WorldWideScience

Sample records for agency safeguards system

  1. Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs

  2. Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, A.

    1997-12-31

    The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs.

  3. Negotiating supranational rules - The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, Astrid

    1998-12-31

    The object of this thesis is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid 1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The evolution is traced not through the practical implementation of the safeguards system, but through the various multilateral negotiations through which it was created. The focus is on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective is to single out the factors determining the result. The discussion is organised into the following chapters: (1) The statute of the IAEA, (2) The IAEA 1961 safeguard document (INFCIRC/26), (3) The IAEA 1965 safeguards document (INFCIRC/66), (4) The non-proliferation treaty, (5) NPT safeguards. 92 refs.

  4. Safeguards -Safeguards system development support-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This project mainly focused to technically support national safeguards inspection which is scheduled in the beginning of 1997. It includes non-destructive assay of nuclear fuels, analysis on inspection and environmental samples, remote monitoring of nuclear activities and its analysis, survey on remote sensing of satellite for safeguards application. Non-destructive assay of nuclear fuels dealt with development on verification of spent fuels with emphasis to fabrication of inspection tools with surveillance and gamma measurement on CANDU spent fuels. For sample analysis, study was carried out on process inspection sample analysis method. In addition to this, ultra low background laboratory was set up to execute environmental and swipe samples and sample treatment techniques including water, soil, plant, et al. were researched. Tritiums which were sampled around power plants were analysed. With cooperation of Satellite Technology Research Center of KAIST, use of civilian satellite imagery was surveyed. To train facility operators for safeguards, various technology on non-destructive assay was lectured to personnel of Korea Electric Power Corporation. And to enhance out capabilities, non-destructive assay training was done at Los Alamos National Lab. of U.S. through the agreement of MOST and DOE agreement, and information on DA technology was exchanged at Nuclear Material Control Center of Japan. (author). 22 tabs., 52 figs., 53 refs

  5. Safeguards system analysis, (1)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A system analysis on the implementing safeguards system based on the traditional materials accountancy was done. This report describes about verification methods applied to operator's measurement data, MUF evaluation method, theories on the decision of PIT frequency and designing of inspection plan. (author)

  6. Networking of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper discusses the design of a safeguards system that can be incorporated into a plant during the final phase of its construction to permit the acquisition and transmission of data during plant operation in the absence of an inspector. The system is an example of a networked data system of weighing, identity, and NDA information. It collects all of its non-surveillance data produced by safeguards equipment in a fuel fabrication plant. The data collection and transfer tasks are carried out by two software packages: NEGUS, a redundant data acquisition system designed to record neutron coincidence data, high-resolution gamma spectra, and sensor data for the NDA information and associated barcode identity information, and BRANCH, which deals with weighing and associated identity information. These processes collect data from local electronics using an ethernet network and provide information to the main review program

  7. The Agency programme for the development of safeguards techniques and instrumentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The programme of the Division of Development concentrates attention upon a variety of technical problems and tasks to enable the Agency safeguards system to achieve its safeguards objectives most economically for the Agency, the Member States and the nuclear facility operators. The programme must take into account the changes which may occur in the Agency's tasks as a consequence of implementation of safeguards in States with important nuclear activities. This paper attempts to summarize where the Agency methods and techniques development programme stands on meeting defined technical objectives, to point out where the main problems lie and to offer some guidelines for their solution. (author)

  8. The Department of Safeguards Quality Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards quality management system (QMS) provides the framework for all activities that support the Agency's commitment to providing soundly-based safeguards conclusions regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material. The focus of the QMS is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation through defined, documented processes, routine oversight and continual improvement initiatives. In accordance with QMS principles, the high-level business processes representing the Department's activities are defined in procedures, guidelines and policies that are maintained in the Safeguards Document Manager. These processes form the basis for Department operations for drawing safeguards conclusions regarding State's compliance with their safeguards obligations. Oversight is provided through internal quality audits. These audits are targeted at processes selected by Senior Management with a focus on procedure compliance as well as customer expectations. Best practices and areas for improvement are assessed through continual improvement. Noncompliance and conditions that are adverse to quality are identified and analyzed in the Condition Report System. Root cause analysis and the implementation actions to eliminate the cause reduce the chance of condition recurrence. Through continual process improvement, processes are measured and analyzed to reduce process and administration waste. The improved processes improve efficiency while providing the desired results. Within the scope of the QMS, these tools support the performance of Departmental processes so that Safeguards products achieve the intended purpose. This paper describes how the various elements of the Department's QMS support safeguards implementation. (author)

  9. International safeguards data management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The data base management system ''ISADAM'' (i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System) described in this report is intended to facilitate the safeguards authority in making efficient and effective use of accounting reports. ISADAM has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. The evaluation of safeguards declarations focuses on three main objectives: - the requirement of syntactical consistency with the legal conventions of data recording for safeguards accountancy; - the requirement of accounting evidence that there is no material unaccounted for (MUF); - the requirement of semantic consistency with the technological characteristics of the plant and the processing plans of the operator. Section 2 describes in more detail the facilities which ISADAM makes available to a safeguards inspector. Section 3 describes how the MUF variance computation is derived from models of measurement error propagation. Many features of the ISADAM system are automatically provided by ADABAS. The exceptions to this are the utility software designed to: - screen plant declarations before loading into the data base, - prepare variance summary files designed to support real-time computation of MUF and variance of MUF, - provide analyses in response to user requests in interactive or batch mode. Section 4 describes the structure and functions of this software which have been developed by JRC-Ispra

  10. Goals of measurement systems for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency are based on technical performance goals and criteria that have been developed, but not officially adopted by the Agency. The goals derive in part from the external consequences that safeguards are intended to prevent and in some cases on internal considerations of feasibility. To the extent that these goals may not be attainable, as may be the case with large-throughput bulk reprocessing plants, the Agency is placed in a difficult position. In this paper safeguards goals and criteria and their underlying rationales are critically examined. Suggestions for a more rational and workable structure of performance goals are offered

  11. Safeguards system effectiveness modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A general methodology for the comparative evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness at nuclear facilities is presently under development. The approach is applicable to problems of sabotage or theft at fuel cycle facilities. In this paper, the overall methodology and the primary analytic techniques used to assess system effectiveness are briefly outlined

  12. Brazil and the strengthening of safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency: from the four-part agreement to the additional protocol

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The main objective of this paper is to analyse the evolution of IAEA verification system, that constitutes one of the main fundaments of the Non-proliferation nuclear weapons regimen, and to point out elements that contribute to inform the Brazilian position related to the Model Protocol additional to agreements for safeguard application: instrument that comprehend the most recent multilateral efforts of the nuclear verification

  13. Safeguards and legal matters 1996. International Atomic Energy Agency publications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This catalogue lists all currently valid sales publications of the International Atomic Energy Agency dealing with Safeguards and Legal Matters. Most publications are published in English. Proceedings of conferences, symposia and panels of experts may contain some papers in languages other than English (French, Russian or Spanish), but all of these papers have abstracts in English. It should be noted that prices of books are quoted in Austrian Schillings. The prices do not include local taxes and are subject to change without notice. All books in this catalogue are 16 x 24 cm, paper-bound, unless otherwise stated

  14. The IAEA's safeguards systems. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? what assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification? (author)

  15. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards after Iraq - some Austrailian perceptions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iraq's nuclear weapons development program used facilities and nuclear material separate from its safeguarded activities. To detect such a strategy the IAEA's safeguards inspectors need access to locations and information beyond that foreseen in NPT safeguards agreements. But the IAEA is short of money. And detecting undeclared activities could be expensive. If the IAEA can establish a capability to detect undeclared activities, then it might be able to save on regular safeguards. But it's important not to put the cart before the horse - effective safeguards must come first, savings second

  16. Measurement trends for future safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safeguards for future commercial-scale nuclear facilities may employ three materials control and accounting concepts: classical accounting, dynamic materials balancing, and independent verification of inventories and materials balances. Typical measurement needs associated with the implementation of these concepts at high-throughput facilities are discussed. Promising measurement methods for meeting these needs are described and recent experience is cited. General directions and considerations for meeting advanced safeguards systems needs through measurement technology development over the next decade are presented

  17. Strenghening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Goodman,M.; Lockwood, d.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Tape, J.W.

    2008-06-06

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system has changed in major ways from the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 until the present. Changes include strengthening the legal framework of safeguards; improvements in concepts and approaches for safeguards implementation; and significant improvements in the technical tools available to inspectors. In this paper, we explore three broad areas related to strengthening safeguards authorities and institutions: integrated safeguards and State-Level Approaches; special inspections; and NPT withdrawal and the continuation of safeguards.

  18. Model protocol additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguard system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives

  19. Implementation of safeguard system and its current challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear safeguards system is a system developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and adopted by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as an instrument to observe the compliance of a non-nuclear weapon state as a party against the legal obligations contain in the Treaty. This system was developed during 1960-1990, and then strengthened in the period of 1990-2005. By fulfilling the legal obligations under safeguards system a non-nuclear weapon state can give guarantee to the international world that this state has no nuclear material, activities or facilities to be made as nuclear weapon. Challenges in its implementation in the forms of breaches have been occurred several times. Most of the branches can be secured by the IAEA Secretariat, even though there are those reported to the United Nation Security Council. Considering the importance of this safeguards system in the framework of work peace and security, it is encouraged that state party to the NPT to conclude and implement safeguards agreement with the IAEA. (author)

  20. Implementation of a Strengthened International Safeguards System ABBAC 15 years

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of the paper is to explain how the system of a regional safeguard has been operating and developing in the framework of the Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), and how the international recommendation of radiological protection must be taken into account in the safeguards implementation and its impact in the international context. The ABACC has been a dynamic system, which contributes worldwide in the application of the regional and international safeguard. In 2006, the ABACC celebrated its 15th anniversary. The ABBAC was created in 1991 in the framework of a Bilateral Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful use of Nuclear Energy, the ABBAC was created in order to apply the aforementioned system called 'Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials' (SCCC). During this time, the ABBAC has grown in its implementation and has become a model in the application of regional safeguards that is recognized internationally. The ABBAC was the pillar to signed an Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABBAC and the International Atomic Energy Agency, called 'Quadripartite Agreement', committed themselves to accept the application of safeguards to all nuclear materials in all the nuclear activities performed in both countries. The ABACC and the relevant implementing and supplementary agreements, set forth the conditions for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the exchange of technical staff, the transfer of knowledge and international cooperation in a strong commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This introduction provides an overview of political, legal and technical aspects implemented in the ABACC, which will be developed later in the paper. (author)

  1. Conceptual design of integrated safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) is currently involved in the conceptual design of safeguards for generic facilities in the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle (spent-fuel reprocessing, plutonium nitrate-to-oxide conversion, mixed-oxide fuel fabrication, plutonium scrap recovery, and waste handling). These studies are first steps aimed at eventually providing detailed designs of integrated safeguards systems to guide safeguards-related facility construction and/or modification. The purpose of this presentation is to describe the conceptual design process in terms of its definition, a systematic procedure for its implementation, some of the tools required, and an example of the results of a conceptual design. The value of conceptual design and its relationship to other facets of the complete facility design process are also discussed

  2. Waste isolation safeguards and security system. Volume 2. Bibliography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of this study is to define the rationale and scope of the Waste Isolation System (WIS) safeguards system, to establish a set of proposed basic safeguards criteria, and to identify the areas requiring development of specific criteria and technology. The report also presents a proposed program schedule and provides an extensive bibliography, in volumes two and three of applicable reference safeguards documents

  3. Waste isolation safeguards and security system. Volume 3. Bibliography supplement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of this study is to define the rationale and scope of the Waste Isolation System (WIS) safeguards system, to establish a set of proposed basic safeguards criteria, and to identify the areas requiring development of specific criteria and technology. The report also presents a proposed program schecule and provides an extensive bibliography in volumes two and three of applicable reference safeguards documents

  4. CIPSS [computer-integrated process and safeguards system]: The integration of computer-integrated manufacturing and robotics with safeguards, security, and process operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This poster session describes the computer-integrated process and safeguards system (CIPSS). The CIPSS combines systems developed for factory automation and automated mechanical functions (robots) with varying degrees of intelligence (expert systems) to create an integrated system that would satisfy current and emerging security and safeguards requirements. Specifically, CIPSS is an extension of the automated physical security functions concepts. The CIPSS also incorporates the concepts of computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) with integrated safeguards concepts, and draws upon the Defense Advance Research Project Agency's (DARPA's) strategic computing program

  5. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards after Iraq - some Australian perceptions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The authors attach the first priority to providing the IAEA with pointers to sites where extended access inspections are most likely to be of benefit. Proposals for more cost-effective safeguards are outlined particularly in respect to the use of technology to save inspection effort as well as the development of procedures for detecting undeclared nuclear activities

  6. Design of safeguards systems for authentication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    To permit valid conclusions to be drawn from safeguards data, it is essential that this data is known to be authentic. That is, it must be known that the data originated from the intended source, that the data was not changed in transit, and that it is not a repeat or delayed copy of previous data. Safeguards systems and equipment should be designed with authentication included, instead of attempting to add security later. Failure to integrate authentication measures early in the design results in systems that are expensive or possibly impossible to deploy securely. This paper gives some of the factors that should be considered and some of the methods that can be employed for ensuring high security while minimizing cost. The paper is a compilation of some of the lessons learned by the authors during many years of working with the authentication of these systems. (author)

  7. The Text of the Agreement between the Agency and Argentina relating to the Application of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards came into force on 4 March 1994

  8. Waste isolation safeguards and security system. Volume 1. Scoping study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of this study is to define the rationale and scope of the Waste Isolation System (WIS) safeguards system, to establish a set of proposed basic safeguards criteria, and to identify the areas requiring development of specific criteria and technology. The report also presents a proposed program schedule and provides an extensive bibliography of applicable reference safeguards documents. Volume one contains the following: glossary, system description; threat definition; safeguards regulations review - current and future; WIS safeguards criteria; assessment of criteria applicability and development requirements; and program plan

  9. Implementation of remove monitoring in facilities under safeguards with unattended systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Nordquist, Heather A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Umebayaashi, Eiji [JAEA

    2009-01-01

    Remote monitoring is being applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at nuclear facilities around the world. At the Monju Reactor in Japan we have designed, developed and implemented a remote monitoring approach that can serve as a model for applying remote monitoring to facilities that are already under full-scope safeguards using unattended instrumentation. Remote monitoring implementations have historically relied upon the use of specialized data collection hardware and system design features that integrate remote monitoring into the safeguards data collection system. The integration of remote monitoring and unattended data collection increases the complexity of safeguards data collection systems. This increase in complexity necessarily produces a corresponding reduction of system reliability compared to less-complex unattended monitoring systems. At the Monju facility we have implemented a remote monitoring system that is decoupled from the activity of safeguards data collection. In the completed system the function of remote data transfer is separated from the function of safeguards data collection. As such, a failure of the remote monitoring function cannot produce an associated loss of safeguards data, as is possible with integrated remote-monitoring implementations. Currently, all safeguards data from this facility is available to the IAEA on a 24/7 basis. This facility employs five radiation-based unattended systems, video surveillance and numerous optical seal systems. The implementation of remote monitoring at this facility, while increasing the complexity of the safeguards system, is designed to avoid any corresponding reduction in reliability of the safeguards data collection systems by having decoupled these functions. This design and implementation can serve as a model for implementation of remote monitoring at nuclear facilities that currently employ unattended safeguards systems.

  10. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.)

  11. Next Generation Germanium Systems for Safeguards Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We are developing the latest generation of highly portable, mechanically cooled germanium systems for safeguard applications. In collaboration with our industrial partner, Ph.D.s Co, we have developed the Germanium Gamma Ray Imager (GeGI), an imager with a 2π field of view. This instrument has been thoroughly field tested in a wide range of environments and have performed reliably even in the harshest conditions. The imaging capability of GeGI complements existing safeguards techniques by allowing for the spatial detection, identification, and characterization of nuclear material. Additionally, imaging can be used in design information verification activities to address potential material diversions. Measurements conducted at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant highlight the advantages this instrument offers in the identification and localization of LEU, HEU and Pu holdup. GeGI has also been deployed to the Savannah River Site for the measurement of radioactive waste canisters, providing information valuable for waste characterization and inventory accountancy. Measuring 30 x 15 x 23 cm and weighing approximately 15 kg, this instrument is the first portable germanium-based imager. GeGI offers high reliability with the convenience of mechanical cooling, making this instrument ideal for the next generation of safeguards instrumentation. (author)

  12. The Text of the Safeguards Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan for the application of safeguards with respect to a fuel reprocessing plant and to nuclear material, facilities, equipment and relevant technological information supplied by France to Pakistan for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  13. Development of the strengthened safeguards system and the Additional Protocol

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For the past 30 years, the IAEA's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. The paper summarizes the evolution of the safeguards system, describes strengthened safeguards, reports on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outlines plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  14. Design of safeguards systems for authentication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: To permit valid conclusions to be drawn from safeguards data, it is essential that this data be authentic. That is, it must be known that the data originated from the intended source, that the data was not changed in transit and that it is not a repeat or delayed copy of previous data. Furthermore a compromise of the source must not permit new trusted data to be generated and should not invalidate previous data. Authentication should be designed into safeguards systems instead of being added later. Failure to integrate authentication early in the design results in systems that are expensive or possibly impossible to deploy securely. This paper gives some of the factors that should be considered and some of the methods that can be employed for ensuring high security while minimizing cost. The paper is a compilation of some of the lessons learned by the authors during the last few years of working with the authentication of these systems. Examples are given of approaches that worked well and some that the authors found less successful. More use is being made of unattended and remote monitoring, and more facilities are becoming heavily automated. In some cases sensors and data generators may be deployed in many locations within a facility and may not be easily accessed (or may be located in hazardous locations). Because of these factors, physical access is becoming more limited, so safeguards systems must be designed to maximize reliability and to minimize inspection and maintenance time. For example, tamper indicating enclosures are only effective when they are adequately inspected, thus the number, size, and complexity of tamper indicating enclosures should be minimized. This might be accomplished by applying cryptographic data authentication at the sensor thus avoiding the need to install tamper indicating conduit (The inspection of long runs of conduit is difficult and expensive.) The proper use of standard internationally accepted protocols for data

  15. Developing the information management system for safeguards national inspection

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, S. J.; Jeon, I.; Park, W. S.; Min, K. S. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2003-10-01

    The inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection is aimed to do the national safeguards inspection with efficiency, and to decrease the inspector's load to write inspection report by systematizing the inspection jobs and sharing the inspection data. National safeguards inspection is consisted two large jobs. The first is the national safeguards supporting job of managing to support the national inspection mission. The other is the writing a national inspection report after completing the national inspection. Before the developing of inspection information management system, the official tools(spread sheet, word processor) are usually used. But there is problem to share the data, to produce the statistics data. To solve the these problem, we developed the inspection information management system that process the job from initial to final inspection work, and opened user education. This paper explain the procedure of developing the inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection.

  16. Systems Analysis of Safeguards Effectiveness in a Uranium Conversion Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Elayat, H A; Lambert, H; O' Connell, W J

    2004-06-16

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems. For this goal several DOE National Laboratories are defining the characteristics of typical facilities of several size scales, and the safeguards measures and instrumentation that could be applied. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is providing systems modeling and analysis of facility and safeguards operations, diversion path generation, and safeguards system effectiveness. The constituent elements of diversion scenarios are structured using directed graphs (digraphs) and fault trees. Safeguards indicator probabilities are based on sampling statistics and/or measurement accuracies. Scenarios are ranked based on value and quantity of material removed and the estimated probability of non-detection. Significant scenarios, especially those involving timeliness or randomly varying order of events, are transferred to simulation analysis. Simulations show the range of conditions encountered by the safeguards measurements and inspections, e.g., the quantities of intermediate materials in temporary storage and the time sequencing of material flow. Given a diversion campaign, simulations show how much the range of the same parameters observed by the safeguards system can differ from the base-case range. The combination of digraphs, fault trees, statistics and simulation constitute a method for evaluation of the estimated benefit of alternate or additional safeguards equipment or features. A generic example illustrates the method.

  17. Optimizing the integrated safeguards system: Pragmatism and fresh views are the keys to a viable system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The implementation of the new Integrated Safeguards System is a major responsibility for the IAEA and its Member States. Providing not only the capability to better control declared activities, but also to detect clandestine attempts, it is essential to improve the international nuclear weapons control regime and to increase the credibility of assurances given to the international community. Having the sole goal of establishing integrated safeguards in an optimal manner would in itself be a very challenging and demanding task. Unfortunately, the Secretariat is faced with other conflicting challenges: statutory obligations, additional programme requests from Member States and, not the least, the obligation to fit all its activities within a strict budgetary framework. Universal and early acceptance is necessary for the system to be fully effective and credible. It must however be recognised that wide and rapid adherence will be only achieved if the system is attractive enough and offers shared benefits, that is not only increased non-proliferation assurances, but also perspectives of optimisation and reduction of the inspection burden, not to forget the assurance of keeping costs under control. It is essential that the safeguards system be non-discriminatory and apply the same objectives and implementation principles to all States. Integrated Safeguards should only be applied in States which are in good standing with respect to their obligations under their safeguards Agreements and Protocols, and for which the Agency has reached positive conclusions after having applied all necessary verification measures and having performed a complete evaluation of the information available. Cost neutrality is obviously a primary constraint for Integrated Safeguards. Even if one has to recognise the additional costs and difficulties generated in the short term by the implementation of the new system, it is essential to be conscious that budgetary limits will be maintained, and to

  18. The Canadian safeguards program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

  19. Potential nuclear material safeguards applied to the Department of Energy's Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) within the U.S. Department of Energy is charged with the responsibility of safe and efficient disposal of this Nation's civilian high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel. Part of this responsibility includes providing for the application of both domestic and international safeguards on nuclear material at facilities of the Civilian Waste Management System. While detailed safeguards requirements for these disposal facilities have yet to be established, once established, they could impact facility design. Accordingly, OCRWM has participated in efforts to develop safeguards approaches for geologic repositories and will continue to participate actively with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as other Department of Energy (DOE) Offices in efforts to resolve safeguards issues related to spent fuel disposal, to minimize any potential design impacts and to support effective nuclear material safeguards. The following paper discusses current plants and issues related to the application of safeguards to the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS)

  20. Reactor safeguards system assessment and design. Volume I

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Varnado, G.B.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Daniel, S.L.; Bennett, H.A.; Hulme, B.L.

    1978-06-01

    This report describes the development and application of a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear power reactor safeguards systems. Analytic techniques are used to identify the sabotage acts which could lead to release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant, to determine the areas of a plant which must be protected to assure that significant release does not occur, to model the physical plant layout, and to evaluate the effectiveness of various safeguards systems. The methodology was used to identify those aspects of reactor safeguards systems which have the greatest effect on overall system performance and which, therefore, should be emphasized in the licensing process. With further refinements, the methodology can be used by the licensing reviewer to aid in assessing proposed or existing safeguards systems.

  1. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... under the authority and supervision of a state Control Terminal Agency. This authority and supervision... reside inside a locked room within a secure facility. Access to the facility will be restricted to authorized personnel who have identified themselves and their need for access to a system security...

  2. Implementation of the Safeguards System in the Republic of Tajikistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    specialists training and provide them a stimulus to make a carrier in IAEA. Important safeguards element is more effective export control and efforts to liquidate black markets network. Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency (Regulatory Authority) successfully cooperates with the IAEA Safeguards Department: (1) There were 14 expert missions of the IAEA Safeguards department to our country. (2) Have been carried out inspections of: a) Tailings and the Uranium oxide-protoxide production plant. b) Republican Waste Repository Site. c) Anzobe Ore Mining and Processing Plant. d) Non-operating Research reactor of Physical and Technical Institute of the Academy of sciences of Tajikistan. e) Establishments of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Nature Protection and the Ministry of Extreme Situations and Civil Defence. (3) IAEA Safeguards Department experts and our specialists jointly liquidated the risk of radiation pollution. The risk was caused of helicopter crash in mountains of Northern Tajikistan. (author)

  3. Quantitative validation of nuclear safeguards monitoring systems and their simulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear safeguards monitoring systems like those used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are comprised of instruments to detect the misuse of nuclear materials. Attempting to prove that these systems meet their objectives in their intended facilities under operational conditions is too difficult, expensive, and risky. Alternatively, the system may be proved in a laboratory under like conditions, or in a simulation if its quality is known and is acceptable. The main result of this research is a statistical procedure for determining the quality of a safeguards monitoring systems and its simulation. Quality is manifest in two metrics, validity and fidelity, which can be determined quantitatively by administering a validation test. Validity is the demonstrated ability of the system or its simulation to make correct decisions whereas fidelity is the realism of the data used in making the aforementioned decisions. The metrics fit into a Bayesian hypothesis test wherefrom optimal and automated decisions are possible. The technique was successfully tested using real and simulated versions of a laboratory nuclear safeguards monitoring system comprised of an IAEA video camera and Swedish-made boron-trifluoride neutron detector. Validation test data sets were prepared by acquiring data in the real safeguards system about movements of a drum containing a beryllium-plutonium radiation source. The real and simulated automatic evaluation systems were then trained to recognize named movements by providing them recorded data. The validation test was administered by letting the system in question, either real or simulated, attempt to name the events in the validation test data set. Recognition by either real or simulated systems was done by automatically isolating events in the data and comparing them to their respective library data, and then choosing the best match. For images, matching was based on the coordinates of the centroid of pixels resulting from subtraction

  4. Safeguards effectiveness assessment system (SEAS): More than a document retrieval system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In order to increase the transparency and to improve the uniformity of safeguards activities at nuclear facilities, a variety of documents have been produced in the last few years. One consequence of this expansion of safeguards related reference material is the difficulty to collate this disparate information. The primary goal of the development of the safeguards effectiveness assessment system (SEAS) - a collaborative work of the Safeguards Effectiveness Evaluation (SEE) Section and the Data Processing Development (IDD) Section - is to provide the possibility of linking safeguards related information sources and to enable safeguards staff to access quickly information related to the description of IAEA verification activities. 5 refs, 4 figs

  5. Protocol to suspend the application of safeguards pursuant to the Agreement of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in the light of the provisions for the application of safeguards pursuant to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol of 16 October 1998 suspending the application of safeguards under the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/237) of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany in the light of the provisions for the application of safeguards pursuant to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between the Agency, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA. The Protocol entered into force on 21 October 1999

  6. National system of accounting and control and co-operation with international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper offers a description of the National System of Accounting and Control applied in Argentina. Besides, the importance of having a National System is also highlighted as a way of supplying effective and efficiency to assure reasonably that the nuclear materials, materials, equipment and installations of nuclear interest are used according to the stated in the licenses and authorisations emitted by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA), complying with the international compromises assumed by the country. The role of the National System referring to the co-operation with the International Agencies of safeguards applications, ABACC and IAEA, is also explained. This co-operation must be understood as the one tending to strengthen and improve safeguards. The existence of a National System of Accounting and Control contributes to widen guarantees on the compliment of compromises of non proliferation, facilitates the application of international safeguards by the agencies and improves the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards through the development of new techniques and methods. (author)

  7. Report on Iran nuclear safeguards sent to Agency's Board and UN Security Council

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei today released his report Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report was prepared at the request of the United Nation's Security Council. Its circulation is restricted, and unless the IAEA Board of Governors and Security Council decide otherwise, the Agency can not authorise its release to the public. On 29 March 2006 the Security Council requested 'in 30 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on the process of Iranian compliance with the steps required by the IAEA Board, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration.' The report was simultaneously circulated to the Agency's Member States and to the Security Council in New York this afternoon. (IAEA)

  8. Methodology for characterizing potential adversaries of Nuclear Material Safeguards Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The results are described of a study by Woodward--Clyde Consultants to assist the University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in the development of methods to analyze and evaluate Nuclear Material Safeguards (NMS) Systems. The study concentrated on developing a methodology to assist experts in describing, in quantitative form, their judgments about the characteristics of potential adversaries of NMS Systems

  9. Methodology for characterizing potential adversaries of Nuclear Material Safeguards Systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kirkwood, C.W.; Pollock, S.M.

    1978-11-01

    The results are described of a study by Woodward--Clyde Consultants to assist the University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in the development of methods to analyze and evaluate Nuclear Material Safeguards (NMS) Systems. The study concentrated on developing a methodology to assist experts in describing, in quantitative form, their judgments about the characteristics of potential adversaries of NMS Systems.

  10. Establishing a national safeguards system at the State level

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper is the guide to a workshop designed to enable the participants to gain a better understanding of National Safeguards Systems and their functions. The workshop provides an opportunity to address the requirements for the organization that has to carry out the system functions at the State level in a country having a research reactor and ancillary laboratories

  11. Communication received from the Resident Representative of Australia to the Agency concerning the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Director General has received a letter dated 16 September 2009 from the Resident Representative of Australia to the Agency attaching the text of the Statement of Principles of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN). The letter and, as requested therein, the Statement of Principles are herewith circulated for the information of Member States

  12. A Critical Element to Successful Implementation Of Future Safeguards Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As we look to the future of nuclear materials management and safeguards systems, it is essential to place significant emphasis on creation of a strong infrastructure to support and sustain modern systems. Traditionally, safeguards infrastructure development has focused on such elements as equipment development, strengthening of the national regulatory base, creation of state-of-the-art accounting and control systems, and procedure development. Less emphasis has been placed on recognition of the 'human element' as a primary component of the necessary infrastructure and the key to successful implementation of new or existing systems. The importance of the human element can be recognized by considering the broad span of influence and control, direction, regulation and implementation of safeguards systems exhibited by a large number of professionals: diplomats, scholars, politicians, facility managers, program directors and technical specialists. These individuals provide the connectivity or 'glue' that binds together a myriad of smaller safeguards program elements and ensures a holistic approach is fostered and maintained. The education and training of our future leaders and experts must receive the highest priority. In addition, this effort must consider factors beyond development of technical capabilities. Given the rapidly evolving world climate since the end of the cold war, our safeguards leaders and experts need education and training that will provide a well-developed understanding of the broader political dimensions of current nonproliferation challenges. They need to learn how to think, rather than what to think. A sustained effort is required to highlight the importance of the human dimension of safeguards and nuclear materials management and how these systems support international nonproliferation efforts. New educational initiatives are needed to better prepare the next generation of leaders and experts. Increased regional and national cooperation in the

  13. International Atomic Energy Agency's advisory group meeting on safeguards related to the final disposal of waste and spent fuel, Vienna, Austria, September 12-16, 1988: Foreign trip report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moran, B.W.

    1988-10-01

    B.W. Moran traveled to Vienna, Austria, during the period of September 12--16, 1988, to serve as the technical advisor to the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Advisory Group Meeting on ''Safeguards Related to the Final Disposal of Nuclear Material in Waste and Spent Fuel.'' The goal of the US representatives to this meeting was to ensure that the advisory group's recommendations established (1) an effective IAEA safeguards approach for all radioactive waste and spent fuel management facilities and (2) a safeguards approach that is appropriate for the US Federal Waste Management System. The principal concerns of the United States on entering the advisory group meeting were: criteria for the termination of safeguards on waste should not be established, but should be referred for further study, safeguards on spent fuel should not be terminated, and safeguards studies are required before IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel are established. The US representatives generally recommended that consultant meetings be convened to address the technical issues after the requisite safeguards related research and development tasks have been performed. These objectives of the US representatives were achieved, and the recommendations of the advisory group generally coincided with and extended the recommendations presented in the US position paper.

  14. International Atomic Energy Agency's advisory group meeting on safeguards related to the final disposal of waste and spent fuel, Vienna, Austria, September 12-16, 1988: Foreign trip report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    B.W. Moran traveled to Vienna, Austria, during the period of September 12--16, 1988, to serve as the technical advisor to the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Advisory Group Meeting on ''Safeguards Related to the Final Disposal of Nuclear Material in Waste and Spent Fuel.'' The goal of the US representatives to this meeting was to ensure that the advisory group's recommendations established (1) an effective IAEA safeguards approach for all radioactive waste and spent fuel management facilities and (2) a safeguards approach that is appropriate for the US Federal Waste Management System. The principal concerns of the United States on entering the advisory group meeting were: criteria for the termination of safeguards on waste should not be established, but should be referred for further study, safeguards on spent fuel should not be terminated, and safeguards studies are required before IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel are established. The US representatives generally recommended that consultant meetings be convened to address the technical issues after the requisite safeguards related research and development tasks have been performed. These objectives of the US representatives were achieved, and the recommendations of the advisory group generally coincided with and extended the recommendations presented in the US position paper

  15. Design considerations for an integrated safeguards system for fuel-reprocessng plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report presents design ideas for safeguards systems in nuclear fuels reprocessing plants. The report summarizes general safeguards requirements and describes a safeguards system concept being developed and tested at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The report gives some general concepts intended for design consideration and a checklist of specific problems that should be considered. The report is intended as an aid for the safeguards system designer and as a source of useful information

  16. Report on Iran nuclear safeguards sent to Agency's Board and UN Security Council

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei today released his report Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report was prepared at the request of the United Nation's Security Council. Its circulation is restricted, and unless the IAEA Board of Governors and Security Council decide otherwise, the Agency can not authorise its release to the public. On 23 December 2006 the Security Council requested 'within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration'. The report was simultaneously circulated to the Agency's Member States and to the Security Council in New York this afternoon. (IAEA)

  17. Safeguards Strategy in Physical Protection System for Nuclear Installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safeguards strategy is directed at efforts of eliminating theft of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installation. For achieving the above objective, it is necessary to set up safeguards strategy in physical protection of nuclear materials and installation. The safeguards strategy starts from anticipated security condition, list of thefts, planning referred to as safeguards planning. Safeguards planning are implemented in safeguards implementation, followed up then by evaluation. Results of evaluation are equipped with results of safeguards survey already developed. Safeguards' planning is made from these results and serve as guidelines for next safeguards implementation and is repeated to form a safeguard cycle. One safeguard cycle is made on a periodical basis, at least annually. (author)

  18. Agreement Between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities. Addition to the List of Facilities Subject to Safeguards Under the Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In accordance with Paragraph 14(a) of the Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities (hereinafter “the Agreement”), India shall notify the Agency in writing of its decision to offer any facility identified by India for Agency safeguards under the Agreement. Any facility so notified by India becomes subject to the Agreement as of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India, and is to be included in the Annex to the Agreement. On 11 March 2014, the Agency received from India written notification, pursuant to Paragraph 14(a) of the Agreement, of its decision to bring one additional facility under safeguards in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. Pursuant to Paragraph 14 4(a) of the Agreement, the Annex to the Agreement has been updated and is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency

  19. Optimizing the Integrated Safeguards System: Pragmatism and fresh views are the keys to a viable system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The development of the Integrated Safeguards System is a major progress in international safeguards, through which the value of the assurances provided by the IAEA to its Member States will be greatly increased. However, the implementation of Integrated Safeguards will have to take into account a number of principles, objectives and constraints, among which a delicate balance will have to be struck. The IAEA safeguards activities are placed in a new environment and set of constraints, where previous schemes are not any longer adapted to meet efficiently new goals and expectations. Rethinking safeguards implementation will be necessary, especially to move to a result-oriented process, and from systematic application to flexible and unpredictable measures, while keeping targeted on the ultimate goal of stronger safeguards and increased assurances to the international community. (author)

  20. Nuclear energy forecasts and the international safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper assesses the impact of the increasing use of nuclear energy on the international safeguards system, and it identifies and assesses options for coping with the anticipated impact. A review of nuclear energy forecasts indicates a need for substantial increases in the financial and personnel resources of the safeguards system over the next decade. The requisite financial increases are probably within the limits of political feasibility, but the personnel needs may become problematic. There is also likely to be a continuing decline in confidence in the effectiveness of the system because of perceptions of inadequate resources and methods. There are several options that could reduce the projected technical and political pressures on the system: a postponement of plutonium recycle; improved materials measurement accuracies; immediate increases in the IAEA inspections staff. There are also options that would supplement the safeguards system and alleviate the pressures on it; multinational fuel cycle centers; a suppliers' cartel-like arrangement; and an International Nuclear Materials Custodial Authority. 53 refs

  1. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  2. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  3. Unique computer system for safeguards use

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Microprocessors have been used to implement specialized scientific data processing systems since 1976. One such system, the LeCroy 3500, is presently being used by the Detection and Verification Group of the Energy Division at Los Alamos National Laboratory for a large variety of tasks involving measurement of various nuclear parameters associated with radioactive materials. The system is unique because it can do not only sophisticated pulse height and multi-scale analyses but also other analyses that are limited only by the availability fo CAMAC modules that would acquire data from exotic experiments. The system is also field portable which extends the range of experiments that it can control. Four applications of this system are described in this paper: (1) plutonium storage vault monitoring, (2) coded aperture image reconstruction, (3) spatial distribution of gamma radiation, and (4) nuclear waste management. 7 figures

  4. Extended Evaluations of the Commercial Spectrometer Systems for Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duc T. Vo

    1999-08-01

    Safeguards applications require the best of the spectrometer system with excellent resolution, stability, and throughput. Instruments must perform well in all situations and environments. Data communication to the computer should be convenient, fast, and reliable. The software should have all the necessary tools and be easy to use. Portable systems should be small in size, lightweight, and have a long battery life. Nine commercially available spectrometer systems are tested with five different germanium detectors. Considering the performance of the Digital Signal Processors (DSP), digital-based spectroscope y may become the way of future gamma-ray spectroscopy.

  5. Strengthening regional safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

  6. Strengthening regional safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O. [Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)] [and others

    1996-08-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980`s and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States.

  7. The Text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  8. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  9. Panel on protection and management of plutonium: Subpanel on safeguards and security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-07-01

    Nuclear materials safeguards and security systems are described in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Materials of interest to safeguards, threats, proposals to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, evolving safeguards issues and requirements, system effectiveness, and elements of a global nuclear materials management regime are discussed. Safeguards are seen as an essential element of nuclear materials management, but not a driver for decisions regarding nuclear power or the disposal of excess weapon nuclear materials.

  10. Panel on protection and management of plutonium: Subpanel on safeguards and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear materials safeguards and security systems are described in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Materials of interest to safeguards, threats, proposals to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, evolving safeguards issues and requirements, system effectiveness, and elements of a global nuclear materials management regime are discussed. Safeguards are seen as an essential element of nuclear materials management, but not a driver for decisions regarding nuclear power or the disposal of excess weapon nuclear materials

  11. Expert system characteristics and potential applications in safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The general growth of expert, knowledge-based (KB) or rule based systems will significantly increase in the next three to five years. Improvements in computer hardware (speed, reduced size, power) and software (rule based, data based, user interfaces) in recent years are providing the foundations for the growth of expert systems. A byproduct of this growth will undoubtedly be the application of expert systems to various safeguards problems. Characteristics of these expert systems will involve 1) multiple rules governing an outcome, 2) confidence factors on individual variables and rule sets, 3) priority, cost, and risk based rule sets, and 4) the reasoning behind the advice or decision given by the expert system. This paper presents characteristics, structures, and examples of simple rule based systems. Potential application areas for these expert systems may include training, operations, management, designs, evaluations, and specific hardware operation

  12. Project planning at the Hanford Site for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards of excess fissile material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, B.W. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); McRae, L.P. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States); Walker, A.C. [USDOE Richland Operation Office, Richland, WA (United States)

    1995-06-01

    In his September 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton proposed several initiatives to promote nuclear nonproliferation. One element is of these initiatives was that the United States offered to place excess fissile material under International Atomic Energy Agency @A) safeguards. Three Department of Energy (DOE) facilities were identified as part of a phased approach for initial implementation. This paper describes the planning process used to provide information to assist the DOE in making decisions for the initial offer, outlines tasks to be performed, and develops a budget request. The process consisted of: (1) Characterizing the Hanford Site from the perspective of IAEA safeguards; (2) identify key issues to be resolved; (3) developing budget estimates and schedules; (4) interfacing with other DOE components and the IAEA to clarify expected activities; and (5) initiating additional data collection and preparatory activities to reduce planning uncertainties.

  13. Project planning at the Hanford Site for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards of excess fissile material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In his September 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton proposed several initiatives to promote nuclear nonproliferation. One element is of these initiatives was that the United States offered to place excess fissile material under International Atomic Energy Agency at sign A) safeguards. Three Department of Energy (DOE) facilities were identified as part of a phased approach for initial implementation. This paper describes the planning process used to provide information to assist the DOE in making decisions for the initial offer, outlines tasks to be performed, and develops a budget request. The process consisted of: (1) Characterizing the Hanford Site from the perspective of IAEA safeguards; (2) identify key issues to be resolved; (3) developing budget estimates and schedules; (4) interfacing with other DOE components and the IAEA to clarify expected activities; and (5) initiating additional data collection and preparatory activities to reduce planning uncertainties

  14. Lifecycle Management of Safeguards Equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In recent years, traditional procurement procedures for safeguards equipment have experienced major setbacks that have led to costly and time-consuming re-design and re-evaluation periods, as well as delays in the delivery and deployment of urgently needed equipment. A common element of all encountered problems is the rapid development of technical components. The accelerated pace of 69 safeguards systems development, when coupled with the absence of a disciplined lifecycle approach to design and development, leads to early technical obsolescence as well as the inability to support a safeguards system over its operational lifecycle. This condition is further aggravated by safeguards equipment suppliers who wrestle with economies of scale associated with a unique safeguards market that generally does not provide sufficient margins to stay in business. As a result, international agencies charged with safeguards responsibilities find it difficult to secure the supply of identical safeguards equipment over periods of ten or more years. However, all these problems are merely symptoms of the lack of an integrated lifecycle management approach with early involvement of all parties: vendors and their suppliers, national laboratories and contracted developers, national support programs, and international agencies with nonproliferation responsibilities. The following paper will describe the unique constellation of players within the safeguards community, and why this constellation is a cause of most of the problems inherent in traditional procurement procedures. Further, it will offer a comprehensive lifecycle management approach that will ensure the availability of identical safeguards equipment over its required lifespan (ten to fifteen years). It should be noted that an integrated lifecycle management approach will be difficult to implement and will require a fundamental re-orientation of efforts in: need identification, system design and development, funding, and

  15. Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

    1979-02-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use.

  16. Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

  17. Safeguards and security considerations for automated and robotic systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Within the reconfigured Nuclear Weapons Complex there will be a large number of automated and robotic (A ampersand R) systems because of the many benefits derived from their use. To meet the overall security requirements of a facility, consideration must be given to those systems that handle and process nuclear material. Since automation and robotics is a relatively new technology, not widely applied to the Nuclear Weapons Complex, safeguards and security (S ampersand S) issues related to these systems have not been extensively explored, and no guidance presently exists. The goal of this effort is to help integrate S ampersand S into the design of future A ampersand R systems. Towards this, the authors first examined existing A and R systems from a security perspective to identify areas of concern and possible solutions of these problems. They then were able to develop generalized S ampersand S guidance and design considerations for automation and robotics

  18. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  19. 41 CFR 51-9.101-5 - Safeguarding systems of records.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Safeguarding systems of records. 51-9.101-5 Section 51-9.101-5 Public Contracts and Property Management Other Provisions Relating... ACT RULES 9.1-General Policy § 51-9.101-5 Safeguarding systems of records. The Executive...

  20. Some technological aspects of an evaluation and visualisation component for the safeguards integrated information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    According to Safeguards strengthening measures which include both Measures under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Measures under Model Additional Protocol, the Agency receives much more information than some years before. It seems reasonable to develop an integrated information system (IIS) because information evaluation and review are important parts of Safeguards assessments. An integrated information system can include the following components: information search, primary messages selection, evaluation of received information, data storage, visualisation and evaluation of State's nuclear programme (SNP) and elaboration of management decisions. Hereby, IIS is a human-computer system where all components listed above are implemented. Within the framework of SNP a human factor plays an important role. SNP has a number of special properties such as uniqueness, multi-dimensions, subjectivity of its state evaluation, time variation, incompleteness of its description and the mentioned above human factor. For realistic simulation of SNP development it is necessary to reduce usage of quantitative methods and apply methods which are closer to perception of the outward things by a human being. This task requires to convert all available information, both qualitative and quantitative, into a special format. The format requires methods which are being developed on the basis of pragmatic, visual and Zadeh's linguistic variables which define corresponding scales. A pragmatic scale is defined on a basic metric scale taking into account a particular pragmatic cut of SNP. In other words pragmatic scale maps a pragmatic cut of the problem which is important from the point of view of IIS goal. By using pragmatic scales it is possible, for example, to estimate the speed of development of processes existing within the framework of SNP. The visual variable allows to solve the following engineering tasks: input of the expert's evaluations in the system and interpretations of its

  1. A remote verification system for international safeguards: Status of the RECOVER programme in the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The paper describes the current status of the Remote Continual Verification (RECOVER) programme being conducted in the Agency. The programme which started in 1979 with support from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has, as participants, several other Member States besides the U.S.A., namely Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom, the aim being to demonstrate a new system designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. The paper briefly explains the RECOVER concept and the functions of the various components of the system such as the Monitoring Unit (MU), On-Site Multiplexer (OSM) and the Resident Verification Unit (RVU). Results obtained since the installation of the RVU at IAEA Headquarters at the beginning of 1980 are outlined. The feasibility of secure transmission data via public telephone lines was demonstrated. In the initial design these data were supposed to be status-data of containment/surveillance devices such as cameras, seals, CCTV. A later modification permitted the transmission of alpha-numerical texts such as certain inspection forms via RECOVER. With the progress of testing and demonstrating the RECOVER system it was felt necessary to evaluate the cost and benefits of implementing RECOVER for IAEA safeguards. A draft report prepared by the Brookhaven National Laboratory on this subject was the main topic of discussion at the last meeting of RECOVER participants held in June 1982. The paper concludes by identifying certain tasks that need to be successfully completed before RECOVER is ready for routine use by the Agency. (author)

  2. Active Time Domain Reflectometry for Tamper Indication in Unattended Safeguards Systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sheen, David M.; Smith, Leon E.; Tedeschi, Jonathan R.; Moore, David E.; Gavric, Gordan; Conrad, Ryan C.

    2015-07-14

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to expand its use of unattended measurement systems. An increasing number of systems and an expanding family of instruments create challenges in terms of deployment efficiency and the implementation of data authentication measures. In collaboration with the IAEA, tamper-indicating measures to address data-transmission authentication challenges with unattended safeguards systems are under investigation. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is studying the viability of active time-domain reflectometry (TDR) along two parallel but interconnected paths: (1) swept-frequency TDR as the highly flexible, laboratory gold standard to which field-deployable options can be compared, and (2) a low-cost commercially available spread-spectrum TDR technology as one option for field implementation. This paper describes the TDR methods under investigation and the associated benchtop test-bed, tampering scenarios of interest,, and viability measurement results to date (e.g., comparison of relative sensitivity to tamper scenarios).

  3. Cyber Security Evaluation of the Wireless Communication for the Mobile Safeguard Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper introduces cyber security evaluation results and a design of the wireless communication technology to apply to safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. While wireless communication technologies can generally make mobility and efficiency on plant operation, those have seldom been installed on the nuclear I&C systems due to the negative concern of unexpected outcomes that stem from electromagnetic interference and cyber attack. New design of advanced digital safeguard and I&C systems uses computer-based systems for the safeguard and safety functions. On the other hand, those are being exposed to various types of new and existing cyber threats, vulnerabilities and risks which significantly increase the likelihood that those could be compromised. In order to employ the wireless communication technology in safeguard function, licencees assess and manage the potential for adverse effects on safeguard and safety functions so as to provide high assurance that critical functions are properly protected cyber attack. It is expected that the safeguard function, specifically on the area of real-time monitoring, logging, can be enhanced by employing the mobile safeguard devices (: smart phone, laptop, smart pad, etc). In this paper, we deal with the cyber security evaluation, which consists of threat analysis, vulnerability test, establishment of security plan, and design solutions for the wireless communication on the basis of IEEE 802.11(Wi-Fi) protocol. Proposed evaluation and design solution could be a basis for the design of wireless communication and mobile safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. (author)

  4. Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs

  5. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  6. 77 FR 51496 - Federal Acquisition Regulation; Basic Safeguarding of Contractor Information Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-08-24

    ... basic safeguarding of contractor information systems that contain information provided by or generated... contractor information systems. DATES: Interested parties should submit written comments to the Regulatory... information systems that contain or process information provided by or generated for the Government...

  7. System aspects on safeguards for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fritzell, Anni (Dept. of Physics and Astronomy, Uppsala Univ., Uppsala (Sweden))

    2008-03-15

    This thesis has investigated system aspects of safeguarding the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. These aspects include the important notion of continuity of knowledge, the philosophy of verifying measurements and the need to consider the safeguards system as a whole when expanding it to include the encapsulation facility and the geological repository. The research has been analytical in method both in the identification of concrete challenges for the safeguards community in Paper 1, and in the diversion path analysis performed in Paper 2. This method of work is beneficial for example when abstract notions are treated. However, as a suggestion for further work along these lines, a formal systems analysis would be advantageous, and may even reveal properties of the safeguards system that the human mind so far has been to narrow to consider. A systems analysis could be used to model a proposed safeguards approach with the purpose of finding vulnerabilities in its detection probabilities. From the results, capabilities needed to overcome these vulnerabilities could be deduced, thereby formulating formal boundary conditions. These could include: The necessary partial defect level for the NDA measurement; The level of redundancy required in the C/S system to minimize the risk of inconclusive results due to equipment failure; and, Requirements on the capabilities of seismic methods, etc. The field of vulnerability assessment as a tool for systems analysis should be of interest for the safeguards community, as a formal approach could give a new dimension to the credibility of safeguards systems

  8. The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  9. IAEA preparations for the year 2000 compliance of safeguards equipment systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Department of Safeguards, IAEA, has used equipment systems for acquiring relevant data to support safeguards evaluation and verification activities. Typically an equipment system consists of EPROM (embedded system), a connecting personal computer with instrument software for data acquisition, and may include data evaluation software. Complementing the equipment systems is a collection of general evaluation software systems (application software) which support the analysis of the acquired data. In preparing for the year 2000 compliance of all safeguards systems, SGTS (Safeguards Division of Technical Services) in IAEA, must ascertain the equipment systems and the evaluation software authorised for inspection use can properly operate through the passage of year 2000. We present the year 2000 challenge for these systems, the approach we use to tackle the problem, and the status of our year 2000 project. (author)

  10. Virtual Reality based System for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    OpenAIRE

    Goncalves, Joao; MOLTO CARACENA Teofilo; SEQUEIRA Vitor; Vendrell Vidal, Eduardo

    2010-01-01

    Many Nuclear Safeguards applications can benefit from interactive design and simulation tools to be used by planners and inspectors at headquarters. Virtual Reality technologies provide the capability to create accurate, realistic and immersive environments, as well as create ¿objects¿ ¿ representing equipment, measurement devices and radiation sources, with specific properties and behaviours. To be adapted to Safeguards, applications need to reflect the equipment, functions (including the la...

  11. Anomaly detection in an automated safeguards system using neural networks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An automated safeguards system must be able to detect an anomalous event, identify the nature of the event, and recommend a corrective action. Neural networks represent a new way of thinking about basic computational mechanisms for intelligent information processing. In this paper, we discuss the issues involved in applying a neural network model to the first step of this process: anomaly detection in materials accounting systems. We extend our previous model to a 3-tank problem and compare different neural network architectures and algorithms. We evaluate the computational difficulties in training neural networks and explore how certain design principles affect the problems. The issues involved in building a neural network architecture include how the information flows, how the network is trained, how the neurons in a network are connected, how the neurons process information, and how the connections between neurons are modified. Our approach is based on the demonstrated ability of neural networks to model complex, nonlinear, real-time processes. By modeling the normal behavior of the processes, we can predict how a system should be behaving and, therefore, detect when an abnormality occurs

  12. Brazil and the strengthening of safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency: from the four-part agreement to the additional protocol; O Brasil e o fortalecimento do sistema de salvaguardas da Agencia Internacional de Energia Atomica: do acordo quadripartite ao protocolo adicional

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moura, Carmen Lidia Richter Ribeiro

    2001-07-01

    The main objective of this paper is to analyse the evolution of IAEA verification system, that constitutes one of the main fundaments of the Non-proliferation nuclear weapons regimen, and to point out elements that contribute to inform the Brazilian position related to the Model Protocol additional to agreements for safeguard application: instrument that comprehend the most recent multilateral efforts of the nuclear verification

  13. The Text of the Agreement of 2 March 1977 between the Agency and Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of Uranium Concentrate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 2 March 1977 between the Agency and Pakistan for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of uranium concentrate from Niger is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force pursuant to Article 24, on 2 March 1977.

  14. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Nepal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Nepal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  16. Agreement of 13 December 1991 between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 7 December 1991 and signed in Vienna on 13 December 1991

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In accordance with Protocol Number II to the Agreement of 29 February 1972 between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this Agreement has been replaced by the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency, which entered into force on 21 February 1977

  18. Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities of Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to all Nuclear Material in all Peaceful Nuclear Activities of Ukraine is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 28 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 13 January 1995

  19. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  20. Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Ukraine to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1995, signed in Vienna on 21 September 1995, and entered into force on 22 January 1998

  1. International acceptability of advanced safeguarding techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    There are active development programs now under way to significantly enhance the effectiveness of international safeguarding. Advanced safeguarding techniques now under development include new material accounting methods utilizing nondestructive assay techniques, more reliable surveillance instrumentation, tamper-resistant and tamper-indicating seals, new means of utilizing continuous human inspection, and systems that incorporate both passive and active use-denial technologies. Before these new safeguarding techniques are utilized, however, they must be acceptable to the international community. This will unquestionably result in a compromise between what is technically feasible and what is politically acceptable. This report highlights many of the elements common to advanced safeguarding techniques that impact directly upon international acceptability. The concept of acceptability is viewed from the perspective of three different groups: (1) those States seeking upgraded safeguards, (2) those States having safeguards imposed upon them, and (3) the International Atomic Energy Agency. In general, a more conducive climate exists today for the acceptance of advanced safeguarding techniques than at any period in the past; but the differences between advanced safeguards and those safeguards being employed today are so large that considerable opposition to their implementation can be expected

  2. Challenging curriculum. Training the IAEA international safeguards inspectorate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Each year, the IAEA recruits a group of highly qualified specialists to join its experienced international team of safeguards inspectors. Their work will take them to nuclear facilities around the world, to utilize instrumentation and gather information for verifying national pledges that nuclear activities and materials under IAEA safeguards are exclusively used for peaceful purposes, and in those States which have signed a protocol in addition to their safeguards agreement, they will provide assurances that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials. Under more than 220 safeguards agreements with 139 States, the IAEA has served as the world's nuclear safeguards inspectorate for the past four decades. The Agency carries out verification activities at more than 900 facilities worldwide, conducting about 2200 inspections a year. Before the new inspectors take to the field, however, they enter the classroom - participating in an extensive series of IAEA training courses, workshops, and seminars. The courses comprehensively cover the nuclear fuel cycle, the IAEA's safeguards role and responsibilities, and the skills and competence that safeguards inspectors need to do their jobs effectively and efficiently. Once on the job, training reinforces the evolving safeguards mission. Under the Agency's 'enhanced' safeguards training curriculum, experienced inspectors participate in seminars and courses designed to upgrade their skills and keep them fully informed of safeguards developments with respect to, for example, legal responsibilities, technological capabilities, and inspection procedures. The enhanced curriculum was developed in response to the IAEA's increasing safeguards responsibilities. The system has been strengthened in many ways since 1991, particularly for detecting any undeclared nuclear material and activities that should have been declared by a State under its safeguards agreement. This article presents an overview of the IAEA's safeguards

  3. Development of a Safeguard System Using an Episomal Mammalian Artificial Chromosome for Gene and Cell Therapy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Uno, Narumi; Uno, Katsuhiro; Komoto, Shinya; Suzuki, Teruhiko; Hiratsuka, Masaharu; Osaki, Mitsuhiko; Kazuki, Yasuhiro; Oshimura, Mitsuo

    2015-01-01

    The development of a safeguard system to remove tumorigenic cells would allow safer clinical applications of stem cells for the treatment of patients with an intractable disease including genetic disorders. Such safeguard systems should not disrupt the host genome and should have long-term stability. Here, we attempted to develop a tumor-suppressing mammalian artificial chromosome containing a safeguard system that uses the immune rejection system against allogeneic tissue from the host. For proof-of-concept of the safeguard system, B16F10 mouse melanoma cells expressing the introduced H2-K(d) major histocompatibility complex (MHC class I)-allogenic haplotype were transplanted into recipient C57BL/6J mice expressing MHC H2-K(b). Subcutaneous implantation of B16F10 cells into C57BL/6J mice resulted in high tumorigenicity. The volume of tumors derived from B16F10 cells expressing allogenic MHC H2-K(d) was decreased significantly (P < 0.01). Suppression of MHC H2-K(d)-expressing tumors in C57BL/6J mice was enhanced by immunization with MHC H2-K(d)-expressing splenocytes (P < 0.01). These results suggest that the safeguard system is capable of suppressing tumor formation by the transplanted cells. PMID:26670279

  4. Active Time-Domain Reflectometry for Unattended Safeguards Systems FY15 Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tedeschi, Jonathan R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Smith, Leon E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Moore, David E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sheen, David M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Conrad, Ryan C. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Gavric, Gordan [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2015-09-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to expand its use of unattended measurement systems. An increasing number of systems and an expanding family of instruments create challenges in terms of deployment efficiency and the implementation of data authentication measures. In collaboration with the IAEA, tamper-indicating measures to address data-transmission authentication challenges with unattended safeguards systems are under investigation. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is studying the viability of active time-domain reflectometry (TDR) along two parallel but interconnected paths: (1) swept-frequency TDR as the highly flexible, laboratory gold standard to which field-deployable options can be compared, and (2) a low-cost commercially available spread-spectrum TDR technology as one option for field implementation. This report describes PNNL’s FY15 progress in the viability study including: an overview of the TDR methods under investigation; description of the testing configurations and mock tampering scenarios; results from a preliminary sensitivity comparison of the two TDR methods; demonstration of a quantitative metric for estimating field performance that acknowledges the need for high detection probability while minimizing false alarms. FY15 progress reported here sets the stage for a rigorous comparison of the candidate TDR methods, over a range of deployment scenarios and perturbing effects typical of IAEA unattended monitoring systems.

  5. Active Time-Domain Reflectometry for Unattended Safeguards Systems FY15 Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tedeschi, Jonathan R.; Smith, Leon E.; Moore, David E.; Sheen, David M.; Conrad, Ryan C.; Gavric, Gordan

    2016-09-30

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to expand its use of unattended measurement systems. An increasing number of systems and an expanding family of instruments create challenges in terms of deployment efficiency and the implementation of data authentication measures. In collaboration with the IAEA, tamper-indicating measures to address data-transmission authentication challenges with unattended safeguards systems are under investigation. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is studying the viability of active time-domain reflectometry (TDR) along two parallel but interconnected paths: (1) swept-frequency TDR as the highly flexible, laboratory gold standard to which field-deployable options can be compared, and (2) a low-cost commercially available spread-spectrum TDR technology as one option for field implementation. This report describes PNNL’s FY15 progress in the viability study including: an overview of the TDR methods under investigation; description of the testing configurations and mock tampering scenarios; results from a preliminary sensitivity comparison of the two TDR methods; demonstration of a quantitative metric for estimating field performance that acknowledges the need for high detection probability while minimizing false alarms. FY15 progress reported here sets the stage for a rigorous comparison of the candidate TDR methods, over a range of deployment scenarios and perturbing effects typical of IAEA unattended monitoring systems.

  6. 75 FR 78777 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Renewal

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-12-16

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office ] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Renewal AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission... accident phenomena; design of nuclear power plant structures, systems and components; materials...

  7. The Text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 between Ethiopia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 and of the Protocol thereto between Ethiopia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 December 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  8. The Text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977 between Singapore and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Singapore and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  9. Reactor safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Russell, Charles R

    2013-01-01

    Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

  10. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  11. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  12. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

  13. The text of the Agreement of 14 July 1980 between Indonesia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The full text of the agreement between Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  14. 18 CFR 3b.204 - Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... information in manual and computer-based record systems. 3b.204 Section 3b.204 Conservation of Power and Water... Collection of Records § 3b.204 Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems. (a) The administrative and physical controls to protect the information in the manual and computer-based record...

  15. Protocol Additional to the agreement between France, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between France, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in France is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 16 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 30 April 2004, the date on which the Agency received written notification that the European Atomic Energy Community and France had met their respective internal requirements for entry into force

  16. Towards unified performance measures for evaluating nuclear safeguard systems: mathematical foundations and formal comparison of existing models

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An important step in the analysis of large-scale systems is the development of economical and meaningful measures of system performance. In the literature on analysis of nuclear safeguard systems, many performance measures have been advanced, but their interrelationships and their relevance to overall system objectives have not received attention commensurate with the effort spent in developing detailed safeguard models. The work reported here is an attempt to improve the development and evaluation of performance measures for nuclear safeguard systems. This work falls into three main areas. First, we develop a new framework which provides an initial basis for defining and structuring performance measures. To demonstrate that this framework allows a clear understanding of the purposes of nuclear safeguard systems, we employ it to state various safeguard questions clearly and concisely. The framework reflects the rough subsystem structure of safeguard systems - the detection and response subsystems - and formally accommodates various safeguard models. We especially emphasize two of these models which are under development at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, the structured assessment approach (SAA) and the systems vulnerability assessment method (SVAM). Second, we examine some performance measures presently used in the nuclear safeguards area and in reliability theory in general. Some of these we accept and modify to obtain system performance measures that are an additive combination of subsystem performance measures, a very convenient form indeed. Others we reject as impractical and meaningless. Finally, we determine some common features between the SAA and SVAM models by formally comparing these models in our framework

  17. Towards unified performance measures for evaluating nuclear safeguard systems: mathematical foundations and formal comparison of existing models

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Corynen, G.C.

    1979-05-15

    An important step in the analysis of large-scale systems is the development of economical and meaningful measures of system performance. In the literature on analysis of nuclear safeguard systems, many performance measures have been advanced, but their interrelationships and their relevance to overall system objectives have not received attention commensurate with the effort spent in developing detailed safeguard models. The work reported here is an attempt to improve the development and evaluation of performance measures for nuclear safeguard systems. This work falls into three main areas. First, we develop a new framework which provides an initial basis for defining and structuring performance measures. To demonstrate that this framework allows a clear understanding of the purposes of nuclear safeguard systems, we employ it to state various safeguard questions clearly and concisely. The framework reflects the rough subsystem structure of safeguard systems - the detection and response subsystems - and formally accommodates various safeguard models. We especially emphasize two of these models which are under development at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, the structured assessment approach (SAA) and the systems vulnerability assessment method (SVAM). Second, we examine some performance measures presently used in the nuclear safeguards area and in reliability theory in general. Some of these we accept and modify to obtain system performance measures that are an additive combination of subsystem performance measures, a very convenient form indeed. Others we reject as impractical and meaningless. Finally, we determine some common features between the SAA and SVAM models by formally comparing these models in our framework.

  18. International safeguards data management system. System description: Version 1.1.; Release PLI 82

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This document describes a nuclear material accountancy system which has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. Throughout the report, the data base system is referred to as ''ISADAM'', i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System. The system provides tools for a safeguards authority to decide whether an operators MUF (Material Unaccounted For) can be accounted for as an accumulation of operator measurement errors. The principle objective of the applications programs described here is to provide a variance analysis of MUF in which the variance of MUF is computed as a function of the accounting declarations and the error characteristics of the operator measurement system. A overview of ISADAM is presented; then, a detailed description of the processing applied by the system is given. A description of the parameter information required by the four autonomous programs ISADAM is presented. In developing ISADAM, one of the prime factors taken into consideration was the ease with which it could be used

  19. Executive summary of the special safeguards study on material control and accounting systems. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report assesses the feasibility of real-time systems applied to mixed-oxide fuel rod fabrication. Their interaction with other material control and accounting measures are considered. Economics, effectiveness, and acceptance factors are discussed. A cost-benefit evaluation is made and recommendations given for safeguards improvements

  20. The evolution of information-driven safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Budlong-sylvester, Kory W [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-10-14

    From the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards in the 1990s, to current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to deal with cases of noncompliance, the question of how the Agency can best utilize all the information available to it remains of great interest and increasing importance. How might the concept of 'information-driven' safeguards (IDS) evolve in the future? The ability of the Agency to identify and resolve anomalies has always been important and has emerged as a core Agency function in recent years as the IAEA has had to deal with noncompliance in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Future IAEA safeguards implementation should be designed with the goal of facilitating and enhancing this vital capability. In addition, the Agency should utilize all the information it possesses, including its in-house assessments and expertise, to direct its safeguards activities. At the State level, knowledge of proliferation possibilities is currently being used to guide the analytical activities of the Agency and to develop inspection plans. How far can this approach be extended? Does it apply across State boundaries? Should it dictate a larger fraction of safeguards activities? Future developments in IDS should utilize the knowledge resident within the Agency to ensure that safeguards resources flow to where they are most needed in order to address anomalies first and foremost, but also to provide greater confidence in conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The elements of such a system and related implementation issues are assessed in this paper.

  1. Development and implementation of international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The unique institution of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards has been commented on at length by both technicians and politicians. IAEA safeguards have variously been extolled as a great international break-through and model for other arms control verification regimes and alternatively as a not very credible arrangement with many weaknesses and contradictions and which cannot, essentially by definition, do the job it's supposed to do. The 1981 bombing by Israel of the safeguarded Iraqi research reactor at Tuwaitha is used by both extremes to support their positions. As a physicist who has been working in this area, among others, for several years it seems to me that neither side is giving the reality of IAEA safeguards a fair deal. The bottom line on safeguards is to ensure that nuclear material, especially plutonium or highly enriched uranium (>20% U-236 but usually 93% U-235) under safeguards, is not used to make nuclear explosives or to further other military purposes. In the first instance they are pretty good and do represent a major concession by sovereign states; but the structure of the safeguards regime was designed in another era. The system has its flaws technically, but it is also a political system which, because of its dual nature can and does do a very useful and important job for the international community

  2. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including

  3. The remote monitoring systems LOVER and RECOVER for international safeguards technical, economic and legal aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The electronic remote monitoring systems RECOVER and LOVER were developed to comply with the IAEA's tasks concerning international nuclear materials safeguards with the aim of reducing the inspection expenditure and enhancing control effectiveness. The present study on the technical, economic and legal aspects of an application of these systems is intended to show possible implications and provide argumentation aids for discussions on the application of these systems. RECOVER and LOVER offer the possibility of establishing a direct communication path between containment and surveillance system (c/s), instruments at the site of application and a central monitoring station. The demonstration versions of both systems have shown that remote interrogation of data under safeguards-specific boundary conditions (e.g. requirement of tamper safety) will be technically feasible. (orig./HP)

  4. International and regional safeguards inspector training guidelines

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Recent international developments have prompted a need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the supporting international safeguards system, and related new inspection requirements. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in carrying out its responsibilities for international safeguards, and in coordination with other U.S. agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), initiated a study to identify training programs, techniques, and technologies that might enhance implementation of international nuclear safeguards inspections. As a result, an analysis of training needs was conducted and a set of guidelines was developed to assist in meeting future international safeguards inspection requirements. The objectives of the analysis and guidelines were to (1) to identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for international safeguards inspections with emphasis of new requirements; (2) identify training needs and resources available; and (3) sharpen the sense and understanding of the inspector's role. This paper summarizes the findings of this study and discusses potential applications of new training technologies to safeguards inspectors' needs

  5. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and

  6. Computerized real-time materials accountability system for safeguards material control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A real-time, computer-based system is described which provides safeguards material control at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Originally installed in 1972 to provide computerized real-time fissile materials accountability for criticality control purposes, the system has been expanded to provide accountability of all source and nuclear materials (SNM) and to utilize the on-line inventory files in support of the Laboratory physical protection and surveillance procedures. (auth)

  7. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS,INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME I/III SETTING THE STAGE: 1991-1996

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Events in Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to be improved. It had failed, after all, to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program even though some of Iraq's's activities had been pursued at inspected facilities in buildings adjacent to ones being inspected by the IAEA. Although there were aspects of the implementation of safeguards where the IAEA needed to improve, the primary limitations were considered to be part of the safeguards system itself. That system was based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, to which Iraq was a party, and implemented on the basis of a model NPT safeguards agreement, published by the IAEA 1972 as INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The agreement calls for states to accept and for the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in the state. Iraq was a party to such an agreement, but it violated the agreement by concealing nuclear material and other nuclear activities from the IAEA. Although the IAEA was inspecting in Iraq, it was hindered by aspects of the agreement that essentially limited its access to points in declared facilities and provided the IAEA with little information about nuclear activities anywhere else in Iraq. As a result, a major review of the NPT safeguards system was initiated by its Director General and Member States with the objective of finding the best means to enable the IAEA to detect both diversions from declared stocks and any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. Significant improvements that could be made within existing legal authority were taken quickly, most importantly a change in 1992 in how and when and what design information would be reported to the IAEA. During 1991-1996, the IAEA pursued intensive study, legal and technical analysis, and field trials and held numerous consultations with Member States. The Board of Governors discussed the issue of strengthening safeguards

  8. The Text of the Agreement between the Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Lesotho to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  9. Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  10. The Text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Senegal to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

  14. The text of the Agreement of 21 February 1985 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency for the application of safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of the Soviet Union to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in peaceful nuclear facilities, namely several nuclear power stations and nuclear research reactors to be designated by the Soviet Union within its territory with a view to enabling the Agency to verify that such material is not withdrawn. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000

  17. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Shirley J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2011-10-10

    The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA draws such conclusions from the evaluation of all available information. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of this “State-level” approach. Efficiently used, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) methodologies , , , now being developed can contribute to effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards. The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) introduced here supports SBD in three areas. 1. It describes necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner / designer of a new or modified facility to determine where SBD efforts can be productively applied, 2. It presents a screening approach intended to identify potential safeguard issues for; a) design changes to existing facilities; b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with approved safeguards approaches, and c) new designs, 3. It identifies resources (the FSA toolkit), such as good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods that can be used by the owner/designer to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA. FSA presents a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools developed in other efforts. The more a design evolves, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues could be introduced. Likewise, for first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, it is reasonable to expect that a number of possible safeguards issues might exist. Accordingly, FSA is intended to help the designer and its safeguards experts identify early in the design process: • Areas where elements of previous accepted safeguards approach(es) may be applied

  18. Nuclear safeguards; Salvaguardias nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zurron, O.

    2015-07-01

    Safeguards control at the Juzbado Plant is implemented through the joint IAEA/EURATOM partnership approach in force within the European Union for all nuclear facilities. this verification agreement is designed to minimize burden on the operators whilst ensuring that both inspectorate achieve the objectives related to their respective safeguards regimes. This paper outlines the safeguards approaches followed by the inspectorate and the particularities of the Juzbado Plants nuclear material accountancy and control system. (Authors)

  19. The safeguards options study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state

  20. The safeguards options study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  1. Safeguarding trust in Irish Official Statistics: A code of practice for the Irish statistical system

    OpenAIRE

    Dalton, Padraig

    2014-01-01

    Symposium: Safeguarding Trust in Official Statistics – Launching a Code of Practice for the Irish Statistical System For official statistics to be of value they must be trusted. Achieving and maintaining trust requires that statistics are produced in an objective, transparent and independent manner. In many countries codes of practice for official statistics have been developed to enshrine those principles and protect trust. While compilers of European statistics are expected to comply wit...

  2. Safeguard Application Options for the Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laughter, Mark D [ORNL

    2008-10-01

    Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) are developing a Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS) for advanced safeguards at nuclear facilities. LBIMS uses a low-power laser transceiver to monitor the presence and position of items with retroreflective tags. The primary advantages of LBIMS are its scalability to continuously monitor a wide range of items, its ability to operate unattended, its low cost of implementation, and its inherent information security due to its line-of-sight and non-broadcasting operation. The primary proposed safeguard application of LBIMS is described in its name: item monitoring. LBIMS could be implemented in a storage area to continuously monitor containers of nuclear material and the area in which they are stored. The system could be configured to provide off-site notification if any of the containers are moved or removed or if the area is accessed. Individual tags would be used to monitor storage containers, and additional tags could be used to record information regarding secondary storage units and room access. The capability to register small changes in tag position opens up the possibility of several other uses. These include continuously monitoring piping arrangements for design information verification or recording equipment positions for other safeguards systems, such as tracking the opening and closing of autoclaves as part of a cylinder tracking system or opening and closing valves on a sample or product take-off line. Combined with attribute tags, which transmit information from any kind of sensor by modulating the laser signal, LBIMS provides the capability to wirelessly and securely collect safeguards data, even in areas where radio-frequency or other wireless communication methods are not practicable. Four application types are described in this report: static item monitoring, in-process item monitoring with trigger tags, multi-layered integration with trigger tags, and line-of-sight data transfer with

  3. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

  4. Integrating virtual reality applications in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Virtual reality (VR) tools have already been developed and deployed in the nuclear industry, including in nuclear power plant construction, project management, equipment and system design, and training. Recognized as powerful tools for, inter alia, integration of data, simulation of activities, design of facilities, validation of concepts and mission planning, their application in nuclear safeguards is still very limited. However, VR tools may eventually offer transformative potential for evolving the future safeguards system to be more fully information-driven. The paper focuses especially on applications in the area of training that have been underway in the Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also outlines future applications envisioned for safeguards information and knowledge management, and information-analytic collaboration. The paper identifies some technical and programmatic pre-requisites for realizing the integrative potential of VR technologies. If developed with an orientation to integrating applications through compatible platforms, software, and models, virtual reality tools offer the long-term potential of becoming a real 'game changer,' enabling a qualitative leap in the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear safeguards. The IAEA invites Member States, industry, and academia to make proposals as to how such integrating potential in the use of virtual reality technology for nuclear safeguards could be realized. (author)

  5. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

  6. Protocol between the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol between the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol on 21 March 2000. It was signed on 22 March 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 16 October 2007, the date on which the Agency received from the Russian Federation written notification that the procedures of the Russian Federation required for entry into force had been met

  7. Safe-Guarded Agent Design Pattern for Mechatronic Systems

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Phong, Dao Ba; Vries, de Theo J.A.; Amerongen, van Job

    2010-01-01

    To support the application of real-time Multi-Agent Control Systems (MACS) for mechatronic systems, a combination between the MACS design approach and OROCOS framework has been implemented: the OROCOS-based Implementation Framework for MACS (OROMACS). This paper presents our research results to make

  8. Consultants' report on meeting for development of technical criteria for termination of safeguards for material categorized as measured discards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The following view is held by the consultants. The Agency should have criteria which can be used in the field and which can be used by an inspector to answer the question of whether a particular batch of material presented for termination of safeguards does, in fact, qualify for the termination of safeguards. To maintain the credibility of safeguards, the criteria of termination should be such that termination of waste is not the weak link in the safeguards system. That is, that given a choice, a potential diverter would choose to obtain nuclear material he needs from a source other than recovery from waste upon which safeguards has been terminated

  9. Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  10. Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 20 March 2001. It was signed on 11 June 2002 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 16 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Niger written notification that Niger's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  11. Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001

  12. Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 3 May 2005 in New York. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of the Marshall Islands and the Agency

  13. Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001

  14. Evaluations of the commercial spectrometer systems for safeguards applications using the germanium detectors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vo, D.T.

    1998-12-31

    Safeguards applications require the best spectrometer systems with excellent resolution, stability, and throughput. Instruments must perform well in all the situations and environments. Data communication to the computer should be convenient, fast, and reliable. The software should have all the necessary tools and be ease to use. Portable systems should be small in size, lightweight, and have a long battery life. Nine commercially available spectrometer systems are tested with both the planar and coaxial germanium detectors. Considering the performance of the Digital Signal Processors (DSP), digital-based spectroscopy may be the future of gamma-ray spectroscopy.

  15. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shipley, J.P. (comp.)

    1982-09-01

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

  16. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer

  17. A removable optical sealing system for application to international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A removable, optically verifiable sealing system for CANDU spent fuel storage facilities has been developed. The seal is based on the use of unique crystal patterns formed in a pure metal identity/integrity element and has been designed for easy installation and removal using simple tooling. Since the seal is optically verified, a wide range of commercial instruments, including those in use by the IAEA, can be used to verify it. Futhermore, optical verification allows the level of scrutiny to be matched with the degree of confidence required to be confident that spent fuel has not been diverted

  18. Safeguarding the provision of ecosystem services in catchment systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Everard, Mark

    2013-04-01

    A narrow technocentric focus on a few favored ecosystem services (generally provisioning services) has led to ecosystem degradation globally, including catchment systems and their capacities to support human well-being. Increasing recognition of the multiple benefits provided by ecosystems is slowly being translated into policy and some areas of practice, although there remains a significant shortfall in the incorporation of a systemic perspective into operation management and decision-making tools. Nevertheless, a range of ecosystem-based solutions to issues as diverse as flooding and green space provision in the urban environment offers hope for improving habitat and optimization of beneficial services. The value of catchment ecosystem processes and their associated services is also being increasingly recognized and internalized by the water industry, improving water quality and quantity through catchment land management rather than at greater expense in the treatment costs of contaminated water abstracted lower in catchments. Parallel recognition of the value of working with natural processes, rather than "defending" built assets when catchment hydrology is adversely affected by unsympathetic upstream development, is being progressively incorporated into flood risk management policy. This focus on wider catchment processes also yields a range of cobenefits for fishery, wildlife, amenity, flood risk, and other interests, which may be optimized if multiple stakeholders and their diverse value systems are included in decision-making processes. Ecosystem services, particularly implemented as a central element of the ecosystem approach, provide an integrated framework for building in these different perspectives and values, many of them formerly excluded, into commercial and resource management decision-making processes, thereby making tractable the integrative aspirations of sustainable development. This can help redress deeply entrenched inherited assumptions

  19. Past, Present and Future of Safeguards in Lithuania

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Davainis, Marius [State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI), Vilnius (Lithuania)

    2003-05-01

    Changing Safeguards climate has been a phenomenon for already ten years in Lithuania. Since the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in 1992, two distinctive periods of five years could be discerned. Safeguards was a new matter in Lithuania back in 1992 and its perception was not a one day work. For instance, development of the national system of accounting for and control of nuclear material took years. Safeguards implementation in Lithuania was not a simple and easy task for the IAEA either. The Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant inherited by Lithuania from the Soviet Union brought its particularity, as there was no precedent experience in safeguarding the RBMK type reactors. Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguards Agreement and the national regulation for nuclear material accounting and control came into force in 1997. That year could be considered as the end of the first five- year period, which could be called an initial stage of Safeguards application in Lithuania. In March 1998 Lithuania signed the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement. After two years it was ratified and came into force on the 5th of July 2000. That was a certain change and a new stage of Safeguards application in Lithuania. The year 2000 was also the time when the EURATOM system appeared on the horizon. The 1st of January 2004 is the most likely date of accession of Lithuania to the European Union and it can be said that Safeguards in Lithuania is heading to the next generation. This paper is aimed to review developments, which took place and the experience gained through the ten years of Safeguards application in Lithuania and also to present some considerations about the approaching changes.

  20. The nuclear safeguards system and the process of global governance accountability

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles, E-mail: xavier@cnen.gov.b [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Coordenacao Geral de Planejamento e Avaliacao

    2011-07-01

    Due to rising energy costs and climate concerns, nuclear energy is again being seriously considered as an energy source for several countries. Along with the resurgence of nuclear energy comes the concern of the world if these countries will develop their programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If on one hand the growth potential of nuclear energy should not be stifled, on the other hand it is imperative that a climate of mutual trust is developed, respecting the right of each country to develop its nuclear program without taking a climate of mistrust to a possible 'intention' behind the pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mechanisms of accountability of global governance are institutionalized at the institutional architecture of the international process of nuclear safeguards, more specifically to the nuclear fuel cycle, so that abuses of power in this sphere does not happen, both by countries that aspire to develop projects nuclear, and by the suppliers of technology. In this context, the case study of Brazil and Argentina gained importance, because these two countries have a single binational organization of nuclear safeguards in the world: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC. In the theoretical question, the paper tries to understand what happens with the process of legitimacy and authority of the organizations of global governance by analyzing the degree of publicness and constrictiveness. This work intends to focus on the role of ABACC as an interstate institution of accountability, which has a key role to control the nation States of Brazil and Argentina regarding the appropriate use of nuclear material used in their programs, and analyze how this Agency behaves within of tension legitimacy-authority, taking into account existing studies on accountability in global governance. (author)

  1. The nuclear safeguards system and the process of global governance accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Due to rising energy costs and climate concerns, nuclear energy is again being seriously considered as an energy source for several countries. Along with the resurgence of nuclear energy comes the concern of the world if these countries will develop their programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If on one hand the growth potential of nuclear energy should not be stifled, on the other hand it is imperative that a climate of mutual trust is developed, respecting the right of each country to develop its nuclear program without taking a climate of mistrust to a possible 'intention' behind the pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mechanisms of accountability of global governance are institutionalized at the institutional architecture of the international process of nuclear safeguards, more specifically to the nuclear fuel cycle, so that abuses of power in this sphere does not happen, both by countries that aspire to develop projects nuclear, and by the suppliers of technology. In this context, the case study of Brazil and Argentina gained importance, because these two countries have a single binational organization of nuclear safeguards in the world: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC. In the theoretical question, the paper tries to understand what happens with the process of legitimacy and authority of the organizations of global governance by analyzing the degree of publicness and constrictiveness. This work intends to focus on the role of ABACC as an interstate institution of accountability, which has a key role to control the nation States of Brazil and Argentina regarding the appropriate use of nuclear material used in their programs, and analyze how this Agency behaves within of tension legitimacy-authority, taking into account existing studies on accountability in global governance. (author)

  2. Physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. Safeguards and the role of the IAEA in physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The physical protection and security of nuclear facilities and materials concerns utilities, manufactures, the general public, and those who are responsible for licensing and regulating such facilities. The requirements and process to ensure an acceptable physical protection and security system have been evolutionary in nature. This paper reviews the first step of such process: the State's safeguards system and the international safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the relationship between these two safeguards systems. The elements of these systems that are reviewed include the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, physical protection measures, and containment and surveillance measures. In addition, the interactions between the State, the facility operator, and the IAEA are described. The paper addresses the IAEA safeguards system, including material accountancy and containment and surveillance; the State safeguards system, including material control and accountancy, and physical protection; the role of the IAEA in physical protection; a summary of safeguards system interactions.(author)

  3. Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Azerbaijan to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 6 November 1998, and entered into force on 29 April 1999. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  4. Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Safeguards Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Abu Dhabi on 15 December 2002. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 9 October 2003, the date upon which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  5. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  6. Process Monitoring for Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Process Monitoring has long been used to evaluate industrial processes and operating conditions in nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. In nuclear applications there is a recognized need to demonstrate the safeguards benefits from using advanced process monitoring on spent fuel reprocessing technologies and associated facilities, as a complement to nuclear materials accounting. This can be accomplished by: defining credible diversion pathway scenarios as a sample problem; using advanced sensor and data analysis techniques to illustrate detection capabilities; and formulating 'event detection' methodologies as a means to quantify performance of the safeguards system. Over the past 30 years there have been rapid advances and improvement in the technology associated with monitoring and control of industrial processes. In the context of bulk handling facilities that process nuclear materials, modern technology can provide more timely information on the location and movement of nuclear material to help develop more effective safeguards. For international safeguards, inspection means verification of material balance data as reported by the operator through the State to the international inspectorate agency. This verification recognizes that the State may be in collusion with the operator to hide clandestine activities, potentially during abnormal process conditions with falsification of data to mask the removal. Records provided may show material is accounted for even though a removal occurred. Process monitoring can offer additional fidelity during a wide variety of operating conditions to help verify the declaration or identify possible diversions. The challenge is how to use modern technology for process monitoring and control in a proprietary operating environment subject to safeguards inspectorate or other regulatory oversight. Under the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a range of potential safeguards applications

  7. The NINO [No Inspector, No Operator system] cask-loading safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It is, in general difficult to determine by means of camera-surveillance techniques what is loaded into spent-fuel casks being prepared for shipment from light-water reactors to other reactors, reprocessing facilities, or long-term storage. Furthermore, the expected high frequency of cask loadings in the coming years would place too great a burden on the IAEA and Euratom inspectorates if each had to be observed by an inspector. For the case of shipment to other reactors and reprocessing facilities, the casks are soon opened and, in principle, their contents could be ascertained by direct inspection. In the case of long-term-storage facilities, the casks would stay sealed for years, thereby requiring the IAEA to know positively how many spent-fuel assemblies were loaded at the reactor and to have a continuity of knowledge of the cask's contents. It has been proposed instead that the facility operator place the cask seal on the cask within the field of view of a surveillance system linked to the cask seal. This solution, however, may not provide enough credibility for acceptance by the safeguards community. This paper presents an alternative to both inspector presence at cask loading and operator assistance in applying seals; this alternative is called the No Inspector, No Operator system (NINO)

  8. Integrated safeguards and the role of the SSAC: an Australian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    'Classical' safeguards retain a strong emphasis on facility-based materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major efforts are being made to establish the Agency's capabilities in this regard. Current priorities include, ensuring the wide-spread conclusion of individual Additional Protocols so the Strengthened Safeguards System enters into general application without delay, and continuing the development of new methodologies - including associated quality assurance and evaluation. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalisation of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. The strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system is a matter of the highest priority to Australia. Australia has had a major influence in this process, that is provision of consultancy services to the Agency on new safeguards and analytical techniques, and in the development and field testing of new safeguards technology such as remote surveillance. (Yi, J. H.)

  9. The CANDU irradiated fuel safeguards sealing system at the threshold of implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The development of a safeguards containment and surveillance system for the irradiated fuel discharged from CANDU nuclear generating stations has inspired the development of three different sealing technologies. Each seal type utilizes a random seal identity of different design. The AECL Random Coil (ARC) Seal combines the identity and integrity elements in the ultrasonic signature of a wire coil. Two variants of an optical seal have been developed which features identity elements of crystalline zirconium and aluminum. The sealed cap-seal uses a conventional IAEA 'Type X Seal' (wire seal). The essential features and relative merits of each seal design are described

  10. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  11. The text of the agreement of 5 December 1974 between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 5 December 1974, and the Protocol thereto, between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agreement entered into force on 21 February 1978

  12. The Text of the Agreement between New Zealand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between New Zealand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  13. Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  14. Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Dominican Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  15. The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Ghana to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  16. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  17. Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Panama to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 March 1984 between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  18. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  19. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  20. The Texts of Instruments connected with the Agency's Supply of Uranium to Japan. Letters relating to the Agency's Safeguards and Health and Safety measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    On 2 March 1962 the Director General, pursuant to a decision taken by the Board of Governors on 28 February, addressed a letter to the Governor from Japan cancelling those provisions of the letter of 24 March 1959 that related to the safeguards against diversion applicable to the JRR-3 research reactor project. On 20 June the Director General, pursuant to a decision taken by the Board on 14 June, addressed a further letter to the Governor cancelling the remaining provisions of the letter of 24 March 1959, which related to health and safety measures for the project. The texts of the two letters in question are reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  1. Agreement of 18 November 1993 between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 February 1975 and signed in Vienna on 31 October 1990 and in Nuku'Alofa on 18 November 1993

  2. Agreement of 22 September 1994 between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 22 September 1994

  3. Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 2 December 1993 and signed in Vienna on 6 December 1993 and in Riga on 21 December 1993

  4. Agreement of 30 September 1993 between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 September 1993 and signed in Vienna on 30 September 1993. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 5 May 1994

  5. Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994

  6. Instrumentation for international safeguards. Present and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    On-site inspection supported by instrumentation has become the primary verification mode for international safeguards. The custom designed instrumentation for measurement, monitoring, sealing and containment has become the essential tools to support inspectors. At present, 76 instruments or instrumental systems are authorized for inspection use by IAEA. The global summary of IAEA safeguard statistics for 1992 is shown. Also field instrumentation use is shown. The Agency is in the transitional mode for optical surveillance from films to CCTV units. One-time use seals are predominantly employed, but the use of in-situ verifiable seals is increasing. It is noted that instrumentation has become an essential tool for safeguard effectiveness. Instrumentation is generally 'dumb' in the sense that it provides inspectors with specific information that must be interpreted and integrated with other data before drawing safeguard conclusion. The positive features of in-situ instrumentation are shown. A prime example of in-situ instruments is core discharge monitor. Also high count rate gamma spectrometry system and improved Cerenkov viewing device are described. As the equipment carried by inspectors to facilities, miniature CdTe detector probe is shown. Safeguard instrumentation needs for future and the instrumentation activities presently underway are described. (K.I.)

  7. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  8. Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

  9. IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

  10. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992. It was signed on 21 May 1992 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  11. Agreement between the Republic of Namibia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Republic of Namibia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 17 March 1998, signed in Vienna on 19 March 1998, and entered into force on 15 April 1998

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Armenia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997, and it will enter into force on the date the Agency receives written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Pending entry into force, this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature, i.e., 29 September 1997

  13. Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992, It was signed on 28 July 1992 in Vienna and on 26 August 1992 in Geneva. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2005. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  14. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Czech Republic to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 9 September 1996, signed in Vienna on 18 September 1996 and entered into force on 11 September 1997

  15. Part 7. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report describes fissile nuclear material safeguards technology, both current and developmental, and discusses the possible application of this technology to FBR systems. The proliferation risks associated with both subnational and national-level diversion are addressed

  16. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  17. Containment and surveillance - A principal IAEA safeguards measure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is in its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future

  18. Two low-level gamma spectrometry systems of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parus, J.L. [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Raab, W. [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Donohue, D. [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Jansta, V. [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Kierzek, J. [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria)

    1997-03-01

    A gamma spectrometry system designed for the measurement of samples with low and medium radioactivity (activity from a few to about 10{sup 4} Bq in the energy range from 25 to 2700 keV) has been installed at the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf. The system consists of 3 low level detectors: (1) n-type coaxial Ge with 42.4% relative efficiency, 1.85 keV FWHM at 1.33 MeV (2) planar Ge with 2000 mm{sup 2} area and 20 mm thickness, 562 eV FWHM at 122 keV (3) NaI(Tl) annulus of 25.4 cm diameter and 25.4 cm height, hole diameter 90 mm. (orig./DG)

  19. Agreement Between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with New Zealand to Amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Prolilferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 24 February 2014, the date on which the Agency received New Zealand's affirmative reply

  20. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  1. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  2. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  3. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  4. Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of a nuclear power station from the People's Republic of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of a Nuclear Power Station from the People's Republic of China is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 22 February 2007. Pursuant to Section 30 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 22 February 2007, upon signature by the Director General of the Agency and by the authorised representative of Pakistan

  5. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS,INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME I/III SETTING THE STAGE: 1991-1996.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.; Anzelon, G.

    2010-01-01

    Events in Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to be improved. It had failed, after all, to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program even though some of Iraq's's activities had been pursued at inspected facilities in buildings adjacent to ones being inspected by the IAEA. Although there were aspects of the implementation of safeguards where the IAEA needed to improve, the primary limitations were considered to be part of the safeguards system itself. That system was based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, to which Iraq was a party, and implemented on the basis of a model NPT safeguards agreement, published by the IAEA 1972 as INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The agreement calls for states to accept and for the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in the state. Iraq was a party to such an agreement, but it violated the agreement by concealing nuclear material and other nuclear activities from the IAEA. Although the IAEA was inspecting in Iraq, it was hindered by aspects of the agreement that essentially limited its access to points in declared facilities and provided the IAEA with little information about nuclear activities anywhere else in Iraq. As a result, a major review of the NPT safeguards system was initiated by its Director General and Member States with the objective of finding the best means to enable the IAEA to detect both diversions from declared stocks and any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. Significant improvements that could be made within existing legal authority were taken quickly, most importantly a change in 1992 in how and when and what design information would be reported to the IAEA. During 1991-1996, the IAEA pursued intensive study, legal and technical analysis, and field trials and held numerous consultations with Member States. The Board of Governors discussed the issue of

  6. Integrated Process Monitoring based on Systems of Sensors for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards Sensitivity and Robustness

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Humberto E. Garcia

    2014-07-01

    This paper illustrates safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) can have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). In order to infer the possible existence of proliferation-driven activities, the objective of NMA-based methods is often to statistically evaluate materials unaccounted for (MUF) computed by solving a given mass balance equation related to a material balance area (MBA) at every material balance period (MBP), a particular objective for a PM-based approach may be to statistically infer and evaluate anomalies unaccounted for (AUF) that may have occurred within a MBP. Although possibly being indicative of proliferation-driven activities, the detection and tracking of anomaly patterns is not trivial because some executed events may be unobservable or unreliably observed as others. The proposed similarity between NMA- and PM-based approaches is important as performance metrics utilized for evaluating NMA-based methods, such as detection probability (DP) and false alarm probability (FAP), can also be applied for assessing PM-based safeguards solutions. To this end, AUF count estimates can be translated into significant quantity (SQ) equivalents that may have been diverted within a given MBP. A diversion alarm is reported if this mass estimate is greater than or equal to the selected value for alarm level (AL), appropriately chosen to optimize DP and FAP based on the particular characteristics of the monitored MBA, the sensors utilized, and the data processing method employed for integrating and analyzing collected measurements. To illustrate the application of the proposed PM approach, a protracted diversion of Pu in a waste stream was selected based on incomplete fuel dissolution in a dissolver unit operation, as this diversion scenario is considered to be problematic for detection using NMA-based methods alone. Results demonstrate benefits of conducting PM under a system

  7. Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 12 September 1995. It was signed on 27 September 1995 in Vienna and 14 June 1996 in Chisinau. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 May 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Moldova written notification that Moldova's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  8. Communication Dated 9 May 2011 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the Director General on Implementation of Safeguards in Iran

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Secretariat has received a communication dated 9 May 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency enclosing an explanatory note on the report of the Director General on 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran' contained in GOV/2011/7. As requested by the Permanent Mission, the explanatory note is circulated for information

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  16. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000

  17. Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000

  20. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria

  2. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003

  5. Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by exchange of letters with the Republic of Mauritius in connection with the amendment of Article 15 of the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Through the attached Exchange of Letters, Article 15 of the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been amended to read as follows: 'The Government of Mauritius and the Agency will bear the expenses incurred by them in implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However, if the Government of Mauritius or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may request.'

  6. Measurement and simulation of a Compton suppression system for safeguards application

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lee, Seung Kyu; Seo, Hee; Won, Byung-Hee; Lee, Chaehun; Shin, Hee-Sung; Na, Sang-Ho; Song, Dae-Yong; Kim, Ho-Dong; Park, Geun-Il; Park, Se-Hwan

    2015-11-01

    Plutonium (Pu) contents in spent nuclear fuels, recovered uranium (U) or uranium/transuranium (U/TRU) products must be measured in order to secure the safeguardability of a pyroprocessing facility. Self-induced X-Ray fluorescence (XRF) and gamma-ray spectroscopy are useful techniques for determining Pu-to-U ratios and Pu isotope ratios of spent fuel. Photon measurements of spent nuclear fuel by using high-resolution spectrometers such as high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors show a large continuum background in the low-energy region, which is due in large part to Compton scattering of energetic gamma rays. This paper proposes a Compton suppression system for reducing of the Compton continuum background. In the present study, the system was configured by using an HPGe main detector and a BGO (bismuth germanate: Bi4Ge3O12) guard detector. The system performances for gamma-ray measurement and XRF were evaluated by means of Monte Carlo simulations and measurements of the radiation source. The Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) simulations were performed using the same geometry as for the experiments, and considered, for exact results, the production of secondary electrons and photons. As a performance test of the Compton suppression system, the peak-to-Compton ratio, which is a figure of merit to evaluate the gamma-ray detection, was enhanced by a factor of three or more when the Compton suppression system was used.

  7. Safeguards technology research and development at CIAE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) is a multi-disciplinary institute under the leadership of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Safeguards was established at CIAE in 1991 to develop safeguards technology and to provide technical assistance to competent authorities for nuclear material management and control, which became one of the key laboratories approved by CNNC in 1993. The main research works for safeguards at CIAE include: nuclear material control and accounting, facilities license review and assessment, domestic inspection, NDA and DA analysis, physical protection and technical training. Research and development of equipment and technique for safeguards has been continuing at CIAE. A variety of NDA equipment that has different resolution and analysis capability has been developed. Method of NDA measurement has been investigated for nuclear material with different characteristics. Mathematics method such as Monte Carlo simulation is applied in NDA. Advanced destructive analysis (DA) instrument is installed at laboratory of CIAE, such as TIMS, ICP-MS and electronic chemistry analyzing system. The high accuracy results of element analysis and isotopic analysis for nuclear material can be obtained. It is possible to measure the types and quantities of nuclear material in a given area by means of NDA and DA. Physical protection system has also been developed. It consists of access control and management, various alarm (including perimeter alarm, intrusion alarms, fire alarms), video and audio monitors, intercommunication set and central console. The system can meet technical requirement for safeguards of first rank. Nuclear material accounting is an important aspect of safeguards research at CIAE. The computer software related to material accounting has been developed. It is the important task for scientists at CIAE to design and review nuclear accounting systems in various facilities. For

  8. Agreement Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of Two Nuclear Power Stations from the People's Republic of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of two Nuclear Power Stations from the People's Republic of China is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 8 March 2011. It was signed on 15 April 2011 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Section 30 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 15 April 2011, upon signature by the representatives of Pakistan and the Agency

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Additional Protocol), the Additional Protocol, which had been applied provisionally from 17 February 2010, entered into force on 10 October 2012, the date upon which the Agency received written notification from Iraq that Iraq's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  10. Agreement of 5 April 1995 between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 26, on 5 April 1995

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 19 July 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 July 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Afghanistan and the Agency

  13. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 January 2006, the date on which the Agency received from Ukraine written notification that Ukraine's constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  14. Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  15. Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereof) between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Roseau, Dominica on 3 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 3 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  16. Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 26 June 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 26 June 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  17. Agreement of 8 October 1994 between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 February 1994 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1994 and in Tashkent on 8 October 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 8 October 1994

  18. Agreement of 14 April 1995 between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 November 1994 and in Minsk on 14 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 August 1995

  19. Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 9 June 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 19 January 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  20. Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1991 and signed in Vienna on 30 January 1992. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 10 April 1992

  1. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Madagascar and the Agency, i.e., on 18 September 2003

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  3. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 28 November 2002. It was signed on 24 April 2003 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 12 July 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Malta written notification that Malta's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

  5. Safeguard Verification as Cooperative Measure for Non Proliferation Control in Peru

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peru applies the safeguard measures on its nuclear activities based in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreement and the Additional Protocol which has been fully implemented becoming part of the Integrated Safeguard since 2005. In addition to international safeguard commitments Peru is also committed with the United Nations 1540 Resolution by which national controls has to be established for preventing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their vector systems. The safeguards measures have become an important part of the verification activities related to this Resolution by analyzing of materials and equipment to be imported or that may be in transit across the country. These activities are part of those developed jointly with other governmental organizations. (author)

  6. Policy study on preparation for the implementation of IAEA strengthened safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The objectives of this study was to analyze the language of the protocol, evaluate the impact on the nuclear activities and discuss various measures such as the amendment draft of the Korean Atomic Energy Act and subsidiaries, proposals for the negotiation with the recommendation to the organization and facilities in Korea on how to deal with the new situation. First, newly imposed responsibilities to the State and researchers was extracted through the article-by-article analysis of the protocol and through the comparison with the existing safeguards system. Second, the way to minimize the possible burden of the researchers and facility operators was presented in implementing SSS by reflecting their opinions and ideas in the restructuring of the legal system. It also tried to find any problem in implementing the measures of the Protocol domestically so that they could be mitigated before implementation and recommend future milestones. Finally, the way to actively cope with the international non-proliferation regime and to enhance transparency was brought up by observing other countries' attitudes on the SSS. (author). 40 refs., 8 tabs., 8 figs

  7. The text of the Agreement between Egypt and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Egypt to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  8. A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-06-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches.

  9. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  10. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  11. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control

  12. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  13. Reporting of safeguards events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    On June 9, 1987, the Commission published in the Federal Register a final rule revising the reporting requirements for safeguards events. Safeguards events include actual or attempted theft of special nuclear material (SNM); actual or attempted acts or events which interrupt normal operations at power reactors due to unauthorized use of or tampering with machinery, components, or controls; certain threats made against facilities possessing SNM; and safeguards system failures impacting the effectiveness of the system. The revised rule was effective October 8, 1987. On September 14, 1987, the NRC held a workshop in Bethesda, MD, to answer affected licensees' questions on the final rule. This report documents questions discussed at the September 14 meeting, reflects a completed staff review of the answers, and supersedes previous oral comment on the topics covered

  14. VISA: a method for evaluating the performance of integrated safeguards systems at nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This is the second volume of a two volume report on the VISA method for evaluating safeguards at fixed-site facilities. This volume contains appendices that support the description of the VISA concept and the initial working version of the method, VISA-1, presented in Volume I. The information is separated into four appendices, each describing details of one of the four analysis modules that comprise the analysis sections of the method. The first appendix discusses Path Analysis methodology, applies it to a Model Fuel Facility, and describes the computer codes that are being used. Introductory material on Path Analysis given in Chapter 3.2.1 and Chapter 4.2.1 of Volume I. The second appendix deals with Detection Analysis, specifically the schemes used in VISA-1 for classifying adversaries and the methods proposed for evaluating individual detection mechanisms in order to build the data base required for detection analysis. Examples of evaluations on identity-access systems, SNM portal monitors, and intrusion devices are provided. The third appendix describes the Containment Analysis overt-segment path ranking, the Monte Carlo engagement model, the network simulation code, the delay mechanism data base, and the results of a sensitivity analysis. The last appendix presents general equations used in Interruption Analysis for combining covert-overt segments and compares them with equations given in Volume I, Chapter 3

  15. Technology guidance for safeguards information management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Manatt, D.R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Howell, J.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Steinmaus, K.; St. Pierre, D. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Deland, S.M.; Vandewart, R. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1994-09-01

    The Safeguards Information Management Systems project, SIMS, seeks to provide information access tools to the IAEA to assist in implementation of enhanced safeguards. The Technology and Systems Group advises the SIMS project in the selection of hardware and software, the integration of system components, and the evaluation of realistic information management approaches. The group`s guidance has led to reevaluation of the system hardware choices, visual data storage methods, and geographical data sources. Consultation with the Agency has resulted in a major realignment of the effort towards providing information access on Networked Microsoft Windows desk top computers rather than separate SUN workstations. The manner in which imagery is stored and presented is another developing area. Initial systems delivered to the Agency relied on analogue video disc recorders and VCRs. Future systems will store and manipulate digital images. The initial source of map data for the workstation was analogue video discs from the US Defense Mapping Agency. Many of these maps are restricted in their distribution, therefore additional map data sources were developed. The Technology map data sources were developed. The Technology and Systems Group`s efforts to steer a clear course through this ever changing mine-field is described.

  16. Agreement between the government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of Republic of Estonia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 24 February 1992, signed in Vienna on 18 November 1997 and in Tallinn on 24 November 1997, and entered into force on 24 November 1997

  17. The spread of international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force on 5 March 1970 by the ratification of 40 non-nuclear-weapon States and that of three nuclear weapon States - the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR. Since then it has been signed by 98 States, and now 73 States have ratified it. For more than a year the Safeguards Committee (1970), a Committee established by the Board and open to all member States of the Agency, discussed the Structure and Content of Agreements to be concluded between the Agency and States Party to the Treaty in order to fulfill their obligations under it. Today, of the 73 States that have ratified the NPT, agreements have already been concluded with 25 States, and negotiations are underway with 31 other States including the five non-nuclear-weapon States Members of the European Community (Euratom). At its June session, the Board of Governors of the IAEA approved the text of a co-operation agreement between the Agency and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), which was established to ensure compliance with the obligations contracted by States Party to the Tlatelolco Treaty. It will be remembered that that Treaty was signed in Tlatelolco in 1967 by 22 Latin American countries. Since then 19 States have ratified it, and the additional protocols have been signed and ratified by two of the nuclear powers - the UK and the USA. As Dr. Eklund, Director General of the IAEA, has remarked, 'the Treaty of Tlatelolco could be regarded as the first multilateral treaty in the field of nuclear disarmament which provides for the application of an institutionalized and international control system, and as such it represented a decisive step forward in the recognition and acceptance of international safeguards'. Both the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty call upon the IAEA to perform one of its main statutory functions: that is, to apply safeguards at the request of the parties to a multilateral

  18. Advances toward a transportable antineutrino detector system for reactor monitoring and safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reyna, D. [Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Bernstein, A. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Lund, J.; Kiff, S.; Cabrera-Palmer, B. [Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Bowden, N. S.; Dazeley, S.; Keefer, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States)

    2011-07-01

    Nuclear reactors have served as the neutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Our SNL/LLNL collaboration has demonstrated that such antineutrino based monitoring is feasible using a relatively small cubic meter scale liquid scintillator detector at tens of meters standoff from a commercial Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). With little or no burden on the plant operator we have been able to remotely and automatically monitor the reactor operational status (on/off), power level, and fuel burnup. The initial detector was deployed in an underground gallery that lies directly under the containment dome of an operating PWR. The gallery is 25 meters from the reactor core center, is rarely accessed by plant personnel, and provides a muon-screening effect of some 20-30 meters of water equivalent earth and concrete overburden. Unfortunately, many reactor facilities do not contain an equivalent underground location. We have therefore attempted to construct a complete detector system which would be capable of operating in an aboveground location and could be transported to a reactor facility with relative ease. A standard 6-meter shipping container was used as our transportable laboratory - containing active and passive shielding components, the antineutrino detector and all electronics, as well as climate control systems. This aboveground system was deployed and tested at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in southern California in 2010 and early 2011. We will first present an overview of the initial demonstrations of our below ground detector. Then we will describe the aboveground system and the technological developments of the two antineutrino

  19. Use of Antineutrino Detectors for Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Effectiveness Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bernstein, A; Lambert, H E; Elayat, H A; O' Connell, W J; Rexroth, P; Baldwin, G; Bowden, N; Huelskamp, R

    2006-06-05

    As described in an earlier article [1], important information regarding reactor power and the amount and type of fissile material in reactor cores can be determined by measuring the antineutrino rate and energy spectrum, using a cubic meter scale antineutrino detector at tens of meters standoff from the core. Current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards techniques do not provide such real-time quantitative information regarding core power levels and isotopic composition. The possible benefits of this approach are several and have been discussed in the earlier article. One key advantage is that the method gives the inspecting agency completely independent access to real-time information on the operational status and fissile content of the core. Furthermore, the unattended and non-intrusive nature of the technology may reduce the monitoring burden on the plant operator, even though more information is being provided than is available within the current IAEA safeguards regime. Here we present a detailed analytical framework for measuring the impact that such a detector might have on IAEA safeguards, if implemented. To perform the analysis, we will use initial data from our operating detector and a standard analysis technique for safeguards regimes, developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Because characterization of the prototype detector is still underway, and because improvements in the prototype could have important impact on safeguards performance, the results presented here should be understood to be preliminary, and not reflective of the ultimate performance of the system. The structure of this paper is as follows. Reactor safeguards and the relevant properties of antineutrino detectors are briefly reviewed. A set of hypothetical diversion scenarios are then described, and one of these is analyzed using the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Integrated Safeguards System Analysis Tool (LISSAT) The probability of successful

  20. Safeguarding research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The report is organized in four sections, including the introduction. The second section contains a discussion of the characteristics and attributes of research reactors important to safeguards. In this section, research reactors are described according to their power level, if greater than 25 thermal megawatts, or according to each fuel type. This descriptive discussion includes both reactor and reactor fuel information of a generic nature, according to the following categories. 1. Research reactors with more than 25 megawatts thermal power, 2. Plate fuelled reactors, 3. Assembly fuelled reactors. 4. Research reactors fuelled with individual rods. 5. Disk fuelled reactors, and 6. Research reactors fuelled with aqueous homogeneous fuel. The third section consists of a brief discussion of general IAEA safeguards as they apply to research reactors. This section is based on IAEA safeguards implementation documents and technical reports that are used to establish Agency-State agreements and facility attachments. The fourth and last section describes inspection activities at research reactors necessary to meet Agency objectives. The scope of the activities extends to both pre and post inspection as well as the on-site inspection and includes the examination of records and reports relative to reactor operation and to receipts, shipments and certain internal transfers, periodic verification of fresh fuel, spent fuel and core fuel, activities related to containment and surveillance, and other selected activities, depending on the reactor

  1. Achievements to date in strengthened safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    There is substantial progress in developing and implementing measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Safeguards System. The measures comprise those to be implemented pursuant to the Agency's legal authority conferred by existing safeguards agreements as well as those to be implemented under the complementary legal authority conferred by Additional Protocols concluded on the basis of Document INFCIRC/540(Corrected). Activities on implementing measures under existing legal authority, particularly with respect to the evaluation of States' nuclear programmes, environmental sampling and the use of remote monitoring for safeguards purposes had been carried continuously ion the recent post. In 1998, additional protocols entered into force with four States (the Holy See, Jordan, New Zealand and Uzbekistan). Additional protocols with a further 27 States were approved by the Board and were awaiting ratification by the respective States. The additional protocol with Australia, which entered into force in December 1997, was being implemented following receipt of its Article 2 declaration. Agency consultations on concluding additional protocols take place with a number of States on a regular basis. As of 1 October 1999, Additional Protocols had been concluded and approved by the Board of Governors with a total of 45 States. Of these, Additional Protocols with 44 States had been signed and five had entered into force. (author)

  2. Review of effectiveness-evaluation methodologies for safeguards and security systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We discuss the factors that influence the effectiveness of safeguards and security measures and the characteristics required of effectiveness evaluation methodologies. Within this context and from a utility standpoint, we review those effectiveness evaluation methodologies that have been developed. Our principal recommendation concerns the application and concomitant validation of existing methodologies. This recommendation derives from our conclusion that there has been a gross imbalance between the effort spent on methodology development and the application of those methodologies. Only for those safeguards measures that do not seem to be covered by existing methodologies or that seem to be inadequately covered do we suggest development. 44 references

  3. Reversing the Trend: Creating a Growing and Sustainable Cadre of Safeguards Experts in the United States

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lockwood, Dunbar; Mathews, Caroline E.; Seward, Amy M.

    2008-07-17

    In October 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a wide-ranging study on international safeguards issues that found, inter alia, that the human capital base in the United States must be revitalized and expanded to ensure a seamless succession from the current generation of safeguards experts. Many current safeguards experts will soon retire and a new generation of talent with capabilities that cover the full spectrum of safeguards-relevant disciplines is needed. The success of this effort will have direct bearing on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An effective international safeguards system that responds to current and future nonproliferation challenges requires a cadre of skilled safeguards specialists. However, a number of factors have converged in recent years that have challenged the IAEA’s ability to effectively carry out its safeguards mission, e.g. flat funding, expanding responsibilities, and several ad hoc high profile investigations. In the near future, the Agency will require increased numbers of qualified staff to address the expansion and evolution of its mission and anticipated worldwide growth in nuclear energy production. Without a large-scale effort to address this requirement in the near future, the international community will have far less confidence that nuclear material in civil programs is not being diverted for nuclear weapons and the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase around the world. This paper will describe in detail NNSA’s efforts, in coordination with other federal agencies, to address the safeguards human resources challenge, focusing on the recommendations of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI).

  4. TASTEX: Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the years 1978 to 1981 the Governments of France, Japan and the United States of America cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the TASTEX (Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise) programme. The aim of this programme was to improve the technology for the application of international safeguards at reprocessing facilities, and the results are presented in the present report

  5. Inspection technologies -Development of national safeguards technology-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    17 facility regulations prepared by nuclear facilities according to the Ministerial Notices were evaluated. Safeguards inspection activities under Safeguards are described. Safeguards inspection equipments and operation manuals to be used for national inspection are also described. Safeguards report are produced and submitted to MOST by using the computerized nuclear material accounting system at state level. National inspection support system are developed to produce the on-site information for domestic inspection. Planning and establishment of policy for nuclear control of nuclear materials, international cooperation for nuclear control, CTBT, strengthening of international safeguards system, and the supply of PWRs to North Korea are also described. (author). 43 tabs., 39 figs

  6. Agency Full Time Equivalency Reporting System

    Data.gov (United States)

    US Agency for International Development — AFTERS provides an automated means for the Agency to report its full time equivalency work years to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Office of...

  7. Safeguards Indexing Method for the Regulatory Assessment of Safeguards Culture at Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) has just introduced a safeguards indexing method for evaluation the safeguards culture at Hungarian nuclear facilities. The main goal of this indexing method is to provide a useful tool for the regulatory body to evaluate the safeguards culture at nuclear facilities. The evaluated parameters are e.g. educational requirement for safeguards staff, quality of safeguards reporting for IAEA and EC, results of safeguards inspections etc. Input of the method is for the one hand the outcome of the comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system consisting of regular comprehensive SSAC verifications of the facilities. The main goals of the comprehensive verification system are: (1) to assess the facilities safeguards system compliance with the relevant national legislation and recommendations, (2) to assess the activities of the facility aimed at maintaining and further developing its safeguards system and (3) to revise validity of data and information previously provided by the facility subject to safeguards licensing procedures. On the other hand the annual report of the nuclear facilities also supports the safeguards indexing method, which is a good indicator of the present and future effectiveness of the facility level safeguards system and the level of safeguards culture.

  8. Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on behalf of the Board of Governors to all members of the Agency on the Non-Compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (INFCIRC/403) and on the Agency's inability to verify the non-diversion of material required to be safeguarded

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains the following items: Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on behalf of the Board of Governors to all members of the Agency on the non-compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of Safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the Agency's inability to verify the non-diversion of material required to be safeguarded; resolution adopted by the Board on 1 April 1993 (Annex 1); Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Annex 2); resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 25 February 1993 (Annex 3); Communications from the Director General of the IAEA to the Minister for Atomic Energy of DPRK or from the Minister for Atomic Energy of the DPRK of the Director General of the IAEA (Annexes 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12); statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pyongyang, 12 March 1993 (Annex 7); resolution adopted by the Board on 18 March 1993 (Annex 10)

  9. Communications dated 18 March 2013 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the Report of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Secretariat has received two communications dated 18 March 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency enclosing explanatory notes by the Permanent Mission dated September 2012 and November 2012 respectively, on the reports of the Director General on 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran' contained in GOV/2012/37 (30 August 2012) and GOV/2012/55 (16 November 2012). 2. The communications and, as requested by the Permanent Mission, the explanatory notes are circulated herewith for information.

  10. Agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  11. Agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 21 September 2000. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 August 2002. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  12. Communication dated 5 March 2014 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the Report of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Secretariat has received a communication dated 5 March 2014 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, enclosing an explanatory note by the Permanent Mission on the report of the Director General on ''Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran'' contained in document GOV/2014/10 (20 February 2014). The communication and, as requested by the Permanent Mission, the explanatory note are circulated herewith for information

  13. Agency Secure Image And Storage Tracking System (ASIST)

    Data.gov (United States)

    US Agency for International Development — Agency Secure Image and Storage Tracking System (Missions): is a Documentum-based user interface developed and maintained by the USAID OCIO (formerly IRM) to...

  14. IAEA 1985: Safeguards continues to be main activity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This year's General Conference of the IAEA again focused on the political problems in connection with South Africa and Israel. According to a report discussing measures and results arising from last year's resolution South Africa had indicated no willingness to put all its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. A resolution was tabled in which sanctions against South Africa were demanded. However, once more real encroachments upon the membership rights of South Africa and Israel were avoided. IAEA safeguards measures were unanimously referred to as indispensable constituent parts of the non-proliferation system, which will continue to be the Agency's main activity. Safeguards is not only of fundamental importance to peace and security, but also contributes greatly to peaceful trade and cooperation in the nuclear power sector. (orig./HP)

  15. Safeguardability of a commercial-scaled ACP facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. This report documents a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP. The sub-processes and material flow of the pilot scale ACP facility were designed for this study. Then, their Material Balance Areas (MBA) and Key Measurement Point (KMP) were defined based on diversion scenario analysis. Finally, the limit of error in the MUF value was estimated using international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods. Based on the results of preliminary study, we concluded that the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility

  16. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, H. D.; Ko, W. I.; Song, D. Y. [and others

    2000-03-01

    During the first phase of R and D program conducted from 1997 to 1999, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. For the nuclear material measurement system, the performance test was finished and received IAEA approval, and now is being used in DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility(DFDF) for nuclear material accounting and control. Other systems being developed in this study were already installed in DFDF and being under performance test. Those systems developed in this study will make a contribution not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author)

  17. 20 Years of Achievement and Future Challenge for International Capacity Building Regarding Safeguards and SSAC at Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Developing human resources in the fields of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards is critical to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The shortfall of human resources in such fields presents a serious challenge. It has, therefore, become important to urgently develop human resources and thereby to ensure. With a long experience in practicing Japan's nuclear non-proliferation policy, JAEA has been contributing since the 1990s to international human-resource development. More than 300 people from about 40 countries have joined the training courses organized by the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) of JAEA. These courses use lectures, workshops, group discussions, and facility tours to teach knowledge of the basic concepts of IAEA safeguards, SSAC requirements, and safeguards tools to government officials who are responsible for safeguards implementation and to operators who are engaged in nuclear-material accounting and control. Based on Japan's statement at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, ISCN was established in December 2010. ISCN places top priority on providing support for the development of future leaders, the development of legal and regulatory infrastructure, and the fostering of nuclear non-proliferation culture. For further advancement, ISCN also examines the current situations of the Asian nations that ISCN supports, based on discussions made between the Japanese government and the IAEA. It works on formulating new training courses that focus on specific themes, such as NDA training and table-top exercises for CA under the AP, identified through needs surveys. ISCN is committed to the development of human resources in the field of safeguards and work closely with governmental organizations in Japan and with other Asian countries, the IAEA, US DOE, European Commission, FNCA, and APSN. (author)

  18. Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

  19. The Text of the Agreement of 22 July 1977 between Argentina and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with a Contract Concluded between the Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica (Argentina) and the Reactor Brennelement Union Gmbh Hanau (Federal Republic Of Germany) for Co-Operation in The Field of Fabrication of Fuel Elements for Peaceful Nuclear Activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards came into force on 4 March 1994

  20. Protocol between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 June 1999, signed in Vienna on 11 June 1999, and entered into force on 7 July 2000

  1. Broader use of information under IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    International Safeguards applied for more than 25 years consists of a complex control system based on nuclear material accountancy. The technical objective is to provide for 'the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devises or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection' (para. 28. INFCIRC 153). Each Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT undertakes to accept full-scope IAEA Safeguards to all nuclear material within the State's territory or under it's jurisdiction or control. The current Safeguards system is focused on declared facilities and activities. It involves the independent verifications of the States' declarations. The IAEA's effort to Strengthen International Safeguards include measures to increase the information provided by States on their nuclear programmes broader access to 'other information' and measures related to increased physical access to sites and to the effectiveness of that access. The general approach is to compare a State's declared nuclear activities with supplementary information available to the IAEA, and to find any apparent inconsistencies. This paper presents an overview of the sources of information available to the Agency and its use with the overall goal of detecting at a very early stage undeclared nuclear activities. The discovery of clandestine nuclear activities in Iraq shows that nuclear material accountancy alone cannot give the international community through IAEA safeguards, credible assurance that State party to comprehensive safeguards are in compliance with their obligations. Nuclear material accountancy, as traditionally practised, focuses on detecting the possible diversion of nuclear material declared to the IAEA. Accountancy cannot indicate whether a state has undeclared nuclear material or facilities, which might point to the

  2. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

  3. Startup strategy design and safeguarding of industrial adiabatic tubular reactor systems

    OpenAIRE

    Verwijs, J.W.; Berg, van den, S.J.P.L.; Westerterp, K.R.

    1996-01-01

    The safeguarding methodology of chemical plants is usually based on controlling the instantaneous values of process state variables within a certain operating window, the process being brought to shutdown when operating constraints are exceeded. This method does not necessarily prevent chemical reactors suffering from a runaway during dynamic operations because (a) excessive amounts of unreacted chemicals can still accumulate in the process, and (b) no means are provided to the operating pers...

  4. Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The book contains contributed papers from various authors on the following subjects: Safeguards systems and implementation, Measurement techniques: general, Measurement techniques: destructive analysis, Measurement techniques: non-destructive assay, Containment and surveillance, Spent fuel strategies, Material accounting and data evaluation

  5. Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

  6. Safeguards information challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Overall, the aim of this paper is to provide the background and the broader vision in which the various information related presentations and posters proposed by the Department find their place, exploring solutions to the challenges faced. At a time when the Agency is expected to be a reference for the assessment of nuclear proliferation threats, providing the international community with independent, impartial, timely and credible conclusions that no declared nuclear material is diverted to non-peaceful purposes and that no undeclared nuclear material or activities exist in States, it has to address major challenges with regard to information. Drawing credible conclusions assumes that all relevant information is accessible and put into relevant context. Because of the legal constraints under which it operates, the limitation of resources for collecting existing but difficult to reach details and simply because of the overwhelming quantity of the information needed to properly evaluate proliferation issues, the Agency has to continually improve the way it collects, processes and internally disseminates safeguards relevant information. Developing a coherent picture of a State's nuclear capability is a complex process based on many experts' assessments and fusion of information. The search for better, broader and deeper information through dedicated collection processes is an ongoing effort aimed at filling the gaps of such pictures. Implementing well selected information collection tools is a sine qua non to render effective the Agency's detection capabilities. Beyond collection, another prerequisite to ensuring that the available information is accessible to those who need to know is the establishment of a proper information system architecture and an efficient set of standard business processes. At the same time, that information must be sufficiently protected by appropriate security measures, particularly at a time when private hacking has become a

  7. Feasibility Study of Implementing a Mobile Collaborative Information Platform for International Safeguards Inspections

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gastelum, Zoe N. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Gitau, Ernest T. N. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Doehle, Joel R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Toomey, Christopher M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-09-01

    In response to the growing pervasiveness of mobile technologies such as tablets and smartphones, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories have been exploring the potential use of these platforms for international safeguards activities. Specifically of interest are information systems (software, and accompanying servers and architecture) deployed on mobile devices to increase the situational awareness and productivity of an IAEA safeguards inspector in the field, while simultaneously reducing paperwork and pack weight of safeguards equipment. Exploratory development in this area has been met with skepticism regarding the ability to overcome technology deployment challenges for IAEA safeguards equipment. This report documents research conducted to identify potential challenges for the deployment of a mobile collaborative information system to the IAEA, and proposes strategies to mitigate those challenges.

  8. Feasibility Study of Implementing a Mobile Collaborative Information Platform for International Safeguards Inspections

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Doehle, Joel R.; Toomey, Christopher M.

    2014-09-30

    In response to the growing pervasiveness of mobile technologies such as tablets and smartphones, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories have been exploring the potential use of these platforms for international safeguards activities. Specifically of interest are information systems (software, and accompanying servers and architecture) deployed on mobile devices to increase the situational awareness and productivity of an IAEA safeguards inspector in the field, while simultaneously reducing paperwork and pack weight of safeguards equipment. Exploratory development in this area has been met with skepticism regarding the ability to overcome technology deployment challenges for IAEA safeguards equipment. This report documents research conducted to identify potential challenges for the deployment of a mobile collaborative information system to the IAEA, and proposes strategies to mitigate those challenges.

  9. Reactor safeguards against insider sabotage

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bennett, H.A.

    1982-03-01

    A conceptual safeguards system is structured to show how both reactor operations and physical protection resources could be integrated to prevent release of radioactive material caused by insider sabotage. Operational recovery capabilities are addressed from the viewpoint of both detection of and response to disabled components. Physical protection capabilities for preventing insider sabotage through the application of work rules are analyzed. Recommendations for further development of safeguards system structures, operational recovery, and sabotage prevention are suggested.

  10. Time-Domain Reflectometry for Tamper Indication in Unattended Monitoring Systems for Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tedeschi, Jonathan R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Smith, Leon E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Moore, David E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sheen, David M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Conrad, Ryan C. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-12-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to expand its use of unattended, remotely monitored measurement systems. An increasing number of systems and an expanding family of instruments create challenges in terms of deployment efficiency and the implementation of data authentication measures. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) leads a collaboration that is exploring various tamper-indicating (TI) measures that could help to address some of the long-standing detector and data-transmission authentication challenges with IAEA’s unattended systems. PNNL is investigating the viability of active time-domain reflectometry (TDR) along two parallel but interconnected paths: (1) swept-frequency TDR as the highly flexible, laboratory gold standard to which field-deployable options can be compared, and (2) a low-cost commercially available spread-spectrum TDR technology as one option for field implementation. This report describes PNNL’s progress and preliminary findings from the first year of the study, and describes the path forward.

  11. Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 1999. It was signed on 28 June 2001 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 5 September 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Oman written notification that Oman's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force the same date

  12. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 December 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Tajikistan written notification that the Republic of Tajikistan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  14. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 16 June 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 February 2005, the date upon which the Agency received from the Swiss Confederation written notification that the Swiss Confederation's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  17. Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 19 July 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Seychelles written notification that Seychelles' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  18. Protocol additional to the agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 23 September 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 7 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from the United Republic of Tanzania written notification that the United Republic of Tanzania's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional, the Protocol entered into force on 13 October 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Seychelles written notification that the Republic of Seychelles's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  20. Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna

  1. Safeguards as catastrophic risk management: insights and projections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The system of international agreements designed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and to control the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies (collectively referred to as the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation regimes) is posited as humanity.s first attempt to mitigate a man-made global catastrophic risk. By extrapolating general principles of government response to risk from the arms control and nonproliferation regimes, a model of international regime building for catastrophic risk mitigation is constructed. This model provides the context for an examination of the system of safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which serves as the nuclear nonproliferation regime.s verification and enforcement mechanism and thereby constitutes the regime's most completely developed discrete mechanism for risk mitigation (a 'system within a system'). An assessment of the history, evolution and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system in the context of the regimes-as-risk-mitigation model reveals some general principles for risk-mitigation regimes which are then applied to the safeguards system to identify ways in which it may be strengthened. Finally, the IAEA safeguards system is posited as the prototype verification/enforcement mechanism for future risk mitigation regimes that governments will be compelled to create in the face of new global catastrophic risks that technological advance will inevitably create. (author)

  2. Environment Agency England flood warning systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Strong, Chris; Walters, Mark; Haynes, Elizabeth; Dobson, Peter

    2015-04-01

    Context In England around 5 million homes are at risk of flooding. We invest significantly in flood prevention and management schemes but we can never prevent all flooding. Early alerting systems are fundamental to helping us reduce the impacts of flooding. The Environment Agency has had the responsibility for flood warning since 1996. In 2006 we invested in a new dissemination system that would send direct messages to pre-identified recipients via a range of channels. Since then we have continuously improved the system and service we offer. In 2010 we introduced an 'opt-out' service where we pre-registered landline numbers in flood risk areas, significantly increasing the customer base. The service has performed exceptionally well under intense flood conditions. Over a period of 3 days in December 2013, when England was experiencing an east coast storm surge, the system sent nearly 350,000 telephone messages, 85,000 emails and 70,000 text messages, with a peak call rate of around 37,000 per hour and 100% availability. The Floodline Warnings Direct (FWD) System FWD provides warnings in advance of flooding so that people at risk and responders can take action to minimise the impact of the flood. Warnings are sent via telephone, fax, text message, pager or e-mail to over 1.1 million properties located within flood risk areas in England. Triggers for issuing alerts and warnings include attained and forecast river levels and rainfall in some rapidly responding locations. There are three levels of warning: Flood Alert, Flood Warning and Severe Flood Warning, and a stand down message. The warnings can be updated to include relevant information to help inform those at risk. Working with our current provider Fujitsu, the system is under a programme of continuous improvement including expanding the 'opt-out' service to mobile phone numbers registered to at risk addresses, allowing mobile registration to the system for people 'on the move' and providing access to

  3. The entry into force of the Additional Protocol in the European Union: The new dimension of safeguards in Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Recio, M. [Deputy Direction General for Nuclear Energy, Direction General for Energy Policy and Mines Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, Paseo de la Castellana, 160 Madrid 28046 (Spain)]. E-mail: MRecio@mityc.es; Prieto, N. [Asesoria Juridica, Direccion de Division Administracion, Enresa, c/Emilio Vargas, 7, Madrid 28043 (Spain)]. E-mail: nprs@enresa.es

    2006-07-01

    The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has entered into force on 30 April 2004. This completes the implementation in the EU of what undoubtedly represents the most ambitious project undertaken by the IAEA, designed to reinforce its current safeguards system, a project that the international community considers to be a key component strengthening the fight against one of the most serious threats for world security: nuclear proliferation. (author)

  4. Innovations and international safeguards: Information processing technology for the '90s and beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (Agency) is chartered to administer safeguards to nuclear facilities in countries that are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT). In signing the NPT, nations make nuclear facilities within their jurisdiction available for inspection by the Agency, in order for the Agency to gain assurance that the material is being used for declared peaceful purposes. There is a technical aspect to the responsibilities of the Agency in development of procedures and equipment for inspection of facilities in the member countries. The Agency relies on support programs in the member states to provide technical experts and resources. In the United States, the support program, the Program for Technical Assistance to Agency Safeguards (POTAS), is funded through the United States Department of State, and administered by the International Safeguards Project Office located at Brookhaven National Laboratory. With funding through this program, a number of organizations, including groups within Martin Marietta Energy Systems at Oak Ridge, contribute to the needs of the Agency. Personnel at Martin Marietta Energy Systems contribute to a number of POTAS tasks. Three such tasks deal with methods for the Agency to make use of modern data processing systems for rapid assessment of safeguards information, and to reduce manpower requirements for field inspections at nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. The first program is concerned with Agency responsibilities to gain assurance that reprocessing facilities are built to declared specifications, referred to as design verification. The second activity is directed at reduction of on-site inspection requirements after the facility has started operation. The third task involves development of hardware and software specifications for Agency equipment for installation in new facilities to accomplish these objectives

  5. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  6. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kirk, Bernadette Lugue [ORNL; Eipeldauer, Mary D [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL

    2011-12-01

    In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together

  7. IAEA safeguards: Staying ahead of the game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    What are nuclear safeguards and why are they important? Answers are provided in the booklet, describing and explaining the fundamentals of the IAEA safeguards system and its role as a key element of international security, and addressing the system's implementation, costs, requirements, resources and historical development, with an emphasis on trends and strengthening measures over the past 10-15 years. Topics discussed include the safeguards State evaluation process and and the key requirements of the safeguards system including information sources (open source information, commercial satellite imagery and nuclear trade related information) and the state of the art equipment, techniques and technology (unattended and remote monitoring equipment, environmental sampling, etc.)

  8. Video image processing for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The field of nuclear safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world's nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and use of nuclear materials as reported by states that have signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty throughout the world. Nuclear safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies such as DOE, NRC, IAEA, and EURATOM and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and non destructive analysis of product materials/process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards

  9. Flate-plate photovoltaic power systems handbook for Federal agencies

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cochrane, E. H.; Lawson, A. C.; Savage, C. H.

    1984-01-01

    The primary purpose is to provide a tool for personnel in Federal agencies to evaluate the viability of potential photovoltaic applications. A second objective is to provide descriptions of various photovoltaic systems installed by different Federal agencies under the Federal Photovoltaic Utilization Program so that other agencies may consider similar applications. A third objective is to share lessons learned to enable more effective procurement, design, installation, and operation of future photovoltaic systems. The intent is not to provide a complete handbook, but rather to provide a guide for Federal agency personnel with additional information incorporated by references. The steps to be followed in selecting, procuring, and installing a photovoltaic application are given.

  10. Nuclear safeguards research and development program. Status report, January--April 1977

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sapir, J.L. (comp.)

    1977-06-01

    The status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development program pursued by LASL Safeguards Groups Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 is presented . Topics covered include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, perimeter safeguards and surveillance, concepts and subsystems development (e.g., DYMAC program), integrated safeguards systems, training courses, and technology transfer.

  11. Integrated software package for nuclear material safeguards in a MOX fuel fabrication facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since computerized data processing was introduced to Safeguards at large bulk handling facilities, a large number of individual software applications have been developed for nuclear material Safeguards implementation. Facility inventory and flow data are provided in computerized format for performing stratification, sample size calculation and selection of samples for destructive and non-destructive assay. Data is collected from nuclear measurement systems running in attended, unattended mode and more recently from remote monitoring systems controlled. Data sets from various sources have to be evaluated for Safeguards purposes, such as raw data, processed data and conclusions drawn from data evaluation results. They are reported in computerized format at the International Atomic Energy Agency headquarters and feedback from the Agency's mainframe computer system is used to prepare and support Safeguards inspection activities. The integration of all such data originating from various sources cannot be ensured without the existence of a common data format and a database system. This paper describes the fundamental relations between data streams, individual data processing tools, data evaluation results and requirements for an integrated software solution to facilitate nuclear material Safeguards at a bulk handling facility. The paper also explains the basis for designing a software package to manage data streams from various data sources and for incorporating diverse data processing tools that until now have been used independently from each other and under different computer operating systems. (author)

  12. 45 CFR 303.21 - Safeguarding and disclosure of confidential information.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... of confidential information. (a) Definitions—(1) Confidential information means any information... computerized support enforcement systems, the IV-D agency shall establish appropriate safeguards to comply with... subject to any State and Federal statutes that impose legal sanctions for such disclosure. Effective...

  13. Safeguards issues in spent fuel consolidation facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Belew, W.L.; Moran, B.W.

    1991-01-01

    In the nuclear power industry, the fuel assembly is the basic unit for nuclear material accountancy. The safeguards procedures for the spent fuel assemblies, therefore, are based on an item accountancy approach. When fuel consolidation occurs in at-reactor'' or away-from-reactor'' facilities, the fuel assemblies are disassembled and cease to be the basic unit containing nuclear material. Safeguards can no longer be based on item accountancy of fuel assemblies. The spent fuel pins containing plutonium are accessible, and the possibilities for diversion of spent fuel for clandestine reprocessing to recover the plutonium are increased. Thus, identifying the potential safeguards concerns created by operation of these facilities is necessary. Potential safeguards techniques to address these concerns also must be identified so facility designs may include the equipment and systems required to provide an acceptable level of assurance that the international safeguards objectives can be met when these facilities come on-line. The objectives of this report are (1) to identify the safeguards issues associated with operation of spent fuel consolidation facilities, (2) to provide a preliminary assessment of the assessment of the safeguards vulnerabilities introduced, and (3) to identify potential safeguards approaches that could meet international safeguards requirements. The safeguards aspects of spent fuel consolidation are addressed in several recent reports and papers. 11 refs., 3 figs., 3 tabs.

  14. Strategic analysis for safeguards systems: a feasibility study. Volume 2. Appendix

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Goldman, A J

    1984-12-01

    This appendix provides detailed information regarding game theory (strategic analysis) and its potential role in safeguards to supplement the main body of this report. In particualr, it includes an extensive, though not comprehensive review of literature on game theory and on other topics that relate to the formulation of a game-theoretic model (e.g. the payoff functions). The appendix describes the basic form and components of game theory models, and the solvability of various models. It then discusses three basic issues related to the use of strategic analysis in material accounting: (1) its understandability; (2) its viability in regulatory settings; and (3) difficulties in the use of mixed strategies. Each of the components of a game theoretic model are then discussed and related to the present context.

  15. Experience in ensuring authenticity of information from safeguards systems installed in facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The increasing sophistication of non-destructive assay instruments, containment and surveillance devices and ancillary computer facilities used for safeguards purposes has resulted in a growing requirement for means to ensure the authenticity of information and thus preserve for the IAEA its capability to draw independent conclusions. The achievements of the last few years, particularly with regard to the development of new instruments, one of a kind instrumentation, conceptually new approaches such as the use of near-real-time accounting, and joint use arrangements, are largely the result of cooperation between the IAEA, state authorities, plant operators and certain national laboratories. It is anticipated that demands for various authentication features will further expand as growth in sophistication of equipment and automation of nuclear facilities continues, and that increasing reliance on in-line, unattended use instrumentation will become in future years the approach of choice. 8 refs, 1 fig., 1 tab

  16. Strategic analysis for safeguards systems: a feasibility study. Volume 2. Appendix

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This appendix provides detailed information regarding game theory (strategic analysis) and its potential role in safeguards to supplement the main body of this report. In particualr, it includes an extensive, though not comprehensive review of literature on game theory and on other topics that relate to the formulation of a game-theoretic model (e.g. the payoff functions). The appendix describes the basic form and components of game theory models, and the solvability of various models. It then discusses three basic issues related to the use of strategic analysis in material accounting: (1) its understandability; (2) its viability in regulatory settings; and (3) difficulties in the use of mixed strategies. Each of the components of a game theoretic model are then discussed and related to the present context

  17. Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R., E-mail: M.Barletta@iaea.or [IAEA, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, 1400 Vienna (Austria)

    2010-10-15

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

  18. Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

  19. Open Source Information Acquisition and Analysis in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new center of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro-actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This paper provides an overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and will likely continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multidisciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (authors)

  20. An Intelligent Agency Framework to Realize Adaptive System Management

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    FU Yu; SHEN Jun-yi; FENG Zhong-hui; WANG Yong

    2007-01-01

    In order to realize the required scalable and adaptive system management, an interactive intelligent agency framework, iSMAcy (intelligent System Management Agency), is proposed as an integrated solution to realize distributed autonomous system management. Firstly, it is a multiagent platform that supports inter-agent communication and cooperation. Secondly, the functional agents are based on intentional agent architecture that achieves balance between goal-directed behavior and situated reactive action. An example of applying the iSMAcy system to a network management environment has been described to illustrate and validate the scalable and adaptive management capability of the intelligent agency framework.

  1. Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 July 2006, upon signature by the representatives of the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the Agency

  2. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Santi, Peter A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hypes, Philip A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-06-14

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  3. Understanding Learner Agency as a Complex Dynamic System

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mercer, Sarah

    2011-01-01

    This paper attempts to contribute to a fuller understanding of the nature of language learner agency by considering it as a complex dynamic system. The purpose of the study was to explore detailed situated data to examine to what extent it is feasible to view learner agency through the lens of complexity theory. Data were generated through a…

  4. Agreement of 10 September 1991 between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of a miniature neutron source reactor from the People's Republic of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 10 September 1991, between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of a miniature neutron source reactor from the People's Republic of China. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 20 February 1990 and entered into force upon signature on 10 September 1991

  5. Lessons Learned from the Development of an Example Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gastelum, Zoe N. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Henry, Michael J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Burtner, IV, E. R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Doehle, J. R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Hampton, S. D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); La Mothe, R. R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Nordquist, P. L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Zarzhitsky, D. V. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-12-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is interested in increasing capabilities of IAEA safeguards inspectors to access information that would improve their situational awareness on the job. A mobile information platform could potentially provide access to information, analytics, and technical and logistical support to inspectors in the field, as well as providing regular updates to analysts at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna or at satellite offices. To demonstrate the potential capability of such a system, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) implemented a number of example capabilities within a PNNL-developed precision information environment (PIE), and using a tablet as a mobile information platform. PNNL’s safeguards proof-of-concept PIE intends to; demonstrate novel applications of mobile information platforms to international safeguards use cases; demonstrate proof-of-principle capability implementation; and provide “vision” for capabilities that could be implemented. This report documents the lessons learned from this two-year development activity for the Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards (PIE-IS), describing the developed capabilities, technical challenges, and considerations for future development, so that developers working to develop a similar system for the IAEA or other safeguards agencies might benefit from our work.

  6. A model to improve efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The main purpose of our current studies is to analyse the measures to be adopted tending to integrate the traditional safeguard measures to the ones stated in the Additional Protocol (AP). A simplified nuclear fuel cycle model is considered to draw some conclusions on the application of integrated safeguard measures. This paper includes a briefing, describing the historical review that gave birth to the A.P. and proposes a model to help the control bodies in the making decision process. In May 1997, the Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol (MAP) which aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguard measures. For States under a comprehensive safeguard agreement the measures adopted provide credible assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. In September 1999, the governments of Argentina and Brazil formally announced in the Board of Governors that both countries would start preliminary consultations on one adapted MAP applied to the Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (Quatripartite Agreement/INFCIRC 435). In December 1999, a first draft of the above mentioned document was provided as a starting point of discussion. During the year 2000 some modifications to the original draft took place. These were the initial steps in the process aiming at reaching the adequate conditions to adhere to the A.P. in each country in a future Having in mind the future AP implementation, the safeguards officers of the Regulatory Body of Argentina (ARN) began to think about the future simultaneous application of the two types of safeguards measures, the traditional and the non traditional ones, what should converge in an integrated system. By traditional safeguards it is understood quantitative

  7. Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials

  8. Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

  9. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01

    Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards

  10. Experiences and prospects of safeguards in PNC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) initiated nuclear safeguards activities in 1960. In 1965, PNC developed a nuclear material accounting system for the handling of plutonium. A participant in IAEA inspections since 1968, PNC enacted the nuclear safeguards provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1977. By that time, the methods and equipment used in the IAEA inspections were similar to those used today. New Safeguards Concepts for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Material, which Japan and the USA will sign shortly, clearly states that information on relevant safeguard features shall be supplied to the IAEA on a voluntary basis, starting from the early design stages of the facility. The information will permit the IAEA to identify the key techniques and measures needed to implement the relevant safeguard provisions agreed to between Japan and the USA. In compliance with the Safeguards Concepts, work is proceeding on the relevant safeguard provisions for the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility and MONJU. PNC's nuclear safeguards experience should prove useful in developing the safeguard provisions for new R and D programs and facilities. (author)

  11. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

  12. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included

  13. Agreement between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocols thereto) between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 21 March 2000 by the representative of the Government of the French Republic and the Director General of the IAEA, and on 26 September 2000 by the representative of the European Atomic Energy Community. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 26 October 2007, one month after the Agency has received notification from both France and the European Atomic Energy Community that their respective internal requirements for entry into force have been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocols, the Protocols entered into force on the same date

  14. Technology Development of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I. (and others)

    2007-04-15

    The objective of this project is to perform R and D on the essential technologies in nuclear material measurement and surveillance and verification system, and to improve the state of being transparent on the nuclear material management of DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) through the evaluation of safeguard ability on non-proliferation fuel cycle and nuclear proliferation resistance. Nuclear material position scan system for the reduction of measurement error was developed for the spatial distribution search of spent fuel in DUPIC facility. Web-based realtime remote monitoring system was designed and constructed for satisfying the IAEA's performance criteria of continuous monitoring, and also developed a software for the function of remote control and message. And diversion paths in a proliferation resistant pyroprocess for SFR were analyzed and its protecting system against the diversion paths were suggested for enhancing proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear fuel cycle. These results could be used for planning the further R and D items in the area of safeguards. Those R and D results mentioned above would be helpful for increasing Korean nuclear transparency in the future.

  15. Rape Survivors' Agency within the Legal and Medical Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Greeson, Megan R.; Campbell, Rebecca

    2011-01-01

    Many rape survivors seek help from the legal and medical systems post-assault. Previous studies have examined how social system personnel treat survivors, but less attention has been paid to how survivors attempt to shape their interactions with these systems. The purpose of this qualitative study was to examine rape survivors' agency--the active…

  16. Instrument development for safeguards measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zebarth, M.; Davidson, D.; Koskelo, M.; Gardner, G. [Canberra Nuclear Products Group, Meriden, CT (United States)

    1996-12-31

    New safeguards requirements, such as those resulting from industrial reprocessing activities, makes the faster and more accurate determination of the uranium enrichment and/or the isotopic composition of plutonium essential in measuring the fissile mass. In response to these needs, Canberra has developed several improved safeguards systems in the last few years. In this paper, we will present an overview of our newest safeguards systems and the improvements they contain. The portable systems include the U-Pu InSpector, the IMCA and the JSR-14 systems. All combine automatic control of acquisition electronics and rapid analysis with an integrated software package for ease of use. The U-Pu InSpector incorporates the MGA code used by the IAEA and Euratom for plutonium analysis. The IMCA complies with IAEA PMCN and PMCG procedures for uranium analysis. With the JSR-14, we are currently developing the procedures to provide compliance with the IAEA neutron counting procedures. In addition to portable safeguards systems, Canberra has designed and installed many installed systems such as the WDAS and PSMC systems at PNC Tokai in Japan, and the large unattended neutron/gamma systems at Cogema La Hague and the Melox reprocessing facility in France. (author)

  17. Instrument development for safeguards measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    New safeguards requirements, such as those resulting from industrial reprocessing activities, makes the faster and more accurate determination of the uranium enrichment and/or the isotopic composition of plutonium essential in measuring the fissile mass. In response to these needs, Canberra has developed several improved safeguards systems in the last few years. In this paper, we will present an overview of our newest safeguards systems and the improvements they contain. The portable systems include the U-Pu InSpector, the IMCA and the JSR-14 systems. All combine automatic control of acquisition electronics and rapid analysis with an integrated software package for ease of use. The U-Pu InSpector incorporates the MGA code used by the IAEA and Euratom for plutonium analysis. The IMCA complies with IAEA PMCN and PMCG procedures for uranium analysis. With the JSR-14, we are currently developing the procedures to provide compliance with the IAEA neutron counting procedures. In addition to portable safeguards systems, Canberra has designed and installed many installed systems such as the WDAS and PSMC systems at PNC Tokai in Japan, and the large unattended neutron/gamma systems at Cogema La Hague and the Melox reprocessing facility in France. (author)

  18. NASA guidelines for assuring the adequacy and appropriateness of security safeguards in sensitive applications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tompkins, F. G.

    1984-01-01

    The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-71, transmittal Memorandum No. 1, requires that each agency establish a management control process to assure that appropriate administrative, physical and technical safeguards are incorporated into all new computer applications. In addition to security specifications, the management control process should assure that the safeguards are adequate for the application. The security activities that should be integral to the system development process are examined. The software quality assurance process to assure that adequate and appropriate controls are incorporated into sensitive applications is also examined. Security for software packages is also discussed.

  19. FUTURE SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVENESS: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    K. W. BUDLONG-SYLVESTER; J. F. PILAT

    2000-09-01

    With new safeguards measures (under old and new authority) now available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there will be fundamental changes in the manner IAEA safeguards are implemented, raising questions about their effectiveness in meeting expanded Agency safeguards objectives. In order to characterize the capability of various safeguards approaches in meeting their objectives, it will be necessary to fully understand what is involved in the new safeguards equation. Both old and new measures will be required to construct a comprehensive picture of a State's nuclear activities and capabilities, and they both have strengths and weaknesses. There are (for political and cost reasons) likely to be tradeoffs between the two types of measures. Significant differences among measures with respect to the probability of their detecting an anomaly, along with other characteristics, need be considered in this context. Given the important role of both types of measures in future approaches, their inherent differences with regard to their capabilities and limitations, and their potential impact on the credibility of safeguards, it will be essential to consider these measures systematically, independently, and in combination in any effectiveness evaluation. This paper will consider concepts and issues in addressing this need.

  20. Potential application of LIBS to NNSA next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barefield Ii, James E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Clegg, Samuel M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Veirs, Douglas K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Browne, Mike [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lopez, Leon [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Martinez, Ron [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Le, Loan [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lamontagne, Stephen A [DOE/NNSA/NA241; Veal, Kevin [NN/ADTR

    2009-01-01

    In a climate in which states and nations have been and perhaps currently are involved in the prol iferation of nuclear materials and technologies, advanced methodologies and improvements in current measurement techniques are needed to combat new threats and increased levels of sophistication. The Department of Energy through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has undertaken a broad review of International Safeguards. The conclusion from that review was that a comprehensive initiative to revitalize international safeguards technology and the human resource base was urgently needed to keep pace with demands and increasingly sophisticated emerging safeguards challenges. To address these challenges, NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as its mission evolves for the next 25 years. NGSI is designed to revitalize and strengthen the U.S. safeguards technical base, recognizing that without a robust program the United States of America will not be in a position to exercise leadership or provide the necessary support to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). International safeguards as administrated by the IAEA are the primary vehicle for verifying compliance with the peaceful use and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy or LIBS has the potential to support the goals of NGSI as follows: by providing (1) automated analysis in complex nuclear processing or reprocessing facilities in real-time or near real-time without sample preparation or removal, (2) isotopic and important elemental ratio (Cm/Pu, Cm/U, ... etc) analysis, and (3) centralized remote control, process monitoring, and analysis of nuclear materials in nuclear facilities at multiple locations within the facility. Potential application of LIBS to international safeguards as

  1. Structure for the decomposition of safeguards responsibilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A major mission of safeguards is to protect against the use of nuclear materials by adversaries to harm society. A hierarchical structure of safeguards responsibilities and activities to assist in this mission is defined. The structure begins with the definition of international or multi-national safeguards and continues through domestic, regional, and facility safeguards. The facility safeguards is decomposed into physical protection and material control responsibilities. In addition, in-transit safeguards systems are considered. An approach to the definition of performance measures for a set of Generic Adversary Action Sequence Segments (GAASS) is illustrated. These GAASS's begin outside facility boundaries and terminate at some adversary objective which could lead to eventual safeguards risks and societal harm. Societal harm is primarily the result of an adversary who is successful in the theft of special nuclear material or in the sabotage of vital systems which results in the release of material in situ. With the facility safeguards system, GAASS's are defined in terms of authorized and unauthorized adversary access to materials and components, acquisition of material, unauthorized removal of material, and the compromise of vital components. Each GAASS defines a set of ''paths'' (ordered set of physical protection components) and each component provides one or more physical protection ''functions'' (detection, assessment, communication, delay, neutralization). Functional performance is then developed based upon component design features, the environmental factors, and the adversary attributes. An example of this decomposition is presented

  2. The safeguards revolution: Contributions and perspectives of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: It is no exaggeration to describe the ongoing changes to the IAEA safeguards system as revolutionary. In the past decade safeguards have moved from a relatively routine system, operating in a seemingly benign environment, to a system undergoing radical change, having to reinvent itself to respond to major challenges. Yet the process of revolution has a long way to go. The conceptual framework for the new safeguards has been developed, but this framework has to be consolidated through new implementation practices. In this sense the revolution needs to be ongoing. There is much more to be done if the safeguards system is to be successful in meeting the challenges. When the traditional safeguards system was introduced, in the early 1970s following the conclusion of the NPT, the objectives of the safeguards system were seen as being very different to today. At that time it was thought that proliferation would require diversion of safeguarded nuclear material, and misuse of safeguarded nuclear facilities. It was considered beyond the capability of most States to establish a wholly clandestine nuclear fuel cycle, independent of safeguarded nuclear material and facilities. So, it was thought, countering proliferation was a matter of applying suitably rigorous safeguards procedures to declared material and facilities. During the 1970s and 1980s the traditional safeguards system developed in conditions of apparent stability, where the main challenge was seen as resource allocation, how to manage a steadily growing workload with a relatively static budget. During this period the traditional safeguards system developed with an emphasis on nuclear materials accountancy, and on verifying the correctness of declared nuclear material inventories. The organisational culture developed around the use of quantitative and relatively mechanistic procedures. This culture was reinforced through a particular policy perspective, specifically, that avoiding discrimination

  3. Safeguards Workforce Repatriation, Retention and Utilization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallucci, Nicholas [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Poe, Sarah [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-10-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory was tasked by NA-241 to assess the transition of former IAEA employees back to the United States, investigating the rate of retention and overall smoothness of the repatriation process among returning safeguards professionals. Upon conducting several phone interviews, study authors found that the repatriation process went smoothly for the vast majority and that workforce retention was high. However, several respondents expressed irritation over the minimal extent to which their safeguards expertise had been leveraged in their current positions. This sentiment was pervasive enough to prompt a follow-on study focusing on questions relating to the utilization rather than the retention of safeguards professionals. A second, web-based survey was conducted, soliciting responses from a larger sample pool. Results suggest that the safeguards workforce may be oversaturated, and that young professionals returning to the United States from Agency positions may soon encounter difficulties finding jobs in the field.

  4. Potential nuclear safeguards applications for neutron generators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Many nuclear safeguards inspection instruments use neutron sources to interrogate the fissile material (commonly 235U and 239Pu) to be measured. The neutron sources currently used in these instruments are isotopics such as Californium-252, Americium-Lithium, etc. It is becoming increasingly more difficult to transport isotopic sources from one measurement location to another. This represents a significant problem for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspectors because they must take their safeguards instruments with them to each nuclear installation to make an independent measurement. Purpose of this paper is to review the possibility of replacing isotopic neutron sources now used in IAEA safeguards instruments with electric neutron sources such as deuterium-tritium (D-T, 14-MeV neutrons) or deuterium-deuterium (D-D, 2-MeV neutrons). The potential for neutron generators to interrogate spent-light water reactor fuel assemblies in storage pools is also reviewed

  5. Advanced safeguards for the nuclear renaissance

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miller, Michael C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2008-01-01

    The global expansion of nuclear energy provides not only the benefit of carbon-neutral electricity, but also the potential for proliferation concern as well. Nuclear safeguards implemented at the state level (domestic) and at the international level by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are essential for ensuring that nuclear materials are not misused and are thereby a critical component of the increased usage of nuclear energy. In the same way that the 1950's Atoms for Peace initiative provided the foundation for a robust research and development program in nuclear safeguards, the expansion of nuclear energy that is underway today provides the impetus to enter a new era of technical development in the safeguards community. In this paper, we will review the history of nuclear safeguards research and development as well future directions.

  6. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

    2012-08-01

    The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

  7. Domestic safeguards: annual report to Congress, fiscal year 1978

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The annual report includes an assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of safeguards at facilities and activities licensed by the Commission. The report details NRC's criteria for judging the adequacy of safeguards at fuel cycle facilities; the report also summarizes actions required by NRC at any fuel facility whose safeguards systems are judged to provide less than high assurance protection against our design threat. The report also contains a discussion of NRC's criteria for safeguards adequacy at nuclear reactors and for transportation activities

  8. Determining information management needs for enhanced international safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Badalamente, R.V. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); DeLand, S.M. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whiteson, R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Anzelon, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1994-08-01

    The Safeguards Information Management System initiative is a program of the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation aimed at supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA) efforts to strengthen safeguards through the enhancement of information management capabilities. The DOE hopes to provide the IAEA with the ability to correlate and analyze data from existing and new sources of information, including publicly available information, information on imports and exports, design information, environmental monitoring data, and non-safeguards information. The first step in this effort is to identify and define IAEA requirements. In support of this, we have created a users` requirements document based on interviews with IAEA staff that describes the information management needs of the end user projected by the IAEA, including needs for storage, retrieval, analysis, communication, and visualization of data. Also included are characteristics of the end user and attributes of the current environment. This paper describes our efforts to obtain the required information. We discuss how to accurately represent user needs and involve users for an international organization with a multi-cultural user population. We describe our approach, our experience in setting up and conducting the interviews and brainstorming sessions, and a brief discussion of what we learned.

  9. The psychology of nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, which it was designed to do. However it is considered that although prevention cannot be guaranteed it is possible to deter such diversions. The question of publicity is examined since any safeguards system is judged exclusively on what is seen to be their failures and safeguard authorities will be tempted to conceal any diversion. (U.K.)

  10. The international scope of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As a result of safeguards agreements under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and with States not Party to that Treaty, the Agency's safeguards coverage today is very extensive. According to the best information officially available to the Agency, there are only five States in the world besides the nuclear-weapon States that have significant nuclear activities which are not subject to Agency safeguards, namely Egypt, India, Israel, South Africa and Spain. Nevertheless, any State that is not a Party to the NPT or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) is free, in the absence of treaty obligations, to build or otherwise acquire unsafeguarded nuclear plant. Furthermore, there are significant differences between the NPT safeguards agreements and those with States not Party to the NPT, not only with regard to scope (NPT agreements cover all peaceful nuclear activities in the State, which in practice means all nuclear activities, while non-NPT agreements so far only cover particular plants or supply agreements) but also in technical and legal approach (NPT agreements reflect important advances in safeguards concepts indicated in the Treaty itself). (author)

  11. The future for safeguards technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The present paper presents some elements of an emerging vision of a new and updated potential role for safeguard instrumentation in the overall process of deterring the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The paper focusses on installed, transportable and portable measurement systems and in-situ techniques for maintaining continuity of knowledge. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  12. Nuclear safeguards and physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the present lecture two topics are covered: 1) the steps or the infrastructure which the operators of a nuclear facility have to foresee for the implementation of safeguards according to the NPT. 2) General features of a national physical protection system for nuclear materials in use, storage and transport. (orig./RW)

  13. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems

  14. International Atomic Energy Agency Annual Report 2014. Additional Annex Information

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This annex contains information on: • Coordinated research projects completed in 2014; • Publications issued in 2014; • Training courses, seminars and workshops held in 2014; • Relevant Agency web sites; • Number and types of facilities under Agency safeguards by State as of 31 December 2014 and • Facilities under Agency safeguards or containing safeguarded nuclear material on 31 December 2014

  15. Technology transfer significance of the International Safeguards Project Office

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marcuse, W.; Wallgura, A.J.

    1988-01-01

    The safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are of major importance to the non-proliferation objectives of the United States of America and other nations of the world. Assurance of safeguards effectiveness is mandatory to continued peaceful use of nuclear power. To enhance the ability of the IAEA to apply safeguards effectively, and to ensure that the IAEA does not lack technical assistance in critical areas, the U.S. Congress has made available a special authorization for a Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS). In expediting the program full use is made of existing DOE laboratory resources.

  16. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  17. Considerations in the evaluation of the human element of a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    By understanding the human system and its function, then a structure for evaluating the human system can be developed. This understanding must be available at the research and development levels, and must occur at the working level so that individuals who impact the system will have a common goal in mind. Then by appropriate coordination and review, a system can be developed which will function as designed with a high degree of assurance

  18. Violence: Safeguarding Our Children.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Our Children, 1995

    1995-01-01

    This adaptation of the National Parent Teacher Association (PTA) booklet "Safeguarding Your Children" discusses cooperative efforts of communities, schools, and homes to protect children from violence. (SM)

  19. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since 2008, the Human Capital Development (HCD) subprogramme of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has supported the recruitment, education, training, and retention of the next generation of international safeguards professionals to meet the needs of both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United States. Specifically, HCD's efforts respond to data indicating that 82% of safeguards experts at U.S. Laboratories will have left the workforce within 15 years. This paper provides an update on the status of the subprogramme since its last presentation at the IAEA Safeguards Symposium in 2010. It highlights strengthened, integrated efforts in the areas of graduate and post-doctoral fellowships, young and midcareer professional support, short safeguards courses, and university engagement. It also discusses lessons learned from the U.S. experience in safeguards education and training as well as the importance of long-range strategies to develop a cohesive, effective, and efficient human capital development approach. (author)

  20. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Reprocessing Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Richard; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-06-24

    U.S. efforts to promote the international expansion of nuclear energy through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) will result in a dramatic expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the United States. New demonstration facilities, such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), the Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR), and the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC) will use advanced nuclear and chemical process technologies that must incorporate increased proliferation resistance to enhance nuclear safeguards. The ASA-100 Project, “Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities,” commissioned by the NA-243 Office of NNSA, has been tasked with reviewing and developing advanced safeguards approaches for these demonstration facilities. Because one goal of GNEP is developing and sharing proliferation-resistant nuclear technology and services with partner nations, the safeguards approaches considered are consistent with international safeguards as currently implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This first report reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new fuel reprocessing processes to be deployed at the AFCF and CFTC facilities. Similar analyses addressing the ABR and transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication lines at AFCF and CFTC will be presented in subsequent reports.

  1. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  2. Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

  3. Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

  4. Development of the unattended spent fuel flow monitoring safeguards system (UFFM) for the high temperature engineering test reactor (HTTR) (Joint research)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As of the safeguards approach in the HTTR facility, an unattended spent fuel flow monitor (UFFM) was developed to carry out an item counting of spent fuel blocks. The UFFM is so designed and fabricated as to be the compact and unique monitor system to verify a movement of spent fuel blocks in 'difficult to access' area and reduce inspection efforts. The UFFM was well-incorporated in small space along fuel transfer path. This system consists of two detector packages, electronics named GRAND and computer. One package consists of two ionization chambers and a He-3 counter. Tungsten collimators are installed on the nose of the packages to increase the time difference between two detectors. The IAEA acceptance tests were performed and it was confirmed the followings: All the detectors used in the UFFM were functioning properly to measure a spent fuel block flow. The time difference between detector signals was sufficient to determine the direction of the spent fuel blocks. The UFFM was useful to carry out the item counting of spent fuel blocks. The UFFM was approved as the IAEA safeguards equipment applied the item counting for spent fuels in the safeguards approach in the HTTR. (author)

  5. Technology transfer significance of the International Safeguards Project Office

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marcuse, W.; Waligura, A.J.

    1988-06-01

    The safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are of major importance to the non-proliferation objectives of the United States of America and other nations of the world. Assurance of safeguards effectiveness is mandatory to continued peaceful use of nuclear power. To enhance the ability of the IAEA to apply safeguards effectively, and to ensure that the IAEA does not lack technical assistance in critical areas, the US Congress has made available a special authorization for a Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS). This substantial program of technology transfer was initiated in 1976. The United States Departments of State and Energy, the Arms control and Disarmament Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have each accepted responsibility for parts of the Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards. Funding is provided by state through the Foreign Assistance Act. This report provides a discussion of this program.

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007

  8. Safeguards research at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The LLL safeguards research program includes inspection methods, facility assessment methodologies, value-impact analysis, vulnerability analysis of accounting systems, compliance with regulations, process monitoring, etc. Each of those projects is described as are their goals and progress

  9. Structured Assessment Approach: a procedure for the assessment of fuel cycle safeguard systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parziale, A.A.; Patenaude, C.J.; Renard, P.A.; Sacks, I.J.

    1980-03-06

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has developed and tested for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission a procedure for the evaluation of Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) Systems at Nuclear Fuel Facilities. This procedure, called the Structured Assessment Approach, SAA, subjects the MC and A system at a facility to a series of increasingly sophisticated adversaries and strategies. A fully integrated version of the computer codes which assist the analyst in this assessment was made available in October, 1979. The concepts of the SAA and the results of the assessment of a hypothetical but typical facility are presented.

  10. Addressing verification challenges. Proceedings of an international safeguards symposium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The symposium on international safeguards, Addressing Verification Challenges, was held in Vienna from 16 to 20 October 2006, with the aim of assessing the challenges to the IAEA safeguards system that have emerged, or intensified, since the previous IAEA safeguards symposium in 2001. Some 500 nuclear safeguards and verification experts from more than 60 countries and international organizations attended the event. In all, 129 papers were presented in 21 sessions. There were 14 keynote speeches and 110 oral presentations. A total of 65 papers were presented as posters. In addition, 16 commercial suppliers of safeguards relevant equipment and technology presented their wares and capabilities. The symposium was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA). The symposium provided an important forum at which related issues could be discussed, the IAEA could showcase some of its ongoing work and the experts present could provide inputs of fresh thinking. The IAEA Safeguards Symposium 2006 was developed to cover five topics: current challenges to the safeguards system, further strengthening of safeguards practices and approaches, improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information, advances in safeguards techniques and technology, and future challenges. These proceedings contain the addresses given at the opening session, the technical plenary session and the closing session. The summary provides an overview of the oral presentations at the 21 sessions of the symposium. Each individual paper is indexed separately

  11. Adversary modeling: an analysis of criminal activities analogous to potential threats to nuclear safeguard systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heineke, J.M.

    1978-12-20

    This study examines and analyzes several classes of incidents in which decision makers are confronted with adversaries. The classes are analogous to adversaries in a material control system in a nuclear facility. Both internal threats (bank frauds and embezzlements) and external threats (aircraft hijackings and hostage-type terrorist events were analyzed. (DLC)

  12. Adversary modeling: an analysis of criminal activities analogous to potential threats to nuclear safeguard systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This study examines and analyzes several classes of incidents in which decision makers are confronted with adversaries. The classes are analogous to adversaries in a material control system in a nuclear facility. Both internal threats (bank frauds and embezzlements) and external threats (aircraft hijackings and hostage-type terrorist events were analyzed

  13. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities - Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  14. Development of DUPIC safeguards neutron counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Young Gil; Cha, Hong Ryul; Kim, Ho Dong; Hong, Jong Sook; Kang, Hee Young

    1999-08-01

    KAERI, in cooperation with LANL, developed DSNC (DUPIC Safeguards Neutron Counter) for safeguards implementing on DUPIC process which is under development by KAERI for direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors. DSNC is a well-type neutron coincidence counter with substantial shielding to protect system from high gamma radiation of spent fuel. General development procedures in terms of design, manufacturing, fabrication, cold and hot test, performance test for DSNC authentication by KAERI-IAEA-LANL are described in this report. It is expected that the techniques related DSNC development and associated neutron detection and evaluation method could be applied for safeguards improvement. (Author). 20 refs., 16 tabs. 98 figs.

  15. Reactor monitoring and safeguards using antineutrino detectors

    CERN Document Server

    Bowden, N S

    2008-01-01

    Nuclear reactors have served as the antineutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Measurements made with antineutrino detectors could therefore offer an alternative means for verifying the power history and fissile inventory of a reactors, as part of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other reactor safeguards regimes. Several efforts to develop this monitoring technique are underway across the globe.

  16. SARP-II: Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program, Revised

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kempf, C.R.

    1994-03-01

    A computer code, SARP (Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program) which will generate and maintain at-facility safeguards accounting records, and generate IAEA safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user, was completed in 1990 by the Safeguards, Safety, and Nonproliferation Division (formerly the Technical Support Organization) at Brookhaven National Laboratory as a task under the US Program of Technical Support to IAEA safeguards. The code was based on a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) for off-load refueled power reactor facilities, with model facility and safeguards accounting regime as described in IAEA Safeguards Publication STR-165. Since 1990, improvements in computing capabilities and comments and suggestions from users engendered revision of the original code. The result is an updated, revised version called SARP-II which is discussed in this report.

  17. SARP-II: Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program, Revised

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A computer code, SARP (Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program) which will generate and maintain at-facility safeguards accounting records, and generate IAEA safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user, was completed in 1990 by the Safeguards, Safety, and Nonproliferation Division (formerly the Technical Support Organization) at Brookhaven National Laboratory as a task under the US Program of Technical Support to IAEA safeguards. The code was based on a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) for off-load refueled power reactor facilities, with model facility and safeguards accounting regime as described in IAEA Safeguards Publication STR-165. Since 1990, improvements in computing capabilities and comments and suggestions from users engendered revision of the original code. The result is an updated, revised version called SARP-II which is discussed in this report

  18. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-09-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed.

  19. Protecting sensitive systems and data in an open agency

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hunt, Douglas B.; Tompkins, Frederick G.

    1987-01-01

    This paper focuses on the policy and definitional issues associated with providing adequate and reasonable levels of protection for sensitive systems and data in an agency whose basic charter mandates the open sharing of information and transfer of technology into the market economy. An information model based on current Federal regulatory issuances is presented. A scheme for determining sensitivity levels, based on a categorization taxonomy,is provided.

  20. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  1. Countering the livestock-targeted bioterrorism threat and responding with an animal health safeguarding system.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yeh, J-Y; Lee, J-H; Park, J-Y; Cho, Y S; Cho, I-S

    2013-08-01

    Attacks against livestock and poultry using biological agents constitute a subtype of agroterrorism. These attacks are defined as the intentional introduction of an animal infectious disease to strike fear in people, damage a nation's economy and/or threaten social stability. Livestock bioterrorism is considered attractive to terrorists because biological agents for use against livestock or poultry are more readily available and difficult to monitor than biological agents for use against humans. In addition, an attack on animal husbandry can have enormous economic consequences, even without human casualties. Animal husbandry is vulnerable to livestock-targeted bioterrorism because it is nearly impossible to secure all livestock animals, and compared with humans, livestock are less well-guarded targets. Furthermore, anti-livestock biological weapons are relatively easy to employ, and a significant effect can be produced with only a small amount of infectious material. The livestock sector is presently very vulnerable to bioterrorism as a result of large-scale husbandry methods and weaknesses in the systems used to detect disease outbreaks, which could aggravate the consequences of livestock-targeted bioterrorism. Thus, terrorism against livestock and poultry cannot be thought of as either a 'low-probability' or 'low-consequence' incident. This review provides an overview of methods to prevent livestock-targeted bioterrorism and respond to terrorism involving the deliberate introduction of a pathogen-targeting livestock and poultry.

  2. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper examines the present approach of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguarding various types of facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, in the hope that it will serve as useful background material for several of the various working groups of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). The objectives and criteria of safeguards as well as the specific safeguards techniques which are utilized by the Agency, are addressed. In Part I, a general overview of safeguards as well as a discussion of procedures applicable to most if not all IAEA safeguarded facilities are included. Part II is broken down into specific facility types and focusses on the particular safeguards measures applied to them. Safeguards have reached different degrees of development for different types of facilities, in part because the Agency's experience in safeguarding certain types is considerably greater than for other types. Thus the Agency safeguards described herein are not static, but are continuously evolving. This evolution results not only from the fact that larger and more complex facilities have been coming under safeguards. Changes are also continually being introduced based on practical experience and research and development aimed at improving safeguards efficiency, reducing intrusiveness into plant operations, minimizing operator and inspector radiation exposure, and reducing subjective evaluations in determining the effectiveness of safeguards. To these ends, the technical support programmes of various countries are playing an important role. It is emphasized that this paper is not intended to evaluate the effectiveness of Agency safeguards or to highlight problem areas. It is simply aimed at providing a picture of what safeguards are or are planned to be at various stages of the fuel cycle

  3. Agreement of 28 March 1991 between the Government of Solomon Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first one stipulates the agreement of Solomon Islands to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part two specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  4. The text of the Agreement of 5 July 1980 between Sri Lanka and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Sri Lanka to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  5. Agreement of 13 June 1996 between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Principality of Monaco to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  6. Agreement of 30 March 1996 between the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Algeria to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  7. Agreement of 16 September 1991 between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of South Africa to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  8. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

  10. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/258) concluded between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1998 and it entered into force on 28 july 1998

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

  12. IAEA safeguards instrumentation: Development, implementation and control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Extensive development efforts over the last 5 years have produced a number of new instruments to help the IAEA meet its safeguards obligations. Implementation of these new instruments is proceeding at a necessarily slower pace. To optimize the performance and reliability of the instrumentation systems when used in safeguards applications, increasing attention is needed to be spent on performance monitoring and control of the instruments. (author)

  13. Comprehensive safeguards evaluation methods and societal risk analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Essential capabilities of an integrated evaluation methodology for analyzing safeguards systems are discussed. Such a methodology must be conceptually meaningful, technically defensible, discriminating and consistent. A decompostion of safeguards systems by function is mentioned as a possible starting point for methodology development. The application of a societal risk equation to safeguards systems analysis is addressed. Conceptual problems with this approach are discussed. Technical difficulties in applying this equation to safeguards systems are illustrated through the use of confidence intervals, information content, hypothesis testing and ranking and selection procedures

  14. Secure data communication for safeguards implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Secure, reliable and cost-effective communication is necessary for effective IAEA safeguards implementation. The transmission of safeguards data from nuclear facilities to IAEA headquarters and regional offices (referred to as remote monitoring) initially demonstrated the need for secure, cost-effective data communication that satisfies the confidentiality requirements of Member States and provides data authenticity that allows the IAEA to draw soundly based, independent safeguards conclusions. The implementation of integrated safeguards further demonstrates the need for information obtained in the course of an inspection, complementary access or design information verification, to be analyzed and corroborated with other information available at IAEA headquarters or regional offices while the inspector is still on-site. This requires the capability to connect the inspector, anywhere in the field, to the IAEA data network with secure voice, video, or data transfer capabilities. Such a data network would allow inspectors to 'push' information to headquarters, thereby providing IAEA managers with the ability to make evaluation in near real time, as well as the ability to 'pull' information from IAEA databases for evaluations in the field. In order to expand the IAEA's present capabilities in the area of secure data communication, in 2005 the Safeguards Division of Technical Support (SGTS) initiated cooperation with the European Space Agency (ESA) on satellite communications. This cooperation included testing an ESA provided satellite terminal at IAEA headquarters and at a nuclear facility. Two feasibility studies were carried out to address end-to-end communication services based on existing orbital and ground-based infrastructures. The goal was to determine how the deployment of advanced satellite communication and services could meet future IAEA safeguards needs. The paper presents the results of these studies, including a summary of costs, benefits and possible

  15. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

  16. Development of national safeguards inspection technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It is considered that the safeguards trend in the IAEA and international nonproliferation regime is being accelerated toward strengthened safeguards system. In order to effectively respond to the stream as a whole, government has to have a firm policy-intention on nuclear non-proliferation, and supporting stance as to the stream should be taken consistently. Also, technological development satisfying the non-proliferation requirement would be pursued for the establishment of transparency and the enhancement of international confidence. At present, Korea stands at take-off stage in terms of safeguards. Therefore, necessary measures such as arrangement of legal framework, staffing and training of inspection man-power, and purchase of inspection equipment should be taken at the same time for earlier settlement of national safeguards system. In this connection, international cooperation with the share of the inspection results and equipment between the IAEA and TCNC is demanded. In the long term, the development of inspection technology as well as the research of sophisticated technology will have to be pursued. Emphasis should be placed on the regional safeguards system as well. In addition, it is necessary to ensure internationally that nuclear technological development to be planned is development of safeguards technology. (author). 20 tabs., 24 figs., 45 refs

  17. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities - International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  18. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  19. Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice

  20. Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice.

  1. Overcoming Safeguards Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The focus of the 2010 IAEA International Safeguards Symposium was how best, from a technical perspective, to prepare for future verification challenges during this time of change. By bringing together the leading experts in the field from across the world, this symposium provided an opportunity for stakeholders to explore possible solutions in support of the IAEA's nuclear verification mission, and to identify areas where the different stakeholders in the safeguards business can help address these challenges

  2. International safeguards data authentication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Safeguards community is becoming increasingly reliant on information stored in electronic form. In international monitoring and related activities it must be possible to verify and maintain the integrity of this electronic information. This paper discusses the use of data authentication technology to assist in accomplishing this task. The paper provides background information, identifies the relevance to international safeguards, discusses issues related to export controls, algorithm patents, key management and the use of commercial vs. custom software

  3. International safeguards data authentication

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Melton, R.B.; Smith, C.E.; DeLand, S.M.; Manatt, D.R.

    1996-07-01

    The International Safeguards community is becoming increasingly reliant on information stored in electronic form. In international monitoring and related activities it must be possible to verify and maintain the integrity of this electronic information. This paper discusses the use of data authentication technology to assist in accomplishing this task. The paper provides background information, identifies the relevance to international safeguards, discusses issues related to export controls, algorithm patents, key management and the use of commercial vs. custom software.

  4. Safeguards and physics measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carchon, R

    2002-04-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'.

  5. Norms, Action and Agency in Multi-agent Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sergot, Marek

    This presentation has two parts. The technical part concerns the logic of expressions of the form 'agent x brings it about that A', or 'agent x is responsible for its being the case that A', or more generally, 'the group of agents G collectively, though perhaps inadvertently, bring it about that A'. I will present an account that combines this agency view of action with the transition based conceptions more usually encountered in computer science and temporal logic. A two-sorted (modal) language is defined for talking about properties of states and transitions in a transition system, and about the actions of individual agents or groups of agents, including two modalities of the 'brings it about' kind. Since no assumptions at all are made about the reasoning or perceptual capabilities of the agents - they can be human, or computer agents, or simple reactive devices - I refer to this form of agency as 'unwitting'; unwitting can mean both inadvertent and unaware. The resulting logic bears a resemblance to Ingmar Pörn's (1977) logic of 'brings it about' though there are differences, The account generalises naturally to talking about the collective actions of groups of agents: several different forms of (unwitting) collective agency can be identified.

  6. The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards - How It Works

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nock,C.; Hoffheins,B.

    2008-07-13

    The U.S. Support Program to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to transfer US technology and expertise to assist the IAEA Department of Safeguards because its limited budget and scope would not allow for R&D activities and the procurement of specialized or customized equipment. Over the years, the USSP and the Department of Safeguards have worked together continuously to develop and improve processes for requesting, selecting, and managing projects that support the Safeguards verification mission. This paper will discuss the main USSP processes for accepting and processing Safeguards requests, and managing and reporting task progress.

  7. Legal Resources Information System for Information Agencies of Specialized Libraries

    CERN Document Server

    Nguyen, Phuc V

    2011-01-01

    In recent years, the rapid development of information technology and communication has a strong impact to industry information - the library. The mission of the industry when in fact the great social place to see the library as knowledge management. Vietnam is in the process of building the rule of law socialist orientation and improves the legal system. So in the current development process, the law library plays an important role in the retention, dissemination and provision of legal information service of legislative, executive and judiciary, particularly especially research, teaching and learning of law school. But the response of the legal information library information agencies remains limited compared to the increasing demand of users.

  8. Paying tribute to 25 years of safeguards leadership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    After phases of intensive development in the 1970s and consolidation in the 1980s, the IAEA's international safeguards system is now in a phase of transition. The 1990s look to be a time when verification activities are further expanded in response to global developments and challenges in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. How far have safeguards come, and where are they headed? This article offers some thoughts and perspectives on the main challenges and opportunities facing IAEA safeguards, in the context of some recent developments and the overall evolution of the safeguards system

  9. Combining Measurements with Three-Dimensional Laser Scanning System and Coded Aperture Gamma-Ray Imaging System for International Safeguards Applications

    OpenAIRE

    RAFFO-CAIADO Ana; ZIOCK Klaus-Peter; HAYWARD Jason; Smith, S E; BOGARD C.b.; BOEHNEN C.b.; SEQUEIRA Vitor; PUIG ALCORIZA David; Goncalves, Joao; PEIXOTO Orpet; ALMEIDA Silvio; CALZETTA Osvaldo

    2010-01-01

    Being able to verify the operator¿s declaration in regard to the technical design of nuclear facilities is an important aspect of every safeguards approach. In addition to visual observation, it is necessary to know if nuclear material is present or has been present in undeclared piping and ducts. The possibility of combining the results from different measurement techniques into one easily interpreted product should optimize the inspection effort and increase safeguards effectiveness. A coll...

  10. Are xenotransplantation safeguards legally viable?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Florencio, P S; Ramanathan, E D

    2001-01-01

    Scientists agree on the need for robust public health safeguards to accompany the imminent introduction of xenotransplantation--clinical transplantation of animal tissue into humans. To protect society in the event of emerging infectious diseases, governments must devise a legally effective means of ensuring compliance with such safeguards. Neither consent law, the law of contracts, nor existing public health legislation can adequately enforce such compliance. Consent law serves as a mechanism of communicating the momentary waiver of legal rights, not as a durable enforcement doctrine. Because it would be essential for recipients personally to comply with public safety measures, the law of contracts would also be unable to compel compliance. Existing public health legislation would also likely be ineffective because it would need to be substantially amended to incorporate the heightened powers necessary for the periodic examination of asymptomatic xenotransplant recipients. Xenotransplantation-specific legislation would be a legally effective means of enforcing public health safeguards since it could require conforming behaviors and could impose monetary fines on those recipients who, having benefited from life-saving intervention, fail to comply. This Article argues that legislation implementing a post-xenotransplantation surveillance system should withstand constitutional scrutiny because it would not be discriminatory and because, although it would violate fundamental rights of recipients, such violations would be justified under existing constitutional doctrines. PMID:15212014

  11. End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Badalamente, R. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Anzelon, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Deland, S. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whiteson, R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

  12. End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information

  13. Verification and the safeguards legacy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A number of inspection or monitoring systems throughout the world over the last decades have been structured drawing upon the IAEA experience of setting up and operating its safeguards system. The first global verification system was born with the creation of the IAEA safeguards system, about 35 years ago. With the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, inspections were to be performed under safeguards agreements, concluded directly between the IAEA and non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty. The IAEA developed the safeguards system within the limitations reflected in the Blue Book (INFCIRC 153), such as limitations of routine access by the inspectors to 'strategic points', including 'key measurement points', and the focusing of verification on declared nuclear material in declared installations. The system, based as it was on nuclear material accountancy. It was expected to detect a diversion of nuclear material with a high probability and within a given time and therefore determine also that there had been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes. The most vital element of any verification system is the inspector. Technology can assist but cannot replace the inspector in the field. Their experience, knowledge, intuition and initiative are invaluable factors contributing to the success of any inspection regime. The IAEA inspectors are however not part of an international police force that will intervene to prevent a violation taking place. To be credible they should be technically qualified with substantial experience in industry or in research and development before they are recruited. An extensive training program has to make sure that the inspectors retain their professional capabilities and that it provides them with new skills. Over the years, the inspectors and through them the safeguards verification system gained experience in: organization and management of large teams; examination of records and evaluation of material balances

  14. Status and trends of safeguards equipment development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meeting the technical and logistical challenges of international safeguards instrumentation has been a major concern since the first safeguards inspection in the early 1960s. This concern and the related activities have been pursued vigorously since the inception of Member State Support Programs in 1976. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with the vital and crucial assistance of member states, has strived toward reliable, credible instrumentation that can be directed toward the various specific applications encountered in the nuclear fuel cycle. This paper provides a status report on agency instrumentation as of 1993 and lists some of the new, perhaps even more formidable, challenges and trends that are expected to be encountered over the next few years

  15. Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  16. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/226) concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998, and signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998. Pending entry into force, the Protocol is being applied provisionally as from the date of signature, i.e. 12 June 1998

  17. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME II/III IAEA COMMITTEE 24, Major Issues Underlying the Model Additional Protocol (1996-1997).

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.

    2010-01-01

    Volume I of this Review traces the origins of the Model Additional Protocol. It covers the period from 1991, when events in Iraq triggered an intensive review of the safeguards system, until 1996, when the IAEA Board of Governors established Committee 24 to negotiate a new protocol to safeguards agreement. The period from 1991-1996 set the stage for this negotiation and shaped its outcome in important ways. During this 5-year period, many proposals for strengthening safeguards were suggested and reviewed. Some proposals were dropped, for example, the suggestion by the IAEA Secretariat to verify certain imports, and others were refined. A rough consensus was established about the directions in which the international community wanted to go, and this was reflected in the draft of an additional protocol that was submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors on May 6, 1996 in document GOV/2863, Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System - Proposals For Implementation Under Complementary Legal Authority, A Report by the Director General. This document ended with a recommendation that, 'the Board, through an appropriate mechanism, finalize the required legal instrument taking as a basis the draft protocol proposed by the Secretariat and the explanation of the measures contained in this document.'

  18. Conversion of control systems, protection and engineering safeguard system signals of Almaraz NPP model from RELAP5 into TRAC-M

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the scope of a joint project between the Spanish Regulatory Commission (CSN) and the electric energy industry of Spain (UNESA) about the USNRC state-of-art thermal hydraulic code, TRAC-M, there is a task relating to the translation of the Spanish NPP models from other TH codes to the new one. As a part of this project, our team is working on the translation of Almaraz NPP model from RELAP5/MOD3.2 to TRAC-M. One of the goals of the project is to analyze the conversion of control blocks, signal variables and trips in order to correct modelling all instrumentation and control systems, and also protection and engineering safeguard system-signals of the NPP. At present, several portions of the input deck have been converted to TRAC-M, and the output data have also been compared with RELAP5 data. This paper describes the problems found in the conversion and the solutions achieved.(author)

  19. UK Safeguards R and D Project progress report for the period July 1983 - April 1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Progress reports are presented on the following projects: centrifuge enrichment plant safeguards; stores safeguards and general accounting techniques; generic programmes (projects underlying many instrument systems (e.g. tamper proofing and indication; neutron interrogation systems); system studies); FBR fuel cycle safeguards; service programmes (services to the IAEA); exploratory and short projects. (U.K.)

  20. Safeguards on nuclear material after Czech Republic's accession to the European Union

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Two different international safeguards systems are compared: IAEA safeguards under the NPT, and Euratom safeguards under the Euratom Treaty. A short overview of the creation and evaluation of the two systems is given. The paper is conceived so as to highlight the main differences between the two systems and their consequences for the Czech Republic after the state's accession to the EU and the trilateral safeguards agreement. Attention is concentrated on the problems which are likely to be met in this context. (author)

  1. Supporting Technical Work Under IAEA Safeguards Agreements of 2013 Completed by Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Safeguards

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    GAO; Qiang; LIU; Hong-bin; YANG; Qun; BU; Li-xin; MIAO; Qiang; HE; Li-xia; XU; Zheng; ZHANG; Wen-liang

    2013-01-01

    Safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA)are an important element of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.In order to verify that commitments made by states under safeguards agreements with the IAEA are fulfilled.China signed the voluntary offer agreement(INFCIRC/369)with IAEA in 1988.The agreement entered into force in 1989.There are three nuclear

  2. Defining the needs for gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-04-05

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared UF{sub 6} containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. In verifying declared LEU production, the inspectors also take samples for off-site destructive assay (DA) which provide accurate data, with 0.1% to 0.5% measurement uncertainty, on the enrichment of the UF{sub 6} feed, tails, and product. However, taking samples of UF{sub 6} for off-site analysis is a much more labor and resource intensive exercise for the operator and inspector. Furthermore, the operator must ship the samples off-site to the IAEA laboratory which delays the timeliness of results and interruptions to the continuity of knowledge (CofK) of the samples during their storage and transit. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems such as process monitoring and possible on-site analysis of DA samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements and provide more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also introduce examples advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation.

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  5. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the clean and safe growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports these three areas should be robust. The focus of this paper will be on the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards, and the integration of safeguards infrastructure with other elements critical to ensuring nuclear energy security

  6. Insider safeguards effectiveness model (ISEM). User's guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A comprehensive presentation of the ISEM computer program is provided. ISEM was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of a fixed-site facility safeguards system in coping with the theft, sabotage, or dispersal of radiological material by a single person who has authorized access to the facility. This insider may be aided by a group of insiders who covertly degrade sensor systems. Each ISEM run evaluates safeguards system performance for a particular scenario specified by the user. The dispatching of guards following alarms and their interaction with the insider are explicitly treated by the model

  7. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of International Nuclear Safeguards: Human Capital Development Activity in FY16

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States). Nuclear Security and Isotope Technology Division; Gaudet, Rachel N. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States). Nuclear Security and Isotope Technology Division

    2016-09-30

    In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. One of the report’s key recommendations was for DOE NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: policy development and outreach, concepts and approaches, technology and analytical methodologies, human capital development (HCD), and infrastructure development. This report addresses the HCD component of NGSI. The goal of the HCD component as defined in the NNSA Program Plan is “to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.” The major objectives listed in the HCD goal include education and training, outreach to universities and professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories.

  8. Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

    2010-08-07

    This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of ‘safeguards by design’. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how ‘safeguardability’ was introduced into RRP.

  9. Some major challenges: Nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear arms control and nuclear terrorism. Vienna, 29 October 2001. Statement to the symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The main topics dealt with the ensuring of an effective, universal and adequately financed system for the verification of nuclear non-proliferation, namely as follows: Effectiveness of the system; Participation in the system ; Financing of the system; Making Progress in Nuclear Arms Control; Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism. In the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2000, the Agency was able to conclude that for all 140 states with safeguards agreements in place the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. The Agency currently safeguards over 900 facilities in 70 countries on a regular safeguards budget of approximately US $80 million per year. Turning to the major recent challenge, protection against nuclear terrorism, the IAEA has long been active in encouraging States to make security an integral part of the management of their nuclear programmes. The recent attacks in the United States were, however, a wake-up call to all that more can and must be done. In the week immediately following the tragedy, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution which requested a thorough review of Agency activities and programmes relevant to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism

  10. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  11. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the ''non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs

  12. DOE integrated safeguards and security (DISS) system a nation-wide distributed information system for personnel security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Block, B.

    1997-06-05

    DISS uses secure client-server and relational database technology across open networks to address the problems of security clearance request processing and tracking of security clearances for the Department of energy. The system supports the entire process from data entry by the prospective clearance holders through tracking of all DOE clearances, and use of standard DOE badges in automated access control systems throughout the DOE complex.

  13. [Anthropocentrism versus pathozentrism - On the integration of animal protection into the system of safeguarding basic democratic rights

    Science.gov (United States)

    Caspar, Johannes

    1998-01-01

    Modern animal protection laws must be firmly rooted in a decisive pathocentric fundamental declaration. In accordance with this, it is not a case of protecting human interests concerning a particular way of treating animals but rather to protect animals from the exploitation interests of humans. In order to attain a balance between animal protection and the laws pertaining to animal use, the regulations governing pathocentric animal protection must rest on a legal foundation backed up by constitutional law. In the final instance, a statutory framework either in the form of an objective legal obligation - or better still - in the form of subjective-legal animal protection must be considered. The latter solution has the advantage that the law enforcement deficits of the authorities responsible for animal protection may be supplemented by the fiduciary safeguarding of animal rights by a third party. PMID:11178518

  14. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Safeguards and Security quarterly progress report ending March 31, 1996

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Davis, B.; Davis, G.; Johnson, D.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.

    1996-04-01

    LLNL carries out safeguards and security activities for DOE Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) and other organizations within and outside DOE. LLNL is supporting OSS in 6 areas: safeguards technology, safeguards and materials accountability, computer security--distributed systems, complex-wide access control, standardization of security systems, and information technology and security center. This report describes the activities in each of these areas.

  15. Technology development of nuclear material safeguards for DUPIC fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the second phase of research and development program conducted from 1993 to 1996, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. By securing in advance a optimized safeguards system with domestically developed hardware and software, it will contribute not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author). 27 refs., 13 tabs., 89 figs

  16. Technology development of nuclear material safeguards for DUPIC fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, Jong Sook; Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, Hee Young; Lee, Young Gil; Byeon, Kee Ho; Park, Young Soo; Cha, Hong Ryul; Park, Ho Joon; Lee, Byung Doo; Chung, Sang Tae; Choi, Hyung Rae; Park, Hyun Soo

    1997-07-01

    During the second phase of research and development program conducted from 1993 to 1996, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. By securing in advance a optimized safeguards system with domestically developed hardware and software, it will contribute not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author). 27 refs., 13 tabs., 89 figs.

  17. The role of quality management in delivering safeguards conclusions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: How does an organisation assess and assure the quality of its product when that product is a statement regarding the absence of undeclared activities? Such a statement cannot be quality controlled in a traditional sense like manufactured components, there is simply nothing to measure or control against, and unlike a modern service industry the customer is not able to simply switch to another service provider if it perceives that the product is of poor quality, however it may define quality. This is the challenge that the IAEA faces as more States move towards safeguards under a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, with the requirement to draw conclusions not only on the correctness of declarations but also their completeness. Conclusions are no longer based solely on assessment against well defined Criteria for facility types but instead have a wide variety of inputs, ranging from expanded declarations, results of complementary access, assessment of environmental samples, open source information, satellite imagery, analysis of trade networks in addition to the output from inspections. These all combine to generate an overall State evaluation. When considering the far-reaching consequences of getting it wrong, more than hope is needed to assure the international community that conclusions drawn by the Agency are sound and credible. Part of the approach being taken by the Department of Safeguards to meet this challenge is to implement a quality management system (QMS) based on ISO9001:2000. Implementing a QMS will enable the Secretariat to confirm that the necessary and sufficient processes are in place, they are carried out correctly, adequately monitored and that appropriate feedback loops are used. Importantly it will also allow the Department to understand what the processes cannot deliver so that any weaknesses can be handled correctly. The need for a QMS was recognised internally by the Department of Safeguards in light of

  18. New Measures to Safeguard Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Whitaker, Jr., James [ORNL; Garner, James R [ORNL; Whitaker, Michael [ORNL; Lockwood, Dunbar [U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA; Gilligan, Kimberly V [ORNL; Younkin, James R [ORNL; Hooper, David A [ORNL; Henkel, James J [ORNL; Krichinsky, Alan M [ORNL

    2011-01-01

    As Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) increase in separative work unit (SWU) capacity, the current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) model safeguards approach needs to be strengthened. New measures to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards approach are being investigated that will be mutually beneficial to the facility operators and the IAEA. One of the key concepts being studied for application at future GCEPs is embracing joint use equipment for process monitoring of load cells at feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations. A mock F/W system was built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to generate and collect F/W data from an analogous system. The ORNL system has been used to collect data representing several realistic normal process and off-normal (including diversion) scenarios. Emphasis is placed on the novelty of the analysis of data from the sensors as well as the ability to build information out of raw data, which facilitates a more effective and efficient verification process. This paper will provide a progress report on recent accomplishments and next steps.

  19. Eight years of groundwater monitoring at the building site of the MOSE system for the safeguard of Venice

    Science.gov (United States)

    Casasso, Alessandro; Sethi, Rajandrea; Di Molfetta, Antonio

    2015-04-01

    The survival of Venice is threatened by the continuous increase of frequency and intensity of tidal floods. To prevent these events, a safeguarding system known as MOSE is under construction at the inlets of the Lagoon of Venice. Four arrays of mobile barriers will be lifted in the case of exceptionally high tides (>1.10 m) to insulate the Lagoon. The prefabrication of the mobile barriers required a large construction area close to the final installation sites. Given the lack of space in the inlets of Lido and Chioggia, two basins of the future navigation locks were used for this purpose, and a system of water pumps and wells was therefore installed in each site to ensure the accessibility and safety of the construction areas. The impact of dewatering on the aquifers on the mainland in Punta Sabbioni (inlet of Lido) was monitored by means of continuous hydraulic head measurements in a network 25 piezometers, 11 screened in the phreatic aquifer and 14 in the shallowest confined aquifer. These aquifers are separated by a 5 m thick clayey aquiclude, and a 30 m thick impervious layer isolates them from the underlying confined aquifers, which were therefore not monitored. Each monitoring well was equipped with an automatic water pressure transducer and the hourly recorded hydraulic heads were compensated with the barometric pressure. The time series were compared with the natural driving forces (tides, rainfall, evapotranspiration) and the anthropogenic impact sources (dewatering pumping, slurry walls, land reclamation channels). The dynamics of seawater intrusion were also studied through monthly measurements of the vertical profiles of the electrical conductivity (EC) of groundwater. The monitoring activity was successful in assessing the impacts of the construction works. A drawdown was observed in the confined aquifer due to the dewatering pumping, with a maximum displacement of some 5 m on the mainland and an extension of some 1000 m from the dewatered basin. By

  20. The organisation of interagency training to safeguard children in England: a case study using realistic evaluation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Demi Patsios

    2010-11-01

    Full Text Available Background: Joint training for interagency working is carried out by Local Safeguarding Children Boards in England to promote effective local working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.Purpose: This paper reports on the findings of the outputs and outcomes of interagency training to safeguard children in eight Local Safeguarding Children Boards.Methods: A review of Local Safeguarding Children Board documentation, observations of Local Safeguarding Children Board training sub-group meetings and a series of interviews with training key stakeholders in each Local Safeguarding Children Board were used to assess how partner agencies in the Local Safeguarding Children Boards carried out their statutory responsibilities to organise interagency training. 'Realistic Evaluation' was used to evaluate the mechanisms by which a central government mandate produced particular inter-agency training outputs (number of courses, training days and joint working outcomes (effective partnerships, within particular Local Safeguarding Children Board contexts.Results: The 'mandated partnership' imposed on Local Safeguarding Children Boards by central government left little choice but for partner agencies to work together to deliver joint training, which in turn affected the dynamics of working partnerships across the various sites. The effectiveness of the training sub group determined the success of the organisation and delivery of training for joint working. Despite having a central mandate, Local Safeguarding Children Boards had heterogeneous funding and training arrangements. These resulted in significant variations in the outputs in terms of the number of courses per 'children in need' in the locality and in the cost per course.Conclusions: Interagency training which takes account of the context of the Local Safeguarding Children Board is more likely to produce better trained staff, effective partnership working, and lead to better integrated

  1. The organisation of interagency training to safeguard children in England: a case study using realistic evaluation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Demi Patsios

    2010-11-01

    Full Text Available Background: Joint training for interagency working is carried out by Local Safeguarding Children Boards in England to promote effective local working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. Purpose: This paper reports on the findings of the outputs and outcomes of interagency training to safeguard children in eight Local Safeguarding Children Boards. Methods: A review of Local Safeguarding Children Board documentation, observations of Local Safeguarding Children Board training sub-group meetings and a series of interviews with training key stakeholders in each Local Safeguarding Children Board were used to assess how partner agencies in the Local Safeguarding Children Boards carried out their statutory responsibilities to organise interagency training. 'Realistic Evaluation' was used to evaluate the mechanisms by which a central government mandate produced particular inter-agency training outputs (number of courses, training days and joint working outcomes (effective partnerships, within particular Local Safeguarding Children Board contexts. Results: The 'mandated partnership' imposed on Local Safeguarding Children Boards by central government left little choice but for partner agencies to work together to deliver joint training, which in turn affected the dynamics of working partnerships across the various sites. The effectiveness of the training sub group determined the success of the organisation and delivery of training for joint working. Despite having a central mandate, Local Safeguarding Children Boards had heterogeneous funding and training arrangements. These resulted in significant variations in the outputs in terms of the number of courses per 'children in need' in the locality and in the cost per course. Conclusions: Interagency training which takes account of the context of the Local Safeguarding Children Board is more likely to produce better trained staff, effective partnership working, and lead to better integrated

  2. Development of Nuclear Material Accounting and Safeguards Technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This project is aimed at the development of nuclear material accounting and safeguards technology. Nuclear material accountancy technology for an each unit process and nuclear characteristic analysis technology to demonstrate the safeguards technology for a pyroprocessing facility have been developed during the first phase of the project. A study for analyzing the safeguardability of pyroprocessing facility and preliminary evaluation has also been carried out. The safeguards technology system for electro-reduction process has been established to develop the unit process nuclear material accountancy technology through nuclear material accounting in ACPF and performance test of surveillance equipment using spent fuels and neutron source. Nuclear material accountancy measure for electro-refining process where various kinds of nuclear materials are generated compared to electro-reduction process has been constructed, and its performance test has been conducted as well. A Gamma/neutron integrated system has been developed as a nuclear characteristic analysis technology for pyroprocess nuclear material, the possibility of Pu and U measurement has been analyzed using FRAM, and fundamental experiment has been performed to examine whether LIBS technology is applicable to nuclear material accountancy of pyroprocess. A preliminary concept design of safeguards system for pyroprocessing facility and basic design of computer code for analyzing the safeguardability have been carried out to perform the safeguardability analysis and preliminary evaluation for pyroprocessing facility, and a study for analyzing the safeguardability of KAPF which has scale of 100 MT-HM/year has been conducted in collaboration with LANL. Also, an IAEA Member State Support Program for establishing safeguards approach technology for pyroprocessing facility ('Support for Development for a Safeguards Approach for a Pyroprocessing Plant') has been conducting in cooperation with KINAC. It is expected that

  3. Additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For States with additional protocols, the Agency may request complementary access for any of the following reasons: (a) to ensure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at sites of facilities or locations outside facilities (LOFs) or at other locations declared under Article 2 as containing nuclear material (Article 4.a.i); (b) to resolve a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information provided pursuant to Article 2 or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that information (Article 4.a.ii); and (c) to confirm, for safeguards purposes, the State's declaration of the decommissioned status of a facility or of a LOF where nuclear material was used (Article 4.a.iii). Under additional protocols, the activities that the Agency may carry out in a State include visual observation, environmental sampling and non-destructive measurement. Agency guidelines for complementary access are being developed. In the late 1980s and in the 1990s, new technologies became available enabling the IAEA to detect even minute trace indicators of various types of nuclear activities. This technique which is known as environmental sampling, contributes to the confirmation of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities. Collection of environmental samples at or near a nuclear site combined with ultra-sensitive analytical techniques can reveal signatures of post and current activities in locations where nuclear material is being handled. Another important new technology is remote monitoring which makes use of unattended safeguards instrument systems and ships off-site the data gathered from those instruments to IAEA Headquarters. Cost effectiveness is a prime justification for adding this feature to unattended monitoring systems such as optical surveillance and advanced optical seals. (author)

  4. Network technology for safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A new flexible technology is now available to design sensor and control networks based on a protocol embedded in an intelligent communications integrated circuit. The flexibility allows a system designer and/or a technical installer to make appropriate tradeoffs between simplicity, functionality, and cost in the design of network nodes and their installation. This is especially important in designing the installation scenario for the safeguards network. The network technology permits several choices of installations with the same basic mode hardware. This paper is a discussion of this technology

  5. Safeguards techniques and equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The current booklet is intended to give a full and balanced description of the techniques and equipment used for both nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures, and for the new safeguards measure of environmental sampling. As new verification measures continue to be developed, the material in the booklet will be periodically reviewed and updated versions issued. (author)

  6. Facility safeguards at an LEU fuel fabrication facility in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A facility description of a Japanese LEU BWR-type fuel fabrication plant focusing on safeguards viewpoints is presented. Procedures and practices of MC and A plan, measurement program, inventory taking, and the report and record system are described. Procedures and practices of safeguards inspection are discussed and lessons learned from past experiences are reviewed

  7. Development of nuclear material accounting and safeguards technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shin, H. S.; Kim, H. D.; Park, K. J; and others

    2012-04-15

    The objective of this project is to analyze the safeguard ability of pyroprocess facility and to establish the safeguards system for pyroprocess by developing the technology of nuclear material accounting for unit process, surveillance technology and nuclear characteristics analysis technology which are needed to demonstrate the safeguards technology of pyroprocess. In order to establish the nuclear material accountancy for PRIDE the unified NDA was designed by integrating neutron detection, gamma ray detection, and mass measurement. The surveillance system of PRIDE includes gamma ray detector system for tracing the position of nuclear material in PRIDE and the safeguards system was designed considering the characteristics of nuclear material accountancy and surveillance equipment and monitoring the main factors of process equipment. Based on the design of safeguards system for PRIDE a simulation program for the integrated accounting and surveillance information system has been developed and tested. The safeguard ability analysis code for pyroprocessing facility has been designed to develop a Pyroprocessing Material flow and Material Unaccounted For Uncertainty Simulation (PYMUS) program based on the result from safeguard ability analysis by ROK IAEA MSSP. For novel technologies development of nuclear material accountancy by domestic and international cooperation, the application of XRF, SINRD, PNAR, FRAM, LIBS to NMA has been studied. The safeguards system of PRIDE will be referred to verify the safeguards approach and implementation techniques for pyroprocessing facility on international cooperation(ROK US Joint Fuel Cycle Study and ROK IAEA Member State Support Program). The results of this project will contribute to increase the nuclear transparency for realizing the pyroprocessing technology of the ROK as well as to establish the safeguards technology for pyroprocessing facility.

  8. Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  9. Agreement of 23 August 1974 between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 September 1973. It was signed in Vienna on 30 April 1974 and in La Paz on 23 August 1974. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 6 February 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  10. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 30 April 2004, the date on which the Agency received written notification that the European Atomic Energy Community and the United Kingdom had met their respective internal requirements for entry into force

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 15 September 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Paraguay written notification that Paraguay's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 18 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Nicaragua written notification that Nicaragua's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999 and signed in Vienna on 21 June 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Korea written notification that the Republic of Korea's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  15. Agreement between the Republic of San Marino and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of San Marino and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Agreement was signed in Vienna on 3 March 1995 and in San Marino on 7 September 1998. It entered into force on 15 September 1998. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  16. Protocol additional to the agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement (INFCIRC/217) concluded between Australia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of the Additional Protocol was authorized by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997 and signed in Vienna on the same date. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 12 December 1997

  17. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security

  18. Integrated international safeguards concepts for fuel reprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.; Camp, A.L.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Ellwein, L.B.

    1981-12-01

    This report is the fourth in a series of efforts by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to identify problems and propose solutions for international safeguarding of light-water reactor spent-fuel reprocessing plants. Problem areas for international safeguards were identified in a previous Problem Statement (LA-7551-MS/SAND79-0108). Accounting concepts that could be verified internationally were presented in a subsequent study (LA-8042). Concepts for containment/surveillance were presented, conceptual designs were developed, and the effectiveness of these designs was evaluated in a companion study (SAND80-0160). The report discusses the coordination of nuclear materials accounting and containment/surveillance concepts in an effort to define an effective integrated safeguards system. The Allied-General Nuclear Services fuels reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, was used as the reference facility.

  19. Integrated international safeguards concepts for fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report is the fourth in a series of efforts by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to identify problems and propose solutions for international safeguarding of light-water reactor spent-fuel reprocessing plants. Problem areas for international safeguards were identified in a previous Problem Statement (LA-7551-MS/SAND79-0108). Accounting concepts that could be verified internationally were presented in a subsequent study (LA-8042). Concepts for containment/surveillance were presented, conceptual designs were developed, and the effectiveness of these designs was evaluated in a companion study (SAND80-0160). The report discusses the coordination of nuclear materials accounting and containment/surveillance concepts in an effort to define an effective integrated safeguards system. The Allied-General Nuclear Services fuels reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, was used as the reference facility

  20. Parental Traffic Safeguarding at School Sites: Unequal Risks and Responsibilities

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Arlene Tigar McLaren

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available Scholars recognize the importance of parental chauffeuring in urbanenvironments, but pay remarkably little attention to how parents, as part of everyday, domestic practices, safeguard their children in auto-dominated streets. Based on in-depth, qualitative interviews with parents whose children attend public elementary schools, this exploratory study compares traffic safeguarding experiences on the east and west sides of Vancouver, British Columbia. The analysisshows how social class and gender intersect in three traffic sites: school streetscapes, school entrances, and school traffic safety volunteerism. Utilizing automobility and feminist theories, we argue that urban parental traffic safeguarding is a complex and variegated phenomenon involving unequal risks and responsibilities. Our analysis illustrates the ways in which parental traffic safeguarding is a lynchpin to the automobility system, particularly with respect to itsillusion of safety, and how, conversely, this system shapes parenting by constituting traffic safeguarding as part of domestic responsibilities.

  1. IAEA Safeguards in Pakistan and Emerging Issues/Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in Pakistan dates back to March, 1962 when a trilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/34) was signed for the supply of Pakistan Research Reactor-1 (PARR-1). Since then Pakistan has concluded several safeguards agreements with the Agency. All the safeguards agreements concluded by Pakistan are governed under the Safeguards Document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, which is a model for countries not party to NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). As per this model the item-specific safeguards are applied to Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Being a 66-type country, some times, very peculiar nature of safeguards issues arise that are not common in the States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and which pose challenges for both the IAEA and the country. In Pakistan, not only nuclear material, but non-nuclear material is also subjected to safeguards under the respective Safeguards Agreement. At KANUPP, for example, the heavy water used as moderator and coolant, is under IAEA safeguards. The Suspension and Termination options of INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 are atypical from comprehensive safeguards and are utilized in Pakistan to resolve various issues. For example, the HEU plates are targeted in a safeguarded research reactor (PARR-1) for Mo-99 production, which are then separated in an unsafeguarded Moly Production Plant employing the suspension clause of INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. The Additional Protocol substantially enlarges the IAEA's ability to check for clandestine nuclear activities and facilities. The requirements of the Model Additional Protocol are basically designed for the non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the NPT; the nuclear weapon states are, however, free to choose among or limit the application of the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol. The INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 countries (countries not party to the NPT) may analyse the impact to their programme, of adhering to the Additional Protocol. However, INFCIRC/66/Rev.2

  2. The US Support Program Assistance to the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology, Collection, and Analysis 2008

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tackentien,J.

    2008-06-12

    One of the United States Support Program's (USSP) priorities for 2008 is to support the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) development of an integrated and efficient safeguards information infrastructure, including reliable and maintainable information systems, and effective tools and resources to collect and analyze safeguards-relevant information. The USSP has provided funding in support of this priority for the ISIS Re-engineering Project (IRP), and for human resources support to the design and definition of the enhanced information analysis architecture project (nVision). Assistance for several other information technology efforts is provided. This paper will report on the various ongoing support measures undertaken by the USSP to support the IAEA's information technology enhancements and will provide some insights into activities that the USSP may support in the future.

  3. Advanced Process Monitoring Techniques for Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Orton, Christopher R.; Bryan, Samuel A.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Peper, Shane M.

    2010-11-30

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MC&A) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource-intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies, including both the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor and a spectroscopy-based monitoring system, to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The MIP Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. This paper will provide an overview of our methods and report our on-going efforts to develop and demonstrate the technologies.

  4. Authentication in the context of international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International atomic Energy Agency held its first Advisory Group meeting on the subject of authentication in 1981. This meeting concentrated on the application of authentication to in-plant Non-Destructive Assay equipment supplied by the Facility Operator/State. In the decade since this meeting, a considerable amount of interest has developed over the use of authentication technology as a vital element of effective International Safeguards. Attendant with this interest, confusion has developed over the meaning and the need for the application of the technology as it exists today, and it may exist in the future. This paper addresses the subject of authentication, with emphasis on its basic definition and the applications of authentication technology in International Safeguards

  5. NRC safeguards - An evolving policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The responsibilities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) related to the safeguarding of nuclear material derive from a number of legislative enactments which include the Energy Reorganization Act, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act. The development of NRC material control and accounting requirements over the years has resulted in a number of refinements in system capabilities. A recent rule amendment will provide for more timely analysis of accounting data to enhance anomaly detection and resolution and thus provide for earlier detection of possible theft or diversion. This, along with present initiatives in physical protection program areas, combine to provide increase assurance in capabilities to adequately protect special nuclear materials. Among the physical protection measures now under consideration are revised requirements for security force training and the establishment of a formal requirement for tactical response exercises to evaluate security system effectiveness. In the international arena, full cooperation with the IAEA continues to be regarded as an important function. A recommendation in this area is to reconvene an international committee to review IAEA programs for physical protection (INFCIRC 225). NRC activities in support of these goals include the establishment of improving safeguards capabilities, requiring the reduction of enrichments used in nonpower reactor, the reduction of inventories of highly enriched uranium to levels actually needed for nonpower reactor operations, the maintenance of comparable levels of protection for weapons usable materials under Department of Energy and NRC programs, and continued support of IAEA initiatives and objectives

  6. 42 CFR 431.305 - Types of information to be safeguarded.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Types of information to be safeguarded. 431.305... Information on Applicants and Recipients § 431.305 Types of information to be safeguarded. (a) The agency must have criteria that govern the types of information about applicants and recipients that are...

  7. IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

  8. Managing Suspicious Activity Reporting Systems at Small Agency Police Departments

    OpenAIRE

    Roberts, Bryan A.

    2012-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Law enforcement agencies have managed anonymous tip line programs for decades whereby community members can submit suspected criminal activity to their local law enforcement agency. As a result of the increasing threat of terrorism in the United States, suspicious activity reporting programs (SAR) accompany the traditional anonymous tip line. SARs include the reporting of suspicious behavior related to terrorism, as well as other crimi...

  9. Applications of Virtual Reality to Nuclear Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stansfield, S.

    1998-11-03

    This paper explores two potential applications of Virtual Reality (VR) to international nuclear safeguards: training and information organization and navigation. The applications are represented by two existing prototype systems, one for training nuclear weapons dismantlement and one utilizing a VR model to facilitate intuitive access to related sets of information.

  10. Readability of Special Education Procedural Safeguards

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mandic, Carmen Gomez; Rudd, Rima; Hehir, Thomas; Acevedo-Garcia, Dolores

    2012-01-01

    This study focused on literacy-related barriers to understanding the rights of students with disabilities and their parents within the special education system. SMOG readability scores were determined for procedural safeguards documents issued by all state departments of education. The average reading grade level was 16; 6% scored in the high…

  11. Agency problems of global budget system in Taiwan's National Health Insurance.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yan, Yu-Hua; Yang, Chen-Wei; Fang, Shih-Chieh

    2014-05-01

    The main purpose of this study was to investigate the agency problem presented by the global budget system followed by hospitals in Taiwan. In this study, we examine empirically the interaction between the principal: Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) and agency: medical service providers (hospitals); we also describe actual medical service provider and hospital governance conditions from a agency theory perspective. This study identified a positive correlation between aversion to agency hazard (self-interest behavior, asymmetric information, and risk hedging) and agency problem risks (disregard of medical ethics, pursuit of extra-contract profit, disregard of professionalism, and cost orientation). Agency costs refer to BNHI auditing and monitoring expenditures used to prevent hospitals from deviating from NHI policy goals. This study also found agency costs negatively moderate the relationship between agency hazards and agency problems The main contribution of this study is its use of agency theory to clarify agency problems and several potential factors caused by the NHI system. This study also contributes to the field of health policy study by clarifying the nature and importance of agency problems in the health care sector.

  12. 41 CFR 301-71.1 - What is the purpose of an agency travel accounting system?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... an agency travel accounting system? 301-71.1 Section 301-71.1 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Travel Regulation System TEMPORARY DUTY (TDY) TRAVEL ALLOWANCES AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES 71... accounting system? To: (a) Pay authorized and allowable travel expenses of employees; (b) Provide...

  13. Non-proliferation policy and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    At the beginning of '90s the international community and IAEA have been confronted with serious problems related to the maintaining of the world non-proliferation policy. At the end of the cold war, rumors regarding Iraq's nuclear armament secret program and a new democracies' perception regarding nuclear safety have given a strong impetus toward reinforcing and redefining the safeguards systems. Today this system has got the most advanced and modern means for the detection of nuclear materials stealing and surreptitious production. At the same time with the implementation of the new additional model of safeguards agreements, every country developed an important contribution to end this period in which proliferation and threatening of nuclear weapons were a ruling feature on the international scene. The paper presents the principles of IAEA and national nuclear safeguards system. Mentioned are the techniques and equipment for nuclear safeguards control applied particularly at Cernavoda NPP and TRIGA reactor at IRN - Pitesti as well as those related to the evaluation of the plutonium content in the irradiated fuel. In Romania largely utilized was the program ORIGEN

  14. Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laughter, Mark D [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL; Howell, John [University of Glasgow

    2010-01-01

    Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF{sub 6} feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide

  15. Market Research Survey of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Portable MS Systems for IAEA Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hart, Garret L.; Hager, George J.; Barinaga, Charles J.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2013-02-01

    This report summarizes the results for the market research survey of mass spectrometers that are deemed pertinent to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needs and strategic objectives. The focus of the report is on MS instruments that represent currently available (or soon to be) commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technology and weigh less than 400 pounds. A compilation of all available MS instruments (36 COTS and 2 R&D) is presented, along with pertinent information regarding each instrument.

  16. The road to safeguards quality: An e-learning tutorial

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    their work environment, and where to find further assistance and information. To make the interactive training program as widely and easily available as possible, it was decided to create an Intranet-based solution rather than a CD-ROM or DVD-based training package. This decision presented several challenges arising from: a departmental Intranet architecture that, for security reasons, includes firewalls that limit outside access to Department of Safeguards materials; and the need to first implement a learning management system for online courses. To meet these challenges and create a truly useful training experience, the CSSP team made a commitment to work closely with its IAEA 'customer' throughout the course development cycle to capture the required subject matter, develop an appropriate instructional design, model and test the online learning environment, and work out technical challenges arising from the agency's online environment. To capture interest and promote learning, the course that has emerged - entitled The Road to Safeguards Quality: An e-Learning Tutorial - uses a wide variety of presentation techniques. These include: - Short video clips featuring concise testimonials and scene-setting commentaries throughout the program. - An entertaining 'story' module designed to provide a light introduction to key QMS concepts. - Animated vignettes at the beginning of each module to capture key messages in a memorable way. - Frequent quizzes and exercises to test understanding and broaden perspectives. - Continuous online access to reference documents and Web resources. - Ready access to departmental trainers and subject matter experts by means of an e-mail utility. - Tracking of student progress to help participants resume their studies from session to session. - A technical design that enables the Department to make course updates, as required. - A pass-fail test to conclude the course. Departmental IT staff have identified ways to work with firewall barriers

  17. The text of a safeguards transfer agreement relating to a bilateral agreement between Argentina and the United States of America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of a safeguards transfer agreement of 28 August 1996 relating to a bilateral agreement between Argentina and the United States of America to suspend the application of safeguards pursuant to the agreement of 25 July 1969 between the Agency, Argentina and the United States of America in light of the provisions for the application of safeguards pursuant to the quadripartite safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA. The Protocol entered into force on 13 January 1997

  18. United States Program for Technical assistance to IAEA Standards. Concept Paper: Knowledge Acquisition, Skills training for enhanced IAEA safeguards inspections

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Morris, F.A.; Toquam, J.L.

    1993-11-01

    This concept paper explores the potential contribution of ``Knowledge Acquisition Skills`` in enhancing the effectiveness of international safeguards inspections by the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) and identifies types of training that could be provided to develop or improve such skills. For purposes of this concept paper, Knowledge Acquisition Skills are defined broadly to include all appropriate techniques that IAEA safeguards inspectors can use to acquire and analyze information relevant to the performance of successful safeguards inspections. These techniques include a range of cognitive, analytic, judgmental, interpersonal, and communications skills that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively.

  19. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-15

    The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

  20. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Long, Jon D. [Y-12 National Security Complex; McGinnis, Brent R [ORNL; Morgan, James B [ORNL; Whitaker, Michael [ORNL; Lockwood, Mr. Dunbar [U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA; Shipwash, Jacqueline L [ORNL

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment

  1. Safeguards-by-Design: An Element of 3S Integration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 2008, the '20/20 Vision for the Future' background report by the IAEA Director General identified the possibility of integrating certain activities related to safeguards, safety, and security. Later in the year, the independent Commission report prepared at the request of the IAEA Director General noted that the Agency's's roles in nuclear safeguards, safety, and security (3S) complement and can mutually reinforce each other. Safeguards-by-design (SBD) is a practical measure that strengthens 3S integration, especially for the stage of nuclear facility design and construction, but also with ramifications for other stages of the facility life-cycle. This paper describes the SBD concept, with examples for diverse regulatory environments, being developed in the U.S under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. This is compared with related international SBD work performed in the recent IAEA workshop on 'Facility Design and Plant Operation Features that Facilitate the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards'. Potential future directions for further development of SBD and its integration within 3S are identified.

  2. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  3. Remote monitoring for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Remote monitoring is not a new technology, and its application to safeguards relevant activities has been examined for a number of years. On behalf of the US Department of Energy and international partners, remote monitoring systems have been emplaced in nuclear facilities and laboratories in various parts of the world. The experience gained from these field trials of remote monitoring systems has shown the viability of the concept of using integrated monitoring systems. Although a wide variety of sensors has been used in the remote monitoring field trials conducted to date, the possible range of instrumentation that might be used has scarcely been touched. As the technology becomes widespread, large amounts of data will become available to inspectors responsible for safeguards activities at the sites. Effective use of remote monitoring will require processing, archiving, presenting, and assessing of these data. To provide reasonable efficiency in the application of this technology, data processing should be done in a careful and organized manner. The problem will be not an issue of poring over scant records but of surviving under a deluge of information made possible by modern technology. Fortunately, modern technology, which created the problem of the data glut, is available to come to the assistance of those inundated by data. Apart from the technological problems, one of the most important aspects of remote monitoring is the potential constraint related to the transmission of data out of a facility or beyond national borders. Remote monitoring across national borders can be seriously considered only in the context of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime

  4. Development of Pattern Recognition Options for Combining Safeguards Subsystems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Burr, Thomas L. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hamada, Michael S. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-24

    This talk reviews project progress in combining process monitoring data and nuclear material accounting data to improve the over nuclear safeguards system. Focus on 2 subsystems: (1) nuclear materials accounting (NMA); and (2) process monitoring (PM).

  5. Environmental Protection Agency`s third generation air quality modeling system: An overall perspective

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dennis, R.L.

    1998-03-01

    Current and future problem solving need air quality modeling capabilities that: that as a basis a one atmosphere perspective; are multi-pollutant in character; integrate chemistry and meteorology together in a common system; are multi-scale, able to connect diverse scales in a consistent manner; and support community interactions and cooperative advancement.

  6. IMPLEMENTATION OF A QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN A TRAVEL AGENCY

    OpenAIRE

    Virgil NICULA; POPSA Roxana Elena

    2014-01-01

    The present research refers to the major problems existing in the Romanian tourism, namely, "manufacturing" and commercialization of certain products non-compliant with the user’s requirements in terms of quality. In tourism and hospitality industry, quality can be judged on the extent to which the service received meets the customer’s expectations. So, the quality is important for both customers and managers of various travel agencies, as it can contribute to making better products at lower ...

  7. 78 FR 41428 - In the Matter of Licensee Identified in Attachment 1 and All Other Persons Who Obtain Safeguards...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-10

    ... transmission of documents; use of automatic data processing systems; removal of the Safeguards Information... Information (SGI-M) General Requirement Redacted Attachment 3: Trustworthiness and Reliability Requirements... Information Described Herein; Order Imposing Requirements for the Protection of Certain Safeguards...

  8. Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections. Final report: Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This is the second of two reports prepared to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) in enhancing the effectiveness of its international safeguards inspections through inspector training in open-quotes Observational Skillsclose quotes. The first (Phase 1) report was essentially exploratory. It defined Observational Skills broadly to include all appropriate cognitive, communications, and interpersonal techniques that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively. It identified 10 specific Observational Skills components, analyzed their relevance to IAEA safeguards inspections, and reviewed a variety of inspection programs in the public and private sectors that provide training in one or more of these components. The report concluded that while it should be possible to draw upon these other programs in developing Observational Skills training for IAEA inspectors, the approaches utilized in these programs will likely require significant adaption to support the specific job requirements, policies, and practices that define the IAEA inspector's job. The overall objective of this second (Phase 2) report is to provide a basis for the actual design and delivery of Observational Skills training to IAEA inspectors. The more specific purposes of this report are to convey a fuller understanding of the potential application of Observational Skills to the inspector's job, describe inspector perspectives on the relevance and importance of particular Observational Skills, identify the specific Observational Skill components that are most important and relevant to enhancing safeguards inspections, and make recommendations as to Observational Skills training for the IAEA's consideration in further developing its Safeguards training program

  9. Safeguards can not operate alone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    There are around 20 new states which are planning to use nuclear energy in the near future. Globally there are several nuclear power plants under construction and they will be bigger than ever. Also new type of nuclear facility, final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, will be constructed and in operation in Finland and Sweden in ca. 10 years time. It is evident that the nuclear world is changing much and quickly. After the Additional Protocol, safeguards are no longer only about accounting and control of nuclear materials, but also about verifying that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the state. It is not possible or effective anymore to implement safeguards without taking into account of the nuclear safety and security. The safeguards should not be isolated. The synergy between safeguards, security and safety exist, when implementing nationally that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities. In safeguards we could not do our duties effectively if we ignore some of those other S's. Safeguards by Design process does not work properly if only international safeguards and security requirements has been taken into account, it urges all 3S to be taken care at the same time. Safeguards should operate also with other synergetic regimes and organisations like CTBTO, Fissile Material Cut-off, disarmament, export control, border control,... The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  10. Report of the LASCAR forum: Large scale reprocessing plant safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report has been prepared to provide information on the studies which were carried out from 1988 to 1992 under the auspices of the multinational forum known as Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards (LASCAR) on safeguards for four large scale reprocessing plants operated or planned to be operated in the 1990s. The report summarizes all of the essential results of these studies. The participants in LASCAR were from France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Commission of the European Communities - Euratom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency

  11. Safeguards and Security Research and Development progress report, October 1990--September 1991

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research And Development (R ampersand D) program from October 1990 through September 1991. The activities presented in the first three parts--Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, and Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support--were, for the most part, sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS). The activities described in Part 4--International Safeguards--were supported by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (OACN/IS). Part 5 describes several safeguards or safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS or OACN/IS. The final part of the report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos safeguards R ampersand D reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were published in 1991

  12. Library Information Systems at the European Space Agency

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ansari, S. G.; Loekken, S.; Marie, L.; Brinkmann, J.

    The European Space Agency provides an establishment-wide coordinated library information service to the ESA centres made available by the Technical Information and Documentation Centre at ESTEC. Based on World Wide Web technology the services, developed ESRIN and maintained by ESTEC give access to a number of library services, including an electronic version of Espace : the TIDC Newsletter, the ESA Press Releases, READ : the online TIDC Card Catalogue, ESA official documents archive, the TIDC Image Bank, to name but a few. In this paper, we discuss each service and the functionalities available to the user and how this same technology is being used for other services within ESA.

  13. 40 CFR 35.936-21 - Delegation to State agencies; certification of procurement systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... Treatment Works-Clean Water Act § 35.936-21 Delegation to State agencies; certification of procurement...; certification of procurement systems. 35.936-21 Section 35.936-21 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL... to a State agency to review and certify the technical and administrative adequacy of...

  14. Integrating security analysis and safeguards software engineering

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Spencer, D.D.; Axline, R.M.

    1989-01-01

    These initiatives will work together to provide more secure safeguards software, as well as other critical systems software. The resulting design tools and methodologies, the evolving guidelines for software security, and the adversary-resistant software components will be applied to the software design at each stage to increase the design's inherent security and to make the design easier to analyze. The resident hardware monitor or other architectural innovations will provide complementary additions to the design to remove some of the burden of security from the software. The security analysis process, supported by new analysis methodologies and tools, will be applied to the software design as it evolves in an attempt to identify and remove vulnerabilities at the earliest possible point in the safeguards system life cycle. The result should be better and more verifiably secure software systems.

  15. Target values for nuclear material safeguards measurements - motivation or burden to operators?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The analytical determination of material streams and inventories plays an important part in those nuclear facilities called bulk-handling facilities in safeguards terminology. Reprocessing plants and mixed-oxide fabrication facilities are typical examples. With respect to their safeguards, the relevant regulations attach fundamental importance to material accountancy. The balance itself is examined by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and within the boundaries of the European Communities by Euratom inspectors as well, with regard to formal correctness. The analytical methods of accountancy in, for example, reprocessing plants, make high demands on the qualifications of the analyst. A conscientious analyst will, of course, try to fulfill his task as well and effectively as possible. These target values will become a burden, however, when they have been drawn up for purely scientific interest and the operator has been urged to achieve them on the pretext of improving safeguards. There are basically two reasons for which the authors have misgivings in this respect. First, the measurement system, which the material balance is based on, has to conform to the latest international regulations. This could easily lead to a permanent obligation of updating for the plants concerned. Second, the goal quantities set by the IAEA will induce an attempt to adjust measurement techniques and chemical analysis to goals totally unsuitable for large-scale plants

  16. The Canadian experience in implementing the State-level integrated safeguards concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    After receiving the Broad Safeguards Conclusion in 2005 that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities, Canada began implementing the State-level Integrated Safeguards Approach for Canada (SLISAC) on a Sector-by-Sector basis, culminating in the full State-wide implementation of Integrated Safeguards in January 2010. The Approach has resulted in a significant reduction in IAEA person days of inspection, a shift from scheduled routine inspections to randomized, short-notice and unannounced inspections, increased information streams on operational activities and inventory flows to the IAEA, and closer collaboration between the Agency and the SSAC (State System of Accounting and Control). This paper will describe the implementation of this new approach, touching on: the main features of the Canadian SLA (State-level Approach); the agreed order of priority in the transition to the approach within the various sectors of the Canadian fuel cycle; the work plan established for moving forward in a logical and orderly manner, thereby allowing all parties to put in place the necessary protocols and procedures; and some initial thoughts on the lessons learned throughout this process. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  17. Attaining and maintaining a continuity of knowledge to draw safeguards conclusions with confidence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As the 21. century progresses, new nuclear facilities and the expansion of nuclear activities into new countries will require the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to place a higher reliance on attaining and maintaining a Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of its safeguards information than is currently practiced. Additionally, a conceptual view of where and how CoK can be applied will need to evolve to support improved efficiency and efficacy of drawing a safeguards conclusion for each Member State. The ability to draw a safeguards conclusion for a Member State will be predicated on the confidence that CoK has been attained and subsequently maintained with respect to the data and information streams used by the IAEA. This confidence can be described as a function of factors such as elapsed time since the measurement, surveillance of attributes, authentication of information, historic knowledge of potential system failures, and the number and type of data collections. A set of general scenarios are described for determining what is required to attain CoK and whether CoK has been maintained. A high‑level analysis of example scenarios is presented to identify failures or gaps that could cause a loss of CoK. Potential areas for technological research and development are discussed for the next generation of CoK tools.

  18. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

  19. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented

  20. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a mixed-oxide fuel facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shipley, J.P.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Evans, M.L.; Schelonka, E.P.; Smith, D.B.; Walton, R.B.

    1977-02-01

    A coordinated safeguards system is described for safeguarding strategic quantities of special nuclear materials in mixed-oxide recycle fuel fabrication facilities. The safeguards system is compatible with industrial process requirements and combines maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimal process interference. It is based on unit process accounting using a combination of conventional and state-of-the-art NDA measurement techniques. The effectiveness of the system against single and multiple thefts is evaluated using computer modeling and simulation techniques.