safety Bureau of STA, inquiry was conducted to the head of the Atomic Energy Safety Commission (AESC) on June 6, 1979, from the director of the STA. The head of AESC directed to conduct the safety examination to the head of the Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Specialist Committee on June 7, 1979. The content of the modification of usage of nuclear fuel material is the establishment of waste safety testing facility to study and test the safety relating to the treatment and disposal of high level radioactive liquid wastes due to the reprocessing of spent fuel. As for the results of the safety examination, the siting of the waste safety testing facility which is located in the Tokai Laboratory, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), and the test plan of the glass solidification of high level radioactive liquid are presented as the outline of the study plan. The building, main equipments including six cells, the isolation room and the glove box, the storage, and the disposal facilities for gas, liquid and solid wastes are explained as the outline of the facilities. Concerning the items from the viewpoint of safety, aseismatic design, slightly vacuum operation, shielding, decay heat removal, fire protection, explosion protection, criticality management, radiation management and environmental effect were evaluated, and the safety was confirmed. (Nakai, Y.)

  3. North Korea has the means to develop a nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For a long time already, North Korea has been developing technology that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon. Progress of the nuclear weapons programme has been monitored by means of satellites, and proof of the programme has been obtained, for instance, from a diplomat who defected and when unauthorized exports have been revealed. Led by the United States, the international community has wanted to bring the nuclear weapons programme to an end, but the exceptional negotiating skills of North Korean representatives and sudden turns of events have made the task the difficult one. North Korea has been threatened with economic sanctions, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has decided to cease all technical assistance to North Korea. North Korea could hardly benefit from the use of a nuclear weapon: instead, giving up the programme might help the country economically. The death of the country's dictatorial leader Kim Il Sung seems to have increased the willingness to give up the programme. However, not the slightest information has yet been received as to the destiny of the plutonium already produced. In the end, North Korea may not be required to cancel the entire nuclear weapons programme; freezing the programme may be enough. Thus there would eventually be silent approval of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. (orig.)

  4. Agreement between the Republic of Namibia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Republic of Namibia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 17 March 1998, signed in Vienna on 19 March 1998, and entered into force on 15 April 1998

  5. Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  6. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/226) concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998, and signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998. Pending entry into force, the Protocol is being applied provisionally as from the date of signature, i.e. 12 June 1998

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Armenia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997, and it will enter into force on the date the Agency receives written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Pending entry into force, this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature, i.e., 29 September 1997

  8. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Czech Republic to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 9 September 1996, signed in Vienna on 18 September 1996 and entered into force on 11 September 1997

  9. Arms Control: US and International efforts to ban biological weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1992-12-01

    The Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, the treaty that bans the development, production, and stockpiling and acquisition of biological weapons was opened for signature in 1972 and came into force in 1975 after being ratified by 22 governments, including the depository nations of the USA, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union. In support of the Convention, the USA later established export controls on items used to make biological weapons. Further, in accordance with the 1990 President`s Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, actions were taken to redefine and expand US export controls, as well as to encourage multilateral controls through the Australia Group. Thus far, the Convention has not been effective in stopping the development of biological weapons. The principal findings as to the reasons of the failures of the Convention are found to be: the Convention lacks universality, compliance measures are effective, advantage of verification may outweigh disadvantages. Recommendations for mitigating these failures are outlined in this report.

  10. The use of neutron scattering in nuclear weapons research

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Juzaitis, R.J. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1995-10-01

    We had a weapons science breakout session last week. Although it would have been better to hold it closer in time to this workshop, I think that it was very valuable. it may have been less of a {open_quotes}short-sleeve{close_quotes} workshop environment than we would have liked, but as the first time two communities-the weapons community and the neutron scattering community- got together, it was a wonderful opportunity to transfer information during the 24 presentations that were made. This report contains discussions on the fundamental analysis of documentation of the enduring stockpile; LANSCE`s contribution to weapons; spallation is critical to understanding; weapons safety assessments; applied nuclear physics requires cross section information; fission models need refinement; and establishing teams on collaborative projects.

  11. Verification of Chemical Weapons Destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Chemical Weapons Convention is the only multilateral treaty that bans completely an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under international verification arrangements. Possessor States, i.e. those that have chemical weapons stockpiles at the time of becoming party to the CWC, commit to destroying these. All States undertake never to acquire chemical weapons and not to help other States acquire such weapons. The CWC foresees time-bound chemical disarmament. The deadlines for destruction for early entrants to the CWC are provided in the treaty. For late entrants, the Conference of States Parties intervenes to set destruction deadlines. One of the unique features of the CWC is thus the regime for verifying destruction of chemical weapons. But how can you design a system for verification at military sites, while protecting military restricted information? What degree of assurance is considered sufficient in such circumstances? How do you divide the verification costs? How do you deal with production capability and initial declarations of existing stockpiles? The founders of the CWC had to address these and other challenges in designing the treaty. Further refinement of the verification system has followed since the treaty opened for signature in 1993 and since inspection work was initiated following entry-into-force of the treaty in 1997. Most of this work concerns destruction at the two large possessor States, Russia and the United States. Perhaps some of the lessons learned from the OPCW experience may be instructive in a future verification regime for nuclear weapons. (author)

  12. History on establishment of Korea nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book deals with the history on establishment of Korea nuclear energy from 1955 to 1980 with 8.15 emancipation and Korea economy, declaration on using nuclear for peace, public opinion on making on contract for Korea-U.S.A nuclear agreement, building of reactor and departure of research center, plan for economic development for five years and propel for industrialization, establishment of the Ministry of Science-Technology and retreat of nuclear administration, plan for the development for nuclear power, issues on safety supervision in Korea atomic energy law, building for Yonggwang reactor 3.4, building of nuclear power plant and commission, nuclear reprocessing facilities and frustration on development of nuclear weapon, process on KEDO and academic society and social organization related nuclear power.

  13. Nuclear weapons and NATO-Russia relations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cornwell, G.C.

    1998-12-01

    Despite the development of positive institutional arrangements such as Russian participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council, the strategic culture of Russia has not changed in any fundamental sense. Russian strategic culture has not evolved in ways that would make Russian policies compatible with those of NATO countries in the necessary economic, social, technological, and military spheres. On the domestic side, Russia has yet to establish a stable democracy and the necessary legal, judicial, and regulatory institutions for a free-market economy. Russia evidently lacks the necessary cultural traditions, including concepts of accountability and transparency, to make these adaptations in the short-term. Owing in part to its institutional shortcomings, severe socioeconomic setbacks have afflicted Russia. Russian conventional military strength has been weakened, and a concomitant reliance by the Russians on nuclear weapons as their ultimate line of defense has increased. The breakdown in the infrastructure that supports Russian early warning and surveillance systems and nuclear weapons stewardship defense, coupled with a tendency towards has exacerbated Russian anxiety and distrust toward NATO. Russia`s reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate line of defense, coupled with a tendency toward suspicion and distrust toward NATO, could lead to dangerous strategic miscalculation and nuclear catastrophe.

  14. How electroshock weapons kill!

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lundquist, Marjorie

    2010-03-01

    Growing numbers of law enforcement officers now carry an electroshock weapon (ESW). Over 500 U.S. deaths have followed ESW use in the past 26 years; over 450 of these deaths followed use of an electromuscular disruptor in the past 9 years. Most training courses teach that ESWs are safe; that they can kill only by the direct effect of electric current on the heart; and that a death following use of an ESW always has some other cause. All these teachings are false! The last was disproved by Lundquist.^1 Williams^2 ruled out direct electrical effects as a cause of almost all the 213 deaths he studied, leaving disruption of normal physiological processes as the only alternative explanation. Careful study of all such deaths identifies 4 different ways that death has or could have been brought about by the ESW: kidney failure following rhabdomyolysis [rare]; cardiac arrest from hyperkalemia following rhabdomyolysis [undocumented]; lactic acid-induced ventricular fibrillation [conclusive proof impossible]; and [most common] anoxia from so much lactic acid in the circulating blood that it acts as an oxygen scavenger, continuously depleting the blood of oxygen until most of the lactate has been metabolized. ^1M. Lundquist, BAPS 54(1) K1.270(2009). ^2Howard E. Williams, Taser Electronic Control Devices and Sudden In-Custody Death, 2008.

  15. Analysis of High Energy Laser Weapon Employment from a Navy Ship

    OpenAIRE

    ANG, Ching Na

    2012-01-01

    This paper analyzes the employability of laser weapons on a Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class ship to counter small and fast boat threats. A general model of laser weapons is established to identify the attributes that characterize the laser weapon system. Quantitative values of each attribute are compared with current laser systems (that are under development) to identify potential laser types for employment on the Navy ship. In addition, plausible operational scenarios of suicide attack...

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999 and signed in Vienna on 21 June 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Korea written notification that the Republic of Korea's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  17. Nuclear Weapons and Science Education.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wellington, J. J.

    1984-01-01

    Provides suggestions on how science teachers can, and should, deal with the nuclear weapons debate in a balanced and critical way. Includes a table outlining points for and against deterrence and disarmament. (JN)

  18. Risk in the Weapons Stockpile

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Noone, Bailey C [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-14

    When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

  19. Agreement between the government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of Republic of Estonia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 24 February 1992, signed in Vienna on 18 November 1997 and in Tallinn on 24 November 1997, and entered into force on 24 November 1997

  20. Islamic State and Chemical Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lukáš Rafay

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available The article deals with topic of Islamic State and chemical weapons. The issue is analysed in three dimensions: origin of used chemical weapons and possibility of independent production; known chemical attacks and tactical regularities in their execution; and traits of future chemical terrorist attacks. By providing a thorough examination of the problem, the article aims at predicting the future development of the group’s chemical program as well as describing any prospective chemical terrorist attacks in Europe

  1. Nuclear weapons and the law.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Murray, R K

    1999-01-01

    The history of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is summarized, with a discussion of some of its earlier Advisory Opinions. The Advisory Opinion on the legality of nuclear arms is considered in the light of the principles of international humanitarian law and a review of nuclear weapons effects. The present government's position on nuclear weapons as outlined in the Strategic Defence Review (which ignores the issue of legality) is examined critically. PMID:10371869

  2. After fifty years of the nuclear age: Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or elimination of them?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ever since the first test of the atomic bomb and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, mankind lived with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were inevitably connected with the Cold War, with its end new opportunity has come concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Steps are to be undertaken in order to eliminate the nuclear weapons. First, would be the prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. By excluding the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, the world could be closer to nuclear disarmament than ever. The prohibition of the use of some type of weapons could be a breakthrough towards the elimination of such weapons. While the negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons would be difficult, as were those to ban chemical weapons, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons would eventually lead to their elimination. During the Cold War, the imminent goal of disarmament was to stop the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. But in the post-Cold War era an opportunity has developed for further steps towards nuclear disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons

  3. White paper on atomic energy in 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This is the White Paper on the Atomic Energy, 1995. This was prepared on general trends of the atomic power in Japan for recent one year. This paper is composed of two parts, which are the subjective part and the reference part. In Chapter 1 of the subjective part, summaries on international trend of non-proliferation and national trend focussing to nuclear fuel recycling and an attitude of Japanese government on treatment and disposal of high-level radioactive wastes essential for promoting the nuclear fuel recycling policy were shown. In Chapter 2, some concrete descriptions were shown at center of their recent trends, on establishment of international reliability for non-proliferation of nuclear weapon, safety security of atomic energy, promotion of information opening and peoples' understandings, present status and future trend on nuclear power generation, nuclear power generation due to light water reactor system, research and development of nuclear fuel recycling, back end countermeasure, promotion of diverse development and basic research on nuclear science technology, international cooperation in atomic energy field, promotive base for atomic energy development and utilization, and development and utilization, and development of nuclear industries. Furthermore, in the reference part, some reports were introduced on main decisions in the Atomic Energy Commission, talk of the chief of the Atomic Energy Commission, and governmental estimates and year table relating to the atomic energy, and so forth. (G.K.)

  4. Youths Carrying a Weapon or Using a Weapon in a Fight: What Makes the Difference?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-Andre; Berchtold, Andre; Akre, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were…

  5. On the U.S.-Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons Cut as a Path toward a Nuclear-free World

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Shi; Jianbin

    2015-01-01

    Complete destruction of nuclear weapons and realization of a world free from nuclear weapons are the common aspiration of mankind in the atomic era.To achieve the goal,the international community has proposed a series of steps and measures,which include calling for a deep reduction of the U.S.and Russian nuclear arsenals,promoting ratification of the CTBT,initiating negotiation of the FMCT,reducing the role of nuclear weapons

  6. Re-examining the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion: Concerning the Legality of Nuclear Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jasjit Singh

    2012-10-01

    Full Text Available The primary objections raised against total elimination of nuclear weapons are built around a few arguments mostly of non-technical nature.Nuclear weapons and the strategies for their use have resulted in the establishment of a vicious circle within which the international community is trapped.The argument that the world will be unsafe without nuclear weapons is only meant to further the narrow self-interest of the nuclear weapon states and their allies.The World Court’s far-reaching 1996 advisory opinion concluded that almost any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would violate international humanitarian law and law applicable in armed conflict, undermining most claims of nuclear weapon states regarding the legitimacy of possession, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The next logical step would be an initiative for a nuclear convention banning the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons in Asia and the adjoining oceans. But as long as the dominant elites in society and the nation-state believe in the utility of nuclear weapons for national security or as the currency of power, abolition of nuclear weapons will remain a mirage.

  7. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1994-03-01

    The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, seeks to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) that will extend from the US-Mexican border to Antarctica`s territorial boundaries, including large areas of open ocean. Under the treaty, signatory states pledge not to test, use, produce, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons; to use nuclear materials and facilities {open_quotes}exclusively for peaceful purposes;{close_quotes} and not to permit the stationing or development of nuclear weapons on their territories.

  8. The GT-MHR for destruction of weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The disposal of nearly 100 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium (WG-Pu) made surplus by the disarmament treaties is receiving urgent attention, highlighted by the recent seizure in Germany of small quantities of weapons-useful plutonium. Unlike highly enriched uranium, simple denaturing cannot make this plutonium worthless for use in future weapons. The use of physical security and institutional barriers, including long-term storage in high-level waste repositories, to provide secure storage for centuries to come is questionable when considering government instability and the possibility of national recidivism. The Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and General Atomics have signed an agreement for the cooperative design of a gas turbine-modular helium reactor (GT-MHR) to burn the WG-Pu stockpile. A formal proposal for a joint U.S./Russian program for the development of this reactor has been submitted by MINATOM to Vice President Gore. The major benefit of this program is that the reactor would deplete the Russian surplus plutonium stockpile, provide jobs for technical specialists in the former weapons complex, and produce valuable electric power. It would also provide a mutually assured means of destroying the U.S. and Russian stockpiles

  9. By Weapons Made Worthy

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bazelmans, Jos

    1999-01-01

    In this book Jos Bazelmans offers a new perspective on the relationship between lord and retainer in early medieval society. This perspective goes beyond established politico-economic interpretations and aims for an interpretation of this relationship in ritual-cosmological terms.Drawing on recent d

  10. Ultrasound-assisted extraction technique for establishing selenium contents in breast cancer biopsies by Zeeman-electrothermal atomic absorption spectrometry using multi-injection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A solid-liquid extraction method is developed to establish the contents of selenium in breast cancer biopsies. The method is based on the ultrasound-assisted extraction of selenium from pretreated biopsies prior to Se determination by atomic absorption spectrometry with longitudinal-Zeeman background correction. Fifty-one breast biopsies were collected from the Cies Hospital (Vigo, Spain), 32 of which correspond to tumor tissue and 19 to normal tissue (parenchyma). Difficulties arising from the samples analyzed, i.e. small samples mass (50-100 mg), extremely low Se contents and sample texture modification including tissue hardening due to formaldehyde preservation are addressed and overcome. High intensity sonication using a probe together with addition of hydrogen peroxide succeeded in completely extracting Se from biopsies. The multiple injection technique was useful to tackle the low Se contents present in some biopsies. The detection limit was 25 ng g-1 of Se and the precision, expressed as relative standard deviation, was less than 10%. Se contents ranged from 0.08 to 0.4 μg g-1 for parenchyma samples and from 0.09 to 0.8 μg g-1 for tumor samples. In general, Se levels in tumor biopsies were higher as compared with the adjacent normal tissue in 19 patients by a factor of up to 6. Analytical data confirmed Se accumulation in the breast tumors

  11. Standards for transport and storage components established by The Atomic Energy Society of Japan and The Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since June 1997 the standards/specifications and inspection/certification of various products in Japan have been reviewed by Ministries and Agencies, with the aim of reducing direct government intervention to a necessary minimum and creating a free and fair socio-economic system that is fully opened to the international community and based on the rules of self-responsibility and market principles. Reflecting this policy the administrative regulations which prescribe technical standards as specific requirements have been revised by degrees into performance prescriptions. Detailed provisions in ordinances and notices have been abolished gradually to utilize voluntary standards and rules. In the nuclear energy field voluntary standards are being developed to make up statutory performance requirements by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) and the Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers (JSME) together with other organizations such as the Japan Electric Association, the Thermal and Nuclear Power Engineering Society. These voluntary standards and rules by these organizations have been established in order to maintain openness, transparency, fairness, professionalism and promptness and to promote development and globalization

  12. Ultrasound-assisted extraction technique for establishing selenium contents in breast cancer biopsies by Zeeman-electrothermal atomic absorption spectrometry using multi-injection

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lavilla, I. [Departamento de Quimica Analitica y Alimentaria, Facultad de Quimica, Universidad de Vigo, As Lagoas-Marcosende s/n, 36310 Vigo (Spain); Mosquera, A. [Departamento de Quimica Analitica y Alimentaria, Facultad de Quimica, Universidad de Vigo, As Lagoas-Marcosende s/n, 36310 Vigo (Spain); Millos, J. [Centro de Apoyo Cientifico y Tecnologico a la Investigacion, Universidad de Vigo (Spain); Cameselle, J. [Complejo Hospitalario Xeral-Cies, Pizarro 22, 36311 Vigo (Spain); Bendicho, C. [Departamento de Quimica Analitica y Alimentaria, Facultad de Quimica, Universidad de Vigo, As Lagoas-Marcosende s/n, 36310 Vigo (Spain)]. E-mail: bendicho@uviqo.es

    2006-04-27

    A solid-liquid extraction method is developed to establish the contents of selenium in breast cancer biopsies. The method is based on the ultrasound-assisted extraction of selenium from pretreated biopsies prior to Se determination by atomic absorption spectrometry with longitudinal-Zeeman background correction. Fifty-one breast biopsies were collected from the Cies Hospital (Vigo, Spain), 32 of which correspond to tumor tissue and 19 to normal tissue (parenchyma). Difficulties arising from the samples analyzed, i.e. small samples mass (50-100 mg), extremely low Se contents and sample texture modification including tissue hardening due to formaldehyde preservation are addressed and overcome. High intensity sonication using a probe together with addition of hydrogen peroxide succeeded in completely extracting Se from biopsies. The multiple injection technique was useful to tackle the low Se contents present in some biopsies. The detection limit was 25 ng g{sup -1} of Se and the precision, expressed as relative standard deviation, was less than 10%. Se contents ranged from 0.08 to 0.4 {mu}g g{sup -1} for parenchyma samples and from 0.09 to 0.8 {mu}g g{sup -1} for tumor samples. In general, Se levels in tumor biopsies were higher as compared with the adjacent normal tissue in 19 patients by a factor of up to 6. Analytical data confirmed Se accumulation in the breast tumors.

  13. Prevention of the Outer Space Weaponization

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhukov, Gennady P.

    2002-01-01

    9 states. The satellites of various functions (early warning, communication, data acquisition, reconnaissance and navigation) were actively used and continue to be used with the purposes of raising efficiency of ground armed forces, especially in fight against international terrorism. At the same time such satellites are not a weapon in the sense of that word since they do not create the threats of armed attack in outer space or from outer space. Moreover, they promote maintaining of stability in the international relations. For this reason the reconnaissance and data acquisition satellites used for the verification of observance by States of the arms limitation agreements are under international protection as national technical means of the control. Similar protection is enjoyed by the early warning satellites. With the help of space communication facilities the more reliable operative connection of the statesmen is organized in the strained situations. By this way the probability of making of the incorrect retaliatory decisions in critical political situations is reduced. At the same time it's necessary to take into consideration that the activities of such satellite systems are tightly connected with ground armed forces of the states. the earth, what from the point of view of international law may be qualified as establishing a partial demilitarization regime in outer space. After the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons it will be possible to speak about establishing of an international legal regime of complete demilitarization in outer space eliminating any kinds of weapon from outer space. in a peaceful time. weaponization.The main task of this paper is to analyze and to discuss the present binding regime of the outer space deweaponization and particular measures on consolidation and strengthening of this regime. agreements of the Russian Federation and the USA into multilateral Treaties. Such "immunity" would cover

  14. OIL AS POLITICAL WEAPON

    OpenAIRE

    Mariana, BUICAN

    2013-01-01

    Oil (called by some black gold) has not always been as coveted and used, but only in the last hundred years has established itself as a highly sought after as an indispensable proper functioning of modern economic activity that an important factor in international politics. International oil regime has changed in the last decades. In 1960, oil regime was a private oligopol which had links with governments main consuming countries. By then the price of a barrel of oil was two U.S. dollars and ...

  15. Nuclear weapon states: Their roles, responsibilities and management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Four issues concerning the role of nuclear-weapon sates are briefly analyzed. The first is related to the importance of responsibilities that nuclear weapon states should take in order to improve the existing mechanisms for non-proliferation. Nuclear weapon states should cease further nuclear armament immediately and should unanimously agree to implement a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is both legal and moral obligation stipulated in the Non-proliferation Treaty. Second, an international plutonium management system needs to be established. The third issue is related to the need for IAEA special inspections (problem of North Korea). Difficulties could be overcome by strengthening the IAEA negotiation powers. Fourth, the IAEA and the international community could indicate their appreciation to states like South Korea that voluntarily abandon nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment in order to contribute to regional and global peace and stability

  16. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1992-12-31

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL`s Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents.

  17. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL's Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents

  18. UFOs and nukes. Extraordinary encounters at nuclear weapons sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Everyone knows about the reported recovery of a crashed alien spaceship near Roswell, New Mexico in July 1947. However, most people are unaware that, at the time of the incident, Roswell Army Airfield was home to the world's only atomic bomber squadron, the 509th Bomb Group. Was this merely a coincidence? During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built thousands of the far more destructive hydrogen bombs, some of them a thousand times as destructive as the first atomic bombs dropped on Japan. If the nuclear standoff between the superpowers had erupted into World War III, human civilization - and perhaps the very survival of our species - would have been at risk. Did this ominous state of affairs come to the attention of outside observers? Was there a connection between the atomic bomber squadron based at Roswell and the reported crash of a UFO nearby? Did those who pilot the UFOs monitor the superpowers' nuclear arms race during the dangerous Cold War era? Do they scrutinize American and Russian weapons sites even now? UFOs and Nukes provides the startling and sometimes shocking answers to these questions. Veteran researcher Robert Hastings has investigated nuclear weapons-related UFO incidents for more than three decades and has interviewed more than 120 ex-US Air Force personnel, from former Airmen to retired Colonels, who witnessed extraordinary UFO encounters at nuclear weapons sites. Their amazing stories are presented here.

  19. Weapons engineering tritium facility overview

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Najera, Larry [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-20

    Materials provide an overview of the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) as introductory material for January 2011 visit to SRS. Purpose of the visit is to discuss Safety Basis, Conduct of Engineering, and Conduct of Operations. WETF general description and general GTS program capabilities are presented in an unclassified format.

  20. Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Agreement by exchange of letters of 6 November 1995 and 25 June 1996 with the Republic of Chile in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the Agreement by exchange of letters with the Republic of Chile on Safeguards Agreement of 5 April 1995 concluded between Chile and the IAEA, in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty). The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 1996. The texts of letters of 6 November 1995 and 25 June 1996 are also included

  1. Direct-energy weapons : invisible and invincible?

    OpenAIRE

    Deveci, Bayram Mert

    2007-01-01

    A military weapon is any tool used to increase the reach or power of a nation. Simply, it can be said that each era witnesses the deployment of new and powerful mass destruction weaponry. What will this century's most powerful weapon be? Directed-energy weapons, which offer advantages over conventional weapons by providing attack at the speed of light, precise targeting, rapid engagement of multiple targets, adjustable damage capacity, low operational cost, reduced logistic support, a nea...

  2. 32 CFR 1903.10 - Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 6 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons. 1903.10 Section 1903.10 National... INSTALLATIONS § 1903.10 Weapons. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, knowingly possessing or causing to be present a weapon on an Agency installation, or attempting to do so is prohibited....

  3. Fast reactors and surplus weapon`s grade plutonium utilization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Antipov, S.A.; Astafiev, V.A.; Bibilashvily, Yu.K.; Reshetnikov, F.G. [All-Russia Research Inst. of Inorganic Materials, Moscow (Russian Federation)

    1997-12-31

    Liberated large quantities of surplus weapon`s grade Pu have lead to a more acute problem relevant to Pu utilization and storage. The Russian scientists acknowledge the use of Pu in fast reactors to be most efficient. In this case a new composition of fuel is to be designed that would much reduce or eliminate Pu breeding. With this aim in view two kinds of fuel are under study, namely, higher Pu content (up to 45-50%) fuel and the one containing an inert diluent. The study and optimization of their production processes are in progress. In the nearest future experimental fuel rods fueled with both the fuel types will be loaded to be in-pile tested. (author)

  4. Fire control apparatus for a laser weapon

    Science.gov (United States)

    Worsham, R. H.

    1985-10-01

    This patent application discloses a laser weapon fire control computer apparatus for responding in real time to the escort/threat scenario that confronts the weapon. The fire control computer apparatus compares the threat data with stored predicted scenarios to develop a firing strategy menu which takes into account the fact that the laser energy is instantaneously propagated to the target but requires a substantial amount of time to inflict damage. The fire control computer apparatus utilizes the weapon's status, dwell time, slow time and fuel limits to yield a weapon pointing sequence and weapon on-off times.

  5. Radiological Weapons: How Great Is The Danger?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moore, G M

    2003-06-01

    One of the underlying purposes of this paper is to provoke thinking about the interplay between the regulation of radioactive materials and the risk of their use in an radiological weapon (RW). Also considered in this paper are the types of RWs that a terrorist might use, the nature of the threat and danger posed by the various types of RWs, the essential elements that must be considered in responding to the terrorist use of an RW, and what steps may need to be taken a priori to minimize the consequences of the inevitable use of an RW. Because radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) have been the focus of so much recent concern and because RDDs are arguably the most likely of RWs to be used by a terrorist group, a major focus of this paper will be on RDDs. Radiological weapons are going to be used by some individual or group, if not this year then next year, or at some time in the foreseeable future. A policy of focusing resources solely on prevention of their use would leave any government open to significant economic disruption when the inevitable use occurs. Preplanning can limit the injuries, property damage, and economic losses that might result from the use of an RW. Moreover, a combination of efforts to prevent and to minimize the impact of RWs may significantly discourage potential users. The dangers from RWs can be dealt with while society continues to enjoy the benefits of nuclear technology that were promised under Atoms for Peace. However, some restructuring of our use of radioactive materials is necessary to ensure that the current and future uses of radioactive materials outweigh the potential disruption caused by misuse of the materials in RWs.

  6. Why Sexually Selected Weapons Are Not Ornaments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McCullough, Erin L; Miller, Christine W; Emlen, Douglas J

    2016-10-01

    The elaboration and diversification of sexually selected weapons remain poorly understood. We argue that progress in this topic has been hindered by a strong bias in sexual selection research, and a tendency for weapons to be conflated with ornaments used in mate choice. Here, we outline how male-male competition and female choice are distinct mechanisms of sexual selection, and why weapons and ornaments are fundamentally different types of traits. We call for research on the factors contributing to weapon divergence, the potential for male-male competition to drive speciation, and the specific use of weapons in the context of direct fights versus displays. Given that weapons are first and foremost fighting structures, biomechanical approaches are an especially promising direction for understanding weapon design. PMID:27475833

  7. Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. An agreement by exchange of letters of 5 February and 5 April 2001 with the Republic of Colombia in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. This Exchange of Letters constitutes an agreement confirming that: - the Safeguards Agreement of 22 December 1982, concluded between the Republic of Colombia and the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty), also satisfies the obligation of Colombia under Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA; the safeguards set forth in the Safeguards Agreement shall also apply, as regards Colombia, in connection with the NPT; the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply as long as Colombia is party to the NPT or the Tlatelolco Treaty or both

  8. Proceedings of the Tungsten Workshop for Hard Target Weapons Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mackiewicz-Ludtka, G.; Hayden, H.W.; Davis, R.M.

    1995-06-01

    The purpose of this meeting was to review and exchange information and provide technical input for improving technologies relevant to the Hard Target Weapons Program. This workshop was attended by representatives from 17 organizations, including 4 Department of Defense (DoD) agencies, 8 industrial companies, and 5 laboratories within DOE. Hard targets are defined as reinforced underground structures that house enemy forces, weapon systems, and support equipment. DOE-ORO and Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems) have been involved in advanced materials research and development (R&D) for several DOE and DoD programs. These programs are conducted in close collaboration with Eglin AFB, Department of the Army`s Picatinny Arsenal, and other DoD agencies. As part of this ongoing collaboration, Eglin AFB and Oak Ridge National Laboratory planned and conducted this workshop to support the Hard Target Weapons Program. The objectives of this workshop were to (1) review and identify the technology base that exists (primarily due to anti-armor applications) and assess the applicability of this technology to the Hard Target Weapons Program requirements; (2) determine future directions to establish the W materials, processing, and manufacturing technologies suitable for use in fixed, hard target penetrators; and (3) identify and prioritize the potential areas for technical collaboration among the participants.

  9. Weapons barrel life cycle determination

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Nebojša Pene Hristov

    2013-10-01

    Full Text Available This article describes the dynamic processes within the gun barrel during the firing process in exploitation. It generally defines the basic principles of constructing tube elements, and shows the distortion of the basic geometry of the tube interior due to wear as well as the impact it causes during exploitation. The article also defines basic empirical models as well as a model based on fracture mechanics for the calculation of a use-life of the barrel, and other elements essential for the safe use of the barrel as the basic weapon element. Erosion causes are analysed in order to control and reduce wear and prolong the lifetime of the gun barrel. It gives directions for the reparation of barrels with wasted resources. In conclusion, the most influential elements of tube wear are given as well as possible modifications of existing systems, primarily propellant charges, with a purpose of prolonging lifetime of gun barrels. The guidelines for a proper determination of the lifetime based on the barrel condition assessment are given as well. INTRODUCTION The barrel as the basic element of each weapon is described as well as the processes occurring during the firing that have impulsive character and are accompanied by large amounts of energy. The basic elements of barrel and itheir constructive characteristics are descibed. The relation between Internal ballistics, ie calculation of the propellant gas pressure in the firing process, and structural elements defined by the barrel material resistance is shown. In general, this part of the study explains the methodology of the gun barrel structural elements calculation, ie. barrel geometry, taking into account the degrees of safety in accordance with Military Standards.   TUBE WEAR AND DEFORMATIONS The weapon barrel gradually wears out during exploitation due to which it no longer satisfies the set requirements. It is considered that the barrel has experienced a lifetime when it fails to fulfill the

  10. Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Vladimír Pitschmann

    2014-01-01

    This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical we...

  11. Nuclear weapons non proliferation treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taking into account the devastation that a nuclear war would inflict upon mankind, and the resulting need to do all that is in our power to keep such a tragedy from occuring, as well as to implement measures to safeguard all the peoples' safety, each State that owns nuclear weapons and that is a part of the Treaty pledges not to trade nuclear weapons, other explosive devices nor the control over such instruments to any other entity whatsoever, wether directly or indirectly. Likewise, all States that does not posses any nuclear weaponry and that are part of the Treaty, in turn pledge not to receive from any other entity nuclear weaponry or other explosive devices in trade, wether directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire this fashion of weaponry and not to request or accept any help whatsoever in the manufacturing of nuclear weaponry or related devices. The present Treaty remains open to the subscription of other countries, on July 26, 1968, with Mexico as one of the signatory countries

  12. US and Russia face urgent decisions on weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Surplus plutonium poses a ''clear and present danger to national and international security,'' warns a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study released in January, titled ''The Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium.'' Over the past few years, many different methods of disposing of plutonium have been proposed. They range from shooting it into the Sun with missiles, to deep-seabed disposal, to fissioning it within a new generation of nuclear reactors. The NAS report rejects most of the methods suggested so far, but does recommend pursuing two of the options. One is to incorporate the plutonium in mixed-oxide fuel, a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides, and use it to fuel commercial nuclear reactors. The other is to mix the plutonium with high-level waste and molten glass and mold the resulting material into large glass logs for eventual geologic disposal. Both are discussed here. The panel that wrote the NAS study is a standing committee called the Committee on International Security ampersand Arms Control. It suggests steps that should be taken now to guard supplies of plutonium removed from weapons. One step is bilateral US-Russian monitoring of warhead dismantlement. Others include setting up secure interim storage for the fissile materials and establishing an international monitoring system to verify the stockpiles and ensure that materials are not withdrawn for use in new weapons. The panel also urges Russia to stop producing fissile weapons materials and both countries to commit a very large fraction of their plutonium and highly enriched uranium from dismantled weapons to nonaggressive uses. The US and Russia have already made initial moves to accomplish these goals but have not fully implemented any of them

  13. A nuclear-weapon-free zone from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1995, at the Extension and Review Conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Belarus introduced the new idea of establishing the nuclear-weapon-free zone 'in the center of Europe', as an alternative to a military and nuclear expansion eastwards by the Western military alliance NATO. The geographical scope of the zone from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea could encompass the former Warsaw pact territory west of Russian federation including: the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), four Visegrad states (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), newly independent states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova), Romania and Bulgaria. The success of nuclear-weapon-free zone is dependent on how it would be accepted by the nuclear-weapon powers and the surrounding world. There would be four measures of central importance for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in general and in European case: non-possession of nuclear weapons by zonal states; non-stationing of nuclear weapons within the zone by any state; non-use or no-threat of use of nuclear weapons throughout the zone or against targets within the zone; and verification that parties comply with their treaty obligations

  14. Law project (no. 1329) adopted by the Senate and authorizing the ratification of the agreement between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency relative to the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of nuclear weapons prohibition in South America and the Caribbeans area (two protocols together); Projet de loi (no. 1329) adopte par le Senat autorisant la ratification de l'accord entre la Republique francaise, la Communaute europeenne de l'energie atomique et l'Agence internationale de l'energie atomique relatif a l'application de garanties dans le cadre du traite visant l'interdiction des armes nucleraires en Amerique latine et dans les Caraibes (ensemble deux protocoles)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2004-01-01

    The French Senate adopted on January 6, 2004 the project of law which authorizes the ratification of the agreement between France, the European atomic energy community and the IAEA about the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons in South America and in the Caribbean area signed in Vienna (Austria) on March 21, 2000. The text of this treaty is attached to this law. (J.S.)

  15. Color image fusion for concealed weapon detection

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Toet, A.

    2003-01-01

    Recent advances in passive and active imaging sensor technology offer the potential to detect weapons that are concealed underneath a person's clothing or carried along in bags. Although the concealed weapons can sometimes easily be detected, it can be difficult to perceive their context, due to the

  16. Overview of surplus weapons plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rudy, G.

    1996-05-01

    The safe disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium is a very important and urgent task. While the functions of long term storage and disposition directly relate to the Department`s weapons program and the environmental management program, the focus of this effort is particularly national security and nonproliferation.

  17. Nuclear Weapons, Psychology, and International Relations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dougherty, James E.

    1976-01-01

    Fear of nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and nuclear was is widespread among the peoples of the world. However, to what extent do the fears (both rational and irrational) of policy-making elites and political masses produce actual effects upon the behavior of governments (who, after all, control the use of nuclear weapons)? (Author/RK)

  18. Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bing, G.F.

    1991-08-20

    This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

  19. "Fat Man and Little Boy": The Cinematic Representation of Interests in the Nuclear Weapons Organization.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Taylor, Bryan C.

    1993-01-01

    Examines the ironic "problems" of the 1989 Hollywood film "Fat Man and Little Boy" (portraying the construction of the atomic bomb at the Los Alamos Laboratory during World War II) to demonstrate the ideological operations of nuclear texts, and the role of the nuclear weapons organization as a symbolic form in cultural discourse. (SR)

  20. Electronic eyebox for weapon sights

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szapiel, Stan; Greenhalgh, Catherine; Wagner, Kevin; Nobes, Ryan

    2016-05-01

    We expand the effective size of the eyebox of a magnified telescopic weapon sight by following the movements of the operator's eye to create a larger, `electronic eyebox'. The original eyebox of the telescope is dynamically relocated in space so that proper overlap between the pupil of the eye and the exit pupil of the device is maintained. Therefore, the operator will perceive the entire field of view of the instrument in a much bigger spatial region than the one defined by the original eyebox. Proof-of-the-concept results are presented with a more than 3.5X enlargement of the eyebox volume along with recommendations for the next phase of development.

  1. Taser and Conducted Energy Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    LeClair, Thomas G; Meriano, Tony

    2015-01-01

    It is clear that CEWs are an increasingly prevalent law enforcement tool, adopted to address a complex and challenging problem. The potential for serious injury from a single deployment of a CEW is extremely low. The debate regarding the link between these electrical weapons and sudden in-custody death is likely to continue because their use is often in complex and volatile situations. Any consideration of injuries has to be put into that context. One must also consider what injuries to a subject would result if an alternative force method was used. Furthermore, the potential benefits of CEWs, including reduction in injuries to the public and law-enforcement officers, need to be considered. PMID:26630100

  2. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We all want to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The issue before us is how best to achieve this objective; more specifically, whether the peaceful applications of nuclear energy help or hinder, and to what extent. Many of us in the nuclear industry are working on these applications from a conviction that without peaceful nuclear energy the risk of nuclear war would be appreciably greater. Others, however, hold the opposite view. In discussing the subject, a necessary step in allaying fears is understanding some facts, and indeed facing up to some unpalatable facts. When the facts are assessed, and a balance struck, the conclusion is that peaceful nuclear energy is much more part of the solution to preventing nuclear war than it is part of the problem

  3. Weapon Control System for Airborne Application.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    M. Sankar Kishore

    2000-07-01

    Full Text Available The integrated fire' control system (IFCS plays an important role in the present-day fighter aircraft and helicopters. Wecapons, such as missiles (active/passive, rockets and guns may be present on thelfighter aircraft or helicopter .IFCS monitors the status of the weapons present on the vehicle and passes the information to pilot/co-pilot. Depending upon the health/availability of the weapons, IFCS selects/fires the weapons. An attempt has been made to bring out the details of one such IFCS. As a I stepping stone, smaller version is developed and same philosophy can be used for integrating ftlore and I more weapons. Here, emphasis has been made on design and development of weapon control unit which is the heart f IFCS, both in hardware and software. The system has been developed using a 486 DX2 processor, and an elaborate software has been developed in PL/M.

  4. The American atom: A documentary history of nuclear policies from the discovery of fission to the present

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In selecting these historical documents the authors have applied three general tests: first, does the document help tell the story of the development of American nuclear policy in a nontechnical way; second, is the source primary rather than secondary, written by an actor in the drama rather than by a member of the audience; third, does the document provide coverage of the major chapters in the story? The Manhattan Project was America's $2 billion secret project to build an atomic bomb. Many documents associated with the project have come to light only in recent years. In Section II they use the letters of J. Robert Oppenheimer and the recently declassified minutes of policy committees to tell the story of how the bomb was designed and built and how the decision was made to drop the first uranium and plutonium devices on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. How did a weapon of war become the key to a peacetime industry? In considering atomic energy after World War II, they focus in Section III on the legislative enabling acts that established the Atomic Energy Commission, the short-lived dream of international control of nuclear weapons under the Baruch Plan, and the ''atoms for peace'' program of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. By 1954 the highly classified work on nuclear weapons paralleled a new development of nuclear energy and power reactors. Knowledge was shared with both private industry and other countries. The fruits of this program are considered in the later section on nuclear power

  5. Concealed weapons detection using electromagnetic resonances

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hunt, Allen R.; Hogg, R. Douglas; Foreman, William

    1998-12-01

    Concealed weapons pose a significant threat to both law enforcement and security agency personnel. The uncontrolled environments associated with peacekeeping and the move toward relaxation of concealed weapons laws here in the U.S. provide a strong motivation for developing weapons detection technologies which are noninvasive and can function noncooperatively. Existing weapons detection systems are primarily oriented to detecting metal and require the cooperation of the person being searched. The new generation of detectors under development that focuses primarily on imaging methods, faces problems associated with privacy issues. There remains a need for a weapons detector which is portable, detects weapons remotely, avoids the issues associated with privacy rights, can tell the difference between car keys and a knife, and is affordable enough that one can be issued to every peacekeeper and law enforcement officer. AKELA is developing a concealed weapons detector that uses wideband radar techniques to excite natural electromagnetic resonances that characterize the size, shape, and material composition of an object. Neural network processing is used to classify the difference between weapons and nuisance objects. We have constructed both time and frequency domain test systems and used them to gather experimental data on a variety of armed and unarmed individuals. These experiments have been performed in an environment similar to the operational environment. Preliminary results from these experiments show that it is possible to detect a weapon being carried by an individual from a distance of 10 to 15 feet, and to detect a weapon being concealed behind the back. The power required is about 100 milliwatts. A breadboard system is being fabricated and will be used by AKELA and our law enforcement partner to gather data in operationally realistic situations. While a laptop computer will control the breadboard system, the wideband radar electronics will fit in a box the

  6. Project Increase of infrastructure: 'Establishment of a laboratory for studies of pollutants in air, water and soil through atomic and nuclear techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this report there are the guidelines of this project as well as the goals, activities and costs. The general objectives were: 1. A laboratory that allows to analyze with efficiency samples of air, water and soil pollutants using atomic and nuclear origin techniques as PIXE (Proton Induced X-ray Emission, NRA (Nuclear Reaction Analysis) and RBS (Rutherford Backscattering) as well as auxiliary and/or complementary techniques. 2. To obtain indicators of the influence of the pollution of the Valley of Mexico about the ecology and the health of the inhabitants of Mexico City with perspectives of carrying out studies in other cities. 3. To develop an appropriate technology for the realization of those studies and to generate human resources in this area. (Author)

  7. Toxikological and health aspects of nonlethal chemical weapons.

    OpenAIRE

    HAMERNÍKOVÁ, Magdalena

    2010-01-01

    ABSTRACT Toxicology and Health Aspects of Non-lethal Chemical Weapons. Non-lethal chemical weapons, which belong among the mass destruction weapons, have been one of the most frequently discussed topics recently. These weapons are able to disbar manpower or combat technology and weapons smartly and temporarily with minimum costs. The range of possible application of chemical weapons as non-lethal is probably wider compared to any other type, and there are a lot of means capable of immediate w...

  8. Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on behalf of the Board of Governors to all members of the Agency on the Non-Compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (INFCIRC/403) and on the Agency's inability to verify the non-diversion of material required to be safeguarded

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains the following items: Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on behalf of the Board of Governors to all members of the Agency on the non-compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of Safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the Agency's inability to verify the non-diversion of material required to be safeguarded; resolution adopted by the Board on 1 April 1993 (Annex 1); Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Annex 2); resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 25 February 1993 (Annex 3); Communications from the Director General of the IAEA to the Minister for Atomic Energy of DPRK or from the Minister for Atomic Energy of the DPRK of the Director General of the IAEA (Annexes 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12); statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pyongyang, 12 March 1993 (Annex 7); resolution adopted by the Board on 18 March 1993 (Annex 10)

  9. Atomic phase diagram

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    LI Shichun

    2004-01-01

    Based on the Thomas-Fermi-Dirac-Cheng model, atomic phase diagram or electron density versus atomic radius diagram describing the interaction properties of atoms of different kinds in equilibrium state is developed. Atomic phase diagram is established based on the two-atoms model. Besides atomic radius, electron density and continuity condition for electron density on interfaces between atoms, the lever law of atomic phase diagram involving other physical parameters is taken into account, such as the binding energy, for the sake of simplicity.

  10. Atom Skimmers and Atom Lasers Utilizing Them

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hulet, Randall; Tollett, Jeff; Franke, Kurt; Moss, Steve; Sackett, Charles; Gerton, Jordan; Ghaffari, Bita; McAlexander, W.; Strecker, K.; Homan, D.

    2005-01-01

    Atom skimmers are devices that act as low-pass velocity filters for atoms in thermal atomic beams. An atom skimmer operating in conjunction with a suitable thermal atomic-beam source (e.g., an oven in which cesium is heated) can serve as a source of slow atoms for a magneto-optical trap or other apparatus in an atomic-physics experiment. Phenomena that are studied in such apparatuses include Bose-Einstein condensation of atomic gases, spectra of trapped atoms, and collisions of slowly moving atoms. An atom skimmer includes a curved, low-thermal-conduction tube that leads from the outlet of a thermal atomic-beam source to the inlet of a magneto-optical trap or other device in which the selected low-velocity atoms are to be used. Permanent rare-earth magnets are placed around the tube in a yoke of high-magnetic-permeability material to establish a quadrupole or octupole magnetic field leading from the source to the trap. The atoms are attracted to the locus of minimum magnetic-field intensity in the middle of the tube, and the gradient of the magnetic field provides centripetal force that guides the atoms around the curve along the axis of the tube. The threshold velocity for guiding is dictated by the gradient of the magnetic field and the radius of curvature of the tube. Atoms moving at lesser velocities are successfully guided; faster atoms strike the tube wall and are lost from the beam.

  11. No first use of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper reports that at present, nuclear weapons are considered legitimate, if terrible, weapons, usable as other weapons are for national purposes. In the West and in the East, strategy, military forces, readiness posture, all are based fundamentally on the threat and, ultimately, the use of nuclear weapons. In the West this threat is directed not only against a nuclear attack against the US or its allies, but also against conventional, non-nuclear operations beyond our ability to hold. The term for such nuclear deterrence of non-nuclear hostilities is extended deterrence. It has been at the heart of US and NATO policy for a generation. In the East, the Soviet Union has declared a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons, a declaration, that is to say, that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in any future hostilities, that they would fire them only in retaliation against nuclear attack. To make that declaration a sure control over Soviet and Warsaw Pact decisions and actions in crisis, however, and to make it so convincing to others that they can, cautiously, rely on it, the governmental announcement of the No First Use must be supplemented by a host of implementing and indoctrinating measures that are yet to be taken. Nuclear preemption, first use, has not yet by any means been eliminated from Soviet doctrine, force structures and weapons programmes

  12. The atom must not serve war

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Petros`yants, A.M.

    1987-03-27

    The history of the discovery and use of nuclear energy is reviewed from the Soviet viewpoint, including contributions of Russian and Soviet Scientists to atomic science. Political issues are addressed, including atomic "blackmail", the nonproliferation treaty, a total and general ban on nuclear weapons testing, and peaceful uses for nuclear energy. Nuclear science research centers in the Soviet Union are described. (LEW)

  13. Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maaranen, S.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). Center for International Security Affairs

    1996-09-01

    Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures and dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.

  14. Excess Weapons Plutonium Immobilization in Russia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jardine, L.; Borisov, G.B.

    2000-04-15

    The joint goal of the Russian work is to establish a full-scale plutonium immobilization facility at a Russian industrial site by 2005. To achieve this requires that the necessary engineering and technical basis be developed in these Russian projects and the needed Russian approvals be obtained to conduct industrial-scale immobilization of plutonium-containing materials at a Russian industrial site by the 2005 date. This meeting and future work will provide the basis for joint decisions. Supporting R&D projects are being carried out at Russian Institutes that directly support the technical needs of Russian industrial sites to immobilize plutonium-containing materials. Special R&D on plutonium materials is also being carried out to support excess weapons disposition in Russia and the US, including nonproliferation studies of plutonium recovery from immobilization forms and accelerated radiation damage studies of the US-specified plutonium ceramic for immobilizing plutonium. This intriguing and extraordinary cooperation on certain aspects of the weapons plutonium problem is now progressing well and much work with plutonium has been completed in the past two years. Because much excellent and unique scientific and engineering technical work has now been completed in Russia in many aspects of plutonium immobilization, this meeting in St. Petersburg was both timely and necessary to summarize, review, and discuss these efforts among those who performed the actual work. The results of this meeting will help the US and Russia jointly define the future direction of the Russian plutonium immobilization program, and make it an even stronger and more integrated Russian program. The two objectives for the meeting were to: (1) Bring together the Russian organizations, experts, and managers performing the work into one place for four days to review and discuss their work with each other; and (2) Publish a meeting summary and a proceedings to compile reports of all the excellent

  15. Toxicological issues after depleted uranium weapons attacked

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Depleted Uranium (DU) is a byproduct of the uranium enrichment for producing nuclear reactor or nuclear weapon. DU is used in the military as an armor-piercing projectile due to its hardness, strength, and density. A lot of DU weapons were fired in the Gulf War, and bring about critical environmental and internal contamination. Therefore, DU becomes suddenly a hot issue. Some toxicological problems after DU weapons attacked have been reviewed, which include features of internal DU contamination. Hazard of wound contamination and inhalation with insoluble uranium, and other urgent toxicological issues. The healthy effects of implanted with depleted uranium pellets were illustrated in particular

  16. Weapon container catalog. Volumes 1 & 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brown, L.A.; Higuera, M.C.

    1998-02-01

    The Weapon Container Catalog describes H-gear (shipping and storage containers, bomb hand trucks and the ancillary equipment required for loading) used for weapon programs and for special use containers. When completed, the catalog will contain five volumes. Volume 1 for enduring stockpile programs (B53, B61, B83, W62, W76, W78, W80, W84, W87, and W88) and Volume 2, Special Use Containers, are being released. The catalog is intended as a source of information for weapon program engineers and also provides historical information. The catalog also will be published on the SNL Internal Web and will undergo periodic updates.

  17. Weapon Control System for Airborne Application.

    OpenAIRE

    M. Sankar Kishore

    2000-01-01

    The integrated fire' control system (IFCS) plays an important role in the present-day fighter aircraft and helicopters. Wecapons, such as missiles (active/passive), rockets and guns may be present on thelfighter aircraft or helicopter .IFCS monitors the status of the weapons present on the vehicle and passes the information to pilot/co-pilot. Depending upon the health/availability of the weapons, IFCS selects/fires the weapons. An attempt has been made to bring out the details of one such IFC...

  18. Primary tasks to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kellman, B. [DePaul Univ., Chicago, IL (United States). Coll. of Law; Tanzman, E.A. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1997-12-31

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is an unprecedented multilateral effort to eradicate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction and assure their continued absence through international verification. In 1993, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the treaty with national law could cause some nations to implement the Convention without regard to what others nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States Parties in how the Conventional would be carried out. As a result, the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention was prepared. The Manual is designed to assist States Parties by increasing understanding of the Convention and identifying its obligations as well as suggesting methods to meet them, duly taking into account the distinctive aspects of their legal systems. It acknowledges areas of ambiguity that States Parties should address, and it analyzes legal initiatives that may be undertaken to strengthen the Convention`s enforcement. This paper draws from the Manual and briefly addresses the two tasks that every CWC State Party must undertake first in order to effectively fulfill its extensive requirements. First, each State Party must establish a National Authority. Second, each State Party must enact implementing measures to ensure that its government as well as its businesses and citizens comply with the treaty. As this paper generally discusses how States Parties from different legal backgrounds can accomplish these two tasks, it cannot address every detail of how each State Party should proceed.

  19. Voice command weapons launching system

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brown, H. E.

    1984-09-01

    This abstract discloses a voice-controlled weapons launching system for use by a pilot of an aircraft against a plurality of simultaneously appearing (i.e., existing) targets, such as two or more aggressor aircraft (or tanks, or the like) attacking more aggressor aircraft. The system includes, in combination, a voice controlled input device linked to and controlling a computer; apparatus (such as a television camera, receiver, and display), linked to and actuated by the computer by a voice command from the pilot, for acquiring and displaying an image of the multi-target area; a laser, linked to and actuated by the computer by a voice command from the pilot to point to (and to lock on to) any one of the plurality of targets, with the laser emitting a beam toward the designated (i.e., selected) target; and a plurality of laser beam-rider missiles, with a different missile being launched toward and attacking each different designated target by riding the laser beam to that target. Unlike the prior art, the system allows the pilot to use his hands full-time to fly and to control the aircraft, while also permitting him to launch each different missile in rapid sequence by giving a two-word spoken command after he has visually selected each target of the plurality of targets, thereby making it possible for the pilot of a single defender aircraft to prevail against the plurality of simultaneously attacking aircraft, or tanks, or the like.

  20. The chemical and biological weapon terrorism by the Aum Shnirikyo

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Aum Shinrikyo, an obscure cult religious group, attacked the Tokyo subways employing sarin gas in March 1995, which was viewed as a mark of a new era in terrorism. The Aum Shinrikyo remains the one empirical example of a religiously motivated cult with an affluent amount of financial and human resources and motivations to use unconventional weapons. The Aum Shinrikyo's leaders included the scientific elite of a young generation as well as former Yakuza members who had close ties with organized crime networks. Aum succeeded in establishing an extensive network to procure weapons, material, and drug, primarily in Russia but also other countries including the United States and even North Korea. Despite the fact that the law enforcement authority had already obtained various pieces of information that reasonably indicated that Aum was producing sarin by late 1994, the law enforcement authority became too cautious to advance its investigation to arrest Aum members until it was too late. Japan's experience with the Aum Shinrikyo's threats provides valuable insights for democratic governments seeking to thwart the deadly plans of religiously motivated non-state actors. It reveals the tremendous difficulties for a democratic society to confront the terrorists who were willing to pursue their deadly 'divine' objectives, especially when the society had no experience to encounter such a threat. This presentation will explain the chemical and biological weapon programs of the Aum Shinrikyo, especially focusing on the following elements: Intention and capability of the Aum Shinrikyo; Weapon systems and mode of attacks, including their target selections; The lessons learned from this case for the prevention and crisis/consequence management n the event of CBW terrorism. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the Research Institute for Science and Technology for Society or its research sponsors.(author)

  1. Health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report briefly reviews previous WHO work on the health consequences of nuclear war and concentrates on current information about the effects of nuclear weapons on health, and related environmental problems. 15 refs

  2. Democracy, public opinion, and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    To the degree that people's fears of nuclear war are deep and pervasive, they become subject to manipulation by cynical or politically utopian promises, whether those promises be to abolish nuclear weapons from the earth or to create a leakproof peace shield (SDI). But the basic yearning for protection could also be mobilized to support serious arms reduction and arms control agreements. Nuclear weapons provide the basis for a vivid form of symbolic politics, perhaps equivalent in foreign policy considerations to the Korean and Vietnam wars during their durations, and in similar ways (although not necessarily as severe) as unemployment does among domestic policy issues. This paper presents survey research directed specifically at the role of public opinion on nuclear imagery (difference between expectation of nuclear war versus any kind of weapon war; willingness to spend on nuclear weapons versus conventional ones or general defense spending) can help in understanding these phenomena

  3. Weapons of mass destruction - current security threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This publication brings a complex and comprehensive view of the weapons of mass destruction phenomenon in the context of present military and political situation. It emphasizes the threat posed by proliferation of these destructive devices and their carriers as well as the threat present in their possession by unpredictable totalitarian regimes or terrorist groups. The publication is structured into four basic parts: Introduction Into The Topic, Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons. The Introduction reflects the latest developments on the field of military technologies, which lead to the development of new destructive devices with characteristics comparable to basic types of WMDs - nuclear, chemical and biological. Based on the definition of WMD as 'weapon systems with enormous impact causing mass destruction, population, equipment and material losses', the modern mass destruction devices are assorted here, such as ecological, radiological and beam weapons, aerosol and container intelligent ammunition, the outburst of dangerous chemical substances from infrastructure, non-conventional weapons and military devices. The Nuclear Weapons part depicts the most destructive device of mass destruction mankind ever invented in close detail. It maps the history of most significant discoveries in nuclear physics, development and construction of the first nuclear weapons, accumulation of nuclear warheads and their carriers in the Cold war era, attempts of nuclear disarmament and reducing the number of nuclear weapons in possession of superpowers and their proliferation in the world's crisis regions including North Korea and Iran. The chapters devoted to theoretical grounds and physical principles of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons' functioning, the main categories and types, as well as destructive effects and consequences of use contain an adequate mathematical apparatus. This chapter's conclusion brings the overview of nuclear armament of states that

  4. Reframing the debate against nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    'Some 35,000 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the nuclear powers, with thousands still deployed on hair-trigger alert. Whatever rationale these weapons may once have had has long since dwindled. Political, moral, and legal constraints on actually using them further undermine their strategic utility without, however, reducing the risks of inadvertent war or proliferation. The objective of nuclear non-proliferation is not helped by the fact that the nuclear weapon States continue to insist that those weapons in their hands enhance security, while in the hands of others they are a threat to world peace. If we were making steady progress towards disarmament, this situation would be less alarming. Unfortunately, the reverse is true.' - United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 'Something is wrong with the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Although seemingly well-equipped with an arsenal of legal and political mechanisms, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), decades' worth of General Assembly (GA) resolutions and even a recent slew of ad-hoc, plurilateral initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the regime created to prevent the catastrophe of nuclear war remains inadequate. This insufficiency is even starker when viewed in relation to the regimes controlling other weapons of mass destruction. Despite its own challenges, the Organization for the Prohibition on Chemical Weapons remains relatively well-funded and well-situated to facilitate the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Even the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), while still lacking the necessary verification mechanisms, has managed to effectively criminalize not just the use and threat of use of biological weapons, but also their production, development and stockpiling. Meanwhile, the anti-nuclear regime seems to be faltering. Progress made in

  5. Prions: the danger of biochemical weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Eric Almeida Xavier

    2014-01-01

    The knowledge of biotechnology increases the risk of using biochemical weapons for mass destruction. Prions are unprecedented infectious pathogens that cause a group of fatal neurodegenerative diseases by a novel mechanism. They are transmissible particles that are devoid of nucleic acid. Due to their singular characteristics, Prions emerge as potential danger since they can be used in the development of such weapons. Prions cause fatal infectious diseases, and to date there is no therapeutic...

  6. Pantex: safety in nuclear weapons processing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johannesen, R E; Farrell, L M

    2000-11-01

    The Pantex Plant, located in the Texas panhandle near Amarillo, is a major Department of Energy (DOE) participant in maintaining the safety of the nation's nuclear weapons resources and protecting the employees, public, and environment. With more than 168,000 person-years of operations involving nuclear materials, explosives, and hazardous chemicals, Pantex has maintained a notable safety record. This article overviews the nuclear weapon activities at Pantex and describes their safety culture. PMID:11045518

  7. Economic Analysis of Investment in Nuclear Weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Martínková, Hana

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear weapons are a rather marginal issue in economics as opposed to the political realm where it is an ever-present topic concerning global security. This thesis argues that economics can make a valuable contribution to the nuclear weapons debate in several ways and aims to present those in a comprehensive manner. First, a cost-benefit approach is employed to show that costs and benefits go beyond counting dollars directly spent on nuclear arsenals. Second, market investment in nuclear wea...

  8. A Weapon Target Assignment Model Based on Weapon Utility%一种基于武器效用的武器目标分配模型

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    王金山; 李伟兵

    2015-01-01

    为解决武器优化分配中存在的2个问题,提出一种基于武器效用的武器目标分配模型。通过两类武器的效用分析,把目标达到期望毁伤概率作为武器效用最大的起点,设置两类武器的效用函数,以最大武器效用为准则,建立武器分配的线性整数规划模型,并对比2种模型的结果。实践结果证明:新模型求解分配的速度快耗时短,可满足战场需求,且结果更加合理。%In order to overtake two problems in weapon optimal assignment, propose a weapon target assignment model based on weapon utility. By two type weapons utility analysis, set expected kill probability as the start point of maximum weapon utility, and set utility function of two type weapons, takes maximum weapon utility as rule, establish linear integer planning model, and compare the results of two models. The practice results show that the new model has fast speed on solution distribution and use less time. It meets the battlefield requirements and has more reasonable results.

  9. Some mathematics of nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: In the many decades since the first demonstration of the power of nuclear weapons we have created a 'data set' that we may analyze to see if simple principles account for the observed history. There was initial fear that the proliferation of weapons would be exponential, driven by the principle that each nation would desire to have weapons to deter each other nuclear-armed nation. The doubling time could be taken as four years, between the tests of the US in 1945 and the USSR in 1949. By 1985, with ten doubling times, we would have had 1024 nuclear weapons states, far from the data. If we make a different hypothesis, that each nation is deterred from seeking nuclear weapons by each existing nuclear state, we obtain a differential equation leading to an expression for a much slower rate of increase, which is indeed found to be closely followed. If we have an understanding of the processes that lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we can be better at strengthening the barriers to further growth. The mathematical equations and relevant plots will be used to illustrate these observations. (author)

  10. Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vladimír Pitschmann

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist.

  11. China's mixed signals on nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ultimately, it is nuclear whether the Chinese leadership has made up its collective mind on practical nuclear weapons. It is known from Chinese official sources, including articles in Communist Party and military publications and histories of the Chinese nuclear program, that an internal debate has proceeded for more than two decades, punctuated by occasional nuclear exercises or low-yield warhead tests. But China presumably has less reason now to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons than in previous decades: relations with the Soviet Union have improved and military confrontation has eased; China's relations with India and Vietnam are also improving. The decision may already have been made, however, and the weapons built. The mystery surrounding Chinese tactical nuclear weapons is itself interesting, but it is also symbolic of the difficulty of understanding China's nuclear weapons program and policies. The West has accumulated a considerable body of knowledge about China's nuclear forces, especially historical material. But important aspects of China's nuclear behavior and its future as a nuclear power are hard to discern. A key question is China's future role in the spread of nuclear-capable weapons to other countries. China might add to international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear related technology, or it might become the world's missile merchant. It could make a constructive contribution to arms control efforts in general, or it could act as a spoiler

  12. 48 CFR 217.173 - Multiyear contracts for weapon systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... weapon systems. 217.173 Section 217.173 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION... Mulityear Contracting 217.173 Multiyear contracts for weapon systems. As authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2306b(h... contract for— (a) A weapon system and associated items, services, and logistics support for a weapon...

  13. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11... § 15.11 Explosives and dangerous weapons. No person shall carry, use or possess within the Preserve... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond...

  14. Philippine Bases and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy

    OpenAIRE

    Schirmer, Daniel Boone

    1983-01-01

    In 1947, when the newly independent Philippine government granted the United States the right to use military bases at Subic Bay and Clark Air Field, the United States government saw to it that the terms included the right of the U.S. to install on these bases "any type of weapons." From the very beginning the Pentagon insisted on establishing the right to relate U.S. bases in the Philippines to possible plans for nuclear war. Also, from the very beginning many Filipinos opposed U.S. bases th...

  15. Nuclear weapons and the Korean Peninsula: A Chinese perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1991, North and South Korea issued a joint declaration on the denuclearisation of the peninsula. Such denuclearisation will undoubtedly be conductive to the security, stability and development of the region. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone relies, in the first place, on the efforts of the countries in the region. China does not advocate, nor support nuclear proliferation. China's basic position concerning nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is to seek to maintain peace and stability and to promote realisation of denuclearisation

  16. 76 FR 6087 - Draft Weapons Safety Assessment on the Use of Enhanced Weapons; Notice of Availability and...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-02-03

    ... COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 73 RIN 3150-AI49 Draft Weapons Safety Assessment on the Use of Enhanced Weapons... guidance document entitled ``Weapons Safety Assessment'' (WSA). This guidance would be used by licensees and certificate holders applying to the NRC to obtain enhanced weapons under the NRC's proposed...

  17. Radiocesium Discharges and Subsequent Environmental Transport at the Major U.S. Weapons Production Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Garten, Jr. C.T.; Hamby, D.M.; Schreckhise, R.G.

    1999-11-14

    Radiocesium is one of the more prevalent radionuclides in the environment as a result of weapons production related atomic projects in the United States and the former Soviet Union. Radiocesium discharges during the 1950's account for a large fraction of the historical releases from U.S. weapons production facilities. Releases of radiocesium to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems during the early ,years of nuclear weapons production provided the opportunity to conduct multidisciplinary studies on the transport mechanisms of this potentially hazardous radionuclide. The major U.S. Department of Energy facilities (Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, and Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina) are located in regions of the country that have different geographical characteristics. The facility siting provided diverse backgrounds for the development of an understanding of environmental factors contributing to the fate and transport of radiocesium. In this paper, we summarize the significant environmental releases of radiocesium in the early -years of weapons production and then discuss the historically significant transport mechanisms for r37Cs at the three facilities that were part of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

  18. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Every year since 1974 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the subject ''Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East''. By that resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, taking into account the circumstances and characteristics of the Middle East, as well as the views and the suggestions of the parties of the region, and to submit this study to the General Assembly. The study was carried out between July 1989 and August 1990. The study discusses a number of steps and measures that could ease the process leading to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Those measures could be undertaken independently or in conjunction with each other, as well as by individual States or jointly by several, and also on a reciprocal basis; each of them would move the States concerned closer to their ultimate objective - the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons

  19. Implementing the chemical weapons convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1993, as the CWC ratification process was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the CWC with national law could cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States as to how the CWC would be carried out. As a result, the author's colleagues and the author prepared the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Committee of CWC Legal Experts, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Central Europe, reviewed the Manual. In February 1998, they finished the second edition of the Manual in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The Manual tries to increase understanding of the Convention by identifying its obligations and suggesting methods of meeting them. Education about CWC obligations and available alternatives to comply with these requirements can facilitate national response that are consistent among States Parties. Thus, the Manual offers options that can strengthen international realization of the Convention's goals if States Parties act compatibly in implementing them. Equally important, it is intended to build confidence that the legal issues raised by the Convention are finite and addressable. They are now nearing competition of an internet version of this document so that interested persons can access it electronically and can view the full text of all of the national implementing legislation it cites. The internet address, or URL, for the internet version of the Manual is http: //www.cwc.ard.gov. This paper draws from the Manual. It comparatively addresses approximately thirty

  20. Implementing the chemical weapons convention

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kellman, B.; Tanzman, E. A.

    1999-12-07

    In 1993, as the CWC ratification process was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the CWC with national law could cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States as to how the CWC would be carried out. As a result, the author's colleagues and the author prepared the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Committee of CWC Legal Experts, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Central Europe, reviewed the Manual. In February 1998, they finished the second edition of the Manual in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The Manual tries to increase understanding of the Convention by identifying its obligations and suggesting methods of meeting them. Education about CWC obligations and available alternatives to comply with these requirements can facilitate national response that are consistent among States Parties. Thus, the Manual offers options that can strengthen international realization of the Convention's goals if States Parties act compatibly in implementing them. Equally important, it is intended to build confidence that the legal issues raised by the Convention are finite and addressable. They are now nearing competition of an internet version of this document so that interested persons can access it electronically and can view the full text of all of the national implementing legislation it cites. The internet address, or URL, for the internet version of the Manual is http: //www.cwc.ard.gov. This paper draws from the Manual. It comparatively addresses approximately thirty

  1. Frederic Joliot-Curie and the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The author describes the attitude and action of Pierre Joliot-Curie after the explosion of the first nuclear bomb in Hiroshima and during the following years. He notably describes the creation of the French CEA (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique), the commitment of Joliot-Curie for the creation of a scientist movement, the atomic negotiation within the United Nations, the creation and actions of the Mouvement de la Paix (from April 1949 until the Stockholm Appeal) within the Cold War context, the commitment of Joliot-Curie against weapons of mass destruction and its difficult relationship with his communists friends, his participation to the elaboration of the Einstein-Russel Appeal, and the Pugwash conference in 1957

  2. Are Cyber Weapons Effective Military Tools

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Emilio Iasiello

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available Cyber-attacks are often viewed in academic and military writings as strategic asymmetric weapons, great equalizers with the potential of leveling the battlefield between powerful nations and those less capable. However, there has been little evidence to suggest that cyber-attacks are a genuine military option in a state-on-state conflict. In instances of actual military operations (e.g., Afghanistan, Georgia, Iraq, and Israel/Gaza, there is little accompanying evidence of a military conducting cyber-attacks against either a civilian or military target. Given that some of the nation states that have been involved in military conflict or peacekeeping missions in hostile areas are believed to have some level of offensive cyber capability, this may be indicative. More substantive examples demonstrate that cyber-attacks have been more successful in non-military activities, as they may serve as a clandestine weapon of subterfuge better positioned to incapacitate systems without alerting the victims, veiling the orchestrator’s true identity via proxy groups and plausible deniability. Consequently, this paper provides a counter argument to the idea that cyber tools are instrumental military weapons in modern day warfare; cyber weapons are more effective options during times of nation state tension rather than military conflict, and are more serviceable as a signaling tool than one designed to gain military advantage. In situations where state-on-state conflict exists, high value targets that need to be neutralized would most likely be attacked via conventional weapons where battle damage assessment can be easily quantified. This raises the question: are cyber weapons effective military tools?

  3. Nuclear Weapon and Military Equipment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    N. Natarajan

    1985-10-01

    Full Text Available Military equipment must survive a, nuclear attack if enough personnel required to operate them remain combat effective. To achieve this goal, the criteria that determine equipment survivability should be established and any new design should incorporate these criteria to evolve a hardened design. An analysis of the overall response by considering the response to each individual nuclear environment can result in a balanced overall hardened system. The paper discusses the criteria required to be known.

  4. The evolution of legal approaches to controlling nuclear and radiological weapons and combating the threat of nuclear terrorism

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    J. Herbach

    2015-01-01

    This chapter traces the evolution of international law related to the weaponization of nuclear and other radioactive materials, focusing in particular on the law pertaining to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism. International efforts to control atomic energy have evolved substantially since the on

  5. Controlling weapons of mass destruction through the rule of law

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tanzman, E.A.

    1995-08-08

    Many who speak of the end of the Cold War emphasize the improvement in international relations when they speak of the momentous consequences of this event. According to this image, the half century since Trinity has been a period of sparse international communication during which the Eastern and Western blocs hibernated in their isolated dens of security alliances. The emphasis in the phrase ``Cold War`` was on the word ``cold,`` and relations with the former Communist regimes are now ``warm`` by comparison. It is equally valid to consider what has happened to the word ``was` in this highly descriptive phrase. While meaningful international dialogue was in a state of relative lethargy during much of the last fifty years, the military establishments of the Great Powers were actively engaged in using as much force as possible in their efforts to control world affairs, short of triggering a nuclear holocaust. Out of these military postures a tense peace ironically emerged, but the terms by which decisions were made about controlling weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) were the terms of war. The thesis of this paper is that the end of the Cold War marks a shift away from reliance on military might toward an international commitment to controlling weapons,of mass destruction through the ``rule of law.`` Rawls wrote that ``legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the framework for social cooperation. The regular and impartial administration of public rules, becomes the rule of law when applied to the legal system.`` Inparticular, Rawls identifies as part of this system of public rules those laws that aim to prevent free riders on the economic system and those that aim to correct such externalities as environmental pollution.``

  6. [Possession of weapon and hunting license: the role of the physician].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Manaouil, Cécile; Gignon, Maxime; Giboulet, Nicolas; Jardé, Olivier

    2012-01-01

    In France, the physician can inform the prefect that a patient, detaining weapon and followed for a pathology (psychiatric notably), is dangerous. Then, it comes back to the prefect to appreciate the appropriate measurements to take, notably to order the delivery of weapon and ammunitions. In France, the doctor can be solicited to establish the necessary medical certficates during requests of approval or acquisition and having guns for hunting and sports shooting, or to obtain the licence of hunting. The acquisition and the possession of certain weapon cannot be granted if the applicant is a protected person over 18, was or is hospitalized, without his consent, owing to mental disturbances or, is in a physical or psychical state apparently incompatible with the possession of weapon. But it appears that the access to this information by the prefects is made difficult by the absence of files centralizing these data. Question settles to institute an automated national file of hospitalizations under pressure, which could be consulted prior to the deliverance or the approval of possession of weapon for hunting and as sports shooting. In our opinion, this should be made, in a strictly supervised manner, through a sworn doctor, systematically solicited as part of the licence of hunting and licence of shooting, to liberate the family practitioners of an expertise role.

  7. University Management of Weapons Labs? Yes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kahn, James S.

    1986-01-01

    Promulgates the view that university management of weapons laboratories provides the best scientific results, and more independent advice than could be possible under government or industrial management. Focuses on Los Alamos and Livermore national laboratories, operated by the University of California. (An opposing viewpoint is presented in SE…

  8. Creating competitive weapons from information systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wiseman, C; MacMillan, I C

    1984-01-01

    As the pace of competition intensifies in the 1980s, information systems will emerge as critical new weapons in the battle to gain an advantage over competitors. The authors show how a business can use modern information technologies to create a competitive edge by adding value to present products and services. PMID:10269062

  9. Stochastic Duel with Several Types of Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    N. Bhashyam

    1967-04-01

    Full Text Available This paper attempts to study a 'Stochastic Duel' model wherein each of the contestants has got more than one type of weapons. The ultimate probability of win for each of them is evaluated and the results for a few particular cases are given.

  10. Managing nuclear weapons in the United States

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miller, G.

    1993-03-16

    This report discusses the management and security of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war United States. The definition of what constitutes security is clearly changing in the US. It is now a much more integrated view that includes defense and the economy. The author tries to bring some semblance of order to these themes in this brief adaptation of a presentation.

  11. Optical countermeasures against CLOS weapon systems

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Toet, A.; Benoist, K.W.; Lingen, J.N.J. van; Schleijpen, H.M.A.

    2013-01-01

    There are many weapon systems in which a human operator acquires a target, tracks it and designates it. Optical countermeasures against this type of systems deny the operator the possibility to fulfill this visual task. We describe the different effects that result from stimulation of the human visu

  12. Impulse noise trauma during army weapon firing

    OpenAIRE

    Munjal, K. R.; Singh, V. P.

    1997-01-01

    A 100 infanty personnel firing modern weapons such as the Anti Tank Guided Missile, 106mm Recoiless Gun (RCL), 84mm Rocket Launcher (RL) and 81mm Mortar were studied for the effect of impulse noise on the ear and the evolution of the Temporary Threshold Shift (TTS), Recovery Time (RT) and Permanent Threshold Shift (PTS) was traced.

  13. The Spear: An Effective Weapon Since Antiquity

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Robert E. Dohrenwend

    2012-07-01

    Full Text Available The spear is perhaps man’s oldest weapon, and may even be his oldest tool. Over the hundreds of thousands of years of the weapon’s existence, it evolved from a pointed stick into an efficient hunting missile, and then became the most effective hand-held bladed weapon humans ever devised. The spear and its use is the only martial art originally devised for use against species other than our own, and more than any other weapon, the spear emphasizes the relationship between hunting and warfare. Virtually without exception, the spear is present wherever there are humans. The spear may claim to be the senior martial art, and the weapon is still in use today. Early techniques are preserved by the small number of Japanese sojutsu schools, and modern Chinese martial artists have developed elegant and impressive gymnastic routines for the spear. The javelin throw is a modern Olympic track and field event, and there are people who have resurrected the Aztec atlatl for sporting competition. Today, the spear is still used in Europe for hunting wild boar, and the continued issue of the obsolete bayonet to modern soldiers testifies to a deep, almost instinctive respect still possessed by the military for the spear.

  14. What Do Americans Know about Nuclear Weapons?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zweigenhaft, Richard L.

    1984-01-01

    Reports on a survey of knowledge of and attitudes toward nuclear weapons. Respondents (N=938) were students and adults aged 15 to 89 who completed a 51-item questionnaire. Also reports on an experiment in which college students (N=166) were given the survey under one of four different conditions. (JN)

  15. Principles of Guided Missiles and Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Naval Personnel Program Support Activity, Washington, DC.

    Fundamentals of missile and nuclear weapons systems are presented in this book which is primarily prepared as the second text of a three-volume series for students of the Navy Reserve Officers' Training Corps and the Officer Candidate School. Following an introduction to guided missiles and nuclear physics, basic principles and theories are…

  16. Cognitive Consistency in Beliefs about Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nelson, Linden

    The paper details a study supporting the hypothesis that people's opinions about nuclear arms control are influenced by their logically relevant beliefs about nuclear weapons, nuclear war, and the Soviet Union. The hypothesis should not be construed to imply that these beliefs are the only influences or the most powerful influences on arms control…

  17. Nuclear Weapons: Concepts, Issues, and Controversies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reardon, Betty; And Others

    1983-01-01

    The schools must confront and deal with the issues of the nuclear weapons controversy on pain of ceasing to be relevant to the critical needs of the rising generation. Every aspect of the nuclear arms controversy needs to be discussed in secondary and university classrooms. (RM)

  18. Europium-155 in Debris from Nuclear Weapons

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Aarkrog, Asker; Lippert, Jørgen Emil

    1967-01-01

    The lithium-drifted germanium detector enables determination of europium-155 on a routine basis in environmental samples contaminated with debris from nuclear weapons. From measurements of europium-155, cesium-144, and strontium-90 in air filters collected between 1961 and 1966, the yield...

  19. The text of the Agreement of 14 July 1980 between Indonesia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The full text of the agreement between Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  20. The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the later years the risks of nuclear proliferation have again become a major topic of interest. This is primarily due to the acute problems caused by Iraq, North Korea, and the 3 new states of the former USSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Analysis shows that security problems and prestige are the two most important motives, when the risks of proliferation are considered. But motives are not enough. To produce nuclear weapons a number of technological requirements must also be fulfilled. The country must be able to produce almost pure fissile material, i.e. 235U or 239Pu. It must also be able to solve a number of metallurgical, explosive, ignition, physics and other problems. These are in particular non-trivial, if a implosion weapon is to be designed. A review is made of the nuclear facilities in a number of the countries which have been suggested as possible future nuclear weapons countries. In particular facilities which can produce almost pure fissile materials, 235U and 239Pu, are considered. The possibility of nuclear terrorists have often been discussed in the media. However, it seems very unlikely that even a major terrorist or mafia organization will be able to solve all the weapons design problems, even if they could steal the fissile material. It is finally discussed what can be done to reduce the risk of further nuclear proliferation. Political pressure can be brought to bear on countries outside the NPT to join it, but it can be counter-productive, and sometimes the countries that are able to exert such pressure, are not willing to do so for other political reasons. The problem of countries which are party to the NPT, but which are believed to acquire nuclear weapons capability in violation of the treaty, can be countered by unannounced inspections of non-declared facilities. However, such inspections can only be meaningfully performed if the necessary intelligence is available. (EG)

  1. The future of nuclear weapons in Europe workshop summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A summary is presented of a workshop that addressed the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. The workshop topics included the evolving European security environment; the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and nuclear weapons; the United States, NATO, and nuclear weapons; and Western Europe and nuclear weapons. The workshop, held at Los Alamos July 26, 1991, was sponsored by the Center for National Security Studies of the Los Alamos National Laboratory

  2. The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Garaizar, Xabier [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2009-07-02

    In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

  3. Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glauser, H

    2011-03-03

    Over the next 10-20 years, the probability of a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) on the United States is projected to increase. At some point over the next few decades, it may be inevitable that a terrorist group will have access to a WMD. The economic and social impact of an attack using a WMD anywhere in the world would be catastrophic. For weapons developed overseas, the routes of entry are air and sea with the maritime vector as the most porous. Providing a system to track, perform a risk assessment and inspect all inbound marine traffic before it reaches US coastal cities thereby mitigating the threat has long been a goal for our government. The challenge is to do so effectively without crippling the US economy. The Portunus Project addresses only the maritime threat and builds on a robust maritime domain awareness capability. It is a process to develop the technologies, policies and practices that will enable the US to establish a waypoint for the inspection of international marine traffic, screen 100% of containerized and bulk cargo prior to entry into the US if deemed necessary, provide a palatable economic model for transshipping, grow the US economy, and improve US environmental quality. The implementation strategy is based on security risk, and the political and economic constraints of implementation. This article is meant to provide a basic understanding of how and why this may be accomplished.

  4. A system for automated, dismantlement of plutonium weapons components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The development of advanced dismantlement technologies will play an integral part on the changing role of the DOE. As an important component to this effort, the ARIES (Automated Retirement and Integrated Extraction System) System is designed to provide a test bed for the development of technology for the dismantlement of the primaries of nuclear weapons (pits). The ARIES system will integrate and automate the processes of pit disassembly, plutonium, plutonium removal, preparation of oxide from plutonium metal, decontamination of non-plutonium parts, and in-line measurement of the products and wastes by state-of-the-art non-destructive assay (NDA) methods. No integrated method now exists for the dismantlement and recovery of nuclear material from many weapons designs. Even those assemblies for which recovery techniques have been established require extensive manual handling (with associated personnel exposure to radiation) and result in considerable waste generation during dismantlement. The disposition of excess plutonium will require a facility to disassemble and remove plutonium from the pits. ARIES will provide the methods to satisfy this goal while at the same time reducing waste generation, lowering personnel radiation exposures, and operating to the highest standards of safety and security. A description of the ARIES system is given

  5. 43 CFR 423.30 - Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons, firearms, explosives, and... WATERBODIES Rules of Conduct § 423.30 Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. (a) You may possess... exceptions: (1) You must not have a weapon in your possession when at or in a Reclamation facility. (2)...

  6. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and arrows, air guns, spears,...

  7. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying...

  8. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives...

  9. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor...

  10. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is...

  11. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will...

  12. 10 CFR Appendix H to Part 73 - Weapons Qualification Criteria

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... Draw weapon and fire 2 rounds from prone position Shotgun 1 1 7 yards 2 Double 0 buck-shot 4 seconds At... position, then fire 2 rounds and reholster 2 15 yards 2 5 seconds Standing, draw weapon, move to kneeling...) Standing, draw weapon, fire 2 rounds, move to kneeling position and fire 2 rounds, reload and...

  13. 76 FR 76935 - Impact of Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Commercial Activities Involving...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-12-09

    ... Bureau of Industry and Security Impact of Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on... implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA), and the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR), has had on commercial...

  14. International safeguards to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The ever-expanding use of atomic energy not only promotes the welfare of mankind but also leads to the accumulation of nuclear materials which can be employed for building weapons of mass destruction. Certain progress has recently been made towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the main barrier against the diversion of nuclear materials for the production of nuclear explosive devices. The factors essential for strengthening non-proliferation are accession to the Treaty by all countries, above all those engaged in nuclear activities, effective national systems of control of and accounting for nuclear materials, and an effective system of IAEA safeguards, as envisaged by the Treaty. Substantial nuclear activities are being carried out in States not party to the Treaty, and it is in these cases that effective control by an international organization is particularly important. The paper considers ways and means of implementing measures which would further enhance the universal character of non-proliferation and improve its effectiveness. It also discusses the features of the IAEA safeguards system and the factors governing its effectiveness. It is concluded that the essential conditions for improving effectiveness are application of control to the entire fuel cycle in non-nuclear-weapon States, the perfecting of the IAEA safeguards system, including automatic processing of nuclear materials accounting data, and effective physical protection of nuclear materials. (author)

  15. From the nuclear stalemate to a nuclear-weapon free world. In memory of Klaus Fuchs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The following topics were dealt with: The first soviet atomic bomb and Klaus Fuchs, in illusory worlds of Andrei Sakharov, Edward Teller, and Klaus Fuchs, Klaus Fuchs as grandfather of the hydrogen bomb, memories of and thinking about Klaus Fuchs, the Scottish years of Klaus Fuchs 1937-1941, Klaus Fuchs in the mirror of the Venona documents, Gernot Zippe and the ultracentrifuge or east-west technology transfer in the cold war, secret impulses for the soviet nuclear project, responsibility of knowledge with anti-facism, philosophy, and science as well as peace as the first human right in the work of Klaus Fuchs, the request of Klaus Fuchs for a lasting peace, Klaus Fuchs in Daniel Granin's roman ''Escape to Russia'', ways to a nuclear-weapon free world, Otto Hahn and the declarations of Mainau and Goettingen, nuclear winter, initiatives of the GDR for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons in negative entropy, militarism and antimilitarism of the nuclear age, contributions of the young Klaus Fuchs to statistical physics, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the responsibility of the scientists for a socially effective and efficient energy change, Berlin-Bucher contributions to a world free of biological weapons. (HSI)

  16. Under fire: Is the world's treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons strong enough?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fifteen years into the 'atoms for peace' era, Ireland in 1968 took the historic first step to sign the global treaty against tile spread of nuclear weapons. Since then, more than 180 other countries without nuclear weapons have joined the pact, most of them during the cold war period. They see their security in not having (lie bomb, and bind themselves to work for nuclear disarmament everywhere. Their shared commitments make the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) the most accepted arms-control agreement in history, a cornerstone of nuclear cooperation, countries that join it renounce the military atom, and they must accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities to verify it. But the Treaty is under fire, and some critics think it no longer fits the times. They say it cannot prevent Treaty countries from breaking out at will, or ensure that those having nuclear ambitions or arsenals are actually honouring their pledges. Neither has it attracted three key countries - India and Pakistan, which have tested atomic bombs, and Israel, which is suspected of having them - to its ranks of members. Not everyone agrees that the NPT is outdated. But it is clear that the Treaty and its associated regime are under stress, and that its fragile condition needs urgent care. The debate is important and timely - the Treaty comes up for international review in 2005 and countries already are preparing for it. A major question today is whether the NPT is strong enough to keep the lid on nuclear weapons in the world's changed security environment. A former senior official at the IAEA looks at the challenging picture

  17. Toward the establishment of semi-homemade energy. A new era for atomic energy R and D as a general science and approach to social and international contribution (2)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In November 2004, the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, through its New Long-Term Program Council, reaffirmed adhering to the nuclear fuel cycle policy, while the Kyoto Protocol finally entered into force in February 2005, thus marking the beginning of a new era in global efforts to solve climate change. In order to promote that policy steadily, Japanese nuclear industry has various problems to be solved, such as recovery of public reliance on nuclear power, responses to liberalization of the power market, and establishment of the nuclear fuel cycle. Furthermore, research and development on the fuel cycle leading to practical use of fast breeder reactors will be the key. For this, it is necessary to efficiently overcome political, economic and technological obstacles. The article includes the editor's interview with President Mr. Kojima, Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Company, several comments from the authorities from nuclear research institutions, industries, and universities on the occasion of the operation of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant together with the perspective of fast breeder reactor development and nuclear materials management with safeguards and required international cooperation. (S. Ohno)

  18. Atoms for peace: thirtieth anniversary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper was prepared for the thirtieth anniversary of President Eisenhower's programme: ''Atoms for Peace''. The author wants to demonstrate that nuclear power has made major contributions to reduction of oil imports and that at the same time, despite repeated predictions of unbridled proliferation, the fact is that proliferation has proceeded at a dramatically slower pace than foreseen by some. To date no country has employed plutonium derived from the nuclear power fuel cycle to initiate its nuclear explosion program. The author concludes that the ''Atoms for Peace'' programme, from the viewpoint of its goal of reducing the spread of nuclear weapons, has been a successful policy. (NEA)

  19. Nuclear proliferation. I. Atoms for Brazil, dangers for all

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    West Germany and Brazil, by seeking to establish their independence in the transfer of nuclear technology to a developing country, have raised international anxieties over how to finance and manage nuclear trade in a way that will secure peace. The deal, which commits the two countries to a program of uranium exploration and mining, enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing, and power plant construction, means food supplies, jobs, and contracts for Germany and economic development for Brazil. Of concern to the rest of the world are the opportunities for diverting nuclear materials to weapons. Both countries have agreed to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards agreement, but Brazil is not bound by it. Brazil's development is making her the dominant power in South America and altering her relationship with the United States. A review of the West German-Brazilian agreement focuses on the historical competition for export markets and the lessening of U.S. control over the enriched uranium market

  20. Emergency management of chemical weapons injuries.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Peter D

    2012-02-01

    The potential for chemical weapons to be used in terrorism is a real possibility. Classes of chemical weapons include nerve agents, vesicants (blister agents), choking agents, incapacitating agents, riot control agents, blood agents, and toxic industrial chemicals. The nerve agents work by blocking the actions of acetylcholinesterase leading to a cholinergic syndrome. Nerve agents include sarin, tabun, VX, cyclosarin, and soman. The vesicants include sulfur mustard and lewisite. The vesicants produce blisters and also damage the upper airways. Choking agents include phosgene and chlorine gas. Choking agents cause pulmonary edema. Incapacitating agents include fentanyl and its derivatives and adamsite. Riot control agents include Mace and pepper spray. Blood agents include cyanide. The mechanism of toxicity for cyanide is blocking oxidative phosphorylation. Toxic industrial chemicals include agents such as formaldehyde, hydrofluoric acid, and ammonia. PMID:22080590

  1. Making Weapons for the Terracotta Army

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marcos Martinón-Torres

    2011-10-01

    Full Text Available The Terracotta Army of the First Emperor of China is one of the most emblematic archaeological sites in the world. Many questions remain about the logistics of technology, standardisation and labour organisation behind the creation of such a colossal construction in just a few decades over 2,000 years ago. An ongoing research project co-ordinated between the UCL Institute of Archaeology and the Emperor Qin Shihang's Terracotta Army Museum is beginning to address some of these questions. This paper outlines some results of the typological, metric, microscopic, chemical and spatial analyses of the 40,000 bronze weapons recovered with the Terracotta Warriors. Thanks to a holistic approach developed specifically for this project, it is possible to reveal remarkable aspects of the organisation of the Qin workforce in production cells, of the standardisation, efficiency and quality-control procedures employed, and of the sophisticated technical knowledge of the weapon-makers.

  2. Effects of nuclear weapons. Third edition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, S.; Dolan, P.J.

    1977-01-01

    Since the last edition of ''The Effects of Nuclear Weapons'' in 1962 much new information has become available concerning nuclear weapon effects. This has come in part from the series of atmospheric tests, including several at very high altitudes, conducted in the Pacific Ocean area in 1962. In addition, laboratory studies, theoretical calculations, and computer simulations have provided a better understanding of the various effects. A new chapter has been added on the electromagnetic pulse. The chapter titles are as follows: general principles of nuclear explosions; descriptions of nuclear explosions; air blast phenomena in air and surface bursts; air blast loading; structural damage from air blast; shock effects of surface and subsurface bursts; thermal radiation and its effects; initial nuclear radiation; residual nuclear radiation and fallout; radio and radar effects; the electromagnetic pulse and its effects; and biological effects. (LTN)

  3. Ending the scourge of chemical weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brin, J.

    1993-04-01

    After more than 20 years of arduous negotiations, representatives from 131 countries gathered in Paris in January to sign a treaty banning the development, production, and transfer to other countries of chemical-warfare agents and their means of delivery. The treaty - called the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC - complements the more limited Geneva Protocol of 1925, which bans the use of toxic chemicals in warfare. When the CWC enters into force in about two years, it will prohibit the manufacture for military purposes of lethal chemicals such as sulfur mustard, which causes painful skin blistering and lung damage, and nerve agents, which cause rapid death by interfering with the transmission of nerve impulses. The goal is to eliminate from the earth this particularly inhumane form of warfare. The paper discusses facets of the treaty, especially the verification challenge with its inspection on demand features. Short accompanying pieces discuss classifying chemicals and the destruction of chemical weapons under the CWC.

  4. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the last century, the rapid progress in science and technology enabled richer and more comfortable lives, but the other side of this double-edged sword is that science and technology have also been used to develop and improve high-tech weaponry. Due to this fact, deployed around the world are tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and detonation of only a few of them would kill some hundreds of million of people and destroy out civilization. The human race stands at a crossroad. What should be done? It is a crucially important responsibility for the Japanese government to work for peace in which there will be no fear or threat of nuclear weapons

  5. Weapon plutonium in accelerator driven power system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose and problems of the research - creation of a safe and reliable ADS for processing of about 25 tons of weapons plutonium in 30 years on the basis of a proton-accelerator with energies 0.8-1.2 GeV and a current of 10-30 mA; liquid Pb/Bi eutectic targets; one-directionally coupled fast/thermal blanket with plutonium fuel. The approach to weapons-Pu utilization is based on the understanding of the unconditional priority of safety features of ADS over economic considerations and, accordingly, on the priority of subcritical systems over critical. The description of a variant of ADS from the point of view of possibilities of its realization in an acceptable period of time on the base of approbated technologies is presented here. 7 refs., 4 figs., 1 tab

  6. Manhattan project II: Abolishing nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Most people seem to think that the era of nuclear danger is over, that it ended along with the Cold War. Whatever residual problems remain in terms of proliferation or possible terrorism, they believe, are being dealt urgently and adequately by their national leaders. Unfortunately, they are wrong on both counts. Although the risk of nuclear war between the NATO and former Warsaw Pact powers has virtually vanished, the chance that some nuclear weapons will kill many people, may be higher than before. The elimination of nuclear weapons, meaning rejection of terrorism, must be accomplished by multilateral collaboration. To recover fundamental moral bearings, as well as to preserve life and civilization, the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, India and Pakistan must cease to be terrorist states

  7. #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nissen, Thomas Elkjer

    In today’s conflict environment, transformed by information technology and of who can communicate and how, states, non-state actors, ad hoc activist networks and individuals create effect(s) in and through social network media in support of their objectives. #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia develops...... a framework for understanding how social network media shapes global politics and contemporary conflicts by examining their role as a platform for conduction intelligence collection, targeting, cyber-operations, psychological warfare and command and control activities. Through these, the weaponization...... of social media shows both the possibilities and the limitations of social network media in contemporary conflicts and makes a contribution to theorizing and studying contemporary conflicts....

  8. Weapons test seismic investigations at Yucca Mountain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yucca Mountain, located on and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site, is being characterized as part of an ongoing effort to identify a potential high-level nuclear waste repository. This site will be subjected to seismic ground motions induced by underground nuclear explosions. A knowledge of expected ground motion levels from these tests will enable the designers to provide for the necessary structural support in the designs of the various components of the repository. The primary objective of the Weapons Test Seismic Investigation project is to develop a method to predict the ground motions expected at the repository site as a result of future weapons tests. This paper summarizes the data base presently assembled for the Yucca Mountain Project, characteristics of expected ground motions, and characterization of the two-dimensional seismic properties along paths between Yucca Mountain and the testing areas of the Nevada Test Site

  9. Storage of weapons-grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    With the end of the cold war, the United States has started to reduce its nuclear weapons stockpiles and will place special nuclear material (plutonium and uranium) into storage. The existing plutonium storage facilities are designed for short-term storage or to support operation of adjacent processing facilities. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is proposing to construct and operate a new plutonium storage facility as part of the reconfigured weapons complex, called Complex-21, to provide safe and secure long-term storage of plutonium materials. This facility will be required to meet new, more stringent requirements such as potential third-party inspection, enhanced safeguard and security requirements, and reduced personnel radiation exposure limits

  10. Implications of a North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lehman, R.F. II

    1993-07-01

    The Democratic People`s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the Cold War`s last remaining totalitarian regimes. Rarely has any society been as closed to outside influences and so distant from political, economic, and military developments around the globe. In 1991 and in 1992, however, this dictatorship took a number of political steps which increased Pyongyang`s interaction with the outside world. Although North Korea`s style of engagement with the broader international community involved frequent pauses and numerous steps backward, many observers believed that North Korea was finally moving to end its isolated, outlaw status. As the end of 1992 approached, however, delay and obstruction by Pyongyang became intense as accumulating evidence suggested that the DPRK, in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it would not accept additional inspections proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve concerns about possible violations and instead would withdraw from the Treaty. Pyongyang`s action raised the specter that, instead of a last act of the Cold War, North Korea`s diplomatic maneuvering would unravel the international norms that were to be the basis of stability and peace in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the discovery that North Korea was approaching the capability to produce nuclear weapons suggested that the nuclear threat, which had been successfully managed throughout the Cold War era, could increase in the post-Cold War era.

  11. Polonium-210 as Weapon for Mass Destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Properties of Po-210 make it possible for its use as weapon of mass destruction. Po-210 occurs naturally in minute quantities in the human body, in Uranium ore (< 0.1 mg Po-210 / ton ) and as a product of Radon-222 gas decay chain. Po-210 also occurs as deposition on vegetation (tobacco leaves). Po-210 is produced by bombardment of Bi-209 with neutrons in a nuclear reactor. Russia produces 8 grams per year for export to USA market

  12. A Proposed Taxonomy of Software Weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Karresand, Martin

    2002-01-01

    The terms and classification schemes used in the computer security field today are not standardised. Thus the field is hard to take in, there is a risk of misunderstandings, and there is a risk that the scientific work is being hampered. Therefore this report presents a proposal for a taxonomy of software based IT weapons. After an account of the theories governing the formation of a taxonomy, and a presentation of the requisites, seven taxonomies from different parts of the computer securit...

  13. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP)

  14. Nuclear weapons and the World Court ruling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    based on the initiatives by non-governmental organizations, the World Health Organisation (WHO) Assembly asked the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion in 1993 whether, considering the environmental and health consequences, the use of nuclear weapons by a state in war or other armed conflict would be a breach of its obligations under international law. The World Court decided that it was not able to give an advisory opinion as requested, because of the fact that questions of use of force and such like were beyond the scope of specialized agencies like the WHO. The Court has ruled that the international community, especially the five nuclear weapon states have not only an obligation to negotiate a treaty for total nuclear disarmament, but also have an obligation to conclude such treaty. We may expect that the nuclear weapon states will cynically disregard the ruling of the World Court as they have been doing to the basic obligation itself in pursuit of nuclear hegemony. But the remaining 150 countries or so also bear a responsibility to keep nudging the recalcitrant states into implementing their commitments to disarm

  15. The Chemical Weapons Convention -- Legal issues

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-08-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers a unique challenge to the US system of constitutional law. Its promise of eliminating what is the most purely genocidal type of weapon from the world`s arsenals as well as of destroying the facilities for producing these weapons, brings with it a set of novel legal issues. The reservations about the CWC expressed by US business people are rooted in concern about safeguarding confidential business information and protecting the constitutional right to privacy. The chief worry is that international verification inspectors will misuse their power to enter commercial property and that trade secrets or other private information will be compromised as a result. It has been charged that the Convention is probably unconstitutional. The author categorically disagrees with that view and is aware of no scholarly writing that supports it. The purpose of this presentation is to show that CWC verification activities can be implemented in the US consistently with the traditional constitutional regard for commercial and individual privacy. First, he very briefly reviews the types of verification inspections that the CWC permits, as well as some of its specific privacy protections. Second, he explains how the Fourth Amendment right to privacy works in the context of CWC verification inspections. Finally, he reviews how verification inspections can be integrated into these constitutional requirements in the SU through a federal implementing statute.

  16. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Immele, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wagner, Richard L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in

  17. Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  18. Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Dominican Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  19. Measures to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tanzman, E.; Kellman, B.

    1999-11-05

    This seminar is another excellent opportunity for those involved in preventing chemical weapons production and use to learn from each other about how the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) can become a foundation of arms control in Africa and around the world. The author is grateful to the staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for inviting him to address this distinguished seminar. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone, and do not represent the position of the government of the US nor or of any other institution. In 1993, as the process of CWC ratification was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the treaty with national law would cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States Parties in how the Convention would be carried out. As a result the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention was prepared and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Manual was reviewed by the Committee of Legal Experts on National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Mica. In February 1998, the second edition of the Manual was published in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The second edition 1998 clarified the national implementation options to reflect post-entry-into-force thinking, added extensive references to national implementing measures that had been enacted by various States Parties, and included a prototype national implementing statute developed by the authors to provide a starting point for those whose national implementing

  20. Atomic Energy Control Board

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper has been prepared to provide an overview of the responsibilities and activities of the Atomic Energy Control Board. It is designed to address questions that are often asked concerning the establishment of the Atomic Energy Control Board, its enabling legislation, licensing and compliance activities, federal-provincial relationships, international obligations, and communications with the public

  1. Is there any future for nuclear weapons?; Les armes nucleaires ont-elles un avenir?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heisbourg, F.

    2011-07-01

    Nuclear weapons occupy a paradoxal place both in the collective imagination and in the historical reality: on the one hand everybody dreads the apocalypse horror, and on the other hand, dissuasion appears as an unchanging and quite comfortable situation. However, the world has become multipolar in this domain as well. The geopolitical map is reconstructing. Doctrinal revisions, initiatives against nuclear weapons proliferation, and nuclear disarmament measures are now on the agenda. The best foreign and French experts examine for the first time the consequences of these evolutions. They analyse in particular the split up risks and the potential consequences of a nuclear conflict in regions where atomic arms have become a key-component of the strategic landscape: Middle-Est, Far-East, Southern Asia. The choices France and its allies will have to face are examined as well. (J.S.)

  2. Why are sexually selected weapons almost absent in females?

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Anders BERGLUND

    2013-01-01

    In sex role reversed species,predominantly females evolve sexually selected traits,such as ornaments and/or weapons.Female ornaments are common and their function well documented in many species,whether sex role reversed or not.However,sexually selected female weapons seem totally absent except for small wing spurs in three jacana species,present in both males and females.This poor female weaponry is in sharp contrast to the situation in species with conventional sex roles:males commonly have evolved sexually selected weapons as well as ornaments.At the same time,females in many taxa have naturally selected weapons,used in competition over resources or in predator defence.Why are sexually selected weapons then so rare,almost absent,in females? Here I briefly review weaponry in females and the function of these weapons,conclude that the near absence of sexually selected weapons begs an explanation,and suggest that costs of sexually selected weapons may exceed costs of ornaments.Females are more constrained when evolving sexually selected traits compared to males,at least compared to those males that do not provide direct benefits,as trait costs reduce a female's fecundity.I suggest that this constraining trade-off between trait and fecundity restricts females to evolve ornaments but rarely weapons.The same may apply to paternally investing males.Whether sexually selected weapons actually are more costly than sexually selected ornaments remains to be investigated.

  3. Mission possible: Nuclear weapons inspections in Iraq - 7 March 2003. Essay, published in the Wall Street Journal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For the past three months, a cadre of highly trained inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been on a focused mission: to verify, through intrusive inspection, the existence or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. Nuclear weapons inspections in Iraq are making marked progress. To date, no substantiated evidence was found of the revival in Iraq of a nuclear weapons programme - the most lethal of the weapons of mass destruction. No verification programme can provide absolute guarantees that every facility or piece of equipment has been seen; there is always some degree of risk - and for that reason we need to continue to maintain a monitoring and verification presence in Iraq well into the future. For the present, we intend to continue our programme of intrusive inspection, making use of all the authority granted to us by the Security Council and all the information provided by other States. Barring any unforeseen circumstances, and provided that the level of co-operation by Iraq accelerates and support by other States continues, the IAEA should be able, in the near future, to provide the Security Council with credible assurance regarding the presence or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq

  4. The Role of Alcohol and Drug Consumption in Determining Physical Fights and Weapon Carrying by Teenagers

    OpenAIRE

    Sara Markowitz

    2001-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to examine the question of whether alcohol or drug use causes teenagers to engage in violent behaviors as measured by physical fighting, carrying a gun, or carrying other types of weapons. Simple OLS estimation of the effects of drug and alcohol consumption on violence may be biased because of the possibility that both behaviors are determined by unmeasured individual traits. Two-stage least squares estimates are employed to establish causality. This method first ...

  5. Cardiac fibrillation risk of Taser weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leitgeb, Norbert

    2014-06-01

    The debate on potential health hazards associated with delivering electric discharges to incapacitated subjects, in particular on whether electric discharge weapons are lethal, less lethal or non-lethal, is still controversial. The cardiac fibrillation risks of Taser weapons X26 and X3 have been investigated by measuring the delivered high-tension pulses in dependence on load impedance. Excitation thresholds and sinus-to-Taser conversion factors have been determined by numerical modeling of endocardial, myocardial, and epicardial cells. Detailed quantitative assessment of cardiac electric exposure has been performed by numerical simulation at the normal-weighted anatomical model NORMAN. The impact of anatomical variation has been quantified at an overweight model (Visible Man), both with a spatial resolution of 2 × 2 × 2 mm voxels. Spacing and location of dart electrodes were systematically varied and the worst-case position determined. Based on volume-weighted cardiac exposure assessment, the fibrillation probability of the worst-case hit was determined to 30% (Taser X26) and 9% (Taser X3). The overall risk assessment of Taser application accounting for realistic spatial hit distributions was derived from training sessions of police officers under realistic scenarios and by accounting for the influence of body (over-)weight as well as gender. The analysis of the results showed that the overall fibrillation risk of Taser use is not negligible. It is higher at Taser X26 than at Taser X3 and amounts to about 1% for Europeans with an about 20% higher risk for Asians. Results demonstrate that enhancement as well as further reduction of fibrillation risk depends on responsible use or abuse of Taser weapons. PMID:24776896

  6. Systems engineering analysis of kinetic energy weapon concepts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Senglaub, M.

    1996-06-01

    This study examines, from a systems engineering design perspective, the potential of kinetic energy weapons being used in the role of a conventional strategic weapon. Within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, strategic weapon experience falls predominantly in the nuclear weapons arena. The techniques developed over the years may not be the most suitable methodologies for use in a new design/development arena. For this reason a more fundamental approach was pursued with the objective of developing an information base from which design decisions might be made concerning the conventional strategic weapon system concepts. The study examined (1) a number of generic missions, (2) the effects of a number of damage mechanisms from a physics perspective, (3) measures of effectiveness (MOE`s), and (4) a design envelope for kinetic energy weapon concepts. With the base of information a cut at developing a set of high-level system requirements was made, and a number of concepts were assessed against these requirements.

  7. Nuclear weapons, a danger for our world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is about an exhibition about the danger of the increasing amount of nuclear-weapons and was presented in the occasion of the second special meeting of the UN General Assembly (1982). This report describes the causes of a nuclear-war and analyses the causes of the bomb-drop of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as possible causes of a bombing of New York City and long-term-consequences of nuclear radiation. Furthermore it lists problems with a higher priority than the armament of nuclear-arms. (kancsar)

  8. Interdicting a Nuclear‐Weapons Project

    OpenAIRE

    Brown, G.G.; Carlyle, W.M.; Harney, R.C.; Skroch, E.; Wood, R.K.

    2009-01-01

    Operations Research, 57, pp. 866‐877. Center for Infrastructure Defense (CID) Paper. Operations Research, 57, pp. 866-877. The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0643 A “proliferator” seeks to complete a first small batch of fission weapons as quickly as possible, whereas an “interdictor” wishes to delay that completion for as long as possible. We develop and solve a max-min model that identifies resource- limited interdiction acti...

  9. Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Stephen J. Cimbala

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia threatens nuclear deterrence and crisis stability in the region and o!ers unique challenges to United States and allied security. The article contrasts two possible futures for nuclear Asia: a relatively more constrained proliferation regime with tiered levels of agreed deployment ceilings among states; and an unconstrained nuclear arms race in Asia. Not only regional tensions, but also the overlap between regional and global antagonisms and ambitions might upset nuclear deterrence stability in Asia.

  10. Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kemp, R. Scott

    2016-06-01

    Environmental sensing of nuclear activities has the potential to detect nuclear weapon programs at early stages, deter nuclear proliferation, and help verify nuclear accords. However, no robust system of detection has been deployed to date. This can be variously attributed to high costs, technical limitations in detector technology, simple countermeasures, and uncertainty about the magnitude or behavior of potential signals. In this article, current capabilities and promising opportunities are reviewed. Systematic research in a variety of areas could improve prospects for detecting covert nuclear programs, although the potential for countermeasures suggests long-term verification of nuclear agreements will need to rely on methods other than environmental sensing.

  11. Postulated accident scenarios in weapons disassembly

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Payne, S.S. [Dept. of Energy, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1997-06-01

    A very brief summary of three postulated accident scenarios for weapons disassembly is provided in the paper. The first deals with a tetrahedral configuration of four generic pits; the second, an infinite planar array of generic pits with varying interstitial water density; and the third, a spherical shell with internal mass suspension in water varying the size and mass of the shell. Calculations were performed using the Monte Carlo Neutron Photon transport code MCNP4A. Preliminary calculations pointed to a need for higher resolution of small pit separation regimes and snapshots of hydrodynamic processes of water/plutonium mixtures.

  12. Thermal radiation from a nuclear weapon burst

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The different methods and correlations used to calculate the propagation of thermal radiation are reviewed and compared. A simple method to account for radiation enhancement by reflection from a superior cloud deck or snow cover, as well as attenuation of radiation by cloud cover below the burst is presented. The results show that the thermal reach may vary considerably. Additional calculation show that a significant fraction of the thermal energy may be incident after the arrival of the shock wave. Results for a range of weapon yields are presented, and the implications for blast-induced (secondary) fire starts are discussed

  13. Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons: Military effectiveness and collateral effects

    OpenAIRE

    Gsponer, Andre

    2005-01-01

    The paper begins with a general introduction and update to Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons (FGNW), and then addresses some particularly important military aspects on which there has been only limited public discussion so far. These aspects concern the unique military characteristics of FGNWs which make them radically different from both nuclear weapons based on previous-generation nuclear-explosives and from conventional weapons based on chemical-explosives: yields in the 1 to 100 tons rang...

  14. Small sample Bayesian analyses in assessment of weapon performance

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2007-01-01

    Abundant test data are required in assessment of weapon performance.When weapon test data are insufficient,Bayesian analyses in small sample circumstance should be considered and the test data should be provided by simulations.The several Bayesian approaches are discussed and some limitations are founded.An improvement is put forward after limitations of Bayesian approaches available are analyzed and t he improved approach is applied to assessment of some new weapon performance.

  15. Recovery of weapon plutonium as feed material for reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report presents preliminary considerations for recovering and converting weapon plutonium from various US weapon forms into feed material for fabrication of reactor fuel elements. An ongoing DOE study addresses the disposition of excess weapon plutonium through its use as fuel for nuclear power reactors and subsequent disposal as spent fuel. The spent fuel would have characteristics similar to those of commercial power spent fuel and could be similarly disposed of in a geologic repository

  16. Use of Depleted Uranium Weapons in Contemporary Military Interventions

    OpenAIRE

    Okafor-Yarwood, Ifesinachi Marybenedette

    2014-01-01

    This research note examines the use of depleted uranium weapons in contemporarymilitary interventions and the hazardous effects of their use. It also demonstratesattempts made by the United States and the United Kingdom to block anyinternational efforts to ban the use of these weapons. Although there is no laboratory evidence, experiential evidence from Iraq indicates that depleted uranium weapons are dangerous to human health and the environment. This research note argues that the United Nat...

  17. Recovery of weapon plutonium as feed material for reactor fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Armantrout, G.A.; Bronson, M.A.; Choi, Jor-Shan [and others

    1994-03-16

    This report presents preliminary considerations for recovering and converting weapon plutonium from various US weapon forms into feed material for fabrication of reactor fuel elements. An ongoing DOE study addresses the disposition of excess weapon plutonium through its use as fuel for nuclear power reactors and subsequent disposal as spent fuel. The spent fuel would have characteristics similar to those of commercial power spent fuel and could be similarly disposed of in a geologic repository.

  18. Predication and Optimization of Maintenance Resources for Weapon System

    OpenAIRE

    Yabin Wang

    2011-01-01

    Maintenance resources are important part of the maintenance support system. The whole efficiency of weapon system is directly affected by the allocation of maintenance resources. Joint support for weapon system of multi-kinds of equipments is the main fashion of maintenance support in the future. However, there is a lack of the efficiency tools and methods for predication and optimization of weapon system maintenance resources presently. For the prediction requirement of maintenance resources...

  19. The shipboard employment of a free electron laser weapon system

    OpenAIRE

    Allgaier, Gregory G.

    2003-01-01

    Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited A megawatt (MW) class Free Electron Laser (FEL) shows promise as a new weapon for antiship cruise missile defense. An FEL weapon system delivers energy at the speed of light at controllable energy levels, giving the war fighter new engagement options. Considerations for this weapon system include employment, design, and stability. In order to reach a MW class laser, system parameters must be optimized and the high power optical beam mu...

  20. DOE Nuclear Weapon Reliability Definition: History, Description, and Implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wright, D.L.; Cashen, J.J.; Sjulin, J.M.; Bierbaum, R.L.; Kerschen, T.J.

    1999-04-01

    The overarching goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapon reliability assessment process is to provide a quantitative metric that reflects the ability of the weapons to perform their intended function successfully. This white paper is intended to provide insight into the current and long-standing DOE definition of nuclear weapon reliability, which can be summarized as: The probability of achieving the specified yield, at the target, across the Stockpile-To-Target Sequence of environments, throughout the weapon's lifetime, assuming proper inputs.

  1. Granular analyzing of weapon SoS demand description

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Zhao Qingsong; Yang Kewei; Chen Yingwu; Li Mengjun

    2009-01-01

    The systematism of weapon combat is the typical characteristic of a modern battlefield. The process of combat is complex and the demand description of weapon system of systems (SOS) is difficult. Granular analyzing is an important method for solving the complex problem in the world. Granular thinking is introduced into the demand description of weapon SoS. Granular computing and granular combination based on a relation of compatibility is proposed. Based on the level of degree and degree of detail, the granular resolution of weapon SoS is defined and an example is illustrated at the end.

  2. ON THE OFFENSE: USING CYBER WEAPONS TO INFLUENCE COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mary Fendley

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available There is an increasing recognition that cyber warfare is an important area of development for targeting and weaponeering, with far-reaching effects in national defense and economic security. The ability to conduct effective operations in cyberspace relies on a robust situational awareness of events occurring in both the physical and information domains, with an understanding of how they affect the cognitive domain of friendly, neutral, and adversary population sets. The dynamic nature of the battlefield complicates efforts to understand shifting adversary motivations and intentions. There are very few approaches, to date, that systematically evaluate the effects of the repertoire of cyber weapons on the cognitive, perceptual, and behavioral characteristics of the adversary. In this paper, we describe a software environment called Cognitive Cyber Weapon Selection Tool (CCWST that simulates a scenario involving cyber weaponry.This tool provides the capabilities to test weapons which may induce behavioral state changes in the adversaries. CCWST provides the required situational awareness to the Cyber Information Operations (IO planner to conduct intelligent weapon selection during weapon activation in order to induce the desired behavioral change in the perception of the adversary. Weapons designed to induce the cognitive state changes of deception, distraction, distrust and confusion were then tested empirically to evaluate the capabilities and expected cognitive state changes induced by these weapons. The results demonstrated that CCWST is a powerful environment within which to test and evaluate the impact of cyber weapons on influencing cognitive behavioral states during information processing.

  3. Strategies for denaturing the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buckner, M.R.; Parks, P.B.

    1992-10-01

    In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclear weapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclear weapons.

  4. Report of the Canberra commission. Eliminating nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book was originally published in Australia under the title: 'Report of the Canberra commission on the elimination of nuclear weapons'. The aim of this report in to convince any reader that the elimination of nuclear weapons has become a necessary goal at the end of this century. After a summary of the political conclusions of the commission, a first part presents the debate about nuclear weapons while a second part describes the different steps that must be followed to completely eliminate the nuclear weapons worldwide. Details about verification, legal aspects and actions are given in appendixes. (J.S.)

  5. How is rape a weapon of war?: feminist international relations, modes of critical explanation and the study of wartime sexual violence

    OpenAIRE

    Kirby, Paul

    2012-01-01

    Rape is a weapon of war. Establishing this now common claim has been an achievement of feminist scholarship and activism and reveals wartime sexual violence as a social act marked by gendered power. But the consensus that rape is a weapon of war obscures important, and frequently unacknowledged, differences in ways of understanding and explaining it. This article opens these differences to analysis. Drawing on recent debates regarding the philosophy of social science in IR and social theory, ...

  6. Disposal of Surplus Weapons Grade Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is responsible for disposing of inventories of surplus US weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium as well as providing, technical support for, and ultimate implementation of, efforts to obtain reciprocal disposition of surplus Russian plutonium. On January 4, 2000, the Department of Energy issued a Record of Decision to dispose of up to 50 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium using two methods. Up to 17 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be immobilized in a ceramic form, placed in cans and embedded in large canisters containing high-level vitrified waste for ultimate disposal in a geologic repository. Approximately 33 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be used to fabricate MOX fuel (mixed oxide fuel, having less than 5% plutonium-239 as the primary fissile material in a uranium-235 carrier matrix). The MOX fuel will be used to produce electricity in existing domestic commercial nuclear reactors. This paper reports the major waste-package-related, long-term disposal impacts of the two waste forms that would be used to accomplish this mission. Particular emphasis is placed on the possibility of criticality. These results are taken from a summary report published earlier this year

  7. Zirconia ceramics for excess weapons plutonium waste

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gong, W. L.; Lutze, W.; Ewing, R. C.

    2000-01-01

    We synthesized a zirconia (ZrO 2)-based single-phase ceramic containing simulated excess weapons plutonium waste. ZrO 2 has large solubility for other metallic oxides. More than 20 binary systems A xO y-ZrO 2 have been reported in the literature, including PuO 2, rare-earth oxides, and oxides of metals contained in weapons plutonium wastes. We show that significant amounts of gadolinium (neutron absorber) and yttrium (additional stabilizer of the cubic modification) can be dissolved in ZrO 2, together with plutonium (simulated by Ce 4+, U 4+ or Th 4+) and impurities (e.g., Ca, Mg, Fe, Si). Sol-gel and powder methods were applied to make homogeneous, single-phase zirconia solid solutions. Pu waste impurities were completely dissolved in the solid solutions. In contrast to other phases, e.g., zirconolite and pyrochlore, zirconia is extremely radiation resistant and does not undergo amorphization. Baddeleyite (ZrO 2) is suggested as the natural analogue to study long-term radiation resistance and chemical durability of zirconia-based waste forms.

  8. Diagnosis and Prognosis of Weapon Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nolan, Mary; Catania, Rebecca; deMare, Gregory

    2005-01-01

    The Prognostics Framework is a set of software tools with an open architecture that affords a capability to integrate various prognostic software mechanisms and to provide information for operational and battlefield decision-making and logistical planning pertaining to weapon systems. The Prognostics NASA Tech Briefs, February 2005 17 Framework is also a system-level health -management software system that (1) receives data from performance- monitoring and built-in-test sensors and from other prognostic software and (2) processes the received data to derive a diagnosis and a prognosis for a weapon system. This software relates the diagnostic and prognostic information to the overall health of the system, to the ability of the system to perform specific missions, and to needed maintenance actions and maintenance resources. In the development of the Prognostics Framework, effort was focused primarily on extending previously developed model-based diagnostic-reasoning software to add prognostic reasoning capabilities, including capabilities to perform statistical analyses and to utilize information pertaining to deterioration of parts, failure modes, time sensitivity of measured values, mission criticality, historical data, and trends in measurement data. As thus extended, the software offers an overall health-monitoring capability.

  9. Modern Weapons and Military Equipment for Issue 1/2014

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mladen R. Tišma

    2014-02-01

    Full Text Available Czech Aero star development of L-169 trainer; Scorpion light attack jet performs maiden flight; New M-345 HET trainer revealed; Turkish attack helicopter again in delay; India’s LCA Tejas reaches IOC; Iran reveals UCAV Fotros; Integration of Meteor missile onto Gripen E agreed; French MoD and MBDA signed development and production contract for antitank system Moyenne Portee; UK invests 79 million Pounds into development of new generation submarines; German Iris-T SL surface-to-air missile successful trails; Alexander Nevsky submarine enters into operation with the Russian Navy; Maiden flight of Chinese Z-20 helicopter; F-35’s first live AMRAAM firing; KAI reveals model of the new version of its KFX fighter; Lockheed’s Skunk Works reveals SR-72; India’s DRDO presents tactical ballistic missile Pragati; Sikorsky Innovations wins contract for VTOL experimental aircraft; Jordanian gunship CN235 performs maiden flight; General Atomics shows its EMRG railgun; Aurora too wins contract for Phase I of VTOL X-Plane program; Airbus Military reveals more details on new Fire-fighter; US proposal of weapons and equipment for Romanian F-16A/B; Russia to develop light-weight front-line fighter; Start of Eurofighter cruise missile integration trails.

  10. The Manhattan Project: Making the atomic bomb

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gosling, F.G.

    1994-09-01

    This article is a short history of the origins and development of the American atomic bomb program during World War II. Beginning with the scientific developments of the pre-war years, the monograph details the role of US government in conducting a secret, nationwide enterprise that took science from the laboratory and into combat with an entirely new type of weapon. The monograph concludes with a discussion of the immediate postwar period, the debate over the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and the founding of the Atomic Energy Commission.

  11. Atomic Energy Commission Act, 1963

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Promulgated in 1963, the Atomic Energy Commission Act (204) established and vested in the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission the sole responsibility for all matters relating to the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the country. Embodied in the Act are provisions relating to the powers, duties, rights and liabilities of the Commission. (EAA)

  12. The Regulation of the Possession of Weapons at Gatherings

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pieter du Toit

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available The Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013 provides for certain prohibitions and restrictions in respect of the possession of a dangerous weapon and it repeals the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 as well as the different Dangerous Weapons Acts in operation in the erstwhile TBVC States. The Act also amends the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 to prohibit the possession of any dangerous weapon at a gathering or demonstration. The Dangerous Weapons Act provides for a uniform system of law governing the use of dangerous weapons for the whole of South Africa and it furthermore no longer places the onus on the individual charged with the offence of the possession of a dangerous weapon to show that he or she did not have any intention of using the firearm for an unlawful purpose. The Act also defines the meaning of a dangerous weapon. According to our court’s interpretation of the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 a dangerous weapon was regarded as an object used or intended to be used as a weapon even if it had not been designed for use as a weapon. The Act, however, requires the object to be capable of causing death or inflicting serious bodily harm if it were used for an unlawful purpose. The possession of a dangerous weapon, in circumstances which may raise a reasonable suspicion that the person intends to use it for an unlawful purpose, attracts criminal liability. The Act also provides a useful set of guidelines to assist courts to determine if a person charged with the offence of the possession of a dangerous weapon had indeed intended to use the weapon for an unlawful purpose. It seems, however, that the Act prohibits the possession of a dangerous weapon at gatherings, even if the person carrying the weapon does not intend to use it for an unlawful purpose. The state will, however, have to prove that the accused had the necessary control over the object and the intention to exercise such control, as well as that the object is capable of

  13. Atomic war field Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Progressive atomic weapons, results of a perfect and perfidious technology face each other in the centre of a possible crisis - in Europe. The strategists of the Warszhaw Pact and of Nato seem very optimistic, which they owe to their professions, the population's increasing fear of a war, however, can no longer be denied. Nervous military personnel, political and religions fanatics and perplexed politicians sit at the switches of fear - without a concept and without alternatives. Despite this alarming conditions, Nigel Calder who has investigated in the USA and in the USSR, and in Europe, managed to remain a calm spectator of the imminent apocalypse. Without compromises and clearly he analyses the nearly hopeless consequences resulting from the changed world-political situation, the tremendously fast development of the arms technology, and the crazy strategical doctrines in East and West and in the Third World. (orig./UA)

  14. Russia's atomic tsar: Viktor N. Mikhailov

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Minatom (Ministry of Atomic Energy) was created to manage Russia's nuclear weapons program in the age of disarmament. The ministry is responsible for the development, production, and maintenance of nuclear weapons, warhead dismantlement, the production of nuclear materials for weapons, the disposition of nuclear materials disassembled from warheads, the administration of Russia's vast nuclear weapons complex, the development of policy for the future role of Russia's nuclear complex and payment of employees entrusted with such tasks. Thus, Minatom is instrumental in the implementation of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation agreements. The director of Minatom, Viktor N. Mikhailov, wields a great deal of power and influence over Russia's nuclear infrastructure. He is an important player amidst efforts to reduce the threats posed by Russia's decaying nuclear complex. There are certainly other personalities in the Russian government who influence Minatom; however, few affect the ministry as profoundly as Mikhailov. His ability to influence Russia's nuclear complex has been clearly demonstrated by his policies in relation to the US purchase of Russian highly enriched uranium, the planned fissile material storage facility at Mayak, materials protection, control and accountability programs, and his unwavering determination to sell Iran commercial nuclear technology. Mikhailov has also been a key negotiator when dealing with the US on issues of transparency of weapons dismantlement and fissile material disposition, as well as the use of US threat reduction funds. His policies and concerns in these areas will affect the prospects for the successful negotiation and implementation of future nuclear threat reduction programs and agreements with Russia

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Romania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agency received from Romania on 22 August 2007 and from the European Atomic Energy Community on 1 May 2010, the notifications required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement. Accordingly, the Agreement entered into force for Romania on 1 May 2010

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of the Czech Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agency received from the Czech Republic on 18 May 2009 and from the European Atomic Energy Community on 1 October 2009, the notifications required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement. Accordingly, the Agreement entered into force for the Czech Republic on 1 October 2009

  17. Guarding the guardians: Civilian control of nuclear weapons in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book has three separate complementary goals. First, it develops a model to explain how the command and control of nuclear weapons evolves over time. Second, it tells the story of the evolution of one critical aspect of the nuclear command system, the custody of nuclear weapons. Finally, it assesses the general problem of ensuring civilian control over nuclear operations. The focus is on the formation of operational policy. Where to deploy a weapon and at what state of alertness is an operational decision. Part I, The Theory of Civilian Control is divided into three chapters: Civilian control: Principles and problems; Civilian Control: From alerts to war termination; and Explaining changes in civilian control. Part II, The Evolution of Custody Policy has seven chapters: The Atomic Energy Act and the origin of assertive control, 1945-1947; The first test of assertive civilian control, 1948-1949; The breach in assertive control, 1950-1952; Assertive control becomes delegative control, 1953-1958; The resurgence of assertive control, 1959-1962; The cycle continues, 1963-1990; and Conclusion: The future of civilian control

  18. North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moon, Duk-ho (Korean Consulate General in New York)

    2003-12-01

    A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.

  19. Atom Chips

    CERN Document Server

    Folman, R; Cassettari, D; Hessmo, B; Maier, T; Schmiedmayer, J; Folman, Ron; Krüger, Peter; Cassettari, Donatella; Hessmo, Björn; Maier, Thomas

    1999-01-01

    Atoms can be trapped and guided using nano-fabricated wires on surfaces, achieving the scales required by quantum information proposals. These Atom Chips form the basis for robust and widespread applications of cold atoms ranging from atom optics to fundamental questions in mesoscopic physics, and possibly quantum information systems.

  20. 对抗高超声速武器的机载激光武器发展研究%Research on the Development of Airborne Laser Weapons Against Hypersonic Weapons

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    张同鑫; 李权

    2016-01-01

    The military threat of hypersonic weapon to current air defense system, and the potential military value of airborne laser weapon confronted to the hypersonic weapon were illustrated. Detailed introduction was made on the technical barriers of airborne laser weapon and the state of the art research progress. It is emphasized that now to research airborne laser weapon, its weight and size must be decreased, beam control system and aiming and tracking system in dynamic environments must be researched, special aerodynamic layout must be designed and smart energy sources management must be established.%介绍了高超声速武器对现有军事防御系统的威胁,机载激光武器对抗高超声速武器的军事价值。详细描述了国外机载激光武器的研究进展以及研究机载激光武器的技术难点,指出当前研究机载激光武器必须进一步降低激光武器的重量和体积,研发动态环境的光束控制与瞄准跟踪系统,开展特殊气动布局设计研究,建立周密的能源管理系统。

  1. Constraining potential nuclear-weapons proliferation from civilian reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cessation of the Cold War and renewed international attention to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are leading to national policies aimed at restraining nuclear-weapons proliferation that could occur through the nuclear-fuel cycle. Argonne, which has unique experience, technology, and capabilities, is one of the US national laboratories contributing to this nonproliferation effort

  2. Factors associated with weapon use in maternal filicide.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lewis, C F; Baranoski, M V; Buchanan, J A; Benedek, E P

    1998-05-01

    The objective of this study was to identify factors associated with weapon use in a group of filicidal women. Clinical data were gathered from the charts of sixty filicidal women evaluated at Michigan's Center for Forensic Psychiatry or through Connecticut's Psychiatric Security Review Board from 1970 to 1996. Factors associated with weapon use were determined using chi squares, ANCOVAS, and a logistic regression. Results were compared to national statistics for child homicide from the Department of Justice Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Weapon was defined as knife or gun for the study. Weapons were used by one of four women in our study. Guns were used by 13% of filicidal women and knives by 12%. Odds ratio showed that psychotic women were eleven times more likely to kill their child with a weapon than their non-psychotic counterparts (11.2; p = .008). Psychosis was present in every mother who killed her child with a knife and in seven of eight women who killed their children with a gun. Younger children were less likely to be killed with weapons (ANCOVA; F = 8.28; p = .006). This finding was independent of presence or absence of maternal psychosis. These results show that psychotic women are more likely than non-psychotic women to kill their children with weapons. They also show that mothers are more likely to use weapons to kill older children than younger children. PMID:9608698

  3. 14 CFR 135.119 - Prohibition against carriage of weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Prohibition against carriage of weapons... Flight Operations § 135.119 Prohibition against carriage of weapons. No person may, while on board an aircraft being operated by a certificate holder, carry on or about that person a deadly or dangerous...

  4. Victimization and Health Risk Factors among Weapon-Carrying Youth

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stayton, Catherine; McVeigh, Katharine H.; Olson, E. Carolyn; Perkins, Krystal; Kerker, Bonnie D.

    2011-01-01

    Objective: To compare health risks of 2 subgroups of weapon carriers: victimized and nonvictimized youth. Methods: 2003-2007 NYC Youth Risk Behavior Surveys were analyzed using bivariate analyses and multinomial logistic regression. Results: Among NYC teens, 7.5% reported weapon carrying without victimization; 6.9% reported it with victimization.…

  5. Nuclear Weapons--A Suitable Topic for the Classroom?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Eijkelhof, Harrie; And Others

    1984-01-01

    Describes the development and implementation of curriculum materials that discuss nuclear weapons and the evaluation of those materials by administrators, teachers, and students. Also discusses the place of the study of nuclear weapons in the curriculum and aims of the materials. Suggested student activities are included. (JM)

  6. Willingness to pay for defense against weapons of mass destruction.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mulvaney, J M; LaBarre, D; Pastel, R; Landauer, M

    2001-12-01

    A survey assessed the willingness to pay for defense against weapons of mass destruction. The results were evaluated according to the benefit to society. The results indicated preferences for increased spending on intelligence gathering, training, and equipment. We concluded that the United States is spending less for weapons of mass destruction defense than the sample population was willing to pay.

  7. The Relationship between Social Capital and Weapon Possession on Campus

    Science.gov (United States)

    Messer, Rachel H.; Bradley, Kristopher I.; Calvi, Jessica L.; Kennison, Shelia M.

    2012-01-01

    The present research focused on the problem of how college officials might be able to predict weapon possession on college campuses. We hypothesized that measures of social capital (i.e., trust and participation in society) may be useful in identifying individuals who are likely to possess weapons on campuses. Prior research has shown that those…

  8. 31 CFR 0.215 - Possession of weapons and explosives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Possession of weapons and explosives. 0.215 Section 0.215 Money and Finance: Treasury Office of the Secretary of the Treasury DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY EMPLOYEE RULES OF CONDUCT Rules of Conduct § 0.215 Possession of weapons...

  9. Someone at School Has a Weapon. What Should I Do?

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... animals talking about weapons and violence fascination with violent video games, television, and movies threatening or bullying others isolation from family and friends Of course, these signs don't necessarily mean that a person will become violent or bring a weapon to school. Still, you ...

  10. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504.14 Section 504.14 Parks, Forests, and Public Property SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms,...

  11. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or...

  12. 44 CFR 15.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 15.15 Section 15.15 Emergency Management and Assistance FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY GENERAL CONDUCT AT THE MT. WEATHER EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE CENTER AND AT THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY TRAINING CENTER § 15.15 Weapons...

  13. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON BELTSVILLE AGRICULTURE RESEARCH CENTER PROPERTY, BELTSVILLE, MARYLAND § 502.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while...

  14. Cancer in People Exposed to Nuclear Weapons Testing

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... Compensation Programs for People Exposed to Radiation as Part of Nuclear Weapons Testing Between 1945 and 1962, the United States ... involving about 200,000 people were conducted as part of many of these tests. ... several nuclear weapons plant sites were exposed to radiation and other ...

  15. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall...

  16. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS GOVERNING PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms,...

  17. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520.15 Section 520.15 Parks, Forests, and Public Property SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS OF THE NATIONAL ZOOLOGICAL PARK OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION § 520.15 Weapons and explosives. No person while...

  18. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 702.7 Section 702.7 Parks, Forests, and Public Property LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONDUCT ON LIBRARY PREMISES § 702.7 Weapons and explosives. Except where duly authorized by law, and in the performance of law enforcement functions, no person shall...

  19. A Study of New Method for Weapon System Effectiveness Evaluation Based on Bayesian Network

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    YAN Dai-wei; GU Liang-xian; PAN Lei

    2008-01-01

    As weapon system effectiveness is affected by many factors, its evaluation is essentially a multi-criterion decision making problem for its complexity. The evaluation model of the effectiveness is established on the basis of metrics architecture of the effectiveness. The Bayesian network, which is used to evaluate the effectiveness, is established based on the metrics architecture and the evaluation models. For getting the weights of the metrics by Bayesian network, subjective initial values of the weights are given, gradient ascent algorithm is adopted, and the reasonable values of the weights are achieved. And then the effectiveness of every weapon system project is gained. The weapon system, whose effectiveness is relative maximum, is the optimization system. The research result shows that this method can solve the problem of AHP method which evaluation results are not compatible to the practice results and overcome the shortcoming of neural network in multilayer and multi-criterion decision. The method offers a new approaeh for evaluating the effectiveness.

  20. The bane of "inhumane" weapons and overkill: an overview of increasingly lethal arms and the inadequacy of regulatory controls.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Richardson, Jacques G

    2004-10-01

    Weapons of both defense and offense have grown steadily in their effectiveness--especially since the industrial revolution. The mass destruction of humanity, by parts or in whole, became reality with the advent of toxic agents founded on chemistry and biology or nuclear weapons derived from physics. The military's new non-combat roles, combined with a quest for non-lethal weapons, may change the picture in regard to conventional defense establishments but are unlikely to deter bellicose tyrants or the new terrorists from using the unlimited potential of today's and tomorrow's arsenals. The author addresses the issues that are raised by this developing situation with the intent of seeking those ethics that will enable us to survive in a future and uncertain world.

  1. Sweden and the bomb. The Swedish plans to acquire nuclear weapons, 1945 - 1972

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid-50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The prime minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue. During this period

  2. UFOs and nukes. Extraordinary encounters at nuclear weapons sites; UFOs und Atomwaffen. Unheimliche Begegnungen in der Naehe von Nuklearwaffendepots

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hastings, Robert L.

    2015-07-01

    Everyone knows about the reported recovery of a crashed alien spaceship near Roswell, New Mexico in July 1947. However, most people are unaware that, at the time of the incident, Roswell Army Airfield was home to the world's only atomic bomber squadron, the 509th Bomb Group. Was this merely a coincidence? During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built thousands of the far more destructive hydrogen bombs, some of them a thousand times as destructive as the first atomic bombs dropped on Japan. If the nuclear standoff between the superpowers had erupted into World War III, human civilization - and perhaps the very survival of our species - would have been at risk. Did this ominous state of affairs come to the attention of outside observers? Was there a connection between the atomic bomber squadron based at Roswell and the reported crash of a UFO nearby? Did those who pilot the UFOs monitor the superpowers' nuclear arms race during the dangerous Cold War era? Do they scrutinize American and Russian weapons sites even now? UFOs and Nukes provides the startling and sometimes shocking answers to these questions. Veteran researcher Robert Hastings has investigated nuclear weapons-related UFO incidents for more than three decades and has interviewed more than 120 ex-US Air Force personnel, from former Airmen to retired Colonels, who witnessed extraordinary UFO encounters at nuclear weapons sites. Their amazing stories are presented here.

  3. Improved $\\tau$-weapons for Higgs hunting

    CERN Document Server

    Barenboim, G; López-Ibáñez, M L; Vives, O

    2013-01-01

    In this work, we use the results from Higgs searches in the $\\gamma\\gamma$ and $\\tau\\tau$ decay channels at LHC and indirect bounds as BR$(B \\to X_s \\gamma)$ to constrain the parameter space of a generic MSSM Higgs sector. In particular, we include the latest CMS results that look for additional Higgs states with masses up to 1 TeV. We show that the $\\tau \\tau$ channel is the best and most accurate weapon in the hunt for new Higgs states beyond the Standard Model. We obtain that present experimental results rule out additional neutral Higgs bosons in a generic MSSM below 300 GeV for any value of $\\tan \\beta$ and, for instance, values of $\\tan \\beta$ above 30 are only possible for Higgs masses above 600 GeV. ATLAS stored data has the potential to render this bound obsolete in the near future.

  4. Nuclear weapons issues in South Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Joeck, N.

    1993-07-02

    This report discusses how the US can play a productive mediating role in South Asia by engaging India and Pakistan in an international forum to manage nuclear weapons, as Edward Teller advocated. India and Pakistan have developed their nuclear capabilities because they fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten the US. The appropriate response for the US, therefore, is diplomatic engagement and negotiations. In addition to the international approach, encouragement and facilitation of regional and bilateral interactions will also be important. Formal arms control agreements have been reached, but less formal confidence-building measures, and unilateral security pledges may well be combined to form a more secure strategic environment in South Asia than a nuclear armed confrontation across the porous South Asian border.

  5. Emerging nuclear energy systems and nuclear weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Generally when considering problems of proliferation of nuclear weapons, discussions are focused on horizontal proliferation. However, the emerging nuclear energy systems currently have an impact mainly on vertical proliferation. The paper indicates that technologies connected with emerging nuclear energy systems, such as fusion reactors and accelerators, enhance the knowledge of thermonuclear weapon physics and will enable production of military useful nuclear materials (including some rare elements). At present such technologies are enhancing the arsenal of the nuclear weapon states. But one should not forget the future implications for horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons as some of the techniques will in the near future be within the technological and economic capabilities of non-nuclear weapon states. Some of these systems are not under any international control. (orig.)

  6. Proposals for chemical weapons during the American Civil War.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hasegawa, Guy R

    2008-05-01

    Proposals for chemical weapons that arose during the American Civil War are described. Most incendiary and all biological agents are excluded. The described proposals appeared primarily in periodicals or letters to government officials on both sides. The weapons were usually meant to temporarily disable enemy combatants, but some might have been lethal, and Civil War caregivers were ill-prepared to deal with the weapons' effects. Evidently, none of the proposed weapons were used. In only one instance was use against civilians mentioned. Among the agents most commonly proposed were cayenne pepper or other plant-based irritants such as black pepper, snuff, mustard, and veratria. Other suggested agents included chloroform, chlorine, hydrogen cyanide, arsenic compounds, sulfur, and acids. Proponents usually suggested that the chemicals be included in explosive artillery projectiles. Less commonly proposed vehicles of delivery included fire engines, kites, and manned balloons. Some of the proposed weapons have modern counterparts. PMID:18543573

  7. Statistical sampling and chemical analysis of complex weapon components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    One of the waste streams generated by nuclear weapon dismantlement programs will be component ''hardware'', including complex electronic assemblies such as: radars, arming/fusing/firing systems, power sources, and use-control and safety systems. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has been the design and development laboratory for many of these components and will be responsible for their ultimate disposition. This disposition, whether it be reuse, material recycle, or disposal, will require some level of material characterization and analysis. Previous efforts at developing a process for segregation and characterization of hazardous materials in weapon components have been documented. This paper describes the results of recent activities undertaken in support of the Weapon Hardware Inventory Reduction Effort (WHIRE) at Sandia National Laboratories. These activities have been directed principally towards: The development of a statistically sound sampling plan for chemical analysis of weapon component materials; the development of a non-destructive analytical screening method for determining the Toxicity Characteristic of excess weapon hardware

  8. 78 FR 75910 - Impact of the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Legitimate Commercial...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-12-13

    ... Convention (CWC) on Legitimate Commercial Chemical, Biotechnology, and Pharmaceutical Activities Involving... Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA) and the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR), has had on commercial activities...

  9. Atom chips

    CERN Document Server

    Reichel, Jakob

    2010-01-01

    This book provides a stimulating and multifaceted picture of a rapidly developing field. The first part reviews fundamentals of atom chip research in tutorial style, while subsequent parts focus on the topics of atom-surface interaction, coherence on atom chips, and possible future directions of atom chip research. The articles are written by leading researchers in the field in their characteristic and individual styles.

  10. (+/-)-catechin: chemical weapon, antioxidant, or stress regulator?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chobot, Vladimir; Huber, Christoph; Trettenhahn, Guenter; Hadacek, Franz

    2009-08-01

    (+/-)-Catechin is a flavan-3-ol that occurs in the organs of many plant species, especially fruits. Health-beneficial effects have been studied extensively, and notable toxic effects have not been found. In contrast, (+/-)-catechin has been implicated as a 'chemical weapon' that is exuded by the roots of Centaurea stoebe, an invasive knapweed of northern America. Recently, this hypothesis has been rejected based on (+/-)-catechin's low phytotoxicity, instability at pH levels higher than 5, and poor recovery from soil. In the current study, (+/-)-catechin did not inhibit the development of white and black mustard to an extent that was comparable to the highly phytotoxic juglone, a naphthoquinone that is allegedly responsible for the allelopathy of the walnut tree. At high stress levels, caused by sub-lethal methanol concentrations in the medium, and a 12 h photoperiod, (+/-)-catechin even attenuated growth retardation. A similar effect was observed when (+/-)-catechin was assayed for brine shrimp mortality. Higher concentrations reduced the mortality caused by toxic concentrations of methanol. Further, when (+/-)-catechin was tested in variants of the deoxyribose degradation assay, it was an efficient scavenger of reactive oxygen species (ROS) when they were present in higher concentrations. This antioxidant effect was enhanced when iron was chelated directly by (+/-)-catechin. Conversely, if iron was chelated to EDTA, pro-oxidative effects were demonstrated at higher concentrations; in this case (+/-)-catechin reduced molecular oxygen and iron to reagents required by the Fenton reaction to produce hydroxyl radicals. A comparison of cyclic voltammograms of (+/-)-catechin with the phytotoxic naphthoquinone juglone indicated similar redox-cycling properties for both compounds although juglone required lower electrochemical potentials to enter redox reactions. In buffer solutions, (+/-)-catechin remained stable at pH 3.6 (vacuole) and decomposed at pH 7.4 (cytoplasm

  11. Verifying the transition from low levels of nuclear weapons to a nuclear weapon-free world. VERTIC research report no. 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    results, would be very useful. By far the hardest verification problem facing nuclear disarmament is that of illicit acquisition or retention of nuclear weapons. This challenge would benefit from further study by each of the nuclear weapon states and as many other nations as are willing to devote resources to supporting nuclear disarmament. As is the case for all disarmament agreements, an industrialised country could, in theory, circumvent verification measures included in a nuclear weapons convention. But a verification regime should reduce the uncertainties in disarmament, and demonstrate an open and co-operative approach to creating a nuclear weapon-free world. Verification is just one of the many possible interlocking measures in an international disarmament treaty, and should not be seen as the single most important. While verification regimes have an important role to play in encouraging the participation of states in international disarmament treaties, and in ensuring that these treaties are effective, they are only part of a wider disarmament process. Since nuclear weapons might be eliminated over decades, it is relevant to consider the main respects in which the possibilities for verifying nuclear disarmament could change on such a timescale. Two important trends, in this respect, are those towards greater openness in the world, and towards improving technological verification capabilities. Greater openness at nuclear facilities is of particular importance in building international confidence in disarmament. Whenever possible, national research programmes on verification and other aspects of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, should involve international collaboration, since this could be a primary means of increasing openness, as well as of perfecting verification techniques. Openness at nuclear weapons establishments, including regular interactions between nuclear weapons scientists from different countries, should promote societal verification

  12. Application of Improved Grey Target Technology in Weapon Evaluation

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    XIE Zhi-jian; BO Yu-cheng; WANG Zhi-lin

    2005-01-01

    A new method of effectiveness evaluation of weapon systems is set up by improving the formula of approaching degree. According to the grey target theory of grey system theory, the patterns of the weapon systems to be evaluated are formed with the main tactical and technical performance indices of these weapon systems, thereby the standard pattern of these patterns is determined. By solving the approaching degree of patterns to their standard one and making a comparison among them, the evaluation results can be obtained.

  13. Is a nuclear weapon-free world desirable?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this article, the author shows that a nuclear weapon-free world would probably be more dangerous than today's world because benefits of the existence of nuclear weapons are probably more important that the risks related to their existence. He outlines that nuclear deterrence has been very efficient for these last 65 years. He states that the disappearance of nuclear weapons could be envisaged only after a large transformation of safety conditions, but that such transformations are actually not at all under way. It would indeed require peaceful and democratic world governance

  14. Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons: Military effectiveness and collateral effects

    CERN Document Server

    Gsponer, A

    2005-01-01

    The paper begins with a general introduction and update to Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons (FGNW), and then addresses some particularly important military aspects on which there has been only limited public discussion so far. These aspects concern the unique military characteristics of FGNWs which make them radically different from both nuclear weapons based on previous-generation nuclear-explosives and from conventional weapons based on chemical-explosives: yields in the 1 to 100 tons range, greatly enhanced coupling to targets, possibility to drive powerful shaped charged jets and forged fragments, enhanced prompt radiation effects, reduced collateral damage and residual radioactivity, etc.

  15. The Problem Of Prohibition On The Use Of Nuclear Weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Ayse Nur Tutuncu

    2004-01-01

    As a result of United States’bombing of two Japanese cities in 1945, the Soviet Union, by setting fire of a weapon competition, became the second State which has developed nuclear weapons and has global interest in the nuclear division. The general nuclear weapons are not the only risk. The September 11th incident has been increased concerns about the world’s nuclear power stations and means that could be target of the terrorists. After the Second World War, an increasing trend of prolife...

  16. The sacred weapon: bow and arrow combat in Iran

    OpenAIRE

    Manouchehr Moshtagh Khorasani

    2012-01-01

    The following article presents the development of the bow and arrow, and its important role in the history of Iran. The bow always played an important role not only on the battlefield, but also in hunting. It was also considered as a sacred weapon and additionally a royal symbol. Bow and arrow were considered as a superior weapon in comparison with other types of weapons because one could fight with them at a safer distance as one offered by swords, maces and axes. The first part of the artic...

  17. Atomic Physics

    CERN Document Server

    Foot, Christopher J

    2007-01-01

    This text will thoroughly update the existing literature on atomic physics. Intended to accompany an advanced undergraduate course in atomic physics, the book will lead the students up to the latest advances and the applications to Bose-Einstein Condensation of atoms, matter-wave inter-ferometry and quantum computing with trapped ions. The elementary atomic physics covered in the early chapters should be accessible to undergraduates when they are first introduced to the subject. To complement. the usual quantum mechanical treatment of atomic structure the book strongly emphasizes the experimen

  18. Foams for barriers and nonlethal weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rand, Peter B.

    1997-01-01

    Our times demand better solutions to conflict resolution than simply shooting someone. Because of this, police and military interest in non-lethal concepts is high. Already in use are pepper sprays, bean-bag guns, flash-bang grenades, and rubber bullets. At Sandia we got a head start on non- lethal weapon concepts. Protection of nuclear materials required systems that went way beyond the traditional back vault. Dispensable deterrents were used to allow a graduated response to a threat. Sticky foams and stabilized aqueous foams were developed to provide access delay. Foams won out for security systems simply because you could get a large volume from a small container. For polymeric foams the expansion ratio is thirty to fifty to one. In aqueous foams expansion ratios of one thousand to ne are easily obtained. Recent development work on sticky foams has included a changeover to environmentally friendly solvents, foams with very low toxicity, and the development of non-flammable silicone resin based foams. High expansion aqueous foams are useful visual and aural obscurants. Our recent aqueous foam development has concentrated on using very low toxicity foaming agents combined with oleoresin capsicum irritant to provide a safe but highly irritating foam.

  19. Nuclear weapon race does not stop

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    60 years after Hiroshima, the race for nuclear weaponry keeps on. The comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), signed in 1996 by the 5 official nuclear-weapon-owning states (Usa, Russia, China, U.K. and France), has not yet been implemented because its implementation requires the ratification of 44 states that harbour on their territories industrial or research nuclear reactors. Till now only 33 such states have ratified CTBT. CTBT aims at prohibiting any nuclear test whatever the amount of energy released in it. Countries like Usa, North-Korea, Russia, soon Iran... are suspected to develop new types of nuclear warfare. For 2005 the American Congress have decided to freeze the funding of programmes dedicated to the development of 'mini-nukes' like the bunker-burster. The international network of monitoring stations will soon cover all the world and will be able to detect and locate, in an almost automated way, any test involving an energy greater than 1 kiloton. 321 stations have been settled and their efficient detection systems are based on seismic or infra-sound or radioactivity or hydro-acoustic analysis. (A.C.)

  20. Optical countermeasures against CLOS weapon systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Toet, Alexander; Benoist, Koen W.; van Lingen, Joost N. J.; Schleijpen, H. Ric M. A.

    2013-10-01

    There are many weapon systems in which a human operator acquires a target, tracks it and designates it. Optical countermeasures against this type of systems deny the operator the possibility to fulfill this visual task. We describe the different effects that result from stimulation of the human visual system with high intensity (visible) light, and the associated potential operational impact. Of practical use are flash blindness, where an intense flash of light produces a temporary "blind-spot" in (part of) the visual field, flicker distraction, where strong intensity and/or color changes at a discomfortable frequency are produced, and disability glare where a source of light leads to contrast reduction. Hence there are three possibilities to disrupt the visual task of an operator with optical countermeasures such as flares or lasers or a combination of these; namely, by an intense flash of light, by an annoying light flicker or by a glare source. A variety of flares for this purpose is now available or under development: high intensity flash flares, continuous burning flares or strobe flares which have an oscillating intensity. The use of flare arrays seems particularly promising as an optical countermeasure. Lasers are particularly suited to interfere with human vision, because they can easily be varied in intensity, color and size, but they have to be directed at the (human) target, and issues like pointing and eye-safety have to be taken into account. Here we discuss the design issues and the operational impact of optical countermeasures against human operators.

  1. Atom interferometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We will first present a development of the fundamental principles of atom interferometers. Next we will discuss a few of the various methods now available to split and recombine atomic De Broglie waves, with special emphasis on atom interferometers based on optical pulses. We will also be particularly concerned with high precision interferometers with long measurement times such those made with atomic fountains. The application of atom interferometry to the measurement of the acceleration due to gravity will be detailed. We will also develop the atom interferometry based on adiabatic transfer and we will apply it to the measurement of the photon recoil in the case of the Doppler shift of an atomic resonance caused by the momentum recoil from an absorbed photon. Finally the outlook of future developments will be given. (A.C.)

  2. 电化学原子层沉积研究现状及沉积体系的构建%Research Application and Platform Establishment of Electrochemical Atomic Layer Deposition

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    王立世; 张国庆; Marie-Christine Record; 卜智翔; 孙力

    2015-01-01

    近年来,电化学原子层沉积(Electrochemical atomic layer deposition,E-ALD)技术在制备催化、光电及热电等功能薄膜的研究和应用方面取得了较大进展.概述了E-ALD的发展历史、沉积原理、研究及应用情况,介绍了课题组研发的E-ALD系统的构成和生长过程的控制机理.

  3. Los Alamos National Laboratory JOWOG 31 Weapons Engineering Education & Training

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Domzalski, Mark W. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-10-03

    The objectives of this report are to recruit talented staff, invest in new and early/mid career staff, retain trained and talented staff and future leaders, and shorten the ~5-10 year time line to realize new Weaponeers.

  4. Application of inertial confinement fusion to weapon technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report reviews aspects of the military applications of the inertial confinement fusion (ICF) program at Sandia Laboratories. These applications exist in the areas of: (1) weapon physics research, and (2) weapon effects simulation. In the area of weapon physics research, ICF source technology can be used to study: (1) equations-of-state at high energy densities, (2) implosion dynamics, and (3) laboratory simulation of exoatmospheric burst phenomena. In the area of weapon effects simulation, ICF technology and facilities have direct near, intermediate, and far term applications. In the near term, short pulse x-ray simulation capabilities exist for electronic component effects testing. In the intermediate term, capabilities can be developed for high energy neutron exposures and bremsstrahlung x-ray exposures of components. In the far term, system level exposures of full reentry vehicles will be possible if sufficiently high pellet gains are achieved

  5. Perfection and the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Teleology, and Motives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brummett, Barry

    1989-01-01

    Uses Kenneth Burke's theory of perfection to explore the vocabularies of nuclear weapons in United States public discourse and how "the Bomb" as a God term has gained imbalanced ascendancy in centers of power. (MS)

  6. Application of inertial confinement fusion to weapon technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Toepfer, A.J.; Posey, L.D.

    1978-12-01

    This report reviews aspects of the military applications of the inertial confinement fusion (ICF) program at Sandia Laboratories. These applications exist in the areas of: (1) weapon physics research, and (2) weapon effects simulation. In the area of weapon physics research, ICF source technology can be used to study: (1) equations-of-state at high energy densities, (2) implosion dynamics, and (3) laboratory simulation of exoatmospheric burst phenomena. In the area of weapon effects simulation, ICF technology and facilities have direct near, intermediate, and far term applications. In the near term, short pulse x-ray simulation capabilities exist for electronic component effects testing. In the intermediate term, capabilities can be developed for high energy neutron exposures and bremsstrahlung x-ray exposures of components. In the far term, system level exposures of full reentry vehicles will be possible if sufficiently high pellet gains are achieved.

  7. The proliferation of massive destruction weapons and ballistic missiles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The author studies the actual situation of nuclear deterrence policies, the possibilities of use chemical weapons as massive destructions weapons for non nuclear governments. The situation of non proliferation of nuclear weapons took a new interest with the disintegration of the communism block, but it seems that only few nuclear matter disappeared towards proliferating countries. The denuclearization of Bielorussia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan makes progress with the START I treaty; China has signed the Non proliferation treaty in 1992, it conducts an export policy in matter of equipment and know-how, towards Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia and Syria. In a future of ten years, countries such, Iran, North Korea could catch up with Israel, India and Pakistan among non declared nuclear countries. For chemical weapon, Libya, Iran and Syria could catch up with Iraq. (N.C.)

  8. Hamburgian weapon delivery technology: a quantitative comparative approach

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Riede, Felix

    2010-01-01

    The pioneer human re-colonisation of Southern Scandinavia after the Last Ice Age began some time around 12,700 calendar years BC and is associated with the Hamburgian techno-complex. These groups were reindeer hunters whose hunting weapons were tipped with the eponymous shouldered points (pointes á...... cran). Numerous studies have addressed the question of whether these points tipped arrows fired from bows, darts launched with the help of spear-throwers, or some other projectile delivery weapon. This paper approaches the question of Hamburgian weapon delivery technology from a quantitative...... comparative angle. Lithic metric data as well as information on presumed Hamburgian projectile shafts are used to demonstrate that the bow-and-arrow was the most likely weapon delivery method. This is reflected in the shape similarity with both later prehistoric arrow-points and shafts of the Ahrensburgian...

  9. Model National Implementing Legislation for the Chemical Weapons Convention

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tanzman, E.A. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Kellman, B. [DePaul University, Chicago, IL (United States)

    1997-12-31

    It is an honor to address this distinguished audience. We are grateful to the Republique Gabonaise for hosting this important gathering and to the staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for supporting it. This seminar is another excellent opportunity for all of us to learn from each other about how the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) can become a foundation of arms control in Africa and around the world. At this meeting we speak only for ourselves, neither for the government of the United States of America nor for any other institution. This paper discusses model national implementing legislation under the CWC. Every State Party likely must enact implementing legislation - not only the few States Parties that will declare and destroy chemical weapons, but also the many States Parties that have never had a chemical weapons programme.

  10. A Conceptual Framework for Teaching about Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jacobson, Willard; And Others

    1983-01-01

    Concepts which represent the minimal conceptual essentials for the study of nuclear weapons in secondary level social studies classes are discussed, and issues and controversies which may rise during such a study are examined. (RM)

  11. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle, vessel or other mode of transportation is prohibited, except... propelled by machinery and is used as a shooting platform in accordance with Federal and State law. (c)...

  12. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... their ready use. (b) Carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle, vessel or other mode of... vessel is not being propelled by machinery and is used as a shooting platform in accordance with...

  13. Military applications of the laser weapons in the future battlefield

    Science.gov (United States)

    Celik, Hasan; Adana, Saban; Yahsi, Erhan

    2013-05-01

    Contemporary operating environment requires a wide range of tools to respond to a myriad of regular and irregular threats. Accordingly, conventional weapons do not suffice in some cases. As technology improves exponentially, the dominance of conventional weapons is slowly fading away by the advances in laser technology. This study first outlines the characteristics of laser weapons, then provides the military applications of them in land, maritime, air and space domains and finally exhibits implications for battlefield functions. This study concludes that any country that is seeking primacy in military terms must allocate extra time and resources to obtain this emerging technology. Since it seems that there are not adequate studies about the military applications and operational concepts of the laser weapons, this study tries to increase awareness about their potential advantages.

  14. The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb. 1999 edition.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gosling, F. G.

    1999-01-01

    "The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb" is a short history of the origins and development of the American atomic bomb program during World War II. Beginning with the scientific developments of the pre-war years, the monograph details the role of the United States government in conducting a secret, nationwide enterprise that took science from the laboratory and into combat with an entirely new type of weapon. The monograph concludes with a discussion of the immediate postwar period, the debate over the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and the founding of the Atomic Energy Commission.

  15. The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb. 1999 edition.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gosling, F.G.

    1999-01-01

    ``The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb`` is a short history of the origins and development of the American atomic bomb program during World War II. Beginning with the scientific developments of the pre-war years, the monograph details the role of the United States government in conducting a secret, nationwide enterprise that took science from the laboratory and into combat with an entirely new type of weapon. The monograph concludes with a discussion of the immediate postwar period, the debate over the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and the founding of the Atomic Energy Commission.

  16. Can we stop the spread of nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In his address to the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, IAEA Director General Hans Blix reviewed the world's non-proliferation regime and the role of IAEA safeguards in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. He emphasized that the first and fundamental barrier to proliferation is the political will and determination of individual States not to acquire nuclear weapons, other barriers being legal obligations under treaties or agreements and the acceptance of safeguards inspections to verify peaceful uses of nuclear facilities

  17. Japan's nuclear weapons options and U.S. Security interests

    OpenAIRE

    Sharman, Christopher H.

    1998-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Japan is a virtual nuclear weapons power. It has the scientific and technical ability to produce hundreds or even thousands of nuclear weapons, but has chosen not to do so for political reasons. This thesis examines the historical development of Japan's nuclear energy and aerospace programs since the mid-1950s and considers the possibility that at various points in its history, Japan used these programs as a cover to insure that its nu...

  18. Book review: Nuclear weapons in the information age

    OpenAIRE

    Diskaya, Ali

    2013-01-01

    Far from being obsolete in today’s information age, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have not only survived, but have become weapons for states that face security threats, including perceived threats of nuclear blackmail, or expectation of conflicts. This study focuses on this unplanned coexistence of two distinct arts of war, including the possibility that states like the U.S. may be held hostage to nuclear blackmail by “outlier” regimes or terrorists, such as Nor...

  19. Experimental damage studies for a free electron laser weapon

    OpenAIRE

    Thomson, Robert W.

    1999-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Laser material damage experiments for this thesis were the first ever conducted at the new DoE Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility (TJNAF) free electron laser (FEL) user laboratory. In the past only large-scale laser experiments were thought to properly model weapons applications. Experimental procedures developed in this thesis allowed a scaled-down laser of a few hundred Watts to characterize the damage from a weapon-scale...

  20. Shipborne Laser Beam Weapon System for Defence against Cruise Missiles

    OpenAIRE

    J.P. Dudeja; G.S. Kalsey

    2000-01-01

    Sea-skim~ing cruise missiles pose the greatest threat to a surface ship in the present-day war scenario. The convenitional close-in-weapon-systems (CIWSs) are becoming less reliable against these new challenges requiring extremely fast reaction time. Naval Forces see a high energy laser as a feasible andjeffective directed energy weapon against sea-skimming antiship cruise missiles becauseof its .ability to deliver destructive energy at the speed of light on to a distant target. The paper com...

  1. 75 FR 69630 - Impact of Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention on Commercial Activities Involving...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-11-15

    ... Bureau of Industry and Security Impact of Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention on Commercial... implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA) and the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR), has had on commercial...

  2. 77 FR 75145 - Impact of the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Commercial Activities...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-19

    ... Bureau of Industry and Security Impact of the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on... implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA) and the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR), has had on commercial...

  3. 32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined...

  4. 32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are...

  5. Your Career and Nuclear Weapons: A Guide for Young Scientists and Engineers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Albrecht, Andreas; And Others

    This four-part booklet examines various issues related to nuclear weapons and how they will affect an individual working as a scientist or engineer. It provides information about the history of nuclear weapons, about the weapons industry which produces them, and about new weapons programs. Issues are raised so that new or future graduates may make…

  6. Analysis of Economic Llife of Weapon Equipment%武器装备经济寿命分析与研究

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    白利军; 王永智; 郜鹏; 耿爽

    2013-01-01

    This paper analyzes of economic life of weapon equipment, and establishes the model of economic life of weapon equipment, weighing the life cycle cost of weapon equipment, considering its time value, and employing the method witch pick up the minimum cost of per year. It promotes the full efficiency of weapon equipment to analyze the economic life of weapon equipment. The model is used in practical, and its reference value is also used in economic analysis of weapon equipment.%主要针对武器装备的经济寿命进行分析,以寿命周期费用的量值为权衡判据,综合考虑资金的时间价值,采用年均费用法,建立武器装备的经济寿命数学分析模型.通过经济寿命分析,可提高装备的综合效率和武器装备方案决策的科学性.提出的经济寿命数学分析模型具有一定的实用性,对武器装备的经济性分析具有一定的参考价值.

  7. Operational assessment of Target Acquisitions Weapons Software (TAWS) prediction performance at Nellis AFB, NV

    OpenAIRE

    Hernandez, Jerome H.

    2006-01-01

    Target Acquisition Weapons Software (TAWS) Version 3.4 is a joint Tactical Decision Aid (TDA) used to predict performance of electro-optic and electro-magnetic (EM/EO) munitions and navigation systems. TAWS is the USAF and USN mission-planning standard for laser-guided, infrared, and TV munitions and navigation systems TDAs. As TAWS continues to deploy through the mission planning community there is a need to establish a systematic approach to assessing TAWS accuracy. This study was an op...

  8. Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Principle of Unnecessary Suffering : The Use of Nuclear Weapons in an Armed Conflict

    OpenAIRE

    Krasny, Jaroslav; Kawano, Noriyuki

    2015-01-01

    This research is concerned with the use of nuclear weapons against combatants in an armed conflict and whether such a use violates or would violate the principle of unnecessary suffering as codified in St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 and the Hague Conventions. In order to analyze what constitutes unnecessary suffering the method chosen for this research is comparison of the effects of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons on the human body. The reason for choosing this method is the abh...

  9. Atomic physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Research activities in atomic physics at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory during 1976 are described. Topics covered include: experiments on stored ions; test for parity violation in neutral weak currents; energy conservation and astrophysics; atomic absorption spectroscopy, atomic and molecular detectors; theoretical studies of quantum electrodynamics and high-z ions; atomic beam magnetic resonance; radiative decay from the 23Po,2 levels of helium-like argon; quenching of the metastable 2S/sub 1/2/ state of hydrogen-like argon in an external electric field; and lifetime of the 23Po level of helium-like krypton

  10. AMO Database in KAERI and Atomic Structure Studies

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rhee, Yongjoo; Park, H. M.; Kwon, D. H.

    2005-05-01

    Atomic spectroscopy studies carried out at the Laboratory for Quantum Optics in Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute are introduced together with the AMO (Atomic, Molecular, and Optical) database established based upon those studies.

  11. A History of the Atomic Energy Commission

    Science.gov (United States)

    Buck, Alice L.

    1983-07-01

    This pamphlet traces the history of the US Atomic Energy Commission's twenty-eight year stewardship of the Nation's nuclear energy program, from the signing of the Atomic Energy Act on August 1, 1946 to the signing of the Energy Reorganization Act on October 11, 1974. The Commission's early concentration on the military atom produced sophisticated nuclear weapons for the Nation's defense and made possible the creation of a fleet of nuclear submarines and surface ships. Extensive research in the nuclear sciences resulted in the widespread application of nuclear technology for scientific, medical and industrial purposes, while the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 made possible the development of a nuclear industry, and enabled the United States to share the new technology with other nations.

  12. A History of the Atomic Energy Commission

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buck, A.L.

    1983-07-01

    This pamphlet traces the history of the US Atomic Energy Commission's twenty-eight year stewardship of the Nation's nuclear energy program, from the signing of the Atomic Energy Act on August 1, 1946 to the signing of the Energy Reorganization Act on October 11, 1974. The Commission's early concentration on the military atom produced sophisticated nuclear weapons for the Nation's defense and made possible the creation of a fleet of nuclear submarines and surface ships. Extensive research in the nuclear sciences resulted in the widespread application of nuclear technology for scientific, medical and industrial purposes, while the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 made possible the development of a nuclear industry, and enabled the United States to share the new technology with other nations.

  13. History of the Atomic Energy Commission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This pamphlet traces the history of the US Atomic Energy Commission's twenty-eight year stewardship of the Nation's nuclear energy program, from the signing of the Atomic Energy Act on August 1, 1946 to the signing of the Energy Reorganization Act on October 11, 1974. The Commission's early concentration on the military atom produced sophisticated nuclear weapons for the Nation's defense and made possible the creation of a fleet of nuclear submarines and surface ships. Extensive research in the nuclear sciences resulted in the widespread application of nuclear technology for scientific, medical and industrial purposes, while the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 made possible the development of a nuclear industry, and enabled the United States to share the new technology with other nations

  14. US technical assistance to the IAEA and the chemical weapons convection (CWC) - a review and look to the future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Indusi, J.; Parsick, R.J.; Reisman, A.W.

    1997-08-01

    This paper reviews the Safeguards mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and describes U.S. technical support programs. We also review the mandate of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and speculate on the technical areas where U.S. assistance may prove useful. The IAEA was organized in 1957 in response to President Eisenhower`s {open_quotes}Atoms for Peace{close_quotes} initiative presented to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been organized by a Preparatory Commission (PREPCOM) to prepare for the entry-into-force of this new convention which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The safeguards mandate of the IAEA is to carry out verifications of nuclear material pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other voluntary but legally binding agreements. U.S. technical support programs have provided and continue to provide assistance in the form of Cost-Free Experts (CFE`s), systems studies on new safeguards approaches, training, computerized information systems, and equipment for nuclear materials measurements and containment and surveillance systems. Because the CWC just recently entered into force (April 29, 1997), verification procedures of the OPCW are not yet fully developed. However, it is expected, and can already be seen for many aspects of the technical task, that there are many similarities between the verification activities of the OPCW and those carried out by the IAEA. This paper will discuss potential technical support areas that can help strengthen the OPCW. 9 refs.

  15. Bohmian picture of Rydberg atoms

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    Partha Ghose; Manoj K Samal; Animesh Datta

    2002-08-01

    Unlike the previous theoretical results based on standard quantum mechanics that established the nearly elliptical shapes for the centre-of-mass motion in Rydberg atoms using numerical simulations, we show analytically that the Bohmian trajectories in Rydberg atoms are nearly elliptical.

  16. Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This Act provides for the setting up of an Atomic Energy Authority for the United Kingdom. It also makes provision for the Authority's composition, powers, duties, rights and liabilities, and may amend, as a consequence of the establishment of the Authority and in connection therewith, the Atomic Energy Act, 1946, the Radioactive Substances Act 1948 and other relevant enactments. (NEA)

  17. Why are U.S. nuclear weapon modernization efforts controversial?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Acton, James

    2016-03-01

    U.S. nuclear weapon modernization programs are focused on extending the lives of existing warheads and developing new delivery vehicles to replace ageing bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. These efforts are contested and controversial. Some critics argue that they are largely unnecessary, financially wasteful and potentially destabilizing. Other critics posit that they do not go far enough and that nuclear weapons with new military capabilities are required. At its core, this debate centers on three strategic questions. First, what roles should nuclear weapons be assigned? Second, what military capabilities do nuclear weapons need to fulfill these roles? Third, how severe are the unintended escalation risks associated with particular systems? Proponents of scaled-down modernization efforts generally argue for reducing the role of nuclear weapons but also that, even under existing policy, new military capabilities are not required. They also tend to stress the escalation risks of new--and even some existing--capabilities. Proponents of enhanced modernization efforts tend to advocate for a more expansive role for nuclear weapons in national security strategy. They also often argue that nuclear deterrence would be enhanced by lower yield weapons and/or so called bunker busters able to destroy more deeply buried targets. The debate is further fueled by technical disagreements over many aspects of ongoing and proposed modernization efforts. Some of these disagreements--such as the need for warhead life extension programs and their necessary scope--are essentially impossible to resolve at the unclassified level. By contrast, unclassified analysis can help elucidate--though not answer--other questions, such as the potential value of bunker busters.

  18. Weapons of Mass Destruction Technology Evaluation and Training Range

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kevin Larry Young

    2009-05-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has a long history for providing technology evaluation and training for military and other federal level Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response agencies. Currently there are many federal organizations and commercial companies developing technologies related to detecting, assessing, mitigating and protecting against hazards associated with a WMD event. Unfortunately, very few locations exist within the United States where WMD response technologies are realistically field tested and evaluated using real chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials. This is particularly true with biological and radiological hazards. Related to this lack of adequate WMD, multi-hazard technology testing capability is the shortage of locations where WMD response teams can train using actual chemical, biological, and radiological material or highly realistic simulates. In response to these technology evaluation and training needs, the INL has assembled a consortium of subject matter experts from existing programs and identified dedicated resources for the purpose of establishing an all-hazards, WMD technology evaluation and training range. The author describes the challenges associated with creating the all-hazards WMD technology evaluation and training range and lists the technical, logistical and financial benefits of an all-hazards technology evaluation and training range. Current resources and capabilities for conducting all-hazard technology evaluation and training at the INL are identified. Existing technology evaluation and training programs at the INL related to radiological, biological and chemical hazards are highlighted, including successes and lessons learned. Finally, remaining gaps in WMD technology evaluation and training capabilities are identified along with recommendations for closing those gaps.

  19. Еstablishing the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Is a Step Towards Global Nuclear Security

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    S. M. Adilkhodzhaeva

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The article is devoted to an actual problem of guaranteeing global security and promoting an idea of nuclear-free world. The article provides some data on the history of establishing, the key stages of formation and consolidation of international legal agreements of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. The author considers peculiarities and distinguishing features of a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia.

  20. Atomic physics

    CERN Document Server

    Born, Max

    1989-01-01

    The Nobel Laureate's brilliant exposition of the kinetic theory of gases, elementary particles, the nuclear atom, wave-corpuscles, atomic structure and spectral lines, electron spin and Pauli's principle, quantum statistics, molecular structure and nuclear physics. Over 40 appendices, a bibliography, numerous figures and graphs.

  1. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons; Armes de terreur. Debarrasser le monde des armes nucleaires, biologiques et chimiques - Commission sur les armes de destruction massive

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blix, H.; Journe, V.

    2010-07-01

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  2. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

  3. Mobile and stationary laser weapon demonstrators of Rheinmetall Waffe Munition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ludewigt, K.; Riesbeck, Th.; Baumgärtel, Th.; Schmitz, J.; Graf, A.; Jung, M.

    2014-10-01

    For some years Rheinmetall Waffe Munition has successfully developed, realised and tested a variety of versatile high energy laser (HEL) weapon systems for air- and ground-defence scenarios like C-RAM, UXO clearing. By employing beam superimposition technology and a modular laser weapon concept, the total optical power has been successively increased. Stationary weapon platforms and now military mobile vehicles were equipped with high energy laser effectors. Our contribution summarises the most recent development stages of Rheinmetalls high energy laser weapon program. We present three different vehicle based HEL demonstrators: the 5 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Track V integrated in an M113 tank, the 20 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Wheel XX integrated in a multirole armoured vehicle GTK Boxer 8x8 and the 50 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Container L integrated in a reinforced container carried by an 8x8 truck. As a highlight, a stationary 30 kW Laser Weapon Demonstrator shows the capability to defeat saturated attacks of RAM targets and unmanned aerial vehicles. 2013 all HEL demonstrators were tested in a firing campaign at the Rheinmetall testing centre in Switzerland. Major results of these tests are presented.

  4. Chemical and biological weapons in the 'new wars'.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ilchmann, Kai; Revill, James

    2014-09-01

    The strategic use of disease and poison in warfare has been subject to a longstanding and cross-cultural taboo that condemns the hostile exploitation of poisons and disease as the act of a pariah. In short, biological and chemical weapons are simply not fair game. The normative opprobrium is, however, not fixed, but context dependent and, as a social phenomenon, remains subject to erosion by social (or more specifically, antisocial) actors. The cross cultural understanding that fighting with poisons and disease is reprehensible, that they are taboo, is codified through a web of interconnected measures, principal amongst these are the 1925 Geneva Protocol; the Biological Weapons Convention; and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Whilst these treaties have weathered the storm of international events reasonably well, their continued health is premised on their being 'tended to' in the face of contextual changes, particularly facing changes in science and technology, as well as the changed nature and character of conflict. This article looks at the potential for normative erosion of the norm against chemical and biological weapons in the face of these contextual changes and the creeping legitimization of chemical and biological weapons. PMID:24132385

  5. Real life identification of partially occluded weapons in video frames

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hempelmann, Christian F.; Arslan, Abdullah N.; Attardo, Salvatore; Blount, Grady P.; Sirakov, Nikolay M.

    2016-05-01

    We empirically test the capacity of an improved system to identify not just images of individual guns, but partially occluded guns and their parts appearing in a videoframe. This approach combines low-level geometrical information gleaned from the visual images and high-level semantic information stored in an ontology enriched with meronymic part-whole relations. The main improvements of the system are handling occlusion, new algorithms, and an emerging meronomy. Well-known and commonly deployed in ontologies, actual meronomies need to be engineered and populated with unique solutions. Here, this includes adjacency of weapon parts and essentiality of parts to the threat of and the diagnosticity for a weapon. In this study video sequences are processed frame by frame. The extraction method separates colors and removes the background. Then image subtraction of the next frame determines moving targets, before morphological closing is applied to the current frame in order to clean up noise and fill gaps. Next, the method calculates for each object the boundary coordinates and uses them to create a finite numerical sequence as a descriptor. Parts identification is done by cyclic sequence alignment and matching against the nodes of the weapons ontology. From the identified parts, the most-likely weapon will be determined by using the weapon ontology.

  6. Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper examines international treaties in relation to the threat or use of nuclear weapons including the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It can be concluded that the effect of the aforesaid international treaties is still in doubt without explicit enforcement mechanisms and penalty for non-compliance. This paper also reviews the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and comments that a clear explanation on the legality of use of nuclear weapons in 'extreme circumstances of self-defence' is required. Examples from current state practice in relation to nuclear non-proliferation efforts are also provided, with special attention to China, North Korea and Iran. This paper suggests that China as a leader of developing countries should extend its efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and conduct communication between North Korea and Iran and other nuclear weapons states to reduce or prohibit nuclear weapons.

  7. Joint Actions of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United States of America in the Field of Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The paper describes the legislative basis in the field of radiation safety and security and regulatory authority establishment in Tajikistan. Joint actions undertaken after the civil war in Tajikistan by regulatory authorities of the Governments of the United States of America and Tajikistan are presented. Actions performed and planned in order to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Tajikistan are presented. (author)

  8. Doping of Semiconducting Atomic Chains

    Science.gov (United States)

    Toshishige, Yamada; Kutler, Paul (Technical Monitor)

    1997-01-01

    Due to the rapid progress in atom manipulation technology, atomic chain electronics would not be a dream, where foreign atoms are placed on a substrate to form a chain, and its electronic properties are designed by controlling the lattice constant d. It has been shown theoretically that a Si atomic chain is metallic regardless of d and that a Mg atomic chain is semiconducting or insulating with a band gap modified with d. For electronic applications, it is essential to establish a method to dope a semiconducting chain, which is to control the Fermi energy position without altering the original band structure. If we replace some of the chain atoms with dopant atoms randomly, the electrons will see random potential along the chain and will be localized strongly in space (Anderson localization). However, if we replace periodically, although the electrons can spread over the chain, there will generally appear new bands and band gaps reflecting the new periodicity of dopant atoms. This will change the original band structure significantly. In order to overcome this dilemma, we may place a dopant atom beside the chain at every N lattice periods (N > 1). Because of the periodic arrangement of dopant atoms, we can avoid the unwanted Anderson localization. Moreover, since the dopant atoms do not constitute the chain, the overlap interaction between them is minimized, and the band structure modification can be made smallest. Some tight-binding results will be discussed to demonstrate the present idea.

  9. Consistency analysis on laser signal in laser guided weapon simulation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yin, Ruiguang; Zhang, Wenpan; Guo, Hao; Gan, Lin

    2015-10-01

    The hardware-in-the-loop simulation is widely used in laser semi-active guidance weapon experiments, the authenticity of the laser guidance signal is the key problem of reliability. In order to evaluate the consistency of the laser guidance signal, this paper analyzes the angle of sight, laser energy density, laser spot size, atmospheric back scattering, sun radiation and SNR by comparing the different working state between actual condition and hardware-in-the-loop simulation. Based on measured data, mathematical simulation and optical simulation result, laser guidance signal effects on laser seeker are determined. By using Monte Carlo method, the laser guided weapon trajectory and impact point distribution are obtained, the influence of the systematic error are analyzed. In conclusion it is pointed out that the difference between simulation system and actual system has little influence in normal guidance, has great effect on laser jamming. The research is helpful to design and evaluation of laser guided weapon simulation.

  10. Asynchronous data-driven classification of weapon systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This communication addresses real-time weapon classification by analysis of asynchronous acoustic data, collected from microphones on a sensor network. The weapon classification algorithm consists of two parts: (i) feature extraction from time-series data using symbolic dynamic filtering (SDF), and (ii) pattern classification based on the extracted features using the language measure (LM) and support vector machine (SVM). The proposed algorithm has been tested on field data, generated by firing of two types of rifles. The results of analysis demonstrate high accuracy and fast execution of the pattern classification algorithm with low memory requirements. Potential applications include simultaneous shooter localization and weapon classification with soldier-wearable networked sensors. (rapid communication)

  11. Countdown to zero Day stuxnet and the launch of the world's first digital weapon

    CERN Document Server

    Zetter, Kim

    2014-01-01

    In January 2010, inspectors with the International Atomic Energy Agency noticed that centrifuges at an Iranian uranium enrichment plant were failing at an unprecedented rate. The cause was a complete mystery—apparently as much to the technicians replacing the centrifuges as to the inspectors observing them. Then, five months later, a seemingly unrelated event occurred: A computer security firm in Belarus was called in to troubleshoot some computers in Iran that were crashing and rebooting repeatedly. At first, the firm’s programmers believed the malicious code on the machines was a simple, routine piece of malware. But as they and other experts around the world investigated, they discovered a mysterious virus of unparalleled complexity. They had, they soon learned, stumbled upon the world’s first digital weapon. For Stuxnet, as it came to be known, was unlike any other virus or worm built before: Rather than simply hijacking targeted computers or stealing information from them, it escaped the d...

  12. Radioactive fallout: an overview of internal emitter research in the era of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is a review of the literature on the radiobiology of internal emitters. Its purpose is to consider what has become known about the radiobiology of internally deposited radionuclides over the last four decades. The primary emphasis is the progression of radiobiological information through the 1950s and early 1960s, when atmospheric testing of atomic weapons was occurring with increasing regularity. We also consider information on fission products that are biologically important, specifically, isotopes of iodine, strontium, and cesium. We also examine data for plutonium and uranium. For each of the radionuclides discussed, we consider environmental pathways that are available for the eventual exposure to human populations and the metabolic pathways that determine the tissues at risk following exposure. We also consider the radiobiological effects of exposure given at high levels, and, when appropriate, the risks accompanying low-level exposures

  13. Health consequences and health systems response to the Pacific U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Palafox, Neal A; Riklon, Sheldon; Alik, Wilfred; Hixon, Allen L

    2007-03-01

    Between 1946 and 1958, the United States detonated 67 thermonuclear devices in the Pacific as part of their U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program (USNWTP). The aggregate explosive power was equal to 7,200 Hiroshima atomic bombs. Recent documents released by the U.S. government suggest that the deleterious effects of the nuclear testing were greater and extended farther than previously known. The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) government and affected communities have sought refress through diplomatic routes with the U.S. government, however, existing medical programs and financial reparations have not adequately addressed many of the health consequences of the USNWTP. Since radiation-induced cancers may have a long latency, a healthcare infrastructure is needed to address both cancer and related health issues. This article reviews the health consequences of the Pacific USNWTP and the current health systems ability to respond. PMID:19772154

  14. Canadians, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War security dilemma

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This dissertation provides a history of Canadian ideas about nuclear weapons from the late 1950s until the end of the Trudeau era in 1984. Throughout this period, Canadians reacted to the insecurity they felt in the world around them by expressing many conflicting, often irreconcilable views about a range of nuclear weapon issues, including Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads in 1963, the U.S. ABM program in the 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Canadian nuclear technology in the development of India's first nuclear explosion, and the Trudeau government's decision to allow the U.S. military to test cruise missiles in northern Canada The dissertation concludes with an examination of the emergence of a broadly-based, increasingly mainstream and influential anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s, the clearest manifestation of the insecurity Canadians experienced at the time. .The nuclear debates examined in this dissertation reveal that Canadians were divided over nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the arms race, proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, they came to fundamentally different conclusions about how Canada's nuclear weapon policies, and its support for the nuclear policies of its alliances, would contribute to international stability and order. Some believed that their security rested on the maintenance of a strong Western nuclear deterrent and supported Canada contributing to its credibility; others believed that the constant modernisation of nuclear arsenals fuelled by the superpower arms race posed a serious threat to their security. This conceptual dilemma-the security through nuclear strength argument versus the fear that the quest for security through quantitative and qualitative improvements of nuclear stockpiles increased the likelihood of nuclear war-left Canadians divided over the value and utility of nuclear weapons and the strategies developed around them. At the same time, Canadians' ideas about nuclear weapons

  15. Estabelecimento de condições operacionais para o bico rotativo micromax na aplicação do herbicida glyphosate Establishment of operational conditions for micromax rotary atomizers in the application of glyphosate

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    P. C. R. Oliveira

    1984-01-01

    Full Text Available Alguns parâmetros operaciona is do bico rotativo Micromax para apli cação do herbi cida glypho sate foram estudados em condições de laboratório. O bico Micromax a 1.600 rpm e vazão de 0,96 //min forneceu gotas com vmd de 280 μm e à vazão de 0,43 i/min , de 232 μm, sendo que em ambas as condições o coeficient e de dispersão (r = vmd/nmd foi inferior a 1,4, atendendo, portanto, às especificações para o processo CDA. A distância entre bicos a serem montadas numa barra foi determinada em mesa de estudo do padrão de deposição foi de 1,80 m para a vazão de 0,96 Z/min e concentração da formulação comercial do glyphosate entre 4% e 6%. Essa distancia foi de 1,40 m para vazão de 0,43 1/min e concentração de glyphosate entre 9% e 13%. Distancias fora dessas especificações produziram deposições bastante irregulares sob a barra de pulverização.Some operation al parameters of Micromax rotary atomizers in the application of glyphosate were studied under laboratory conditions. Micromax nozzle at 1.600 rpm and 0,96 1/min feed rate produced 280m vmd droplets and 0,43 1/min feed rate, produ ced 232 m vmd droplets. In both conditions the dispersion coefficien t (r = vmd/nmd was bellow 1,4, attending to the spedfication for CDA. Nozzl espacement between Micromax heads in a spray boom was estab lished as 1,80 m for 0,96 1/min feed rate using 4% to 6% glyphosate (commercia l solution and 1,40 m for 0,43 Z/min feed rate using 9% to 13% solution. Nozzle spacement out of these specifications produces very irregular deposition patterns.

  16. GC-MS Study of Mono- and Bishaloethylphosphonates Related to Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention: The Discovery of a New Intramolecular Halogen Transfer

    Science.gov (United States)

    Picazas-Márquez, Nerea; Sierra, María; Nova, Clara; Moreno, Juan Manuel; Aboitiz, Nuria; de Rivas, Gema; Sierra, Miguel A.; Martínez-Álvarez, Roberto; Gómez-Caballero, Esther

    2016-09-01

    A new class of compounds, mono- and bis-haloethylphosphonates (HAPs and bisHAPs, respectively), listed in Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), has been synthesized and studied by GC-MS with two aims. First, to improve the identification of this type of chemicals by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, (OPCW). Second, to study the synergistic effect of halogen and silicon atoms in molecules undergoing mass spectrometry. Fragmentation patterns of trimethylsilyl derivatives of HAPs were found to depend on the nature of the halogen atom; this was in agreement with DFT-calculations. The data suggest that a novel intramolecular halogen transfer takes place during the fragmentation process.

  17. GC-MS Study of Mono- and Bishaloethylphosphonates Related to Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention: The Discovery of a New Intramolecular Halogen Transfer

    Science.gov (United States)

    Picazas-Márquez, Nerea; Sierra, María; Nova, Clara; Moreno, Juan Manuel; Aboitiz, Nuria; de Rivas, Gema; Sierra, Miguel A.; Martínez-Álvarez, Roberto; Gómez-Caballero, Esther

    2016-06-01

    A new class of compounds, mono- and bis-haloethylphosphonates (HAPs and bisHAPs, respectively), listed in Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), has been synthesized and studied by GC-MS with two aims. First, to improve the identification of this type of chemicals by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, (OPCW). Second, to study the synergistic effect of halogen and silicon atoms in molecules undergoing mass spectrometry. Fragmentation patterns of trimethylsilyl derivatives of HAPs were found to depend on the nature of the halogen atom; this was in agreement with DFT-calculations. The data suggest that a novel intramolecular halogen transfer takes place during the fragmentation process.

  18. GC-MS Study of Mono- and Bishaloethylphosphonates Related to Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention: The Discovery of a New Intramolecular Halogen Transfer.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Picazas-Márquez, Nerea; Sierra, María; Nova, Clara; Moreno, Juan Manuel; Aboitiz, Nuria; de Rivas, Gema; Sierra, Miguel A; Martínez-Álvarez, Roberto; Gómez-Caballero, Esther

    2016-09-01

    A new class of compounds, mono- and bis-haloethylphosphonates (HAPs and bisHAPs, respectively), listed in Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), has been synthesized and studied by GC-MS with two aims. First, to improve the identification of this type of chemicals by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, (OPCW). Second, to study the synergistic effect of halogen and silicon atoms in molecules undergoing mass spectrometry. Fragmentation patterns of trimethylsilyl derivatives of HAPs were found to depend on the nature of the halogen atom; this was in agreement with DFT-calculations. The data suggest that a novel intramolecular halogen transfer takes place during the fragmentation process. Graphical Abstract ᅟ. PMID:27300717

  19. Challenges in the application of modular open system architecture to weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shaver, Jonathan; Rose, Leo; Young, Quinn; Christensen, Jacob

    2016-05-01

    The overarching objective for Flexible Weapons is to replace current inventory weapons that will not fully utilize the increased capabilities of 6th generation platforms, with a single weapons kit made up of flexible, open architecture components. Flexible Weapon will develop a common architecture to enable modular subsystems to achieve flexible weapons capability while allowing technology refresh at the pace of technology discovery in an affordable and sustainable design. The various combinations of weapons to address multiple missions must be 100% compatible with 6th generation delivery platforms (fighters, bombers, RPAs) and backwards compatible with 4th and 5th generation platforms.

  20. Can Iraq be deterred from using weapons of mass destruction?

    OpenAIRE

    Klemick, Michael T

    1997-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited It generally is assumed that the threat of a U.S. nuclear strike deterred the intentional use of chemical and biological weapons by Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Evidence suggests that this assumption might be faulty, or at least incomplete. The purpose of this thesis is to test the common wisdom about nuclear deterrence and Iraq's non-use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) during the Gulf War. This thesis examines the u...

  1. Nuclear Weapons in Regional Contexts: The Cases of Argentina and Brazil

    CERN Document Server

    Junior, Olival Freire; Moreira, Ildeu C; Barros, Fernando de Souza

    2015-01-01

    South America is a region which is free from nuclear weapons. However, this was not an inevitable development from the relationships among its countries. Indeed, regional rivalries between Brazil and Argentina, with military implications for both countries, lasted a long time. After WWII these countries took part in the race to obtain nuclear technologies and nuclear ambitions were part of the game. In the mid 1980s, the end of military dictatorships and the successful establishing of democratic institutions put an end to the race. Thus regional and national interests in addition to the establishment of democracies in Latin America have been responsible for the building of trust between the two countries. Meaningful international initiatives are once again needed in the framework of worldwide cooperation. This cooperation is better developed when democratic regimes are in place.

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In accordance with Protocol Number II to the Agreement of 29 February 1972 between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this Agreement has been replaced by the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency, which entered into force on 21 February 1977

  3. Transmission Probability of an Ultracold Atom in the Presence of Atomic Coherence

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    熊锦; 储开芹; 张智明

    2002-01-01

    We investigate the transmission probability of an ultracold V-type three-level atom passing through a micromaser cavity, in the presence of atomic coherence which is established by a coherent driving field. We show that the transmissibility of this micromaser system with the atomic coherence is better than that of the ordinary micromaser system without atomic coherence. When the driving field is strong enough, for any cavity length the ultracold atom can pass through the micromaser cavity freely.

  4. Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jenkins-Smith, H.C.; Herron, K.G. [Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States). Institute for Public Policy; Barke, R.P. [Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA (United States). School of Public Policy

    1994-04-01

    This report summarizes the findings of a nationwide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories. A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-cold war security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust and official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons; (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons, and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4) preventing nuclear terrorism. Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-cold war security environment.

  5. An atomic empire a technical history of the rise and fall of the British atomic energy programme

    CERN Document Server

    Hill, C N

    2013-01-01

    Britain was the first country to exploit atomic energy on a large scale, and at its peak in the mid-1960s, it had generated more electricity from nuclear power than the rest of the world combined.The civil atomic energy programme grew out of the military programme which produced plutonium for atomic weapons. In 1956, Calder Hall power station was opened by the Queen. The very next year, one of the early Windscale reactors caught fire and the world's first major nuclear accident occurred.The civil programme ran into further difficulty in the mid-1960s and as a consequence of procrastination in

  6. Chlorine-36 in Water, Snow, and Mid-Latitude Glacial Ice of North America: Meteoric and Weapons-Tests Production in the Vicinity of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. DeWayne; J. R. Green (USGS); S. Vogt, P. Sharma (Purdue University); S. K. Frape (University of Waterloo); S. N. Davis (University of Arizona); G. L. Cottrell (USGS)

    1999-01-01

    Measurements of chlorine-36 (36Cl) were made for 64 water, snow, and glacial-ice and -runoff samples to determine the meteoric and weapons-tests-produced concentrations and fluxes of this radionuclide at mid-latitudes in North America. The results will facilitate the use of 36Cl as a hydrogeologic tracer at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). This information was used to estimate meteoric and weapons-tests contributions of this nuclide to environmental inventories at and near the INEEL. The data presented in this report suggest a meteoric source 36Cl for environmental samples collected in southeastern Idaho and western Wyoming if the concentration is less than 1 x 10 7 atoms/L. Additionally, concentrations in water, snow, or glacial ice between 1 x 10 7 and 1 x 10 8 atoms/L may be indicative of a weapons-tests component from peak 36Cl production in the late 1950s. Chlorine-36 concentrations between 1 x 10 8 and 1 x 10 9 atoms/L may be representative of re-suspension of weapons-tests fallout airborne disposal of 36Cl from the INTEC, or evapotranspiration. It was concluded from the water, snow, and glacial data presented here that concentrations of 36Cl measured in environmental samples at the INEEL larger than 1 x 10 9 atoms/L can be attributed to waste-disposal practices.

  7. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This study is in response to a request by the Reactor Panel Subcommittee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) to evaluate the feasibility of using plutonium fuels (without uranium) for disposal in existing conventional or advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs and in low temperature/pressure LWR designs that might be developed for plutonium disposal. Three plutonium-based fuel forms (oxides, aluminum metallics, and carbides) are evaluated for neutronic performance, fabrication technology, and material and compatibility issues. For the carbides, only the fabrication technologies are addressed. Viable plutonium oxide fuels for conventional or advanced LWRs include plutonium-zirconium-calcium oxide (PuO2-ZrO2-CaO) with the addition of thorium oxide (ThO2) or a burnable poison such as erbium oxide (Er2O3) or europium oxide (Eu2O3) to achieve acceptable neutronic performance. Thorium will breed fissile uranium that may be unacceptable from a proliferation standpoint. Fabrication of uranium and mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuels is well established; however, fabrication of plutonium-based oxide fuels will require further development. Viable aluminum-plutonium metallic fuels for a low temperature/pressure LWR include plutonium aluminide in an aluminum matrix (PuAl4-Al) with the addition of a burnable poison such as erbium (Er) or europium (Eu). Fabrication of low-enriched plutonium in aluminum-plutonium metallic fuel rods was initially established 30 years ago and will require development to recapture and adapt the technology to meet current environmental and safety regulations. Fabrication of high-enriched uranium plate fuel by the picture-frame process is a well established process, but the use of plutonium would require the process to be upgraded in the United States to conform with current regulations and minimize the waste streams

  8. Atomic secrecy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An article, The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It, by Howard Morland was to be published in The Progressive magazine in February, 1979. The government, after learning of the author's and the editors' intention to publish the article and failing to persuade them to voluntarily delete about 20% of the text and all of the diagrams showing how an H-bomb works, requested a court injunction against publication. Acting under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, US District Court Judge Robert W. Warren granted the government's request on March 26. Events dealing with the case are discussed in this publication. Section 1, Progressive Hydrogen Bomb Case, is discussed under the following: Court Order Blocking Magazine Report; Origins of the Howard Morland Article; Author's Motives, Defense of Publication; and Government Arguments Against Disclosure. Section 2, Access to Atomic Data Since 1939, contains information on need for secrecy during World War II; 1946 Atomic Energy Act and its effects; Soviet A-Bomb and the US H-Bomb; and consequences of 1954 Atomic Energy Act. Section 3, Disputed Need for Atomic Secrecy, contains papers entitled: Lack of Studies on H-Bomb Proliferation; Administration's Position on H-Bombs; and National Security Needs vs Free Press

  9. An overview of the future of non-lethal weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alexander, J B

    2001-01-01

    During the past decade, vast changes have occurred in the geopolitical landscape and the nature of the types of conflicts in which technologically developed countries have been involved. While the threat of conventional war remains, forces have been more frequently deployed in situations that require great restraint. Adversaries are often likely to be elusive and commingled with noncombatants. There has been some shift in public opinion away from tolerance of collateral casualties. Therefore there is a need to be able to apply force while limiting casualties. Non-lethal weapons provide part of the solution. Among the changes that will influence the future have been studies by the US and NATO concerning the use of non-lethal weapons, coincidental with increased funding for their development and testing. New concepts and policies have recently been formalized. Surprisingly, the most strident objections to the implementation of non-lethal weapons have come from organizations that are ostensibly designed to protect non-combatants. These arguments are specious and, while technically and academically challenging, actually serve to foster an environment that will result in the deaths of many more innocent civilians. They misconstrue technology with human intent. The reasons for use of force will not abate. Alternatives to bombs, missiles, tanks and artillery must therefore be found. Non-lethal weapons are not a panacea but do offer the best hope of minimizing casualties while allowing nations or alliances the means to use force in protection of national or regional interests.

  10. Disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Westinghouse reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alsaed, A.A.; Adams, M. [Texas A& M Univ., College Station, TX (United States)

    1998-03-01

    The authors have studied the feasibility of using weapons-grade plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing Westinghouse reactors. They have designed three transition Cycles from an all LEU core to a partial MOX core. They found that four-loop Westinghouse reactors such as the Vogtle power plant are capable of handling up to 45 percent weapons-grade MOX loading without any modifications. The authors have also designed two kinds of weapons-grade MOX assemblies with three enrichments per assembly and four total enrichments. Wet annular burnable absorber (WABA) rods were used in all the MOX feed assemblies, some burned MOX assemblies, and some LEU feed assemblies. Integral fuel burnable absorber (IFBA) was used in the rest of the LEU feed assemblies. The average discharge burnup of MOX assemblies was over 47,000 MWD/MTM, which is more than enough to meet the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard.{close_quotes} One unit is capable of consuming 0.462 MT of weapons-grade plutonium per year. Preliminary analyses showed that important reactor physics parameters for the three transitions cycles are comparable to those of LEU cores including boron levels, reactivity coefficients, peaking factors, and shutdown margins. Further transient analyses will need to be performed.

  11. The role of nuclear weapons in the year 2000

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-01-01

    This publication presents the proceedings for the workshop, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Year 2000, held on October 22--24, 1990. The workshop participants considered the changing nature of deterrence and of our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, the impact of nuclear proliferation on regional conflicts, and ways that the nuclear forces might be restructured to reflect new political circumstances.

  12. Incorporation of excess weapons material into the IFR fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hannum, W.H.; Wade, D.C.

    1993-09-01

    The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) provides both a diversion resistant closed fuel cycle for commercial power generation and a means of addressing safeguards concerns related to excess nuclear weapons material. Little head-end processing and handling of dismantled warhead materials is required to convert excess weapons plutonium (Pu) to IFR fuel and a modest degree of proliferation protection is available immediately by alloying weapons Pu to an IFR fuel composition. Denaturing similar to that of spent fuel is obtained by short cycle (e.g. 45 day) use in an IFR reactor, by mixing which IFR recycle fuel, or by alloying with other spent fuel constituents. Any of these permanent denaturings could be implemented as soon as an operating IFR and/or an IFR recycle capability of reasonable scale is available. The initial Pu charge generated from weapons excess Pu can then be used as a permanent denatured catalyst, enabling the IFR to efficiently and economically generate power with only a natural or depleted uranium feed. The Pu is thereafter permanently safeguarded until consumed, with essentially none going to a waste repository.

  13. Cardiac fibrillation risks with TASER conducted electrical weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Panescu, Dorin; Kroll, Mark; Brave, Michael

    2015-01-01

    The TASER(®) conducted electrical weapon (CEW) delivers electrical pulses that can temporarily incapacitate subjects. We analyzed the cardiac fibrillation risk with TASER CEWs. Our risk model accounted for realistic body mass index distributions, used a new model of effects of partial or oblique dart penetration and used recent epidemiological CEW statics. PMID:26736265

  14. Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, and the Arms Race.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hollander, Jack, Ed.

    A symposium was organized to reexamine the realities of vertical proliferation between the United States and the Soviet Union and to place into perspective the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world, including the possible role of commercial nuclear power in facilitating proliferation. The four invited symposium…

  15. Less-lethal munitions as extended-range impact weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hubbs, Ken

    1997-01-01

    With the proliferation of 'suicide by cop' incidents, the concept of less lethal (LL) impact munitions has definitely caught on. There is much to be said for sterile laboratory testing and wound ballistic studies, but having 'real world' operational data is invaluable. Two years ago, a data base was set up to collect this information. The data base continues to grow with incidents from a cross the country and others pursued internationally. Indications are that LL munitions deliver a similar amount of force as conventional police impact weapons i.e., police batons, PR-24's, nunchakus, etc. One advantage over conventional impact weapons, is that LL munitions can be used at much greater distances from a suspect or crown of rioters. This gave rise to the term: extended range impact weapons. Having the ability to examine numerous cases in which these LL munitions have been successfully used for the resolution of critical incidents, is beneficial in evaluating the application and defending the usage of these force options. This paper examines 187 less lethal shootings and discusses such things as: the distance the munitions were fired, the types of injuries sustained by the targeted suspect, the body area of impact, what, if any weapons the suspect was armed with, and the type of incident requiring police response.

  16. Are Weapons Searches in the Job Descriptions of Instructional Leaders?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zimmerman, Judith A.

    2005-01-01

    In this article, the author poses the question "Are weapons searches in the job descriptions of instructional leaders?" which brings to attention changing duties of school principals that were not faced by previous generations. The article reports observations made during time spent with a current high school principal.

  17. Is (-)-Catechin a "Novel Weapon" of Spotted Knapweed (Centaurea stoebe)?

    Science.gov (United States)

    The “novel weapons” hypothesis states that some invasive weed species owe part of their success as invaders to allelopathy mediated by allelochemicals that are new to the native species. Presumably, no resistance has evolved among the native species to this new allelochemical (i.e. the novel weapon...

  18. Disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Westinghouse reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The authors have studied the feasibility of using weapons-grade plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing Westinghouse reactors. They have designed three transition Cycles from an all LEU core to a partial MOX core. They found that four-loop Westinghouse reactors such as the Vogtle power plant are capable of handling up to 45 percent weapons-grade MOX loading without any modifications. The authors have also designed two kinds of weapons-grade MOX assemblies with three enrichments per assembly and four total enrichments. Wet annular burnable absorber (WABA) rods were used in all the MOX feed assemblies, some burned MOX assemblies, and some LEU feed assemblies. Integral fuel burnable absorber (IFBA) was used in the rest of the LEU feed assemblies. The average discharge burnup of MOX assemblies was over 47,000 MWD/MTM, which is more than enough to meet the open-quotes spent fuel standard.close quotes One unit is capable of consuming 0.462 MT of weapons-grade plutonium per year. Preliminary analyses showed that important reactor physics parameters for the three transitions cycles are comparable to those of LEU cores including boron levels, reactivity coefficients, peaking factors, and shutdown margins. Further transient analyses will need to be performed

  19. Joseph A. Burton Forum Award: Some Nuclear Weapons Dilemmas

    Science.gov (United States)

    May, Michael

    2014-03-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a combination of political and ethical dilemmas the solution to which has not been found. On one hand, in the view of both US government leaders and US allies, nuclear deterrence continues to play an essential part in the US role as the ultimate source of military strength for the alliances among the major democratic countries. It also continues to be in demand by countries that believe themselves to be isolated and threatened. On the other hand, nuclear weapons, besides being effective deterrents, can cause unprecedented loss of life and risk the demise of civilizations. No ban or technical precaution could prevent the rebuilding of nuclear weapons in a crisis. No diplomatic arrangement to date has erased the threat of invasion and war in the world. Only the abandonment of war and the threat of war as instruments of policy can make nuclear weapons obsolete. The slow, halting, risky road to that end remains the only hope for a world in which lasting solutions to the nuclear dilemmas are possible.

  20. Shipborne Laser Beam Weapon System for Defence against Cruise Missiles

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    J.P. Dudeja

    2000-04-01

    Full Text Available Sea-skim~ing cruise missiles pose the greatest threat to a surface ship in the present-day war scenario. The convenitional close-in-weapon-systems (CIWSs are becoming less reliable against these new challenges requiring extremely fast reaction time. Naval Forces see a high energy laser as a feasible andjeffective directed energy weapon against sea-skimming antiship cruise missiles becauseof its .ability to deliver destructive energy at the speed of light on to a distant target. The paper comparesthe technology and capability of deuterium fluoride (DF and chemical-oxygen-iodine laser (COIL in effectively performing the role of a shipborne CIWS altainst sea-skimming missiles. Out of these twolasers, it is argued that DF laser wo.uld be more effective a,s a shipborne weapon for defence against sea-skimmin,g cruise missiles. Besides the high energy laser as the primary (killing laser, othersub-systems required in the complete weapon system would be: A beacon laser to sense phase distor'ions in the primary laser, adaptive optics to compensate the atmospheric distortions, beam-directing optics, illuminating lasers, IRST sensors, surveillance and tracking radars, interfacing system, etc.