WorldWideScience

Sample records for atomic weapon tests

  1. AWRE: Atomic Weapons Research Establishment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This reviews the work of AWRE at Aldermaston and Foulness. The main programme is nuclear and is concerned with the design and development of warheads for strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for the British nuclear deterrent, including those for the Royal Navy's missile carrying submarine fleet. The work is described grouped as design physics, development and materials. Services to these groups and to the whole establishment are provided by Engineering, Safety and Administration. The work ranges from long-term fundamental research, the development of technology, design, prototype development to the environmental testing of engineered products. In materials research the emphasis is on plutonium, uranium and beryllium, on high explosives and a wide range of inorganic and organic materials. The physics of the earth's crust is studied to aid detection of underground nuclear explosions. Reactor research facilities include the two reactors, Herald and Viper. (U.K.)

  2. Characteristics of plutonium and americium contamination at the former U.K. atomic weapons test ranges at Maralinga and Emu

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Physico-chemical studies on environmental plutonium are described, which provide data integral to an assessment of dose for the inhalation of artificial actinides by Australian Aborigines living a semi-traditional lifestyle at Maralinga and Emu, sites of U.K. atomic weapons tests between 1953 and 1963. The most significant area, from a radiological perspective, is the area contaminated by plutonium in a series of ''one point'' safety trials in which large quantities of plutonium were dispersed explosively at a location known as Taranaki. The activity distribution of plutonium and americium with particle size is quite different from the mass distribution, as a considerably higher proportion of the activity is contained in the finer (inhalable) fraction than of the mass. Except in areas which were disturbed through ploughing during a cleanup in 1967, most the activity remains in the top 1 cm of the surface. Much of the activity is in particulate form, even at distances > 20 km from the firing sites, and discrete particles have been located even at distances beyond 100 km. Data are presented which permit the assessment of annual committed doses through the inhalation pathway, for Aborigines living a semi-traditional lifestyle in the areas affected by the Taranaki firings in particular. (author)

  3. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION FROM WEAPON TESTS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    none

    1958-10-01

    The program of the Atomic Energy Commission on environmental contamination from weapons tests is designed for the overall evaluation of the hazard to humans from test operations. It is limited to studies of the deposition of activity at long range rather than the problems associated with immediate, close-in fallout. The program has largely been a study of Sr{sup 90}, since considerations based on experience and measurement indicate that it is the isotope of greatest potential hazard. Data are presented pertinent to the monitoring of long-range fallout, particularly Sr{sup 90} and Cs{sup 137}. Values are tabulated for the fallout deposition, air concentrations, water concentrations, and the amounts in foods and human bone. In addition, results are given for some experimental investigations. The report of these results is not interpretative although certain papers that do attempt to interpret the present situation with respect to Sr{sup 90} in particular are reprinted. Bibliographies are presented covering the period since the 1957 hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy concerning the nature of radioactive fallout and its effects on man. A document list of submissions to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation is given to illustrate the work done in other countries. Several papers on the subject, which have not been generally available, are reprinted.

  4. Manhattan Project redux: Canada and the first atomic weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Only three nuclear weapons produced by the Manhattan Project (MP) were used during World War II: Trinity Test, New Mexico on 16 July 1945, Hiroshima, Japan, on 6 August 1945, and Nagasaki, Japan, on 9 August 1945. Several sources and authors, including EM and RL (1967), Stacey (1970), Sanger (1981), and Buckley (2000), have written that it is unlikely that any Canadian uranium was used in the atomic weapons that ended WW II. These sources offer no detailed justification for their conclusion, nevertheless, after analysis of data contained in numerous sources, this article reaches a similar conclusion. (author)

  5. Weapons test seismic investigations at Yucca Mountain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yucca Mountain, located on and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site, is being characterized as part of an ongoing effort to identify a potential high-level nuclear waste repository. This site will be subjected to seismic ground motions induced by underground nuclear explosions. A knowledge of expected ground motion levels from these tests will enable the designers to provide for the necessary structural support in the designs of the various components of the repository. The primary objective of the Weapons Test Seismic Investigation project is to develop a method to predict the ground motions expected at the repository site as a result of future weapons tests. This paper summarizes the data base presently assembled for the Yucca Mountain Project, characteristics of expected ground motions, and characterization of the two-dimensional seismic properties along paths between Yucca Mountain and the testing areas of the Nevada Test Site

  6. Operation greenhouse. Scientific director`s report of atomic weapon tests at Eniwetok, 1951. Annex 8.1. Blast effects on aircraft in flight. Nuclear explosion

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wayne, J.C.; Lehmkuhl, J.C.

    1951-10-01

    The primary objective of this report is to present data concerning the structural and aerodynamic loads as measured on various types of aircraft, in flight, in the vicinity of an atomic explosion. A secondary objective is to describe the instrumentation (installation, calibration, and operation) in order to provide for the future planning and conduct of similar tests. The data presented herein were obtained on Dog, Easy, and George shots of Operation Greenhouse. The airplanes used to collect these data were B-17`s, T-33`s, B-50D`s and one XB-47. These instrumented airplanes were arrayed at preassigned locations in the air space above the explosions. A total of approximately 250 channels of information were obtained which essentially consisted in wing bending, torsion, and shear at the root, mid-span, and outer panel; horizontal stabilizer bending at the root; normal accelerations at the nose, c.g., and tail; aerodynamic pressures at various locations on the airplanes; and temperatures experienced by various critical components of the airplane. The positions of the airplanes at the time of shock arrival were accurately determined by means of radar tracking. The measured data were correlated by means of time signals, every second, from a land based radio transmitter station, and with reference to time zero, by means of a photoelectric cell. The recorded data show that the loads produced by the shock wave were in general accord with theory. The loading experienced by an airplane while passing through the `puff` of the atomic cloud is shown to be considerably higher than that caused by the shock wave. For this reason the penetration of the puff should be avoided even by `sampling` drones.

  7. Characterization and Detection of Biological Weapons with Atomic Force Microscopy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Malkin, A J; Plomp, M; Leighton, T J; McPherson, A

    2006-09-25

    Critical gaps exist in our capabilities to rapidly characterize threat agents which could be used in attacks on facilities and military forces. DNA-based PCR and immunoassay-based techniques provide unique identification of species, strains and protein signatures of pathogens. However, differentiation between naturally occurring and weaponized bioagents and the identification of formulation signatures are beyond current technologies. One of the most effective and often the only definitive means to identify a threat agent is by its direct visualization. Atomic force microscopy (AFM) is a rapid imaging technique that covers the size range of most biothreat agents (several nanometers to tens of microns), is capable of resolving pathogen morphology and structure, and could be developed into a portable device for biological weapons (BW) field characterization. AFM can detect pathogens in aerosol, liquid, surface and soil samples while concomitantly acquiring their weaponization and threat agent digital signatures. BW morphological and structural signatures, including modifications to pathogen microstructural architecture and topology that occur during formulation and weaponization, provide the means for their differentiation from crude or purified unformulated agent, processing signatures, as well as assessment of their potential for dispersion, inhalation and environmental persistence. AFM visualization of pathogen morphology and architecture often provides valuable digital signatures and allows direct detection and identification of threat agents. We have demonstrated that pathogens, spanning the size range from several nanometers for small agricultural satellite viruses to almost half micron for pox viruses, and to several microns for bacteria and bacterial spores, can be visualized by AFM under physiological conditions to a resolution of {approx}20-30 {angstrom}. We have also demonstrated that viruses from closely related families could be differentiated by AFM on

  8. Cancer in People Exposed to Nuclear Weapons Testing

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... Compensation Programs for People Exposed to Radiation as Part of Nuclear Weapons Testing Between 1945 and 1962, the United States ... involving about 200,000 people were conducted as part of many of these tests. ... several nuclear weapons plant sites were exposed to radiation and other ...

  9. Operation GREENHOUSE. Scientific Director's report of atomic weapon tests at Eniwetok, 1951. Annex 6. 7. Contamination-decontamination studies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Werner, L.B.; Sinnreich, S.R.

    1951-08-01

    This 1951 NTPR report describes experiments conducted in Operation Greenhouse at Eniwetok on certain processes and materials associated with contamination and decontamination phenomena. For this type of contaminating event, in which surfaces are contaminated by being carried by aircraft through an atomic cloud, information was obtained which will assist in development of effective protective measures and recovery measures from contaminating atomic detonations. The contaminant which was deposited on surfaces mounted on drone planes was shown to be nonuniform under various contaminating conditions, both as to distribution and composition. Data have been obtained on the relative importance of such surface characteristics as roughness, porosity, retentivity, and contact angle. The relative behavior of various chemical agents as decontaminants was determined and use of industrial cleaning methods employing chemical additives to effect decontamination was investigated.

  10. Lead isotopic composition of trinitite melt glass: evidence for the presence of Canadian industrial lead in the first atomic weapon test.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bellucci, Jeremy J; Simonetti, Antonio; Wallace, Christine; Koeman, Elizabeth C; Burns, Peter C

    2013-08-01

    The Pb isotopic compositions for 51 spots of melt glass in 11 samples of trinitite have been determined by laser ablation multicollector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LA-MC-ICP-MS). Trinitite glass yields a large range of Pb isotopic compositions (i.e., (206)Pb/(204)Pb = 17.08-19.04), which reflect mixing between industrial Pb from materials used in the Trinity test and natural geologic components. Areas within trinitite melt glass containing high concentrations of both Cu and Pb, which are derived from the bomb and blast site-related components, were used for delineating the Pb isotopic composition corresponding to the anthropogenic Pb component. Comparison between the isotopic composition estimated here for the industrial Pb used in the Trinity test and those from known Pb deposits worldwide indicates close agreement with ore from the Buchans mine (Newfoundland, Canada). The Buchans mine was active during the time of the Trinity test and was operated by the American Smelting and Refining Company, which could have provided the Pb used in the test. The industrial Pb used in the Trinity test materials is not documented in the literature (or declassified) but could have been present in bricks, solder, pigs, or some other anthropogenic component related to the experiment. PMID:23829180

  11. Worldwide fallout of plutonium from nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Measurements of 238Pu and /sup 239,240/Pu fallout from nuclear weapons tests and the SNAP-9A navigational satellite burnup are presented for the years through 1980. Data abstracted from the literature were taken from the stratosphere, atmosphere, and from deposition and surface soil. Over 7300 data entries are included in the 23 tables. The tables are sorted by medium (stratosphere, atmosphere, and deposition near the surface and soil, nuclide, hemisphere, and longitude going from west to east, and are arranged in chronological order. Latitudes are also provided. Fallout levels in SI units (becquerels), calculated from the original readings, and the references from which the original data were taken are given in the report. The appendix is a map showing the various sites from which data were obtained

  12. Health consequences and health systems response to the Pacific U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Palafox, Neal A; Riklon, Sheldon; Alik, Wilfred; Hixon, Allen L

    2007-03-01

    Between 1946 and 1958, the United States detonated 67 thermonuclear devices in the Pacific as part of their U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program (USNWTP). The aggregate explosive power was equal to 7,200 Hiroshima atomic bombs. Recent documents released by the U.S. government suggest that the deleterious effects of the nuclear testing were greater and extended farther than previously known. The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) government and affected communities have sought refress through diplomatic routes with the U.S. government, however, existing medical programs and financial reparations have not adequately addressed many of the health consequences of the USNWTP. Since radiation-induced cancers may have a long latency, a healthcare infrastructure is needed to address both cancer and related health issues. This article reviews the health consequences of the Pacific USNWTP and the current health systems ability to respond. PMID:19772154

  13. Radioactive fallout: an overview of internal emitter research in the era of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is a review of the literature on the radiobiology of internal emitters. Its purpose is to consider what has become known about the radiobiology of internally deposited radionuclides over the last four decades. The primary emphasis is the progression of radiobiological information through the 1950s and early 1960s, when atmospheric testing of atomic weapons was occurring with increasing regularity. We also consider information on fission products that are biologically important, specifically, isotopes of iodine, strontium, and cesium. We also examine data for plutonium and uranium. For each of the radionuclides discussed, we consider environmental pathways that are available for the eventual exposure to human populations and the metabolic pathways that determine the tissues at risk following exposure. We also consider the radiobiological effects of exposure given at high levels, and, when appropriate, the risks accompanying low-level exposures

  14. The French atomic bomb tests

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    N. K. Nayak

    1961-10-01

    Full Text Available This article summarizes the details of two French Atomic Tests. Both were carried out at Hamoudia in the vicinity of Reggane (Sahara, the first on 13th of February 1960 and the second on the 1st April 1960. The nuclear explosive used in both cases was plutonium. In the first test the device was placed on the top of a tower of about 100 meters high whereas in the second test it was placed in a prefabricated shed. According to unofficial reports, the yields of the two tests were about 60Kt and less than 20Kt respectively.

  15. Project of law relative to the sanitary consequences of French nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In order to make easy the indemnifications and to include the persons having participate to nuclear weapons tests (Sahara and French Polynesia) and populations leaving in the concerned areas, the project of law relative to the repair of sanitary consequences of nuclear weapons tests proposes to create a right to integral repair of prejudices for the persons suffering of a radioinduced disease coming from these tests. The American example and the British example are given for comparison. The modalities of financing are detailed as well as the social economic and administrative impacts. (N.C.)

  16. Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  17. DOE/LLNL verification symposium on technologies for monitoring nuclear tests related to weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The rapidly changing world situation has raised concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the ability to monitor a possible clandestine nuclear testing program. To address these issues, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Treaty Verification Program sponsored a symposium funded by the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Arms Control, Division of Systems and Technology. The DOE/LLNL Symposium on Technologies for Monitoring Nuclear Tests Related to Weapons Proliferation was held at the DOE's Nevada Operations Office in Las Vegas, May 6--7,1992. This volume is a collection of several papers presented at the symposium. Several experts in monitoring technology presented invited talks assessing the status of monitoring technology with emphasis on the deficient areas requiring more attention in the future. In addition, several speakers discussed proliferation monitoring technologies being developed by the DOE's weapons laboratories

  18. Assessing depleted uranium (DU) contamination of soil, plants and earthworms at UK weapons testing sites

    OpenAIRE

    Oliver, I.W.; Graham, M C; Mackenzie, A. B.; Ellam, R.M.; Farmer, J.G.

    2007-01-01

    Depleted uranium (DU) weapons testing programmes have been conducted at two locations within the UK. An investigation was therefore carried out to assess the extent of any environmental contamination arising from these test programmes using both alpha spectrometry and mass spectrometry techniques. Uranium isotopic signatures indicative of DU contamination were observed in soil, plant and earthworm samples collected in the immediate vicinity of test firing points and targets, but contamination...

  19. DOE (Department of Energy) nuclear weapon R and T (research, development, and testing): Objectives, roles, and responsibilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Otey, G.R.

    1989-07-01

    An overview of the DOE nuclear weapons research, development, and testing program is given along with a description of the program objectives and the roles and responsibilities of the various involved organizations. The relationship between the DoD and DOE is described and the division of responsibilities for weapon development as well as the coordinated planning and acquisition activities are reviewed. Execution of the RD T program at the nuclear weapons laboratories is outlined. 24 refs., 3 figs.

  20. Plutonium and uranium contamination in soils from former nuclear weapon test sites in Australia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Child, D.P., E-mail: dpc@ansto.gov.au [Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Locked Bag 2001, Kirrawee DC, NSW 2232 (Australia); Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Macquarie University, NSW 2109 (Australia); Hotchkis, M.A.C. [Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Locked Bag 2001, Kirrawee DC, NSW 2232 (Australia)

    2013-01-15

    The British government performed a number of nuclear weapon tests on Australian territory from 1952 through to 1963 with the cooperation of Australian government. Nine fission bombs were detonated in South Australia at Emu Junction and Maralinga, and a further three fission weapons were detonated in the Monte Bello Islands off the coast of Western Australia. A number of soil samples were collected by Australian Radiation Laboratories in 1972 and 1978 during field surveys at these nuclear weapon test sites. They were analysed by gamma spectrometry and, for a select few samples, by alpha spectrometry to measure the remaining activities of fission products, activation products and weapon materials. We have remeasured a number of these Montebello Islands and Emu Junction soil samples using the ANTARES AMS facility, ANSTO. These samples were analysed for plutonium and uranium isotopic ratios and isotopic concentrations. Very low {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu ratios were measured at both sites ({approx}0.05 for Alpha Island and {approx}0.02 for Emu Field), substantially below global fallout averages. Well correlated but widely varying {sup 236}U and plutonium concentrations were measured across both sites, but {sup 233}U did not correlate with these other isotopes and instead showed correlation with distance from ground zero, indicating in situ production in the soils.

  1. Polycythemia vera among participants of a nuclear weapons test

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sobell, J.L.; Codd, M.B.; Silverstein, M.N.; Kurland, L.T.

    1987-03-06

    Three letters-to-the-editors discuss the finding of a statistically significant excess of polycythemia vera cases among participants in the Smoky detonation. Had population-based incidence rates from Rochester been used to derive an expected incidence, and had only bona fide polycythemia vera cases been considered, as is the rule in most epidemiologic studies, the observed frequency of polycythemia vera among participants in the Smoky test would have been found to be well within chance expectations.

  2. Dose assessment studies at former nuclear weapons test sites in Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Field and laboratory measurements are described and data presented which enable a dose assessment for the inhalation of artificial radionuclides at Maralinga and Emu, the sites of United kingdom atomic weapons tests between 1953 and 1963. Dose assessments for the inhalation of artificial radionuclides are presented for all remaining contaminated areas at Maralinga and Emu. In the case of Aborigines, these doses are estimated assuming inhalable dust loadings of 1 mg/m3 for adults and 1.5 mg/m3 for children and infants. Particle size is taken to be 5 μm AMAD. Plutonium and americium are taken to be represented by solubility Class Y for major trial sites and 25% Class W and 75% Class Y for all minor trial sites. For other radionuclides, where no data are available, the most conservative dose intake conversion factor values are used. All calculations of dose assume 100% occupancy. The results indicate that doses to children are higher than doses to adults and infants. This is a consequence of children being subjected to higher dust concentrations than adults because of their play activities and because of generally higher dose intake conversion factor values than adults, which more than offset their smaller breathing rates. Thus children form the critical group. With the exception of one site which is contaminated with uranium, at all other sites it is only the inhalation of plutonium and americium that contributes significantly to the dose, and of these 239Pu is the largest contributor. Therefore, having regard to the long half lives of the radionuclides concerned, the inhalation problems highlighted by this dose assessment will not diminish significantly within any reasonable period of time and hence management strategies must be developed to deal with them. (author). 35 refs, 1 fig., 2 tabs

  3. Testing the Gravitational Redshift with Atomic Gravimeters?

    CERN Document Server

    Wolf, Peter; Bordé, Christian J; Reynaud, Serge; Salomon, Christophe; Cohen-Tannoudji, Claude

    2011-01-01

    Atom interferometers allow the measurement of the acceleration of freely falling atoms with respect to an experimental platform at rest on Earth's surface. Such experiments have been used to test the universality of free fall by comparing the acceleration of the atoms to that of a classical freely falling object. In a recent paper, M\\"uller, Peters and Chu [Nature {\\bf 463}, 926-929 (2010)] argued that atom interferometers also provide a very accurate test of the gravitational redshift (or universality of clock rates). Considering the atom as a clock operating at the Compton frequency associated with the rest mass, they claimed that the interferometer measures the gravitational redshift between the atom-clocks in the two paths of the interferometer at different values of gravitational potentials. In the present paper we analyze this claim in the frame of general relativity and of different alternative theories, and conclude that the interpretation of atom interferometers as testing the gravitational redshift ...

  4. Atmospheric nuclear weapons test history narrated by carbon-14 in human teeth

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons since 1945 caused a significant increase in the concentration of atmospheric 14C. The 14C concentration in plants that assimilate 14C directly by photosynthesis reflects the atmospheric 14C concentration. Carbon-14 is then transferred into the human body through the food chain. Based on animal experiments, the collagen in human teeth is metabolically inert after its formation. This implies that the collagen of each tooth retains the 14C concentration which reflects the 14C concentration in the blood at the time collagen metabolism ceased. The distribution of the 14C concentration in the collagen of teeth from subjects of various ages would follow a pattern similar to that shown by soft tissues. In this paper the authors elucidate the relationship between the number of nuclear weapon tests and the distribution of 14C concentration in teeth

  5. A high resolution record of chlorine-36 nuclear-weapons-tests fallout from Central Asia

    Science.gov (United States)

    Green, J.R.; Cecil, L.D.; Synal, H.-A.; Santos, J.; Kreutz, K.J.; Wake, C.P.

    2004-01-01

    The Inilchek Glacier, located in the Tien Shan Mountains, central Asia, is unique among mid-latitude glaciers because of its relatively large average annual accumulation. In July 2000, two ice cores of 162 and 167 meters (m) in length were collected from the Inilchek Glacier for (chlorine-36) 36Cl analysis a part of a collaborative international effort to study the environmental changes archived in mid-latitude glaciers worldwide. The average annual precipitation at the collection site was calculated to be 1.6 m. In contrast, the reported average annual accumulations at the high-latitude Dye-3 glacial site, Greenland, the mid-latitude Guliya Ice Cap, China, and the mid-latitude Upper Fremont Glacier, Wyoming, USA, were 0.52, 0.16 and 0.76 m, respectively. The resolution of the 36Cl record in one of the Inilchek ice cores was from 2 to 10 times higher than the resolution of the records at these other sites and could provide an opportunity for detailed study of environmental changes that have occurred over the past 150 years. Despite the differences in accumulation among these various glacial sites, the 36Cl profile and peak concentrations for the Inilchek ice core were remarkably similar in shape and magnitude to those for ice cores from these other sites. The 36Cl peak concentration from 1958, the year during the mid-1900s nuclear-weapons-tests period when 36Cl fallout was largest, was preserved in the Inilchek core at a depth of 90.56 m below the surface of the glacier (74.14-m-depth water equivalent) at a concentration of 7.7 ?? 105 atoms of 36Cl/gram (g) of ice. Peak 36Cl concentrations from Dye-3, Guliya and the Upper Fremont glacial sites were 7.1 ?? 105, 5.4 ?? 105 and 0.7 ?? 105 atoms of 36Cl/g of ice, respectively. Measurements of 36Cl preserved in ice cores improve estimates of historical worldwide atmospheric deposition of this isotope and allow the sources of 36Cl in ground water to be better identified. ?? 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.

  6. Report to Congress on stockpile reliability, weapon remanufacture, and the role of nuclear testing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miller, G.H.; Brown, P.S.; Alonso, C.T.

    1987-10-01

    This report analyzes two issues: (1) ''whether past warhead reliability problems demonstrate that nuclear explosive testing is needed to identify or to correct stockpile reliability,'' or (2) ''whether a program of stockpile inspection, nonnuclear testing, and remanufacture would be sufficient to deal with stockpile reliability problems.'' Chapter 1 examines the reasons for nuclear testing. Although the thrust of the request from Congressman Aspin et al., has to do with the need for nuclear testing as it relates to stockpile reliability and remanufacture, there are other very important reasons for nuclear testing. Since there has been increasing interest in the US Congress for more restrictive nuclear test limits, we have addressed the overall need for nuclear testing and the potential impact of further nuclear test limitations. Chapter 1 also summarizes the major conclusions of a recent study conducted by the Scientific and Academic Advisory Committee (SAAC) for the President of the University of California; the SAAC report is entitled, ''Nuclear Weapon Tests: The Role of the University of California-Department of Energy Laboratories.'' Chapter 2 presents a brief history of stockpile problems that involved post-deployment nuclear testing for their resolution. Chapter 3 addresses the problems involved in remanufacturing nuclear weapons, and Chapter 4 discusses measures that should be taken to prepare for possible future restrictive test limits.

  7. 机载武器总体测试平台设计%Overall Test Airborne Weapons Platform

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    吴丽

    2011-01-01

    According to the overall airborne weapons testing needs the development of the overall test airborne weapons platform that can be achieved in the laboratory environment,a new rapid overall airborne weapons testing capabilities.%根据机载武器的总体测试需求开发的机载武器总体测试平台,能够在试验室环境下实现新型机载武器的快速总体测试能力。

  8. FMCT after South Asia's tests. A view from a nuclear-weapon state

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Proposals to negotiate an international treaty to cutoff the production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons have been on the international nuclear agenda for many decades. Hopes in the early 1990s that it would be possible finally to negotiate a FMCT, however, have not been borne out. Instead, a deadlock had ensued at the Geneva CD. It remains to be seen whether the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan will contribute to breaking that deadlock - or only to foreclosing any prospects for negotiating cutoff in the foreseeable future. The key lies in the attitudes of Delhi and Islamabad - influenced to the extent possible by the efforts of the international community to convince both countries' leaders to stop short of an escalating nuclear war in the region. Regardless, there are a variety of other initiatives aimed at heightening transparency and controls over the nuclear weapons materials in the five NPT nuclear weapon states that could be pursued as part of broader ongoing efforts to roll back the Cold War nuclear legacies

  9. Chlorine-36 in Water, Snow, and Mid-Latitude Glacial Ice of North America: Meteoric and Weapons-Tests Production in the Vicinity of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. DeWayne; J. R. Green (USGS); S. Vogt, P. Sharma (Purdue University); S. K. Frape (University of Waterloo); S. N. Davis (University of Arizona); G. L. Cottrell (USGS)

    1999-01-01

    Measurements of chlorine-36 (36Cl) were made for 64 water, snow, and glacial-ice and -runoff samples to determine the meteoric and weapons-tests-produced concentrations and fluxes of this radionuclide at mid-latitudes in North America. The results will facilitate the use of 36Cl as a hydrogeologic tracer at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). This information was used to estimate meteoric and weapons-tests contributions of this nuclide to environmental inventories at and near the INEEL. The data presented in this report suggest a meteoric source 36Cl for environmental samples collected in southeastern Idaho and western Wyoming if the concentration is less than 1 x 10 7 atoms/L. Additionally, concentrations in water, snow, or glacial ice between 1 x 10 7 and 1 x 10 8 atoms/L may be indicative of a weapons-tests component from peak 36Cl production in the late 1950s. Chlorine-36 concentrations between 1 x 10 8 and 1 x 10 9 atoms/L may be representative of re-suspension of weapons-tests fallout airborne disposal of 36Cl from the INTEC, or evapotranspiration. It was concluded from the water, snow, and glacial data presented here that concentrations of 36Cl measured in environmental samples at the INEEL larger than 1 x 10 9 atoms/L can be attributed to waste-disposal practices.

  10. Development of nuclear technologies and conversion of nuclear weapon testing system infrastructure in Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The article gives a brief description of the work done by the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan in development of nuclear technology and conversion of nuclear weapon testing infrastructure in Kazakhstan. Content and trends of works are as follows: 1. Peaceful use of all physical facilities, created earlier for nuclear tests in Kazakhstan; 2. Development of methods and technologies for safe nuclear reactors use; 3. Examination of different materials in field of great neutron flow for thermonuclear reactor's first wall development; 4. Liquidation of all wells, which were formed in the results of underground nuclear explosions in Degelen mountain massif of former Semipalatinsk test site; 5. Study of consequences of nuclear tests in West Kazakhstan (territory of Azgir test site and Karachaganak oil field); 6. Study of radiological situation on the Semipalatinsk test site and surrounding territories; 7. Search of ways for high-level radioactive wastes disposal; 8. Construction of safe nuclear power plants in Kazakhstan

  11. Subcritical tests - nuclear weapon testing under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Subkritiske tester - kjernevaapentesting under avtalen om fullstendig proevestans

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hoeibraaten, S

    1998-10-01

    The report discusses possible nuclear weapons related experiments and whether these are permitted under the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The term ''subcritical experiments'' as used in the United States includes experiments in which one studies fissile materials (so far only plutonium) under extreme conditions generated by conventional high explosives, and in which a self-sustained chain reaction never develops in the fissile material. The known facts about the American subcritical experiments are presented. There is very little reason to doubt that these experiments were indeed subcritical and therefore permitted under the CTBT. Little is known about the Russian efforts that are being made on subcritical experiments.

  12. Nuclear weapons tests and short-term effects on atmospheric ozone

    Science.gov (United States)

    Miller, A. J.; Krueger, A. J.; Prabhakara, C.; Hilsenrath, E.

    1974-01-01

    Observations made when Nimbus 4 passed over a nuclear cloud about three hours after the bomb exploded are presented. Infrared and BUV measurements indicated that the atmospheric ozone level in the area of cloud was significantly less than in areas directly north and south of the cloud. It is noted, however, that it is not possible to state definitively that the ozone depletion was caused by nitrogen oxides released in the nuclear weapons test, and that further observations must be made to clarify the situation.

  13. Environmental radiation at the Monte Bello Islands from nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1952 and 1956

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The results from the 1962 and 1968 surveys of environmental radiation at the Monte Bello Islands are presented. These were the first of the series of surveys of radioactive contamination of the Islands to be carried out following nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1952 and 1956. Detailed comparison is made with the results obtained in the subsequent surveys in 1972 and 1978. For more than 20 years, no area at the Monte Bello Islands has presented an acute hazard due to external exposure to environmental radiation

  14. Radioactive fallout from Chinese nuclear weapons test of March 15, 1978

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has measured the radionuclide concentration of short-lived debris from a radioactive cloud, produced by a nuclear weapons test conducted by the People's Republic of China on March 15, 1978. Analysis with a 40 cfm Sierra impactor showed that a large portion of the radioactivity was associated with relatively large particles. Surface air samples showed significant concentrations of 124Sb. Samples of rain water from New York State showed that radioactivity arrived on the east coast at about the same time as peak debris levels were observed on the west coast. Highest concentrations of 131I occurred along the Washington State--Canadian border

  15. Hitler's bomb: the secret story of Germans' attempts to get the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this historical book, the author claims to have evidence concerning the development and testing of a possible 'nuclear weapon' by Nazi Germany in 1945. The 'weapon' in question is not alleged to be a standard nuclear weapon powered by nuclear fission, but something closer to either a radiological weapon (a so-called 'dirty bomb') or a hybrid-nuclear fusion weapon. Its new evidence is concerned primarily with the parts of the German nuclear energy project (an attempted clandestine scientific effort led by Germany to develop and produce atomic weapons during World War II) under Kurt Diebner, a German nuclear physicist who directed and administrated the project

  16. Residual radioactive contamination of the test site at Emu from nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1953

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The detailed distributions and soil concentrations of long-lived radionuclides remaining from nuclear weapons trials conducted at Emu in October 1953, are presented. Significant radiation levels due to long-lived neutron activation products in soil, 60Co and 152Eu, occur only in the immediate vicinity of the ground zeros of TOTEM 1 and TOTEM 2. It is shown that the levels of contamination due to fallout products in the soil are well below those which would constitute a health hazard to occupants of the area

  17. (236)U and (239,)(240)Pu ratios from soils around an Australian nuclear weapons test site.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tims, S G; Froehlich, M B; Fifield, L K; Wallner, A; De Cesare, M

    2016-01-01

    The isotopes (236)U, (239)Pu and (240)Pu are present in surface soils as a result of global fallout from nuclear weapons tests carried out in the 1950's and 1960's. These isotopes potentially constitute artificial tracers of recent soil erosion and sediment movement. Only Accelerator Mass Spectrometry has the requisite sensitivity to measure all three isotopes at these environmental levels. Coupled with its relatively high throughput capabilities, this makes it feasible to conduct studies of erosion across the geographical extent of the Australian continent. In the Australian context, however, global fallout is not the only source of these isotopes. As part of its weapons development program the United Kingdom carried out a series of atmospheric and surface nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga, South Australia in 1956 and 1957. The tests have made a significant contribution to the Pu isotopic abundances present in the region around Maralinga and out to distances ∼1000 km, and impact on the assessment techniques used in the soil and sediment tracer studies. Quantification of the relative fallout contribution derived from detonations at Maralinga is complicated owing to significant contamination around the test site from numerous nuclear weapons safety trials that were also carried out around the site. We show that (236)U can provide new information on the component of the fallout that is derived from the local nuclear weapons tests, and highlight the potential of (236)U as a new fallout tracer.

  18. Time-dependent behaviour of radiocaesium: A new method to compare the mobility of weapons test and Chernobyl derived fallout

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Environmental radiocaesium (137Cs) originates primarily from two sources, atmospheric nuclear weapons testing, and the Chernobyl accident. It has not, to our knowledge, previously been possible statistically to compare changes in the environmental mobility of 137Cs from these two sources since the weapons test fallout varied in a complex manner over a number of years. A novel technique is presented for curve-fitting measurements with a time-dependent input function such as that for weapons test fallout. Different models were fitted to measurements of both pre- and post-Chernobyl 137Cs activity concentrations in five major Finnish rivers. It was shown that there was no significant difference in the temporal changes in 137Cs mobility from these two sources during the years after fallout. Transport parameters derived from weapons test measurements gave good predictions of the long-term contamination of these rivers by Chernobyl fallout. Changes in 137Cs activity concentrations in rivers after Chernobyl have previously been shown to decline as a result of slow sorption to clay minerals in catchment soils. It is shown that weapons test fallout also exhibited this slow decline over time. Rates of decline in 137Cs activity concentrations 10 years after fallout correspond to effective ecological half-lives (Teff) in the range 10-30 years. Removal of activity from the catchment was found to have no significant effect on the long-term decline in 137Cs activity concentrations in these rivers

  19. (236)U and (239,)(240)Pu ratios from soils around an Australian nuclear weapons test site.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tims, S G; Froehlich, M B; Fifield, L K; Wallner, A; De Cesare, M

    2016-01-01

    The isotopes (236)U, (239)Pu and (240)Pu are present in surface soils as a result of global fallout from nuclear weapons tests carried out in the 1950's and 1960's. These isotopes potentially constitute artificial tracers of recent soil erosion and sediment movement. Only Accelerator Mass Spectrometry has the requisite sensitivity to measure all three isotopes at these environmental levels. Coupled with its relatively high throughput capabilities, this makes it feasible to conduct studies of erosion across the geographical extent of the Australian continent. In the Australian context, however, global fallout is not the only source of these isotopes. As part of its weapons development program the United Kingdom carried out a series of atmospheric and surface nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga, South Australia in 1956 and 1957. The tests have made a significant contribution to the Pu isotopic abundances present in the region around Maralinga and out to distances ∼1000 km, and impact on the assessment techniques used in the soil and sediment tracer studies. Quantification of the relative fallout contribution derived from detonations at Maralinga is complicated owing to significant contamination around the test site from numerous nuclear weapons safety trials that were also carried out around the site. We show that (236)U can provide new information on the component of the fallout that is derived from the local nuclear weapons tests, and highlight the potential of (236)U as a new fallout tracer. PMID:26141189

  20. Standard Model tests with trapped radioactive atoms

    CERN Document Server

    Behr, J A; 10.1088/0954-3899/36/3/033101

    2009-01-01

    We review the use of laser cooling and trapping for Standard Model tests, focusing on trapping of radioactive isotopes. Experiments with neutral atoms trapped with modern laser cooling techniques are testing several basic predictions of electroweak unification. For nuclear $\\beta$ decay, demonstrated trap techniques include neutrino momentum measurements from beta-recoil coincidences, along with methods to produce highly polarized samples. These techniques have set the best general constraints on non-Standard Model scalar interactions in the first generation of particles. They also have the promise to test whether parity symmetry is maximally violated, to search for tensor interactions, and to search for new sources of time reversal violation. There are also possibilites for exotic particle searches. Measurements of the strength of the weak neutral current can be assisted by precision atomic experiments using traps of small numbers of radioactive atoms, and sensitivity to possible time-reversal violating elec...

  1. Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.; Shuh, D. K.; Knight, K. B.; Eppich, G. R.; Holliday, K. S.

    2016-05-01

    Nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. We find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. The resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.

  2. On the reduction of nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Bacher, Robert F.

    1981-01-01

    The United States, in 1946, proposed that an international authority be formed to control the dangerous parts of atomic energy. The proposal met with very little success, except to lead to the conclusion that there was no apparent reason why it was not technically feasible. Discussions on nuclear weapons testing, initiated in 1958, reached some agreement on test restrictions in Subsequent years.

  3. Long-range tropospheric transport of uranium and plutonium weapons fallout from Semipalatinsk nuclear test site to Norway.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wendel, Cato Christian; Fifield, L Keith; Oughton, Deborah H; Lind, Ole Christian; Skipperud, Lindis; Bartnicki, Jerzy; Tims, Stephen G; Høibråten, Steinar; Salbu, Brit

    2013-09-01

    A combination of state-of-the-art isotopic fingerprinting techniques and atmospheric transport modelling using real-time historical meteorological data has been used to demonstrate direct tropospheric transport of radioactive debris from specific nuclear detonations at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan to Norway via large areas of Europe. A selection of archived air filters collected at ground level at 9 stations in Norway during the most intensive atmospheric nuclear weapon testing periods (1957-1958 and 1961-1962) has been screened for radioactive particles and analysed with respect to the concentrations and atom ratios of plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U) using accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS). Digital autoradiography screening demonstrated the presence of radioactive particles in the filters. Concentrations of (236)U (0.17-23nBqm(-3)) and (239+240)Pu (1.3-782μBqm(-3)) as well as the atom ratios (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.0517-0.237) and (236)U/(239)Pu (0.0188-0.7) varied widely indicating several different sources. Filter samples from autumn and winter tended to have lower atom ratios than those sampled in spring and summer, and this likely reflects a tropospheric influence in months with little stratospheric fallout. Very high (236)U, (239+240)Pu and gross beta activity concentrations as well as low (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.0517-0.077), (241)Pu/(239)Pu (0.00025-0.00062) and (236)U/(239)Pu (0.0188-0.046) atom ratios, characteristic of close-in and tropospheric fallout, were observed in filters collected at all stations in Nov 1962, 7-12days after three low-yield detonations at Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan). Atmospheric transport modelling (NOAA HYSPLIT_4) using real-time meteorological data confirmed that long range transport of radionuclides, and possibly radioactive particles, from Semipalatinsk to Norway during this period was plausible. The present work shows that direct tropospheric transport of fallout from atmospheric nuclear detonations periodically may have

  4. The assessment of radiation exposures in native American communities from nuclear weapons testing in Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Native Americans residing in a broad region downwind from the Nevada Test Site during the 1950s and 1960s received significant radiation exposures from nuclear weapons testing. Because of differences in diet, activities, and housing, their radiation exposures are only very imperfectly represented in the Department of Energy dose reconstructions. There are important missing pathways, including exposures to radioactive iodine from eating small game. The dose reconstruction model assumptions about cattle feeding practices across a year are unlikely to apply to the native communities as are other model assumptions about diet. Thus exposures from drinking milk and eating vegetables have not yet been properly estimated for these communities. Through consultations with members of the affected communities, these deficiencies could be corrected and the dose reconstruction extended to Native Americans. An illustration of the feasibility of extending the dose reconstruction is provided by a sample calculation to estimate radiation exposures to the thyroid from eating radio-iodine-contaminated rabbit thyroids after the Dedan test. The illustration is continued with a discussion of how the calculation results may be used to make estimates for other tests and other locations

  5. Trends in childhood leukaemia in the Nordic countries in relation to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

    OpenAIRE

    Darby, S. C.; Olsen, J. H.; Doll, R.; Thakrar, B.; Brown, P. D.; Storm, H H; Barlow, L.; Langmark, F.; Teppo, L; H. Tulinius

    1992-01-01

    OBJECTIVE--To obtain further information about the risks of childhood leukaemia after exposure to ionising radiation at low doses and low dose rates before or after birth or to the father's testes shortly before conception. DESIGN--Observational study of trends in incidence of childhood leukaemia in relation to estimated radiation exposures due to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing during the 1950s and 1960s. SETTING--Nordic countries. SUBJECTS--Children aged under 15 years. MAI...

  6. Testing Atom and Neutron Neutrality with Atom Interferometry

    OpenAIRE

    Arvanitaki, Asimina; Dimopoulos, Savas; Geraci, Andrew A.; Hogan, Jason; Kasevich, Mark

    2007-01-01

    We propose an atom-interferometry experiment based on the scalar Aharonov-Bohm effect which detects an atom charge at the 10^{-28}e level, and improves the current laboratory limits by 8 orders of magnitude. This setup independently probes neutron charges down to 10^{-28}e, 7 orders of magnitude below current bounds.

  7. Prediction of ground motion from underground nuclear weapons tests as it relates to siting of a nuclear waste storage facility at NTS and compatibility with the weapons test program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report assumes reasonable criteria for NRC licensing of a nuclear waste storage facility at the Nevada Test Site where it would be exposed to ground motion from underground nuclear weapons tests. Prediction equations and their standard deviations have been determined from measurements on a number of nuclear weapons tests. The effect of various independent parameters on standard deviation is discussed. That the data sample is sufficiently large is shown by the fact that additional data have little effect on the standard deviation. It is also shown that coupling effects can be separated out of the other contributions to the standard deviation. An example, based on certain licensing assumptions, shows that it should be possible to have a nuclear waste storage facility in the vicinity of Timber Mountain which would be compatible with a 700 kt weapons test in the Buckboard Area if the facility were designed to withstand a peak vector acceleration of 0.75 g. The prediction equation is a log-log linear equation which predicts acceleration as a function of yield of an explosion and the distance from it

  8. Atomic Interferometry Test of Dark Energy

    CERN Document Server

    Brax, Philippe

    2016-01-01

    Atomic interferometry can be used to probe dark energy models coupled to matter. We consider the constraints coming from recent experimental results on models generalising the inverse power law chameleons such as $f(R)$ gravity in the large curvature regime, the environmentally dependent dilaton and symmetrons. Using the tomographic description of these models, we find that only symmetrons with masses smaller than the dark energy scale can be efficiently tested. In this regime, the resulting constraints complement the bounds from the E\\"otwash experiment and exclude small values of the symmetron self-coupling.

  9. Gunshot residue testing in suicides: Part II: Analysis by inductive coupled plasma-atomic emission spectrometry.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Molina, D Kimberley; Castorena, Joe L; Martinez, Michael; Garcia, James; DiMaio, Vincent J M

    2007-09-01

    Several different methods can be employed to test for gunshot residue (GSR) on a decedent's hands, including scanning electron microscopy with energy dispersive x-ray (SEM/EDX) and inductive coupled plasma-atomic emission spectrometry (ICP-AES). In part I of this 2-part series, GSR results performed by SEM/EDX in undisputed cases of suicidal handgun wounds were studied. In part II, the same population was studied, deceased persons with undisputed suicidal handgun wounds, but GSR testing was performed using ICP-AES. A total of 102 cases were studied and analyzed for caliber of weapon, proximity of wound, and the results of the GSR testing. This study found that 50% of cases where the deceased was known to have fired a handgun immediately prior to death had positive GSR results by ICP/AES, which did not differ from the results of GSR testing by SEM/EDX. Since only 50% of cases where the person is known to have fired a weapon were positive for GSR by either method, this test should not be relied upon to determine whether someone has discharged a firearm and is not useful as a determining factor of whether or not a wound is self-inflicted or non-self-inflicted. While a positive GSR result may be of use, a negative result is not helpful in the medical examiner setting as a negative result indicates that either a person fired a weapon prior to death or a person did not fire a weapon prior to death. PMID:17721164

  10. Reconversion of nuclear weapons

    CERN Document Server

    Kapitza, Sergei P

    1993-01-01

    The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

  11. The relationship of thyroid cancer in the people of the Marshall Islands to potential exposure to radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The US atomic weapons testing programme in the Pacific conducted between 1946 and 1958 resulted in radioactive contamination of a number of atolls in the Marshall Islands to various degrees. The largest weapon named BRAVO was tested in 1954 and resulted in high exposures to residents living on three atolls immediately downwind of the test site. Between 1993 and 1997, as part of the Nationwide Radiological Study of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, we examined 4767 Marshallese for all forms of thyroid disease, benign and malignant. Those examined had residences at the time of the test on all inhabited atolls of the nation and were born before the end of the nuclear testing period and thus potentially exposed to radioiodines from bomb test fallout. This group includes more than 60% of the alive population at risk. We diagnosed 38 thyroid cancers and found 23 other study participants who had been operated for thyroid cancer before. These findings indicate that 1 in 100 Marshallese had thyroid cancer or had been diagnosed with thyroid cancer before the investigation. Thyroid cancer rates varied little throughout the country, which suggests that thyroid cancer is endemic to the Marshallese population. However, the highest prevalence (1.8%) was found among women who were alive at the time of the BRAVO test. We derived crude estimates of thyroid dose for each study participant, using age-specific dose estimates on Utirik as estimated by Lessard et al. and adjusting those for location on the basis of contemporary measurements of Cs-137 at their island of residence in 1954. Prevalence of thyroid cancer generally increased with estimated dose to the thyroid, but the trend was not statistically significant. In view of these data, more precise individual thyroid dose reconstruction becomes an essential task for future work. (author)

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007

  14. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  15. A Preliminary study on attitudes toward nuclear weapons and nuclear tests of the residents of Kurchatov, Kazakhstan

    OpenAIRE

    Matsuo, Masatsugu; Bektorov, Yerzhan; Muldagaliyev, Talgat; Apsalikov, Kazbek; Hirabayashi, Kyoko; Kawano, Noriyuki

    2006-01-01

    The town of Kurchatov was a secret city newly built in the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site as the headquarters of the nuclear tests. The present paper is a pilot study, first, to explore how the current Kurchatov residents think and feel about nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, and secondly, to compare the results of the survey with those of the similar survey near Semipalatinsk. Though the present study is based upon a small and limited survey conducted in the city, it is hoped that it will ...

  16. Test of the quantumness of atom-atom correlations in a bosonic gas

    OpenAIRE

    Ivanov, D.; Wallentowitz, S.

    2006-01-01

    It is shown how the quantumness of atom-atom correlations in a trapped bosonic gas can be made observable. Application of continuous feedback control of the center of mass of the atomic cloud is shown to generate oscillations of the spatial extension of the cloud, whose amplitude can be directly used as a characterization of atom-atom correlations. Feedback parameters can be chosen such that the violation of a Schwarz inequality for atom-atom correlations can be tested at noise levels much hi...

  17. Test of Nonlocality with an Atom-Field Entangled State

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    ZHENG Shi-Biao

    2002-01-01

    We propose a scheme for the test of nonlocality with atom-field entanglement. An atom is sent through a cavity filled with a coherent field with a small amplitude. The dispersive interaction leads to atom-field entanglement.Then the field is driven by a classical current. The Bell inequality can be tested by the joint measurement of the parity of the field and the atomic state.

  18. United States population dose estimates for 131I in the thyroid after the Chinese atmospheric nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Analysis of samples collected within the United States after the Chinese atmospheric nuclear weapons tests of 26 September and 17 November 1976 indicates that the radiation dose to the thyroid from iodine-131 in milk was predominant. A U.S. population dose to the thyroid of 68,000 man-rads was calculated for the iodine-131 fallout. The four excess thyroid cancers that are estimated to occur as a result of the September test during the next 45 years will be masked by the 380,000 cases of thyroid cancer which are expected to occur in the United States from all causes during the same interval

  19. Special Weapons

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — Supporting Navy special weapons, the division provides an array of engineering services, technical publication support services, logistics support services, safety...

  20. Estimates of fallout in the continental U.S. from Nevada weapons testing based on gummed-film monitoring data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During periods of weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) between 1951 and 1958, the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) monitored daily fallout at about 100 sites in the U.S. using gummed-film collectors. These gummed-film data represent the only comprehensive set of actual measurements of fallout during this period for areas outside the immediate vicinity of the NTS. The measured beta activities originally reported by EML have been reviewed and reevaluated. This reevaluation corrected a number of errors in the original data set and allowed fairly accurate estimates to be made of specific radionuclide depositions from individual NTS shots. Estimates of the geographical and temporal variations in cumulative 137Cs and 131I depositions from all NTS shots through 1957 are presented, as well as estimates of the relative impact of particular shots and test series. The revised gummed-film estimates of total NTS fallout depositions are compared with estimates based on contemporary and historical soil sample analyses. These reevaluated gummed-film fallout deposition estimates are being extensively utilized in a number of ongoing programs to reconstruct the radiation exposure of the U.S. population from Nevada weapons testing

  1. Atomic precision tests and light scalar couplings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We calculate the shift in the atomic energy levels induced by the presence of a scalar field which couples to matter and photons. We find that a combination of atomic measurements can be used to probe both these couplings independently. A new and stringent bound on the matter coupling springs from the precise measurement of the 1s to 2s energy level difference in the hydrogen atom, while the coupling to photons is essentially constrained by the Lamb shift. Combining these constraints with current particle physics bounds we find that the contribution of a scalar field to the recently claimed discrepancy in the proton radius measured using electronic and muonic atoms is negligible. (orig.)

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  4. Atom interferometry in the presence of an external test mass

    CERN Document Server

    Dubetsky, B; Libby, S B; Berman, P R

    2016-01-01

    The influence of an external test mass on the phase of the signal of an atom interferometer is studied theoretically. Using traditional techniques in atom optics based on the density matrix equations in the Wigner representation, we are able to extract the various contributions to the phase of the signal associated with the classical motion of the atoms, the quantum correction to this motion resulting from atomic recoil that is produced when the atoms interact with Raman field pulses, and quantum corrections to the atomic motion that occur in the time between the Raman field pulses. By increasing the effective wave vector associated with the Raman field pulses using modified field parameters, we can increase the sensitivity of the signal to the point where the quantum corrections can be measured. The expressions that are derived can be evaluated numerically to isolate the contribution to the signal from an external test mass. The regions of validity of the exact and approximate expressions are determined.

  5. After fifty years of the nuclear age: Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or elimination of them?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ever since the first test of the atomic bomb and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, mankind lived with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were inevitably connected with the Cold War, with its end new opportunity has come concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Steps are to be undertaken in order to eliminate the nuclear weapons. First, would be the prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. By excluding the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, the world could be closer to nuclear disarmament than ever. The prohibition of the use of some type of weapons could be a breakthrough towards the elimination of such weapons. While the negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons would be difficult, as were those to ban chemical weapons, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons would eventually lead to their elimination. During the Cold War, the imminent goal of disarmament was to stop the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. But in the post-Cold War era an opportunity has developed for further steps towards nuclear disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons

  6. News UK public libraries offer walk-in access to research Atoms for Peace? The Atomic Weapons Establishment and UK universities Students present their research to academics: CERN@school Science in a suitcase: Marvin and Milo visit Ethiopia Inspiring telescopes A day for everyone teaching physics 2014 Forthcoming Events

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-05-01

    UK public libraries offer walk-in access to research Atoms for Peace? The Atomic Weapons Establishment and UK universities Students present their research to academics: CERN@school Science in a suitcase: Marvin and Milo visit Ethiopia Inspiring telescopes A day for everyone teaching physics 2014 Forthcoming Events

  7. Agreement between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocols thereto) between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 21 March 2000 by the representative of the Government of the French Republic and the Director General of the IAEA, and on 26 September 2000 by the representative of the European Atomic Energy Community. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 26 October 2007, one month after the Agency has received notification from both France and the European Atomic Energy Community that their respective internal requirements for entry into force have been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocols, the Protocols entered into force on the same date

  8. Results of field testing with the FightSight infrared-based projectile tracking and weapon-fire characterization technology

    Science.gov (United States)

    Snarski, Steve; Menozzi, Alberico; Sherrill, Todd; Volpe, Chris; Wille, Mark

    2010-04-01

    This paper describes experimental results from recent live-fire data collects that demonstrate the capability of a prototype system for projectile detection and tracking. This system, which is being developed at Applied Research Associates, Inc., under the FightSight program, consists of a high-speed thermal camera and sophisticated image processing algorithms to detect and track projectiles. The FightSight operational vision is automated situational intelligence to detect, track, and graphically map large-scale firefights and individual shooting events onto command and control (C2) systems in real time (shot location and direction, weapon ID, movements and trends). Gaining information on enemy-fire trajectories allows educated inferences on the enemy's intent, disposition, and strength. Our prototype projectile detection and tracking system has been tested at the Joint Readiness Training Center (Ft Polk, LA) during live-fire convoy and mortar registration exercises, in the summer of 2009. It was also tested during staged military-operations- on-urban-terrain (MOUT) firefight events at Aberdeen Test Center (Aberdeen, MD) under the Hostile Fire Defeat Army Technology Objective midterm experiment, also in the summer of 2009, where we introduced fusion with acoustic and EO sensors to provide 3D localization and near-real time display of firing events. Results are presented in this paper that demonstrate effective and accurate detection and localization of weapon fire (5.56mm, 7.62mm, .50cal, 81/120mm mortars, 40mm) in diverse and challenging environments (dust, heat, day and night, rain, arid open terrain, urban clutter). FightSight's operational capabilities demonstrated under these live-fire data collects can support closecombat scenarios. As development continues, FightSight will be able to feed C2 systems with a symbolic map of enemy actions.

  9. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the grand scheme of things we are a little more than halfway through the cycle of splitting the atom for weapons purposes. If we visualize this historic cycle as the full sweep of a clockface, at zero hour we would find the first nuclear chain reaction by Enrico Fermi, followed immediately by the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the first atomic bombs. From two o'clock until five, the United States built and ran a massive industrial complex that produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At half past, the Cold War ended, and the United States shut down most of its nuclear weapons factories. The second half of this cycle involves dealing with the waste and contamination from nuclear weapons production - a task that had, for the most part, been postponed into the indefinite future. That future is now upon us. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War is in many ways as big a challenge for us today as the building of the atomic bomb was for the Manhattan Project pioneers in the 1940s. Our challenges are political and social as well as technical, and we are meeting those challenges. We are reducing risks, treating wastes, developing new technologies, and building democratic institutions for a constructive debate on our future course

  10. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-01-01

    In the grand scheme of things we are a little more than halfway through the cycle of splitting the atom for weapons purposes. If we visualize this historic cycle as the full sweep of a clockface, at zero hour we would find the first nuclear chain reaction by Enrico Fermi, followed immediately by the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the first atomic bombs. From two o`clock until five, the United States built and ran a massive industrial complex that produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At half past, the Cold War ended, and the United States shut down most of its nuclear weapons factories. The second half of this cycle involves dealing with the waste and contamination from nuclear weapons production - a task that had, for the most part, been postponed into the indefinite future. That future is now upon us. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War is in many ways as big a challenge for us today as the building of the atomic bomb was for the Manhattan Project pioneers in the 1940s. Our challenges are political and social as well as technical, and we are meeting those challenges. We are reducing risks, treating wastes, developing new technologies, and building democratic institutions for a constructive debate on our future course.

  11. City mayors on the march. Hiroshima leading citizen campaign to ban nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Led on our tragic experience 58 years ago, Hiroshima has continually called for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the realization of genuine and lasting world peace. Unfortunately, despite our efforts, this planet still bristles with enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons, and today we face an increasingly perilous nuclear crisis. We see States that have nuclear weapons taking more rigid positions regarding disarmament, and non-nuclear-weapon States frightened into seeking their own nuclear bombs. The global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). the pivotal international agreement regarding nuclear weapons, is teetering on the brink of collapse. The world's leading superpower, the United States, for example, has refused to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and is resuming research into small nuclear weapons. These steps run contrary to the enshrined commitment of nuclear powers to reduce atomic arsenals and move toward a nuclear-weapon free world. We cannot sit quietly as the world plunges toward unspeakable violence and misery. We must let our leaders know, first and foremost, that we demand immediate freedom from the nuclear threat. Nuclear weapons are heinous, cruel, inhumane weapons that threaten our entire species. In 1996, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion declaring them illegal. At the Meeting of the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference held in April 2003 in Geneva the president of the World Conference of Mayors for Peace, a non-governmental organization (NGO) that now has 554 member cities in 107 countries and regions, the following demands, were made: A complete and total ban on all nuclear weapons everywhere; Removal of all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert immediately and withdrawal of all nuclear weapons deployed on foreign territory; It is high time for all recognized nuclear-weapon States to join in a multilateral process of nuclear disarmament and for de-facto nuclear-weapon States

  12. Tests of nuclear weapons and the beginning of radioactivity monitoring using the example of Switzerland; Die Kernwaffenversuche und der Beginn der Radioaktivitaetsueberwachung am Beispiel der Schweiz

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Voelkle, Hansruedi [Univ. Chemin du Musee 3, Fribourg (Switzerland). Physikdept.

    2016-05-01

    A historical survey is given on the development and the tests of nuclear weapons including the consequences for humans and the environment, as well as on the generation of measuring networks for radioactivity in the environment in the same time. Some results of the measurements are shown exemplarily for Switzerland.

  13. The influence of the Lop Nor Nuclear Weapons Test Base to the population of the Republic of Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The method of electron spin resonance (ESR) dosimetry was applied to human tooth enamel to obtain estimates of individual absorbed dose for residents of Makanchi, Urdzhar and Taskesken settlements located near the Kazakhstan-Chinese border (about 400 km to the South-East, from the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS) and about 1000 km from the Lop Nor Nuclear Weapons Test Base, China). Since the ground and atmospheric nuclear tests (1964-1981) at Lop Nor, the people residing in these settlements are believed to have been heavily exposed to radioactive fallout. Tooth samples had been extracted for medical reasons during the course of ordinary dental treatment. The village of Kokpekty, located 400 km to the South-east of the SNTS, was chosen as the control group since it has not been subjected to any radioactive contamination. The mean excess doses in tooth enamel obtained after subtraction of the contribution of natural background radiation do not exceed 62 ± 28 mGy, 64 ± 30 mGy, 49 ± 27 mGy and -19 ± 36 mGy for all ages of the residents of Makanchi, Urdzhar, Taskesken and the control village of Kokpekty, respectively.

  14. Precision Gravity Tests with Atom Interferometry in Space

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tino, G. M.; Sorrentino, F.; Aguilera, D.; Battelier, B.; Bertoldi, A.; Bodart, Q.; Bongs, K.; Bouyer, P.; Braxmaier, C.; Cacciapuoti, L.; Gaaloul, N.; Gürlebeck, N.; Hauth, M.; Herrmann, S.; Krutzik, M.; Kubelka, A.; Landragin, A.; Milke, A.; Peters, A.; Rasel, E. M.; Rocco, E.; Schubert, C.; Schuldt, T.; Sengstock, K.; Wicht, A.

    2013-10-01

    Atom interferometry provides extremely sensitive and accurate tools for the measurement of inertial forces. Operation of atom interferometers in microgravity is expected to enhance the performance of such sensors. This paper presents two possible implementations of a dual 85Rb-87Rb atom interferometer to perform differential gravity measurements in space, with the primary goal to test the Weak Equivalence Principle. The proposed scheme is in the framework of two projects of the European Space Agency, namely Q-WEP and STE-QUEST. The paper describes the baseline experimental configuration, and discusses the technology readiness, noise and error budget for the two proposed experiments.

  15. Precision Gravity Tests with Atom Interferometry in Space

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tino, G.M.; Sorrentino, F. [Dipartimento di Fisica e Astronomia and LENS, Università di Firenze, INFN Sezione di Firenze, via Sansone 1, I-50019 Sesto Fiorentino (Italy); Aguilera, D. [Institute of Space Systems, German Aerospace Center, Robert-Hooke-Strasse 7, 28359 Bremen (Germany); Battelier, B.; Bertoldi, A. [Laboratoire Photonique, Numérique et Nanosciences, LP2N - UMR5298 - IOGS - CNRS Université Bordeaux 1, Bâtiment A30 351 cours de la Libération F-33405 TALENCE Cedex France (France); Bodart, Q. [Dipartimento di Fisica e Astronomia and LENS, Università di Firenze, INFN Sezione di Firenze, via Sansone 1, I-50019 Sesto Fiorentino (Italy); Bongs, K. [Midlands Ultracold Atom Research Centre School of Physics and Astronomy University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT (United Kingdom); Bouyer, P. [Laboratoire Photonique, Numérique et Nanosciences, LP2N - UMR5298 - IOGS - CNRS Université Bordeaux 1, Bâtiment A30 351 cours de la Libération F-33405 TALENCE Cedex France (France); Braxmaier, C. [Institute of Space Systems, German Aerospace Center, Robert-Hooke-Strasse 7, 28359 Bremen (Germany); Cacciapuoti, L. [European Space Agency, Research and Scientific Support Department, Keplerlaan 1, 2201 AZ Noordwijk (Netherlands); Gaaloul, N. [Institute of Quantum Optics, Leibniz Universitaet Hannover, Welfengarten 1, D 30167 Hannover (Germany); Gürlebeck, N. [University of Bremen, Centre of Applied Space Technology and Microgravity (ZARM), Am Fallturm, D - 29359 Bremen (Germany); Hauth, M. [Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Newtonstr. 15, D-12489 Berlin (Germany); and others

    2013-10-15

    Atom interferometry provides extremely sensitive and accurate tools for the measurement of inertial forces. Operation of atom interferometers in microgravity is expected to enhance the performance of such sensors. This paper presents two possible implementations of a dual {sup 85}Rb-{sup 87}Rb atom interferometer to perform differential gravity measurements in space, with the primary goal to test the Weak Equivalence Principle. The proposed scheme is in the framework of two projects of the European Space Agency, namely Q-WEP and STE-QUEST. The paper describes the baseline experimental configuration, and discusses the technology readiness, noise and error budget for the two proposed experiments.

  16. Moruroa and us: Experiences of Polynesian people during the thirty years of nuclear weapons tests in the South Pacific (Ocean)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is separated in nine chapters. In the chapters 2 and 3 we find the results of an inquiry got from 737 ancient workers of the sites. The chapter 4 studies the case of the Island of Mangareva in the Gambier archipelago, island situated at 500 km from Moruroa, the economical, sociological and cultural effects of nuclear weapons tests are analyzed. The chapter number 5 shows the different points of view got from institutions or government officials. In the chapter 6, the elements of public debate on the situation of the CEP ( Pacific study center) and the tests are analyzed in a chronological order on giving a particular importance to the way whom Polynesian people have been informed. The chapter 7 examines the evolution of the scientific debate related to the marine fauna poisoning, the radioactive contamination and the ciguatera. The chapter 8 is centered on the risks perception by the Polynesian society and on the different kinds of resistance at the CEP. In the last chapter, a certain number of conclusions and recommends are given. (N.C.)

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article 111(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, pursuant to the first sentence of Article 25(a) thereof, on 21 February 1977

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  9. Agreement of 18 November 1993 between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 February 1975 and signed in Vienna on 31 October 1990 and in Nuku'Alofa on 18 November 1993

  10. Agreement of 22 September 1994 between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 22 September 1994

  11. Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 2 December 1993 and signed in Vienna on 6 December 1993 and in Riga on 21 December 1993

  12. Agreement of 30 September 1993 between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 September 1993 and signed in Vienna on 30 September 1993. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 5 May 1994

  13. Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000

  15. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999

  18. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000

  20. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998 and signed in Vienna on 4 December 1998. The Protocol entered into force on 16 December 1998

  4. Tests of local position invariance using continuously running atomic clocks

    CERN Document Server

    Peil, Steven; Hanssen, James L; Swanson, Thomas B; Ekstrom, Christopher R; 10.1103/PhysRevA.87.010102

    2013-01-01

    Tests of local position invariance (LPI) made by comparing the relative redshift of atomic clocks based on different atoms have been carried out for a variety of pairs of atomic species. In most cases, several absolute frequency measurements per year are used to look for an annual signal, resulting in tests that can span on order of a decade. By using the output of continuously running clocks, we carry out LPI tests with comparable or higher precision after less than 1.5 years. These include new measurements of the difference in redshift anomalies \\beta\\ for hyperfine transitions in Rb87 and Cs133 and in H and Cs133 and a measurement comparing Rb87 and H, resulting in a stringent limit on LPI, \\beta(Rb) - \\beta(H)=(-2.7 +/- 4.9) x 10^(-7). The method of making these measurements for continuous clocks is discussed.

  5. Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  6. Agreement of 23 August 1974 between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 September 1973. It was signed in Vienna on 30 April 1974 and in La Paz on 23 August 1974. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 6 February 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  7. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 2002. It was signed on 5 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 May 2004, the date on which Agency received from El Salvador written notification that El Salvador's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  8. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 15 September 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Paraguay written notification that Paraguay's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  9. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 18 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Nicaragua written notification that Nicaragua's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  11. Modeling coupled blast/structure interaction with Zapotec, benchmark calculations for the Conventional Weapon Effects Backfill (CONWEB) tests.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bessette, Gregory Carl

    2004-09-01

    Modeling the response of buried reinforced concrete structures subjected to close-in detonations of conventional high explosives poses a challenge for a number of reasons. Foremost, there is the potential for coupled interaction between the blast and structure. Coupling enters the problem whenever the structure deformation affects the stress state in the neighboring soil, which in turn, affects the loading on the structure. Additional challenges for numerical modeling include handling disparate degrees of material deformation encountered in the structure and surrounding soil, modeling the structure details (e.g., modeling the concrete with embedded reinforcement, jointed connections, etc.), providing adequate mesh resolution, and characterizing the soil response under blast loading. There are numerous numerical approaches for modeling this class of problem (e.g., coupled finite element/smooth particle hydrodynamics, arbitrary Lagrange-Eulerian methods, etc.). The focus of this work will be the use of a coupled Euler-Lagrange (CEL) solution approach. In particular, the development and application of a CEL capability within the Zapotec code is described. Zapotec links two production codes, CTH and Pronto3D. CTH, an Eulerian shock physics code, performs the Eulerian portion of the calculation, while Pronto3D, an explicit finite element code, performs the Lagrangian portion. The two codes are run concurrently with the appropriate portions of a problem solved on their respective computational domains. Zapotec handles the coupling between the two domains. The application of the CEL methodology within Zapotec for modeling coupled blast/structure interaction will be investigated by a series of benchmark calculations. These benchmarks rely on data from the Conventional Weapons Effects Backfill (CONWEB) test series. In these tests, a 15.4-lb pipe-encased C-4 charge was detonated in soil at a 5-foot standoff from a buried test structure. The test structure was composed of a

  12. Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Azerbaijan to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 6 November 1998, and entered into force on 29 April 1999. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  13. Controlling Weapons-Grade Fissile Material

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rotblat, J.

    1977-01-01

    Discusses the problems of controlling weapons-grade fissionable material. Projections of the growth of fission nuclear reactors indicates sufficient materials will be available to construct 300,000 atomic bombs each containing 10 kilograms of plutonium by 1990. (SL)

  14. Nuclear Weapons Effects (Self-Teaching Materials).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Developed by the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, this autoinstructional text deals with nuclear weapons effects. The destructive effects of an atomic blast are first introduced, and then long-term radioactive consequences are stressed. (CP)

  15. Nuclear weapons test detection: Ensuring a verifiable treaty. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty research and development program 1995 progress report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-12-31

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) has an active program to provide technologies for monitoring and verifying a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). DOE technologies will significantly increase the nation`s capability to identify potential nuclear explosions with high confidence and with minimal false alarms. This report presents the highlights of the first year of this program. The primary objectives of the CTBT monitoring system are to deter nuclear explosions in all environments (underground, underwater, or in the atmosphere) and, if such an explosion does occur, to detect, locate, and identify its source. The system is designed to provide credible evidence to national authorities to aid in resolving ambiguities and to serve as the basis for appropriate action. To collect this evidence, one must develop technologies that can detect and identify the signals from a nuclear test against a background of hundreds of thousands of benign events. The monitoring system must have high sensitivity to detect the events of interest and, to minimize false alarms, it must identify those events with a high level of confidence.

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Additional Protocol), the Additional Protocol, which had been applied provisionally from 17 February 2010, entered into force on 10 October 2012, the date upon which the Agency received written notification from Iraq that Iraq's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  17. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992. It was signed on 21 May 1992 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  18. Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  19. Agreement of 5 April 1995 between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 26, on 5 April 1995

  20. Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 20 March 2001. It was signed on 11 June 2002 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 16 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Niger written notification that Niger's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  1. Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  3. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 19 July 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 July 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Afghanistan and the Agency

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 January 2006, the date on which the Agency received from Ukraine written notification that Ukraine's constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  5. Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  6. Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereof) between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Roseau, Dominica on 3 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 3 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  7. Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 26 June 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 26 June 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  8. Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992, It was signed on 28 July 1992 in Vienna and on 26 August 1992 in Geneva. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2005. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  9. Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 3 May 2005 in New York. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of the Marshall Islands and the Agency

  10. Agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  11. Agreement of 8 October 1994 between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 February 1994 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1994 and in Tashkent on 8 October 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 8 October 1994

  12. Agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 21 September 2000. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 August 2002. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  13. Agreement of 14 April 1995 between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 November 1994 and in Minsk on 14 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 August 1995

  14. Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 9 June 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 19 January 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  15. Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1991 and signed in Vienna on 30 January 1992. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 10 April 1992

  16. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Madagascar and the Agency, i.e., on 18 September 2003

  17. Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 28 November 2002. It was signed on 24 April 2003 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 12 July 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Malta written notification that Malta's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  20. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1957-06-01

    This handbook prepared by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant government agencies and published by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, is a comprehensive summary of current knowledge on the effects of nuclear weapons. The effects information contained herein is calculated for yields up to 20 megatons and the scaling laws for hypothetically extending the calculations beyond this limit are given. The figure of 20 megatons however is not be taken as an indication of capabilities or developments.

  1. The atom must not serve war

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Petros`yants, A.M.

    1987-03-27

    The history of the discovery and use of nuclear energy is reviewed from the Soviet viewpoint, including contributions of Russian and Soviet Scientists to atomic science. Political issues are addressed, including atomic "blackmail", the nonproliferation treaty, a total and general ban on nuclear weapons testing, and peaceful uses for nuclear energy. Nuclear science research centers in the Soviet Union are described. (LEW)

  2. Testing in-medium $\\pi N$ dynamics on pionic atoms

    CERN Document Server

    Friedman, E

    2014-01-01

    A general algorithm for handling the energy dependence of meson-nucleon amplitudes in the nuclear medium has been recently applied to antikaons and to eta mesons. Here we test this approach on $\\pi N$ amplitudes in pionic atoms where direct comparison can be made with ample experimental results. Applying this algorithm to a large-scale fit of 100 pionic-atom data points across the periodic table, which also include the `deeply-bound' states in Sn and Pb, reaffirms earlier conclusions on the density-dependent renormalization of the $\\pi N$ threshold isovector amplitude $b_1$, or equivalently the renormalization of the pion decay constant $f_{\\pi}$ in the nuclear medium.

  3. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1964-02-01

    This book is a revision of "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" which was issued in 1957. It was prepared by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant governmental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomc Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the combined judgment of a number of the most competent scientists working the problem. There is a need for widespread public understanding of the best information available on the effects of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible, within the limits of national security, a comprehensive summary of this information.

  4. Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Panama to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 March 1984 between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  5. Law project (no. 1329) adopted by the Senate and authorizing the ratification of the agreement between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency relative to the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of nuclear weapons prohibition in South America and the Caribbeans area (two protocols together)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The French Senate adopted on January 6, 2004 the project of law which authorizes the ratification of the agreement between France, the European atomic energy community and the IAEA about the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons in South America and in the Caribbean area signed in Vienna (Austria) on March 21, 2000. The text of this treaty is attached to this law. (J.S.)

  6. Protocol between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 June 1999, signed in Vienna on 11 June 1999, and entered into force on 7 July 2000

  7. General Atomic's superconducting high field test facility and initial performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    General Atomic has established a high field test facility whose primary mission is to investigate the J-B-T and stability performance margins of commercial NbTi superconductor in the 10 tesla, 4.20K region. This work is part of the overall DOE/MFE/MAGNETIC SYSTEMS effort to provide an adequate technological base for construction of superconducting toroidal field coils for the next generation of large tokamak fusion devices. The principal components of the facility are the coil/cryostat assembly, the helium refrigerator-liquefier/compressor system, and the gaseous helium recovery and storage system. The epoxy impregnated, layer wound main background field coil generates 8 tesla within its 40 cm diameter bore. The insert background field coil was layer wound with cooling channels provided by ''barber pole'' mylar conductor insulation. Ten tesla is generated within its 22 cm bore. The initial performance of the facility will be discussed. Future testing calls for operating test coils with implanted heating elements to simulate mechanically induced perturbations. The normal zone growth and recovery behavior will be observed for various disturbance energies. This data will then be compared with results obtained from the transient recovery analysis developed at General Atomic

  8. Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna

  9. Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Ukraine to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1995, signed in Vienna on 21 September 1995, and entered into force on 22 January 1998

  10. Atomic spin chains as testing ground for quantum magnetism

    Science.gov (United States)

    Otte, Sander

    2015-03-01

    The field of quantum magnetism aims to capture the rich emergent physics that arises when multiple spins interact, in terms of elementary models such as the spin 1/2 Heisenberg chain. Experimental platforms to verify these models are rare and generally do not provide the possibility to detect spin correlations locally. In my lab we use low-temperature scanning tunneling microscopy to design and build artificial spin lattices with atomic precision. Inelastic electron tunneling spectroscopy enables us to identify the ground state and probe spin excitations as a function of system size, location inside the lattice and coupling parameter values. Two types of collective excitations that play a role in many dynamic magnetic processes are spin waves (magnons) and spinons. Our experiments enable us to study both types of excitations. First, we have been able to map the standing spin wave modes of a ferromagnetic bit of six atoms, and to determine their role in the collective reversal process of the bit (Spinelli et al., Nature Materials 2014). More recently, we have crafted antiferromagnetic spin 1/2 XXZ chains, which allow us to observe spinon excitations, as well as the stepwise transition to a fully aligned phase beyond the critical magnetic field (Toskovic et al., in preparation). These findings create a promising experimental environment for putting quantum magnetic models to the test. Research funded by NWO and FOM.

  11. Microtensile Tests Using In Situ Atomic Force Microscopy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lang, Udo; Dual, Jurg

    In recent years a new field in the micromechanical characterization of materials has emerged. Researchers started to integrate atomic force microscopes (AFM) into microtensile tests. This allowed to investigate surface deformation of layers with thicknesses in the range of micrometers. In the first part of this article experiments on organic samples are presented followed by developments on anorganic specimens. In the second part of the paper latest developments at the Center of Mechanics of ETH Zurich are presented. The setup allows to monitor crack growth with micrometer resolution. At the same time forces can be measured in the millinewton range. Specimens are made from photodefinable polyimide. The stress-crack- length diagrams of two experiments are presented which enables to identify different stages of crack growth and therefore of fracture behaviour. Finally, possible extensions of the setup employing digital image correlation (DIC) are envisioned by analyzing the displacement field around the crack tip.

  12. Collection and use of individual behavioral and consumption rate data to improve reconstruction of thyroid doses from nuclear weapons tests in Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Historical behavioral and consumption rate data were collected from residents of Kazakhstan exposed to nuclear weapons testing fallout using a focus group data collection strategy. These data will enable improved thyroid dose estimation in a radiation epidemiological study being carried out the U.S. National Cancer Institute. The study on the relationship of radiation exposure from weapons testing fallout and thyroid disease in a cohort of 2,994 subjects is now in a stage of improving earlier dose estimates based on individual information collected from a basic questionnaire administered to the study population in 1998. The study subjects of both Kazakh and Russian origin were exposed during childhood to radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons tests conducted at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site between 1949 and 1962. Due to the long time since exposure, a well developed strategy is necessary to encourage accurate memory recall. Limitations of the data collected in 1998 suggested the need to obtain reliable information that is tailored specific to the requirements of the dose reconstruction algorithm and to the evaluation of individual dose uncertainties. Focus group data collection in Kazakhstan in 2007 involved four 8-person focus groups (three of women and one of men) in each of four exposed settlements where thyroid disease screening was conducted in 1998. Age-specific data on relevant childhood behaviour, including time spent indoors and consumption of milk and other dairy products from cows, goats, horses, and sheep, were collected from women's groups. Men's focus groups were interviewed about construction materials of houses and schools as well as animal grazing patterns and supplemental feed to animals. Information obtained from the focus groups are being used to derive the settlement-, ethnicity-, age-, and gender-specific (where appropriate) probability density distributions on individual consumption rates of milk and dairy products

  13. Atoms

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    刘洪毓

    2007-01-01

    Atoms(原子)are all around us.They are something like the bricks (砖块)of which everything is made. The size of an atom is very,very small.In just one grain of salt are held millions of atoms. Atoms are very important.The way one object acts depends on what

  14. Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Safeguards Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Abu Dhabi on 15 December 2002. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 9 October 2003, the date upon which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  15. Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 1999. It was signed on 28 June 2001 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 5 September 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Oman written notification that Oman's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force the same date

  16. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 December 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Tajikistan written notification that the Republic of Tajikistan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  18. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 16 June 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 February 2005, the date upon which the Agency received from the Swiss Confederation written notification that the Swiss Confederation's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  1. Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 19 July 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Seychelles written notification that Seychelles' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  2. Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 12 September 1995. It was signed on 27 September 1995 in Vienna and 14 June 1996 in Chisinau. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 May 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Moldova written notification that Moldova's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  3. Protocol additional to the agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 23 September 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 7 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from the United Republic of Tanzania written notification that the United Republic of Tanzania's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional, the Protocol entered into force on 13 October 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Seychelles written notification that the Republic of Seychelles's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  5. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 30 April 2004, the date on which the Agency received written notification that the European Atomic Energy Community and the United Kingdom had met their respective internal requirements for entry into force

  6. Testing Three Explanations of the Emergence of Weapon Carrying in Peer Context: The Roles of Aggression, Victimization, and the Social Network

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dijkstra, J.K.; Gest, S.D.; Lindenberg, S.M.; Veenstra, D.R.; Cillessen, A.H.N.

    2012-01-01

    Purpose: To examine the relative contribution of weapon carrying of peers, aggression, and victimization to weapon carrying of male and female adolescents over time. Methods: Data were derived from a population-based sample of male (N = 224) and female (N = 244) adolescents followed from grade 10 (M

  7. Testing Three Explanations of the Emergence of Weapon Carrying in Peer Context : The Roles of Aggression, Victimization, and the Social Network

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dijkstra, Jan; Gest, Scott D.; Lindenberg, Siegwart; Veenstra, René; Cillessen, A.H.N.

    2012-01-01

    Purpose: To examine the relative contribution of weapon carrying of peers, aggression, and victimization to weapon carrying of male and female adolescents over time. Methods: Data were derived from a population-based sample of male (N = 224) and female (N = 244) adolescents followed from grade 10 (M

  8. Field testing the prototype BNL fan-atomized oil burner

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McDonald, R.; Celebi, Y. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)

    1995-04-01

    BNL has developed a new oil burner design referred to as the Fan Atomized burner System. The primary objective of the field study was to evaluate and demonstrate the reliable operation of the Fan Atomized Burner. The secondary objective was to establish and validate the ability of a low firing rate burner (0.3-0.4 gph) to fully satisfy the heating and domestic hot water load demands of an average household in a climate zone with over 5,000 heating-degree-days. The field activity was also used to evaluate the practicality of side-wall venting with the Fan Atomized Burner with a low stack temperature (300F) and illustrate the potential for very high efficiency with an integrated heating system approach based on the Fan Atomized Burner.

  9. Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 July 2006, upon signature by the representatives of the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the Agency

  10. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Bulgaria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Cyprus

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Estonia and the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  13. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Slovenia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  14. The Text of the Agreement Between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Portugal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193) of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193/Add.2), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: i. Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and ii. Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  15. The Text of the Agreement Between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Greece

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193) of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: i. Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and ii. Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Lithuania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)2 provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  18. Concealed weapons detection using electromagnetic resonances

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hunt, Allen R.; Hogg, R. Douglas; Foreman, William

    1998-12-01

    Concealed weapons pose a significant threat to both law enforcement and security agency personnel. The uncontrolled environments associated with peacekeeping and the move toward relaxation of concealed weapons laws here in the U.S. provide a strong motivation for developing weapons detection technologies which are noninvasive and can function noncooperatively. Existing weapons detection systems are primarily oriented to detecting metal and require the cooperation of the person being searched. The new generation of detectors under development that focuses primarily on imaging methods, faces problems associated with privacy issues. There remains a need for a weapons detector which is portable, detects weapons remotely, avoids the issues associated with privacy rights, can tell the difference between car keys and a knife, and is affordable enough that one can be issued to every peacekeeper and law enforcement officer. AKELA is developing a concealed weapons detector that uses wideband radar techniques to excite natural electromagnetic resonances that characterize the size, shape, and material composition of an object. Neural network processing is used to classify the difference between weapons and nuisance objects. We have constructed both time and frequency domain test systems and used them to gather experimental data on a variety of armed and unarmed individuals. These experiments have been performed in an environment similar to the operational environment. Preliminary results from these experiments show that it is possible to detect a weapon being carried by an individual from a distance of 10 to 15 feet, and to detect a weapon being concealed behind the back. The power required is about 100 milliwatts. A breadboard system is being fabricated and will be used by AKELA and our law enforcement partner to gather data in operationally realistic situations. While a laptop computer will control the breadboard system, the wideband radar electronics will fit in a box the

  19. Small sample Bayesian analyses in assessment of weapon performance

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2007-01-01

    Abundant test data are required in assessment of weapon performance.When weapon test data are insufficient,Bayesian analyses in small sample circumstance should be considered and the test data should be provided by simulations.The several Bayesian approaches are discussed and some limitations are founded.An improvement is put forward after limitations of Bayesian approaches available are analyzed and t he improved approach is applied to assessment of some new weapon performance.

  20. Fast reactors and surplus weapon`s grade plutonium utilization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Antipov, S.A.; Astafiev, V.A.; Bibilashvily, Yu.K.; Reshetnikov, F.G. [All-Russia Research Inst. of Inorganic Materials, Moscow (Russian Federation)

    1997-12-31

    Liberated large quantities of surplus weapon`s grade Pu have lead to a more acute problem relevant to Pu utilization and storage. The Russian scientists acknowledge the use of Pu in fast reactors to be most efficient. In this case a new composition of fuel is to be designed that would much reduce or eliminate Pu breeding. With this aim in view two kinds of fuel are under study, namely, higher Pu content (up to 45-50%) fuel and the one containing an inert diluent. The study and optimization of their production processes are in progress. In the nearest future experimental fuel rods fueled with both the fuel types will be loaded to be in-pile tested. (author)

  1. An exacting transition probability measurement - a direct test of atomic many-body theories

    OpenAIRE

    Tarun Dutta; Debashis De Munshi; Dahyun Yum; Riadh Rebhi; Manas Mukherjee

    2016-01-01

    A new protocol for measuring the branching fraction of hydrogenic atoms with only statistically limited uncertainty is proposed and demonstrated for the decay of the P$_{3/2}$ level of the barium ion, with precision below $0.5\\%$. Heavy hydrogenic atoms like the barium ion are test beds for fundamental physics such as atomic parity violation and they also hold the key to understanding nucleo-synthesis in stars. To draw definitive conclusion about possible physics beyond the standard model by ...

  2. Test of the universality of free fall with atoms in different spin Orientations

    CERN Document Server

    Duan, Xiao-Chun; Deng, Xiao-Bing; Yao, Hui-Bin; Shao, Cheng-Gang; Luo, Jun; Hu, and Zhong-Kun

    2015-01-01

    We report a test of the universality of free fall (UFF) related to spin-gravity coupling effects by comparing the gravity acceleration of the $^{87}$Rb atoms in $m_F=+1$ versus that in $m_F=-1$, where the corresponding spin orientations are opposite. A Mach-Zehnder-type atom interferometer is exploited to sequentially measure the free fall acceleration of the atoms in these two sublevels, and the resultant E$\\rm{\\ddot{o}}$tv$\\rm{\\ddot{o}}$s ratio determined by this work is ${\\eta_S} =(-0.2\\pm1.5)\\times 10^{-5}$. The interferometer using atoms in $m_F=+1$ or $m_F=-1$ is highly sensitive to magnetic field inhomogeneity, which limits the current experimental precision of our UFF test. The work here provides a stepping stone for future higher precision UFF test related to different spin orientations on atomic basis.

  3. Test of vacuum polarization and hyperfine interaction in muonic atoms

    CERN Document Server

    Backe, H; Engfer, R; Link, R; Michaelsen, R; Petitjean, C; Robert-Tissot, B; Roschert, G; Schellenberg, L; Schneuwly, H; Schröder, W U; Von Gunten, A H; Vuilleumier, J L; Walter, H K; Zehnder, A

    1972-01-01

    In connection with discrepancies between experimental and theoretical values for the vacuum polarization correction in the case of the 5-4 transitions in heavy and medium muonic atoms, the energies of this transition in /sup nat/Hg and /sup 203/Tl were measured at the CERN-SC muon channel. The broadening of the 2/sup +/-0/sup +/- nuclear gamma transition in muonic /sup 190/Os and /sup 192/Os was used to determine the magnetic h.f. splitting of the 2/sup +/ rotational state. The results are compared with the predictions of different models. (7 refs).

  4. PRex: An Experiment to Investigate Detection of Near-field Particulate Deposition from a Simulated Underground Nuclear Weapons Test Vent.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Keillor, Martin E; Arrigo, Leah M; Baciak, James E; Chipman, Veraun; Detwiler, Rebecca S; Emer, Dudley F; Kernan, Warnick J; Kirkham, Randy R; MacDougall, Matthew R; Milbrath, Brian D; Rishel, Jeremy P; Seifert, Allen; Seifert, Carolyn E; Smart, John E

    2016-05-01

    A radioactive particulate release experiment to produce a near-field ground deposition representative of small-scale venting from an underground nuclear test was conducted to gather data in support of treaty capability development activities. For this experiment, a CO2-driven "air cannon" was used to inject (140)La, a radioisotope of lanthanum with 1.7-d half-life and strong gamma-ray emissions, into the lowest levels of the atmosphere at ambient temperatures. Witness plates and air samplers were laid out in an irregular grid covering the area where the plume was anticipated to deposit based on climatological wind records. This experiment was performed at the Nevada National Security Site, where existing infrastructure, radiological procedures, and support personnel facilitated planning and execution of the work. A vehicle-mounted NaI(Tl) spectrometer and a polyvinyl toluene-based backpack instrument were used to survey the deposited plume. Hand-held instruments, including NaI(Tl) and lanthanum bromide scintillators and high purity germanium spectrometers, were used to take in situ measurements. Additionally, three soil sampling techniques were investigated and compared. The relative sensitivity and utility of sampling and survey methods are discussed in the context of on-site inspection.

  5. PREX: AN EXPERIMENT TO INVESTIGATE DETECTION OF NEAR-FIELD PARTICULATE DEPOSITION FROM A SIMULATED UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST VENT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Keillor, Martin E.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Baciak, James E.; Chipman, Veraun D.; Detwiler, Rebecca S.; Emer, Dudley; Kernan, Warnick J.; Kirkham, Randy R.; MacDougall, Matthew R.; Milbrath, Brian D.; Rishel, Jeremy P.; Seifert, Allen; Seifert, Carolyn E.; Smart, John E.

    2016-05-01

    An experiment to release radioactive particles representative of small-scale venting from an underground nuclear test was conducted to gather data in support of treaty capability development activities. For this experiment, a CO2-driven “air cannon” was used to release lanthanum-140 at ambient temperatures. The radioisotope 140La was chosen as a representative fission fragment with a short half-life and prominent gamma-ray emissions; the choice was also influenced by the successful production and use of 140La with low levels of radioactive contaminants in the Defence Research and Development Canada Field Trials. The source was created through activation of high-purity lanthanum oxide at the TRIGA research reactor of Washington State University, Pullman, Washington. Witness plates and air samplers were laid out in an irregular grid covering the area for which the plume was anticipated to deposit based on climatological wind records. A vehicle-mounted spectrometer, and handheld and backpack instruments ranging from polyvinyl toluene to high purity germanium, were used to survey the plume. Additionally, three soil sampling techniques were investigated. The relative sensitivity and utility of sampling and survey methods are discussed in the context of On-Site Inspection.

  6. PRex: An Experiment to Investigate Detection of Near-field Particulate Deposition from a Simulated Underground Nuclear Weapons Test Vent.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Keillor, Martin E; Arrigo, Leah M; Baciak, James E; Chipman, Veraun; Detwiler, Rebecca S; Emer, Dudley F; Kernan, Warnick J; Kirkham, Randy R; MacDougall, Matthew R; Milbrath, Brian D; Rishel, Jeremy P; Seifert, Allen; Seifert, Carolyn E; Smart, John E

    2016-05-01

    A radioactive particulate release experiment to produce a near-field ground deposition representative of small-scale venting from an underground nuclear test was conducted to gather data in support of treaty capability development activities. For this experiment, a CO2-driven "air cannon" was used to inject (140)La, a radioisotope of lanthanum with 1.7-d half-life and strong gamma-ray emissions, into the lowest levels of the atmosphere at ambient temperatures. Witness plates and air samplers were laid out in an irregular grid covering the area where the plume was anticipated to deposit based on climatological wind records. This experiment was performed at the Nevada National Security Site, where existing infrastructure, radiological procedures, and support personnel facilitated planning and execution of the work. A vehicle-mounted NaI(Tl) spectrometer and a polyvinyl toluene-based backpack instrument were used to survey the deposited plume. Hand-held instruments, including NaI(Tl) and lanthanum bromide scintillators and high purity germanium spectrometers, were used to take in situ measurements. Additionally, three soil sampling techniques were investigated and compared. The relative sensitivity and utility of sampling and survey methods are discussed in the context of on-site inspection. PMID:27023040

  7. Virtual nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  8. An atomic hydrogen beam to test ASACUSA’s apparatus for antihydrogen spectroscopy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Diermaier, M., E-mail: martin.diermaier@oeaw.ac.at; Caradonna, P.; Kolbinger, B. [Austrian Academy of Sciences, Stefan Meyer Institute for Subatomic Physics (Austria); Malbrunot, C. [CERN (Switzerland); Massiczek, O.; Sauerzopf, C.; Simon, M. C.; Wolf, M.; Zmeskal, J.; Widmann, E. [Austrian Academy of Sciences, Stefan Meyer Institute for Subatomic Physics (Austria)

    2015-08-15

    The ASACUSA collaboration aims to measure the ground state hyperfine splitting (GS-HFS) of antihydrogen, the antimatter counterpart to atomic hydrogen. Comparisons of the corresponding transitions in those two systems will provide sensitive tests of the CPT symmetry, the combination of the three discrete symmetries charge conjugation, parity, and time reversal. For offline tests of the GS-HFS spectroscopy apparatus we constructed a source of cold polarised atomic hydrogen. In these proceedings we report the successful observation of the hyperfine structure transitions of atomic hydrogen with our apparatus in the earth’s magnetic field.

  9. Wounds and weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Purpose: X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. Material and method: The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Results: Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Conclusion: Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports

  10. Some mathematics of nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: In the many decades since the first demonstration of the power of nuclear weapons we have created a 'data set' that we may analyze to see if simple principles account for the observed history. There was initial fear that the proliferation of weapons would be exponential, driven by the principle that each nation would desire to have weapons to deter each other nuclear-armed nation. The doubling time could be taken as four years, between the tests of the US in 1945 and the USSR in 1949. By 1985, with ten doubling times, we would have had 1024 nuclear weapons states, far from the data. If we make a different hypothesis, that each nation is deterred from seeking nuclear weapons by each existing nuclear state, we obtain a differential equation leading to an expression for a much slower rate of increase, which is indeed found to be closely followed. If we have an understanding of the processes that lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we can be better at strengthening the barriers to further growth. The mathematical equations and relevant plots will be used to illustrate these observations. (author)

  11. China's mixed signals on nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ultimately, it is nuclear whether the Chinese leadership has made up its collective mind on practical nuclear weapons. It is known from Chinese official sources, including articles in Communist Party and military publications and histories of the Chinese nuclear program, that an internal debate has proceeded for more than two decades, punctuated by occasional nuclear exercises or low-yield warhead tests. But China presumably has less reason now to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons than in previous decades: relations with the Soviet Union have improved and military confrontation has eased; China's relations with India and Vietnam are also improving. The decision may already have been made, however, and the weapons built. The mystery surrounding Chinese tactical nuclear weapons is itself interesting, but it is also symbolic of the difficulty of understanding China's nuclear weapons program and policies. The West has accumulated a considerable body of knowledge about China's nuclear forces, especially historical material. But important aspects of China's nuclear behavior and its future as a nuclear power are hard to discern. A key question is China's future role in the spread of nuclear-capable weapons to other countries. China might add to international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear related technology, or it might become the world's missile merchant. It could make a constructive contribution to arms control efforts in general, or it could act as a spoiler

  12. Operational research in weapon system

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    R. S. Varma

    1958-04-01

    Full Text Available "The paper is divided into three parts: (a The first part deals with what operational research is. (bThe second part gives what we mean by Weapon Systems and discusses considerations that determine the choice of a particular weapon system from a class weapon systems. (cThe third part deals with some aspects of weapon replacement policy.The effectiveness of a weapon system is defined as E=D/C where E is weapon effectiveness (a comparative figure of merit; D is total damage inflicted or prevented and C is total cost, D and C being reduced to common dimensions. During the course of investigations, criteria regarding to choice of weapon or weapons from a set of weapon systems are established through production function and military effect curves. A procedure is described which maximizes the expectation of military utility in order to select a weapon system from the class of weapon systems. This is done under the following simplifying assumptions: (a Non- decreasing utility function; (b Constant average cost for each kind of weapons; and (c Independence of the performance of each unit of weapon. Some of the difficulties which arises when any of these restrictions is relaxed are briefly mentioned. Finally, the policy of weapon replacement and the factors governing the same are described."

  13. Reframing the debate against nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    recent years has been all but negated; consensus-based agreements are rejected just a few years after being reached. Despite the threats posed by State or non-State proliferation, an increasing likelihood of a return to nuclear testing and the development of new nuclear weapons, a handful of powerful people continue to view these weapons as a legitimate source of security. All States Parties and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should approach the seventh NPT Review Conference in May 2005 as a major opportunity to reinvigorate the nuclear disarmament regime and transform it into an effective tool by which a true collective security can be ensured. First, however, we must reclaim the ground that has been eroded in recent years by the vertical and horizontal proliferation threats stemming from various corners of the globe

  14. Accreditation of testing laboratories in CNEA (National Atomic Energy Commission)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The recognition of the technical capability of a testing laboratory is carried out by Laboratory Accreditation Bodies as the result of a satisfactory evaluation and the systematic follow up of the certified qualification. In Argentina the creation of a National Center for the Accreditation of Testing Laboratories, as a first step to assess a National Accreditation System is currently projected. CNEA, as an institution involved in technological projects and in the development and production of goods and services, has adopted since a long time ago quality assurance criteria. One of their requirements is the qualification of laboratories. Due to the lack of a national system, a Committee for the Qualification of Laboratories was created jointly by the Research and Development and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Areas with the responsibility of planning and management of the system evaluation and the certification of the quality of laboratories. The experience in the above mentioned topics is described in this paper. (author)

  15. Experimental Test of Bohr's Complementarity Principle with Single Neutral Atom

    OpenAIRE

    WANG, Zhihui; TIAN, YALI; Yang, Chen; Zhang, Pengfei; Li, Gang; Zhang, Tiancai

    2016-01-01

    Bohr's complementarity principle (BCP) is one of the cornerstones of quantum mechanics, and the counterintuitive behavior of wave-particle duality lies at its heart.BCP says that the properties of waves and particles for a quantum system cannot be simultaneously observed. Various tests of BCP with single photons have been performed.However, the low detection efficiency associated with fast-moving, massless photons makes the results less persuasive and more untenable. Here we use a well-contro...

  16. Bioterrorism: toxins as weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Peter D

    2012-04-01

    The potential for biological weapons to be used in terrorism is a real possibility. Biological weapons include infectious agents and toxins. Toxins are poisons produced by living organisms. Toxins relevant to bioterrorism include ricin, botulinum, Clostridium perfrigens epsilson toxin, conotoxins, shigatoxins, saxitoxins, tetrodotoxins, mycotoxins, and nicotine. Toxins have properties of biological and chemical weapons. Unlike pathogens, toxins do not produce an infection. Ricin causes multiorgan toxicity by blocking protein synthesis. Botulinum blocks acetylcholine in the peripheral nervous system leading to muscle paralysis. Epsilon toxin damages cell membranes. Conotoxins block potassium and sodium channels in neurons. Shigatoxins inhibit protein synthesis and induce apoptosis. Saxitoxin and tetrodotoxin inhibit sodium channels in neurons. Mycotoxins include aflatoxins and trichothecenes. Aflatoxins are carcinogens. Trichothecenes inhibit protein and nucleic acid synthesis. Nicotine produces numerous nicotinic effects in the nervous system.

  17. The Atomic Testing Museum: Presenting the History and Preservation of a 50 Year Journey

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is one of the premier test and evaluation sites belonging to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a part of the Department of Energy. Founded in 1950, it is a major domestic location for the testing of nuclear components and nuclear weapons destined for the stockpile, the nuclear deterrent of the United States. From 1951 until 1992 there were 100 atmospheric and 828 underground nuclear tests conducted at the NTS. Those tests resulted in the development of a nuclear deterrent that helped prevent a world war and played a major role in the final defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Those tests lead to the development of yield measurement techniques that allowed the United States Government to take the lead in the negotiations of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which took effect in 1992, ending the requirement to do routine nuclear tests. This paper describes the walk through the history of the NTS' Cold War battlefield. (authors)

  18. Initial tests of atomic layer deposition (ALD) coatings for superconducting RF systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Atomic Layer Deposition (ALD) is a method of synthesizing materials in single atomic layers. We are studying this technique as a method of producing highly controlled surfaces for superconducting RF systems. We have begun tests of ALD coatings of single cells that will involve RF measurements of a cell before and after coating at Argonne. In addition to the tests on complete cells, we are also beginning a program of point contact tunneling measurements to determine the properties of the superconductors at the interface between the bulk niobium and the oxide layer. We describe the method, and tests we are beginning with single cell resonators and small samples.

  19. ON THE OFFENSE: USING CYBER WEAPONS TO INFLUENCE COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mary Fendley

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available There is an increasing recognition that cyber warfare is an important area of development for targeting and weaponeering, with far-reaching effects in national defense and economic security. The ability to conduct effective operations in cyberspace relies on a robust situational awareness of events occurring in both the physical and information domains, with an understanding of how they affect the cognitive domain of friendly, neutral, and adversary population sets. The dynamic nature of the battlefield complicates efforts to understand shifting adversary motivations and intentions. There are very few approaches, to date, that systematically evaluate the effects of the repertoire of cyber weapons on the cognitive, perceptual, and behavioral characteristics of the adversary. In this paper, we describe a software environment called Cognitive Cyber Weapon Selection Tool (CCWST that simulates a scenario involving cyber weaponry.This tool provides the capabilities to test weapons which may induce behavioral state changes in the adversaries. CCWST provides the required situational awareness to the Cyber Information Operations (IO planner to conduct intelligent weapon selection during weapon activation in order to induce the desired behavioral change in the perception of the adversary. Weapons designed to induce the cognitive state changes of deception, distraction, distrust and confusion were then tested empirically to evaluate the capabilities and expected cognitive state changes induced by these weapons. The results demonstrated that CCWST is a powerful environment within which to test and evaluate the impact of cyber weapons on influencing cognitive behavioral states during information processing.

  20. The text of the agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Finland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. On 18 September 1995 the Agency received in respect of the European Atomic Energy Community and Finland the notifications required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement. For practical accounting purposes as proposed in the notifications, the Agreement came into force for Finland on 1 October 1995

  1. The text of the agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Latvia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. The Agreement and the Protocol thereto, which came into force for the above-mentioned original signatories on 21 February 1977, have also entered into force for Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. The Agency received from the Republic of Latvia on 17 March 2008 and from the European Atomic Energy Community on 1 October 2008, the notifications required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement. Accordingly, the Agreement entered into force for Latvia on 1 October 2008

  2. Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sartori, Leo

    1983-01-01

    Fundamental principles governing nuclear explosions and their effects are discussed, including three components of a nuclear explosion (thermal radiation, shock wave, nuclear radiation). Describes how effects of these components depend on the weapon's yield, its height of burst, and distance of detonation point. Includes effects of three…

  3. How to weaponize anthrax?

    OpenAIRE

    Dizer, Ufuk; Levent KENAR; ORTATATLI, Mesut; Karayılanoğlu, Turan

    2013-01-01

    Anthrax, a zoonotic disease caused by  Bacillusanthracis, occurs in domesticated and wild animals-primarily herbivores. Humans usually become infectedby contact with infected animals or their products.Anthrax is so easy to obtain that it could be weaponizedfor biological warfare if a laboratory area of 5 m2  isowned with 10.000$.Key words: Anthrax, weapon, spore, Bacillus anthracis

  4. Nuclear Weapons and Schools.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Howie, David I.

    1984-01-01

    The growing debate on nuclear weapons in recent years has begun to make inroads into school curricula. Elementary and secondary school teachers now face the important task of educating their students on issues relating to nuclear war without indoctrinating them to a particular point of view. (JBM)

  5. Neutrino Counter Nuclear Weapon

    CERN Document Server

    Tang, Alfred

    2008-01-01

    Radiations produced by neutrino-antineutrino annihilation at the Z0 pole can be used to heat up the primary stage of a thermonuclear warhead and can in principle detonate the device remotely. Neutrino-antineutrino annihilation can also be used as a tactical assault weapon to target hideouts that are unreachable by conventional means.

  6. Nuclear weapons in Europe

    CERN Document Server

    Calogero, F

    1981-01-01

    Information speech given by Prof. Calogero from the university of Roma to describe the actual situation of nuclear weapons in Europe, the strategical reasons or justifications for this deployment, the prospects of negociations, and what scientists could do and do on this issue.

  7. The Optimum Replacement of Weapon

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    ZHANG Xiao; ZHANG Jin-chun

    2002-01-01

    The theory of LCC (Life Cycle Cost) is applied in this paper. The relation between the economic life of weapon and the optimum replacement is analyzed. The method to define the optimum replacement time of weapon is discussed.

  8. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described

  9. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  10. Test of the Universality of Free Fall with Atoms in Different Spin Orientations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Duan, Xiao-Chun; Deng, Xiao-Bing; Zhou, Min-Kang; Zhang, Ke; Xu, Wen-Jie; Xiong, Feng; Xu, Yao-Yao; Shao, Cheng-Gang; Luo, Jun; Hu, Zhong-Kun

    2016-07-01

    We report a test of the universality of free fall by comparing the gravity acceleration of the 87Rb atoms in mF=+1 versus those in mF=-1 , of which the corresponding spin orientations are opposite. A Mach-Zehnder-type atom interferometer is exploited to alternately measure the free fall acceleration of the atoms in these two magnetic sublevels, and the resultant Eötvös ratio is ηS=(0.2 ±1.2 )×10-7. This also gives an upper limit of 5.4 ×10-6 m-2 for a possible gradient field of the spacetime torsion. The interferometer using atoms in mF=±1 is highly sensitive to the magnetic field inhomogeneity. A double differential measurement method is developed to alleviate the inhomogeneity influence, of which the effectiveness is validated by a magnetic field modulating experiment.

  11. Under fire: Is the world's treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons strong enough?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fifteen years into the 'atoms for peace' era, Ireland in 1968 took the historic first step to sign the global treaty against tile spread of nuclear weapons. Since then, more than 180 other countries without nuclear weapons have joined the pact, most of them during the cold war period. They see their security in not having (lie bomb, and bind themselves to work for nuclear disarmament everywhere. Their shared commitments make the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) the most accepted arms-control agreement in history, a cornerstone of nuclear cooperation, countries that join it renounce the military atom, and they must accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities to verify it. But the Treaty is under fire, and some critics think it no longer fits the times. They say it cannot prevent Treaty countries from breaking out at will, or ensure that those having nuclear ambitions or arsenals are actually honouring their pledges. Neither has it attracted three key countries - India and Pakistan, which have tested atomic bombs, and Israel, which is suspected of having them - to its ranks of members. Not everyone agrees that the NPT is outdated. But it is clear that the Treaty and its associated regime are under stress, and that its fragile condition needs urgent care. The debate is important and timely - the Treaty comes up for international review in 2005 and countries already are preparing for it. A major question today is whether the NPT is strong enough to keep the lid on nuclear weapons in the world's changed security environment. A former senior official at the IAEA looks at the challenging picture

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Hungary and Malta

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. The Agreement and the Protocol thereto, which came into force for the above-mentioned original signatories on 21 February 1977, have also entered into force for Austria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden

  13. Bioterrorism: pathogens as weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Peter D; Bokor, Gyula

    2012-10-01

    Biowarfare has been used for centuries. The use of biological weapons in terrorism remains a threat. Biological weapons include infectious agents (pathogens) and toxins. The most devastating bioterrorism scenario would be the airborne dispersal of pathogens over a concentrated population area. Characteristics that make a specific pathogen a high-risk for bioterrorism include a low infective dose, ability to be aerosolized, high contagiousness, and survival in a variety of environmental conditions. The most dangerous potential bioterrorism agents include the microorganisms that produce anthrax, plague, tularemia, and smallpox. Other diseases of interest to bioterrorism include brucellosis, glanders, melioidosis, Q fever, and viral encephalitis. Food safety and water safety threats are another area of concern.

  14. Illegal Weapons Exports?

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2006-01-01

    Amnesty International, a human rights organization, released a report on June 11 accusing China of facilitating regional conflicts and human rights violations by exporting a large quantity of weapons to Sudan, Nepal, Myanmar and the Great Lakes countries of Africa. Responding to such charges, Teng Jianqun, a researcher with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, told the official Xinhua News Agency that China has always put its limited arms exports under strict control and surveillance, deno...

  15. The risk of leukaemia in young children from exposure to tritium and carbon-14 in the discharges of German nuclear power stations and in the fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wakeford, Richard

    2014-05-01

    Towards the end of 2007, the results were published from a case-control study (the "KiKK Study") of cancer in young children, diagnosed nuclear power stations in western Germany. The study found a tendency for cases of leukaemia to live closer to the nearest nuclear power station than their matched controls, producing an odds ratio that was raised to a statistically significant extent for residence within 5 km of a nuclear power station. The findings of the study received much publicity, but a detailed radiological risk assessment demonstrated that the radiation doses received by young children from discharges of radioactive material from the nuclear reactors were much lower than those received from natural background radiation and far too small to be responsible for the statistical association reported in the KiKK Study. This has led to speculation that conventional radiological risk assessments have grossly underestimated the risk of leukaemia in young children posed by exposure to man-made radionuclides, and particular attention has been drawn to the possible role of tritium and carbon-14 discharges in this supposedly severe underestimation of risk. Both (3)H and (14)C are generated naturally in the upper atmosphere, and substantial increases in these radionuclides in the environment occurred as a result of their production by atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons during the late 1950s and early 1960s. If the leukaemogenic effect of these radionuclides has been seriously underestimated to the degree necessary to explain the KiKK Study findings, then a pronounced increase in the worldwide incidence of leukaemia among young children should have followed the notably elevated exposure to (3)H and (14)C from nuclear weapons testing fallout. To investigate this hypothesis, the time series of incidence rates of leukaemia among young children nuclear weapons testing, or that incidence rates are related to level of exposure to fallout, is apparent from these

  16. Agreement Between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with New Zealand to Amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Prolilferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 24 February 2014, the date on which the Agency received New Zealand's affirmative reply

  17. Thermal molecule and atom test of the modified special relativity theory

    OpenAIRE

    Liu, Jian-Miin

    2001-01-01

    The correction to Maxwell-Boltzmann's velocity distribution law is obtained in the framework of the modified special relativity theory. The detection of velocity and velocity rate distributions for thermal molecules or atoms or other particles can serve as a test of the modified special relativity theory.

  18. The relevance of random choice in tests of Bell inequalities with atomic qubits

    OpenAIRE

    Santos Corchero, Emilio

    2009-01-01

    It is pointed out that a loophole may exist in experimental tests of Bell inequalities using atomic qubits, due to possible errors in the angles defining the observables whose correlation is measured. A sufficient condition is derived for closing the loophole.

  19. Does an atom interferometer test the gravitational redshift at the Compton frequency ?

    CERN Document Server

    Wolf, Peter; Bordé, Christian J; Cohen-Tannoudji, Claude; Salomon, Christophe; Reynaud, Serge

    2010-01-01

    Atom interferometers allow the measurement of the acceleration of freely falling atoms with respect to an experimental platform at rest on Earth's surface. Such experiments have been used to test the universality of free fall by comparing the acceleration of the atoms to that of a classical freely falling object. In a recent paper, M\\"uller, Peters and Chu [Nature {\\bf 463}, 926-929 (2010)] argued that atom interferometers also provide a very accurate test of the gravitational redshift when considering the atom as a clock operating at the Compton frequency associated with the rest mass. We analyze this claim in the frame of general relativity and of different alternative theories. We show that the difference of "Compton phases" between the two paths of the interferometer is actually zero in a large class of theories, including general relativity, all metric theories of gravity, most non-metric theories and most theoretical frameworks used to interpret the violations of the equivalence principle. Therefore, in...

  20. An exacting transition probability measurement - a direct test of atomic many-body theories.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dutta, Tarun; De Munshi, Debashis; Yum, Dahyun; Rebhi, Riadh; Mukherjee, Manas

    2016-01-01

    A new protocol for measuring the branching fraction of hydrogenic atoms with only statistically limited uncertainty is proposed and demonstrated for the decay of the P3/2 level of the barium ion, with precision below 0.5%. Heavy hydrogenic atoms like the barium ion are test beds for fundamental physics such as atomic parity violation and they also hold the key to understanding nucleo-synthesis in stars. To draw definitive conclusion about possible physics beyond the standard model by measuring atomic parity violation in the barium ion it is necessary to measure the dipole transition probabilities of low-lying excited states with a precision better than 1%. Furthermore, enhancing our understanding of the barium puzzle in barium stars requires branching fraction data for proper modelling of nucleo-synthesis. Our measurements are the first to provide a direct test of quantum many-body calculations on the barium ion with a precision below one percent and more importantly with no known systematic uncertainties. The unique measurement protocol proposed here can be easily extended to any decay with more than two channels and hence paves the way for measuring the branching fractions of other hydrogenic atoms with no significant systematic uncertainties. PMID:27432734

  1. Seeing the Light: Visibility of the July '45 Trinity Atomic Bomb Test from the Inner Solar System

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reed, B. Cameron

    2006-01-01

    In his "The Making of the Atomic Bomb," Richard Rhodes remarks of the July 16, 1945, Trinity atomic bomb test in New Mexico that "had astronomers been watching they could have seen it reflected from the moon, literal moonshine," an allusion to Ernest Rutherford's famous dismissal of the prospect of atomic energy. Investigating…

  2. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of an agreement by exchange of letters with Belize in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1997 and entered into force on that date

  3. Research on Test Method of Ship-Borne Torpedo Defence Weapon System Intercepting Torpedo in Sea Trial%舰载鱼雷防御武器系统拦截实航鱼雷试验方法

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    侯宝娥; 陈高杰

    2014-01-01

    Based on the test destination of ship-borne torpedo defence weapon system intercepting torpedo in sea trial,this paper first introduces the system constitution and working principle briefly. And then,the feasible test sea -lanes are researched and designed. Lastly,the concrete test implementary scheme,data-processing and result assessment are proposed. The method can guide the torpedo defense fighting and the operating of torpedo defense weapon system.%针对舰载鱼雷防御武器系统拦截实航鱼雷试验目的,在简单介绍系统组成及工作原理的基础上,研究设计了可行的试验航路,并提出具体的试验实施方案、试验数据处理及结果评定方法。对水面舰的鱼雷防御作战、鱼雷防御武器系统的使用有一定的指导意义。

  4. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  5. Is there any future for nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons occupy a paradoxal place both in the collective imagination and in the historical reality: on the one hand everybody dreads the apocalypse horror, and on the other hand, dissuasion appears as an unchanging and quite comfortable situation. However, the world has become multipolar in this domain as well. The geopolitical map is reconstructing. Doctrinal revisions, initiatives against nuclear weapons proliferation, and nuclear disarmament measures are now on the agenda. The best foreign and French experts examine for the first time the consequences of these evolutions. They analyse in particular the split up risks and the potential consequences of a nuclear conflict in regions where atomic arms have become a key-component of the strategic landscape: Middle-Est, Far-East, Southern Asia. The choices France and its allies will have to face are examined as well. (J.S.)

  6. Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An agreement by exchange of letters of 6 November 1995 and 17 November 2003 with the Republic of Panama in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. This Exchange of Letters constitutes an agreement confirming that: the Safeguards Agreement of 23 March 1984, concluded between the Republic of Panama and the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty), also satisfies the obligation of Panama under Article III of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA; the safeguards set forth in the Safeguards Agreement shall also apply, as regards Panama, in connection with the NPT; the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply as long as Panama is party to the NPT or the Tlatelolco Treaty or both. The agreement reflected in the Exchange of Letters was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 November 2003, and pursuant to its terms, entered into force on that date

  7. STE-QUEST—test of the universality of free fall using cold atom interferometry

    Science.gov (United States)

    Aguilera, D. N.; Ahlers, H.; Battelier, B.; Bawamia, A.; Bertoldi, A.; Bondarescu, R.; Bongs, K.; Bouyer, P.; Braxmaier, C.; Cacciapuoti, L.; Chaloner, C.; Chwalla, M.; Ertmer, W.; Franz, M.; Gaaloul, N.; Gehler, M.; Gerardi, D.; Gesa, L.; Gürlebeck, N.; Hartwig, J.; Hauth, M.; Hellmig, O.; Herr, W.; Herrmann, S.; Heske, A.; Hinton, A.; Ireland, P.; Jetzer, P.; Johann, U.; Krutzik, M.; Kubelka, A.; Lämmerzahl, C.; Landragin, A.; Lloro, I.; Massonnet, D.; Mateos, I.; Milke, A.; Nofrarias, M.; Oswald, M.; Peters, A.; Posso-Trujillo, K.; Rasel, E.; Rocco, E.; Roura, A.; Rudolph, J.; Schleich, W.; Schubert, C.; Schuldt, T.; Seidel, S.; Sengstock, K.; Sopuerta, C. F.; Sorrentino, F.; Summers, D.; Tino, G. M.; Trenkel, C.; Uzunoglu, N.; von Klitzing, W.; Walser, R.; Wendrich, T.; Wenzlawski, A.; Weßels, P.; Wicht, A.; Wille, E.; Williams, M.; Windpassinger, P.; Zahzam, N.

    2014-06-01

    The theory of general relativity describes macroscopic phenomena driven by the influence of gravity while quantum mechanics brilliantly accounts for microscopic effects. Despite their tremendous individual success, a complete unification of fundamental interactions is missing and remains one of the most challenging and important quests in modern theoretical physics. The spacetime explorer and quantum equivalence principle space test satellite mission, proposed as a medium-size mission within the Cosmic Vision program of the European Space Agency (ESA), aims for testing general relativity with high precision in two experiments by performing a measurement of the gravitational redshift of the Sun and the Moon by comparing terrestrial clocks, and by performing a test of the universality of free fall of matter waves in the gravitational field of Earth comparing the trajectory of two Bose-Einstein condensates of 85Rb and 87Rb. The two ultracold atom clouds are monitored very precisely thanks to techniques of atom interferometry. This allows to reach down to an uncertainty in the Eötvös parameter of at least 2 × 10-15. In this paper, we report about the results of the phase A mission study of the atom interferometer instrument covering the description of the main payload elements, the atomic source concept, and the systematic error sources.

  8. Agreement of 4 November 1992 between the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Trinidad and Tobago to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities with its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  9. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Antigua and Barbuda to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  10. Agreement of 23 July 1996 between Grenada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Grenada to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory , under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  11. Agreement of 14 August 1996 between the Government of Barbados and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Barbados to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  12. Agreement between the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Bahamas to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguard provisions of Part I

  13. Agreement between the co-operative republic of Guyana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Guyana to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguard provisions of Part I

  14. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Transformation - A Sustainable Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this process of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start

  15. An exacting transition probability measurement - a direct test of atomic many-body theories

    CERN Document Server

    Dutta, T; Yum, D; Rebhi, R; Mukherjee, M

    2016-01-01

    A new protocol for measuring the branching fraction of hydrogenic atoms with only statistically limited uncertainty is proposed and demonstrated for the decay of the P$_{3/2}$ level of the barium ion, with precision below $0.5\\%$. Heavy hydrogenic atoms like the barium ion are test beds for fundamental physics such as atomic parity violation and they also hold the key to understanding nucleo-synthesis in stars. To draw definitive conclusion about possible physics beyond the standard model by measuring atomic parity violation in the barium ion it is necessary to measure the dipole transition probabilities of low-lying excited states with precision better than $1\\%$. Furthermore, enhancing our understanding of the $\\it{barium-puzzle}$ in barium stars requires branching fraction data for proper modelling of nucleo-synthesis. Our measurements are the first to provide a direct test of quantum many-body calculations on the barium ion with precision below one percent and more importantly with no known systematic unc...

  16. Test of the universality of free fall with atoms in different spin orientations

    CERN Document Server

    Duan, Xiao-Chun; Zhou, Min-Kang; Zhang, Ke; Xu, Wen-Jie; Xiong, Feng; Xu, Yao-Yao; Shao, Cheng-Gang; Luo, Jun; Hu, Zhong-Kun

    2016-01-01

    We report a test of the universality of free fall (UFF) by comparing the gravity acceleration of the $^{87}$Rb atoms in $m_F=+1$ versus that in $m_F=-1$, where the corresponding spin orientations are opposite. A Mach-Zehnder-type atom interferometer is exploited to sequentially measure the free fall acceleration of the atoms in these two magnetic sublevels, and the resultant E$\\rm{\\ddot{o}}$tv$\\rm{\\ddot{o}}$s ratio is ${\\eta _S} =(0.2\\pm1.2)\\times 10^{-7}$. This also gives an upper limit of $1.1\\times 10^{-21}$ GeV/m for possible gradient field of the spacetime torsion. The interferometer using atoms in $m_F=\\pm 1$ is highly sensitive to the magnetic field inhomogeneity, and a double differential measurement method is developed to alleviate the inhomogeneity influence. Moreover, a proof experiment by modulating the magnetic field is performed, which validates the alleviation of the inhomogeneity influence in our test.

  17. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  18. Weapons Neutron Research Facility (WNR)

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — The Weapons Neutron Research Facility (WNR) provides neutron and proton beams for basic, applied, and defense-related research. Neutron beams with energies ranging...

  19. Agreement of 28 March 1991 between the Government of Solomon Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first one stipulates the agreement of Solomon Islands to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part two specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  20. Agreement of 13 June 1996 between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Principality of Monaco to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  1. Agreement of 30 March 1996 between the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Algeria to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  2. Agreement between the Republic of San Marino and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of San Marino and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Agreement was signed in Vienna on 3 March 1995 and in San Marino on 7 September 1998. It entered into force on 15 September 1998. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  3. Agreement of 16 September 1991 between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of South Africa to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  4. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

  6. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/258) concluded between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1998 and it entered into force on 28 july 1998

  7. Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

  8. Protocol additional to the agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement (INFCIRC/217) concluded between Australia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of the Additional Protocol was authorized by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997 and signed in Vienna on the same date. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 12 December 1997

  9. Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jenkins-Smith, H.C.; Herron, K.G. [Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States). Institute for Public Policy; Barke, R.P. [Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA (United States). School of Public Policy

    1994-04-01

    This report summarizes the findings of a nationwide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories. A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-cold war security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust and official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons; (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons, and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4) preventing nuclear terrorism. Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-cold war security environment.

  10. STE-QUEST - Test of the Universality of Free Fall Using Cold Atom Interferometry

    CERN Document Server

    Aguilera, D; Battelier, B; Bawamia, A; Bertoldi, A; Bondarescu, R; Bongs, K; Bouyer, P; Braxmaier, C; Cacciapuoti, L; Chaloner, C; Chwalla, M; Ertmer, W; Franz, M; Gaaloul, N; Gehler, M; Gerardi, D; Gesa, L; Gürlebeck, N; Hartwig, J; Hauth, M; Hellmig, O; Herr, W; Herrmann, S; Heske, A; Hinton, A; Ireland, P; Jetzer, P; Johann, U; Krutzik, M; Kubelka, A; Lämmerzahl, C; Landragin, A; Lloro, I; Massonnet, D; Mateos, I; Milke, A; Nofrarias, M; Oswald, M; Peters, A; Posso-Trujillo, K; Rasel, E; Rocco, E; Roura, A; Rudolph, J; Schleich, W; Schubert, C; Schuldt, T; Seidel, S; Sengstock, K; Sopuerta, C F; Sorrentino, F; Summers, D; Tino, G M; Trenkel, C; Uzunoglu, N; von Klitzing, W; Walser, R; Wendrich, T; Wenzlawski, A; Weßels, P; Wicht, A; Wille, E; Williams, M; Windpassinger, P; Zahzam, N

    2013-01-01

    The theory of general relativity describes macroscopic phenomena driven by the influence of gravity while quantum mechanics brilliantly accounts for microscopic effects. Despite their tremendous individual success, a complete unification of fundamental interactions is missing and remains one of the most challenging and important quests in modern theoretical physics. The STE-QUEST satellite mission, proposed as a medium-size mission within the Cosmic Vision program of the European Space Agency (ESA), aims for testing general relativity with high precision in two experiments by performing a measurement of the gravitational redshift of the Sun and the Moon by comparing terrestrial clocks, and by performing a test of the Universality of Free Fall of matter waves in the gravitational field of Earth comparing the trajectory of two Bose-Einstein condensates of Rb85 and Rb87. The two ultracold atom clouds are monitored very precisely thanks to techniques of atom interferometry. This allows to reach down to an uncerta...

  11. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This...

  12. Magneto-optical trapping of radioactive atoms for test of the fundamental symmetries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We are planning test experiments of fundamental symmetries based on the intrinsic properties of francium. It is expected that the laser cooling and trapping of francium will produce precision measurements. The pilot experiment using rubidium was performed with the goal of francium trapping. The ion beam generated with a francium ion source was investigated using a Wien filter. Each piece of equipment still must be studied in more detail, and the equipment should be upgraded in order to trap radioactive atoms

  13. Loophole-free Bell test for one atom and less than one photon

    CERN Document Server

    Sangouard, N; Gisin, N; Rosenfeld, W; Sekatski, P; Weber, M; Weinfurter, H

    2011-01-01

    We consider the entanglement between two internal states of a single atom and two photon number states describing either the vaccum or a single photon and thus containing, on average, less than one photon. We show that this intriguing entanglement can be characterized through substantial violations of a Bell inequality by performing homodyne detections on the optical mode. We present the experimental challenges that need to be overcome to pave the way towards a loophole-free Bell test in this setup.

  14. Loophole-free Bell test with one atom and less than one photon on average

    OpenAIRE

    Sangouard N.; Bancal J.-D.; Gisin N.; Rosenfeld W.; Sekatski P.; Weber M.; Weinfurter H.

    2011-01-01

    We consider the entanglement between two internal states of a single atom and two photon number states describing either the vaccum or a single photon and thus containing, on average, less than one photon. We show that this intriguing entanglement can be characterized through substantial violations of a Bell inequality by performing homodyne detections on the optical mode. We present the experimental challenges that need to be overcome to pave the way towards a loophole-free Bell test in this...

  15. Loophole-free Bell test with one atom and less than one photon on average

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sangouard, N.; Bancal, J.-D.; Gisin, N.; Sekatski, P. [Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, CH-1211 Geneva 4 (Switzerland); Rosenfeld, W.; Weber, M.; Weinfurter, H. [Fakultat fur Physik, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munchen, DE-80799 Munchen (Germany)

    2011-11-15

    We consider the entanglement between two internal states of a single atom and two photon number states describing either the vacuum or a single photon and thus containing, on average, less than one photon. We show that this intriguing entanglement can be characterized through substantial violations of a Bell inequality by performing homodyne detections on the optical mode. We present the experimental challenges that need to be overcome to pave the way toward a loophole-free Bell test.

  16. Magneto-optical trapping of radioactive atoms for test of the fundamental symmetries

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kawamura, Hirokazu, E-mail: hirokazu.kawamura.c2@tohoku.ac.jp [Tohoku University, Frontier Research Institute for Interdisciplinary Sciences (Japan); Ando, S.; Aoki, T.; Arikawa, H.; Harada, K.; Hayamizu, T. [Tohoku University, Cyclotron and Radioisotope Center (Japan); Inoue, T. [Tohoku University, Frontier Research Institute for Interdisciplinary Sciences (Japan); Ishikawa, T.; Itoh, M.; Kato, K.; Köhler, L.; Mathis, J.; Sakamoto, K.; Uchiyama, A.; Sakemi, Y. [Tohoku University, Cyclotron and Radioisotope Center (Japan)

    2015-11-15

    We are planning test experiments of fundamental symmetries based on the intrinsic properties of francium. It is expected that the laser cooling and trapping of francium will produce precision measurements. The pilot experiment using rubidium was performed with the goal of francium trapping. The ion beam generated with a francium ion source was investigated using a Wien filter. Each piece of equipment still must be studied in more detail, and the equipment should be upgraded in order to trap radioactive atoms.

  17. Testing EUV/X-ray Atomic Data for the Solar Dynamics Observatory

    OpenAIRE

    Testa, Paola; Drake, Jeremy J.; Landi, Enrico

    2011-01-01

    The Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA) and the Exteme-ultraviolet Variability Experiment (EVE) onboard the Solar Dynamics Observatory include spectral windows in the X-ray/EUV band. Accuracy and completeness of the atomic data in this wavelength range is essential for interpretation of the spectrum and irradiance of the solar corona, and of SDO observations made with the AIA and EVE instruments. Here we test the X-ray/EUV data in the CHIANTI database to assess their completeness and accuracy ...

  18. Proposition of law relative to the admission and compensation of nuclear weapons tests victims; Proposition de Loi relative a la reconnaissance et a l'indemnisation des victimes des essais nucleaires

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2008-07-01

    The present proposition of law has for object to come up to the expectations of persons having participated to nuclear weapons test made by France between the 13. february 1960 and the 27 january 1996, in Sahara or French polynesia. The consequences on health can not be ignored even after several decades of years. Decades of veterans have for several years, have got involve in justice procedures to be entitled to obtain compensation in damage repair they assign to the nuclear tests. Some courts of justice have, for years, recognized the legitimacy of these claims and the judgements cite irradiation consequences able to be revealed late even several decades after the radiation exposure. Other states have adopted laws of compensation for the victims of their populations, civil or military ones. That is why this proposition of law comes today to be adopted. (N.C.)

  19. Rays as weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vogel, H. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)], E-mail: Hermann.vogel@ak-stgeorg.lbk-hh.de

    2007-08-15

    Purpose: Ionizing radiation is being regarded as life threatening. Therefore, accidents in nuclear power plants are considered equal threatening as nuclear bomb explosions, and attacks with dirty bombs are thought as dangerous as nuclear weapon explosions. However, there are differences between a nuclear bomb explosion, the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and an attack with a dirty bomb. It is intended to point them out. Method: The processes are described, which damage in a nuclear bomb explosion, in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and in an attack with a dirty bomb. Their effects are compared with each other, i.e. explosion, heat, shock wave (blast), ionizing radiation, and fallout. Results: In the center of the explosion of a nuclear bomb, the temperature rises to 100 Mio deg.C, this induces damaging heat radiation and shock wave. In the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant and in the conventional explosion of a dirty bomb, the temperature may rise up to 3000 deg. C, heat radiation and blast are limited to a short distance. In nuclear power plants, explosions due to oxyhydrogen gas or steam may occur. In nuclear explosions the dispersed radioactive material (fall out) consists mainly of isotopes with short half-life, in nuclear power plants and in dirty bomb attacks with longer half-life. The amount of fall out is comparable in nuclear bomb explosions with that in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, it is smaller in attacks with dirty bombs. An explosion in a nuclear power plant even in the largest imaginable accident is not a nuclear explosion. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were 200,000 victims nearly all by heat and blast, some 300 died by ionizing radiation. In Chernobyl, there have been less than 100 victims due to ionizing radiation up till now. A dirty bomb kills possibly with the explosion of conventional explosive, the dispersed radioactive material may damage

  20. Testing general relativity and alternative theories of gravity with space-based atomic clocks and atom interferometers

    OpenAIRE

    Bondarescu Ruxandra; Schärer Andreas; Jetzer Philippe; Angélil Raymond; Saha Prasenjit; Lundgren Andrew

    2015-01-01

    The successful miniaturisation of extremely accurate atomic clocks and atom interferometers invites prospects for satellite missions to perform precision experiments. We discuss the effects predicted by general relativity and alternative theories of gravity that can be detected by a clock, which orbits the Earth. Our experiment relies on the precise tracking of the spacecraft using its observed tick-rate. The spacecraft's reconstructed four-dimensional trajectory will reveal the nature of gra...

  1. Standard Test Method for Hydrophobic Surface Films by the Atomizer Test

    CERN Document Server

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    1965-01-01

    1.1 This test method covers the detection of the presence of hydrophobic (nonwetting) films on surfaces and the presence of hydrophobic organic materials in processing ambients. When properly conducted, the test will enable detection of fractional molecular layers of hydrophobic organic contaminants. On very rough or porous surfaces the sensitivity of the test may be significantly decreased. 1.2 The values stated in inch-pound units are to be regarded as the standard. The values given in parentheses are for information only. 1.3 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate safety and health practices and determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.

  2. Fundamental limitations to tests of the universality of free fall by dropping atoms

    CERN Document Server

    Nobili, Anna M

    2015-01-01

    Tests of the universality of free fall and the weak equivalence principle probe the foundations of General Relativity. Evidence of a violation may lead to the discovery of a new force. The best torsion balance experiments have ruled it out to 10^-13[1]. Cold-atom tests[2-5] have reached 10^-7 and promise to do 7 to 10 orders of magnitude better[6-10] on ground or in space. As mass-dropping experiments[2-4] in a non uniform gravitational field they are sensitive to initial conditions. Errors in the relative position and velocity of the atom clouds at release give rise to a systematic effect which mimics a violation, and these offsets are never measured concurrently with the drop. At the current 10^-7 level they are not an issue. Here we show that when aiming at 2x10^-15 as in[9-10], a fundamental limitation arises. Heisenberg's principle does not allow the centre of mass of free atom clouds to be confined at will in both position and velocity space. The required confinement would be short of the position-momen...

  3. North Korea has the means to develop a nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For a long time already, North Korea has been developing technology that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon. Progress of the nuclear weapons programme has been monitored by means of satellites, and proof of the programme has been obtained, for instance, from a diplomat who defected and when unauthorized exports have been revealed. Led by the United States, the international community has wanted to bring the nuclear weapons programme to an end, but the exceptional negotiating skills of North Korean representatives and sudden turns of events have made the task the difficult one. North Korea has been threatened with economic sanctions, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has decided to cease all technical assistance to North Korea. North Korea could hardly benefit from the use of a nuclear weapon: instead, giving up the programme might help the country economically. The death of the country's dictatorial leader Kim Il Sung seems to have increased the willingness to give up the programme. However, not the slightest information has yet been received as to the destiny of the plutonium already produced. In the end, North Korea may not be required to cancel the entire nuclear weapons programme; freezing the programme may be enough. Thus there would eventually be silent approval of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. (orig.)

  4. Agreement between the Republic of Namibia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Republic of Namibia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 17 March 1998, signed in Vienna on 19 March 1998, and entered into force on 15 April 1998

  5. Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  6. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/226) concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998, and signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998. Pending entry into force, the Protocol is being applied provisionally as from the date of signature, i.e. 12 June 1998

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Armenia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997, and it will enter into force on the date the Agency receives written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Pending entry into force, this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature, i.e., 29 September 1997

  8. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Czech Republic to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 9 September 1996, signed in Vienna on 18 September 1996 and entered into force on 11 September 1997

  9. Realistic loophole-free Bell test with atom-photon entanglement

    CERN Document Server

    Teo, Colin; Quintino, Marco Túlio; Minář, Jiří; Cavalcanti, Daniel; Scarani, Valerio; Cunha, Marcelo Terra; Santos, Marcelo França

    2012-01-01

    The establishment of nonlocal correlations, obtained through the violation of a Bell inequality, is not only important from a fundamental point of view, but constitutes the basis for device-independent quantum information technologies. Although several nonlocality tests have been performed so far, all of them suffered from either the locality or the detection loopholes. Recent studies have suggested that the use of atom-photon entanglement can lead to Bell inequality violations with moderate transmission and detection efficiencies. In this paper we propose an experimental setup realizing a simple atom-photon entangled state that, under realistic experimental parameters available to date, achieves a significant violation of the Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt inequality. Most importantly, the violation remains when considering typical detection efficiencies and losses due to required propagation distances.

  10. Atomic force microscopy and mechanical testing of bovine pericardium irradiated to radiotherapy doses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Within the context of radiotherapy our work investigates the feasibility of identifying changes in structural and biomechanical properties of pericardium resulting from exposure to penetrating photon irradiation. Collagen fibres extracted from bovine pericardium were chosen as a model of pericardium extracellular matrix as these form the main fibrous component of the medium. Tests of mechanical properties, controlled by the various structural elements of the tissues, were performed on frontal pericardium, including uni-axial tests and atomic force microscopy (AFM). While the irradiated collagen fibres showed no significant change in D-band spacing up to doses of 80 Gy, the fibre width was found to increase by 34±9% at 80 Gy when compared with that for un-irradiated samples. - Highlights: • Methods for identifying changes in tissue biophysical properties following photon irradiation. • Tests made using collagen fibres extracted from bovine pericardium. • Sensitivity of uni-axial tests and atomic force microscopy (AFM) investigated. • Radiotherapy doses investigated up to 80 Gy, delivered by 6 MV photons

  11. Imprecise Probability Methods for Weapons UQ

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Picard, Richard Roy [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Vander Wiel, Scott Alan [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-05-13

    Building on recent work in uncertainty quanti cation, we examine the use of imprecise probability methods to better characterize expert knowledge and to improve on misleading aspects of Bayesian analysis with informative prior distributions. Quantitative approaches to incorporate uncertainties in weapons certi cation are subject to rigorous external peer review, and in this regard, certain imprecise probability methods are well established in the literature and attractive. These methods are illustrated using experimental data from LANL detonator impact testing.

  12. Verification of Chemical Weapons Destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Chemical Weapons Convention is the only multilateral treaty that bans completely an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under international verification arrangements. Possessor States, i.e. those that have chemical weapons stockpiles at the time of becoming party to the CWC, commit to destroying these. All States undertake never to acquire chemical weapons and not to help other States acquire such weapons. The CWC foresees time-bound chemical disarmament. The deadlines for destruction for early entrants to the CWC are provided in the treaty. For late entrants, the Conference of States Parties intervenes to set destruction deadlines. One of the unique features of the CWC is thus the regime for verifying destruction of chemical weapons. But how can you design a system for verification at military sites, while protecting military restricted information? What degree of assurance is considered sufficient in such circumstances? How do you divide the verification costs? How do you deal with production capability and initial declarations of existing stockpiles? The founders of the CWC had to address these and other challenges in designing the treaty. Further refinement of the verification system has followed since the treaty opened for signature in 1993 and since inspection work was initiated following entry-into-force of the treaty in 1997. Most of this work concerns destruction at the two large possessor States, Russia and the United States. Perhaps some of the lessons learned from the OPCW experience may be instructive in a future verification regime for nuclear weapons. (author)

  13. Guarding the guardians: Civilian control of nuclear weapons in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book has three separate complementary goals. First, it develops a model to explain how the command and control of nuclear weapons evolves over time. Second, it tells the story of the evolution of one critical aspect of the nuclear command system, the custody of nuclear weapons. Finally, it assesses the general problem of ensuring civilian control over nuclear operations. The focus is on the formation of operational policy. Where to deploy a weapon and at what state of alertness is an operational decision. Part I, The Theory of Civilian Control is divided into three chapters: Civilian control: Principles and problems; Civilian Control: From alerts to war termination; and Explaining changes in civilian control. Part II, The Evolution of Custody Policy has seven chapters: The Atomic Energy Act and the origin of assertive control, 1945-1947; The first test of assertive civilian control, 1948-1949; The breach in assertive control, 1950-1952; Assertive control becomes delegative control, 1953-1958; The resurgence of assertive control, 1959-1962; The cycle continues, 1963-1990; and Conclusion: The future of civilian control

  14. Hybrid quantum logic and a test of Bell's inequality using two different atomic isotopes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ballance, C J; Schäfer, V M; Home, J P; Szwer, D J; Webster, S C; Allcock, D T C; Linke, N M; Harty, T P; Aude Craik, D P L; Stacey, D N; Steane, A M; Lucas, D M

    2015-12-17

    Entanglement is one of the most fundamental properties of quantum mechanics, and is the key resource for quantum information processing (QIP). Bipartite entangled states of identical particles have been generated and studied in several experiments, and post-selected or heralded entangled states involving pairs of photons, single photons and single atoms, or different nuclei in the solid state, have also been produced. Here we use a deterministic quantum logic gate to generate a 'hybrid' entangled state of two trapped-ion qubits held in different isotopes of calcium, perform full tomography of the state produced, and make a test of Bell's inequality with non-identical atoms. We use a laser-driven two-qubit gate, whose mechanism is insensitive to the qubits' energy splittings, to produce a maximally entangled state of one (40)Ca(+) qubit and one (43)Ca(+) qubit, held 3.5 micrometres apart in the same ion trap, with 99.8 ± 0.6 per cent fidelity. We test the CHSH (Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt) version of Bell's inequality for this novel entangled state and find that it is violated by 15 standard deviations; in this test, we close the detection loophole but not the locality loophole. Mixed-species quantum logic is a powerful technique for the construction of a quantum computer based on trapped ions, as it allows protection of memory qubits while other qubits undergo logic operations or are used as photonic interfaces to other processing units. The entangling gate mechanism used here can also be applied to qubits stored in different atomic elements; this would allow both memory and logic gate errors caused by photon scattering to be reduced below the levels required for fault-tolerant quantum error correction, which is an essential prerequisite for general-purpose quantum computing. PMID:26672554

  15. Low energy (anti)atoms for precision tests of basic physics

    CERN Document Server

    Silveira, D M; Veloso, M; Cesar, C L

    2001-01-01

    Recent advances in techniques to manipulate and study, with high precision, atomic hydrogen, from one hand, and successful trapping schemes for positrons and antiprotons, from the other hand, have encouraged the pursuit of experiments to test CPT violation and the weak equivalence principle (WEP) through the comparison of hydrogen and antihydrogen. A description of the hydrogen trap and laser system being built in Rio, to trap and perform high resolution spectroscopy on cold hydrogen, is presented along with a discussion on the techniques and experimental system being implemented by the ATHENA collaboration at CERN to produce cold antihydrogen. A new technique to make a cold antihydrogen beam is proposed. (25 refs).

  16. [The Chinese nuclear test and 'atoms for peace' as a measure for preventing nuclear armament of Japan: the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the United States and the introduction of light water reactors into Japan, 1964-1968].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yamazaki, Masakatsu

    2014-07-01

    Japan and the United States signed in 1968 a new atomic energy agreement through which US light-water nuclear reactors, including those of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant of Tokyo Electric Power Company, were to be introduced into Japan. This paper studies the history of negotiations for the 1968 agreement using documents declassified in the 1990s in the US and Japan. After the success of the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, the United States became seriously concerned about nuclear armament of other countries in Asia including Japan. Expecting that Japan would not have its own nuclear weapons, the US offered to help the country to demonstrate its superiority in some fields of science including peaceful nuclear energy to counter the psychological effect of the Chinese nuclear armament. Driven by his own political agenda, the newly appointed Prime Minister Eisaku Sato responded to the US expectation favorably. When he met in January 1965 with President Johnson, Sato made it clear that Japan would not pursue nuclear weapons. Although the US continued its support after this visit, it nevertheless gave priority to the control of nuclear technology in Japan through the bilateral peaceful nuclear agreement. This paper argues that the 1968 agreement implicitly meant a strategic measure to prevent Japan from going nuclear and also a tactic to persuade Japan to join the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty. PMID:25296517

  17. [The Chinese nuclear test and 'atoms for peace' as a measure for preventing nuclear armament of Japan: the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the United States and the introduction of light water reactors into Japan, 1964-1968].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yamazaki, Masakatsu

    2014-07-01

    Japan and the United States signed in 1968 a new atomic energy agreement through which US light-water nuclear reactors, including those of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant of Tokyo Electric Power Company, were to be introduced into Japan. This paper studies the history of negotiations for the 1968 agreement using documents declassified in the 1990s in the US and Japan. After the success of the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, the United States became seriously concerned about nuclear armament of other countries in Asia including Japan. Expecting that Japan would not have its own nuclear weapons, the US offered to help the country to demonstrate its superiority in some fields of science including peaceful nuclear energy to counter the psychological effect of the Chinese nuclear armament. Driven by his own political agenda, the newly appointed Prime Minister Eisaku Sato responded to the US expectation favorably. When he met in January 1965 with President Johnson, Sato made it clear that Japan would not pursue nuclear weapons. Although the US continued its support after this visit, it nevertheless gave priority to the control of nuclear technology in Japan through the bilateral peaceful nuclear agreement. This paper argues that the 1968 agreement implicitly meant a strategic measure to prevent Japan from going nuclear and also a tactic to persuade Japan to join the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty.

  18. How electroshock weapons kill!

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lundquist, Marjorie

    2010-03-01

    Growing numbers of law enforcement officers now carry an electroshock weapon (ESW). Over 500 U.S. deaths have followed ESW use in the past 26 years; over 450 of these deaths followed use of an electromuscular disruptor in the past 9 years. Most training courses teach that ESWs are safe; that they can kill only by the direct effect of electric current on the heart; and that a death following use of an ESW always has some other cause. All these teachings are false! The last was disproved by Lundquist.^1 Williams^2 ruled out direct electrical effects as a cause of almost all the 213 deaths he studied, leaving disruption of normal physiological processes as the only alternative explanation. Careful study of all such deaths identifies 4 different ways that death has or could have been brought about by the ESW: kidney failure following rhabdomyolysis [rare]; cardiac arrest from hyperkalemia following rhabdomyolysis [undocumented]; lactic acid-induced ventricular fibrillation [conclusive proof impossible]; and [most common] anoxia from so much lactic acid in the circulating blood that it acts as an oxygen scavenger, continuously depleting the blood of oxygen until most of the lactate has been metabolized. ^1M. Lundquist, BAPS 54(1) K1.270(2009). ^2Howard E. Williams, Taser Electronic Control Devices and Sudden In-Custody Death, 2008.

  19. OIL AS POLITICAL WEAPON

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mariana, BUICAN

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available Oil (called by some black gold has not always been as coveted and used, but only in the last hundred years has established itself as a highly sought after as an indispensable proper functioning of modern economic activity that an important factor in international politics. International oil regime has changed in the last decades. In 1960, oil regime was a private oligopol which had links with governments main consuming countries. By then the price of a barrel of oil was two U.S. dollars and seven major transnational oil companies decided the amount of oil that will be produced. Meanwhile the world region with the largest oil exports were more strongly expressed nationalism and decolonization. Result, it was so in the late 60s in the region occur independent states. They have created an organization aim of this resource to their advantage - OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Thus since 1973 there have been changes in the international regime governing oil field, namely producing countries were fixed production rate and price. After this time the oil weapon has become increasingly important in the management of international relations. Oil influenced the great powers to Middle East conflicts that occurred in the last century, but their attitude about the emergence of new sources of oil outside OPEC. In the late 90's, Russia has become a major supplier of oil to the West.

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999 and signed in Vienna on 21 June 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Korea written notification that the Republic of Korea's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  1. Nuclear Weapons and Science Education.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wellington, J. J.

    1984-01-01

    Provides suggestions on how science teachers can, and should, deal with the nuclear weapons debate in a balanced and critical way. Includes a table outlining points for and against deterrence and disarmament. (JN)

  2. Risk in the Weapons Stockpile

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Noone, Bailey C [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-14

    When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

  3. Effects of nuclear weapons. Third edition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, S.; Dolan, P.J.

    1977-01-01

    Since the last edition of ''The Effects of Nuclear Weapons'' in 1962 much new information has become available concerning nuclear weapon effects. This has come in part from the series of atmospheric tests, including several at very high altitudes, conducted in the Pacific Ocean area in 1962. In addition, laboratory studies, theoretical calculations, and computer simulations have provided a better understanding of the various effects. A new chapter has been added on the electromagnetic pulse. The chapter titles are as follows: general principles of nuclear explosions; descriptions of nuclear explosions; air blast phenomena in air and surface bursts; air blast loading; structural damage from air blast; shock effects of surface and subsurface bursts; thermal radiation and its effects; initial nuclear radiation; residual nuclear radiation and fallout; radio and radar effects; the electromagnetic pulse and its effects; and biological effects. (LTN)

  4. Agreement between the government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of Republic of Estonia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 24 February 1992, signed in Vienna on 18 November 1997 and in Tallinn on 24 November 1997, and entered into force on 24 November 1997

  5. Reply to the comment on: "Does an atom interferometer test the gravitational redshift at the Compton frequency?"

    CERN Document Server

    Wolf, Peter; Bordé, Christian J; Reynaud, Serge; Salomon, Christophe; Cohen-Tannoudji, Claude

    2012-01-01

    Hohensee, Chu, Peters and M\\"uller have submitted a comment (arXiv:1112.6039 [gr-qc]) on our paper "Does an atom interferometer test the gravitational redshift at the Compton frequency?", Classical and Quantum Gravity 28, 145017 (2011), arXiv:1009.2485 [gr-qc]. Here we reply to this comment and show that the main result of our paper, namely that atom interferometric gravimeters do not test the gravitational redshift at the Compton frequency, remains valid.

  6. Application of LabWindows/CVI-based Database Technology in Light Weapons Killing Test Software%Labwindows/CVI数据库技术在轻武器杀伤测试软件中的应用

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    刘乃强; 郑宾; 王舒; 王浩圣; 侯雁伟

    2015-01-01

    During Light weapons killing test, it is needed to change channel configuration, sensor’s parameters, ve-locity target model since the testing conditions are changeable and the sensor is easily damaged. The database tech-nology based on virtual instruments development platform Labwindows/CVI is introduced in detail, which is applied in the test software combining with actual application requirement. The test result shows that using database tech-nology can improve flexibility and extendibility of the software in precondition of ensuring stability.%在轻武器杀伤测试过程中由于测试条件多变、传感器易受损坏,需要经常对通道配置、传感器参数、测速靶型号进行更改。针对虚拟仪器开发平台Labwindows/CVI的数据库技术进行了详细的介绍,并结合实际应用需求,将数据库技术运用于测试软件中。测试结果表明,利用数据库技术可在保证稳定性的前提下提高软件灵活性和可扩展性。

  7. Islamic State and Chemical Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lukáš Rafay

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available The article deals with topic of Islamic State and chemical weapons. The issue is analysed in three dimensions: origin of used chemical weapons and possibility of independent production; known chemical attacks and tactical regularities in their execution; and traits of future chemical terrorist attacks. By providing a thorough examination of the problem, the article aims at predicting the future development of the group’s chemical program as well as describing any prospective chemical terrorist attacks in Europe

  8. Nuclear weapons and the law.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Murray, R K

    1999-01-01

    The history of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is summarized, with a discussion of some of its earlier Advisory Opinions. The Advisory Opinion on the legality of nuclear arms is considered in the light of the principles of international humanitarian law and a review of nuclear weapons effects. The present government's position on nuclear weapons as outlined in the Strategic Defence Review (which ignores the issue of legality) is examined critically. PMID:10371869

  9. Testing General Relativity and Alternative Theories of Gravity with Space-based Atomic Clocks and Atom Interferometers

    CERN Document Server

    Bondarescu, Ruxandra; Jetzer, Philippe; Angélil, Raymond; Saha, Prasenjit; Lundgren, Andrew

    2015-01-01

    The successful miniaturisation of extremely accurate atomic clocks and atom interferometers invites prospects for satellite missions to perform precision experiments. We discuss the effects predicted by general relativity and alternative theories of gravity that can be detected by a clock, which orbits the Earth. Our experiment relies on the precise tracking of the spacecraft using its observed tick-rate. The spacecraft's reconstructed four-dimensional trajectory will reveal the nature of gravitational perturbations in Earth's gravitational field, potentially differentiating between different theories of gravity. This mission can measure multiple relativistic effects all during the course of a single experiment, and constrain the Parametrized Post-Newtonian Parameters around the Earth. A satellite carrying a clock of fractional timing inaccuracy of $\\Delta f/f \\sim 10^{-16}$ in an elliptic orbit around the Earth would constrain the PPN parameters $|\\beta -1|, |\\gamma-1| \\lesssim 10^{-6}$. We also briefly revi...

  10. Testing general relativity and alternative theories of gravity with space-based atomic clocks and atom interferometers

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bondarescu Ruxandra

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available The successful miniaturisation of extremely accurate atomic clocks and atom interferometers invites prospects for satellite missions to perform precision experiments. We discuss the effects predicted by general relativity and alternative theories of gravity that can be detected by a clock, which orbits the Earth. Our experiment relies on the precise tracking of the spacecraft using its observed tick-rate. The spacecraft’s reconstructed four-dimensional trajectory will reveal the nature of gravitational perturbations in Earth’s gravitational field, potentially differentiating between different theories of gravity. This mission can measure multiple relativistic effects all during the course of a single experiment, and constrain the Parametrized Post-Newtonian Parameters around the Earth. A satellite carrying a clock of fractional timing inaccuracy of Δ f / f ∼ 10−16 in an elliptic orbit around the Earth would constrain the PPN parameters |β − 1|, |γ − 1| ≲ 10−6. We also briefly review potential constraints by atom interferometers on scalar tensor theories and in particular on Chameleon and dilaton models.

  11. An ISOL test-bench at China Institute of Atomic Energy

    CERN Document Server

    CuiBaoQun; Li Li; Wang Rong; Bao Yi We

    2003-01-01

    An isotope separation on-line (ISOL) test-bench has been built at China Institute of Atomic Energy, an electron beam plasma type target/ion source selected as the ion source of the system. By bombarding selected targets with a proton beam from the HV-13 tandem, low intensity radioactive ion beam can be produced on-line. The first planned ion species is sup 6 sup 2 Zn sup + and it will be used as nuclear probe to investigate the character of solid material by perturbed angular correlation and positive electron annihilation methods. Off-line tests are being carried out. The character of the target ion source and copper target to be used is described in this paper. Finally, a brief introduction of the ISOL design for the Beijing radioactive nuclear beam facility will be given.

  12. An ISOL test-bench at China Institute of Atomic Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An isotope separation on-line (ISOL) test-bench has been built at China Institute of Atomic Energy, an electron beam plasma type target/ion source selected as the ion source of the system. By bombarding selected targets with a proton beam from the HV-13 tandem, low intensity radioactive ion beam can be produced on-line. The first planned ion species is 62Zn+ and it will be used as nuclear probe to investigate the character of solid material by perturbed angular correlation and positive electron annihilation methods. Off-line tests are being carried out. The character of the target ion source and copper target to be used is described in this paper. Finally, a brief introduction of the ISOL design for the Beijing radioactive nuclear beam facility will be given

  13. Application of inertial confinement fusion to weapon technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report reviews aspects of the military applications of the inertial confinement fusion (ICF) program at Sandia Laboratories. These applications exist in the areas of: (1) weapon physics research, and (2) weapon effects simulation. In the area of weapon physics research, ICF source technology can be used to study: (1) equations-of-state at high energy densities, (2) implosion dynamics, and (3) laboratory simulation of exoatmospheric burst phenomena. In the area of weapon effects simulation, ICF technology and facilities have direct near, intermediate, and far term applications. In the near term, short pulse x-ray simulation capabilities exist for electronic component effects testing. In the intermediate term, capabilities can be developed for high energy neutron exposures and bremsstrahlung x-ray exposures of components. In the far term, system level exposures of full reentry vehicles will be possible if sufficiently high pellet gains are achieved

  14. Application of inertial confinement fusion to weapon technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Toepfer, A.J.; Posey, L.D.

    1978-12-01

    This report reviews aspects of the military applications of the inertial confinement fusion (ICF) program at Sandia Laboratories. These applications exist in the areas of: (1) weapon physics research, and (2) weapon effects simulation. In the area of weapon physics research, ICF source technology can be used to study: (1) equations-of-state at high energy densities, (2) implosion dynamics, and (3) laboratory simulation of exoatmospheric burst phenomena. In the area of weapon effects simulation, ICF technology and facilities have direct near, intermediate, and far term applications. In the near term, short pulse x-ray simulation capabilities exist for electronic component effects testing. In the intermediate term, capabilities can be developed for high energy neutron exposures and bremsstrahlung x-ray exposures of components. In the far term, system level exposures of full reentry vehicles will be possible if sufficiently high pellet gains are achieved.

  15. Youths Carrying a Weapon or Using a Weapon in a Fight: What Makes the Difference?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-Andre; Berchtold, Andre; Akre, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were…

  16. On the U.S.-Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons Cut as a Path toward a Nuclear-free World

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Shi; Jianbin

    2015-01-01

    Complete destruction of nuclear weapons and realization of a world free from nuclear weapons are the common aspiration of mankind in the atomic era.To achieve the goal,the international community has proposed a series of steps and measures,which include calling for a deep reduction of the U.S.and Russian nuclear arsenals,promoting ratification of the CTBT,initiating negotiation of the FMCT,reducing the role of nuclear weapons

  17. 77 FR 38595 - Taking and Importing Marine Mammals; Precision Strike Weapon and Air-to-Surface Gunnery Training...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-28

    ...; Precision Strike Weapon and Air-to-Surface Gunnery Training and Testing Operations at Eglin Air Force Base... with Precision Strike Weapon (PSW) and Air-to-Surface (AS) gunnery missions, both of which are military... two weapons: (1) The Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM) AGM-158 A and B; and (2) the...

  18. The GT-MHR for destruction of weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The disposal of nearly 100 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium (WG-Pu) made surplus by the disarmament treaties is receiving urgent attention, highlighted by the recent seizure in Germany of small quantities of weapons-useful plutonium. Unlike highly enriched uranium, simple denaturing cannot make this plutonium worthless for use in future weapons. The use of physical security and institutional barriers, including long-term storage in high-level waste repositories, to provide secure storage for centuries to come is questionable when considering government instability and the possibility of national recidivism. The Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and General Atomics have signed an agreement for the cooperative design of a gas turbine-modular helium reactor (GT-MHR) to burn the WG-Pu stockpile. A formal proposal for a joint U.S./Russian program for the development of this reactor has been submitted by MINATOM to Vice President Gore. The major benefit of this program is that the reactor would deplete the Russian surplus plutonium stockpile, provide jobs for technical specialists in the former weapons complex, and produce valuable electric power. It would also provide a mutually assured means of destroying the U.S. and Russian stockpiles

  19. Moruroa and us: Experiences of Polynesian people during the thirty years of nuclear weapons tests in the South Pacific (Ocean); Moruroa et nous. Experiences des polynesiens au cours des 30 annees d`essais nucleaires dans le pacifique sud

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vries, P. de; Seur, H

    1997-12-31

    This report is separated in nine chapters. In the chapters 2 and 3 we find the results of an inquiry got from 737 ancient workers of the sites. The chapter 4 studies the case of the Island of Mangareva in the Gambier archipelago, island situated at 500 km from Moruroa, the economical, sociological and cultural effects of nuclear weapons tests are analyzed. The chapter number 5 shows the different points of view got from institutions or government officials. In the chapter 6, the elements of public debate on the situation of the CEP ( Pacific study center) and the tests are analyzed in a chronological order on giving a particular importance to the way whom Polynesian people have been informed. The chapter 7 examines the evolution of the scientific debate related to the marine fauna poisoning, the radioactive contamination and the ciguatera. The chapter 8 is centered on the risks perception by the Polynesian society and on the different kinds of resistance at the CEP. In the last chapter, a certain number of conclusions and recommends are given. (N.C.)

  20. TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

    2013-07-16

    Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  1. Scaled-Down Moderator Circulation Test Facility at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Hyoung Tae Kim

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI started the experimental research on moderator circulation as one of a the national research and development programs from 2012. This research program includes the construction of the moderator circulation test (MCT facility, production of the validation data for self-reliant computational fluid dynamics (CFD tools, and development of optical measurement system using the particle image velocimetry (PIV. In the present paper we introduce the scaling analysis performed to extend the scaling criteria suitable for reproducing thermal-hydraulic phenomena in a scaled-down CANDU- (CANada Deuterium Uranium- 6 moderator tank, a manufacturing status of the 1/4 scale moderator tank. Also, preliminary CFD analysis results for the full-size and scaled-down moderator tanks are carried out to check whether the moderator flow and temperature patterns of both the full-size reactor and scaled-down facility are identical.

  2. Lifetime Measurements of $ \\pi ^+ \\pi ^- $ and $\\pi^{+-} K^{-+}$ Atoms to Test Low-Energy QCD Predictions

    CERN Multimedia

    Ponta, T C; Dumitriu, D E; Afanasyev, L; Zhabitskiy, M; Rykalin, V; Hons, Z; Schacher, J; Yazkov, V; Gerndt, J; Detraz, C C; Guaraldo, C; Dreossi, D; Smolik, J; Gorchakov, O; Nikitin, M; Dudarev, A; Kluson, J; Hansroul, M; Okada, K; Constantinescu, S; Kruglov, V; Komarov, V; Takeutchi, F; Tarta, P D; Kuptsov, A; Nemenov, L; Karpukhin, V; Shliapnikov, P; Brekhovskikh, V; Saborido silva, J J; Drijard, D; Rappazzo, G F; Pentia, M C; Gugiu, M M; Kruglova, L; Pustylnik, Z; Trojek, T; Vrba, T; Iliescu, M A; Duma, M; Ciocarlan, C; Kulikov, A; Ol'shevskiy, V; Ryazantsev, A; Chiba, M; Anania, A; Tarasov, A; Gritsay, K; Lapchine, V; Cechak, T; Lopez aguera, A

    2002-01-01

    %PS212 \\\\ \\\\ The proposed experiment aims to measure the lifetime of $ \\pi ^+ \\pi ^- $ atoms in the ground state with 10\\% precision, using the 24~GeV/c proton beam of the CERN Proton Synchrotron. As the value of the above lifetime of order 10$ ^- ^{1} ^{5} $s is dictated by a strong interaction at low energy, the precise measurement of this quantity enables to determine a combination of S-wave pion scattering lengths to 5\\%. Pion scattering lengths have been calculated in the framework of chiral perturbation theory and values predicted at the same level of accuracy have, up to now, never been confronted with accurate experimental data. Such a measurement would submit the understanding of chiral symmetry breaking of QCD to a crucial test.

  3. Analysis method on shoot precision of weapon in small-sample case

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Jiang Jun; Song Baowei; Liang Qingwei

    2007-01-01

    Because of limits of cost, in general, the test data of weapons are shortness. It is always an important topic that to gain scientific results of weapon performance analyses in small-sample case. Based on the analysis of distribution function characteristics and grey mathematics, a weighting grey method in small-sample case is presented. According to the analysis of test data of a weapon, it is proved that the method is a good method to deal with data in the small-sample case and has a high value in the analysis of weapon performance.

  4. Mobile and stationary laser weapon demonstrators of Rheinmetall Waffe Munition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ludewigt, K.; Riesbeck, Th.; Baumgärtel, Th.; Schmitz, J.; Graf, A.; Jung, M.

    2014-10-01

    For some years Rheinmetall Waffe Munition has successfully developed, realised and tested a variety of versatile high energy laser (HEL) weapon systems for air- and ground-defence scenarios like C-RAM, UXO clearing. By employing beam superimposition technology and a modular laser weapon concept, the total optical power has been successively increased. Stationary weapon platforms and now military mobile vehicles were equipped with high energy laser effectors. Our contribution summarises the most recent development stages of Rheinmetalls high energy laser weapon program. We present three different vehicle based HEL demonstrators: the 5 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Track V integrated in an M113 tank, the 20 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Wheel XX integrated in a multirole armoured vehicle GTK Boxer 8x8 and the 50 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Container L integrated in a reinforced container carried by an 8x8 truck. As a highlight, a stationary 30 kW Laser Weapon Demonstrator shows the capability to defeat saturated attacks of RAM targets and unmanned aerial vehicles. 2013 all HEL demonstrators were tested in a firing campaign at the Rheinmetall testing centre in Switzerland. Major results of these tests are presented.

  5. The radiological situation at the atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa. Technical report. V. 4. Releases to the biosphere of radionuclides from underground nuclear weapon tests at the atolls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is Volume 4 in the series of 6 volumes of the Technical Report on the radiological situation at the atolls of Mururoa and the Fangataufa. It is the second of the three volumes dealing with the evaluation of the long term radiological situation as a consequence of radionuclide migration from underground sources, which is the responsibility of Task Group B. This volume is based on the activities of Working Group 4 and uses, as its primary input on radionuclide inventories the report of Working Group 3, which is Vol. 3 in this series of Technical Report. Nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under open ocean was prohibited by the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 5 August 1963 and signed by UK, USA and USSR. France ceased atmospheric testing in September 1974. Isolation from the biosphere in geological formations, or containment in geological formations, became the preferred alternative. The explosion of 137 underground nuclear devices in Mururoa and Fangataufa over the testing period 1975-1996, together with 10 safety trials and the burial of radioactively contaminated material gathered from the atoll surfaces, has resulted in a substantial accumulation of radionuclides in the rock beneath the two atolls. Assessment of the rate at which these radionuclides move from the cavities to the environment accessible to humans, or biosphere and the total radionuclide release to the biosphere over time is the central effort of this Study. The rock mass within which the radionuclides are initially deposited, and which serves to contain or delay release of the radionuclides, will be referred to as the geosphere to distinguish it from the biosphere, where the radionuclides would be accessible either directly or through the food chain to the living environment. This assessment of geosphere transport has been divided into the following four interrelated tasks: (a) Geological Pathways; (b) Hydrological Modelling; (c) Solution Source Term; and (d) Geosphere

  6. A comparative analysis of the resources required for test and evaluation on Army-led weapon system programs, based upon program size and acquisition management complexity

    OpenAIRE

    Johnson, Arne A.; Philistine, John J.

    2007-01-01

    Joint Applied Project Test and Evaluation (TandE) is an integral part of every acquisition program, as such, it consumes considerable program resources. The Department of Defense (DoD) TandE program management requirements are written to meet the risk reduction needs of large acquisition programs, but do not provide the details needed to consistently scale TandE management efforts for smaller programs across DoD. This research study investigates ways that the TandE burden to programs d...

  7. UFOs and nukes. Extraordinary encounters at nuclear weapons sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Everyone knows about the reported recovery of a crashed alien spaceship near Roswell, New Mexico in July 1947. However, most people are unaware that, at the time of the incident, Roswell Army Airfield was home to the world's only atomic bomber squadron, the 509th Bomb Group. Was this merely a coincidence? During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built thousands of the far more destructive hydrogen bombs, some of them a thousand times as destructive as the first atomic bombs dropped on Japan. If the nuclear standoff between the superpowers had erupted into World War III, human civilization - and perhaps the very survival of our species - would have been at risk. Did this ominous state of affairs come to the attention of outside observers? Was there a connection between the atomic bomber squadron based at Roswell and the reported crash of a UFO nearby? Did those who pilot the UFOs monitor the superpowers' nuclear arms race during the dangerous Cold War era? Do they scrutinize American and Russian weapons sites even now? UFOs and Nukes provides the startling and sometimes shocking answers to these questions. Veteran researcher Robert Hastings has investigated nuclear weapons-related UFO incidents for more than three decades and has interviewed more than 120 ex-US Air Force personnel, from former Airmen to retired Colonels, who witnessed extraordinary UFO encounters at nuclear weapons sites. Their amazing stories are presented here.

  8. Weapons engineering tritium facility overview

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Najera, Larry [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-20

    Materials provide an overview of the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) as introductory material for January 2011 visit to SRS. Purpose of the visit is to discuss Safety Basis, Conduct of Engineering, and Conduct of Operations. WETF general description and general GTS program capabilities are presented in an unclassified format.

  9. Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Agreement by exchange of letters of 6 November 1995 and 25 June 1996 with the Republic of Chile in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the Agreement by exchange of letters with the Republic of Chile on Safeguards Agreement of 5 April 1995 concluded between Chile and the IAEA, in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty). The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 1996. The texts of letters of 6 November 1995 and 25 June 1996 are also included

  10. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1994-03-01

    The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, seeks to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) that will extend from the US-Mexican border to Antarctica`s territorial boundaries, including large areas of open ocean. Under the treaty, signatory states pledge not to test, use, produce, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons; to use nuclear materials and facilities {open_quotes}exclusively for peaceful purposes;{close_quotes} and not to permit the stationing or development of nuclear weapons on their territories.

  11. The role of nuclear weapon ban in the peace keeping laws of the United Nations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The thesis includes a comparison of bilateral and multilateral nuclear weapon banning contracts and treaties (nuclear test ban treaty, nuclear weapon-free zones, nuclear disarmament etc.) and voluntary nuclear weapon abandonment declarations in view of legal aspects, their verification, ratification, included exceptions, and potential penalties. In the second part an eventual stabilization of the nuclear weapon ban and the non-proliferation treaty as customary international law and ''ius congens'' is discussed. The third part is concerned with possible measures and sanctions in connections with these laws. The fourth part discusses military measures for justifiable enforcement of the non-proliferation treaty and their legitimization.

  12. Direct-energy weapons : invisible and invincible?

    OpenAIRE

    Deveci, Bayram Mert

    2007-01-01

    A military weapon is any tool used to increase the reach or power of a nation. Simply, it can be said that each era witnesses the deployment of new and powerful mass destruction weaponry. What will this century's most powerful weapon be? Directed-energy weapons, which offer advantages over conventional weapons by providing attack at the speed of light, precise targeting, rapid engagement of multiple targets, adjustable damage capacity, low operational cost, reduced logistic support, a nea...

  13. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander...

  14. 32 CFR 1903.10 - Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 6 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons. 1903.10 Section 1903.10 National... INSTALLATIONS § 1903.10 Weapons. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, knowingly possessing or causing to be present a weapon on an Agency installation, or attempting to do so is prohibited....

  15. Testing EUV/X-ray Atomic Data for the Solar Dynamics Observatory

    CERN Document Server

    Testa, Paola; Landi, Enrico

    2011-01-01

    The Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA) and the Exteme-ultraviolet Variability Experiment (EVE) onboard the Solar Dynamics Observatory include spectral windows in the X-ray/EUV band. Accuracy and completeness of the atomic data in this wavelength range is essential for interpretation of the spectrum and irradiance of the solar corona, and of SDO observations made with the AIA and EVE instruments. Here we test the X-ray/EUV data in the CHIANTI database to assess their completeness and accuracy in the SDO bands, with particular focus on the 94A and 131A AIA passbands. Given the paucity of solar observations adequate for this purpose, we use high-resolution X-ray spectra of the low-activity solar-like corona of Procyon obtained with the Chandra Low Energy Transmission Grating Spectrometer (LETGS). We find that while spectral models overall can reproduce quite well the observed spectra in the soft X-ray range ll 130A, they significantly underestimate the observed flux in the 50-130A wavelength range. The model und...

  16. Predictors of Weapon Carrying in Youth Attending Drop-in Centers

    Science.gov (United States)

    Blumberg, Elaine J.; Liles, Sandy; Kelley, Norma J.; Hovell, Melbourne F.; Bousman, Chad A.; Shillington, Audrey M.; Ji, Ming; Clapp, John

    2009-01-01

    Objective: To test and compare 2 predictive models of weapon carrying in youth (n=308) recruited from 4 drop-in centers in San Diego and Imperial counties. Methods: Both models were based on the Behavioral Ecological Model (BEM). Results: The first and second models significantly explained 39% and 53% of the variance in weapon carrying,…

  17. Abdus Salam: A Reappraisal. Part II Salam's Part in the Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Programme

    CERN Document Server

    Dombey, Norman

    2011-01-01

    Salam's biographies claim that he was opposed to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. This is somewhat strange given that he was the senior Science Advisor to the Pakistan government for at least some of the period between 1972 when the programme was initiated and 1998 when a successful nuclear weapon test was carried out. I look at the evidence for his participation in the programme.

  18. Fire control apparatus for a laser weapon

    Science.gov (United States)

    Worsham, R. H.

    1985-10-01

    This patent application discloses a laser weapon fire control computer apparatus for responding in real time to the escort/threat scenario that confronts the weapon. The fire control computer apparatus compares the threat data with stored predicted scenarios to develop a firing strategy menu which takes into account the fact that the laser energy is instantaneously propagated to the target but requires a substantial amount of time to inflict damage. The fire control computer apparatus utilizes the weapon's status, dwell time, slow time and fuel limits to yield a weapon pointing sequence and weapon on-off times.

  19. Microscratch testing method for systematic evaluation of the adhesion of atomic layer deposited thin films on silicon

    OpenAIRE

    Kilpi, Lauri; Ylivaara, Oili M. E.; Vaajoki, Antti; Malm, Jari; Sintonen, Sakari; Tuominen, Marko; Puurunen, Riikka L.; Ronkainen, Helena

    2016-01-01

    The scratch test method is widely used for adhesion evaluation of thin films and coatings. Usual critical load criteria designed for scratch testing of coatings were not applicable to thin atomic layer deposition (ALD) films on silicon wafers. Thus, the bases for critical load evaluation were established and the critical loads suitable for ALD coating adhesion evaluation on silicon wafers were determined in this paper as LCSi1, LCSi2, LCALD1, and LCALD2, representing the failure p...

  20. Use and Storage of Test and Operations Data from the High Temperature Test Reactor Acquired by the US Government from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hans Gougar

    2010-02-01

    This document describes the use and storage of data from the High Temperature Test Reactor (HTTR) acquired from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) by the U.S. Government for high temperature reactor research under the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) Project.

  1. Real life identification of partially occluded weapons in video frames

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hempelmann, Christian F.; Arslan, Abdullah N.; Attardo, Salvatore; Blount, Grady P.; Sirakov, Nikolay M.

    2016-05-01

    We empirically test the capacity of an improved system to identify not just images of individual guns, but partially occluded guns and their parts appearing in a videoframe. This approach combines low-level geometrical information gleaned from the visual images and high-level semantic information stored in an ontology enriched with meronymic part-whole relations. The main improvements of the system are handling occlusion, new algorithms, and an emerging meronomy. Well-known and commonly deployed in ontologies, actual meronomies need to be engineered and populated with unique solutions. Here, this includes adjacency of weapon parts and essentiality of parts to the threat of and the diagnosticity for a weapon. In this study video sequences are processed frame by frame. The extraction method separates colors and removes the background. Then image subtraction of the next frame determines moving targets, before morphological closing is applied to the current frame in order to clean up noise and fill gaps. Next, the method calculates for each object the boundary coordinates and uses them to create a finite numerical sequence as a descriptor. Parts identification is done by cyclic sequence alignment and matching against the nodes of the weapons ontology. From the identified parts, the most-likely weapon will be determined by using the weapon ontology.

  2. Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper examines international treaties in relation to the threat or use of nuclear weapons including the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It can be concluded that the effect of the aforesaid international treaties is still in doubt without explicit enforcement mechanisms and penalty for non-compliance. This paper also reviews the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and comments that a clear explanation on the legality of use of nuclear weapons in 'extreme circumstances of self-defence' is required. Examples from current state practice in relation to nuclear non-proliferation efforts are also provided, with special attention to China, North Korea and Iran. This paper suggests that China as a leader of developing countries should extend its efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and conduct communication between North Korea and Iran and other nuclear weapons states to reduce or prohibit nuclear weapons.

  3. Radiological Weapons: How Great Is The Danger?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moore, G M

    2003-06-01

    One of the underlying purposes of this paper is to provoke thinking about the interplay between the regulation of radioactive materials and the risk of their use in an radiological weapon (RW). Also considered in this paper are the types of RWs that a terrorist might use, the nature of the threat and danger posed by the various types of RWs, the essential elements that must be considered in responding to the terrorist use of an RW, and what steps may need to be taken a priori to minimize the consequences of the inevitable use of an RW. Because radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) have been the focus of so much recent concern and because RDDs are arguably the most likely of RWs to be used by a terrorist group, a major focus of this paper will be on RDDs. Radiological weapons are going to be used by some individual or group, if not this year then next year, or at some time in the foreseeable future. A policy of focusing resources solely on prevention of their use would leave any government open to significant economic disruption when the inevitable use occurs. Preplanning can limit the injuries, property damage, and economic losses that might result from the use of an RW. Moreover, a combination of efforts to prevent and to minimize the impact of RWs may significantly discourage potential users. The dangers from RWs can be dealt with while society continues to enjoy the benefits of nuclear technology that were promised under Atoms for Peace. However, some restructuring of our use of radioactive materials is necessary to ensure that the current and future uses of radioactive materials outweigh the potential disruption caused by misuse of the materials in RWs.

  4. Why Sexually Selected Weapons Are Not Ornaments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McCullough, Erin L; Miller, Christine W; Emlen, Douglas J

    2016-10-01

    The elaboration and diversification of sexually selected weapons remain poorly understood. We argue that progress in this topic has been hindered by a strong bias in sexual selection research, and a tendency for weapons to be conflated with ornaments used in mate choice. Here, we outline how male-male competition and female choice are distinct mechanisms of sexual selection, and why weapons and ornaments are fundamentally different types of traits. We call for research on the factors contributing to weapon divergence, the potential for male-male competition to drive speciation, and the specific use of weapons in the context of direct fights versus displays. Given that weapons are first and foremost fighting structures, biomechanical approaches are an especially promising direction for understanding weapon design. PMID:27475833

  5. Can Iraq be deterred from using weapons of mass destruction?

    OpenAIRE

    Klemick, Michael T

    1997-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited It generally is assumed that the threat of a U.S. nuclear strike deterred the intentional use of chemical and biological weapons by Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Evidence suggests that this assumption might be faulty, or at least incomplete. The purpose of this thesis is to test the common wisdom about nuclear deterrence and Iraq's non-use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) during the Gulf War. This thesis examines the u...

  6. Nuclear weapon states: Their roles, responsibilities and management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Four issues concerning the role of nuclear-weapon sates are briefly analyzed. The first is related to the importance of responsibilities that nuclear weapon states should take in order to improve the existing mechanisms for non-proliferation. Nuclear weapon states should cease further nuclear armament immediately and should unanimously agree to implement a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is both legal and moral obligation stipulated in the Non-proliferation Treaty. Second, an international plutonium management system needs to be established. The third issue is related to the need for IAEA special inspections (problem of North Korea). Difficulties could be overcome by strengthening the IAEA negotiation powers. Fourth, the IAEA and the international community could indicate their appreciation to states like South Korea that voluntarily abandon nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment in order to contribute to regional and global peace and stability

  7. Asynchronous data-driven classification of weapon systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This communication addresses real-time weapon classification by analysis of asynchronous acoustic data, collected from microphones on a sensor network. The weapon classification algorithm consists of two parts: (i) feature extraction from time-series data using symbolic dynamic filtering (SDF), and (ii) pattern classification based on the extracted features using the language measure (LM) and support vector machine (SVM). The proposed algorithm has been tested on field data, generated by firing of two types of rifles. The results of analysis demonstrate high accuracy and fast execution of the pattern classification algorithm with low memory requirements. Potential applications include simultaneous shooter localization and weapon classification with soldier-wearable networked sensors. (rapid communication)

  8. TESTING EUV/X-RAY ATOMIC DATA FOR THE SOLAR DYNAMICS OBSERVATORY

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Testa, Paola; Drake, Jeremy J. [Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, 60 Garden Street, MS 58, Cambridge, MA 02138 (United States); Landi, Enrico, E-mail: ptesta@cfa.harvard.edu [Department of Atmospheric, Oceanic and Space Sciences, University of Michigan, 2455 Hayward Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (United States)

    2012-02-01

    The Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA) and the Extreme-ultraviolet Variability Experiment (EVE) on board the Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) include spectral windows in the X-ray/EUV band. Accuracy and completeness of the atomic data in this wavelength range is essential for interpretation of the spectrum and irradiance of the solar corona, and of SDO observations made with the AIA and EVE instruments. Here, we test the X-ray/EUV data in the CHIANTI database to assess their completeness and accuracy in the SDO bands, with particular focus on the 94 A and 131 A AIA passbands. Given the paucity of solar observations adequate for this purpose, we use high-resolution X-ray spectra of the low-activity solar-like corona of Procyon obtained with the Chandra Low Energy Transmission Grating Spectrometer (LETGS). We find that while spectral models overall can reproduce quite well the observed spectra in the soft X-ray range {lambda} {approx}< 50 A, and at the EUV wavelengths {lambda} {approx}> 130 A, they significantly underestimate the observed flux in the 50-130 A wavelength range. The model underestimates the observed flux by a variable factor ranging from Almost-Equal-To 1.5, at short wavelengths below {approx}50 A, up to Almost-Equal-To 5-7 in the {approx}70-125 A range. In the AIA bands covered by LETGS, i.e., 94 A and 131 A, we find that the observed flux can be underestimated by large factors ({approx}3 and {approx}1.9, respectively, for the case of Procyon presented here). We discuss the consequences for analysis of AIA data and possible empirical corrections to the AIA responses to model more realistically the coronal emission in these passbands.

  9. Testing EUV/X-Ray Atomic Data for the Solar Dynamics Observatory

    Science.gov (United States)

    Testa, Paola; Drake, Jeremy J.; Landi, Enrico

    2012-02-01

    The Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA) and the Extreme-ultraviolet Variability Experiment (EVE) on board the Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) include spectral windows in the X-ray/EUV band. Accuracy and completeness of the atomic data in this wavelength range is essential for interpretation of the spectrum and irradiance of the solar corona, and of SDO observations made with the AIA and EVE instruments. Here, we test the X-ray/EUV data in the CHIANTI database to assess their completeness and accuracy in the SDO bands, with particular focus on the 94 Å and 131 Å AIA passbands. Given the paucity of solar observations adequate for this purpose, we use high-resolution X-ray spectra of the low-activity solar-like corona of Procyon obtained with the Chandra Low Energy Transmission Grating Spectrometer (LETGS). We find that while spectral models overall can reproduce quite well the observed spectra in the soft X-ray range λ ~ 130 Å, they significantly underestimate the observed flux in the 50-130 Å wavelength range. The model underestimates the observed flux by a variable factor ranging from ≈1.5, at short wavelengths below ~50 Å, up to ≈5-7 in the ~70-125 Å range. In the AIA bands covered by LETGS, i.e., 94 Å and 131 Å, we find that the observed flux can be underestimated by large factors (~3 and ~1.9, respectively, for the case of Procyon presented here). We discuss the consequences for analysis of AIA data and possible empirical corrections to the AIA responses to model more realistically the coronal emission in these passbands.

  10. Diagnosis and Prognosis of Weapon Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nolan, Mary; Catania, Rebecca; deMare, Gregory

    2005-01-01

    The Prognostics Framework is a set of software tools with an open architecture that affords a capability to integrate various prognostic software mechanisms and to provide information for operational and battlefield decision-making and logistical planning pertaining to weapon systems. The Prognostics NASA Tech Briefs, February 2005 17 Framework is also a system-level health -management software system that (1) receives data from performance- monitoring and built-in-test sensors and from other prognostic software and (2) processes the received data to derive a diagnosis and a prognosis for a weapon system. This software relates the diagnostic and prognostic information to the overall health of the system, to the ability of the system to perform specific missions, and to needed maintenance actions and maintenance resources. In the development of the Prognostics Framework, effort was focused primarily on extending previously developed model-based diagnostic-reasoning software to add prognostic reasoning capabilities, including capabilities to perform statistical analyses and to utilize information pertaining to deterioration of parts, failure modes, time sensitivity of measured values, mission criticality, historical data, and trends in measurement data. As thus extended, the software offers an overall health-monitoring capability.

  11. Testing the universality of free fall with rubidium and ytterbium in a very large baseline atom interferometer

    CERN Document Server

    Hartwig, Jonas; Schubert, Christian; Schlippert, Dennis; Ahlers, Holger; Posso-Trujillo, Katerine; Gaaloul, Naceur; Ertmer, Wolfgang; Rasel, Ernst M

    2015-01-01

    We propose a very long baseline atom interferometer test of Einstein's equivalence principle (EEP) with ytterbium and rubidium extending over 10m of free fall. In view of existing parametrizations of EEP violations, this choice of test masses significantly broadens the scope of atom interferometric EEP tests with respect to other performed or proposed tests by comparing two elements with high atomic numbers. In a first step, our experimental scheme will allow reaching an accuracy in the E\\"otv\\"os ratio of $7\\times 10^{-13}$. This achievement will constrain violation scenarios beyond our present knowledge and will represent an important milestone for exploring a variety of schemes for further improvements of the tests as outlined in the paper. We will discuss the technical realisation in the new infrastructure of the Hanover Institute of Technology (HITec) and give a short overview of the requirements to reach this accuracy. The experiment will demonstrate a variety of techniques which will be employed in fut...

  12. The future of nuclear weapons: Proliferation in South Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kamal, N. [Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabada (Pakistan)

    1992-12-31

    The signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987, followed by the dramatic changes in East-West relations since 1989 and the more recent Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreement, have greatly eased public concerns about the danger of nuclear war. The context has also changed for the Nonaligned Movement, which had made nuclear disarmament and condemnation of the concept of nuclear deterrence the primary themes of its multilateral disarmament diplomacy. More important would be the interrelationship among the states possessing nuclear weapons (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). In any case, there is little risk of a revival of nuclear competition. Both France and China have decided to sign the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); they are the only two nuclear-weapon states that have stayed outside the regime. Meanwhile, Brazil and Argentina have moved further down the nonproliferation road by engaging in confidence-building measures and moving closer to joining the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free zone established under the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967. South Africa has also agreed to embrace the NPT as well as a nuclear-weapons-free zone regime for the entire African continent, while North Korea has agreed to sign a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thereby allowing in principle international inspection of its nuclear facilities. In the third world regions, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and competitive nuclear buildup are most pronounced in South Asia, a region where a variety of complicating problems exist: acute threat perceptions, historical emity, religious and sectarian animosity, ethnic antagonism, territorial disputes, ambitions for regional dominance, and domestic political instability. This chapter will focus primarily on South Asia, although references will also be made to other regions, where relevant. 17 refs.

  13. Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. An agreement by exchange of letters of 5 February and 5 April 2001 with the Republic of Colombia in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. This Exchange of Letters constitutes an agreement confirming that: - the Safeguards Agreement of 22 December 1982, concluded between the Republic of Colombia and the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty), also satisfies the obligation of Colombia under Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA; the safeguards set forth in the Safeguards Agreement shall also apply, as regards Colombia, in connection with the NPT; the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply as long as Colombia is party to the NPT or the Tlatelolco Treaty or both

  14. Canadians, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War security dilemma

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This dissertation provides a history of Canadian ideas about nuclear weapons from the late 1950s until the end of the Trudeau era in 1984. Throughout this period, Canadians reacted to the insecurity they felt in the world around them by expressing many conflicting, often irreconcilable views about a range of nuclear weapon issues, including Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads in 1963, the U.S. ABM program in the 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Canadian nuclear technology in the development of India's first nuclear explosion, and the Trudeau government's decision to allow the U.S. military to test cruise missiles in northern Canada The dissertation concludes with an examination of the emergence of a broadly-based, increasingly mainstream and influential anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s, the clearest manifestation of the insecurity Canadians experienced at the time. .The nuclear debates examined in this dissertation reveal that Canadians were divided over nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the arms race, proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, they came to fundamentally different conclusions about how Canada's nuclear weapon policies, and its support for the nuclear policies of its alliances, would contribute to international stability and order. Some believed that their security rested on the maintenance of a strong Western nuclear deterrent and supported Canada contributing to its credibility; others believed that the constant modernisation of nuclear arsenals fuelled by the superpower arms race posed a serious threat to their security. This conceptual dilemma-the security through nuclear strength argument versus the fear that the quest for security through quantitative and qualitative improvements of nuclear stockpiles increased the likelihood of nuclear war-left Canadians divided over the value and utility of nuclear weapons and the strategies developed around them. At the same time, Canadians' ideas about nuclear weapons

  15. Weapons barrel life cycle determination

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Nebojša Pene Hristov

    2013-10-01

    Full Text Available This article describes the dynamic processes within the gun barrel during the firing process in exploitation. It generally defines the basic principles of constructing tube elements, and shows the distortion of the basic geometry of the tube interior due to wear as well as the impact it causes during exploitation. The article also defines basic empirical models as well as a model based on fracture mechanics for the calculation of a use-life of the barrel, and other elements essential for the safe use of the barrel as the basic weapon element. Erosion causes are analysed in order to control and reduce wear and prolong the lifetime of the gun barrel. It gives directions for the reparation of barrels with wasted resources. In conclusion, the most influential elements of tube wear are given as well as possible modifications of existing systems, primarily propellant charges, with a purpose of prolonging lifetime of gun barrels. The guidelines for a proper determination of the lifetime based on the barrel condition assessment are given as well. INTRODUCTION The barrel as the basic element of each weapon is described as well as the processes occurring during the firing that have impulsive character and are accompanied by large amounts of energy. The basic elements of barrel and itheir constructive characteristics are descibed. The relation between Internal ballistics, ie calculation of the propellant gas pressure in the firing process, and structural elements defined by the barrel material resistance is shown. In general, this part of the study explains the methodology of the gun barrel structural elements calculation, ie. barrel geometry, taking into account the degrees of safety in accordance with Military Standards.   TUBE WEAR AND DEFORMATIONS The weapon barrel gradually wears out during exploitation due to which it no longer satisfies the set requirements. It is considered that the barrel has experienced a lifetime when it fails to fulfill the

  16. Attempts to test an alternative electrodynamic theory of superconductors by low-temperature scanning tunneling and atomic force microscopy

    OpenAIRE

    Peronio, Angelo; Giessibl, Franz J

    2016-01-01

    We perform an experiment to test between two theories of the electrodynamics of superconductors: the standard London theory and an alternative proposed by J. E. Hirsch. The two alternatives give different predictions with respect to the screening of an electric field by a superconductor, and we try to detect this effect using atomic force microscopy on a niobium sample. We also perform the reverse experiment, where we demonstrate that a superconductive tip mounted on a qPlus force sensor with...

  17. Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Vladimír Pitschmann

    2014-01-01

    This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical we...

  18. Nuclear weapons non proliferation treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taking into account the devastation that a nuclear war would inflict upon mankind, and the resulting need to do all that is in our power to keep such a tragedy from occuring, as well as to implement measures to safeguard all the peoples' safety, each State that owns nuclear weapons and that is a part of the Treaty pledges not to trade nuclear weapons, other explosive devices nor the control over such instruments to any other entity whatsoever, wether directly or indirectly. Likewise, all States that does not posses any nuclear weaponry and that are part of the Treaty, in turn pledge not to receive from any other entity nuclear weaponry or other explosive devices in trade, wether directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire this fashion of weaponry and not to request or accept any help whatsoever in the manufacturing of nuclear weaponry or related devices. The present Treaty remains open to the subscription of other countries, on July 26, 1968, with Mexico as one of the signatory countries

  19. External Radiation in Dolon Village Due to Local Fallout from the First USSR Atomic Bomb Test in 1949

    OpenAIRE

    Imanaka, Tetsuji; FUKUTANI, Satoshi; Yamamoto, Masayoshi; Sakaguchi, Aya; Hoshi, Masaharu

    2006-01-01

    Dolon village, located about 60 km from the border of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, is known to be heavily contaminated by local fallout from the first USSR atomic bomb test in 1949. External radiation in Dolon was evaluated based on recent 137Cs data in soil and calculation of temporal change in the fission product composition. After fitting a log-normal distribution to the soil data, a 137Cs deposition of 32 kBq m-2, which corresponds to the 90th-percentile of the distribution, was t...

  20. Fringe-locking method for the weak equivalence principle test by simultaneous dual-species atom interferometers

    CERN Document Server

    Duan, Xiao-Chun; Mao, De-Kai; Zhou, Min-Kang; Shao, Cheng-Gang; Hu, Zhong-Kun

    2016-01-01

    We theoretically investigate the application of the fringe-locking method (FLM) in the dual-species quantum test of the weak equivalence principle (WEP). With the FLM, the measurement is performed invariably at the midfringe, and the extraction of the phase shift for atom interferometers is linearized. For the simultaneous interferometers, this linearization enables a good common-mode rejection of vibration noise, which is usually the main limit for high precision WEP tests of dual-species kind. We note that this method also allows for an unbiased determination of the gravity accelerations difference, which meanwhile is readily to be implemented.

  1. Research on Cloud Model and Swrl-based in Weapon Test Fault Prediction%基于云模型和SWRL预测兵器试验故障的研究

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    都业宏; 连素杰; 赵学刚

    2012-01-01

    将云模型理论和语言方式规则语言(Semantic Web Rule Language,SWRL)应用于预测兵器试验故障的研究,用MATLAB实现了正向云和逆向云发生器,用protégé建立了兵器试验故障本体并确立了SWRL规则.举例将云模型预测的数据输入兵器试验故障本体用SWRL规则进行了推理,以保证预测结果的正确性与一致性.%Cloud model theories and SWRL are applied in the research of fault prediction of the weapon experiments , and normal cloud generator and backward cloud generator are developed by MATLAB, and the weapon experiments fault ontology and SWRL rules are built with the prot6g6. An example is given that the data of cloud model predicting is inputted into the weapon experiments fault ontology to distinguish with SWRL rules to assure the accuracy and consistency of prediction result.

  2. Test of Bell’s inequality using the one-atom micromaser

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    A S Majumdar; N Nayak

    2001-02-01

    We examine a local realist bound in the case of a one-atom micromaser. It is shown that such a bound is violated using a simplified treatment of the micromaser. We consider the effect of dissipation in a proposed experiment with the real micromaser. It is seen that the magnitude of violation of a Bell-type inequality depends significantly on the cavity parameters.

  3. Atomic physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Research activities in atomic physics at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory during 1976 are described. Topics covered include: experiments on stored ions; test for parity violation in neutral weak currents; energy conservation and astrophysics; atomic absorption spectroscopy, atomic and molecular detectors; theoretical studies of quantum electrodynamics and high-z ions; atomic beam magnetic resonance; radiative decay from the 23Po,2 levels of helium-like argon; quenching of the metastable 2S/sub 1/2/ state of hydrogen-like argon in an external electric field; and lifetime of the 23Po level of helium-like krypton

  4. Attempts to test an alternative electrodynamic theory of superconductors by low-temperature scanning tunneling and atomic force microscopy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Peronio, Angelo; Giessibl, Franz J.

    2016-09-01

    We perform an experiment to test between two theories of the electrodynamics of superconductors: the standard London theory and an alternative proposed by J. E. Hirsch [Phys. Rev. B 69, 214515 (2004), 10.1103/PhysRevB.69.214515]. The two alternatives give different predictions with respect to the screening of an electric field by a superconductor, and we try to detect this effect using atomic force microscopy on a niobium sample. We also perform the reverse experiment, where we demonstrate a superconductive tip mounted on a qPlus force sensor. Due to limited accuracy, we are able neither to prove nor to disprove Hirsch's hypothesis. Within our accuracy of 0.17 N/m, the superconductive transition does not alter the atomic-scale interaction between tip and sample.

  5. An overview of the future of non-lethal weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alexander, J B

    2001-01-01

    During the past decade, vast changes have occurred in the geopolitical landscape and the nature of the types of conflicts in which technologically developed countries have been involved. While the threat of conventional war remains, forces have been more frequently deployed in situations that require great restraint. Adversaries are often likely to be elusive and commingled with noncombatants. There has been some shift in public opinion away from tolerance of collateral casualties. Therefore there is a need to be able to apply force while limiting casualties. Non-lethal weapons provide part of the solution. Among the changes that will influence the future have been studies by the US and NATO concerning the use of non-lethal weapons, coincidental with increased funding for their development and testing. New concepts and policies have recently been formalized. Surprisingly, the most strident objections to the implementation of non-lethal weapons have come from organizations that are ostensibly designed to protect non-combatants. These arguments are specious and, while technically and academically challenging, actually serve to foster an environment that will result in the deaths of many more innocent civilians. They misconstrue technology with human intent. The reasons for use of force will not abate. Alternatives to bombs, missiles, tanks and artillery must therefore be found. Non-lethal weapons are not a panacea but do offer the best hope of minimizing casualties while allowing nations or alliances the means to use force in protection of national or regional interests.

  6. Less-lethal munitions as extended-range impact weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hubbs, Ken

    1997-01-01

    With the proliferation of 'suicide by cop' incidents, the concept of less lethal (LL) impact munitions has definitely caught on. There is much to be said for sterile laboratory testing and wound ballistic studies, but having 'real world' operational data is invaluable. Two years ago, a data base was set up to collect this information. The data base continues to grow with incidents from a cross the country and others pursued internationally. Indications are that LL munitions deliver a similar amount of force as conventional police impact weapons i.e., police batons, PR-24's, nunchakus, etc. One advantage over conventional impact weapons, is that LL munitions can be used at much greater distances from a suspect or crown of rioters. This gave rise to the term: extended range impact weapons. Having the ability to examine numerous cases in which these LL munitions have been successfully used for the resolution of critical incidents, is beneficial in evaluating the application and defending the usage of these force options. This paper examines 187 less lethal shootings and discusses such things as: the distance the munitions were fired, the types of injuries sustained by the targeted suspect, the body area of impact, what, if any weapons the suspect was armed with, and the type of incident requiring police response.

  7. Law project (no. 1329) adopted by the Senate and authorizing the ratification of the agreement between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency relative to the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of nuclear weapons prohibition in South America and the Caribbeans area (two protocols together); Projet de loi (no. 1329) adopte par le Senat autorisant la ratification de l'accord entre la Republique francaise, la Communaute europeenne de l'energie atomique et l'Agence internationale de l'energie atomique relatif a l'application de garanties dans le cadre du traite visant l'interdiction des armes nucleraires en Amerique latine et dans les Caraibes (ensemble deux protocoles)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2004-01-01

    The French Senate adopted on January 6, 2004 the project of law which authorizes the ratification of the agreement between France, the European atomic energy community and the IAEA about the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons in South America and in the Caribbean area signed in Vienna (Austria) on March 21, 2000. The text of this treaty is attached to this law. (J.S.)

  8. Color image fusion for concealed weapon detection

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Toet, A.

    2003-01-01

    Recent advances in passive and active imaging sensor technology offer the potential to detect weapons that are concealed underneath a person's clothing or carried along in bags. Although the concealed weapons can sometimes easily be detected, it can be difficult to perceive their context, due to the

  9. Overview of surplus weapons plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rudy, G.

    1996-05-01

    The safe disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium is a very important and urgent task. While the functions of long term storage and disposition directly relate to the Department`s weapons program and the environmental management program, the focus of this effort is particularly national security and nonproliferation.

  10. Nuclear Weapons, Psychology, and International Relations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dougherty, James E.

    1976-01-01

    Fear of nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and nuclear was is widespread among the peoples of the world. However, to what extent do the fears (both rational and irrational) of policy-making elites and political masses produce actual effects upon the behavior of governments (who, after all, control the use of nuclear weapons)? (Author/RK)

  11. Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bing, G.F.

    1991-08-20

    This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

  12. "Fat Man and Little Boy": The Cinematic Representation of Interests in the Nuclear Weapons Organization.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Taylor, Bryan C.

    1993-01-01

    Examines the ironic "problems" of the 1989 Hollywood film "Fat Man and Little Boy" (portraying the construction of the atomic bomb at the Los Alamos Laboratory during World War II) to demonstrate the ideological operations of nuclear texts, and the role of the nuclear weapons organization as a symbolic form in cultural discourse. (SR)

  13. Electronic eyebox for weapon sights

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szapiel, Stan; Greenhalgh, Catherine; Wagner, Kevin; Nobes, Ryan

    2016-05-01

    We expand the effective size of the eyebox of a magnified telescopic weapon sight by following the movements of the operator's eye to create a larger, `electronic eyebox'. The original eyebox of the telescope is dynamically relocated in space so that proper overlap between the pupil of the eye and the exit pupil of the device is maintained. Therefore, the operator will perceive the entire field of view of the instrument in a much bigger spatial region than the one defined by the original eyebox. Proof-of-the-concept results are presented with a more than 3.5X enlargement of the eyebox volume along with recommendations for the next phase of development.

  14. Taser and Conducted Energy Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    LeClair, Thomas G; Meriano, Tony

    2015-01-01

    It is clear that CEWs are an increasingly prevalent law enforcement tool, adopted to address a complex and challenging problem. The potential for serious injury from a single deployment of a CEW is extremely low. The debate regarding the link between these electrical weapons and sudden in-custody death is likely to continue because their use is often in complex and volatile situations. Any consideration of injuries has to be put into that context. One must also consider what injuries to a subject would result if an alternative force method was used. Furthermore, the potential benefits of CEWs, including reduction in injuries to the public and law-enforcement officers, need to be considered. PMID:26630100

  15. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We all want to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The issue before us is how best to achieve this objective; more specifically, whether the peaceful applications of nuclear energy help or hinder, and to what extent. Many of us in the nuclear industry are working on these applications from a conviction that without peaceful nuclear energy the risk of nuclear war would be appreciably greater. Others, however, hold the opposite view. In discussing the subject, a necessary step in allaying fears is understanding some facts, and indeed facing up to some unpalatable facts. When the facts are assessed, and a balance struck, the conclusion is that peaceful nuclear energy is much more part of the solution to preventing nuclear war than it is part of the problem

  16. Weapon Control System for Airborne Application.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    M. Sankar Kishore

    2000-07-01

    Full Text Available The integrated fire' control system (IFCS plays an important role in the present-day fighter aircraft and helicopters. Wecapons, such as missiles (active/passive, rockets and guns may be present on thelfighter aircraft or helicopter .IFCS monitors the status of the weapons present on the vehicle and passes the information to pilot/co-pilot. Depending upon the health/availability of the weapons, IFCS selects/fires the weapons. An attempt has been made to bring out the details of one such IFCS. As a I stepping stone, smaller version is developed and same philosophy can be used for integrating ftlore and I more weapons. Here, emphasis has been made on design and development of weapon control unit which is the heart f IFCS, both in hardware and software. The system has been developed using a 486 DX2 processor, and an elaborate software has been developed in PL/M.

  17. Development and Testing of Atomic Beam-Based Plasma Edge Diagnostics in the CIEMAT Fusion Devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this report the development of plasma edge diagnostic based on atomic beam techniques fir their application in the CIEMAT fusion devices is described. The characterisation of the beams in laboratory experiments at the CSIC, together with first results in the Torsatron TJ-II are reported. Two types of beam diagnostics have been developed: a thermal (effusive) Li and a supersonic, pulsed He beams. This work has been carried out in collaboration between the institutions mentioned above under partial financial support by EURATOM. (Author) 17 refs

  18. Quantum electrodynamics tests and X-rays standards using pionic atoms and highly charged ions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The object of this thesis is to present a new measurement of the pion mass using pionic nitrogen X-ray spectroscopy and results on helium-like argon and sulphur spectroscopy. The new pion mass has been measured with an accuracy of 1.7 ppm, 30% better that the present world average value, and it is obtained from Bragg spectroscopy of 5 ->4 pionic nitrogen transitions using the theoretical predictions provided by quantum electrodynamics. We have got: m(π-) = (139.571042 ± 0.000210 ± 0.000110) where the first error is due to the statistics and the second is the systematic error. I present the calculation of the hyperfine structure and recoil corrections for pionic atoms using a new perturbation method for the Klein-Gordon equation. The spectrometer used for this measurement has been characterized with the relativistic M1 transitions from helium-like ions produced with a new device, the Electron-Cyclotron-Resonance Ion Trap. High statistics spectra from these ions have enabled us to measure transition energies with an accuracy of some ppm which has allowed us to compare theoretical predictions with experiment data. X-ray emission from pionic atoms and multicharged ions can be used to define new types of X-ray standards for energies of a few keV

  19. Toxikological and health aspects of nonlethal chemical weapons.

    OpenAIRE

    HAMERNÍKOVÁ, Magdalena

    2010-01-01

    ABSTRACT Toxicology and Health Aspects of Non-lethal Chemical Weapons. Non-lethal chemical weapons, which belong among the mass destruction weapons, have been one of the most frequently discussed topics recently. These weapons are able to disbar manpower or combat technology and weapons smartly and temporarily with minimum costs. The range of possible application of chemical weapons as non-lethal is probably wider compared to any other type, and there are a lot of means capable of immediate w...

  20. Characterization of a Simultaneous Dual-Species Atom Interferometer for a Quantum Test of the Weak Equivalence Principle

    CERN Document Server

    Bonnin, A; Bidel, Y; Bresson, A

    2015-01-01

    We present here the performance of a simultaneous dual-species matter-wave accelerometer for measuring the differential acceleration between two different atomic species ($^{87}$Rb and $^{85}$Rb). We study the expression and the extraction of the differential phase from the interferometer output. The differential accelerometer reaches a short-term sensitivity of $1.23\\times10^{-7}g/\\sqrt{Hz}$ limited by the detection noise and a resolution of $2\\times10^{-9}g$ after 11000 s, the highest reported thus far with a dual-species atom interferometer to our knowledge. Thanks to the simultaneous measurement, such resolution levels can still be achieved even with vibration levels up to $3\\times10^{-3}g$, corresponding to a common-mode vibration noise rejection ratio of 94 dB (rejection factor of 50 000). These results prove the ability of such atom sensors for realizing a quantum based test of the weak equivalence principle (WEP) at a level of $\\eta\\sim10^{-9}$ even with high vibration levels and a compact sensor.

  1. Nuclear weapon race does not stop

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    60 years after Hiroshima, the race for nuclear weaponry keeps on. The comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), signed in 1996 by the 5 official nuclear-weapon-owning states (Usa, Russia, China, U.K. and France), has not yet been implemented because its implementation requires the ratification of 44 states that harbour on their territories industrial or research nuclear reactors. Till now only 33 such states have ratified CTBT. CTBT aims at prohibiting any nuclear test whatever the amount of energy released in it. Countries like Usa, North-Korea, Russia, soon Iran... are suspected to develop new types of nuclear warfare. For 2005 the American Congress have decided to freeze the funding of programmes dedicated to the development of 'mini-nukes' like the bunker-burster. The international network of monitoring stations will soon cover all the world and will be able to detect and locate, in an almost automated way, any test involving an energy greater than 1 kiloton. 321 stations have been settled and their efficient detection systems are based on seismic or infra-sound or radioactivity or hydro-acoustic analysis. (A.C.)

  2. Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on behalf of the Board of Governors to all members of the Agency on the Non-Compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (INFCIRC/403) and on the Agency's inability to verify the non-diversion of material required to be safeguarded

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains the following items: Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on behalf of the Board of Governors to all members of the Agency on the non-compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of Safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the Agency's inability to verify the non-diversion of material required to be safeguarded; resolution adopted by the Board on 1 April 1993 (Annex 1); Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Annex 2); resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 25 February 1993 (Annex 3); Communications from the Director General of the IAEA to the Minister for Atomic Energy of DPRK or from the Minister for Atomic Energy of the DPRK of the Director General of the IAEA (Annexes 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12); statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pyongyang, 12 March 1993 (Annex 7); resolution adopted by the Board on 18 March 1993 (Annex 10)

  3. Statement by IAEA Director General on the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: No one who has seen the victims, the film footage or photographs of the aftermath of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II can fail to be horrified by the devastation that was wrought by the use of nuclear weapons. To date, Hiroshima and Nagasaki thankfully remain the only instances in which nuclear weapons have been used, and while it is difficult to speak of any good coming out of such ruin, it has always been hoped that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki stand as constant reminders of why preventing the further use and proliferation of such weapons - and why nuclear disarmament leading to a nuclear-weapon-free world - is of utmost importance for the survival of humankind and planet Earth. The International Atomic Energy Agency born out of President Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' vision, came at a time when the horrifying consequences and images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were still fresh. Through its safeguards and verification system in support of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other similar non-proliferation agreements, the IAEA has done a great deal of work to help stem the tide of nuclear proliferation, while ensuring that the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are made available to all those who want them. While the Agency can effectively verify compliance with non-proliferation undertakings, the value of these efforts can be better realized if they are reinforced by all other components of the nuclear non-proliferation and arms control regime, and accompanied by the political will and dialogue among concerned States to address underlying issues of security and confidence building with a view to achieving a system of collective security that no longer relies on nuclear weapons. A world without nuclear weapons remains a far-off goal and the world continues to be burdened with nearly thirty thousand nuclear warheads. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

  4. North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Implications for future policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This essay assesses North Korea's long-standing quest for nuclear weapons; alternative strategies for inhibiting Pyongyang's weapons development; and the potential implications for regional security and nonproliferation should the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) retain and enhance its weapons programs. North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability has long provoked heated debate among policy makers and research analysts about the purposes of engagement with the North, reflecting the repeated frustrations in efforts to negotiate Korean denuclearization. These debates reflect widely divergent views of the North Korean regime; its sustainability as an autonomous political, economic, and military system; and the potential consequences of continued nuclear development in this isolated, highly idiosyncratic state. These questions assume additional salience as North Korea approaches a leadership succession for only the second time in its six-decade history. The effort to inhibit North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons is among the longest running and least successful sagas in international security and non-proliferation policy of the past quarter century. In early 2010, Pyongyang claims a rudimentary nuclear capability by possession of weaponized plutonium, the conduct of two nuclear tests, and advances in the production of enriched uranium as an alternative means of fissile material production, though the latter step is nominally justified as a source for reactor fuel. North Korea defends its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent to counter what Pyongyang deems existential threats posed by the United States.Despite the resumption of high-level diplomatic contact between Washington and Pyongyang in late 2009, realization of a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula remains a very remote prospect. The DPRK insists that a peace agreement between the U.S. and North Korea and hence the cessation of 'hostile DPRK-U.S. relations' are necessary before any consideration of

  5. Summary of indicators of Nth country weapon development programs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A discussion of indicators that various phases of weapon development programs are being carried out is presented. An attempt is made to answer the question ''what observations can be made that would help in deciding whether country X is developing nuclear explosive devices.'' The indicators themselves are accompanied by some general discussions of what is likely to be going on in the areas of nuclear materials ''manufacture,'' nuclear materials chemistry, development and testing, scientific personnel, delivery systems, and evasion of safeguards

  6. No first use of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper reports that at present, nuclear weapons are considered legitimate, if terrible, weapons, usable as other weapons are for national purposes. In the West and in the East, strategy, military forces, readiness posture, all are based fundamentally on the threat and, ultimately, the use of nuclear weapons. In the West this threat is directed not only against a nuclear attack against the US or its allies, but also against conventional, non-nuclear operations beyond our ability to hold. The term for such nuclear deterrence of non-nuclear hostilities is extended deterrence. It has been at the heart of US and NATO policy for a generation. In the East, the Soviet Union has declared a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons, a declaration, that is to say, that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in any future hostilities, that they would fire them only in retaliation against nuclear attack. To make that declaration a sure control over Soviet and Warsaw Pact decisions and actions in crisis, however, and to make it so convincing to others that they can, cautiously, rely on it, the governmental announcement of the No First Use must be supplemented by a host of implementing and indoctrinating measures that are yet to be taken. Nuclear preemption, first use, has not yet by any means been eliminated from Soviet doctrine, force structures and weapons programmes

  7. Activities of clean up committee of Atomic Energy Society of Japan. Actual soil washing tests for agriculture and rice crop tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Clean up committee of Atomic Society of Japan has several kinds of activities for remediation of cesium contaminated soil in Fukushima prefecture in order to return to the native village, for example, advance of recovery of environments in Fukushima prefecture, making catalogue of various kind of decontamination technique, actual soil washing tests for agriculture and rice crop tests, Q and A for temporary storage for contaminated soil and materials. This paper outlines actual soil washing tests for agriculture and rice crop tests in Fukushima prefecture. We tested the actual soil washing method 'Ara-kaki' using water for rice fields. Once of 'Ara-kaki' decreased half of the radioactivity in rice field. Twice of 'Ara-kaki' decreased s quarter of the radioactivity there last year. This year, rice crop tests have been done in order to investigate the effect of dispersing zeolite and fertilizing in rice field of Fukushima prefecture. Amount of zeolite and fertilizer as parameter are changed to rice field. The results of the rice crop tests will be presented. (author)

  8. Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maaranen, S.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). Center for International Security Affairs

    1996-09-01

    Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures and dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.

  9. Toxicological issues after depleted uranium weapons attacked

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Depleted Uranium (DU) is a byproduct of the uranium enrichment for producing nuclear reactor or nuclear weapon. DU is used in the military as an armor-piercing projectile due to its hardness, strength, and density. A lot of DU weapons were fired in the Gulf War, and bring about critical environmental and internal contamination. Therefore, DU becomes suddenly a hot issue. Some toxicological problems after DU weapons attacked have been reviewed, which include features of internal DU contamination. Hazard of wound contamination and inhalation with insoluble uranium, and other urgent toxicological issues. The healthy effects of implanted with depleted uranium pellets were illustrated in particular

  10. Weapon container catalog. Volumes 1 & 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brown, L.A.; Higuera, M.C.

    1998-02-01

    The Weapon Container Catalog describes H-gear (shipping and storage containers, bomb hand trucks and the ancillary equipment required for loading) used for weapon programs and for special use containers. When completed, the catalog will contain five volumes. Volume 1 for enduring stockpile programs (B53, B61, B83, W62, W76, W78, W80, W84, W87, and W88) and Volume 2, Special Use Containers, are being released. The catalog is intended as a source of information for weapon program engineers and also provides historical information. The catalog also will be published on the SNL Internal Web and will undergo periodic updates.

  11. Weapon Control System for Airborne Application.

    OpenAIRE

    M. Sankar Kishore

    2000-01-01

    The integrated fire' control system (IFCS) plays an important role in the present-day fighter aircraft and helicopters. Wecapons, such as missiles (active/passive), rockets and guns may be present on thelfighter aircraft or helicopter .IFCS monitors the status of the weapons present on the vehicle and passes the information to pilot/co-pilot. Depending upon the health/availability of the weapons, IFCS selects/fires the weapons. An attempt has been made to bring out the details of one such IFC...

  12. The nuclear weapons complex: Management for health, safety, and the environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Department of Energy (DOE) operates 17 major facilities to develop and produce nuclear weapons. The facilities, which together are termed the ''weapons complex,'' include laboratores that design and test the weapons and components; materials for use in weapons; and weapons production facilities that either produce various components or assemble them into completed weapons, or both. This report, which was requested of the National Research Council by DOE at the direction of Congress, sets out an assessment of various management, environmental, health, and safety issues melting to the operation of the complex. An examination of the weapons complex is an immense undertaking. The facilities are located throughout the United States, and each of the major facilities is a huge and sophisticated operation. The total budget of the complex for FY 1990 amounts to some $10 billion and involves a staff of some 80,000 people working for the Department and its contractors. The Department confronts a variety of problems in connection with its stewardship of the complex. Many of the facilities are old, and maintenance over the years has been inadequate. There is a legacy of environmental contamination that must be addressed. Moreover, DOE must be prepared to operate under close public scrutiny and in compliance with environmental and safety standards that have become increasingly stringent over time. 42 refs., 8 figs., 4 tabs

  13. Ground Tests of Einstein's Equivalence Principle: From Lab-based to 10-m Atomic Fountains

    CERN Document Server

    Schlippert, D; Richardson, L L; Nath, D; Heine, H; Meiners, C; Wodey, É; Billon, A; Hartwig, J; Schubert, C; Gaaloul, N; Ertmer, W; Rasel, E M

    2015-01-01

    To date, no framework combining quantum field theory and general relativity and hence unifying all four fundamental interactions, exists. Violations of the Einstein's equivalence principle (EEP), being the foundation of general relativity, may hold the key to a theory of quantum gravity. The universality of free fall (UFF), which is one of the three pillars of the EEP, has been extensively tested with classical bodies. Quantum tests of the UFF, e.g. by exploiting matter wave interferometry, allow for complementary sets of test masses, orders of magnitude larger test mass coherence lengths and investigation of spin-gravity coupling. We review our recent work towards highly sensitive matter wave tests of the UFF on ground. In this scope, the first quantum test of the UFF utilizing two different chemical elements, Rb-87 and K-39, yielding an E\\"otv\\"os ratio $\\eta_{\\,\\text{Rb,K}}=(0.3\\pm 5.4)\\times 10^{-7}$ has been performed. We assess systematic effects currently limiting the measurement at a level of parts in...

  14. A nuclear-weapon-free world. Report on working group 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The stages of nuclear material management are reviewed in respect to dismantlement of nuclear weapons, disposal of weapon-grade fissile materials and cut-off of their production as well as START I and II reduction which are underway. Separate chapters are dealing with the comprehensive test ban treaty, verification, control and regulation in this matter, and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, Canberra Commission, the ABM USA-Soviet Treaty

  15. China's ASAT Weapon: Capabilities and the Potential Threat

    Science.gov (United States)

    Forden, Geoffrey

    2008-04-01

    Much has been said about China's 11 January 2007 test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon but few analysts have based their comments on a scientific determination of the weapons capabilities. This paper presents such an analysis derived from the observed pattern of debris, as observed by NORAD and posted on-line by NASA. It is clear that this was a direct hit-to-kill weapon (as opposed to a fragmentation-type explosive warhead), it massed about 600 kg, and was capable of accelerations of at least 6 Gs. It can be inferred with a reasonable degree of confidence that it used an on-board optical tracker, most likely operating in visible light. Furthermore, since the closing speed between the target satellite and the interceptor was 8 km/s during the test, this weapon could be used to attack satellites at higher altitude orbits, such as NAVSTAR/GPS and geostationary satellites that include communications and early warning satellites. This test produced ten times as many pieces of debris as an earlier US hit-to-kill ASAT test which, because of their higher altitudes, will last thousands of years---hundreds of times longer than the debris in the US test. China's test increased the chances of some low earth orbit satellite being hit by a piece of debris by 50%, from about 12% to 18% each year. Given this weapon's capabilities, it is possible to ``war game'' what an all-out Chinese ASAT attack would look like and what responses the US could take. (It is important to emphasize that this is a capabilities-based exercise and not based on Chinese intentions.) If China did launch such an attack, it could eliminate a large fraction of US military satellites in low earth orbit including photo-reconnaissance and electronic intelligence satellites, but not all of them, in the first 24 hours; the requirement that the target satellites be illuminated by the sun limits the attack. Furthermore, the US could maneuver its LEO satellites in the first hours of the attack and greatly

  16. Catalyst synthesis and evaluation using an integrated atomic layer deposition synthesis-catalysis testing tool

    Science.gov (United States)

    Camacho-Bunquin, Jeffrey; Shou, Heng; Aich, Payoli; Beaulieu, David R.; Klotzsch, Helmut; Bachman, Stephen; Marshall, Christopher L.; Hock, Adam; Stair, Peter

    2015-08-01

    An integrated atomic layer deposition synthesis-catalysis (I-ALD-CAT) tool was developed. It combines an ALD manifold in-line with a plug-flow reactor system for the synthesis of supported catalytic materials by ALD and immediate evaluation of catalyst reactivity using gas-phase probe reactions. The I-ALD-CAT delivery system consists of 12 different metal ALD precursor channels, 4 oxidizing or reducing agents, and 4 catalytic reaction feeds to either of the two plug-flow reactors. The system can employ reactor pressures and temperatures in the range of 10-3 to 1 bar and 300-1000 K, respectively. The instrument is also equipped with a gas chromatograph and a mass spectrometer unit for the detection and quantification of volatile species from ALD and catalytic reactions. In this report, we demonstrate the use of the I-ALD-CAT tool for the synthesis of platinum active sites and Al2O3 overcoats, and evaluation of catalyst propylene hydrogenation activity.

  17. Catalyst synthesis and evaluation using an integrated atomic layer deposition synthesis–catalysis testing tool

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Camacho-Bunquin, Jeffrey; Shou, Heng; Marshall, Christopher L. [Chemical Sciences and Engineering Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont, Illinois 60439 (United States); Aich, Payoli [Chemical Sciences and Engineering Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont, Illinois 60439 (United States); Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60607 (United States); Beaulieu, David R.; Klotzsch, Helmut; Bachman, Stephen [Arradiance Inc., Sudbury, Massachusetts 01776 (United States); Hock, Adam [Chemical Sciences and Engineering Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont, Illinois 60439 (United States); Department of Chemistry, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois 60616 (United States); Stair, Peter [Chemical Sciences and Engineering Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont, Illinois 60439 (United States); Department of Chemistry, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208 (United States)

    2015-08-15

    An integrated atomic layer deposition synthesis-catalysis (I-ALD-CAT) tool was developed. It combines an ALD manifold in-line with a plug-flow reactor system for the synthesis of supported catalytic materials by ALD and immediate evaluation of catalyst reactivity using gas-phase probe reactions. The I-ALD-CAT delivery system consists of 12 different metal ALD precursor channels, 4 oxidizing or reducing agents, and 4 catalytic reaction feeds to either of the two plug-flow reactors. The system can employ reactor pressures and temperatures in the range of 10{sup −3} to 1 bar and 300–1000 K, respectively. The instrument is also equipped with a gas chromatograph and a mass spectrometer unit for the detection and quantification of volatile species from ALD and catalytic reactions. In this report, we demonstrate the use of the I-ALD-CAT tool for the synthesis of platinum active sites and Al{sub 2}O{sub 3} overcoats, and evaluation of catalyst propylene hydrogenation activity.

  18. Catalyst synthesis and evaluation using an integrated atomic layer deposition synthesis–catalysis testing tool

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An integrated atomic layer deposition synthesis-catalysis (I-ALD-CAT) tool was developed. It combines an ALD manifold in-line with a plug-flow reactor system for the synthesis of supported catalytic materials by ALD and immediate evaluation of catalyst reactivity using gas-phase probe reactions. The I-ALD-CAT delivery system consists of 12 different metal ALD precursor channels, 4 oxidizing or reducing agents, and 4 catalytic reaction feeds to either of the two plug-flow reactors. The system can employ reactor pressures and temperatures in the range of 10−3 to 1 bar and 300–1000 K, respectively. The instrument is also equipped with a gas chromatograph and a mass spectrometer unit for the detection and quantification of volatile species from ALD and catalytic reactions. In this report, we demonstrate the use of the I-ALD-CAT tool for the synthesis of platinum active sites and Al2O3 overcoats, and evaluation of catalyst propylene hydrogenation activity

  19. Voice command weapons launching system

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brown, H. E.

    1984-09-01

    This abstract discloses a voice-controlled weapons launching system for use by a pilot of an aircraft against a plurality of simultaneously appearing (i.e., existing) targets, such as two or more aggressor aircraft (or tanks, or the like) attacking more aggressor aircraft. The system includes, in combination, a voice controlled input device linked to and controlling a computer; apparatus (such as a television camera, receiver, and display), linked to and actuated by the computer by a voice command from the pilot, for acquiring and displaying an image of the multi-target area; a laser, linked to and actuated by the computer by a voice command from the pilot to point to (and to lock on to) any one of the plurality of targets, with the laser emitting a beam toward the designated (i.e., selected) target; and a plurality of laser beam-rider missiles, with a different missile being launched toward and attacking each different designated target by riding the laser beam to that target. Unlike the prior art, the system allows the pilot to use his hands full-time to fly and to control the aircraft, while also permitting him to launch each different missile in rapid sequence by giving a two-word spoken command after he has visually selected each target of the plurality of targets, thereby making it possible for the pilot of a single defender aircraft to prevail against the plurality of simultaneously attacking aircraft, or tanks, or the like.

  20. IAEA Preliminary Assessment of the Former French Nuclear Test Sites in Algeria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1999, the International Atomic Energy Agency received a request from the Government of Algeria to perform an assessment of the radiological conditions of the former sites used by the French Government in the early 1960s for the testing of nuclear weapons. This paper describes the history and the nature of the test site and the tests that were performed, the methodology of the IAEA assessment and the results and conclusions drawn from the mission of international experts. (author)

  1. Standard test method for determining elements in waste Streams by inductively coupled plasma-atomic emission spectroscopy

    CERN Document Server

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2010-01-01

    1.1 This test method covers the determination of trace, minor, and major elements in waste streams by inductively coupled plasma-atomic emission spectroscopy (ICP-AES) following an acid digestion of the sample. Waste streams from manufacturing processes of nuclear and non-nuclear materials can be analyzed. This test method is applicable to the determination of total metals. Results from this test method can be used to characterize waste received by treatment facilities and to formulate appropriate treatment recipes. The results are also usable in process control within waste treatment facilities. 1.2 This test method is applicable only to waste streams that contain radioactivity levels that do not require special personnel or environmental protection. 1.3 A list of the elements determined in waste streams and the corresponding lower reporting limit is found in Table 1. 1.4 This test method has been used successfully for treatment of a large variety of waste solutions and industrial process liquids. The com...

  2. 50 kW laser weapon demonstrator of Rheinmetall Waffe munition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ludewigt, K.; Riesbeck, Th.; Graf, A.; Jung, M.

    2013-10-01

    We will present the setup of a 50 kW Laser Weapon Demonstrator (LWD) and results achieved with this system. The LWD is a ground based Air Defence system consisting of a Skyguard sensor unit for target acquisition and two laser equipped weapon turrets. The weapon turrets used are standard air defence turrets of Rheinmetall Air Defence which were equipped with several 10 kW Laser Weapon Modules (LWM). Each LWM consists of one 10 kW fiber laser and a beam forming unit (BFU). Commercial of the shelf fiber laser were modified for our defence applications. The BFU providing diffraction limited beam focusing, target imaging and fine tracking of the target was developed. The LWD was tested in a firing campaign at Rheinmetall test ground in Switzerland. All laser beams of both weapon turrets were superimposed on stationary and dynamic targets. Test results of the LWD for the scenarios Air Defence and C-RAMM (counter rockets, artillery, mortar and missiles) will be presented. An outlook for the next development stage towards a 100 kW class laser weapon on RWM will be given.

  3. Health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report briefly reviews previous WHO work on the health consequences of nuclear war and concentrates on current information about the effects of nuclear weapons on health, and related environmental problems. 15 refs

  4. Democracy, public opinion, and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    To the degree that people's fears of nuclear war are deep and pervasive, they become subject to manipulation by cynical or politically utopian promises, whether those promises be to abolish nuclear weapons from the earth or to create a leakproof peace shield (SDI). But the basic yearning for protection could also be mobilized to support serious arms reduction and arms control agreements. Nuclear weapons provide the basis for a vivid form of symbolic politics, perhaps equivalent in foreign policy considerations to the Korean and Vietnam wars during their durations, and in similar ways (although not necessarily as severe) as unemployment does among domestic policy issues. This paper presents survey research directed specifically at the role of public opinion on nuclear imagery (difference between expectation of nuclear war versus any kind of weapon war; willingness to spend on nuclear weapons versus conventional ones or general defense spending) can help in understanding these phenomena

  5. Weapons of mass destruction - current security threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This publication brings a complex and comprehensive view of the weapons of mass destruction phenomenon in the context of present military and political situation. It emphasizes the threat posed by proliferation of these destructive devices and their carriers as well as the threat present in their possession by unpredictable totalitarian regimes or terrorist groups. The publication is structured into four basic parts: Introduction Into The Topic, Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons. The Introduction reflects the latest developments on the field of military technologies, which lead to the development of new destructive devices with characteristics comparable to basic types of WMDs - nuclear, chemical and biological. Based on the definition of WMD as 'weapon systems with enormous impact causing mass destruction, population, equipment and material losses', the modern mass destruction devices are assorted here, such as ecological, radiological and beam weapons, aerosol and container intelligent ammunition, the outburst of dangerous chemical substances from infrastructure, non-conventional weapons and military devices. The Nuclear Weapons part depicts the most destructive device of mass destruction mankind ever invented in close detail. It maps the history of most significant discoveries in nuclear physics, development and construction of the first nuclear weapons, accumulation of nuclear warheads and their carriers in the Cold war era, attempts of nuclear disarmament and reducing the number of nuclear weapons in possession of superpowers and their proliferation in the world's crisis regions including North Korea and Iran. The chapters devoted to theoretical grounds and physical principles of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons' functioning, the main categories and types, as well as destructive effects and consequences of use contain an adequate mathematical apparatus. This chapter's conclusion brings the overview of nuclear armament of states that

  6. Computational Challenges in Nuclear Weapons Simulation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McMillain, C F; Adams, T F; McCoy, M G; Christensen, R B; Pudliner, B S; Zika, M R; Brantley, P S; Vetter, J S; May, J M

    2003-08-29

    After a decade of experience, the Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons. The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) program was established to provide leading edge, high-end simulation capabilities needed to meet the program's assessment and certification requirements. The great challenge of this program lies in developing the tools and resources necessary for the complex, highly coupled, multi-physics calculations required to simulate nuclear weapons. This paper describes the hardware and software environment we have applied to fulfill our nuclear weapons responsibilities. It also presents the characteristics of our algorithms and codes, especially as they relate to supercomputing resource capabilities and requirements. It then addresses impediments to the development and application of nuclear weapon simulation software and hardware and concludes with a summary of observations and recommendations on an approach for working with industry and government agencies to address these impediments.

  7. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization - the Stockpile Life Extension Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cook, Donald

    2016-03-01

    Underground nuclear testing of U.S. nuclear weapons was halted by President George H.W. Bush in 1992 when he announced a moratorium. In 1993, the moratorium was extended by President Bill Clinton and, in 1995, a program of Stockpile Stewardship was put in its place. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Twenty years have passed since then. Over the same time, the average age of a nuclear weapon in the stockpile has increased from 6 years (1992) to nearly 29 years (2015). At its inception, achievement of the objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) appeared possible but very difficult. The cost to design and construct several large facilities for precision experimentation in hydrodynamics and high energy density physics was large. The practical steps needed to move from computational platforms of less than 100 Mflops/sec to 10 Teraflops/sec and beyond were unknown. Today, most of the required facilities for SSP are in place and computational speed has been increased by more than six orders of magnitude. These, and the physicists and engineers in the complex of labs and plants within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) who put them in place, have been the basis for underpinning an annual decision, made by the weapons lab directors for each of the past 20 years, that resort to underground nuclear testing is not needed for maintaining confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S stockpile. A key part of that decision has been annual assessment of the physical changes in stockpiled weapons. These weapons, quite simply, are systems that invariably and unstoppably age in the internal weapon environment of radioactive materials and complex interfaces of highly dissimilar organic and inorganic materials. Without an ongoing program to rebuild some components and replace other components to increase safety or security, i.e., life extending these weapons, either underground testing would again be

  8. Prions: the danger of biochemical weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Eric Almeida Xavier

    2014-01-01

    The knowledge of biotechnology increases the risk of using biochemical weapons for mass destruction. Prions are unprecedented infectious pathogens that cause a group of fatal neurodegenerative diseases by a novel mechanism. They are transmissible particles that are devoid of nucleic acid. Due to their singular characteristics, Prions emerge as potential danger since they can be used in the development of such weapons. Prions cause fatal infectious diseases, and to date there is no therapeutic...

  9. Examining the discourse on nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Ghafele, Roya

    2000-01-01

    Nuclear weapons and language - is there a connection? Linguistics is an established science, but what has it got to do with nuclear weapons? This article was inspired by several international disarmament negotiations where I noticed that diplomats work in a communicative reality related to the nuclear arms issue. But is anyone involved in this highly political process aware of the activity of that process of talking? Observations showed that the political problem around the issue of nuclear a...

  10. Pantex: safety in nuclear weapons processing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johannesen, R E; Farrell, L M

    2000-11-01

    The Pantex Plant, located in the Texas panhandle near Amarillo, is a major Department of Energy (DOE) participant in maintaining the safety of the nation's nuclear weapons resources and protecting the employees, public, and environment. With more than 168,000 person-years of operations involving nuclear materials, explosives, and hazardous chemicals, Pantex has maintained a notable safety record. This article overviews the nuclear weapon activities at Pantex and describes their safety culture. PMID:11045518

  11. Economic Analysis of Investment in Nuclear Weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Martínková, Hana

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear weapons are a rather marginal issue in economics as opposed to the political realm where it is an ever-present topic concerning global security. This thesis argues that economics can make a valuable contribution to the nuclear weapons debate in several ways and aims to present those in a comprehensive manner. First, a cost-benefit approach is employed to show that costs and benefits go beyond counting dollars directly spent on nuclear arsenals. Second, market investment in nuclear wea...

  12. Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vladimír Pitschmann

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist.

  13. 48 CFR 217.173 - Multiyear contracts for weapon systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... weapon systems. 217.173 Section 217.173 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION... Mulityear Contracting 217.173 Multiyear contracts for weapon systems. As authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2306b(h... contract for— (a) A weapon system and associated items, services, and logistics support for a weapon...

  14. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11... § 15.11 Explosives and dangerous weapons. No person shall carry, use or possess within the Preserve... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond...

  15. High-Volume Non-Destructive Test Applications at the Hanford Atomic Products Operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safety and efficiency of critical Hanford processes are assured with rapid, reliable, and automatic non-destructive tests. High-sensitive eddy-current and ultrasonic inspection systems are in routine use in the field and in manufacturing production processes to provide maximum quality assurance of large volumes of material in minimum inspection time. This paper describes inspection systems being used to ensure quality of Hanford's production nuclear-fuel manufacturing processes. Operated as regular in-line manufacturing equipment, these systems employ ultrasonic attenuation measurements to monitor grain structure of bare uranium fuel cores, ultrasonic and eddy- current techniques to ensure adequate bonding and thickness of 0.040 in aluminium cladding on canned elements, and novel wide-band, high-resolution ultrasonic inspection techniques to detect defects in the fuel end-weld closures. Combined eddy-current and ultrasonic tests are applied simultaneously to perform a complete fuel- element inspection on a nine-second cycle; defective elements are automatically segregated from the process stream. Emphasis is given to advanced ultrasonic test methods of inspecting thin-walled, fuel-sheath tubing. Special highly focused transducers are used with wide-band circuitry to generate pure shear waves in 0.015-in-thick wall tubing. Lamb and other complicated wave motions are excluded so that tests results are readily interpreted and reproduced. Novel, economical methods of producing defect standards have been developed, as have critically important methods of ensuring uniform operating characteristics of the transducers themselves. Automatic tubing inspection equipment has been developed, and results of its routine use in testing some 30 000 ft of tubing are summarized. Finally, eddy-current techniques developed specifically for inspecting installed heat-exchanger tubing are reviewed. The technique employs novel read-out features which plot defect indications as oscilloscope

  16. Standard test method for atom percent fission in uranium and plutonium fuel (Neodymium-148 Method)

    CERN Document Server

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    1996-01-01

    1.1 This test method covers the determination of stable fission product 148Nd in irradiated uranium (U) fuel (with initial plutonium (Pu) content from 0 to 50 %) as a measure of fuel burnup (1-3). 1.2 It is possible to obtain additional information about the uranium and plutonium concentrations and isotopic abundances on the same sample taken for burnup analysis. If this additional information is desired, it can be obtained by precisely measuring the spike and sample volumes and following the instructions in Test Method E267. 1.3 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate safety and health practices and determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.

  17. The American atom: A documentary history of nuclear policies from the discovery of fission to the present

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In selecting these historical documents the authors have applied three general tests: first, does the document help tell the story of the development of American nuclear policy in a nontechnical way; second, is the source primary rather than secondary, written by an actor in the drama rather than by a member of the audience; third, does the document provide coverage of the major chapters in the story? The Manhattan Project was America's $2 billion secret project to build an atomic bomb. Many documents associated with the project have come to light only in recent years. In Section II they use the letters of J. Robert Oppenheimer and the recently declassified minutes of policy committees to tell the story of how the bomb was designed and built and how the decision was made to drop the first uranium and plutonium devices on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. How did a weapon of war become the key to a peacetime industry? In considering atomic energy after World War II, they focus in Section III on the legislative enabling acts that established the Atomic Energy Commission, the short-lived dream of international control of nuclear weapons under the Baruch Plan, and the ''atoms for peace'' program of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. By 1954 the highly classified work on nuclear weapons paralleled a new development of nuclear energy and power reactors. Knowledge was shared with both private industry and other countries. The fruits of this program are considered in the later section on nuclear power

  18. (+/-)-catechin: chemical weapon, antioxidant, or stress regulator?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chobot, Vladimir; Huber, Christoph; Trettenhahn, Guenter; Hadacek, Franz

    2009-08-01

    (+/-)-Catechin is a flavan-3-ol that occurs in the organs of many plant species, especially fruits. Health-beneficial effects have been studied extensively, and notable toxic effects have not been found. In contrast, (+/-)-catechin has been implicated as a 'chemical weapon' that is exuded by the roots of Centaurea stoebe, an invasive knapweed of northern America. Recently, this hypothesis has been rejected based on (+/-)-catechin's low phytotoxicity, instability at pH levels higher than 5, and poor recovery from soil. In the current study, (+/-)-catechin did not inhibit the development of white and black mustard to an extent that was comparable to the highly phytotoxic juglone, a naphthoquinone that is allegedly responsible for the allelopathy of the walnut tree. At high stress levels, caused by sub-lethal methanol concentrations in the medium, and a 12 h photoperiod, (+/-)-catechin even attenuated growth retardation. A similar effect was observed when (+/-)-catechin was assayed for brine shrimp mortality. Higher concentrations reduced the mortality caused by toxic concentrations of methanol. Further, when (+/-)-catechin was tested in variants of the deoxyribose degradation assay, it was an efficient scavenger of reactive oxygen species (ROS) when they were present in higher concentrations. This antioxidant effect was enhanced when iron was chelated directly by (+/-)-catechin. Conversely, if iron was chelated to EDTA, pro-oxidative effects were demonstrated at higher concentrations; in this case (+/-)-catechin reduced molecular oxygen and iron to reagents required by the Fenton reaction to produce hydroxyl radicals. A comparison of cyclic voltammograms of (+/-)-catechin with the phytotoxic naphthoquinone juglone indicated similar redox-cycling properties for both compounds although juglone required lower electrochemical potentials to enter redox reactions. In buffer solutions, (+/-)-catechin remained stable at pH 3.6 (vacuole) and decomposed at pH 7.4 (cytoplasm

  19. The flap by flap dissection in terminal ballistic applied to less lethal weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    de Freminville, Humbert; Rongieras, Fréderic; Prat, Nicolas; Voiglio, Eric J

    2011-06-01

    Medical examiners often have to solve questions such as firing distance and bullet trajectory for lethal weapons. Knowledge in the field of terminal ballistics has increased during the last 30 years and layer by layer dissection reveals superficial wounds that can be linked with the permanent cavity. At the end of the 1990s, terminal ballistics also focused on less lethal weapons and their wounds. Here, 2 different less lethal weapons with single bullets were tested on nonembalmed and undressed cadavers (N = 26) at different ranges and speeds. We have developed a technique for dissection which we call flap by flap dissection that reveals the advantage of the bullet-skin-bone entity, the absence of wounds linking its components and range of less lethal weapons. PMID:20110799

  20. Long-term retrievability and safeguards for immobilized weapons plutonium in geologic storage

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Peterson, P.F. [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States)

    1996-05-01

    If plutonium is not ultimately used as an energy source, the quantity of excess weapons plutonium (w-Pu) that would go into a US repository will be small compared to the quantity of plutonium contained in the commercial spent fuel in the repository, and the US repository(ies) will likely be only one (or two) locations out of many around the world where commercial spent fuel will be stored. Therefore excess weapons plutonium creates a small perturbation to the long-term (over 200,000 yr) global safeguard requirements for spent fuel. There are details in the differences between spent fuel and immobilized w-Pu waste forms (i.e. chemical separation methods, utility for weapons, nuclear testing requirements), but these are sufficiently small to be unlikely to play a significant role in any US political decision to rebuild weapons inventories, or to change the long-term risks of theft by subnational groups.

  1. Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. Summary of a United Nations study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In December 1988, by resolution 43/75N, the United Nations General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to carry out a comprehensive update of a 1980 study on nuclear weapons. The study was to take into account recent relevant studies, and consider the political, legal and security aspects of: (a) nuclear arsenals and pertinent technological developments; (b) doctrines concerning nuclear weapons; (c) efforts to reduce nuclear weapons; (d) physical, environmental, medical and other effects of the use of nuclear weapons and of nuclear testing; (e) efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban; (f) efforts to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and their horizontal and vertical proliferation; and (g) the question of verification of compliance with nuclear-arms limitation agreements. The Group's report is presented in nine chapters, eight of which are summarized here; chapter 9, entitled ''Conclusions'', is included in its entirety. In his foreword to the report, the Secretary-General observes that the study represents the most comprehensive review of the relevant developments in the field over the last decade and was carried out during a period of ''far-reaching changes in international relations'' and an ''unprecedented evolution in the relationship between East and West''. This period experienced for the first time the initiation of an effective process of reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles

  2. 76 FR 6087 - Draft Weapons Safety Assessment on the Use of Enhanced Weapons; Notice of Availability and...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-02-03

    ... COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 73 RIN 3150-AI49 Draft Weapons Safety Assessment on the Use of Enhanced Weapons... guidance document entitled ``Weapons Safety Assessment'' (WSA). This guidance would be used by licensees and certificate holders applying to the NRC to obtain enhanced weapons under the NRC's proposed...

  3. Microscratch testing method for systematic evaluation of the adhesion of atomic layer deposited thin films on silicon

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kilpi, Lauri, E-mail: Lauri.Kilpi@vtt.fi; Ylivaara, Oili M. E.; Vaajoki, Antti; Puurunen, Riikka L.; Ronkainen, Helena [VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd., P.O. Box 1000, FI-02044 VTT (Finland); Malm, Jari [Department of Physics, University of Jyväskylä, P.O. Box 35, Jyväskylä 40014 (Finland); Sintonen, Sakari [Department of Micro- and Nanosciences, Aalto University School of Electrical Engineering, P.O. Box 13500, FI-00076 AALTO (Finland); Tuominen, Marko [ASM Microchemistry Oy, Pietari Kalmin katu 1 F 2, FIN-00560 Helsinki (Finland)

    2016-01-15

    The scratch test method is widely used for adhesion evaluation of thin films and coatings. Usual critical load criteria designed for scratch testing of coatings were not applicable to thin atomic layer deposition (ALD) films on silicon wafers. Thus, the bases for critical load evaluation were established and the critical loads suitable for ALD coating adhesion evaluation on silicon wafers were determined in this paper as L{sub CSi1}, L{sub CSi2}, L{sub CALD1}, and L{sub CALD2}, representing the failure points of the silicon substrate and the coating delamination points of the ALD coating. The adhesion performance of the ALD Al{sub 2}O{sub 3}, TiO{sub 2}, TiN, and TaCN+Ru coatings with a thickness range between 20 and 600 nm and deposition temperature between 30 and 410 °C on silicon wafers was investigated. In addition, the impact of the annealing process after deposition on adhesion was evaluated for selected cases. The tests carried out using scratch and Scotch tape test showed that the coating deposition and annealing temperature, thickness of the coating, and surface pretreatments of the Si wafer had an impact on the adhesion performance of the ALD coatings on the silicon wafer. There was also an improved load carrying capacity due to Al{sub 2}O{sub 3}, the magnitude of which depended on the coating thickness and the deposition temperature. The tape tests were carried out for selected coatings as a comparison. The results show that the scratch test is a useful and applicable tool for adhesion evaluation of ALD coatings, even when carried out for thin (20 nm thick) coatings.

  4. Test of Equivalence Principle at $10^{-8}$ Level by a Dual-species Double-diffraction Raman Atom Interferometer

    CERN Document Server

    Zhou, Lin; Tang, Biao; Chen, Xi; Gao, Fen; Peng, Wencui; Duan, Weitao; Zhong, Jiaqi; Xiong, Zongyuan; Wang, Jin; Zhang, Yuanzhong; Zhan, Mingsheng

    2015-01-01

    We report an improved test of the weak equivalence principle by using a simultaneous $^{85}$Rb-$^{87}$Rb dual-species atom interferometer. We propose and implement a four-wave double-diffraction Raman transition scheme for the interferometer, and demonstrate its ability in suppressing common-mode phase noise of Raman lasers after their frequencies and intensity ratios are optimized. The statistical uncertainty of the experimental data for E\\"{o}tv\\"{o}s parameter $\\eta$ is $0.8\\times10^{-8}$ at 3200 s. With various systematic errors corrected the final value is $\\eta=(2.8\\pm3.0)\\times10^{-8}$. The major uncertainty is attributed to the Coriolis effect.

  5. Test of Equivalence Principle at 10(-8) Level by a Dual-Species Double-Diffraction Raman Atom Interferometer.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhou, Lin; Long, Shitong; Tang, Biao; Chen, Xi; Gao, Fen; Peng, Wencui; Duan, Weitao; Zhong, Jiaqi; Xiong, Zongyuan; Wang, Jin; Zhang, Yuanzhong; Zhan, Mingsheng

    2015-07-01

    We report an improved test of the weak equivalence principle by using a simultaneous 85Rb-87Rb dual-species atom interferometer. We propose and implement a four-wave double-diffraction Raman transition scheme for the interferometer, and demonstrate its ability in suppressing common-mode phase noise of Raman lasers after their frequencies and intensity ratios are optimized. The statistical uncertainty of the experimental data for Eötvös parameter η is 0.8×10(-8) at 3200 s. With various systematic errors corrected, the final value is η=(2.8±3.0)×10(-8). The major uncertainty is attributed to the Coriolis effect.

  6. Radiocesium Discharges and Subsequent Environmental Transport at the Major U.S. Weapons Production Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Garten, Jr. C.T.; Hamby, D.M.; Schreckhise, R.G.

    1999-11-14

    Radiocesium is one of the more prevalent radionuclides in the environment as a result of weapons production related atomic projects in the United States and the former Soviet Union. Radiocesium discharges during the 1950's account for a large fraction of the historical releases from U.S. weapons production facilities. Releases of radiocesium to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems during the early ,years of nuclear weapons production provided the opportunity to conduct multidisciplinary studies on the transport mechanisms of this potentially hazardous radionuclide. The major U.S. Department of Energy facilities (Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, and Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina) are located in regions of the country that have different geographical characteristics. The facility siting provided diverse backgrounds for the development of an understanding of environmental factors contributing to the fate and transport of radiocesium. In this paper, we summarize the significant environmental releases of radiocesium in the early -years of weapons production and then discuss the historically significant transport mechanisms for r37Cs at the three facilities that were part of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

  7. Report made in the name of the Commission of cultural affairs, familial and social on the law proposition (n.1258) of Misses Christiane Taubira relative to the admission and the indemnification of the victims of the nuclear weapons tests or nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The present proposition of law has for object to come up to the expectations of persons having participated to nuclear weapons test made by France between the 13. february 1960 and the 27 january 1996, in Sahara or French polynesia. The consequences on health can not be ignored even after several decades of years. Furthermore, the present proposition of law chooses to extend this measure to the victims of nuclear accidents. The Chernobylsk accident has shown that the French territory did not avoid to a risk inherent to this kind of activity. This project makes a census of the different nuclear tests with incidents, different accidents in France and the different kind of pathologies among the veterans and their progeny. The different steps for the victims to claim are detailed. Other states have adopted laws of compensation for the victims of their populations, civil or military ones. That is why this proposition of law comes today to be adopted. (N.C.)

  8. Testing the distance-dependence of the van der Waals interaction between an atom and a surface through spectroscopy in a vapor nanocell

    CERN Document Server

    Laliotis, A; Todorov, P; Hamdi, I; Dutier, G; Yarovitski, A; Saltiel, S; Gorza, M P; Fichet, M; Ducloy, M; Bloch, D; Laliotis, Athanasdios; Maurin, Isabelle; Todorov, Petko; Hamdi, Ismah\\`{e}ne; Dutier, Gabriel; Yarovitski, Alexander; Saltiel, Solomon; Gorza, Marie-Pascale; Fichet, Mich\\`{e}le; Ducloy, Martial; Bloch, Daniel

    2007-01-01

    This paper presents our current measurements in a vapor nanocell aiming at a test of the distance-dependence of the atom-surface interaction, when simple asymptotic descriptions may turn to be not valid. A state-of-the-art of atom-surface interaction measurements is provided as an introduction, along with the comparison with the theory of the van der Waals (or Casimir-Polder) interaction; it is followed by a presentation of the most salient features of nanocell spectroscopy

  9. Standard test method for graphite furnace atomic absorption spectrometric determination of lead and cadmium extracted from ceramic foodware

    CERN Document Server

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2000-01-01

    1.1 This test method covers procedures for using graphite furnace atomic absorption spectroscopy (GFAAS) to quantitatively determine lead and cadmium extracted by acetic acid at room temperature from the food-contact surface of foodware. The method is applicable to food-contact surfaces composed of silicate-based materials (earthenware, glazed ceramicware, decorated ceramicware, decorated glass, and lead crystal glass) and is capable of determining lead concentrations greater than 0.005 to 0.020 g/mL and cadmium concentrations greater than 0.0005 to 0.002 g/mL, depending on instrument design. 1.2 This test method also describes quality control procedures to check for contamination and matrix interference during GFAAS analyses and a specific sequence of analytical measurements that demonstrates proper instrument operation during the time period in which sample solutions are analyzed. 1.3 Cleaning and other contamination control procedures are described in this test method. Users may modify contamination cont...

  10. Simultaneous Laser-induced Fluorescence of Nitric Oxide and Atomic Oxygen in the Hypersonic Materials Environment Test System Arcjet Facility

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johansen, Craig; Lincoln, Daniel; Bathel, Brett; Inman, Jennifer; Danehy, Paul

    2014-01-01

    Simultaneous nitric oxide (NO) and atomic oxygen (O) laser induced fluorescence (LIF) experiments were performed in the Hypersonic Materials Environmental Test System (HYMETS) facility at the NASA Langley Research Center. The data serves as an experimental database for validation for chemical and thermal nonequilibrium models used in hypersonic flows. Measurements were taken over a wide range of stagnation enthalpies (6.7 - 18.5 MJ/kg) using an Earth atmosphere simulant with a composition of 75% N2, 20% O2, and 5% Ar (by volume). These are the first simultaneous measurements of NO and O LIF to be reported in literature for the HYMETS facility. The maximum O LIF mean signal intensity was observed at a stagnation enthalpy of approximately 12 MJ/kg while the maximum NO LIF mean signal intensity was observed at a stagnation enthalpy of 6.7 MJ/kg. Experimental results were compared to simple fluorescence model that assumes equilibrium conditions in the plenum and frozen chemistry in the isentropic nozzle expansion (Mach 5). The equilibrium calculations were performed using CANTERA v2.1.1 with 16 species. The fluorescence model captured the correlation in mean O and NO LIF signal intensities over the entire range of stagnation enthalpies tested. Very weak correlations between single-shot O and NO LIF intensities were observed in the experiments at all of the stagnation enthalpy conditions.

  11. Implementing the chemical weapons convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1993, as the CWC ratification process was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the CWC with national law could cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States as to how the CWC would be carried out. As a result, the author's colleagues and the author prepared the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Committee of CWC Legal Experts, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Central Europe, reviewed the Manual. In February 1998, they finished the second edition of the Manual in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The Manual tries to increase understanding of the Convention by identifying its obligations and suggesting methods of meeting them. Education about CWC obligations and available alternatives to comply with these requirements can facilitate national response that are consistent among States Parties. Thus, the Manual offers options that can strengthen international realization of the Convention's goals if States Parties act compatibly in implementing them. Equally important, it is intended to build confidence that the legal issues raised by the Convention are finite and addressable. They are now nearing competition of an internet version of this document so that interested persons can access it electronically and can view the full text of all of the national implementing legislation it cites. The internet address, or URL, for the internet version of the Manual is http: //www.cwc.ard.gov. This paper draws from the Manual. It comparatively addresses approximately thirty

  12. Implementing the chemical weapons convention

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kellman, B.; Tanzman, E. A.

    1999-12-07

    In 1993, as the CWC ratification process was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the CWC with national law could cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States as to how the CWC would be carried out. As a result, the author's colleagues and the author prepared the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Committee of CWC Legal Experts, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Central Europe, reviewed the Manual. In February 1998, they finished the second edition of the Manual in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The Manual tries to increase understanding of the Convention by identifying its obligations and suggesting methods of meeting them. Education about CWC obligations and available alternatives to comply with these requirements can facilitate national response that are consistent among States Parties. Thus, the Manual offers options that can strengthen international realization of the Convention's goals if States Parties act compatibly in implementing them. Equally important, it is intended to build confidence that the legal issues raised by the Convention are finite and addressable. They are now nearing competition of an internet version of this document so that interested persons can access it electronically and can view the full text of all of the national implementing legislation it cites. The internet address, or URL, for the internet version of the Manual is http: //www.cwc.ard.gov. This paper draws from the Manual. It comparatively addresses approximately thirty

  13. Frederic Joliot-Curie and the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The author describes the attitude and action of Pierre Joliot-Curie after the explosion of the first nuclear bomb in Hiroshima and during the following years. He notably describes the creation of the French CEA (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique), the commitment of Joliot-Curie for the creation of a scientist movement, the atomic negotiation within the United Nations, the creation and actions of the Mouvement de la Paix (from April 1949 until the Stockholm Appeal) within the Cold War context, the commitment of Joliot-Curie against weapons of mass destruction and its difficult relationship with his communists friends, his participation to the elaboration of the Einstein-Russel Appeal, and the Pugwash conference in 1957

  14. The design of the multifunctional training simulation system on the platform as the same as the weapon system

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Lu,Bin; Zhou,XiaoDong

    2003-01-01

    This paper presents the way to design the multifunc-tional (fighting, testing, maintenance, query about malfunctionetc) training simulation system on the platform of hardware thatas same as the weapon system with C++ Builder language.

  15. Are Cyber Weapons Effective Military Tools

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Emilio Iasiello

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available Cyber-attacks are often viewed in academic and military writings as strategic asymmetric weapons, great equalizers with the potential of leveling the battlefield between powerful nations and those less capable. However, there has been little evidence to suggest that cyber-attacks are a genuine military option in a state-on-state conflict. In instances of actual military operations (e.g., Afghanistan, Georgia, Iraq, and Israel/Gaza, there is little accompanying evidence of a military conducting cyber-attacks against either a civilian or military target. Given that some of the nation states that have been involved in military conflict or peacekeeping missions in hostile areas are believed to have some level of offensive cyber capability, this may be indicative. More substantive examples demonstrate that cyber-attacks have been more successful in non-military activities, as they may serve as a clandestine weapon of subterfuge better positioned to incapacitate systems without alerting the victims, veiling the orchestrator’s true identity via proxy groups and plausible deniability. Consequently, this paper provides a counter argument to the idea that cyber tools are instrumental military weapons in modern day warfare; cyber weapons are more effective options during times of nation state tension rather than military conflict, and are more serviceable as a signaling tool than one designed to gain military advantage. In situations where state-on-state conflict exists, high value targets that need to be neutralized would most likely be attacked via conventional weapons where battle damage assessment can be easily quantified. This raises the question: are cyber weapons effective military tools?

  16. Igniting the Light Elements: The Los Alamos Thermonuclear Weapon Project, 1942-1952

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anne C. Fitzpatrick

    1999-07-01

    The American system of nuclear weapons research and development was conceived and developed not as a result of technological determinism, but by a number of individual architects who promoted the growth of this large technologically-based complex. While some of the technological artifacts of this system, such as the fission weapons used in World War II, have been the subject of many historical studies, their technical successors--fusion (or hydrogen) devices--are representative of the largely unstudied highly secret realms of nuclear weapons science and engineering. In the postwar period a small number of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's staff and affiliates were responsible for theoretical work on fusion weapons, yet the program was subject to both the provisions and constraints of the US Atomic Energy Commission, of which Los Alamos was a part. The Commission leadership's struggle to establish a mission for its network of laboratories, least of all to keep them operating, affected Los Alamos's leaders' decisions as to the course of weapons design and development projects. Adapting Thomas P. Hughes's ''large technological systems'' thesis, I focus on the technical, social, political, and human problems that nuclear weapons scientists faced while pursuing the thermonuclear project, demonstrating why the early American thermonuclear bomb project was an immensely complicated scientific and technological undertaking. I concentrate mainly on Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's Theoretical, or T, Division, and its members' attempts to complete an accurate mathematical treatment of the ''Super''--the most difficult problem in physics in the postwar period--and other fusion weapon theories. Although tackling a theoretical problem, theoreticians had to address technical and engineering issues as well. I demonstrate the relative value and importance of H-bomb research over time in the postwar era to

  17. Heralded mapping of photonic entanglement into single atoms in free space: Proposal for a loophole-free Bell test

    OpenAIRE

    Sangouard N.; Bancal J.-D.; Muller P.; Ghosh J.; Eschner J.

    2013-01-01

    An obvious way to entangle two atoms located at remote locations is to produce a pair of entangled photons half-way between the two atoms, to sent one photon to each location and to subsequently map the photonic entanglement into the atoms. The efficiency of this process is, however, fundamentally limited due to overall transmission losses. We propose a method to herald the success of the mapping operation in free space without destroying nor revealing the stored quantum state. Interestingly ...

  18. The evolution of legal approaches to controlling nuclear and radiological weapons and combating the threat of nuclear terrorism

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    J. Herbach

    2015-01-01

    This chapter traces the evolution of international law related to the weaponization of nuclear and other radioactive materials, focusing in particular on the law pertaining to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism. International efforts to control atomic energy have evolved substantially since the on

  19. University Management of Weapons Labs? Yes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kahn, James S.

    1986-01-01

    Promulgates the view that university management of weapons laboratories provides the best scientific results, and more independent advice than could be possible under government or industrial management. Focuses on Los Alamos and Livermore national laboratories, operated by the University of California. (An opposing viewpoint is presented in SE…

  20. Creating competitive weapons from information systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wiseman, C; MacMillan, I C

    1984-01-01

    As the pace of competition intensifies in the 1980s, information systems will emerge as critical new weapons in the battle to gain an advantage over competitors. The authors show how a business can use modern information technologies to create a competitive edge by adding value to present products and services. PMID:10269062

  1. Stochastic Duel with Several Types of Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    N. Bhashyam

    1967-04-01

    Full Text Available This paper attempts to study a 'Stochastic Duel' model wherein each of the contestants has got more than one type of weapons. The ultimate probability of win for each of them is evaluated and the results for a few particular cases are given.

  2. Managing nuclear weapons in the United States

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miller, G.

    1993-03-16

    This report discusses the management and security of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war United States. The definition of what constitutes security is clearly changing in the US. It is now a much more integrated view that includes defense and the economy. The author tries to bring some semblance of order to these themes in this brief adaptation of a presentation.

  3. Optical countermeasures against CLOS weapon systems

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Toet, A.; Benoist, K.W.; Lingen, J.N.J. van; Schleijpen, H.M.A.

    2013-01-01

    There are many weapon systems in which a human operator acquires a target, tracks it and designates it. Optical countermeasures against this type of systems deny the operator the possibility to fulfill this visual task. We describe the different effects that result from stimulation of the human visu

  4. Impulse noise trauma during army weapon firing

    OpenAIRE

    Munjal, K. R.; Singh, V. P.

    1997-01-01

    A 100 infanty personnel firing modern weapons such as the Anti Tank Guided Missile, 106mm Recoiless Gun (RCL), 84mm Rocket Launcher (RL) and 81mm Mortar were studied for the effect of impulse noise on the ear and the evolution of the Temporary Threshold Shift (TTS), Recovery Time (RT) and Permanent Threshold Shift (PTS) was traced.

  5. The Spear: An Effective Weapon Since Antiquity

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Robert E. Dohrenwend

    2012-07-01

    Full Text Available The spear is perhaps man’s oldest weapon, and may even be his oldest tool. Over the hundreds of thousands of years of the weapon’s existence, it evolved from a pointed stick into an efficient hunting missile, and then became the most effective hand-held bladed weapon humans ever devised. The spear and its use is the only martial art originally devised for use against species other than our own, and more than any other weapon, the spear emphasizes the relationship between hunting and warfare. Virtually without exception, the spear is present wherever there are humans. The spear may claim to be the senior martial art, and the weapon is still in use today. Early techniques are preserved by the small number of Japanese sojutsu schools, and modern Chinese martial artists have developed elegant and impressive gymnastic routines for the spear. The javelin throw is a modern Olympic track and field event, and there are people who have resurrected the Aztec atlatl for sporting competition. Today, the spear is still used in Europe for hunting wild boar, and the continued issue of the obsolete bayonet to modern soldiers testifies to a deep, almost instinctive respect still possessed by the military for the spear.

  6. What Do Americans Know about Nuclear Weapons?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zweigenhaft, Richard L.

    1984-01-01

    Reports on a survey of knowledge of and attitudes toward nuclear weapons. Respondents (N=938) were students and adults aged 15 to 89 who completed a 51-item questionnaire. Also reports on an experiment in which college students (N=166) were given the survey under one of four different conditions. (JN)

  7. Principles of Guided Missiles and Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Naval Personnel Program Support Activity, Washington, DC.

    Fundamentals of missile and nuclear weapons systems are presented in this book which is primarily prepared as the second text of a three-volume series for students of the Navy Reserve Officers' Training Corps and the Officer Candidate School. Following an introduction to guided missiles and nuclear physics, basic principles and theories are…

  8. Cognitive Consistency in Beliefs about Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nelson, Linden

    The paper details a study supporting the hypothesis that people's opinions about nuclear arms control are influenced by their logically relevant beliefs about nuclear weapons, nuclear war, and the Soviet Union. The hypothesis should not be construed to imply that these beliefs are the only influences or the most powerful influences on arms control…

  9. Nuclear Weapons: Concepts, Issues, and Controversies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reardon, Betty; And Others

    1983-01-01

    The schools must confront and deal with the issues of the nuclear weapons controversy on pain of ceasing to be relevant to the critical needs of the rising generation. Every aspect of the nuclear arms controversy needs to be discussed in secondary and university classrooms. (RM)

  10. Europium-155 in Debris from Nuclear Weapons

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Aarkrog, Asker; Lippert, Jørgen Emil

    1967-01-01

    The lithium-drifted germanium detector enables determination of europium-155 on a routine basis in environmental samples contaminated with debris from nuclear weapons. From measurements of europium-155, cesium-144, and strontium-90 in air filters collected between 1961 and 1966, the yield...

  11. Atomic Absorption Spectrometry in Wilson’s Disease and Its Comparison with Other Laboratory Tests and Paraclinical Findings

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rana Fereiduni

    2012-03-01

    Full Text Available Objective: Wilson's disease (WD is an autosomal recessive disease with genetic abnormality on chromosome 13 causing defect in copper metabolism and increased copper concentration in liver, central nervous system and other organs, which causes different clinical manifestations. The aim of this study was to determine the sensitivity of different clinical and paraclinical tests for diagnosis of Wilson’s disease.Methods: Paraffin blocks of liver biopsy from 41 children suspicious of WD were collected. Hepatic copper concentrations were examined with atomic absorption spectrophotometry (Australian GBC, model: PAL 3000. Fifteen specimens had hepatic copper concentration (dry weight more than 250μg/g. Clinical and laboratory data and histologic slides of liver biopsies of these 15 children were reviewed retrospectively. Liver tissue was examined for staging and grading of hepatic involvement and also stained with rubeonic acid method for copper.Findings: Patients were 5-15 years old (mean age=9.3 years, standard deviation=2.6 with slight male predominance (9/15=60%. Five (33% patients were 10 years old. Three (20% of them were referred for icterus, 8 (54% because of positive family history, 2 (13% due to abdominal pain and 2 (13% because of hepatosplenomegaly and ascites. Serum AST and ALT levels were elevated at the time of presentation in all patients. In liver biopsy, histological grade and stage was 0-8 and 0-6 respectively, 2 (13% had cirrhosis, 1 (7% had normal biopsy and 12 (80% showed chronic hepatitis. Hepatic copper concentrations were between 250 and 1595 μg/g dry weight. The sensitivity of various tests were 85% for serum copper, 83% for serum ceruloplasmin, 53% for urinary copper excretion, 44% for presence of KF ring and 40% for rubeonic acid staining on liver biopsies.

  12. Water supply for the Nuclear Rocket Development Station at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's Nevada Test Site

    Science.gov (United States)

    Young, Richard Arden

    1972-01-01

    The Nuclear Rocket Development Station, in Jackass Flats, occupies about 123 square miles in the southwestern part of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's Nevada Test Site. Jackass Flats, an intermontane valley bordered by highlands on all sides except for a drainage outlet in the southwestern corner, has an average annual rainfall of 4 inches. Jackass Flats is underlain by alluvium, colluvium, and volcanic rocks of Cenozoic age and, at greater depth, by sedimentary rocks of Paleozoic age. The alluvium and the colluvium lie above the saturated zone throughout nearly all of Jackass Flats. The Paleozoic sedimentary rocks contain limestone and dolomite units that are excellent water producers elsewhere ; however, these units are too deep in Jackass Flats to be economic sources of water. The only important water-producing unit known in the vicinity of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station is a welded-tuff aquifer, the Topopah Spring Member of the Paintbrush Tuff, which receives no significant recharge. This member contains about 500 feet of highly fractured rock underlying an area 11 miles long and 3 miles wide in western Jackass Flats. Permeability of the aquifer is derived mostly from joints and fractures; however, some permeability may be derived from gas bubbles in the upper part of the unit. Transmissivity, obtained from pumping tests, ranges from 68,000 to 488,000 gallons per day per foot. Volume of the saturated part of the aquifer is about 3.5 cubic miles, and the average specific yield probably ranges from 1 to 5 percent. The volume of ground water in storage is probably within the range of 37-187 billion gallons. This large amount of water should be sufficient to supply the needs of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station for many years. Water at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station is used for public supply, construction, test-cell coolant, exhaust cooling, and thermal shielding during nuclear reactor and engine testing, and washdown. Present (1967) average

  13. The text of the Agreement of 14 July 1980 between Indonesia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The full text of the agreement between Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  14. The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the later years the risks of nuclear proliferation have again become a major topic of interest. This is primarily due to the acute problems caused by Iraq, North Korea, and the 3 new states of the former USSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Analysis shows that security problems and prestige are the two most important motives, when the risks of proliferation are considered. But motives are not enough. To produce nuclear weapons a number of technological requirements must also be fulfilled. The country must be able to produce almost pure fissile material, i.e. 235U or 239Pu. It must also be able to solve a number of metallurgical, explosive, ignition, physics and other problems. These are in particular non-trivial, if a implosion weapon is to be designed. A review is made of the nuclear facilities in a number of the countries which have been suggested as possible future nuclear weapons countries. In particular facilities which can produce almost pure fissile materials, 235U and 239Pu, are considered. The possibility of nuclear terrorists have often been discussed in the media. However, it seems very unlikely that even a major terrorist or mafia organization will be able to solve all the weapons design problems, even if they could steal the fissile material. It is finally discussed what can be done to reduce the risk of further nuclear proliferation. Political pressure can be brought to bear on countries outside the NPT to join it, but it can be counter-productive, and sometimes the countries that are able to exert such pressure, are not willing to do so for other political reasons. The problem of countries which are party to the NPT, but which are believed to acquire nuclear weapons capability in violation of the treaty, can be countered by unannounced inspections of non-declared facilities. However, such inspections can only be meaningfully performed if the necessary intelligence is available. (EG)

  15. The future of nuclear weapons in Europe workshop summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A summary is presented of a workshop that addressed the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. The workshop topics included the evolving European security environment; the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and nuclear weapons; the United States, NATO, and nuclear weapons; and Western Europe and nuclear weapons. The workshop, held at Los Alamos July 26, 1991, was sponsored by the Center for National Security Studies of the Los Alamos National Laboratory

  16. 43 CFR 423.30 - Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons, firearms, explosives, and... WATERBODIES Rules of Conduct § 423.30 Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. (a) You may possess... exceptions: (1) You must not have a weapon in your possession when at or in a Reclamation facility. (2)...

  17. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and arrows, air guns, spears,...

  18. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying...

  19. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives...

  20. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor...

  1. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is...

  2. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will...

  3. 10 CFR Appendix H to Part 73 - Weapons Qualification Criteria

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... Draw weapon and fire 2 rounds from prone position Shotgun 1 1 7 yards 2 Double 0 buck-shot 4 seconds At... position, then fire 2 rounds and reholster 2 15 yards 2 5 seconds Standing, draw weapon, move to kneeling...) Standing, draw weapon, fire 2 rounds, move to kneeling position and fire 2 rounds, reload and...

  4. 76 FR 76935 - Impact of Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Commercial Activities Involving...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-12-09

    ... Bureau of Industry and Security Impact of Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on... implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA), and the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR), has had on commercial...

  5. International safeguards to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The ever-expanding use of atomic energy not only promotes the welfare of mankind but also leads to the accumulation of nuclear materials which can be employed for building weapons of mass destruction. Certain progress has recently been made towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the main barrier against the diversion of nuclear materials for the production of nuclear explosive devices. The factors essential for strengthening non-proliferation are accession to the Treaty by all countries, above all those engaged in nuclear activities, effective national systems of control of and accounting for nuclear materials, and an effective system of IAEA safeguards, as envisaged by the Treaty. Substantial nuclear activities are being carried out in States not party to the Treaty, and it is in these cases that effective control by an international organization is particularly important. The paper considers ways and means of implementing measures which would further enhance the universal character of non-proliferation and improve its effectiveness. It also discusses the features of the IAEA safeguards system and the factors governing its effectiveness. It is concluded that the essential conditions for improving effectiveness are application of control to the entire fuel cycle in non-nuclear-weapon States, the perfecting of the IAEA safeguards system, including automatic processing of nuclear materials accounting data, and effective physical protection of nuclear materials. (author)

  6. From the nuclear stalemate to a nuclear-weapon free world. In memory of Klaus Fuchs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The following topics were dealt with: The first soviet atomic bomb and Klaus Fuchs, in illusory worlds of Andrei Sakharov, Edward Teller, and Klaus Fuchs, Klaus Fuchs as grandfather of the hydrogen bomb, memories of and thinking about Klaus Fuchs, the Scottish years of Klaus Fuchs 1937-1941, Klaus Fuchs in the mirror of the Venona documents, Gernot Zippe and the ultracentrifuge or east-west technology transfer in the cold war, secret impulses for the soviet nuclear project, responsibility of knowledge with anti-facism, philosophy, and science as well as peace as the first human right in the work of Klaus Fuchs, the request of Klaus Fuchs for a lasting peace, Klaus Fuchs in Daniel Granin's roman ''Escape to Russia'', ways to a nuclear-weapon free world, Otto Hahn and the declarations of Mainau and Goettingen, nuclear winter, initiatives of the GDR for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons in negative entropy, militarism and antimilitarism of the nuclear age, contributions of the young Klaus Fuchs to statistical physics, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the responsibility of the scientists for a socially effective and efficient energy change, Berlin-Bucher contributions to a world free of biological weapons. (HSI)

  7. The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Garaizar, Xabier [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2009-07-02

    In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

  8. Nuclear-weapon-free zones: Pursuing security, region by region. Conference of States Parties and Signatories of treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, over the past four decades, is a testament to what nations can do, region by region, to achieve common security objectives. In fact, when considering the history of nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it might be said that here in Mexico City is where it all began. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first multilateral treaty to establish a region free of nuclear weapons and a requirement for comprehensive IAEA safeguards for its parties - and clearly gave impetus to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones provide tangible security benefits. They help to reassure the larger international community of the peaceful nuclear intentions of countries in these regions. They provide their members with security assurances against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons by a nuclear-weapon State. They include control mechanisms for dealing with non-compliance in a regional setting. And in all cases, they prohibit the development, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in their respective regions. An important benefit of these zones is that they open a forum for expanded regional dialogue on issues of security. Because the causes of insecurity vary from region to region, security solutions do not come in a 'one-size-fits-all' package. It is for this reason that regional dialogues, as we see in the nuclear-weapon-free zones, are so beneficial. It is clear that such treaties, and such security dialogues, would be invaluable in other areas of the world, such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. Since the end of the Cold War, the international security landscape has undergone dramatic changes. For example, the rise in terrorism, the discovery of clandestine nuclear programmes, and the emergence of covert nuclear procurement networks have heightened our awareness of vulnerabilities in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This statement focuses on two issues

  9. Atoms for peace: thirtieth anniversary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper was prepared for the thirtieth anniversary of President Eisenhower's programme: ''Atoms for Peace''. The author wants to demonstrate that nuclear power has made major contributions to reduction of oil imports and that at the same time, despite repeated predictions of unbridled proliferation, the fact is that proliferation has proceeded at a dramatically slower pace than foreseen by some. To date no country has employed plutonium derived from the nuclear power fuel cycle to initiate its nuclear explosion program. The author concludes that the ''Atoms for Peace'' programme, from the viewpoint of its goal of reducing the spread of nuclear weapons, has been a successful policy. (NEA)

  10. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. Proceedings of the forty-fifth Pugwash conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the fiftieth year after the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Council of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, rededicates itself to the goals of the Russel-Einstein Manifesto of 1955 that initiated the Pugwash movement, to the abolition of nuclear weapons and abolition of war. Under dramatic changes in the post Cold War period, and the difficulties that United Nations are facing, it is concluded that United Nations role is indispensable. Within the framework of achieving a nuclear weapon-free world, the Conference Working group dealt with the implementation of START talks, dismantlement and disposition of nuclear weapons, international control, elimination of the relevance of nuclear weapons in military policies and international relations. Another major topic was related to reducing proliferation risks including Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, expanding and internationalizing the verification and control regime, IAEA safeguards, managing proliferation risks from civilian and weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium. An important topic was the security in the Asia-Pacific region

  11. Emergency management of chemical weapons injuries.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Peter D

    2012-02-01

    The potential for chemical weapons to be used in terrorism is a real possibility. Classes of chemical weapons include nerve agents, vesicants (blister agents), choking agents, incapacitating agents, riot control agents, blood agents, and toxic industrial chemicals. The nerve agents work by blocking the actions of acetylcholinesterase leading to a cholinergic syndrome. Nerve agents include sarin, tabun, VX, cyclosarin, and soman. The vesicants include sulfur mustard and lewisite. The vesicants produce blisters and also damage the upper airways. Choking agents include phosgene and chlorine gas. Choking agents cause pulmonary edema. Incapacitating agents include fentanyl and its derivatives and adamsite. Riot control agents include Mace and pepper spray. Blood agents include cyanide. The mechanism of toxicity for cyanide is blocking oxidative phosphorylation. Toxic industrial chemicals include agents such as formaldehyde, hydrofluoric acid, and ammonia. PMID:22080590

  12. Making Weapons for the Terracotta Army

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marcos Martinón-Torres

    2011-10-01

    Full Text Available The Terracotta Army of the First Emperor of China is one of the most emblematic archaeological sites in the world. Many questions remain about the logistics of technology, standardisation and labour organisation behind the creation of such a colossal construction in just a few decades over 2,000 years ago. An ongoing research project co-ordinated between the UCL Institute of Archaeology and the Emperor Qin Shihang's Terracotta Army Museum is beginning to address some of these questions. This paper outlines some results of the typological, metric, microscopic, chemical and spatial analyses of the 40,000 bronze weapons recovered with the Terracotta Warriors. Thanks to a holistic approach developed specifically for this project, it is possible to reveal remarkable aspects of the organisation of the Qin workforce in production cells, of the standardisation, efficiency and quality-control procedures employed, and of the sophisticated technical knowledge of the weapon-makers.

  13. Ending the scourge of chemical weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brin, J.

    1993-04-01

    After more than 20 years of arduous negotiations, representatives from 131 countries gathered in Paris in January to sign a treaty banning the development, production, and transfer to other countries of chemical-warfare agents and their means of delivery. The treaty - called the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC - complements the more limited Geneva Protocol of 1925, which bans the use of toxic chemicals in warfare. When the CWC enters into force in about two years, it will prohibit the manufacture for military purposes of lethal chemicals such as sulfur mustard, which causes painful skin blistering and lung damage, and nerve agents, which cause rapid death by interfering with the transmission of nerve impulses. The goal is to eliminate from the earth this particularly inhumane form of warfare. The paper discusses facets of the treaty, especially the verification challenge with its inspection on demand features. Short accompanying pieces discuss classifying chemicals and the destruction of chemical weapons under the CWC.

  14. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the last century, the rapid progress in science and technology enabled richer and more comfortable lives, but the other side of this double-edged sword is that science and technology have also been used to develop and improve high-tech weaponry. Due to this fact, deployed around the world are tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and detonation of only a few of them would kill some hundreds of million of people and destroy out civilization. The human race stands at a crossroad. What should be done? It is a crucially important responsibility for the Japanese government to work for peace in which there will be no fear or threat of nuclear weapons

  15. Weapon plutonium in accelerator driven power system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose and problems of the research - creation of a safe and reliable ADS for processing of about 25 tons of weapons plutonium in 30 years on the basis of a proton-accelerator with energies 0.8-1.2 GeV and a current of 10-30 mA; liquid Pb/Bi eutectic targets; one-directionally coupled fast/thermal blanket with plutonium fuel. The approach to weapons-Pu utilization is based on the understanding of the unconditional priority of safety features of ADS over economic considerations and, accordingly, on the priority of subcritical systems over critical. The description of a variant of ADS from the point of view of possibilities of its realization in an acceptable period of time on the base of approbated technologies is presented here. 7 refs., 4 figs., 1 tab

  16. Manhattan project II: Abolishing nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Most people seem to think that the era of nuclear danger is over, that it ended along with the Cold War. Whatever residual problems remain in terms of proliferation or possible terrorism, they believe, are being dealt urgently and adequately by their national leaders. Unfortunately, they are wrong on both counts. Although the risk of nuclear war between the NATO and former Warsaw Pact powers has virtually vanished, the chance that some nuclear weapons will kill many people, may be higher than before. The elimination of nuclear weapons, meaning rejection of terrorism, must be accomplished by multilateral collaboration. To recover fundamental moral bearings, as well as to preserve life and civilization, the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, India and Pakistan must cease to be terrorist states

  17. #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nissen, Thomas Elkjer

    In today’s conflict environment, transformed by information technology and of who can communicate and how, states, non-state actors, ad hoc activist networks and individuals create effect(s) in and through social network media in support of their objectives. #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia develops...... a framework for understanding how social network media shapes global politics and contemporary conflicts by examining their role as a platform for conduction intelligence collection, targeting, cyber-operations, psychological warfare and command and control activities. Through these, the weaponization...... of social media shows both the possibilities and the limitations of social network media in contemporary conflicts and makes a contribution to theorizing and studying contemporary conflicts....

  18. Storage of weapons-grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    With the end of the cold war, the United States has started to reduce its nuclear weapons stockpiles and will place special nuclear material (plutonium and uranium) into storage. The existing plutonium storage facilities are designed for short-term storage or to support operation of adjacent processing facilities. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is proposing to construct and operate a new plutonium storage facility as part of the reconfigured weapons complex, called Complex-21, to provide safe and secure long-term storage of plutonium materials. This facility will be required to meet new, more stringent requirements such as potential third-party inspection, enhanced safeguard and security requirements, and reduced personnel radiation exposure limits

  19. Implications of a North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lehman, R.F. II

    1993-07-01

    The Democratic People`s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the Cold War`s last remaining totalitarian regimes. Rarely has any society been as closed to outside influences and so distant from political, economic, and military developments around the globe. In 1991 and in 1992, however, this dictatorship took a number of political steps which increased Pyongyang`s interaction with the outside world. Although North Korea`s style of engagement with the broader international community involved frequent pauses and numerous steps backward, many observers believed that North Korea was finally moving to end its isolated, outlaw status. As the end of 1992 approached, however, delay and obstruction by Pyongyang became intense as accumulating evidence suggested that the DPRK, in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it would not accept additional inspections proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve concerns about possible violations and instead would withdraw from the Treaty. Pyongyang`s action raised the specter that, instead of a last act of the Cold War, North Korea`s diplomatic maneuvering would unravel the international norms that were to be the basis of stability and peace in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the discovery that North Korea was approaching the capability to produce nuclear weapons suggested that the nuclear threat, which had been successfully managed throughout the Cold War era, could increase in the post-Cold War era.

  20. Feature extraction from time domain acoustic signatures of weapons systems fire

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yang, Christine; Goldman, Geoffrey H.

    2014-06-01

    The U.S. Army is interested in developing algorithms to classify weapons systems fire based on their acoustic signatures. To support this effort, an algorithm was developed to extract features from acoustic signatures of weapons systems fire and applied to over 1300 signatures. The algorithm filtered the data using standard techniques then estimated the amplitude and time of the first five peaks and troughs and the location of the zero crossing in the waveform. The results were stored in Excel spreadsheets. The results are being used to develop and test acoustic classifier algorithms.

  1. Polonium-210 as Weapon for Mass Destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Properties of Po-210 make it possible for its use as weapon of mass destruction. Po-210 occurs naturally in minute quantities in the human body, in Uranium ore (< 0.1 mg Po-210 / ton ) and as a product of Radon-222 gas decay chain. Po-210 also occurs as deposition on vegetation (tobacco leaves). Po-210 is produced by bombardment of Bi-209 with neutrons in a nuclear reactor. Russia produces 8 grams per year for export to USA market

  2. A Proposed Taxonomy of Software Weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Karresand, Martin

    2002-01-01

    The terms and classification schemes used in the computer security field today are not standardised. Thus the field is hard to take in, there is a risk of misunderstandings, and there is a risk that the scientific work is being hampered. Therefore this report presents a proposal for a taxonomy of software based IT weapons. After an account of the theories governing the formation of a taxonomy, and a presentation of the requisites, seven taxonomies from different parts of the computer securit...

  3. Nuclear weapons and NATO-Russia relations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cornwell, G.C.

    1998-12-01

    Despite the development of positive institutional arrangements such as Russian participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council, the strategic culture of Russia has not changed in any fundamental sense. Russian strategic culture has not evolved in ways that would make Russian policies compatible with those of NATO countries in the necessary economic, social, technological, and military spheres. On the domestic side, Russia has yet to establish a stable democracy and the necessary legal, judicial, and regulatory institutions for a free-market economy. Russia evidently lacks the necessary cultural traditions, including concepts of accountability and transparency, to make these adaptations in the short-term. Owing in part to its institutional shortcomings, severe socioeconomic setbacks have afflicted Russia. Russian conventional military strength has been weakened, and a concomitant reliance by the Russians on nuclear weapons as their ultimate line of defense has increased. The breakdown in the infrastructure that supports Russian early warning and surveillance systems and nuclear weapons stewardship defense, coupled with a tendency towards has exacerbated Russian anxiety and distrust toward NATO. Russia`s reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate line of defense, coupled with a tendency toward suspicion and distrust toward NATO, could lead to dangerous strategic miscalculation and nuclear catastrophe.

  4. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP)

  5. Nuclear weapons and the World Court ruling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    based on the initiatives by non-governmental organizations, the World Health Organisation (WHO) Assembly asked the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion in 1993 whether, considering the environmental and health consequences, the use of nuclear weapons by a state in war or other armed conflict would be a breach of its obligations under international law. The World Court decided that it was not able to give an advisory opinion as requested, because of the fact that questions of use of force and such like were beyond the scope of specialized agencies like the WHO. The Court has ruled that the international community, especially the five nuclear weapon states have not only an obligation to negotiate a treaty for total nuclear disarmament, but also have an obligation to conclude such treaty. We may expect that the nuclear weapon states will cynically disregard the ruling of the World Court as they have been doing to the basic obligation itself in pursuit of nuclear hegemony. But the remaining 150 countries or so also bear a responsibility to keep nudging the recalcitrant states into implementing their commitments to disarm

  6. The Chemical Weapons Convention -- Legal issues

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-08-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers a unique challenge to the US system of constitutional law. Its promise of eliminating what is the most purely genocidal type of weapon from the world`s arsenals as well as of destroying the facilities for producing these weapons, brings with it a set of novel legal issues. The reservations about the CWC expressed by US business people are rooted in concern about safeguarding confidential business information and protecting the constitutional right to privacy. The chief worry is that international verification inspectors will misuse their power to enter commercial property and that trade secrets or other private information will be compromised as a result. It has been charged that the Convention is probably unconstitutional. The author categorically disagrees with that view and is aware of no scholarly writing that supports it. The purpose of this presentation is to show that CWC verification activities can be implemented in the US consistently with the traditional constitutional regard for commercial and individual privacy. First, he very briefly reviews the types of verification inspections that the CWC permits, as well as some of its specific privacy protections. Second, he explains how the Fourth Amendment right to privacy works in the context of CWC verification inspections. Finally, he reviews how verification inspections can be integrated into these constitutional requirements in the SU through a federal implementing statute.

  7. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Immele, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wagner, Richard L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in

  8. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

    Science.gov (United States)

    Middleton, Tiffany Willey

    2010-01-01

    In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

  9. Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  10. Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Dominican Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  11. Stable atomic hydrogen: Polarized atomic beam source

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We have carried out experiments with stable atomic hydrogen with a view to possible applications in polarized targets or polarized atomic beam sources. Recent results from the stabilization apparatus are described. The first stable atomic hydrogen beam source based on the microwave extraction method (which is being tested ) is presented. The effect of the stabilized hydrogen gas density on the properties of the source is discussed. (orig.)

  12. Optomechanical design of a field-deployable thermal weapon sight

    Science.gov (United States)

    Boucher, Marc-André; Desnoyers, Nichola; Bernier, Sophie; Bergeron, Alain; Doucet, Michel; Lagacé, François; Laou, Philips

    2007-09-01

    The use of uncooled infrared (IR) imaging technology in Thermal Weapon Sight (TWS) systems produces a unique tool that perfectly fulfills the all-weather, day-and-night vision demands in modern battlefields by significantly increasing the effectiveness and survivability of a dismounted soldier. The main advantage of IR imaging is that no illumination is required; therefore, observation can be accomplished in a passive mode. It is particularly well adapted for target detection even through smoke, dust, fog, haze, and other battlefield obscurants. In collaboration with the Defense Research and Development Canada (DRDC Valcartier), INO engineering team developed, produced, and tested a rugged thermal weapon sight. An infrared channel provides for human detection at 800m and recognition at 200m. Technical system requirements included very low overall weight as well as the need to be field-deployable and user-friendly in harsh conditions. This paper describes the optomechanical design and focuses on the catadioptric-based system integration. The system requirements forced the optomechanical engineers to minimize weight while maintaining a sufficient level of rigidity in order to keep the tight optical tolerances. The optical system's main features are: a precision manual focus, a watertight vibration insulated front lens, a bolometer and two gold coated aluminum mirrors. Finite element analyses using ANSYS were performed to validate the subsystems performance. Some of the finite element computations were validated using different laboratory setups.

  13. Corrosion and conservation of weapons and military equipment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bore V. Jegdić

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper analyzed the conditions for the occurrence of corrosion processes on historically important weapons and military equipment made of steel during the period in outdoor environment. A considerable attention has been given to the characteristics of the most important corrosion products formed on the steel surface. The formation of akaganite, β-FeOOH is a sign of active corrosion under a layer of corrosion products. The conditions that cause the formation and regeneration of hydrochloric and sulphuric acid during the exposure to the elements were analyzed. The most often applied methods of diagnostics and procedures of removing active corrosion anions (desalination were described as well. The NaOH solution of certain pH values still has the most important application for the desalination process. The procedures for cleaning the surface before the application of protective coatings and the application of chemicals that transform rust into stable compounds were discussed. As protective coatings, different types of organic coatings plated on well-prepared steel surfaces were used and sometimes special types of waxes as well. This paper presents the results of the tests of corrosion products taken from the exhibits of weapons and military equipment from the Military Museum in Belgrade.

  14. A system for automated, dismantlement of plutonium weapons components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The development of advanced dismantlement technologies will play an integral part on the changing role of the DOE. As an important component to this effort, the ARIES (Automated Retirement and Integrated Extraction System) System is designed to provide a test bed for the development of technology for the dismantlement of the primaries of nuclear weapons (pits). The ARIES system will integrate and automate the processes of pit disassembly, plutonium, plutonium removal, preparation of oxide from plutonium metal, decontamination of non-plutonium parts, and in-line measurement of the products and wastes by state-of-the-art non-destructive assay (NDA) methods. No integrated method now exists for the dismantlement and recovery of nuclear material from many weapons designs. Even those assemblies for which recovery techniques have been established require extensive manual handling (with associated personnel exposure to radiation) and result in considerable waste generation during dismantlement. The disposition of excess plutonium will require a facility to disassemble and remove plutonium from the pits. ARIES will provide the methods to satisfy this goal while at the same time reducing waste generation, lowering personnel radiation exposures, and operating to the highest standards of safety and security. A description of the ARIES system is given

  15. Measures to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tanzman, E.; Kellman, B.

    1999-11-05

    This seminar is another excellent opportunity for those involved in preventing chemical weapons production and use to learn from each other about how the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) can become a foundation of arms control in Africa and around the world. The author is grateful to the staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for inviting him to address this distinguished seminar. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone, and do not represent the position of the government of the US nor or of any other institution. In 1993, as the process of CWC ratification was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the treaty with national law would cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States Parties in how the Convention would be carried out. As a result the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention was prepared and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Manual was reviewed by the Committee of Legal Experts on National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Mica. In February 1998, the second edition of the Manual was published in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The second edition 1998 clarified the national implementation options to reflect post-entry-into-force thinking, added extensive references to national implementing measures that had been enacted by various States Parties, and included a prototype national implementing statute developed by the authors to provide a starting point for those whose national implementing

  16. Pyrochemical conversion of weapon-grade plutonium into plutonium oxide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    One of the objectives of the French-Russian studies conducted from 1993 to 1996 under the AIDA-MOX 1 program was to define a reference process for converting the weapon-grade plutonium excess (designated W-Pu) into plutonium dioxide for further use as MOX fuel in existing nuclear reactors. Among the different selected options, one is performed in molten alkali chlorides bath at high temperature. Several laboratory-scale tests have permitted to demonstrate the feasibility of this conversion in this medium. The main results described in this paper -conversion yield, plutonium purification beside gallium, americium and other impurities, - tend to confirm that pyrochemical processes could offer potential interests if however the plutonium oxide sinterability is proved in next tests. (authors)

  17. Is there any future for nuclear weapons?; Les armes nucleaires ont-elles un avenir?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heisbourg, F.

    2011-07-01

    Nuclear weapons occupy a paradoxal place both in the collective imagination and in the historical reality: on the one hand everybody dreads the apocalypse horror, and on the other hand, dissuasion appears as an unchanging and quite comfortable situation. However, the world has become multipolar in this domain as well. The geopolitical map is reconstructing. Doctrinal revisions, initiatives against nuclear weapons proliferation, and nuclear disarmament measures are now on the agenda. The best foreign and French experts examine for the first time the consequences of these evolutions. They analyse in particular the split up risks and the potential consequences of a nuclear conflict in regions where atomic arms have become a key-component of the strategic landscape: Middle-Est, Far-East, Southern Asia. The choices France and its allies will have to face are examined as well. (J.S.)

  18. Tonopah test range - outpost of Sandia National Laboratories

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, L.

    1996-03-01

    Tonopah Test Range is a unique historic site. Established in 1957 by Sandia Corporation, Tonopah Test Range in Nevada provided an isolated place for the Atomic Energy Commission to test ballistics and non-nuclear features of atomic weapons. It served this and allied purposes well for nearly forty years, contributing immeasurably to a peaceful conclusion to the long arms race remembered as the Cold War. This report is a brief review of historical highlights at Tonopah Test Range. Sandia`s Los Lunas, Salton Sea, Kauai, and Edgewood testing ranges also receive abridged mention. Although Sandia`s test ranges are the subject, the central focus is on the people who managed and operated the range. Comments from historical figures are interspersed through the narrative to establish this perspective, and at the end a few observations concerning the range`s future are provided.

  19. Why are sexually selected weapons almost absent in females?

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Anders BERGLUND

    2013-01-01

    In sex role reversed species,predominantly females evolve sexually selected traits,such as ornaments and/or weapons.Female ornaments are common and their function well documented in many species,whether sex role reversed or not.However,sexually selected female weapons seem totally absent except for small wing spurs in three jacana species,present in both males and females.This poor female weaponry is in sharp contrast to the situation in species with conventional sex roles:males commonly have evolved sexually selected weapons as well as ornaments.At the same time,females in many taxa have naturally selected weapons,used in competition over resources or in predator defence.Why are sexually selected weapons then so rare,almost absent,in females? Here I briefly review weaponry in females and the function of these weapons,conclude that the near absence of sexually selected weapons begs an explanation,and suggest that costs of sexually selected weapons may exceed costs of ornaments.Females are more constrained when evolving sexually selected traits compared to males,at least compared to those males that do not provide direct benefits,as trait costs reduce a female's fecundity.I suggest that this constraining trade-off between trait and fecundity restricts females to evolve ornaments but rarely weapons.The same may apply to paternally investing males.Whether sexually selected weapons actually are more costly than sexually selected ornaments remains to be investigated.

  20. Atomic arias

    Science.gov (United States)

    Crease, Robert P.

    2009-01-01

    The American composer John Adams uses opera to dramatize controversial current events. His 1987 work Nixon in China was about the landmark meeting in 1972 between US President Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong of China; The Death of Klinghoffer (1991) was a musical re-enactment of an incident in 1985 when Palestinian terrorists kidnapped and murdered a wheelchair-bound Jewish tourist on a cruise ship. Adams's latest opera, Doctor Atomic, is also tied to a controversial event: the first atomic-bomb test in Alamogordo, New Mexico, on 16 June 1945. The opera premièred in San Francisco in 2005, had a highly publicized debut at the Metropolitan Opera in New York in 2008, and will have another debut on 25 February - with essentially the same cast - at the English National Opera in London.

  1. Mission possible: Nuclear weapons inspections in Iraq - 7 March 2003. Essay, published in the Wall Street Journal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For the past three months, a cadre of highly trained inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been on a focused mission: to verify, through intrusive inspection, the existence or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. Nuclear weapons inspections in Iraq are making marked progress. To date, no substantiated evidence was found of the revival in Iraq of a nuclear weapons programme - the most lethal of the weapons of mass destruction. No verification programme can provide absolute guarantees that every facility or piece of equipment has been seen; there is always some degree of risk - and for that reason we need to continue to maintain a monitoring and verification presence in Iraq well into the future. For the present, we intend to continue our programme of intrusive inspection, making use of all the authority granted to us by the Security Council and all the information provided by other States. Barring any unforeseen circumstances, and provided that the level of co-operation by Iraq accelerates and support by other States continues, the IAEA should be able, in the near future, to provide the Security Council with credible assurance regarding the presence or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq

  2. A strategy for weapons-grade plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sylvester, K.W.B. [Iowa State Univ., Ames, IA (United States)

    1994-09-01

    A political as well as technical analysis was performed to determine the feasibility of glassification (vitrification) for weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) disposition. The political analysis provided the criteria necessary to compare alternative storage forms. The technical areas of weapon useability and environmental safety were then computationally and experimentally explored and a vitrification implementation strategy postulated. The Monte Carlo Neutron Photon (MCNP) computer code was used to model the effect of blending WGPu with reactor grade Pu (RGPu). A mixture of 30% RGPu and 70% WGPu more than doubled the surface flux from a bare sphere of the mixture which assumedly correlates to a significantly increased predetonation probability. Rare earth diluents were also examined (using MCNP) for their ability to increase the compressed critical mass of the WGPu mixture. The rare earths (notably Eu) were effective in this regard. As Pu-239 has a 24,100 year half life, reactivity control in the long term is an environmental safety issue. Rare earths were investigated as criticality controllers due to their neutron absorption capabilities and insolubility in aqueous environments. Thorium (a Pu surrogate) and the rare earths Eu, Gd, and Sm were added to two standard frits (ARM-1 and SRL-165) and formed into glass. Aqueous leach tests were performed (using MCC-1P guidelines) to measure rare earth leaching and determine the added elements` effects on glass durability. Europium was much more leach resistant than boron in the glasses tested. The elements had no negative effect on the environmental durability of the glasses tested at 90 C and minimal effect at room temperature. No fission product releases were detected in the ARM-1 compositions (which contained numerous simulated fission products).

  3. A strategy for weapons-grade plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A political as well as technical analysis was performed to determine the feasibility of glassification (vitrification) for weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) disposition. The political analysis provided the criteria necessary to compare alternative storage forms. The technical areas of weapon useability and environmental safety were then computationally and experimentally explored and a vitrification implementation strategy postulated. The Monte Carlo Neutron Photon (MCNP) computer code was used to model the effect of blending WGPu with reactor grade Pu (RGPu). A mixture of 30% RGPu and 70% WGPu more than doubled the surface flux from a bare sphere of the mixture which assumedly correlates to a significantly increased predetonation probability. Rare earth diluents were also examined (using MCNP) for their ability to increase the compressed critical mass of the WGPu mixture. The rare earths (notably Eu) were effective in this regard. As Pu-239 has a 24,100 year half life, reactivity control in the long term is an environmental safety issue. Rare earths were investigated as criticality controllers due to their neutron absorption capabilities and insolubility in aqueous environments. Thorium (a Pu surrogate) and the rare earths Eu, Gd, and Sm were added to two standard frits (ARM-1 and SRL-165) and formed into glass. Aqueous leach tests were performed (using MCC-1P guidelines) to measure rare earth leaching and determine the added elements' effects on glass durability. Europium was much more leach resistant than boron in the glasses tested. The elements had no negative effect on the environmental durability of the glasses tested at 90 C and minimal effect at room temperature. No fission product releases were detected in the ARM-1 compositions (which contained numerous simulated fission products)

  4. The interaction between clothing and air weapon pellets.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wightman, G; Wark, K; Thomson, J

    2015-01-01

    Comparatively few studies have been carried out on air weapon injuries yet there are significant number of injuries and fatalities caused by these low power weapons because of their availability and the public perception that because they need no licence they are assumed to be safe. In this study ballistic gel was tested by Bloom and rupture tests to check on consistency of production. Two series of tests were carried out firing into unclothed gel blocks and blocks loosely covered by different items of clothing to simulate attire (tee shirt, jeans, fleece, and jacket). The damage to the clothing caused by different shaped pellets when fired at different ranges was examined. The apparent hole size was affected by the shape of pellet (round, pointed, flat and hollow point) and whether damage was predominantly caused by pushing yarn to one side or by laceration of the yarn through cutting or tearing. The study also compared penetration into clothed gel and unclothed gel under identical conditions, and loose clothing greatly reduced penetration. With loose clothing at 9.1 m range clothing reduced penetration to 50-70% of the penetration of unclothed gel but at 18.3m range only 7 out of 36 shots penetrated the gel. This cannot be accounted for by the energy loss at the longer range (3-7% reduction from 9.1 m to 18.3 m range in unclothed gels) and it is suggested that impulse may have a role to play. Shots that did not penetrate the gel were used to estimate the possible stopping time for the pellet (around 75 μs) and force (1700 N) or stress (100 MPa) required to bring the pellet to a halt. Even with these low energy projectiles, cloth fibres were entrained in the gel showing the potential for penetration of the body and subsequent infection. PMID:25460102

  5. Prevention of the Outer Space Weaponization

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhukov, Gennady P.

    2002-01-01

    9 states. The satellites of various functions (early warning, communication, data acquisition, reconnaissance and navigation) were actively used and continue to be used with the purposes of raising efficiency of ground armed forces, especially in fight against international terrorism. At the same time such satellites are not a weapon in the sense of that word since they do not create the threats of armed attack in outer space or from outer space. Moreover, they promote maintaining of stability in the international relations. For this reason the reconnaissance and data acquisition satellites used for the verification of observance by States of the arms limitation agreements are under international protection as national technical means of the control. Similar protection is enjoyed by the early warning satellites. With the help of space communication facilities the more reliable operative connection of the statesmen is organized in the strained situations. By this way the probability of making of the incorrect retaliatory decisions in critical political situations is reduced. At the same time it's necessary to take into consideration that the activities of such satellite systems are tightly connected with ground armed forces of the states. the earth, what from the point of view of international law may be qualified as establishing a partial demilitarization regime in outer space. After the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons it will be possible to speak about establishing of an international legal regime of complete demilitarization in outer space eliminating any kinds of weapon from outer space. in a peaceful time. weaponization.The main task of this paper is to analyze and to discuss the present binding regime of the outer space deweaponization and particular measures on consolidation and strengthening of this regime. agreements of the Russian Federation and the USA into multilateral Treaties. Such "immunity" would cover

  6. Cardiac fibrillation risk of Taser weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leitgeb, Norbert

    2014-06-01

    The debate on potential health hazards associated with delivering electric discharges to incapacitated subjects, in particular on whether electric discharge weapons are lethal, less lethal or non-lethal, is still controversial. The cardiac fibrillation risks of Taser weapons X26 and X3 have been investigated by measuring the delivered high-tension pulses in dependence on load impedance. Excitation thresholds and sinus-to-Taser conversion factors have been determined by numerical modeling of endocardial, myocardial, and epicardial cells. Detailed quantitative assessment of cardiac electric exposure has been performed by numerical simulation at the normal-weighted anatomical model NORMAN. The impact of anatomical variation has been quantified at an overweight model (Visible Man), both with a spatial resolution of 2 × 2 × 2 mm voxels. Spacing and location of dart electrodes were systematically varied and the worst-case position determined. Based on volume-weighted cardiac exposure assessment, the fibrillation probability of the worst-case hit was determined to 30% (Taser X26) and 9% (Taser X3). The overall risk assessment of Taser application accounting for realistic spatial hit distributions was derived from training sessions of police officers under realistic scenarios and by accounting for the influence of body (over-)weight as well as gender. The analysis of the results showed that the overall fibrillation risk of Taser use is not negligible. It is higher at Taser X26 than at Taser X3 and amounts to about 1% for Europeans with an about 20% higher risk for Asians. Results demonstrate that enhancement as well as further reduction of fibrillation risk depends on responsible use or abuse of Taser weapons. PMID:24776896

  7. The real value of nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The international community has greeted the establishment of two new nuclear weapon-free zones with praise. Africa and South Asia are the regions which will join, once the respective treaties are ratified and in force, Latin America and the South Pacific to ensure that extensive areas of the earth remain free of nuclear weapons. The usual reaction to these accomplishments is to hail them as important contributions to international peace and security, and as meaningful steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon-free zones have their value but this value relates mainly to the countries within the zone. The interest of nuclear-weapon states are not really affected, or, if they are, the influence is not significant. One should bear in mind that the really important and meaningful nuclear weapon-free zones have yet to be achieved

  8. Systems engineering analysis of kinetic energy weapon concepts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Senglaub, M.

    1996-06-01

    This study examines, from a systems engineering design perspective, the potential of kinetic energy weapons being used in the role of a conventional strategic weapon. Within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, strategic weapon experience falls predominantly in the nuclear weapons arena. The techniques developed over the years may not be the most suitable methodologies for use in a new design/development arena. For this reason a more fundamental approach was pursued with the objective of developing an information base from which design decisions might be made concerning the conventional strategic weapon system concepts. The study examined (1) a number of generic missions, (2) the effects of a number of damage mechanisms from a physics perspective, (3) measures of effectiveness (MOE`s), and (4) a design envelope for kinetic energy weapon concepts. With the base of information a cut at developing a set of high-level system requirements was made, and a number of concepts were assessed against these requirements.

  9. Performance calculation and simulation system of high energy laser weapon

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Pei; Liu, Min; Su, Yu; Zhang, Ke

    2014-12-01

    High energy laser weapons are ready for some of today's most challenging military applications. Based on the analysis of the main tactical/technical index and combating process of high energy laser weapon, a performance calculation and simulation system of high energy laser weapon was established. Firstly, the index decomposition and workflow of high energy laser weapon was proposed. The entire system was composed of six parts, including classical target, platform of laser weapon, detect sensor, tracking and pointing control, laser atmosphere propagation and damage assessment module. Then, the index calculation modules were designed. Finally, anti-missile interception simulation was performed. The system can provide reference and basis for the analysis and evaluation of high energy laser weapon efficiency.

  10. Nuclear weapons, a danger for our world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is about an exhibition about the danger of the increasing amount of nuclear-weapons and was presented in the occasion of the second special meeting of the UN General Assembly (1982). This report describes the causes of a nuclear-war and analyses the causes of the bomb-drop of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as possible causes of a bombing of New York City and long-term-consequences of nuclear radiation. Furthermore it lists problems with a higher priority than the armament of nuclear-arms. (kancsar)

  11. Interdicting a Nuclear‐Weapons Project

    OpenAIRE

    Brown, G.G.; Carlyle, W.M.; Harney, R.C.; Skroch, E.; Wood, R.K.

    2009-01-01

    Operations Research, 57, pp. 866‐877. Center for Infrastructure Defense (CID) Paper. Operations Research, 57, pp. 866-877. The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0643 A “proliferator” seeks to complete a first small batch of fission weapons as quickly as possible, whereas an “interdictor” wishes to delay that completion for as long as possible. We develop and solve a max-min model that identifies resource- limited interdiction acti...

  12. Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Stephen J. Cimbala

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia threatens nuclear deterrence and crisis stability in the region and o!ers unique challenges to United States and allied security. The article contrasts two possible futures for nuclear Asia: a relatively more constrained proliferation regime with tiered levels of agreed deployment ceilings among states; and an unconstrained nuclear arms race in Asia. Not only regional tensions, but also the overlap between regional and global antagonisms and ambitions might upset nuclear deterrence stability in Asia.

  13. Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kemp, R. Scott

    2016-06-01

    Environmental sensing of nuclear activities has the potential to detect nuclear weapon programs at early stages, deter nuclear proliferation, and help verify nuclear accords. However, no robust system of detection has been deployed to date. This can be variously attributed to high costs, technical limitations in detector technology, simple countermeasures, and uncertainty about the magnitude or behavior of potential signals. In this article, current capabilities and promising opportunities are reviewed. Systematic research in a variety of areas could improve prospects for detecting covert nuclear programs, although the potential for countermeasures suggests long-term verification of nuclear agreements will need to rely on methods other than environmental sensing.

  14. Postulated accident scenarios in weapons disassembly

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Payne, S.S. [Dept. of Energy, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1997-06-01

    A very brief summary of three postulated accident scenarios for weapons disassembly is provided in the paper. The first deals with a tetrahedral configuration of four generic pits; the second, an infinite planar array of generic pits with varying interstitial water density; and the third, a spherical shell with internal mass suspension in water varying the size and mass of the shell. Calculations were performed using the Monte Carlo Neutron Photon transport code MCNP4A. Preliminary calculations pointed to a need for higher resolution of small pit separation regimes and snapshots of hydrodynamic processes of water/plutonium mixtures.

  15. Thermal radiation from a nuclear weapon burst

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The different methods and correlations used to calculate the propagation of thermal radiation are reviewed and compared. A simple method to account for radiation enhancement by reflection from a superior cloud deck or snow cover, as well as attenuation of radiation by cloud cover below the burst is presented. The results show that the thermal reach may vary considerably. Additional calculation show that a significant fraction of the thermal energy may be incident after the arrival of the shock wave. Results for a range of weapon yields are presented, and the implications for blast-induced (secondary) fire starts are discussed

  16. Inquiry relating to safety due to modification of usage of nuclear fuel material (establishment of waste safety testing facility) in Tokai Laboratory, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Application was made to the director of the Science and Technology Agency (STA) for the license relating to the modification of usage of nuclear fuel material (the establishment of waste safety testing facility) from the director of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute on November 30, 1978. After passing through the safety evaluation in the Nuclear Safety Bureau of STA, inquiry was conducted to the head of the Atomic Energy Safety Commission (AESC) on June 6, 1979, from the director of the STA. The head of AESC directed to conduct the safety examination to the head of the Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Specialist Committee on June 7, 1979. The content of the modification of usage of nuclear fuel material is the establishment of waste safety testing facility to study and test the safety relating to the treatment and disposal of high level radioactive liquid wastes due to the reprocessing of spent fuel. As for the results of the safety examination, the siting of the waste safety testing facility which is located in the Tokai Laboratory, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), and the test plan of the glass solidification of high level radioactive liquid are presented as the outline of the study plan. The building, main equipments including six cells, the isolation room and the glove box, the storage, and the disposal facilities for gas, liquid and solid wastes are explained as the outline of the facilities. Concerning the items from the viewpoint of safety, aseismatic design, slightly vacuum operation, shielding, decay heat removal, fire protection, explosion protection, criticality management, radiation management and environmental effect were evaluated, and the safety was confirmed. (Nakai, Y.)

  17. Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons: Military effectiveness and collateral effects

    OpenAIRE

    Gsponer, Andre

    2005-01-01

    The paper begins with a general introduction and update to Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons (FGNW), and then addresses some particularly important military aspects on which there has been only limited public discussion so far. These aspects concern the unique military characteristics of FGNWs which make them radically different from both nuclear weapons based on previous-generation nuclear-explosives and from conventional weapons based on chemical-explosives: yields in the 1 to 100 tons rang...

  18. Recovery of weapon plutonium as feed material for reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report presents preliminary considerations for recovering and converting weapon plutonium from various US weapon forms into feed material for fabrication of reactor fuel elements. An ongoing DOE study addresses the disposition of excess weapon plutonium through its use as fuel for nuclear power reactors and subsequent disposal as spent fuel. The spent fuel would have characteristics similar to those of commercial power spent fuel and could be similarly disposed of in a geologic repository

  19. Use of Depleted Uranium Weapons in Contemporary Military Interventions

    OpenAIRE

    Okafor-Yarwood, Ifesinachi Marybenedette

    2014-01-01

    This research note examines the use of depleted uranium weapons in contemporarymilitary interventions and the hazardous effects of their use. It also demonstratesattempts made by the United States and the United Kingdom to block anyinternational efforts to ban the use of these weapons. Although there is no laboratory evidence, experiential evidence from Iraq indicates that depleted uranium weapons are dangerous to human health and the environment. This research note argues that the United Nat...

  20. Recovery of weapon plutonium as feed material for reactor fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Armantrout, G.A.; Bronson, M.A.; Choi, Jor-Shan [and others

    1994-03-16

    This report presents preliminary considerations for recovering and converting weapon plutonium from various US weapon forms into feed material for fabrication of reactor fuel elements. An ongoing DOE study addresses the disposition of excess weapon plutonium through its use as fuel for nuclear power reactors and subsequent disposal as spent fuel. The spent fuel would have characteristics similar to those of commercial power spent fuel and could be similarly disposed of in a geologic repository.