WorldWideScience

Sample records for atomic weapon tests

  1. Atomic Weapons Establishment Bill [Money

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The debate concerns the authorisation of payment of the money required to reorganise the atomic weapons establishment in the United Kingdom provided for in the Atomic Weapons Establishment Bill in progress through Parliament. In the Bill the contractorisation of the establishment is recommended and some sort of Government owned company operated scheme set up. The debate lasted about half an hour and is reported verbatim. The issues raised concerned the actual sums likely to be incurred in the formation of a Company to carry out the designated activities of the Bill. These are connected with the research, development, production or maintenance of nuclear devices and the premises needed. The government spokesman suggested the sums required to support the Bill would not be large and the resolution was agreed to without a vote. (UK)

  2. Radiological safety and future land use at the Maralinga atomic weapons test range

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A field study was undertaken to investigate the extent of radioactive contamination at the Maralinga range, South Australia, from nuclear weapons tests conducted in the 1950s. It is shown that radiation levels are well below those which could constitute a health hazard to occupants of the area. In the region of the ground zeros, long lived neutron activation products in soil are present in sufficient abundance to give rise to gamma radiation dose rates of up to 2 mr per hour. Plutonium-239 concentrations in soil exceeded levels considered to be acceptable for continuous occupancy in one area. Distribution of europium-152 indicates that there has been some wind dispersion. Recommendations regarding identification, enclosures and public access are given

  3. Radiological safety and future land use at the EMU atomic weapons test sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The distributions and soil concentrations of long-lived radionuclides remaining from nuclear weapons trials conducted at Emu, South Australia, in October 1953 are presented. Radiation levels due to long-lived neutron activation products in soil, 60Co and 152 Eu, occur only in the immediate vicinity of the ground zeros of the two nuclear explosions. It is shown that the levels of contamination due to fallout products in the soil are well below those which would constitute a health hazard to occupants of the area

  4. AWRE: Atomic Weapons Research Establishment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This reviews the work of AWRE at Aldermaston and Foulness. The main programme is nuclear and is concerned with the design and development of warheads for strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for the British nuclear deterrent, including those for the Royal Navy's missile carrying submarine fleet. The work is described grouped as design physics, development and materials. Services to these groups and to the whole establishment are provided by Engineering, Safety and Administration. The work ranges from long-term fundamental research, the development of technology, design, prototype development to the environmental testing of engineered products. In materials research the emphasis is on plutonium, uranium and beryllium, on high explosives and a wide range of inorganic and organic materials. The physics of the earth's crust is studied to aid detection of underground nuclear explosions. Reactor research facilities include the two reactors, Herald and Viper. (U.K.)

  5. Characteristics of plutonium and americium contamination at the former U.K. atomic weapons test ranges at Maralinga and Emu

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Burns, P.A.; Cooper, M.B.; Lokan, K.H.; Wilks, M.J.; Williams, G.A. [Australian Radiation Lab., Melbourne, VIC (Australia)

    1995-11-01

    Physico-chemical studies on environmental plutonium are described, which provide data integral to an assessment of dose for the inhalation of artificial actinides by Australian Aborigines living a semi-traditional lifestyle at Maralinga and Emu, sites of U.K. atomic weapons tests between 1953 and 1963. The most significant area, from a radiological perspective, is the area contaminated by plutonium in a series of ``one point`` safety trials in which large quantities of plutonium were dispersed explosively at a location known as Taranaki. The activity distribution of plutonium and americium with particle size is quite different from the mass distribution, as a considerably higher proportion of the activity is contained in the finer (inhalable) fraction than of the mass. Except in areas which were disturbed through ploughing during a cleanup in 1967, most the activity remains in the top 1 cm of the surface. Much of the activity is in particulate form, even at distances > 20 km from the firing sites, and discrete particles have been located even at distances beyond 100 km. Data are presented which permit the assessment of annual committed doses through the inhalation pathway, for Aborigines living a semi-traditional lifestyle in the areas affected by the Taranaki firings in particular. (author).

  6. Characteristics of plutonium and americium contamination at the former U.K. atomic weapons test ranges at Maralinga and Emu

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Physico-chemical studies on environmental plutonium are described, which provide data integral to an assessment of dose for the inhalation of artificial actinides by Australian Aborigines living a semi-traditional lifestyle at Maralinga and Emu, sites of U.K. atomic weapons tests between 1953 and 1963. The most significant area, from a radiological perspective, is the area contaminated by plutonium in a series of ''one point'' safety trials in which large quantities of plutonium were dispersed explosively at a location known as Taranaki. The activity distribution of plutonium and americium with particle size is quite different from the mass distribution, as a considerably higher proportion of the activity is contained in the finer (inhalable) fraction than of the mass. Except in areas which were disturbed through ploughing during a cleanup in 1967, most the activity remains in the top 1 cm of the surface. Much of the activity is in particulate form, even at distances > 20 km from the firing sites, and discrete particles have been located even at distances beyond 100 km. Data are presented which permit the assessment of annual committed doses through the inhalation pathway, for Aborigines living a semi-traditional lifestyle in the areas affected by the Taranaki firings in particular. (author)

  7. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION FROM WEAPON TESTS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    none

    1958-10-01

    The program of the Atomic Energy Commission on environmental contamination from weapons tests is designed for the overall evaluation of the hazard to humans from test operations. It is limited to studies of the deposition of activity at long range rather than the problems associated with immediate, close-in fallout. The program has largely been a study of Sr{sup 90}, since considerations based on experience and measurement indicate that it is the isotope of greatest potential hazard. Data are presented pertinent to the monitoring of long-range fallout, particularly Sr{sup 90} and Cs{sup 137}. Values are tabulated for the fallout deposition, air concentrations, water concentrations, and the amounts in foods and human bone. In addition, results are given for some experimental investigations. The report of these results is not interpretative although certain papers that do attempt to interpret the present situation with respect to Sr{sup 90} in particular are reprinted. Bibliographies are presented covering the period since the 1957 hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy concerning the nature of radioactive fallout and its effects on man. A document list of submissions to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation is given to illustrate the work done in other countries. Several papers on the subject, which have not been generally available, are reprinted.

  8. Workshop on dosimetry of the population living in the proximity of the Semipalatinsk atomic weapons test site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From 1949 nuclear weapons tests were conducted at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan. Until the early 1960s many of these tests were conducted either on the ground or above ground. The radioactive fission products released in these explosions were deposited at substantial distances from the test site (Polygon) and may have exposed populations living in Semipalatinsk Region and the Altai region of the Russian Federation. A much larger number of tests has been conducted underground with only limited release of radioactive material to the atmosphere. A number of estimates have been made, by Kazak and Russian scientists, of the radiation doses to the populations living in the areas surrounding the test site but few of these are based on actual measurements of radioactivity on the ground and in vegetation. More recently, other international groups have predicted historical doses based on literature data and/or contemporary soil caesium measurements while others have used a variety of modern measurement techniques such as thermoluminescence in ceramic objects, EPR in teeth, and other types of biological dosimetry. A workshop addressing these issues was organised by the National Cancer Institute (NCI, USA), World Health Organisation (WHO) and Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK, Finland) in May 2001. The purpose of the workshop was to review all the available dosimetric data in order to make an assessment of the radiological impact and the associated uncertainties, on populations in the vicinity and identify populations that might be useful subjects of epidemiological study. Particular emphasis was given to assessing doses to members of the public, i.e., off-site populations. (orig.)

  9. Manhattan Project redux: Canada and the first atomic weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Only three nuclear weapons produced by the Manhattan Project (MP) were used during World War II: Trinity Test, New Mexico on 16 July 1945, Hiroshima, Japan, on 6 August 1945, and Nagasaki, Japan, on 9 August 1945. Several sources and authors, including EM and RL (1967), Stacey (1970), Sanger (1981), and Buckley (2000), have written that it is unlikely that any Canadian uranium was used in the atomic weapons that ended WW II. These sources offer no detailed justification for their conclusion, nevertheless, after analysis of data contained in numerous sources, this article reaches a similar conclusion. (author)

  10. Nuclear Weapons Tests and Environmental Consequences: A Global Perspective

    OpenAIRE

    Prăvălie, Remus

    2014-01-01

    The beginning of the atomic age marked the outset of nuclear weapons testing, which is responsible for the radioactive contamination of a large number of sites worldwide. The paper aims to analyze nuclear weapons tests conducted in the second half of the twentieth century, highlighting the impact of radioactive pollution on the atmospheric, aquatic, and underground environments. Special attention was given to the concentration of main radioactive isotopes which were released, such as 14C, 137...

  11. Nuclear weapon testing and the monkey business

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reasons for India's total ban on the export of rhesus monkeys to U.S. have been explained. The major reason is that some of the animals were used in nuclear weapon related radiation experiments. This was a clear violation of a stricture in the agreement about supply of monkeys. The stricture prohibited the use of animals for research concerning military operations, including nuclear weapon testing. It is pleaded that a strict enforcement of strictures rather than a total ban on the export of monkeys would be better in the interest of advancement of knowledge in human medicine and disease control. (M.G.B.)

  12. Weapons test seismic investigations at Yucca Mountain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yucca Mountain, located on and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site, is being characterized as part of an ongoing effort to identify a potential high-level nuclear waste repository. This site will be subjected to seismic ground motions induced by underground nuclear explosions. A knowledge of expected ground motion levels from these tests will enable the designers to provide for the necessary structural support in the designs of the various components of the repository. The primary objective of the Weapons Test Seismic Investigation project is to develop a method to predict the ground motions expected at the repository site as a result of future weapons tests. This paper summarizes the data base presently assembled for the Yucca Mountain Project, characteristics of expected ground motions, and characterization of the two-dimensional seismic properties along paths between Yucca Mountain and the testing areas of the Nevada Test Site

  13. Cancer in People Exposed to Nuclear Weapons Testing

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... Compensation Programs for People Exposed to Radiation as Part of Nuclear Weapons Testing Between 1945 and 1962, the United States ... involving about 200,000 people were conducted as part of many of these tests. ... several nuclear weapons plant sites were exposed to radiation and other ...

  14. Operation GREENHOUSE. Scientific Director's report of atomic weapon tests at Eniwetok, 1951. Annex 6. 7. Contamination-decontamination studies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Werner, L.B.; Sinnreich, S.R.

    1951-08-01

    This 1951 NTPR report describes experiments conducted in Operation Greenhouse at Eniwetok on certain processes and materials associated with contamination and decontamination phenomena. For this type of contaminating event, in which surfaces are contaminated by being carried by aircraft through an atomic cloud, information was obtained which will assist in development of effective protective measures and recovery measures from contaminating atomic detonations. The contaminant which was deposited on surfaces mounted on drone planes was shown to be nonuniform under various contaminating conditions, both as to distribution and composition. Data have been obtained on the relative importance of such surface characteristics as roughness, porosity, retentivity, and contact angle. The relative behavior of various chemical agents as decontaminants was determined and use of industrial cleaning methods employing chemical additives to effect decontamination was investigated.

  15. Nuclear weapons tests detectable worldwide by means of seismographic recording

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The site and intensity of nuclear weapons tests can be reliably determined by measurement and suitable interpretation of seismic waves. A seismic focus is up to 20 times larger than the destruction zone of a comparably strong explosion, so that a seismic event will last longer by one order of magnitude than an explosion. Nuclear weapons tests induce much more high-frequency vibrations than a seismic event, and a seismic event normally proceeds in a series of subsequent shocks. Diaphragms applied in the range 10 to 30 Hz considerably improve the signal-to-noise ratio of systems for the detection of nuclear weapons tests. (orig./DG)

  16. Lead isotopic composition of trinitite melt glass: evidence for the presence of Canadian industrial lead in the first atomic weapon test.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bellucci, Jeremy J; Simonetti, Antonio; Wallace, Christine; Koeman, Elizabeth C; Burns, Peter C

    2013-08-01

    The Pb isotopic compositions for 51 spots of melt glass in 11 samples of trinitite have been determined by laser ablation multicollector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LA-MC-ICP-MS). Trinitite glass yields a large range of Pb isotopic compositions (i.e., (206)Pb/(204)Pb = 17.08-19.04), which reflect mixing between industrial Pb from materials used in the Trinity test and natural geologic components. Areas within trinitite melt glass containing high concentrations of both Cu and Pb, which are derived from the bomb and blast site-related components, were used for delineating the Pb isotopic composition corresponding to the anthropogenic Pb component. Comparison between the isotopic composition estimated here for the industrial Pb used in the Trinity test and those from known Pb deposits worldwide indicates close agreement with ore from the Buchans mine (Newfoundland, Canada). The Buchans mine was active during the time of the Trinity test and was operated by the American Smelting and Refining Company, which could have provided the Pb used in the test. The industrial Pb used in the Trinity test materials is not documented in the literature (or declassified) but could have been present in bricks, solder, pigs, or some other anthropogenic component related to the experiment. PMID:23829180

  17. Radioactive fallout in the southern hemisphere from nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fallout in the southern hemisphere, and its origins in the national programs of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing in both hemispheres, are reviewed. Of the 390 nuclear tests conducted in the atmosphere to date, 53 were carried out in the southern hemisphere and it is the second phase of these, between 1966 and 1974, that is seen to have been responsible for the main fallout of short-lived fission products in the southern hemisphere. In contrast to this, the programs of atmospheric nuclear testing in the northern hemisphere up to 1962 are shown to have been the main source of long-lived fission products in fallout in the southern hemisphere. The course followed by this contamination through the environment of the southern hemisphere is traced for the national programs of nuclear testing after 1962 taken separately (France, China) and for the earlier national programs taken together (U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and U.K.). The impact on populations in the southern hemisphere of fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests to date is assessed

  18. Summary of fifty years research on the late effects of atomic bomb irradiation in Japan with special reference to possible similar late effects by nuclear weapons tests in Semipalatinsk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The investigation clearly demonstrated statistically significant increases of risks for acute myeloid and lymphoid leukemia, chronic myeloid leukemia, and solid tumors including thyroid cancer, gastrointestinal cancers, lung cancer, hepatoma and skin cancer. The excess relative risks was highest for acute lymphoid leukemia, followed by chronic myeloid leukemia, acute myeloid leukemia, and solid cancer. The increased risk for leukemia has almost completely disappeared after 50 years, whereas the risks for cancers are apparently persisting giving a great threat to general health of atomic bomb survivors. These observations can be directly referred to the possible late effects of the acute and chronic exposure to irradiation caused by nuclear tests in Semipalatinsk region. Recent dose-estimation efforts by Kazakhstan, US and Japanese scientists indicated that there had been Hiroshima/Nagasaki atomic bomb equivalent high-dose exposure in some residents around the test sites. Some researchers suggested increased risks for malignant diseases such as leukemia and cancers. Unfortunately there was a lack of high-quality statistics in the Semipalatinsk survey, providing a considerable difficulty in interpreting the estimated incidences of such malignant diseases

  19. Worldwide fallout of plutonium from nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Measurements of 238Pu and /sup 239,240/Pu fallout from nuclear weapons tests and the SNAP-9A navigational satellite burnup are presented for the years through 1980. Data abstracted from the literature were taken from the stratosphere, atmosphere, and from deposition and surface soil. Over 7300 data entries are included in the 23 tables. The tables are sorted by medium (stratosphere, atmosphere, and deposition near the surface and soil, nuclide, hemisphere, and longitude going from west to east, and are arranged in chronological order. Latitudes are also provided. Fallout levels in SI units (becquerels), calculated from the original readings, and the references from which the original data were taken are given in the report. The appendix is a map showing the various sites from which data were obtained

  20. Aerial systems support for the Nevada Test Site weapons testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    EG and G Energy Measurements, Inc. operates two aircraft for the Department of Energy in support of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) activities. A King Air B-200 and a Turbo Beech aircraft are used to perform wind measurements, cloud sampling and cloud tracking operations in support of each test

  1. Aerial systems support for Nevada Test Site weapons testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    EG and G Energy Measurements, Inc. operates two aircraft for the Department of Energy in support of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) activities. A King Air B-200 and a Turbo Beech aircraft are used to perform wind measurements, cloud sampling and cloud tracking operations in support of each test

  2. Health consequences and health systems response to the Pacific U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Palafox, Neal A; Riklon, Sheldon; Alik, Wilfred; Hixon, Allen L

    2007-03-01

    Between 1946 and 1958, the United States detonated 67 thermonuclear devices in the Pacific as part of their U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program (USNWTP). The aggregate explosive power was equal to 7,200 Hiroshima atomic bombs. Recent documents released by the U.S. government suggest that the deleterious effects of the nuclear testing were greater and extended farther than previously known. The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) government and affected communities have sought refress through diplomatic routes with the U.S. government, however, existing medical programs and financial reparations have not adequately addressed many of the health consequences of the USNWTP. Since radiation-induced cancers may have a long latency, a healthcare infrastructure is needed to address both cancer and related health issues. This article reviews the health consequences of the Pacific USNWTP and the current health systems ability to respond. PMID:19772154

  3. Radioactive fallout: an overview of internal emitter research in the era of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is a review of the literature on the radiobiology of internal emitters. Its purpose is to consider what has become known about the radiobiology of internally deposited radionuclides over the last four decades. The primary emphasis is the progression of radiobiological information through the 1950s and early 1960s, when atmospheric testing of atomic weapons was occurring with increasing regularity. We also consider information on fission products that are biologically important, specifically, isotopes of iodine, strontium, and cesium. We also examine data for plutonium and uranium. For each of the radionuclides discussed, we consider environmental pathways that are available for the eventual exposure to human populations and the metabolic pathways that determine the tissues at risk following exposure. We also consider the radiobiological effects of exposure given at high levels, and, when appropriate, the risks accompanying low-level exposures

  4. The management of health and safety at Atomic Weapons Establishment premises. Pt. 2: Detailed findings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A review of the management of health and safety and the standards of risk control at premises run by Atomic Weapons Establishment plc (AWE) in the United Kingdom was completed in January 1994. This second volume of the review report records the findings relating to the eight health and safety topics chosen as the focus of the review because they provide evidence from AWE's key areas of activity. The topics are: Layard identification and risk assessment; operations; maintenance; research and experimentation; new facilities and modifications; decommissioning and waste; emergency preparedness; and health and safety specialist function. The Health and Safety Executive review team spent time at each of the four main AWE sites and observed an emergency exercise at Aldermaston. A report on the emergency exercise is included as an appendix. (UK)

  5. Nuclear weapons testing fallout: proving causation for exposure injury

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A recent Federal District Court opinion dealing with exposure of civilians to fallout from atomic bomb testing more than two decades ago provides guidance on how court action may in the future, address this problem. Close to 1200 negligence liability claims have been brought against the US government in the names of individuals who had resided near the Nevada Test Site and who subsequently developed cancer or leukemia. Because of the importance and complexity of the cases, the parties involved mutually agreed to the selection of 24 bellwether cases which then provided a legal and factural pattern against which other cases may be subsequently matched. The trial court's decision announced in Allen vs. United States, concluded that the government had a duty to adequately monitor, warn, and educate the population put at risk by the tests and that it had failed to fulfill its duty. However, it is only through case-by-case decision making, by courts reviewing all of the evidence in specific cases and tailoring results to best fit the specific facts, that equitable solutions can be applied in our optimal number of cases

  6. Nuclear weapon tests on the testing ground near Semipalatinsk and health of communities of Altay region

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The comparative analysis of morbidity, mortality and invalidization of the population of Altay region and other regions of West Siberia. It was found that in recent years in spite of a more favorable ecologic situation in this area the level of morbidity (hematological disorders, cardiovascular disorders, urinary diseases), mortality from infectious, parasitic, pulmonary diseases and malignant tumors and invalidisation of the population increased. The main cause of this is supposed to be the consequences of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in 1949-1962 on the testing ground near Semipalatinsk at the border of Altay region. The data on repeated pollutions by the products of nuclear disintegration in Altay region are reported

  7. The French atomic bomb tests

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    N. K. Nayak

    1961-10-01

    Full Text Available This article summarizes the details of two French Atomic Tests. Both were carried out at Hamoudia in the vicinity of Reggane (Sahara, the first on 13th of February 1960 and the second on the 1st April 1960. The nuclear explosive used in both cases was plutonium. In the first test the device was placed on the top of a tower of about 100 meters high whereas in the second test it was placed in a prefabricated shed. According to unofficial reports, the yields of the two tests were about 60Kt and less than 20Kt respectively.

  8. Project of law relative to the sanitary consequences of French nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In order to make easy the indemnifications and to include the persons having participate to nuclear weapons tests (Sahara and French Polynesia) and populations leaving in the concerned areas, the project of law relative to the repair of sanitary consequences of nuclear weapons tests proposes to create a right to integral repair of prejudices for the persons suffering of a radioinduced disease coming from these tests. The American example and the British example are given for comparison. The modalities of financing are detailed as well as the social economic and administrative impacts. (N.C.)

  9. Mortality and cancer incidence in UK participants in UK atmospheric nuclear weapon tests and experimental programmes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A brief report is given of a study by the NRPB on the mortality and cancer incidence in UK participants in UK atmospheric nuclear weapon tests and experimental programmes. The results of 22,347 participants were compared with a population of 22,326 controls. It was concluded that participation in the nuclear weapons tests had no detectable effect on the participants' expectation of life or on their total risk of developing cancer, apart possibly from an effect on the risks from developing multiple myeloma and leukaemia. (U.K.)

  10. DOE/LLNL verification symposium on technologies for monitoring nuclear tests related to weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The rapidly changing world situation has raised concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the ability to monitor a possible clandestine nuclear testing program. To address these issues, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Treaty Verification Program sponsored a symposium funded by the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Arms Control, Division of Systems and Technology. The DOE/LLNL Symposium on Technologies for Monitoring Nuclear Tests Related to Weapons Proliferation was held at the DOE's Nevada Operations Office in Las Vegas, May 6--7,1992. This volume is a collection of several papers presented at the symposium. Several experts in monitoring technology presented invited talks assessing the status of monitoring technology with emphasis on the deficient areas requiring more attention in the future. In addition, several speakers discussed proliferation monitoring technologies being developed by the DOE's weapons laboratories

  11. Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  12. Fallout Deposition in the Marshall Islands from Bikini and Enewetak Nuclear Weapons Tests

    OpenAIRE

    Beck, Harold L.; Bouville, André; Moroz, Brian E.; Simon, Steven L.

    2010-01-01

    Deposition densities (Bq m-2) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides occurring in nuclear weapons testing fallout from tests conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls (1946-1958) have been estimated on a test-specific basis for all the 31 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. A complete review of various historical and contemporary data, as well as meteorological analysis, was used to make judgments regarding which tests deposited fallout in the Marshall Islands an...

  13. Tests of nuclear weapons and the beginning of radioactivity monitoring using the example of Switzerland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A historical survey is given on the development and the tests of nuclear weapons including the consequences for humans and the environment, as well as on the generation of measuring networks for radioactivity in the environment in the same time. Some results of the measurements are shown exemplarily for Switzerland.

  14. Assessing depleted uranium (DU) contamination of soil, plants and earthworms at UK weapons testing sites

    OpenAIRE

    Oliver, I.W.; Graham, M C; Mackenzie, A. B.; Ellam, R.M.; Farmer, J.G.

    2007-01-01

    Depleted uranium (DU) weapons testing programmes have been conducted at two locations within the UK. An investigation was therefore carried out to assess the extent of any environmental contamination arising from these test programmes using both alpha spectrometry and mass spectrometry techniques. Uranium isotopic signatures indicative of DU contamination were observed in soil, plant and earthworm samples collected in the immediate vicinity of test firing points and targets, but contamination...

  15. Prediction of ground motion from nuclear weapons tests at NTS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ground motion data from underground nuclear detonations during FY78 were added to data from earlier detonations; the data were used to formulate a tentative equation for predicting ground motion at the Nevada Test Site. Additional measurements to explore an unexplained seismic anomaly in Jackass Flats are described. Methods used in automatic processing of ground motion data are explained

  16. DOE (Department of Energy) nuclear weapon R and T (research, development, and testing): Objectives, roles, and responsibilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Otey, G.R.

    1989-07-01

    An overview of the DOE nuclear weapons research, development, and testing program is given along with a description of the program objectives and the roles and responsibilities of the various involved organizations. The relationship between the DoD and DOE is described and the division of responsibilities for weapon development as well as the coordinated planning and acquisition activities are reviewed. Execution of the RD T program at the nuclear weapons laboratories is outlined. 24 refs., 3 figs.

  17. Polycythemia vera among participants of a nuclear weapons test

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sobell, J.L.; Codd, M.B.; Silverstein, M.N.; Kurland, L.T.

    1987-03-06

    Three letters-to-the-editors discuss the finding of a statistically significant excess of polycythemia vera cases among participants in the Smoky detonation. Had population-based incidence rates from Rochester been used to derive an expected incidence, and had only bona fide polycythemia vera cases been considered, as is the rule in most epidemiologic studies, the observed frequency of polycythemia vera among participants in the Smoky test would have been found to be well within chance expectations.

  18. Polycythemia vera among participants of a nuclear weapons test

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Three letters-to-the-editors discuss the finding of a statistically significant excess of polycythemia vera cases among participants in the Smoky detonation. Had population-based incidence rates from Rochester been used to derive an expected incidence, and had only bona fide polycythemia vera cases been considered, as is the rule in most epidemiologic studies, the observed frequency of polycythemia vera among participants in the Smoky test would have been found to be well within chance expectations

  19. Atomic test site (south Australia)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The debate, which lasted about half an hour, is reported verbatin. It was prompted by the campaign by the Maralinga people of South Australia to have their traditional lands restored to them. Between 1953 and 1957 the United Kingdom government carried out of atomic tests and several hundred minor trials on the lands. A clean-up programme had taken place in 1967 but further decontamination was needed before the area is safe for traditional aboriginal life and culture. A small area will remain contaminated with plutonium for thousands of years. The cost and who would pay, the Australian or UK government was being negotiated. The UK government's position was that the site is remote, the health risk is slight and the clean-up operation of 1967 was acknowledged as satisfactory by the Australian government. (UK)

  20. Plutonium and uranium contamination in soils from former nuclear weapon test sites in Australia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Child, D.P., E-mail: dpc@ansto.gov.au [Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Locked Bag 2001, Kirrawee DC, NSW 2232 (Australia); Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Macquarie University, NSW 2109 (Australia); Hotchkis, M.A.C. [Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Locked Bag 2001, Kirrawee DC, NSW 2232 (Australia)

    2013-01-15

    The British government performed a number of nuclear weapon tests on Australian territory from 1952 through to 1963 with the cooperation of Australian government. Nine fission bombs were detonated in South Australia at Emu Junction and Maralinga, and a further three fission weapons were detonated in the Monte Bello Islands off the coast of Western Australia. A number of soil samples were collected by Australian Radiation Laboratories in 1972 and 1978 during field surveys at these nuclear weapon test sites. They were analysed by gamma spectrometry and, for a select few samples, by alpha spectrometry to measure the remaining activities of fission products, activation products and weapon materials. We have remeasured a number of these Montebello Islands and Emu Junction soil samples using the ANTARES AMS facility, ANSTO. These samples were analysed for plutonium and uranium isotopic ratios and isotopic concentrations. Very low {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu ratios were measured at both sites ({approx}0.05 for Alpha Island and {approx}0.02 for Emu Field), substantially below global fallout averages. Well correlated but widely varying {sup 236}U and plutonium concentrations were measured across both sites, but {sup 233}U did not correlate with these other isotopes and instead showed correlation with distance from ground zero, indicating in situ production in the soils.

  1. Plutonium and uranium contamination in soils from former nuclear weapon test sites in Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The British government performed a number of nuclear weapon tests on Australian territory from 1952 through to 1963 with the cooperation of Australian government. Nine fission bombs were detonated in South Australia at Emu Junction and Maralinga, and a further three fission weapons were detonated in the Monte Bello Islands off the coast of Western Australia. A number of soil samples were collected by Australian Radiation Laboratories in 1972 and 1978 during field surveys at these nuclear weapon test sites. They were analysed by gamma spectrometry and, for a select few samples, by alpha spectrometry to measure the remaining activities of fission products, activation products and weapon materials. We have remeasured a number of these Montebello Islands and Emu Junction soil samples using the ANTARES AMS facility, ANSTO. These samples were analysed for plutonium and uranium isotopic ratios and isotopic concentrations. Very low 240Pu/239Pu ratios were measured at both sites (∼0.05 for Alpha Island and ∼0.02 for Emu Field), substantially below global fallout averages. Well correlated but widely varying 236U and plutonium concentrations were measured across both sites, but 233U did not correlate with these other isotopes and instead showed correlation with distance from ground zero, indicating in situ production in the soils.

  2. External radiation exposure of the population of Utah from Nevada weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The external gamma radiation exposure of the population of Utah from nuclear weapons tests carried out at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) during 1951 to 1958 has been reconstructed from measurements of residual 137Cs and 239240Pu in soil. The maximum time integrated (to infinity) free air exposure in any major population center is estimated to have been approx. 4 R at St. George and Hurricane. Exposures decreased with distance from the NTS to lower than 0.2 R at Richfield and Gunnison in south central Utah, before increasing again to levels of 1 to 2 R in the more populous northern valleys around Provo, Salt Lake City, and Ogden. These relatively higher exposures, coupled with the much larger population, probably resulted in a total population dose (person-rads) to the heretofore supposedly low fallout counties of northern Utah significantly greater than that for the supposedly high fallout areas nearer the NTS. Nevertheless, the total doses incurred from Nevada tests were probably only a few times greater than doses incurred from Nevada tests were probably only a few times greater than the doses which this northern valley population, as well as the rest of the US population, incurred from worldwide weapons fallout from all other atmospheric weapons tests. The mean exposure estimates for towns in southwest Utah nearest the NTS are somewhat lower but reasonably consistent with other retrospective estimates based on radiation surveys made directly after the tests

  3. Dose assessment studies at former nuclear weapons test sites in Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Field and laboratory measurements are described and data presented which enable a dose assessment for the inhalation of artificial radionuclides at Maralinga and Emu, the sites of United kingdom atomic weapons tests between 1953 and 1963. Dose assessments for the inhalation of artificial radionuclides are presented for all remaining contaminated areas at Maralinga and Emu. In the case of Aborigines, these doses are estimated assuming inhalable dust loadings of 1 mg/m3 for adults and 1.5 mg/m3 for children and infants. Particle size is taken to be 5 μm AMAD. Plutonium and americium are taken to be represented by solubility Class Y for major trial sites and 25% Class W and 75% Class Y for all minor trial sites. For other radionuclides, where no data are available, the most conservative dose intake conversion factor values are used. All calculations of dose assume 100% occupancy. The results indicate that doses to children are higher than doses to adults and infants. This is a consequence of children being subjected to higher dust concentrations than adults because of their play activities and because of generally higher dose intake conversion factor values than adults, which more than offset their smaller breathing rates. Thus children form the critical group. With the exception of one site which is contaminated with uranium, at all other sites it is only the inhalation of plutonium and americium that contributes significantly to the dose, and of these 239Pu is the largest contributor. Therefore, having regard to the long half lives of the radionuclides concerned, the inhalation problems highlighted by this dose assessment will not diminish significantly within any reasonable period of time and hence management strategies must be developed to deal with them. (author). 35 refs, 1 fig., 2 tabs

  4. Atmospheric nuclear weapons test history narrated by carbon-14 in human teeth

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons since 1945 caused a significant increase in the concentration of atmospheric 14C. The 14C concentration in plants that assimilate 14C directly by photosynthesis reflects the atmospheric 14C concentration. Carbon-14 is then transferred into the human body through the food chain. Based on animal experiments, the collagen in human teeth is metabolically inert after its formation. This implies that the collagen of each tooth retains the 14C concentration which reflects the 14C concentration in the blood at the time collagen metabolism ceased. The distribution of the 14C concentration in the collagen of teeth from subjects of various ages would follow a pattern similar to that shown by soft tissues. In this paper the authors elucidate the relationship between the number of nuclear weapon tests and the distribution of 14C concentration in teeth

  5. A high resolution record of chlorine-36 nuclear-weapons-tests fallout from Central Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Green, J.R. E-mail: jaromy.green@gcccks.edu; Cecil, L.D.; Synal, H.-A.; Santos, J.; Kreutz, K.J.; Wake, C.P

    2004-08-01

    The Inilchek Glacier, located in the Tien Shan Mountains, central Asia, is unique among mid-latitude glaciers because of its relatively large average annual accumulation. In July 2000, two ice cores of 162 and 167 meters (m) in length were collected from the Inilchek Glacier for (chlorine-36) {sup 36}Cl analysis a part of a collaborative international effort to study the environmental changes archived in mid-latitude glaciers worldwide. The average annual precipitation at the collection site was calculated to be 1.6 m. In contrast, the reported average annual accumulations at the high-latitude Dye-3 glacial site, Greenland, the mid-latitude Guliya Ice Cap, China, and the mid-latitude Upper Fremont Glacier, Wyoming, USA, were 0.52, 0.16 and 0.76 m, respectively. The resolution of the {sup 36}Cl record in one of the Inilchek ice cores was from 2 to 10 times higher than the resolution of the records at these other sites and could provide an opportunity for detailed study of environmental changes that have occurred over the past 150 years. Despite the differences in accumulation among these various glacial sites, the {sup 36}Cl profile and peak concentrations for the Inilchek ice core were remarkably similar in shape and magnitude to those for ice cores from these other sites. The {sup 36}Cl peak concentration from 1958, the year during the mid-1900s nuclear-weapons-tests period when {sup 36}Cl fallout was largest, was preserved in the Inilchek core at a depth of 90.56 m below the surface of the glacier (74.14-m-depth water equivalent) at a concentration of 7.7 x 10{sup 5} atoms of {sup 36}Cl/gram (g) of ice. Peak {sup 36}Cl concentrations from Dye-3, Guliya and the Upper Fremont glacial sites were 7.1 x 10{sup 5}, 5.4 x 10{sup 5} and 0.7 x 10{sup 5} atoms of {sup 36}Cl/g of ice, respectively. Measurements of {sup 36}Cl preserved in ice cores improve estimates of historical worldwide atmospheric deposition of this isotope and allow the sources of {sup 36}Cl in ground

  6. 机载武器总体测试平台设计%Overall Test Airborne Weapons Platform

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    吴丽

    2011-01-01

    According to the overall airborne weapons testing needs the development of the overall test airborne weapons platform that can be achieved in the laboratory environment,a new rapid overall airborne weapons testing capabilities.%根据机载武器的总体测试需求开发的机载武器总体测试平台,能够在试验室环境下实现新型机载武器的快速总体测试能力。

  7. Testing the Gravitational Redshift with Atomic Gravimeters?

    CERN Document Server

    Wolf, Peter; Bordé, Christian J; Reynaud, Serge; Salomon, Christophe; Cohen-Tannoudji, Claude

    2011-01-01

    Atom interferometers allow the measurement of the acceleration of freely falling atoms with respect to an experimental platform at rest on Earth's surface. Such experiments have been used to test the universality of free fall by comparing the acceleration of the atoms to that of a classical freely falling object. In a recent paper, M\\"uller, Peters and Chu [Nature {\\bf 463}, 926-929 (2010)] argued that atom interferometers also provide a very accurate test of the gravitational redshift (or universality of clock rates). Considering the atom as a clock operating at the Compton frequency associated with the rest mass, they claimed that the interferometer measures the gravitational redshift between the atom-clocks in the two paths of the interferometer at different values of gravitational potentials. In the present paper we analyze this claim in the frame of general relativity and of different alternative theories, and conclude that the interpretation of atom interferometers as testing the gravitational redshift ...

  8. The parallex project: CANDU MOX fuel testing with weapons-derived plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Parallex Project consists of a parallel experiment in which weapons-derived plutonium (WPu) from the United States and from the Russian Federation will be tested as mixed-oxide (MOX) CANDU fuel in the National Research Universal (NRU) reactor at the Chalk River Laboratories in Canada. Plutonium derived from excess weapons will be fabricated into CANDU MOX fuel at the A.A. Bochvar Institute in Moscow and at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the United States. The MOX fuel will be transported to CRL, where it will be characterized, assembled into fuel bundles and then irradiated in the NRU reactor. Following irradiation, the fuel will be examined in hot cells to assess its irradiation performance. This paper describes the scope, rationale and current status of the Parallex Project. (author)

  9. Structural Monitoring of a Weapons Test Unit Using Imaging Methods for Dynamic Signature Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A methodology to identify structural changes in weapons systems during environmental tests is being developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The method is coherence based and relies on comparing the ''dynamic signature'' response of the test article before and after an environmental test or test series. Physical changes in the test article result in changes in the dynamic signature and are mapped to an image matrix where a color scale represents changes in sensor-to-sensor coherence. This methodology is convenient because it allows an image to represent large amounts of information in a very compact form, where even subtle system changes may be easily and quickly identified. Furthermore, comparison of the dynamic signature response data before and after any test event can be made on a quasi-real-time basis. This approach is particularly useful on large and/or complex test articles where many sensors are present, and large volumes of data are generated

  10. FMCT after South Asia's tests. A view from a nuclear-weapon state

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Proposals to negotiate an international treaty to cutoff the production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons have been on the international nuclear agenda for many decades. Hopes in the early 1990s that it would be possible finally to negotiate a FMCT, however, have not been borne out. Instead, a deadlock had ensued at the Geneva CD. It remains to be seen whether the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan will contribute to breaking that deadlock - or only to foreclosing any prospects for negotiating cutoff in the foreseeable future. The key lies in the attitudes of Delhi and Islamabad - influenced to the extent possible by the efforts of the international community to convince both countries' leaders to stop short of an escalating nuclear war in the region. Regardless, there are a variety of other initiatives aimed at heightening transparency and controls over the nuclear weapons materials in the five NPT nuclear weapon states that could be pursued as part of broader ongoing efforts to roll back the Cold War nuclear legacies

  11. Development of nuclear technologies and conversion of nuclear weapon testing system infrastructure in Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The article gives a brief description of the work done by the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan in development of nuclear technology and conversion of nuclear weapon testing infrastructure in Kazakhstan. Content and trends of works are as follows: 1. Peaceful use of all physical facilities, created earlier for nuclear tests in Kazakhstan; 2. Development of methods and technologies for safe nuclear reactors use; 3. Examination of different materials in field of great neutron flow for thermonuclear reactor's first wall development; 4. Liquidation of all wells, which were formed in the results of underground nuclear explosions in Degelen mountain massif of former Semipalatinsk test site; 5. Study of consequences of nuclear tests in West Kazakhstan (territory of Azgir test site and Karachaganak oil field); 6. Study of radiological situation on the Semipalatinsk test site and surrounding territories; 7. Search of ways for high-level radioactive wastes disposal; 8. Construction of safe nuclear power plants in Kazakhstan

  12. Doses from external irradiation to Marshall Islanders from Bikini and Enewetak nuclear weapons tests.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bouville, André; Beck, Harold L; Simon, Steven L

    2010-08-01

    Annual doses from external irradiation resulting from exposure to fallout from the 65 atmospheric nuclear weapons tests conducted in the Marshall Islands at Bikini and Enewetak between 1946 and 1958 have been estimated for the first time for Marshallese living on all inhabited atolls. All tests that deposited fallout on any of the 23 inhabited atolls or separate reef islands have been considered. The methodology used to estimate the radiation doses at the inhabited atolls is based on test- and location-specific radiation survey data, deposition density estimates of 137Cs, and fallout times-of-arrival provided in a companion paper (Beck et al.), combined with information on the radionuclide composition of the fallout at various times after each test. These estimates of doses from external irradiation have been combined with corresponding estimates of doses from internal irradiation, given in a companion paper (Simon et al.), to assess the cancer risks among the Marshallese population (Land et al.) resulting from exposure to radiation from the nuclear weapons tests. PMID:20622549

  13. Subcritical tests - nuclear weapon testing under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Subkritiske tester - kjernevaapentesting under avtalen om fullstendig proevestans

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hoeibraaten, S

    1998-10-01

    The report discusses possible nuclear weapons related experiments and whether these are permitted under the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The term ''subcritical experiments'' as used in the United States includes experiments in which one studies fissile materials (so far only plutonium) under extreme conditions generated by conventional high explosives, and in which a self-sustained chain reaction never develops in the fissile material. The known facts about the American subcritical experiments are presented. There is very little reason to doubt that these experiments were indeed subcritical and therefore permitted under the CTBT. Little is known about the Russian efforts that are being made on subcritical experiments.

  14. No conceivable injury. [Nuclear weapons tests in Australia, 1952-1957

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Milliken, R.

    1986-01-01

    Between 1952 and 1957 Britain conducted 12 nuclear tests in Australia in order to develop a nuclear weapon capability. At that time a special relationship existed between the two countries with Australians keen to help. However, an Australian Royal Commission investigating British nuclear tests in the mid-eighties gave attention to some aspects of the tests which had been kept secret, especially by Britain. In particular the contamination of the sites, especially at Maralinga, a sacred place of the Aborigines, is highlighted. The Royal Commission indeed recommended that Britain should decontaminate the site and Australia should compensate the Aborigines. Doing this, however, would acknowledge the responsibility of the tests for health problems of British and Australian servicemen due to radiation exposure. This was postponed while another report was commissioned from another body. The history of the nuclear tests and their consequences in both human and political terms is chronicled.

  15. Environmental radiation at the Monte Bello Islands from nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1952 and 1956

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The results from the 1962 and 1968 surveys of environmental radiation at the Monte Bello Islands are presented. These were the first of the series of surveys of radioactive contamination of the Islands to be carried out following nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1952 and 1956. Detailed comparison is made with the results obtained in the subsequent surveys in 1972 and 1978. For more than 20 years, no area at the Monte Bello Islands has presented an acute hazard due to external exposure to environmental radiation

  16. Nuclear weapons tests and short-term effects on atmospheric ozone

    Science.gov (United States)

    Miller, A. J.; Krueger, A. J.; Prabhakara, C.; Hilsenrath, E.

    1974-01-01

    Observations made when Nimbus 4 passed over a nuclear cloud about three hours after the bomb exploded are presented. Infrared and BUV measurements indicated that the atmospheric ozone level in the area of cloud was significantly less than in areas directly north and south of the cloud. It is noted, however, that it is not possible to state definitively that the ozone depletion was caused by nitrogen oxides released in the nuclear weapons test, and that further observations must be made to clarify the situation.

  17. Radioactive fallout from Chinese nuclear weapons test of March 15, 1978

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has measured the radionuclide concentration of short-lived debris from a radioactive cloud, produced by a nuclear weapons test conducted by the People's Republic of China on March 15, 1978. Analysis with a 40 cfm Sierra impactor showed that a large portion of the radioactivity was associated with relatively large particles. Surface air samples showed significant concentrations of 124Sb. Samples of rain water from New York State showed that radioactivity arrived on the east coast at about the same time as peak debris levels were observed on the west coast. Highest concentrations of 131I occurred along the Washington State--Canadian border

  18. Public health impact of fallout from British nuclear weapons tests in Australia, 1952-1957

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the period 1952-1957, Britain conducted 12 full-scale nuclear weapons tests in Australia in five series, viz. Hurricane(1952), Totem(1953), Mosaic(1956), Buffalo(1956) and Antler(1957). Radioactive fallout from the tests reached many parts of Australia. This report reviews the pathways by which the radionuclides in the fallout could have irradiated the population. The methodology is presented for estimating the radiation doses and values are derived from the available data. The possible effect that the radiation exposure had on public health is assessed. Estimation of the radiation doses is approached in two parts: (a) the contributions from the Mosaic, Buffalo and Antler series which were monitored, and (b) the contributions from the Hurricane and Totem series for which there are few fallout data. In part (a), the activities of the radionuclides making up the measured fallout are established by calculation. Standard models are then used to derive the radiation doses for the population centres - from external radiation, from ingestion of radionuclides in food and from inhalation of radionuclides in air. A simple treatment is adopted to estimate radiation doses from drinking contaminated water. For Part (b), the data assembled in (a) provide the basis for developing statistical models for predicting radiation doses from weapon yields and trajectories of the radioactive clouds. The models are then applied to give the radiation doses to population centres following the tests in Hurricane and Totem, using their yields and trajectories. 71 refs., 20 tabs., 8 figs

  19. Residual radioactive contamination of the test site at Emu from nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1953

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The detailed distributions and soil concentrations of long-lived radionuclides remaining from nuclear weapons trials conducted at Emu in October 1953, are presented. Significant radiation levels due to long-lived neutron activation products in soil, 60Co and 152Eu, occur only in the immediate vicinity of the ground zeros of TOTEM 1 and TOTEM 2. It is shown that the levels of contamination due to fallout products in the soil are well below those which would constitute a health hazard to occupants of the area

  20. Hitler's bomb: the secret story of Germans' attempts to get the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this historical book, the author claims to have evidence concerning the development and testing of a possible 'nuclear weapon' by Nazi Germany in 1945. The 'weapon' in question is not alleged to be a standard nuclear weapon powered by nuclear fission, but something closer to either a radiological weapon (a so-called 'dirty bomb') or a hybrid-nuclear fusion weapon. Its new evidence is concerned primarily with the parts of the German nuclear energy project (an attempted clandestine scientific effort led by Germany to develop and produce atomic weapons during World War II) under Kurt Diebner, a German nuclear physicist who directed and administrated the project

  1. Time-dependent behaviour of radiocaesium: A new method to compare the mobility of weapons test and Chernobyl derived fallout

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Environmental radiocaesium (137Cs) originates primarily from two sources, atmospheric nuclear weapons testing, and the Chernobyl accident. It has not, to our knowledge, previously been possible statistically to compare changes in the environmental mobility of 137Cs from these two sources since the weapons test fallout varied in a complex manner over a number of years. A novel technique is presented for curve-fitting measurements with a time-dependent input function such as that for weapons test fallout. Different models were fitted to measurements of both pre- and post-Chernobyl 137Cs activity concentrations in five major Finnish rivers. It was shown that there was no significant difference in the temporal changes in 137Cs mobility from these two sources during the years after fallout. Transport parameters derived from weapons test measurements gave good predictions of the long-term contamination of these rivers by Chernobyl fallout. Changes in 137Cs activity concentrations in rivers after Chernobyl have previously been shown to decline as a result of slow sorption to clay minerals in catchment soils. It is shown that weapons test fallout also exhibited this slow decline over time. Rates of decline in 137Cs activity concentrations 10 years after fallout correspond to effective ecological half-lives (Teff) in the range 10-30 years. Removal of activity from the catchment was found to have no significant effect on the long-term decline in 137Cs activity concentrations in these rivers

  2. (236)U and (239,)(240)Pu ratios from soils around an Australian nuclear weapons test site.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tims, S G; Froehlich, M B; Fifield, L K; Wallner, A; De Cesare, M

    2016-01-01

    The isotopes (236)U, (239)Pu and (240)Pu are present in surface soils as a result of global fallout from nuclear weapons tests carried out in the 1950's and 1960's. These isotopes potentially constitute artificial tracers of recent soil erosion and sediment movement. Only Accelerator Mass Spectrometry has the requisite sensitivity to measure all three isotopes at these environmental levels. Coupled with its relatively high throughput capabilities, this makes it feasible to conduct studies of erosion across the geographical extent of the Australian continent. In the Australian context, however, global fallout is not the only source of these isotopes. As part of its weapons development program the United Kingdom carried out a series of atmospheric and surface nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga, South Australia in 1956 and 1957. The tests have made a significant contribution to the Pu isotopic abundances present in the region around Maralinga and out to distances ∼1000 km, and impact on the assessment techniques used in the soil and sediment tracer studies. Quantification of the relative fallout contribution derived from detonations at Maralinga is complicated owing to significant contamination around the test site from numerous nuclear weapons safety trials that were also carried out around the site. We show that (236)U can provide new information on the component of the fallout that is derived from the local nuclear weapons tests, and highlight the potential of (236)U as a new fallout tracer. PMID:26141189

  3. Status of the parallex project--testing CANDU MOX fuel with weapons-derived plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Parallex project is a parallel experiment, the purpose of which is to demonstrate the use of weapons-derived plutonium (WPu) from the United States (U.S.) and the Russian Federation (R.F.) in CANDU mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel elements. The scope of the project includes the fabrication of CANDU MOX fuel in the R.F. and the U.S., the transporting of the fuel to Canada, and the testing of the fuel in the NRU research reactor at the Chalk River Laboratories (CRL). A significant milestone in the project was achieved earlier this year, with the start of the irradiation testing of the MOX elements received from both the U.S. and the R.F. This paper presents the status of the project, and highlights the major activities that lead to the commencement of this historic experiment. (author)

  4. Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.; Shuh, D. K.; Knight, K. B.; Eppich, G. R.; Holliday, K. S.

    2016-05-01

    Nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. We find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. The resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.

  5. An estimate of Sandia resources for underground nuclear weapons effects testing.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bomber, Thomas M.; Zeuch, David Henry

    2003-11-01

    We conducted a study of the time and resources that would be required for Sandia National Laboratories to once again perform nuclear weapons effects experiments of the sort that it did in the past. The study is predicated on the assumptions that if underground nuclear weapons effects testing (UG/NWET) is ever resumed, (1) a brief series of tests (i.e., 2-3) would be done, and (2) all required resources other than those specific to SNL experiments would be provided by others. The questions that we sought to answer were: (1) What experiments would SNL want to do and why? (2) How much would they cost? (3) How long would they take to field? To answer these questions, we convened panels of subject matter experts first to identify five experiments representative of those that SNL has done in the past, and then to determine the costs and timelines to design, fabricate and field each of them. We found that it would cost $76M to $84M to do all five experiments, including 164 to 174 FTEs to conduct all five experiments in a single test. Planning and expenditures for some of the experiments needed to start as early as 5.5 years prior to zero-day, and some work would continue up to 2 years beyond the event. Using experienced personnel as mentors, SNL could probably field such experiments within the next five years. However, beyond that time frame, loss of personnel would place us in the position of essentially starting over.

  6. On the reduction of nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Bacher, Robert F.

    1981-01-01

    The United States, in 1946, proposed that an international authority be formed to control the dangerous parts of atomic energy. The proposal met with very little success, except to lead to the conclusion that there was no apparent reason why it was not technically feasible. Discussions on nuclear weapons testing, initiated in 1958, reached some agreement on test restrictions in Subsequent years.

  7. Fallout from Chernobyl and atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. Chernobyl in perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Some results and experience gained so far in Sweden after the Chernobyl accident are discussed in the light of knowledge obtained from the studies of fallout from the atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. Cesium-137, which was an important radionuclide in the bomb fallout, was still more important after Chernobyl. For most Swedes the external irradiation from deposited Cs-137 was the dominating source of irradiation. Studies of Chernobyl fallout have given new information in the fate of contamination in the forest environment, lakes, urban areas, on shielding factors for houses etc. The releases from Chernobyl gave relatively lower dietary doses than expected form the same amount of Cs-137, released through nuclear weapons testing. However lake fish, moose and forest products have shown to be of greater importance than earlier realized. The main reason for the lower dietary doses from Chernobyl was the seasonal distribution of the fallout with deposition just before the start of the growing season. The various actions taken also reduced the intake of Cs-137 and Cs-134. Otherwise, there are no radical differences in the behaviour of cesium in the environment after the bombs and after Chernobyl. Differences may exist, primarily during the first year, due to different fallout conditions, where also the physical-chemical form of the fallout might have been of some importance. The average Swede will have an effective dose commitment of around 1 mSv from Chernobyl, which is about the same as from the bomb fallout. The highest doses due to Chernobyl area received by people living in high deposition areas (>80 kBq/m2 of CS-137) and consuming larger amounts of game animals, lake fish and reindeer. (66 refs.)

  8. Radiation doses to local populations near nuclear weapons test sites worldwide.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Simon, Steven L; Bouville, André

    2002-05-01

    Nuclear weapons testing was conducted in the atmosphere at numerous sites worldwide between 1946 and 1980, which resulted in exposures to local populations as a consequence of fallout of radioactive debris. The nuclear tests were conducted by five nations (United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China) primarily at 16 sites. The 16 testing sites, located in nine different countries on five continents (plus Oceania) contributed nearly all of the radioactive materials released to the environment by atmospheric testing; only small amounts were released at a fewother minor testing sites. The 16 sites discussed here are Nevada Test Site, USA (North American continent), Bikini and Enewetak, Marshall Islands (Oceania); Johnston Island, USA (Oceania), Christmas and Malden Island, Kiribati (Oceania); Emu Field, Maralinga, and Monte Bello Islands, Australia (Australian continent); Mururoa and Fangataufa, French Polynesia (Oceania), Reggane, Algeria (Africa), Novaya Zemlya and Kapustin Yar, Russia (Europe), Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan (Asia), and Lop Nor, China (Asia). There were large differences in the numbers of tests conducted at each location and in the total explosive yields. Those factors, as well as differences in population density, lifestyle, environment, and climate at each site, led to large differences in the doses received by local populations. In general, the tests conducted earliest led to the highest individual and population exposures, although the amount of information available for a few of these sites is insufficient to provide any detailed evaluation of radiation exposures. The most comprehensive information for any site is for the Nevada Test Site. The disparities in available information add difficulty to determining the radiation exposures of local populations at each site. It is the goal of this paper to summarize the available information on external and internal doses received by the public living in the regions near each of the

  9. Radiation doses to local populations near nuclear weapons test sites worldwide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons testing was conducted in the atmosphere at numerous sites worldwide between 1946 and 1980, which resulted in exposures to local populations as a consequence of fallout of radioactive debris. The nuclear tests were conducted by five nations (United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China) primarily at 16 sites. The 16 testing sites, located in nine different countries on five continents (plus Oceania) contributed nearly all of the radioactive materials released to the environment by atmospheric testing; only small amounts were released at a few other minor testing sites. The 16 sites discussed here are Nevada Test Site, USA (North American continent), Bikini and Enewetak, Marshall Islands (Oceania); Johnston Island, USA (Oceania), Christmas and Malden Island, Kiribati (Oceania); Emu Field, Maralinga, and Monte Bello Islands, Australia (Australian continent); Mururoa and Fangataufa, French Polynesia (Oceania), Reggane, Algeria (Africa), Novaya Zemlya and Kapustin Yar, Russia (Europe), Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan (Asia), and Lop Nor, China (Asia). There were large differences in the numbers of tests conducted at each location and in the total explosive yields. Those factors, as well as differences in population density, lifestyle, environment, and climate at each site, led to large differences in the doses received by local populations. In general, the tests conducted earliest led to the highest individual and population exposures, although the amount of information available for a few of these sites is insufficient to provide any detailed evaluation of radiation exposures. The most comprehensive information for any site is for the Nevada Test Site. The disparities in available information add difficulty to determining the radiation exposures of local populations at each site. It is the goal of this paper to summarize the available information on external and internal doses received by the public living in the regions near each of the

  10. Fallout deposition in the Marshall Islands from Bikini and Enewetak nuclear weapons tests.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Beck, Harold L; Bouville, André; Moroz, Brian E; Simon, Steven L

    2010-08-01

    Deposition densities (Bq m(-2)) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides occurring in nuclear weapons testing fallout from tests conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls (1946-1958) have been estimated on a test-specific basis for 32 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. A complete review of various historical and contemporary data, as well as meteorological analysis, was used to make judgments regarding which tests deposited fallout in the Marshall Islands and to estimate fallout deposition density. Our analysis suggested that only 20 of the 66 nuclear tests conducted in or near the Marshall Islands resulted in substantial fallout deposition on any of the 23 inhabited atolls. This analysis was confirmed by the fact that the sum of our estimates of 137Cs deposition from these 20 tests at each atoll is in good agreement with the total 137Cs deposited as estimated from contemporary soil sample analyses. The monitoring data and meteorological analyses were used to quantitatively estimate the deposition density of 63 activation and fission products for each nuclear test, plus the cumulative deposition of 239+240Pu at each atoll. Estimates of the degree of fractionation of fallout from each test at each atoll, as well as of the fallout transit times from the test sites to the atolls were used in this analysis. The estimates of radionuclide deposition density, fractionation, and transit times reported here are the most complete available anywhere and are suitable for estimations of both external and internal dose to representative persons as described in companion papers. PMID:20622548

  11. The assessment of radiation exposures in native American communities from nuclear weapons testing in Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Native Americans residing in a broad region downwind from the Nevada Test Site during the 1950s and 1960s received significant radiation exposures from nuclear weapons testing. Because of differences in diet, activities, and housing, their radiation exposures are only very imperfectly represented in the Department of Energy dose reconstructions. There are important missing pathways, including exposures to radioactive iodine from eating small game. The dose reconstruction model assumptions about cattle feeding practices across a year are unlikely to apply to the native communities as are other model assumptions about diet. Thus exposures from drinking milk and eating vegetables have not yet been properly estimated for these communities. Through consultations with members of the affected communities, these deficiencies could be corrected and the dose reconstruction extended to Native Americans. An illustration of the feasibility of extending the dose reconstruction is provided by a sample calculation to estimate radiation exposures to the thyroid from eating radio-iodine-contaminated rabbit thyroids after the Dedan test. The illustration is continued with a discussion of how the calculation results may be used to make estimates for other tests and other locations

  12. The relationship of thyroid cancer with radiation exposure from nuclear weapon testing in the Marshall Islands

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The US nuclear weapons testing program in the Pacific conducted between 1946 and 1958 resulted in radiation exposure in the Marshall Islands. The potentially widespread radiation exposure from radioiodines of fallout has raised concerns about the risk of thyroid cancer in the Marshallese population. The most serious exposures and its health hazards resulted from the hydrogen-thermonuclear bomb test, the Castle BRAVO, on March 1, 1954. Between 1993 and 1997, we screened 3,709 Marshallese for thyroid disease who were born before the BRAVO test. It was 60% of the entire population at risk and who were still alive at the time of our examinations. We diagnosed 30 thyroid cancers and found 27 other study participants who had been operated for thyroid cancer before our screening in this group. Fifty-seven Marshallese born before 1954 (1.5%) had thyroid cancer or had been operated for thyroid cancer. Nearly all (92%) of these cancers were papillary carcinoma. We derived estimates of individual thyroid dose proxy from the BRAVO test in 1954 on the basis of published age-specific doses estimated on Utirik atoll and 137Cs deposition levels on the atolls where the participants came from. There was suggestive evidence that the prevalence of thyroid cancer increased with category of estimated dose to the thyroid. (author)

  13. Assessment of thyroid doses due to 131I from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    About 100 of the atmospheric nuclear weapons tests carried out at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) resulted in off-site detection of radioactive materials. These tests released about 5 EBq of 131I in the atmosphere, predominantly in 1952, 1953, 1955 and 1957. Radioiodine was deposited across the United States of America, with the highest values immediately downwind of the NTS and the lowest values of the west coast. In the 1980s, three major dose reconstruction studies were undertaken in order to address the assessment of thyroid doses due to 131I fallout from the NTS: (1) the ORERP study of the US Department of Energy; (2) the Utah thyroid cohort study; and (3) the NCI thyroid study. The first two studies are concerned with doses received by 'local' populations (less than 800 km from the NTS), while the third study deals with the estimation of thyroid doses received by populations across the continental USA. In all three studies, uncertainty estimates were attached to the calculated doses. The second and third studies specifically addressed the assessment of thyroid doses from radioiodines, whereas the first study has a much wider scope, in that it considers both external and internal irradiation of the main organs and tissues of the body from all radionuclides produced by nuclear weapons tests. The thyroid doses from NTS fallout resulted essentially from the ingestion of milk contaminated with 131I; other, usually less important, pathways of exposure are the consumption of leafy vegetables and eggs. Because children generally drink more milk than adults, and because of the smaller mass of their thyroid gland, children received higher doses than adults for a given deposition of 131I. The thyroid doses are estimated to have ranged up to a few grays for small children in south-western Utah who drank milk from a family owned goat. A preliminary estimate of the collective thyroid dose to the US population from NTS fallout is 4 x 106 man·Gy, corresponding to a per capita

  14. Proposal for health effects studies related to nuclear weapon testing at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Populations that resided and who now resid in and the Semipalatinsk Test Site have emained there for decades and experienced little in and out migration. Semipalatinsk City was literally a secret city until the dissolution of the USSR. The urban population of the city of Semipalatinsk has steadily grown from several hundred thousand to about 1 million people in the area. Although current urban and rural levels of exposure from environmental radiocontamination are not markedly increased beyond natural background, there are many villagers who resided near the Semipalatinsk Test Site whose cumulative lifetime doses are on the order of 0.8-2 Sv. Over the course of 40 years, more than 470 nuclear weapons were tested at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS) in the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan. From 1949 to 1963, 38 detonations occured on the ground and 128 in the air. Radionuclides emanating from there tests resulted in atmospheric and enviromental contamination leading to varios levels of acute and chronic radiation exposure. The medical, scientific and social ramifications of the nuclear testing pose serius challenges to the Kazakhstan Repubic and its scientific and health care systems. The release of radionuclides over a long period of time and their spread in the enveronment posed major problems to the Kazakhstan authorities. Efforts to study the association between fallout radiation and radiation-induced health effects were prevented by official decree until 1980. Initially, efforts to address the medical and scientific challenges of the radioactive contamination which was classified in the FSU. After the dissolution of the FSU, efforts to study populations aroud STS were hampered and further encumbered by the political and social changes that increased sharply in the FSU soon after test suspension

  15. Sperm competition and the coevolution of pre- and postcopulatory traits: Weapons evolve faster than testes among onthophagine dung beetles.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Simmons, Leigh W; Fitzpatrick, John L

    2016-05-01

    Reproductive competition generates episodes of both pre- and postcopulatory sexual selection. Theoretical models of sperm competition predict that as the fitness gains from expenditure on the weapons of male combat increase, males should increase their expenditure on weapons and decrease their expenditure on traits that contribute to competitive fertilization success. Although traits subject to sexual selection are known to have accelerated evolutionary rates of phenotypic divergence, it is not known whether the competing demands of investment into pre- and postcopulatory traits affect their relative rates of evolutionary divergence. We use a comparative approach to estimate the rates of divergence in pre- and postcopulatory traits among onthophagine dung beetles. Weapons evolved faster than body size while testes mass and sperm length evolved more slowly than body size, suggesting that precopulatory competition is the stronger episode of sexual selection acting on these beetles. Although horns evolved faster than testes, evolutionary increases in horn length were not associated with evolutionary reductions in testes mass. Our data for onthophagines support the notion that in taxa where males are unable to monopolize paternity, expenditure on both weapons and testes should both be favored. PMID:27061413

  16. Methodology for the Weapons-Grade MOX Fuel Burnup Analysis in the Advanced Test Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A UNIX BASH (Bourne Again SHell) script CMO has been written and validated at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to couple the Monte Carlo transport code MCNP with the depletion and buildup code ORIGEN-2 (CMO). The new Monte Carlo burnup analysis methodology in this paper consists of MCNP coupling through CMO with ORIGEN-2, and is therefore called the MCWO. MCWO is a fully automated tool that links the Monte Carlo transport code MCNP with the radioactive decay and burnup code ORIGEN-2. MCWO is capable of handling a large number of fuel burnup and material loading specifications, Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) lobe powers, and irradiation time intervals. MCWO processes user input that specifies the system geometry, initial material compositions, feed/removal specifications, and other code-specific parameters. Calculated results from MCNP, ORIGEN-2, and data process module calculations are output in succession as MCWO executes. The principal function of MCWO is to transfer one-group cross-section and flux values from MCNP to ORIGEN-2, and then transfer the resulting material compositions (after irradiation and/or decay) from ORIGEN-2 back to MCNP in a repeated, cyclic fashion. The basic requirements of MCWO are a working MCNP input file and some additional input parameters; all interaction with ORIGEN-2 as well as other calculations are performed by CMO. This paper presents the MCWO-calculated results for the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) experiments RERTR-1 and RERTR-2 as well as the Weapons-Grade Mixed Oxide (WG-MOX) fuel testing in ATR. Calculations performed for the WG-MOX test irradiation, which is managed by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), supports the DOE Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP). The MCWO-calculated results are compared with measured data

  17. Trends in childhood leukaemia in the Nordic countries in relation to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

    OpenAIRE

    Darby, S. C.; Olsen, J. H.; Doll, R.; Thakrar, B.; Brown, P. D.; Storm, H H; Barlow, L.; Langmark, F.; Teppo, L; H. Tulinius

    1992-01-01

    OBJECTIVE--To obtain further information about the risks of childhood leukaemia after exposure to ionising radiation at low doses and low dose rates before or after birth or to the father's testes shortly before conception. DESIGN--Observational study of trends in incidence of childhood leukaemia in relation to estimated radiation exposures due to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing during the 1950s and 1960s. SETTING--Nordic countries. SUBJECTS--Children aged under 15 years. MAI...

  18. Prediction of ground motion from underground nuclear weapons tests as it relates to siting of a nuclear waste storage facility at NTS and compatibility with the weapons test program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report assumes reasonable criteria for NRC licensing of a nuclear waste storage facility at the Nevada Test Site where it would be exposed to ground motion from underground nuclear weapons tests. Prediction equations and their standard deviations have been determined from measurements on a number of nuclear weapons tests. The effect of various independent parameters on standard deviation is discussed. That the data sample is sufficiently large is shown by the fact that additional data have little effect on the standard deviation. It is also shown that coupling effects can be separated out of the other contributions to the standard deviation. An example, based on certain licensing assumptions, shows that it should be possible to have a nuclear waste storage facility in the vicinity of Timber Mountain which would be compatible with a 700 kt weapons test in the Buckboard Area if the facility were designed to withstand a peak vector acceleration of 0.75 g. The prediction equation is a log-log linear equation which predicts acceleration as a function of yield of an explosion and the distance from it

  19. Mortality and cancer incidence 1952-1990 in UK participants in the UK atmospheric nuclear weapon tests and experimental programmes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    To study long-term effects of participating in the United Kingdom's atmospheric nuclear weapon tests and experimental programmes which took place in Australia and the Pacific Ocean between 1952 and 1967, a total of 21,358 men who took part in the tests have been identified from archives of the Ministry of Defence and followed up to 1 January 1991. The mortality and incidence of cancer in these men were compared with those in 22,333 controls selected from the same archives. It is concluded that participant in the nuclear weapon testing programmes has not had a detectable effect on participants' expectation of life, or on their risk of developing cancer or other fatal diseases. (author)

  20. Reconversion of nuclear weapons

    CERN Document Server

    Kapitza, Sergei P

    1993-01-01

    The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

  1. The relationship of thyroid cancer in the people of the Marshall Islands to potential exposure to radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The US atomic weapons testing programme in the Pacific conducted between 1946 and 1958 resulted in radioactive contamination of a number of atolls in the Marshall Islands to various degrees. The largest weapon named BRAVO was tested in 1954 and resulted in high exposures to residents living on three atolls immediately downwind of the test site. Between 1993 and 1997, as part of the Nationwide Radiological Study of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, we examined 4767 Marshallese for all forms of thyroid disease, benign and malignant. Those examined had residences at the time of the test on all inhabited atolls of the nation and were born before the end of the nuclear testing period and thus potentially exposed to radioiodines from bomb test fallout. This group includes more than 60% of the alive population at risk. We diagnosed 38 thyroid cancers and found 23 other study participants who had been operated for thyroid cancer before. These findings indicate that 1 in 100 Marshallese had thyroid cancer or had been diagnosed with thyroid cancer before the investigation. Thyroid cancer rates varied little throughout the country, which suggests that thyroid cancer is endemic to the Marshallese population. However, the highest prevalence (1.8%) was found among women who were alive at the time of the BRAVO test. We derived crude estimates of thyroid dose for each study participant, using age-specific dose estimates on Utirik as estimated by Lessard et al. and adjusting those for location on the basis of contemporary measurements of Cs-137 at their island of residence in 1954. Prevalence of thyroid cancer generally increased with estimated dose to the thyroid, but the trend was not statistically significant. In view of these data, more precise individual thyroid dose reconstruction becomes an essential task for future work. (author)

  2. Application of NEPA to nuclear weapons production, storage, and testing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirement of environmental impact statements for the testing of military equipment, specifically nuclear weapons, conflicts with national security objectives. The author examines NEPA and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in terms of the environmental effects of weapons testing and the relevant case law. The Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project sought to resolve the conflict by distinguishing between a project which is contemplated and one which is proposed. The classification scheme embodied in the FOIA exemption for national security may cause unwarranted frustration of NEPA's goals. The author outlines a new classification system and review mechanism that could curb military abuse in this area

  3. Testing Atom and Neutron Neutrality with Atom Interferometry

    OpenAIRE

    Arvanitaki, Asimina; Dimopoulos, Savas; Geraci, Andrew A.; Hogan, Jason; Kasevich, Mark

    2007-01-01

    We propose an atom-interferometry experiment based on the scalar Aharonov-Bohm effect which detects an atom charge at the 10^{-28}e level, and improves the current laboratory limits by 8 orders of magnitude. This setup independently probes neutron charges down to 10^{-28}e, 7 orders of magnitude below current bounds.

  4. The nuclear weapons legacy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    On the 50th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, two new reports from the US DOE shed light on nuclear weapons production and its aftermath. This article summarizes and comments on the two reports: Closing the Circle on the Splitting of the Atom: the Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Production in the United States and What the Department of Energy is Doing About it; and Estimating the Cold War Mortgage: the 1995 Baseline Environmental Management Report

  5. Gunshot residue testing in suicides: Part II: Analysis by inductive coupled plasma-atomic emission spectrometry.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Molina, D Kimberley; Castorena, Joe L; Martinez, Michael; Garcia, James; DiMaio, Vincent J M

    2007-09-01

    Several different methods can be employed to test for gunshot residue (GSR) on a decedent's hands, including scanning electron microscopy with energy dispersive x-ray (SEM/EDX) and inductive coupled plasma-atomic emission spectrometry (ICP-AES). In part I of this 2-part series, GSR results performed by SEM/EDX in undisputed cases of suicidal handgun wounds were studied. In part II, the same population was studied, deceased persons with undisputed suicidal handgun wounds, but GSR testing was performed using ICP-AES. A total of 102 cases were studied and analyzed for caliber of weapon, proximity of wound, and the results of the GSR testing. This study found that 50% of cases where the deceased was known to have fired a handgun immediately prior to death had positive GSR results by ICP/AES, which did not differ from the results of GSR testing by SEM/EDX. Since only 50% of cases where the person is known to have fired a weapon were positive for GSR by either method, this test should not be relied upon to determine whether someone has discharged a firearm and is not useful as a determining factor of whether or not a wound is self-inflicted or non-self-inflicted. While a positive GSR result may be of use, a negative result is not helpful in the medical examiner setting as a negative result indicates that either a person fired a weapon prior to death or a person did not fire a weapon prior to death. PMID:17721164

  6. Radiation impact of nuclear weapons tests at the Semipalatinks test site on the population of the Altai region

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The population of the Altai region was exposed repeatedly to radiation during atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons from 1949 to 1962 and during cratering explosions in 1965. It has now been established that 22 nuclear explosions resulted in transport of radionuclides towards the Altai region. The nuclear explosions of 29 August 1949 alone produced an effective dose exceeding 250 mSv in 44 settlements. In the case of the nuclear explosion of 7 August 1962, the thyroid dose to persons living in a number of settlements was more than a few gray. The impact of the tests on the population of the Altai region has been under study since 1990 (as of 1992 under the ''Semipalatinsk test site/Altai'' State research programme). This study covers: reconstruction of doses from the tests, risk assessment, epidemiological studies, health and demosgraphic studies, and ecological research (radioactive and chemical contamination). The goals of the research are development and realization of the programme of additional measures for health protection and compensation, and environmental and social protection. The nuclear test of 1949 produced the greatest radiation impact. The total collective dose from this test to the population of the region is estimated at approximately 32,000 man·Sv, with about 250,000 individuals receiving a dose of above 5 cSv. The radiation impact from this test on the cohort and population levels was estimated using up-to-date scientific theories about stochastic health effects of ionizing radiation. The goal of the research is to obtain data on the consequences of the tests in order to plan social protection measures as well as future research. An analysis of the medico-ecological situation in the affected and control regions and an epidemiological study are being carried out. Some results of the study are presented in the paper. A concept of social protection for the population affected by the tests has been prepared and serves as the basis for taking

  7. A Preliminary study on attitudes toward nuclear weapons and nuclear tests of the residents of Kurchatov, Kazakhstan

    OpenAIRE

    Matsuo, Masatsugu; Bektorov, Yerzhan; Muldagaliyev, Talgat; Apsalikov, Kazbek; Hirabayashi, Kyoko; Kawano, Noriyuki

    2006-01-01

    The town of Kurchatov was a secret city newly built in the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site as the headquarters of the nuclear tests. The present paper is a pilot study, first, to explore how the current Kurchatov residents think and feel about nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, and secondly, to compare the results of the survey with those of the similar survey near Semipalatinsk. Though the present study is based upon a small and limited survey conducted in the city, it is hoped that it will ...

  8. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin-America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in Guatemala City on 14 December 2001

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007

  12. The NATO Semipalatinsk project - an assessment of longterm effects of atomic bomb tests in Kazhakstan on the population

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    To determine the long-term consequences of atmospheric atomic bomb tests for the population in the surroundings of the former nuclear weapons test site near Semipalatinsk, a pilot study was performed by international cooperation between Kazakh, French, Czech and German institutes at two measuring locations (Mostik, Maisk) in Kazakhstan. Mostik is a village close to Dolon and downwind of the first atomic bomb explosion on August 29, 1949. Maisk is close to Kurchatov and not too far from ground zero. The results show that surface contamination from nuclear weapons tests has in the meantime decayed to a large extent. External doses largely correspond to the natural background. The remaining incorporation of longer-lived radionuclides is also slight and in 1995 for 137Cs and 90Sr merely led to an annual dose of less than 1% of the natural radiation exposure. The question of a dose contribution by the possible incorporation of 239Pu remains open. Dose contributions from intake of uranium seems to be of natural origin. Life in the villages of Maisk and Mostik does not currently involve any radiological threat to the inhabitants. Two scenarios have been investigated to reconstruct the dose accumulated since 1949 due to incorporation of 90Sr. It has been found to be in the order of magnitude from a few mSv up to about 100 mSv. However, dose reconstruction for the older inhabitants directly affected by above ground atomic weapon tests remains difficult and needs further effort. (orig.)

  13. United States population dose estimates for 131I in the thyroid after the Chinese atmospheric nuclear weapons tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Analysis of samples collected within the United States after the Chinese atmospheric nuclear weapons tests of 26 September and 17 November 1976 indicates that the radiation dose to the thyroid from iodine-131 in milk was predominant. A U.S. population dose to the thyroid of 68,000 man-rads was calculated for the iodine-131 fallout. The four excess thyroid cancers that are estimated to occur as a result of the September test during the next 45 years will be masked by the 380,000 cases of thyroid cancer which are expected to occur in the United States from all causes during the same interval

  14. Special Weapons

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — Supporting Navy special weapons, the division provides an array of engineering services, technical publication support services, logistics support services, safety...

  15. Test of the quantumness of atom-atom correlations in a bosonic gas

    OpenAIRE

    Ivanov, D.; Wallentowitz, S.

    2006-01-01

    It is shown how the quantumness of atom-atom correlations in a trapped bosonic gas can be made observable. Application of continuous feedback control of the center of mass of the atomic cloud is shown to generate oscillations of the spatial extension of the cloud, whose amplitude can be directly used as a characterization of atom-atom correlations. Feedback parameters can be chosen such that the violation of a Schwarz inequality for atom-atom correlations can be tested at noise levels much hi...

  16. Test of Nonlocality with an Atom-Field Entangled State

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    ZHENG Shi-Biao

    2002-01-01

    We propose a scheme for the test of nonlocality with atom-field entanglement. An atom is sent through a cavity filled with a coherent field with a small amplitude. The dispersive interaction leads to atom-field entanglement.Then the field is driven by a classical current. The Bell inequality can be tested by the joint measurement of the parity of the field and the atomic state.

  17. Estimates of fallout in the continental U.S. from Nevada weapons testing based on gummed-film monitoring data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During periods of weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) between 1951 and 1958, the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) monitored daily fallout at about 100 sites in the U.S. using gummed-film collectors. These gummed-film data represent the only comprehensive set of actual measurements of fallout during this period for areas outside the immediate vicinity of the NTS. The measured beta activities originally reported by EML have been reviewed and reevaluated. This reevaluation corrected a number of errors in the original data set and allowed fairly accurate estimates to be made of specific radionuclide depositions from individual NTS shots. Estimates of the geographical and temporal variations in cumulative 137Cs and 131I depositions from all NTS shots through 1957 are presented, as well as estimates of the relative impact of particular shots and test series. The revised gummed-film estimates of total NTS fallout depositions are compared with estimates based on contemporary and historical soil sample analyses. These reevaluated gummed-film fallout deposition estimates are being extensively utilized in a number of ongoing programs to reconstruct the radiation exposure of the U.S. population from Nevada weapons testing

  18. Concentration of plutonium in placentas from the Nenetz autonomous district close to the Novaya Zemlaye nuclear weapons test site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The level of alpha radiation from 239,240Pu was measured in placentas from the Nenetz district south of the nuclear weapons test site at the Novaya Zemlaye archipelago in Russia. A sample of ten placentas was collected consecutively in 1993 from a maternity ward in Narjan Mar and analysed using standard chemical alpha spectrometry. The highest concentration was close to one mBq per kilo fresh placenta or an order of ten higher than previously reported from England. The study indicates that placentas could be used for biological monitoring of external pollution by plutonium. (Author)

  19. Testing times: A nuclear weapons laboratory at the end of the Cold War

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This dissertation focuses on the role of discursive and other practices in the construction of two alternative regimes of truth in regard to nuclear weapons, and in the cultural production of persons at the Livermore Laboratory and in the local anti-nuclear movement. In the 1980s the scientists' regime of truth was challenged by a heterogeneous anti-nuclear movement recruited largely from the humanistic middle class - a class fragment profoundly hostile to the policies of the Reagan Administration. The movement attacked the Laboratory in a number of ways, ranging from local ballot initiatives and lobbying in Washington to civil disobedience at the Laboratory. By the end of the 1980s this movement, in combination with Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union and a decade of internal scandals at the Laboratory, left the Laboratory weakened - though Laboratory scientists and managers are currently working to adapt the system of ideas and practices evolved during the Cold War to legitimate continued weapons work in a post-Cold War environment

  20. Atomic precision tests and light scalar couplings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brax, Philippe [CEA, IPhT, CNRS, URA 2306, Gif-sur-Yvette (France). Inst. de Physique Theorique; Burrage, Clare [Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (DESY), Hamburg (Germany); Geneve Univ. (Switzerland). Dept. de Physique Theorique

    2010-10-15

    We calculate the shift in the atomic energy levels induced by the presence of a scalar field which couples to matter and photons. We find that a combination of atomic measurements can be used to probe both these couplings independently. A new and stringent bound on the matter coupling springs from the precise measurement of the 1s to 2s energy level difference in the hydrogen atom, while the coupling to photons is essentially constrained by the Lamb shift. Combining these constraints with current particle physics bounds we find that the contribution of a scalar field to the recently claimed discrepancy in the proton radius measured using electronic and muonic atoms is negligible. (orig.)

  1. Atomic precision tests and light scalar couplings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We calculate the shift in the atomic energy levels induced by the presence of a scalar field which couples to matter and photons. We find that a combination of atomic measurements can be used to probe both these couplings independently. A new and stringent bound on the matter coupling springs from the precise measurement of the 1s to 2s energy level difference in the hydrogen atom, while the coupling to photons is essentially constrained by the Lamb shift. Combining these constraints with current particle physics bounds we find that the contribution of a scalar field to the recently claimed discrepancy in the proton radius measured using electronic and muonic atoms is negligible. (orig.)

  2. Agreement of 15 October 1992 between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Republic of Lithuania on 1 January 2008

  3. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for the Republic of Estonia on 1 December 2005

  4. Results of field testing with the FightSight infrared-based projectile tracking and weapon-fire characterization technology

    Science.gov (United States)

    Snarski, Steve; Menozzi, Alberico; Sherrill, Todd; Volpe, Chris; Wille, Mark

    2010-04-01

    This paper describes experimental results from recent live-fire data collects that demonstrate the capability of a prototype system for projectile detection and tracking. This system, which is being developed at Applied Research Associates, Inc., under the FightSight program, consists of a high-speed thermal camera and sophisticated image processing algorithms to detect and track projectiles. The FightSight operational vision is automated situational intelligence to detect, track, and graphically map large-scale firefights and individual shooting events onto command and control (C2) systems in real time (shot location and direction, weapon ID, movements and trends). Gaining information on enemy-fire trajectories allows educated inferences on the enemy's intent, disposition, and strength. Our prototype projectile detection and tracking system has been tested at the Joint Readiness Training Center (Ft Polk, LA) during live-fire convoy and mortar registration exercises, in the summer of 2009. It was also tested during staged military-operations- on-urban-terrain (MOUT) firefight events at Aberdeen Test Center (Aberdeen, MD) under the Hostile Fire Defeat Army Technology Objective midterm experiment, also in the summer of 2009, where we introduced fusion with acoustic and EO sensors to provide 3D localization and near-real time display of firing events. Results are presented in this paper that demonstrate effective and accurate detection and localization of weapon fire (5.56mm, 7.62mm, .50cal, 81/120mm mortars, 40mm) in diverse and challenging environments (dust, heat, day and night, rain, arid open terrain, urban clutter). FightSight's operational capabilities demonstrated under these live-fire data collects can support closecombat scenarios. As development continues, FightSight will be able to feed C2 systems with a symbolic map of enemy actions.

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 1 October 1999

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  8. After fifty years of the nuclear age: Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or elimination of them?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ever since the first test of the atomic bomb and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, mankind lived with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were inevitably connected with the Cold War, with its end new opportunity has come concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Steps are to be undertaken in order to eliminate the nuclear weapons. First, would be the prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. By excluding the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, the world could be closer to nuclear disarmament than ever. The prohibition of the use of some type of weapons could be a breakthrough towards the elimination of such weapons. While the negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons would be difficult, as were those to ban chemical weapons, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons would eventually lead to their elimination. During the Cold War, the imminent goal of disarmament was to stop the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. But in the post-Cold War era an opportunity has developed for further steps towards nuclear disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons

  9. Antisatellite weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The authors take issue with the assessment that the advent of antisatellite weapons implies that the beneficial role of satellites in arms control, confidence building, and conflict resolution has been judged less important than their ability to support actual military operations. They argue that there is still an opportunity to negotiate a militarily significant and verifiable constraint on the growth of antisatellite technology that would be in the security interest of the US and the world as a whole. They base their opinion on an assessment of the roles of the existing military satellites and their vulnerability to antisatellite weapons and the probable impact of antisatellite weapons on various kinds of crisis and conflict. 10 figures, 1 table

  10. Agreement between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocols thereto) between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 21 March 2000 by the representative of the Government of the French Republic and the Director General of the IAEA, and on 26 September 2000 by the representative of the European Atomic Energy Community. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 26 October 2007, one month after the Agency has received notification from both France and the European Atomic Energy Community that their respective internal requirements for entry into force have been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocols, the Protocols entered into force on the same date

  11. Atomic theory and tests of the Standard Model in atomic experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Measurements of the weak charge characterizing the strength of the electron-nucleon weak interaction provide tests of the Standard Model and a way of searching for new physics beyond the Standard Model. Atomic experiments give limits on the extra Z-boson, leptoquarks, composite fermions, and radiative corrections produced by particles that are predicted by new theories. To extract the accurate value of the weak charge from atomic experiments one has to perform high precision atomic calculations of the PNC effects

  12. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the grand scheme of things we are a little more than halfway through the cycle of splitting the atom for weapons purposes. If we visualize this historic cycle as the full sweep of a clockface, at zero hour we would find the first nuclear chain reaction by Enrico Fermi, followed immediately by the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the first atomic bombs. From two o'clock until five, the United States built and ran a massive industrial complex that produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At half past, the Cold War ended, and the United States shut down most of its nuclear weapons factories. The second half of this cycle involves dealing with the waste and contamination from nuclear weapons production - a task that had, for the most part, been postponed into the indefinite future. That future is now upon us. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War is in many ways as big a challenge for us today as the building of the atomic bomb was for the Manhattan Project pioneers in the 1940s. Our challenges are political and social as well as technical, and we are meeting those challenges. We are reducing risks, treating wastes, developing new technologies, and building democratic institutions for a constructive debate on our future course

  13. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-01-01

    In the grand scheme of things we are a little more than halfway through the cycle of splitting the atom for weapons purposes. If we visualize this historic cycle as the full sweep of a clockface, at zero hour we would find the first nuclear chain reaction by Enrico Fermi, followed immediately by the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the first atomic bombs. From two o`clock until five, the United States built and ran a massive industrial complex that produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At half past, the Cold War ended, and the United States shut down most of its nuclear weapons factories. The second half of this cycle involves dealing with the waste and contamination from nuclear weapons production - a task that had, for the most part, been postponed into the indefinite future. That future is now upon us. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War is in many ways as big a challenge for us today as the building of the atomic bomb was for the Manhattan Project pioneers in the 1940s. Our challenges are political and social as well as technical, and we are meeting those challenges. We are reducing risks, treating wastes, developing new technologies, and building democratic institutions for a constructive debate on our future course.

  14. Dechlorination, dissolution and purification of weapon grade plutonium oxide contaminated with chlorides: tests performed in the CEA Atalante Facility for the aqueous polishing part of MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the first two to three years of operation, the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) designed by Duke Cogema Stone and Webster (DCS) will receive and process low grade plutonium oxide from alternate feedstock (AFS). Some of this feedstock does not meet the specifications of material normally processed by MFFF, high grade plutonium oxide from the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF). To validate the process selection and design parameters, DCS has requested the CEA (Acronym for French Atomic Energy Commission) to perform laboratory scale active tests using with weapons grade Plutonium oxide contaminated with chloride and other metallic impurities. Dechlorination, silver(II) dissolution and purification active tests have been performed in CEA Atalante Facility at Marcoule France with the same process parameters than the MFFF design parameters. The aim of this paper is to present the feed characteristics, the tests conditions and the tests results. (authors)

  15. Parity conservation in atoms: testing laporte's rule

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The successful development of unified theories of weak and electromagnetic interactions and the experimental discovery of the elastic scattering of high energy neutrinos from nucleons has provided strong motivation to the search for weak electron-nucleon interactions in ordinary atoms, through a breakdown of Laporte's rule. A review is presented of recent developments in this field, including a qualitative discussion of this type of weak interaction and a short summary of the experiments in progress. A more detailed discussion of one particular experiment is given, involving microwave transitions in a metastable hydrogen beam. Presently no evidence contradicts Laporte's rule. Data from optical activity in bismuth vapor, has probably ruled out the gauge model of Weinberg-Salam. (Auth.)

  16. The legacy of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It could be argued that discussion of the legacy of nuclear weapons should be strictly limited to the effects of the use of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in 1945. However, it seems reasonable also to include the activities related to the potential use of nuclear weapons, these being: testing of nuclear weapons, which was carried out principally by the USA and the USSR, but also by the United Kingdom, France and China; the military fuel cycle associated with the production of nuclear weapons, including uranium mining, reactors, fuel reprocessing, waste disposal and transport of nuclear weapons. Estimates of collective effective dose commitments arising from the most important human made sources of radiation that result in environmental releases of radioactive materials are presented 27 refs, 2 tabs

  17. The influence of the Lop Nor Nuclear Weapons Test Base to the population of the Republic of Kazakhstan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zhumadilov, Kassym, E-mail: kassym@hiroshima-u.ac.j [Research Institute for Radiation Biology and Medicine, Hiroshima University, 1-2-3, Kasumi, Minami-ku, Hiroshima 734-8553 (Japan); Ivannikov, Alexander [Medical Radiological Research Center, Korolev str. 4, Obninsk 249036 (Russian Federation); Zharlyganova, Dinara [Astana Medical University, Astana 010000 (Kazakhstan); Stepanenko, Valeriy [Medical Radiological Research Center, Korolev str. 4, Obninsk 249036 (Russian Federation); Zhumadilov, Zhaxybay [Nazarbayev University, Life Science Center, Astana 010000 (Kazakhstan); Apsalikov, Kazbek [Kazakh Scientific-Research Institute for Radiation Medicine and Ecology, Semey 071400 (Kazakhstan); Toyoda, Shin [Department of Applied Physics, Faculty of Science, Okayama University of Science, 1-1 Ridai, Okayama 700-0005 (Japan); Endo, Satoru [Department of Quantum Energy Applications, Graduate School of Engineering, Hiroshima University, 1-4-1 Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima 739-8527 (Japan); Tanaka, Kenichi [Division of Physics, Department of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Center of Medical Education, Sapporo Medical University, South 1, West 17, Chuo-ku, Sapporo 060-8556 (Japan); Miyazawa, Chuzou [School of Dentistry, Ohu University, 31-1, Aza-Misumido, Tomita-machi, Koriyama-shi, Fukushima Pref. 963-8611 (Japan); Okamoto, Tetsuji [Department of Molecular Oral Medicine and Maxillofacial Surgery, Division of Frontier Medical Sciences, Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences, Hiroshima University (Japan); Hoshi, Masaharu [Research Institute for Radiation Biology and Medicine, Hiroshima University, 1-2-3, Kasumi, Minami-ku, Hiroshima 734-8553 (Japan)

    2011-04-15

    The method of electron spin resonance (ESR) dosimetry was applied to human tooth enamel to obtain estimates of individual absorbed dose for residents of Makanchi, Urdzhar and Taskesken settlements located near the Kazakhstan-Chinese border (about 400 km to the South-East, from the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS) and about 1000 km from the Lop Nor Nuclear Weapons Test Base, China). Since the ground and atmospheric nuclear tests (1964-1981) at Lop Nor, the people residing in these settlements are believed to have been heavily exposed to radioactive fallout. Tooth samples had been extracted for medical reasons during the course of ordinary dental treatment. The village of Kokpekty, located 400 km to the South-east of the SNTS, was chosen as the control group since it has not been subjected to any radioactive contamination. The mean excess doses in tooth enamel obtained after subtraction of the contribution of natural background radiation do not exceed 62 {+-} 28 mGy, 64 {+-} 30 mGy, 49 {+-} 27 mGy and -19 {+-} 36 mGy for all ages of the residents of Makanchi, Urdzhar, Taskesken and the control village of Kokpekty, respectively.

  18. The influence of the Lop Nor Nuclear Weapons Test Base to the population of the Republic of Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The method of electron spin resonance (ESR) dosimetry was applied to human tooth enamel to obtain estimates of individual absorbed dose for residents of Makanchi, Urdzhar and Taskesken settlements located near the Kazakhstan-Chinese border (about 400 km to the South-East, from the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS) and about 1000 km from the Lop Nor Nuclear Weapons Test Base, China). Since the ground and atmospheric nuclear tests (1964-1981) at Lop Nor, the people residing in these settlements are believed to have been heavily exposed to radioactive fallout. Tooth samples had been extracted for medical reasons during the course of ordinary dental treatment. The village of Kokpekty, located 400 km to the South-east of the SNTS, was chosen as the control group since it has not been subjected to any radioactive contamination. The mean excess doses in tooth enamel obtained after subtraction of the contribution of natural background radiation do not exceed 62 ± 28 mGy, 64 ± 30 mGy, 49 ± 27 mGy and -19 ± 36 mGy for all ages of the residents of Makanchi, Urdzhar, Taskesken and the control village of Kokpekty, respectively.

  19. Tests of nuclear weapons and the beginning of radioactivity monitoring using the example of Switzerland; Die Kernwaffenversuche und der Beginn der Radioaktivitaetsueberwachung am Beispiel der Schweiz

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Voelkle, Hansruedi [Univ. Chemin du Musee 3, Fribourg (Switzerland). Physikdept.

    2016-05-01

    A historical survey is given on the development and the tests of nuclear weapons including the consequences for humans and the environment, as well as on the generation of measuring networks for radioactivity in the environment in the same time. Some results of the measurements are shown exemplarily for Switzerland.

  20. Justice downwind: America's atomic testing program in the 1950s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drawing on personal interviews, case histories, and the archives of the Atomic Energy Commission, Professor Ball discusses the American nuclear-testing program from 1951 to 1963, the impact of the testing on people living downwind from the Nevada Test Site, long-term effects of radiation exposure, and the clash between the ''downwinders'' and the government

  1. City mayors on the march. Hiroshima leading citizen campaign to ban nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Led on our tragic experience 58 years ago, Hiroshima has continually called for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the realization of genuine and lasting world peace. Unfortunately, despite our efforts, this planet still bristles with enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons, and today we face an increasingly perilous nuclear crisis. We see States that have nuclear weapons taking more rigid positions regarding disarmament, and non-nuclear-weapon States frightened into seeking their own nuclear bombs. The global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). the pivotal international agreement regarding nuclear weapons, is teetering on the brink of collapse. The world's leading superpower, the United States, for example, has refused to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and is resuming research into small nuclear weapons. These steps run contrary to the enshrined commitment of nuclear powers to reduce atomic arsenals and move toward a nuclear-weapon free world. We cannot sit quietly as the world plunges toward unspeakable violence and misery. We must let our leaders know, first and foremost, that we demand immediate freedom from the nuclear threat. Nuclear weapons are heinous, cruel, inhumane weapons that threaten our entire species. In 1996, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion declaring them illegal. At the Meeting of the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference held in April 2003 in Geneva the president of the World Conference of Mayors for Peace, a non-governmental organization (NGO) that now has 554 member cities in 107 countries and regions, the following demands, were made: A complete and total ban on all nuclear weapons everywhere; Removal of all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert immediately and withdrawal of all nuclear weapons deployed on foreign territory; It is high time for all recognized nuclear-weapon States to join in a multilateral process of nuclear disarmament and for de-facto nuclear-weapon States

  2. Multi-Use Seismic Stations Offer Strong Deterrent to Clandestine Nuclear Weapons Testing

    OpenAIRE

    Hennet, C. B.; van der Vink, G. E.; Richards, P.G.; Adushkin, V. V.; Kopnichev, Y. F.; Geary, R.

    1996-01-01

    As the United States and other nations push for the signing of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, representatives are meeting in Geneva this year to develop an International Seismic Monitoring System to verify compliance with the treaty's restrictions. In addition to the official monitoring system, regional networks developed for earthquake studies and basic research can provide a strong deterrent against clandestine testing. The recent release of information by the U.S. Department of Energy (D...

  3. Trends in childhood leukaemia in the Nordic countries in relation to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A study was performed to obtain further information about the risks of childhood leukaemia after exposure to ionising radiation at low doses and low dose rates before or after birth or to the father's testes shortly before conception. Trends were studied in the incidence of childhood leukaemia in the Nordic countries in relation to estimated radiation exposures due to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing during the 1950s and 1960s. During the high fallout period the average estimated dose equivalent to the fetal red bone marrow was around 140 μSv and the average annual testicular dose 140 μSv. There was little evidence of increased incidence of leukaemia among children born in these years. Doses to the red bone marrow of a child after birth were higher, and during the high exposure period children would have been subjected to an additional dose equivalent of around 1500 μSv, similar to doses received by children in several parts of central and eastern Europe owing to the Chernobyl accident and about 50% greater than the annual dose equivalent to the red bone marrow of a child from natural radiation. Leukaemia incidence and red marrow dose was not related overall, but rates of leukaemia in the high exposure period were slightly higher than in the surrounding medium exposure period. (Author)

  4. Moruroa and us: Experiences of Polynesian people during the thirty years of nuclear weapons tests in the South Pacific (Ocean)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is separated in nine chapters. In the chapters 2 and 3 we find the results of an inquiry got from 737 ancient workers of the sites. The chapter 4 studies the case of the Island of Mangareva in the Gambier archipelago, island situated at 500 km from Moruroa, the economical, sociological and cultural effects of nuclear weapons tests are analyzed. The chapter number 5 shows the different points of view got from institutions or government officials. In the chapter 6, the elements of public debate on the situation of the CEP ( Pacific study center) and the tests are analyzed in a chronological order on giving a particular importance to the way whom Polynesian people have been informed. The chapter 7 examines the evolution of the scientific debate related to the marine fauna poisoning, the radioactive contamination and the ciguatera. The chapter 8 is centered on the risks perception by the Polynesian society and on the different kinds of resistance at the CEP. In the last chapter, a certain number of conclusions and recommends are given. (N.C.)

  5. Residual radioactivity in the terrestrial environment of the Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls nuclear weapon test sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Activity concentration of alpha-emitting Pu isotopes, 241Pu, 241Am, the pure beta-emitting isotope 90Sr, and the gamma-emitting isotope 137Cs measured in geological and biological samples collected in the terrestrial environment of the former French nuclear test sites of Mururoa and Fangataufa is presented. The samples were collected during an international sampling campaign conducted by the IAEA staff and a team of international experts in summer 1996. The IAEA's Seibersdorf Laboratories and a network of test laboratories, selected on the basis of a proficiency test, carried out the analytical determination of the activity concentrations of the radionuclides. The results obtained were compared with the French data. The study concluded that the radioactivity levels are generally low and of no radiological significance. (author)

  6. Prevalence of pulmonary diseases among the population of different districts of Altay region, affected by irradiation during the nuclear weapon tests on the testing ground near Semipalatinsk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The comparison of the prevalence rate of pulmonary diseases among the population of several districts of Altay region, exposed to different levels of irradiation during the nuclear weapon tests in 1949 was carried out. The prevalence rate of pulmonary diseases for them due to radiation dose to which the adult population was exposed in 1949 was investiged. It was found that the morbidity of their children was not immediately caused by the degree of irradiation to which their parents were exposed in 1949. Disorders of respiratory system were found among the persons born during intensive tests in the atmosphere (1949-1963) and exposed to the irradiation in 1949 during their puberty period. It is confirmed by these people ofren having acute abscesses

  7. Novel Weapons Testing: Are Invasive Plants More Chemically Defended than Native Plants?

    OpenAIRE

    Lind, Eric M.; Parker,John D.

    2010-01-01

    Background Exotic species have been hypothesized to successfully invade new habitats by virtue of possessing novel biochemistry that repels native enemies. Despite the pivotal long-term consequences of invasion for native food-webs, to date there are no experimental studies examining directly whether exotic plants are any more or less biochemically deterrent than native plants to native herbivores. Methodology/Principal Findings In a direct test of this hypothesis using herbivore feeding assa...

  8. Radioactive contamination of the environment and biota on Novaya Zemlya following nuclear weapon tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Data of radiochemical studies have shown that in key elements of ecosystems on the archipelago (lake and sea waters, bottom deposits, mosses lichens, birds and deer) the content of Cs137 and other radioisotopes is within the background level. Bottom deposits and soils of local territories of the abandoned nuclear test sites are the exception (the concentration of radioisotopes in the environment and biota amounts to 5000 Bq/rg and more). It is recommended that mosses and lichens on the ground and benthonic organisms in the sea should be used as biological indicators of artificial radiological background

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 2005

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2010. It was signed on 7 October 2011 in Banjul, The Gambia, and on 18 October 2011 in Vienna, Austria

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 6 July 2000

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (TLATELOLCO) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 29 November 2001. It was signed in the City of Panama on 11 December 2001

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 September 2001. It was signed in Vienna on 5 December 2001

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 14 September 2004. It was signed on 9 December 2004 in Vienna

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article 111(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, pursuant to the first sentence of Article 25(a) thereof, on 21 February 1977

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Additional Protocol entered into force on 28 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Armenia written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  20. Protocol between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)1 is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 9 April 2003

  1. Agreement of 18 November 1993 between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 February 1975 and signed in Vienna on 31 October 1990 and in Nuku'Alofa on 18 November 1993

  2. Agreement of 22 September 1994 between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 22 September 1994

  3. Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 2 December 1993 and signed in Vienna on 6 December 1993 and in Riga on 21 December 1993

  4. Agreement of 30 September 1993 between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 September 1993 and signed in Vienna on 30 September 1993. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 5 May 1994

  5. Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994

  6. The Text of the Agreement of 6 September 1976 between The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Amendment of Article 17

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the amendment to the Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The amendment was approved by the Board of Governors in June 1999, and entered into force on 10 September 1999

  14. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998 and signed in Vienna on 4 December 1998. The Protocol entered into force on 16 December 1998

  18. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  7. Precision Gravity Tests with Atom Interferometry in Space

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tino, G.M.; Sorrentino, F. [Dipartimento di Fisica e Astronomia and LENS, Università di Firenze, INFN Sezione di Firenze, via Sansone 1, I-50019 Sesto Fiorentino (Italy); Aguilera, D. [Institute of Space Systems, German Aerospace Center, Robert-Hooke-Strasse 7, 28359 Bremen (Germany); Battelier, B.; Bertoldi, A. [Laboratoire Photonique, Numérique et Nanosciences, LP2N - UMR5298 - IOGS - CNRS Université Bordeaux 1, Bâtiment A30 351 cours de la Libération F-33405 TALENCE Cedex France (France); Bodart, Q. [Dipartimento di Fisica e Astronomia and LENS, Università di Firenze, INFN Sezione di Firenze, via Sansone 1, I-50019 Sesto Fiorentino (Italy); Bongs, K. [Midlands Ultracold Atom Research Centre School of Physics and Astronomy University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT (United Kingdom); Bouyer, P. [Laboratoire Photonique, Numérique et Nanosciences, LP2N - UMR5298 - IOGS - CNRS Université Bordeaux 1, Bâtiment A30 351 cours de la Libération F-33405 TALENCE Cedex France (France); Braxmaier, C. [Institute of Space Systems, German Aerospace Center, Robert-Hooke-Strasse 7, 28359 Bremen (Germany); Cacciapuoti, L. [European Space Agency, Research and Scientific Support Department, Keplerlaan 1, 2201 AZ Noordwijk (Netherlands); Gaaloul, N. [Institute of Quantum Optics, Leibniz Universitaet Hannover, Welfengarten 1, D 30167 Hannover (Germany); Gürlebeck, N. [University of Bremen, Centre of Applied Space Technology and Microgravity (ZARM), Am Fallturm, D - 29359 Bremen (Germany); Hauth, M. [Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Newtonstr. 15, D-12489 Berlin (Germany); and others

    2013-10-15

    Atom interferometry provides extremely sensitive and accurate tools for the measurement of inertial forces. Operation of atom interferometers in microgravity is expected to enhance the performance of such sensors. This paper presents two possible implementations of a dual {sup 85}Rb-{sup 87}Rb atom interferometer to perform differential gravity measurements in space, with the primary goal to test the Weak Equivalence Principle. The proposed scheme is in the framework of two projects of the European Space Agency, namely Q-WEP and STE-QUEST. The paper describes the baseline experimental configuration, and discusses the technology readiness, noise and error budget for the two proposed experiments.

  8. Precision Gravity Tests with Atom Interferometry in Space

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Atom interferometry provides extremely sensitive and accurate tools for the measurement of inertial forces. Operation of atom interferometers in microgravity is expected to enhance the performance of such sensors. This paper presents two possible implementations of a dual 85Rb-87Rb atom interferometer to perform differential gravity measurements in space, with the primary goal to test the Weak Equivalence Principle. The proposed scheme is in the framework of two projects of the European Space Agency, namely Q-WEP and STE-QUEST. The paper describes the baseline experimental configuration, and discusses the technology readiness, noise and error budget for the two proposed experiments

  9. Nuclear weapons identification system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A nuclear weapons identification system (NWIS) has been under development at the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant since 1984. NWIS employs active neutron interrogation to obtain a variety of time and frequency analysis signature to identify nuclear weapons in containers. Advantages of NWIS are (1) high sensitivity (small changes in configurations produce large changes in signatures); (2) insensitivity of some signatures to background radiation, (useful for storage configurations or for tracking of secondaries through the first stage of dismantlement since the presence of the primary on the assembled system does not affect some signatures for the secondary); (3) nonintrusive (does not reveal design information, which makes it useful for bilateral treaties or by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)); and (4) very difficult to deceive

  10. Tests of local position invariance using continuously running atomic clocks

    CERN Document Server

    Peil, Steven; Hanssen, James L; Swanson, Thomas B; Ekstrom, Christopher R; 10.1103/PhysRevA.87.010102

    2013-01-01

    Tests of local position invariance (LPI) made by comparing the relative redshift of atomic clocks based on different atoms have been carried out for a variety of pairs of atomic species. In most cases, several absolute frequency measurements per year are used to look for an annual signal, resulting in tests that can span on order of a decade. By using the output of continuously running clocks, we carry out LPI tests with comparable or higher precision after less than 1.5 years. These include new measurements of the difference in redshift anomalies \\beta\\ for hyperfine transitions in Rb87 and Cs133 and in H and Cs133 and a measurement comparing Rb87 and H, resulting in a stringent limit on LPI, \\beta(Rb) - \\beta(H)=(-2.7 +/- 4.9) x 10^(-7). The method of making these measurements for continuous clocks is discussed.

  11. Modeling coupled blast/structure interaction with Zapotec, benchmark calculations for the Conventional Weapon Effects Backfill (CONWEB) tests.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bessette, Gregory Carl

    2004-09-01

    Modeling the response of buried reinforced concrete structures subjected to close-in detonations of conventional high explosives poses a challenge for a number of reasons. Foremost, there is the potential for coupled interaction between the blast and structure. Coupling enters the problem whenever the structure deformation affects the stress state in the neighboring soil, which in turn, affects the loading on the structure. Additional challenges for numerical modeling include handling disparate degrees of material deformation encountered in the structure and surrounding soil, modeling the structure details (e.g., modeling the concrete with embedded reinforcement, jointed connections, etc.), providing adequate mesh resolution, and characterizing the soil response under blast loading. There are numerous numerical approaches for modeling this class of problem (e.g., coupled finite element/smooth particle hydrodynamics, arbitrary Lagrange-Eulerian methods, etc.). The focus of this work will be the use of a coupled Euler-Lagrange (CEL) solution approach. In particular, the development and application of a CEL capability within the Zapotec code is described. Zapotec links two production codes, CTH and Pronto3D. CTH, an Eulerian shock physics code, performs the Eulerian portion of the calculation, while Pronto3D, an explicit finite element code, performs the Lagrangian portion. The two codes are run concurrently with the appropriate portions of a problem solved on their respective computational domains. Zapotec handles the coupling between the two domains. The application of the CEL methodology within Zapotec for modeling coupled blast/structure interaction will be investigated by a series of benchmark calculations. These benchmarks rely on data from the Conventional Weapons Effects Backfill (CONWEB) test series. In these tests, a 15.4-lb pipe-encased C-4 charge was detonated in soil at a 5-foot standoff from a buried test structure. The test structure was composed of a

  12. Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  13. Agreement of 23 August 1974 between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 September 1973. It was signed in Vienna on 30 April 1974 and in La Paz on 23 August 1974. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 6 February 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Mexican States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Mexican States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 4 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the United Mexican States written notification that Mexico's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  16. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 2002. It was signed on 5 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 May 2004, the date on which Agency received from El Salvador written notification that El Salvador's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  17. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 15 September 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Paraguay written notification that Paraguay's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  18. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 18 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Nicaragua written notification that Nicaragua's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 19 March 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Jamaica and the Agency, i.e. on 19 March 2003

  20. RADIATION DOSES AND CANCER RISKS IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS ASSOCIATED WITH EXPOSURE TO RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT FROM BIKINI AND ENEWETAK NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS: SUMMARY

    OpenAIRE

    Simon, Steven L.; Bouville, André; Land, Charles E.; Beck, Harold L.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear weapons testing conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls during 1946–1958 resulted in exposures of the resident population of the present-day Republic of the Marshall Islands to radioactive fallout. This paper summarizes the results of a thorough and systematic reconstruction of radiation doses to that population, by year, age at exposure, and atoll of residence, and the related cancer risks. Detailed methods and results are presented in a series of companion papers in this volume. Fro...

  1. Testing Parity with Atomic Radiative Capture of $\\mu^-$

    CERN Document Server

    McKeen, David

    2012-01-01

    The next generation of "intensity frontier" facilities will bring a significant increase in the intensity of sub-relativistic beams of $\\mu^-$. We show that the use of these beams in combination with thin targets of $Z\\sim 30$ elements opens up the possibility of testing parity-violating interactions of muons with nuclei via direct radiative capture of muons into atomic 2S orbitals. Since atomic capture preserves longitudinal muon polarization, the measurement of the gamma ray angular asymmetry in the single photon $2S_{1/2}$-$1S_{1/2}$ transition will offer a direct test of parity. We calculate the probability of atomic radiative capture taking into account the finite size of the nucleus to show that this process can dominate over the usual muonic atom cascade, and that the as yet unobserved single photon $2S_{1/2}$-$1S_{1/2}$ transition in muonic atoms can be detected in this way using current muon facilities.

  2. Residual radioactive contamination of the Monte Bello Islands from nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1952 and 1956

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Distributions of long-lived radionuclides remaining from nuclear weapons trials conducted at the Monte Bello Islands in 1952 and 1956 are presented. These data are derived from a field survey carried out in 1978 and augmented with earlier data from a survey in 1972

  3. Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Republic of Latvia on 1 October 2008. 2. As a result of the entry into force of the aforesaid Agreement for the Republic of Latvia, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, has been suspended

  4. Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Azerbaijan to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 6 November 1998, and entered into force on 29 April 1999. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  5. Nuclear weapons test detection: Ensuring a verifiable treaty. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty research and development program 1995 progress report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-12-31

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) has an active program to provide technologies for monitoring and verifying a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). DOE technologies will significantly increase the nation`s capability to identify potential nuclear explosions with high confidence and with minimal false alarms. This report presents the highlights of the first year of this program. The primary objectives of the CTBT monitoring system are to deter nuclear explosions in all environments (underground, underwater, or in the atmosphere) and, if such an explosion does occur, to detect, locate, and identify its source. The system is designed to provide credible evidence to national authorities to aid in resolving ambiguities and to serve as the basis for appropriate action. To collect this evidence, one must develop technologies that can detect and identify the signals from a nuclear test against a background of hundreds of thousands of benign events. The monitoring system must have high sensitivity to detect the events of interest and, to minimize false alarms, it must identify those events with a high level of confidence.

  6. Nuclear Weapons Effects (Self-Teaching Materials).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Developed by the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, this autoinstructional text deals with nuclear weapons effects. The destructive effects of an atomic blast are first introduced, and then long-term radioactive consequences are stressed. (CP)

  7. Plutonium isotopes and 137Cs in Dolon settlement near the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site. About 50 years after the first nuclear weapon testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Recent controversies concerning the radiation doses for populations living in the village of Dolon due to the nuclear explosions carried out at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS) have encouraged us to evaluate in more detail the levels and distributions of residual long-lived radionuclides 137Cs and Pu isotopes (238Pu, 239,240Pu) in soils within the village. Soil core samples up to a depth of about 30 cm and/or 100 cm were collected at 25 sites and subjected to analysis of 137Cs and Pu isotopes. The inventories of 137Cs and 239,240Pu were found to be in the wide range of 790-10,310 and 530-14,320 Bq/m2, respectively. Sequential leaching of Pu from the soil showed that more than ca. 80% of the 239,240Pu was not leached by hot digestion with conc. HNO3 + H2O2, indicating the presence of Pu associated with fused silicates. Further, the presence of hot-particles from the Pu contaminants by a-track radiography technique using CR-39 polycarbonate was confirmed in the soil, even at present, after about 50 years from the first nuclear weapon testing. (author)

  8. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1957-06-01

    This handbook prepared by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant government agencies and published by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, is a comprehensive summary of current knowledge on the effects of nuclear weapons. The effects information contained herein is calculated for yields up to 20 megatons and the scaling laws for hypothetically extending the calculations beyond this limit are given. The figure of 20 megatons however is not be taken as an indication of capabilities or developments.

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 13 June 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 27 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 27 September 2007, upon signature by the representatives of Burundi and the Agency

  10. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 25 November 2004. It was signed in Vienna on 11 May 2005. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 5 March 2009, the date on which the Agency received from Colombia written notification that Colombia's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Additional Protocol), the Additional Protocol, which had been applied provisionally from 17 February 2010, entered into force on 10 October 2012, the date upon which the Agency received written notification from Iraq that Iraq's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  12. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992. It was signed on 21 May 1992 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  13. Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  14. Agreement of 5 April 1995 between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 26, on 5 April 1995

  15. Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 20 March 2001. It was signed on 11 June 2002 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 16 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Niger written notification that Niger's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  16. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Iceland and the Agency, i.e., on 12 September 2003

  17. Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 9 June 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 19 January 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  18. Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  19. Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereof) between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Roseau, Dominica on 3 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 3 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  20. Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 26 June 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 26 June 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  1. Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992, It was signed on 28 July 1992 in Vienna and on 26 August 1992 in Geneva. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2005. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  2. Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 3 May 2005 in New York. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of the Marshall Islands and the Agency

  3. Agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  4. Agreement of 8 October 1994 between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 February 1994 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1994 and in Tashkent on 8 October 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 8 October 1994

  5. Agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 21 September 2000. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 August 2002. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  6. Agreement of 14 April 1995 between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 November 1994 and in Minsk on 14 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 August 1995

  7. Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 5 June 2012. It was signed on 6 June 2012 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 4 April 2013, the date on which the Agency received from Bosnia and Herzegovina written notification that Bosnia and Herzegovina's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 22 March 2013, upon signature by the representatives of the Denmark and the Agency.

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 16 April 2014 in Basseterre, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and on 19 May 2014 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 May 2014, upon signature by the representatives of Saint Kitts and Nevis and the Agency

  10. Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1991 and signed in Vienna on 30 January 1992. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 10 April 1992

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Madagascar and the Agency, i.e., on 18 September 2003

  12. Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  14. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 28 November 2002. It was signed on 24 April 2003 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 12 July 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Malta written notification that Malta's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  15. Agreement between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 13 June 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 27 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 27 September 2007, upon signature by the representatives of Burundi and the Agency. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  16. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 13 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of South Africa and the Agency, i.e. on 13 September 2002

  17. Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 19 July 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 July 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Afghanistan and the Agency

  20. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 January 2006, the date on which the Agency received from Ukraine written notification that Ukraine's constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  1. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  2. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 September 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Mali and the Agency, i.e. on 12 September 2002

  3. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1964-02-01

    This book is a revision of "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" which was issued in 1957. It was prepared by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant governmental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomc Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the combined judgment of a number of the most competent scientists working the problem. There is a need for widespread public understanding of the best information available on the effects of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible, within the limits of national security, a comprehensive summary of this information.

  4. The atom must not serve war

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Petros`yants, A.M.

    1987-03-27

    The history of the discovery and use of nuclear energy is reviewed from the Soviet viewpoint, including contributions of Russian and Soviet Scientists to atomic science. Political issues are addressed, including atomic "blackmail", the nonproliferation treaty, a total and general ban on nuclear weapons testing, and peaceful uses for nuclear energy. Nuclear science research centers in the Soviet Union are described. (LEW)

  5. Entanglement of atomic beams: Tests of complementarity and other applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It is shown that distinct atomic beams can be entangled when they interact with quantum superpositions of macroscopically separated micromaser fields. Experimentally feasible tests of complementarity are proposed, detecting Ramsey interference (or not) in one and open-quote open-quote Welcher Weg close-quote close-quote information (or not) in the other entangled beam. Available information and fringe contrast can be manipulated using classical and quantum fields. The open-quote open-quote quantum eraser close-quote close-quote is realized in the former case, while it is only a special feature in the latter one. Other applications of entangled atoms are also suggested. copyright 1996 The American Physical Society

  6. Differential cross section of fast neutrons elastic scattering and its ecological importance under study of consequences of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the present work the systematics of experimental differential and total cross sections of fast neutrons elastic scattering within range from 7 to 14 MeV is carried out. This range was selected because within it the maximal amount of nuclear reaction secondary products is producing in the objects nature environment. It is noted that study of a whole spectrum of nuclear reaction channels challenging by fast neutrons and charged particles is extremely important for analysis of consequences of mass distraction weapon tests especially for biological objects and their genetic systems

  7. Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Panama to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 March 1984 between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  8. Law project (no. 1329) adopted by the Senate and authorizing the ratification of the agreement between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency relative to the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of nuclear weapons prohibition in South America and the Caribbeans area (two protocols together)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The French Senate adopted on January 6, 2004 the project of law which authorizes the ratification of the agreement between France, the European atomic energy community and the IAEA about the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons in South America and in the Caribbean area signed in Vienna (Austria) on March 21, 2000. The text of this treaty is attached to this law. (J.S.)

  9. Protocol between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 June 1999, signed in Vienna on 11 June 1999, and entered into force on 7 July 2000

  10. Spin-dependent electron-atom scattering - a detailed test of atomic collision theory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In recent years, much progress has been made in the experimental and theoretical studies of atomic collision processes. The use of polarized collision partners has enabled experimentalists to perform very detailed tests of theoretical models, particularly with regard to the description of spin-dependent effects such as electron exchange or the spin-orbit interactions. Besides the development of the general theoretical formulation of spin-dependent electron-atom collisions - predominantly in terms of the density matrix formalism - much progress has also been made in the numerical treatment of such processes. In particular, the non-perturbative R-matrix (close-coupling) method and the open-quotes Distorted Wave Born Approximationclose quotes (DWBA), based on the Born series expansion of the T-operator have been applied very successfully. The presentation will begin with an outline of the density matrix formalism and its use to describe several, apparently different, atomic collision processes in a common framework. Next, the origin of spin-dependence in these collisions will be investigated, with particular emphasis on the so-called open-quotes fine-structure effectclose quotes where explicitly spin-dependent terms in the projectile-target interaction (such as the spin-orbit interaction) are assumed to be negligible during the collision process. Selected results for elastic and inelastic (including ionization) electron scattering from various targets will be presented and compared with recent experimental data

  11. General Atomic's superconducting high field test facility and initial performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    General Atomic has established a high field test facility whose primary mission is to investigate the J-B-T and stability performance margins of commercial NbTi superconductor in the 10 tesla, 4.20K region. This work is part of the overall DOE/MFE/MAGNETIC SYSTEMS effort to provide an adequate technological base for construction of superconducting toroidal field coils for the next generation of large tokamak fusion devices. The principal components of the facility are the coil/cryostat assembly, the helium refrigerator-liquefier/compressor system, and the gaseous helium recovery and storage system. The epoxy impregnated, layer wound main background field coil generates 8 tesla within its 40 cm diameter bore. The insert background field coil was layer wound with cooling channels provided by ''barber pole'' mylar conductor insulation. Ten tesla is generated within its 22 cm bore. The initial performance of the facility will be discussed. Future testing calls for operating test coils with implanted heating elements to simulate mechanically induced perturbations. The normal zone growth and recovery behavior will be observed for various disturbance energies. This data will then be compared with results obtained from the transient recovery analysis developed at General Atomic

  12. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kristensen, Hans M. [Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC (United States)

    2014-05-09

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  13. Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna

  14. Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Ukraine to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1995, signed in Vienna on 21 September 1995, and entered into force on 22 January 1998

  15. Collection and use of individual behavioral and consumption rate data to improve reconstruction of thyroid doses from nuclear weapons tests in Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Historical behavioral and consumption rate data were collected from residents of Kazakhstan exposed to nuclear weapons testing fallout using a focus group data collection strategy. These data will enable improved thyroid dose estimation in a radiation epidemiological study being carried out the U.S. National Cancer Institute. The study on the relationship of radiation exposure from weapons testing fallout and thyroid disease in a cohort of 2,994 subjects is now in a stage of improving earlier dose estimates based on individual information collected from a basic questionnaire administered to the study population in 1998. The study subjects of both Kazakh and Russian origin were exposed during childhood to radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons tests conducted at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site between 1949 and 1962. Due to the long time since exposure, a well developed strategy is necessary to encourage accurate memory recall. Limitations of the data collected in 1998 suggested the need to obtain reliable information that is tailored specific to the requirements of the dose reconstruction algorithm and to the evaluation of individual dose uncertainties. Focus group data collection in Kazakhstan in 2007 involved four 8-person focus groups (three of women and one of men) in each of four exposed settlements where thyroid disease screening was conducted in 1998. Age-specific data on relevant childhood behaviour, including time spent indoors and consumption of milk and other dairy products from cows, goats, horses, and sheep, were collected from women's groups. Men's focus groups were interviewed about construction materials of houses and schools as well as animal grazing patterns and supplemental feed to animals. Information obtained from the focus groups are being used to derive the settlement-, ethnicity-, age-, and gender-specific (where appropriate) probability density distributions on individual consumption rates of milk and dairy products

  16. Atomic spin chains as testing ground for quantum magnetism

    Science.gov (United States)

    Otte, Sander

    2015-03-01

    The field of quantum magnetism aims to capture the rich emergent physics that arises when multiple spins interact, in terms of elementary models such as the spin 1/2 Heisenberg chain. Experimental platforms to verify these models are rare and generally do not provide the possibility to detect spin correlations locally. In my lab we use low-temperature scanning tunneling microscopy to design and build artificial spin lattices with atomic precision. Inelastic electron tunneling spectroscopy enables us to identify the ground state and probe spin excitations as a function of system size, location inside the lattice and coupling parameter values. Two types of collective excitations that play a role in many dynamic magnetic processes are spin waves (magnons) and spinons. Our experiments enable us to study both types of excitations. First, we have been able to map the standing spin wave modes of a ferromagnetic bit of six atoms, and to determine their role in the collective reversal process of the bit (Spinelli et al., Nature Materials 2014). More recently, we have crafted antiferromagnetic spin 1/2 XXZ chains, which allow us to observe spinon excitations, as well as the stepwise transition to a fully aligned phase beyond the critical magnetic field (Toskovic et al., in preparation). These findings create a promising experimental environment for putting quantum magnetic models to the test. Research funded by NWO and FOM.

  17. Microtensile Tests Using In Situ Atomic Force Microscopy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lang, Udo; Dual, Jurg

    In recent years a new field in the micromechanical characterization of materials has emerged. Researchers started to integrate atomic force microscopes (AFM) into microtensile tests. This allowed to investigate surface deformation of layers with thicknesses in the range of micrometers. In the first part of this article experiments on organic samples are presented followed by developments on anorganic specimens. In the second part of the paper latest developments at the Center of Mechanics of ETH Zurich are presented. The setup allows to monitor crack growth with micrometer resolution. At the same time forces can be measured in the millinewton range. Specimens are made from photodefinable polyimide. The stress-crack- length diagrams of two experiments are presented which enables to identify different stages of crack growth and therefore of fracture behaviour. Finally, possible extensions of the setup employing digital image correlation (DIC) are envisioned by analyzing the displacement field around the crack tip.

  18. Fallout: Hedley Marston and atomic bomb tests in Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book tells the story of Australian scientists involved in the 1956 British atomic tests at Maralinga. The story involves several of the country's most respected and trusted scientists of the 1950s and spills over to the scientific organisations that mattered. As the drama unfolds we see how the controversy touched the lives of many senior Australian scientists, and in a few cases those of British scientists, too. What is described in this book, however, is more than an esoteric scientific dispute kept within laboratory walls; it is a story about the nature of science in relation to society that continues into the present day. This controversy was, and is, about the health effects of low-level ionising radiation. There is still, after all these years, intense debate about the health effects of low-level ionising radiation to which from time to time most Australians are exposed through the dental and medical industry

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 13 December 2005. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 January 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the Union of the Comoros written notification that Comoros' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  1. Agreement between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 13 June 2007. It was signed on 26 May 2008 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 4 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Montenegro written notification that Montenegro's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  2. Agreement Between the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 22 February 1989. It was signed in Vienna on 22 November 1991. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on the date upon which the Agency received from Laos written notification that Laos' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 5 April 2001. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  3. Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Safeguards Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Abu Dhabi on 15 December 2002. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 9 October 2003, the date upon which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 1999. It was signed on 28 June 2001 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 5 September 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Oman written notification that Oman's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force the same date

  5. Agreement between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 16 June 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 13 December 2005. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 20 January 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the Union of the Comoros written notification that Comoros statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  6. Agreement between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 22 November 2007. It was signed on 23 June 2010 in Lisbon, Portugal, and on 8 July 2010 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Mozambique written notification that Mozambique's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  7. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Canada written notification that Canada's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 8 September 2000

  8. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 5 July 2000. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Azerbaijan written notification that Azerbaijan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 29 November 2000

  9. Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 19 July 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Seychelles written notification that Seychelles' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  10. Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 12 September 1995. It was signed on 27 September 1995 in Vienna and 14 June 1996 in Chisinau. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 May 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Moldova written notification that Moldova's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  11. Protocol additional to the agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 23 September 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 7 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from the United Republic of Tanzania written notification that the United Republic of Tanzania's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional, the Protocol entered into force on 13 October 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Seychelles written notification that the Republic of Seychelles's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  13. Agreement between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 11 September 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 19 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 10 May 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the Kingdom of Bahrain written notification that Bahrain's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  14. Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 16 June 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 16 June 2005. 2. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 January 2009, the date upon which the Agency received from Saudi Arabia written notification that Saudi Arabia's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  15. Agreement between the State of Qatar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the State of Qatar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 24 September 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 19 January 2009. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 21 January 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the State of Qatar written notification that Qatar's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  16. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 28 September 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from the Czech Republic written notification that the Czech Republic's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 1 July 2002

  17. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 December 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Tajikistan written notification that the Republic of Tajikistan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 16 June 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 February 2005, the date upon which the Agency received from the Swiss Confederation written notification that the Swiss Confederation's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  2. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 29 July 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2003, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Cyprus written notification that Cyprus' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  3. Agreement between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 September 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Mali and the Agency, i.e. on 12 September 2002. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 September 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 19 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 November 2003, the date on which the Agency received from Chile written notification that Chile's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  5. Assessment of iodine-131 transfer to cow's milk and to man resulting from the Nevada weapons tests of the 1950's

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The main pathway to man from fallout I-131 is, for most individuals, via the grass-cow-milk chain. In order to assess I-131 exposures for persons in each county of the contiguous U.S. the following estimates must be made : the activities of I-131 deposited on soil and pasture grass, the resulting I-131 concentrations in cow's milk, and the quantity of I-131 ingested by man. The most significant atmospheric weapons tests with respect to fallout occurred in the 1950's, during which time most of the monitoring of environmental radioactivity consisted of gross beta or gamma measurements. Assessments of exposures due to I-131 can be inferred from the original measurements of gross beta or gamma activity, from current or past measurements of radionuclides other than I-131, or from mathematical models

  6. Atoms

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    刘洪毓

    2007-01-01

    Atoms(原子)are all around us.They are something like the bricks (砖块)of which everything is made. The size of an atom is very,very small.In just one grain of salt are held millions of atoms. Atoms are very important.The way one object acts depends on what

  7. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 30 April 2004, the date on which the Agency received written notification that the European Atomic Energy Community and the United Kingdom had met their respective internal requirements for entry into force

  8. Agreement of 3 August 1992 between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Malawi to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  9. The text of the agreement between Belgium, Denmark, The Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the treaty of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  10. Atoms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Completed by recent contributions on various topics (atoms and the Brownian motion, the career of Jean Perrin, the evolution of atomic physics since Jean Perrin, relationship between scientific atomism and philosophical atomism), this book is a reprint of a book published at the beginning of the twentieth century in which the author addressed the relationship between atomic theory and chemistry (molecules, atoms, the Avogadro hypothesis, molecule structures, solutes, upper limits of molecular quantities), molecular agitation (molecule velocity, molecule rotation or vibration, molecular free range), the Brownian motion and emulsions (history and general features, statistical equilibrium of emulsions), the laws of the Brownian motion (Einstein's theory, experimental control), fluctuations (the theory of Smoluchowski), light and quanta (black body, extension of quantum theory), the electricity atom, the atom genesis and destruction (transmutations, atom counting)

  11. Testing Three Explanations of the Emergence of Weapon Carrying in Peer Context : The Roles of Aggression, Victimization, and the Social Network

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dijkstra, Jan; Gest, Scott D.; Lindenberg, Siegwart; Veenstra, René; Cillessen, A.H.N.

    2012-01-01

    Purpose: To examine the relative contribution of weapon carrying of peers, aggression, and victimization to weapon carrying of male and female adolescents over time. Methods: Data were derived from a population-based sample of male (N = 224) and female (N = 244) adolescents followed from grade 10 (M

  12. Testing Three Explanations of the Emergence of Weapon Carrying in Peer Context: The Roles of Aggression, Victimization, and the Social Network

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dijkstra, J.K.; Gest, S.D.; Lindenberg, S.M.; Veenstra, D.R.; Cillessen, A.H.N.

    2012-01-01

    Purpose: To examine the relative contribution of weapon carrying of peers, aggression, and victimization to weapon carrying of male and female adolescents over time. Methods: Data were derived from a population-based sample of male (N = 224) and female (N = 244) adolescents followed from grade 10 (M

  13. Chemical and biological weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper discusses the prospects of the multilateral negotiations aimed at achieving a complete and total ban on chemical weapons the Chemical Weapons convention (CWC). The control of the proliferation of chemical weapons is no longer just on East-West issue; it is also an issue of concern in Third World Countries, and in some of the wealthier middle eastern nations, such as Kuwait

  14. Excess weapons materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile continues to decline, dismantlement of nuclear weapons removed from the stockpile proceeds at an accelerated pace. From dismantlement of the weapons, the Department of Energy (DOE) receives uranium, plutonium, and many nonnuclear materials. The current and projected returns of enriched uranium from nuclear weapons have made it possible for DOE to shut down the top of the uranium enrichment plant at Portsmouth, Ohio. The Portsmouth Top is where highly enriched uranium was produced. Now, future needs for highly enriched uranium, at least for the foreseeable future, can be met with highly enriched uranium from retired nuclear weapons. Like enriched uranium, plutonium in large quantities is becoming available from weapons dismantlement. However, unlike enriched uranium, there are no firm needs for the plutonium from weapons. However, there are some potential needs, and the Department is reserving plutonium to meet them. These potential needs are for both weapons and nonweapons programs. While there is a nuclear weapons stockpile reduction, both in the United States and in the former Soviet Union, there is no assurance that future needs for plutonium for defense programs will never exceed the current projections. Just as prudent financial planning should not assume that peak years of savings or revenues or profits can be extended indefinitely, prudent defense planning should not assume that current years of zero or minimum demand for plutonium will be extended indefinitely. Thus, a reserve of plutonium for potential weapons use is maintained. Essentially, all available plutonium not in active use or reserved for weapons programs will be available for nonweapons programs. The paper discusses the grades of plutonium available, the categorization of the plutonium inventory, the forms in which the plutonium exists, the quantities available, and storage locations

  15. Field testing the prototype BNL fan-atomized oil burner

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McDonald, R.; Celebi, Y. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)

    1995-04-01

    BNL has developed a new oil burner design referred to as the Fan Atomized burner System. The primary objective of the field study was to evaluate and demonstrate the reliable operation of the Fan Atomized Burner. The secondary objective was to establish and validate the ability of a low firing rate burner (0.3-0.4 gph) to fully satisfy the heating and domestic hot water load demands of an average household in a climate zone with over 5,000 heating-degree-days. The field activity was also used to evaluate the practicality of side-wall venting with the Fan Atomized Burner with a low stack temperature (300F) and illustrate the potential for very high efficiency with an integrated heating system approach based on the Fan Atomized Burner.

  16. Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 July 2006, upon signature by the representatives of the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the Agency

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Bulgaria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Cyprus

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Estonia and the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Slovenia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  1. The Text of the Agreement Between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Portugal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193) of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193/Add.2), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: i. Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and ii. Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  2. The Text of the Agreement Between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Greece

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193) of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: i. Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and ii. Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  3. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Lithuania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)2 provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  4. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  5. The text of the Agreement between Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Austria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)7 provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

  6. Siamese twins - nuclear weapons and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The historical development of nuclear weapons and civil nuclear power is summarized. The initiative by President Eisenhower in launching the 'atoms for peace' programme is mentioned, and the intentions and shortcomings of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are outlined. The developments in individual countries are discussed under the headings: who has the bomb (query); nuclear flashpoints; the nuclear state; BNFL's involvement. (U.K.)

  7. Comment on: "Does an atom interferometer test the gravitational redshift at the Compton frequency?"

    OpenAIRE

    Hohensee, Michael A.; Chu, Steven; Peters, Achim; Mueller, Holger

    2011-01-01

    We show that Wolf et al.'s 2011 analysis in Class. Quant. Grav. v28, 145017 does not support their conclusions, in particular that there is "no redshift effect" in atom interferometers except in inconsistent dual Lagrangian formalisms. Wolf et al. misapply both Schiff's conjecture and the results of their own analysis when they conclude that atom interferometers are tests of the weak equivalence principle which only become redshift tests if Schiff's conjecture is invalid. Atom interferometers...

  8. Estimation of dose to human tissues from ingestion of foods exposed to fallout from nuclear weapons tests in Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper provides a brief overview of the methodology developed to estimate the transport of radionuclides through agricultural ecosystems to persons of various ages, lifestyles, and geographic locations. The methodology, embodied in the computer code PATHWAY, was used to convert estimates of fallout deposition to time-dependent concentrations of radionuclides in food products, total intakes by people, and organ-specific doses from 21 radionuclides in fallout from 86 nuclear test events. A summary of model prediction uncertainties, an assessment of predictive accuracy, and a discussion of the relative importance of different exposure pathways is also provided. 14 refs

  9. PRex: An Experiment to Investigate Detection of Near-field Particulate Deposition from a Simulated Underground Nuclear Weapons Test Vent.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Keillor, Martin E; Arrigo, Leah M; Baciak, James E; Chipman, Veraun; Detwiler, Rebecca S; Emer, Dudley F; Kernan, Warnick J; Kirkham, Randy R; MacDougall, Matthew R; Milbrath, Brian D; Rishel, Jeremy P; Seifert, Allen; Seifert, Carolyn E; Smart, John E

    2016-05-01

    A radioactive particulate release experiment to produce a near-field ground deposition representative of small-scale venting from an underground nuclear test was conducted to gather data in support of treaty capability development activities. For this experiment, a CO2-driven "air cannon" was used to inject (140)La, a radioisotope of lanthanum with 1.7-d half-life and strong gamma-ray emissions, into the lowest levels of the atmosphere at ambient temperatures. Witness plates and air samplers were laid out in an irregular grid covering the area where the plume was anticipated to deposit based on climatological wind records. This experiment was performed at the Nevada National Security Site, where existing infrastructure, radiological procedures, and support personnel facilitated planning and execution of the work. A vehicle-mounted NaI(Tl) spectrometer and a polyvinyl toluene-based backpack instrument were used to survey the deposited plume. Hand-held instruments, including NaI(Tl) and lanthanum bromide scintillators and high purity germanium spectrometers, were used to take in situ measurements. Additionally, three soil sampling techniques were investigated and compared. The relative sensitivity and utility of sampling and survey methods are discussed in the context of on-site inspection. PMID:27023040

  10. Dose reconstruction related to the nuclear weapons tests conducted by the U.S. in the Pacific in the 1950S

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons testing conducted at Bikini and Enewetak atolls during 1946-1958 resulted in exposures of the resident population of the present-day Republic of the Marshall Islands to radioactive fallout. This paper summarizes the results of a thorough and systematic reconstruction of radiation doses to that population, by year, age at exposure, and atoll of residence. The main results of this dose-reconstruction effort, which were presented in detail in a special issue of Health Physics (August 2010) are: (1) the determination that twenty of the 66 nuclear tests conducted in or near the Marshall Islands resulted in measurable fallout deposition on one or more of the inhabited atolls of the Marshall Islands; (2) the estimation of deposition densities (kBq m-2) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides at each of the 32 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands, following each of the twenty tests that are considered; (3) the estimation of age-dependent doses from external irradiation resulting from each test and aggregated on an annual basis; and (4) the estimation of age-dependent doses from internal irradiation to the red bone marrow, thyroid gland, stomach wall, and colon wall of representative individuals of the inhabited atolls and reef islands. The dose estimates are based on the available radiation measurement data (concentrations of 131I in urine, whole-body measurements, concentrations of 137Cs in soil, exposure rates, etc.) supplemented with a variety of models and assumptions. It was found that the total deposition of 137Cs, external dose, and internal organ doses followed the same geographic pattern with the large population of the southern atolls receiving the lowest doses. Permanent residents of the southern atolls who were of adult age at the beginning of the testing period received external doses ranging from 5 to 12 mGy on average; the external doses to adults at the mid-latitude atolls ranged from 22 to 60 mGy on average

  11. Virtual nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  12. An exacting transition probability measurement - a direct test of atomic many-body theories

    OpenAIRE

    Tarun Dutta; Debashis De Munshi; Dahyun Yum; Riadh Rebhi; Manas Mukherjee

    2016-01-01

    A new protocol for measuring the branching fraction of hydrogenic atoms with only statistically limited uncertainty is proposed and demonstrated for the decay of the P$_{3/2}$ level of the barium ion, with precision below $0.5\\%$. Heavy hydrogenic atoms like the barium ion are test beds for fundamental physics such as atomic parity violation and they also hold the key to understanding nucleo-synthesis in stars. To draw definitive conclusion about possible physics beyond the standard model by ...

  13. Test of vacuum polarization and hyperfine interaction in muonic atoms

    CERN Document Server

    Backe, H; Engfer, R; Link, R; Michaelsen, R; Petitjean, C; Robert-Tissot, B; Roschert, G; Schellenberg, L; Schneuwly, H; Schröder, W U; Von Gunten, A H; Vuilleumier, J L; Walter, H K; Zehnder, A

    1972-01-01

    In connection with discrepancies between experimental and theoretical values for the vacuum polarization correction in the case of the 5-4 transitions in heavy and medium muonic atoms, the energies of this transition in /sup nat/Hg and /sup 203/Tl were measured at the CERN-SC muon channel. The broadening of the 2/sup +/-0/sup +/- nuclear gamma transition in muonic /sup 190/Os and /sup 192/Os was used to determine the magnetic h.f. splitting of the 2/sup +/ rotational state. The results are compared with the predictions of different models. (7 refs).

  14. Hydrostatic testing of power generating plant for atomic electric stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Descriptions are given of layouts for the hydrostatic testing of products; these vary according to the shell material and the technical specifications of the different test fluids. Recommendations are made for the organization of central installations for supplying several test sections with the necessary fluid, with these sections being suitably located close to such a centralized installation. Special features of the hydrostatic testing of large-volume components at test pressures of 20 MPa and over are discussed, as well as the problems of guaranteeing the safety of workers and equipment

  15. Test of the universality of free fall with atoms in different spin Orientations

    CERN Document Server

    Duan, Xiao-Chun; Deng, Xiao-Bing; Yao, Hui-Bin; Shao, Cheng-Gang; Luo, Jun; Hu, and Zhong-Kun

    2015-01-01

    We report a test of the universality of free fall (UFF) related to spin-gravity coupling effects by comparing the gravity acceleration of the $^{87}$Rb atoms in $m_F=+1$ versus that in $m_F=-1$, where the corresponding spin orientations are opposite. A Mach-Zehnder-type atom interferometer is exploited to sequentially measure the free fall acceleration of the atoms in these two sublevels, and the resultant E$\\rm{\\ddot{o}}$tv$\\rm{\\ddot{o}}$s ratio determined by this work is ${\\eta_S} =(-0.2\\pm1.5)\\times 10^{-5}$. The interferometer using atoms in $m_F=+1$ or $m_F=-1$ is highly sensitive to magnetic field inhomogeneity, which limits the current experimental precision of our UFF test. The work here provides a stepping stone for future higher precision UFF test related to different spin orientations on atomic basis.

  16. The risk of leukaemia in young children from exposure to tritium and carbon-14 in the discharges of German nuclear power stations and in the fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wakeford, Richard

    2014-05-01

    Towards the end of 2007, the results were published from a case-control study (the "KiKK Study") of cancer in young children, diagnosed tritium and carbon-14 discharges in this supposedly severe underestimation of risk. Both (3)H and (14)C are generated naturally in the upper atmosphere, and substantial increases in these radionuclides in the environment occurred as a result of their production by atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons during the late 1950s and early 1960s. If the leukaemogenic effect of these radionuclides has been seriously underestimated to the degree necessary to explain the KiKK Study findings, then a pronounced increase in the worldwide incidence of leukaemia among young children should have followed the notably elevated exposure to (3)H and (14)C from nuclear weapons testing fallout. To investigate this hypothesis, the time series of incidence rates of leukaemia among young children <5 years of age at diagnosis has been examined from ten cancer registries from three continents and both hemispheres, which include registration data from the early 1960s or before. No evidence of a markedly increased risk of leukaemia in young children following the peak of above-ground nuclear weapons testing, or that incidence rates are related to level of exposure to fallout, is apparent from these registration rates, providing strong grounds for discounting the idea that the risk of leukaemia in young children from (3)H or (14)C (or any other radionuclide present in both nuclear weapons testing fallout and discharges from nuclear installations) has been grossly underestimated and that such exposure can account for the findings of the KiKK Study. PMID:24477409

  17. [Application of model 4650 type I compressor atomizer in bronchial challenge test].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yuan, Y; Wang, Y; Zeng, J; He, T

    2000-06-01

    This study was directed to the feasibility of applying a simple atomizer-model 4650 type I (abbrev. M)-to bronchial challenge test. 92 cases of asthma were divided into 3 groups randomly. All of them were subjected to the bronchial challenge test by M atomizer, and by standard Dosimeter atomizer (abbrev. D) as a comparison. In the test by M atomizer, the times for inspiring challenging medicine were 1, 1.5 and 2 minutes for the 3 groups respectively, while the time for D atomizer was 1 minute for all. The results showed no significant differences (P > 0.2-0.5) between the two atomizers in the 3 groups, their values were linear correlated. When the inspiring time was 1 minute for both M and D, the test needed a higher concentration of challenging medicine for M than for D, their coefficient of correlation (r = 0.285) was relatively low. When inspiring time postponed to 1.5 minute for M, the difference in medicine concentration between M and D was smallest (-0.075 g/L), r = 0.665. However, a further postponed inspiring time to 2 minute for M reversely broadened their difference. These results indicated that the efficiency of M atomizer was a little lower than that of D, postponing the inspiring time for M could make up this weakness. A 1.5 minute inspiring time for M atomizer was the suggestion. Some modifications on M atomizer were done by us for a better efficiency, and the cheap and popular M atomizer could be a good replacement in bronchial challenge test. PMID:12515156

  18. ACUTE AND CHRONIC INTAKES OF FALLOUT RADIONUCLIDES BY MARSHALLESE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING AT BIKINI AND ENEWETAK AND RELATED INTERNAL RADIATION DOSES

    Science.gov (United States)

    Simon, Steven L.; Bouville, André; Melo, Dunstana; Beck, Harold L.; Weinstock, Robert M.

    2014-01-01

    Annual internal radiation doses resulting from both acute and chronic intakes of all important dose-contributing radionuclides occurring in fallout from nuclear weapons testing at Bikini and Enewetak from 1946 through 1958 have been estimated for the residents living on all atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. Internal radiation absorbed doses to the tissues most at risk to cancer induction (red bone marrow, thyroid, stomach, and colon) have been estimated for representative persons of all population communities for all birth years from 1929 through 1968, and for all years of exposure from 1948 through 1970. The acute intake estimates rely on a model using, as its basis, historical urine bioassay data, for members of the Rongelap Island and Ailinginae communities as well as for Rongerik residents. The model also utilizes fallout times of arrival and radionuclide deposition densities estimated for all tests and all atolls. Acute intakes of 63 radionuclides were estimated for the populations of the 20 inhabited atolls and for the communities that were relocated during the testing years for reasons of safety and decontamination. The model used for chronic intake estimates is based on reported whole-body, urine, and blood counting data for residents of Utrik and Rongelap. Dose conversion coefficients relating intake to organ absorbed dose were developed using internationally accepted models but specifically tailored for intakes of particulate fallout by consideration of literature-based evidence to choose the most appropriate alimentary tract absorption fraction (f1) values. Dose estimates were much higher for the thyroid gland than for red marrow, stomach wall, or colon. The highest thyroid doses to adults were about 7,600 mGy for the people exposed on Rongelap; thyroid doses to adults were much lower, by a factor of 100 or more, for the people exposed on the populated atolls of Kwajalein and Majuro. The estimates of radionuclide intake and

  19. Wounds and weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vogel, H. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)], E-mail: Hermann.vogel@ak-stgeorg.lbk-hh.de; Dootz, B. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)

    2007-08-15

    Purpose: X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. Material and method: The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Results: Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Conclusion: Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports.

  20. Wounds and weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Purpose: X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. Material and method: The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Results: Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Conclusion: Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports

  1. Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Exchange of Letters with the Commonwealth of Dominica in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean, which constitutes an agreement confirming that the Safeguards Agreement of 3 May 1996 (IAEA-INFCIRC-513) concluded between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica) and the IAEA pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) satisfies the obligation of Dominica under Article 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA

  2. Weapons of mass destruction, WMD

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Purpose: Since the invasion into Iraq in 2003, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), have come to general notice; they include today chemical, biological, and atomic/nuclear weapons, (CW, BW, and AW). Radiological findings shall be described. Material and methods: X-ray findings of victims of WMD are described. From CW, own observations are reported. Examples of (possible) X-ray findings of victims of BW are described. AW may induce radiation disease. Results: Exposure to sulfur-lost induces severe bronchitis; if the radiograph shows pulmonary infiltrations, the prognosis is bad; a late consequence maybe bronchiectasis. BW can be based on bacteria, virus or toxins. An approach of the X-ray findings for BW victims is based on the assumption that the disease induced by BW has the same (or a similar) clinic and radiology as that induced by the original microorganism or by the unchanged toxism. This approximation may have its limits, if the germ or toxin has been modified. In survivors of AW, the radiology is probably that of victims of thermal radiation and blast. Conclusion: WMD seem to be a real or a possible threat. They can be used in war, in terrorist attacks, in crime, and in action of secret services. In case that WMD are employed, X-ray diagnostic will be used to evaluate the prognosis (triage) and the risk of infection

  3. Maintaining non-nuclear weapon status

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Among the some 170 sovereign states in the world, five are legally recognized as nuclear weapon states (NWS) under the terms of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Six countries (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa) are counted as threshold states: they possess sizeable unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or have passed the brink of a nuclear test or of clandestine weapon production. Six other countries (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Taiwan, and North and South Korea) have been suspected periodically of either considering the nuclear weapon option or of working secretly on the development of weapons. Thus, about 150 non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain which neither possess nuclear weapons nor strive to acquire them. These states are distributed throughout the globe and encompass highly industrialized as well as underdeveloped countries, liberal democracies, socialist states, sheikdoms and dictatorships. Some NNWS face acute military threats; other are far removed from the quarrels of the world, as in the case of some remote fortunate islands. Furthermore, NNWS may be members of nuclear-umbrella alliances or may have opted for a policy of neutrality or non-alignment

  4. Memory impairment in the weapon focus effect.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Saunders, Jo

    2009-04-01

    Two experiments are reported in which postevent source of misinformation was manipulated within weapon-present and weapon-absent scenarios. Participants viewed slides depicting either a weapon or a newspaper event and then received either incomplete questioning or a narrative. Both postevent sources contained misleading information about a central and peripheral detail concerning either the weapon or the newspaper scenario. With a modified test in Experiment 1, questioning was found to increase misinformation effects concerning the central item, as compared with a narrative, and more misinformation effects were found for the weapon-peripheral than for the newspaper-peripheral item. In Experiment 2, the participants were more likely to claim to have seen contradictory and additive misinformation about the central item in the slides following questioning, and more contradictory and additive misinformation effects occurred for the weapon-peripheral than for the newspaper-peripheral item. The findings are considered in terms of the effects of both postevent and encoding factors on memory. PMID:19246347

  5. Some mathematics of nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: In the many decades since the first demonstration of the power of nuclear weapons we have created a 'data set' that we may analyze to see if simple principles account for the observed history. There was initial fear that the proliferation of weapons would be exponential, driven by the principle that each nation would desire to have weapons to deter each other nuclear-armed nation. The doubling time could be taken as four years, between the tests of the US in 1945 and the USSR in 1949. By 1985, with ten doubling times, we would have had 1024 nuclear weapons states, far from the data. If we make a different hypothesis, that each nation is deterred from seeking nuclear weapons by each existing nuclear state, we obtain a differential equation leading to an expression for a much slower rate of increase, which is indeed found to be closely followed. If we have an understanding of the processes that lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we can be better at strengthening the barriers to further growth. The mathematical equations and relevant plots will be used to illustrate these observations. (author)

  6. China's mixed signals on nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ultimately, it is nuclear whether the Chinese leadership has made up its collective mind on practical nuclear weapons. It is known from Chinese official sources, including articles in Communist Party and military publications and histories of the Chinese nuclear program, that an internal debate has proceeded for more than two decades, punctuated by occasional nuclear exercises or low-yield warhead tests. But China presumably has less reason now to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons than in previous decades: relations with the Soviet Union have improved and military confrontation has eased; China's relations with India and Vietnam are also improving. The decision may already have been made, however, and the weapons built. The mystery surrounding Chinese tactical nuclear weapons is itself interesting, but it is also symbolic of the difficulty of understanding China's nuclear weapons program and policies. The West has accumulated a considerable body of knowledge about China's nuclear forces, especially historical material. But important aspects of China's nuclear behavior and its future as a nuclear power are hard to discern. A key question is China's future role in the spread of nuclear-capable weapons to other countries. China might add to international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear related technology, or it might become the world's missile merchant. It could make a constructive contribution to arms control efforts in general, or it could act as a spoiler

  7. Operational research in weapon system

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    R. S. Varma

    1958-04-01

    Full Text Available "The paper is divided into three parts: (a The first part deals with what operational research is. (bThe second part gives what we mean by Weapon Systems and discusses considerations that determine the choice of a particular weapon system from a class weapon systems. (cThe third part deals with some aspects of weapon replacement policy.The effectiveness of a weapon system is defined as E=D/C where E is weapon effectiveness (a comparative figure of merit; D is total damage inflicted or prevented and C is total cost, D and C being reduced to common dimensions. During the course of investigations, criteria regarding to choice of weapon or weapons from a set of weapon systems are established through production function and military effect curves. A procedure is described which maximizes the expectation of military utility in order to select a weapon system from the class of weapon systems. This is done under the following simplifying assumptions: (a Non- decreasing utility function; (b Constant average cost for each kind of weapons; and (c Independence of the performance of each unit of weapon. Some of the difficulties which arises when any of these restrictions is relaxed are briefly mentioned. Finally, the policy of weapon replacement and the factors governing the same are described."

  8. An atomic hydrogen beam to test ASACUSA’s apparatus for antihydrogen spectroscopy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Diermaier, M., E-mail: martin.diermaier@oeaw.ac.at; Caradonna, P.; Kolbinger, B. [Austrian Academy of Sciences, Stefan Meyer Institute for Subatomic Physics (Austria); Malbrunot, C. [CERN (Switzerland); Massiczek, O.; Sauerzopf, C.; Simon, M. C.; Wolf, M.; Zmeskal, J.; Widmann, E. [Austrian Academy of Sciences, Stefan Meyer Institute for Subatomic Physics (Austria)

    2015-08-15

    The ASACUSA collaboration aims to measure the ground state hyperfine splitting (GS-HFS) of antihydrogen, the antimatter counterpart to atomic hydrogen. Comparisons of the corresponding transitions in those two systems will provide sensitive tests of the CPT symmetry, the combination of the three discrete symmetries charge conjugation, parity, and time reversal. For offline tests of the GS-HFS spectroscopy apparatus we constructed a source of cold polarised atomic hydrogen. In these proceedings we report the successful observation of the hyperfine structure transitions of atomic hydrogen with our apparatus in the earth’s magnetic field.

  9. Reframing the debate against nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    recent years has been all but negated; consensus-based agreements are rejected just a few years after being reached. Despite the threats posed by State or non-State proliferation, an increasing likelihood of a return to nuclear testing and the development of new nuclear weapons, a handful of powerful people continue to view these weapons as a legitimate source of security. All States Parties and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should approach the seventh NPT Review Conference in May 2005 as a major opportunity to reinvigorate the nuclear disarmament regime and transform it into an effective tool by which a true collective security can be ensured. First, however, we must reclaim the ground that has been eroded in recent years by the vertical and horizontal proliferation threats stemming from various corners of the globe

  10. Beyond the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since the end of the cold war, many people called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. That this decision seems difficult to realize because of the world political environment. Meanwhile the reduction of the nuclear weapons costs and risks believes more than ever a challenge of the international relations and more particularly in the proliferation domain. In this perspective the proliferation fight strategies need to be studied with a special interest in the domain of the alternatives and the possibilities of synergy. (A.L.B.)

  11. The environmental and sanitary effects of nuclear weapons tests made by France between 1960 and 1996 and comparison elements with the tests of others great nuclear countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For the most of nuclear test sites, in a condensed way, elements of information and analysis about the environmental and sanitary effects of nuclear explosions are given. This report gives a precise view about this question. (N.C.)

  12. Accreditation of testing laboratories in CNEA (National Atomic Energy Commission)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The recognition of the technical capability of a testing laboratory is carried out by Laboratory Accreditation Bodies as the result of a satisfactory evaluation and the systematic follow up of the certified qualification. In Argentina the creation of a National Center for the Accreditation of Testing Laboratories, as a first step to assess a National Accreditation System is currently projected. CNEA, as an institution involved in technological projects and in the development and production of goods and services, has adopted since a long time ago quality assurance criteria. One of their requirements is the qualification of laboratories. Due to the lack of a national system, a Committee for the Qualification of Laboratories was created jointly by the Research and Development and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Areas with the responsibility of planning and management of the system evaluation and the certification of the quality of laboratories. The experience in the above mentioned topics is described in this paper. (author)

  13. Experimental Test of Bohr's Complementarity Principle with Single Neutral Atom

    OpenAIRE

    WANG, Zhihui; TIAN, YALI; Yang, Chen; Zhang, Pengfei; Li, Gang; Zhang, Tiancai

    2016-01-01

    Bohr's complementarity principle (BCP) is one of the cornerstones of quantum mechanics, and the counterintuitive behavior of wave-particle duality lies at its heart.BCP says that the properties of waves and particles for a quantum system cannot be simultaneously observed. Various tests of BCP with single photons have been performed.However, the low detection efficiency associated with fast-moving, massless photons makes the results less persuasive and more untenable. Here we use a well-contro...

  14. Testing Lorentz Invariance using Zeeman Transitions in Atomic Fountains

    CERN Document Server

    Wolf, P; Bize, S; Clairon, A; Wolf, Peter; Chapelet, Fr\\'{e}deric; Bize, Sebastien; Clairon, Andre

    2005-01-01

    Lorentz Invariance (LI) is the founding postulate of Einstein's 1905 theory of relativity, and therefore at the heart of all accepted theories of physics. It characterizes the invariance of the laws of physics in inertial frames under changes of velocity or orientation. This central role, and indications from unification theories hinting toward a possible LI violation, have motivated tremendous experimental efforts to test LI. A comprehensive theoretical framework to describe violations of LI has been developed over the last decade: the Lorentz violating Standard Model Extension (SME). It allows a characterization of LI violations in all fields of present day physics using a large (but finite) set of parameters which are all zero when LI is satisfied. All classical tests (e.g. Michelson-Morley or Kennedy-Thorndike experiments) can be analyzed in the SME, but it also allows the conception of new types of experiments, not thought of previously. We have carried out such a conceptually new LI test, by comparing p...

  15. The Atomic Testing Museum: Presenting the History and Preservation of a 50 Year Journey

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is one of the premier test and evaluation sites belonging to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a part of the Department of Energy. Founded in 1950, it is a major domestic location for the testing of nuclear components and nuclear weapons destined for the stockpile, the nuclear deterrent of the United States. From 1951 until 1992 there were 100 atmospheric and 828 underground nuclear tests conducted at the NTS. Those tests resulted in the development of a nuclear deterrent that helped prevent a world war and played a major role in the final defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Those tests lead to the development of yield measurement techniques that allowed the United States Government to take the lead in the negotiations of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which took effect in 1992, ending the requirement to do routine nuclear tests. This paper describes the walk through the history of the NTS' Cold War battlefield. (authors)

  16. How to weaponize anthrax?

    OpenAIRE

    Dizer, Ufuk; Levent KENAR; ORTATATLI, Mesut; Karayılanoğlu, Turan

    2013-01-01

    Anthrax, a zoonotic disease caused by  Bacillusanthracis, occurs in domesticated and wild animals-primarily herbivores. Humans usually become infectedby contact with infected animals or their products.Anthrax is so easy to obtain that it could be weaponizedfor biological warfare if a laboratory area of 5 m2  isowned with 10.000$.Key words: Anthrax, weapon, spore, Bacillus anthracis

  17. Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sartori, Leo

    1983-01-01

    Fundamental principles governing nuclear explosions and their effects are discussed, including three components of a nuclear explosion (thermal radiation, shock wave, nuclear radiation). Describes how effects of these components depend on the weapon's yield, its height of burst, and distance of detonation point. Includes effects of three…

  18. The Optimum Replacement of Weapon

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    ZHANG Xiao; ZHANG Jin-chun

    2002-01-01

    The theory of LCC (Life Cycle Cost) is applied in this paper. The relation between the economic life of weapon and the optimum replacement is analyzed. The method to define the optimum replacement time of weapon is discussed.

  19. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described

  20. Initial tests of atomic layer deposition (ALD) coatings for superconducting RF systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Atomic Layer Deposition (ALD) is a method of synthesizing materials in single atomic layers. We are studying this technique as a method of producing highly controlled surfaces for superconducting RF systems. We have begun tests of ALD coatings of single cells that will involve RF measurements of a cell before and after coating at Argonne. In addition to the tests on complete cells, we are also beginning a program of point contact tunneling measurements to determine the properties of the superconductors at the interface between the bulk niobium and the oxide layer. We describe the method, and tests we are beginning with single cell resonators and small samples.

  1. The text of the agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Finland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. On 18 September 1995 the Agency received in respect of the European Atomic Energy Community and Finland the notifications required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement. For practical accounting purposes as proposed in the notifications, the Agreement came into force for Finland on 1 October 1995

  2. The text of the agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Latvia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. The Agreement and the Protocol thereto, which came into force for the above-mentioned original signatories on 21 February 1977, have also entered into force for Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. The Agency received from the Republic of Latvia on 17 March 2008 and from the European Atomic Energy Community on 1 October 2008, the notifications required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement. Accordingly, the Agreement entered into force for Latvia on 1 October 2008

  3. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  4. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section... use a weapon in support of a security, law enforcement, or other lawful purpose while on the...

  5. Early retirement for weaponeers?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Department of Energy's Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's once-vital nuclear weapons division is now in dire straits. The laboratory was established in 1952, during the titanic struggle over the hydrogen bomb, has grown steadily from $7 million to its peak of $1.1 billion in 1991. The future for key members of their most experienced weapons design team is uncertain. Over the past two years, Livermore's operating budget has fallen by 12.5 percent or $127.6 million. Nearly 750 employees, 10 percent of the work force, accepted early retirement offers last year. Further budget cuts will force another 300 to 600 personnel out by the end of 1995. The future resides in the U.S. Congress

  6. Radiation doses and cancer risks in the Marshall Islands associated with exposure to radioactive fallout from Bikini and Enewetak nuclear weapons tests: summary.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Simon, Steven L; Bouville, André; Land, Charles E; Beck, Harold L

    2010-08-01

    Nuclear weapons testing conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls during 1946-1958 resulted in exposures of the resident population of the present-day Republic of the Marshall Islands to radioactive fallout. This paper summarizes the results of a thorough and systematic reconstruction of radiation doses to that population, by year, age at exposure, and atoll of residence, and the related cancer risks. Detailed methods and results are presented in a series of companion papers in this volume. From our analysis, we concluded that 20 of the 66 nuclear tests conducted in or near the Marshall Islands resulted in measurable fallout deposition on one or more of the inhabited atolls of the Marshall Islands. In this work, we estimated deposition densities (kBq m(-2)) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides at each of the 32 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. Quantitative deposition estimates were made for 63 radionuclides from each test at each atoll. Those estimates along with reported measurements of exposure rates at various times after fallout were used to estimate radiation absorbed doses to the red bone marrow, thyroid gland, stomach wall, and colon wall of atoll residents from both external and internal exposure. Annual doses were estimated for six age groups ranging from newborns to adults. We found that the total deposition of 137Cs, external dose, internal organ doses, and cancer risks followed the same geographic pattern with the large population of the southern atolls receiving the lowest doses. Permanent residents of the southern atolls who were of adult age at the beginning of the testing period received external doses ranging from 5 to 12 mGy on average; the external doses to adults at the mid-latitude atolls ranged from 22 to 59 mGy on average, while the residents of the northern atolls received external doses in the hundreds to over 1,000 mGy. Internal doses varied significantly by age at exposure, location, and organ. Except

  7. US nuclear weapons policy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    May, M.

    1990-12-05

    We are closing chapter one'' of the nuclear age. Whatever happens to the Soviet Union and to Europe, some of the major determinants of nuclear policy will not be what they have been for the last forty-five years. Part of the task for US nuclear weapons policy is to adapt its nuclear forces and the oganizations managing them to the present, highly uncertain, but not urgently competitive situation between the US and the Soviet Union. Containment is no longer the appropriate watchword. Stabilization in the face of uncertainty, a more complicated and politically less readily communicable goal, may come closer. A second and more difficult part of the task is to deal with what may be the greatest potential source of danger to come out of the end of the cold war: the breakup of some of the cooperative institutions that managed the nuclear threat and were created by the cold war. These cooperative institutions, principally the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the US-Japan alliance, were not created specifically to manage the nuclear threat, but manage it they did. A third task for nuclear weapons policy is that of dealing with nuclear proliferation under modern conditions when the technologies needed to field effective nuclear weapons systems and their command and control apparatus are ever more widely available, and the leverage over some potential proliferators, which stemmed from superpower military support, is likely to be on the wane. This paper will make some suggestions regarding these tasks, bearing in mind that the unsettled nature of that part of the world most likely to become involved in nuclear weapons decisions today must make any suggestions tentative and the allowance for surprise more than usually important.

  8. Illegal Weapons Exports?

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2006-01-01

    Amnesty International, a human rights organization, released a report on June 11 accusing China of facilitating regional conflicts and human rights violations by exporting a large quantity of weapons to Sudan, Nepal, Myanmar and the Great Lakes countries of Africa. Responding to such charges, Teng Jianqun, a researcher with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, told the official Xinhua News Agency that China has always put its limited arms exports under strict control and surveillance, deno...

  9. Fundamental limitations to high-precision tests of the universality of free fall by dropping atoms

    OpenAIRE

    Nobili, Anna M.

    2015-01-01

    Tests of the universality of free fall and the weak equivalence principle probe the foundations of General Relativity. Evidence of a violation may lead to the discovery of a new force. The best torsion balance experiments have ruled it out to 10^-13. Cold-atom drop tests have reached 10^-7 and promise to do 7 to 10 orders of magnitude better, on the ground or in space. They are limited by the random shot noise, which depends on the number N of atoms in the clouds. As mass-dropping experiments...

  10. Report of test and research results on atomic energy obtained in national institutes in fiscal 1988

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The test and research on atomic energy utilization in national institutions were begun in 1956, and valuable results have been produced in the fields of nuclear fusion, safety research, food irradiation, medicine and others, thus those have accomplished great roles for the promotion of atomic energy utilization in Japan. Atomic energy technology synthesizes various advanced technologies over wide technical domains, therefore at the time of its research and development, it is important to place emphasis on the creative and innovative regions which cause large technical innovation and in which the effect spreading to general science and technology can be expected. In addition to the test and research according to such recognition, also the basic technology of atomic energy field has been studied. At present foreign countries request Japan to contribute to the development of the world by creating the new technology and knowledge on atomic energy, and national institutions must meet the request. This is the report No.29, in which the results of the test and research in the fields of nuclear fusion, safety research, food irradiation, the countermeasures to cancer, agriculture, forestry and fishery, medicine, mining and industry, power utilization, construction, radioactivation analysis and advanced basic research, carried out in 1988 are summarized. (K.I.)

  11. Under fire: Is the world's treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons strong enough?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fifteen years into the 'atoms for peace' era, Ireland in 1968 took the historic first step to sign the global treaty against tile spread of nuclear weapons. Since then, more than 180 other countries without nuclear weapons have joined the pact, most of them during the cold war period. They see their security in not having (lie bomb, and bind themselves to work for nuclear disarmament everywhere. Their shared commitments make the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) the most accepted arms-control agreement in history, a cornerstone of nuclear cooperation, countries that join it renounce the military atom, and they must accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities to verify it. But the Treaty is under fire, and some critics think it no longer fits the times. They say it cannot prevent Treaty countries from breaking out at will, or ensure that those having nuclear ambitions or arsenals are actually honouring their pledges. Neither has it attracted three key countries - India and Pakistan, which have tested atomic bombs, and Israel, which is suspected of having them - to its ranks of members. Not everyone agrees that the NPT is outdated. But it is clear that the Treaty and its associated regime are under stress, and that its fragile condition needs urgent care. The debate is important and timely - the Treaty comes up for international review in 2005 and countries already are preparing for it. A major question today is whether the NPT is strong enough to keep the lid on nuclear weapons in the world's changed security environment. A former senior official at the IAEA looks at the challenging picture

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Hungary and Malta

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. The Agreement and the Protocol thereto, which came into force for the above-mentioned original signatories on 21 February 1977, have also entered into force for Austria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden

  13. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  14. Agreement of 2 February 1990 between Saint Lucia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Exchange of Letters of 6 November 1995 and 24 April 1996 with Saint Lucia in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean ('the Tlatelolco Treaty'). The agreement reflected in the Exchange of Letters was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 1996

  15. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of an agreement by exchange of letters with Belize in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1997 and entered into force on that date

  16. The Text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977 between Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between Japan and the Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced for the information of all Members

  17. Agreement of 14 April 1975 Between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 14 April 1975 between Sweden and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  18. Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Croatia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 26 May 2008, the date on which the Agency received from Croatia written notification that Croatia's internal requirements for entry into force had been fulfilled

  19. Agreement between the Republic of Uganda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on The Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by exchange of letters with the Republic of Uganda to amend the Protocol to the safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Uganda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 24 June 2009, the date on which the Agency received Uganda's affirmative reply

  20. Agreement Between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with New Zealand to Amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Prolilferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 24 February 2014, the date on which the Agency received New Zealand's affirmative reply

  1. Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Zimbabwe to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 31 August 2011, the date on which the Agency received Zimbabwe's affirmative reply

  2. Is there any future for nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons occupy a paradoxal place both in the collective imagination and in the historical reality: on the one hand everybody dreads the apocalypse horror, and on the other hand, dissuasion appears as an unchanging and quite comfortable situation. However, the world has become multipolar in this domain as well. The geopolitical map is reconstructing. Doctrinal revisions, initiatives against nuclear weapons proliferation, and nuclear disarmament measures are now on the agenda. The best foreign and French experts examine for the first time the consequences of these evolutions. They analyse in particular the split up risks and the potential consequences of a nuclear conflict in regions where atomic arms have become a key-component of the strategic landscape: Middle-Est, Far-East, Southern Asia. The choices France and its allies will have to face are examined as well. (J.S.)

  3. General Atomic reprocessing pilot plant: description and results of initial testing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-12-01

    In June 1976 General Atomic completed the construction of a reprocessing head-end cold pilot plant. In the year since then, each system within the head end has been used for experiments which have qualified the designs. This report describes the equipment in the plant and summarizes the results of the initial phase of reprocessing testing.

  4. Thermal molecule and atom test of the modified special relativity theory

    OpenAIRE

    Liu, Jian-Miin

    2001-01-01

    The correction to Maxwell-Boltzmann's velocity distribution law is obtained in the framework of the modified special relativity theory. The detection of velocity and velocity rate distributions for thermal molecules or atoms or other particles can serve as a test of the modified special relativity theory.

  5. Report of test and research results on atomic energy obtained in national institutes in fiscal 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As for the test and research on the utilization of atomic energy in national institutes, the budget was appropriated for the first time in fiscal year 1956, and since then, the many valuable results of research have been obtained so far in the diversified fields of nuclear fusion, safety research, the irradiation of foods, medicine and others, thus the test and research accomplished the large role for promoting the utilization of atomic energy in Japan. In this report, the gists of the results of the test and research on the utilization of atomic energy carried out by national institutes in fiscal year 1985 are collected. No.1 of this report was published in 1960, and this is No.26. It is desired to increase the understanding about the recent trend and the results of the test and research on atomic energy utilization with this book. The researches on nuclear fusion, engineering safety and environmental radioactivity safety, the irradiation of foods, the countermeasures against cancer, fertilized soil, the quality improvement of brewing and farm products, the protection of farm products and the improvement of breeding, diagnosis and medical treatment, pharmaceuticals, environmental hygiene, the application to physiology and pathology, radiochemistry, radiation measurement, process analysis, nuclear reactor materials, nuclear powered ships, civil engineering, radioactivation analysis and injury prevention are reported. (Kako, I.)

  6. The relevance of random choice in tests of Bell inequalities with atomic qubits

    OpenAIRE

    Santos Corchero, Emilio

    2009-01-01

    It is pointed out that a loophole may exist in experimental tests of Bell inequalities using atomic qubits, due to possible errors in the angles defining the observables whose correlation is measured. A sufficient condition is derived for closing the loophole.

  7. Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An agreement by exchange of letters of 6 November 1995 and 17 November 2003 with the Republic of Panama in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. This Exchange of Letters constitutes an agreement confirming that: the Safeguards Agreement of 23 March 1984, concluded between the Republic of Panama and the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty), also satisfies the obligation of Panama under Article III of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA; the safeguards set forth in the Safeguards Agreement shall also apply, as regards Panama, in connection with the NPT; the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply as long as Panama is party to the NPT or the Tlatelolco Treaty or both. The agreement reflected in the Exchange of Letters was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 November 2003, and pursuant to its terms, entered into force on that date

  8. Agreement of 4 November 1992 between the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Trinidad and Tobago to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities with its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  9. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Antigua and Barbuda to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  10. Agreement of 23 July 1996 between Grenada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Grenada to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory , under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  11. Agreement of 14 August 1996 between the Government of Barbados and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Barbados to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  12. Agreement between the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Bahamas to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguard provisions of Part I

  13. Agreement between the co-operative republic of Guyana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Guyana to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguard provisions of Part I

  14. Does an atom interferometer test the gravitational redshift at the Compton frequency ?

    CERN Document Server

    Wolf, Peter; Bordé, Christian J; Cohen-Tannoudji, Claude; Salomon, Christophe; Reynaud, Serge

    2010-01-01

    Atom interferometers allow the measurement of the acceleration of freely falling atoms with respect to an experimental platform at rest on Earth's surface. Such experiments have been used to test the universality of free fall by comparing the acceleration of the atoms to that of a classical freely falling object. In a recent paper, M\\"uller, Peters and Chu [Nature {\\bf 463}, 926-929 (2010)] argued that atom interferometers also provide a very accurate test of the gravitational redshift when considering the atom as a clock operating at the Compton frequency associated with the rest mass. We analyze this claim in the frame of general relativity and of different alternative theories. We show that the difference of "Compton phases" between the two paths of the interferometer is actually zero in a large class of theories, including general relativity, all metric theories of gravity, most non-metric theories and most theoretical frameworks used to interpret the violations of the equivalence principle. Therefore, in...

  15. Seeing the Light: Visibility of the July '45 Trinity Atomic Bomb Test from the Inner Solar System

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reed, B. Cameron

    2006-01-01

    In his "The Making of the Atomic Bomb," Richard Rhodes remarks of the July 16, 1945, Trinity atomic bomb test in New Mexico that "had astronomers been watching they could have seen it reflected from the moon, literal moonshine," an allusion to Ernest Rutherford's famous dismissal of the prospect of atomic energy. Investigating…

  16. A comparison of some heavy-atom refinement and phasing programs in a test case

    OpenAIRE

    Diederichs, Kay

    1994-01-01

    The performance of some heavy atom refinement and phasing programs or packages (PROTEIN, VECREF/MLPHARE, HEAVY, DAREFI, PHASES, XtalView) was compared in a test case. As the success of heavy atom refinement and phasing heavily depends on the skills and experience of the investigator, and the resources for evaluation of more than one or two packages were not locally available, a proposal was posted in a Internet newsgroup (bionet.xtallography) and two mailing lists (CCP4 and O-info). Particip...

  17. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Transformation - A Sustainable Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this process of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start

  18. Report of test and research results on atomic energy obtained in national institutes in fiscal 1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The test and research regarding the utilization of atomic energy carried out in national institutions have produced many valuable results in diverse fields so far, such as nuclear fusion, safety research, food irradiation and medicine, since the budget had been appropriated for the first time in 1956. It has accomplished large role in the promotion of atomic energy utilization in Japan. This report is volume 28, in which the results of the test and research on atomic energy utilization carried out by national institutions in fiscal year 1987 are summarized. It is hoped that the understanding about the recent trend and the results of the test and research on atomic energy utilization is further promoted by this report. The contents of this report are nuclear fusion; the research on engineering safety and environmental radioactivity safety; food irradiation; the countermeasures against cancer; fertilized soil, the improvement of quality, the protection of plants and the improvement of breeding in agriculture and fishery fields; diagnosis and medical treatment, pharmaceuticals, environmental hygiene and the application to physiology and pathology in medical field; radiation measurement and process analysis in mining and industry fields; nuclear reactor materials and nuclear-powered ships; civil engineering; radioactivation analysis; the research on the prevention of injuries; and the basic researches on materials and acessment and reduction of irradiation risk. (J.P.N.)

  19. STE-QUEST—test of the universality of free fall using cold atom interferometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The theory of general relativity describes macroscopic phenomena driven by the influence of gravity while quantum mechanics brilliantly accounts for microscopic effects. Despite their tremendous individual success, a complete unification of fundamental interactions is missing and remains one of the most challenging and important quests in modern theoretical physics. The spacetime explorer and quantum equivalence principle space test satellite mission, proposed as a medium-size mission within the Cosmic Vision program of the European Space Agency (ESA), aims for testing general relativity with high precision in two experiments by performing a measurement of the gravitational redshift of the Sun and the Moon by comparing terrestrial clocks, and by performing a test of the universality of free fall of matter waves in the gravitational field of Earth comparing the trajectory of two Bose–Einstein condensates of 85Rb and 87Rb. The two ultracold atom clouds are monitored very precisely thanks to techniques of atom interferometry. This allows to reach down to an uncertainty in the Eötvös parameter of at least 2 × 10−15. In this paper, we report about the results of the phase A mission study of the atom interferometer instrument covering the description of the main payload elements, the atomic source concept, and the systematic error sources. (paper)

  20. Weapons Neutron Research Facility (WNR)

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — The Weapons Neutron Research Facility (WNR) provides neutron and proton beams for basic, applied, and defense-related research. Neutron beams with energies ranging...

  1. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  2. Agreement of 19 December 1990, between the Republic of Kiribati and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of the Republic of Kiribati to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  3. Agreement of 24 February 1989 between the Republic of Tunisia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Tunisia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  4. The text of the Agreement between the Ivory Coast and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of the Ivory Coast to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  5. Agreement of 28 March 1991 between the Government of Solomon Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first one stipulates the agreement of Solomon Islands to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part two specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  6. Agreement of 25 February 1992 between the government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first one stipulates the agreement of the Syrian Arab Republic to accept Safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  7. Agreement of 13 June 1996 between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Principality of Monaco to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  8. Agreement of 30 March 1996 between the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Algeria to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  9. Agreement between the Republic of San Marino and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of San Marino and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Agreement was signed in Vienna on 3 March 1995 and in San Marino on 7 September 1998. It entered into force on 15 September 1998. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  10. Agreement of 24 October 1989 between the Kingdom of Bhutan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Bhutan to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  11. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

  13. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/258) concluded between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1998 and it entered into force on 28 july 1998

  14. Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

  15. Protocol additional to the agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement (INFCIRC/217) concluded between Australia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of the Additional Protocol was authorized by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997 and signed in Vienna on the same date. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 12 December 1997

  16. Agreement of 16 September 1991 between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of South Africa to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  17. Agreement of 2 October 1989 between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Viet Nam to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Hungary and Malta

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 17.a. of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)3 provides that the Additional Protocol shall come into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the Community and the Signatory States written notification that their respective requirements for entry into force have been met. Article 23(a) of INFCIRC/193 provides the means for non-signatory States of the Additional Protocol to express their consent to be bound by the Additional Protocol

  19. Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jenkins-Smith, H.C.; Herron, K.G. [Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States). Institute for Public Policy; Barke, R.P. [Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA (United States). School of Public Policy

    1994-04-01

    This report summarizes the findings of a nationwide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories. A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-cold war security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust and official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons; (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons, and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4) preventing nuclear terrorism. Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-cold war security environment.

  20. Protection of the population against radiation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The papers include: information on the physical principles of several nuclear weapons; their radiation; long term effects of nuclear test; biological effects; shelter design and construction, and the management of major nuclear events in Switzerland. (G.Q.)

  1. Proposition of law relative to the admission and compensation of nuclear weapons tests victims; Proposition de Loi relative a la reconnaissance et a l'indemnisation des victimes des essais nucleaires

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2008-07-01

    The present proposition of law has for object to come up to the expectations of persons having participated to nuclear weapons test made by France between the 13. february 1960 and the 27 january 1996, in Sahara or French polynesia. The consequences on health can not be ignored even after several decades of years. Decades of veterans have for several years, have got involve in justice procedures to be entitled to obtain compensation in damage repair they assign to the nuclear tests. Some courts of justice have, for years, recognized the legitimacy of these claims and the judgements cite irradiation consequences able to be revealed late even several decades after the radiation exposure. Other states have adopted laws of compensation for the victims of their populations, civil or military ones. That is why this proposition of law comes today to be adopted. (N.C.)

  2. Report of test and research results on atomic energy obtained in national institutes in fiscal 1992

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The tests and researches on the development and utilization of atomic energy in national laboratories were begun in 1956, and have accomplished the great role for the advance of the development and utilization of atomic energy in Japan by having produced many valuable results so far. Atomic energy has been utilized not only in the field of nuclear power but also in diverse fields, and in national laboratories, the research for expanding the development and utilization of atomic energy in medicine, agriculture, forestry, fishery, radioactivation analysis and others in addition the basic research on nuclear fusion have been advanced. Further expecting the pervasive effect to general science and technology, the development of integrated research are promoted from the viewpoint of new technical innovation and creative technology. The safety research of nuclear facilities have been carried out to keep them high level on the basis of the yearly program enacted by Nuclear Safety Commission. This is the report No. 33, in which the results of the test and research in the fields of nuclear fusion safety research, food irradiation, cancer countermeasures, agriculture, forestry, fishery, medicine, mining and manufacture, power utilization, construction, radioactivation analysis carried on in fiscal 1992 are summarized. (J.P.N.)

  3. An exacting transition probability measurement - a direct test of atomic many-body theories

    CERN Document Server

    Dutta, T; Yum, D; Rebhi, R; Mukherjee, M

    2016-01-01

    A new protocol for measuring the branching fraction of hydrogenic atoms with only statistically limited uncertainty is proposed and demonstrated for the decay of the P$_{3/2}$ level of the barium ion, with precision below $0.5\\%$. Heavy hydrogenic atoms like the barium ion are test beds for fundamental physics such as atomic parity violation and they also hold the key to understanding nucleo-synthesis in stars. To draw definitive conclusion about possible physics beyond the standard model by measuring atomic parity violation in the barium ion it is necessary to measure the dipole transition probabilities of low-lying excited states with precision better than $1\\%$. Furthermore, enhancing our understanding of the $\\it{barium-puzzle}$ in barium stars requires branching fraction data for proper modelling of nucleo-synthesis. Our measurements are the first to provide a direct test of quantum many-body calculations on the barium ion with precision below one percent and more importantly with no known systematic unc...

  4. Rays as weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vogel, H. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)], E-mail: Hermann.vogel@ak-stgeorg.lbk-hh.de

    2007-08-15

    Purpose: Ionizing radiation is being regarded as life threatening. Therefore, accidents in nuclear power plants are considered equal threatening as nuclear bomb explosions, and attacks with dirty bombs are thought as dangerous as nuclear weapon explosions. However, there are differences between a nuclear bomb explosion, the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and an attack with a dirty bomb. It is intended to point them out. Method: The processes are described, which damage in a nuclear bomb explosion, in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and in an attack with a dirty bomb. Their effects are compared with each other, i.e. explosion, heat, shock wave (blast), ionizing radiation, and fallout. Results: In the center of the explosion of a nuclear bomb, the temperature rises to 100 Mio deg.C, this induces damaging heat radiation and shock wave. In the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant and in the conventional explosion of a dirty bomb, the temperature may rise up to 3000 deg. C, heat radiation and blast are limited to a short distance. In nuclear power plants, explosions due to oxyhydrogen gas or steam may occur. In nuclear explosions the dispersed radioactive material (fall out) consists mainly of isotopes with short half-life, in nuclear power plants and in dirty bomb attacks with longer half-life. The amount of fall out is comparable in nuclear bomb explosions with that in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, it is smaller in attacks with dirty bombs. An explosion in a nuclear power plant even in the largest imaginable accident is not a nuclear explosion. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were 200,000 victims nearly all by heat and blast, some 300 died by ionizing radiation. In Chernobyl, there have been less than 100 victims due to ionizing radiation up till now. A dirty bomb kills possibly with the explosion of conventional explosive, the dispersed radioactive material may damage

  5. Nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this paper, GAO provides its views on DOE's January 1991 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study. GAO believes that DOE's new reconfiguration study provides a starting point for reaching agreement on solutions to many of the complex's problems. Key decisions still need to be made about the size of the complex, where to relocate plutonium operations, what technologies should be used for new tritium production, and what to do with excess plutonium. The total cost for reconfiguring and modernizing is still uncertain and some management issues remain unresolved. Congress faces a difficult task in making these decisions given the conflicting demands for scare resources in a time of growing budget deficits and war in the Persian Gulf

  6. STE-QUEST - Test of the Universality of Free Fall Using Cold Atom Interferometry

    CERN Document Server

    Aguilera, D; Battelier, B; Bawamia, A; Bertoldi, A; Bondarescu, R; Bongs, K; Bouyer, P; Braxmaier, C; Cacciapuoti, L; Chaloner, C; Chwalla, M; Ertmer, W; Franz, M; Gaaloul, N; Gehler, M; Gerardi, D; Gesa, L; Gürlebeck, N; Hartwig, J; Hauth, M; Hellmig, O; Herr, W; Herrmann, S; Heske, A; Hinton, A; Ireland, P; Jetzer, P; Johann, U; Krutzik, M; Kubelka, A; Lämmerzahl, C; Landragin, A; Lloro, I; Massonnet, D; Mateos, I; Milke, A; Nofrarias, M; Oswald, M; Peters, A; Posso-Trujillo, K; Rasel, E; Rocco, E; Roura, A; Rudolph, J; Schleich, W; Schubert, C; Schuldt, T; Seidel, S; Sengstock, K; Sopuerta, C F; Sorrentino, F; Summers, D; Tino, G M; Trenkel, C; Uzunoglu, N; von Klitzing, W; Walser, R; Wendrich, T; Wenzlawski, A; Weßels, P; Wicht, A; Wille, E; Williams, M; Windpassinger, P; Zahzam, N

    2013-01-01

    The theory of general relativity describes macroscopic phenomena driven by the influence of gravity while quantum mechanics brilliantly accounts for microscopic effects. Despite their tremendous individual success, a complete unification of fundamental interactions is missing and remains one of the most challenging and important quests in modern theoretical physics. The STE-QUEST satellite mission, proposed as a medium-size mission within the Cosmic Vision program of the European Space Agency (ESA), aims for testing general relativity with high precision in two experiments by performing a measurement of the gravitational redshift of the Sun and the Moon by comparing terrestrial clocks, and by performing a test of the Universality of Free Fall of matter waves in the gravitational field of Earth comparing the trajectory of two Bose-Einstein condensates of Rb85 and Rb87. The two ultracold atom clouds are monitored very precisely thanks to techniques of atom interferometry. This allows to reach down to an uncerta...

  7. Areas free of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In fact there is considerable disagreement about the concept of zones free of nuclear weapons, but the different angles from which countries see this idea, conditions of entry into force and assess of their effectiveness in achieving objectives contributed to the lack of final formulation of one specific definition and not to develop an integrated aspects concept. There is a necessity to try to find a clear definition of zones free of nuclear weapons to address in a second phase to the basic purposes of the establishment. The article addressed the following points: the definition of zones free from nuclear weapons; international conventions establishing the zones free of nuclear weapons; advantages of treaties on the areas free of nuclear weapons, which can be summarized mainly in two basic goals: ensuring not to give birth to new nuclear states and achieving regional security and stability.

  8. Magneto-optical trapping of radioactive atoms for test of the fundamental symmetries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We are planning test experiments of fundamental symmetries based on the intrinsic properties of francium. It is expected that the laser cooling and trapping of francium will produce precision measurements. The pilot experiment using rubidium was performed with the goal of francium trapping. The ion beam generated with a francium ion source was investigated using a Wien filter. Each piece of equipment still must be studied in more detail, and the equipment should be upgraded in order to trap radioactive atoms

  9. Magneto-optical trapping of radioactive atoms for test of the fundamental symmetries

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kawamura, Hirokazu, E-mail: hirokazu.kawamura.c2@tohoku.ac.jp [Tohoku University, Frontier Research Institute for Interdisciplinary Sciences (Japan); Ando, S.; Aoki, T.; Arikawa, H.; Harada, K.; Hayamizu, T. [Tohoku University, Cyclotron and Radioisotope Center (Japan); Inoue, T. [Tohoku University, Frontier Research Institute for Interdisciplinary Sciences (Japan); Ishikawa, T.; Itoh, M.; Kato, K.; Köhler, L.; Mathis, J.; Sakamoto, K.; Uchiyama, A.; Sakemi, Y. [Tohoku University, Cyclotron and Radioisotope Center (Japan)

    2015-11-15

    We are planning test experiments of fundamental symmetries based on the intrinsic properties of francium. It is expected that the laser cooling and trapping of francium will produce precision measurements. The pilot experiment using rubidium was performed with the goal of francium trapping. The ion beam generated with a francium ion source was investigated using a Wien filter. Each piece of equipment still must be studied in more detail, and the equipment should be upgraded in order to trap radioactive atoms.

  10. Testing EUV/X-ray Atomic Data for the Solar Dynamics Observatory

    OpenAIRE

    Testa, Paola; Drake, Jeremy J.; Landi, Enrico

    2011-01-01

    The Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA) and the Exteme-ultraviolet Variability Experiment (EVE) onboard the Solar Dynamics Observatory include spectral windows in the X-ray/EUV band. Accuracy and completeness of the atomic data in this wavelength range is essential for interpretation of the spectrum and irradiance of the solar corona, and of SDO observations made with the AIA and EVE instruments. Here we test the X-ray/EUV data in the CHIANTI database to assess their completeness and accuracy ...

  11. Loophole-free Bell test for one atom and less than one photon

    CERN Document Server

    Sangouard, N; Gisin, N; Rosenfeld, W; Sekatski, P; Weber, M; Weinfurter, H

    2011-01-01

    We consider the entanglement between two internal states of a single atom and two photon number states describing either the vaccum or a single photon and thus containing, on average, less than one photon. We show that this intriguing entanglement can be characterized through substantial violations of a Bell inequality by performing homodyne detections on the optical mode. We present the experimental challenges that need to be overcome to pave the way towards a loophole-free Bell test in this setup.

  12. Loophole-free Bell test with one atom and less than one photon on average

    OpenAIRE

    Sangouard N.; Bancal J.-D.; Gisin N.; Rosenfeld W.; Sekatski P.; Weber M.; Weinfurter H.

    2011-01-01

    We consider the entanglement between two internal states of a single atom and two photon number states describing either the vaccum or a single photon and thus containing, on average, less than one photon. We show that this intriguing entanglement can be characterized through substantial violations of a Bell inequality by performing homodyne detections on the optical mode. We present the experimental challenges that need to be overcome to pave the way towards a loophole-free Bell test in this...

  13. Loophole-free Bell test with one atom and less than one photon on average

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sangouard, N.; Bancal, J.-D.; Gisin, N.; Sekatski, P. [Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, CH-1211 Geneva 4 (Switzerland); Rosenfeld, W.; Weber, M.; Weinfurter, H. [Fakultat fur Physik, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munchen, DE-80799 Munchen (Germany)

    2011-11-15

    We consider the entanglement between two internal states of a single atom and two photon number states describing either the vacuum or a single photon and thus containing, on average, less than one photon. We show that this intriguing entanglement can be characterized through substantial violations of a Bell inequality by performing homodyne detections on the optical mode. We present the experimental challenges that need to be overcome to pave the way toward a loophole-free Bell test.

  14. Report of test and research results on atomic energy obtained in national institutes in fiscal 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As for the test and research on the utilization of atomic energy by national organizations, the budget was appropriated for the first time in fiscal year 1956. Since then, many valuable results of research have been produced in the diverse fields of nuclear fusion, safety research, food irradiation, medicine and others, in this way, the test and research have played large roles in the promotion of the utilization of atomic energy in Japan. This is the 24th report, in which the results of the test and research on the utilization of atomic energy carried out in fiscal year 1983 by national organizations are summarized. 5 researches on nuclear fusion, 19 researches on engineering safety and environmental radioactivity safety, 3 researches on food irradiation, 6 researches on the countermeasures to cancer, 19 researches on agriculture, forestry and fishery, 30 researches on medicine, pharmaceuticals and environmental hygiene, 6 researches on mining and industry, 6 researches on power reactors and nuclear ships, 1 research on agricultural water, 7 researches on activation analysis and 4 researches on injury prevention are reported. (Kako, I.)

  15. Report of test and research results on atomic energy obtained in national institutes in fiscal 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As for the test and research on the utilization of atomic energy by national organizations, the budget was appropriated for the first time in fiscal year 1956. Since then, many valuable results of research have been produced in the diverse fields of nuclear fusion, safety research, food irradiation, medicine and others, in this way, the test and research have played large roles in the promotion of the utilization of atomic energy in Japan. This is the 23rd report, in which the results of the test and research on the utilization of atomic energy carried out in fiscal year 1982 by national organizations are summarized. 5 researches on nuclear fusion, 12 researches on engineering safety, 5 researches on environmental radioactivity safety, 3 researches on food irradiation, 5 researches on the countermeasures to cancer, 8 researches on soil fertilization, 4 researches on quality improvement, 7 researches on crop protection, 5 researches on the improvement of breeding, 8 researches on diagnosis and treatment, 8 researches on pharmaceuticals, 10 researches on the application to pathology, 6 researches on mining and industry, 6 researches on power reactors and nuclear ships, 1 research on underground water, 6 researches on activation analysis and 3 researches on injury prevention are reported. (Kako, I.)

  16. Standard Test Method for Hydrophobic Surface Films by the Atomizer Test

    CERN Document Server

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    1965-01-01

    1.1 This test method covers the detection of the presence of hydrophobic (nonwetting) films on surfaces and the presence of hydrophobic organic materials in processing ambients. When properly conducted, the test will enable detection of fractional molecular layers of hydrophobic organic contaminants. On very rough or porous surfaces the sensitivity of the test may be significantly decreased. 1.2 The values stated in inch-pound units are to be regarded as the standard. The values given in parentheses are for information only. 1.3 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate safety and health practices and determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.

  17. North Korea has the means to develop a nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For a long time already, North Korea has been developing technology that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon. Progress of the nuclear weapons programme has been monitored by means of satellites, and proof of the programme has been obtained, for instance, from a diplomat who defected and when unauthorized exports have been revealed. Led by the United States, the international community has wanted to bring the nuclear weapons programme to an end, but the exceptional negotiating skills of North Korean representatives and sudden turns of events have made the task the difficult one. North Korea has been threatened with economic sanctions, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has decided to cease all technical assistance to North Korea. North Korea could hardly benefit from the use of a nuclear weapon: instead, giving up the programme might help the country economically. The death of the country's dictatorial leader Kim Il Sung seems to have increased the willingness to give up the programme. However, not the slightest information has yet been received as to the destiny of the plutonium already produced. In the end, North Korea may not be required to cancel the entire nuclear weapons programme; freezing the programme may be enough. Thus there would eventually be silent approval of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. (orig.)

  18. Agreement between the Republic of Namibia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Republic of Namibia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 17 March 1998, signed in Vienna on 19 March 1998, and entered into force on 15 April 1998

  19. Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  20. Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first one stipulates the agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provision of Part I

  1. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Czech Republic to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 9 September 1996, signed in Vienna on 18 September 1996 and entered into force on 11 September 1997

  2. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/226) concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998, and signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998. Pending entry into force, the Protocol is being applied provisionally as from the date of signature, i.e. 12 June 1998

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Armenia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997, and it will enter into force on the date the Agency receives written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Pending entry into force, this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature, i.e., 29 September 1997

  4. Technical report on the Piping Reliability Proving Tests at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) conducts Piping Reliability Proving Tests from 1975 to 1992 based upon the contracts between JAERI and Science and Technology Agency of Japan (STA) under the auspices of the special account law for electric power development promotion. The purpose of these tests are to prove the structural reliability of the primary cooling piping constituting a part of the pressure boundary in the light water reactor power plants. The tests with large experimental facilities had ended already in 1990. Presently piping reliability analysis by the probabilistic fracture mechanics method is being done. Until now annual reports concerning the proving tests were produced and submitted to STA, whereas this report summarizes the test results done during these 16 years. Objectives of the piping reliability proving tests are to prove that the primary piping of the light water reactor (1) be reliable throughout the service period, (2) have no possibility of rupture, (3) bring no detrimental influence on the surrounding instrumentations or equipments near the break location even if it ruptured suddenly. To attain these objectives (i) pipe fatigue tests, (ii) unstable pipe fracture tests, (iii) pipe rupture tests and also the analyses by computer codes were done. After carrying out these tests, it is verified that the piping is reliable throughout the service period. The authors of this report are T. Isozaki, K. Shibata, S. Ueda, R. Kurihara, K. Onizawa and A. Kohsaka. The parts they wrote are shown in contents. (author)

  5. Testing general relativity and alternative theories of gravity with space-based atomic clocks and atom interferometers

    OpenAIRE

    Bondarescu Ruxandra; Schärer Andreas; Jetzer Philippe; Angélil Raymond; Saha Prasenjit; Lundgren Andrew

    2015-01-01

    The successful miniaturisation of extremely accurate atomic clocks and atom interferometers invites prospects for satellite missions to perform precision experiments. We discuss the effects predicted by general relativity and alternative theories of gravity that can be detected by a clock, which orbits the Earth. Our experiment relies on the precise tracking of the spacecraft using its observed tick-rate. The spacecraft's reconstructed four-dimensional trajectory will reveal the nature of gra...

  6. Verification of Chemical Weapons Destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Chemical Weapons Convention is the only multilateral treaty that bans completely an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under international verification arrangements. Possessor States, i.e. those that have chemical weapons stockpiles at the time of becoming party to the CWC, commit to destroying these. All States undertake never to acquire chemical weapons and not to help other States acquire such weapons. The CWC foresees time-bound chemical disarmament. The deadlines for destruction for early entrants to the CWC are provided in the treaty. For late entrants, the Conference of States Parties intervenes to set destruction deadlines. One of the unique features of the CWC is thus the regime for verifying destruction of chemical weapons. But how can you design a system for verification at military sites, while protecting military restricted information? What degree of assurance is considered sufficient in such circumstances? How do you divide the verification costs? How do you deal with production capability and initial declarations of existing stockpiles? The founders of the CWC had to address these and other challenges in designing the treaty. Further refinement of the verification system has followed since the treaty opened for signature in 1993 and since inspection work was initiated following entry-into-force of the treaty in 1997. Most of this work concerns destruction at the two large possessor States, Russia and the United States. Perhaps some of the lessons learned from the OPCW experience may be instructive in a future verification regime for nuclear weapons. (author)

  7. Fundamental limitations to tests of the universality of free fall by dropping atoms

    CERN Document Server

    Nobili, Anna M

    2015-01-01

    Tests of the universality of free fall and the weak equivalence principle probe the foundations of General Relativity. Evidence of a violation may lead to the discovery of a new force. The best torsion balance experiments have ruled it out to 10^-13[1]. Cold-atom tests[2-5] have reached 10^-7 and promise to do 7 to 10 orders of magnitude better[6-10] on ground or in space. As mass-dropping experiments[2-4] in a non uniform gravitational field they are sensitive to initial conditions. Errors in the relative position and velocity of the atom clouds at release give rise to a systematic effect which mimics a violation, and these offsets are never measured concurrently with the drop. At the current 10^-7 level they are not an issue. Here we show that when aiming at 2x10^-15 as in[9-10], a fundamental limitation arises. Heisenberg's principle does not allow the centre of mass of free atom clouds to be confined at will in both position and velocity space. The required confinement would be short of the position-momen...

  8. Circumventing Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in atom interferometry tests of the equivalence principle

    CERN Document Server

    Roura, Albert

    2015-01-01

    Atom interferometry tests of universality of free fall based on the differential measurement of two different atomic species provide a useful complement to those based on macroscopic masses. However, when striving for the highest possible sensitivities, gravity gradients pose a serious challenge. Indeed, the relative initial position and velocity for the two species need to be controlled with extremely high accuracy, which can be rather demanding in practice and whose verification may require rather long integration times. Furthermore, in highly sensitive configurations gravity gradients lead to a drastic loss of contrast. These difficulties can be mitigated by employing wave packets with narrower position and momentum widths, but this is ultimately limited by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. We present a novel scheme that simultaneously overcomes the loss of contrast and the initial co-location problem. In doing so, it circumvents the fundamental limitations due to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and e...

  9. Realistic loophole-free Bell test with atom-photon entanglement

    CERN Document Server

    Teo, Colin; Quintino, Marco Túlio; Minář, Jiří; Cavalcanti, Daniel; Scarani, Valerio; Cunha, Marcelo Terra; Santos, Marcelo França

    2012-01-01

    The establishment of nonlocal correlations, obtained through the violation of a Bell inequality, is not only important from a fundamental point of view, but constitutes the basis for device-independent quantum information technologies. Although several nonlocality tests have been performed so far, all of them suffered from either the locality or the detection loopholes. Recent studies have suggested that the use of atom-photon entanglement can lead to Bell inequality violations with moderate transmission and detection efficiencies. In this paper we propose an experimental setup realizing a simple atom-photon entangled state that, under realistic experimental parameters available to date, achieves a significant violation of the Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt inequality. Most importantly, the violation remains when considering typical detection efficiencies and losses due to required propagation distances.

  10. Atomic force microscopy and mechanical testing of bovine pericardium irradiated to radiotherapy doses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Within the context of radiotherapy our work investigates the feasibility of identifying changes in structural and biomechanical properties of pericardium resulting from exposure to penetrating photon irradiation. Collagen fibres extracted from bovine pericardium were chosen as a model of pericardium extracellular matrix as these form the main fibrous component of the medium. Tests of mechanical properties, controlled by the various structural elements of the tissues, were performed on frontal pericardium, including uni-axial tests and atomic force microscopy (AFM). While the irradiated collagen fibres showed no significant change in D-band spacing up to doses of 80 Gy, the fibre width was found to increase by 34±9% at 80 Gy when compared with that for un-irradiated samples. - Highlights: • Methods for identifying changes in tissue biophysical properties following photon irradiation. • Tests made using collagen fibres extracted from bovine pericardium. • Sensitivity of uni-axial tests and atomic force microscopy (AFM) investigated. • Radiotherapy doses investigated up to 80 Gy, delivered by 6 MV photons

  11. OIL AS POLITICAL WEAPON

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mariana, BUICAN

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available Oil (called by some black gold has not always been as coveted and used, but only in the last hundred years has established itself as a highly sought after as an indispensable proper functioning of modern economic activity that an important factor in international politics. International oil regime has changed in the last decades. In 1960, oil regime was a private oligopol which had links with governments main consuming countries. By then the price of a barrel of oil was two U.S. dollars and seven major transnational oil companies decided the amount of oil that will be produced. Meanwhile the world region with the largest oil exports were more strongly expressed nationalism and decolonization. Result, it was so in the late 60s in the region occur independent states. They have created an organization aim of this resource to their advantage - OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Thus since 1973 there have been changes in the international regime governing oil field, namely producing countries were fixed production rate and price. After this time the oil weapon has become increasingly important in the management of international relations. Oil influenced the great powers to Middle East conflicts that occurred in the last century, but their attitude about the emergence of new sources of oil outside OPEC. In the late 90's, Russia has become a major supplier of oil to the West.

  12. How electroshock weapons kill!

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lundquist, Marjorie

    2010-03-01

    Growing numbers of law enforcement officers now carry an electroshock weapon (ESW). Over 500 U.S. deaths have followed ESW use in the past 26 years; over 450 of these deaths followed use of an electromuscular disruptor in the past 9 years. Most training courses teach that ESWs are safe; that they can kill only by the direct effect of electric current on the heart; and that a death following use of an ESW always has some other cause. All these teachings are false! The last was disproved by Lundquist.^1 Williams^2 ruled out direct electrical effects as a cause of almost all the 213 deaths he studied, leaving disruption of normal physiological processes as the only alternative explanation. Careful study of all such deaths identifies 4 different ways that death has or could have been brought about by the ESW: kidney failure following rhabdomyolysis [rare]; cardiac arrest from hyperkalemia following rhabdomyolysis [undocumented]; lactic acid-induced ventricular fibrillation [conclusive proof impossible]; and [most common] anoxia from so much lactic acid in the circulating blood that it acts as an oxygen scavenger, continuously depleting the blood of oxygen until most of the lactate has been metabolized. ^1M. Lundquist, BAPS 54(1) K1.270(2009). ^2Howard E. Williams, Taser Electronic Control Devices and Sudden In-Custody Death, 2008.

  13. Guarding the guardians: Civilian control of nuclear weapons in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This book has three separate complementary goals. First, it develops a model to explain how the command and control of nuclear weapons evolves over time. Second, it tells the story of the evolution of one critical aspect of the nuclear command system, the custody of nuclear weapons. Finally, it assesses the general problem of ensuring civilian control over nuclear operations. The focus is on the formation of operational policy. Where to deploy a weapon and at what state of alertness is an operational decision. Part I, The Theory of Civilian Control is divided into three chapters: Civilian control: Principles and problems; Civilian Control: From alerts to war termination; and Explaining changes in civilian control. Part II, The Evolution of Custody Policy has seven chapters: The Atomic Energy Act and the origin of assertive control, 1945-1947; The first test of assertive civilian control, 1948-1949; The breach in assertive control, 1950-1952; Assertive control becomes delegative control, 1953-1958; The resurgence of assertive control, 1959-1962; The cycle continues, 1963-1990; and Conclusion: The future of civilian control

  14. Risk in the Weapons Stockpile

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Noone, Bailey C [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-14

    When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

  15. Weapon Target Assignment with Combinatorial Optimization Techniques

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Asim Tokgöz

    2013-07-01

    Full Text Available Weapon Target Assignment (WTA is the assignment of friendly weapons to the hostile targets in order to protect friendly assets or destroy the hostile targets and considered as a NP-complete problem. Thus, it is very hard to solve it for real time or near-real time operational needs. In this study, genetic algorithm (GA, tabu search (TS, simulated annealing (SA and Variable Neighborhood Search (VNS combinatorial optimization techniques are applied to the WTA problem and their results are compared with each other and also with the optimized GAMS solutions. Algorithms are tested on the large scale problem instances. It is found that all the algorithms effectively converge to the near global optimum point(s (a good quality and the efficiency of the solutions (speed of solution might be improved according to the operational needs. VNS and SA solution qualities are better than both GA and TS.

  16. Effects of nuclear weapons. Third edition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, S.; Dolan, P.J.

    1977-01-01

    Since the last edition of ''The Effects of Nuclear Weapons'' in 1962 much new information has become available concerning nuclear weapon effects. This has come in part from the series of atmospheric tests, including several at very high altitudes, conducted in the Pacific Ocean area in 1962. In addition, laboratory studies, theoretical calculations, and computer simulations have provided a better understanding of the various effects. A new chapter has been added on the electromagnetic pulse. The chapter titles are as follows: general principles of nuclear explosions; descriptions of nuclear explosions; air blast phenomena in air and surface bursts; air blast loading; structural damage from air blast; shock effects of surface and subsurface bursts; thermal radiation and its effects; initial nuclear radiation; residual nuclear radiation and fallout; radio and radar effects; the electromagnetic pulse and its effects; and biological effects. (LTN)

  17. Islamic State and Chemical Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lukáš Rafay

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available The article deals with topic of Islamic State and chemical weapons. The issue is analysed in three dimensions: origin of used chemical weapons and possibility of independent production; known chemical attacks and tactical regularities in their execution; and traits of future chemical terrorist attacks. By providing a thorough examination of the problem, the article aims at predicting the future development of the group’s chemical program as well as describing any prospective chemical terrorist attacks in Europe

  18. Nuclear weapons and the law.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Murray, R K

    1999-01-01

    The history of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is summarized, with a discussion of some of its earlier Advisory Opinions. The Advisory Opinion on the legality of nuclear arms is considered in the light of the principles of international humanitarian law and a review of nuclear weapons effects. The present government's position on nuclear weapons as outlined in the Strategic Defence Review (which ignores the issue of legality) is examined critically. PMID:10371869

  19. Hybrid quantum logic and a test of Bell’s inequality using two different atomic isotopes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ballance, C. J.; Schäfer, V. M.; Home, J. P.; Szwer, D. J.; Webster, S. C.; Allcock, D. T. C.; Linke, N. M.; Harty, T. P.; Aude Craik, D. P. L.; Stacey, D. N.; Steane, A. M.; Lucas, D. M.

    2015-12-01

    Entanglement is one of the most fundamental properties of quantum mechanics, and is the key resource for quantum information processing (QIP). Bipartite entangled states of identical particles have been generated and studied in several experiments, and post-selected or heralded entangled states involving pairs of photons, single photons and single atoms, or different nuclei in the solid state, have also been produced. Here we use a deterministic quantum logic gate to generate a ‘hybrid’ entangled state of two trapped-ion qubits held in different isotopes of calcium, perform full tomography of the state produced, and make a test of Bell’s inequality with non-identical atoms. We use a laser-driven two-qubit gate, whose mechanism is insensitive to the qubits’ energy splittings, to produce a maximally entangled state of one 40Ca+ qubit and one 43Ca+ qubit, held 3.5 micrometres apart in the same ion trap, with 99.8 ± 0.6 per cent fidelity. We test the CHSH (Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt) version of Bell’s inequality for this novel entangled state and find that it is violated by 15 standard deviations; in this test, we close the detection loophole but not the locality loophole. Mixed-species quantum logic is a powerful technique for the construction of a quantum computer based on trapped ions, as it allows protection of memory qubits while other qubits undergo logic operations or are used as photonic interfaces to other processing units. The entangling gate mechanism used here can also be applied to qubits stored in different atomic elements; this would allow both memory and logic gate errors caused by photon scattering to be reduced below the levels required for fault-tolerant quantum error correction, which is an essential prerequisite for general-purpose quantum computing.

  20. Hybrid quantum logic and a test of Bell's inequality using two different atomic isotopes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ballance, C J; Schäfer, V M; Home, J P; Szwer, D J; Webster, S C; Allcock, D T C; Linke, N M; Harty, T P; Aude Craik, D P L; Stacey, D N; Steane, A M; Lucas, D M

    2015-12-17

    Entanglement is one of the most fundamental properties of quantum mechanics, and is the key resource for quantum information processing (QIP). Bipartite entangled states of identical particles have been generated and studied in several experiments, and post-selected or heralded entangled states involving pairs of photons, single photons and single atoms, or different nuclei in the solid state, have also been produced. Here we use a deterministic quantum logic gate to generate a 'hybrid' entangled state of two trapped-ion qubits held in different isotopes of calcium, perform full tomography of the state produced, and make a test of Bell's inequality with non-identical atoms. We use a laser-driven two-qubit gate, whose mechanism is insensitive to the qubits' energy splittings, to produce a maximally entangled state of one (40)Ca(+) qubit and one (43)Ca(+) qubit, held 3.5 micrometres apart in the same ion trap, with 99.8 ± 0.6 per cent fidelity. We test the CHSH (Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt) version of Bell's inequality for this novel entangled state and find that it is violated by 15 standard deviations; in this test, we close the detection loophole but not the locality loophole. Mixed-species quantum logic is a powerful technique for the construction of a quantum computer based on trapped ions, as it allows protection of memory qubits while other qubits undergo logic operations or are used as photonic interfaces to other processing units. The entangling gate mechanism used here can also be applied to qubits stored in different atomic elements; this would allow both memory and logic gate errors caused by photon scattering to be reduced below the levels required for fault-tolerant quantum error correction, which is an essential prerequisite for general-purpose quantum computing. PMID:26672554

  1. Polarized Atomic Hydrogen Beam Tests in the Mark-II Ultra-Cold Jet Target.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Luppov, V. G.; Blinov, B. B.; Gladycheva, S. E.; Kageya, T.; Kantsyrev, D. Yu.; Krisch, A. D.; Murray, J. R.; Neumann, J. J.; Raymond, R. S.; Borisov, N. S.; Kleppner, D.; Davidenko, A. M.; Grishin, V. N.

    2000-04-01

    To study spin effects in high energy collisions, we are developing an ultra-cold high-density jet target of proton-spin-polarized hydrogen atoms (Mark-II). The target uses a 12 Tesla magnetic field and a 0.3 K separation cell coated with superfluid helium-4 to produce a slow monochromatic electron-spin-polarized atomic hydrogen beam; an rf transition unit then converts this into a proton-spin-polarized beam, which is focused by a superconducting sextupole into the interaction region. Recently, the Jet produced a measured electron-spin-polarized atomic hydrogen beam of about 10^15 H s-1 into a 0.3 cm^2 area at the detector. This intensity corresponds to the free jet density of about 10^11 H cm-3 with a proton polarization of about 50%. So far, the intensity is limited by the high insulation vacuum pressure due to the evaporation of the separation cell's helium film. The beam's angular and radial distributions were measured. A test of a new superfluid-^4He-coated parabolic mirror, attached to the separation cell, appeared to increase the beam intensity by a factor of about 3, as expected.

  2. Agreement between the government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of Republic of Estonia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 24 February 1992, signed in Vienna on 18 November 1997 and in Tallinn on 24 November 1997, and entered into force on 24 November 1997

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999 and signed in Vienna on 21 June 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Korea written notification that the Republic of Korea's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. [The Chinese nuclear test and 'atoms for peace' as a measure for preventing nuclear armament of Japan: the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the United States and the introduction of light water reactors into Japan, 1964-1968].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yamazaki, Masakatsu

    2014-07-01

    Japan and the United States signed in 1968 a new atomic energy agreement through which US light-water nuclear reactors, including those of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant of Tokyo Electric Power Company, were to be introduced into Japan. This paper studies the history of negotiations for the 1968 agreement using documents declassified in the 1990s in the US and Japan. After the success of the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, the United States became seriously concerned about nuclear armament of other countries in Asia including Japan. Expecting that Japan would not have its own nuclear weapons, the US offered to help the country to demonstrate its superiority in some fields of science including peaceful nuclear energy to counter the psychological effect of the Chinese nuclear armament. Driven by his own political agenda, the newly appointed Prime Minister Eisaku Sato responded to the US expectation favorably. When he met in January 1965 with President Johnson, Sato made it clear that Japan would not pursue nuclear weapons. Although the US continued its support after this visit, it nevertheless gave priority to the control of nuclear technology in Japan through the bilateral peaceful nuclear agreement. This paper argues that the 1968 agreement implicitly meant a strategic measure to prevent Japan from going nuclear and also a tactic to persuade Japan to join the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty. PMID:25296517

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of the Czech Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of the Czech Republic

  6. Application of inertial confinement fusion to weapon technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report reviews aspects of the military applications of the inertial confinement fusion (ICF) program at Sandia Laboratories. These applications exist in the areas of: (1) weapon physics research, and (2) weapon effects simulation. In the area of weapon physics research, ICF source technology can be used to study: (1) equations-of-state at high energy densities, (2) implosion dynamics, and (3) laboratory simulation of exoatmospheric burst phenomena. In the area of weapon effects simulation, ICF technology and facilities have direct near, intermediate, and far term applications. In the near term, short pulse x-ray simulation capabilities exist for electronic component effects testing. In the intermediate term, capabilities can be developed for high energy neutron exposures and bremsstrahlung x-ray exposures of components. In the far term, system level exposures of full reentry vehicles will be possible if sufficiently high pellet gains are achieved

  7. Reply to the comment on: "Does an atom interferometer test the gravitational redshift at the Compton frequency?"

    CERN Document Server

    Wolf, Peter; Bordé, Christian J; Reynaud, Serge; Salomon, Christophe; Cohen-Tannoudji, Claude

    2012-01-01

    Hohensee, Chu, Peters and M\\"uller have submitted a comment (arXiv:1112.6039 [gr-qc]) on our paper "Does an atom interferometer test the gravitational redshift at the Compton frequency?", Classical and Quantum Gravity 28, 145017 (2011), arXiv:1009.2485 [gr-qc]. Here we reply to this comment and show that the main result of our paper, namely that atom interferometric gravimeters do not test the gravitational redshift at the Compton frequency, remains valid.

  8. Hybrid quantum logic and a test of Bell's inequality using two different atomic species

    CERN Document Server

    Ballance, C J; Home, J P; Szwer, D J; Webster, S C; Allcock, D T C; Linke, N M; Harty, T P; Craik, D P L Aude; Stacey, D N; Steane, A M; Lucas, D M

    2015-01-01

    Entanglement is one of the most fundamental properties of quantum mechanics, and is the key resource for quantum information processing. Bipartite entangled states of identical particles have been generated and studied in several experiments, and post-selected entangled states involving pairs of photons, or single photons and single atoms, have also been produced. Here, we deterministically generate a "hybrid" entangled state of two different species of trapped-ion qubit, perform full tomography of the state produced, and make the first test of Bell's inequality with non-identical atoms. We use a laser-driven two-qubit quantum logic gate, whose mechanism is insensitive to the qubits' energy splittings, to produce a maximally-entangled state of one Ca40 qubit and one Ca43 qubit, held in the same ion trap, with 99.8(5)% fidelity. We make a test of Bell's inequality for this novel entangled state, and find that it is violated by 15 sigma. Mixed-species quantum logic is an essential technique for the construction...

  9. An ISOL test-bench at China Institute of Atomic Energy

    CERN Document Server

    CuiBaoQun; Li Li; Wang Rong; Bao Yi We

    2003-01-01

    An isotope separation on-line (ISOL) test-bench has been built at China Institute of Atomic Energy, an electron beam plasma type target/ion source selected as the ion source of the system. By bombarding selected targets with a proton beam from the HV-13 tandem, low intensity radioactive ion beam can be produced on-line. The first planned ion species is sup 6 sup 2 Zn sup + and it will be used as nuclear probe to investigate the character of solid material by perturbed angular correlation and positive electron annihilation methods. Off-line tests are being carried out. The character of the target ion source and copper target to be used is described in this paper. Finally, a brief introduction of the ISOL design for the Beijing radioactive nuclear beam facility will be given.

  10. An ISOL test-bench at China Institute of Atomic Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An isotope separation on-line (ISOL) test-bench has been built at China Institute of Atomic Energy, an electron beam plasma type target/ion source selected as the ion source of the system. By bombarding selected targets with a proton beam from the HV-13 tandem, low intensity radioactive ion beam can be produced on-line. The first planned ion species is 62Zn+ and it will be used as nuclear probe to investigate the character of solid material by perturbed angular correlation and positive electron annihilation methods. Off-line tests are being carried out. The character of the target ion source and copper target to be used is described in this paper. Finally, a brief introduction of the ISOL design for the Beijing radioactive nuclear beam facility will be given

  11. Testing General Relativity and Alternative Theories of Gravity with Space-based Atomic Clocks and Atom Interferometers

    CERN Document Server

    Bondarescu, Ruxandra; Jetzer, Philippe; Angélil, Raymond; Saha, Prasenjit; Lundgren, Andrew

    2015-01-01

    The successful miniaturisation of extremely accurate atomic clocks and atom interferometers invites prospects for satellite missions to perform precision experiments. We discuss the effects predicted by general relativity and alternative theories of gravity that can be detected by a clock, which orbits the Earth. Our experiment relies on the precise tracking of the spacecraft using its observed tick-rate. The spacecraft's reconstructed four-dimensional trajectory will reveal the nature of gravitational perturbations in Earth's gravitational field, potentially differentiating between different theories of gravity. This mission can measure multiple relativistic effects all during the course of a single experiment, and constrain the Parametrized Post-Newtonian Parameters around the Earth. A satellite carrying a clock of fractional timing inaccuracy of $\\Delta f/f \\sim 10^{-16}$ in an elliptic orbit around the Earth would constrain the PPN parameters $|\\beta -1|, |\\gamma-1| \\lesssim 10^{-6}$. We also briefly revi...

  12. Medical implications of enhanced radiation weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reeves, Glen I

    2010-12-01

    During the 1960s through 1980s the United States and several other nations developed, and even considered deploying, enhanced-radiation warheads (ERWs). The main effect of ERWs (sometimes called "neutron bombs"), as compared to other types of nuclear weapons, is to enhance radiation casualties while reducing blast and thermal damage to the infrastructure. Five nations were reported to have developed and tested ERWs during this period, but since the termination of the "Cold War" there have been no threats of development, deployment, or use of such weapons. However, if the technology of a quarter of a century ago has been developed, maintained, or even advanced since then, it is conceivable that the grim possibility of future ERW use exists. The type of destruction, initial triage of casualties, distribution of patterns of injury, and medical management of ERWs will be shown to significantly differ from that of fission weapons. Emergency response planners and medical personnel, civilian or military, must be aware of these differences to reduce the horrible consequences of ERW usage and appropriately treat casualties. PMID:21265303

  13. Testing general relativity and alternative theories of gravity with space-based atomic clocks and atom interferometers

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bondarescu Ruxandra

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available The successful miniaturisation of extremely accurate atomic clocks and atom interferometers invites prospects for satellite missions to perform precision experiments. We discuss the effects predicted by general relativity and alternative theories of gravity that can be detected by a clock, which orbits the Earth. Our experiment relies on the precise tracking of the spacecraft using its observed tick-rate. The spacecraft’s reconstructed four-dimensional trajectory will reveal the nature of gravitational perturbations in Earth’s gravitational field, potentially differentiating between different theories of gravity. This mission can measure multiple relativistic effects all during the course of a single experiment, and constrain the Parametrized Post-Newtonian Parameters around the Earth. A satellite carrying a clock of fractional timing inaccuracy of Δ f / f ∼ 10−16 in an elliptic orbit around the Earth would constrain the PPN parameters |β − 1|, |γ − 1| ≲ 10−6. We also briefly review potential constraints by atom interferometers on scalar tensor theories and in particular on Chameleon and dilaton models.

  14. Nuclear obligations: Nuremberg law, nuclear weapons, and protest

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Burroughs, J.R.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear weapons use and deployment and nonviolent anti-nuclear protests are evaluated. Use of nuclear weapons would constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in both the Nuremberg Charter and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and applied by the International Military Tribunal and other Nuremberg courts. Strategic and atomic bombing during World War 2 did not set a precedent for use of nuclear weapons. The consequentialist argument for World War 2 bombing fails and the bombing has also been repudiated by codification of the law of war in Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The legality of deploying nuclear weapons as instruments of geopolitical policy is questionable when measured against the Nuremberg proscription of planning and preparation of aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and the United Nations Charter's proscription of aggressive threat of force. While states' practice of deploying the weapons and the arms-control treaties that regulate but do not prohibit mere possession provide some support for legality, those treaties recognize the imperative of preventing nuclear war, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits nuclear-armed states to good-faith negotiation of nuclear disarmament.

  15. Nuclear obligations: Nuremberg law, nuclear weapons, and protest

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear weapons use and deployment and nonviolent anti-nuclear protests are evaluated. Use of nuclear weapons would constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in both the Nuremberg Charter and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and applied by the International Military Tribunal and other Nuremberg courts. Strategic and atomic bombing during World War 2 did not set a precedent for use of nuclear weapons. The consequentialist argument for World War 2 bombing fails and the bombing has also been repudiated by codification of the law of war in Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The legality of deploying nuclear weapons as instruments of geopolitical policy is questionable when measured against the Nuremberg proscription of planning and preparation of aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and the United Nations Charter's proscription of aggressive threat of force. While states' practice of deploying the weapons and the arms-control treaties that regulate but do not prohibit mere possession provide some support for legality, those treaties recognize the imperative of preventing nuclear war, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits nuclear-armed states to good-faith negotiation of nuclear disarmament

  16. Fundamental limitations to high-precision tests of the universality of free fall by dropping atoms

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nobili, Anna M.

    2016-02-01

    Tests of the universality of free fall and the weak equivalence principle probe the foundations of general relativity. Evidence of a violation may lead to the discovery of a new force. The best torsion balance experiments have ruled it out to 10-13. Cold-atom drop tests have reached 10-7 and promise to do 7 to 10 orders of magnitude better, on the ground or in space. They are limited by the random shot noise, which depends on the number N of atoms in the clouds (as 1 /√{N } ). As mass-dropping experiments in the nonuniform gravitational field of Earth, they are sensitive to the initial conditions. Random accelerations due to initial condition errors of the clouds are designed to be at the same level as shot noise, so that they can be reduced with the number of drops along with it. This sets the requirements for the initial position and velocity spreads of the clouds with given N . In the STE-QUEST space mission proposal aiming at 2 ×10-15 they must be about a factor 8 above the limit established by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and the integration time required to reduce both errors is 3 years, with a mission duration of 5 years. Instead, offset errors at release between position and velocity of different atom clouds are systematic and give rise to a systematic effect which mimics a violation. Such systematic offsets must be demonstrated to be as small as required in all drops, i.e., they must be kept small by design, and they must be measured. For STE-QUEST to meet its goal they must be several orders of magnitude smaller than the size—in position and velocity space—of each individual cloud, which in its turn must be at most 8 times larger than the uncertainty principle limit. Even if all technical problems are solved and different atom clouds are released with negligible systematic errors, still these errors must be measured; and Heisenberg's principle dictates that such measurement lasts as long as the experiment. While shot noise is random, hence

  17. Moruroa and us: Experiences of Polynesian people during the thirty years of nuclear weapons tests in the South Pacific (Ocean); Moruroa et nous. Experiences des polynesiens au cours des 30 annees d`essais nucleaires dans le pacifique sud

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vries, P. de; Seur, H

    1997-12-31

    This report is separated in nine chapters. In the chapters 2 and 3 we find the results of an inquiry got from 737 ancient workers of the sites. The chapter 4 studies the case of the Island of Mangareva in the Gambier archipelago, island situated at 500 km from Moruroa, the economical, sociological and cultural effects of nuclear weapons tests are analyzed. The chapter number 5 shows the different points of view got from institutions or government officials. In the chapter 6, the elements of public debate on the situation of the CEP ( Pacific study center) and the tests are analyzed in a chronological order on giving a particular importance to the way whom Polynesian people have been informed. The chapter 7 examines the evolution of the scientific debate related to the marine fauna poisoning, the radioactive contamination and the ciguatera. The chapter 8 is centered on the risks perception by the Polynesian society and on the different kinds of resistance at the CEP. In the last chapter, a certain number of conclusions and recommends are given. (N.C.)

  18. A year-by-year record of 236-U/238-U in coral as a step towards establishing 236-U from nuclear weapons testing fall-out as oceanic tracer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since uranium is known to behave conservatively in ocean waters, 236-U has great potential in application as oceanic tracer. 236-U (t1/2=23.4 Ma) was introduced into the oceans by atmospheric nuclear weapon testing with amount estimates ranging from 700 kg to 1500 kg. Thus a resulting initial average 236-U/238-U ratio of at least 5e-9 is expected for an oceanic mixed layer depth of 100 m. This ratio is already higher than the natural pre-nuclear background, which is expected to be at 10e-14 levels. Even the elevated ratios of global stratospheric fall-out are beyond the capabilities of ICPMS and TIMS methods. However, the exceptional sensitivity and ultra-low background for 236-U of the Vienna Environmental Research Accelerator's Accelerator Mass Spectrometry system allows us to measure down to 10-13 detection limits. We present a year-by-year record of 236-U/238-U for a Caribbean coral core covering years 1944 to 2006, thus allowing to us put constraints on the oceanic input of 236-U by atmospheric testing. Moreover modeling of the results also demonstrates the capabilities of 236-U as oceanic tracer.

  19. On the U.S.-Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons Cut as a Path toward a Nuclear-free World

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Shi; Jianbin

    2015-01-01

    Complete destruction of nuclear weapons and realization of a world free from nuclear weapons are the common aspiration of mankind in the atomic era.To achieve the goal,the international community has proposed a series of steps and measures,which include calling for a deep reduction of the U.S.and Russian nuclear arsenals,promoting ratification of the CTBT,initiating negotiation of the FMCT,reducing the role of nuclear weapons

  20. TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

    2013-07-16

    Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  1. Tracking surplus plutonium from weapons to disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this ''excess'' and ''surplus'' plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC and A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  2. The GT-MHR for destruction of weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The disposal of nearly 100 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium (WG-Pu) made surplus by the disarmament treaties is receiving urgent attention, highlighted by the recent seizure in Germany of small quantities of weapons-useful plutonium. Unlike highly enriched uranium, simple denaturing cannot make this plutonium worthless for use in future weapons. The use of physical security and institutional barriers, including long-term storage in high-level waste repositories, to provide secure storage for centuries to come is questionable when considering government instability and the possibility of national recidivism. The Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and General Atomics have signed an agreement for the cooperative design of a gas turbine-modular helium reactor (GT-MHR) to burn the WG-Pu stockpile. A formal proposal for a joint U.S./Russian program for the development of this reactor has been submitted by MINATOM to Vice President Gore. The major benefit of this program is that the reactor would deplete the Russian surplus plutonium stockpile, provide jobs for technical specialists in the former weapons complex, and produce valuable electric power. It would also provide a mutually assured means of destroying the U.S. and Russian stockpiles

  3. Analysis method on shoot precision of weapon in small-sample case

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Jiang Jun; Song Baowei; Liang Qingwei

    2007-01-01

    Because of limits of cost, in general, the test data of weapons are shortness. It is always an important topic that to gain scientific results of weapon performance analyses in small-sample case. Based on the analysis of distribution function characteristics and grey mathematics, a weighting grey method in small-sample case is presented. According to the analysis of test data of a weapon, it is proved that the method is a good method to deal with data in the small-sample case and has a high value in the analysis of weapon performance.

  4. Mobile and stationary laser weapon demonstrators of Rheinmetall Waffe Munition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ludewigt, K.; Riesbeck, Th.; Baumgärtel, Th.; Schmitz, J.; Graf, A.; Jung, M.

    2014-10-01

    For some years Rheinmetall Waffe Munition has successfully developed, realised and tested a variety of versatile high energy laser (HEL) weapon systems for air- and ground-defence scenarios like C-RAM, UXO clearing. By employing beam superimposition technology and a modular laser weapon concept, the total optical power has been successively increased. Stationary weapon platforms and now military mobile vehicles were equipped with high energy laser effectors. Our contribution summarises the most recent development stages of Rheinmetalls high energy laser weapon program. We present three different vehicle based HEL demonstrators: the 5 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Track V integrated in an M113 tank, the 20 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Wheel XX integrated in a multirole armoured vehicle GTK Boxer 8x8 and the 50 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Container L integrated in a reinforced container carried by an 8x8 truck. As a highlight, a stationary 30 kW Laser Weapon Demonstrator shows the capability to defeat saturated attacks of RAM targets and unmanned aerial vehicles. 2013 all HEL demonstrators were tested in a firing campaign at the Rheinmetall testing centre in Switzerland. Major results of these tests are presented.

  5. Test of the Pauli exclusion principle for nucleons and atomic electrons by accelerator mass spectrometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Pauli exclusion principle was tested by searching with accelerator mass spectrometry for non-Paulian atoms with three electrons in the K-shell and for non-Paulian nuclei with three protons or three neutrons in the nuclear 1 s1/2 shell. For non-Paulian atoms of 20Ne and 36Ar the following limits have been obtained: N(20Ne)/N(20Ne)-21 and N(36Ar)/N(36Ar)-17. For non-Paulian nuclei of 5Li and 5He with three protons or three neutrons, respectively, in the nuclear 1 s1/2 shell the following limits have been measured: N(5Li)/N(6Li)-17 for a range of proton separation energies of 5Li between 0 and 50 MeV and N(5He)/N(4He)-15 for neutron separation energies between 0 and 32 MeV. The result for 5Li is used to deduce a limit for the probability β2/2 of finding two colliding protons in the symmetric state with respect to exchange to be β2/2-32. (orig.)

  6. Lifetime Measurements of $ \\pi ^+ \\pi ^- $ and $\\pi^{+-} K^{-+}$ Atoms to Test Low-Energy QCD Predictions

    CERN Multimedia

    Ponta, T C; Dumitriu, D E; Afanasyev, L; Zhabitskiy, M; Rykalin, V; Hons, Z; Schacher, J; Yazkov, V; Gerndt, J; Detraz, C C; Guaraldo, C; Dreossi, D; Smolik, J; Gorchakov, O; Nikitin, M; Dudarev, A; Kluson, J; Hansroul, M; Okada, K; Constantinescu, S; Kruglov, V; Komarov, V; Takeutchi, F; Tarta, P D; Kuptsov, A; Nemenov, L; Karpukhin, V; Shliapnikov, P; Brekhovskikh, V; Saborido silva, J J; Drijard, D; Rappazzo, G F; Pentia, M C; Gugiu, M M; Kruglova, L; Pustylnik, Z; Trojek, T; Vrba, T; Iliescu, M A; Duma, M; Ciocarlan, C; Kulikov, A; Ol'shevskiy, V; Ryazantsev, A; Chiba, M; Anania, A; Tarasov, A; Gritsay, K; Lapchine, V; Cechak, T; Lopez aguera, A

    2002-01-01

    %PS212 \\\\ \\\\ The proposed experiment aims to measure the lifetime of $ \\pi ^+ \\pi ^- $ atoms in the ground state with 10\\% precision, using the 24~GeV/c proton beam of the CERN Proton Synchrotron. As the value of the above lifetime of order 10$ ^- ^{1} ^{5} $s is dictated by a strong interaction at low energy, the precise measurement of this quantity enables to determine a combination of S-wave pion scattering lengths to 5\\%. Pion scattering lengths have been calculated in the framework of chiral perturbation theory and values predicted at the same level of accuracy have, up to now, never been confronted with accurate experimental data. Such a measurement would submit the understanding of chiral symmetry breaking of QCD to a crucial test.

  7. The radiological situation at the atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa. Technical report. V. 4. Releases to the biosphere of radionuclides from underground nuclear weapon tests at the atolls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is Volume 4 in the series of 6 volumes of the Technical Report on the radiological situation at the atolls of Mururoa and the Fangataufa. It is the second of the three volumes dealing with the evaluation of the long term radiological situation as a consequence of radionuclide migration from underground sources, which is the responsibility of Task Group B. This volume is based on the activities of Working Group 4 and uses, as its primary input on radionuclide inventories the report of Working Group 3, which is Vol. 3 in this series of Technical Report. Nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under open ocean was prohibited by the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 5 August 1963 and signed by UK, USA and USSR. France ceased atmospheric testing in September 1974. Isolation from the biosphere in geological formations, or containment in geological formations, became the preferred alternative. The explosion of 137 underground nuclear devices in Mururoa and Fangataufa over the testing period 1975-1996, together with 10 safety trials and the burial of radioactively contaminated material gathered from the atoll surfaces, has resulted in a substantial accumulation of radionuclides in the rock beneath the two atolls. Assessment of the rate at which these radionuclides move from the cavities to the environment accessible to humans, or biosphere and the total radionuclide release to the biosphere over time is the central effort of this Study. The rock mass within which the radionuclides are initially deposited, and which serves to contain or delay release of the radionuclides, will be referred to as the geosphere to distinguish it from the biosphere, where the radionuclides would be accessible either directly or through the food chain to the living environment. This assessment of geosphere transport has been divided into the following four interrelated tasks: (a) Geological Pathways; (b) Hydrological Modelling; (c) Solution Source Term; and (d) Geosphere

  8. You've asked us about nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Judging from its name alone, the Atomic Energy Control Board would seem a logical place to get information on nuclear weapons. If we are involved in the control of atomic energy, we must know something about its military uses. In actual fact, however, our regulatory activities are restricted to the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and our safeguards - an international audit system to discourage the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment from peaceful applications to the production of explosive devices. Not being the best source of information on the subject of weapons, we have prepared this fact sheet to assist your research. Simply look for the topic heading that interests you, to find out where to go for more information. The publications listed under the various headings are available to the public free of charge, upon request. A bibliography of books and periodicals is also attached for your reference

  9. Nuclear weapons proliferation problem: can we lead without leadership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The immediate problem facing us with respect to proliferation and nuclear power involves reprocessing and the availability of plutonium from reprocessing plants. One solution supported by the Atomic Industrial Forum is that reprocessing centers be restricted to locations in those industrial nations already having weapons capability and that the energy of the reprocessed plutonium be returned to the user nation in the form of low enriched uranium. Thus, the plutonium would remain where it would not add to problems of proliferation

  10. Evaluation of the Long-Term Performance of Titanate Ceramics for Immobilization of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Results from Pressurized Unsaturated Flow and Single Pass Flow-Through Testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report summarizes our findings from pressurized unsaturated flow (PUF) and single-pass flow-through (SPFT) experiments to date. Results from the PUF test of a Pu-bearing ceramic with enclosing surrogate high-level waste glass show that the glass reacts rapidly to alteration products. Glass reaction causes variations in the solution pH in contact with the ceramic materials. We also document variable concentrations of Pu in solution, primarily in colloidal form, which appear to be related to secular variations in solution composition. The apparent dissolution rate of the ceramic waste form, based on Ba concentrations in the effluent, is estimated at le 10-5 g/(m2 · d). Pu-bearing colloids were recovered in the size range of 0.2 to 2 microm, but it is not clear that such entities would be transported in a system that is not advective-flow dominated. Results from SPFT experiments give information on the corrosion resistance of two surrogate Pu-ceramics (Ce-pyrochlore and Ce-zirconolite) at 90 C over a pH range of 2 to 12. The two ceramics were doped with minor quantities (approximately0.1 mass%) of MoO3, so that concentrations of Mo in the effluent solution could be used to monitor the reaction behavior of the materials. The data obtained thus far from experiments with durations up to 150 d do not conclusively prove that the solid-aqueous solution systems have reached steady-state conditions. Therefore, the dissolution mechanism cannot be determined. Apparent dissolution rates of the two ceramic materials based on Ce, Gd, and Mo concentrations in the effluent solutions from the SPFT are nearly identical and vary between 1.1 to 8.5 x 10-4 g/(m2 · d). In addition, the data reveal a slightly amphoteric dissolution behavior, with a minimum apparent rate at pH = 7 to 8, over the pH range examined. Results from two related ceramic samples suggest that radiation damage can have a measurable effect on the dissolution of titanium-based ceramics. The rare earth

  11. Weapons engineering tritium facility overview

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Najera, Larry [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-20

    Materials provide an overview of the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) as introductory material for January 2011 visit to SRS. Purpose of the visit is to discuss Safety Basis, Conduct of Engineering, and Conduct of Operations. WETF general description and general GTS program capabilities are presented in an unclassified format.

  12. UFOs and nukes. Extraordinary encounters at nuclear weapons sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Everyone knows about the reported recovery of a crashed alien spaceship near Roswell, New Mexico in July 1947. However, most people are unaware that, at the time of the incident, Roswell Army Airfield was home to the world's only atomic bomber squadron, the 509th Bomb Group. Was this merely a coincidence? During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built thousands of the far more destructive hydrogen bombs, some of them a thousand times as destructive as the first atomic bombs dropped on Japan. If the nuclear standoff between the superpowers had erupted into World War III, human civilization - and perhaps the very survival of our species - would have been at risk. Did this ominous state of affairs come to the attention of outside observers? Was there a connection between the atomic bomber squadron based at Roswell and the reported crash of a UFO nearby? Did those who pilot the UFOs monitor the superpowers' nuclear arms race during the dangerous Cold War era? Do they scrutinize American and Russian weapons sites even now? UFOs and Nukes provides the startling and sometimes shocking answers to these questions. Veteran researcher Robert Hastings has investigated nuclear weapons-related UFO incidents for more than three decades and has interviewed more than 120 ex-US Air Force personnel, from former Airmen to retired Colonels, who witnessed extraordinary UFO encounters at nuclear weapons sites. Their amazing stories are presented here.

  13. Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Agreement by exchange of letters of 6 November 1995 and 25 June 1996 with the Republic of Chile in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the Agreement by exchange of letters with the Republic of Chile on Safeguards Agreement of 5 April 1995 concluded between Chile and the IAEA, in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty). The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 1996. The texts of letters of 6 November 1995 and 25 June 1996 are also included

  14. Direct-energy weapons : invisible and invincible?

    OpenAIRE

    Deveci, Bayram Mert

    2007-01-01

    A military weapon is any tool used to increase the reach or power of a nation. Simply, it can be said that each era witnesses the deployment of new and powerful mass destruction weaponry. What will this century's most powerful weapon be? Directed-energy weapons, which offer advantages over conventional weapons by providing attack at the speed of light, precise targeting, rapid engagement of multiple targets, adjustable damage capacity, low operational cost, reduced logistic support, a nea...

  15. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1994-03-01

    The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, seeks to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) that will extend from the US-Mexican border to Antarctica`s territorial boundaries, including large areas of open ocean. Under the treaty, signatory states pledge not to test, use, produce, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons; to use nuclear materials and facilities {open_quotes}exclusively for peaceful purposes;{close_quotes} and not to permit the stationing or development of nuclear weapons on their territories.

  16. The role of nuclear weapon ban in the peace keeping laws of the United Nations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The thesis includes a comparison of bilateral and multilateral nuclear weapon banning contracts and treaties (nuclear test ban treaty, nuclear weapon-free zones, nuclear disarmament etc.) and voluntary nuclear weapon abandonment declarations in view of legal aspects, their verification, ratification, included exceptions, and potential penalties. In the second part an eventual stabilization of the nuclear weapon ban and the non-proliferation treaty as customary international law and ''ius congens'' is discussed. The third part is concerned with possible measures and sanctions in connections with these laws. The fourth part discusses military measures for justifiable enforcement of the non-proliferation treaty and their legitimization.

  17. 32 CFR 1903.10 - Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... or causing to be present a weapon on an Agency installation, or attempting to do so is prohibited. (b) Knowingly possessing or causing to be present a weapon on an Agency installation, incident to hunting or..., or from his or her designee to possess, carry, transport, or use a weapon in support of the...

  18. Precision spectroscopy of exotic atoms as a tool to test chiral dynamics in nuclei

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Exotic atoms, or meson-nucleus bound states in more general, are excellent tools for studying chiral dynamics in nuclei, since both the nuclear density and the meson wavefunction are precisely known in these systems. We here discuss pionic hydrogen, deeply-bound pionic atoms, kaonic hydrogen and kaonic helium atoms, with emphasis on experimental details which affect the accuracy of quantitative determination of chiral dynamics in nuclei. (author)

  19. Abdus Salam: A Reappraisal. Part II Salam's Part in the Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Programme

    CERN Document Server

    Dombey, Norman

    2011-01-01

    Salam's biographies claim that he was opposed to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. This is somewhat strange given that he was the senior Science Advisor to the Pakistan government for at least some of the period between 1972 when the programme was initiated and 1998 when a successful nuclear weapon test was carried out. I look at the evidence for his participation in the programme.

  20. Fire control apparatus for a laser weapon

    Science.gov (United States)

    Worsham, R. H.

    1985-10-01

    This patent application discloses a laser weapon fire control computer apparatus for responding in real time to the escort/threat scenario that confronts the weapon. The fire control computer apparatus compares the threat data with stored predicted scenarios to develop a firing strategy menu which takes into account the fact that the laser energy is instantaneously propagated to the target but requires a substantial amount of time to inflict damage. The fire control computer apparatus utilizes the weapon's status, dwell time, slow time and fuel limits to yield a weapon pointing sequence and weapon on-off times.

  1. Testing EUV/X-ray Atomic Data for the Solar Dynamics Observatory

    CERN Document Server

    Testa, Paola; Landi, Enrico

    2011-01-01

    The Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA) and the Exteme-ultraviolet Variability Experiment (EVE) onboard the Solar Dynamics Observatory include spectral windows in the X-ray/EUV band. Accuracy and completeness of the atomic data in this wavelength range is essential for interpretation of the spectrum and irradiance of the solar corona, and of SDO observations made with the AIA and EVE instruments. Here we test the X-ray/EUV data in the CHIANTI database to assess their completeness and accuracy in the SDO bands, with particular focus on the 94A and 131A AIA passbands. Given the paucity of solar observations adequate for this purpose, we use high-resolution X-ray spectra of the low-activity solar-like corona of Procyon obtained with the Chandra Low Energy Transmission Grating Spectrometer (LETGS). We find that while spectral models overall can reproduce quite well the observed spectra in the soft X-ray range ll 130A, they significantly underestimate the observed flux in the 50-130A wavelength range. The model und...

  2. Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper examines international treaties in relation to the threat or use of nuclear weapons including the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It can be concluded that the effect of the aforesaid international treaties is still in doubt without explicit enforcement mechanisms and penalty for non-compliance. This paper also reviews the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and comments that a clear explanation on the legality of use of nuclear weapons in 'extreme circumstances of self-defence' is required. Examples from current state practice in relation to nuclear non-proliferation efforts are also provided, with special attention to China, North Korea and Iran. This paper suggests that China as a leader of developing countries should extend its efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and conduct communication between North Korea and Iran and other nuclear weapons states to reduce or prohibit nuclear weapons.

  3. Can Iraq be deterred from using weapons of mass destruction?

    OpenAIRE

    Klemick, Michael T

    1997-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited It generally is assumed that the threat of a U.S. nuclear strike deterred the intentional use of chemical and biological weapons by Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Evidence suggests that this assumption might be faulty, or at least incomplete. The purpose of this thesis is to test the common wisdom about nuclear deterrence and Iraq's non-use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) during the Gulf War. This thesis examines the u...

  4. Proliferation of massive destruction weapons: fantasy or reality?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This article evaluates the threat of massive destruction weapons (nuclear, chemical, biological) for Europe and recalls the existing safeguards against the different forms of nuclear proliferation: legal (non-proliferation treaty (NPT), comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), fissile material cut off treaty (FMCT) etc..), technical (fabrication of fissile materials, delays). However, all these safeguards can be overcome as proven by the activities of some countries. The situation of proliferation for the other type of massive destruction weapons is presented too. (J.S.)

  5. Radiological Weapons: How Great Is The Danger?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moore, G M

    2003-06-01

    One of the underlying purposes of this paper is to provoke thinking about the interplay between the regulation of radioactive materials and the risk of their use in an radiological weapon (RW). Also considered in this paper are the types of RWs that a terrorist might use, the nature of the threat and danger posed by the various types of RWs, the essential elements that must be considered in responding to the terrorist use of an RW, and what steps may need to be taken a priori to minimize the consequences of the inevitable use of an RW. Because radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) have been the focus of so much recent concern and because RDDs are arguably the most likely of RWs to be used by a terrorist group, a major focus of this paper will be on RDDs. Radiological weapons are going to be used by some individual or group, if not this year then next year, or at some time in the foreseeable future. A policy of focusing resources solely on prevention of their use would leave any government open to significant economic disruption when the inevitable use occurs. Preplanning can limit the injuries, property damage, and economic losses that might result from the use of an RW. Moreover, a combination of efforts to prevent and to minimize the impact of RWs may significantly discourage potential users. The dangers from RWs can be dealt with while society continues to enjoy the benefits of nuclear technology that were promised under Atoms for Peace. However, some restructuring of our use of radioactive materials is necessary to ensure that the current and future uses of radioactive materials outweigh the potential disruption caused by misuse of the materials in RWs.

  6. Nuclear weapon states: Their roles, responsibilities and management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Four issues concerning the role of nuclear-weapon sates are briefly analyzed. The first is related to the importance of responsibilities that nuclear weapon states should take in order to improve the existing mechanisms for non-proliferation. Nuclear weapon states should cease further nuclear armament immediately and should unanimously agree to implement a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is both legal and moral obligation stipulated in the Non-proliferation Treaty. Second, an international plutonium management system needs to be established. The third issue is related to the need for IAEA special inspections (problem of North Korea). Difficulties could be overcome by strengthening the IAEA negotiation powers. Fourth, the IAEA and the international community could indicate their appreciation to states like South Korea that voluntarily abandon nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment in order to contribute to regional and global peace and stability

  7. Asynchronous data-driven classification of weapon systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This communication addresses real-time weapon classification by analysis of asynchronous acoustic data, collected from microphones on a sensor network. The weapon classification algorithm consists of two parts: (i) feature extraction from time-series data using symbolic dynamic filtering (SDF), and (ii) pattern classification based on the extracted features using the language measure (LM) and support vector machine (SVM). The proposed algorithm has been tested on field data, generated by firing of two types of rifles. The results of analysis demonstrate high accuracy and fast execution of the pattern classification algorithm with low memory requirements. Potential applications include simultaneous shooter localization and weapon classification with soldier-wearable networked sensors. (rapid communication)

  8. Microscratch testing method for systematic evaluation of the adhesion of atomic layer deposited thin films on silicon

    OpenAIRE

    Kilpi, Lauri; Ylivaara, Oili M. E.; Vaajoki, Antti; Malm, Jari; Sintonen, Sakari; Tuominen, Marko; Puurunen, Riikka L.; Ronkainen, Helena

    2016-01-01

    The scratch test method is widely used for adhesion evaluation of thin films and coatings. Usual critical load criteria designed for scratch testing of coatings were not applicable to thin atomic layer deposition (ALD) films on silicon wafers. Thus, the bases for critical load evaluation were established and the critical loads suitable for ALD coating adhesion evaluation on silicon wafers were determined in this paper as LCSi1, LCSi2, LCALD1, and LCALD2, representing the failure p...

  9. Use and Storage of Test and Operations Data from the High Temperature Test Reactor Acquired by the US Government from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hans Gougar

    2010-02-01

    This document describes the use and storage of data from the High Temperature Test Reactor (HTTR) acquired from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) by the U.S. Government for high temperature reactor research under the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) Project.

  10. The future of nuclear weapons: Proliferation in South Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kamal, N. [Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabada (Pakistan)

    1992-12-31

    The signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987, followed by the dramatic changes in East-West relations since 1989 and the more recent Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreement, have greatly eased public concerns about the danger of nuclear war. The context has also changed for the Nonaligned Movement, which had made nuclear disarmament and condemnation of the concept of nuclear deterrence the primary themes of its multilateral disarmament diplomacy. More important would be the interrelationship among the states possessing nuclear weapons (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). In any case, there is little risk of a revival of nuclear competition. Both France and China have decided to sign the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); they are the only two nuclear-weapon states that have stayed outside the regime. Meanwhile, Brazil and Argentina have moved further down the nonproliferation road by engaging in confidence-building measures and moving closer to joining the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free zone established under the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967. South Africa has also agreed to embrace the NPT as well as a nuclear-weapons-free zone regime for the entire African continent, while North Korea has agreed to sign a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thereby allowing in principle international inspection of its nuclear facilities. In the third world regions, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and competitive nuclear buildup are most pronounced in South Asia, a region where a variety of complicating problems exist: acute threat perceptions, historical emity, religious and sectarian animosity, ethnic antagonism, territorial disputes, ambitions for regional dominance, and domestic political instability. This chapter will focus primarily on South Asia, although references will also be made to other regions, where relevant. 17 refs.

  11. Testing EUV/X-Ray Atomic Data for the Solar Dynamics Observatory

    Science.gov (United States)

    Testa, Paola; Drake, Jeremy J.; Landi, Enrico

    2012-02-01

    The Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA) and the Extreme-ultraviolet Variability Experiment (EVE) on board the Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) include spectral windows in the X-ray/EUV band. Accuracy and completeness of the atomic data in this wavelength range is essential for interpretation of the spectrum and irradiance of the solar corona, and of SDO observations made with the AIA and EVE instruments. Here, we test the X-ray/EUV data in the CHIANTI database to assess their completeness and accuracy in the SDO bands, with particular focus on the 94 Å and 131 Å AIA passbands. Given the paucity of solar observations adequate for this purpose, we use high-resolution X-ray spectra of the low-activity solar-like corona of Procyon obtained with the Chandra Low Energy Transmission Grating Spectrometer (LETGS). We find that while spectral models overall can reproduce quite well the observed spectra in the soft X-ray range λ ~ 130 Å, they significantly underestimate the observed flux in the 50-130 Å wavelength range. The model underestimates the observed flux by a variable factor ranging from ≈1.5, at short wavelengths below ~50 Å, up to ≈5-7 in the ~70-125 Å range. In the AIA bands covered by LETGS, i.e., 94 Å and 131 Å, we find that the observed flux can be underestimated by large factors (~3 and ~1.9, respectively, for the case of Procyon presented here). We discuss the consequences for analysis of AIA data and possible empirical corrections to the AIA responses to model more realistically the coronal emission in these passbands.

  12. Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. An agreement by exchange of letters of 5 February and 5 April 2001 with the Republic of Colombia in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. This Exchange of Letters constitutes an agreement confirming that: - the Safeguards Agreement of 22 December 1982, concluded between the Republic of Colombia and the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty), also satisfies the obligation of Colombia under Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA; the safeguards set forth in the Safeguards Agreement shall also apply, as regards Colombia, in connection with the NPT; the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply as long as Colombia is party to the NPT or the Tlatelolco Treaty or both

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Estonia and the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Article 17.a. of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Additional Protocol shall come into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the Community and the Signatory States written notification that their respective requirements for entry into force have been met. Article 23(a) of INFCIRC/193 provides the means for non-signatory States of the Additional Protocol to express their consent to be bound by the Additional Protocol

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998

  15. Testing the universality of free fall with rubidium and ytterbium in a very large baseline atom interferometer

    CERN Document Server

    Hartwig, Jonas; Schubert, Christian; Schlippert, Dennis; Ahlers, Holger; Posso-Trujillo, Katerine; Gaaloul, Naceur; Ertmer, Wolfgang; Rasel, Ernst M

    2015-01-01

    We propose a very long baseline atom interferometer test of Einstein's equivalence principle (EEP) with ytterbium and rubidium extending over 10m of free fall. In view of existing parametrizations of EEP violations, this choice of test masses significantly broadens the scope of atom interferometric EEP tests with respect to other performed or proposed tests by comparing two elements with high atomic numbers. In a first step, our experimental scheme will allow reaching an accuracy in the E\\"otv\\"os ratio of $7\\times 10^{-13}$. This achievement will constrain violation scenarios beyond our present knowledge and will represent an important milestone for exploring a variety of schemes for further improvements of the tests as outlined in the paper. We will discuss the technical realisation in the new infrastructure of the Hanover Institute of Technology (HITec) and give a short overview of the requirements to reach this accuracy. The experiment will demonstrate a variety of techniques which will be employed in fut...

  16. Epicenter of the Nagasaki weapon: a reanalysis of available data with recommended values

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A significant source of uncertainty in estimates of radiation dose for atomic-bomb survivors of Nagasaki and in correlations of radiation dose with medical effects observed in these survivors is due to unresolved discrepancies in the literature with respect to the location of the epicenter or burst point of the weapon. Available data on the epicenter of the weapon have been reanalyzed in this report using several different approaches. These appear to have resolved some of the major discrepancies found in the literature and to justify a recalculation of radiation doses for the atomic bomb survivors of Nagasaki. A recommended epicenter for recalculating the radiation doses is given in the report

  17. Canadians, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War security dilemma

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This dissertation provides a history of Canadian ideas about nuclear weapons from the late 1950s until the end of the Trudeau era in 1984. Throughout this period, Canadians reacted to the insecurity they felt in the world around them by expressing many conflicting, often irreconcilable views about a range of nuclear weapon issues, including Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads in 1963, the U.S. ABM program in the 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Canadian nuclear technology in the development of India's first nuclear explosion, and the Trudeau government's decision to allow the U.S. military to test cruise missiles in northern Canada The dissertation concludes with an examination of the emergence of a broadly-based, increasingly mainstream and influential anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s, the clearest manifestation of the insecurity Canadians experienced at the time. .The nuclear debates examined in this dissertation reveal that Canadians were divided over nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the arms race, proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, they came to fundamentally different conclusions about how Canada's nuclear weapon policies, and its support for the nuclear policies of its alliances, would contribute to international stability and order. Some believed that their security rested on the maintenance of a strong Western nuclear deterrent and supported Canada contributing to its credibility; others believed that the constant modernisation of nuclear arsenals fuelled by the superpower arms race posed a serious threat to their security. This conceptual dilemma-the security through nuclear strength argument versus the fear that the quest for security through quantitative and qualitative improvements of nuclear stockpiles increased the likelihood of nuclear war-left Canadians divided over the value and utility of nuclear weapons and the strategies developed around them. At the same time, Canadians' ideas about nuclear weapons

  18. Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Vladimír Pitschmann

    2014-01-01

    This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical we...

  19. The radiation effects of nuclear weapons explosions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The energy resulting from nuclear weapons explosions consists of thermal energy (heat radiation), shock waves, initial radiation (nuclear ray flash, gamma and neutron flash), and nuclear radiation of the fission products (fallout). The contribution of the different energy components depends on the energy amounts produced by fission or fusion reactions (A-weapon, H-weapon), on the components used for conversion to helium-4 (deuterium, tritium, lithium), the weapon design (radiation absorption and induced activity in auxiliaries), and on the type of employment (atmospheric, ground, or underground explosion). The damaging effects vary accordingly, consisting of thermal damage, blast effects, and radiation injuries. The effects are explained and compared. (orig.)

  20. Nuclear weapons non proliferation treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taking into account the devastation that a nuclear war would inflict upon mankind, and the resulting need to do all that is in our power to keep such a tragedy from occuring, as well as to implement measures to safeguard all the peoples' safety, each State that owns nuclear weapons and that is a part of the Treaty pledges not to trade nuclear weapons, other explosive devices nor the control over such instruments to any other entity whatsoever, wether directly or indirectly. Likewise, all States that does not posses any nuclear weaponry and that are part of the Treaty, in turn pledge not to receive from any other entity nuclear weaponry or other explosive devices in trade, wether directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire this fashion of weaponry and not to request or accept any help whatsoever in the manufacturing of nuclear weaponry or related devices. The present Treaty remains open to the subscription of other countries, on July 26, 1968, with Mexico as one of the signatory countries

  1. Research on Cloud Model and Swrl-based in Weapon Test Fault Prediction%基于云模型和SWRL预测兵器试验故障的研究

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    都业宏; 连素杰; 赵学刚

    2012-01-01

    将云模型理论和语言方式规则语言(Semantic Web Rule Language,SWRL)应用于预测兵器试验故障的研究,用MATLAB实现了正向云和逆向云发生器,用protégé建立了兵器试验故障本体并确立了SWRL规则.举例将云模型预测的数据输入兵器试验故障本体用SWRL规则进行了推理,以保证预测结果的正确性与一致性.%Cloud model theories and SWRL are applied in the research of fault prediction of the weapon experiments , and normal cloud generator and backward cloud generator are developed by MATLAB, and the weapon experiments fault ontology and SWRL rules are built with the prot6g6. An example is given that the data of cloud model predicting is inputted into the weapon experiments fault ontology to distinguish with SWRL rules to assure the accuracy and consistency of prediction result.

  2. Proportionality, just war theory and weapons innovation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Forge, John

    2009-03-01

    Just wars are supposed to be proportional responses to aggression: the costs of war must not greatly exceed the benefits. This proportionality principle raises a corresponding 'interpretation problem': what are the costs and benefits of war, how are they to be determined, and a 'measurement problem': how are costs and benefits to be balanced? And it raises a problem about scope: how far into the future do the states of affairs to be measured stretch? It is argued here that weapons innovation always introduces costs, and that these costs cannot be determined in advance of going to war. Three examples, the atomic bomb, the AK-47 and the ancient Greek catapult, are given as examples. It is therefore argued that the proportionality principle is inapplicable prospectively. Some replies to the argument are discussed and rejected. Some more general defences of the proportionality principle are considered and also rejected. Finally, the significance of the argument for Just War Theory as a whole is discussed. PMID:18802788

  3. Attempts to test an alternative electrodynamic theory of superconductors by low-temperature scanning tunneling and atomic force microscopy

    OpenAIRE

    Peronio, Angelo; Giessibl, Franz J

    2016-01-01

    We perform an experiment to test between two theories of the electrodynamics of superconductors: the standard London theory and an alternative proposed by J. E. Hirsch. The two alternatives give different predictions with respect to the screening of an electric field by a superconductor, and we try to detect this effect using atomic force microscopy on a niobium sample. We also perform the reverse experiment, where we demonstrate that a superconductive tip mounted on a qPlus force sensor with...

  4. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ..., the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net. (iii) Using a weapon, trap or net. (2) Weapons, traps or nets may be carried, possessed or used... possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle, vessel or other mode of transportation is prohibited,...

  5. Weapons barrel life cycle determination

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Nebojša Pene Hristov

    2013-10-01

    Full Text Available This article describes the dynamic processes within the gun barrel during the firing process in exploitation. It generally defines the basic principles of constructing tube elements, and shows the distortion of the basic geometry of the tube interior due to wear as well as the impact it causes during exploitation. The article also defines basic empirical models as well as a model based on fracture mechanics for the calculation of a use-life of the barrel, and other elements essential for the safe use of the barrel as the basic weapon element. Erosion causes are analysed in order to control and reduce wear and prolong the lifetime of the gun barrel. It gives directions for the reparation of barrels with wasted resources. In conclusion, the most influential elements of tube wear are given as well as possible modifications of existing systems, primarily propellant charges, with a purpose of prolonging lifetime of gun barrels. The guidelines for a proper determination of the lifetime based on the barrel condition assessment are given as well. INTRODUCTION The barrel as the basic element of each weapon is described as well as the processes occurring during the firing that have impulsive character and are accompanied by large amounts of energy. The basic elements of barrel and itheir constructive characteristics are descibed. The relation between Internal ballistics, ie calculation of the propellant gas pressure in the firing process, and structural elements defined by the barrel material resistance is shown. In general, this part of the study explains the methodology of the gun barrel structural elements calculation, ie. barrel geometry, taking into account the degrees of safety in accordance with Military Standards.   TUBE WEAR AND DEFORMATIONS The weapon barrel gradually wears out during exploitation due to which it no longer satisfies the set requirements. It is considered that the barrel has experienced a lifetime when it fails to fulfill the

  6. External Radiation in Dolon Village Due to Local Fallout from the First USSR Atomic Bomb Test in 1949

    OpenAIRE

    Imanaka, Tetsuji; FUKUTANI, Satoshi; Yamamoto, Masayoshi; Sakaguchi, Aya; Hoshi, Masaharu

    2006-01-01

    Dolon village, located about 60 km from the border of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, is known to be heavily contaminated by local fallout from the first USSR atomic bomb test in 1949. External radiation in Dolon was evaluated based on recent 137Cs data in soil and calculation of temporal change in the fission product composition. After fitting a log-normal distribution to the soil data, a 137Cs deposition of 32 kBq m-2, which corresponds to the 90th-percentile of the distribution, was t...

  7. Fringe-locking method for the weak equivalence principle test by simultaneous dual-species atom interferometers

    CERN Document Server

    Duan, Xiao-Chun; Mao, De-Kai; Zhou, Min-Kang; Shao, Cheng-Gang; Hu, Zhong-Kun

    2016-01-01

    We theoretically investigate the application of the fringe-locking method (FLM) in the dual-species quantum test of the weak equivalence principle (WEP). With the FLM, the measurement is performed invariably at the midfringe, and the extraction of the phase shift for atom interferometers is linearized. For the simultaneous interferometers, this linearization enables a good common-mode rejection of vibration noise, which is usually the main limit for high precision WEP tests of dual-species kind. We note that this method also allows for an unbiased determination of the gravity accelerations difference, which meanwhile is readily to be implemented.

  8. Less-lethal munitions as extended-range impact weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hubbs, Ken

    1997-01-01

    With the proliferation of 'suicide by cop' incidents, the concept of less lethal (LL) impact munitions has definitely caught on. There is much to be said for sterile laboratory testing and wound ballistic studies, but having 'real world' operational data is invaluable. Two years ago, a data base was set up to collect this information. The data base continues to grow with incidents from a cross the country and others pursued internationally. Indications are that LL munitions deliver a similar amount of force as conventional police impact weapons i.e., police batons, PR-24's, nunchakus, etc. One advantage over conventional impact weapons, is that LL munitions can be used at much greater distances from a suspect or crown of rioters. This gave rise to the term: extended range impact weapons. Having the ability to examine numerous cases in which these LL munitions have been successfully used for the resolution of critical incidents, is beneficial in evaluating the application and defending the usage of these force options. This paper examines 187 less lethal shootings and discusses such things as: the distance the munitions were fired, the types of injuries sustained by the targeted suspect, the body area of impact, what, if any weapons the suspect was armed with, and the type of incident requiring police response.

  9. Nuclear electric power and the proliferation of nuclear weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Control and elimination of the strategic nuclear weapons held by the nuclear weapon states remains the central problem in the arms control and disarmament field. Whether the proliferation of nations with nuclear weapons can be stopped is dubious. A sovereign nation will launch a nuclear weapons program if it has the motivation and resource. Motivation depends on military and political considerations. The necessary resources are economic and technological. Conditions in some sovereign states explain this issue. A survey of commercial nuclear power programs outside the USA lists 45 countries using or planning to use nuclear reactors for power generation. There are currently 112 reactors now operating outside the United States, 117 more under construction, 60 on order, and 180 planned. The U. S. as of December 1976 has 64 operating reactors, 72 under construction, 84 on order, and 8 planned. Nuclear trade and export policies are discussed. In this article, Mr. Walske says that American industry is convinced that the need for nuclear energy abroad is more urgent than in the United States; that in the long run, the breeder reactor must be developed to enable the supply of nuclear fuel to last for centuries; and that the experience of American industry abroad has convinced it that emphasis on restrictive, denial type policies will almost certainly fail--a collapse of what has been gained through the test ban treaty and the nonproliferation treaty

  10. Patenting the bomb: nuclear weapons, intellectual property, and technological control.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wellerstein, Alex

    2008-03-01

    During the course of the Manhattan Project, the U.S. government secretly attempted to acquire a monopoly on the patent rights for inventions used in the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. The use of patents as a system of control, while common for more mundane technologies, would seem at first glance to conflict with the regimes of secrecy that have traditionally been associated with nuclear weapons. In explaining the origins and operations of the Manhattan Project patent system, though, this essay argues that the utilization of patents was an ad hoc attempt at legal control of the atomic bomb by Manhattan Project administrators, focused on the monopolistic aspects of the patent system and preexisting patent secrecy legislation. From the present perspective, using patents as a method of control for such weapons seems inadequate, if not unnecessary; but at the time, when the bomb was a new and essentially unregulated technology, patents played an important role in the thinking of project administrators concerned with meaningful postwar control of the bomb. PMID:18505023

  11. Color image fusion for concealed weapon detection

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Toet, A.

    2003-01-01

    Recent advances in passive and active imaging sensor technology offer the potential to detect weapons that are concealed underneath a person's clothing or carried along in bags. Although the concealed weapons can sometimes easily be detected, it can be difficult to perceive their context, due to the

  12. Overview of surplus weapons plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rudy, G.

    1996-05-01

    The safe disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium is a very important and urgent task. While the functions of long term storage and disposition directly relate to the Department`s weapons program and the environmental management program, the focus of this effort is particularly national security and nonproliferation.

  13. Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bing, G.F.

    1991-08-20

    This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

  14. Taser and Conducted Energy Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    LeClair, Thomas G; Meriano, Tony

    2015-01-01

    It is clear that CEWs are an increasingly prevalent law enforcement tool, adopted to address a complex and challenging problem. The potential for serious injury from a single deployment of a CEW is extremely low. The debate regarding the link between these electrical weapons and sudden in-custody death is likely to continue because their use is often in complex and volatile situations. Any consideration of injuries has to be put into that context. One must also consider what injuries to a subject would result if an alternative force method was used. Furthermore, the potential benefits of CEWs, including reduction in injuries to the public and law-enforcement officers, need to be considered. PMID:26630100

  15. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We all want to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The issue before us is how best to achieve this objective; more specifically, whether the peaceful applications of nuclear energy help or hinder, and to what extent. Many of us in the nuclear industry are working on these applications from a conviction that without peaceful nuclear energy the risk of nuclear war would be appreciably greater. Others, however, hold the opposite view. In discussing the subject, a necessary step in allaying fears is understanding some facts, and indeed facing up to some unpalatable facts. When the facts are assessed, and a balance struck, the conclusion is that peaceful nuclear energy is much more part of the solution to preventing nuclear war than it is part of the problem

  16. Heavy Ion Storage Ring for Atomic Physics (HISTRAP) vacuum test stand for pressures of 10-12 Torr

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    HISTRAP (Heavy Ion Storage Ring for Atomic Physics) is a proposed synchrotron/cooler/storage ring accelerator optimized for advanced atomic physics research. The ring has a circumference of 46.8 m, a bore diameter of /similar to/15 cm, and requires a vacuum of 10-12 Torr to decelerate highly charged, very heavy ions down to low energies. To be able to test components and procedures to achieve this pressure, a test stand approximately modeling 1/16 of the ring vacuum chamber has been built. The 3.5-m-long test stand has been fabricated from 10-cm-diam components, with 316LN stainless-steel flanges. Prior to assembly, these components were vacuum fired at 950 0C at a pressure of 10-4 Torr. The test stand is bakable in situ at 300 0C. Pumping is achieved with two 750 l/s titanium sublimator pumps and one 60 l/s ion pump. Pressure is measured with two extractor ion gauges and a 10-4 partial pressure residual gas analyser. The roughing for the test stand consists of cryosorption pumps followed by a cryopump. A pressure of 4 x 10-12 Torr has been achieved

  17. Test of Bell’s inequality using the one-atom micromaser

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    A S Majumdar; N Nayak

    2001-02-01

    We examine a local realist bound in the case of a one-atom micromaser. It is shown that such a bound is violated using a simplified treatment of the micromaser. We consider the effect of dissipation in a proposed experiment with the real micromaser. It is seen that the magnitude of violation of a Bell-type inequality depends significantly on the cavity parameters.

  18. Testing spatial α-variation with optical atomic clocks based on highly charged ions

    OpenAIRE

    Berengut J. C.; Flambaum V. V.; Ong A.

    2013-01-01

    We review recent works illustrating the potential use of highly charged ions as the basis of optical atomic clocks of exceptional accuracy and very high sensitivity to variation of the fine structure constant, α. The tendency towards large transition energies in highly charged ions can be overcome using level crossings, which allow transitions between different orbitals to be within the range of usual lasers. We present simple scaling laws that demonstrate reduced systematics that could be re...

  19. Weapon Control System for Airborne Application.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    M. Sankar Kishore

    2000-07-01

    Full Text Available The integrated fire' control system (IFCS plays an important role in the present-day fighter aircraft and helicopters. Wecapons, such as missiles (active/passive, rockets and guns may be present on thelfighter aircraft or helicopter .IFCS monitors the status of the weapons present on the vehicle and passes the information to pilot/co-pilot. Depending upon the health/availability of the weapons, IFCS selects/fires the weapons. An attempt has been made to bring out the details of one such IFCS. As a I stepping stone, smaller version is developed and same philosophy can be used for integrating ftlore and I more weapons. Here, emphasis has been made on design and development of weapon control unit which is the heart f IFCS, both in hardware and software. The system has been developed using a 486 DX2 processor, and an elaborate software has been developed in PL/M.

  20. Polarized Atomic Hydrogen Beam Tests in the Michigan Ultra-Cold Jet Target

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kageya, T.; Blinov, B. B.; Denbow, J. M.; Kandes, M. C.; Krisch, A. D.; Kulkarni, D. A.; Lehman, M. A.; Luppov, V. G.; Morozov, V. S.; Murray, J. R.; Peters, C. C.; Raymond, R. S.; Ross, M. R.; Yonehara, K.; Borisov, N. S.; Fimushkin, V. V.; Kleppner, D.; Grishin, V. N.; Mysnik, A. L.

    2001-04-01

    To study spin effects in high energy collisions, we are developing an ultra-cold high-density jet target of proton-spin-polarized hydrogen atoms (Michigan Jet Target). The target uses a 12 Tesla magnetic field and a 0.3 K separation cell coated with superfluid helium-4 to produce a slow monochromatic electron-spin-polarized atomic hydrogen beam; an rf transition unit then converts this into a proton-spin-polarized beam, which is focused by a superconducting sextupole into the interaction region. The Jet produced, at the detector, a spin-polarized atomic hydrogen beam with a measured intensity of about 1.7 10^15 H s-1 and a FWHM area of less than 0.13 cm^2. This intensity corresponds to a free jet density of about 1.3 10^12 H cm-3 with a proton polarization of about 50%. When the transition RF unit is installed, we expect a proton polarization higher than 90%.