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Sample records for agency safeguards system

  1. The International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A system of international safeguards has been established to provide assurance that nuclear materials in civilian use are not diverted from their peaceful purpose. The safeguards system is administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency/Department of Safeguards and devolves from treaties and other international agreements. Inspectors from the Agency verify reports from States about nuclear facilities by audits, observation, and measurements. (author)

  2. Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs

  3. Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, A.

    1997-12-31

    The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs.

  4. Negotiating supranational rules - The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, Astrid

    1998-12-31

    The object of this thesis is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid 1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The evolution is traced not through the practical implementation of the safeguards system, but through the various multilateral negotiations through which it was created. The focus is on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective is to single out the factors determining the result. The discussion is organised into the following chapters: (1) The statute of the IAEA, (2) The IAEA 1961 safeguard document (INFCIRC/26), (3) The IAEA 1965 safeguards document (INFCIRC/66), (4) The non-proliferation treaty, (5) NPT safeguards. 92 refs.

  5. IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The basic concepts, structure, and operation of the Agency Safeguards Information System is discussed with respect to its role in accomplishing the overall objectives of safeguards. The basis and purposes of the Agency's information system, the structure and flow of information within the Agency's system, the relationship of the components is the Agency system, the requirements of Member States in respect of their reporting to the Agency, and the relationship of accounting data vis-a-vis facility and inspection data are described

  6. ABACC: A regional safeguards agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created as a common system of accounting and control. It is based on Bilateral Agreement between the two countries and the agreement with the IAEA. After a few years of experience it might be concluded that a regional system may contribute in many ways to enhance the safeguards system. The most relevant are: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards by sending as professionals who are experts in the process involved in installations that are to be inspected; to have much more information on nuclear activities in each of the two countries than available to the IAEA; and to maintain formal and informal channels of communication

  7. Safeguards -Safeguards system development support-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This project mainly focused to technically support national safeguards inspection which is scheduled in the beginning of 1997. It includes non-destructive assay of nuclear fuels, analysis on inspection and environmental samples, remote monitoring of nuclear activities and its analysis, survey on remote sensing of satellite for safeguards application. Non-destructive assay of nuclear fuels dealt with development on verification of spent fuels with emphasis to fabrication of inspection tools with surveillance and gamma measurement on CANDU spent fuels. For sample analysis, study was carried out on process inspection sample analysis method. In addition to this, ultra low background laboratory was set up to execute environmental and swipe samples and sample treatment techniques including water, soil, plant, et al. were researched. Tritiums which were sampled around power plants were analysed. With cooperation of Satellite Technology Research Center of KAIST, use of civilian satellite imagery was surveyed. To train facility operators for safeguards, various technology on non-destructive assay was lectured to personnel of Korea Electric Power Corporation. And to enhance out capabilities, non-destructive assay training was done at Los Alamos National Lab. of U.S. through the agreement of MOST and DOE agreement, and information on DA technology was exchanged at Nuclear Material Control Center of Japan. (author). 22 tabs., 52 figs., 53 refs

  8. Safeguards information management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The requirements for the management of information at the IAEA and its Department of Safeguards are rapidly changing. Historically, the Department of Safeguards has had the requirement to process large volumes of conventional safeguards information. An information management system is currently in place that adequately handles the IAEA's conventional safeguards data needs. In the post-Iraq environment, however, there is a growing need to expand the IAEA information management capability to include unconventional forms of information. These data include environmental sampling results, photographs, video film, lists of machine tools, and open-source materials such as unclassified publications. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has responded to this information management need by implementing the safeguards information management system (SIMS) initiative. SIMS was created by the DOE to anticipate and respond to IAEA information management needs through a multilaboratory initiative that will utilize an integrated approach to develop and deploy technology in a timely and cost effective manner. The DOE will use the SIMS initiative to co-ordinate US information management activities that support the IAEA Department of Safeguards. (author). 1 ref., 2 figs

  9. Safeguards system analysis, (1)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A system analysis on the implementing safeguards system based on the traditional materials accountancy was done. This report describes about verification methods applied to operator's measurement data, MUF evaluation method, theories on the decision of PIT frequency and designing of inspection plan. (author)

  10. Networking of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper discusses the design of a safeguards system that can be incorporated into a plant during the final phase of its construction to permit the acquisition and transmission of data during plant operation in the absence of an inspector. The system is an example of a networked data system of weighing, identity, and NDA information. It collects all of its non-surveillance data produced by safeguards equipment in a fuel fabrication plant. The data collection and transfer tasks are carried out by two software packages: NEGUS, a redundant data acquisition system designed to record neutron coincidence data, high-resolution gamma spectra, and sensor data for the NDA information and associated barcode identity information, and BRANCH, which deals with weighing and associated identity information. These processes collect data from local electronics using an ethernet network and provide information to the main review program

  11. The Agency programme for the development of safeguards techniques and instrumentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The programme of the Division of Development concentrates attention upon a variety of technical problems and tasks to enable the Agency safeguards system to achieve its safeguards objectives most economically for the Agency, the Member States and the nuclear facility operators. The programme must take into account the changes which may occur in the Agency's tasks as a consequence of implementation of safeguards in States with important nuclear activities. This paper attempts to summarize where the Agency methods and techniques development programme stands on meeting defined technical objectives, to point out where the main problems lie and to offer some guidelines for their solution. (author)

  12. IAEA safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.)

  13. The Department of Safeguards Quality Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards quality management system (QMS) provides the framework for all activities that support the Agency's commitment to providing soundly-based safeguards conclusions regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material. The focus of the QMS is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation through defined, documented processes, routine oversight and continual improvement initiatives. In accordance with QMS principles, the high-level business processes representing the Department's activities are defined in procedures, guidelines and policies that are maintained in the Safeguards Document Manager. These processes form the basis for Department operations for drawing safeguards conclusions regarding State's compliance with their safeguards obligations. Oversight is provided through internal quality audits. These audits are targeted at processes selected by Senior Management with a focus on procedure compliance as well as customer expectations. Best practices and areas for improvement are assessed through continual improvement. Noncompliance and conditions that are adverse to quality are identified and analyzed in the Condition Report System. Root cause analysis and the implementation actions to eliminate the cause reduce the chance of condition recurrence. Through continual process improvement, processes are measured and analyzed to reduce process and administration waste. The improved processes improve efficiency while providing the desired results. Within the scope of the QMS, these tools support the performance of Departmental processes so that Safeguards products achieve the intended purpose. This paper describes how the various elements of the Department's QMS support safeguards implementation. (author)

  14. Information analysis in the strengthened safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Information Analysis is the heart of Strengthened Safeguards. The strengthened safeguards system is to detect the diversion of declared nuclear material and the presence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State with Comprehensive Safeguards agreements in force. In other words, under Strengthened Safeguards the Department of Safeguards must verify both the correctness and the completeness of State declarations concerning their nuclear inventories, facilities and activities. The changing political framework of the early 1990's, including such watershed events as the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the information unearthed about the Iraqi weapon program, the declaration by South Africa of its past program, the resistance of the DPRK to verifying the completeness of its declarations, and the indefinite extension of the NPT, caused the IAEA Member States to demand stronger Safeguards and to accept the correspondingly more intrusive inspections and more complete declarations requirements. Two tracks were followed to strengthen safeguards under the 93 +2 Programme: additional measures were proposed under the existing authority of comprehensive safeguards agreements and still other measures were proposed which required the additional authority captured in a model Additional protocol (INFCIRC/540). Both types of additional measures required the Department to collect and process more information. Both types required new methods for integrating and evaluating this information. The new measures adopted under existing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements included: voluntary reporting by States of the export of specified nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear materials; collection and processing of environmental samples collected during inspections; remote monitoring of facilities and the use of unannounced inspections; acquisition of information from other Agency Departments; collection of publicly available, nuclear-related textual information from

  15. International safeguards data management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The data base management system ''ISADAM'' (i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System) described in this report is intended to facilitate the safeguards authority in making efficient and effective use of accounting reports. ISADAM has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. The evaluation of safeguards declarations focuses on three main objectives: - the requirement of syntactical consistency with the legal conventions of data recording for safeguards accountancy; - the requirement of accounting evidence that there is no material unaccounted for (MUF); - the requirement of semantic consistency with the technological characteristics of the plant and the processing plans of the operator. Section 2 describes in more detail the facilities which ISADAM makes available to a safeguards inspector. Section 3 describes how the MUF variance computation is derived from models of measurement error propagation. Many features of the ISADAM system are automatically provided by ADABAS. The exceptions to this are the utility software designed to: - screen plant declarations before loading into the data base, - prepare variance summary files designed to support real-time computation of MUF and variance of MUF, - provide analyses in response to user requests in interactive or batch mode. Section 4 describes the structure and functions of this software which have been developed by JRC-Ispra

  16. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in technology transfer for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the strengthening of the Safeguards system, Santiago, 9 December 1998

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the IAEA national seminar on 'Nuclear Development and its Implications for Chilean International Policy' in Santiago, Chile, on 9 December 1998. After a short presentation of Chile's participation in all aspects of the work of the Agency, the conference focuses on the Agency's role in the following areas: technology transfer with emphasis on Agency's Technical Co-operation Programme, nuclear power and sustainable energy development, including nuclear safety aspects, and the strengthened safeguards system, including future prospects of verification

  17. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in technology transfer for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the strengthening of the Safeguards system, Buenos Aires, 15 December 1998

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the meeting of the Council for International Relations in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on 15 December 1998. After a short presentation of Argentina's participation in all aspects of the work of the Agency, the conference focuses on the Agency's role in the following areas: nuclear power and sustainable energy development, including nuclear safety aspects, verification and the strengthened safeguards system (including future prospects of verification), and technology transfer with emphasis on Agency's Technical Co-operation Programme

  18. Goals of measurement systems for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency are based on technical performance goals and criteria that have been developed, but not officially adopted by the Agency. The goals derive in part from the external consequences that safeguards are intended to prevent and in some cases on internal considerations of feasibility. To the extent that these goals may not be attainable, as may be the case with large-throughput bulk reprocessing plants, the Agency is placed in a difficult position. In this paper safeguards goals and criteria and their underlying rationales are critically examined. Suggestions for a more rational and workable structure of performance goals are offered

  19. Safeguards system effectiveness modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A general methodology for the comparative evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness at nuclear facilities is presently under development. The approach is applicable to problems of sabotage or theft at fuel cycle facilities. In this paper, the overall methodology and the primary analytic techniques used to assess system effectiveness are briefly outlined

  20. Process monitoring in support of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts touched on various concepts and a few specific applications, but none was comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report develops prototypical process monitoring concepts that can be incorporated into the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) general safeguards approach for fuel reprocessing plants. This effort considers existing approaches, recognizing limitations and needed improvements. Prototypical process monitoring applications are developed and proposed for implementation and demonstration in the Integrated Equipment Test facility, which is located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The specific information needed to accomplish the process monitoring objectives are defined, and the mechanics for obtaining that information are described. Effort is given to the identification and assessment of potential impacts and benefits associated with process monitoring concepts, with particular attention to IAEA, state, and plant operator interests. The historical development of process monitoring is described and the implications of using process monitoring in international safeguards are discussed. Specific process process monitoring applications for demonstration in the IET facility are developed in Sects. 6 through 14. 1 fig

  1. Validation of safeguards monitoring systems and their simulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Research is underway at the Atominstitut in Vienna Austria where the objective is to design and validate quantitatively a safeguards monitoring system (SMS) and its simulation. The work is novel because the simulation is also used as the basis for automated evaluation of SMS data. Preliminary results indicate that video and radiation data can be automatically interpreted using this approach. Application of the technique promises that an investment in a simulation supports directly the safeguards objective, which is to catch diversion of nuclear material. Consequently, it is easier for a safeguards agency to also realize other benefits associated with simulation-based acquisition, in addition to having a quantitative method for validation

  2. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in technology transfer for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the strengthening of the Safeguards system, Brasilia, 16 December 1998

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil in Brasilia on 16 December 1998. After a short presentation of Brazil's participation in all aspects of the work of the Agency, the conference focuses on the Agency's role in the following areas: verification and the strengthened safeguards system (including future prospects of verification), technology transfer (mainly through the Technical Co-operation Programme), and nuclear power and sustainable energy development, including nuclear safety aspects

  3. Brazil and the strengthening of safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency: from the four-part agreement to the additional protocol

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The main objective of this paper is to analyse the evolution of IAEA verification system, that constitutes one of the main fundaments of the Non-proliferation nuclear weapons regimen, and to point out elements that contribute to inform the Brazilian position related to the Model Protocol additional to agreements for safeguard application: instrument that comprehend the most recent multilateral efforts of the nuclear verification

  4. Multimedia systems for safeguards training

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Joint Research Center as part of its support program to Euratom safeguards, is developing a line of unattended systems for fresh fuel assemblies in fabrication plants (low enrichment and mixed oxide). These systems combine neutron coincidence counting in the form of a neutron collar and a vision system for identification of the fuel assembly. The system is unattended, i.e. it is integrated into the production flow of the facility, and there is no inspector presence during verification measurement. The facility operator loads the assembly into the unattended measurement station which then automatically starts its predefined measurement cycle without the intervention of the facility operator. The station positions the collar according to a programming strategy for each assembly type and loads/unloads its own AmLi source for active and passive measurements. This paper is a discussion of the training requirements for such a system and the development of multimedia training aids to meet these requirements

  5. Safeguards and legal matters 1996. International Atomic Energy Agency publications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This catalogue lists all currently valid sales publications of the International Atomic Energy Agency dealing with Safeguards and Legal Matters. Most publications are published in English. Proceedings of conferences, symposia and panels of experts may contain some papers in languages other than English (French, Russian or Spanish), but all of these papers have abstracts in English. It should be noted that prices of books are quoted in Austrian Schillings. The prices do not include local taxes and are subject to change without notice. All books in this catalogue are 16 x 24 cm, paper-bound, unless otherwise stated

  6. Workshop on facility safeguards system design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Physical inventory of nuclear material within a LWR facility is established by counting assemblies and identifying serial numbers of fuel subassemblies. Seals and surveillance cameras are used to maintain continuity of safeguards knowledge during time intervals between inspections. The main features of the IAEA safeguards approach at LWRs are the following: auditing of facility records and comparison with reports submitted to the Agency, periodic closing of material balance by the operator (usually annually) by taking physical inventory, independent verification of nuclear material by the Agency, usually by item counting and serial number identification and application of containment and surveillance measures to maintain knowledge of nuclear material

  7. Information analysis in the strengthened safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The changing political framework of the early 1990s revealed the limitations of traditional Safeguards and led the Member States to strengthen Safeguards. This was done under a two- pronged approach: while Programme 93+2 developed the model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), which would require an expanded declaration, complementary access, and broader environmental sampling, the Safeguards measures in force under the existing comprehensive Safeguards Agreements were strengthened through voluntary reporting, environmental sampling, and enhanced information analysis. The purpose of both of these initiatives was to broaden the mission of the IAEA to include the detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The effect was to increase dramatically the amount of information available to the Agency and the challenge was to develop a method and infrastructure to evaluate all this information. Since 1992 the Agency has developed a state evaluation process for collecting, organizing, and analyzing new types of information (open source information, the results of environmental sampling, commercial satellite imagery) and integrating this information with the familiar state declared and verification information traditionally collected and evaluated by the Agency. This address will describe the components and challenges of information analysis under strengthened Safeguards, the heart of the state evaluation process. (author)

  8. The IAEA's safeguards system. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? What assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification?

  9. The IAEA's safeguards systems. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? what assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification? (author)

  10. Safeguards and legal matters 1994. International Atomic Energy Agency Publications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This catalogue lists all sales publications of the International Atomic Energy Agency dealing with Safeguards and Legal Matters issued during the period 1970-1994. Most publications are published in English, through some are also available in French, Russian and Spanish. Proceedings of conferences, symposia and panels of experts may contain some papers in languages other than English (French, Russian or Spanish), but all of these papers have abstracts in English. If publications are also available in other languages than English, this is noted as C for Chinese, F for French, R for Russian and S for Spanish by the relevant ISBN number. It should be noted that prices of books are quoted in Austrian Schillings. The prices do not include local taxes and are subject to change without notice. All books in this catalogue are 16 x 24 cm, paper-bound, unless otherwise stated

  11. The safeguards system of the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The safeguards system of the IAEA intended to guard against diversion of nuclear materials for military uses, comprising the identification of sealed fuel assemblies, the automated inspection of the fuels by tv and photographic cameras and by other means, the near-real-time materials accounting based on material balance and periodical reports is briefly reviewed. Experiences of some national safeguard systems (those in the GDR, Canada, Japan) and of two international organizations (TASTEX, EURATOM) are also summarized. (V.N.)

  12. The safeguards active response inventory system (SARIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS) is a computerized accountability system developed for nuclear materials control that incorporates elements of process monitoring, criticality safety, physical inventory and safeguards. It takes data from the process operations, stores it in an on-line database and translates the information into the formats needed by the various users. It traces the material through the process from feed to product; including recycle, waste and scraps streams. It models the process as the material changes form to ensure that artificial losses are not created. It automatically generates input to Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), performs checks to prevent the possibility of a criticality accident, prepares an audit trail for Safeguards, prints labels for nuclear material containers, and produces DOE/NRC 741 forms. SARIS has been installed at three laboratories across the country

  13. Implementation of national system of nuclear material accounting and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper describes the implementation of a national system of accounting and safeguards of nuclear material in egypt. A plan of the implementation was designed in three stages. The first stage covers the existing nuclear activities in the country which are actually in operation. The second and third stages were designed to cover the mid-term and long term prospects of the nuclear development in the country. The paper also describes the methodology, procedures and formats which have to be used for the implementation. This is harmony with nuclear safeguards and verification procedures of the international Atomic Energy Agency.5 fig

  14. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards after Iraq - some Austrailian perceptions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iraq's nuclear weapons development program used facilities and nuclear material separate from its safeguarded activities. To detect such a strategy the IAEA's safeguards inspectors need access to locations and information beyond that foreseen in NPT safeguards agreements. But the IAEA is short of money. And detecting undeclared activities could be expensive. If the IAEA can establish a capability to detect undeclared activities, then it might be able to save on regular safeguards. But it's important not to put the cart before the horse - effective safeguards must come first, savings second

  15. Measurement trends for future safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safeguards for future commercial-scale nuclear facilities may employ three materials control and accounting concepts: classical accounting, dynamic materials balancing, and independent verification of inventories and materials balances. Typical measurement needs associated with the implementation of these concepts at high-throughput facilities are discussed. Promising measurement methods for meeting these needs are described and recent experience is cited. General directions and considerations for meeting advanced safeguards systems needs through measurement technology development over the next decade are presented

  16. Introducing the Brazilian program of technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency - Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As an active Member State of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Brazil has applied substantial resources in order to maintain the best possible cooperation with the Agency, aiming at a continuous improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. Over the last decades a number of projects, involving the participation of high-level Brazilian professionals in the nuclear area, have already been jointly completed. To continue providing this voluntary support to the IAEA Department of Safeguards for research, development and implementation, in 2006 Brazil decided to accept the IAEA's invitation to participate in the IAEA Member States Support Programmes initiative, which currently includes 21 Member States. The Research and Development (R and D) Programme for Nuclear Verification is the IAEA reference in this regard, establishing the high priority needs and describing each recognized departmental project. The Programme is issued every two years. The 'Brazilian Support Programme (BRZ SP)' was established on the basis of a set of administrative procedures titled 'Cooperation Arrangements and Guidelines', agreed between the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) and the IAEA - Department of Safeguards. The scope of the BRZ SP includes: the participation in field tests and the evaluation of state-of-the-art technologies as requested by the IAEA for its safeguards applications; the training of safeguards personnel involved with safeguards implementation at both facility and State levels; laboratorial support in the area of destructive and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials; the analysis of safeguards issues; information acquisition, analysis and evaluation; and the provision of human resources, such as experts and consultants to work directly with the IAEA Secretariat. The activities agreed under the BRZ SP are not restricted to CNEN staff members. Professionals from other Brazilian organizations may also be involved

  17. The international safeguards system and physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The report summarizes and explains facts and aspects of the IAEA safeguards performed within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and shows perspectives to be discussed by the NPT Review Conferences in 1990 and 1995. The technical background of potential misuse of nuclear materials for military purposes is explained in connection with the physical protection regime of the international safeguards, referring to recent developments for improvement of technical measures for material containment and surveillance. Most attention is given to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their surveillance by the IAEA safeguards, including such new technologies and applications as controlled nuclear fusion, laser techniques for uranium enrichment, and particle accelerators. The report's concluding analyses of the current situation show potentials for improvement and desirable or necessary consequences to be drawn for the international safeguards system, also taking into account recent discussions on the parliamentary level. (orig./HP)

  18. Model protocol additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguard system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives

  19. Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives

  20. Strenghening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Goodman,M.; Lockwood, d.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Tape, J.W.

    2008-06-06

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system has changed in major ways from the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 until the present. Changes include strengthening the legal framework of safeguards; improvements in concepts and approaches for safeguards implementation; and significant improvements in the technical tools available to inspectors. In this paper, we explore three broad areas related to strengthening safeguards authorities and institutions: integrated safeguards and State-Level Approaches; special inspections; and NPT withdrawal and the continuation of safeguards.

  1. The Text of the Agreement between the Agency and Argentina Relating to the Application of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Agency and Argentina relating to the application of safeguards is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 23 October 1973 pursuant to Section 10.

  2. Implementation of safeguard system and its current challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear safeguards system is a system developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and adopted by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as an instrument to observe the compliance of a non-nuclear weapon state as a party against the legal obligations contain in the Treaty. This system was developed during 1960-1990, and then strengthened in the period of 1990-2005. By fulfilling the legal obligations under safeguards system a non-nuclear weapon state can give guarantee to the international world that this state has no nuclear material, activities or facilities to be made as nuclear weapon. Challenges in its implementation in the forms of breaches have been occurred several times. Most of the branches can be secured by the IAEA Secretariat, even though there are those reported to the United Nation Security Council. Considering the importance of this safeguards system in the framework of work peace and security, it is encouraged that state party to the NPT to conclude and implement safeguards agreement with the IAEA. (author)

  3. Implementation of a Strengthened International Safeguards System ABBAC 15 years

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of the paper is to explain how the system of a regional safeguard has been operating and developing in the framework of the Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), and how the international recommendation of radiological protection must be taken into account in the safeguards implementation and its impact in the international context. The ABACC has been a dynamic system, which contributes worldwide in the application of the regional and international safeguard. In 2006, the ABACC celebrated its 15th anniversary. The ABBAC was created in 1991 in the framework of a Bilateral Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful use of Nuclear Energy, the ABBAC was created in order to apply the aforementioned system called 'Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials' (SCCC). During this time, the ABBAC has grown in its implementation and has become a model in the application of regional safeguards that is recognized internationally. The ABBAC was the pillar to signed an Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABBAC and the International Atomic Energy Agency, called 'Quadripartite Agreement', committed themselves to accept the application of safeguards to all nuclear materials in all the nuclear activities performed in both countries. The ABACC and the relevant implementing and supplementary agreements, set forth the conditions for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the exchange of technical staff, the transfer of knowledge and international cooperation in a strong commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This introduction provides an overview of political, legal and technical aspects implemented in the ABACC, which will be developed later in the paper. (author)

  4. Systems analysis for evaluation of safeguards effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has developed an integrated safeguards system analysis tool (LISSAT), which is a framework for performing systems analysis of safeguards effectiveness for all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The method has been applied to assess safeguards effectiveness for a conversion facility, an enrichment facility and for various types of nuclear reactors. LISSAT has the potential for evaluating safeguards for future proliferation resistant designs, and evaluating current safeguards tools/methods/on-the-shelf tools to assess safeguards strategies beyond Hexapartite. The key components of LISSAT include digraph/fault tree analysis, statistical analysis and time-domain simulation. The digraph fault tree methodology presents a well-structured systematic approach for generation and analysis of the diversion paths and is more comprehensive and systematic than traditional safeguards analysis methods. The digraph analysis is an effective method to organize and structure the possible diversion activities in a diversion scenario together with the safeguards measures and activities relevant to the diversion scenario. The fault tree analysis incorporates possible failure modes of the safeguards measures and develops a fault tree for the safeguard system in this situation. Output of the digraph-fault tree analysis provides an identification of the safeguards elements of most importance that has the potential for reducing the probability of diversion of nuclear material. Additional outputs include the ranking of the various diversion scenarios. Statistical analysis provides the basic event probabilities for the fault tree and addresses the probabilities that a short notice random inspections plan will encounter time-clustered physical diversion activities, the probabilities that inspection sampling and measurement plans will detect concealment schemes that use large or medium misdeclarations on some material items, deliberate bias in

  5. Conceptual design of integrated safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) is currently involved in the conceptual design of safeguards for generic facilities in the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle (spent-fuel reprocessing, plutonium nitrate-to-oxide conversion, mixed-oxide fuel fabrication, plutonium scrap recovery, and waste handling). These studies are first steps aimed at eventually providing detailed designs of integrated safeguards systems to guide safeguards-related facility construction and/or modification. The purpose of this presentation is to describe the conceptual design process in terms of its definition, a systematic procedure for its implementation, some of the tools required, and an example of the results of a conceptual design. The value of conceptual design and its relationship to other facets of the complete facility design process are also discussed

  6. Nuclear safeguards - a system in transition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    'Classical' safeguards have a strong emphasis on nuclear materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - what has been termed the correctness of States' declarations. Following the Gulf War, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major changes are in progress to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the IAEA's authority, and there has been good progress in developing the new approaches and technologies required to ensure this authority is used effectively. IAEA safeguards are undergoing a major transition, towards greater emphasis on information collection and analysis, diversity of verification methods, incorporation of more qualitative judgments, and improved efficiency. These changes present major challenges to the IAEA and to the international community, but the end result will be a more effective safeguards system

  7. Waste isolation safeguards and security system. Volume 2. Bibliography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of this study is to define the rationale and scope of the Waste Isolation System (WIS) safeguards system, to establish a set of proposed basic safeguards criteria, and to identify the areas requiring development of specific criteria and technology. The report also presents a proposed program schedule and provides an extensive bibliography, in volumes two and three of applicable reference safeguards documents

  8. Waste isolation safeguards and security system. Volume 3. Bibliography supplement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of this study is to define the rationale and scope of the Waste Isolation System (WIS) safeguards system, to establish a set of proposed basic safeguards criteria, and to identify the areas requiring development of specific criteria and technology. The report also presents a proposed program schecule and provides an extensive bibliography in volumes two and three of applicable reference safeguards documents

  9. CIPSS [computer-integrated process and safeguards system]: The integration of computer-integrated manufacturing and robotics with safeguards, security, and process operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This poster session describes the computer-integrated process and safeguards system (CIPSS). The CIPSS combines systems developed for factory automation and automated mechanical functions (robots) with varying degrees of intelligence (expert systems) to create an integrated system that would satisfy current and emerging security and safeguards requirements. Specifically, CIPSS is an extension of the automated physical security functions concepts. The CIPSS also incorporates the concepts of computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) with integrated safeguards concepts, and draws upon the Defense Advance Research Project Agency's (DARPA's) strategic computing program

  10. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards after Iraq - some Australian perceptions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The authors attach the first priority to providing the IAEA with pointers to sites where extended access inspections are most likely to be of benefit. Proposals for more cost-effective safeguards are outlined particularly in respect to the use of technology to save inspection effort as well as the development of procedures for detecting undeclared nuclear activities

  11. The Text of the Agreement for the Application of Agency Safeguards to United States Reactor Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Agency and the Government of the United States of America for the application of Agency safeguards to United States reactor facilities, which was signed on 15 June 1964 and entered into force on 1 August 1964, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  12. The Text of the Agreement between the Agency and Argentina relating to the Application of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards came into force on 4 March 1994

  13. The structure of nuclear safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safeguards systems for facilities that handle special nuclear material combine procedural, protective, and materials accounting elements to prevent and/or detect sabotage and diversion or theft of material. Because most of the discussion in this course is devoted to materials accounting topics only, this chapter provides a brief introduction to some of the procedural and protective elements of safeguards systems, placing the materials accounting system in its proper context. The chapter begins by reviewing certain pertinent DOE definitions and then surveys some protection requirements and technology - protective personnel, personnel identification systems, barriers, detectors, and communication systems. Considered next are the procedures of personnel selection and monitoring, definition and division of job functions, and operation. The chapter then describes the way the procedural, protective, and materials accounting elements can be combined, becoming a total safeguards system. Although such a system necessarily requires elements of procedure, protection, and materials accounting, only the materials accounting gives positive assurance that nuclear material is not diverted or stolen

  14. Design of safeguards systems for authentication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    To permit valid conclusions to be drawn from safeguards data, it is essential that this data is known to be authentic. That is, it must be known that the data originated from the intended source, that the data was not changed in transit, and that it is not a repeat or delayed copy of previous data. Safeguards systems and equipment should be designed with authentication included, instead of attempting to add security later. Failure to integrate authentication measures early in the design results in systems that are expensive or possibly impossible to deploy securely. This paper gives some of the factors that should be considered and some of the methods that can be employed for ensuring high security while minimizing cost. The paper is a compilation of some of the lessons learned by the authors during many years of working with the authentication of these systems. (author)

  15. The Review of Quality System on IAEA Safeguards to Improve the Quality of National Safeguards Inspection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korea is the 6th largest producer of nuclear power in the world and also has many extensive nuclear research programs. As a result, Korea is also the 3rd most frequent inspected country by the IAEA. Nuclear nonproliferation has been a supreme concern in Korea; and the government has fully understood the importance of nuclear safeguards inspection. KOREA established a state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC), immediately after the safeguards agreement with the IAEA on 14 November 1975. The Nuclear Control Team from MEST (government) has the primary responsibility to oversee safeguards and KINAC has been entrusted to perform this duty under the delegated authority by the Atomic Energy Act. Safeguards Activities from KINAC have been conducted over the last 20 years. Yet Quality System concerning national safeguards inspection has not been taken into consideration. In order to have an effective and efficient national safeguards inspection program, it is time to seriously consider Quality System. In this paper, the quality assurance with regulatory bodies which was recommended by IAEA, the quality management system in IAEA safeguards department, and other countries cases were reviewed and analyzed. From this initial step, an attempt was made to design a more efficiently and effectively quality system for conducting national safeguards inspection

  16. Waste isolation safeguards and security system. Volume 1. Scoping study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of this study is to define the rationale and scope of the Waste Isolation System (WIS) safeguards system, to establish a set of proposed basic safeguards criteria, and to identify the areas requiring development of specific criteria and technology. The report also presents a proposed program schedule and provides an extensive bibliography of applicable reference safeguards documents. Volume one contains the following: glossary, system description; threat definition; safeguards regulations review - current and future; WIS safeguards criteria; assessment of criteria applicability and development requirements; and program plan

  17. Strengthened safeguards system implementation at Serpong Nuclear Research Center - Batan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreement as INFCIRC/540 document. The document requires declaration completely included all activities nuclear related in past, present, and the future. Peaceful purpose or no, and the most important thing is to require Member State permitting IAEA inspectors to access information and location on facility and location other facility that have declared. Briefly, the safeguards action is addressed especially to ensure absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Information that reported to the IAEA based on INFCIRC/540 included all R and D activities nuclear related information are conducted by Member State or all activities are indicated by: Specific equipment nuclear related; Supporting infrastructure; Tell-tale traces environment; Nuclear material utilization prediction. Approachable things by preparing base information covers: Broaden declaration by Member State; Information evaluation by IAEA; Measuring using new technique; Broader access of inspector. These things enable for the IAEA to evaluate consistency of declaration conducted by Member State and preparing data on verification or detection of absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Special arrangement for short notice Inspection (SNI) for Multipurpose Reactor (MBA RI-C) at Serpong Nuclear Research Center had been conducted. Since MBA RI-C classified into group III that has 1 SQ inventory required one PIV inspection. During inspection time, the Agency inspector may add another access to specified location by short notice at least 2 hours before start and access. Both fax and direct phone contact should deliver those notices to certain official. This position will also have impact to the BAPETEN routine inspection to each facility. And BAPETEN recommends the operators that always keep on update their record and report all material and activities. Conclusion. Based on description above, it can be concluded that there are no problems on implementing strengthened safeguards system at

  18. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.)

  19. Next Generation Germanium Systems for Safeguards Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We are developing the latest generation of highly portable, mechanically cooled germanium systems for safeguard applications. In collaboration with our industrial partner, Ph.D.s Co, we have developed the Germanium Gamma Ray Imager (GeGI), an imager with a 2π field of view. This instrument has been thoroughly field tested in a wide range of environments and have performed reliably even in the harshest conditions. The imaging capability of GeGI complements existing safeguards techniques by allowing for the spatial detection, identification, and characterization of nuclear material. Additionally, imaging can be used in design information verification activities to address potential material diversions. Measurements conducted at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant highlight the advantages this instrument offers in the identification and localization of LEU, HEU and Pu holdup. GeGI has also been deployed to the Savannah River Site for the measurement of radioactive waste canisters, providing information valuable for waste characterization and inventory accountancy. Measuring 30 x 15 x 23 cm and weighing approximately 15 kg, this instrument is the first portable germanium-based imager. GeGI offers high reliability with the convenience of mechanical cooling, making this instrument ideal for the next generation of safeguards instrumentation. (author)

  20. The Text of a Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and the Republic of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the agreement between the Agency and the Republic of China for the application of safeguards to the Taiwan research reactor facility, which entered into force on 13 October 1969, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  1. The Text of the Safeguards Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan for the application of safeguards with respect to a fuel reprocessing plant and to nuclear material, facilities, equipment and relevant technological information supplied by France to Pakistan for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  2. The Text of a Safeguards Agreement between the Agency, Canada and India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the agreement between the Agency, the Government of Canada and the Government of India providing for the Agency to apply safeguards in connection with the Agreement of 16 December 1963 between those Governments relating to the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station and the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station is reproduced in Part I below for the information of all Members. The texts of the latter Agreement and of a supplementary agreement amending it are reproduced in Parts II and III respectively

  3. Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) for unannounced safeguards inspections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The joint project addresses specific requirements of redundant surveillance systems installed in two South American nuclear facilities as a tool to support unannounced inspections conducted by ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The surveillance covers the critical time (as much as a few hours) between the notification of an inspection and the access of inspectors to the location in facility where surveillance equipment is installed. ABACC and the IAEA currently use the EURATOM Multiple Optical Surveillance System (EMOSS). This outdated system is no longer available or supported by the manufacturer. The current EMOSS system has met the project objective; however, the lack of available replacement parts and system support has made this system unsustainable and has increased the risk of an inoperable system. A new system that utilizes current technology and is maintainable is required to replace the aging EMOSS system. ABACC intends to replace one of the existing ABACC EMOSS systems by the Secure Video Surveillance System. SVSS utilizes commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technologies for all individual components. Sandia National Laboratories supported the system design for SVSS to meet Safeguards requirements, i.e. tamper indication, data authentication, etc. The SVSS consists of two video surveillance cameras linked securely to a data collection unit. The collection unit is capable of retaining historical surveillance data for at least three hours with picture intervals as short as 1sec. Images in .jpg format are available to inspectors using various software review tools. SNL has delivered two SVSS systems for test and evaluation at the ABACC Safeguards Laboratory. An additional 'proto-type' system remains

  4. System design and evaluation for national safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper presents a structure of the safeguards problem that brings into context various aspects of the objective and scope of a national safeguards system. The ''societal risk'' approach is used to develop a comprehensive rationale for safeguards design and evaluation, the continuing systematic assessment of the safeguards system, and the allocation of safeguards resources. Within the objective of achieving or maintaining an acceptable level of risk, a nation can utilize this structure to design and implement a comprehensive and cost-effectve safeguards system. The combination of protective mechanisms which provides the desired degree of protection at minimum cost will depend on the total set of mechanisms legally, culturally, and technically available to a particular nation and on that nation's definition of the threat and consequences associated with the wilful misuse of nuclear material. While the basic elements of the problem and the broad internal concerns remain much the same from nation to nation, it should not be expected that the cost-effective solution matching appropriate protective mechanisms to all feasible adversary actions will be the same. Information on the effectiveness of the protective mechanisms with respect to each sub-objective and each part of the necessary action sequence will enable a balanced application of resources appropriate to the national circumstances. (author)

  5. Development of the strengthened safeguards system and the Additional Protocol

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For the past 30 years, the IAEA's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. The paper summarizes the evolution of the safeguards system, describes strengthened safeguards, reports on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outlines plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  6. Design of safeguards systems for authentication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: To permit valid conclusions to be drawn from safeguards data, it is essential that this data be authentic. That is, it must be known that the data originated from the intended source, that the data was not changed in transit and that it is not a repeat or delayed copy of previous data. Furthermore a compromise of the source must not permit new trusted data to be generated and should not invalidate previous data. Authentication should be designed into safeguards systems instead of being added later. Failure to integrate authentication early in the design results in systems that are expensive or possibly impossible to deploy securely. This paper gives some of the factors that should be considered and some of the methods that can be employed for ensuring high security while minimizing cost. The paper is a compilation of some of the lessons learned by the authors during the last few years of working with the authentication of these systems. Examples are given of approaches that worked well and some that the authors found less successful. More use is being made of unattended and remote monitoring, and more facilities are becoming heavily automated. In some cases sensors and data generators may be deployed in many locations within a facility and may not be easily accessed (or may be located in hazardous locations). Because of these factors, physical access is becoming more limited, so safeguards systems must be designed to maximize reliability and to minimize inspection and maintenance time. For example, tamper indicating enclosures are only effective when they are adequately inspected, thus the number, size, and complexity of tamper indicating enclosures should be minimized. This might be accomplished by applying cryptographic data authentication at the sensor thus avoiding the need to install tamper indicating conduit (The inspection of long runs of conduit is difficult and expensive.) The proper use of standard internationally accepted protocols for data

  7. The need of a nuclear safeguard system under Congress responsibility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This work discusses the need of a nuclear safeguard system under the congress responsibility. It is proposed that the National Congress creates a system of safeguards that should control the possible deviations of pacific use of nuclear power to produce nuclear bombs which are forbidden by the Brazilian Constitution. (A.C.A.S.)

  8. The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS) was developed by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) to perform material control and accountability on all the nuclear material under WHC's jurisdiction. SARIS has been in operation for four and one-half years. It has reduced physical inventory plant shutdown time from several days to a few hours. The user-friendly interface has proven successful, as the training time for a new operator is only two to three hours; also errors have been dramatically reduced. The modeling features of SARIS have reduced the reported inventory difference and provide better information for measurement of scrap and waste. The audit files have been usefull in resolving data entry errors and the backup features have averted several potential problems. SARIS as a computerized accountability system has replaced manual record keeping with a consequent increase in productivity. 4 refs

  9. Nuclear material safeguards and security system analysis based on measurement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear material safeguards and security are the important aspect in the nuclear facility management due to the nuclear material could be terrorisms object. The two aspect of nuclear material security are nuclear material safeguards system and physical protection system. The most important in safeguards system is how to report the existence of nuclear material and the quantity of nuclear material. To perform the safeguards system the data of nuclear material are needed. The data of quality and quantity of nuclear material could be found by destructive analysis (DA) technique and non destructive analysis (NDA) technique. The DA technique are used to analysis the nuclear material that forming in powder, the NDA technique are used to analysis the nuclear material in spent fuel. In BATAN, the technique of measurement of nuclear material weight is more dominant than the other technique to be used in nuclear material safeguards and security systems. (author)

  10. Smart unattended systems for plutonium safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Large automated facilities for fabricating plutonium fuel present both difficulties and challenges for improved accounting of nuclear materials. The traditional methods of sample measurements, requiring the transfer of the sample from the production line to the assay measurement station, are not possible in automated facilities. The robotics used for automation require special containers for nuclear material that cannot be easily removed from the production line. Safety and radiation protection considerations also require that the assay instrumentation be installed in the fuel production lines because, in general, personnel cannot be in the fuel-handling area with nuclear material during operations. Such operational constraints are common in many of the modern facilities that have been designed for fabricating and processing plutonium fuel. A bilateral safeguards agreement between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) in Japan was signed to develop and implement nondestructive assay (NDA) systems to provide continuous safeguards measurements for material accountancy in the robot-automated Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF). The PFFF assay systems were required to operate in unattended mode with a size and fuel mass capability to match the robotics fuel manipulators. Unattended assay systems reduce the requirement for inspector's oversight of measurement operations, reduce the inspector's workload, and improve inspection efficiencies. In addition, unattended measurements become essential when facility constraints limit the access of inspectors to the operations area during material processing. Authentication techniques were incorporated into the NDA systems so that data obtained from unattended assays could be used by independent inspectors such as the IAEA

  11. Developing the information management system for safeguards national inspection

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, S. J.; Jeon, I.; Park, W. S.; Min, K. S. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2003-10-01

    The inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection is aimed to do the national safeguards inspection with efficiency, and to decrease the inspector's load to write inspection report by systematizing the inspection jobs and sharing the inspection data. National safeguards inspection is consisted two large jobs. The first is the national safeguards supporting job of managing to support the national inspection mission. The other is the writing a national inspection report after completing the national inspection. Before the developing of inspection information management system, the official tools(spread sheet, word processor) are usually used. But there is problem to share the data, to produce the statistics data. To solve the these problem, we developed the inspection information management system that process the job from initial to final inspection work, and opened user education. This paper explain the procedure of developing the inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection.

  12. Can a safeguards accountancy system really detect an unauthorized removal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Theoretical investigations and system studies indicate safeguards material balance data from reprocessing plants can be used to detect unauthorized removals. Plant systems have been modeled and simulated data used to demonstrate the techniques. But how sensitive are the techniques when used with actual plant data. What is the effect of safeguards applications on plant operability. Can safeguards be acceptable to plant operators, and are there any benefits to be derived. The Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) has been devoted to answering these and other questions over the past several years. A computerized system of near-real-time accounting and in-process inventory has been implemented and demonstrated during actual plant test runs. Measured inventories and hourly material balance closures have been made to assess safeguards in an operating plant application. The tests have culminated in actual removals of material from the operating plant to investigate the response and measure the sensitivity of the safeguards and data evaluation system

  13. Optimizing the integrated safeguards system: Pragmatism and fresh views are the keys to a viable system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The implementation of the new Integrated Safeguards System is a major responsibility for the IAEA and its Member States. Providing not only the capability to better control declared activities, but also to detect clandestine attempts, it is essential to improve the international nuclear weapons control regime and to increase the credibility of assurances given to the international community. Having the sole goal of establishing integrated safeguards in an optimal manner would in itself be a very challenging and demanding task. Unfortunately, the Secretariat is faced with other conflicting challenges: statutory obligations, additional programme requests from Member States and, not the least, the obligation to fit all its activities within a strict budgetary framework. Universal and early acceptance is necessary for the system to be fully effective and credible. It must however be recognised that wide and rapid adherence will be only achieved if the system is attractive enough and offers shared benefits, that is not only increased non-proliferation assurances, but also perspectives of optimisation and reduction of the inspection burden, not to forget the assurance of keeping costs under control. It is essential that the safeguards system be non-discriminatory and apply the same objectives and implementation principles to all States. Integrated Safeguards should only be applied in States which are in good standing with respect to their obligations under their safeguards Agreements and Protocols, and for which the Agency has reached positive conclusions after having applied all necessary verification measures and having performed a complete evaluation of the information available. Cost neutrality is obviously a primary constraint for Integrated Safeguards. Even if one has to recognise the additional costs and difficulties generated in the short term by the implementation of the new system, it is essential to be conscious that budgetary limits will be maintained, and to

  14. Systems Analysis of Safeguards Effectiveness in a Uranium Conversion Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Elayat, H A; Lambert, H; O' Connell, W J

    2004-06-16

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems. For this goal several DOE National Laboratories are defining the characteristics of typical facilities of several size scales, and the safeguards measures and instrumentation that could be applied. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is providing systems modeling and analysis of facility and safeguards operations, diversion path generation, and safeguards system effectiveness. The constituent elements of diversion scenarios are structured using directed graphs (digraphs) and fault trees. Safeguards indicator probabilities are based on sampling statistics and/or measurement accuracies. Scenarios are ranked based on value and quantity of material removed and the estimated probability of non-detection. Significant scenarios, especially those involving timeliness or randomly varying order of events, are transferred to simulation analysis. Simulations show the range of conditions encountered by the safeguards measurements and inspections, e.g., the quantities of intermediate materials in temporary storage and the time sequencing of material flow. Given a diversion campaign, simulations show how much the range of the same parameters observed by the safeguards system can differ from the base-case range. The combination of digraphs, fault trees, statistics and simulation constitute a method for evaluation of the estimated benefit of alternate or additional safeguards equipment or features. A generic example illustrates the method.

  15. The Text of the Safeguards Agreement of 10 February 1977 between the Agency, Canada and Spain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 10 February 1977 between the Agency, Canada and Spain for the application of safeguards in relation to the Agreement of 7 July 1975 between the two Governments for the Development and Application of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Section 34, on 10 February 1977.

  16. Nuclear non-proliferation states urged to conclude Safeguards Agreement with International Atomic Energy Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains a brief presentation of the annual report of the IAEA, the statement of the Director General of the IAEA at the General Assembly Plenary with emphasis on Agency's actions to strengthen safeguards, and statements made by the representatives of Brazil, Finland, Mexico, United States, Lithuania, Cuba, Czech Republic, Japan, Egypt, Ukraine, South Africa, India, Myanmar, and the Russian Federation at the 46th Meeting, on 4 November 1999

  17. The Canadian safeguards program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

  18. The Text of an Agreement between the Agency and the United Kingdom for the Application of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 14 December 1972 between the Agency and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the application of safeguards is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  19. The Text of the Agreement for the Application of Agency Safeguards to Four United States Reactor Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Agency and the United States of America for the application of Agency safeguards to four United States reactor facilities, which was signed on 30 March 1962 and will enter into force on 1 June 1962, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency

  20. Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

    2001-05-01

    We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system.

  1. Potential nuclear material safeguards applied to the Department of Energy's Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) within the U.S. Department of Energy is charged with the responsibility of safe and efficient disposal of this Nation's civilian high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel. Part of this responsibility includes providing for the application of both domestic and international safeguards on nuclear material at facilities of the Civilian Waste Management System. While detailed safeguards requirements for these disposal facilities have yet to be established, once established, they could impact facility design. Accordingly, OCRWM has participated in efforts to develop safeguards approaches for geologic repositories and will continue to participate actively with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as other Department of Energy (DOE) Offices in efforts to resolve safeguards issues related to spent fuel disposal, to minimize any potential design impacts and to support effective nuclear material safeguards. The following paper discusses current plants and issues related to the application of safeguards to the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS)

  2. Reactor safeguards system assessment and design. Volume I

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Varnado, G.B.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Daniel, S.L.; Bennett, H.A.; Hulme, B.L.

    1978-06-01

    This report describes the development and application of a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear power reactor safeguards systems. Analytic techniques are used to identify the sabotage acts which could lead to release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant, to determine the areas of a plant which must be protected to assure that significant release does not occur, to model the physical plant layout, and to evaluate the effectiveness of various safeguards systems. The methodology was used to identify those aspects of reactor safeguards systems which have the greatest effect on overall system performance and which, therefore, should be emphasized in the licensing process. With further refinements, the methodology can be used by the licensing reviewer to aid in assessing proposed or existing safeguards systems.

  3. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... under the authority and supervision of a state Control Terminal Agency. This authority and supervision... reside inside a locked room within a secure facility. Access to the facility will be restricted to authorized personnel who have identified themselves and their need for access to a system security...

  4. Implementation of the Safeguards System in the Republic of Tajikistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    specialists training and provide them a stimulus to make a carrier in IAEA. Important safeguards element is more effective export control and efforts to liquidate black markets network. Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency (Regulatory Authority) successfully cooperates with the IAEA Safeguards Department: (1) There were 14 expert missions of the IAEA Safeguards department to our country. (2) Have been carried out inspections of: a) Tailings and the Uranium oxide-protoxide production plant. b) Republican Waste Repository Site. c) Anzobe Ore Mining and Processing Plant. d) Non-operating Research reactor of Physical and Technical Institute of the Academy of sciences of Tajikistan. e) Establishments of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Nature Protection and the Ministry of Extreme Situations and Civil Defence. (3) IAEA Safeguards Department experts and our specialists jointly liquidated the risk of radiation pollution. The risk was caused of helicopter crash in mountains of Northern Tajikistan. (author)

  5. Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

  6. Quantitative validation of nuclear safeguards monitoring systems and their simulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear safeguards monitoring systems like those used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are comprised of instruments to detect the misuse of nuclear materials. Attempting to prove that these systems meet their objectives in their intended facilities under operational conditions is too difficult, expensive, and risky. Alternatively, the system may be proved in a laboratory under like conditions, or in a simulation if its quality is known and is acceptable. The main result of this research is a statistical procedure for determining the quality of a safeguards monitoring systems and its simulation. Quality is manifest in two metrics, validity and fidelity, which can be determined quantitatively by administering a validation test. Validity is the demonstrated ability of the system or its simulation to make correct decisions whereas fidelity is the realism of the data used in making the aforementioned decisions. The metrics fit into a Bayesian hypothesis test wherefrom optimal and automated decisions are possible. The technique was successfully tested using real and simulated versions of a laboratory nuclear safeguards monitoring system comprised of an IAEA video camera and Swedish-made boron-trifluoride neutron detector. Validation test data sets were prepared by acquiring data in the real safeguards system about movements of a drum containing a beryllium-plutonium radiation source. The real and simulated automatic evaluation systems were then trained to recognize named movements by providing them recorded data. The validation test was administered by letting the system in question, either real or simulated, attempt to name the events in the validation test data set. Recognition by either real or simulated systems was done by automatically isolating events in the data and comparing them to their respective library data, and then choosing the best match. For images, matching was based on the coordinates of the centroid of pixels resulting from subtraction

  7. Protocol to suspend the application of safeguards pursuant to the Agreement of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in the light of the provisions for the application of safeguards pursuant to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol of 16 October 1998 suspending the application of safeguards under the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/237) of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany in the light of the provisions for the application of safeguards pursuant to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between the Agency, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA. The Protocol entered into force on 21 October 1999

  8. Safeguards effectiveness assessment system (SEAS): More than a document retrieval system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In order to increase the transparency and to improve the uniformity of safeguards activities at nuclear facilities, a variety of documents have been produced in the last few years. One consequence of this expansion of safeguards related reference material is the difficulty to collate this disparate information. The primary goal of the development of the safeguards effectiveness assessment system (SEAS) - a collaborative work of the Safeguards Effectiveness Evaluation (SEE) Section and the Data Processing Development (IDD) Section - is to provide the possibility of linking safeguards related information sources and to enable safeguards staff to access quickly information related to the description of IAEA verification activities. 5 refs, 4 figs

  9. The Text of the Agreement of 20 July 1977 between the Agency and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards to the Research Reactor Facility (IRT). Suspension of the Application of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The application of safeguards under the Agency's agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in respect of a research reactor facility has been suspended pursuant to Article 23 of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  10. National system of accounting and control and co-operation with international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper offers a description of the National System of Accounting and Control applied in Argentina. Besides, the importance of having a National System is also highlighted as a way of supplying effective and efficiency to assure reasonably that the nuclear materials, materials, equipment and installations of nuclear interest are used according to the stated in the licenses and authorisations emitted by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA), complying with the international compromises assumed by the country. The role of the National System referring to the co-operation with the International Agencies of safeguards applications, ABACC and IAEA, is also explained. This co-operation must be understood as the one tending to strengthen and improve safeguards. The existence of a National System of Accounting and Control contributes to widen guarantees on the compliment of compromises of non proliferation, facilitates the application of international safeguards by the agencies and improves the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards through the development of new techniques and methods. (author)

  11. Report on Iran nuclear safeguards sent to Agency's Board and UN Security Council

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei today released his report Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report was prepared at the request of the United Nation's Security Council. Its circulation is restricted, and unless the IAEA Board of Governors and Security Council decide otherwise, the Agency can not authorise its release to the public. On 29 March 2006 the Security Council requested 'in 30 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on the process of Iranian compliance with the steps required by the IAEA Board, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration.' The report was simultaneously circulated to the Agency's Member States and to the Security Council in New York this afternoon. (IAEA)

  12. Commercial-off-the-shelf digital surveillance systems for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The reasons why safeguards authorities are from time to time looking for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (C.O.T.S.) equipment for safeguards purposes are for the following reasons: Equipment that is designed from scratch to satisfy specific safeguards requirements is very likely to go through a period of teething problems. If these problems are only discovered once the equipment is deployed for routine use, this will be accompanied with large overhead costs for the safeguards authorities to maintain and repair such equipment. The overhead costs are much higher if unattended equipment is concerned that is permanently installed on-site. In that case an extra mission has to be organised to return the faulty equipment to our headquarters before it can be repaired. Using C.O.T.S. equipment that is also used by others reduces the risk of teething problems. At least the burden of going through such kind of problem period is shared with other customers of the concerned equipment. It is clear that safeguards is not a big market on its own. The non-negligible cost of the development of equipment that only fits safeguards requirements will therefore have to be recovered on the expected sales. If the market is small, if the expected number of units that can be sold is small, a large part of the unit cost will depend on the initial development costs. Going for C.O.T.S. equipment that is also sold in other markets, would in that respect lower the equipment cost. That not any safeguards equipment can be obtained commercially off the shelf is clear, but in certain domains like digital surveillance, the functionality of C.O.T.S. equipment has been approaching the one needed for safeguards. That is why in 1998 the Euratom Safeguards Office published an open call for tender for the purchase of a digital surveillance system that is able to support up to 64 colour camera channels. In response to a successful bid for this call for tender a contract for the delivery of 3 prototype systems and 6

  13. Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author)

  14. Safeguards Implementation: Establishment of Indonesian Safeguards Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Under the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), U.S. National Laboratories support the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to ''collaborate with international partners to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development.'' This engagement in safeguards implementation cooperation is the basis for the security and safeguards arrangement with the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (BAPETEN) and includes strengthening of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). There are many components in a robust SSAC. While INSEP carries on its program in a holistic approach, it is more effective and efficient to address individual components, rather than the entire system at one time, with the objective of strengthening the system as a whole. Nuclear material accountancy is one of these components. Nuclear material accountancy necessitates that a State periodically take an inventory of its material and record changes. To better perform these activities, BAPETEN requested assistance with establishing a safeguards laboratory where its staff could perform independent material characterization, maintain nondestructive assay equipment, and facilitate hands-on training of BAPETEN safeguards inspectors. In compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines and safety series documents, INSEP and BAPETEN opened the BAPETEN Safeguards Laboratory in February 2010 to provide these competencies. BAPETEN showcased these new capabilities in July 2010 at the IAEA-sponsored Regional Workshop on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control at Facilities where hands-on activities were held at BAPETEN's Headquarters in Jakarta using the equipment supplied by INSEP. Discussions have begun on the establishment of a security and safeguards laboratory at the BAPETEN Training Center located in Cisarua. This paper describes the many steps

  15. IAEA safeguards information system re-engineering project (IRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Safeguards Information System Re-engineering Project (IRP) was initiated to assist the IAEA in addressing current and future verification and analysis activities through the establishment of a new information technology framework for strengthened and integrated safeguards. The Project provides a unique opportunity to enhance all of the information services for the Department of Safeguards and will require project management 'best practices' to balance limited funds, available resources and Departmental priorities. To achieve its goals, the Project will require the participation of all stakeholders to create a comprehensive and cohesive plan that provides both a flexible and stable foundation for address changing business needs. The expectation is that high quality integrated information systems will be developed that incorporate state-of-the-art technical architectural standards, improved business processes and consistent user interfaces to store various data types in an enterprise data repository which is accessible on-line in a secure environment. (author)

  16. Methodology for characterizing potential adversaries of Nuclear Material Safeguards Systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kirkwood, C.W.; Pollock, S.M.

    1978-11-01

    The results are described of a study by Woodward--Clyde Consultants to assist the University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in the development of methods to analyze and evaluate Nuclear Material Safeguards (NMS) Systems. The study concentrated on developing a methodology to assist experts in describing, in quantitative form, their judgments about the characteristics of potential adversaries of NMS Systems.

  17. Methodology for characterizing potential adversaries of Nuclear Material Safeguards Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The results are described of a study by Woodward--Clyde Consultants to assist the University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in the development of methods to analyze and evaluate Nuclear Material Safeguards (NMS) Systems. The study concentrated on developing a methodology to assist experts in describing, in quantitative form, their judgments about the characteristics of potential adversaries of NMS Systems

  18. Establishing a national safeguards system at the State level

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper is the guide to a workshop designed to enable the participants to gain a better understanding of National Safeguards Systems and their functions. The workshop provides an opportunity to address the requirements for the organization that has to carry out the system functions at the State level in a country having a research reactor and ancillary laboratories

  19. The Texts of the Instruments connected with the Agency's Assistance to Iran in Establishing a Research Reactor Project. Suspension of the Application of Safeguards under the Project Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The application of safeguards by the Agency under Section 5 of the Project Agreement reproduced in document INFCIRC/97, part II has been suspended pursuant to Article 23 of Iran's agreement with the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  20. A data management system for safeguards applications (DMSSA)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Implementation of the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) in China has begun since 1989. DESSA serves as an automated tool to provide the quality Accounting Reports to the IAEA as well as to perform the data management of safeguards database. It is implemented on an IBM-compatible PC. The system is characterized as a single-user, small-scale system with cost-effective and easy-to-use feature. It consists of a data manipulating system and a database specially designed for safeguards applications. It involves several functions such as: Report Edit, Quality Control, Auditing and Data Verification, Information Retrieval and Film Management, Database Querying and so on. All functions of the system are used in an interactive mode and organized in a pull-down menu. The general design consideration of the system is that it should completely meet the requirements of the safeguards activities to provide the basis for the application of safeguards pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement between China and IAEA

  1. Communication received from the Resident Representative of Australia to the Agency concerning the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Director General has received a letter dated 16 September 2009 from the Resident Representative of Australia to the Agency attaching the text of the Statement of Principles of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN). The letter and, as requested therein, the Statement of Principles are herewith circulated for the information of Member States

  2. The text of the Safeguards Agreement of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Safeguards Agreement of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany relating to the agreement of 27 June 1975 between the two Governments for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which entered into force on 26 February 1976

  3. International Atomic Energy Agency's advisory group meeting on safeguards related to the final disposal of waste and spent fuel, Vienna, Austria, September 12-16, 1988: Foreign trip report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    B.W. Moran traveled to Vienna, Austria, during the period of September 12--16, 1988, to serve as the technical advisor to the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Advisory Group Meeting on ''Safeguards Related to the Final Disposal of Nuclear Material in Waste and Spent Fuel.'' The goal of the US representatives to this meeting was to ensure that the advisory group's recommendations established (1) an effective IAEA safeguards approach for all radioactive waste and spent fuel management facilities and (2) a safeguards approach that is appropriate for the US Federal Waste Management System. The principal concerns of the United States on entering the advisory group meeting were: criteria for the termination of safeguards on waste should not be established, but should be referred for further study, safeguards on spent fuel should not be terminated, and safeguards studies are required before IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel are established. The US representatives generally recommended that consultant meetings be convened to address the technical issues after the requisite safeguards related research and development tasks have been performed. These objectives of the US representatives were achieved, and the recommendations of the advisory group generally coincided with and extended the recommendations presented in the US position paper

  4. A Critical Element to Successful Implementation Of Future Safeguards Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As we look to the future of nuclear materials management and safeguards systems, it is essential to place significant emphasis on creation of a strong infrastructure to support and sustain modern systems. Traditionally, safeguards infrastructure development has focused on such elements as equipment development, strengthening of the national regulatory base, creation of state-of-the-art accounting and control systems, and procedure development. Less emphasis has been placed on recognition of the 'human element' as a primary component of the necessary infrastructure and the key to successful implementation of new or existing systems. The importance of the human element can be recognized by considering the broad span of influence and control, direction, regulation and implementation of safeguards systems exhibited by a large number of professionals: diplomats, scholars, politicians, facility managers, program directors and technical specialists. These individuals provide the connectivity or 'glue' that binds together a myriad of smaller safeguards program elements and ensures a holistic approach is fostered and maintained. The education and training of our future leaders and experts must receive the highest priority. In addition, this effort must consider factors beyond development of technical capabilities. Given the rapidly evolving world climate since the end of the cold war, our safeguards leaders and experts need education and training that will provide a well-developed understanding of the broader political dimensions of current nonproliferation challenges. They need to learn how to think, rather than what to think. A sustained effort is required to highlight the importance of the human dimension of safeguards and nuclear materials management and how these systems support international nonproliferation efforts. New educational initiatives are needed to better prepare the next generation of leaders and experts. Increased regional and national cooperation in the

  5. Design considerations for an integrated safeguards system for fuel-reprocessng plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report presents design ideas for safeguards systems in nuclear fuels reprocessing plants. The report summarizes general safeguards requirements and describes a safeguards system concept being developed and tested at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The report gives some general concepts intended for design consideration and a checklist of specific problems that should be considered. The report is intended as an aid for the safeguards system designer and as a source of useful information

  6. Report on Iran nuclear safeguards sent to Agency's Board and UN Security Council

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei today released his report Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report was prepared at the request of the United Nation's Security Council. Its circulation is restricted, and unless the IAEA Board of Governors and Security Council decide otherwise, the Agency can not authorise its release to the public. On 23 December 2006 the Security Council requested 'within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration'. The report was simultaneously circulated to the Agency's Member States and to the Security Council in New York this afternoon. (IAEA)

  7. Unattended digital video surveillance: A system prototype for EURATOM safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ever increasing capabilities in video and computer technology have changed the face of video surveillance. From yesterday's film and analog video tape-based systems, we now emerge into the digital era with surveillance systems capable of digital image processing, image analysis, decision control logic, and random data access features -- all of which provide greater versatility with the potential for increased effectiveness in video surveillance. Digital systems also offer other advantages such as the ability to ''compress'' data, providing increased storage capacities and the potential for allowing longer surveillance Periods. Remote surveillance and system to system communications are also a benefit that can be derived from digital surveillance systems. All of these features are extremely important in today's climate Of increasing safeguards activity and decreasing budgets -- Los Alamos National Laboratory's Safeguards Systems Group and the EURATOM Safeguards Directorate have teamed to design and implement a period surveillance system that will take advantage of the versatility of digital video for facility surveillance system that will take advantage of the versatility of digital video for facility surveillance and data review. In this Paper we will familiarize you with system components and features and report on progress in developmental areas such as image compression and region of interest processing

  8. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The following topics are covered in this chapter: basis for international safeguards; basis for applying international safeguards in US facilities; application of international safeguards at the facility level; and example of application of international safeguards at a low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication facility including material balance area structure and key measurement points, inspection activities, auditing operator's measurement system, verifying nuclear material, containment and surveillance measures, and inspector's conclusions

  9. Agreement Between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities. Addition to the List of Facilities Subject to Safeguards Under the Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In accordance with Paragraph 14(a) of the Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities (hereinafter “the Agreement”), India shall notify the Agency in writing of its decision to offer any facility identified by India for Agency safeguards under the Agreement. Any facility so notified by India becomes subject to the Agreement as of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India, and is to be included in the Annex to the Agreement. On 11 March 2014, the Agency received from India written notification, pursuant to Paragraph 14(a) of the Agreement, of its decision to bring one additional facility under safeguards in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. Pursuant to Paragraph 14 4(a) of the Agreement, the Annex to the Agreement has been updated and is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency

  10. Optimizing the Integrated Safeguards System: Pragmatism and fresh views are the keys to a viable system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The development of the Integrated Safeguards System is a major progress in international safeguards, through which the value of the assurances provided by the IAEA to its Member States will be greatly increased. However, the implementation of Integrated Safeguards will have to take into account a number of principles, objectives and constraints, among which a delicate balance will have to be struck. The IAEA safeguards activities are placed in a new environment and set of constraints, where previous schemes are not any longer adapted to meet efficiently new goals and expectations. Rethinking safeguards implementation will be necessary, especially to move to a result-oriented process, and from systematic application to flexible and unpredictable measures, while keeping targeted on the ultimate goal of stronger safeguards and increased assurances to the international community. (author)

  11. Safeguards Strategy in Physical Protection System for Nuclear Installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safeguards strategy is directed at efforts of eliminating theft of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installation. For achieving the above objective, it is necessary to set up safeguards strategy in physical protection of nuclear materials and installation. The safeguards strategy starts from anticipated security condition, list of thefts, planning referred to as safeguards planning. Safeguards planning are implemented in safeguards implementation, followed up then by evaluation. Results of evaluation are equipped with results of safeguards survey already developed. Safeguards' planning is made from these results and serve as guidelines for next safeguards implementation and is repeated to form a safeguard cycle. One safeguard cycle is made on a periodical basis, at least annually. (author)

  12. Quality control of MC and A system and integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the integrated safeguards regime, co-operation with SSAC is a vital element to achieve efficiency of safeguards implementation while maintaining the effectiveness. However, the degree of co-operation fully depends upon the credibility, technical capability and the transparency of SSAC. Since the credibility of SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) depends heavily on effectiveness of facility operator's Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) practice, some measures to provide continuous assurance of the function and effectiveness of the system such as quality assurance program including periodical system audit (diagnostic) function ought to be established. This paper discusses quality assurance program for facility level MC and A including audit (diagnostic) method to maintain continuous assurance of the effectiveness. (author)

  13. MPCA system of the ASTC 'Sosny' for safeguard applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The main quantities of nuclear materials in Belarus are located in the Academic Scientific Technical Center (ASTC) 'Sosny' which were used for researches in the past 1994 - 1988: research reactor, critical assemblies, 'hot' chambers, laboratories. Having signed in 1995 an Agreement on Safeguard with the IAEA Belarus started a program of implementation of the SSAC with the support of the IAEA and countries-donors: Japan, the United States and Sweden. Measurement, computer technique has been supplied, training and implementation of accounting system has been started, physical protection system developed. In August 1995 Physical Inventory List has been declared to the IAEA and work with DIQ has been started. Verification of physical inventory is continuing up to now. In the report the status of MPCA system with regards to safeguard implementation for the installations of research center is presented. (author)

  14. Nuclear energy forecasts and the international safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper assesses the impact of the increasing use of nuclear energy on the international safeguards system, and it identifies and assesses options for coping with the anticipated impact. A review of nuclear energy forecasts indicates a need for substantial increases in the financial and personnel resources of the safeguards system over the next decade. The requisite financial increases are probably within the limits of political feasibility, but the personnel needs may become problematic. There is also likely to be a continuing decline in confidence in the effectiveness of the system because of perceptions of inadequate resources and methods. There are several options that could reduce the projected technical and political pressures on the system: a postponement of plutonium recycle; improved materials measurement accuracies; immediate increases in the IAEA inspections staff. There are also options that would supplement the safeguards system and alleviate the pressures on it; multinational fuel cycle centers; a suppliers' cartel-like arrangement; and an International Nuclear Materials Custodial Authority. 53 refs

  15. Commercial-off-the-shelf digital surveillance systems for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The reasons why safeguards authorities are from time to time looking for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (C.O.T.S.) equipment for safeguards purposes are for the following reasons: operational stability, equipment cost, perspective of new features, additional services. The reason why the company FAST could make an interesting offer to the Euratom Safeguards Office was primarily because it had an existing commercial digital surveillance system that already fulfilled most of the specified requirements. Those requirements that were still missing could be easily implemented as the system is mainly software based and uses as much as possible standard computing and communication equipment. The following aspects are further elaborated in the paper: The need to adapt the system to be compliant with ESO's user requirements; The hardware and the Alpha Kernel software; Recording modes (time-lapse, motion detection at the camera, digital input/outputs); he software for review (synchronise recorded images in time); The chip card (or smart card); the Inspector Interface (dedicated development, owned by Euratom); The modified AXIS box: JPEG images with authentication; Standard computer networking technologies throughout the system; Ready for remote monitoring (modem, ISDN, any TCP/IP based interconnection); Openness: the API to the Alpha Kernel; The link with the past: analogue cameras and legacy cabling; A glimpse at the future: MPEG2 in an intelligent way

  16. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  17. The IAEA Safeguards Information System Re-Engineering Project (IRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The ISIS Re-engineering Project was initiated to assist the IAEA in addressing current and future verification and analysis activities and also on building the new information technology framework for strengthened and integrated safeguards. It is a unique opportunity to enhance all information services for the Department of Safeguards and will require project management 'best practices' to balance the limited funds to the available resources with divisional priorities. To be successful the program requires the participation from all stakeholders to create a comprehensive and cohesive Plan that provides a flexible but stable foundation to address our changing business needs. The expectation is that high-quality integrated information systems will be built that incorporate state-of-the-art technical architectural standards, improved business processes and consistent user interfaces to store various data types in an enterprise data repository which is accessible online in a secure environment. (author)

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  19. The Text of the Agreement Between the Agency and Argentina for the Application of Safeguards to the Embalse Power Reactor Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Agency and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Application of Safeguards to the Embalse Power Reactor Facility is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  20. The Text of the Agreement between the Agency and Argentina for the Application of Safeguards to the Atucha Power Reactor Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Agency and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Application of Safeguards to the Atucha Power Reactor Facility is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  1. The Text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  3. The Text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  4. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  5. Safeguards system in the Republic of Belarus

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    At the time of signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1993), the Republic of Belarus did not have any state system of nuclear material accountancy and control. Accounting for and control were performed by departmental systems which did not involve computer data processing, generation of reports, independent measurements, data coding, etc. They were no able to perform accounting for and control in real time. In this paper the existing system of nuclear material accounting for and control is briefly discussed as well as system of physical protection of nuclear materials, export/import measures and measures to combat illicit trafficking. (author)

  6. Unique computer system for safeguards use

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Microprocessors have been used to implement specialized scientific data processing systems since 1976. One such system, the LeCroy 3500, is presently being used by the Detection and Verification Group of the Energy Division at Los Alamos National Laboratory for a large variety of tasks involving measurement of various nuclear parameters associated with radioactive materials. The system is unique because it can do not only sophisticated pulse height and multi-scale analyses but also other analyses that are limited only by the availability fo CAMAC modules that would acquire data from exotic experiments. The system is also field portable which extends the range of experiments that it can control. Four applications of this system are described in this paper: (1) plutonium storage vault monitoring, (2) coded aperture image reconstruction, (3) spatial distribution of gamma radiation, and (4) nuclear waste management. 7 figures

  7. The Texts of the Instruments connected with the Agency's Assistance to Finland in Establishing a Research Reactor Project. Suspension of the application of safeguards under the Project Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The application of safeguards by the Agency under Article V.2 of the Project Agreement for providing assistance to Finland in establishing a research reactor project has been suspended, pursuant to Article 23 of Finland's agreement with the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension took effect from 9 February 1972, the date on which the latter agreement entered into force

  8. The Texts of the Instruments connected with the Agency's Assistance to Mexico in Establishing a Research Reactor Project. Suspension of the Application of Safeguards under the Project Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The application of safeguards by the Agency under Section 6 of the Project Agreement that is reproduced in document INFCIRC/52, part II, and was amended by the Second Supply Agreement reproduced in document INFCIRC/52/Add.1, has been suspended pursuant to Article 23 of Mexico's agreement with the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  9. Report on the US Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (POTAS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This document summarizes the work done under the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), providing the US Government, IAEA, and others with a short review of the progress made in the program since its inception. Becaue of the size and complexity of the program, only major accomplishments are presented. These are grouped under the following categories: (1) equipment and standard which cover assay of irradiated and unirradiated nuclear materials, automatic data processing, and physical standards; (2) experts who are involved in technology transfer, training, system design, and safeguard information processing and analysis; (3) system studies which cover diversion hazard analysis, safeguards approaches and application, and inspection effort planning and forecasting; (4) techniques, procedures, and equipment evaluation; (5) training of IAEA inspectors and safeguards specialists from member states. The major achievement has been the provisions of safeguards equipment designed to be reliable, and tamper resistant, some of which have already been in use in the field by inspector or by IAEA staff members in Vienna. These are listed in a table

  10. Human as a component of a nuclear material safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Many human vigilance experiments are summarized and principles are extracted which should be useful in designing and evaluating a nuclear material safeguard system. A human is a poor observer and is not a dependable part of any man-machine system when required to function as an observer. There are a few techniques which improve his performance by providing feedback. A conceptual model is presented which is helpful in design and evaluation of systems. There is some slight experimental support for the model. Finally, some techniques of time study and statistical control charting will be useful as a means of detecting nuclear diversion attempts

  11. Strengthening regional safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

  12. Strengthening regional safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O. [Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)] [and others

    1996-08-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980`s and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States.

  13. NNSA's next generation safeguards initiative to define an effective state system of accounting and control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), the international outreach component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), is a collaborative program that endeavors to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development. One of the critical ways the program achieves this objective is through working with partners to increase the effectiveness of the State System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) - the essential elements of national, regulatory and facility safeguards competencies that work as a system to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the world the full assurance of the state's adherence to its safeguards agreements. INSEP provides assistance in developing a state's SSAC in a number of areas, from developing national legislation governing the possession and use of nuclear material to working with nuclear facility operators to developing good practices in waste management. INSEP has collaborated with foreign partners in peaceful nuclear applications for over two decades, but recently, it has focused its efforts on strengthening SSACs due to the growth of nuclear power worldwide, particularly in countries with limited nuclear infrastructures. This new area of focus has prompted INSEP to develop a model of SSAC competencies that will serve not only as a structure for its engagement with partner states, but also as a means to facilitate coordination with other states that provide training and assistance, and as a mechanism for evaluating the effectiveness of its work in reaching its intended objectives. While this model uses as its starting point the requirements on a State that are presented in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, it is not, in itself, a requirements document or guidance for implementing requirements. It is rather an analysis of what capabilities will be needed in a State to be able to meet requirements and to

  14. Twenty Years of Regional Safeguards: the ABACC System and the Synergy with the National Nuclear Material Control Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As result of the nuclear integration between Brazil and Argentina, in July 1991 the Agreement for Peaceful Uses of the Nuclear Energy (Bilateral Agreement) was signed and the Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accountancy and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) was created [1]. The main role assigned to ABACC was the implementation and administration of the regional control system and the coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in all nuclear activities of Argentina and Brazil. In December 1991 the IAEA, ABACC, Argentina and Brazil signed the Quadripartite Agreement (INFCIRC/435) [2]. The agreement establishes obligations similar to those established by model INFCIRC/153 comprehensive agreements. The Bilateral Agreement establishes that the Parties should make available financial and technical capabilities to support ABACC activities. In order to accomplish this challenge, the National Systems had to improve their structure and capabilities. Through the close interaction with the IAEA and ABACC, the national systems have been enriched by adopting new methodologies, implementing innovative safeguards approaches and providing specialized training to the regional inspectors. All of this also resulted in relevant technical improvements to the regional system as a whole. The approach of both neighborhoods controlling each other increased the confidence between the partners and permitted a better knowledge of their potentialities. The recognized performance of the regional system in the implementation of innovative, efficient and credible safeguards measures increased the confidence of the international community on the implementation of nuclear safeguards in Argentina and Brazil. In this paper, after twenty years of the creation of the ABACC System, the view of the Brazilian and Argentine National Authorities is presented. (authors)

  15. Panel on protection and management of plutonium: Subpanel on safeguards and security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-07-01

    Nuclear materials safeguards and security systems are described in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Materials of interest to safeguards, threats, proposals to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, evolving safeguards issues and requirements, system effectiveness, and elements of a global nuclear materials management regime are discussed. Safeguards are seen as an essential element of nuclear materials management, but not a driver for decisions regarding nuclear power or the disposal of excess weapon nuclear materials.

  16. Panel on protection and management of plutonium: Subpanel on safeguards and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear materials safeguards and security systems are described in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Materials of interest to safeguards, threats, proposals to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, evolving safeguards issues and requirements, system effectiveness, and elements of a global nuclear materials management regime are discussed. Safeguards are seen as an essential element of nuclear materials management, but not a driver for decisions regarding nuclear power or the disposal of excess weapon nuclear materials

  17. Legal frame work and implementation of the strengthened safeguards system in Indonesia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Nuclear legislation in Indonesia was initiated by Act No.31 Year 1964. Under the act the government established National Atomic Energy Agency (BATAN), which was responsible for promotional and development activity as well as for regulatory activity. Since 1997 Indonesia has Act No. 10,1997 on Nuclear Energy, which replaced Act No.31 Year 1964, under article 3 and 4 of the Act No. 10,1997 the Indonesian Government established the separation of executing body and regulatory body, which are directly responsible to the president. Regulatory body has a task to control any nuclear activity by establishing regulations, conduct licensing processes and inspections. In 1998 the Indonesian Government established the Nuclear Energy Control Boards or BAPETEN. Indonesia's nuclear activity is used for peaceful purposes; it is stated clearly under article 15 Act no. 10 that one of the objectives of the control is to prevent the diversion of the purpose of the nuclear energy utilization. Indonesia has seven facilities, which are safeguarded, three research reactors in Serpong (30 MWt.), Bandung (2 MWt), and Yogyakarta (100 kWt), four other nuclear facilities LEU Fuel Element fabrication installation, Experimental Fuel Element installation, radiometallurgy installation and Interim Storage for spent fuel. Indonesia signed non-proliferation of nuclear weapon NPT in 1970 and ratified in 1978. On 14 July 1980 Indonesia signed Safeguards Agreement. The structure and content of the agreement is the same as INFICIRC/153 which called full scope Safeguards agreement. Based on the agreement, BAPETEN established Chairman decree No. 13/Ka. BAPETEN/99 on SSAC, which is a legal basis for implementation of Comprehensive Safeguards in Indonesia. BAPETEN as a National Authority has right to verify and inspect the operator's declaration of nuclear material accountancy including accountancy record and supporting source document. BAPETEN should evaluate and send Facility report (ICR, PIL and

  18. Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. Integration is approached by coordinating all safeguards information through a safeguards coordination center. This center represents a higher level in a communication, data-processing, and decision-making structure which is needed for efficient real-time operation of the integrated system. The safeguards coordination center functions to assess alarm and warning data required to resolve threats in the safeguards system, coordinate information and interaction involving the material accounting, physical protection, and facility monitoring and control systems, and present a single unified interface for interaction with facility management, facility operations, safeguards system personnel, and response forces

  19. Project planning at the Hanford Site for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards of excess fissile material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, B.W. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); McRae, L.P. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States); Walker, A.C. [USDOE Richland Operation Office, Richland, WA (United States)

    1995-06-01

    In his September 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton proposed several initiatives to promote nuclear nonproliferation. One element is of these initiatives was that the United States offered to place excess fissile material under International Atomic Energy Agency @A) safeguards. Three Department of Energy (DOE) facilities were identified as part of a phased approach for initial implementation. This paper describes the planning process used to provide information to assist the DOE in making decisions for the initial offer, outlines tasks to be performed, and develops a budget request. The process consisted of: (1) Characterizing the Hanford Site from the perspective of IAEA safeguards; (2) identify key issues to be resolved; (3) developing budget estimates and schedules; (4) interfacing with other DOE components and the IAEA to clarify expected activities; and (5) initiating additional data collection and preparatory activities to reduce planning uncertainties.

  20. Project planning at the Hanford Site for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards of excess fissile material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In his September 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton proposed several initiatives to promote nuclear nonproliferation. One element is of these initiatives was that the United States offered to place excess fissile material under International Atomic Energy Agency at sign A) safeguards. Three Department of Energy (DOE) facilities were identified as part of a phased approach for initial implementation. This paper describes the planning process used to provide information to assist the DOE in making decisions for the initial offer, outlines tasks to be performed, and develops a budget request. The process consisted of: (1) Characterizing the Hanford Site from the perspective of IAEA safeguards; (2) identify key issues to be resolved; (3) developing budget estimates and schedules; (4) interfacing with other DOE components and the IAEA to clarify expected activities; and (5) initiating additional data collection and preparatory activities to reduce planning uncertainties

  1. A study on the national safeguards system -Current status and suggested development-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In Korea, 17 nuclear facilities are currently under IAEA's safeguards and it is expected that more than 25 nuclear facilities will be under IAEA's safeguards in the year 2000 according to nuclear R and D and industry expansion. In connection with unlimited extension of NPT in 1995 and IAEA's measures to strengthen the safeguards like 'Programme 93+2', the international non-proliferation regime will be strengthened more and nuclear advanced countries will require the transparency and credibility of nuclear activities in recipient countries instead of transferring advanced nuclear technologies and nuclear material. In 1995, the Korean government had revised the Atomic Energy Law to control increasing nuclear facilities and nuclear material effectively and to establish international transparency and credibility. In the revised Atomic Energy Law, it is provided that the national inspection, other than IAEA inspection, will be started from 1996. Currently, necessary arrangements for national inspection are being prepared by MOST and TCNC at KAERI. However, the safeguards system in Korea is still beginning stage, Korea's safeguards activity was passive and fragmentary that leads non-attainment of safeguards goal in many facilities. The reasons were; absence of systematic safeguards system (SSAC); lack of understanding safeguards concepts; lack of manpower, designated organization for safeguards, etc. As Korea ranked world top 10 nuclear power generation country and has a plan to be a nuclear advanced country, Korea should have appropriate safeguards system and should not spare necessary assistance to that system. 14 tabs., 15 figs., 29 refs. (Author)

  2. Expert system characteristics and potential applications in safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The general growth of expert, knowledge-based (KB) or rule based systems will significantly increase in the next three to five years. Improvements in computer hardware (speed, reduced size, power) and software (rule based, data based, user interfaces) in recent years are providing the foundations for the growth of expert systems. A byproduct of this growth will undoubtedly be the application of expert systems to various safeguards problems. Characteristics of these expert systems will involve 1) multiple rules governing an outcome, 2) confidence factors on individual variables and rule sets, 3) priority, cost, and risk based rule sets, and 4) the reasoning behind the advice or decision given by the expert system. This paper presents characteristics, structures, and examples of simple rule based systems. Potential application areas for these expert systems may include training, operations, management, designs, evaluations, and specific hardware operation

  3. Lifecycle Management of Safeguards Equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In recent years, traditional procurement procedures for safeguards equipment have experienced major setbacks that have led to costly and time-consuming re-design and re-evaluation periods, as well as delays in the delivery and deployment of urgently needed equipment. A common element of all encountered problems is the rapid development of technical components. The accelerated pace of 69 safeguards systems development, when coupled with the absence of a disciplined lifecycle approach to design and development, leads to early technical obsolescence as well as the inability to support a safeguards system over its operational lifecycle. This condition is further aggravated by safeguards equipment suppliers who wrestle with economies of scale associated with a unique safeguards market that generally does not provide sufficient margins to stay in business. As a result, international agencies charged with safeguards responsibilities find it difficult to secure the supply of identical safeguards equipment over periods of ten or more years. However, all these problems are merely symptoms of the lack of an integrated lifecycle management approach with early involvement of all parties: vendors and their suppliers, national laboratories and contracted developers, national support programs, and international agencies with nonproliferation responsibilities. The following paper will describe the unique constellation of players within the safeguards community, and why this constellation is a cause of most of the problems inherent in traditional procurement procedures. Further, it will offer a comprehensive lifecycle management approach that will ensure the availability of identical safeguards equipment over its required lifespan (ten to fifteen years). It should be noted that an integrated lifecycle management approach will be difficult to implement and will require a fundamental re-orientation of efforts in: need identification, system design and development, funding, and

  4. Development of a safeguards database

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1. Introduction to Database. An effort has been made to computerize the information regarding safeguards inspections conducted at our facilities, the IAEA inspectors designated for Pakistan, material inventory at our safeguarded facilities and our safeguards agreements with the Agency. The information on these components such as searching of inspectors of a particular nationality ever designated to Pakistan, the material inventory of a certain kind of nuclear material present at any of the safeguarded facility, or the information on the type of safeguards agreement covering any facility can be easily traced using the database that provides flexible search options. The Relational Database Management System ACCESS has been used for the development of the database. All the information is managed from a single database file. Within the file, the Safeguards data is divided into separate tables, one for each type of information. Relationships are defined between the tables to bring the data from multiple tables together in a query, form, or report. Various forms have been created to edit/add data indirectly to the tables. To find and retrieve the data that is frequently required, including data from multiple tables, various queries have been made. Reports have been created using these queries, to present data in a certain format. In order to create application to navigate around the Safeguards Database, the Switchboard Manager has been used that automatically creates switchboard Forms that helps to navigate around the database. The switchboard Form has buttons that can be clicked to open various forms and reports or open other switchboards that can further open additional forms and reports. The Safeguards Database also employs various macros and event procedures to automate common tasks. In order to secure the Safeguards database, the simplest method that is to set a password for opening the Database has been used. 2. Components of Safeguards Database (DB). There are

  5. Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

  6. Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

    1979-02-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use.

  7. The changing nature of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Statute of the IAEA permits the implementation of safeguards tailored to differing security demands of States parties to non-proliferation and nuclear arms control treaties. The agreements concluded in response to these demands foresee the continuous development of safeguards verification. The safeguards system was first implemented in the 1960s to provide exporters of specified nuclear material, technology and facilities assurances that these were used for peaceful purposes only. With the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty), and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT). the overall objective of IAEA safeguards took a major step forward as non-nuclear weapon State parties undertook to accept comprehensive safeguards on all nuclear material within their territory, under their jurisdiction or control, for the purpose of verifying that such material is used only for peaceful purposes. The system of comprehensive safeguards, following the structural content of the NPT Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153(Corr.)), has developed continuously with the accumulation of experience and the introduction of new technology and methods. This system, based on material accountancy, has proved reliable in providing assurances about the peaceful use of declared nuclear material and declared facilities (i.e. that States' declarations are correct). However, while the scope of the NPT agreement is not limited to declared material and facilities (the Agency has the basic right and obligation to apply safeguards to all nuclear material and activities of a State). the safeguards system developed through the early 1990s had limited capability to deal with the completeness of States' nuclear material declarations. The discoveries in Iraq of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in the early 1990s emphasized the increasing importance of assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material

  8. Safeguard system of IPEN-CNEN/Sao Paulo - Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The history, requirements, organization, and operation of the State System of Accounting and Control from the institute for Energetic and Nuclear Research (IPEN-CNEN/SP) are described. The implementation system at the institution take into consideration the national and international safeguards requirements. It has started by the nuclear material (U, Pu and Th) physical inventory taking, including their provenance and transformation. The earlier computerized accounting system used for control has been replaced by a new one developed by the National Authority (CNEN/SESAL). The optimized system has more flexibility, giving a more effective answer to any occurred change on Material Balance Area. The actual system make use of an effective methodology. (author)

  9. Safeguards and security considerations for automated and robotic systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Within the reconfigured Nuclear Weapons Complex there will be a large number of automated and robotic (A ampersand R) systems because of the many benefits derived from their use. To meet the overall security requirements of a facility, consideration must be given to those systems that handle and process nuclear material. Since automation and robotics is a relatively new technology, not widely applied to the Nuclear Weapons Complex, safeguards and security (S ampersand S) issues related to these systems have not been extensively explored, and no guidance presently exists. The goal of this effort is to help integrate S ampersand S into the design of future A ampersand R systems. Towards this, the authors first examined existing A and R systems from a security perspective to identify areas of concern and possible solutions of these problems. They then were able to develop generalized S ampersand S guidance and design considerations for automation and robotics

  10. Agreement of 20 September 1988 between the People's Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of China to accept IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in peaceful nuclear facilities to be designated by China within its territory with a view to enabling the Agency to verify that such material is not withdrawn, except as provided for in this Agreement, from those facilities while such material is subject to safeguards under this Agreement. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  11. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  12. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  13. The evolution of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

  14. A remote verification system for international safeguards: Status of the RECOVER programme in the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The paper describes the current status of the Remote Continual Verification (RECOVER) programme being conducted in the Agency. The programme which started in 1979 with support from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has, as participants, several other Member States besides the U.S.A., namely Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom, the aim being to demonstrate a new system designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. The paper briefly explains the RECOVER concept and the functions of the various components of the system such as the Monitoring Unit (MU), On-Site Multiplexer (OSM) and the Resident Verification Unit (RVU). Results obtained since the installation of the RVU at IAEA Headquarters at the beginning of 1980 are outlined. The feasibility of secure transmission data via public telephone lines was demonstrated. In the initial design these data were supposed to be status-data of containment/surveillance devices such as cameras, seals, CCTV. A later modification permitted the transmission of alpha-numerical texts such as certain inspection forms via RECOVER. With the progress of testing and demonstrating the RECOVER system it was felt necessary to evaluate the cost and benefits of implementing RECOVER for IAEA safeguards. A draft report prepared by the Brookhaven National Laboratory on this subject was the main topic of discussion at the last meeting of RECOVER participants held in June 1982. The paper concludes by identifying certain tasks that need to be successfully completed before RECOVER is ready for routine use by the Agency. (author)

  15. Some technological aspects of an evaluation and visualisation component for the safeguards integrated information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    According to Safeguards strengthening measures which include both Measures under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Measures under Model Additional Protocol, the Agency receives much more information than some years before. It seems reasonable to develop an integrated information system (IIS) because information evaluation and review are important parts of Safeguards assessments. An integrated information system can include the following components: information search, primary messages selection, evaluation of received information, data storage, visualisation and evaluation of State's nuclear programme (SNP) and elaboration of management decisions. Hereby, IIS is a human-computer system where all components listed above are implemented. Within the framework of SNP a human factor plays an important role. SNP has a number of special properties such as uniqueness, multi-dimensions, subjectivity of its state evaluation, time variation, incompleteness of its description and the mentioned above human factor. For realistic simulation of SNP development it is necessary to reduce usage of quantitative methods and apply methods which are closer to perception of the outward things by a human being. This task requires to convert all available information, both qualitative and quantitative, into a special format. The format requires methods which are being developed on the basis of pragmatic, visual and Zadeh's linguistic variables which define corresponding scales. A pragmatic scale is defined on a basic metric scale taking into account a particular pragmatic cut of SNP. In other words pragmatic scale maps a pragmatic cut of the problem which is important from the point of view of IIS goal. By using pragmatic scales it is possible, for example, to estimate the speed of development of processes existing within the framework of SNP. The visual variable allows to solve the following engineering tasks: input of the expert's evaluations in the system and interpretations of its

  16. Extensive cooperation in establishment and installation of safeguards system at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rokkasho reprocessing plant (RRP) has an operating throughput of 800tU/y and the construction had completed. In RRP, active commissioning test is being performed for final confirmation of the system and validation, and the commercial operation is scheduled in second half of 2007. The IAEA has been implementing international safeguards to reprocessing plants around the world for more than 30 years, and also Japan has applied the safeguards to Tokai Reprocessing Plant about almost 30 years experienced. However, it has never before been experienced with designing a credible safeguards approach for a large scale reprocessing plant. The safeguards discussion was initiated in 1988, but that time no available any model or guideline that could be used as a reference. Therefore, during the period of 1988 through 1992, a multinational forum, referred to as LASCAR (Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards) provided recommendations that how an effective safeguards approach could be implemented to the large scale plant with maintaining an efficient use of resources. In order for establishment and implement an effective, efficient and credible safeguards for RRP, IAEA, State and JNFL has studied and discussed the safeguards approach and safeguards system under extensive cooperation manner. This paper presents the following especially from the operator's viewpoint: - Overview of the safeguards system at RRP. - Joint use of equipment dedicated to the safeguards between IAEA and State. - Use of operator's equipment for the inspections. - Providing timely analytical results by Onsite Laboratory (OSL) with Automatic Sampling Authentication System. - Implementing Design Information Examination (DIE) and Design Information Verification (DIV) during construction stage

  17. Cyber Security Evaluation of the Wireless Communication for the Mobile Safeguard Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper introduces cyber security evaluation results and a design of the wireless communication technology to apply to safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. While wireless communication technologies can generally make mobility and efficiency on plant operation, those have seldom been installed on the nuclear I&C systems due to the negative concern of unexpected outcomes that stem from electromagnetic interference and cyber attack. New design of advanced digital safeguard and I&C systems uses computer-based systems for the safeguard and safety functions. On the other hand, those are being exposed to various types of new and existing cyber threats, vulnerabilities and risks which significantly increase the likelihood that those could be compromised. In order to employ the wireless communication technology in safeguard function, licencees assess and manage the potential for adverse effects on safeguard and safety functions so as to provide high assurance that critical functions are properly protected cyber attack. It is expected that the safeguard function, specifically on the area of real-time monitoring, logging, can be enhanced by employing the mobile safeguard devices (: smart phone, laptop, smart pad, etc). In this paper, we deal with the cyber security evaluation, which consists of threat analysis, vulnerability test, establishment of security plan, and design solutions for the wireless communication on the basis of IEEE 802.11(Wi-Fi) protocol. Proposed evaluation and design solution could be a basis for the design of wireless communication and mobile safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. (author)

  18. Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs

  19. Information analysis and international safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, K. W. (Kory W.); Tape, J. W. (James W.)

    2004-01-01

    After the first Gulf War, it was recognized that one of the key weaknesses of the international safeguards system was that there was no systematic attempt by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to analyze all available information about States nuclear programs to determine whether these programs were consistent with nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA, as part of its effort to redesign the international safeguards system, is looking closely at the issue of information review and evaluation. The application of information analysis (IA) techniques to the international nuclear safeguards system has the potential to revolutionize the form and practice of safeguards. Assessing the possibilities of IA for the IAEA, and in particular those embodied in concepts of information-driven safeguards, requires an understanding of IA, the limits on its effectiveness and the requirements placed on such analyses in a variety of safeguards contexts. The Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office (ASNO) and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) agreed in July 2002 to undertake a joint study of 'information-driven safeguards' under a long-standing cooperative arrangement. It was decided that a broad range of ideas should be considered, and that the study would not be intended to be and would not be an elaboration of either US or Australian governmental positions. This paper reports some findings of Phase 1 of this collaborative effort and offers some initial thinking on the part of the authors on the outstanding issues to be addressed in Phase 2. An effort to explore through case studies alternative strategies for utilizing IA by the IAEA that provide the same or increased confidence in safeguards conclusions while allowing safeguards resource allocation to be determined not only by the types and quantities of nuclear material and facilities in a State but also by other objective factors.

  20. Information analysis and international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    After the first Gulf War, it was recognized that one of the key weaknesses of the international safeguards system was that there was no systematic attempt by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to analyze all available information about States nuclear programs to determine whether these programs were consistent with nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA, as part of its effort to redesign the international safeguards system, is looking closely at the issue of information review and evaluation. The application of information analysis (IA) techniques to the international nuclear safeguards system has the potential to revolutionize the form and practice of safeguards. Assessing the possibilities of IA for the IAEA, and in particular those embodied in concepts of information-driven safeguards, requires an understanding of IA, the limits on its effectiveness and the requirements placed on such analyses in a variety of safeguards contexts. The Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office (ASNO) and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) agreed in July 2002 to undertake a joint study of 'information-driven safeguards' under a long-standing cooperative arrangement. It was decided that a broad range of ideas should be considered, and that the study would not be intended to be and would not be an elaboration of either US or Australian governmental positions. This paper reports some findings of Phase 1 of this collaborative effort and offers some initial thinking on the part of the authors on the outstanding issues to be addressed in Phase 2. An effort to explore through case studies alternative strategies for utilizing IA by the IAEA that provide the same or increased confidence in safeguards conclusions while allowing safeguards resource allocation to be determined not only by the types and quantities of nuclear material and facilities in a State but also by other objective factors.

  1. EMCAS, an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    EMCAS is an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems. It provides a score card of projected or actual system performance for several areas of system operation. In one area, the performance of material control and accounting and security systems, which jointly defend against the insider threat to divert or steal special nuclear material (SNM) using stealth and deceit, is evaluated. Time-dependent and time-independent risk equations are used for both diversion and theft risk calculations. In the case of loss detection by material accounting, a detailed timeliness model is provided to determine the combined effects of loss detection sensitivity and timeliness on the overall effectiveness of the material accounting detection procedure. Calculated risks take into account the capabilities of process area containment/surveillance, material accounting mass balance tests, and physical protection barriers and procedures. In addition, EMCAS evaluates the Material Control and Accounting (MCandA) System in the following areas: (1) system capability to detect errors in the official book inventory of SNM, using mass balance accounting methods, (2) system capability to prevent errors from entering the nuclear material data base during periods of operation between mass balance tests, (3) time to conduct inventories and resolve alarms, and (4) time lost from production to carry out material control and accounting loss detection activities

  2. EMCAS: An evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    EMCAS is an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems. It provides a score card of projected or actual system performance for several areas of system operation. In one area, the performance of material control and accounting and security systems, which jointly defend against the insider threat to divert or steal special nuclear material (SNM) using stealth and deceit, is evaluated. Time-dependent and time-independent risk equations are used for both diversion and theft risk calculations. In the case of loss detection by material accounting, a detailed timeliness model is provided to determine the combined effects of loss detection sensitivity and timeliness on the overall effectiveness of the material accounting detection procedure. Calculated risks take into account the capabilities of process area containment/surveillance, material accounting mass balance tests, and physical protection barriers and procedures. In addition, EMCAS evaluates the Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) System in the following areas: (1) system capability to detect errors in the official book inventory of SNM, using mass balance accounting methods, (2) system capability to prevent errors from entering the nuclear material data base during periods of operation between mass balance tests, (3) time to conduct inventories and resolve alarms, and (4) time lost from production to carry out material control and accounting loss detection activities. 3 figs., 5 tabs

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in China is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 31 December 1998. Pursuant to Article 10 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from China written notification that China's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 28 March 2002

  4. Legal frame work and implementation of the strengthened safeguards system in Indonesia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    operator's declaration of nuclear material accountancy including accountancy record and supporting source document. BAPETEN should evaluate and send the Facility's report (ICR, PIL and MBR) to the Agency. Additional Protocol to Safeguards agreement was signed and ratified on 29 September 1999, that means Indonesia committed to implement Strengthened Safeguards System. Indonesia has already participated in developing Strengthened Safeguards regimes by offering itself for trial of a number of new concepts before signing the protocol. Since 1995, Indonesia has reported its thorium import every year, which is known as the Voluntary Reporting Scheme. Indonesia also offered itself for trial of environmental sampling test, which are taken during special visits by IAEA inspectors and during routine inspection, up to the initial declaration submission of the Additional Protocol. IAEA has already conducted six times location for specific environmental sampling and twice wide area environmental sampling. The first year declaration was set to the IAEA six batch declaration submission, three batches of them are pursuant to article 2.a (ix) with respect to export of specified equipment and non nuclear material listed in annex D. It was a very easy task since we just sent a blank form with the statement 'Nothing to declare' on it. The second batch declaration pursuant to the additional protocol article 2.a (I), 2.a (iii), 2.a (iv), 2.a (v), 2.a (vi), 2.a (vii), 2.a (x), and 2.b (i) ran to about 22 pages of information in tabular form of which about half was dedicated to the information of buildings on nuclear sites. The second batch declaration submission was not easy to finish due to a lot of information to fill out. To get and collect this information we conducted several meetings with BATAN, and made a lot of phone calls for confirmation. The third batch declaration are pursuant to the additional protocol article 2.a (v), 2.a (vi) b and c, 2.a (viii), and 2.a (ix), to get source

  5. System aspects on safeguards for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This thesis has investigated system aspects of safeguarding the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. These aspects include the important notion of continuity of knowledge, the philosophy of verifying measurements and the need to consider the safeguards system as a whole when expanding it to include the encapsulation facility and the geological repository. The research has been analytical in method both in the identification of concrete challenges for the safeguards community in Paper 1, and in the diversion path analysis performed in Paper 2. This method of work is beneficial for example when abstract notions are treated. However, as a suggestion for further work along these lines, a formal systems analysis would be advantageous, and may even reveal properties of the safeguards system that the human mind so far has been to narrow to consider. A systems analysis could be used to model a proposed safeguards approach with the purpose of finding vulnerabilities in its detection probabilities. From the results, capabilities needed to overcome these vulnerabilities could be deduced, thereby formulating formal boundary conditions. These could include: The necessary partial defect level for the NDA measurement; The level of redundancy required in the C/S system to minimize the risk of inconclusive results due to equipment failure; and, Requirements on the capabilities of seismic methods, etc. The field of vulnerability assessment as a tool for systems analysis should be of interest for the safeguards community, as a formal approach could give a new dimension to the credibility of safeguards systems

  6. System aspects on safeguards for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fritzell, Anni (Dept. of Physics and Astronomy, Uppsala Univ., Uppsala (Sweden))

    2008-03-15

    This thesis has investigated system aspects of safeguarding the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. These aspects include the important notion of continuity of knowledge, the philosophy of verifying measurements and the need to consider the safeguards system as a whole when expanding it to include the encapsulation facility and the geological repository. The research has been analytical in method both in the identification of concrete challenges for the safeguards community in Paper 1, and in the diversion path analysis performed in Paper 2. This method of work is beneficial for example when abstract notions are treated. However, as a suggestion for further work along these lines, a formal systems analysis would be advantageous, and may even reveal properties of the safeguards system that the human mind so far has been to narrow to consider. A systems analysis could be used to model a proposed safeguards approach with the purpose of finding vulnerabilities in its detection probabilities. From the results, capabilities needed to overcome these vulnerabilities could be deduced, thereby formulating formal boundary conditions. These could include: The necessary partial defect level for the NDA measurement; The level of redundancy required in the C/S system to minimize the risk of inconclusive results due to equipment failure; and, Requirements on the capabilities of seismic methods, etc. The field of vulnerability assessment as a tool for systems analysis should be of interest for the safeguards community, as a formal approach could give a new dimension to the credibility of safeguards systems

  7. The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  8. IAEA preparations for the year 2000 compliance of safeguards equipment systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Department of Safeguards, IAEA, has used equipment systems for acquiring relevant data to support safeguards evaluation and verification activities. Typically an equipment system consists of EPROM (embedded system), a connecting personal computer with instrument software for data acquisition, and may include data evaluation software. Complementing the equipment systems is a collection of general evaluation software systems (application software) which support the analysis of the acquired data. In preparing for the year 2000 compliance of all safeguards systems, SGTS (Safeguards Division of Technical Services) in IAEA, must ascertain the equipment systems and the evaluation software authorised for inspection use can properly operate through the passage of year 2000. We present the year 2000 challenge for these systems, the approach we use to tackle the problem, and the status of our year 2000 project. (author)

  9. Brazil and the strengthening of safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency: from the four-part agreement to the additional protocol; O Brasil e o fortalecimento do sistema de salvaguardas da Agencia Internacional de Energia Atomica: do acordo quadripartite ao protocolo adicional

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moura, Carmen Lidia Richter Ribeiro

    2001-07-01

    The main objective of this paper is to analyse the evolution of IAEA verification system, that constitutes one of the main fundaments of the Non-proliferation nuclear weapons regimen, and to point out elements that contribute to inform the Brazilian position related to the Model Protocol additional to agreements for safeguard application: instrument that comprehend the most recent multilateral efforts of the nuclear verification

  10. Anomaly detection in an automated safeguards system using neural networks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An automated safeguards system must be able to detect an anomalous event, identify the nature of the event, and recommend a corrective action. Neural networks represent a new way of thinking about basic computational mechanisms for intelligent information processing. In this paper, we discuss the issues involved in applying a neural network model to the first step of this process: anomaly detection in materials accounting systems. We extend our previous model to a 3-tank problem and compare different neural network architectures and algorithms. We evaluate the computational difficulties in training neural networks and explore how certain design principles affect the problems. The issues involved in building a neural network architecture include how the information flows, how the network is trained, how the neurons in a network are connected, how the neurons process information, and how the connections between neurons are modified. Our approach is based on the demonstrated ability of neural networks to model complex, nonlinear, real-time processes. By modeling the normal behavior of the processes, we can predict how a system should be behaving and, therefore, detect when an abnormality occurs

  11. Virtual Reality based System for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    OpenAIRE

    Goncalves, Joao; MOLTO CARACENA Teofilo; SEQUEIRA Vitor; Vendrell Vidal, Eduardo

    2010-01-01

    Many Nuclear Safeguards applications can benefit from interactive design and simulation tools to be used by planners and inspectors at headquarters. Virtual Reality technologies provide the capability to create accurate, realistic and immersive environments, as well as create ¿objects¿ ¿ representing equipment, measurement devices and radiation sources, with specific properties and behaviours. To be adapted to Safeguards, applications need to reflect the equipment, functions (including the la...

  12. Openness, transparency, and enhanced safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Much confusion exists regarding the use of the terms openness and transparency in the context of improved International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). While the two are often used interchangeably, they are quite different aspects of the overall NPT safeguards approach. To clarify the terms, Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) describes transparency as a glass house with an interior that can be viewed from a distance, and openness is a brick house that one can enter. While this analogy is helpful, it is not entirely satisfactory. Transparency is not a synonym for openness; it is a function or a result of openness. There can be no transparency without openness first, thus the issue of improved openness should be a prime consideration in ongoing international efforts to strengthen the current NPT safeguards system. The safeguards system administered by the IAEA pursuant to the NPT works because the treaty's signatories have a common commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and have agreed to common guidelines to verify compliance with this commitment. Nevertheless, a need to improve existing safeguards was expressed at the 1990 NPT Review Conference. This perceived weakness in the NPT safeguards system may be rooted in the lack of a common definition among Member States as to what constitutes openness. In this context, the issue of openness could have ramification not only for the effectiveness of the international community's nuclear nonproliferation efforts but also for the activities of the IAEA in terms of the resources required for the effective administration of the current NPT safeguards system. Some adjustment of the IAEA's NPT safeguards activities should occur in the form of a redirection of current efforts, an augmentation of current resources, or both

  13. An improved safeguards system and its application to large backend facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The evaluation criteria, which are commonly applicable to both Material Accountancy (MA) and Containment and Surveillance (C/S) and applicable to a large backend facilities, are discussed. It is analyzed that substantial increase of the proliferation resistance can be expected by improving the presently existing safeguards systems. The improved safeguards system described in this paper is expected to be applicable to large-scaled backend facilities without giving unnecessary economical and technical burdens. The main purpose of this approach is to move away from the present trend of too much reliance on MA and to develop the synthetical safeguards effects by harmonizing C/S and continuing MA effectively

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

  15. The Text of an Agreement between the Agency and Spain Relating to the Application of Safeguards to a Quantity of Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of an agreement between the Agency and Spain relating to the application of safeguards to a quantity of enriched uranium is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The agreement entered into force on 18 June 1975, pursuant to Section 24.

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Nepal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Nepal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  19. Communication dated 3 October 2008 received from the Resident Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency concerning the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Director General has received a communication dated 3 October 2008 from the Resident Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2007. As requested therein, the communication is herewith circulated for information

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  1. The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Denmark and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Denmark and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  3. The Text of the Agreement between Mongolia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mongolia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  4. The Text of the Agreement between Norway and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Norway and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  5. The Text of the Agreement between Cyprus and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Cyprus and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  6. The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  7. The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  8. The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  9. The Text of the Agreement of 2 March 1977 between the Agency and Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of Uranium Concentrate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 2 March 1977 between the Agency and Pakistan for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of uranium concentrate from Niger is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force pursuant to Article 24, on 2 March 1977.

  10. Agreement of 13 December 1991 between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 7 December 1991 and signed in Vienna on 13 December 1991

  11. Communication dated 19 January 2009 received from the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the Agency regarding ratification by the United States of the Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement with the Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agency has received a communication dated 19 January 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the Agency regarding ratification by the United States of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America. As requested therein, the communication is herewith circulated for information

  12. IAEA development programme for a strengthened and more cost effective safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA is evaluating a number of measures and recommendations for improving the cost effectiveness of its safeguards system. The measures under evaluation, through a two-year development programme known as 'Programme 93 + 2', were recommended by the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI). SAGSI is comprised of experts appointed in consultation with governments to advise the Director General on effectiveness and efficiency in the safeguards system. The IAEA programme is designed to further assess, develop and test SAGSI's recommendations and related measures, including evaluations of their technical, legal and financial implications. Six specific areas are being evaluated: cost analysis of present safeguards implementation; assessment of potential cost saving measures; environmental monitoring techniques for safeguards application; increased co-operation with State Systems of Accounting and Control (SSACs) of nuclear material and other measures for improving the cost effectiveness of safeguards; improved analysis of information on a State's nuclear activities; and enhanced safeguards training. The results from these evaluations will be integrated into proposals for more effective and efficient safeguards that are expected to be made to the IAEA Board of Governors in early 1995. An integral part of the programme is the active participation of a number of countries in technical areas, including environmental monitoring field trials. Countries that have offered assistance include Argentina, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Sweden. Overall, the programme builds upon actions already taken to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system. These include Board decisions in late 1991 and early 1992 regarding the early provision and use of design information, and a voluntary reporting scheme on imports and exports of nuclear material, as well as exports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material. (author)

  13. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In accordance with Protocol Number II to the Agreement of 29 February 1972 between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this Agreement has been replaced by the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency, which entered into force on 21 February 1977

  14. Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities of Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to all Nuclear Material in all Peaceful Nuclear Activities of Ukraine is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 28 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 13 January 1995

  15. Technical support organization efforts in support of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Technical Support Organization (TSO) of the Brookhaven National Laboratory has been carrying out tasks in support of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards since 1968, when TSO was founded. These tasks have been funded by both the Department of Energy Office of Safeguards and Security and by the United States Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS). These tasks have included a variety of systems studies (e.g. the zone approach to IAEA safeguards, the Safeguards Effectiveness Assessment Methodology, and international safeguards for uranium enrichment plants), development of instruments (e.g., the automated electromanometer and the load-cell-based weighing system for UF6 cylinders), preparation of guidance documents, training of inspectors, and the development and evaluation of safeguards seals. This paper reviews some of the highlights from this program of support

  16. Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Ukraine to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1995, signed in Vienna on 21 September 1995, and entered into force on 22 January 1998

  17. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  18. The text of the agreement of 1 July 1986 between Albania and the Agency for the application of safeguards to all nuclear activities of Albania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 1 July 1986 between the People's Socialist Republic of Albania and the Agency for the application of safeguards to all nuclear activities of Albania. It contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Albania to accept safeguards on all nuclear material or facilities within its territory, or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere for the purpose of verifying that such material is not used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement entered into force on 25 March 1988

  19. International acceptability of advanced safeguarding techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    There are active development programs now under way to significantly enhance the effectiveness of international safeguarding. Advanced safeguarding techniques now under development include new material accounting methods utilizing nondestructive assay techniques, more reliable surveillance instrumentation, tamper-resistant and tamper-indicating seals, new means of utilizing continuous human inspection, and systems that incorporate both passive and active use-denial technologies. Before these new safeguarding techniques are utilized, however, they must be acceptable to the international community. This will unquestionably result in a compromise between what is technically feasible and what is politically acceptable. This report highlights many of the elements common to advanced safeguarding techniques that impact directly upon international acceptability. The concept of acceptability is viewed from the perspective of three different groups: (1) those States seeking upgraded safeguards, (2) those States having safeguards imposed upon them, and (3) the International Atomic Energy Agency. In general, a more conducive climate exists today for the acceptance of advanced safeguarding techniques than at any period in the past; but the differences between advanced safeguards and those safeguards being employed today are so large that considerable opposition to their implementation can be expected

  20. Enhanced safeguards training

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The transition to a strengthened safeguards system engendered new skill demands for the International Atomic Energy Agency Inspectorate and information requirements for State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSAC). In response to these demands, the Section for Safeguards Training (TTR) developed courses to ensure that inspectors have the capability to better detect undeclared nuclear activities in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements, to better detect the misuse of declared nuclear facilities and installations, and to more efficiently and effectively manage the inspection process that allows such detection. The resulting extended training curriculum for inspectors and the activities undertaken to convey relevant information to SSAC's personnel placed even a greater emphasis on a modernisation of the techniques used to impart knowledge and skills to the trainees and on the implementation of a systematic approach to training methodology. This methodology reflects a logical progression from the identification of the new competencies required under the strengthened safeguards regime to the development and implementation of training to achieve these competencies, and to the subsequent evaluation of how effective the training has been. This paper addresses the resulting expanded training curriculum and enhanced training approach implemented by TTR. (author)

  1. The nuclear materials control system: Safeguards - circa 1957

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the late 1950s, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation undertook a nuclear materials control study for the Division of International Affairs of the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The objective of the study was to develop a Nuclear Materials Control System (NMCS) that could be used under the US bilateral agreements or by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Phase I was a system study to determine the requirements for an NMCS for an assumed nuclear fuel complex. This paper summarizes aspects of Phase I studies addressing facility types, measurement points, and instrumentation needs and Phase II studies covering chemistry/chemical engineering, nuclear, special devices, and security devices and techniques. 1 fig

  2. Thesis on safeguards gains doctorate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: One of the most complete analyses yet to be made outside the Agency of its Safeguards system for preventing diversion of materials to military purposes has gained for its author a Doctorate of Philosophy. The subject was chosen as a thesis by Miss Gabrielle Martino, daughter of His Excellency Mr. Enrico Martino, Italian Ambassador to Austria and Resident Representative to IAEA. Miss Martino has been studying in the Faculty of Political Science at Rome University. Her thesis, which runs to 110 pages, traces the history of safeguards and the stages in evolution to the system adopted by the General Conference at its 1965 Session held in Tokyo. (author)

  3. Challenging curriculum. Training the IAEA international safeguards inspectorate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Each year, the IAEA recruits a group of highly qualified specialists to join its experienced international team of safeguards inspectors. Their work will take them to nuclear facilities around the world, to utilize instrumentation and gather information for verifying national pledges that nuclear activities and materials under IAEA safeguards are exclusively used for peaceful purposes, and in those States which have signed a protocol in addition to their safeguards agreement, they will provide assurances that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials. Under more than 220 safeguards agreements with 139 States, the IAEA has served as the world's nuclear safeguards inspectorate for the past four decades. The Agency carries out verification activities at more than 900 facilities worldwide, conducting about 2200 inspections a year. Before the new inspectors take to the field, however, they enter the classroom - participating in an extensive series of IAEA training courses, workshops, and seminars. The courses comprehensively cover the nuclear fuel cycle, the IAEA's safeguards role and responsibilities, and the skills and competence that safeguards inspectors need to do their jobs effectively and efficiently. Once on the job, training reinforces the evolving safeguards mission. Under the Agency's 'enhanced' safeguards training curriculum, experienced inspectors participate in seminars and courses designed to upgrade their skills and keep them fully informed of safeguards developments with respect to, for example, legal responsibilities, technological capabilities, and inspection procedures. The enhanced curriculum was developed in response to the IAEA's increasing safeguards responsibilities. The system has been strengthened in many ways since 1991, particularly for detecting any undeclared nuclear material and activities that should have been declared by a State under its safeguards agreement. This article presents an overview of the IAEA's safeguards

  4. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

  5. Experience on the application of safeguards systems to Italian nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The safeguards systems applied in Italy to the various fuel-cycle phases, including nuclear power stations, are presented in this paper in view of the present situation resulting from the Rome Treaty obligations and from the obligations to be defined in relation to the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by Italy. This short survey concerns not only the systems usually applied, but also the research and development aspects of new systems that facilitate the attainment of the aims specified in the Treaties. Moreover, this paper illustrates the philosophy of nuclear material physical security, aiming at supplementing the efficiency of the safeguards systems. (author)

  6. Project plan international atomic energy agency (IAEA) safeguards project plutonium finishing plant; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This plan presents the overall objectives, description, justification and planning for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) project. The intent of this plan is to describe how this project will be managed and integrated with other facility stabilization and deactivation activities. This plan supplements the overall integrated plan presented in the PFP Integrated Project Management Plan (PMP), HNF-3617,Rev. 0. This project plan is the top-level definitive project management document for the PFP IAEA project. It specifies the technical, schedule, requirements and the cost baselines to manage the execution of the IAEA project. Any deviations to the document must be authorized through the appropriate change control process

  7. The Text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 between Ethiopia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 and of the Protocol thereto between Ethiopia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 December 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  8. The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

  10. The Text of the Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mauritius and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 31 January 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Fiji and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Fiji and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 22 March 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Lesotho and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 12 June 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  13. The Text of the Agreement between Austria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Austria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document

  14. The Text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977 between Singapore and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Singapore and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  15. American national standard generic requirements for auditing nuclear materials safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This standard establishes criteria for conducting all types of audits, whether limited or broad in scope, of nuclear materials safeguard as systems and subsystems that include fuel-cycle facilities for mining, milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactors, scrap recovery, spent-fuel storage, chemical reprocessing, waste disposal, transportation, storage, research, and all other activities involving nuclear material. The objective of these audits shall be to assess and report on the compliance of the safeguards systems and subsystems with the requirements established for that system. Reporting shall be based upon an audit made in accordance with auditing criteria as here-in expressed

  16. A video imaging system and related control hardware for nuclear safeguards surveillance applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A novel video surveillance system has been developed for safeguards applications in nuclear installations. The hardware was tested at a small experimental enrichment facility located at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories. The system uses digital video techniques to store, encode and transmit still television pictures over the public telephone network to a receiver located in the Australian Safeguards Office at Kings Cross, Sydney. A decoded, reconstructed picture is then obtained using a second video frame store. A computer-controlled video cassette recorder is used automatically to archive the surveillance pictures. The design of the surveillance system is described with examples of its operation

  17. IAEA preparations for the year 2000 compliance of safeguards information systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The year-2000 (Y2K) problem affects both information systems and equipment systems. This paper describes the work which has been done, and is currently underway, to make the information systems of the Department of Safeguards year-2000 compliant. (author)

  18. The text of the Agreement of 14 July 1980 between Indonesia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The full text of the agreement between Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  19. The Text of the Agreement between the German Democratic Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the German Democratic Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  20. The text of the Agreement of 22 September 1982 between Chile and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of nuclear material from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The full text of the agreement of 22 September 1982 between Chile and the Agency for the application of safeguards to nuclear material supplied from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is presented

  1. The text of the Agreement of 8 July 1980 between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The full text of the agreement between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  2. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  3. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between France, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between France, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in France is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 16 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 30 April 2004, the date on which the Agency received written notification that the European Atomic Energy Community and France had met their respective internal requirements for entry into force

  5. Spain accepts safeguards controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spain became the 26th country to accept safeguards controls by the Agency in December. An agreement was signed in Vienna, transferring to IAEA the administration of safeguards against diversion of materials and installations to military purposes provided for under a nuclear co-operation agreement concluded between Spain and USA in 1957

  6. Safeguard sleuths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

  7. Determination of plutonium in highly radioactive liquid waste by spectrophotometry using neodymium as an internal standard for safeguards analysis. Japan support program for agency safeguards (JASPAS) JC-19

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A spectrophotometric determination using neodymium as an internal standard was developed for safeguards verification analysis of plutonium in highly radioactive liquid waste which is produced by the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The internal standard is used as a means to analyze plutonium and also to authenticate the instrument conditions. The method offers reduced sample preparation and analysis time compared to isotope dilution mass spectrometry. The sample was mixed with a known amount of internal standard. Subsequently, plutonium was quantitatively oxidized to Pu(VI) by the addition of Ce(IV) for spectrophotometry. Plutonium concentration was calculated from a relation between Nd(III)/Pu(VI) molar extinction coefficient ratio and their absorbance ratio. The relative expanded uncertainty of the repeated analysis (n=5) was 8.9% (coverage factor k=2) for a highly radioactive liquid waste sample (173 mg L-1). The determination limit was 6 mg L-1 (ten fold's the standard deviation). This method was validated through comparison experiments with isotope dilution mass spectrometry. The analytical results of plutonium in highly radioactive liquid waste using this method were agree well with values obtained using isotope dilution mass spectrometry. The proposed method can be applied to independent on-site safeguards analysis at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant. (author)

  8. Reactor safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Russell, Charles R

    2013-01-01

    Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

  9. Towards unified performance measures for evaluating nuclear safeguard systems: mathematical foundations and formal comparison of existing models

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An important step in the analysis of large-scale systems is the development of economical and meaningful measures of system performance. In the literature on analysis of nuclear safeguard systems, many performance measures have been advanced, but their interrelationships and their relevance to overall system objectives have not received attention commensurate with the effort spent in developing detailed safeguard models. The work reported here is an attempt to improve the development and evaluation of performance measures for nuclear safeguard systems. This work falls into three main areas. First, we develop a new framework which provides an initial basis for defining and structuring performance measures. To demonstrate that this framework allows a clear understanding of the purposes of nuclear safeguard systems, we employ it to state various safeguard questions clearly and concisely. The framework reflects the rough subsystem structure of safeguard systems - the detection and response subsystems - and formally accommodates various safeguard models. We especially emphasize two of these models which are under development at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, the structured assessment approach (SAA) and the systems vulnerability assessment method (SVAM). Second, we examine some performance measures presently used in the nuclear safeguards area and in reliability theory in general. Some of these we accept and modify to obtain system performance measures that are an additive combination of subsystem performance measures, a very convenient form indeed. Others we reject as impractical and meaningless. Finally, we determine some common features between the SAA and SVAM models by formally comparing these models in our framework

  10. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  11. 18 CFR 3b.204 - Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... information in manual and computer-based record systems. 3b.204 Section 3b.204 Conservation of Power and Water... Collection of Records § 3b.204 Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems. (a) The administrative and physical controls to protect the information in the manual and computer-based record...

  12. Safeguards symposium. Overviews of the 2001 IAEA symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA Safeguards Symposia are held at four-year intervals; this was the ninth such Symposium. Activities of the Agency's Department of Safeguards are sufficiently coherent that it is practical to gather representatives of the international non-proliferation community to examine the current situation and prospects for the future. They are carried out in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA). Safeguards implementation continues every day, with new requirements arising from developments in peaceful applications of nuclear energy and new safeguards practices arising from technology innovation. Four years ago, the Safeguards Symposium came at a time when the IAEA system was being strengthened by adoption of the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC /540/(Corr.)), but no Additional Protocols had been signed. Over the past four years, the full extent of the 'Strengthened Safeguards System' began to take shape. Although the rate at which the Protocols are being signed and further has served to force compromises in the quality of the safeguards system, and to demand working expectations beyond prudent limits. The Symposium programme was developed with three basic threads proceeding in parallel: policy and major political considerations; safeguards technology development and experience; and experience in the implementation of IAEA safeguards, including activities carried out by States and those carried out by IAEA inspectors. In addition, for the first time, separate sessions were organized on physical protection and illicit trafficking, and on future Agency verification roles in relation to nuclear disarmament. Also, for the first time, commercial manufacturers of related equipment were invited to exhibit their products. In all, 179 papers were accepted and presented at the Symposium: 119 oral presentations were given and 60 were presented as posters. Within days of the

  13. Use of Equipment Information System (EQUIS) to determine priority for purchasing safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    To manage its large world-wide inventory of safeguards equipment, the IAEA Safeguards department uses a computerized Equipment Information System (EQUIS). EQUIS data have been analyzed using Queueing Theory to determine if inventory is adequate to meet inspector demands and in those cases where it is inadequate, to indicate how many additional units should be procured. Results are tabulated for various types of non-destructive analysis (NDA) equipment. For equipment where there is a high turnover and hence a large amount of data, the analysis provides a powerful tool for assisting procurement decisions

  14. Deriving, Communicating and Applying Safeguards Conclusions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safeguards are arrangements for verifying that states are in compliance with international agreements or undertakings relating to the peaceful use of nuclear materials. The IAEA has operated a system of comprehensive safeguards agreements with non-nuclearweapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for over forty years. This system has evolved over time in recognition that a progressively broader approach to verification is required to substantiate the IAEA's conclusions. Current policy debates on the further evolution of safeguards implementation primarily relate to the development of the IAEA's 'state level concept' for safeguards, and the resolution of compliance or performance issues in several countries. Safeguards experts acknowledge that the identification and clarification of principles for determining safeguards priorities and for deriving safeguards conclusions will be a crucial step in strengthening the non-proliferation regime. This paper recommends the development of a procedure by which the IAEA Secretariat would issue standardized notices to the Board of Governors in situations where anomalies in safeguards implementation remain unresolved for a prescribed period of time. These 'Automatic Notices' are designed to assist the Secretariat with the structured communication of technical information about state compliance. The procedure would enhance the transparency of the operation of the IAEA, the credibility of the verification assurance, and the timeliness of identification of potential non-compliance. It also provides states, whether acting through the Agency's Board of Governors or otherwise, with opportunities to craft effective solutions to potential proliferation crises. Furthermore, the existence and number of these 'Automatic Notices' would provide one transparent and objective basis for differentiating between states in future allocation of safeguards

  15. International safeguards data management system. System description: Version 1.1.; Release PLI 82

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This document describes a nuclear material accountancy system which has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. Throughout the report, the data base system is referred to as ''ISADAM'', i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System. The system provides tools for a safeguards authority to decide whether an operators MUF (Material Unaccounted For) can be accounted for as an accumulation of operator measurement errors. The principle objective of the applications programs described here is to provide a variance analysis of MUF in which the variance of MUF is computed as a function of the accounting declarations and the error characteristics of the operator measurement system. A overview of ISADAM is presented; then, a detailed description of the processing applied by the system is given. A description of the parameter information required by the four autonomous programs ISADAM is presented. In developing ISADAM, one of the prime factors taken into consideration was the ease with which it could be used

  16. Safeguards evolution towards unattended c/s (containment and surveillance) systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper shows the development and evolution of safeguards towards the use of different containment and surveillance (C/S) systems, which involve the possibility of working unattended. They are designed to transmit safeguards relevant data remotely. It is believed that they would increase safeguards efficiency while maintaining or even enhancing their effectiveness. At present, unattended C/S systems with or without remote transmission are in place at several installations. In addition, some other possible applications are being tested. One of these is the Remote Monitoring Systems (RMS) field trial at Embalse nuclear power plant to cover the transfers of spent fuel from the ponds to the dry storage. Some of the matters to be addressed are of general nature (i.e. applicable to any unattended/remote system) while others depend on the specific application in a nuclear installation. Among others, the following are particularly important: -) Sharing of data with the SSAC; -) Impact of a failure of the RMS on the operator, IAEA and the SSAC; -) Provision of relevant operational and accounting information; -) Review of the current safeguard approach for the selected installation; -) RMS cost-effectiveness assessment. This paper describes the status of the RMS field trial as well as the current C/S system in place at Embalse nuclear power plant. (authors)

  17. Towards wider adherence to the strengthened safeguards system: Additional protocols and small quantities protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the past few years, the IAEA Secretariat has been implementing a Plan of Action to encourage and facilitate the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Such outreach activities by the IAEA and its Member States have contributed to the IAEA's effectiveness and efficiency objectives through a rapidly increasing number of States with additional protocols. Since 2001, the number of States with additional protocols in force has more than tripled from 24 to 78, while 110 States have signed additional protocols. Of particular importance for the strengthening of safeguards, more than 80% of all States with safeguards significant nuclear activities have concluded additional protocols. Following the IAEA Board of Governors' decisions in 2005 regarding small quantities protocols (SQPs), the Secretariat's outreach activities have also promoted the acceptance of the new standardized SQP text, which allows for initial reports, early information about new facilities and IAEA inspections, while making SQPs unavailable for States with planned or existing nuclear facilities. Since the Board took its decisions, nine States have accepted the modified SQP text and the IAEA has written to all relevant States proposing to modify the existing SQPs. For States that have not yet decided to conclude an additional protocol, the Secretariat has found that this is generally because of policy reasons or administrative hurdles or because of legal or technical obstacles. Specifically, a number of States need to put in place an effective national system for accounting and control of nuclear material and activities. Many States have taken action to strengthen such controls in order to be able to report under their safeguards agreements and additional protocols. This is a positive development from the point of view of strengthened safeguards, and also strengthens the authorities' hand in preventing and detecting attempts at illicit trafficking. Accordingly, the IAEA has

  18. Executive summary of the special safeguards study on material control and accounting systems. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report assesses the feasibility of real-time systems applied to mixed-oxide fuel rod fabrication. Their interaction with other material control and accounting measures are considered. Economics, effectiveness, and acceptance factors are discussed. A cost-benefit evaluation is made and recommendations given for safeguards improvements

  19. Use of ISEM in studying the impact of guard tactics on facility safeguards system effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM) is a stochastic, discrete event, Monte-Carlo Simulation Model used to assess the effectiveness of physical protection systems for facilities which store, process, or use SNM. ISEM simulates the interaction of a group of insiders. The sensor control and alarm locations are correlated with the authorized access areas of the insider(s) and, if the insider has the appropriate access, the probability of an insider successfully defeating a sensor control or alarm is computed based upon the surveillance subsystems and the insider's attributes. Following an alarm and an assessment, actions are initiated by the safeguards system. These actions typically involve dispatching guards to specific locations within the facility. Since the specific guard responses must be predetermined, a safeguards system should be evolved from a consideration of a wide spectrum of feasible adversary strategies. The sensitivity of safeguards system effectiveness to a variety of guard tactics is explored in this paper. The evolution of comprehensive guard tactics for protecting a hypothetical facility is demonstrated. Attention is focused on the potential threat posed by insiders and the necessity of well conceived guard tactics in dealing with this threat

  20. 77 FR 51496 - Federal Acquisition Regulation; Basic Safeguarding of Contractor Information Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-08-24

    ...DoD, GSA, and NASA are proposing to amend the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to add a new subpart and contract clause for the basic safeguarding of contractor information systems that contain information provided by or generated for the Government (other than public information) that will be resident on or transiting through contractor information...

  1. Development and implementation of international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The unique institution of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards has been commented on at length by both technicians and politicians. IAEA safeguards have variously been extolled as a great international break-through and model for other arms control verification regimes and alternatively as a not very credible arrangement with many weaknesses and contradictions and which cannot, essentially by definition, do the job it's supposed to do. The 1981 bombing by Israel of the safeguarded Iraqi research reactor at Tuwaitha is used by both extremes to support their positions. As a physicist who has been working in this area, among others, for several years it seems to me that neither side is giving the reality of IAEA safeguards a fair deal. The bottom line on safeguards is to ensure that nuclear material, especially plutonium or highly enriched uranium (>20% U-236 but usually 93% U-235) under safeguards, is not used to make nuclear explosives or to further other military purposes. In the first instance they are pretty good and do represent a major concession by sovereign states; but the structure of the safeguards regime was designed in another era. The system has its flaws technically, but it is also a political system which, because of its dual nature can and does do a very useful and important job for the international community

  2. Safeguards in Austria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The first IAEA routine safeguards inspection of the ASTRA reactor at the Austrian research centre at Seibersdorf near Vienna, was carried out on 2 March 1966. ASTRA is an adapted swimming pool tank type research reactor using 90 per cent enriched uranium fuel, and having a maximum capacity of about 5 MRU). It was supplied from the ISA under a bilateral agreement, in respect of which safeguarding responsibility has been transferred to the Agency. The inspection was made by O. Lendvai of Hungary and B. Sharpe of the United Kingdom. There are in Austria three research reactors under Agency safeguards, the others being respectively in Vienna and Graz. (author)

  3. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including

  4. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R and D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the

  5. The impact of changes in DOE computer security on safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Recent changes in the Department of Energy regulations on classified computer security have introduced a number of significant requirements for automated information systems and networks. These changes are necessary because of changes in computer technology, a reduced level of clearances, and increased personnel access, such as DOE open-quotes Lclose quotes clearances and international inspections, in the facilities. These changes will affect all computer-based systems that process, or are connected to computers that process, classified data. The additional and modified requirements are identified and described. The impact of the requirements on safeguards computer-based systems, such as instruments, database systems, and networks, is reviewed. Some simple examples of typical safeguards systems are discussed with suggestions on how the systems can comply with the requirements

  6. International and regional safeguards inspector training guidelines

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Recent international developments have prompted a need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the supporting international safeguards system, and related new inspection requirements. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in carrying out its responsibilities for international safeguards, and in coordination with other U.S. agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), initiated a study to identify training programs, techniques, and technologies that might enhance implementation of international nuclear safeguards inspections. As a result, an analysis of training needs was conducted and a set of guidelines was developed to assist in meeting future international safeguards inspection requirements. The objectives of the analysis and guidelines were to (1) to identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for international safeguards inspections with emphasis of new requirements; (2) identify training needs and resources available; and (3) sharpen the sense and understanding of the inspector's role. This paper summarizes the findings of this study and discusses potential applications of new training technologies to safeguards inspectors' needs

  7. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS,INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME I/III SETTING THE STAGE: 1991-1996

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Events in Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to be improved. It had failed, after all, to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program even though some of Iraq's's activities had been pursued at inspected facilities in buildings adjacent to ones being inspected by the IAEA. Although there were aspects of the implementation of safeguards where the IAEA needed to improve, the primary limitations were considered to be part of the safeguards system itself. That system was based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, to which Iraq was a party, and implemented on the basis of a model NPT safeguards agreement, published by the IAEA 1972 as INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The agreement calls for states to accept and for the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in the state. Iraq was a party to such an agreement, but it violated the agreement by concealing nuclear material and other nuclear activities from the IAEA. Although the IAEA was inspecting in Iraq, it was hindered by aspects of the agreement that essentially limited its access to points in declared facilities and provided the IAEA with little information about nuclear activities anywhere else in Iraq. As a result, a major review of the NPT safeguards system was initiated by its Director General and Member States with the objective of finding the best means to enable the IAEA to detect both diversions from declared stocks and any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. Significant improvements that could be made within existing legal authority were taken quickly, most importantly a change in 1992 in how and when and what design information would be reported to the IAEA. During 1991-1996, the IAEA pursued intensive study, legal and technical analysis, and field trials and held numerous consultations with Member States. The Board of Governors discussed the issue of strengthening safeguards

  8. The remote monitoring systems LOVER and RECOVER for international safeguards technical, economic and legal aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The electronic remote monitoring systems RECOVER and LOVER were developed to comply with the IAEA's tasks concerning international nuclear materials safeguards with the aim of reducing the inspection expenditure and enhancing control effectiveness. The present study on the technical, economic and legal aspects of an application of these systems is intended to show possible implications and provide argumentation aids for discussions on the application of these systems. RECOVER and LOVER offer the possibility of establishing a direct communication path between containment and surveillance system (c/s), instruments at the site of application and a central monitoring station. The demonstration versions of both systems have shown that remote interrogation of data under safeguards-specific boundary conditions (e.g. requirement of tamper safety) will be technically feasible. (orig./HP)

  9. Agreement of 3 August 1992 between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Malawi to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  10. The Text of the Agreement between the Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Lesotho to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  11. Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  12. The Text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Senegal to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  13. The Text of the Agreement between Iceland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Iceland to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  14. The Text of the Agreement of 8 August 1978 between Gambia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of The Gambia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 6 July 2000

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (TLATELOLCO) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 29 November 2001. It was signed in the City of Panama on 11 December 2001

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

  19. The text of the Agreement of 21 February 1985 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency for the application of safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of the Soviet Union to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in peaceful nuclear facilities, namely several nuclear power stations and nuclear research reactors to be designated by the Soviet Union within its territory with a view to enabling the Agency to verify that such material is not withdrawn. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  3. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and

  4. Enhanced role of SSAC in the future safeguards regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An SSAC should be established and maintained for the effective implementation of the Agency safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153. However, SSAC could be needed not only for the NPT safeguards agreement, but also for another purposes. Some countries have concluded governmental bilateral cooperation agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. One can consider two different types of the SSAC, with regard to the implementation of the Agency safeguards. One type of the SSAC is a system with a capability to verify domestic situation independently. The other type of the SSAC is a system without independent verification capability. Japan's SSAC is the former type, because Japan wanted an equal treatment, at least in the level of Agreement, with the EURATOM-IAEA agreement. Some activities of the SSAC are essential for effective performance of the Agency safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153. The international non-proliferation regime in the 21st century has to be established taking into account two basic concepts, i.e. 'defence-in-depth' concept and 'pluralism' concept. Because of the new situation surrounding the Agency safeguards, the cooperation between the Agency safeguards and the SSAC should be enhanced. (Yi, J. H.)

  5. Computerized real-time materials accountability system for safeguards material control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A real-time, computer-based system is described which provides safeguards material control at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Originally installed in 1972 to provide computerized real-time fissile materials accountability for criticality control purposes, the system has been expanded to provide accountability of all source and nuclear materials (SNM) and to utilize the on-line inventory files in support of the Laboratory physical protection and surveillance procedures. (auth)

  6. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Shirley J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2011-10-10

    The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA draws such conclusions from the evaluation of all available information. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of this “State-level” approach. Efficiently used, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) methodologies , , , now being developed can contribute to effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards. The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) introduced here supports SBD in three areas. 1. It describes necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner / designer of a new or modified facility to determine where SBD efforts can be productively applied, 2. It presents a screening approach intended to identify potential safeguard issues for; a) design changes to existing facilities; b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with approved safeguards approaches, and c) new designs, 3. It identifies resources (the FSA toolkit), such as good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods that can be used by the owner/designer to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA. FSA presents a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools developed in other efforts. The more a design evolves, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues could be introduced. Likewise, for first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, it is reasonable to expect that a number of possible safeguards issues might exist. Accordingly, FSA is intended to help the designer and its safeguards experts identify early in the design process: • Areas where elements of previous accepted safeguards approach(es) may be applied

  7. Industrial Control System Cyber Security: Questions And Answers Relevant To Nuclear Facilities, Safeguards And Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

  8. Development of safeguards information treatment system at facility level in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safeguards Information Treatment System (SITS) at Facility level was developed to implement efficiently the obligations under IAEA comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, bilateral nuclear cooperation Agreements with other countries and domestic law, and to manage efficiently the information related to safeguards implementation at facility level in Korea. Nuclear facilities in Korea are categorized into 8 types based on its accounting characteristics as follows: (1) Item counting facility or bulk handling facility; (2) Batch follow-up facility or not; (3) MUF (Material Unaccounted For) occurrence or not; (4) Nuclear production facility or not; (5) Operation status of facility; (6) Information management of nuclear material transfer status between KMPs or not; (7) Indication of inventory KMP on the inventory change of nuclear material is required or not. Hardware and Software for SITS can be loaded on a personal computer under operation system of Window 2000 or Window NT. MS SQL server 7 and MS Internet Information Server were adopted for database management system and Web server, respectively. Network environment of SITS was designed to include nuclear research institute, nuclear power plants of PWR and CANDU, nuclear fuel fabrication facilities and other facilities. SITS can be operated standalone or under the client-server system if intranet exists. More detailed contents of SITS are described elsewhere. Each module of SITS will be tested during incorporation of existing data into SITS and SITS will be distributed to nuclear facilities in Korea

  9. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

  10. Protocol between the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol between the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol on 21 March 2000. It was signed on 22 March 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 16 October 2007, the date on which the Agency received from the Russian Federation written notification that the procedures of the Russian Federation required for entry into force had been met

  11. An improved safeguards system and its application to large back-end facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The paper suggests that the safeguards problems of large plants could be solved by a combination of containment and surveillance, and material accountancy. The paper places considerable importance on the installation of 'anomaly detectors' at various points. These would detect movements through the containment and unusual changes in the process itself. The importance of the quantification, the contribution of accountancy and containment and surveillance system is emphasised and a mathematical approach is outlined

  12. Safeguarding trust in Irish Official Statistics: A code of practice for the Irish statistical system

    OpenAIRE

    Dalton, Padraig

    2014-01-01

    Symposium: Safeguarding Trust in Official Statistics – Launching a Code of Practice for the Irish Statistical System For official statistics to be of value they must be trusted. Achieving and maintaining trust requires that statistics are produced in an objective, transparent and independent manner. In many countries codes of practice for official statistics have been developed to enshrine those principles and protect trust. While compilers of European statistics are expected to comply wit...

  13. Safeguard Application Options for the Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laughter, Mark D [ORNL

    2008-10-01

    Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) are developing a Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS) for advanced safeguards at nuclear facilities. LBIMS uses a low-power laser transceiver to monitor the presence and position of items with retroreflective tags. The primary advantages of LBIMS are its scalability to continuously monitor a wide range of items, its ability to operate unattended, its low cost of implementation, and its inherent information security due to its line-of-sight and non-broadcasting operation. The primary proposed safeguard application of LBIMS is described in its name: item monitoring. LBIMS could be implemented in a storage area to continuously monitor containers of nuclear material and the area in which they are stored. The system could be configured to provide off-site notification if any of the containers are moved or removed or if the area is accessed. Individual tags would be used to monitor storage containers, and additional tags could be used to record information regarding secondary storage units and room access. The capability to register small changes in tag position opens up the possibility of several other uses. These include continuously monitoring piping arrangements for design information verification or recording equipment positions for other safeguards systems, such as tracking the opening and closing of autoclaves as part of a cylinder tracking system or opening and closing valves on a sample or product take-off line. Combined with attribute tags, which transmit information from any kind of sensor by modulating the laser signal, LBIMS provides the capability to wirelessly and securely collect safeguards data, even in areas where radio-frequency or other wireless communication methods are not practicable. Four application types are described in this report: static item monitoring, in-process item monitoring with trigger tags, multi-layered integration with trigger tags, and line-of-sight data transfer with

  14. Regional safeguards arrangements: The Argentina-Brazil experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (SCCC) was established by Argentina and Brazil in July 1992. It is a full scope safeguard's system in both countries. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created to apply the SCCC. The main elements of the SCCC are presented. The main safeguards' procedures are described. A brief discussion of the inspection methodology and its impact for facility operators is performed. The safeguard's implementation from the operator's point of view is commented, taking as example a fuel fabrication plant in Argentina and a uranium enrichment plant in Brazil. (author)

  15. The safeguards options study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state

  16. The safeguards options study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  17. NNSA's next generation safeguards initiative to define an effective state system of accounting and control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stevens, Rebecca S [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sunshine, Alexander [NNSA; Matthews, Caroline [PNNL; Frazer, Sarah [PNNL; Matthews, Carrie [NON LANL

    2010-01-01

    The International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), the international outreach component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), is a collaborative program that endeavors to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development. One of the critical ways the program achieves this objective is through working with partners to increase the effectiveness of the State System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) - the essential elements of national, regulatory and facility safeguards competencies that work as a system to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the world the full assurance of the state's adherence to its safeguards agreements. INSEP provides assistance in developing a state's SSAC in a number of areas, from developing national legislation governing the possession and use of nuclear material to working with nuclear facility operators to developing good practices in waste management. INSEP has collaborated with foreign partners in peaceful nuclear applications for over two decades, but recently, it has focused its efforts on strengthening SSACs due to the growth of nuclear power worldwide, particularly in countries with limited nuclear infrastructures. This new area of focus has prompted INSEP to develop a model of SSAC competencies that will serve not only as a structure for its engagement with partner states, but also as a means to facilitate coordination with other states that provide training and assistance, and as a mechanism for evaluating the effectiveness of its work in reaching its intended objectives. While this model uses as its starting point the requirements on a State that are presented in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, it is not, in itself, a requirements document or guidance for implementing requirements. It is rather an analysis of what capabilities will be needed in a State to be able to meet requirements

  18. The international safeguards profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a staff of safeguards professionals who are responsible for carrying out on-site inspections to determine compliance with international safeguards agreements. By IAEA Statute, the paramount consideration in recruiting IAEA staff is to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. An analysis of the distribution of professionals in the IAEA Department of Safeguards has revealed some interesting observations regarding the distribution of grade levels, age, time in service, gender, and geographical origin. Following several earlier studies performed by contractors for ACDA, U.S. efforts have been undertaken to attract and better prepare candidates for working at the IAEA

  19. Integrating virtual reality applications in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Virtual reality (VR) tools have already been developed and deployed in the nuclear industry, including in nuclear power plant construction, project management, equipment and system design, and training. Recognized as powerful tools for, inter alia, integration of data, simulation of activities, design of facilities, validation of concepts and mission planning, their application in nuclear safeguards is still very limited. However, VR tools may eventually offer transformative potential for evolving the future safeguards system to be more fully information-driven. The paper focuses especially on applications in the area of training that have been underway in the Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also outlines future applications envisioned for safeguards information and knowledge management, and information-analytic collaboration. The paper identifies some technical and programmatic pre-requisites for realizing the integrative potential of VR technologies. If developed with an orientation to integrating applications through compatible platforms, software, and models, virtual reality tools offer the long-term potential of becoming a real 'game changer,' enabling a qualitative leap in the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear safeguards. The IAEA invites Member States, industry, and academia to make proposals as to how such integrating potential in the use of virtual reality technology for nuclear safeguards could be realized. (author)

  20. Consultants' report on meeting for development of technical criteria for termination of safeguards for material categorized as measured discards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The following view is held by the consultants. The Agency should have criteria which can be used in the field and which can be used by an inspector to answer the question of whether a particular batch of material presented for termination of safeguards does, in fact, qualify for the termination of safeguards. To maintain the credibility of safeguards, the criteria of termination should be such that termination of waste is not the weak link in the safeguards system. That is, that given a choice, a potential diverter would choose to obtain nuclear material he needs from a source other than recovery from waste upon which safeguards has been terminated

  1. Agreement with the government of India for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material subject to Agency safeguards under INFCIRC/154, part I and the agreements between India and the IAEA contained in exchanges of letters dated 1 October and 1 December 1993

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting the amendment to the Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of Safeguards to all nuclear material subject to Agency safeguards under INFCIRC/154, Part I, and the Agreements between India and the IAEA contained in Exchanges of Letters dated 1 October and 1 December 1993, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The amendment to the Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994. The amendment to the Agreement entered into force, pursuant to the Exchange of Letters, on 12 September 1994

  2. Agreement with the Government of India for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material subject to Agency safeguards under INFCIRC/154, Part 1 and under the Agreements between India and the IAEA contained in exchanges of letters dated 1 October and 1 December 1993

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters and the Attachment, constituting the Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of Safeguards to all nuclear material subject to Agency safeguards under INFCIRC/154, Part 1, and under the Agreements between India and the IAEA contained in Exchanges of Letters dated 1 October and 1 December 1993, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 February 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to the Exchange of Letters, on 1 March 1994

  3. IAEA safeguards for the Fissile Materials Disposition Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This document is an overview of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and the basic requirements or elements of an IAEA safeguards regime. The primary objective of IAEA safeguards is the timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of material and the timely detection of undeclared activities. The two important components of IAEA safeguards to accomplish their primary objective are nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance. This overview provides guidance to the Fissile Materials Disposition Project for IAEA inspection requirements. IAEA requirements, DOE Orders, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations will be used as the basis for designing a safeguards and security system for the facilities recommended by the Fissile Materials Disposition Project

  4. Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  5. Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 20 March 2001. It was signed on 11 June 2002 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 16 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Niger written notification that Niger's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  6. Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 3 May 2005 in New York. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of the Marshall Islands and the Agency

  7. Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001

  8. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 13 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of South Africa and the Agency, i.e. on 13 September 2002

  9. Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001

  10. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 September 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Mali and the Agency, i.e. on 12 September 2002

  11. Function allocation in distributed safeguards and security systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Computerized distributed systems are being used to collect and manage data for activities such as nuclear materials accounting, process control, laboratory coordination, and security. Poor choices made in allocating functions to individual processors can make a system unusable by burdening machines with excessive network retrievals and updates. During system design phases, data allocation algorithms based on operation frequencies, field sizes, security information, and reliability requirements can be applied in sensitivity studies to mathematically ensure processor efficiency. The Los Alamos Network Design System (NDS) implements such an allocation algorithm. The authors analyzed a large, existing distributed system to test the cost functions and to compare actual network problems with NDS results. Several common configurations were also designed and studied using the software. From these studies, some basic principles for allocating functions emerged. In this paper recommendations for function allocation in generic systems and related design options are discussed

  12. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

  13. Safe-Guarded Agent Design Pattern for Mechatronic Systems

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Phong, Dao Ba; Vries, de Theo J.A.; Amerongen, van Job

    2010-01-01

    To support the application of real-time Multi-Agent Control Systems (MACS) for mechatronic systems, a combination between the MACS design approach and OROCOS framework has been implemented: the OROCOS-based Implementation Framework for MACS (OROMACS). This paper presents our research results to make

  14. Evaluations of the commercial spectrometer systems for safeguards applications using the germanium detectors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safeguards applications require the best spectrometer systems with excellent resolution, stability, and throughput. Instruments must perform well in all the situations and environments. Data communication to the computer should be convenient, fast, and reliable. The software should have all the necessary tools and be ease to use. Portable systems should be small in size, lightweight, and have a long battery life. Nine commercially available spectrometer systems are tested with both the planar and coaxial germanium detectors. Considering the performance of the Digital Signal Processors (DSP), digital-based spectroscopy may be the future of gamma-ray spectroscopy

  15. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer

  16. Past, Present and Future of Safeguards in Lithuania

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Davainis, Marius [State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI), Vilnius (Lithuania)

    2003-05-01

    Changing Safeguards climate has been a phenomenon for already ten years in Lithuania. Since the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in 1992, two distinctive periods of five years could be discerned. Safeguards was a new matter in Lithuania back in 1992 and its perception was not a one day work. For instance, development of the national system of accounting for and control of nuclear material took years. Safeguards implementation in Lithuania was not a simple and easy task for the IAEA either. The Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant inherited by Lithuania from the Soviet Union brought its particularity, as there was no precedent experience in safeguarding the RBMK type reactors. Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguards Agreement and the national regulation for nuclear material accounting and control came into force in 1997. That year could be considered as the end of the first five- year period, which could be called an initial stage of Safeguards application in Lithuania. In March 1998 Lithuania signed the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement. After two years it was ratified and came into force on the 5th of July 2000. That was a certain change and a new stage of Safeguards application in Lithuania. The year 2000 was also the time when the EURATOM system appeared on the horizon. The 1st of January 2004 is the most likely date of accession of Lithuania to the European Union and it can be said that Safeguards in Lithuania is heading to the next generation. This paper is aimed to review developments, which took place and the experience gained through the ten years of Safeguards application in Lithuania and also to present some considerations about the approaching changes.

  17. Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

  18. Physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. Safeguards and the role of the IAEA in physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The physical protection and security of nuclear facilities and materials concerns utilities, manufactures, the general public, and those who are responsible for licensing and regulating such facilities. The requirements and process to ensure an acceptable physical protection and security system have been evolutionary in nature. This paper reviews the first step of such process: the State's safeguards system and the international safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the relationship between these two safeguards systems. The elements of these systems that are reviewed include the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, physical protection measures, and containment and surveillance measures. In addition, the interactions between the State, the facility operator, and the IAEA are described. The paper addresses the IAEA safeguards system, including material accountancy and containment and surveillance; the State safeguards system, including material control and accountancy, and physical protection; the role of the IAEA in physical protection; a summary of safeguards system interactions.(author)

  19. Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Azerbaijan to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 6 November 1998, and entered into force on 29 April 1999. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  20. Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Safeguards Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Abu Dhabi on 15 December 2002. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 9 October 2003, the date upon which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  1. The challenges of integrating multiple safeguards systems in a large nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full-text: Implementing safeguards in a cost-effective manner in large nuclear facilities such as fuel conditioning, fuel reprocessing, and fuel fabrication plants requires the extensive use of instrumentation that is operated in unattended mode. The collected data is then periodically reviewed by the inspectors either on-site at a central location in the facility or remotely in the IAEA offices. A wide variety of instruments are deployed in large facilities, including video surveillance cameras, electronic sealing devices, non-destructive assay systems based on gamma ray and neutron detection, load cells for mass measurement, ID-readers, and other process-specific monitors. The challenge to integrate these different measurement instruments into an efficient, reliable, and secure system requires implementing standardization at various levels throughout the design process. This standardization includes the data generator behaviour and interface, networking solutions, and data security approaches. This standardization will provide a wide range of savings, including reduced training for inspectors and technicians, reduced periodic technical maintenance, reduced spare parts inventory, increased system robustness, and more predictive system behaviour. The development of standard building blocks will reduce the number of data generators required and allow implementation of simplified architectures that do not require local collection computers but rather utilize transmission of the acquired data directly to a central server via Ethernet connectivity. This approach will result in fewer system components and therefore reduced maintenance efforts and improved reliability. This paper discusses in detail the challenges and the subsequent solutions in the various areas that the IAEA Department of Safeguards has committed to pursue as the best sustainable way of maintaining the ability to implement reliable safeguards systems. (author)

  2. A removable optical sealing system for application to international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A removable, optically verifiable sealing system for CANDU spent fuel storage facilities has been developed. The seal is based on the use of unique crystal patterns formed in a pure metal identity/integrity element and has been designed for easy installation and removal using simple tooling. Since the seal is optically verified, a wide range of commercial instruments, including those in use by the IAEA, can be used to verify it. Futhermore, optical verification allows the level of scrutiny to be matched with the degree of confidence required to be confident that spent fuel has not been diverted

  3. The nuclear safeguards system and the process of global governance accountability

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles, E-mail: xavier@cnen.gov.b [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Coordenacao Geral de Planejamento e Avaliacao

    2011-07-01

    Due to rising energy costs and climate concerns, nuclear energy is again being seriously considered as an energy source for several countries. Along with the resurgence of nuclear energy comes the concern of the world if these countries will develop their programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If on one hand the growth potential of nuclear energy should not be stifled, on the other hand it is imperative that a climate of mutual trust is developed, respecting the right of each country to develop its nuclear program without taking a climate of mistrust to a possible 'intention' behind the pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mechanisms of accountability of global governance are institutionalized at the institutional architecture of the international process of nuclear safeguards, more specifically to the nuclear fuel cycle, so that abuses of power in this sphere does not happen, both by countries that aspire to develop projects nuclear, and by the suppliers of technology. In this context, the case study of Brazil and Argentina gained importance, because these two countries have a single binational organization of nuclear safeguards in the world: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC. In the theoretical question, the paper tries to understand what happens with the process of legitimacy and authority of the organizations of global governance by analyzing the degree of publicness and constrictiveness. This work intends to focus on the role of ABACC as an interstate institution of accountability, which has a key role to control the nation States of Brazil and Argentina regarding the appropriate use of nuclear material used in their programs, and analyze how this Agency behaves within of tension legitimacy-authority, taking into account existing studies on accountability in global governance. (author)

  4. The nuclear safeguards system and the process of global governance accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Due to rising energy costs and climate concerns, nuclear energy is again being seriously considered as an energy source for several countries. Along with the resurgence of nuclear energy comes the concern of the world if these countries will develop their programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If on one hand the growth potential of nuclear energy should not be stifled, on the other hand it is imperative that a climate of mutual trust is developed, respecting the right of each country to develop its nuclear program without taking a climate of mistrust to a possible 'intention' behind the pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mechanisms of accountability of global governance are institutionalized at the institutional architecture of the international process of nuclear safeguards, more specifically to the nuclear fuel cycle, so that abuses of power in this sphere does not happen, both by countries that aspire to develop projects nuclear, and by the suppliers of technology. In this context, the case study of Brazil and Argentina gained importance, because these two countries have a single binational organization of nuclear safeguards in the world: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC. In the theoretical question, the paper tries to understand what happens with the process of legitimacy and authority of the organizations of global governance by analyzing the degree of publicness and constrictiveness. This work intends to focus on the role of ABACC as an interstate institution of accountability, which has a key role to control the nation States of Brazil and Argentina regarding the appropriate use of nuclear material used in their programs, and analyze how this Agency behaves within of tension legitimacy-authority, taking into account existing studies on accountability in global governance. (author)

  5. Status of the safeguards system developed for the LMFBR prototype power plant SNR-300 (KKW Kalkar)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this report the features of the safeguards system developed for the LMFBR Prototype Power Plant SNR-300 (KKW Kalkar) are described. Due to the fact that LMFBR fuel assemblies are mostly handled in a sodium or inert gas environment, visual control and counting of the assemblies containing nuclear material, as routinely used in a LWR power plant, cannot be applied for LMFBRs. Consequently, for safeguarding the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station, an automatic and continuous monitoring of the fissile material inventory is the main objective of special instrumentation, the ''Inaccessible Inventory Instrumentation System'' (IIIS). For a qualitative distinction between the various types of assembly the detection of the emitted neutron and gamma radiation turned out to be most adequate. Based upon this conclusion and taking into account its tasks, the IIIS is composed of an activity measurement system, a position-sensing system and a micro-computer system (MCS). The high reliability, high fraud resistance and low maintenance requirements have had an important influence on the IIIS design. Access to IIIS data is protected by special hardware and software measures. To protect the system against the results of power failures the IIIS possesses an automatic restart facility and a battery-buffered power supply for the RAM-unit of the microprocessor system used for data acquisition and evaluation. (author)

  6. Integrated safeguards and the role of the SSAC: an Australian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    'Classical' safeguards retain a strong emphasis on facility-based materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major efforts are being made to establish the Agency's capabilities in this regard. Current priorities include, ensuring the wide-spread conclusion of individual Additional Protocols so the Strengthened Safeguards System enters into general application without delay, and continuing the development of new methodologies - including associated quality assurance and evaluation. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalisation of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. The strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system is a matter of the highest priority to Australia. Australia has had a major influence in this process, that is provision of consultancy services to the Agency on new safeguards and analytical techniques, and in the development and field testing of new safeguards technology such as remote surveillance. (Yi, J. H.)

  7. ASEA-ATOM's URANUS system for production control, economic control and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ASEA-ATOM needs a system for production and economic control because: (1) the uranium is the valuable property of the customer; (2) short delivery times are a prime means of competition; (3) the manufacture of fuel necessitates frequent enrichment changes and much enrichment blending; (4) minimizing uranium stock reduces interest costs. A system which meets the above needs will with minor modifications meet safeguard requirements. URANUS is an integrated man/computer system with manual input and automatic data treatment and reporting of information. The man/computer interface is monitored by the automatic checking for plausibility of all input. An item is a quantity of material which is treated as a unit in production. Each item receives a unique identification number which may be used only once. If the qualitative properties of an item are changed a new item number is issued. Items are reported on forms and fed into URANUS by authorized personnel using personal passwords or are directly reported by terminal from certain operations. Pertinent information is entered for each project. The URANUS computer system consists of terminal activated on-line and batch modules which are briefly described. Output is information for planning, economic control and safeguards. Safeguards information consists of the following. For flow and blending control: delivery information; change of nominal enrichment; enrichment blending; internal transactions that change an enrichment/origin account; material status report (MSR); item inventory per MBA; general ledger. For physical inventory: material balance report (MBR); book item inventory per MBA; physical item inventory per MBA; uranium balance per origin and enrichment

  8. The Text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 14 June 1979.

  9. The Text of the Agreement of 20 July 1977 between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Respect of a Research Reactor Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 20 July 1977 between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in respect of a research reactor facility is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 23, on 20 July 1977

  10. The Text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 October 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

  11. The Text of the Agreement of 21 February 1985 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 21 February 1985 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency for the application of safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 June 1985, pursuant to Article 24 thereof

  12. The text of the agreement of 5 December 1974 between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 5 December 1974, and the Protocol thereto, between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agreement entered into force on 21 February 1978

  13. The Text of the Agreement of 5 January 1977 between the Agency, France and South Africa for the Application of Safeguards in Respect of the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 5 January 1977 between the Agency, France and South Africa for the application of safeguards in respect of the Koeberg nuclear power station is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 27, on 5 January 1977.

  14. The Text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  15. The Text of the Agreement of 16 May 1974 between Thailand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 16 May 1974 between Thailand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 May 1974, pursuant to Article 25 thereof.

  16. The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ghana and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  17. Agreement of 14 April 1975 Between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 14 April 1975 between Sweden and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

  19. The Text of the Agreement between of 4 April 1975 between the Agency, Israel and the United States of America for the Application of Safeguards. Protocol Prolonging the Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol of 7 April 1977 prolonging the Agreement of 4 April 1975 between the Agency, Israel and the United States of America for the application of safeguards is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  20. The Text of the Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between the Holy See and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  1. The Text of the Agreement between New Zealand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between New Zealand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Viet-Nam and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 9 January 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

  3. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  4. Migration of safeguards instrumentation: Challenges and opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Development of new safeguards instrumentation for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is spurred by a number of factors: Technical issues include issues such as the emergence of new technologies and the inevitable obsolescence of system components. Policy-related issues include changes in safeguards policies, new approaches to the safeguarding of excess material, and the introduction of new types of facilities to be safeguarded. To cope with these issues, development projects are required that migrate between current safeguards systems and state-of-the-art technology. These projects usually involve IAEA staff as well as Member States and their support programs, the private sector, and research and development institutions. One such development project currently underway is the migration between the IAEA's DCM-14 based surveillance system to the Next Generation Surveillance System (NGSS). The challenges and opportunities of the NGSS project include those factors that prompted the migration, the development of user requirements, the selection of appropriate development partners and funding resources, and issues in the development itself. This paper will outline the challenges, issues, opportunities, and synergies that relate to safeguards instrumentation migration, using the NGSS project as an example. The problems necessitating new development will be outlined, as will the management of these problems from project initiation until new instrumentation is available for replacement. The generation of user requirements will be explained in detail. Focus will be given to how to best manage this process in order to produce requirements that will be useful both during the development project and after the migration is completed. The challenges and opportunities in the selection and procurement process will then be highlighted, followed by the structure of the actual development project. Finally, some general comments and recommendations on how a

  5. The NINO [No Inspector, No Operator system] cask-loading safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It is, in general difficult to determine by means of camera-surveillance techniques what is loaded into spent-fuel casks being prepared for shipment from light-water reactors to other reactors, reprocessing facilities, or long-term storage. Furthermore, the expected high frequency of cask loadings in the coming years would place too great a burden on the IAEA and Euratom inspectorates if each had to be observed by an inspector. For the case of shipment to other reactors and reprocessing facilities, the casks are soon opened and, in principle, their contents could be ascertained by direct inspection. In the case of long-term-storage facilities, the casks would stay sealed for years, thereby requiring the IAEA to know positively how many spent-fuel assemblies were loaded at the reactor and to have a continuity of knowledge of the cask's contents. It has been proposed instead that the facility operator place the cask seal on the cask within the field of view of a surveillance system linked to the cask seal. This solution, however, may not provide enough credibility for acceptance by the safeguards community. This paper presents an alternative to both inspector presence at cask loading and operator assistance in applying seals; this alternative is called the No Inspector, No Operator system (NINO)

  6. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  7. The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Ghana to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  8. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  9. Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Panama to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 March 1984 between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  10. Agreement of 6 November 1978 between Jamaica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Jamaica to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  11. Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  12. Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Dominican Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  13. The Texts of Instruments connected with the Agency's Supply of Uranium to Japan. Letters relating to the Agency's Safeguards and Health and Safety measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    On 2 March 1962 the Director General, pursuant to a decision taken by the Board of Governors on 28 February, addressed a letter to the Governor from Japan cancelling those provisions of the letter of 24 March 1959 that related to the safeguards against diversion applicable to the JRR-3 research reactor project. On 20 June the Director General, pursuant to a decision taken by the Board on 14 June, addressed a further letter to the Governor cancelling the remaining provisions of the letter of 24 March 1959, which related to health and safety measures for the project. The texts of the two letters in question are reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  14. Novel technologies for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

  15. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Additional Protocol entered into force on 28 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Armenia written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  16. Agreement of 18 November 1993 between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 February 1975 and signed in Vienna on 31 October 1990 and in Nuku'Alofa on 18 November 1993

  17. Agreement of 22 September 1994 between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 22 September 1994

  18. Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 2 December 1993 and signed in Vienna on 6 December 1993 and in Riga on 21 December 1993

  19. Agreement of 30 September 1993 between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 September 1993 and signed in Vienna on 30 September 1993. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 5 May 1994

  20. Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994

  1. Process Monitoring for Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Process Monitoring has long been used to evaluate industrial processes and operating conditions in nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. In nuclear applications there is a recognized need to demonstrate the safeguards benefits from using advanced process monitoring on spent fuel reprocessing technologies and associated facilities, as a complement to nuclear materials accounting. This can be accomplished by: defining credible diversion pathway scenarios as a sample problem; using advanced sensor and data analysis techniques to illustrate detection capabilities; and formulating 'event detection' methodologies as a means to quantify performance of the safeguards system. Over the past 30 years there have been rapid advances and improvement in the technology associated with monitoring and control of industrial processes. In the context of bulk handling facilities that process nuclear materials, modern technology can provide more timely information on the location and movement of nuclear material to help develop more effective safeguards. For international safeguards, inspection means verification of material balance data as reported by the operator through the State to the international inspectorate agency. This verification recognizes that the State may be in collusion with the operator to hide clandestine activities, potentially during abnormal process conditions with falsification of data to mask the removal. Records provided may show material is accounted for even though a removal occurred. Process monitoring can offer additional fidelity during a wide variety of operating conditions to help verify the declaration or identify possible diversions. The challenge is how to use modern technology for process monitoring and control in a proprietary operating environment subject to safeguards inspectorate or other regulatory oversight. Under the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a range of potential safeguards applications

  2. The CANDU irradiated fuel safeguards sealing system at the threshold of implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The development of a safeguards containment and surveillance system for the irradiated fuel discharged from CANDU nuclear generating stations has inspired the development of three different sealing technologies. Each seal type utilizes a random seal identity of different design. The AECL Random Coil (ARC) Seal combines the identity and integrity elements in the ultrasonic signature of a wire coil. Two variants of an optical seal have been developed which features identity elements of crystalline zirconium and aluminum. The sealed cap-seal uses a conventional IAEA 'Type X Seal' (wire seal). The essential features and relative merits of each seal design are described

  3. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  4. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  5. Lessons learned in testing of safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Department of Safeguards uses complex instrumentation for the application of safeguards at nuclear facilities around the world. Often, this equipment is developed through cooperation with member state support programs because the Agency's requirements are unique and are not met by commercially available equipment. Before approving an instrument or system for routine inspection use, the IAEA subjects it to a series of tests designed to evaluate its reliability. In 2000, the IAEA began to observe operational failures in digital surveillance systems. In response to the observed failures, the IAEA worked with the equipment designer and manufacturer to determine the cause of failure. An action plan was developed to correct the performance issues and further test the systems to make sure that additional operational issues would not surface later. This paper addresses the steps taken to address operation issues related to digital image surveillance systems and the lessons learned during this process. (author)

  6. Japanese Quality Assurance System Regarding the Provision of Material Accounting Reports and the Safeguards Relevant Information to the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The provision of the safeguards relevant reports and information in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and the additional protocol (AP) is the basis for the IAEA safeguards. The government of Japan (Japan Safeguards Office, JSGO) has believed that the correct reports contribute to effective and efficient safeguards therefore the domestic quality assurance system for the reporting to the IAEA was already established at the time of the accession of the CSA in 1977. It consists of Code 10 interpretation (including the seminars for operators in Japan), SSAC's checks for syntax error, code and internal consistency (computer based consistency check between facilities) and the discussion with the IAEA on the facilities' measurement system for bulk-handling facilities, which contributes to the more accurate reports from operators. This spirit has been maintained for the entry into force of the AP. For example, questions and amplification from the IAEA will be taken into account the review of the AP declaration before sending to the IAEA and the open source information such as news article and scientific literature in Japanese is collected and translated into English, and the translated information is provided to the IAEA as the supplementary information, which may contribute to broadening the IAEA information source and to their comprehensive evaluation. The other safeguards relevant information, such as the mail-box information for SNRI at LEU fuel fabrication plants, is also checked by the JSGO's QC software before posting. The software was developed by JSGO and it checks data format, batch IDs, birth/death date, shipper/receiver information and material description code. This paper explains the history of the development of the Japanese quality assurance system regarding the reports and the safeguards relevant information to the IAEA. (author)

  7. A Safeguard System for Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell-Derived Rejuvenated T Cell Therapy

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Miki Ando

    2015-10-01

    Full Text Available The discovery of induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs has created promising new avenues for therapies in regenerative medicine. However, the tumorigenic potential of undifferentiated iPSCs is a major safety concern for clinical translation. To address this issue, we demonstrated the efficacy of suicide gene therapy by introducing inducible caspase-9 (iC9 into iPSCs. Activation of iC9 with a specific chemical inducer of dimerization (CID initiates a caspase cascade that eliminates iPSCs and tumors originated from iPSCs. We introduced this iC9/CID safeguard system into a previously reported iPSC-derived, rejuvenated cytotoxic T lymphocyte (rejCTL therapy model and confirmed that we can generate rejCTLs from iPSCs expressing high levels of iC9 without disturbing antigen-specific killing activity. iC9-expressing rejCTLs exert antitumor effects in vivo. The system efficiently and safely induces apoptosis in these rejCTLs. These results unite to suggest that the iC9/CID safeguard system is a promising tool for future iPSC-mediated approaches to clinical therapy.

  8. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992. It was signed on 21 May 1992 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  9. Agreement between the Republic of Namibia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Republic of Namibia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 17 March 1998, signed in Vienna on 19 March 1998, and entered into force on 15 April 1998

  10. Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992, It was signed on 28 July 1992 in Vienna and on 26 August 1992 in Geneva. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2005. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  11. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Czech Republic to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 9 September 1996, signed in Vienna on 18 September 1996 and entered into force on 11 September 1997

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Armenia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997, and it will enter into force on the date the Agency receives written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Pending entry into force, this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature, i.e., 29 September 1997

  13. Instrumentation for international safeguards. Present and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    On-site inspection supported by instrumentation has become the primary verification mode for international safeguards. The custom designed instrumentation for measurement, monitoring, sealing and containment has become the essential tools to support inspectors. At present, 76 instruments or instrumental systems are authorized for inspection use by IAEA. The global summary of IAEA safeguard statistics for 1992 is shown. Also field instrumentation use is shown. The Agency is in the transitional mode for optical surveillance from films to CCTV units. One-time use seals are predominantly employed, but the use of in-situ verifiable seals is increasing. It is noted that instrumentation has become an essential tool for safeguard effectiveness. Instrumentation is generally 'dumb' in the sense that it provides inspectors with specific information that must be interpreted and integrated with other data before drawing safeguard conclusion. The positive features of in-situ instrumentation are shown. A prime example of in-situ instruments is core discharge monitor. Also high count rate gamma spectrometry system and improved Cerenkov viewing device are described. As the equipment carried by inspectors to facilities, miniature CdTe detector probe is shown. Safeguard instrumentation needs for future and the instrumentation activities presently underway are described. (K.I.)

  14. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  15. IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

  16. Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

  17. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  18. The Text of the Safeguards Agreement of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany relating to the agreement of 27 June 1975 between the two Governments for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  19. Study on a re-verification detection system for IAEA safeguard to a consolidated spent fuel storage system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A modular type storage system that has an enhanced storage density has been developed. It has storage density more than twice larger than silo type which stands alone. The storage module can accommodates 40 cylinders in 4 rows of 10, with 24 located close to periphery of the module and 16 located internally at some distance from the peripheral walls. As for IAEA Safeguards, the module is equipped with a comprehensive set of receptacles into which the IAEA can install seals and verification equipment. The Safeguards equipment, coupled with related measures for physical protection, will facilitate the timely detection of any diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from the spent fuels stored in the modules. Nevertheless, due to its generic design feature it makes very difficult to provide re-verification of the loaded or under loaded cylinders inside module, along with an unattended monitoring system re-verification is an IAEA safeguard requirement to measure the gamma dose rate and spectrum of each irradiated fuel basket once the storage cylinders are loaded with spent fuel. The gamma profile is read by lowering a detector inside the tube so that it can be registered at the level of each basket. For the 24 peripheral storage cylinders this method of measurement is retained on the side wall of the module. However, an alternate method is required for the 16 internal dry fuel storage cylinders since they are located some distance from the module walls and thus surrounded by storage cylinders. (author)

  20. Part 7. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report describes fissile nuclear material safeguards technology, both current and developmental, and discusses the possible application of this technology to FBR systems. The proliferation risks associated with both subnational and national-level diversion are addressed

  1. Strengthened safeguards: Present and future challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The safeguards system is experiencing what has been seen as a revolution and, in doing so, it is confronting a series of challenges. These can be grouped into three areas. Drawing and maintaining safeguards conclusions - The process by which the safeguards conclusions are derived is based upon the analysis, evaluation and review of all the information available to the Agency. This process is on- going, but the State Evaluation Reports are compiled and reviewed periodically. For States with an additional protocol in force, the absence of indicators of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities provides the basis for the safeguards conclusion. Future challenges center on States' expectations of, and reactions to, the results of the evaluation and review process. Designing and implementing integrated safeguards - The conceptual framework of integrated safeguards is being actively pursued. Basic principles have been defined and integrated safeguards approaches have been developed for various types of facilities. Work is also progressing on the design of integrated safeguards approaches for specific States. Complementary access is being successfully implemented, and procedures for the use of unannounced inspections are being developed with the prospect of cost- effectiveness gains. Costs neutrality vs. quality and credibility - The Department faces serious staff and financial challenges. It has succeeded so far in 'doing more' and 'doing better' within a zero-real growth budget, but the scope for further significant efficiency gains is exhausted. There is no capacity to absorb new or unexpected tasks. Difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified and experienced staff exacerbate the problems and add to costs. The Director General of the IAEA has referred to the need for new initiatives to bridge the budgetary gap; a possible measure is proposed. The tasks of meeting the challenges and demands of strengthened safeguards have been added to

  2. Future safeguards equipment needs and technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: As a result of more than 30 years of accumulated field experience, the IAEA has established a wide and sound range of equipment and techniques for use in safeguards implementation activities. As a consequence of a rapidly changing technology marketplace, and with the introduction of the strengthened safeguards system, the Agency must now adapt itself to new challenges so that it can continue to use appropriate and sustainable equipment in a cost effective and efficient manner. Four of the major challenges facing the Agency in the future are as follows: Having the capability to maintain a sound equipment management infrastructure in a fast developing technical environment (equipment sustainability); Having the capability to upgrade existing techniques and methods for strengthened and integrated safeguards; Ensuring the capability for implementing safeguards at new facilities; Improving the capability to detect undeclared nuclear material and nuclear facilities. All equipment authorized for inspection use undergoes extensive testing to ensure their suitability, usability and reliability. Taking into account the high cost of equipment development and implementation, and a substantial inventory of existing safeguards equipment, the Department of Safeguards needs the efficient adaptation of its equipment inventory in order to function effectively within budget constraints and to satisfy new requirements stemming from additional protocol activities. Achieving cost-effectiveness in an environment of rapidly evolving technology requires strong and technically competent in-house resources that take the Department's constraints and requirements as a first priority and are able to focus on equipment sustainability and adaptability. The advantage of such an approach is that it establishes greater independence of safeguards equipment development from national and corporate interests, and achieves greater effectiveness in the use of equipment funds. To ensure the

  3. Containment and surveillance - A principal IAEA safeguards measure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is in its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future

  4. Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Croatia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 26 May 2008, the date on which the Agency received from Croatia written notification that Croatia's internal requirements for entry into force had been fulfilled

  5. Agreement between the Republic of Uganda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on The Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by exchange of letters with the Republic of Uganda to amend the Protocol to the safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Uganda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 24 June 2009, the date on which the Agency received Uganda's affirmative reply

  6. Agreement Between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with New Zealand to Amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Prolilferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 24 February 2014, the date on which the Agency received New Zealand's affirmative reply

  7. Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Zimbabwe to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 31 August 2011, the date on which the Agency received Zimbabwe's affirmative reply

  8. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS,INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME I/III SETTING THE STAGE: 1991-1996.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.; Anzelon, G.

    2010-01-01

    Events in Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to be improved. It had failed, after all, to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program even though some of Iraq's's activities had been pursued at inspected facilities in buildings adjacent to ones being inspected by the IAEA. Although there were aspects of the implementation of safeguards where the IAEA needed to improve, the primary limitations were considered to be part of the safeguards system itself. That system was based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, to which Iraq was a party, and implemented on the basis of a model NPT safeguards agreement, published by the IAEA 1972 as INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The agreement calls for states to accept and for the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in the state. Iraq was a party to such an agreement, but it violated the agreement by concealing nuclear material and other nuclear activities from the IAEA. Although the IAEA was inspecting in Iraq, it was hindered by aspects of the agreement that essentially limited its access to points in declared facilities and provided the IAEA with little information about nuclear activities anywhere else in Iraq. As a result, a major review of the NPT safeguards system was initiated by its Director General and Member States with the objective of finding the best means to enable the IAEA to detect both diversions from declared stocks and any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. Significant improvements that could be made within existing legal authority were taken quickly, most importantly a change in 1992 in how and when and what design information would be reported to the IAEA. During 1991-1996, the IAEA pursued intensive study, legal and technical analysis, and field trials and held numerous consultations with Member States. The Board of Governors discussed the issue of

  9. Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of a nuclear power station from the People's Republic of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of a Nuclear Power Station from the People's Republic of China is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 22 February 2007. Pursuant to Section 30 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 22 February 2007, upon signature by the Director General of the Agency and by the authorised representative of Pakistan

  10. Two low-level gamma spectrometry systems of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parus, J.L. [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Raab, W. [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Donohue, D. [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Jansta, V. [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Kierzek, J. [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria)

    1997-03-01

    A gamma spectrometry system designed for the measurement of samples with low and medium radioactivity (activity from a few to about 10{sup 4} Bq in the energy range from 25 to 2700 keV) has been installed at the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf. The system consists of 3 low level detectors: (1) n-type coaxial Ge with 42.4% relative efficiency, 1.85 keV FWHM at 1.33 MeV (2) planar Ge with 2000 mm{sup 2} area and 20 mm thickness, 562 eV FWHM at 122 keV (3) NaI(Tl) annulus of 25.4 cm diameter and 25.4 cm height, hole diameter 90 mm. (orig./DG)

  11. Trade Analysis and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In order to verify compliance with safeguards and draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collects and analyses trade information that it receives from open sources as well as from Member States. Although the IAEA does not intervene in national export controls, it has to monitor the trade of dual use items. Trade analysis helps the IAEA to evaluate global proliferation threats, to understand States' ability to report exports according to additional protocols but also to compare against State declarations. Consequently, the IAEA has explored sources of trade-related information and has developed analysis methodologies beyond its traditional safeguards approaches. (author)

  12. Status of safeguards instrumentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is performing safeguards at some nuclear power reactors, 50 bulk processing facilities, and 170 research facilities. Its verification activities require the use of instruments to measure nuclear materials and of surveillance instruments to maintain continuity of knowledge of the locations of nuclear materials. Instruments that are in use and under development to measure weight, volume, concentration, and isotopic composition of nuclear materials, and the major surveillance instruments, are described in connection with their uses at representative nuclear facilities. The current status of safeguards instrumentation and the needs for future development are discussed

  13. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  14. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  15. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  16. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  17. An application of the controllable unit approach (CUA) to the analysis of safeguards measurement systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The controllable unit approach (CUA) is a material control and accountability methodology that takes into account the system logic and statistical characteristics of a plant process through the formulation of closure equations. The methodology is adaptable to plant processes of varying degrees of design and operational complexity. No alteration or modification of a process is required to apply the methodology. Cost/benefits of refinements in, or changes to, the proposed measurement system are obtained as incremental cost. To encourage improved safeguards accountability, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been considering the use of performance-oriented regulations to supplement those currently used. The study, sponsored by NRC/Office of Standards Development, evaluated CUA methodology to meet performance-oriented regulations. For this study, the criterion is defined as the detection of a material loss of two kilograms of SNM with 97.5% confidence. Specifically investigated were the timeliness of detection, the ability to localize material loss, process coverage, cost/benefits, and compatibility with other safeguards techniques such as diversion path analysis and data filtering. The feasibility of performance-oriented regulations is demonstrated. To use the system of closure equations fully, a procedure was developed to integrate formally the effect of both short-term and long-term closure equations into an overall systems criterion of performance. Both single and multiple diversion strategies are examined in order to show how the CUA method can protect against either strategy. Quantitative results show that combined closure equations improve the detection sensitivity to material loss, and that multiple diversions provide only diminishing returns. (author)

  18. Safeguards-by-design: 3S integration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Design and construction of a nuclear energy system, particularly the first of its kind - or the first for a given host state - is an immensely complex undertaking. Additionally safeguards, security, and safety each have significant requirements that must be properly addressed by the facility and system design effort. However, the requirements are often in apparent conflict. A simple example would be the safety requirement for emergency egress doors contrasted against the physical security requirement to limit and control access points. This conflict is significant, even as it is often understated. The potential for conflict is increased when different parties are responsible for each component, as in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) performing safeguards while the host state provides for safety and security. Early and complete identification of requirements is critical to design success. This allows consideration of intrinsic design features that can satisfy all parties. The majority of the cost to design and build a facility is committed by the end of the conceptual design. As the design progresses, the cost to change the facility via retrofits is increasingly, even prohibitively, expensive, both in money and time. Conflicts among the safeguards, security, and safety design requirements must be resolved early to allow optimal design solutions, and to avoid costly backfits. The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) project currently underway in the United States is developing a design process that will fully integrate safeguards (to include state and international safeguards, and proliferation barriers) and security into the facility design process, with close coordination with safety. The SBD process includes key features such as early safeguards and security input to the facility requirements documents, a systems approach to nonproliferation and security considerations within the design effort, and agreed upon timelines for communicating with the IAEA. The

  19. IAEA Safeguards: possible future developments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The paper describes the fundamental elements of safeguards under comprehensive safeguards agreements as the provision by States to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of a set of core parameters related to the production and utilization of nuclear material and the provision by States of access to the IAEA to locations that are essential for it to carry out its responsibilities. The paper describes the way in which, over time, the extent of the information shared and the access granted has changed. It is noted that, initially, the IAEA system focused primarily on nuclear material declared by the State, but that this focus proved to be inadequate to meet in the fullest degree the requirements of the NPT and its requirement that safeguards be applied to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities. Examples are given that describe several adaptations that were made to the safeguards system in order to ensure that the IAEA could provide assurance to its Member States of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities at a facility or in a State and that all of a State's nuclear activities are subject to the appropriate safeguards measures. The paper points out that these changes began in the late 1970's but that the new and dramatic changes resulted from the discovery in Iraq of a large clandestine nuclear weapon program in the early 1990's. The paper then outlines how the IAEA could, in the future, meet its objectives better and/or more efficiently by taking advantage of additional information about the operation of facilities as well as new technologies to both provide and to analyze this information. Two areas that seem particularly relevant to explore are described. One is providing the IAEA with operating information available from automated and/or highly instrumented plant operations. This would be particularly relevant in instances where one of the important goals of the IAEA was ensuring the absence of undeclared operations at a declared

  20. Data Collection Guidelines for Consistent Evaluation of Data from Verification and Monitoring Safeguard Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    One of the several activities the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors perform in the verification process of Safeguard operations is the review and correlation of data from different sources. This process is often complex due to the different forms in which the data is presented. This paper describes some of the elements that are necessary to create a ''standardized'' structure for the verification of data. When properly collected and formatted, data can be analyzed with off-the shelf software applications using customized macros to automate the commands for the desired analysis. The standardized-data collection methodology is based on instrumentation guidelines as well as data structure elements, such as verifiable timing of data entry, automated data logging, identification codes, and others. The identification codes are used to associate data items with their sources and to correlate them with items from other data logging activities. The addition of predefined parameter ranges allows automated evaluation with the capability to provide a data summary, a cross-index of all data related to a specific event. Instances of actual databases are used as examples. The data collection guidelines described in this paper facilitate the use of data from a variety of instrumentation platforms and also allow the instrumentation itself to be more easily applied in subsequent monitoring applications

  1. Process: (international) safeguards interface at the Portsmouth GCEP from the safeguards technology developer's viewpoint

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The design of a major portion of a safeguards system for possible use by IAEA at the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant is described from the viewpoint of the safeguards technology developer. The process-safeguards interface is reviewed, including safeguards, process, and operational constraints on the safeguards system. The conflicting requirements of the IAEA and the plant operator are minimized through the use of advanced technology that allows safeguards data to be acquired, analyzed, and reported in an automated, unattended mode. The proposed safeguards system will reduce the impact of the inspections on both the operator and the IAEA

  2. Beyond NPA and toward an integrated safeguards system in countries of the European Union

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The NPA in its present status is at the end of its physiological life, the AP and the provisions of the Integrated Safeguards requires a revisit of the present arrangements with EURATOM. In this regard the following elements could be considered: a) Some of the Euratom functions could be transferred to the State/Operator making Easier the use of short notice or unannounced inspections; b) The use of authenticated surveillance with remote transmission capabilities; c) Electronic seals and unattended monitoring/measuring systems with simultaneous remote transmission to the IAEA HQ and to Euratom. For the Additional Protocol the IAEA has the infrastructure to deal with all requirements of the AP and this can be taken into account to avoid duplications in Euratom. Some of the functions of the Euratom could be also taken over by the IAEA in order to avoid duplications and increase the efficiency provided that the necessary. Financial resources are made available by the EU. (author)

  3. Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Republic of Latvia on 1 October 2008. 2. As a result of the entry into force of the aforesaid Agreement for the Republic of Latvia, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, has been suspended

  4. The text of the agreement of 11 June 1971 between Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for Finland on 1 October 1995. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Finland, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 11 June 1971, which entered into force on 9 February 1972, between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been suspended

  5. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Canada written notification that Canada's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 8 September 2000

  6. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 5 July 2000. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Azerbaijan written notification that Azerbaijan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 29 November 2000

  7. Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 12 September 1995. It was signed on 27 September 1995 in Vienna and 14 June 1996 in Chisinau. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 May 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Moldova written notification that Moldova's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  8. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 28 September 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from the Czech Republic written notification that the Czech Republic's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 1 July 2002

  9. Overview of safeguards aspects related to MOX fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Recent developments in the light of the IAEA verification requirements for MOX fuel at reactors and bulk handling facilities are discussed. Impact of the Additional Protocol and Integrated Safeguards System is briefly addressed. Agency's work undertaken with regard to the nuclear arms control and reduction is presented. (author)

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 2005

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2010. It was signed on 7 October 2011 in Banjul, The Gambia, and on 18 October 2011 in Vienna, Austria

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 September 2001. It was signed in Vienna on 5 December 2001

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 14 September 2004. It was signed on 9 December 2004 in Vienna

  15. Communication Dated 9 May 2011 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the Director General on Implementation of Safeguards in Iran

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Secretariat has received a communication dated 9 May 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency enclosing an explanatory note on the report of the Director General on 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran' contained in GOV/2011/7. As requested by the Permanent Mission, the explanatory note is circulated for information

  16. The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977 between Maldives and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Maldives and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  17. Text of the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Succession by the Czech Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In a communication received on 24 March 1993, the Government of the Czech Republic informed the Director General, inter alia, that by virtue of succession to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, it was a Party, with effect from 1 January 1993, to the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  18. Text of a Protocol between the Agency and the Governments of Norway and the United States of America in Connection with the Application of Safeguards under a Co-Operation Agreement between the Two Governments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of a protocol between the Agency and the Governments of Norway and the United States of America in connection with the application of safeguards under the Agreement for Co-operation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Norway Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy signed on 4 May 1967, as amended, is reproduced herein for the information of all Members. The protocol entered into force on 25 September 1973 pursuant to Section 4.

  19. Protocol between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)1 is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 9 April 2003

  20. The text of the agreement of 18 September 1987 between Chile and the Agency for the application of safeguards to nuclear material supplied from the People's Republic of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Chile and the Agency for the application of safeguards to nuclear material in the form of UF6, enriched to 20% in the isotope U-235, supplied from the People's Republic of China for the fabrication of MTR-type fuel elements for Lo Aguirre research reactor, is reproduced. The agreement entered into force on 18 September 1987

  1. The Text of the Agreement of 28 July 1975 between Swaziland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 28 July 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Swaziland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 July 1975, pursuant to Article 24 thereof. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  2. The Text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Morocco and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 18 February 1975, pursuant to Article 25. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  3. The Text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 between Sudan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 and of the Protocol thereto, between Sudan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 January 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999

  5. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000

  6. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Amendment of Article 17

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the amendment to the Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The amendment was approved by the Board of Governors in June 1999, and entered into force on 10 September 1999

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria

  9. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003

  12. The Text of the Agreement of 22 July 1977 between Argentina and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with a Co-operation Agreement between Argentina and Canada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement of 22 July 1977 between Argentina and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Agreement of 30 January 1976 between the Governments of Argentina and Canada for co-operation in the development and application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Section 31, on 22 July 1977.

  13. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000

  14. Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  2. Safeguards implementation in the nuclear fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1978-01-01

    Today's trend toward tightening regulations and increasingly stringent safeguards underscores the necessity for safeguards criteria to be incorporated at an early stage in the design of future fuel cycle facilities. IAEA and national safeguards systems are discussed. The U.S. Safeguards R and D program is described in some detail: reference facility (Barnwell) safeguards system design, dynamic materials accounting systems (DYMAC), etc. The safeguards problem of the conversion process (Pu nitrate to PuO/sub 2/) is considered. Recent developments and trends in measurement technology are reviewed. 79 references, 6 figures. (DLC)

  3. Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by exchange of letters with the Republic of Mauritius in connection with the amendment of Article 15 of the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Through the attached Exchange of Letters, Article 15 of the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been amended to read as follows: 'The Government of Mauritius and the Agency will bear the expenses incurred by them in implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However, if the Government of Mauritius or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may request.'

  4. Technology development for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency

  5. The Text of a Protocol between the Agency and the Governments of Thailand and the United States of America Terminating the Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the United States of America for the Application of Safeguards and Terminating the Protocol Suspending that Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of a protocol between the Agency and the Governments of Thailand and the United States of America terminating the Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the United States of America for the Application of Safeguards and terminating the Protocol suspending that Agreement is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Protocol entered into force on 27 June 1974, pursuant to Section 6 thereof.

  6. Measurement and simulation of a Compton suppression system for safeguards application

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lee, Seung Kyu; Seo, Hee; Won, Byung-Hee; Lee, Chaehun; Shin, Hee-Sung; Na, Sang-Ho; Song, Dae-Yong; Kim, Ho-Dong; Park, Geun-Il; Park, Se-Hwan

    2015-11-01

    Plutonium (Pu) contents in spent nuclear fuels, recovered uranium (U) or uranium/transuranium (U/TRU) products must be measured in order to secure the safeguardability of a pyroprocessing facility. Self-induced X-Ray fluorescence (XRF) and gamma-ray spectroscopy are useful techniques for determining Pu-to-U ratios and Pu isotope ratios of spent fuel. Photon measurements of spent nuclear fuel by using high-resolution spectrometers such as high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors show a large continuum background in the low-energy region, which is due in large part to Compton scattering of energetic gamma rays. This paper proposes a Compton suppression system for reducing of the Compton continuum background. In the present study, the system was configured by using an HPGe main detector and a BGO (bismuth germanate: Bi4Ge3O12) guard detector. The system performances for gamma-ray measurement and XRF were evaluated by means of Monte Carlo simulations and measurements of the radiation source. The Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) simulations were performed using the same geometry as for the experiments, and considered, for exact results, the production of secondary electrons and photons. As a performance test of the Compton suppression system, the peak-to-Compton ratio, which is a figure of merit to evaluate the gamma-ray detection, was enhanced by a factor of three or more when the Compton suppression system was used.

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 13 June 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 27 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 27 September 2007, upon signature by the representatives of Burundi and the Agency

  8. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 25 November 2004. It was signed in Vienna on 11 May 2005. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 5 March 2009, the date on which the Agency received from Colombia written notification that Colombia's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Additional Protocol), the Additional Protocol, which had been applied provisionally from 17 February 2010, entered into force on 10 October 2012, the date upon which the Agency received written notification from Iraq that Iraq's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  10. Agreement of 5 April 1995 between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 26, on 5 April 1995

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Iceland and the Agency, i.e., on 12 September 2003

  12. Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 9 June 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 19 January 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  13. Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  14. Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereof) between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Roseau, Dominica on 3 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 3 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  15. Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 26 June 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 26 June 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  16. Agreement of 8 October 1994 between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 February 1994 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1994 and in Tashkent on 8 October 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 8 October 1994

  17. Agreement of 14 April 1995 between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 November 1994 and in Minsk on 14 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 August 1995

  18. Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 5 June 2012. It was signed on 6 June 2012 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 4 April 2013, the date on which the Agency received from Bosnia and Herzegovina written notification that Bosnia and Herzegovina's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 22 March 2013, upon signature by the representatives of the Denmark and the Agency.

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 16 April 2014 in Basseterre, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and on 19 May 2014 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 May 2014, upon signature by the representatives of Saint Kitts and Nevis and the Agency

  1. Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1991 and signed in Vienna on 30 January 1992. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 10 April 1992

  2. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Madagascar and the Agency, i.e., on 18 September 2003

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 28 November 2002. It was signed on 24 April 2003 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 12 July 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Malta written notification that Malta's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  5. Agreement between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 13 June 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 27 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 27 September 2007, upon signature by the representatives of Burundi and the Agency. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  6. Agreement Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of Two Nuclear Power Stations from the People's Republic of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of two Nuclear Power Stations from the People's Republic of China is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 8 March 2011. It was signed on 15 April 2011 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Section 30 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 15 April 2011, upon signature by the representatives of Pakistan and the Agency

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  8. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 19 July 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 July 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Afghanistan and the Agency

  9. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 January 2006, the date on which the Agency received from Ukraine written notification that Ukraine's constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  10. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  11. Effective use of information under IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    International Safeguards, applied for more than 25 years, consists of a complex control system based on nuclear material accountancy. The technical objective is to provide for 'the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devises or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection' (para. 28, INFCIRC 153). Each Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT undertakes to accept full-scope IAEA Safeguards to all nuclear material within the State's territory or under it's jurisdiction or control. The current Safeguards system is focused on declared facilities and activities. It involves the independent verifications of the States' declarations. The IAEA's effort to Strengthen International Safeguards include measures to increase the information provided by States on their nuclear programmes, broader access to 'other information' and measures related to increased physical access to sites and to the effectiveness of that access. The general approach is to compare a State's declared nuclear activities with supplementary information available to the IAEA, and to find any apparent inconsistencies. This paper presents an overview of the sources of information available to the Agency and its use with the overall goal of detecting at a very early stage undeclared nuclear activities. (author)

  12. Safeguards technology research and development at CIAE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) is a multi-disciplinary institute under the leadership of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Safeguards was established at CIAE in 1991 to develop safeguards technology and to provide technical assistance to competent authorities for nuclear material management and control, which became one of the key laboratories approved by CNNC in 1993. The main research works for safeguards at CIAE include: nuclear material control and accounting, facilities license review and assessment, domestic inspection, NDA and DA analysis, physical protection and technical training. Research and development of equipment and technique for safeguards has been continuing at CIAE. A variety of NDA equipment that has different resolution and analysis capability has been developed. Method of NDA measurement has been investigated for nuclear material with different characteristics. Mathematics method such as Monte Carlo simulation is applied in NDA. Advanced destructive analysis (DA) instrument is installed at laboratory of CIAE, such as TIMS, ICP-MS and electronic chemistry analyzing system. The high accuracy results of element analysis and isotopic analysis for nuclear material can be obtained. It is possible to measure the types and quantities of nuclear material in a given area by means of NDA and DA. Physical protection system has also been developed. It consists of access control and management, various alarm (including perimeter alarm, intrusion alarms, fire alarms), video and audio monitors, intercommunication set and central console. The system can meet technical requirement for safeguards of first rank. Nuclear material accounting is an important aspect of safeguards research at CIAE. The computer software related to material accounting has been developed. It is the important task for scientists at CIAE to design and review nuclear accounting systems in various facilities. For

  13. IAEA safeguards: Challenges and opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The history of the IAEA safeguards regime is described. New challenges and opportunities are discussed in connection with the discovery in Iraq of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme, the difficulties experienced in the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Argentina, Brazil and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, recent developments in South Africa, the emergence of newly independent States that made up the former USSR. 2 figs

  14. You, your facility and IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the seven year period since the ratification of the Safeguards Agreement between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the involved U.S. agencies and the IAEA have worked together to assure the effective implementation of international safeguards. There has been a continual effort to develop programs and procedures to improve performance and efficiency for the benefit of selected facilities and the IAEA. This paper discusses the implementation and economic impact of safeguards inspections on the IAEA and selected facilities and the ongoing effort to enhance performance and efficiency without compromising the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards

  15. Agency Full Time Equivalency Reporting System

    Data.gov (United States)

    US Agency for International Development — AFTERS provides an automated means for the Agency to report its full time equivalency work years to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Office of...

  16. The Canadian safeguards support program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canada supports international safeguards as a means by which the proliferation of nuclear weapons can be discouraged. Canada recognizes that,to meet that the IAEA must have effective safeguards techniques and the active cooperation of Member States. Therefore the Canadian Government decided in 1976 to initiate a program in support of IAEA safeguards, known as the Canadian Safeguards Support Program (CSSP). The CSSP is funded and administered by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB). The CSSP is a co-ordinated program for the development and the application of safeguards instruments and techniques for nuclear facilities and materials on behalf of the IAEA and also in support of Canada's own national nuclear material safeguards system, implemented by the AECB. (author)

  17. IAEA safeguards at research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency applies safeguards to almost 150 facilities classified as research reactors. From a safeguards point of view, these facilities present a spectrum of features that must be addressed both from the nuclear material and from the operational viewpoints. The nuclear fuel used by these reactors varies from high enriched uranium (NEU), up to 93 U-235, to natural uranium and the thermal power output from over 100 megawatt to less than ten watts. Research reactors are also used for a wide variety of purposes, including materials testing, radiosotope production, training and nuclear physics studies. The effort spent by the Agency in safeguarding these reactors is dependant upon the thermal power of the reactor and on the quantity and type of nuclear material present. On some research reactors, the Agency devotes more inspection effort than on a large power reactor. On others, very little effort is reguired. Safeguards that are applied are done so according to Agency State agreements and consist of a combiination of nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance. In this paper, the safeguards activities performed by the State and by the Agency will be reviewed for a large (≤50MWt) and for a small (≥ 1 MWt) reactor according to the most common type agreement. (author)

  18. Safeguard Verification as Cooperative Measure for Non Proliferation Control in Peru

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peru applies the safeguard measures on its nuclear activities based in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreement and the Additional Protocol which has been fully implemented becoming part of the Integrated Safeguard since 2005. In addition to international safeguard commitments Peru is also committed with the United Nations 1540 Resolution by which national controls has to be established for preventing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their vector systems. The safeguards measures have become an important part of the verification activities related to this Resolution by analyzing of materials and equipment to be imported or that may be in transit across the country. These activities are part of those developed jointly with other governmental organizations. (author)

  19. Complementarities between nuclear security, safeguards and national system of accounting for and control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Nuclear security deals with prevention against theft and diversion of nuclear materials and sabotage against nuclear materials or installations. It is based on provisions of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities complemented by: Provisions for accounting for and control to prevent and, where appropriate, detect loss, theft or diversion of nuclear materials; The nuclear safety provisions to protect nuclear materials and facilities against sabotage. Safeguards are based on the statements and accounting controls in the facilities. The respective aim of EURATOM and IAEA controls is to verify afterwards the respect for the declared use of materials or political commitments undertaken by States under the nonproliferation purpose. However, EURATOM and IAEA controls are not exercised at all facilities (including those working for defence purposes) or in respect of all nuclear materials subject to the French national control. In addition, these international safeguards do not deal with physical protection of nuclear materials which is the sole responsibility of the State. The national control, implemented in France, is positioned upstream to the international controls. It aims to prevent, deter and detect the loss, theft or diversion of nuclear materials in installations or during transport. It places the responsibility of a possible diversion at the operator level. It is made of different components that complement each other and form a coherent whole. This includes: physical protection; accounting for and control; inspections. The physical protection system has to protect nuclear materials against a malicious act. Malicious act means a theft or diversion of nuclear material or an act of sabotage affecting nuclear materials or facilities which could lead to radiological releases into the environment. The accounting for and control system of nuclear materials has to allow the continuous and accurate knowledge of the quantity, quality and

  20. Reassessment of safeguards parameters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Richter, J.L.; Mullen, M.F.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is reassessing the timeliness and goal quantity parameters that are used in defining safeguards approaches. This study reviews technology developments since the parameters were established in the 1970s and concludes that there is no reason to relax goal quantity or conversion time for reactor-grade plutonium relative to weapons-grade plutonium. For low-enriched uranium, especially in countries with advanced enrichment capability there may be an incentive to shorten the detection time.

  1. The text of the Agreement between Egypt and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Egypt to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

  2. A study of a zone approach to IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches

  3. A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-06-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches.

  4. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

  5. Migration of safeguards instrumentation: Challenges and opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Development of new safeguards instrumentation for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is spurred by a number of factors: Technical issues, including the emergence of new technologies and the inevitable obsolescence of system components, as well as policy-related issues including changes in safeguards policies, new approaches to the safeguarding of excess material, and the introduction of new types of facilities. To cope with these issues, development projects are required that migrate between current safeguards systems and state-of-the-art technology. These projects usually involve IAEA staff as well as Member States and their Support Programs (MSSP), the private sector, and research and development institutions. One such development project currently underway is the migration between the IAEA's DCM-14 based surveillance system to the Next Generation Surveillance System (NGSS). The challenges and opportunities of the NGSS project include those factors that prompted the migration, the development of user requirements, and the selection of appropriate development partners and funding resources. This paper will outline the challenges, issues, opportunities, and synergies that relate to safeguards instrumentation migration, using the NGSS project as an example. The problems necessitating new development will be outlined, as will the management of these problems from project initiation until new instrumentation is available for replacement. The generation of user requirements will be explained in detail. Focus will be given to how to best manage this process in order to produce requirements that will be useful both during the development project and after the migration is completed. The challenges and opportunities in the selection and procurement process will then be highlighted, followed by the structure of the actual development project. Finally, a summary of key steps that can help alleviate migration problems and the pressure to quickly complete

  6. Policy study on preparation for the implementation of IAEA strengthened safeguards system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Byung Koo; Kwack, E.H.; Rheem, K.S. [and others

    1998-04-01

    The objectives of this study was to analyze the language of the protocol, evaluate the impact on the nuclear activities and discuss various measures such as the amendment draft of the Korean Atomic Energy Act and subsidiaries, proposals for the negotiation with the recommendation to the organization and facilities in Korea on how to deal with the new situation. First, newly imposed responsibilities to the State and researchers was extracted through the article-by-article analysis of the protocol and through the comparison with the existing safeguards system. Second, the way to minimize the possible burden of the researchers and facility operators was presented in implementing SSS by reflecting their opinions and ideas in the restructuring of the legal system. It also tried to find any problem in implementing the measures of the Protocol domestically so that they could be mitigated before implementation and recommend future milestones. Finally, the way to actively cope with the international non-proliferation regime and to enhance transparency was brought up by observing other countries' attitudes on the SSS. (author). 40 refs., 8 tabs., 8 figs.

  7. Policy study on preparation for the implementation of IAEA strengthened safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The objectives of this study was to analyze the language of the protocol, evaluate the impact on the nuclear activities and discuss various measures such as the amendment draft of the Korean Atomic Energy Act and subsidiaries, proposals for the negotiation with the recommendation to the organization and facilities in Korea on how to deal with the new situation. First, newly imposed responsibilities to the State and researchers was extracted through the article-by-article analysis of the protocol and through the comparison with the existing safeguards system. Second, the way to minimize the possible burden of the researchers and facility operators was presented in implementing SSS by reflecting their opinions and ideas in the restructuring of the legal system. It also tried to find any problem in implementing the measures of the Protocol domestically so that they could be mitigated before implementation and recommend future milestones. Finally, the way to actively cope with the international non-proliferation regime and to enhance transparency was brought up by observing other countries' attitudes on the SSS. (author). 40 refs., 8 tabs., 8 figs

  8. Agency Secure Image And Storage Tracking System (ASIST)

    Data.gov (United States)

    US Agency for International Development — Agency Secure Image and Storage Tracking System (Missions): is a Documentum-based user interface developed and maintained by the USAID OCIO (formerly IRM) to...

  9. Agreement between the government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of Republic of Estonia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 24 February 1992, signed in Vienna on 18 November 1997 and in Tallinn on 24 November 1997, and entered into force on 24 November 1997

  10. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control

  11. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  12. Remote monitoring of radio frequency tamper indicating devices in international safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has placed large quantities of direct use material under international safeguards at a dedicated location. In order to increase efficiency and effectiveness, it was decided to install remote monitoring (RM) systems that allow active radio-frequency tamper-indicating devices (seals) to be interrogated and video surveillance system data to be reviewed, at any time, from dedicated computers at the Agency's headquarters (HQ) in Vienna, Austria. The purpose of this paper is to describe the work performed to develop, install and test RM systems that are being used to reduce inspection costs while increasing the availability and accuracy of critical safeguards information. In this application, the new RM systems replace an interim safeguards solution whereby seals and video surveillance data were reviewed on site by Agency safeguards inspectors at each (monthly) inspection. The Agency is reviewing a cost benefit analysis of these systems and it is expected that physical inspection frequency can be reduced to five inspections annually. The video surveillance and seals RM systems are completely independent and data are separately forwarded to the Agency's HQ. This is the first application where the Agency has implemented an independent RM system for a large number of seals. It is also the Agency's first implementation of radio frequency communication between a large group of seals and a remote data collection system. During 2005, the new RM systems were installed and the transfer of data to the Agency's HQ was tested. The systems have successfully completed a trial period with no 'safeguards significant' system failures. System architecture, data protection methods, implementation and results of the field test will be discussed. (author)

  13. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  14. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  15. Technology guidance for safeguards information management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Manatt, D.R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Howell, J.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Steinmaus, K.; St. Pierre, D. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Deland, S.M.; Vandewart, R. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1994-09-01

    The Safeguards Information Management Systems project, SIMS, seeks to provide information access tools to the IAEA to assist in implementation of enhanced safeguards. The Technology and Systems Group advises the SIMS project in the selection of hardware and software, the integration of system components, and the evaluation of realistic information management approaches. The group`s guidance has led to reevaluation of the system hardware choices, visual data storage methods, and geographical data sources. Consultation with the Agency has resulted in a major realignment of the effort towards providing information access on Networked Microsoft Windows desk top computers rather than separate SUN workstations. The manner in which imagery is stored and presented is another developing area. Initial systems delivered to the Agency relied on analogue video disc recorders and VCRs. Future systems will store and manipulate digital images. The initial source of map data for the workstation was analogue video discs from the US Defense Mapping Agency. Many of these maps are restricted in their distribution, therefore additional map data sources were developed. The Technology map data sources were developed. The Technology and Systems Group`s efforts to steer a clear course through this ever changing mine-field is described.

  16. IAEA safeguards technical manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Part F of the Safeguards Technical Manual is being issued in three volumes. Volume 1 was published in 1977 and revised slightly in 1979. Volume 1 discusses basic probability concepts, statistical inference, models and measurement errors, estimation of measurement variances, and calibration. These topics of general interest in a number of application areas, are presented with examples drawn from nuclear materials safeguards. The final two chapters in Volume 1 deal with problem areas unique to safeguards: calculating the variance of MUF and of D respectively. Volume 2 continues where Volume 1 left off with a presentation of topics of specific interest to Agency safeguards. These topics include inspection planning from a design and effectiveness evaluation viewpoint, on-facility site inspection activities, variables data analysis as applied to inspection data, preparation of inspection reports with respect to statistical aspects of the inspection, and the distribution of inspection samples to more than one analytical laboratory. Volume 3 covers generally the same material as Volumes 1 and 2 but with much greater unity and cohesiveness. Further, the cook-book style of the previous two volumes has been replaced by one that makes use of equations and formulas as opposed to computational steps, and that also provides the bases for the statistical procedures discussed. Hopefully, this will help minimize the frequency of misapplications of the techniques

  17. VISA: a method for evaluating the performance of integrated safeguards systems at nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This is the second volume of a two volume report on the VISA method for evaluating safeguards at fixed-site facilities. This volume contains appendices that support the description of the VISA concept and the initial working version of the method, VISA-1, presented in Volume I. The information is separated into four appendices, each describing details of one of the four analysis modules that comprise the analysis sections of the method. The first appendix discusses Path Analysis methodology, applies it to a Model Fuel Facility, and describes the computer codes that are being used. Introductory material on Path Analysis given in Chapter 3.2.1 and Chapter 4.2.1 of Volume I. The second appendix deals with Detection Analysis, specifically the schemes used in VISA-1 for classifying adversaries and the methods proposed for evaluating individual detection mechanisms in order to build the data base required for detection analysis. Examples of evaluations on identity-access systems, SNM portal monitors, and intrusion devices are provided. The third appendix describes the Containment Analysis overt-segment path ranking, the Monte Carlo engagement model, the network simulation code, the delay mechanism data base, and the results of a sensitivity analysis. The last appendix presents general equations used in Interruption Analysis for combining covert-overt segments and compares them with equations given in Volume I, Chapter 3

  18. Use of Antineutrino Detectors for Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Effectiveness Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bernstein, A; Lambert, H E; Elayat, H A; O' Connell, W J; Rexroth, P; Baldwin, G; Bowden, N; Huelskamp, R

    2006-06-05

    As described in an earlier article [1], important information regarding reactor power and the amount and type of fissile material in reactor cores can be determined by measuring the antineutrino rate and energy spectrum, using a cubic meter scale antineutrino detector at tens of meters standoff from the core. Current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards techniques do not provide such real-time quantitative information regarding core power levels and isotopic composition. The possible benefits of this approach are several and have been discussed in the earlier article. One key advantage is that the method gives the inspecting agency completely independent access to real-time information on the operational status and fissile content of the core. Furthermore, the unattended and non-intrusive nature of the technology may reduce the monitoring burden on the plant operator, even though more information is being provided than is available within the current IAEA safeguards regime. Here we present a detailed analytical framework for measuring the impact that such a detector might have on IAEA safeguards, if implemented. To perform the analysis, we will use initial data from our operating detector and a standard analysis technique for safeguards regimes, developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Because characterization of the prototype detector is still underway, and because improvements in the prototype could have important impact on safeguards performance, the results presented here should be understood to be preliminary, and not reflective of the ultimate performance of the system. The structure of this paper is as follows. Reactor safeguards and the relevant properties of antineutrino detectors are briefly reviewed. A set of hypothetical diversion scenarios are then described, and one of these is analyzed using the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Integrated Safeguards System Analysis Tool (LISSAT) The probability of successful

  19. Transition to integrated safeguards at nuclear fuel fabrication plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full-text: This paper presents the improvements in efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards approach applied at depleted, natural and low enriched uranium (DNLEU) conversion and fuel fabrication plants (FFPs) following a transition from traditional safeguards (TS) to integrated safeguards1 (IS). The paper will explain the relationship between the Agency drawing a broader conclusion for a State and the implementation of IS, highlight how the transition from TS to IS can be accomplished, and describe a process by which IS can be introduced through a combination of good IAEA-National Authority cooperation and field trials. For demonstration purposes, a comparison of the onsite safeguards activities before and after the introduction of IS at a fuel fabrication plant which manufactures both PWR (Pressurized Water Reactors) fuel assemblies and CANDU fuel bundles will be examined. It is expected that this will provide a good reference baseline on the safeguards improvements made possible by the introduction of IS at fuel fabrication facilities without mixed oxide fuels (MOX). The paper will also show the operational and logistical differences between the TS and IS regimes and highlight some of the advantages to a State for which a broader conclusion has been drawn by the Agency. The paper will offer technical insight to safeguards coverage of nuclear material borrowing scenarios and implementation of other safeguards measures such as the introduction of short notice random inspections (SNRI), use of a secure mailbox system at the FFP, and implementation of random interim inspections (RIIs) at LWRs (Light Water Reactors) and CANDU power reactors. (author)

  20. The spread of international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force on 5 March 1970 by the ratification of 40 non-nuclear-weapon States and that of three nuclear weapon States - the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR. Since then it has been signed by 98 States, and now 73 States have ratified it. For more than a year the Safeguards Committee (1970), a Committee established by the Board and open to all member States of the Agency, discussed the Structure and Content of Agreements to be concluded between the Agency and States Party to the Treaty in order to fulfill their obligations under it. Today, of the 73 States that have ratified the NPT, agreements have already been concluded with 25 States, and negotiations are underway with 31 other States including the five non-nuclear-weapon States Members of the European Community (Euratom). At its June session, the Board of Governors of the IAEA approved the text of a co-operation agreement between the Agency and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), which was established to ensure compliance with the obligations contracted by States Party to the Tlatelolco Treaty. It will be remembered that that Treaty was signed in Tlatelolco in 1967 by 22 Latin American countries. Since then 19 States have ratified it, and the additional protocols have been signed and ratified by two of the nuclear powers - the UK and the USA. As Dr. Eklund, Director General of the IAEA, has remarked, 'the Treaty of Tlatelolco could be regarded as the first multilateral treaty in the field of nuclear disarmament which provides for the application of an institutionalized and international control system, and as such it represented a decisive step forward in the recognition and acceptance of international safeguards'. Both the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty call upon the IAEA to perform one of its main statutory functions: that is, to apply safeguards at the request of the parties to a multilateral

  1. Waste management safeguards project: History of and recommendations for development activities in support of safeguards of final disposal of spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coordinated safeguards assessment and development activities in support of the U.S. Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS) and international safeguards objectives were initiated in Fiscal Year 1987. Initial technical support activities were performed at the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM); however, as the priority of support activities changed, direction for the support tasks was transferred to the U.S. Department of State (State), the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/IS-40), and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The direction for technical support activities was established at the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) advisory group meeting and subsequent consultants' meetings on safeguards related to the final disposal of nuclear material contained in waste and spent fuel. Task directions for the development of international safeguards in support of the final disposal of spent fuel are currently being provided by DOE/IS-40. A summary of safeguards activities performed by the Waste Management Safeguards Project is provided. Systems for design information verification for spent fuel consolidation and conditioning operations are needed immediately. Safeguards approaches for maintaining continuity of knowledge of spent fuel processed at the conditioning facility and for verification of the final disposal package will be needed within three years. Systems for design information verification of the repository facilities will be needed by the end of the decade

  2. Advances toward a transportable antineutrino detector system for reactor monitoring and safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reyna, D. [Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Bernstein, A. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Lund, J.; Kiff, S.; Cabrera-Palmer, B. [Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Bowden, N. S.; Dazeley, S.; Keefer, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States)

    2011-07-01

    Nuclear reactors have served as the neutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Our SNL/LLNL collaboration has demonstrated that such antineutrino based monitoring is feasible using a relatively small cubic meter scale liquid scintillator detector at tens of meters standoff from a commercial Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). With little or no burden on the plant operator we have been able to remotely and automatically monitor the reactor operational status (on/off), power level, and fuel burnup. The initial detector was deployed in an underground gallery that lies directly under the containment dome of an operating PWR. The gallery is 25 meters from the reactor core center, is rarely accessed by plant personnel, and provides a muon-screening effect of some 20-30 meters of water equivalent earth and concrete overburden. Unfortunately, many reactor facilities do not contain an equivalent underground location. We have therefore attempted to construct a complete detector system which would be capable of operating in an aboveground location and could be transported to a reactor facility with relative ease. A standard 6-meter shipping container was used as our transportable laboratory - containing active and passive shielding components, the antineutrino detector and all electronics, as well as climate control systems. This aboveground system was deployed and tested at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in southern California in 2010 and early 2011. We will first present an overview of the initial demonstrations of our below ground detector. Then we will describe the aboveground system and the technological developments of the two antineutrino

  3. Reporting of safeguards events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    On June 9, 1987, the Commission published in the Federal Register a final rule revising the reporting requirements for safeguards events. Safeguards events include actual or attempted theft of special nuclear material (SNM); actual or attempted acts or events which interrupt normal operations at power reactors due to unauthorized use of or tampering with machinery, components, or controls; certain threats made against facilities possessing SNM; and safeguards system failures impacting the effectiveness of the system. The revised rule was effective October 8, 1987. On September 14, 1987, the NRC held a workshop in Bethesda, MD, to answer affected licensees' questions on the final rule. This report documents questions discussed at the September 14 meeting, reflects a completed staff review of the answers, and supersedes previous oral comment on the topics covered

  4. Reversing the Trend: Creating a Growing and Sustainable Cadre of Safeguards Experts in the United States

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lockwood, Dunbar; Mathews, Caroline E.; Seward, Amy M.

    2008-07-17

    In October 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a wide-ranging study on international safeguards issues that found, inter alia, that the human capital base in the United States must be revitalized and expanded to ensure a seamless succession from the current generation of safeguards experts. Many current safeguards experts will soon retire and a new generation of talent with capabilities that cover the full spectrum of safeguards-relevant disciplines is needed. The success of this effort will have direct bearing on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An effective international safeguards system that responds to current and future nonproliferation challenges requires a cadre of skilled safeguards specialists. However, a number of factors have converged in recent years that have challenged the IAEA’s ability to effectively carry out its safeguards mission, e.g. flat funding, expanding responsibilities, and several ad hoc high profile investigations. In the near future, the Agency will require increased numbers of qualified staff to address the expansion and evolution of its mission and anticipated worldwide growth in nuclear energy production. Without a large-scale effort to address this requirement in the near future, the international community will have far less confidence that nuclear material in civil programs is not being diverted for nuclear weapons and the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase around the world. This paper will describe in detail NNSA’s efforts, in coordination with other federal agencies, to address the safeguards human resources challenge, focusing on the recommendations of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI).

  5. Managing threats from emerging technologies: can safeguards show the way?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The system of international nuclear safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is primarily a means of verification of states’ commitments under various legal instruments, principally the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to utilize controlled nuclear fission for peaceful purposes only. However, the safeguards system can also be seen as a mechanism through which states acted to reduce the threat posed by a new technology that had a transformative impact on existing national security paradigms when it emerged in the twentieth century. In the twenty‑first century, new technologies with equally profound national security implications are emerging. These include biotechnology and synthetic biology, nano technology, information technology, cognitive science, robotics and artificial intelligence. Throughout its history, the safeguards system has evolved to accommodate new technologies, new undertakings and new threats. Because multiple emerging technologies now constitute potential national security threats, it is appropriate to consider whether and how the lessons and successes of the safeguards system, including its capacity to evolve in response to changing requirements, could be leveraged to mitigate the threat posed by these new technologies. This paper addresses the possibility of re‑imagining safeguards in a way that makes them applicable to a broader range of technology‑based threats without compromising their effectiveness for their original purpose.

  6. Achievements to date in strengthened safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    There is substantial progress in developing and implementing measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Safeguards System. The measures comprise those to be implemented pursuant to the Agency's legal authority conferred by existing safeguards agreements as well as those to be implemented under the complementary legal authority conferred by Additional Protocols concluded on the basis of Document INFCIRC/540(Corrected). Activities on implementing measures under existing legal authority, particularly with respect to the evaluation of States' nuclear programmes, environmental sampling and the use of remote monitoring for safeguards purposes had been carried continuously ion the recent post. In 1998, additional protocols entered into force with four States (the Holy See, Jordan, New Zealand and Uzbekistan). Additional protocols with a further 27 States were approved by the Board and were awaiting ratification by the respective States. The additional protocol with Australia, which entered into force in December 1997, was being implemented following receipt of its Article 2 declaration. Agency consultations on concluding additional protocols take place with a number of States on a regular basis. As of 1 October 1999, Additional Protocols had been concluded and approved by the Board of Governors with a total of 45 States. Of these, Additional Protocols with 44 States had been signed and five had entered into force. (author)

  7. Safeguards - Old and new

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Every 'non-nuclear-weapon' State that joins the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must conclude an agreement with IAEA for the application of safeguards on all nuclear material used in all peaceful nuclear activities in order to prevent diversion to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. In 1970 and 1971, a special Safeguards Committee of the IAEA spent nine months drawing up the guidelines for these agreements. Nearly fifty countries representing every shade of opinion and stage of nuclear development took part in the Committee's work. It reached virtual unanimity on the one hundred sixteen model articles of the recommended guidelines. A single exception related to the method of financing safeguards costs. There was a difference of view about the legal interpretation of the IAEA Statute on this point; this will have a limited effect in practice however. Seldom if ever have so many countries, representing such a wide range of opinion, been able to reach agreement on a matter of such political, technical and legal complexity. The IAEA has been applying safeguards since 1960, but mostly to individual isolated plants or shipments of nuclear material - in circumstances very different, therefore, from those foreseen under the NPT. The following article is a personal appreciation by a member of the IAEA Secretariat of the differences between the old and the new 'NPT' System of safeguards

  8. Safeguarding research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The report is organized in four sections, including the introduction. The second section contains a discussion of the characteristics and attributes of research reactors important to safeguards. In this section, research reactors are described according to their power level, if greater than 25 thermal megawatts, or according to each fuel type. This descriptive discussion includes both reactor and reactor fuel information of a generic nature, according to the following categories. 1. Research reactors with more than 25 megawatts thermal power, 2. Plate fuelled reactors, 3. Assembly fuelled reactors. 4. Research reactors fuelled with individual rods. 5. Disk fuelled reactors, and 6. Research reactors fuelled with aqueous homogeneous fuel. The third section consists of a brief discussion of general IAEA safeguards as they apply to research reactors. This section is based on IAEA safeguards implementation documents and technical reports that are used to establish Agency-State agreements and facility attachments. The fourth and last section describes inspection activities at research reactors necessary to meet Agency objectives. The scope of the activities extends to both pre and post inspection as well as the on-site inspection and includes the examination of records and reports relative to reactor operation and to receipts, shipments and certain internal transfers, periodic verification of fresh fuel, spent fuel and core fuel, activities related to containment and surveillance, and other selected activities, depending on the reactor

  9. Review of effectiveness-evaluation methodologies for safeguards and security systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    We discuss the factors that influence the effectiveness of safeguards and security measures and the characteristics required of effectiveness evaluation methodologies. Within this context and from a utility standpoint, we review those effectiveness evaluation methodologies that have been developed. Our principal recommendation concerns the application and concomitant validation of existing methodologies. This recommendation derives from our conclusion that there has been a gross imbalance between the effort spent on methodology development and the application of those methodologies. Only for those safeguards measures that do not seem to be covered by existing methodologies or that seem to be inadequately covered do we suggest development. 44 references

  10. Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on behalf of the Board of Governors to all members of the Agency on the Non-Compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (INFCIRC/403) and on the Agency's inability to verify the non-diversion of material required to be safeguarded

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The document contains the following items: Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on behalf of the Board of Governors to all members of the Agency on the non-compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of Safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the Agency's inability to verify the non-diversion of material required to be safeguarded; resolution adopted by the Board on 1 April 1993 (Annex 1); Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Annex 2); resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 25 February 1993 (Annex 3); Communications from the Director General of the IAEA to the Minister for Atomic Energy of DPRK or from the Minister for Atomic Energy of the DPRK of the Director General of the IAEA (Annexes 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12); statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pyongyang, 12 March 1993 (Annex 7); resolution adopted by the Board on 18 March 1993 (Annex 10)

  11. TASTEX: Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the years 1978 to 1981 the Governments of France, Japan and the United States of America cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the TASTEX (Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise) programme. The aim of this programme was to improve the technology for the application of international safeguards at reprocessing facilities, and the results are presented in the present report

  12. Inspection technologies -Development of national safeguards technology-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    17 facility regulations prepared by nuclear facilities according to the Ministerial Notices were evaluated. Safeguards inspection activities under Safeguards are described. Safeguards inspection equipments and operation manuals to be used for national inspection are also described. Safeguards report are produced and submitted to MOST by using the computerized nuclear material accounting system at state level. National inspection support system are developed to produce the on-site information for domestic inspection. Planning and establishment of policy for nuclear control of nuclear materials, international cooperation for nuclear control, CTBT, strengthening of international safeguards system, and the supply of PWRs to North Korea are also described. (author). 43 tabs., 39 figs

  13. Integrated Safeguards proposal for Finland. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA has requested several member states to present their proposal of the application of the Integrated Safeguards (IS) system in their nuclear facilities. This report contains a IS proposal for Finland prepared under the Task FIN C 1264 of The Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. The comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been one of the main tools in the fight against nuclear proliferation since the entry-into-force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty three decades ago. In the 1990s some of the inherent weaknesses of this so-called traditional safeguards system were revealed first in Iraq and then in North Korea. Therefore, the member states of the LAEA decided to give the Agency additional legal authority in order to make its control system more effective as well as more efficient than before. This was accomplished by the approval of the so-called Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) in 1997. Straightforward implementation of new safeguards measures allowed by the Additional Protocol (INF-CIRC540) without careful review of the old procedures based on INFCIRC153 would only result in increased costs within the IAEA and in the member states. In order to avoid that kind of outcome the old and new means available to the Agency shall be combined to form an optimised integrated safeguards (IS) system. When creating an effective and efficient system a necessary approach is a state-level evaluation, which means that each state shall be assessed by the IAEA separately and as a whole. The assessment of a country's nuclear field shall result in credible assurance of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials to prohibited purposes and of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, facilities and materials. Having achieved that assurance and being able to maintain it in a state the LAEA can leave some traditional routine safeguards activities undone there. At present, the nuclear fuel cycle in

  14. Integrated Safeguards proposal for Finland. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anttila, M. [VTT Energy, Espoo (Finland)

    2000-08-01

    The IAEA has requested several member states to present their proposal of the application of the Integrated Safeguards (IS) system in their nuclear facilities. This report contains a IS proposal for Finland prepared under the Task FIN C 1264 of The Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. The comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been one of the main tools in the fight against nuclear proliferation since the entry-into-force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty three decades ago. In the 1990s some of the inherent weaknesses of this so-called traditional safeguards system were revealed first in Iraq and then in North Korea. Therefore, the member states of the LAEA decided to give the Agency additional legal authority in order to make its control system more effective as well as more efficient than before. This was accomplished by the approval of the so-called Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) in 1997. Straightforward implementation of new safeguards measures allowed by the Additional Protocol (INF-CIRC540) without careful review of the old procedures based on INFCIRC153 would only result in increased costs within the IAEA and in the member states. In order to avoid that kind of outcome the old and new means available to the Agency shall be combined to form an optimised integrated safeguards (IS) system. When creating an effective and efficient system a necessary approach is a state-level evaluation, which means that each state shall be assessed by the IAEA separately and as a whole. The assessment of a country's nuclear field shall result in credible assurance of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials to prohibited purposes and of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, facilities and materials. Having achieved that assurance and being able to maintain it in a state the LAEA can leave some traditional routine safeguards activities undone there. At present, the nuclear fuel cycle

  15. Hexapartite Safeguards Project - a retrospective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP) was created in November 1980 as an international forum consisting of the technology holders of gas-centrifuge enrichment and the international safeguards inspectorates in order to develop a strategy for applying effective and efficient safeguards to a commercial centrifuge enrichment plant without compromising the sensitive information related to centrifuge enrichment technology. The participants were Australia, Japan, the so-called 'Troika' states, i.e. the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the United States, EURATOM and the IAEA. They met for some two years, producing in February 1983 a final report with the agreed strategy of the 'LFUA' (Limited Frequency Unannounced Access) Model. Its basic feature is to allow the safeguards inspectors to have a routine access to cascade halls only with a short notice and with an agreed average frequency. This model has been serving as the basis for enrichment plant safeguards in HSP countries with necessary modifications and adaptations reflecting the specific features of individual plants. However, more than two decades have passed since the conclusion of HSP and it has become necessary to develop new safeguards approaches to reflect the recent developments in enrichment and safeguards technology, in particular the advent of large scale facilities. SAGSI (Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation) recently reviewed and approved the Agency's proposed approach. In this paper, the author, having served as the Secretariat of HSP in charge of drafting its final report, outlines the outcome of HSP in historical perspective, especially the issues becoming distinctive in the course of HSP deliberations, how they were addressed in the LFUA model, and the significance of HSP in the context of international safeguards, as well as its limitations due to prevailing legal interpretations at that time. (author)

  16. Communication dated 5 March 2014 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the Report of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Secretariat has received a communication dated 5 March 2014 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, enclosing an explanatory note by the Permanent Mission on the report of the Director General on ''Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran's' contained in document GOV/2014/10 (20 February 2014). The communication and, as requested by the Permanent Mission, the explanatory note are circulated herewith for information

  17. Communication dated 6 March 2013 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the Report of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Secretariat has received a communication dated 6 March 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency enclosing an explanatory note by the Permanent Mission dated 6 March 2013, on the report of the Director General on ''Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran'' contained in GOV/2013/6 (21 February 2013) and three letters from the Resident Representative of Iran addressed to the Director General. The communication and, as requested by the Permanent Mission, the explanatory note and the letters are circulated herewith for information.

  18. Communication dated 5 March 2014 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the Report of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Secretariat has received a communication dated 5 March 2014 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, enclosing an explanatory note by the Permanent Mission on the report of the Director General on ''Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran'' contained in document GOV/2014/10 (20 February 2014). The communication and, as requested by the Permanent Mission, the explanatory note are circulated herewith for information

  19. Communications dated 18 March 2013 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the Report of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Secretariat has received two communications dated 18 March 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency enclosing explanatory notes by the Permanent Mission dated September 2012 and November 2012 respectively, on the reports of the Director General on 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran' contained in GOV/2012/37 (30 August 2012) and GOV/2012/55 (16 November 2012). 2. The communications and, as requested by the Permanent Mission, the explanatory notes are circulated herewith for information.

  20. Agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date