WorldWideScience

Sample records for advanced safeguards approaches

  1. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Reprocessing Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Richard; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-06-24

    U.S. efforts to promote the international expansion of nuclear energy through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) will result in a dramatic expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the United States. New demonstration facilities, such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), the Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR), and the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC) will use advanced nuclear and chemical process technologies that must incorporate increased proliferation resistance to enhance nuclear safeguards. The ASA-100 Project, “Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities,” commissioned by the NA-243 Office of NNSA, has been tasked with reviewing and developing advanced safeguards approaches for these demonstration facilities. Because one goal of GNEP is developing and sharing proliferation-resistant nuclear technology and services with partner nations, the safeguards approaches considered are consistent with international safeguards as currently implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This first report reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new fuel reprocessing processes to be deployed at the AFCF and CFTC facilities. Similar analyses addressing the ABR and transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication lines at AFCF and CFTC will be presented in subsequent reports.

  2. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to “breed” nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and “burn” actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is “fertile” or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing “TRU”-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II “EBR-II” at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line – a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors.

  3. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Durst, Philip C.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Boyer, Brian; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This second report in a series of three reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication processes to be deployed at AFCF – specifically, the ceramic TRU (MOX) fuel fabrication line and the metallic (pyroprocessing) line. The most common TRU fuel has been fuel composed of mixed plutonium and uranium dioxide, referred to as “MOX”. However, under the Advanced Fuel Cycle projects custom-made fuels with higher contents of neptunium, americium, and curium may also be produced to evaluate if these “minor actinides” can be effectively burned and transmuted through irradiation in the ABR. A third and final report in this series will evaluate and review the advanced safeguards approach options for the ABR. In reviewing and developing the advanced safeguards approach for the new TRU fuel fabrication processes envisioned for AFCF, the existing international (IAEA) safeguards approach at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) and the conceptual approach planned for the new J-MOX facility in Japan have been considered as a starting point of reference. The pyro-metallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication process at EBR-II near Idaho Falls also provided insight for safeguarding the additional metallic pyroprocessing fuel fabrication line planned for AFCF.

  4. An advanced safeguards approach for a model 200t/a reprocessing facility, (1)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report describes an advanced safeguards approach which has been developed for a model 200 t/a reprocessing plant, using near-real-time materials accountancy in the process MBA, and borrowing advanced ideas from TASTEX, the IWG-RPS, or the authors own invention for the spent fuel storage and plutonium nitrate storage MBAs. In the spent fuel storage MBA primary reliance is placed on 100% inspector observation and verification of all spent fuel receipts, and on surveillance measures to ensure that the inspector is aware of all receipts or other activities in the spent fuel cask receiving bay. The advanced safeguards approach gives more detailed consideration to the mechanical or chop-leach cell than most conventional approaches. Safeguards in the process MBA are based on n.r.t. accountancy. The n.r.t. accountancy model used assumes weekly in-process physical inventories of solution in some five buffer storage tanks. The safeguards approach suggested for the plutonium nitrate storage MBA is not significantly different from conventional approaches. The use of sequential statistical techniques for the analysis of n.r.t. accountancy data requires a significantly different philosophical approach to anomalies and anomaly resolution. This report summarizes anomaly resolution procedures, at least through the earlier stages, and describes a summary estimate of inspection effort likely to be needed to implement the advanced safeguards approach. (author)

  5. IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

  6. International acceptability of advanced safeguarding techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    There are active development programs now under way to significantly enhance the effectiveness of international safeguarding. Advanced safeguarding techniques now under development include new material accounting methods utilizing nondestructive assay techniques, more reliable surveillance instrumentation, tamper-resistant and tamper-indicating seals, new means of utilizing continuous human inspection, and systems that incorporate both passive and active use-denial technologies. Before these new safeguarding techniques are utilized, however, they must be acceptable to the international community. This will unquestionably result in a compromise between what is technically feasible and what is politically acceptable. This report highlights many of the elements common to advanced safeguarding techniques that impact directly upon international acceptability. The concept of acceptability is viewed from the perspective of three different groups: (1) those States seeking upgraded safeguards, (2) those States having safeguards imposed upon them, and (3) the International Atomic Energy Agency. In general, a more conducive climate exists today for the acceptance of advanced safeguarding techniques than at any period in the past; but the differences between advanced safeguards and those safeguards being employed today are so large that considerable opposition to their implementation can be expected

  7. TASTEX: Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the years 1978 to 1981 the Governments of France, Japan and the United States of America cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the TASTEX (Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise) programme. The aim of this programme was to improve the technology for the application of international safeguards at reprocessing facilities, and the results are presented in the present report

  8. Improvement of the safeguards approach at Rokkasho Enrichment Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rokkasho Enrichment Plant (REP) has been operated since 1992 with implementing the safeguards-based on the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP) concept. In order to improve confidence on safeguards at REP, Japan Safeguards Office (JSGO), IAEA and JNFL have established the task force meeting to discuss the safeguards improvement plans including concepts of integrated safeguards approach at REP. This paper presents accountancy method, outline of current inspection activities, group seals on tails cylinders, UF6 tracking system based on optical surveillance cameras under trial use as part of improvement plan, and integrated safeguards approach under study with issue to be solved. (author)

  9. Development of the safeguards approach for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), which is currently undergoing construction and commissioning by the Japan Nuclear Fuels Limited (JNFL), is scheduled to begin active operations in 2005. The planned operating capacity is 800t uranium per year containing approximately 8t of plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Japan Safeguards Office (JSGO) are working with JNFL to develop a Safeguards Approach that is both effective and efficient. In order to accomplish this goal, a number of advanced concepts are being introduced and many currently applied safeguards measures are being enhanced. These new and improved techniques and procedures will provide for more sensitive and reliable verification of nuclear material and facility operations while reducing the required inspection effort. The Safeguards Approach incorporates systematic Design Information Examination and Verification (DIE/DIV) during all phases of construction, commissioning and operation. It incorporates installed, unattended radiation and solution measurement and monitoring systems along with a number of inspector attended measurement systems. While many of the measurement systems will be independent-inspector controlled, others will require authentication of a split signal from operator controlled systems. The independent and/or authenticated data from these systems will be transmitted over a network to a central inspector center for evaluation. Near-Real-Time-Accountancy (NRTA) will be used for short period sequential analysis of the operator and inspector data which, when combined with Solution Monitoring data, will provide higher assurance in the verification of nuclear material for timeliness and of the operational status of the facility. Samples will be taken using a facility installed, but IAEA authenticated, automatic sampling system and will then be transferred to a jointly used IAEA-JSGO On-Site Laboratory (OSL). This paper provides an overview of the Safeguards

  10. Development of safeguards approach for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), which is currently undergoing construction and commissioning by the Japan Nuclear Fuels Limited (JNFL), is scheduled to begin active operations in 2005. The planned operating capacity is 800 tonnes of spent fuel per year containing approximately 8 tonnes of plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Japan safeguards authorities are working with JNFL to develop a Safeguards Approach that is both effective and efficient. In order to accomplish this goal, a number of advanced concepts are being introduced and many currently applied safeguards measures are being enhanced. These new and improved techniques and procedures will provide for more sensitive and reliable verification of nuclear material and facility operations while reducing the required inspection effort. The Safeguards Approach incorporates systematic Design Information Examination and Verification (DIE/DIV) during all phases of construction, commissioning and operation. It incorporates installed, unattended radiation and solution measurement and monitoring systems along with a number of inspector attended measurement systems. While many of the measurement systems will be independent-inspector controlled, others will require authentication of a split signal from operator controlled systems. The independent and/or authenticated data from these systems will be transmitted over a network to a central inspector center for evaluation. Near-Real-Time-Accountancy (NRTA) will be used for short period sequential analysis of the operator and inspector data which, when combined with Solution Monitoring data, will provide higher assurance in the verification of nuclear material for timeliness and of the operational status of the facility. Samples will be taken using a facility installed, but IAEA authenticated, automatic sampling system and will then be transferred to a jointly used IAEA-JSGO On-Site Laboratory (OSL). This paper provides an

  11. Advancement of safeguards inspection technology for CANDU nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jae Sung; Park, W. S.; Cha, H. R.; Ham, Y. S.; Lee, Y. G.; Kim, K. P.; Hong, Y. D

    1999-04-01

    The objectives of this project are to develop both inspection technology and safeguards instruments, related to CANDU safeguards inspection, through international cooperation, so that those outcomes are to be applied in field inspections of national safeguards. Furthermore, those could contribute to the improvement of verification correctness of IAEA inspections. Considering the level of national inspection technology, it looked not possible to perform national inspections without the joint use of containment and surveillance equipment conjunction with the IAEA. In this connection, basic studies for the successful implementation of national inspections was performed, optimal structure of safeguards inspection was attained, and advancement of safeguards inspection technology was forwarded. The successful implementation of this project contributed to both the improvement of inspection technology on CANDU reactors and the implementation of national inspection to be performed according to the legal framework. In addition, it would be an opportunity to improve the ability of negotiating in equal shares in relation to the IAEA on the occasion of discussing or negotiating the safeguards issues concerned. Now that the national safeguards technology for CANDU reactors was developed, the safeguards criteria, procedure and instruments as to the other item facilities and fabrication facilities should be developed for the perfection of national inspections. It would be desirable that the recommendations proposed and concreted in this study, so as to both cope with the strengthened international safeguards and detect the undeclared nuclear activities, could be applied to national safeguards scheme. (author)

  12. Advancement of safeguards inspection technology for CANDU nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The objectives of this project are to develop both inspection technology and safeguards instruments, related to CANDU safeguards inspection, through international cooperation, so that those outcomes are to be applied in field inspections of national safeguards. Furthermore, those could contribute to the improvement of verification correctness of IAEA inspections. Considering the level of national inspection technology, it looked not possible to perform national inspections without the joint use of containment and surveillance equipment conjunction with the IAEA. In this connection, basic studies for the successful implementation of national inspections was performed, optimal structure of safeguards inspection was attained, and advancement of safeguards inspection technology was forwarded. The successful implementation of this project contributed to both the improvement of inspection technology on CANDU reactors and the implementation of national inspection to be performed according to the legal framework. In addition, it would be an opportunity to improve the ability of negotiating in equal shares in relation to the IAEA on the occasion of discussing or negotiating the safeguards issues concerned. Now that the national safeguards technology for CANDU reactors was developed, the safeguards criteria, procedure and instruments as to the other item facilities and fabrication facilities should be developed for the perfection of national inspections. It would be desirable that the recommendations proposed and concreted in this study, so as to both cope with the strengthened international safeguards and detect the undeclared nuclear activities, could be applied to national safeguards scheme. (author)

  13. The state-level approach: moving beyond integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The concept of a State-Level Approach (SLA) for international safeguards planning, implementation, and evaluation was contained in the Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards (IS) agreed in 2002. This paper describes briefly the key elements of the SLA, including State-level factors and high-level safeguards objectives, and considers different cases in which application of the SLA methodology could address safeguards for 'suspect' States, 'good' States, and Nuclear Weapons States hosting fuel cycle centers. The continued use and further development of the SLA to customize safeguards for each State, including for States already under IS, is seen as central to effective and efficient safeguards for an expanding nuclear world.

  14. Advanced safeguards for the nuclear renaissance

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miller, Michael C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2008-01-01

    The global expansion of nuclear energy provides not only the benefit of carbon-neutral electricity, but also the potential for proliferation concern as well. Nuclear safeguards implemented at the state level (domestic) and at the international level by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are essential for ensuring that nuclear materials are not misused and are thereby a critical component of the increased usage of nuclear energy. In the same way that the 1950's Atoms for Peace initiative provided the foundation for a robust research and development program in nuclear safeguards, the expansion of nuclear energy that is underway today provides the impetus to enter a new era of technical development in the safeguards community. In this paper, we will review the history of nuclear safeguards research and development as well future directions.

  15. Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise (TASTEX). An experience in international co-operation on safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    TASTEX stands for Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise, and was the joint programme of Japan, the United States of America, France and the International Atomic Energy Agency for developing, testing and evaluating advanced safeguards technology to be used in reprocessing facilities. The TASTEX programme, which started early in 1978 and successfully ended in May 1981, consisted of thirteen safeguards-technology-related tasks, from Task A to M. They were classified into four groups from the viewpoints of their usefulness and effectiveness: (1) Tasks technically feasible for international safeguards application in the near future: Tasks E, G, H and part of Task A (underwater CCTV and monitoring cameras); (2) Tasks which can be used in the future if research and development are continued: Tasks F, I, J, C and the other part of Task A (exclusive of the themes shown in (1)); (3) Tasks which may be used in future at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility if research and development are continued: Tasks K and L; and (4) Tasks which are difficult to be used at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility: Tasks B, D and M. The tasks classified under Group (1) are being developed further as part of the JASPAS (Japan Support Programme for Agency's Safeguards) project. (author)

  16. FY09 Advanced Instrumentation and Active Interrogation Research for Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    D. L. Chichester; S. A. Pozzi; E. H. Seabury; J. L. Dolan; M. Flaska; J. T. Johnson; S. M. Watson; J. Wharton

    2009-08-01

    Multiple small-scale projects have been undertaken to investigate advanced instrumentation solutions for safeguard measurement challenges associated with advanced fuel cycle facilities and next-generation fuel reprocessing installations. These activities are in support of the U.S. Department of Energy's Fuel Cycle Research and Development program and its Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control for Transmutation (MPACT) campaign. 1) Work was performed in a collaboration with the University of Michigan (Prof. Sara Pozzi, co-PI) to investigate the use of liquid-scintillator radiation detectors for assaying mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, to characterize its composition and to develop advanced digital pulse-shape discrimination algorithms for performing time-correlation measurements in the MOX fuel environment. This work included both simulations and experiments and has shown that these techniques may provide a valuable approach for use within advanced safeguard measurement scenarios. 2) Work was conducted in a collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Dr. Paul Hausladen, co-PI) to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the fast-neutron coded-aperture imaging technique for locating and characterizing fissile material, and as a tool for performing hold-up measurements in fissile material handling facilities. This work involved experiments at Idaho National Laboratory, using MOX fuel and uranium metal, in both passive and active interrogation configurations. A complete analysis has not yet been completed but preliminary results suggest several potential uses for the fast neutron imaging technique. 3) Work was carried out to identify measurement approaches for determining nitric acid concentration in the range of 1 – 4 M and beyond. This work included laboratory measurements to investigate the suitability of prompt-gamma neutron activation analysis for this measurement and product reviews of other commercial solutions. Ultrasonic density analysis appears to

  17. Advanced safeguards technologies promote transparency and cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: In the months following the September 11 terror attacks on the United States, the international nuclear safeguards industry witnessed a merge between physical protection (PP) activities and safeguards principles. Traditionally, physical protection encompassed the physical security equipment, procedures, response tactics, and regulatory requirements necessary to protect a nuclear facility from unauthorized actions of in-house personnel or other persons (sabotage, blackmail, theft of nuclear materials, etc.) that may result in a radiological accident, loss of nuclear material, and other extremely undesirable consequences. In the post-September 11th era, PP has integrated the element of verification into PP activities. In general, safeguards refers to the ensemble of measures taken, within the context of international treaties, to verify that nuclear materials have not been diverted from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. However, the foundation of safeguards is built upon a system of controls established by a monitoring agency (e.g., IAEA, the European Commission, etc.) in order to satisfy itself that any particular safeguarding obligation is complied with. It is this element that has been integrated into PP activities, particularly into those PP activities being carried out in the former Soviet Union. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy is working with a number of Russian organizations to upgrade security at dozens of nuclear facilities in Russia, and after September 11th, the program began to realize that the ability of Russian sites to thwart nuclear theft depends on the effective, uninterrupted operation of the upgraded security systems. Thus, program participants have incorporated the notion of safeguards verification by installing unattended monitoring systems that will allow Russian and U.S. Government officials to ensure sites continue to operate security systems on an

  18. Combined SAFE/SNAP approach to safeguards evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Generally, the scope of a safeguards evaluation model can efficiently address one of two issues, (1) global safeguards effectiveness, or (2) vulnerability analysis for individual scenarios. The Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) focuses on (1) while the Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) is directed at (2). SAFE addresses (1) in that it considers the entire facility, i.e., the composite system of hardware and human components, in one global analysis. SNAP addresses (2) by providing a safeguards modeling symbology sufficiently flexible to represent quite complex scenarios from the standpoint of hardware interfaces while also accounting for a rich variety of human decision making. A combined SAFE/SNAP approach to the problem of safeguards evaluation is described and illustrated through an example

  19. Societal risk approach to safeguards design and evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A comprehensive rationale for safeguards design and evaluation, and a framework for continuing systematic assessment of the system's effectiveness and efficient allocation of available safeguards resources for balanced protection, were developed. The societal risk approach employed considers the likelihood of successful destructive acts involving nuclear materials or facilities and the magnitude of the effects on society. The safeguards problem is described in terms of events affecting societal risk and adversary actions. Structure of the safeguards system and the evaluation of its adequacy are discussed. Adversary characteristics are also discussed

  20. Future challenges and DOE/NNSA-JAEA cooperation for the development of advanced safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has been cooperating with Japan on nuclear safeguards for over thirty years. DOE/NNSA has collaborated with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and its predecessors in addressing the need for innovative solutions to nuclear transparency and verification issues in one of the world's most advanced nuclear fuel cycle states. This collaboration includes over ninety activities that have involved nearly every facility in the JAEA complex and many national laboratories in the U.S. complex. The partnership has yielded new technologies and approaches that have benefited international safeguards not only in Japan, but around the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses a number of safeguards solutions developed under this collaboration to improve its inspection efforts in Japan and elsewhere. Japanese facilities serve as test beds for emerging safeguards technologies and are setting the trend for new nuclear energy and fuel cycle development worldwide. The collaboration continues to be an essential component of U.S. safeguards outreach and is integral to the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. In addition to fostering international safeguards development, the cooperation is an opportunity for U.S. scientists to work in facilities that have no analog in the United States, thus providing crucial real-life experience for and aiding development of the next generation of U.S. safeguards specialists. It is also an important element of promoting regional transparency thereby building confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear programs in the region. The successes engendered by this partnership provide a strong basis for addressing future safeguards challenges, in Japan and elsewhere. This paper summarizes these challenges and the associated cooperative efforts that are either underway or anticipated.

  1. Future challenges and DOE/NNSA-JAEA cooperation for the development of advanced safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stevens, Rebecca S [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mc Clelland - Kerr, John [NNSA-NA-242; Senzaki, Masao [JAEA; Hori, Masato [JAEA

    2009-01-01

    The United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has been cooperating with Japan on nuclear safeguards for over thirty years. DOE/NNSA has collaborated with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and its predecessors in addressing the need for innovative solutions to nuclear transparency and verification issues in one of the world's most advanced nuclear fuel cycle states. This collaboration includes over ninety activities that have involved nearly every facility in the JAEA complex and many national laboratories in the U.S. complex. The partnership has yielded new technologies and approaches that have benefited international safeguards not only in Japan, but around the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses a number of safeguards solutions developed under this collaboration to improve its inspection efforts in Japan and elsewhere. Japanese facilities serve as test beds for emerging safeguards technologies and are setting the trend for new nuclear energy and fuel cycle development worldwide. The collaboration continues to be an essential component of U.S. safeguards outreach and is integral to the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. In addition to fostering international safeguards development, the cooperation is an opportunity for U.S. scientists to work in facilities that have no analog in the United States, thus providing crucial real-life experience for and aiding development of the next generation of U.S. safeguards specialists. It is also an important element of promoting regional transparency thereby building confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear programs in the region. The successes engendered by this partnership provide a strong basis for addressing future safeguards challenges, in Japan and elsewhere. This paper summarizes these challenges and the associated cooperative efforts that are either underway or anticipated.

  2. USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R and D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose

  3. Cost/Benefit Prioritization for Advanced Safeguards Research and Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A system level study utilizing commercially available ExtendTM software, has been initiated to perform cost/benefit analyses for advanced safeguards research and development. The methodology is focused on estimating standard error in the inventory difference (SEID) for reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities, for various proposed advanced safeguards measurement technologies. The inventory duration, and consequent number of inventories per year, is dictated by the detection of a significant quantity of special nuclear material (SNM). Detection is limited by the cumulative measurement uncertainty for the entire system. The cost of inventories is then compared with the cost of advanced instrumentation and/or process design changes. Current progress includes development of the methodology, future efforts will be focused on ascertaining estimated costs and performance. Case studies will be provided as examples of the methodology. (author)

  4. Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Reimold, Benjamin A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ward, Steven L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Howell, John [GLASGOW UNIV.

    2010-09-13

    Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

  5. Advanced digital video surveillance for safeguard and physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    . These advanced surveillance systems aided with highly optimized video compression technologies over wireless and other communicating network media to provide security personnel real time, relevant only, timely information is going to be a great boon for physical security applications. This paper discusses some recent advances in digital video surveillance and its application in safeguard and physical protection. Refs. 5 (author)

  6. Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Durst, Philip [INL; Bean, Robert [INL

    2010-01-01

    The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

  7. Relative safeguards risks of advanced reactor concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of this report is to develop a procedure to quantitatively assess the risk to diversion of the nuclear material in the fuel cycle for seven advanced reactor design concepts (LWR-Pu, LMFBR, HTGR, GCFR, MSBR, LWBR, HWR). Each stage in each of the seven reactor fuel cycles is evaluated and the result of the evaluation is a comparison among the various fuel cycles. This method of evaluation is used to determine the stages in a nuclear reactor fuel cycle that are most susceptible to diversion; it also gives an indication of what factors contribute to that susceptibility

  8. Advanced Safeguards Technology Road-map for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including advanced safeguards, is a cornerstone of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). To meet these challenges, the Safeguards Campaign was formed, whose mission is to provide research and technology development for the foundation of next generation safeguards systems for implementation in U.S. GNEP facilities. The Safeguards Campaign works closely with the Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security department (NA-24) of NNSA (National Nuclear Safety Administration) to ensure that technology developed for domestic safeguards applications are optimum with respect to international safeguards use. A major milestone of the program this year has been the development of the advanced safeguards technology road-map. This paper will broadly describe the road-map, which provides a path to next generation safeguards systems including advanced instrumentation; process monitoring; data integration, protection, and analysis; and system level evaluation and knowledge extraction for real time applications. (authors)

  9. Advanced Safeguards Technology Road-map for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miller, M.C.; Tobin, S. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1663, MS E540, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States); Smith, L.E. [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (United States); Ehinger, M. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (United States); Dougan, A. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (United States); Cipiti, B. [Sandia National Laboratory (United States); Bakel, A. [Argonne National Laboratory (United States); Bean, R. [Idaho National Laboratory (United States)

    2008-07-01

    Strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including advanced safeguards, is a cornerstone of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). To meet these challenges, the Safeguards Campaign was formed, whose mission is to provide research and technology development for the foundation of next generation safeguards systems for implementation in U.S. GNEP facilities. The Safeguards Campaign works closely with the Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security department (NA-24) of NNSA (National Nuclear Safety Administration) to ensure that technology developed for domestic safeguards applications are optimum with respect to international safeguards use. A major milestone of the program this year has been the development of the advanced safeguards technology road-map. This paper will broadly describe the road-map, which provides a path to next generation safeguards systems including advanced instrumentation; process monitoring; data integration, protection, and analysis; and system level evaluation and knowledge extraction for real time applications. (authors)

  10. Safeguards approaches for conversion and gas centrifuge enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper describes recent studies and investigations of new safeguards measures and inspection tools to strengthen international safeguards at GCEPs (Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants) and conversion plants. The IAEA has indicated that continuous, unattended process monitoring should play a central role in future safeguards approaches for conversion plants and GCEPs. Monitoring safeguards relevant information from accountancy scales, process load cells, and unit header pipes can make existing safeguards approaches more efficient by replacing repetitive, routine, labor-intensive inspection activities with automated systems. These systems can make the safeguards approach more effective by addressing more completely the safeguards objectives at these facilities. Automated collection and analysis of the data can further enable the IAEA to move towards a fully-information driven inspection regime with randomized (from the operator's perspective), short-notice inspections. The reduction in repetitive on-site inspection activities would also be beneficial to plant operators, but only if sensitive and proprietary information can be protected and the new systems prove to be reliable. New facilities that incorporate Safeguards by Design into the earliest design stages can facilitate the effective DIV (Design Information Verification) of the plant to allow the inspectors to analyze the capacity of the plant, to project maximum production from the plant, and to provide a focus on the areas in the plant where credible diversion scenarios could be attempted. Facilitating efficient nuclear material accountancy by simplifying process pipework and making flow measurement points more accessible can allow for easier estimation of plant holdup and a potential reduction in the number of person-days of inspection. Lastly, a universal monitoring standard that tracks the location, movement, and use of UF6 cylinders may enhance the efficiency of operations at industry sites and would

  11. Safeguards Approaches for Black Box Processes or Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Diaz-Marcano, Helly; Gitau, Ernest TN; Hockert, John; Miller, Erin; Wylie, Joann

    2013-09-25

    The objective of this study is to determine whether a safeguards approach can be developed for “black box” processes or facilities. These are facilities where a State or operator may limit IAEA access to specific processes or portions of a facility; in other cases, the IAEA may be prohibited access to the entire facility. The determination of whether a black box process or facility is safeguardable is dependent upon the details of the process type, design, and layout; the specific limitations on inspector access; and the restrictions placed upon the design information that can be provided to the IAEA. This analysis identified the necessary conditions for safeguardability of black box processes and facilities.

  12. Considerations on safeguards approach for small centrifuge enrichment facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The safeguards' objectives for enrichment facilities encompass the detection of the diversion of declared nuclear material and of facility misuse. The safeguard's approach presently applied for commercial centrifuge enrichment facilities is based on the Hexa partite Project and seems not to be directly applicable to cases of small plants. Since ABACC started its operation one of the main problems faced was the application of safeguards to small centrifuge enrichment plants for testing centrifuges in cascade mode or for small LEU production. These plants consist of a few fully independent cascades, does not operate in a routine basis and panels prevent visual access to the centrifuges and their surroundings for preserving sensitive information. For such plants misuse scenarios seems to dominate, particularly those associated with feeding the plant with undeclared LEU. This paper presents a concise analysis of misuse strategies in small centrifuge facility and alternative safeguard's approach, describing the main control elements to be applied. The particularities arising from the existence of panels or boxes covering the centrifuges are specifically addressed. Two alternatives approaches based on the application of a transitory perimeter control to increase the effectiveness of unannounced inspection and on the application of permanent perimeter control are presented. (author)

  13. 2. JAPAN-IAEA workshop on advanced safeguards technology for the future nuclear fuel cycle. Abstracts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This international workshop addressed issues and technologies associated with safeguarding the future nuclear fuel cycle. The workshop discussed issues of interest to the safeguards community, facility operators and State Systems of accounting and control of nuclear materials. Topic areas covered were as follows: Current Status and Future Prospects of Developing Safeguards Technologies for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, Technology and Instrumentation Needs, Advanced Safeguards Technologies, Guidelines on Developing Instrumentation to Lead the Way for Implementing Future Safeguards, and Experiences and Lessons learned. This workshop was of interest to individuals and organizations concerned with future nuclear fuel cycle technical developments and safeguards technologies. This includes representatives from the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, safeguards inspectorates, State systems of accountancy and control, and Member States Support Programmes

  14. Global partnering related to nuclear materials safeguards and security - A pragmatic approach to international safeguards work

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper documents issues Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. has addressed in the performance of international work to safeguards and security work. It begins with a description of the package we put together for a sample proposal for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, for which we were ranked number one for technical approach and cost, and concludes with a discussion of approaches that we have taken to performing this work, including issues related to performing the work as part of a team. The primary focus is on communication, workforce, equipment, and coordination issues. Finally, the paper documents the rules that we use to assure the work is performed safely and successfully. (author)

  15. Atucha I nuclear power plant achieving a full safeguards approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    as part of the safeguards approach for this NPP. (author)

  16. Framework for fuel-cycle approaches to IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In order to compare several nuclear-safeguards verification approaches to one another and to the conventional facility-oriented approach, we establish a framework of the classes of information routinely verifiable by IAEA safeguards inspections. For each facility type within a State nuclear fuel cycle, the classes include flow data, inventory data, and shipper and receiver data. By showing which classes of information are verified for each facility type within three fuel cycles of different complexity, we distinguish the inspection approaches from one anoter and exhibit their fuel-cycle dependence, i.e., their need for sets of safeguards inspection activities different from those required under the facility-oriented approach at similar facilities in fuel cycles of differing complexity. Tables V-1, V-2, and V-3 graphically depict these relations and give a qualitative summary of the relative effectiveness and effort requirements of the approaches classified. The zone, information-correlation, diversion-assumption-change, and randomization-over-facilities approaches depend intrinsically on the complexity of the fuel cycle: their very definition implies fuel-cycle dependence. The approaches involving randomization over activities and goal relaxations do not have such dependence

  17. Project Report on Development of a Safeguards Approach for Pyroprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean

    2010-09-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory has undertaken an effort to develop a standard safeguards approach for international commercial pyroprocessing facilities. This report details progress for the fiscal year 2010 effort. A component by component diversion pathway analysis has been performed, and has led to insight on the mitigation needs and equipment development needed for a valid safeguards approach. The effort to develop an in-hot cell detection capability led to the digital cloud chamber, and more importantly, the significant potential scientific breakthrough of the inverse spectroscopy algorithm, including the ability to identify energy and spatial location of gamma ray emitting sources with a single, non-complex, stationary radiation detector system. Curium measurements were performed on historical and current samples at the FCF to attempt to determine the utility of using gross neutron counting for accountancy measurements. A solid cost estimate of equipment installation at FCF has been developed to guide proposals and cost allocations to use FCF as a test bed for safeguards measurement demonstrations. A combined MATLAB and MCNPX model has been developed to perform detector placement calculations around the electrorefiner. Early harvesting has occurred wherein the project team has been requested to provide pyroprocessing technology and safeguards short courses.

  18. Risk-informed approach for safety, safeguards, and security (3S) by design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Over several decades the nuclear energy society worldwide has developed safety assessment methodology based on probabilistic risk analysis for incorporating its benefit into design and accident prevention for nuclear reactors. Although safeguards and security communities have different histories and technical aspects compared to safety, risk assessment as a supplement to their current requirements could be developed to promote synergism between Safety, Safeguards, and Security (3S) and to install effective countermeasures in the design of complex nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Since the 3S initiative was raised by G8 countries at Hokkaido Toyako-Summit in 2008, one approach to developing synergism in a 3S By Design (3SBD) process has been the application of risk-oriented assessment methodology. In the existing regulations of safeguards and security, a risk notion has already been considered for inherent threat and hazard recognition. To integrate existing metrics into a risk-oriented approach, several mathematical methods have already been surveyed, with attention to the scarcity of intentional acts in the case of safeguards and the sparseness of actual event data. A two-dimensional probability distribution composed of measurement error and incidence probabilities has been proposed to formalize inherent difficulties in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards criteria. In particular, the incidence probability that is difficult to estimate has been explained using a Markov model and game theory. In this work, a feasibility study of 3SBD is performed for an aqueous reprocessing process, and synergetic countermeasures are presented for preliminary demonstration of 3SBD. Although differences and conflicts between individual 'S' communities exist, the integrated approach would be valuable for optimization and balance between the 3S design features as well as for effective and efficient implementation under existing regulation frameworks. In addition

  19. A safeguards approach applicable to A plutonium mixed oxide powder plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report describes a safeguards approach possible to apply in a plutonium mixed oxide powder plant which handles large amounts of plutonium in the light of experience gained in some other plutonium bulk handling facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle under IAEA safeguards. The approach is based on performing two routine verifications of the nuclear material per month without interrupting the process operations in the plant combined with continual flow verifications for ongoing process and transfer operations; and two physical inventory verifications per year. The total annual effort to cover all the verifications was estimated to be in the range of 150 to 240 man day. The analysis of the approach showed that with further advances in the Non destructive assay measurement techniques for the determination of plutonium content in solutions and MOX powder would lead to development of the approach towards increase in effectiveness and decrease in the verification effort. 2 fig., 4 tab

  20. Safeguards approach for spent fuel transfers to dry storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Transfers of spent fuel to dry storage, where the fuel is not easily accessible for verification, have become a common occurrence at many nuclear reactors. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on such transfers currently consume a considerable amount of inspection effort and are forecast to increase further. Under traditional safeguards, spent fuel transfers have been inspected by continuous inspector presence or by unattended instruments. The IAEA has recently developed a new safeguards approach for spent fuel transfers to dry storage for States under integrated safeguards. For States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force for which the Agency has completed sufficient activities and evaluation and found no indication of diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards, and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities for the State as a whole, safeguards activities can be optimized in light of the added safeguards assurance provided by measures of the additional protocol. The paper introduces a new safeguards policy, which was developed for transfers of spent fuel to dry storage for States under integrated safeguards, and describes a safeguards approach for transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at common reactors. The policy provides basis for the use of unannounced inspections to confirm the operator declarations of spent fuel transfer activities. During transfers of spent fuel to placement in dry storage, continuity of knowledge will be maintained by an unannounced inspection programme or some combination with temporary containment/surveillance (C/S) measures. With the policy, it will no longer be necessary for IAEA inspectors to be physically present during all spent fuel transfers. Traditional Safeguards Practices. When spent fuel is discharged from a reactor to a spent fuel pond, it is verified by Agency inspectors or by unattended instruments. In traditional safeguards

  1. JAEA development programs of advanced technologies for safeguards and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JAEA has made progress in four development programs of advanced technologies for the measurement of nuclear material for safeguards and security. In the first program, we have designed and simulated a non-destructive assay (NDA) system that uses ZnS-ceramic-scintillator neutron detectors, instead of 3He neutron detectors. The second program is a basic demonstration of nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) as an NDA technique for measuring the fissile isotopes in nuclear material. Construction of one loop of an energy-recovery linac (ERL) at KEK in Tsukuba was begun this past year, and will finish in this fiscal year. The ERL will produce a high-intensity, mono-energetic gamma-ray beam for NRF. Also JAEA and the US Department of Energy are evaluating NRF-simulation codes. In the third program, we have started to design and construct a prototype of a new NDA system to determine the quantity of nuclear material in particle debris of melted nuclear fuel. It uses both neutron resonance transmission analysis (NRTA) and neutron resonance capture analysis (NRCA). In the fourth program, we have made detailed preparations for testing a new NDA instrument (constructed by Los Alamos National Laboratory) on used nuclear fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool at Fugen, next year. It uses a combined technique of passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) and self-interrogation neutron resonance densitometry (SINRD). (author)

  2. Experience on implementation of the Integrated Safeguards approach for the MOX facility from the operator's point of view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IS approach for the JNC-1 site was implemented in August 2008, and this was the first experience in the world. This IS approach aimed not only to improve efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards but also to reduce burden of the plant operation by improvement of efficiency of the inspection activity. It was planned to review effectiveness of this new approach after three years from implementation. And JAEA also evaluated effects by application of the IS approach for two MOX fuel facilities in the JNC-1 site based on the three years experiences from the operator's view point. As the result of evaluation, it was confirmed that there were some difference of benefits by application of the IS approach depending on features of the facility, automation level of equipment and advance level of safeguards systems. (author)

  3. 75 FR 7632 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-22

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling... October 14, 2009 (74 FR 58268-58269). Detailed meeting agendas and meeting transcripts are available...

  4. 75 FR 10840 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-09

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling... October 14, 2009, (74 FR 58268-58269). Detailed meeting agendas and meeting transcripts are available...

  5. Designing a safeguards approach for the transfer and storage of used fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    To provide needed space in the bays for continued CANDU reactor discharges, used fuel must be moved from the bays to on-site Dry Storage Facilities (DSF). Over the next decades, used fuel in the bays in Canada will be loaded into containers or transfer flasks and moved to DSFs. The IAEA currently verifies the transfer of used fuel to dry storage at the Pickering site. When the DSF at the Bruce site starts operating in 2002 followed by the Darlington Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility in 2007-2009 increased Agency safeguards resources will be required. Safeguarding these new facilities and the flow of fuel to them would place additional demand on IAEA resources if the current approach, which relies heavily upon inspectors being present at the facility, were used. In a continuous search for more efficient approaches, the IAEA, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and the facility operators are working together to develop a safeguards scheme that depends less upon inspectors and more upon instruments, operator activity and remote monitoring. This paper describes the current approach to safeguarding used fuel in transit and in storage at the multi-unit CANDU stations. Alternative approaches are also discussed and their application to existing and future used fuel dry storage facilities is considered. Safeguards approaches under existing Safeguards Criteria are compared with approaches that might be possible under a safeguards regime strengthened by the Additional Protocol, and with approaches optimised under Integrated Safeguards. The technologies being considered to safeguard used fuel include position tracking using the Global Positioning System (GPS), Geographical Information System (GIS), radio frequency techniques, electronic seals, operator activity, remote surveillance and monitoring. Unannounced inspections (UAI) and mailbox arrangements for the provision of operational data and schedules are also being considered. (author)

  6. Advances in chemical standards for nuclear fuel analysis and safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The objectives of the Consultants' Meeting were to evaluate the results of enquiries conducted by the IAEA and the CEC on the needs and availability of nuclear reference materials, to prepare a report on the results of the enquiries and on the advances in chemical standards for nuclear fuel analyses and safeguards purposes and to identify needs which are not being met or could not be met in the future

  7. Preliminary assessment of safeguardability on the concepture design of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Sang Yoon; Ha, Jang Ho; Ko, Won Il; Song, Dae Yong; Kim, Ho Dong

    2003-04-01

    In this report, a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP (Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process) was conducted with Los Alamos National Laboratory. The proposed ACP concept is an electrometallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuels into metal forms, which can achieve significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel to be stored and disposed of. For the safeguardability analysis of the ACP facility, sub-processes and their KMPs (Key Measurement Points) were defined first, and then their material flows were analyzed. Finally, the standard deviation of the Inventory Difference (ID) value of the facility was estimated with assumption by assuming international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods and their uncertainty. From the preliminary calculation, we concluded that if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility, the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met. In the second phase of this study, further study on sensitivity analyses considering various factors such as measurement errors, facility capacities, MBA periods etc. may be needed.

  8. Implications for advanced safeguards derived from PR&PP case study results

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    ESFR design should have such features in it if it is seen to have intrinsic proliferation resistance. The technical difficulty in diverting material from the ESFR is at least as strongly impacted by the adversaries overall technical capabilities as it is by the effort required to overcome those barriers intrinsic to the nuclear fuel cycle. The intrinsic proliferation resistance of the ESFR will affect how extrinsic measures in the safeguards approach for the ESFR will provide overall proliferation resistance.

  9. Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

  10. Safeguardability assessment on pilot-scale advanced spent fuel conditioning facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: In South Korea, approximately 6,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactor operation has been accumulated with the expectation of more than 30,000 metric tons, three times the present storage capacity, by the end of 2040. To resolve these challenges in spent fuel management, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing a dry reprocessing technology called Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP). This is an electrometallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent fuel into a metallic form, and the electrolytic reduction (ER) technology developed recently is known as a more efficient concept for spent fuel conditioning. The goal of the ACP study is to recover more than 99% of the actinide elements into a metallic form with minimizing the volume and heat load of spent fuel. The significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel is expected to lighten the burden of final disposal in terms of disposal size, safety, and economics. In the framework of R and D collaboration for the ACP safeguards, a joint study on the safeguardability of the ACP technology has been performed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and KAERI. The purpose of this study is to address the safeguardability of the ACP technology, through analysis of material flow and development of a proper safeguards system that meet IAEA's comprehensive safeguards objective. The sub-processes and material flow of the pilot-scale ACP facility were analyzed, and subsequently the relevant material balance area (MBA) and key measurement point (KMP) were designed for material accounting. The uncertainties in material accounting were also estimated with international target values, and design requirements for the material accounting systems were derived

  11. Integrated safeguards testing laboratories in support of the advanced fuel cycle initiative

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Santi, Peter A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Klasky, Kristen L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lee, Haeok [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Michael C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sprinkle, James K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, Stephen J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Williams, Bradley [DOE, NE

    2009-01-01

    A key enabler for advanced fuel cycle safeguards research and technology development for programs such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) is access to facilities and nuclear materials. This access is necessary in many cases in order to ensure that advanced safeguards techniques and technologies meet the measurement needs for which they were designed. One such crucial facility is a hot cell based laboratory which would allow developers from universities, national laboratories, and commercial companies to perform iterative research and development of advanced safeguards instrumentation under realistic operating conditions but not be subject to production schedule limitations. The need for such a facility arises from the requirement to accurately measure minor actinide and/or fission product bearing nuclear materials that cannot be adequately shielded in glove boxes. With the contraction of the DOE nuclear complex following the end of the cold war, many suitable facilities at DOE sites are increasingly costly to operate and are being evaluated for closure. A hot cell based laboratory that allowed developers to install and remove instrumentation from the hot cell would allow for both risk mitigation and performance optimization of the instrumentation prior to fielding equipment in facilities where maintenance and repair of the instrumentation is difficult or impossible. These benefits are accomplished by providing developers the opportunity to iterate between testing the performance of the instrumentation by measuring realistic types and amounts of nuclear material, and adjusting and refining the instrumentation based on the results of these measurements. In this paper, we review the requirements for such a facility using the Wing 9 hot cells in the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility as a model for such a facility and describe recent use of these hot cells in support of AFCI.

  12. Integrated safeguards testing laboratories in support of the advanced fuel cycle initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A key enabler for advanced fuel cycle safeguards research and technology development for programs such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) is access to facilities and nuclear materials. This access is necessary in many cases in order to ensure that advanced safeguards techniques and technologies meet the measurement needs for which they were designed. One such crucial facility is a hot cell based laboratory which would allow developers from universities, national laboratories, and commercial companies to perform iterative research and development of advanced safeguards instrumentation under realistic operating conditions but not be subject to production schedule limitations. The need for such a facility arises from the requirement to accurately measure minor actinide and/or fission product bearing nuclear materials that cannot be adequately shielded in glove boxes. With the contraction of the DOE nuclear complex following the end of the cold war, many suitable facilities at DOE sites are increasingly costly to operate and are being evaluated for closure. A hot cell based laboratory that allowed developers to install and remove instrumentation from the hot cell would allow for both risk mitigation and performance optimization of the instrumentation prior to fielding equipment in facilities where maintenance and repair of the instrumentation is difficult or impossible. These benefits are accomplished by providing developers the opportunity to iterate between testing the performance of the instrumentation by measuring realistic types and amounts of nuclear material, and adjusting and refining the instrumentation based on the results of these measurements. In this paper, we review the requirements for such a facility using the Wing 9 hot cells in the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility as a model for such a facility and describe recent use of these hot cells in support of AFCI.

  13. Development of an international safeguards approach to the final disposal of spent fuel in geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently pursuing development of an international safeguards approach for the final disposal of spent fuel in geological repositories through consultants meetings and through the Program for Development of Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories (SAGOR). The consultants meetings provide policy guidance to IAEA; SAGOR recommends effective approaches that can be efficiently implemented by IAEA. The SAGOR program, which is a collaboration of eight Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), was initiated in July 1994 and has identified 15 activities in each of three areas (i.e. conditioning facilities, active repositories, and closed repositories) that must be performed to ensure an efficient, yet effective safeguards approach. Two consultants meetings have been held: the first in May 1991 and the last in November 1995. For nuclear materials emplaced in a geological repository, the safeguards objectives were defined to be (1) to detect the diversion of spent fuel, whether concealed or unconcealed, from the repository and (2) to detect undeclared activities of safeguards concern (e.g., tunneling, underground reprocessing, or substitution in containers)

  14. Advanced intelligence and mechanism approach

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    ZHONG Yixin

    2007-01-01

    Advanced intelligence will feature the intelligence research in next 50 years.An understanding of the concept of advanced intelligence as well as its importance will be provided first,and detailed analysis on an approach,the mechanism approach.suitable to the advanced intelligence research will then be flolowed.And the mutual relationship among mechanism approach,traditional approaches existed in artificial intelligence research,and the cognitive informatics will be discussed.It is interesting to discover that mechanism approach is a good one to the Advanced Intelligence research and a tmified form of the existed approaches to artificial intelligence.

  15. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  16. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  17. Development of safeguards technology for lab-scale advanced fuel cycle facility at KAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute) has been developing the DUPIC (Direct Use of PWR spent fuel in CANDU) fuel cycle and ACP (Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process) technology for the purpose of spent fuel management. A safeguards system has been applied to R and D process for fabricating DUPIC fuel directly with PWR spent fuel material. Safeguards issues to be resolved were identified in the areas such as international cooperation on handling foreign origin nuclear material, technology development of operator's measurement system of bulk handling process of spent fuel material, and built-in C/S system for independent verification of material flow. All those safeguards issues have been finally resolved. The lab-scale DUPIC facility (DFDF) safeguards system was successfully established under the international cooperation program. The ACP has been under development at KAERI since 1997 to tackle the problem of the accumulation of the spent fuel. The concept is to convert the spent oxide fuel into a metallic form in a high temperature molten salt in order to reduce the heat power, volume, and radioactivity of the spent fuel. The main objective of the ACP is to treat the PWR spent fuel for a long-term storage and eventual disposal in a proliferation resistant and cost effective way. Moreover, the electrolytic reduction method of the ACP can contribute to the innovative nuclear energy system as a key technology for the preparation of the metallic fuel. Since the inactive tests of the ACP have been successfully implemented to confirm the validity of the electrolytic reduction technology, a lab-scale hot test will be undertaken in the ACP facility (ACPF) to validate the concept. Based on the results of a safeguards implementation at DFDF hot cell, the reference safeguards design conditions are established for the ACPF. Basically, the nuclear material accounting will be performed by ASNC (ACP Safeguards Neutron Counter), which is the same concept as the

  18. Development of a Safeguards Approach for a Pyroprocessing Plant by IAEA Member State Support Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The objective of this project is to analyze the safeguard ability of pyroprocess facility and to establish the safeguards system for pyroprocess by developing the technology of nuclear material accounting for unit process, surveillance technology and nuclear characteristic analysis technology which are needed to demonstrate the safeguards technology of pyroprocess. Therefore, the development of a safeguards approach for pyroprocessing facilities is required as the interest of pyroprocessing increases. Regarding this issue, the IAEA made a contract the 3-years long Member State Support Program (MSSP) for the 'Support for Development of a Safeguards Approach for a Pyroprocessing Plant' with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in July 2008. Even though the pyroprocess technology is currently being developed all over the world, its safeguards approach has not been established yet, and especially, nuclear material accountancy technology which is the core of safeguards has not been established as well. Therefore, the development of new accountancy technology which is appropriate for the construction of pyroprocess facility is needed. Due to the nature of the process, pyroprocess has various kinds of process material form, and the composition of Pu and U isotopes included in process material is not homogeneous. Also, the existing nuclear material accountancy technology for a wet reprocessing facility is hard to apply because of a large quantity of gamma-ray radiation which is emitted from the fissile products in process material. In this report, the study for the development of a safeguards approach for a pyroprocessing plant pyroprocessing has been described. As the previous results six pyroprocessing facility concepts suggested by US, Japan, and Republic of Korea had been summarized and analyzed, and the determination principles were established to determine a reference pyroprocessing facility concept. The reference pyroprocessing facility was determined to be the ESPF of KAERI

  19. New approach for safeguarding enriched uranium hexafluoride bulk transfers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The unique concepts of American National Standard ANSI N15.18-1975 ''Mass Calibration Techniques for Nuclear Material Control'' are discussed in regard to the establishment and maintenance of control of mass measurement of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) both within and between facilities. Emphasis is placed on the role of control of the measurements between facilities, and thus establish decision points for detection of measurement problems and making safeguards judgments. The unique concepts include the use of artifacts of UF6 packaging cylinders, calibrated by a central authority, to introduce the mass unit into all of the industries' weighing processes. These are called Replicate Mass Standards (RMS). This feat is accomplished by comparing the RMS to each facility's In-House Standards (IHS), also artifacts, and thence the usage of these IHS to quantify the systematic and random errors of each UF6 mass measurement process. A recent demonstration, which exchanged UF6 cylinders between two facilities, who used ANSI N15.18-1975 concepts and procedures is discussed. The discussion includes methodology and treatment of data for use in detection of measurement and safeguards problems. The discussion incorporates the methodology for data treatment and judgments concerning (1) the common base, (2) measurement process off-sets, (3) measurement process precision, and (4) shipper-receiver bulk measurement differences. From the evidence gained in the demonstration, conclusions are reached as to the usefulness of the realistic criteria for detection of mass measurement problems upon acceptance of the concepts of ANSI N15.18-1975

  20. Tokai advanced safeguards technology exercise task T-F: study of selected capabilities needed to apply DYMAC principles to safeguarding the Tokai reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Selected technical capabilities needed to apply the DYMAC principles to safeguarding the Tokai reproprocessing plant are presented. The measurements needed to close the mass balance around the process line and the analysis methods for assessing the results were investigated. Process conditions at the Tokai plant were used when numerical values were needed to assist the analyis. A rationale is presented for the selection of instruments (x-ray fluorescence spectrometers, x-ray densitometers, and gamma-ray spectrometers) best suited to establishing plutonium concentrations and inventories in the feed tanks. The current state of the art in estimating inventory in contactors is reviewed and profitable directions for further work are recommended. A generalized performance surface has been developed that can measure the diversion sensitivity of the safeguard system when the instrument performance levels, the number of measurements made, and the false alarm probability are specified. An analysis of its application to the Tokai plant is given. Finally, a conceptual approach to the problem of IAEA safeguards verification is discussed. It appears possible that, in the process of verifying, the full power of the plant operator's safeguard system can be brought to the service of the IAEA

  1. Key tools for nuclear inspections. Advances in environmental sampling strengthen safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The summer of 1991 was a turning point of scientific discovery, one that set the stage for stronger nuclear safeguards. IAEA and United Nations and inspectors were combing the rubble of Iraq's nuclear installations. What the inspectors found that summer were minute traces of radioactive elements such as uranium and plutonium which helped them to piece together details of the programme, its scale, timetable and likely purpose. Thus was opened a new chapter in the development of international nuclear safeguards. States in 1995 adopted measures for a strengthened safeguards system that authorize and equip inspectors to assure that any undeclared nuclear activities would not be overlooked. The science behind this enhanced capability, since given the name 'environmental sampling for safeguards', or ESS - relies on highly sensitive and selective analytical measurements to detect traces of nuclear materials collected in the environment of a known or suspected nuclear facility. Its application demonstrates the importance of having at hand an advanced techniques to address a significant world problem. Some methods were used by IAEA inspectors during Iraq inspections in the early 1990s. Since then, a large amount of work has been carried out by the IAEA in collaboration with national and international experts to establish and implement ESS in all countries covered by comprehensive (NPT-type) safeguards agreements. The tools of ESS also will be applied by inspectors of the IAEA Iraq Action Team who resumed on site inspections in late November 2002 under a reinforced mandate of the Security Council. To acquire the capability, a number of tasks had to be done in parallel: development and validation of sampling methods, provision of certified clean sampling materials, establishment of a Class-100 clean facility for handling the samples without risk of cross contamination, coordination of a network of analytical laboratories (NWAL) with highly-specialized measurement capabilities

  2. Development of a Safeguards Approach for Reference Engineering-Scale Pyroprocessing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocessing Facility (REPF) concept was developed through a Member State Support Programme (MSSP) for the ''Support for Development of a Safeguards Approach for a Pyroprocessing Plant''. Homogenization process, which was aimed to make the homogenous powder for the nuclear material accountancy, was included in the head end process. Material Balance Area (MBA)s and Key Measurement Point (KMP)s for the REPF were identified, and the nuclear material accounting method of each KMP was specified. A three-level method was proposed to evaluate the nuclear material accountancy by using Near Real Time Accountancy (NRTA). A simulation program, Pyroprocessing Material flow and MUF Uncertainty Simulation (PYMUS), was developed to analyze the nuclear material flow in the facility and to calculate the uncertainty of the Material Unaccounted For (MUF). Measurement errors of each KMP were estimated, and the total MUF uncertainties were calculated with the PYMUS. The safeguardability of the REPF safeguards approach was assessed. The result of this study has been reviewed and tested through the following internal collaboration on the safeguards of the pyroprocessing facility. (author)

  3. Near Real-Time Nondestructive Active Inspection Technologies Utilizing Delayed γ-Rays and Neutrons for Advanced Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In this two year project, the research team investigated how delayed γ-rays from short-lived fission fragments detected in the short interval between irradiating pulses can be exploited for advanced safeguards technologies. This program contained experimental and modeling efforts. The experimental effort measured the emitted spectra, time histories and correlations of the delayed γ-rays from aqueous solutions and solid targets containing fissionable isotopes. The modeling effort first developed and benchmarked a hybrid Monte Carlo simulation technique based on these experiments. The benchmarked simulations were then extended to other safeguards scenarios, allowing comparisons to other advanced safeguards technologies and to investigate combined techniques. Ultimately, the experiments demonstrated the possible utility of actively induced delayed γ-ray spectroscopy for fissionable material assay.

  4. Near Real-Time Nondestructive Active Inspection Technologies Utilizing Delayed γ-Rays and Neutrons for Advanced Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hunt, Alan [Idaho State Univ., Pocatello, ID (United States). Idaho Accelerator Center, Dept. of Physics; Reedy, E. T.E. [Idaho State Univ., Pocatello, ID (United States). Dept. of Phyics, Idaho Accelerator Center; Mozin, V. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Tobin, S. J. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Nuclear Nonproliferation

    2015-02-12

    In this two year project, the research team investigated how delayed γ-rays from short-lived fission fragments detected in the short interval between irradiating pulses can be exploited for advanced safeguards technologies. This program contained experimental and modeling efforts. The experimental effort measured the emitted spectra, time histories and correlations of the delayed γ-rays from aqueous solutions and solid targets containing fissionable isotopes. The modeling effort first developed and benchmarked a hybrid Monte Carlo simulation technique based on these experiments. The benchmarked simulations were then extended to other safeguards scenarios, allowing comparisons to other advanced safeguards technologies and to investigate combined techniques. Ultimately, the experiments demonstrated the possible utility of actively induced delayed γ-ray spectroscopy for fissionable material assay.

  5. The Systematic Approach to Training: Analysis and Evaluation in the Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In applying a systematic approach to training (SAT), identifying the learning needs is the first step - a learning needs analysis allows the organization to identify the competencies required to perform a particular job. A systematic approach can provide a clear structure for training and education programme development as well as the necessary evaluation and feedback so that the organization can adjust the development accordingly and deliver the optimal learning experience. In this presentation we will describes two key elements of a SAT used in the Safeguards Training Section in the Department of Safeguards: Analysis and Evaluation. Analysis is the first part of a SAT needed to define competencies for Safeguards staff in order to improve training development within the Department. We describe the training needs analysis used to capture and articulate the various competencies required for safeguards implementation based upon an analysis of tasks and activities carried out by staff members in the Department. Firstly, we highlight the different qualitative methods used to gather information from staff and the process of evaluating and organizing this information into a structured framework. Secondly, we describe how this framework provides the necessary reference to specify learning objectives, evaluate training effectiveness, review and revise training offerings, and select appropriate training paths based on identified needs. In addition, as part of the SAT, evaluation is performed to identify the usefulness of course outcomes and improvements for future offerings based on lessons learned, to ensure that appropriate knowledge and skills are being taught and to demonstrate the value of training by meeting the organization's needs. We present how the Kirkpatrick four-level evaluation model has been implemented by Safeguards Training Section in order to evaluate course effectiveness after the training has been completed, and discuss how the current evaluation

  6. Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may

  7. Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Badwan, Faris M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Demuth, Scott Francis [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Miller, Michael Conrad [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Pshakin, Gennady [Obninsk Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (Russian Federation)

    2015-02-23

    Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may

  8. Strenghening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Goodman,M.; Lockwood, d.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Tape, J.W.

    2008-06-06

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system has changed in major ways from the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 until the present. Changes include strengthening the legal framework of safeguards; improvements in concepts and approaches for safeguards implementation; and significant improvements in the technical tools available to inspectors. In this paper, we explore three broad areas related to strengthening safeguards authorities and institutions: integrated safeguards and State-Level Approaches; special inspections; and NPT withdrawal and the continuation of safeguards.

  9. Using a dual safeguard web-based interactive teaching approach in an introductory physics class

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Lie-Ming; Li, Bin; Luo, Ying

    2015-06-01

    We modified the Just-in-Time Teaching approach and developed a dual safeguard web-based interactive (DGWI) teaching system for an introductory physics course. The system consists of four instructional components that improve student learning by including warm-up assignments and online homework. Student and instructor activities involve activities both in the classroom and on a designated web site. An experimental study with control groups evaluated the effectiveness of the DGWI teaching method. The results indicate that the DGWI method is an effective way to improve students' understanding of physics concepts, develop students' problem-solving abilities through instructor-student interactions, and identify students' misconceptions through a safeguard framework based on questions that satisfy teaching requirements and cover all of the course material. The empirical study and a follow-up survey found that the DGWI method increased student-teacher interaction and improved student learning outcomes.

  10. Reassessment of safeguards parameters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Richter, J.L.; Mullen, M.F.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is reassessing the timeliness and goal quantity parameters that are used in defining safeguards approaches. This study reviews technology developments since the parameters were established in the 1970s and concludes that there is no reason to relax goal quantity or conversion time for reactor-grade plutonium relative to weapons-grade plutonium. For low-enriched uranium, especially in countries with advanced enrichment capability there may be an incentive to shorten the detection time.

  11. Safeguard for Mars Sample Return Based on an Apoptotic Approach

    Science.gov (United States)

    Clark, B.

    A critical link in assuring no inadvertent exposure of returned martian material to the terrestrial biosphere before it has been certified safe by laboratory analysis is the reentry into Earth's atmosphere. For optimized designs, the hypervelocity phase of entry can be traversed safely provided the return capsule remains oriented properly and the angle of entry does not exceed some critical value, beyond which the peak heating rates could overwhelm the forebody protective ablator. Various potential failure modes, although of extremely low probability, c uld result in advertento release of material from an interior vault due to burnthrough and/or breakup of the capsule. It is proposed that an effective, yet mass-efficient and affordable countermeasure to this unlikely event would be a Programmed Self-Sterilization Protocol, by which any deviation from nominal entry conditions (such as failed separation, loss of control, impaired orientation, or improper flight trajectory) would result in autonomous neutralization of sample material by an onboard system prior to reaching the atmospheric interface. The approach is analogous and mimetic of the widespread biological mechanism of inhibited apoptosis, in which programmed cell death is derepressed and allowed to proceed if the cell is not functioning properly.

  12. Concerns when designing a safeguards approach for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In Sweden, the construction of an encapsulation plant and a geological repository for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel is planned to start within the next ten years. Due to Sweden's international agreements on non-proliferation, the Swedish safeguards regime must be extended to include these facilities. The geological repository has some unique features, which present the safeguards system with unprecedented challenges. These features include, inter alia, the long period of time that the facility will contain nuclear material and that the disposed nuclear material will be very difficult to access, implying that physical verification of its presence in the repository is not foreseen. This work presents the available techniques for creating a safeguards system for the backend of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. Important issues to consider in the planning and implementation of the safeguards system have been investigated, which in some cases has led to an identification of areas needing further research. The results include three proposed options for a safeguards approach, which have been evaluated on the basis of the safeguards authorities' requirements. Also, the evolution and present situation of the work carried out in connection to safeguards for geological repositories has been compiled

  13. Concerns when designing a safeguards approach for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fritzell, Anni (Uppsala Univ., Uppsala (Sweden))

    2008-03-15

    In Sweden, the construction of an encapsulation plant and a geological repository for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel is planned to start within the next ten years. Due to Sweden's international agreements on non-proliferation, the Swedish safeguards regime must be extended to include these facilities. The geological repository has some unique features, which present the safeguards system with unprecedented challenges. These features include, inter alia, the long period of time that the facility will contain nuclear material and that the disposed nuclear material will be very difficult to access, implying that physical verification of its presence in the repository is not foreseen. This work presents the available techniques for creating a safeguards system for the backend of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. Important issues to consider in the planning and implementation of the safeguards system have been investigated, which in some cases has led to an identification of areas needing further research. The results include three proposed options for a safeguards approach, which have been evaluated on the basis of the safeguards authorities' requirements. Also, the evolution and present situation of the work carried out in connection to safeguards for geological repositories has been compiled

  14. The Concept of Goals-Driven Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    R. Wigeland; T Bjornard; B. Castle

    2009-02-01

    The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organization’s purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these organizations. Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these regulatory organizations’ approaches to physical protection. The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs containing the full library are available.

  15. Future issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs

  16. The next generation safeguards initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

  17. Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials

  18. Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

  19. Addressing verification challenges. Proceedings of an international safeguards symposium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The symposium on international safeguards, Addressing Verification Challenges, was held in Vienna from 16 to 20 October 2006, with the aim of assessing the challenges to the IAEA safeguards system that have emerged, or intensified, since the previous IAEA safeguards symposium in 2001. Some 500 nuclear safeguards and verification experts from more than 60 countries and international organizations attended the event. In all, 129 papers were presented in 21 sessions. There were 14 keynote speeches and 110 oral presentations. A total of 65 papers were presented as posters. In addition, 16 commercial suppliers of safeguards relevant equipment and technology presented their wares and capabilities. The symposium was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA). The symposium provided an important forum at which related issues could be discussed, the IAEA could showcase some of its ongoing work and the experts present could provide inputs of fresh thinking. The IAEA Safeguards Symposium 2006 was developed to cover five topics: current challenges to the safeguards system, further strengthening of safeguards practices and approaches, improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information, advances in safeguards techniques and technology, and future challenges. These proceedings contain the addresses given at the opening session, the technical plenary session and the closing session. The summary provides an overview of the oral presentations at the 21 sessions of the symposium. Each individual paper is indexed separately

  20. Experience of Integrated Safeguards Approach for Large-scale Hot Cell Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has been operating a large-scale hot cell laboratory, the Fuels Monitoring Facility (FMF), located near the experimental fast reactor Joyo at the Oarai Research and Development Center (JNC-2 site). The FMF conducts post irradiation examinations (PIE) of fuel assemblies irradiated in Joyo. The assemblies are disassembled and non-destructive examinations, such as X-ray computed tomography tests, are carried out. Some of the fuel pins are cut into specimens and destructive examinations, such as ceramography and X-ray micro analyses, are performed. Following PIE, the tested material, in the form of a pin or segments, is shipped back to a Joyo spent fuel pond. In some cases, after reassembly of the examined irradiated fuel pins is completed, the fuel assemblies are shipped back to Joyo for further irradiation. For the IAEA to apply the integrated safeguards approach (ISA) to the FMF, a new verification system on material shipping and receiving process between Joyo and the FMF has been established by the IAEA under technical collaboration among the Japan Safeguard Office (JSGO) of MEXT, the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) and the JAEA. The main concept of receipt/shipment verification under the ISA for JNC-2 site is as follows: under the IS, the FMF is treated as a Joyo-associated facility in terms of its safeguards system because it deals with the same spent fuels. Verification of the material shipping and receiving process between Joyo and the FMF can only be applied to the declared transport routes and transport casks. The verification of the nuclear material contained in the cask is performed with the method of gross defect at the time of short notice random interim inspections (RIIs) by measuring the surface neutron dose rate of the cask, filled with water to reduce radiation. The JAEA performed a series of preliminary tests with the IAEA, the JSGO and the NMCC, and confirmed from the standpoint of the operator that this

  1. Passive and Active Fast-Neutron Imaging in Support of Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative Safeguards Campaign

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blackston, Matthew A [ORNL; Hausladen, Paul [ORNL

    2010-04-01

    Results from safeguards-related passive and active coded-aperture fast-neutron imaging measurements of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) material configurations performed at Idaho National Laboratory s Zero Power Physics Reactor facility are presented. The imaging measurements indicate that it is feasible to use fast neutron imaging in a variety of safeguards-related tasks, such as monitoring storage, evaluating holdup deposits in situ, or identifying individual leached hulls still containing fuel. The present work also presents the first demonstration of imaging of differential die away fast neutrons.

  2. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  3. An application of the controllable unit approach (CUA) to the analysis of safeguards measurement systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The controllable unit approach (CUA) is a material control and accountability methodology that takes into account the system logic and statistical characteristics of a plant process through the formulation of closure equations. The methodology is adaptable to plant processes of varying degrees of design and operational complexity. No alteration or modification of a process is required to apply the methodology. Cost/benefits of refinements in, or changes to, the proposed measurement system are obtained as incremental cost. To encourage improved safeguards accountability, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been considering the use of performance-oriented regulations to supplement those currently used. The study, sponsored by NRC/Office of Standards Development, evaluated CUA methodology to meet performance-oriented regulations. For this study, the criterion is defined as the detection of a material loss of two kilograms of SNM with 97.5% confidence. Specifically investigated were the timeliness of detection, the ability to localize material loss, process coverage, cost/benefits, and compatibility with other safeguards techniques such as diversion path analysis and data filtering. The feasibility of performance-oriented regulations is demonstrated. To use the system of closure equations fully, a procedure was developed to integrate formally the effect of both short-term and long-term closure equations into an overall systems criterion of performance. Both single and multiple diversion strategies are examined in order to show how the CUA method can protect against either strategy. Quantitative results show that combined closure equations improve the detection sensitivity to material loss, and that multiple diversions provide only diminishing returns. (author)

  4. IAEA safeguards glossary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An unambiguous definition and rationalization of many of the terms for the purpose of IAEA safeguards are given, with a view to improving the common understanding of such terms within the international community. The glossary focuses only on safeguards meanings in general, and IAEA meanings in particular, of the terms discussed. Terms belong to the following problems: nuclear and non-nuclear material, nuclear equipment, design of the safeguards approach, nuclear material accountancy, physical standards, sampling, measurements, statistical concepts and others

  5. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

  6. Development of an Advanced Ceramic Seal for Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge in Treaty Verification and Safeguards Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sandia National Laboratories and the Savannah River National Laboratory are collaborating on research and development of technologies for an advanced capability prototype tamper-indicating device known as the Ceramic Seal. Advanced capabilities include multiple levels of tamper indication such as a frangible seal body, surface coatings, and an active detection of seal status; and unique identification via electronics as well as non-reproducible surface features. The innovation of the Ceramic Seal is the inclusion of multiple advanced capabilities in a volume comparable to the ubiquitous metal cup seal. Our advanced capability small volume seal has application in treaty verification and safeguards regimes for maintaining continuity of knowledge. Once attached to a monitored item, the seal's identity and status can be verified in-situ rather than requiring removal and analysis at an inspectorate location. The Ceramic Seal has evolved from a first generation prototype constructed of alumina to a second generation prototype manufactured from low-temperature co-fired ceramic (LTCC). LTCC allows integration of passive electronic components into the seal construction material. Vulnerability reviews have been conducted periodically throughout the project and results used to guide the design. This paper will describe the capabilities of the current generation Ceramic Seal. Keywords: Tamper-indicating devices; seals; Containment and Surveillance

  7. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

  8. Strategic safeguards considerations in the nuclear energy renaissance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: As nuclear energy use increases through the next decade, the international community has an important opportunity to work together to ensure that this time, nonproliferation is taken into account early and often in the technology development process. The United States has begun a new initiative with this in mind called the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). It was announced by the U.S. Department of Energy in February 2006 and the initial program was sent to the US Congress for budget approval as part of the FY 2007 budget. One of the four key goals of the Global Nuclear Partnership Initiative (GNEP) is to introduce new technologies in this next generation of nuclear power that facilitate the application of international safeguards as part of their design to reduce proliferation risk. GNEP will focus on the development and implementation of advanced international nuclear safeguards equipment and techniques to strengthen the IAEA's ability to detect or prevent proliferation. The idea is that facilitating IAEA safeguards should be part of the design process. Safeguards should not be retrofitted. To be successful, development of the advanced safeguards systems will require a concerted effort by the international community to ensure both technology developers/holders and recipients share this goal. This paper will discuss the elements of possible strategic safeguards approaches and technologies which might be considered for facilities under GNEP. The paper will also address the policy and economic considerations in developing and implementing such advanced safeguards approaches. (author)

  9. Status and Prospect of Safeguards By Design for Pyroprocessing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The concept of Safeguards-By-Design (SBD), which is proposed and developed by the United States and the IAEA, is now widely acknowledged as a fundamental consideration for the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards. The application of a SBD concept is of importance especially for developmental nuclear facilities which have new technological features and relevant challenges to their safeguards approach. At this point of time, the examination of the applicability of SBD on a pyroprocessing facility, which has been being developed in the Republic of Korea (ROK), would be meaningful. The ROK developed a safeguards system with the concept of SBD for Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF) and DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) before the SBD concept was formally suggested. Currently. The PRIDE (PyRoprocess Integrated Inactive Demonstration) facility for the demonstration of pyroprocess using 10 ton of non-radioactive nuclear materials per year is being constructed in the ROK. The safeguards system for the facility has been designed in cooperation with a facility designer from the design phase, and the safeguards system would be established according to the future construction schedule. In preparing the design of Engineering Scale Pyroprocess Facility (ESPF), which will use spent fuels in an engineering scale and be constructed in 2016, a research on the safeguards system for this facility is also being conducted. In this connection, a project to support for development of safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility has been carried out by KAERI in cooperation with KINAC and the IAEA through an IAEA Member State Support Program (MSSP). When this MSSP project is finished in August, 2011, a safeguards system model and safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility would be established. Maximizing these early experiences and results, a safeguards system of ESPF based on the concept of SBD would be designed and

  10. A study of a zone approach to IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches

  11. A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-06-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches.

  12. Multi-Level Policy Dialogues, Processes, and Actions: Challenges and Opportunities for National REDD+ Safeguards Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pamela Jagger

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available REDD+ social safeguards have gained increasing attention in numerous forums. This paper reviews the evolution of multi-level policy dialogues, processes, and actions related to REDD+ social safeguards (e.g., Cancun Safeguards 1–5 among policy makers, civil society organizations, and within the media in Brazil, Indonesia and Tanzania, three countries with well advanced REDD+ programs. We find that progress on core aspects of social safeguards is uneven across the three countries. Brazil is by far the most advanced having drafted a REDD+ social safeguards policy. Both Brazil and Indonesia have benefited from progress made by strong sub-national entities in the operationalization of REDD+ safeguards including free prior and informed consent (FPIC, participation, and benefit sharing. Tanzania has weakly articulated how social safeguards will be operationalized and has a more top-down approach. We conclude that in all three countries, measuring, reporting and verifying progress on social safeguards is likely to be a complex issue. Stakeholders with vested interests in REDD+ social safeguards operate in polycentric rather than nested systems, suggesting that aggregation of information from local to national-scale will be a challenge. However, polycentric systems are also likely to support more transparent and comprehensive safeguards systems. Clear direction from the international community and financing for REDD+ safeguard MRV is essential if REDD+ social safeguards are to be meaningfully integrated into forest-based climate mitigation strategies.

  13. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities - Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  14. Safeguards Implementation: Establishment of Indonesian Safeguards Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Under the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), U.S. National Laboratories support the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to ''collaborate with international partners to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development.'' This engagement in safeguards implementation cooperation is the basis for the security and safeguards arrangement with the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (BAPETEN) and includes strengthening of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). There are many components in a robust SSAC. While INSEP carries on its program in a holistic approach, it is more effective and efficient to address individual components, rather than the entire system at one time, with the objective of strengthening the system as a whole. Nuclear material accountancy is one of these components. Nuclear material accountancy necessitates that a State periodically take an inventory of its material and record changes. To better perform these activities, BAPETEN requested assistance with establishing a safeguards laboratory where its staff could perform independent material characterization, maintain nondestructive assay equipment, and facilitate hands-on training of BAPETEN safeguards inspectors. In compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines and safety series documents, INSEP and BAPETEN opened the BAPETEN Safeguards Laboratory in February 2010 to provide these competencies. BAPETEN showcased these new capabilities in July 2010 at the IAEA-sponsored Regional Workshop on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control at Facilities where hands-on activities were held at BAPETEN's Headquarters in Jakarta using the equipment supplied by INSEP. Discussions have begun on the establishment of a security and safeguards laboratory at the BAPETEN Training Center located in Cisarua. This paper describes the many steps

  15. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The following topics are covered in this chapter: basis for international safeguards; basis for applying international safeguards in US facilities; application of international safeguards at the facility level; and example of application of international safeguards at a low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication facility including material balance area structure and key measurement points, inspection activities, auditing operator's measurement system, verifying nuclear material, containment and surveillance measures, and inspector's conclusions

  16. Advances toward a transportable antineutrino detector system for reactor monitoring and safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reyna, D. [Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Bernstein, A. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Lund, J.; Kiff, S.; Cabrera-Palmer, B. [Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Bowden, N. S.; Dazeley, S.; Keefer, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States)

    2011-07-01

    Nuclear reactors have served as the neutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Our SNL/LLNL collaboration has demonstrated that such antineutrino based monitoring is feasible using a relatively small cubic meter scale liquid scintillator detector at tens of meters standoff from a commercial Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). With little or no burden on the plant operator we have been able to remotely and automatically monitor the reactor operational status (on/off), power level, and fuel burnup. The initial detector was deployed in an underground gallery that lies directly under the containment dome of an operating PWR. The gallery is 25 meters from the reactor core center, is rarely accessed by plant personnel, and provides a muon-screening effect of some 20-30 meters of water equivalent earth and concrete overburden. Unfortunately, many reactor facilities do not contain an equivalent underground location. We have therefore attempted to construct a complete detector system which would be capable of operating in an aboveground location and could be transported to a reactor facility with relative ease. A standard 6-meter shipping container was used as our transportable laboratory - containing active and passive shielding components, the antineutrino detector and all electronics, as well as climate control systems. This aboveground system was deployed and tested at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in southern California in 2010 and early 2011. We will first present an overview of the initial demonstrations of our below ground detector. Then we will describe the aboveground system and the technological developments of the two antineutrino

  17. The safeguards options study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state

  18. The safeguards options study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  19. A study of safeguards approach for the area of plutonium evaporator in a large scale reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A preliminary study on a safeguards approach for the chemical processing area in a large scale reprocessing plant has been carried out. In this approach, plutonium inventory at the plutonium evaporator will not be taken, but containment and surveillance (C/S) measures will be applied to ensure the integrity of an area specifically defined to include the plutonium evaporator. The plutonium evaporator area consists of the evaporator itself and two accounting points, i.e., one before the plutonium evaporator and the other after the plutonium evaporator. For newly defined accounting points, two alternative measurement methods, i.e., accounting vessels with high accuracy and flow meters, were examined. Conditions to provide the integrity of the plutonium evaporator area were also examined as well as other technical aspects associated with this approach. The results showed that an appropriate combination of NRTA and C/S measures would be essential to realize a cost effective safeguards approach to be applied for a large scale reprocessing plant. (author)

  20. Approach to integrate current safeguards measures with additional protocol requirements at national level

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peru adhered to the Additional Protocol in March 2000 which was also approved by the Congress in May 2001. After approval by law the obligations derived from this Additional Protocol will be in force after 180 days. After the signing of the Protocol an approach was designed to help better fulfill these requirements in an integrated way with the previous measures. As first stage, a review of the current state of safeguards was undertaken. Under the current agreement (an INFCIRC/153 type agreement) the reporting is less complicated and inexpensive to be carried out because these reports include only the declared nuclear material and the features of declared facilities where the nuclear material is used. No other related facility or material or activity needs to be declared. In Peru there are only two MBAs where low enriched uranium (LEU) is used and the record system includes general ledgers, inventory records and operational books. The results of national inspections and copies of reports and communications sent to the IAEA are also kept in this system. Under the agreement and subsidiary arrangements material balance reports (MBR), physical inventory listings (PIL) and inventory change reports (ICR) are prepared and submitted to the IAEA at scheduled periods. The MBR and PIL reports are sent after yearly regular inspections carried out by the IAEA. The ICR is sent just every time when an import or export of nuclear material is made. The time devoted to carry out all of these activities is not so extensive for both the State System for Accountability and Control (SSAC) and the users because of the limited nuclear activities in the country. Because of the characteristics and limited quantities of nuclear material the efforts for inspection and reporting activities are few. Another subject under review was the procedure for controlling the imports of nuclear material. Under the current agreement this subject was not a problem, as all of the radioactive and nuclear

  1. Study calls for safeguards against misuse of advances in life sciences

    OpenAIRE

    Micale, Barbara L.

    2006-01-01

    Vigilance among the world's scientists, an expanded view of bioterrorism threats, and a stronger public health infrastructure are needed to reduce the growing risk that new advances in the life sciences and related technologies will be used to create novel biological weapons or misused by careless individuals, says a new report from the National Research Council and Institute of Medicine.

  2. A summary of JAEA's R and D programs for advanced technologies for nuclear security and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper reports on the recent progress at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) concerning various research and development (R and D) programs for advanced technologies for the measurement and detection of nuclear material for security and safeguards. These programs are being coordinated through the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN). One program is the development of a neutron detector that uses a ZnS ceramic scintillator material instead of He-3 gas. JAEA is preparing to conduct benchmark experiments to compare the performance of an NDA system that uses the new scintillator detectors against the performance of the existing NDA system that uses He-3 detectors. The Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) program is developing NRF as an NDA technique to detect and measure nuclear-material isotopes in used fuel assemblies and in melted nuclear fuel debris. The Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) program is similarly developing NRD to measure melted nuclear-fuel debris. This past year, JAEA has conducted several important NRF and NRD experiments, collaborated closely with international partners, and improved the NRF and NRD theories and computer-simulation codes. Lastly, JAEA has collaborated with Los Alamos National Laboratory to test a PNAR+SINRD NDA detector on used nuclear fuel assemblies at Fugen. (author)

  3. Novel technologies for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

  4. The use of safeguards data for process monitoring in the Advanced Test Line for Actinide Separations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Los Alamos is constructing an integrated process monitoring/materials control and accounting (PM/MC and A) system in the Advanced Testing Line for Actinide Separations (ATLAS) at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility. The ATLAS will test and demonstrate new methods for aqueous processing of plutonium. The ATLAS will also develop, test, and demonstrate the concepts for integrated process monitoring/materials control and accounting. We describe how this integrated PM/MC and A system will function and provide benefits to both process research and materials accounting personnel

  5. Process: (international) safeguards interface at the Portsmouth GCEP from the safeguards technology developer's viewpoint

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The design of a major portion of a safeguards system for possible use by IAEA at the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant is described from the viewpoint of the safeguards technology developer. The process-safeguards interface is reviewed, including safeguards, process, and operational constraints on the safeguards system. The conflicting requirements of the IAEA and the plant operator are minimized through the use of advanced technology that allows safeguards data to be acquired, analyzed, and reported in an automated, unattended mode. The proposed safeguards system will reduce the impact of the inspections on both the operator and the IAEA

  6. The international scope of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As a result of safeguards agreements under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and with States not Party to that Treaty, the Agency's safeguards coverage today is very extensive. According to the best information officially available to the Agency, there are only five States in the world besides the nuclear-weapon States that have significant nuclear activities which are not subject to Agency safeguards, namely Egypt, India, Israel, South Africa and Spain. Nevertheless, any State that is not a Party to the NPT or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) is free, in the absence of treaty obligations, to build or otherwise acquire unsafeguarded nuclear plant. Furthermore, there are significant differences between the NPT safeguards agreements and those with States not Party to the NPT, not only with regard to scope (NPT agreements cover all peaceful nuclear activities in the State, which in practice means all nuclear activities, while non-NPT agreements so far only cover particular plants or supply agreements) but also in technical and legal approach (NPT agreements reflect important advances in safeguards concepts indicated in the Treaty itself). (author)

  7. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute : an integrated approach to safety, security and safeguards.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beeley, Phillip A. (Khalifa University of Science, Technology and Research, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates); Boyle, David R. (Texas A& M University, College Station, TX); Williams, Adam David; Mohagheghi, Amir Hossein

    2010-04-01

    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University are working with Middle East regional partners to set up a nuclear energy safety, safeguards, and security educational institute in the Gulf region. SNL and NSSPI, partnered with the Khalifa University of Science, Technology, and Research (KUSTAR), with suppot from its key nuclear stakeholders, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), plan to jointly establish the institute in Abu Dhabi. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) will be a KUSTAR-associated, credit-granting regional education program providing both classroom instruction and hands-on experience. The ultimate objective is for GNEII to be autonomous - regionally funded and staffed with personnel capable of teaching all GNEII courses five years after its inauguration. This is a strategic effort to indigenize a responsible nuclear energy culture - a culture shaped by an integrated understanding of nuclear safety, safeguards and security - in regional nuclear energy programs. GNEII also promotes international interests in developing a nuclear energy security and safety culture, increases collaboration between the nuclear energy security and safety communities, and helps to enhance global standards for nuclear energy technology in the Middle East.

  8. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute : an integrated approach to safety, security & safeguards.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williams, Adam David

    2010-04-01

    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University are working with Middle East regional partners to set up a nuclear energy safety, safeguards, and security educational institute in the Gulf region. SNL and NSSPI, partnered with the Khalifa University of Science, Technology, and Research (KUSTAR), with suppot from its key nuclear stakeholders, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), plan to jointly establish the institute in Abu Dhabi. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) will be a KUSTAR-associated, credit-granting regional education program providing both classroom instruction and hands-on experience. The ultimate objective is for GNEII to be autonomous - regionally funded and staffed with personnel capable of teaching all GNEII courses five years after its inauguration. This is a strategic effort to indigenize a responsible nuclear energy culture - a culture shaped by an integrated understanding of nuclear safety, safeguards and security - in regional nuclear energy programs. GNEII also promotes international interests in developing a nuclear energy security and safety culture, increases collaboration between the nuclear energy security and safety communities, and helps to enhance global standards for nuclear energy technology in the Middle East.

  9. Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

  10. A DOE multi-site approach to safeguards integration with facility operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Accountability Technology Exchange (ATEX) Working Group was established in October 1986 by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to help identify nuclear materials accountability measurement needs within the DOE plutonium community and recommend potential improvements. ATEX Working Group membership represents nuclear materials production, safeguards, nondestructive assay (NDA), and analytical chemistry at a multitude of DOE plutonium sites. Currently, the ATEX Working Group has identified twenty NDA accountability measurement needs that fall into five major classes: NDA standards representing various nuclear materials and matrix compositions; NDA for impure nuclear materials compounds, residues, and wastes; NDA for product-grade nuclear materials; NDA for nuclear materials process holdup and in-process inventory; and NDA for nuclear materials item control and verification. Specific needs within these classes have been evaluated and ranked for individual sites and for the total DOE plutonium community

  11. Approach to integrate current safeguards measures with Additional Protocol requirements at national level

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peru approved the Additional Protocol and then new obligations have to be fulfilled. Until now classic safeguards has been applied to two Material Balance Zones and reports are being periodically sent to IAEA as established in the subsidiary arrangements and the records of nuclear materials are kept in the State System for Control and Accountability. The new commitments were analyzed to determine the magnitude of needed efforts. The recommended guidelines to submit information under the new protocol was also reviewed. Co-ordinations were made with Customs organization and with Ministry of Industry to obtain information about the material and equipment specified in the annexes of Protocol. It is expected that implementation of the new measures and activities will increase the volume of records and the reports to IAEA. However, some of these efforts may be saved if adjustments are made in future subsidiary arrangements. (author)

  12. Safeguards information management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The requirements for the management of information at the IAEA and its Department of Safeguards are rapidly changing. Historically, the Department of Safeguards has had the requirement to process large volumes of conventional safeguards information. An information management system is currently in place that adequately handles the IAEA's conventional safeguards data needs. In the post-Iraq environment, however, there is a growing need to expand the IAEA information management capability to include unconventional forms of information. These data include environmental sampling results, photographs, video film, lists of machine tools, and open-source materials such as unclassified publications. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has responded to this information management need by implementing the safeguards information management system (SIMS) initiative. SIMS was created by the DOE to anticipate and respond to IAEA information management needs through a multilaboratory initiative that will utilize an integrated approach to develop and deploy technology in a timely and cost effective manner. The DOE will use the SIMS initiative to co-ordinate US information management activities that support the IAEA Department of Safeguards. (author). 1 ref., 2 figs

  13. Advanced computational approaches to biomedical engineering

    CERN Document Server

    Saha, Punam K; Basu, Subhadip

    2014-01-01

    There has been rapid growth in biomedical engineering in recent decades, given advancements in medical imaging and physiological modelling and sensing systems, coupled with immense growth in computational and network technology, analytic approaches, visualization and virtual-reality, man-machine interaction and automation. Biomedical engineering involves applying engineering principles to the medical and biological sciences and it comprises several topics including biomedicine, medical imaging, physiological modelling and sensing, instrumentation, real-time systems, automation and control, sig

  14. Safeguards in Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Conclusion: (1) The integrated safeguards approach (ISA) was applied to Monju in November 2009 after it was confirmed that fuel assemblies were able to be monitored in every fuel handling route using the safeguards equipments installed in Monju. (2) A series of design, development and improvement related to safeguards in Monju, which were started in about 1985 (on the Monju construction stage), was finished by the shift to the ISA. (3) The safeguards method in Monju is expected to be a future FBR safeguards model. (4) In future, the reliability of safeguards equipments will be confirmed by accumulating the handling achievements of the spent fuel assemblies etc

  15. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.)

  16. IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.)

  17. Lifecycle Management of Safeguards Equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In recent years, traditional procurement procedures for safeguards equipment have experienced major setbacks that have led to costly and time-consuming re-design and re-evaluation periods, as well as delays in the delivery and deployment of urgently needed equipment. A common element of all encountered problems is the rapid development of technical components. The accelerated pace of 69 safeguards systems development, when coupled with the absence of a disciplined lifecycle approach to design and development, leads to early technical obsolescence as well as the inability to support a safeguards system over its operational lifecycle. This condition is further aggravated by safeguards equipment suppliers who wrestle with economies of scale associated with a unique safeguards market that generally does not provide sufficient margins to stay in business. As a result, international agencies charged with safeguards responsibilities find it difficult to secure the supply of identical safeguards equipment over periods of ten or more years. However, all these problems are merely symptoms of the lack of an integrated lifecycle management approach with early involvement of all parties: vendors and their suppliers, national laboratories and contracted developers, national support programs, and international agencies with nonproliferation responsibilities. The following paper will describe the unique constellation of players within the safeguards community, and why this constellation is a cause of most of the problems inherent in traditional procurement procedures. Further, it will offer a comprehensive lifecycle management approach that will ensure the availability of identical safeguards equipment over its required lifespan (ten to fifteen years). It should be noted that an integrated lifecycle management approach will be difficult to implement and will require a fundamental re-orientation of efforts in: need identification, system design and development, funding, and

  18. Trade Analysis and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In order to verify compliance with safeguards and draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collects and analyses trade information that it receives from open sources as well as from Member States. Although the IAEA does not intervene in national export controls, it has to monitor the trade of dual use items. Trade analysis helps the IAEA to evaluate global proliferation threats, to understand States' ability to report exports according to additional protocols but also to compare against State declarations. Consequently, the IAEA has explored sources of trade-related information and has developed analysis methodologies beyond its traditional safeguards approaches. (author)

  19. Safeguard sleuths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

  20. Reactor safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Russell, Charles R

    2013-01-01

    Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

  1. Advanced Approach of Multiagent Based Buoy Communication

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gediminas Gricius

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Usually, a hydrometeorological information system is faced with great data flows, but the data levels are often excessive, depending on the observed region of the water. The paper presents advanced buoy communication technologies based on multiagent interaction and data exchange between several monitoring system nodes. The proposed management of buoy communication is based on a clustering algorithm, which enables the performance of the hydrometeorological information system to be enhanced. The experiment is based on the design and analysis of the inexpensive but reliable Baltic Sea autonomous monitoring network (buoys, which would be able to continuously monitor and collect temperature, waviness, and other required data. The proposed approach of multiagent based buoy communication enables all the data from the costal-based station to be monitored with limited transition speed by setting different tasks for the agent-based buoy system according to the clustering information.

  2. Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

  3. Enhanced safeguards training

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The transition to a strengthened safeguards system engendered new skill demands for the International Atomic Energy Agency Inspectorate and information requirements for State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSAC). In response to these demands, the Section for Safeguards Training (TTR) developed courses to ensure that inspectors have the capability to better detect undeclared nuclear activities in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements, to better detect the misuse of declared nuclear facilities and installations, and to more efficiently and effectively manage the inspection process that allows such detection. The resulting extended training curriculum for inspectors and the activities undertaken to convey relevant information to SSAC's personnel placed even a greater emphasis on a modernisation of the techniques used to impart knowledge and skills to the trainees and on the implementation of a systematic approach to training methodology. This methodology reflects a logical progression from the identification of the new competencies required under the strengthened safeguards regime to the development and implementation of training to achieve these competencies, and to the subsequent evaluation of how effective the training has been. This paper addresses the resulting expanded training curriculum and enhanced training approach implemented by TTR. (author)

  4. Uncertainty quantification approaches for advanced reactor analyses.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Briggs, L. L.; Nuclear Engineering Division

    2009-03-24

    The original approach to nuclear reactor design or safety analyses was to make very conservative modeling assumptions so as to ensure meeting the required safety margins. Traditional regulation, as established by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission required conservatisms which have subsequently been shown to be excessive. The commission has therefore moved away from excessively conservative evaluations and has determined best-estimate calculations to be an acceptable alternative to conservative models, provided the best-estimate results are accompanied by an uncertainty evaluation which can demonstrate that, when a set of analysis cases which statistically account for uncertainties of all types are generated, there is a 95% probability that at least 95% of the cases meet the safety margins. To date, nearly all published work addressing uncertainty evaluations of nuclear power plant calculations has focused on light water reactors and on large-break loss-of-coolant accident (LBLOCA) analyses. However, there is nothing in the uncertainty evaluation methodologies that is limited to a specific type of reactor or to specific types of plant scenarios. These same methodologies can be equally well applied to analyses for high-temperature gas-cooled reactors and to liquid metal reactors, and they can be applied to steady-state calculations, operational transients, or severe accident scenarios. This report reviews and compares both statistical and deterministic uncertainty evaluation approaches. Recommendations are given for selection of an uncertainty methodology and for considerations to be factored into the process of evaluating uncertainties for advanced reactor best-estimate analyses.

  5. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  6. Uncertainty Quantification for Safeguards Measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Part of the scientific method requires all calculated and measured results to be accompanied by a description that meets user needs and provides an adequate statement of the confidence one can have in the results. The scientific art of generating quantitative uncertainty statements is closely related to the mathematical disciplines of applied statistics, sensitivity analysis, optimization, and inversion, but in the field of non-destructive assay, also often draws heavily on expert judgment based on experience. We call this process uncertainty quantification, (UQ). Philosophical approaches to UQ along with the formal tools available for UQ have advanced considerably over recent years and these advances, we feel, may be useful to include in the analysis of data gathered from safeguards instruments. This paper sets out what we hope to achieve during a three year US DOE NNSA research project recently launched to address the potential of advanced UQ to improve safeguards conclusions. By way of illustration we discuss measurement of uranium enrichment by the enrichment meter principle (also known as the infinite thickness technique), that relies on gamma counts near the 186 keV peak directly from 235U. This method has strong foundations in fundamental physics and so we have a basis for the choice of response model — although in some implementations, peak area extraction may result in a bias when applied over a wide dynamic range. It also allows us to describe a common but usually neglected aspect of applying a calibration curve, namely the error structure in the predictors. We illustrate this using a combination of measured data and simulation. (author)

  7. Hexapartite Safeguards Project - a retrospective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP) was created in November 1980 as an international forum consisting of the technology holders of gas-centrifuge enrichment and the international safeguards inspectorates in order to develop a strategy for applying effective and efficient safeguards to a commercial centrifuge enrichment plant without compromising the sensitive information related to centrifuge enrichment technology. The participants were Australia, Japan, the so-called 'Troika' states, i.e. the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the United States, EURATOM and the IAEA. They met for some two years, producing in February 1983 a final report with the agreed strategy of the 'LFUA' (Limited Frequency Unannounced Access) Model. Its basic feature is to allow the safeguards inspectors to have a routine access to cascade halls only with a short notice and with an agreed average frequency. This model has been serving as the basis for enrichment plant safeguards in HSP countries with necessary modifications and adaptations reflecting the specific features of individual plants. However, more than two decades have passed since the conclusion of HSP and it has become necessary to develop new safeguards approaches to reflect the recent developments in enrichment and safeguards technology, in particular the advent of large scale facilities. SAGSI (Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation) recently reviewed and approved the Agency's proposed approach. In this paper, the author, having served as the Secretariat of HSP in charge of drafting its final report, outlines the outcome of HSP in historical perspective, especially the issues becoming distinctive in the course of HSP deliberations, how they were addressed in the LFUA model, and the significance of HSP in the context of international safeguards, as well as its limitations due to prevailing legal interpretations at that time. (author)

  8. Implementation of an integrated safeguards approach for transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at multi-unit CANDU generating stations in Canada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) in 2002 undertook an IAEA Support Program task to develop and test an Integrated Safeguards (IS) approach for transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at multi-unit CANDU stations. The IS approach that Canada proposed in 2003 was successfully field tested in Canada by the IAEA in 2004. Since then the IAEA has drawn a positive conclusion for Canada and is preparing to implement IS in Canada based on the State-level Integrated Safeguards Approach (SLA) for Canada that was concluded in November 2005. Implementation of an IS approach for transfers to dry storage, similar to the one proposed by Canada, will be part of the initial phase of the implementation of the SLA. This paper briefly reviews the IS approach for transfers proposed by Canada and explains how the approach may be modified for implementation as part of the SLA to take into account lessons learned from the field test, operator and IAEA concerns, and developments in technology. (author)

  9. Activities of the ESARDA Working Group on Integrated Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: ESARDA, the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, pursues as a main objective to assist the European safeguards community with advancing progress in safeguards and enhancing the efficiency of systems and measures. Key bodies of ESARDA are standing Working Groups dealing with various technical subjects. The ESARDA Working Group on Integrated Safeguards was created in 2000 with the objective to provide the Safeguards Community with expert advice on methodologies and approaches to integrate INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/540 measures and to present a forum for the exchange of information, views and experiences in that regard. Its members represent inspectorates, national authorities, operators and research centres active in the field of safeguards. The Working Group very soon realized that a first milestone on the road to Integrated Safeguards is the successful and functional implementation of the Additional Protocol. Discussions and activities concentrated on actions necessary to reach this end thereby taking into account the specific situation in European States. Among the topics discussed were issues of: - how to establish a functional site definition for different types of installations, ranging from small locations with very small amounts of nuclear material to complex installations with a complex history; - how to deal with different and even conflicting requirements in the context of unannounced inspections; and - how to interpret and handle the requirements for R and D declarations considering the needs and interests of all parties involved; etc. The IAEA participated in most of the meetings as an observer and provided the group with valuable background information on Additional Protocol questions and received in turn a deep insight into our considerations, motivations and concerns. This procedure contributed much to a better mutual understanding that is not least reflected in the revised draft of the AP implementation guidelines

  10. Safeguards -Safeguards system development support-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This project mainly focused to technically support national safeguards inspection which is scheduled in the beginning of 1997. It includes non-destructive assay of nuclear fuels, analysis on inspection and environmental samples, remote monitoring of nuclear activities and its analysis, survey on remote sensing of satellite for safeguards application. Non-destructive assay of nuclear fuels dealt with development on verification of spent fuels with emphasis to fabrication of inspection tools with surveillance and gamma measurement on CANDU spent fuels. For sample analysis, study was carried out on process inspection sample analysis method. In addition to this, ultra low background laboratory was set up to execute environmental and swipe samples and sample treatment techniques including water, soil, plant, et al. were researched. Tritiums which were sampled around power plants were analysed. With cooperation of Satellite Technology Research Center of KAIST, use of civilian satellite imagery was surveyed. To train facility operators for safeguards, various technology on non-destructive assay was lectured to personnel of Korea Electric Power Corporation. And to enhance out capabilities, non-destructive assay training was done at Los Alamos National Lab. of U.S. through the agreement of MOST and DOE agreement, and information on DA technology was exchanged at Nuclear Material Control Center of Japan. (author). 22 tabs., 52 figs., 53 refs

  11. Safeguards and Non-destructive Assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and non-destructive assay includes: (1) various activities to assure nuclear materials accountancy; (2) contributes to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards measures in Belgium and to assist the IAEA through the Belgian Support Programme; (3) renders services to internal and external customers in the field of safeguards; (4) improves passive neutron coincidence counting techniques for waste assay and safeguards verification measurements by R and D on correlation algorithms implemented via software or dedicated hardware; (5) improves gamma assay techniques for waste assay by implementing advanced scanning techniques and different correlation algorithms; and (6) develops numerical calibration techniques. Major achievements in these areas in 2000 are reported

  12. Openness, transparency, and enhanced safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Much confusion exists regarding the use of the terms openness and transparency in the context of improved International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). While the two are often used interchangeably, they are quite different aspects of the overall NPT safeguards approach. To clarify the terms, Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) describes transparency as a glass house with an interior that can be viewed from a distance, and openness is a brick house that one can enter. While this analogy is helpful, it is not entirely satisfactory. Transparency is not a synonym for openness; it is a function or a result of openness. There can be no transparency without openness first, thus the issue of improved openness should be a prime consideration in ongoing international efforts to strengthen the current NPT safeguards system. The safeguards system administered by the IAEA pursuant to the NPT works because the treaty's signatories have a common commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and have agreed to common guidelines to verify compliance with this commitment. Nevertheless, a need to improve existing safeguards was expressed at the 1990 NPT Review Conference. This perceived weakness in the NPT safeguards system may be rooted in the lack of a common definition among Member States as to what constitutes openness. In this context, the issue of openness could have ramification not only for the effectiveness of the international community's nuclear nonproliferation efforts but also for the activities of the IAEA in terms of the resources required for the effective administration of the current NPT safeguards system. Some adjustment of the IAEA's NPT safeguards activities should occur in the form of a redirection of current efforts, an augmentation of current resources, or both

  13. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

  14. Safeguards issues in spent fuel consolidation facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Belew, W.L.; Moran, B.W.

    1991-01-01

    In the nuclear power industry, the fuel assembly is the basic unit for nuclear material accountancy. The safeguards procedures for the spent fuel assemblies, therefore, are based on an item accountancy approach. When fuel consolidation occurs in at-reactor'' or away-from-reactor'' facilities, the fuel assemblies are disassembled and cease to be the basic unit containing nuclear material. Safeguards can no longer be based on item accountancy of fuel assemblies. The spent fuel pins containing plutonium are accessible, and the possibilities for diversion of spent fuel for clandestine reprocessing to recover the plutonium are increased. Thus, identifying the potential safeguards concerns created by operation of these facilities is necessary. Potential safeguards techniques to address these concerns also must be identified so facility designs may include the equipment and systems required to provide an acceptable level of assurance that the international safeguards objectives can be met when these facilities come on-line. The objectives of this report are (1) to identify the safeguards issues associated with operation of spent fuel consolidation facilities, (2) to provide a preliminary assessment of the assessment of the safeguards vulnerabilities introduced, and (3) to identify potential safeguards approaches that could meet international safeguards requirements. The safeguards aspects of spent fuel consolidation are addressed in several recent reports and papers. 11 refs., 3 figs., 3 tabs.

  15. Containment and surveillance - A principal IAEA safeguards measure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is in its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future

  16. Advanced quantum communications an engineering approach

    CERN Document Server

    Imre, Sandor

    2012-01-01

    The book provides an overview of the most advanced quantum informational geometric techniques, which can help quantum communication theorists analyze quantum channels, such as security or additivity properties. Each section addresses an area of major research of quantum information theory and quantum communication networks. The authors present the fundamental theoretical results of quantum information theory, while also presenting the details of advanced quantum ccommunication protocols with clear mathematical and information theoretical background. This book bridges the gap between quantum ph

  17. International safeguards problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    To recognize the limitations of safeguards as a barrier to nuclear proliferation is not to deny their essential role in the effort to contain that problem. Without a safeguards system, international nuclear commerce and development would not, indeed could not, be what they are today. The problems evoked in the discussion of the spread of sensitive nuclear technology underscore the importance of ensuring that activities do not outpace our ability to control them. To sustain a global nuclear economy requires a readiness to live within the constraints that such an economy requires. Enhanced safeguards and strengthened national commitments to facilitate their application are key elements of those constraints. So also may be a prepardness by many nations to forego explicitly national control over all facets of the nuclear fuel cycle while still sharing fully and equally in the benefits of the peaceful atom. The challenge of the coming years will be to craft mechanisms and institutions enabling the continued growth of peaceful nuclear activity without further impairing international security. The constraints that such an outcome entails are not limited to nations lacking sophisticated nuclear technology; they apply to the most advanced nuclear nations as well--partly through adherence to the safeguards system that these countries call upon others to adopt, and partly through greater willingness to entertain solutions that may involve greater international involvement in, and control over, their own peaceful nuclear productive activities. With time, the relative incompatibility of nuclear energy with full national sovereignty, and the far-sighted wisdom of the Baruch Plan, are becoming increasingly clear. 1 table, 10 references

  18. Towards unified performance measures for evaluating nuclear safeguard systems: mathematical foundations and formal comparison of existing models

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An important step in the analysis of large-scale systems is the development of economical and meaningful measures of system performance. In the literature on analysis of nuclear safeguard systems, many performance measures have been advanced, but their interrelationships and their relevance to overall system objectives have not received attention commensurate with the effort spent in developing detailed safeguard models. The work reported here is an attempt to improve the development and evaluation of performance measures for nuclear safeguard systems. This work falls into three main areas. First, we develop a new framework which provides an initial basis for defining and structuring performance measures. To demonstrate that this framework allows a clear understanding of the purposes of nuclear safeguard systems, we employ it to state various safeguard questions clearly and concisely. The framework reflects the rough subsystem structure of safeguard systems - the detection and response subsystems - and formally accommodates various safeguard models. We especially emphasize two of these models which are under development at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, the structured assessment approach (SAA) and the systems vulnerability assessment method (SVAM). Second, we examine some performance measures presently used in the nuclear safeguards area and in reliability theory in general. Some of these we accept and modify to obtain system performance measures that are an additive combination of subsystem performance measures, a very convenient form indeed. Others we reject as impractical and meaningless. Finally, we determine some common features between the SAA and SVAM models by formally comparing these models in our framework

  19. Developing a Signature Based Safeguards Approach for the Electrorefiner and Salt Cleanup Unit Operations in Pyroprocessing Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Traditional nuclear materials accounting does not work well for safeguards when applied to pyroprocessing. Alternate methods such as Signature Based Safeguards (SBS) are being investigated. The goal of SBS is real-time/near-real-time detection of anomalous events in the pyroprocessing facility as they could indicate loss of special nuclear material. In high-throughput reprocessing facilities, metric tons of separated material are processed that must be accounted for. Even with very low uncertainties of accountancy measurements (<0.1%) the uncertainty of the material balances is still greater than the desired level. Novel contributions of this work are as follows: (1) significant enhancement of SBS development for the salt cleanup process by creating a new gas sparging process model, selecting sensors to monitor normal operation, identifying safeguards-significant off-normal scenarios, and simulating those off-normal events and generating sensor output; (2) further enhancement of SBS development for the electrorefiner by simulating off-normal events caused by changes in salt concentration and identifying which conditions lead to Pu and Cm not tracking throughout the rest of the system; and (3) new contribution in applying statistical techniques to analyze the signatures gained from these two models to help draw real-time conclusions on anomalous events.

  20. Developing a Signature Based Safeguards Approach for the Electrorefiner and Salt Cleanup Unit Operations in Pyroprocessing Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Murphy, Chantell Lynne-Marie [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-01-27

    Traditional nuclear materials accounting does not work well for safeguards when applied to pyroprocessing. Alternate methods such as Signature Based Safeguards (SBS) are being investigated. The goal of SBS is real-time/near-real-time detection of anomalous events in the pyroprocessing facility as they could indicate loss of special nuclear material. In high-throughput reprocessing facilities, metric tons of separated material are processed that must be accounted for. Even with very low uncertainties of accountancy measurements (<0.1%) the uncertainty of the material balances is still greater than the desired level. Novel contributions of this work are as follows: (1) significant enhancement of SBS development for the salt cleanup process by creating a new gas sparging process model, selecting sensors to monitor normal operation, identifying safeguards-significant off-normal scenarios, and simulating those off-normal events and generating sensor output; (2) further enhancement of SBS development for the electrorefiner by simulating off-normal events caused by changes in salt concentration and identifying which conditions lead to Pu and Cm not tracking throughout the rest of the system; and (3) new contribution in applying statistical techniques to analyze the signatures gained from these two models to help draw real-time conclusions on anomalous events.

  1. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The present IAEA approach to safeguarding various types of nuclear facilities is examined. The IAEA safeguards objectives, criteria and specific techniques are addressed, with reference e.g. to concepts like timely detection, quantities of safeguards significance, and conversion times. Material accountancy and containment and surveillance as basic features of IAEA safeguards verification are discussed. Safeguards measures for specific facility types are considered and corresponding levels of IAEA safeguards experience are assessed. Outlines of expected IAEA safeguard approaches to large bulk handling facilities are discussed. The evolutionary nature of safeguards based on experience and research and development is mentioned

  2. Measures for increasing IAEA safeguards effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The effectiveness of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards depends not only on the quality of IAEA inspection and independent verification of declared nuclear material and facility use, but also on the perception of and reaction to IAEA safeguards by the nations who make up the international community. Because perceptions and reactions often involve nontechnical as well as technical factors, it has proven difficult to describe IAEA safeguards effectiveness in quantitative technical terms. This study uses a flow diagram to examine how IAEA inspections and the resulting verification statements lead to the main political objectives of IAEA safeguards, assurance and deterrence. Based on this approach, a figure of merit called the IAEA safeguards effectiveness ratio is defined, and measures for increasing IAEA safeguards effectiveness are identified and discussed

  3. Beyond integrated safeguards: Performance-based assessments for future nuclear controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the future, if the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agendas are to advance, they will likely become increasingly seen as parallel undertakings with the objective of comprehensive cradle-to-grave controls over nuclear materials and possibly even warheads removed from defense programs along with materials in civilian use. This 'back to the future' prospect was envisioned in the Acheson-Lillienthal Report and the Baruch Plan, and more modestly in the Atoms-for-Peace Proposal. Unlike the grand plans of the early nuclear years, today's and tomorrow's undertakings will more likely consist of a series of incremental steps with the goal of expanding nuclear controls. These steps will be undertaken at a time of fundamental change in the IAEA safeguards system, and they will be influenced by those changes in profound ways. This prospective influence needs to be taken into account as the IAEA develops and implements integrated safeguards, including its efforts to establish new safeguards criteria, undertake technological and administrative improvements in safeguards, implement credible capabilities for the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities and, perhaps, provide for a more intensive involvement in applying safeguards in new roles such as the verification of a fissile materials cutoff treaty. Performance-based approaches offer one promising way to assess and characterize the effectiveness of integrated safeguards and to provide a common means of assessing the other key areas of a comprehensive approach to nuclear controls as these develop independently and to the extent that they are coordinated in the future. (author)

  4. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01

    in the future. Consequently, the NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243) sponsored a team of U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory nuclear safeguards experts and technologists to conduct a workshop on methods and technologies for improving this activity, under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Approaches Project. The workshop focused on reviewing and discussing the fundamental safeguards needs, and presented technology and/or methods that could potentially address those needs more effectively and efficiently. Conclusions and Recommendations for technology to enhance the performance of DIV inspections are presented by the workshop team.

  5. Safeguards implications of laser isotope separation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of this report is to describe and emphasise the safeguards and relevant features of atomic vapour laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS), and to consider the issues that must be addressed before a safeguards approach at a commercial AVLIS or MLIS facility can be implemented. (Author)

  6. Safeguards instruments for Large-Scale Reprocessing Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Case, R.S.; Sonnier, C. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1993-06-01

    Between 1987 and 1992 a multi-national forum known as LASCAR (Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards) met to assist the IAEA in development of effective and efficient safeguards for large-scale reprocessing plants. The US provided considerable input for safeguards approaches and instrumentation. This paper reviews and updates instrumentation of importance in measuring plutonium and uranium in these facilities.

  7. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: 2010 and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strengthening the international safeguards system is a key element of the U.S. non-proliferation policy agenda as evidenced by President Obama's call for more 'resources and authority to strengthen international inspections' in his April 2009 Prague speech. Through programs such as the recently-launched Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the long standing U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the United States is working to implement this vision. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration launched NGSI in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges. Following a successful 2009, NGSI has made significant progress toward these goals in 2010. NGSI has recently completed a number of policy studies on advanced safeguards concepts and sponsored several workshops, including a second international meeting on Harmonization of International Safeguards Infrastructure Development in Vienna. The program is also continuing multi-year projects to investigate advanced non-destructive assay techniques, enhance recruitment and training efforts, and strengthen international cooperation on safeguards. In December 2010, NGSI will host the Third Annual International Meeting on International Safeguards in Washington, DC, which will draw together key stakeholders from government, the nuclear industry, and the IAEA to further develop and promote a common understanding of Safeguards by Design principles and goals, and to identify opportunities for practical application of the concept. This paper presents a review of NGSI program activities in 2010 and previews plans for upcoming activities. (author)

  8. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems

  9. Process Monitoring for Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Process Monitoring has long been used to evaluate industrial processes and operating conditions in nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. In nuclear applications there is a recognized need to demonstrate the safeguards benefits from using advanced process monitoring on spent fuel reprocessing technologies and associated facilities, as a complement to nuclear materials accounting. This can be accomplished by: defining credible diversion pathway scenarios as a sample problem; using advanced sensor and data analysis techniques to illustrate detection capabilities; and formulating 'event detection' methodologies as a means to quantify performance of the safeguards system. Over the past 30 years there have been rapid advances and improvement in the technology associated with monitoring and control of industrial processes. In the context of bulk handling facilities that process nuclear materials, modern technology can provide more timely information on the location and movement of nuclear material to help develop more effective safeguards. For international safeguards, inspection means verification of material balance data as reported by the operator through the State to the international inspectorate agency. This verification recognizes that the State may be in collusion with the operator to hide clandestine activities, potentially during abnormal process conditions with falsification of data to mask the removal. Records provided may show material is accounted for even though a removal occurred. Process monitoring can offer additional fidelity during a wide variety of operating conditions to help verify the declaration or identify possible diversions. The challenge is how to use modern technology for process monitoring and control in a proprietary operating environment subject to safeguards inspectorate or other regulatory oversight. Under the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a range of potential safeguards applications

  10. Use of curium neutron flux from head-end pyroprocessing subsystems for the High Reliability Safeguards methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The deployment of nuclear energy systems (NESs) is expanding around the world. Nations are investing in NESs as a means to establish energy independence, grow national economies, and address climate change. Transitioning to the advanced nuclear fuel cycle can meet growing energy demands and ensure resource sustainability. However, nuclear facilities in all phases of the advanced fuel cycle must be ‘safeguardable,’ where safety, safeguards, and security are integrated into a practical design strategy. To this end, the High Reliability Safeguards (HRS) approach is a continually developing safeguardability methodology that applies intrinsic design features and employs a risk-informed approach for systems assessment that is safeguards-motivated. Currently, a commercial pyroprocessing facility is used as the example system. This paper presents a modeling study that investigates the neutron flux associated with processed materials. The intent of these studies is to determine if the neutron flux will affect facility design, and subsequently, safeguardability. The results presented in this paper are for the head-end subsystems in a pyroprocessing facility. The collective results from these studies will then be used to further develop the HRS methodology

  11. Multimodality approach for locally advanced esophageal cancer

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Khaldoun Almhanna; Jonathan R Strosberg

    2012-01-01

    Carcinoma of the esophagus is an aggressive and lethal malignancy with an increasing incidence world-wide.Incidence rates vary internationally,with the highest rates found in Southern and Eastern Africa and Eastern Asia,and the lowest in Western and Middle Africa and Central America.Patients with locally advanced disease face a poor prognosis,with 5-year survival rates ranging from 15%-34%.Recent clinical trials have evaluated different strategies for management of locoregional cancer; however,because of stage migration and changes in disease epidemiology,applying these trials to clinical practice has become a daunting task.We searched Medline and conference abstracts for randomized studies published in the last 3 decades.We restricted our search to articles published in English.Neoadjuvant chemoradiotherapy followed by surgical resection is an accepted standard of care in the United States.Esophagectomy remains an essential component of treatment and can lead to improved overall survival,especially when performed at high volume institutions.The role of adjuvant chemotherapy following curative resection is still unclear.External beam radiation therapy alone is considered palliative and is typically reserved for patients with a poor performance status.

  12. Beyond integrated safeguards: Performance-based assessments for future nuclear controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: In the future, if the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agendas are to advance, they will likely become increasingly seen as parallel undertakings with the objective of comprehensive cradle-to-grave controls over nuclear materials and possibly even warheads removed from defense programs along with materials in civilian use. This 'back to the future' prospect was envisioned in the Acheson-Lillienthal Report and the Baruch Plan, and more modestly in the Atoms-for-Peace Proposal. Unlike the grand plans of the early nuclear years, today's and tomorrow's undertakings will more likely consist of a series of incremental steps with the goal of expanding nuclear controls. These steps will be undertaken at a time of fundamental change in the IAEA safeguards system, and they will be influenced by those changes in profound ways. This prospective influence needs to be taken into account as the IAEA develops and implements integrated safeguards, including its efforts to establish new safeguards criteria, undertake technological and administrative improvements in safeguards, implement credible capabilities for the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities and, perhaps, provide for a more intensive involvement in applying safeguards in new roles such as the verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Performance-based criteria offer one promising way to address the effectiveness of integrated safeguards and to provide a common means of assessing the other key areas of a comprehensive approach to nuclear controls as these develop independently and to the extent that they are coordinated in the future. (author)

  13. Beyond integrated safeguards: performance-based assessments for future nuclear controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the future, iE the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agendas are to advance, they will likely become increasingly seen as parallel undertakings with the objective of comprehensive cradle-to-grave controls over nuclear materials and possibly even warheads removed from defense programs along with materials in civilian use. This 'back to the future' prospect was envisioned in the Acheson-Lillienthal Report and the Baruch Plan, and more modestly in the Atoms-for-Peace Proposal. Unlike the grand plans of the early nuclear years, today's and tomorrow's undertakings will more likely consist of a series of incremental steps with the goal of expanding nuclear controls. These steps will be undertaken at a time of fundamental change in the IAEA safeguards system, and they will be influenced by those changes in profound ways. This prospective influence needs to be taken into account as the IAEA develops and implements integrated safeguards, including its efforts to establish new safeguards criteria, undertake technological and administrative improvements in safeguards, implement credible capabilities for the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities and, perhaps, provide for a more intensive involvement in applying safeguards in new roles such as the verification of a fissile materials cutoff treaty. Performance-based criteria offer one promising way to address the effectiveness of integrated safeguards and to provide a common means of assessing the other key areas of a comprehensive approach to nuclear controls as these develop independently and to the extent that they are coordinated in the future.

  14. Advancing a holistic approach to openness

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Søndergaard, Helle Alsted; Araújo, Ana Luiza Lara de

    Open innovation has emerged as a new and interesting research area, and with this paper we wish to contribute to the research on open innovation by proposing a more holistic approach to openness that includes the internal sphere of openness. We use data from 170 Danish SMEs in the high-tech and...... medium high-tech industries and study the moderating role of internal openness on the relationship between external openness and performance. Our results show that the internal spheres of transformative and exploitative learning moderate the effect of external openness on performance and a model with the...... interaction effects of these variables gives significantly better prediction power. This indicates that internal knowledge practices are important for a firm's ability to leverage open innovation strategies....

  15. IMPLEMENTING THE SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN PROCESS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL; McGinnis, Brent [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL); Laughter, Mark D [ORNL; Morgan, Jim [Innovative Solutions; Bjornard, Trond [Idaho National Laboratory (INL); Bean, Robert [Idaho National Laboratory (INL); Durst, Phillip [Idaho National Laboratory (INL); Hockert, John [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL); DeMuth, Scott [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Lockwood, Dunbar [U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA

    2010-01-01

    The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC&A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.

  16. Nuclear safeguards: a perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safeguards, both international and domestic, are discussed from the industrial viewpoint. Anti-criminal measures are considered in more detail. Areas of anti-criminal safeguards which need improvement are pointed out; they include communications, recovery force, and accounting

  17. Technology Development of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I. (and others)

    2007-04-15

    The objective of this project is to perform R and D on the essential technologies in nuclear material measurement and surveillance and verification system, and to improve the state of being transparent on the nuclear material management of DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) through the evaluation of safeguard ability on non-proliferation fuel cycle and nuclear proliferation resistance. Nuclear material position scan system for the reduction of measurement error was developed for the spatial distribution search of spent fuel in DUPIC facility. Web-based realtime remote monitoring system was designed and constructed for satisfying the IAEA's performance criteria of continuous monitoring, and also developed a software for the function of remote control and message. And diversion paths in a proliferation resistant pyroprocess for SFR were analyzed and its protecting system against the diversion paths were suggested for enhancing proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear fuel cycle. These results could be used for planning the further R and D items in the area of safeguards. Those R and D results mentioned above would be helpful for increasing Korean nuclear transparency in the future.

  18. Advanced measurement approach with loss distribution in operational risk management

    OpenAIRE

    Atilla ÇİFTER; Chambers, Nurgül

    2007-01-01

    According to the last proposal by Basel Committee, commercial banks are allowed to use advanced measurement approach for operational risk. Since basic indicator and standard approach considers operational risk as a percentage of gross profit, these methodologies are not satisfactory as real lost or probability of lost are not taken into consideration. In this article, loss distribution approach is applied with simulated data. 20 nonparametric loss distributions and mixing internal and externa...

  19. Advanced control room evaluation: General approach and rationale

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Advanced control rooms (ACRs) for future nuclear power plants (NPPs) are being designed utilizing computer-based technologies. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission reviews the human engineering aspects of such control rooms to ensure that they are designed to good human factors engineering principles and that operator performance and reliability are appropriately supported in order to protect public health and safety. This paper describes the rationale and general approach to the development of a human factors review guideline for ACRs. The factors influencing the guideline development are discussed, including the review environment, the types of advanced technologies being addressed, the human factors issues associated with advanced technology, and the current state-of-the-art of human factors guidelines for advanced human-system interfaces (HSIs). The proposed approach to ACR review would track the design and implementation process through the application of review guidelines reflecting four review modules: planning, design process analysis, human factors engineering review, and dynamic performance evaluation. 21 refs

  20. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included

  1. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

  2. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; Phillip Casey Durst; John Hockert; James Morgan

    2010-02-01

    Executive Summary Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many – owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: • In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem.

  3. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC and A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many - owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: (1) In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem. (2) Life-cycle cost

  4. Measurement trends for future safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safeguards for future commercial-scale nuclear facilities may employ three materials control and accounting concepts: classical accounting, dynamic materials balancing, and independent verification of inventories and materials balances. Typical measurement needs associated with the implementation of these concepts at high-throughput facilities are discussed. Promising measurement methods for meeting these needs are described and recent experience is cited. General directions and considerations for meeting advanced safeguards systems needs through measurement technology development over the next decade are presented

  5. Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An automated approach to facility safeguards effectiveness evaluation has been developed. This automated process, called Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE), consists of a collection of a continuous stream of operational modules for facility characterization, the selection of critical paths, and the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness along these paths. The technique has been implemented on an interactive computer time-sharing system and makes use of computer graphics for the processing and presentation of information. Using this technique, a comprehensive evaluation of a safeguards system can be provided by systematically varying the parameters that characterize the physical protection components of a facility to reflect the perceived adversary attributes and strategy, environmental conditions, and site operational conditions. The SAFE procedure has broad applications in the nuclear facility safeguards field as well as in the security field in general. Any fixed facility containing valuable materials or components to be protected from theft or sabotage could be analyzed using this same automated evaluation technique

  6. Safeguards and retrievability from waste forms

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Danker, W.

    1996-05-01

    This report describes issues discussed at a session from the PLutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop related to safeguards and retrievability from waste forms. Throughout the discussion, the group probed the goals of disposition efforts, particularly an understanding of the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard{close_quotes}, since the disposition material form derives from these goals. The group felt strongly that not only the disposition goals but safeguards to meet these goals could affect the material form. Accordingly, the Department was encouraged to explore and apply safeguards as early in the implementation process as possible. It was emphasized that this was particularly true for any planned use of existing facilities. It is much easier to build safeguards approaches into the development of new facilities, than to backfit existing facilities. Accordingly, special safeguards challenges are likely to be encountered, given the cost and schedule advantages offered by use of existing facilities.

  7. Safeguards instrumentation: past, present, future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Instruments are essential for accounting, for surveillance and for protection of nuclear materials. The development and application of such instrumentation is reviewed, with special attention to international safeguards applications. Active and passive nondestructive assay techniques are some 25 years of age. The important advances have been in learning how to use them effectively for specific applications, accompanied by major advances in radiation detectors, electronics, and, more recently, in mini-computers. The progress in seals has been disappointingly slow. Surveillance cameras have been widely used for many applications other than safeguards. The revolution in TV technology will have important implications. More sophisticated containment/surveillance equipment is being developed but has yet to be exploited. On the basis of this history, some expectations for instrumentation in the near future are presented

  8. Structure for the decomposition of safeguards responsibilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A major mission of safeguards is to protect against the use of nuclear materials by adversaries to harm society. A hierarchical structure of safeguards responsibilities and activities to assist in this mission is defined. The structure begins with the definition of international or multi-national safeguards and continues through domestic, regional, and facility safeguards. The facility safeguards is decomposed into physical protection and material control responsibilities. In addition, in-transit safeguards systems are considered. An approach to the definition of performance measures for a set of Generic Adversary Action Sequence Segments (GAASS) is illustrated. These GAASS's begin outside facility boundaries and terminate at some adversary objective which could lead to eventual safeguards risks and societal harm. Societal harm is primarily the result of an adversary who is successful in the theft of special nuclear material or in the sabotage of vital systems which results in the release of material in situ. With the facility safeguards system, GAASS's are defined in terms of authorized and unauthorized adversary access to materials and components, acquisition of material, unauthorized removal of material, and the compromise of vital components. Each GAASS defines a set of ''paths'' (ordered set of physical protection components) and each component provides one or more physical protection ''functions'' (detection, assessment, communication, delay, neutralization). Functional performance is then developed based upon component design features, the environmental factors, and the adversary attributes. An example of this decomposition is presented

  9. Open source research and nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The paper will assess the utility of open source research for enhancing the collection and analysis of information related to nuclear safeguards. The International Centre for Security Analysis (ICSA) at King's College London adopts a cross-disciplinary approach for open source research relevant to nuclear safeguards by combining expertise in science and technology, political science, information technology and multiple languages including Arabic, Farsi, English, French, German, Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, Russian and Turkish. The paper will examine the following sets of issues related to open source research in the field of nuclear safeguards: - the various 'types' of open sources that are applicable to enhancing the analysis of nuclear safeguards issues (primary, secondary, technical and 'grey literature'); - the 'utility' of open source research in terms of enhancing the analysis of nuclear safeguards issues (contextual awareness, tip-off, response to unexpected contingencies); - the potential 'problems' associated with researching open sources related to nuclear safeguards issues (inaccuracy, bias, irrelevance, disinformation); - the 'challenges' involved in conducting open source research on nuclear safeguards issues (information overload, open versus closed societies. The paper will also highlight the challenges posed by open source analysis). The utility, problems and challenges associated with open source research in the field of nuclear safeguards will be illustrated with various thematic, regional and country-based examples. (author)

  10. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Shirley J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2011-10-10

    The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA draws such conclusions from the evaluation of all available information. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of this “State-level” approach. Efficiently used, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) methodologies , , , now being developed can contribute to effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards. The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) introduced here supports SBD in three areas. 1. It describes necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner / designer of a new or modified facility to determine where SBD efforts can be productively applied, 2. It presents a screening approach intended to identify potential safeguard issues for; a) design changes to existing facilities; b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with approved safeguards approaches, and c) new designs, 3. It identifies resources (the FSA toolkit), such as good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods that can be used by the owner/designer to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA. FSA presents a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools developed in other efforts. The more a design evolves, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues could be introduced. Likewise, for first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, it is reasonable to expect that a number of possible safeguards issues might exist. Accordingly, FSA is intended to help the designer and its safeguards experts identify early in the design process: • Areas where elements of previous accepted safeguards approach(es) may be applied

  11. The safeguards revolution: Contributions and perspectives of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    required uniformity in safeguards implementation. Yet this apparent stability was dangerously misleading. Beneath the surface, what is now seen as the greatest safeguards challenge - clandestine nuclear programs - remained unrecognised and undetected. By the time of its discovery, following the First Gulf War, Iraq's clandestine nuclear program had been growing for over a decade undetected by safeguards. The discovery of this program prompted the establishment of the program to strengthen safeguards. Today it is recognised that the greatest single safeguards challenge is the detection of undeclared nuclear activities. In IAEA terms this is expressed as requiring that safeguards should provide assurance of the completeness as well as the correctness of States' declarations. The development of new methods, approaches and technology - and a new safeguards culture - are needed to respond to this challenge. In contrast to the previous uniformity, the new safeguards are underpinned by a State-level approach, designing safeguards implementation to address the acquisition paths available to each State, and other State-specific factors. At the same time, new techniques and detection technologies are being developed. The broadening of available verification measures will require greater adaptability at the implementation level - more options will be available to inspectors, there will be less emphasis on routine inspection activities, and much more emphasis on observation skills. Verification activities directed at the possibility of undeclared activities will involve new ways of thinking. The revolutionary aspect of safeguards development is that expert judgment is coming to the fore in drawing safeguards conclusions. Conclusions about the absence of something - undeclared activities - can never be as definitive as conclusions based on quantitative methods applied to a finite problem - the verification of a declared inventory. For the new safeguards conclusions to be credible, a

  12. Adapting advanced engineering design approaches to building design. Potential benefits

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Böhms, M.

    2006-01-01

    A number of industries continuously progress advancing their design approaches based on the changing market constraints. Examples such as car, ship and airplane manufacturing industries utilize process setups and techniques, that differ significantly from the processes and techniques used by the tra

  13. Deriving, Communicating and Applying Safeguards Conclusions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safeguards are arrangements for verifying that states are in compliance with international agreements or undertakings relating to the peaceful use of nuclear materials. The IAEA has operated a system of comprehensive safeguards agreements with non-nuclearweapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for over forty years. This system has evolved over time in recognition that a progressively broader approach to verification is required to substantiate the IAEA's conclusions. Current policy debates on the further evolution of safeguards implementation primarily relate to the development of the IAEA's 'state level concept' for safeguards, and the resolution of compliance or performance issues in several countries. Safeguards experts acknowledge that the identification and clarification of principles for determining safeguards priorities and for deriving safeguards conclusions will be a crucial step in strengthening the non-proliferation regime. This paper recommends the development of a procedure by which the IAEA Secretariat would issue standardized notices to the Board of Governors in situations where anomalies in safeguards implementation remain unresolved for a prescribed period of time. These 'Automatic Notices' are designed to assist the Secretariat with the structured communication of technical information about state compliance. The procedure would enhance the transparency of the operation of the IAEA, the credibility of the verification assurance, and the timeliness of identification of potential non-compliance. It also provides states, whether acting through the Agency's Board of Governors or otherwise, with opportunities to craft effective solutions to potential proliferation crises. Furthermore, the existence and number of these 'Automatic Notices' would provide one transparent and objective basis for differentiating between states in future allocation of safeguards

  14. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Santi, Peter A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hypes, Philip A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-06-14

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  15. Safeguards and Non-destructive Assay

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carchon, R.; Bruggeman, M

    2001-04-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and non-destructive assay includes: (1) various activities to assure nuclear materials accountancy; (2) contributes to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards measures in Belgium and to assist the IAEA through the Belgian Support Programme; (3) renders services to internal and external customers in the field of safeguards; (4) improves passive neutron coincidence counting techniques for waste assay and safeguards verification measurements by R and D on correlation algorithms implemented via software or dedicated hardware; (5) improves gamma assay techniques for waste assay by implementing advanced scanning techniques and different correlation algorithms; and (6) develops numerical calibration techniques. Major achievements in these areas in 2000 are reported.

  16. Current status of process monitoring for IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Based on literature survey, this report tries to answer some of the following questions on process monitoring for safeguards purposes of future large scale reprocessing plants: what is process monitoring, what are the basic elements of process monitoring, what kinds of process monitoring are there, what are the basic problems of process monitoring, what is the relationship between process monitoring and near-real-time materials accountancy, what are actual results of process monitoring tests and what should be studied in future. A brief description of Advanced Safeguards Approaches proposed by the four states (France, U.K., Japan and U.S.A.), the approach proposed by the U.S.A., the description of the process monitoring, the main part of the report published as a result of one of the U.S. Support Programmes for IAEA Safeguards and an article on process monitoring presented at an IAEA Symposium held in November 1986 are given in the annexes. 24 refs, 20 figs, tabs

  17. Technical support organization efforts in support of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Technical Support Organization (TSO) of the Brookhaven National Laboratory has been carrying out tasks in support of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards since 1968, when TSO was founded. These tasks have been funded by both the Department of Energy Office of Safeguards and Security and by the United States Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS). These tasks have included a variety of systems studies (e.g. the zone approach to IAEA safeguards, the Safeguards Effectiveness Assessment Methodology, and international safeguards for uranium enrichment plants), development of instruments (e.g., the automated electromanometer and the load-cell-based weighing system for UF6 cylinders), preparation of guidance documents, training of inspectors, and the development and evaluation of safeguards seals. This paper reviews some of the highlights from this program of support

  18. Safeguards for spent fuels: Verification problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The accumulation of large quantities of spent nuclear fuels world-wide is a serious problem for international safeguards. A number of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) member states, including the US, consider spent fuel to be a material form for which safeguards cannot be terminated, even after permanent disposal in a geologic repository. Because safeguards requirements for spent fuels are different from those of conventional bulk-handling and item-accounting facilities, there is room for innovation to design a unique safeguards regime for spent fuels that satisfies the goals of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty at a reasonable cost to both the facility and the IAEA. Various strategies being pursued for long-term management of spent fuels are examined with a realistic example to illustrate the problems of verifying safeguards under the present regime. Verification of a safeguards regime for spent fuels requires a mix of standard safeguards approaches, such as quantitative verification and use of seals, with other measures that are unique to spent fuels. 17 refs

  19. Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

  20. Violence: Safeguarding Our Children.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Our Children, 1995

    1995-01-01

    This adaptation of the National Parent Teacher Association (PTA) booklet "Safeguarding Your Children" discusses cooperative efforts of communities, schools, and homes to protect children from violence. (SM)

  1. The Canadian safeguards program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

  2. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

  3. Advanced business communication: a multi-media approach

    OpenAIRE

    Christopher, E

    2009-01-01

    The newly launched "Advanced Business Communication" course in the Faculty of Business and Economics adopts a fully integrated multi-media approach to enhancing students’ communication skills through various media such as case videos, case texts, print articles as well as online resources. A key feature of the course is also a fully dedicated interactive course website which contains necessary course information as well as interactive language and discipline related exercises, video related m...

  4. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  5. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  6. IAEA safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.)

  7. Spain accepts safeguards controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spain became the 26th country to accept safeguards controls by the Agency in December. An agreement was signed in Vienna, transferring to IAEA the administration of safeguards against diversion of materials and installations to military purposes provided for under a nuclear co-operation agreement concluded between Spain and USA in 1957

  8. FUTURE SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVENESS: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    K. W. BUDLONG-SYLVESTER; J. F. PILAT

    2000-09-01

    With new safeguards measures (under old and new authority) now available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there will be fundamental changes in the manner IAEA safeguards are implemented, raising questions about their effectiveness in meeting expanded Agency safeguards objectives. In order to characterize the capability of various safeguards approaches in meeting their objectives, it will be necessary to fully understand what is involved in the new safeguards equation. Both old and new measures will be required to construct a comprehensive picture of a State's nuclear activities and capabilities, and they both have strengths and weaknesses. There are (for political and cost reasons) likely to be tradeoffs between the two types of measures. Significant differences among measures with respect to the probability of their detecting an anomaly, along with other characteristics, need be considered in this context. Given the important role of both types of measures in future approaches, their inherent differences with regard to their capabilities and limitations, and their potential impact on the credibility of safeguards, it will be essential to consider these measures systematically, independently, and in combination in any effectiveness evaluation. This paper will consider concepts and issues in addressing this need.

  9. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richard Metcalf

    2010-10-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

  10. Computational experiment approach to advanced secondary mathematics curriculum

    CERN Document Server

    Abramovich, Sergei

    2014-01-01

    This book promotes the experimental mathematics approach in the context of secondary mathematics curriculum by exploring mathematical models depending on parameters that were typically considered advanced in the pre-digital education era. This approach, by drawing on the power of computers to perform numerical computations and graphical constructions, stimulates formal learning of mathematics through making sense of a computational experiment. It allows one (in the spirit of Freudenthal) to bridge serious mathematical content and contemporary teaching practice. In other words, the notion of teaching experiment can be extended to include a true mathematical experiment. When used appropriately, the approach creates conditions for collateral learning (in the spirit of Dewey) to occur including the development of skills important for engineering applications of mathematics. In the context of a mathematics teacher education program, this book addresses a call for the preparation of teachers capable of utilizing mo...

  11. U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In discussing the U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development, five significant eras are identified. The period ending January 1, 1947, may be called the first era. Safeguards as known today did not exist and the classic military approach of security protection applied. The second era covers the period from 1947 to 1954 (when the Atomic Energy Act was completely rewritten to accommodate the then foreseen Civil uses Program and international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and the first steps were taken by the Atomic Energy Commission to establish material accounting records for all source and fissionable materials on inventory. The third era covers the period 1954 through 1968, which focused on nuclear safeguards in its domestic activities and made major policy changes in its approach to material control and accountability. The fourth era, 1968 to 1972 saw a quantum jump in the recognition and need for a significant safeguards research and development program, answered by the formation of a safeguards technical support organization at Brookhaven National Laboratory and a safeguards Laboratory at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for the development and application of non-destructive assay technology. The fifth era had its beginning in 1972 with the burgeoning of international terrorism. The corresponding need for a strong physical protection research and development support program was responded to by the Sandia National Laboratory

  12. The advanced light water reactor program approach for gaining acceptance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Electric utilities in the US face several obstacles and disincentives to building new nuclear power plants. A reformed licensing process that permits true one-step licensing is a prerequisite, as is timely implementation of the technical and political solutions of the high-level waste issue by the federal government and low-level waste storage by state governments. In addition, a more tangible acceptance of the need, benefits, and residual risk of nuclear power by all concerned institutions is an essential impetus for the return of the nuclear option. An improved version of the light water reactor (LWR) is expected to be the preferred choice for the next increment of nuclear capacity ordered in the US. The paper discusses the need for research and advanced LWR development. The advanced LWR program, sponsored jointly by the utility industry and the US Department of Energy (DOE), offers the most promising approach to developing the next generation of nuclear power plants

  13. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    JOE,J.

    2007-07-08

    Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders.

  14. Science based integrated approach to advanced nuclear fuel development - vision, approach, and overview

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Unal, Cetin [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Pasamehmetoglu, Kemal [IDAHO NATIONAL LAB; Carmack, Jon [IDAHO NATIONAL LAB

    2010-01-01

    Advancing the performance of Light Water Reactors, Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, and Advanced Rcactors, such as the Next Generation Nuclear Power Plants, requires enhancing our fundamental understanding of fuel and materials behavior under irradiation. The capability to accurately model the nuclear fuel systems is critical. In order to understand specific aspects of the nuclear fuel, fully coupled fuel simulation codes are required to achieve licensing of specific nuclear fuel designs for operation. The backbone of these codes, models, and simulations is a fundamental understanding and predictive capability for simulating the phase and microstructural behavior of the nuclear fuel system materials and matrices. The purpose of this paper is to identify the modeling and simulation approach in order to deliver predictive tools for advanced fuels development. The coordination between experimental nuclear fuel design, development technical experts, and computational fuel modeling and simulation technical experts is a critical aspect of the approach and naturally leads to an integrated, goal-oriented science-based R & D approach and strengthens both the experimental and computational efforts. The Advanced Fuels Campaign (AFC) and Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) Fuels Integrated Performance and Safety Code (IPSC) are working together to determine experimental data and modeling needs. The primary objective of the NEAMS fuels IPSC project is to deliver a coupled, three-dimensional, predictive computational platform for modeling the fabrication and both normal and abnormal operation of nuclear fuel pins and assemblies, applicable to both existing and future reactor fuel designs. The science based program is pursuing the development of an integrated multi-scale and multi-physics modeling and simulation platform for nuclear fuels. This overview paper discusses the vision, goals and approaches how to develop and implement the new approach.

  15. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since 2008, the Human Capital Development (HCD) subprogramme of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has supported the recruitment, education, training, and retention of the next generation of international safeguards professionals to meet the needs of both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United States. Specifically, HCD's efforts respond to data indicating that 82% of safeguards experts at U.S. Laboratories will have left the workforce within 15 years. This paper provides an update on the status of the subprogramme since its last presentation at the IAEA Safeguards Symposium in 2010. It highlights strengthened, integrated efforts in the areas of graduate and post-doctoral fellowships, young and midcareer professional support, short safeguards courses, and university engagement. It also discusses lessons learned from the U.S. experience in safeguards education and training as well as the importance of long-range strategies to develop a cohesive, effective, and efficient human capital development approach. (author)

  16. Advanced multiresponse process optimisation an intelligent and integrated approach

    CERN Document Server

    Šibalija, Tatjana V

    2016-01-01

    This book presents an intelligent, integrated, problem-independent method for multiresponse process optimization. In contrast to traditional approaches, the idea of this method is to provide a unique model for the optimization of various processes, without imposition of assumptions relating to the type of process, the type and number of process parameters and responses, or interdependences among them. The presented method for experimental design of processes with multiple correlated responses is composed of three modules: an expert system that selects the experimental plan based on the orthogonal arrays; the factor effects approach, which performs processing of experimental data based on Taguchi’s quality loss function and multivariate statistical methods; and process modeling and optimization based on artificial neural networks and metaheuristic optimization algorithms. The implementation is demonstrated using four case studies relating to high-tech industries and advanced, non-conventional processes.

  17. The international safeguards profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a staff of safeguards professionals who are responsible for carrying out on-site inspections to determine compliance with international safeguards agreements. By IAEA Statute, the paramount consideration in recruiting IAEA staff is to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. An analysis of the distribution of professionals in the IAEA Department of Safeguards has revealed some interesting observations regarding the distribution of grade levels, age, time in service, gender, and geographical origin. Following several earlier studies performed by contractors for ACDA, U.S. efforts have been undertaken to attract and better prepare candidates for working at the IAEA

  18. Safeguards in Austria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The first IAEA routine safeguards inspection of the ASTRA reactor at the Austrian research centre at Seibersdorf near Vienna, was carried out on 2 March 1966. ASTRA is an adapted swimming pool tank type research reactor using 90 per cent enriched uranium fuel, and having a maximum capacity of about 5 MRU). It was supplied from the ISA under a bilateral agreement, in respect of which safeguarding responsibility has been transferred to the Agency. The inspection was made by O. Lendvai of Hungary and B. Sharpe of the United Kingdom. There are in Austria three research reactors under Agency safeguards, the others being respectively in Vienna and Graz. (author)

  19. Comprehensive safeguards evaluation methods and societal risk analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Essential capabilities of an integrated evaluation methodology for analyzing safeguards systems are discussed. Such a methodology must be conceptually meaningful, technically defensible, discriminating and consistent. A decompostion of safeguards systems by function is mentioned as a possible starting point for methodology development. The application of a societal risk equation to safeguards systems analysis is addressed. Conceptual problems with this approach are discussed. Technical difficulties in applying this equation to safeguards systems are illustrated through the use of confidence intervals, information content, hypothesis testing and ranking and selection procedures

  20. Methodology and preliminary models for analyzing nuclear-safeguards decisions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report describes a general analytical tool designed with Lawrence Livermore Laboratory to assist the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in making nuclear safeguards decisions. The approach is based on decision analysis - a quantitative procedure for making decisions under uncertain conditions. The report: describes illustrative models that quantify the probability and consequences of diverted special nuclear material and the costs of safeguarding the material; demonstrates a methodology for using this information to set safeguards regulations (safeguards criteria); and summarizes insights gained in a very preliminary assessment of a hypothetical reprocessing plant

  1. Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI's ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI's long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

  2. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  3. Secure data communication for safeguards implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Secure, reliable and cost-effective communication is necessary for effective IAEA safeguards implementation. The transmission of safeguards data from nuclear facilities to IAEA headquarters and regional offices (referred to as remote monitoring) initially demonstrated the need for secure, cost-effective data communication that satisfies the confidentiality requirements of Member States and provides data authenticity that allows the IAEA to draw soundly based, independent safeguards conclusions. The implementation of integrated safeguards further demonstrates the need for information obtained in the course of an inspection, complementary access or design information verification, to be analyzed and corroborated with other information available at IAEA headquarters or regional offices while the inspector is still on-site. This requires the capability to connect the inspector, anywhere in the field, to the IAEA data network with secure voice, video, or data transfer capabilities. Such a data network would allow inspectors to 'push' information to headquarters, thereby providing IAEA managers with the ability to make evaluation in near real time, as well as the ability to 'pull' information from IAEA databases for evaluations in the field. In order to expand the IAEA's present capabilities in the area of secure data communication, in 2005 the Safeguards Division of Technical Support (SGTS) initiated cooperation with the European Space Agency (ESA) on satellite communications. This cooperation included testing an ESA provided satellite terminal at IAEA headquarters and at a nuclear facility. Two feasibility studies were carried out to address end-to-end communication services based on existing orbital and ground-based infrastructures. The goal was to determine how the deployment of advanced satellite communication and services could meet future IAEA safeguards needs. The paper presents the results of these studies, including a summary of costs, benefits and possible

  4. Part 7. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report describes fissile nuclear material safeguards technology, both current and developmental, and discusses the possible application of this technology to FBR systems. The proliferation risks associated with both subnational and national-level diversion are addressed

  5. Strengthening regional safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

  6. Strengthening regional safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O. [Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)] [and others

    1996-08-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980`s and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States.

  7. Licensee safeguards contingency plans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contingency, the responding participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordinated

  8. The emerging safeguards challenges of pyroprocessing technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pyroprocessing technology, when applied to irradiated fissile material, utilizes electrochemical processes in high temperature molten salts to separate the actinides from the fission products. In the process, uranium may be recovered as uranium metal, while transuranics in the spent fuel (such as plutonium, neptunium, americium, and curium) are recovered together as a group with some uranium via a liquid cadmium cathode technique. The concept of processing or recycling spent fuel via pyroprocessing technology has been pursued by researchers since the early 1980s, with one focus being on coupling the technology to an integral fast reactor programme. Today, it is widely accepted that pyroprocessing of spent fuel is best applied to the fabrication of fast reactor fuel in which relatively high levels of fission product impurities can be accepted. At the time of writing, the countries which are known to be actively developing pyroprocessing technology coupled to fast reactors to close the nuclear fuel cycle include: Republic of Korea, Japan, India, China, United States, European Union, and Russia. However, advances in the technology and transnational exchange of knowledge/equipment may see an increase in the availability of this technology to a greater number of states in the future. The IAEA, therefore, is faced with the challenge to develop credible approaches and measures to effectively safeguard future pyroprocessing research and development facilities, and engineering or industrial scale pyroprocessing plants. The emerging safeguards challenges of pyroprocessing technology are reviewed from the point of view of maintaining the continuity of knowledge on U and Pu in the process flow and considering material mass balance and hold-up in a plant. The possible solutions for these emerging challenges are also discussed. (author)

  9. Strengthened safeguards: Present and future challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The safeguards system is experiencing what has been seen as a revolution and, in doing so, it is confronting a series of challenges. These can be grouped into three areas. Drawing and maintaining safeguards conclusions - The process by which the safeguards conclusions are derived is based upon the analysis, evaluation and review of all the information available to the Agency. This process is on- going, but the State Evaluation Reports are compiled and reviewed periodically. For States with an additional protocol in force, the absence of indicators of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities provides the basis for the safeguards conclusion. Future challenges center on States' expectations of, and reactions to, the results of the evaluation and review process. Designing and implementing integrated safeguards - The conceptual framework of integrated safeguards is being actively pursued. Basic principles have been defined and integrated safeguards approaches have been developed for various types of facilities. Work is also progressing on the design of integrated safeguards approaches for specific States. Complementary access is being successfully implemented, and procedures for the use of unannounced inspections are being developed with the prospect of cost- effectiveness gains. Costs neutrality vs. quality and credibility - The Department faces serious staff and financial challenges. It has succeeded so far in 'doing more' and 'doing better' within a zero-real growth budget, but the scope for further significant efficiency gains is exhausted. There is no capacity to absorb new or unexpected tasks. Difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified and experienced staff exacerbate the problems and add to costs. The Director General of the IAEA has referred to the need for new initiatives to bridge the budgetary gap; a possible measure is proposed. The tasks of meeting the challenges and demands of strengthened safeguards have been added to

  10. Technology development for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency

  11. Safeguards and physics measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'

  12. IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The basic concepts, structure, and operation of the Agency Safeguards Information System is discussed with respect to its role in accomplishing the overall objectives of safeguards. The basis and purposes of the Agency's information system, the structure and flow of information within the Agency's system, the relationship of the components is the Agency system, the requirements of Member States in respect of their reporting to the Agency, and the relationship of accounting data vis-a-vis facility and inspection data are described

  13. Safeguards and physics measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carchon, R

    2002-04-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'.

  14. International safeguards data authentication

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Melton, R.B.; Smith, C.E.; DeLand, S.M.; Manatt, D.R.

    1996-07-01

    The International Safeguards community is becoming increasingly reliant on information stored in electronic form. In international monitoring and related activities it must be possible to verify and maintain the integrity of this electronic information. This paper discusses the use of data authentication technology to assist in accomplishing this task. The paper provides background information, identifies the relevance to international safeguards, discusses issues related to export controls, algorithm patents, key management and the use of commercial vs. custom software.

  15. Overcoming Safeguards Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The focus of the 2010 IAEA International Safeguards Symposium was how best, from a technical perspective, to prepare for future verification challenges during this time of change. By bringing together the leading experts in the field from across the world, this symposium provided an opportunity for stakeholders to explore possible solutions in support of the IAEA's nuclear verification mission, and to identify areas where the different stakeholders in the safeguards business can help address these challenges

  16. International safeguards data authentication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Safeguards community is becoming increasingly reliant on information stored in electronic form. In international monitoring and related activities it must be possible to verify and maintain the integrity of this electronic information. This paper discusses the use of data authentication technology to assist in accomplishing this task. The paper provides background information, identifies the relevance to international safeguards, discusses issues related to export controls, algorithm patents, key management and the use of commercial vs. custom software

  17. Conceptual proposals on safeguards while implementation of ABC-project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The report deals with some conceptual problems of nuclear safeguard measures in connection with project ABC implementation. Safeguards issues in this area have a lot of common features with traditional approaches at existing facilities, at the same time there are some characteristic features arising in connection with specific technology process in this project

  18. The development of safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Traditionally, research and development on geological repositories for High Level Waste (HLW) focuses on the short- and long-term safety aspects of the repository. If the repository will also be used for the disposal of spent fuel, safeguards aspects have to be taken into account. Safety and safeguards requirements may be contradictory; the safety of a geological repository is based on the non-intrusion of the geological containment, while safeguards require regular inspections of position and amount of the spent fuel. Examples to reconcile these contradictory requirements are the use of information required for the safety assessment of the geological repository for safeguards purposes and the adaptation of the safeguards approach to use non-intrusive inspection techniques. The principles of an inspection approach for a geological repository are now generally accepted within the IAEA. The practical applicability of the envisaged inspection techniques is still subject to investigation. It is specifically important for the Belgian situation that an inspection technique can be used in clay, the geological medium in which Belgium intends to dispose its HLW and spent fuel. The work reported in this chapter is the result of an international cooperation in the framework of the IAEA, in which SCK-CEN participates

  19. Simulating advanced life support systems to test integrated control approaches

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kortenkamp, D.; Bell, S.

    Simulations allow for testing of life support control approaches before hardware is designed and built. Simulations also allow for the safe exploration of alternative control strategies during life support operation. As such, they are an important component of any life support research program and testbed. This paper describes a specific advanced life support simulation being created at NASA Johnson Space Center. It is a discrete-event simulation that is dynamic and stochastic. It simulates all major components of an advanced life support system, including crew (with variable ages, weights and genders), biomass production (with scalable plantings of ten different crops), water recovery, air revitalization, food processing, solid waste recycling and energy production. Each component is modeled as a producer of certain resources and a consumer of certain resources. The control system must monitor (via sensors) and control (via actuators) the flow of resources throughout the system to provide life support functionality. The simulation is written in an object-oriented paradigm that makes it portable, extensible and reconfigurable.

  20. Technology development of nuclear material safeguards for DUPIC fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the second phase of research and development program conducted from 1993 to 1996, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. By securing in advance a optimized safeguards system with domestically developed hardware and software, it will contribute not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author). 27 refs., 13 tabs., 89 figs

  1. Technology development of nuclear material safeguards for DUPIC fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, Jong Sook; Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, Hee Young; Lee, Young Gil; Byeon, Kee Ho; Park, Young Soo; Cha, Hong Ryul; Park, Ho Joon; Lee, Byung Doo; Chung, Sang Tae; Choi, Hyung Rae; Park, Hyun Soo

    1997-07-01

    During the second phase of research and development program conducted from 1993 to 1996, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. By securing in advance a optimized safeguards system with domestically developed hardware and software, it will contribute not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author). 27 refs., 13 tabs., 89 figs.

  2. Migration of safeguards instrumentation: Challenges and opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Development of new safeguards instrumentation for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is spurred by a number of factors: Technical issues include issues such as the emergence of new technologies and the inevitable obsolescence of system components. Policy-related issues include changes in safeguards policies, new approaches to the safeguarding of excess material, and the introduction of new types of facilities to be safeguarded. To cope with these issues, development projects are required that migrate between current safeguards systems and state-of-the-art technology. These projects usually involve IAEA staff as well as Member States and their support programs, the private sector, and research and development institutions. One such development project currently underway is the migration between the IAEA's DCM-14 based surveillance system to the Next Generation Surveillance System (NGSS). The challenges and opportunities of the NGSS project include those factors that prompted the migration, the development of user requirements, the selection of appropriate development partners and funding resources, and issues in the development itself. This paper will outline the challenges, issues, opportunities, and synergies that relate to safeguards instrumentation migration, using the NGSS project as an example. The problems necessitating new development will be outlined, as will the management of these problems from project initiation until new instrumentation is available for replacement. The generation of user requirements will be explained in detail. Focus will be given to how to best manage this process in order to produce requirements that will be useful both during the development project and after the migration is completed. The challenges and opportunities in the selection and procurement process will then be highlighted, followed by the structure of the actual development project. Finally, some general comments and recommendations on how a

  3. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the ''non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs

  4. Development of Nuclear Material Accounting and Safeguards Technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This project is aimed at the development of nuclear material accounting and safeguards technology. Nuclear material accountancy technology for an each unit process and nuclear characteristic analysis technology to demonstrate the safeguards technology for a pyroprocessing facility have been developed during the first phase of the project. A study for analyzing the safeguardability of pyroprocessing facility and preliminary evaluation has also been carried out. The safeguards technology system for electro-reduction process has been established to develop the unit process nuclear material accountancy technology through nuclear material accounting in ACPF and performance test of surveillance equipment using spent fuels and neutron source. Nuclear material accountancy measure for electro-refining process where various kinds of nuclear materials are generated compared to electro-reduction process has been constructed, and its performance test has been conducted as well. A Gamma/neutron integrated system has been developed as a nuclear characteristic analysis technology for pyroprocess nuclear material, the possibility of Pu and U measurement has been analyzed using FRAM, and fundamental experiment has been performed to examine whether LIBS technology is applicable to nuclear material accountancy of pyroprocess. A preliminary concept design of safeguards system for pyroprocessing facility and basic design of computer code for analyzing the safeguardability have been carried out to perform the safeguardability analysis and preliminary evaluation for pyroprocessing facility, and a study for analyzing the safeguardability of KAPF which has scale of 100 MT-HM/year has been conducted in collaboration with LANL. Also, an IAEA Member State Support Program for establishing safeguards approach technology for pyroprocessing facility ('Support for Development for a Safeguards Approach for a Pyroprocessing Plant') has been conducting in cooperation with KINAC. It is expected that

  5. Next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI) program plan for safeguards by design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lockwood, Dunbar [DOE/NA-243

    2010-01-01

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is defined as the incorporation of safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign the facility at a later date, or retrofit the completed facility. Not only can SBD avoid the need for redesign or retrofit, but consideration of safeguards features early in the facility design effort can provide for a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A program has been initiated by the United States Department of Energy during the past several years to develop, demonstrate and institutionalization SBD. This plan has been developed in parallel with a similar effort at the IAEA while taking into account their achievements and future plans. The United States SBD program is focused on (1) identification of best practices that satisfy existing safeguards requirements, (2) identification of advanced concepts where best practices can be improved, and (3) institutionalizing SBD by gaining its acceptance as a global norm for the design of new nuclear facilities. SBD guidance documents are being prepared as an aid to industry for their design activities, to describe the relationship between requirements, best practices, and advanced concepts. SBD 'lessons learned' studies have been conducted to help identify the existing best practices and potential areas for improvement. Finally, acceptance as a global norm is being pursued by way of international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example by way of its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States.

  6. Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards by Design: The Safeguardability Assessment Tool Provided by the INPRO Collaborative Project ''INPRO'' (Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since the INPRO Collaborative Project on Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment Tools (PROSA) was launched in 2011, Member State experts have worked with the INPRO Section and the IAEA Department of Safeguards to develop a revised methodology for self-assessment of sustainability in the area of proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system (NES). With the common understanding that there is ''no proliferation resistance without safeguards'' the revised approach emphasizes the evaluation of a new 'User Requirement' for ''safeguardability'', that combines metrics of effective and efficient implementation of IAEA Safeguards including ''Safeguards-by-Design'' principles. The assessment with safeguardability as the key issue has been devised as a linear process evaluating the NES against a ''Basic Principle'' in the area of proliferation resistance, answering fundamental questions related to safeguards: 1) Do a State's legal commitments, policies and practices provide credible assurance of the exclusively peaceful use of the NES, including a legal basis for verification activities by the IAEA? 2) Does design and operation of the NES facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards? To answer those questions, a questionnaire approach has been developed that clearly identifies gaps and weaknesses. Gaps include prospects for improvements and needs for research and development. In this context, the PROSA approach assesses the safeguardability of a NES using a layered ''Evaluation Questionnaire'' that defines Evaluation Parameters (EP), EP-related questions, Illustrative Tests and Screening Questions to present and structure the evidence of findings. An integral part of the assessment process is Safeguards-by-Design, the identification of potential diversion, misuse and concealment strategies (coarse diversion path

  7. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer

  8. Long Term R&D for Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Within the Office of Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D), the Nuclear Weapons and Material Security Team conducts research to develop advanced detection and source technologies for the purposes of detecting and characterizing special nuclear materials (SNM); international safeguards and radiological source replacement; nuclear arms control treaty monitoring and verification; and supporting interdiction and nuclear security efforts across NNSA. Our safeguards-specific goal is to develop and demonstrate new technologies and capabilities to cooperatively quantify and track SNM in the nuclear fuel cycle and detect any diversion of these materials for illicit purposes. Our goals and objectives align with a technology goal of the International Atomic Energy's Long Term Strategy for 2012-2023 ''to improve the Department's technical capabilities by making use of scientific and technological innovation, and to enhance its readiness to safeguard new nuclear technology and support new verification missions.'' Toward that end, we work closely with the US Department of Energy's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the US Support Programme to meet their specific long term needs. In this talk we will give a brief overview of current research efforts and specifically describe several helium-3 replacement technologies, advanced spent nuclear fuel characterization methods, and upcoming tags and seals technologies. We will present additional research into cross cutting enabling technologies such as advancements in detector materials, electronics, and sources, and basic physics measurements that support long term safeguards R&D. (author)

  9. Safeguards - Old and new

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Every 'non-nuclear-weapon' State that joins the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must conclude an agreement with IAEA for the application of safeguards on all nuclear material used in all peaceful nuclear activities in order to prevent diversion to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. In 1970 and 1971, a special Safeguards Committee of the IAEA spent nine months drawing up the guidelines for these agreements. Nearly fifty countries representing every shade of opinion and stage of nuclear development took part in the Committee's work. It reached virtual unanimity on the one hundred sixteen model articles of the recommended guidelines. A single exception related to the method of financing safeguards costs. There was a difference of view about the legal interpretation of the IAEA Statute on this point; this will have a limited effect in practice however. Seldom if ever have so many countries, representing such a wide range of opinion, been able to reach agreement on a matter of such political, technical and legal complexity. The IAEA has been applying safeguards since 1960, but mostly to individual isolated plants or shipments of nuclear material - in circumstances very different, therefore, from those foreseen under the NPT. The following article is a personal appreciation by a member of the IAEA Secretariat of the differences between the old and the new 'NPT' System of safeguards

  10. Workshop on facility safeguards system design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Physical inventory of nuclear material within a LWR facility is established by counting assemblies and identifying serial numbers of fuel subassemblies. Seals and surveillance cameras are used to maintain continuity of safeguards knowledge during time intervals between inspections. The main features of the IAEA safeguards approach at LWRs are the following: auditing of facility records and comparison with reports submitted to the Agency, periodic closing of material balance by the operator (usually annually) by taking physical inventory, independent verification of nuclear material by the Agency, usually by item counting and serial number identification and application of containment and surveillance measures to maintain knowledge of nuclear material

  11. Information analysis in the strengthened safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The changing political framework of the early 1990s revealed the limitations of traditional Safeguards and led the Member States to strengthen Safeguards. This was done under a two- pronged approach: while Programme 93+2 developed the model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), which would require an expanded declaration, complementary access, and broader environmental sampling, the Safeguards measures in force under the existing comprehensive Safeguards Agreements were strengthened through voluntary reporting, environmental sampling, and enhanced information analysis. The purpose of both of these initiatives was to broaden the mission of the IAEA to include the detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The effect was to increase dramatically the amount of information available to the Agency and the challenge was to develop a method and infrastructure to evaluate all this information. Since 1992 the Agency has developed a state evaluation process for collecting, organizing, and analyzing new types of information (open source information, the results of environmental sampling, commercial satellite imagery) and integrating this information with the familiar state declared and verification information traditionally collected and evaluated by the Agency. This address will describe the components and challenges of information analysis under strengthened Safeguards, the heart of the state evaluation process. (author)

  12. Recent advances in diagnostic approaches for sub-arachnoid hemorrhage.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kumar, Ashish; Kato, Yoko; Hayakawa, Motoharu; Junpei, Oda; Watabe, Takeya; Imizu, Shuei; Oguri, Daikichi; Hirose, Yuichi

    2011-07-01

    Sub-arachnoid hemorrhage (SAH) has been easily one of the most debilitating neurosurgical entities as far as stroke related case mortality and morbidity rates are concerned. To date, it has case fatality rates ranging from 32-67%. Advances in the diagnostic accuracy of the available imaging methods have contributed significantly in reducing morbidity associated with this deadly disease. We currently have computed tomography angiography (CTA), magnetic resonance angiography (MRA) and the digital subtraction angiography (DSA) including three dimensional DSA as the mainstay diagnostic techniques. The non-invasive angiography in the form of CTA and MRA has evolved in the last decade as rapid, easily available, and economical means of diagnosing the cause of SAH. The role of three dimensional computed tomography angiography (3D-CTA) in management of aneurysms has been fairly acknowledged in the past. There have been numerous articles in the literature regarding its potential threat to the conventional "gold standard" DSA. The most recent addition has been the introduction of the fourth dimension to the established 3D-CT angiography (4D-CTA). At many centers, DSA is still treated as the first choice of investigation. Although, CT angiography still has some limitations, it can provide an unmatched multi-directional view of the aneurysmal morphology and its surroundings including relations with the skull base and blood vessels. We study the recent advances in the diagnostic approaches to SAH with special emphasis on 3D-CTA and 4D-CTA as the upcoming technologies. PMID:22347331

  13. Reporting of safeguards events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    On June 9, 1987, the Commission published in the Federal Register a final rule revising the reporting requirements for safeguards events. Safeguards events include actual or attempted theft of special nuclear material (SNM); actual or attempted acts or events which interrupt normal operations at power reactors due to unauthorized use of or tampering with machinery, components, or controls; certain threats made against facilities possessing SNM; and safeguards system failures impacting the effectiveness of the system. The revised rule was effective October 8, 1987. On September 14, 1987, the NRC held a workshop in Bethesda, MD, to answer affected licensees' questions on the final rule. This report documents questions discussed at the September 14 meeting, reflects a completed staff review of the answers, and supersedes previous oral comment on the topics covered

  14. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the clean and safe growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports these three areas should be robust. The focus of this paper will be on the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards, and the integration of safeguards infrastructure with other elements critical to ensuring nuclear energy security

  15. Safeguards and Physics Measurements: Services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SCK-CEN's department of Safeguards and Physics Measurements provides a wide variety of internal and external services including dosimetry, calibration, instrumentation, whole body counting, safeguards and non-destructive analysis. Main developments in these areas in 1999 are described

  16. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  17. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barth, M.J.; Dunn, D.R.

    1984-08-01

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes.

  18. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes

  19. Safeguards information handling and treatment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper aims at the handling and treatment of nuclear safeguard relevant information by using the linguistic assessment approach. This is based on a hierarchical analysis of States' nuclear activities in a multi-layer structure of the evaluation model. Special emphasis is given to the synthesis and evaluation analysis of the Physical Model indicator information. Accordingly, we focus on the aggregation process with consideration of the different kinds of qualitative criteria. Especially we consider the symbolic approach that acts by the direct computation on linguistic values instead of the approximation approach by using the associated membership function. In this framework, several kinds of ordinal linguistic aggregation operators are presented and analyzed. The application of these linguistic aggregation operators to the combination of the Physical Model indicator information is provided. The study is undertaken in the framework of the Belgian Support Programme to the IAEA (task BEL C 01323). (author)

  20. Organic and inorganic nitrogen dynamics in soil - advanced Ntrace approach

    Science.gov (United States)

    Andresen, Louise C.; Björsne, Anna-Karin; Bodé, Samuel; Klemedtsson, Leif; Boeckx, Pascal; Rütting, Tobias

    2016-04-01

    Depolymerization of soil organic nitrogen (SON) into monomers (e.g. amino acids) is currently thought to be the rate limiting step for the terrestrial nitrogen (N) cycle. The production of free amino acids (AA) is followed by AA mineralization to ammonium, which is an important fraction of the total N mineralization. Accurate assessment of depolymerization and AA mineralization rate is important for a better understanding of the rate limiting steps. Recent developments in the 15N pool dilution techniques, based on 15N labelling of AA's, allow quantifying gross rates of SON depolymerization and AA mineralization (Wanek et al., 2010; Andersen et al., 2015) in addition to gross N mineralization. However, it is well known that the 15N pool dilution approach has limitations; in particular that gross rates of consumption processes (e.g. AA mineralization) are overestimated. This has consequences for evaluating the rate limiting step of the N cycle, as well as for estimating the nitrogen use efficiency (NUE). Here we present a novel 15N tracing approach, which combines 15N-AA labelling with an advanced version of the 15N tracing model Ntrace (Müller et al., 2007) explicitly accounting for AA turnover in soil. This approach (1) provides a more robust quantification of gross depolymerization and AA mineralization and (2) suggests a more realistic estimate for the microbial NUE of amino acids. Advantages of the new 15N tracing approach will be discussed and further improvements will be identified. References: Andresen, L.C., Bodé, S., Tietema, A., Boeckx, P., and Rütting, T.: Amino acid and N mineralization dynamics in heathland soil after long-term warming and repetitive drought, SOIL, 1, 341-349, 2015. Müller, C., Rütting, T., Kattge, J., Laughlin, R. J., and Stevens, R. J.: Estimation of parameters in complex 15N tracing models via Monte Carlo sampling, Soil Biology & Biochemistry, 39, 715-726, 2007. Wanek, W., Mooshammer, M., Blöchl, A., Hanreich, A., and Richter

  1. Status of safeguards instrumentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is performing safeguards at some nuclear power reactors, 50 bulk processing facilities, and 170 research facilities. Its verification activities require the use of instruments to measure nuclear materials and of surveillance instruments to maintain continuity of knowledge of the locations of nuclear materials. Instruments that are in use and under development to measure weight, volume, concentration, and isotopic composition of nuclear materials, and the major surveillance instruments, are described in connection with their uses at representative nuclear facilities. The current status of safeguards instrumentation and the needs for future development are discussed

  2. Safeguards-by-design: 3S integration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Design and construction of a nuclear energy system, particularly the first of its kind - or the first for a given host state - is an immensely complex undertaking. Additionally safeguards, security, and safety each have significant requirements that must be properly addressed by the facility and system design effort. However, the requirements are often in apparent conflict. A simple example would be the safety requirement for emergency egress doors contrasted against the physical security requirement to limit and control access points. This conflict is significant, even as it is often understated. The potential for conflict is increased when different parties are responsible for each component, as in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) performing safeguards while the host state provides for safety and security. Early and complete identification of requirements is critical to design success. This allows consideration of intrinsic design features that can satisfy all parties. The majority of the cost to design and build a facility is committed by the end of the conceptual design. As the design progresses, the cost to change the facility via retrofits is increasingly, even prohibitively, expensive, both in money and time. Conflicts among the safeguards, security, and safety design requirements must be resolved early to allow optimal design solutions, and to avoid costly backfits. The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) project currently underway in the United States is developing a design process that will fully integrate safeguards (to include state and international safeguards, and proliferation barriers) and security into the facility design process, with close coordination with safety. The SBD process includes key features such as early safeguards and security input to the facility requirements documents, a systems approach to nonproliferation and security considerations within the design effort, and agreed upon timelines for communicating with the IAEA. The

  3. IAEA Safeguards: possible future developments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    facility - e.g., at enrichment and reprocessing facilities and at reactors where undeclared production was considered an important consideration. A second area mentioned is the refinement and additional clarification of the reporting of exports that States make to the Agency on either a voluntary basis or as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. The paper concludes by noting that the Agency needs to continue to ensure that its conclusions are soundly based and technically justified and that one of the challenges that lies ahead is to ensure that the adaption made by the Agency do not undermine this fundamental objective. Member States' abilities to rely on the judgments of the Agency will continue to require that the verification approaches used are technically sound and that its conclusions flow from these approaches in a direct and straightforward manner. (author)

  4. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

  5. Past, Present and Future of Safeguards in Lithuania

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Davainis, Marius [State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI), Vilnius (Lithuania)

    2003-05-01

    Changing Safeguards climate has been a phenomenon for already ten years in Lithuania. Since the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in 1992, two distinctive periods of five years could be discerned. Safeguards was a new matter in Lithuania back in 1992 and its perception was not a one day work. For instance, development of the national system of accounting for and control of nuclear material took years. Safeguards implementation in Lithuania was not a simple and easy task for the IAEA either. The Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant inherited by Lithuania from the Soviet Union brought its particularity, as there was no precedent experience in safeguarding the RBMK type reactors. Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguards Agreement and the national regulation for nuclear material accounting and control came into force in 1997. That year could be considered as the end of the first five- year period, which could be called an initial stage of Safeguards application in Lithuania. In March 1998 Lithuania signed the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement. After two years it was ratified and came into force on the 5th of July 2000. That was a certain change and a new stage of Safeguards application in Lithuania. The year 2000 was also the time when the EURATOM system appeared on the horizon. The 1st of January 2004 is the most likely date of accession of Lithuania to the European Union and it can be said that Safeguards in Lithuania is heading to the next generation. This paper is aimed to review developments, which took place and the experience gained through the ten years of Safeguards application in Lithuania and also to present some considerations about the approaching changes.

  6. A study on the national safeguards system -Current status and suggested development-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In Korea, 17 nuclear facilities are currently under IAEA's safeguards and it is expected that more than 25 nuclear facilities will be under IAEA's safeguards in the year 2000 according to nuclear R and D and industry expansion. In connection with unlimited extension of NPT in 1995 and IAEA's measures to strengthen the safeguards like 'Programme 93+2', the international non-proliferation regime will be strengthened more and nuclear advanced countries will require the transparency and credibility of nuclear activities in recipient countries instead of transferring advanced nuclear technologies and nuclear material. In 1995, the Korean government had revised the Atomic Energy Law to control increasing nuclear facilities and nuclear material effectively and to establish international transparency and credibility. In the revised Atomic Energy Law, it is provided that the national inspection, other than IAEA inspection, will be started from 1996. Currently, necessary arrangements for national inspection are being prepared by MOST and TCNC at KAERI. However, the safeguards system in Korea is still beginning stage, Korea's safeguards activity was passive and fragmentary that leads non-attainment of safeguards goal in many facilities. The reasons were; absence of systematic safeguards system (SSAC); lack of understanding safeguards concepts; lack of manpower, designated organization for safeguards, etc. As Korea ranked world top 10 nuclear power generation country and has a plan to be a nuclear advanced country, Korea should have appropriate safeguards system and should not spare necessary assistance to that system. 14 tabs., 15 figs., 29 refs. (Author)

  7. Systems analysis for evaluation of safeguards effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has developed an integrated safeguards system analysis tool (LISSAT), which is a framework for performing systems analysis of safeguards effectiveness for all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The method has been applied to assess safeguards effectiveness for a conversion facility, an enrichment facility and for various types of nuclear reactors. LISSAT has the potential for evaluating safeguards for future proliferation resistant designs, and evaluating current safeguards tools/methods/on-the-shelf tools to assess safeguards strategies beyond Hexapartite. The key components of LISSAT include digraph/fault tree analysis, statistical analysis and time-domain simulation. The digraph fault tree methodology presents a well-structured systematic approach for generation and analysis of the diversion paths and is more comprehensive and systematic than traditional safeguards analysis methods. The digraph analysis is an effective method to organize and structure the possible diversion activities in a diversion scenario together with the safeguards measures and activities relevant to the diversion scenario. The fault tree analysis incorporates possible failure modes of the safeguards measures and develops a fault tree for the safeguard system in this situation. Output of the digraph-fault tree analysis provides an identification of the safeguards elements of most importance that has the potential for reducing the probability of diversion of nuclear material. Additional outputs include the ranking of the various diversion scenarios. Statistical analysis provides the basic event probabilities for the fault tree and addresses the probabilities that a short notice random inspections plan will encounter time-clustered physical diversion activities, the probabilities that inspection sampling and measurement plans will detect concealment schemes that use large or medium misdeclarations on some material items, deliberate bias in

  8. Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1996-05-01

    Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron and those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.

  9. Safeguarding of large scale reprocessing and MOX plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In May 97, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the final measures of the ''93+2'' safeguards strengthening programme, thus improving the international non-proliferation regime by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards verification. These enhancements are not however, a revolution in current practices, but rather an important step in the continuous evolution of the safeguards system. The principles embodied in 93+2, for broader access to information and increased physical access already apply, in a pragmatic way, to large scale reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In these plants, qualitative measures and process monitoring play an important role in addition to accountancy and material balance evaluations in attaining the safeguard's goals. This paper will reflect on the safeguards approaches adopted for these large bulk handling facilities and draw analogies, conclusions and lessons for the forthcoming implementation of the 93+2 Programme. (author)

  10. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  11. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  12. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  13. Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan, and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

  14. Safeguards system analysis, (1)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A system analysis on the implementing safeguards system based on the traditional materials accountancy was done. This report describes about verification methods applied to operator's measurement data, MUF evaluation method, theories on the decision of PIT frequency and designing of inspection plan. (author)

  15. The evolution of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

  16. Safeguards techniques and equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The current booklet is intended to give a full and balanced description of the techniques and equipment used for both nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures, and for the new safeguards measure of environmental sampling. As new verification measures continue to be developed, the material in the booklet will be periodically reviewed and updated versions issued. (author)

  17. IAEA safeguards technical manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Part F of the Safeguards Technical Manual is being issued in three volumes. Volume 1 was published in 1977 and revised slightly in 1979. Volume 1 discusses basic probability concepts, statistical inference, models and measurement errors, estimation of measurement variances, and calibration. These topics of general interest in a number of application areas, are presented with examples drawn from nuclear materials safeguards. The final two chapters in Volume 1 deal with problem areas unique to safeguards: calculating the variance of MUF and of D respectively. Volume 2 continues where Volume 1 left off with a presentation of topics of specific interest to Agency safeguards. These topics include inspection planning from a design and effectiveness evaluation viewpoint, on-facility site inspection activities, variables data analysis as applied to inspection data, preparation of inspection reports with respect to statistical aspects of the inspection, and the distribution of inspection samples to more than one analytical laboratory. Volume 3 covers generally the same material as Volumes 1 and 2 but with much greater unity and cohesiveness. Further, the cook-book style of the previous two volumes has been replaced by one that makes use of equations and formulas as opposed to computational steps, and that also provides the bases for the statistical procedures discussed. Hopefully, this will help minimize the frequency of misapplications of the techniques

  18. Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

  19. A combinatorial approach to the discovery of advanced materials

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sun, Xiao-Dong

    This thesis discusses the application of combinatorial methods to the search of advanced materials. The goal of this research is to develop a "parallel" or "fast sequential" methodology for both the synthesis and characterization of materials with novel electronic, magnetic and optical properties. Our hope is to dramatically accelerate the rate at which materials are generated and studied. We have developed two major combinatorial methodologies to this end. One involves generating thin film materials libraries using a combination of various thin film deposition and masking strategies with multi-layer thin film precursors. The second approach is to generate powder materials libraries with solution precursors delivered with a multi-nozzle inkjet system. The first step in this multistep combinatorial process involves the design and synthesis of high density libraries of diverse materials aimed at exploring a large segment of the compositional space of interest based on our understanding of the physical and structural properties of a particular class of materials. Rapid, sensitive measurements of one or more relevant physical properties of each library member result in the identification of a family of "lead" compositions with a desired property. These compositions are then optimized by continuously varying the stoichiometries of a more focused set of precursors. Materials with the optimal composition are then synthesized in quantities sufficient for detailed characterization of their structural and physical properties. Finally, the information obtained from this process should enhance our predictive ability in subsequent experiments. Combinatorial methods have been successfully used in the synthesis and discovery of materials with novel properties. For example, a class of cobaltite based giant magnetoresistance (GMR) ceramics was discovered; Application of this method to luminescence materials has resulted in the discovery of a few highly efficient tricolor

  20. Future safeguards equipment needs and technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: As a result of more than 30 years of accumulated field experience, the IAEA has established a wide and sound range of equipment and techniques for use in safeguards implementation activities. As a consequence of a rapidly changing technology marketplace, and with the introduction of the strengthened safeguards system, the Agency must now adapt itself to new challenges so that it can continue to use appropriate and sustainable equipment in a cost effective and efficient manner. Four of the major challenges facing the Agency in the future are as follows: Having the capability to maintain a sound equipment management infrastructure in a fast developing technical environment (equipment sustainability); Having the capability to upgrade existing techniques and methods for strengthened and integrated safeguards; Ensuring the capability for implementing safeguards at new facilities; Improving the capability to detect undeclared nuclear material and nuclear facilities. All equipment authorized for inspection use undergoes extensive testing to ensure their suitability, usability and reliability. Taking into account the high cost of equipment development and implementation, and a substantial inventory of existing safeguards equipment, the Department of Safeguards needs the efficient adaptation of its equipment inventory in order to function effectively within budget constraints and to satisfy new requirements stemming from additional protocol activities. Achieving cost-effectiveness in an environment of rapidly evolving technology requires strong and technically competent in-house resources that take the Department's constraints and requirements as a first priority and are able to focus on equipment sustainability and adaptability. The advantage of such an approach is that it establishes greater independence of safeguards equipment development from national and corporate interests, and achieves greater effectiveness in the use of equipment funds. To ensure the

  1. Canadian Educational Approaches for the Advancement of Pharmacy Practice

    OpenAIRE

    Frankel, Grace; Louizos, Christopher; Austin, Zubin

    2014-01-01

    Canadian faculties (schools) of pharmacy are actively engaged in the advancement and restructuring of their programs in response to the shift in pharmacy to pharmacists having/assuming an advanced practitioner role. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of evidence outlining optimal strategies for accomplishing this task. This review explores several educational changes proposed in the literature to aid in the advancement of pharmacy education such as program admission requirements, critical-thin...

  2. Safeguards Evaluation Method for evaluating vulnerability to insider threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As protection of DOE facilities against outsiders increases to acceptable levels, attention is shifting toward achieving comparable protection against insiders. Since threats and protection measures for insiders are substantially different from those for outsiders, new perspectives and approaches are needed. One such approach is the Safeguards Evaluation Method. This method helps in assessing safeguards vulnerabilities to theft or diversion of special nuclear meterial (SNM) by insiders. The Safeguards Evaluation Method-Insider Threat is a simple model that can be used by safeguards and security planners to evaluate safeguards and proposed upgrades at their own facilities. The method is used to evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards in both timely detection (in time to prevent theft) and late detection (after-the-fact). The method considers the various types of potential insider adversaries working alone or in collusion with other insiders. The approach can be used for a wide variety of facilities with various quantities and forms of SNM. An Evaluation Workbook provides documentation of the baseline assessment; this simplifies subsequent on-site appraisals. Quantitative evaluation is facilitated by an accompanying computer program. The method significantly increases an evaluation team's on-site analytical capabilities, thereby producing a more thorough and accurate safeguards evaluation

  3. Non-proliferation policy and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    At the beginning of '90s the international community and IAEA have been confronted with serious problems related to the maintaining of the world non-proliferation policy. At the end of the cold war, rumors regarding Iraq's nuclear armament secret program and a new democracies' perception regarding nuclear safety have given a strong impetus toward reinforcing and redefining the safeguards systems. Today this system has got the most advanced and modern means for the detection of nuclear materials stealing and surreptitious production. At the same time with the implementation of the new additional model of safeguards agreements, every country developed an important contribution to end this period in which proliferation and threatening of nuclear weapons were a ruling feature on the international scene. The paper presents the principles of IAEA and national nuclear safeguards system. Mentioned are the techniques and equipment for nuclear safeguards control applied particularly at Cernavoda NPP and TRIGA reactor at IRN - Pitesti as well as those related to the evaluation of the plutonium content in the irradiated fuel. In Romania largely utilized was the program ORIGEN

  4. Experience and challenges on safeguards practices and approaches for BAEC 3 MW TRIGA Mk-II research reactor and other establishment of Bangladesh

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bangladesh is deeply committed to nuclear non-proliferation signing and accesses to different unilateral protocols, agreements and treaties like Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Safeguards Agreements, Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with the USA and other countries etc. are the manifestations of such commitment. The first of such agreements, the NPT was signed in August 1979. NPT is a national commitment that the signatory country will not engage in activities related on nuclear detonations. Subsequently a bilateral agreement entitled 'Safeguards Agreements' was signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in June 1982. This provides for international verification of facilities and balancing of nuclear materials. 3MW TRIGA Mark-II Research Reactor Facility of Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) is inspected physically by the IAEA Safeguards Inspectors on an annual basis. For this purpose, a subsidiary arrangement was made with the IAEA, which had defined the scope of such verification. Bangladesh has also signed a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the USA on September 17, 1981, which facilitated export of nuclear technology from USA to Bangladesh. Bangladesh also signed another bilateral agreement entitled 'Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreements' with the IAEA in March 30, 2001. The main purpose of this agreement is to provide the IAEA with information on 'so called dual-purpose materials and facilities' including the front end and back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Its enforcement required filing of an initial declaration, draft of which has been sent to the Ministry of Science, Information and Communication Technology (MOSICT) for approval and transmittal to IAEA through the office of the permanent mission in Geneva. This protocol till to-date is the highest level of verification under the nonproliferation regime. The commitment of Bangladesh to non-proliferation is adequately reflected

  5. Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

    2010-08-07

    This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of ‘safeguards by design’. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how ‘safeguardability’ was introduced into RRP.

  6. TAMIS for rectal tumors: advancements of a new approach.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rega, Daniela; Pace, Ugo; Niglio, Antonello; Scala, Dario; Sassaroli, Cinzia; Delrio, Paolo

    2016-03-01

    TAMIS allows transanal excision of rectal lesions by the means of a single-incision access port and traditional laparoscopic instruments. This technique represents a promising treatment of rectal neoplasms since it guarantees precise dissection and reproducible approaches. From May 2010 to September 2015, we performed excisions of rectal lesions in 55 patients using a SILS port. The pre-operative diagnosis was 26 tumours, 26 low and high grade displasias and 3 other benign neoplasias. 11 patients had a neoadjuvant treatment. Pneumorectum was established at a pressure of 15-20 mmHg CO2 with continuous insufflation, and ordinary laparoscopic instruments were used to perform full thickness resection of rectal neoplasm with a conventional 5-mm 30° laparoscopic camera. The average operative time was 78 min. Postoperative recovery was uneventful in 53 cases: in one case a Hartmann procedure was necessary at two postoperative days due to an intraoperative intraperitoneal perforation; in another case, a diverting colostomy was required at the five postoperative days due to an intraoperative perforation of the vaginal wall. Unclear resection margins were detected in six patients: thereafter five patients underwent radical surgery; the other patient was unfit for radical surgery, but is actually alive and well. Patients were discharged after a median of 3 days. Transanal minimally invasive surgery is an advanced transanal platform that provides a safe and effective method for low rectal tumors. The feasibility of TAMIS also for malignant lesions treated in a neoadjuvant setting could be cautiously evaluated in the future. PMID:27052544

  7. Improving the Safeguardability of Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    T. Bjornard; R. Bari; D. Hebditch; P. Peterson; M. Schanfein

    2009-07-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to reduce security risks and proliferation hazards while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency, in a world where significant expansion of nuclear energy use may occur. Correspondingly, the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) includes objectives to contribute to international efforts to develop SBD, and to apply SBD in the development of new U.S. nuclear infrastructure. Here, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical protection, and safety objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility, from initial planning through design, construction and operation. The SBD process, in its simplest form, may be applied usefully today within most national regulatory environments. Development of a mature approach to implementing SBD requires work in the areas of requirements definition, design processes, technology and methodology, and institutionalization. The U.S. efforts described in this paper are supportive of SBD work for international safeguards that has recently been initiated by the IAEA with the participation of many stakeholders including member States, the IAEA, nuclear technology suppliers, nuclear utilities, and the broader international nonproliferation community.

  8. Safeguards technology research and development at CIAE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) is a multi-disciplinary institute under the leadership of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Safeguards was established at CIAE in 1991 to develop safeguards technology and to provide technical assistance to competent authorities for nuclear material management and control, which became one of the key laboratories approved by CNNC in 1993. The main research works for safeguards at CIAE include: nuclear material control and accounting, facilities license review and assessment, domestic inspection, NDA and DA analysis, physical protection and technical training. Research and development of equipment and technique for safeguards has been continuing at CIAE. A variety of NDA equipment that has different resolution and analysis capability has been developed. Method of NDA measurement has been investigated for nuclear material with different characteristics. Mathematics method such as Monte Carlo simulation is applied in NDA. Advanced destructive analysis (DA) instrument is installed at laboratory of CIAE, such as TIMS, ICP-MS and electronic chemistry analyzing system. The high accuracy results of element analysis and isotopic analysis for nuclear material can be obtained. It is possible to measure the types and quantities of nuclear material in a given area by means of NDA and DA. Physical protection system has also been developed. It consists of access control and management, various alarm (including perimeter alarm, intrusion alarms, fire alarms), video and audio monitors, intercommunication set and central console. The system can meet technical requirement for safeguards of first rank. Nuclear material accounting is an important aspect of safeguards research at CIAE. The computer software related to material accounting has been developed. It is the important task for scientists at CIAE to design and review nuclear accounting systems in various facilities. For

  9. Use of curium spontaneous fission neutrons for safeguardability of remotely-handled nuclear facilities: Fuel fabrication in pyroprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Highlights: • The neutron flux due to the metal fuel alloy is modeled. • This is part of a series of studies into major system components. • The strength of the neutron flux will affect hot cell shielding and design. • A residual mass in the injection casting system was determined. • This residual mass could be used in materials accounting. -- Abstract: Advanced nuclear reactor systems (NESs) will utilize remotely-handled facilities in which batch-type processing will occur in hot cells. There are no current formalized criteria for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for these systems. This creates new challenges to develop methodologies for demonstrating the safeguardability of these facilities. A High Reliability Safeguards (HRS) approach therefore has been proposed to enhance intrinsic proliferation resistance by establishing an envelope of adaptable functional components as part of a facility design strategy. Additionally, system assessment can be modeled concurrently with safety and physical security by a risk-informed approach. The HRS approach is currently applied to a commercial pyroprocessing facility as an example system. A scoping study is presented as the first in a series of quantitative modeling efforts to extend the HRS approach. These efforts currently focus on investigating the magnitude of neutron fluxes due to spontaneous fission of curium for commercial batch sizes and held up materials for important processes in the system. Here, the fuel fabrication process is studied. The intent of these initial studies is to learn how the intrinsic properties of materials in the pyroprocessing system will affect facility design and safeguards. The model presented in this paper is intended to be adaptable to more practical and complex scenarios in order to evaluate the safeguardability of remotely-handled nuclear facilities

  10. 76 FR 52954 - Workshop: Advancing Research on Mixtures; New Perspectives and Approaches for Predicting Adverse...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-08-24

    ... HUMAN SERVICES Workshop: Advancing Research on Mixtures; New Perspectives and Approaches for Predicting... ``Advancing Research on Mixtures: New Perspectives and Approaches for Predicting Adverse Human Health Effects... Research and Training, NIEHS, P.O. Box 12233, MD K3-04, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709, (telephone)...

  11. Introduction of designated organization to safeguards implementation in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    With domestic application of the IAEA new measures (program 93+2) for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, the Nuclear Regulation Laws was amended for implementation of the new measures based upon the Additional Protocol, and also the new Designated Organization System was introduced to the SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) for safeguards implementation in Japan since beginning of January 2000. On the basis of accumulated experiences of the state safeguards implementation for more than 20 years and then established standardization of the inspection procedures, the Japan's Government is able to utilize the expertise of private organizations for the safeguards implementation. Any capable organizations can be designated by the Government as the Designated Organization for all or a part of safeguards implementations on behalf of the Government. According to the amended Law, the Prime Minister can make the Designated Organization implement safeguards implementations that are defined firstly as safeguards inspections which can be done along the Government instructions without any discussions and decisions, secondarily as destructive analysis of safeguards samples, and thirdly as technical research on advanced safeguards measures. The amendment of the Law was approved by the National Diet on June 9th 1999 and entered into force on December 16th 1999. The Additional Protocol also entered into force in Japan at the same time. The NMCC (Nuclear Material Control Center) was designated as the Organization on December 27th 1999 and started the safeguards implementation in January 7th 2000. In order to prepare for the Designated Organization, the NMCC rearranged the organizational system and kept capable human resources enough for the safeguards implementations. Also the NMCC carried out many programs of education and training for the inspectors. Furthermore, manuals and criteria for the

  12. IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

  13. Advanced approaches to high intensity laser-driven ion acceleration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since the pioneering work that was carried out 10 years ago, the generation of highly energetic ion beams from laser-plasma interactions has been investigated in much detail in the regime of target normal sheath acceleration (TNSA). Creation of ion beams with small longitudinal and transverse emittance and energies extending up to tens of MeV fueled visions of compact, laser-driven ion sources for applications such as ion beam therapy of tumors or fast ignition inertial con finement fusion. However, new pathways are of crucial importance to push the current limits of laser-generated ion beams further towards parameters necessary for those applications. The presented PhD work was intended to develop and explore advanced approaches to high intensity laser-driven ion acceleration that reach beyond TNSA. In this spirit, ion acceleration from two novel target systems was investigated, namely mass-limited microspheres and nm-thin, free-standing diamond-like carbon (DLC) foils. Using such ultrathin foils, a new regime of ion acceleration was found where the laser transfers energy to all electrons located within the focal volume. While for TNSA the accelerating electric field is stationary and ion acceleration is spatially separated from laser absorption into electrons, now a localized longitudinal field enhancement is present that co-propagates with the ions as the accompanying laser pulse pushes the electrons forward. Unprecedented maximum ion energies were obtained, reaching beyond 0.5 GeV for carbon C6+ and thus exceeding previous TNSA results by about one order of magnitude. When changing the laser polarization to circular, electron heating and expansion were shown to be efficiently suppressed, resulting for the first time in a phase-stable acceleration that is dominated by the laser radiation pressure which led to the observation of a peaked C6+ spectrum. Compared to quasi-monoenergetic ion beam generation within the TNSA regime, a more than 40 times increase in

  14. Advanced approaches to high intensity laser-driven ion acceleration

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henig, Andreas

    2010-04-26

    Since the pioneering work that was carried out 10 years ago, the generation of highly energetic ion beams from laser-plasma interactions has been investigated in much detail in the regime of target normal sheath acceleration (TNSA). Creation of ion beams with small longitudinal and transverse emittance and energies extending up to tens of MeV fueled visions of compact, laser-driven ion sources for applications such as ion beam therapy of tumors or fast ignition inertial con finement fusion. However, new pathways are of crucial importance to push the current limits of laser-generated ion beams further towards parameters necessary for those applications. The presented PhD work was intended to develop and explore advanced approaches to high intensity laser-driven ion acceleration that reach beyond TNSA. In this spirit, ion acceleration from two novel target systems was investigated, namely mass-limited microspheres and nm-thin, free-standing diamond-like carbon (DLC) foils. Using such ultrathin foils, a new regime of ion acceleration was found where the laser transfers energy to all electrons located within the focal volume. While for TNSA the accelerating electric field is stationary and ion acceleration is spatially separated from laser absorption into electrons, now a localized longitudinal field enhancement is present that co-propagates with the ions as the accompanying laser pulse pushes the electrons forward. Unprecedented maximum ion energies were obtained, reaching beyond 0.5 GeV for carbon C{sup 6+} and thus exceeding previous TNSA results by about one order of magnitude. When changing the laser polarization to circular, electron heating and expansion were shown to be efficiently suppressed, resulting for the first time in a phase-stable acceleration that is dominated by the laser radiation pressure which led to the observation of a peaked C{sup 6+} spectrum. Compared to quasi-monoenergetic ion beam generation within the TNSA regime, a more than 40 times

  15. Validation of safeguards monitoring systems and their simulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Research is underway at the Atominstitut in Vienna Austria where the objective is to design and validate quantitatively a safeguards monitoring system (SMS) and its simulation. The work is novel because the simulation is also used as the basis for automated evaluation of SMS data. Preliminary results indicate that video and radiation data can be automatically interpreted using this approach. Application of the technique promises that an investment in a simulation supports directly the safeguards objective, which is to catch diversion of nuclear material. Consequently, it is easier for a safeguards agency to also realize other benefits associated with simulation-based acquisition, in addition to having a quantitative method for validation

  16. Authentication method for safeguards instruments securing data transmission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Because of the worldwide increase in nuclear fuel cycle activities, the need arises to reduce inspection effort by increasing the inspection efficiency per facility. Therefore, more and more advanced safeguards instruments will be designed for automatic operation. In addition, sensoring and recording devices may be well separated from each other within the facility, while the data transmission medium is a cable. The basic problem is the authenticity of the transmitted information. It has to be ensured that no potential adversary is able to falsify the transmitted safeguards data, i.e. the data transmission is secured. At present, predominantly C/S-devices are designed for automatic and remote interrogation. Also in other areas of safeguards instrumentation authentication will become a major issue, in particular, where the facility operator may offer his process instrumentation to be used also for safeguards purposes. In this paper possibilities to solve the problem of authentication are analysed

  17. Networking of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper discusses the design of a safeguards system that can be incorporated into a plant during the final phase of its construction to permit the acquisition and transmission of data during plant operation in the absence of an inspector. The system is an example of a networked data system of weighing, identity, and NDA information. It collects all of its non-surveillance data produced by safeguards equipment in a fuel fabrication plant. The data collection and transfer tasks are carried out by two software packages: NEGUS, a redundant data acquisition system designed to record neutron coincidence data, high-resolution gamma spectra, and sensor data for the NDA information and associated barcode identity information, and BRANCH, which deals with weighing and associated identity information. These processes collect data from local electronics using an ethernet network and provide information to the main review program

  18. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  19. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  20. Experience and challenges on safeguards practices and approaches for BAEC 3 MW TRIGA Mk-II research reactor and other establishment of Bangladesh

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bangladesh is deeply committed to nuclear non-proliferation. Signing and accesses to different unilateral protocols, agreements and treaties like Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Safeguards Agreements, Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with the USA and other countries etc. are the manifestations of such commitment. The first of such agreements, the NPT was signed in August 1979. Subsequently a bilateral agreement entitled 'Safeguards Agreements' was signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in June 1982. This provides for international verification of facilities and balancing of nuclear materials and the facility, TRIGA Mark-II Research Reactor Facility of Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) is inspected physically by the IAEA Safeguards Inspectors on an annual basis. For this purpose, a subsidiary arrangement was made with the IAEA, which had defined the scope of such verification. Bangladesh has also signed a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the USA on September 17, 1981, which facilitated export of nuclear technology from USA to Bangladesh. Bangladesh also signed another bilateral agreement entitled 'Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreements' with the IAEA in March 30, 2001. This protocol till to-date is the highest level of verification under the non-proliferation regime. The commitment of Bangladesh to non-proliferation is adequately reflected in this document. IAEA would decide on the modalities, frequency and scope of conducting its verification program on the basis of the declaration. Bangladesh signed the CTBT in October 1996. The Treaty was ratified in March 2000. This is a manifestation of Bangladesh's potential nuclear capabilities and by signing this Bangladesh has adequately and convincingly reiterated its commitment to the international community about its peaceful intentions. Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE) is the largest R and D establishment of the BAEC. It is

  1. Safeguarding research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The report is organized in four sections, including the introduction. The second section contains a discussion of the characteristics and attributes of research reactors important to safeguards. In this section, research reactors are described according to their power level, if greater than 25 thermal megawatts, or according to each fuel type. This descriptive discussion includes both reactor and reactor fuel information of a generic nature, according to the following categories. 1. Research reactors with more than 25 megawatts thermal power, 2. Plate fuelled reactors, 3. Assembly fuelled reactors. 4. Research reactors fuelled with individual rods. 5. Disk fuelled reactors, and 6. Research reactors fuelled with aqueous homogeneous fuel. The third section consists of a brief discussion of general IAEA safeguards as they apply to research reactors. This section is based on IAEA safeguards implementation documents and technical reports that are used to establish Agency-State agreements and facility attachments. The fourth and last section describes inspection activities at research reactors necessary to meet Agency objectives. The scope of the activities extends to both pre and post inspection as well as the on-site inspection and includes the examination of records and reports relative to reactor operation and to receipts, shipments and certain internal transfers, periodic verification of fresh fuel, spent fuel and core fuel, activities related to containment and surveillance, and other selected activities, depending on the reactor

  2. Nuclear safeguards - a system in transition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    'Classical' safeguards have a strong emphasis on nuclear materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - what has been termed the correctness of States' declarations. Following the Gulf War, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major changes are in progress to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the IAEA's authority, and there has been good progress in developing the new approaches and technologies required to ensure this authority is used effectively. IAEA safeguards are undergoing a major transition, towards greater emphasis on information collection and analysis, diversity of verification methods, incorporation of more qualitative judgments, and improved efficiency. These changes present major challenges to the IAEA and to the international community, but the end result will be a more effective safeguards system

  3. Effective use of information under IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    International Safeguards, applied for more than 25 years, consists of a complex control system based on nuclear material accountancy. The technical objective is to provide for 'the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devises or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection' (para. 28, INFCIRC 153). Each Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT undertakes to accept full-scope IAEA Safeguards to all nuclear material within the State's territory or under it's jurisdiction or control. The current Safeguards system is focused on declared facilities and activities. It involves the independent verifications of the States' declarations. The IAEA's effort to Strengthen International Safeguards include measures to increase the information provided by States on their nuclear programmes, broader access to 'other information' and measures related to increased physical access to sites and to the effectiveness of that access. The general approach is to compare a State's declared nuclear activities with supplementary information available to the IAEA, and to find any apparent inconsistencies. This paper presents an overview of the sources of information available to the Agency and its use with the overall goal of detecting at a very early stage undeclared nuclear activities. (author)

  4. The Canadian safeguards support program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canada supports international safeguards as a means by which the proliferation of nuclear weapons can be discouraged. Canada recognizes that,to meet that the IAEA must have effective safeguards techniques and the active cooperation of Member States. Therefore the Canadian Government decided in 1976 to initiate a program in support of IAEA safeguards, known as the Canadian Safeguards Support Program (CSSP). The CSSP is funded and administered by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB). The CSSP is a co-ordinated program for the development and the application of safeguards instruments and techniques for nuclear facilities and materials on behalf of the IAEA and also in support of Canada's own national nuclear material safeguards system, implemented by the AECB. (author)

  5. Safeguards for spent nuclear fuel in transfer from wet storage to dry storage in on-site interim storage facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: In Germany, the current approach for spent fuel management is on-site interim storage in transport and storage casks as part of a political agreement between the German government and the nuclear operators on the future use of nuclear energy. Recent legislation has triggered the construction of on-site dry storage facilities at nuclear power plants. A reason behind this is to avoid transportation of spent fuel that is determined for direct final disposal via public road or rail systems to away-from-reactor storage facilities, as they had been built at Gorleben and Ahaus. Spent fuel will be loaded into shielding casks, e.g., of the CASTOR-type, and transferred out of the reactor containment into the associated on-site dry storage facility. On-site interim storage of spent nuclear fuel has a strong political relevance for the nuclear debate in Germany. On-site interim storage facilities are being taken into operation on a step-by-step basis. The intention is to develop acceptable safeguards concepts for both transfer and dry storage of spent fuel, ideally, a standard safeguards concept that would match all German nuclear power plant sites without ignoring technical and organisational differences. From the State's point of view the safeguards concepts have to comply with requirements related to operational safety, radiation protection, and physical protection. Furthermore, they have to take into account the political and technical boundary conditions as well as the time schedule for spent fuel transfers that has been coordinated between all the nuclear power plant operators. From a safeguards point of view material balance areas have to be defined and basic technical characteristics (design information) of the on-site interim storage facilities have to be reported to the Euratom Safeguards Office for re-transfer of this information to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Furthermore, plant operators have to announce to Euratom, in advance, dates

  6. Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

  7. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

  8. Development of a safeguards database

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1. Introduction to Database. An effort has been made to computerize the information regarding safeguards inspections conducted at our facilities, the IAEA inspectors designated for Pakistan, material inventory at our safeguarded facilities and our safeguards agreements with the Agency. The information on these components such as searching of inspectors of a particular nationality ever designated to Pakistan, the material inventory of a certain kind of nuclear material present at any of the safeguarded facility, or the information on the type of safeguards agreement covering any facility can be easily traced using the database that provides flexible search options. The Relational Database Management System ACCESS has been used for the development of the database. All the information is managed from a single database file. Within the file, the Safeguards data is divided into separate tables, one for each type of information. Relationships are defined between the tables to bring the data from multiple tables together in a query, form, or report. Various forms have been created to edit/add data indirectly to the tables. To find and retrieve the data that is frequently required, including data from multiple tables, various queries have been made. Reports have been created using these queries, to present data in a certain format. In order to create application to navigate around the Safeguards Database, the Switchboard Manager has been used that automatically creates switchboard Forms that helps to navigate around the database. The switchboard Form has buttons that can be clicked to open various forms and reports or open other switchboards that can further open additional forms and reports. The Safeguards Database also employs various macros and event procedures to automate common tasks. In order to secure the Safeguards database, the simplest method that is to set a password for opening the Database has been used. 2. Components of Safeguards Database (DB). There are

  9. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  10. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses. Addendum

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards ( including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  11. Evaluating Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle through a Fuzzy Logic Barrier Framework

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    fashion, safeguards can be specifically targeted to the needs of the individual fuel cycle. Likewise, this model can be applied to make a test comparison of different technologies within a fuel cycle. For example, looking forward to advanced fuel cycle initiatives, one can apply the model to directly compare the PR performance of different spent fuel reprocessing technologies, such as UREX and PUREX. A similar comparison can be made of the safeguards requirements for such proposed alternatives within a cycle. Thus, such a model has direct utility for both utilities and policy-makers as a complimentary approach to PRA-based methods for 'roughing out' proposed new fuel cycles and assessing future safeguards needs. (authors)

  12. Migration of safeguards instrumentation: Challenges and opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Development of new safeguards instrumentation for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is spurred by a number of factors: Technical issues, including the emergence of new technologies and the inevitable obsolescence of system components, as well as policy-related issues including changes in safeguards policies, new approaches to the safeguarding of excess material, and the introduction of new types of facilities. To cope with these issues, development projects are required that migrate between current safeguards systems and state-of-the-art technology. These projects usually involve IAEA staff as well as Member States and their Support Programs (MSSP), the private sector, and research and development institutions. One such development project currently underway is the migration between the IAEA's DCM-14 based surveillance system to the Next Generation Surveillance System (NGSS). The challenges and opportunities of the NGSS project include those factors that prompted the migration, the development of user requirements, and the selection of appropriate development partners and funding resources. This paper will outline the challenges, issues, opportunities, and synergies that relate to safeguards instrumentation migration, using the NGSS project as an example. The problems necessitating new development will be outlined, as will the management of these problems from project initiation until new instrumentation is available for replacement. The generation of user requirements will be explained in detail. Focus will be given to how to best manage this process in order to produce requirements that will be useful both during the development project and after the migration is completed. The challenges and opportunities in the selection and procurement process will then be highlighted, followed by the structure of the actual development project. Finally, a summary of key steps that can help alleviate migration problems and the pressure to quickly complete

  13. Advanced approaches to intelligent information and database systems

    CERN Document Server

    Boonjing, Veera; Chittayasothorn, Suphamit

    2014-01-01

    This book consists of 35 chapters presenting different theoretical and practical aspects of Intelligent Information and Database Systems. Nowadays both Intelligent and Database Systems are applied in most of the areas of human activities which necessitates further research in these areas. In this book various interesting issues related to the intelligent information models and methods as well as their advanced applications, database systems applications, data models and their analysis, and digital multimedia methods and applications are presented and discussed both from the practical and theoretical points of view. The book is organized in four parts devoted to intelligent systems models and methods, intelligent systems advanced applications, database systems methods and applications, and multimedia systems methods and applications. The book will be interesting for both practitioners and researchers, especially graduate and PhD students of information technology and computer science, as well more experienced ...

  14. Recent advances in diagnostic approaches for sub-arachnoid hemorrhage

    OpenAIRE

    Kumar, Ashish; Kato, Yoko; Hayakawa, Motoharu; Junpei, ODA; Watabe, Takeya; Imizu, Shuei; Oguri, Daikichi; Hirose, Yuichi

    2011-01-01

    Sub-arachnoid hemorrhage (SAH) has been easily one of the most debilitating neurosurgical entities as far as stroke related case mortality and morbidity rates are concerned. To date, it has case fatality rates ranging from 32-67%. Advances in the diagnostic accuracy of the available imaging methods have contributed significantly in reducing morbidity associated with this deadly disease. We currently have computed tomography angiography (CTA), magnetic resonance angiography (MRA) and the digit...

  15. Safeguards and nuclear material accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The safeguards activities performed under INFCIRC/153 type of agreements are often characterized as traditional safeguards. This approach contains three elements: nuclear material accountancy; containment and surveillance measures; and on-site inspections. The nuclear material accountancy establishes the quantity of nuclear material present and changes in that over a period of time. Containment and surveillance measures take advantage of physical boundaries like walls, containers, cameras and seals to restrict, control or monitor the movement of or access to nuclear material. On-site inspection verifies the credibility of the first two verification elements. When we consider accounting of nuclear material we must have in our mind a Material Balance Area (MBA) separated by a physical boundary. There should be a close accounting period and also a nuclear material to account for. If there is some beginning inventory (BPI) in the MBA, it might receipt some material say R from other source. Then after processing some end product say S has been transferred to other MBA. During the process some part of the material can not be used further so it has to be discarded after measurement. Let it be MD. At the end of period some part of the material is still left over in the MBA, call it EPI. Since the nuclear materials are of high monitory and strategic value. The objective of their accounting and control is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities - to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and to deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection

  16. Who safeguards mothers?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wickham, Sara

    2014-11-01

    While routine screening for group B streptococcus is not recommended in the UK, women are sometimes coincidentally found to be carrying these bacteria during investigations of symptoms in pregnancy. If such women decide to decline intravenous antibiotics for themselves in labour, they can seek support from midwives in appropriate roles. But once the woman's baby is born, the situation changes somewhat, as the legal context changes and the issue of safeguarding may be raised. This article considers the issues that arise in such scenarios and raises questions about who is there to support women who experience pressure to consent to their healthy newborn baby having prophylactic intravenous antibiotics. PMID:25582006

  17. Neutron techniques in Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An essential part of Safeguards is the ability to quantitatively and nondestructively assay those materials with special neutron-interactive properties involved in nuclear industrial or military technology. Neutron techniques have furnished most of the important ways of assaying such materials, which is no surprise since the neutronic properties are what characterizes them. The techniques employed rely on a wide selection of the many methods of neutron generation, detection, and data analysis that have been developed for neutron physics and nuclear science in general

  18. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper examines the present approach of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguarding various types of facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, in the hope that it will serve as useful background material for several of the various working groups of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). The objectives and criteria of safeguards as well as the specific safeguards techniques which are utilized by the Agency, are addressed. In Part I, a general overview of safeguards as well as a discussion of procedures applicable to most if not all IAEA safeguarded facilities are included. Part II is broken down into specific facility types and focusses on the particular safeguards measures applied to them. Safeguards have reached different degrees of development for different types of facilities, in part because the Agency's experience in safeguarding certain types is considerably greater than for other types. Thus the Agency safeguards described herein are not static, but are continuously evolving. This evolution results not only from the fact that larger and more complex facilities have been coming under safeguards. Changes are also continually being introduced based on practical experience and research and development aimed at improving safeguards efficiency, reducing intrusiveness into plant operations, minimizing operator and inspector radiation exposure, and reducing subjective evaluations in determining the effectiveness of safeguards. To these ends, the technical support programmes of various countries are playing an important role. It is emphasized that this paper is not intended to evaluate the effectiveness of Agency safeguards or to highlight problem areas. It is simply aimed at providing a picture of what safeguards are or are planned to be at various stages of the fuel cycle

  19. Technological developments and safeguards instrumentation: Responding to new challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Entering the 1990s, technological tools that were in the research and development stage not so long ago are changing the way inspectors are able to verify nuclear materials at many facilities around the world. Many new instruments - ranging from advanced video monitoring systems to miniature detectors and analysers - already are in place. In some cases, they have been custom-made for specific safeguards tasks, or for placement in locations, such as underwater storage pools for spent reactor fuel, where inspectors cannot go. Standing behind the development of many of these new safeguards instruments are a number of factors. They include: technological advances In computer related fields, such as microprocessing and electronics, and specific areas of instrumentation; technical developments in the nuclear industry and Efficiency improvements and efforts to reduce the costs of safeguards implementation

  20. Multilayered genetic safeguards limit growth of microorganisms to defined environments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gallagher, Ryan R; Patel, Jaymin R; Interiano, Alexander L; Rovner, Alexis J; Isaacs, Farren J

    2015-02-18

    Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are commonly used to produce valuable compounds in closed industrial systems. However, their emerging applications in open clinical or environmental settings require enhanced safety and security measures. Intrinsic biocontainment, the creation of bacterial hosts unable to survive in natural environments, remains a major unsolved biosafety problem. We developed a new biocontainment strategy containing overlapping 'safeguards'-engineered riboregulators that tightly control expression of essential genes, and an engineered addiction module based on nucleases that cleaves the host genome-to restrict viability of Escherichia coli cells to media containing exogenously supplied synthetic small molecules. These multilayered safeguards maintain robust growth in permissive conditions, eliminate persistence and limit escape frequencies to <1.3 × 10(-12). The staged approach to safeguard implementation revealed mechanisms of escape and enabled strategies to overcome them. Our safeguarding strategy is modular and employs conserved mechanisms that could be extended to clinically or industrially relevant organisms and undomesticated species. PMID:25567985

  1. Safeguards can not operate alone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    There are around 20 new states which are planning to use nuclear energy in the near future. Globally there are several nuclear power plants under construction and they will be bigger than ever. Also new type of nuclear facility, final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, will be constructed and in operation in Finland and Sweden in ca. 10 years time. It is evident that the nuclear world is changing much and quickly. After the Additional Protocol, safeguards are no longer only about accounting and control of nuclear materials, but also about verifying that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the state. It is not possible or effective anymore to implement safeguards without taking into account of the nuclear safety and security. The safeguards should not be isolated. The synergy between safeguards, security and safety exist, when implementing nationally that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities. In safeguards we could not do our duties effectively if we ignore some of those other S's. Safeguards by Design process does not work properly if only international safeguards and security requirements has been taken into account, it urges all 3S to be taken care at the same time. Safeguards should operate also with other synergetic regimes and organisations like CTBTO, Fissile Material Cut-off, disarmament, export control, border control,... The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  2. The Importance of Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-12-20

    This is a paper we plan to submit to the Nonproliferation Review for publication. The paper provides an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture and gauges its value to the safeguards community. Accompanying the paper are three additional documents that contain the figures and tables cited in the paper. NPR guidelines state these figures and tables are to be submitted in separate documents.

  3. The "liver-first approach" for patients with locally advanced rectal cancer and synchronous liver metastases.

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Verhoef, C.; Pool, A.E. van der; Nuyttens, J.J.; Planting, A.S.; Eggermont, A.M.M.; Wilt, J.H.W. de

    2009-01-01

    PURPOSE: This study was designed to investigate the outcome of "the liver-first" approach in patients with locally advanced rectal cancer and synchronous liver metastases. METHODS: Patients with locally advanced rectal cancer and synchronous liver metastases were primarily treated for their liver me

  4. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  5. The changing nature of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Statute of the IAEA permits the implementation of safeguards tailored to differing security demands of States parties to non-proliferation and nuclear arms control treaties. The agreements concluded in response to these demands foresee the continuous development of safeguards verification. The safeguards system was first implemented in the 1960s to provide exporters of specified nuclear material, technology and facilities assurances that these were used for peaceful purposes only. With the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty), and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT). the overall objective of IAEA safeguards took a major step forward as non-nuclear weapon State parties undertook to accept comprehensive safeguards on all nuclear material within their territory, under their jurisdiction or control, for the purpose of verifying that such material is used only for peaceful purposes. The system of comprehensive safeguards, following the structural content of the NPT Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153(Corr.)), has developed continuously with the accumulation of experience and the introduction of new technology and methods. This system, based on material accountancy, has proved reliable in providing assurances about the peaceful use of declared nuclear material and declared facilities (i.e. that States' declarations are correct). However, while the scope of the NPT agreement is not limited to declared material and facilities (the Agency has the basic right and obligation to apply safeguards to all nuclear material and activities of a State). the safeguards system developed through the early 1990s had limited capability to deal with the completeness of States' nuclear material declarations. The discoveries in Iraq of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in the early 1990s emphasized the increasing importance of assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material

  6. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  7. The Safeguard of Audio Collections: A Computer Science Based Approach to Quality Control—The Case of the Sound Archive of the Arena di Verona

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Federica Bressan

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available In the field of multimedia, very little attention is given to the activities involved in the preservation of audio documents. At the same time, more and more archives storing audio and video documents face the problem of obsolescing and degrading media, which could largely benefit from the instruments and the methodologies of research in multimedia. This paper presents the methodology and the results of the Italian project REVIVAL, aimed at the development of a hardware/software platform to support the active preservation of the audio collection of the Fondazione Arena di Verona, one of the finest in Europe for the operatic genre, with a special attention on protocols and tools for quality control. On the scientific side, the most significant objectives achieved by the project are (i the setup of a working environment inside the archive, (ii the knowledge transfer to the archival personnel, (iii the realization of chemical analyses on magnetic tapes in collaboration with experts in the fields of materials science and chemistry, and (iv the development of original open-source software tools. On the cultural side, the recovery, the safeguard, and the access to unique copies of unpublished live recordings of artists the calibre of Domingo and Pavarotti are of great musicological and economical value.

  8. Strengthening safeguards information evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The strengthening of safeguards should not be limited to the verification of explicit declarations made by the States. Additional information should guide the IAEA to set priorities for further investigations. Not only all aspects of the State's nuclear programme, including the application of safe, secure and transparent nuclear management, but also the level of compliance with other verifiable treaties, political motivation, economic capabilities, international relations and ties, co-operative attitude to safeguards, and general openness and transparency should be included. The evaluation of the diverse forms of information from different sources requires new reliable processes that will result in a high credibility and detection probability. The IAEA uses the physical model for the evaluation of the technical information, and proposed also Fuzzy Logic, or Calculation with Words, to handle the information. But for the evaluation it is questioned whether fuzziness could lead to a crisp judgement. In this paper an objective method of information evaluation is proposed, which allows to integrate different kinds of information and to include calibration and tests in the establishment of the evaluation process. This method, Delta, uses elicitation of a syndicate of experienced inspectors to integrate obvious indicators together with apparently innocent indicators, into a database that forms the core of the evaluation process. Nominal or ordinal scales could be applied to come to an objective and quantifiable result. Experience with this method can in the course of time result in predictive conclusions. 9 refs

  9. Broader use of information under IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    International Safeguards applied for more than 25 years consists of a complex control system based on nuclear material accountancy. The technical objective is to provide for 'the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devises or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection' (para. 28. INFCIRC 153). Each Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT undertakes to accept full-scope IAEA Safeguards to all nuclear material within the State's territory or under it's jurisdiction or control. The current Safeguards system is focused on declared facilities and activities. It involves the independent verifications of the States' declarations. The IAEA's effort to Strengthen International Safeguards include measures to increase the information provided by States on their nuclear programmes broader access to 'other information' and measures related to increased physical access to sites and to the effectiveness of that access. The general approach is to compare a State's declared nuclear activities with supplementary information available to the IAEA, and to find any apparent inconsistencies. This paper presents an overview of the sources of information available to the Agency and its use with the overall goal of detecting at a very early stage undeclared nuclear activities. The discovery of clandestine nuclear activities in Iraq shows that nuclear material accountancy alone cannot give the international community through IAEA safeguards, credible assurance that State party to comprehensive safeguards are in compliance with their obligations. Nuclear material accountancy, as traditionally practised, focuses on detecting the possible diversion of nuclear material declared to the IAEA. Accountancy cannot indicate whether a state has undeclared nuclear material or facilities, which might point to the

  10. Synergies across verification regimes: Nuclear safeguards and chemical weapons convention compliance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the implementation of all arms control agreements, accurate verification is essential. In setting a course for verifying compliance with a given treaty - whether the NPT or the CWC, one must make a technical comparison of existing information-gathering capabilities against the constraints in an agreement. Then it must be decided whether this level of verifiability is good enough. Generally, the policy standard of 'effective verification' includes the ability to detect significant violations, with high confidence, in sufficient time to respond effectively with policy adjustments or other responses, as needed. It is at this juncture where verification approaches have traditionally diverged. Nuclear safeguards requirements have taken one path while chemical verification methods have pursued another. However, recent technological advances have brought a number of changes affecting verification, and lately their pace has been accelerating. First, all verification regimes have more and better information as a result of new kinds of sensors, imagery, and other technologies. Second, the verification provisions in agreements have also advanced, to include on-site inspections, portal monitoring, data exchanges, and a variety of transparency, confidence-building, and other cooperative measures, Together these developments translate into a technological overlap of certain institutional verification measures such as the NPT's safeguards requirements and the IAEA and the CWC's verification visions and the OPCW. Hence, a priority of international treaty-implementing organizations is exploring the development of a synergistic and coordinated approach to WMD policy making that takes into account existing inter-linkages between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons issues. Specific areas of coordination include harmonizing information systems and information exchanges and the shared application of scientific mechanisms, as well as collaboration on technological developments

  11. Information analysis and international safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, K. W. (Kory W.); Tape, J. W. (James W.)

    2004-01-01

    After the first Gulf War, it was recognized that one of the key weaknesses of the international safeguards system was that there was no systematic attempt by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to analyze all available information about States nuclear programs to determine whether these programs were consistent with nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA, as part of its effort to redesign the international safeguards system, is looking closely at the issue of information review and evaluation. The application of information analysis (IA) techniques to the international nuclear safeguards system has the potential to revolutionize the form and practice of safeguards. Assessing the possibilities of IA for the IAEA, and in particular those embodied in concepts of information-driven safeguards, requires an understanding of IA, the limits on its effectiveness and the requirements placed on such analyses in a variety of safeguards contexts. The Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office (ASNO) and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) agreed in July 2002 to undertake a joint study of 'information-driven safeguards' under a long-standing cooperative arrangement. It was decided that a broad range of ideas should be considered, and that the study would not be intended to be and would not be an elaboration of either US or Australian governmental positions. This paper reports some findings of Phase 1 of this collaborative effort and offers some initial thinking on the part of the authors on the outstanding issues to be addressed in Phase 2. An effort to explore through case studies alternative strategies for utilizing IA by the IAEA that provide the same or increased confidence in safeguards conclusions while allowing safeguards resource allocation to be determined not only by the types and quantities of nuclear material and facilities in a State but also by other objective factors.

  12. Information analysis and international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    After the first Gulf War, it was recognized that one of the key weaknesses of the international safeguards system was that there was no systematic attempt by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to analyze all available information about States nuclear programs to determine whether these programs were consistent with nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA, as part of its effort to redesign the international safeguards system, is looking closely at the issue of information review and evaluation. The application of information analysis (IA) techniques to the international nuclear safeguards system has the potential to revolutionize the form and practice of safeguards. Assessing the possibilities of IA for the IAEA, and in particular those embodied in concepts of information-driven safeguards, requires an understanding of IA, the limits on its effectiveness and the requirements placed on such analyses in a variety of safeguards contexts. The Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office (ASNO) and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) agreed in July 2002 to undertake a joint study of 'information-driven safeguards' under a long-standing cooperative arrangement. It was decided that a broad range of ideas should be considered, and that the study would not be intended to be and would not be an elaboration of either US or Australian governmental positions. This paper reports some findings of Phase 1 of this collaborative effort and offers some initial thinking on the part of the authors on the outstanding issues to be addressed in Phase 2. An effort to explore through case studies alternative strategies for utilizing IA by the IAEA that provide the same or increased confidence in safeguards conclusions while allowing safeguards resource allocation to be determined not only by the types and quantities of nuclear material and facilities in a State but also by other objective factors.

  13. Recent advances in rational approaches for enzyme engineering

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kerstin Steiner

    2012-09-01

    Full Text Available Enzymes are an attractive alternative in the asymmetric syntheses of chiral building blocks. To meet the requirements of industrial biotechnology and to introduce new functionalities, the enzymes need to be optimized by protein engineering. This article specifically reviews rational approaches for enzyme engineering and de novo enzyme design involving structure-based approaches developed in recent years for improvement of the enzymes’ performance, broadened substrate range, and creation of novel functionalities to obtain products with high added value for industrial applications.

  14. Implementation of the Safeguards System in the Republic of Tajikistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It is known that IAEA plays an important role in facilitation of nuclear non-proliferation as international authority which carries out nuclear inspections. Republic of Tajikistan in 1997 signed nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty. Then in 2004 Safeguards agreement, additional protocol and small quantity protocol were signed. Information required in accordance with Safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol is figured on that IAEA could compile more detailed and exact conception about nuclear activity in Tajikistan and it has the following purpose: - Information will lead to more transparency, and make it possible to IAEA to ensure with high extent of confidence that in the framework of declared program, any unstated nuclear activity is concealed; - The more exact and comprehensive information, the rare is questions and discrepancies are originating; - Required information is the basis for effective planning and IAEA activity realization, related not only with safeguards implementation in regard to declared nuclear material but also ensuring of confidence in absence of undeclared nuclear activity in Tajikistan. Tajikistan provides necessary information to IAEA in accordance with Additional Protocol: Location where nuclear material is available or might be available; Information about all buildings where nuclear material could be available; Ready to provide assistance for IAEA missions on environmental sampling; Provides to IAEA inspectors multiple visas; Information about scientific and research works. Exclusive importance for IAEA safeguards agreement is high safeguards culture. IAEA should regularly conduct seminars on advanced assessment of safeguards culture - exactly as recommends to nuclear sites regularly to assess safety culture, and to undertake steps on elimination of any revealed shortcomings. One of the important safeguards criteria is nuclear knowledge preservation. IAEA member-states should advocate initiative on attraction and next generation

  15. Optimizing the integrated safeguards system: Pragmatism and fresh views are the keys to a viable system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    evaluation of the State. Ensuring that verification activities are partly unpredictable, with respect to timing, location, and activities performed, is a strong deterrent and can lead to cost savings while maintaining a high level of assurance. Some level of unpredictability should thus be introduced in all aspects of verification. Complementary access is an essential feature of the new Safeguards System. Although it should not be used in a mechanistic fashion nor as a systematic prerequisite for Integrated Safeguards, it should take place whenever necessary, not only to ensure the effectiveness of safeguards, but also to maintain the possibility to have recourse to it. Needless to say, the Agency should also, in a pragmatic way, seize every technical opportunity to reduce costs, for instance through the use of advanced technology where it can provide savings, or through increased co-operation with Regional or State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material and controlled use of the results of their work. In conclusion, it should be tirelessly reiterated that the ultimate goal of the new system is stronger safeguards and increased assurances for the international community. And this will only be possible, especially in a context of financial constraints, through a pragmatic, goal- oriented, fresh and determined approach to the new rules that will make Integrated Safeguards effective, cost-effective and, in the end, viable

  16. Safeguards in Norway-Experiences with Integrated Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Norway was among the first countries to have a nuclear research reactor in operation. JEEP 1, a joint project between the Netherlands and Norway, went into operation in 1951. In the early years of nuclear power there were no safeguards bureau. However, Norway had in the late 1950's signed an agreement with USA concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The agreement secured USA that the nuclear facilities in Norway were not used for military purposes, and provided Norway with uranium and other vital equipment for the reactors. IAEA safeguards was implemented in Norway 1 March 1972. Norway is not part of EURATOM, thus only the bilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA is enforced. For Norway the Additional Protocol came into force in 2000, while Integrated Safeguards was implemented in 2002. As one of the first countries to have Integrated Safeguards implemented, Norway has a broad experience in this field. This paper will present the nuclear facilities in Norway and discuss the experiences with Integrated Safeguards and compare it to traditional safeguards

  17. Digital image surveillance for IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Basic technologies utilized for optical surveillance equipment for IAEA safeguards are mostly dictated by the trends in the commercial market. When in the late 1970s the 8 mm amateur movie film market was gradually subsumed in the market for video home system cameras and video cassette recorders, the IAEA had to cope with this trend and consequently embarked upon developing surveillance equipment by adapting the technology developed for the domestic and security markets. Currently, there is a technological trend towards digital imaging, digital processing, digital storage and digital transmission of image data which will probably continue during the next ten years. The paper describes the move to digital image surveillance, which is planned for IAEA safeguards, and its advantages for present and recommended future approaches, as well as its requirements and limitations. (author). 13 refs, 2 tabs

  18. A trait-based approach to advance coral reef science

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Madin, Joshua S.; Hoogenboom, Mia O.; Connolly, Sean R.;

    2016-01-01

    hampered by a paucity of trait data for the many, often rare, species and by a reliance on nonquantitative approaches. Therefore, we propose filling data gaps by prioritizing traits that are easy to measure, estimating key traits for species with missing data, and identifying ‘supertraits’ that capture...

  19. The responsive approach by the Basel Committee (on Banking Supervision) to regulation: Meta risk regulation, the Internal Ratings Based Approaches and the Advanced Measurement Approaches.

    OpenAIRE

    Ojo, Marianne

    2009-01-01

    The use of complex and sophisticated financial instruments, such as derivatives, in the modern financial environment, has triggered the emergence of new forms of risks. As well as the need to manage such types of risks, this paper investigates developments which have instigated the Basel Committee in developing advanced risk management techniques such as the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approaches and the Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA). Developments since the inception of the 1988 Base...

  20. Recent advances on hybrid approaches for designing intelligent systems

    CERN Document Server

    Melin, Patricia; Pedrycz, Witold; Kacprzyk, Janusz

    2014-01-01

    This book describes recent advances on hybrid intelligent systems using soft computing techniques for diverse areas of application, such as intelligent control and robotics, pattern recognition, time series prediction and optimization complex problems. Soft Computing (SC) consists of several intelligent computing paradigms, including fuzzy logic, neural networks, and bio-inspired optimization algorithms, which can be used to produce powerful hybrid intelligent systems. The book is organized in five main parts, which contain a group of papers around a similar subject. The first part consists of papers with the main theme of type-2 fuzzy logic, which basically consists of papers that propose new models and applications for type-2 fuzzy systems. The second part contains papers with the main theme of bio-inspired optimization algorithms, which are basically papers using nature-inspired techniques to achieve optimization of complex optimization problems in diverse areas of application. The third part contains pape...

  1. Cooperative technology development: An approach to advancing energy technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Technology development requires an enormous financial investment over a long period of time. Scarce national and corporate resources, the result of highly competitive markets, decreased profit margins, wide currency fluctuations, and growing debt, often preclude continuous development of energy technology by single entities, i.e., corporations, institutions, or nations. Although the energy needs of the developed world are generally being met by existing institutions, it is becoming increasingly clear that existing capital formation and technology transfer structures have failed to aid developing nations in meeting their growing electricity needs. This paper will describe a method for meeting the electricity needs of the developing world through technology transfer and international cooperative technology development. The role of nuclear power and the advanced passive plant design will be discussed. (author)

  2. Advanced free space optics (FSO) a systems approach

    CERN Document Server

    Majumdar, Arun K

    2015-01-01

    This book provides a comprehensive, unified tutorial covering the most recent advances in the technology of free-space optics (FSO). It is an all-inclusive source of information on the fundamentals of FSO as well as up-to-date information on the state-of-the-art in technologies available today. This text is intended for graduate students, and will also be useful for research scientists and engineers with an interest in the field. FSO communication is a practical solution for creating a three dimensional global broadband communications grid, offering bandwidths far beyond what is possible in the Radio Frequency (RF) range. However, the attributes of atmospheric turbulence and scattering impose perennial limitations on availability and reliability of FSO links. From a systems point-of-view, this groundbreaking book provides a thorough understanding of channel behavior, which can be used to design and evaluate optimum transmission techniques that operate under realistic atmospheric conditions. Topics addressed...

  3. Safeguards Envelope: The First Steps

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richard Metcalf; Jean Ragusa; Robert Bean

    2008-03-01

    The possibility exists for real time accountancy and assay of nuclear materials as they move through a reprocessing facility. This project aims to establish working parameters and local figures of merit to identify possible diversion in real time with minimal operational impact. Factors such as pH, NOX gas concentration, flow speeds and radiation fields are rarely taken into account in safeguards methodologies and will be included to increase the confidence of location and assay of nuclear materials. An adaptable, real data model is being created of the contactors of the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility and will be analyzed using the appropriate modeling codes. This model will then be subjected to three, diversion scenarios and a figure of merit methodology will be utilized to create the operational parameters under which these diversion scenarios would be detected. This analysis for figure of merit methodology will include statistical fluctuations, operator error, and a rudimentary analysis of transient conditions. The long term goal of the project includes expansion universally over the plant, methods of detection without requiring access to proprietary information, and an evaluation of the requirements for future figure of merit methodologies.

  4. International Safeguards in Nuclear Facility Design and Construction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    One of the IAEA's statutory objectives is to ''seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.'' One way this objective is achieved is through the publication of a range of technical series. Two of these are the IAEA Nuclear Energy Series and the IAEA Safety Standards Series. According to Article III.A.6 of the IAEA Statute, the safety standards establish ''standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property''. The safety standards include the Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. These standards are written primarily in a regulatory style, and are binding on the IAEA for its own programmes. The principal users are the regulatory bodies in member States and other national authorities. The IAEA Nuclear Energy Series comprises reports designed to encourage and assist R and D on, and application of, nuclear energy for peaceful uses. This includes practical examples to be used by owners and operators of utilities in member States, implementing organizations, academia, and government officials, among others. This information is presented in guides, reports on technology status and advances, and best practices for peaceful uses of nuclear energy based on inputs from international experts. The IAEA Nuclear Energy Series complements the IAEA Safety Standards Series. The great majority of States have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Performed under such agreements, the safeguards verification activities carried out by the IAEA are a central part of international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an independent verification role, ensuring that States adhere to their safeguards commitments. Cooperation between States, the IAEA and also all other stakeholders can make safeguards

  5. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented

  6. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented.

  7. A Computationally Based Approach to Homogenizing Advanced Alloys

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jablonski, P D; Cowen, C J

    2011-02-27

    We have developed a computationally based approach to optimizing the homogenization heat treatment of complex alloys. The Scheil module within the Thermo-Calc software is used to predict the as-cast segregation present within alloys, and DICTRA (Diffusion Controlled TRAnsformations) is used to model the homogenization kinetics as a function of time, temperature and microstructural scale. We will discuss this approach as it is applied to both Ni based superalloys as well as the more complex (computationally) case of alloys that solidify with more than one matrix phase as a result of segregation. Such is the case typically observed in martensitic steels. With these alloys it is doubly important to homogenize them correctly, especially at the laboratory scale, since they are austenitic at high temperature and thus constituent elements will diffuse slowly. The computationally designed heat treatment and the subsequent verification real castings are presented.

  8. A Trait-Based Approach to Advance Coral Reef Science.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Madin, Joshua S; Hoogenboom, Mia O; Connolly, Sean R; Darling, Emily S; Falster, Daniel S; Huang, Danwei; Keith, Sally A; Mizerek, Toni; Pandolfi, John M; Putnam, Hollie M; Baird, Andrew H

    2016-06-01

    Coral reefs are biologically diverse and ecologically complex ecosystems constructed by stony corals. Despite decades of research, basic coral population biology and community ecology questions remain. Quantifying trait variation among species can help resolve these questions, but progress has been hampered by a paucity of trait data for the many, often rare, species and by a reliance on nonquantitative approaches. Therefore, we propose filling data gaps by prioritizing traits that are easy to measure, estimating key traits for species with missing data, and identifying 'supertraits' that capture a large amount of variation for a range of biological and ecological processes. Such an approach can accelerate our understanding of coral ecology and our ability to protect critically threatened global ecosystems. PMID:26969335

  9. New advances in the statistical parton distributions approach*

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Soffer Jacques

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The quantum statistical parton distributions approach proposed more than one decade ago is revisited by considering a larger set of recent and accurate Deep Inelastic Scattering experimental results. It enables us to improve the description of the data by means of a new determination of the parton distributions. This global next-to-leading order QCD analysis leads to a good description of several structure functions, involving unpolarized parton distributions and helicity distributions, in terms of a rather small number of free parameters. There are many serious challenging issues. The predictions of this theoretical approach will be tested for single-jet production and charge asymmetry in W± production in p̄p and pp collisions up to LHC energies, using recent data and also for forthcoming experimental results.

  10. An integrated approach to emotion recognition for advanced emotional intelligence

    OpenAIRE

    Panagiotis D Bamidis; Frantzidis, Christos A.; Konstantinidis, Evdokimos I.; Luneski, Andrej; Lithari, Chrysa; Klados, Manousos A.; Bratsas, Charalambos; Papadelis, Christos; Pappas, Costas

    2009-01-01

    Emotion identification is beginning to be considered as an essential feature in human-computer interaction. However, most of the studies are mainly focused on facial expression classifications and speech recognition and not much attention has been paid until recently to physiological pattern recognition. In this paper, an integrative approach is proposed to emotional interaction by fusing multi-modal signals. Subjects are exposed to pictures selected from the International Affective Pic...

  11. The importance of open source information and satellite imagery analysis in safeguards implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    retrieval technologies will remain at the core, but will need to be augmented with more advanced, conceptual approaches in data-mining. (author)

  12. Some developments in safeguards techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

  13. Advancing Partnerships Towards an Integrated Approach to Oil Spill Response

    Science.gov (United States)

    Green, D. S.; Stough, T.; Gallegos, S. C.; Leifer, I.; Murray, J. J.; Streett, D.

    2015-12-01

    Oil spills can cause enormous ecological and economic devastation, necessitating application of the best science and technology available, and remote sensing is playing a growing critical role in the detection and monitoring of oil spills, as well as facilitating validation of remote sensing oil spill products. The FOSTERRS (Federal Oil Science Team for Emergency Response Remote Sensing) interagency working group seeks to ensure that during an oil spill, remote sensing assets (satellite/aircraft/instruments) and analysis techniques are quickly, effectively, appropriately, and seamlessly available to oil spills responders. Yet significant challenges remain for addressing oils spanning a vast range of chemical properties that may be spilled from the Tropics to the Arctic, with algorithms and scientific understanding needing advances to keep up with technology. Thus, FOSTERRS promotes enabling scientific discovery to ensure robust utilization of available technology as well as identifying technologies moving up the TRL (Technology Readiness Level). A recent FOSTERRS facilitated support activity involved deployment of the AVIRIS NG (Airborne Visual Infrared Imaging Spectrometer- Next Generation) during the Santa Barbara Oil Spill to validate the potential of airborne hyperspectral imaging to real-time map beach tar coverage including surface validation data. Many developing airborne technologies have potential to transition to space-based platforms providing global readiness.

  14. Advanced Modular Power Approach to Affordable, Supportable Space Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Oeftering, Richard C.; Kimnach, Greg L.; Fincannon, James; Mckissock,, Barbara I.; Loyselle, Patricia L.; Wong, Edmond

    2013-01-01

    Recent studies of missions to the Moon, Mars and Near Earth Asteroids (NEA) indicate that these missions often involve several distinct separately launched vehicles that must ultimately be integrated together in-flight and operate as one unit. Therefore, it is important to see these vehicles as elements of a larger segmented spacecraft rather than separate spacecraft flying in formation. The evolution of large multi-vehicle exploration architecture creates the need (and opportunity) to establish a global power architecture that is common across all vehicles. The Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Modular Power System (AMPS) project managed by NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) is aimed at establishing the modular power system architecture that will enable power systems to be built from a common set of modular building blocks. The project is developing, demonstrating and evaluating key modular power technologies that are expected to minimize non-recurring development costs, reduce recurring integration costs, as well as, mission operational and support costs. Further, modular power is expected to enhance mission flexibility, vehicle reliability, scalability and overall mission supportability. The AMPS project not only supports multi-vehicle architectures but should enable multi-mission capability as well. The AMPS technology development involves near term demonstrations involving developmental prototype vehicles and field demonstrations. These operational demonstrations not only serve as a means of evaluating modular technology but also provide feedback to developers that assure that they progress toward truly flexible and operationally supportable modular power architecture.

  15. Advances in a Distributed Approach for Ocean Model Data Interoperability

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Richard P. Signell

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available An infrastructure for earth science data is emerging across the globe based on common data models and web services. As we evolve from custom file formats and web sites to standards-based web services and tools, data is becoming easier to distribute, find and retrieve, leaving more time for science. We describe recent advances that make it easier for ocean model providers to share their data, and for users to search, access, analyze and visualize ocean data using MATLAB® and Python®. These include a technique for modelers to create aggregated, Climate and Forecast (CF metadata convention datasets from collections of non-standard Network Common Data Form (NetCDF output files, the capability to remotely access data from CF-1.6-compliant NetCDF files using the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC Sensor Observation Service (SOS, a metadata standard for unstructured grid model output (UGRID, and tools that utilize both CF and UGRID standards to allow interoperable data search, browse and access. We use examples from the U.S. Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS® Coastal and Ocean Modeling Testbed, a project in which modelers using both structured and unstructured grid model output needed to share their results, to compare their results with other models, and to compare models with observed data. The same techniques used here for ocean modeling output can be applied to atmospheric and climate model output, remote sensing data, digital terrain and bathymetric data.

  16. Advances in a distributed approach for ocean model data interoperability

    Science.gov (United States)

    Signell, Richard P.; Snowden, Derrick P.

    2014-01-01

    An infrastructure for earth science data is emerging across the globe based on common data models and web services. As we evolve from custom file formats and web sites to standards-based web services and tools, data is becoming easier to distribute, find and retrieve, leaving more time for science. We describe recent advances that make it easier for ocean model providers to share their data, and for users to search, access, analyze and visualize ocean data using MATLAB® and Python®. These include a technique for modelers to create aggregated, Climate and Forecast (CF) metadata convention datasets from collections of non-standard Network Common Data Form (NetCDF) output files, the capability to remotely access data from CF-1.6-compliant NetCDF files using the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) Sensor Observation Service (SOS), a metadata standard for unstructured grid model output (UGRID), and tools that utilize both CF and UGRID standards to allow interoperable data search, browse and access. We use examples from the U.S. Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS®) Coastal and Ocean Modeling Testbed, a project in which modelers using both structured and unstructured grid model output needed to share their results, to compare their results with other models, and to compare models with observed data. The same techniques used here for ocean modeling output can be applied to atmospheric and climate model output, remote sensing data, digital terrain and bathymetric data.

  17. Data analysis of asymmetric structures advanced approaches in computational statistics

    CERN Document Server

    Saito, Takayuki

    2004-01-01

    Data Analysis of Asymmetric Structures provides a comprehensive presentation of a variety of models and theories for the analysis of asymmetry and its applications and provides a wealth of new approaches in every section. It meets both the practical and theoretical needs of research professionals across a wide range of disciplines and  considers data analysis in fields such as psychology, sociology, social science, ecology, and marketing. In seven comprehensive chapters this guide details theories, methods, and models for the analysis of asymmetric structures in a variety of disciplines and presents future opportunities and challenges affecting research developments and business applications.

  18. Advances in Assays and Analytical Approaches for Botulinum Toxin Detection

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grate, Jay W.; Ozanich, Richard M.; Warner, Marvin G.; Bruckner-Lea, Cindy J.; Marks, James D.

    2010-08-04

    Methods to detect botulinum toxin, the most poisonous substance known, are reviewed. Current assays are being developed with two main objectives in mind: 1) to obtain sufficiently low detection limits to replace the mouse bioassay with an in vitro assay, and 2) to develop rapid assays for screening purposes that are as sensitive as possible while requiring an hour or less to process the sample an obtain the result. This review emphasizes the diverse analytical approaches and devices that have been developed over the last decade, while also briefly reviewing representative older immunoassays to provide background and context.

  19. System design and evaluation for national safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper presents a structure of the safeguards problem that brings into context various aspects of the objective and scope of a national safeguards system. The ''societal risk'' approach is used to develop a comprehensive rationale for safeguards design and evaluation, the continuing systematic assessment of the safeguards system, and the allocation of safeguards resources. Within the objective of achieving or maintaining an acceptable level of risk, a nation can utilize this structure to design and implement a comprehensive and cost-effectve safeguards system. The combination of protective mechanisms which provides the desired degree of protection at minimum cost will depend on the total set of mechanisms legally, culturally, and technically available to a particular nation and on that nation's definition of the threat and consequences associated with the wilful misuse of nuclear material. While the basic elements of the problem and the broad internal concerns remain much the same from nation to nation, it should not be expected that the cost-effective solution matching appropriate protective mechanisms to all feasible adversary actions will be the same. Information on the effectiveness of the protective mechanisms with respect to each sub-objective and each part of the necessary action sequence will enable a balanced application of resources appropriate to the national circumstances. (author)

  20. Technology transfer - insider protection workshop (Safeguards Evaluation Method - Insider Threat)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Safeguards Evaluation Method - Insider Threat, developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, is a field-applicable tool to evaluate facility safeguards against theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM) by nonviolent insiders. To ensure successful transfer of this technology from the laboratory to DOE field offices and contractors, LLNL developed a three-part package. The package includes a workbook, user-friendly microcomputer software, and a three-day training program. The workbook guides an evaluation team through the Safeguards Evaluation Method and provides forms for gathering data. The microcomputer software assists in the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness. The software is designed for safeguards analysts with no previous computer experience. It runs on an IBM Personal Computer or any compatible machine. The three-day training program is called the Insider Protection Workshop. The workshop students learn how to use the workbook and the computer software to assess insider vulnerabilities and to evaluate the benefits and costs of potential improvements. These activities increase the students' appreciation of the insider threat. The workshop format is informal and interactive, employing four different instruction modes: classroom presentations, small-group sessions, a practical exercise, and ''hands-on'' analysis using microcomputers. This approach to technology transfer has been successful: over 100 safeguards planners and analysts have been trained in the method, and it is being used at facilities through the DOE complex

  1. Implementing IAEA safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The commercial scale light water reactor spent fuel reprocessing plant under construction at Rokkasho-mura, Japan, represents the largest and most complex nuclear installation submitted to IAEA safeguards to date. Safeguards discussions have been under way for several years already and, while construction has yet to begin on the main process buildings, the general features of the safeguards approach for this nuclear installation have essentially been agreed. Owing to the amounts of plutonium and uranium anticipated, and the need to minimize verification costs, several features will be emphasized which are either new or represent a significant extension beyond current practice. These include real time acquisition of verification data through installed instruments and a dedicated verification local area network; extensive use of unattended verification systems; extensive computer capabilities for on-site evaluation of verification data; and an on-site analytical laboratory. Resident inspector arrangements are under examination as a means to minimize the number of inspectors required to carry out the verification activities. The IAEA Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited Project has been established within the IAEA Department of Safeguards to oversee all activities required for the implementation of IAEA safeguards; it is anticipated that this project will remain active until normal operations commence. This paper describes the project and the provisions foreseen at present for the implementation of IAEA safeguards at this plant. (author). 7 refs

  2. Advanced welding for closed structure. Pt. 2 The ultrasonic approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sacripanti, A.; Paoloni, M.; Sagratella, G. [ENEA Centro Ricerche Casaccia, Rome (Italy). Dipt. Innovazione

    1999-07-01

    This report describes the activities developed for the European Contract BRITE AWCS III to study the use of ultrasonic sensing techniques to obtain an accurate detection of the internal reinforcement of the closed steel structures employed in the shipbuilding industry. After a description of the methods, techniques and problems for the ultrasonic testing of materials in the conventional approach, a new method of the multiple reflection-absorption is introduced with their experimental tests and results. The obtained conclusion shows that the ultrasonic non destructive testing techniques in the new approach should be useful to assemble a complete sensing system with two receivers, one thermal and one ultrasonic. [Italian] Questo rapporto descrive le attivita' sperimentali sviluppate nell'ambito del contratto europeo BRITE AWCS III, in cui si sono utilizzate tecniche ultrasoniche per ottenere un preciso rilevamento dei rinforzi interni di strutture metalliche chiuse utilizzate nell'industria delle costruzioni navali. Dopo la descrizione dei metodi, delle tecniche e dei problemi riguardanti il testing ultrasonico dei materiali, e' stato introdotto un approccio innovativo basato sul metodo dell'assorbimento delle riflessioni multiple con i risultati sperimentali. Le conclusioni ottenute mostrano che nel nuovo approccio, il testing ultrasonico non distruttivo dovrebbe essere utile per assemblare un sistema sensoriale con due sensori, uno di tipo termico, uno di tipo ultrasonico.

  3. IAEA safeguards: Challenges and opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The history of the IAEA safeguards regime is described. New challenges and opportunities are discussed in connection with the discovery in Iraq of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme, the difficulties experienced in the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Argentina, Brazil and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, recent developments in South Africa, the emergence of newly independent States that made up the former USSR. 2 figs

  4. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Safeguards Summary Event List provides brief summaries of hundreds of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Events are described under the categories: Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing/Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms-related, Radiological Sabotage, Non-radiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. Because of the public interest, the Miscellaneous category also includes events reported involving source material, byproduct material, and natural uranium, which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Information in the event descriptions was obtained from official NRC sources

  5. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, also included are events reported involving byproduct material which is exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, alcohol and drugs, and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  6. Advances in nuclear instrumentation for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper describes detectors, instrumentation, and analytical methods under development to address the above issues. The authors will describe work underway on room-temperature semiconductors including attempts to model the response of these detectors to improve spectrum analysis procedures and detector design. Computerized tomography is used in many medical and industrial applications; they are developing both gamma-ray and neutron tomography for improved measurements of waste and direct-use materials. Modern electronics and scintillation detectors should permit the development of fast neutron coincidence detectors with dramatically improved signal-to-noise ratios. For active measurements, they are studying several improved neutron sources, including a high-fluence, plasma-based, d-t generator. New analysis tools from information theory may permit one to better combine data from different measurement systems. This paper attempts to briefly describe a range of new sensors, electronics, and data analysis methods under study at Los Alamos and other laboratories to promote discussion of promising technology that they may bring to bear on these important global issues

  7. Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs

  8. Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, A.

    1997-12-31

    The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs.

  9. Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. Integration is approached by coordinating all safeguards information through a safeguards coordination center. This center represents a higher level in a communication, data-processing, and decision-making structure which is needed for efficient real-time operation of the integrated system. The safeguards coordination center functions to assess alarm and warning data required to resolve threats in the safeguards system, coordinate information and interaction involving the material accounting, physical protection, and facility monitoring and control systems, and present a single unified interface for interaction with facility management, facility operations, safeguards system personnel, and response forces

  10. Unattended safeguards instrumentation at centrifuge enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As global uranium enrichment capacity under international safeguards expands, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants, particularly high‑capacity plants, while working within budgetary constraints. New safeguards approaches should meet the high‑level verification objectives for such facilities (i.e., timely detection of: diversion of declared material, excess production beyond declared amounts, and production of enrichment levels higher than declared), but should also strive for efficiency advantages in implementation, for both the IAEA and operators. Under the Agency’s State- level approach to safeguards implementation, the Agency needs a flexible toolbox of technologies, allowing tailoring of safeguards measures for each individual enrichment facility. In this paper, the potential roles and development status for three different types of unattended measurement instrumentation are discussed. On‑Line Enrichment Monitors (OLEM) could provide continuous enrichment measurement for 100% of the declared gas flowing through unit header pipes. Unattended Cylinder Verification Stations (UCVS) could provide unattended verification of the declared uranium mass and enrichment of 100% of the cylinders moving through the plant, but also apply and verify an ‘NDA Fingerprint’ to preserve verification knowledge on the contents of each cylinder throughout its life in the facility. Sharing of the operator’s load cell signals from feed and withdrawal stations could count all cylinders introduced to the process and provide periodic monitoring of the uranium mass balance for in‑process material. The integration of load cell, OLEM and UCVS data streams offers the possibility for 100% verification of declared cylinder flow, and enables the periodic verification of the declared 235U mass balance in the plant. These new capabilities would enhance the IAEA’s effectiveness

  11. An evolutionary approach to advanced water cooled reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Based on the result of the Feasibility Study undertaken since 1991, Indonesia may enter in the new nuclear era by introduction of several Nuclear Power Plants in our energy supply system. Requirements for the future NPP's are developed in two step approach. First step is for the immediate future that is the next 50 years where the system will be dominated by A-LWR's/A-PHWR's and the second step is for the time period beyond 50 years in which new reactor systems may start to dominate. The integral reactor concept provides a revolutionary improvements in terms of conceptual and safety. However, it creates a new set of complex machinery and operational problems of its own. The paper concerns with a brief description of nuclear technology status in Indonesia and a qualitative assessment of integral reactor concept. (author)

  12. Advanced welding for closed structure. Pt. 1 The magnetic approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sacripanti, A.; Paoloni, M.; Sagratella, G. [ENEA Centro Ricerche Casaccia, Rome (Italy). Dipt. Innovazione

    1999-07-01

    This report describes the activities developed for the European Contract BRITE AWCS III to study the use of magnetic sensing techniques to obtain an accurate detection of the internal reinforcement of the closed steel structures employed in the shipbuilding industry. After a description of the methods, techniques and problems for the magnetic testing of materials in the conventional approach, a new method was tried to obtain the wanted results. The obtained conclusion shows that the magnetic non destructive testing approach produce very small effects to measure, are too much sensible to the anisotropy of the magnetic properties of the steel plates and to the quality of the contact with the reinforcement. This system is not flexible enough to assemble a sensing for the goal of the BRITE AWCS III. [Italian] Questo rapporto descrive le attivita' sperimentali sviluppate nell'ambito del contratto europeo BRITE AWCS III, in cui si sono utilizzate tecniche magnetiche per ottenere un preciso rilevamento dei rinforzi interni di strutture metalliche chiuse utilizzate nell'industria delle costruzioni navali. Dopo la descrizione dei metodi, delle tecniche e dei problemi riguardanti il testing magnetico dei materiali, e' stato introdotto un approccio innovativo basato su elettromagneti costruiti ad hoc. Le conclusioni ottenute mostrano che nel nuovo approccio, il testing magnetico non distruttivo produce perturbazioni troppo piccole per essere correttamente apprezzate, risulta inoltre troppo legato alle anisotropie ed alla qualita' del contatto tra piatto e web ed infine esso appare poco flessibile per soddisfare le richieste tecniche del BRITE AWCS III.

  13. Planning of Medium- and Long-Term Strategy for the Safeguards Technology Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In Rep. of Korea, active safeguards technology development suitable to phase of a nuclear advanced country is necessary because of below reasons. First reasons are '6th ranked position in the nuclear energy generation all over the world', 'continuously increased outcomes in the various nuclear fields such as research or patent', 'strengthened intention of the new government for nuclear industries', and 'weakness of the R and D foundation related to the safeguards technology'. Second reasons are optimization necessity of the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards according to enlargement of the SSAC (State Systems of Accounting for and Control) role. The reason of the enlargement of the SSAC is IAEA IS (Integrated Safeguards) application for Korea. Third reasons are necessity for the systematic national development plan considering the Korea R and D level and the degree of the difficulty of technology. This is to say, there is necessity of the system construction of safeguards technology development connected to the NuTRM(Nuclear Technology Road Map), integrated national nuclear energy promotion plans because of necessity for concentration of the technology level and development abilities which are spread in the industry fields, the academic world and research fields. So, in this study, the foundation of the advanced safeguards technology is provided through determining the priority of the individual technology of National Safeguards, establishing development strategy for the middle or long term of Safeguards technology, based on domestic and foreign status

  14. Secure data communication for safeguards implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Secure, reliable and cost-effective communications are becoming an increasingly important tool for safeguards verification. This trend began with the initiation of remote monitoring implementation, where secure and cost effective data communications were required both to satisfy the confidentiality requirements of Member States and in order to meet the rigorous data authenticity requirements which allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to draw credible and independent conclusions. In addition, the implementation of additional protocols and integrated safeguards increases the importance of information (obtained in the course of an inspection, visit, complementary access or design information verification) being analyzed and corroborated with other information sources stored at IAEA Headquarters or Regional Offices, often while the inspector is still on-site. This requires the capability of enabling the inspector, wherever he is in the field, to communicate with the IAEA data network via secure voice, video or data communications. The data network should allow the inspector firstly to 'push' information to Headquarters, thereby providing Agency managers with the ability to evaluate data in close to real time, and secondly to 'pull' information from IAEA databases for further evaluation in the field. In order to improve the IAEA's present capabilities in the area of secure data communications, in 2005 the Department of Safeguards initiated cooperation with the European Space Agency (ESA) on secure satellite communications. Within the framework of this cooperation, as well as testing the ESA provided satellite terminal at IAEA Headquarters and in a nuclear facility, two feasibility studies were carried out to address the viability of end-to-end communications services based on existing in-orbit and on-ground infrastructures (short term) and also the potential deployment of advanced satellite communications based services in line with the

  15. Advanced Urothelial Carcinoma: Overcoming treatment resistance through novel treatment approaches

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    RichardMBambury

    2013-02-01

    Full Text Available The current standard of care for metastatic urothelial carcinoma (UC is cisplatin-based chemotherapy but treatment is generally not curative. Mechanisms of resistance to conventional cytotoxic regimens include tumor cell drug efflux pumps, intracellular anti-oxidants and enhanced anti-apoptotic signaling. Blockade of signaling pathways with small molecule tyrosine kinase inhibitors has produced dramatic responses in subsets of other cancers. Multiple potential signaling pathway targets are altered in UC. Blockade of the PI3K/Akt/mTOR pathway may prove efficacious because 21% have activating PI3K mutations and another 30% have PTEN inactivation (which leads to activation of this pathway. The fibroblast growth factor receptor 3 protein may be overactive in 50-60% and agents which block this pathway are under active development. Blockade of multiple other pathways including HER2 and aurora kinase also have potential efficacy. Anti-angiogenic and immunotherapy strategies are also under development in UC and are discussed in this review. Novel therapeutic approaches are needed in UC. We review the various strategies under development in this disease and discuss how best to evaluate and optimize their efficacy.

  16. Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The book contains contributed papers from various authors on the following subjects: Safeguards systems and implementation, Measurement techniques: general, Measurement techniques: destructive analysis, Measurement techniques: non-destructive assay, Containment and surveillance, Spent fuel strategies, Material accounting and data evaluation

  17. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the first phase of R and D program conducted from 1997 to 1999, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. For the nuclear material measurement system, the performance test was finished and received IAEA approval, and now is being used in DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility(DFDF) for nuclear material accounting and control. Other systems being developed in this study were already installed in DFDF and being under performance test. Those systems developed in this study will make a contribution not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author)

  18. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, H. D.; Ko, W. I.; Song, D. Y. [and others

    2000-03-01

    During the first phase of R and D program conducted from 1997 to 1999, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. For the nuclear material measurement system, the performance test was finished and received IAEA approval, and now is being used in DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility(DFDF) for nuclear material accounting and control. Other systems being developed in this study were already installed in DFDF and being under performance test. Those systems developed in this study will make a contribution not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author)

  19. Advanced welding for closed structure. Pt. 3 The thermal approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sacripanti, A.; Bonanno, G.; Paoloni, M.; Sagratella, G. [ENEA Centro Ricerche Casaccia, Rome (Italy). Dipt. Innovazione; Arborino, A.; Varesi, R.; Antonucci, A. [DUNE, (Italy)

    1999-07-01

    This report describes the activities developed for the European Contract BRITE AWCS III to study the use of thermal sensing techniques to obtain an accurate detection of the internal reinforcement of the closed steel structures employed in the shipbuilding industry. After a description of the methods, normally developed in Russia, about the techniques and problems, for the thermal testing of materials in the conventional approach, a new thermal detector was utilized, a new bolometric thermo camera is introduced with a special software for the on line image analysis, there are also shown the experimental tests and results. The obtained conclusion shows that the thermal non destructive testing techniques with the new detector should be useful to assemble a complete sensing system with one ultrasonic head. [Italian] Questo rapporto descrive le attivita' sperimentali sviluppate nell'ambito del contratto europeo BRITE AWCS III, in cui si sono utilizzate tecniche termiche per ottenere un preciso rilevamento dei rinforzi interni di strutture metalliche chiuse utilizzate nell'industria delle costruzioni navali. Dopo la descrizione dei metodi sviluppati essenzialmente in Russia, circa le tecniche e i problemi riguardanti il testing termico dei materiali, e' stato introdotto un approccio innovativo basato su un nuovo sensore: una termocamera bolometrica connessa con un software dedicato per l'analisi online del setto; vengono inoltre mostrati i risultati sperimentali ottenuti. Le conclusioni ottenute mostrano che nel nuovo approccio, il testing termico non distruttivo dovrebbe essere utile per assemblare un sistema sensoriale completo che utilizzi anche un sensore di tipo ultrasonico.

  20. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  1. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  2. Reactor safeguards against insider sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A conceptual safeguards system is structured to show how both reactor operations and physical protection resources could be integrated to prevent release of radioactive material caused by insider sabotage. Operational recovery capabilities are addressed from the viewpoint of both detection of and response to disabled components. Physical protection capabilities for preventing insider sabotage through the application of work rules are analyzed. Recommendations for further development of safeguards system structures, operational recovery, and sabotage prevention are suggested

  3. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  4. Reactor safeguards against insider sabotage

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bennett, H.A.

    1982-03-01

    A conceptual safeguards system is structured to show how both reactor operations and physical protection resources could be integrated to prevent release of radioactive material caused by insider sabotage. Operational recovery capabilities are addressed from the viewpoint of both detection of and response to disabled components. Physical protection capabilities for preventing insider sabotage through the application of work rules are analyzed. Recommendations for further development of safeguards system structures, operational recovery, and sabotage prevention are suggested.

  5. CIPSS [computer-integrated process and safeguards system]: The integration of computer-integrated manufacturing and robotics with safeguards, security, and process operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This poster session describes the computer-integrated process and safeguards system (CIPSS). The CIPSS combines systems developed for factory automation and automated mechanical functions (robots) with varying degrees of intelligence (expert systems) to create an integrated system that would satisfy current and emerging security and safeguards requirements. Specifically, CIPSS is an extension of the automated physical security functions concepts. The CIPSS also incorporates the concepts of computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) with integrated safeguards concepts, and draws upon the Defense Advance Research Project Agency's (DARPA's) strategic computing program

  6. Safeguards information handling and treatment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Many states are currently discussing the new additional protocol (INFCIRC/540). This expanded framework is expected to establish the additional confirmation that there are no undeclared activities and facilities in that state. The information collected by the IAEA mainly comes from three different sources: information either provided by the state, collected by the IAEA, and from open sources. This information can be uncertain, incomplete, imprecise, not fully reliable, contradictory, etc. Hence, there is a need for a mathematical framework that provides a basis for handling and treatment of multidimensional information of varying quality. We use a linguistic assessment based on fuzzy set theory, as a flexible and realistic approach. The concept of a linguistic variable serves the purpose of providing a means of approximated characterization of information that may be imprecise, too complex or ill-defined, for which the traditional quantitative approach does not give an adequate answer. In the application of this linguistic assessment approach, a problem arises on how to aggregate linguistic information. Two different approaches can be followed: (1) approximation approach using the associated membership function; (2) symbolic approach acting by the direct computation on labels, where the use of membership function and the linguistic approximation is unnecessary, which makes computation simple and quick. To manipulate the linguistic information in this context, we work with aggregation operators for combining the linguistic non-weighted and weighted values by direct computation on labels, like the Min-type and Max-type weighted aggregation operators as well as the median aggregation operator. A case study on the application of these aggregation operators to the fusion of safeguards relevant information is given. The IAEA Physical Model of the nuclear fuel cycle can be taken as a systematic and comprehensive indicator system. It identifies and describes indicators of

  7. Safeguardability of a commercial-scaled ACP facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ko, Won Il; Lee, S. Y.; Kim, H. D.; Ha, J. H.; Song, D. Y.; Lee, T. H

    2004-07-01

    The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. This report documents a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP. The sub-processes and material flow of the pilot scale ACP facility were designed for this study. Then, their Material Balance Areas (MBA) and Key Measurement Point (KMP) were defined based on diversion scenario analysis. Finally, the limit of error in the MUF value was estimated using international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods. Based on the results of preliminary study, we concluded that the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility.

  8. Safeguardability of a commercial-scaled ACP facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. This report documents a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP. The sub-processes and material flow of the pilot scale ACP facility were designed for this study. Then, their Material Balance Areas (MBA) and Key Measurement Point (KMP) were defined based on diversion scenario analysis. Finally, the limit of error in the MUF value was estimated using international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods. Based on the results of preliminary study, we concluded that the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility

  9. Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant: Moving from safeguards project to safeguards operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), which is currently in the process of active commissioning, is scheduled to begin commercial operation in the fall of 2007. The planned operating throughput of the plant is 800t of uranium in irradiated light water reactor (LWR) fuel per year. This corresponds to approximately 8 tons of plutonium per year. The plant is designed to separate the LWR fuel and produce mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) powder for future processing to reactor fuel, uranium oxide and vitrified waste. RRP has been an active IAEA task since the early 1990s and is currently transitioning from a safeguards project to a safeguarded facility. The development and implementation of safeguards at RRP represents one of the largest safeguards endeavors not only in terms of nuclear material under safeguards but also in terms of costs for equipment development, procurement and installation, and human resource requirements. The IAEA has been conducting routine inspections at RRP since the first spent fuel assemblies were received by the facility in 1998. However, when the first LWR assemblies were introduced into the process in March of 2006 the IAEA implemented a regime of continuous inspections during operations. This inspector presence ensures that adequate safeguards are applied to the material, provides support the installation, testing and validation of safeguards equipment, and facilitates development/modification of the procedures necessary for day-to-day operations. The startup of the Rokkasho facility has been a stepwise process. Each time the nuclear material reaches a new stage in the process we are confronted with new challenges. Currently the plutonium and uranium separation and purification systems are being tested and most of the nuclear material remains in solution. The next phase will be to test the MOX production processes and associated safeguards equipment. This task of implementing safeguards and installing, adjusting and

  10. Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant: Moving from safeguards project to safeguards operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), which is currently in the process of active commissioning, is scheduled to begin commercial operation in the fall of 2007. The planned operating throughput of the plant is 800t U/y in irradiated light water reactor (LWR) fuel. This corresponds to approximately 8t Pu/y. The plant is designed to separate the LWR fuel and produce plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (MOX) powder for future processing to reactor fuel, uranium oxide and vitrified waste. The RRP has been an active IAEA task since the early 1990s and is currently transitioning from a safeguards project to a safeguarded facility. The development and implementation of safeguards at the RRP represents one of the largest safeguards endeavours not only in terms of nuclear material under safeguards but also in terms of costs for equipment development, procurement, installation and human resource requirements. The IAEA has been conducting routine inspections at the RRP since the first spent fuel assemblies were received by the facility in 1998. However, when the first LWR assemblies were introduced into the process in March 2006 the IAEA implemented a regime of continuous inspections during operations. This inspector presence ensures that adequate safeguards are applied to the material, provides support for the installation, testing and validation of safeguards equipment, and facilitates development/modification of the procedures necessary for day-to-day operations. The start-up of the RRP facility has been a stepwise process. Each time the nuclear material reaches a new stage in the process the IAEA is confronted with new challenges. Currently, the plutonium and uranium separation and purification systems are being tested and most of the nuclear material remains in solution. The next phase will be to test the MOX production processes and associated safeguards equipment. This tasks of implementing safeguards and installing, adjusting and evaluating the safeguards equipment and

  11. Liposuction for Advanced Lymphedema: A Multidisciplinary Approach for Complete Reduction of Arm and Leg Swelling

    OpenAIRE

    Boyages, John; Kastanias, Katrina; Koelmeyer, Louise A.; Winch, Caleb J.; Lam, Thomas C.; Sherman, Kerry A.; Munnoch, David Alex; Brorson, Håkan; Ngo, Quan D.; Heydon-White, Asha; Magnussen, John S.; Mackie, Helen

    2015-01-01

    Purpose This research describes and evaluates a liposuction surgery and multidisciplinary rehabilitation approach for advanced lymphedema of the upper and lower extremities. Methods A prospective clinical study was conducted at an Advanced Lymphedema Assessment Clinic (ALAC) comprised of specialists in plastic surgery, rehabilitation, imaging, oncology, and allied health, at Macquarie University, Australia. Between May 2012 and 31 May 2014, a total of 104 patients attended the ALAC. Eligibili...

  12. Design approach to the development of an advanced HANARO research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Based on the experiences of the HANARO construction and operation, a project to design an advanced research reactor was launched in 2003 to prepare for the future needs of a research reactor. Many improvements identified during the HANARO operation and utilization will be incorporated into the design of the advanced research reactor. This paper deals with the basic principles of the design approach and the preliminary design features of the reactor under study

  13. Safeguards-by-Design: An Element of 3S Integration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 2008, the '20/20 Vision for the Future' background report by the IAEA Director General identified the possibility of integrating certain activities related to safeguards, safety, and security. Later in the year, the independent Commission report prepared at the request of the IAEA Director General noted that the Agency's's roles in nuclear safeguards, safety, and security (3S) complement and can mutually reinforce each other. Safeguards-by-design (SBD) is a practical measure that strengthens 3S integration, especially for the stage of nuclear facility design and construction, but also with ramifications for other stages of the facility life-cycle. This paper describes the SBD concept, with examples for diverse regulatory environments, being developed in the U.S under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. This is compared with related international SBD work performed in the recent IAEA workshop on 'Facility Design and Plant Operation Features that Facilitate the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards'. Potential future directions for further development of SBD and its integration within 3S are identified.

  14. Safeguards information challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of this paper is to provide the background and broader vision in which the various presentations and posters on information related matters, prepared by staff of the Department of Safeguards, find their place, exploring solutions to the challenges faced. At a time when the IAEA is expected to be a reference for the assessment of nuclear proliferation issues, it faces major challenges with regard to the information needed to provide the international community with independent, impartial, timely and soundly based conclusions regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in States. The drawing of such conclusions assumes that all relevant information is accessible and has been put in the relevant context. Unfortunately, because of legal constraints under which it operates, or because of limitations on resources available for collecting existing but difficult to reach facts, or simply because of the overwhelming aspect of the information needed to properly evaluate proliferation issues, the IAEA needs to enhance the way it collects, processes, analyses, evaluates and disseminates safeguards relevant information. The search for better, broader and deeper information through dedicated collection means is an ongoing effort aimed at filling the gaps that constrain the development of the coherent picture that analysts need to be comfortable with the results of complex analyses. Implementation of well-selected information collection tools is sine qua non for effective IAEA verification capabilities. Beyond collection, the establishment of a proper information architecture and documented business processes is a prerequisite for ensuring that the available information is accessible to those with a need to know. At the same time, information must be sufficiently protected by appropriate security measures, particularly when hacking has become an intellectual sport and institutional security

  15. Proliferation resistance and safeguardability of innovative nuclear fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    material for diversion, and the processes required to convert diverted material into a weapons-usable form. There are also intrinsic technical elements of nuclear facilities and equipment that serve to make it difficult to gain access to materials, or to misuse facilities to obtain weapons-usable materials. The extent to which facilities, equipment and processes are resistant to the production of weapons-usable materials represents an important barrier to proliferation, independent from institutional barriers. Innovative nuclear fuel cycles should be Non-proliferating, Economic, Waste-minimised, and Safe (NEWS fuel cycles) and these will form the basis of the so-called Generation IV systems for energy production. Inter alia these concepts should seek to reduce the strategic value of materials involved and to minimise the opportunities for an undetected diversion. The reactors will include advanced light water reactors, high temperature gas-cooled reactors, liquid metal and gas-cooled fast reactors, and possibly molten salt and accelerator driven systems. For most of these reactor concepts, known safeguards approaches (classical approaches and integrated approaches that are being currently developed) will be directly applicable. However, we believe, there will also be some new safeguard-related aspects that will arise with the introduction of these new reactor/fuel cycles. In this paper we describe some of these new issues related to proliferation resistant fuel cycles, in particular: Alternative nuclear materials, including the partitioning and transmutation of minor actinides; Accelerator driven systems; Plutonium recycle without traditional reprocessing; Thorium fuel cycle; Plutonium burners using non-fertile plutonium alloy fuel; Plutonium recycle in the longer term in advanced LWRs; Pyro-metallurgical reprocessing; Small reactors deliverable in pre-assembled and pre-fuelled form, and focus our attention on the safeguardability of the proposed concepts, and to what

  16. Extensive cooperation in establishment and installation of safeguards system at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rokkasho reprocessing plant (RRP) has an operating throughput of 800tU/y and the construction had completed. In RRP, active commissioning test is being performed for final confirmation of the system and validation, and the commercial operation is scheduled in second half of 2007. The IAEA has been implementing international safeguards to reprocessing plants around the world for more than 30 years, and also Japan has applied the safeguards to Tokai Reprocessing Plant about almost 30 years experienced. However, it has never before been experienced with designing a credible safeguards approach for a large scale reprocessing plant. The safeguards discussion was initiated in 1988, but that time no available any model or guideline that could be used as a reference. Therefore, during the period of 1988 through 1992, a multinational forum, referred to as LASCAR (Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards) provided recommendations that how an effective safeguards approach could be implemented to the large scale plant with maintaining an efficient use of resources. In order for establishment and implement an effective, efficient and credible safeguards for RRP, IAEA, State and JNFL has studied and discussed the safeguards approach and safeguards system under extensive cooperation manner. This paper presents the following especially from the operator's viewpoint: - Overview of the safeguards system at RRP. - Joint use of equipment dedicated to the safeguards between IAEA and State. - Use of operator's equipment for the inspections. - Providing timely analytical results by Onsite Laboratory (OSL) with Automatic Sampling Authentication System. - Implementing Design Information Examination (DIE) and Design Information Verification (DIV) during construction stage

  17. (Opening) instrument development for meeting future safeguards goals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full-text: Since the establishment of the IAEA in 1957, instruments supporting safeguards implementation have played an increasingly important role in the IAEA's ability to meet its objectives. The introduction of installed equipment systems has further increased the IAEA's effectiveness and efficiency by reducing on-site inspection effort, while providing continuity of knowledge between less-frequent inspection visits. Safeguards equipment requirements have reflected the evolutionary changes that have followed from changes to inspection approaches, new nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) processes, and challenges to the international verification regime, including those resulting from the 1991 Gulf War and more recent attempts by a few State's to acquire the technology, through indigenous sources or clandestine supply networks, necessary for a nuclear weapons capability. However, with continuing development of alternative processes within the NFC and the acceleration of States' plans to install nuclear power programmes, the IAEA faces a widening gap between increasing numbers and types of safeguarded facilities and the resources available to it to carry out its mandate. As a consequence, further efficiencies, new and novel approaches and increased effectiveness will be required 'to stay ahead of the game'. This paper will briefly review the history of safeguards equipment development and the evolutionary changes that have been implemented to meet the challenges the organization has faced over the past few decades. It will then explore possible future safeguards equipment developments based on various foreseen scenarios. (author)

  18. Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author)

  19. International nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    History can be a very dull subject if it relates to events which have long since lost their relevance. The factors which led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), however, are as important and relevant today as they were when the Agency was first created. Without understanding these factors it is impossible to realise how important the Agency is in the present world or to understand some of the controversies surrounding its future. Central to these controversies is the question of how best to promote the international transfer of nuclear technology without contributing further to the problem of proliferating nuclear explosives or explosive capabilities. One effective means is to subject nuclear materials (see accompanying article in box), which forms the basic link between the manufacture of nuclear explosives and nuclear power generation, to international safeguards. This was realized very early in the development of nuclear power and was given greater emphasis following the deployment of the first two atomic bombs towards the end of World War II. (author)

  20. Negotiating supranational rules - The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, Astrid

    1998-12-31

    The object of this thesis is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid 1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The evolution is traced not through the practical implementation of the safeguards system, but through the various multilateral negotiations through which it was created. The focus is on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective is to single out the factors determining the result. The discussion is organised into the following chapters: (1) The statute of the IAEA, (2) The IAEA 1961 safeguard document (INFCIRC/26), (3) The IAEA 1965 safeguards document (INFCIRC/66), (4) The non-proliferation treaty, (5) NPT safeguards. 92 refs.

  1. The European experience in safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Civil nuclear programs in the European Union member states have from their onset included fuel recycling as an option. The EURATOM Treaty gives to the European Commission the obligation to apply safeguards controls to all civil Nuclear Material in the European Union, and to facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards. The European Commission (EURATOM) has thus gained years of experience in safeguarding reprocessing plants, Pu storages, and MOX fuel fabrication plants and is currently participating in the development of approaches and measures for safeguarding long term repositories. The aim of this paper is to present the regulator's views and experience on safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores, which is based on the following principles: -) Early involvement of the control organizations in the design of the safeguards measures to be developed for a plant (currently referred to as Safeguards by Design); -) Early definition of a safeguards strategy including key measurement points; -) The design and development of plant specific Safeguards equipment, including an on site laboratory for sample analysis; -) The development by the operator of an appropriate Nuclear Material accountancy system to facilitate their declaration obligations; -) The introduction of an inspection regime allowing comprehensive controls under the restrictions imposed by financial and Human Resources limitations; -) Optimization of the inspection effort by using unattended measuring stations, containment and surveillance systems and secure remote transmission of data to the regulator's headquarters. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  2. Use of Antineutrino Detectors for Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Effectiveness Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bernstein, A; Lambert, H E; Elayat, H A; O' Connell, W J; Rexroth, P; Baldwin, G; Bowden, N; Huelskamp, R

    2006-06-05

    As described in an earlier article [1], important information regarding reactor power and the amount and type of fissile material in reactor cores can be determined by measuring the antineutrino rate and energy spectrum, using a cubic meter scale antineutrino detector at tens of meters standoff from the core. Current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards techniques do not provide such real-time quantitative information regarding core power levels and isotopic composition. The possible benefits of this approach are several and have been discussed in the earlier article. One key advantage is that the method gives the inspecting agency completely independent access to real-time information on the operational status and fissile content of the core. Furthermore, the unattended and non-intrusive nature of the technology may reduce the monitoring burden on the plant operator, even though more information is being provided than is available within the current IAEA safeguards regime. Here we present a detailed analytical framework for measuring the impact that such a detector might have on IAEA safeguards, if implemented. To perform the analysis, we will use initial data from our operating detector and a standard analysis technique for safeguards regimes, developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Because characterization of the prototype detector is still underway, and because improvements in the prototype could have important impact on safeguards performance, the results presented here should be understood to be preliminary, and not reflective of the ultimate performance of the system. The structure of this paper is as follows. Reactor safeguards and the relevant properties of antineutrino detectors are briefly reviewed. A set of hypothetical diversion scenarios are then described, and one of these is analyzed using the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Integrated Safeguards System Analysis Tool (LISSAT) The probability of successful

  3. Safeguards implementation in the nuclear fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1978-01-01

    Today's trend toward tightening regulations and increasingly stringent safeguards underscores the necessity for safeguards criteria to be incorporated at an early stage in the design of future fuel cycle facilities. IAEA and national safeguards systems are discussed. The U.S. Safeguards R and D program is described in some detail: reference facility (Barnwell) safeguards system design, dynamic materials accounting systems (DYMAC), etc. The safeguards problem of the conversion process (Pu nitrate to PuO/sub 2/) is considered. Recent developments and trends in measurement technology are reviewed. 79 references, 6 figures. (DLC)

  4. Percutaneous irreversible electroporation of locally advanced pancreatic carcinoma using the dorsal approach: a case report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Scheffer, Hester J; Melenhorst, Marleen C A M; Vogel, Jantien A; van Tilborg, Aukje A J M; Nielsen, Karin; Kazemier, Geert; Meijerink, Martijn R

    2015-06-01

    Irreversible electroporation (IRE) is a novel image-guided ablation technique that is increasingly used to treat locally advanced pancreatic carcinoma (LAPC). We describe a 67-year-old male patient with a 5 cm stage III pancreatic tumor who was referred for IRE. Because the ventral approach for electrode placement was considered dangerous due to vicinity of the tumor to collateral vessels and duodenum, the dorsal approach was chosen. Under CT-guidance, six electrodes were advanced in the tumor, approaching paravertebrally alongside the aorta and inferior vena cava. Ablation was performed without complications. This case describes that when ventral electrode placement for pancreatic IRE is impaired, the dorsal approach could be considered alternatively. PMID:25288173

  5. Percutaneous Irreversible Electroporation of Locally Advanced Pancreatic Carcinoma Using the Dorsal Approach: A Case Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Irreversible electroporation (IRE) is a novel image-guided ablation technique that is increasingly used to treat locally advanced pancreatic carcinoma (LAPC). We describe a 67-year-old male patient with a 5 cm stage III pancreatic tumor who was referred for IRE. Because the ventral approach for electrode placement was considered dangerous due to vicinity of the tumor to collateral vessels and duodenum, the dorsal approach was chosen. Under CT-guidance, six electrodes were advanced in the tumor, approaching paravertebrally alongside the aorta and inferior vena cava. Ablation was performed without complications. This case describes that when ventral electrode placement for pancreatic IRE is impaired, the dorsal approach could be considered alternatively

  6. Percutaneous Irreversible Electroporation of Locally Advanced Pancreatic Carcinoma Using the Dorsal Approach: A Case Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Scheffer, Hester J., E-mail: hj.scheffer@vumc.nl; Melenhorst, Marleen C. A. M., E-mail: m.melenhorst@vumc.nl [VU University Medical Center, Department of Radiology and Nuclear Medicine (Netherlands); Vogel, Jantien A., E-mail: j.a.vogel@amc.uva.nl [Academic Medical Center, Department of Surgery (Netherlands); Tilborg, Aukje A. J. M. van, E-mail: a.vantilborg@vumc.nl [VU University Medical Center, Department of Radiology and Nuclear Medicine (Netherlands); Nielsen, Karin, E-mail: k.nielsen@vumc.nl; Kazemier, Geert, E-mail: g.kazemier@vumc.nl [VU University Medical Center, Department of Surgery (Netherlands); Meijerink, Martijn R., E-mail: mr.meijerink@vumc.nl [VU University Medical Center, Department of Radiology and Nuclear Medicine (Netherlands)

    2015-06-15

    Irreversible electroporation (IRE) is a novel image-guided ablation technique that is increasingly used to treat locally advanced pancreatic carcinoma (LAPC). We describe a 67-year-old male patient with a 5 cm stage III pancreatic tumor who was referred for IRE. Because the ventral approach for electrode placement was considered dangerous due to vicinity of the tumor to collateral vessels and duodenum, the dorsal approach was chosen. Under CT-guidance, six electrodes were advanced in the tumor, approaching paravertebrally alongside the aorta and inferior vena cava. Ablation was performed without complications. This case describes that when ventral electrode placement for pancreatic IRE is impaired, the dorsal approach could be considered alternatively.

  7. Operationalizing social safeguards in REDD+: actors, interests and ideas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    “REDD+” is a mechanism created under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for Reducing {carbon} Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation and forest enhancement. In addition, REDD+ “safeguards” are intended to protect non-carbon forest values. While REDD+ countries are formally requested to provide information on safeguards, there is as yet no agreement on the relative priority of carbon versus non-carbon values, and the appropriate level of safeguard standardization. This, we argue, has allowed REDD+ to function as a “boundary object” spanning disparate priorities. Meanwhile, the contestation of these priorities has been displaced from intergovernmental processes to the various organizations involved in operationalizing REDD+ activities. This article applies a set of organizational, substantive and conceptual typologies to compare differences in the balance of actors, interests and ideas across these organizations. It finds that multi-lateral funding programs have drawn heavily on existing safeguards for international aid, while private certification schemes have specialized in different niche priorities at the project level. In regards to the substance of safeguard requirements, the involvement of donors and investors appears correlated with a stronger emphasis on carbon and risk mitigation while greater NGO involvement and the decoupling of safeguards design from REDD+ funding appear correlated with greater emphasis on social rights and benefits. These findings have several critical implications for future REDD+ activities. Firstly, the choice of organizations involved in defining, funding and verifying safeguard activities, and the balance of actors in their governing structures, are likely to influence the relative emphasis on non-carbon values. Secondly, a diversity of approaches to disbursing REDD+ incentives may be necessary to maintain widespread support for REDD+. Thirdly, it remains to be seen whether REDD

  8. Transition to integrated safeguards at nuclear fuel fabrication plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full-text: This paper presents the improvements in efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards approach applied at depleted, natural and low enriched uranium (DNLEU) conversion and fuel fabrication plants (FFPs) following a transition from traditional safeguards (TS) to integrated safeguards1 (IS). The paper will explain the relationship between the Agency drawing a broader conclusion for a State and the implementation of IS, highlight how the transition from TS to IS can be accomplished, and describe a process by which IS can be introduced through a combination of good IAEA-National Authority cooperation and field trials. For demonstration purposes, a comparison of the onsite safeguards activities before and after the introduction of IS at a fuel fabrication plant which manufactures both PWR (Pressurized Water Reactors) fuel assemblies and CANDU fuel bundles will be examined. It is expected that this will provide a good reference baseline on the safeguards improvements made possible by the introduction of IS at fuel fabrication facilities without mixed oxide fuels (MOX). The paper will also show the operational and logistical differences between the TS and IS regimes and highlight some of the advantages to a State for which a broader conclusion has been drawn by the Agency. The paper will offer technical insight to safeguards coverage of nuclear material borrowing scenarios and implementation of other safeguards measures such as the introduction of short notice random inspections (SNRI), use of a secure mailbox system at the FFP, and implementation of random interim inspections (RIIs) at LWRs (Light Water Reactors) and CANDU power reactors. (author)

  9. Energy Therapies in Advanced Practice Oncology: An Evidence-Informed Practice Approach

    OpenAIRE

    Potter, Pamela J.

    2013-01-01

    Advanced practitioners in oncology want patients to receive state-of-the-art care and support for their healing process. Evidence-informed practice (EIP), an approach to evaluating evidence for clinical practice, considers the varieties of evidence in the context of patient preference and condition as well as practitioner knowledge and experience. This article offers an EIP approach to energy therapies, namely, Therapeutic Touch (TT), Healing Touch (HT), and Reiki, as supportive interventions...

  10. Sensitivity analysis of scenario models for operational risk Advanced Measurement Approach

    OpenAIRE

    Chaudhary, Dinesh

    2014-01-01

    Scenario Analysis (SA) plays a key role in determination of operational risk capital under Basel II Advanced Measurement Approach. However, operational risk capital based on scenario data may exhibit high sensitivity or wrong-way sensitivity to scenario inputs. In this paper, we first discuss scenario generation using quantile approach and parameter estimation using quantile matching. Then we use single-loss approximation (SLA) to examine sensitivity of scenario based capital to scenario inputs.

  11. Practical Approach to Knowledge-based Question Answering with Natural Language Understanding and Advanced Reasoning

    CERN Document Server

    Wong, Wilson

    2007-01-01

    This research hypothesized that a practical approach in the form of a solution framework known as Natural Language Understanding and Reasoning for Intelligence (NaLURI), which combines full-discourse natural language understanding, powerful representation formalism capable of exploiting ontological information and reasoning approach with advanced features, will solve the following problems without compromising practicality factors: 1) restriction on the nature of question and response, and 2) limitation to scale across domains and to real-life natural language text.

  12. Cyber Security Evaluation of the Wireless Communication for the Mobile Safeguard Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper introduces cyber security evaluation results and a design of the wireless communication technology to apply to safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. While wireless communication technologies can generally make mobility and efficiency on plant operation, those have seldom been installed on the nuclear I&C systems due to the negative concern of unexpected outcomes that stem from electromagnetic interference and cyber attack. New design of advanced digital safeguard and I&C systems uses computer-based systems for the safeguard and safety functions. On the other hand, those are being exposed to various types of new and existing cyber threats, vulnerabilities and risks which significantly increase the likelihood that those could be compromised. In order to employ the wireless communication technology in safeguard function, licencees assess and manage the potential for adverse effects on safeguard and safety functions so as to provide high assurance that critical functions are properly protected cyber attack. It is expected that the safeguard function, specifically on the area of real-time monitoring, logging, can be enhanced by employing the mobile safeguard devices (: smart phone, laptop, smart pad, etc). In this paper, we deal with the cyber security evaluation, which consists of threat analysis, vulnerability test, establishment of security plan, and design solutions for the wireless communication on the basis of IEEE 802.11(Wi-Fi) protocol. Proposed evaluation and design solution could be a basis for the design of wireless communication and mobile safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. (author)

  13. Safeguarding the MELOX fabrication plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The main characteristics of Melox, high material throughput and inventory, high level of automation, difficult to access material made it necessary to develop a new Safeguards scheme. In addition there was a need to optimize inspector and operator manpower needs. The definition and the application of the CIV Safeguards Scheme take maximum benefit from the use of highly integrated computer systems, independent unattended measurements systems and branching and logging of operator's equipment. This Scheme allows to achieve the Safeguards goals and to optimize the use of resources. From the viewpoint of Euratom, the capital investment is expected to be reimbursed by savings on manpower costs in 4 to 5 years of operations. The operator expects a reduction of the costs associated with the inevitable intrusion of the Euratom inspectors into the plant operations. This Scheme is the result of the consultations between the French authorities, the Euratom Safeguards Directorate and the Melox staff, in an outstanding spirit of collaboration. The Scheme has been successfully implemented for almost one year thus demonstrating that large MOX fabrication facilities are safeguardable. (J.P.N.)

  14. IAEA safeguards at research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency applies safeguards to almost 150 facilities classified as research reactors. From a safeguards point of view, these facilities present a spectrum of features that must be addressed both from the nuclear material and from the operational viewpoints. The nuclear fuel used by these reactors varies from high enriched uranium (NEU), up to 93 U-235, to natural uranium and the thermal power output from over 100 megawatt to less than ten watts. Research reactors are also used for a wide variety of purposes, including materials testing, radiosotope production, training and nuclear physics studies. The effort spent by the Agency in safeguarding these reactors is dependant upon the thermal power of the reactor and on the quantity and type of nuclear material present. On some research reactors, the Agency devotes more inspection effort than on a large power reactor. On others, very little effort is reguired. Safeguards that are applied are done so according to Agency State agreements and consist of a combiination of nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance. In this paper, the safeguards activities performed by the State and by the Agency will be reviewed for a large (≤50MWt) and for a small (≥ 1 MWt) reactor according to the most common type agreement. (author)

  15. International safeguards data management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The data base management system ''ISADAM'' (i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System) described in this report is intended to facilitate the safeguards authority in making efficient and effective use of accounting reports. ISADAM has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. The evaluation of safeguards declarations focuses on three main objectives: - the requirement of syntactical consistency with the legal conventions of data recording for safeguards accountancy; - the requirement of accounting evidence that there is no material unaccounted for (MUF); - the requirement of semantic consistency with the technological characteristics of the plant and the processing plans of the operator. Section 2 describes in more detail the facilities which ISADAM makes available to a safeguards inspector. Section 3 describes how the MUF variance computation is derived from models of measurement error propagation. Many features of the ISADAM system are automatically provided by ADABAS. The exceptions to this are the utility software designed to: - screen plant declarations before loading into the data base, - prepare variance summary files designed to support real-time computation of MUF and variance of MUF, - provide analyses in response to user requests in interactive or batch mode. Section 4 describes the structure and functions of this software which have been developed by JRC-Ispra

  16. Exploring Advanced Piano Students' Approaches to Sight-Reading

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhukov, Katie

    2014-01-01

    The ability to read music fluently is fundamental for undergraduate music study yet the training of sight-reading is often neglected. This study compares approaches to sight-reading and accompanying by students with extensive sight-reading experience to those with limited experience, and evaluates the importance of this skill to advanced pianists…

  17. Advanced light source's approach to ensure conditions for safe top-off operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The purpose of this document is to outline the Advanced Light Source (ALS) approach for preventing a radiation accident scenario on the ALS experimental floor due to top-off operation. The document will describe the potential risks, the analysis, and the resulting specifications for the controls.

  18. Opening Statement [International Safeguards Symposium on Preparing for Future Verification Challenges, Vienna (Austria), 1-5 November 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The main task of ESARDA is to advance and harmonize R and D in the area of safeguards. It is also a forum for the exchange of information and ideas between nuclear facility operators, safeguards authorities, and organizations and people engaged in R and D. ESARDA aims to bring together all those involved in safeguards, so that progress and continuous improvement in international safeguards can be achieved efficiently and to professional standards. The principal issues are coordination of research, exchange of information and joint execution of R and D programmes. The heart of ESARDA activities are its Working Groups, which were established to promote and undertake collaborative R and D and information exchange in particular fields. ESARDA has nine Working Groups covering: - Destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, containment and surveillance, safeguards implementation, integrated safeguards, and nuclear material accounting and control; - Training and knowledge - we note that over the past six years, ESARDA has educated more than 250 students, and that in 2011, ESARDA will run three courses - in Ispra (Italy), France and Sweden; - Verification technologies and methodologies, and the latest in novel technologies and approaches. The Editorial Committee, which takes care of all external communications, publishes the ESARDA Bulletin, and organizes biennial meetings and symposia. During its 40 year history, ESARDA has been active in building an effective European safeguards world and has reached a remarkable position in the international safeguards community. Success has followed from responding to the needs of our customers. To be successful in the future, we must be sensitive to changes and challenges in our operational environment, and understand how our customers and their needs are developing and changing. During the past year, the ESARDA Steering Committee set up a new Reflection Group, with the task of assessing the international and European context, and

  19. Safeguards and Physics Measurements: Safeguards and Non-destructive Assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and non-destructive assay includes various activities that contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials. In particular, up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards is maintained and consultancy, guidance and scientific and technical support is provided to the Belgian authorities and the nuclear industry. In addition, the programme intends to improve non-destructive methods for the qualification and the quantification of nuclear materials. Major achievements in these areas in 1999 are reported

  20. Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs

  1. 3D technologies in safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty foresees improved verification of existing nuclear installations. To be effective new advanced capabilities must be developed and fielded to increase the accuracy of verification and detection of changes in the facilities. New systems need to be portable, simple to use and yet highly accurate and dependable. 3D laser technologies proved to be effective in Design Information Verification (DIV). IAEA has successfully used the system in Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant. The system allowed IAEA to carry out rapid and accurate DIVs far faster and more accurately than had been possible in the past. A typical example from a mockup area at the JRC is presented. A further application of 3D laser technologies is to perform the verification of the facility buildings. Typical plants are located on sites of few square kilometres with tens of buildings, housing process and storage facilities. This requires systems that are capable of measuring and verifying long distances and easy to handle in an outdoor environment. This paper presents an overview of the different 3D technologies and discusses its potential use in safeguards applications: - Design Information Verification. - 3D Surveillance (overcomes the flatten world of classical 2D Surveillance and provides accurate quantitative (i.e., distance) measurements. - Object self authentication (spatial forensics), including the verification of closure welds on containers. - Outdoor verification System or verification of the facility buildings and outdoor perimeters. For the verification of outdoor areas the paper presents a transportable system capable of acquiring on the fly 3D geometric data from a large installation. The proposed system is a scaled based approach combining different sensors and 3D reconstruction techniques depending on the size of the scene/objects to be modelled and accuracy of the final model. The system is mounted on a vehicle and integrates 3D laser

  2. Validating safeguards effectiveness given inherently limited test data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A key issue in designing and evaluating nuclear safeguards systems is how to validate safeguards effectiveness against a spectrum of potential threats. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by a performance indicator such as the probability of defeating an adversary attempting a malevolent act. Effectiveness validation means a testing program that provides sufficient evidence that the performance indicator is at an acceptable level. Traditional statistical techniques are useful in designing a testing program when numerous independent system trials are possible. However, within the safeguards environment, many situations arise for which traditional statistical approaches may be neither feasible nor appropriate. Such situations can occur, for example, when there are obvious constraints on the number of possible tests due to operational impacts and testing costs. Furthermore, these tests are usually simulations (e.g., staged force-on-force exercises) rather than actual tests, and the system is often modified after each test. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to make and justify inferences about system performance by using traditional statistical techniques. In this paper, we discuss several alternative quantitative techniques for validating system effectiveness. The techniques include: (1) minimizing the number of required tests using sequential testing; (2) combining data from models inspections and exercises using Bayesian statistics to improve inferences about system performance; and (3) using reliability growth and scenario modeling to help specify which safeguards elements and scenarios to test

  3. Strategic plan for the development of IAEA safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The need for a top-down Safeguards Strategy to focus departmental objectives was recognized by the Programme Performance Appraisal System performed on the Equipment Development Project in 1999. The Department of Safeguards prepared, at the end of 2000, Safeguards Strategic Objectives to identify the changes and improvements expected to take place over the 2001-2005 period. Those Strategic Objectives were supposed to be used to properly plan IAEA Safeguards activities and define appropriate and coherent R and D programme. The present paper describes the strategic directions that the IAEA will followed in the area of equipment development in order to meet the Safeguards Department long-term objectives for 2001-2005. The paper, which is derived from the IAEA Strategic Equipment Development Plan, prepared by the Division of Technical Support, includes two parts: general principles and policies applicable to all equipment development tasks; and main development directions for specific equipment type areas. The paper will not describe the detailed plans which are prepared, based on the strategic plan, on a biannual basis, but it will illustrate the concept and approach which was used and the connection with other equipment management activities and documents. Equipment development activities have been divided in five major projects (NDA, Seals, Surveillance, Unattended Monitoring and Remote Monitoring). Strategic directions for each of these projects will be described in the paper. Separate sections will deal with equipment development strategic guidance in the area of additional protocol inspections, JNFL projects, illicit trafficking and Trilateral Initiative

  4. Safeguards aspects during decommissioning of a pilot reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It is generally accepted that nuclear installations have to be safeguarded during operation. The safeguards systems applied differ among states, but the basic requirements of safety, security, material control and accountancy as well as international obligations are almost identical in all nonuclear-weapons states. In Germany, the decommissioning of facilities will also be safeguarded at least by Euratom and domestic authorities. In this paper, the Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage Karlsruhe (WAK), a pilot reprocessing plant, serves as an example. The facility was commissioned in 1971 and was shut down at the end of 1990. During 31 campaigns, fuel elements from different reactors were reprocessed. The total throughput amounted to ∼210 tons of uranium and 110 kg of plutonium. The international safeguards approach [Euratom and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations] for decommissioning of this plant has already been published. Based on the legal requirements in Germany, a concept for decommissioning has been developed. The safeguards system for radioactive waste described in this paper is part of this concept. 1 ref

  5. Safeguards-by-Design: Early integration of physical protection and safeguardability into design of nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper describes a project to define a generic SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated in existing facility design and construction processes. It is expected that the result could ultimately form the basis for a new international norm and standardized process for nuclear facility design. This effort is a component of the U.S. Department of Energy's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Office of Nonproliferation and the Office of Nuclear Energy. The ultimate objective of SBD is use for a global standard to ensure the early, efficient and cost effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical protection features and potentially other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility, i.e. from initial planning through design, construction and operation. The project team examined facility design processes, best practices and lessons learned from previous facility projects, and developments in nuclear safety, and project and systems engineering, in order to identify the essential elements of SBD and a framework for implementation. Further, a generic SBD process was identified, which is expected to be readily adaptable to almost all regulatory, management and engineering environments and applicable to a wide range of facilities. It is available to give immediate benefit for nuclear design projects. Key features of the SBD process include: initiation of safeguards design in the planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the formal project structure, early appointment of a SBD team, participation in facility design options analysis in the conceptual design phase to enhance intrinsic safeguards features, definition of new deliverables akin to safety reports

  6. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Long, Jon D. [Y-12 National Security Complex; McGinnis, Brent R [ORNL; Morgan, James B [ORNL; Whitaker, Michael [ORNL; Lockwood, Mr. Dunbar [U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA; Shipwash, Jacqueline L [ORNL

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment

  7. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, pre-1990 alcohol and drugs (involving reactor operators, security force members, or management persons), and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  8. IAEA Safeguards glossary 1987 edition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In 1980 the IAEA published a safeguards glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/1) with the aim of facilitating the understanding and standardizing the meaning of the rather specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. The revised Glossary presented here takes into account the latest developments as well as comments received since the first version appeared. The terms defined in the Glossary intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence corresponds to the internal relation of the subjects treated. The terms are numbered consecutively and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. Translations of the terms into French, Russian, Spanish, German and Japanese have been added. The Glossary has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements

  9. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

  10. Application of safeguards technology in DOE's environmental restoration program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eccleston, G.W.; Baker, M.P.; Hansen, W.R.; Lucas, M.C.; Markin, J.T.; Phillips, J.R.

    1990-01-01

    During the last two decades, the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) has supported the research and development of safeguards systems analysis methodologies and nondestructive assay (NDS) technology for characterizing, monitoring, and accounting nuclear materials. This paper discusses methodologies and NDA instrumentation developed by the DOE/OSS program that could be applied in the Environmental Restoration Program. NDA instrumentation could be used for field measurements during site characterization and to monitor nuclear materials, heavy metals, and other hazardous materials during site remediation. Systems methodologies can minimize the expenditure of resources and help specify appropriate combinations of NDA instrumentation and chemical analyses to characterize a variety of materials quickly and reduce personnel exposure in hazardous environments. A training program is available to teach fundamental and advanced principles and approaches to characterize and quantify nuclear materials properly and to organize and analyze measurement information for decision making. The ability to characterize the overall volume and distribution of materials at a waste site is difficult because of the inhomogeneous distribution of materials, the requirement for extreme sensitivity, and the lack of resources to collect and chemically analyze a sufficient number of samples. Using a systems study approach based on statistical sampling, the resources necessary to characterize a site can be enhanced by appropriately combining in situ and field NDA measurements with laboratory analyses. 35 refs., 1 figs., 2 tabs.

  11. The role of quality management in delivering safeguards conclusions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drawing safeguards conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities is intrinsically more challenging than verifying the non-diversion of declared nuclear material. Important new measures are available to the IAEA to help in this respect. However, the Secretariat can only have confidence in the soundness of its conclusions, and thus provide credible assurances of States' compliance with their safeguards obligations, if the necessary and sufficient processes and tools are in place, if the processes are carried out correctly and adequately monitored and if appropriate feedback loops are used. It is simply not possible to carry out quality control activities to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Part of the approach being taken by the Department of Safeguards to meet this challenge is to implement a Departmental quality management system (QMS) based on the ISO 9001:2000 standard. This paper describes the steps being taken by the Department to implement such a system. (author)

  12. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials

  13. Tour of safeguards equipment van

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Increasing use is being made of nondestructive assay instruments for identification and measurements of nuclear materials. Important advantages of NDA are: timeliness, portability, and ease of use. Recent development in computer systems and NDA allow for the integration of sample planning, control of NDA, and data analysis into one transportable system. This session acquainted the course participants with the use of mobile NDA safeguards measurement systems. This session considered the practical problems and the type of results that can be expected from field use of NDA instruments. An existing mobile safeguards system was used to demonstrate some of the differences between field and laboratory conditions

  14. Thesis on safeguards gains doctorate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: One of the most complete analyses yet to be made outside the Agency of its Safeguards system for preventing diversion of materials to military purposes has gained for its author a Doctorate of Philosophy. The subject was chosen as a thesis by Miss Gabrielle Martino, daughter of His Excellency Mr. Enrico Martino, Italian Ambassador to Austria and Resident Representative to IAEA. Miss Martino has been studying in the Faculty of Political Science at Rome University. Her thesis, which runs to 110 pages, traces the history of safeguards and the stages in evolution to the system adopted by the General Conference at its 1965 Session held in Tokyo. (author)

  15. The psychology of nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, which it was designed to do. However it is considered that although prevention cannot be guaranteed it is possible to deter such diversions. The question of publicity is examined since any safeguards system is judged exclusively on what is seen to be their failures and safeguard authorities will be tempted to conceal any diversion. (U.K.)

  16. International safeguards and nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report provides a critical review of the effectiveness of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards against potential acts of nuclear terrorism. The author argues that IAEA safeguards should be made applicable to deterring diversions of nuclear materials from civil to weapons purposes by subnational groups as well as by nations. Both technical and institutional factors are considered, and suggestions for organizational restructuring and further technical development are made. Awareness of the necessity for effective preventive measures is emphasized, and possible directions for further effort are suggested

  17. Safeguards information challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: Overall, the aim of this paper is to provide the background and the broader vision in which the various information related presentations and posters proposed by the Department find their place, exploring solutions to the challenges faced. At a time when the Agency is expected to be a reference for the assessment of nuclear proliferation threats, providing the international community with independent, impartial, timely and credible conclusions that no declared nuclear material is diverted to non-peaceful purposes and that no undeclared nuclear material or activities exist in States, it has to address major challenges with regard to information. Drawing credible conclusions assumes that all relevant information is accessible and put into relevant context. Because of the legal constraints under which it operates, the limitation of resources for collecting existing but difficult to reach details and simply because of the overwhelming quantity of the information needed to properly evaluate proliferation issues, the Agency has to continually improve the way it collects, processes and internally disseminates safeguards relevant information. Developing a coherent picture of a State's nuclear capability is a complex process based on many experts' assessments and fusion of information. The search for better, broader and deeper information through dedicated collection processes is an ongoing effort aimed at filling the gaps of such pictures. Implementing well selected information collection tools is a sine qua non to render effective the Agency's detection capabilities. Beyond collection, another prerequisite to ensuring that the available information is accessible to those who need to know is the establishment of a proper information system architecture and an efficient set of standard business processes. At the same time, that information must be sufficiently protected by appropriate security measures, particularly at a time when private hacking has become a

  18. Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections. Final report: Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This is the second of two reports prepared to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) in enhancing the effectiveness of its international safeguards inspections through inspector training in open-quotes Observational Skillsclose quotes. The first (Phase 1) report was essentially exploratory. It defined Observational Skills broadly to include all appropriate cognitive, communications, and interpersonal techniques that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively. It identified 10 specific Observational Skills components, analyzed their relevance to IAEA safeguards inspections, and reviewed a variety of inspection programs in the public and private sectors that provide training in one or more of these components. The report concluded that while it should be possible to draw upon these other programs in developing Observational Skills training for IAEA inspectors, the approaches utilized in these programs will likely require significant adaption to support the specific job requirements, policies, and practices that define the IAEA inspector's job. The overall objective of this second (Phase 2) report is to provide a basis for the actual design and delivery of Observational Skills training to IAEA inspectors. The more specific purposes of this report are to convey a fuller understanding of the potential application of Observational Skills to the inspector's job, describe inspector perspectives on the relevance and importance of particular Observational Skills, identify the specific Observational Skill components that are most important and relevant to enhancing safeguards inspections, and make recommendations as to Observational Skills training for the IAEA's consideration in further developing its Safeguards training program

  19. Remote monitoring in safeguards: Security of information and enhanced cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    to which security is key for RM application acceptance and use for the IAEA, ABACC, States and Operators, ii) the sharing of relevant safeguards data for all the parties concerned, iii) a scheme agreed between ABACC and ARN to trial a RM transmission and a possible approach for international safeguards application. (authors)

  20. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kirk, Bernadette Lugue [ORNL; Eipeldauer, Mary D [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL

    2011-12-01

    In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together

  1. Commercial-off-the-shelf digital surveillance systems for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The reasons why safeguards authorities are from time to time looking for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (C.O.T.S.) equipment for safeguards purposes are for the following reasons: Equipment that is designed from scratch to satisfy specific safeguards requirements is very likely to go through a period of teething problems. If these problems are only discovered once the equipment is deployed for routine use, this will be accompanied with large overhead costs for the safeguards authorities to maintain and repair such equipment. The overhead costs are much higher if unattended equipment is concerned that is permanently installed on-site. In that case an extra mission has to be organised to return the faulty equipment to our headquarters before it can be repaired. Using C.O.T.S. equipment that is also used by others reduces the risk of teething problems. At least the burden of going through such kind of problem period is shared with other customers of the concerned equipment. It is clear that safeguards is not a big market on its own. The non-negligible cost of the development of equipment that only fits safeguards requirements will therefore have to be recovered on the expected sales. If the market is small, if the expected number of units that can be sold is small, a large part of the unit cost will depend on the initial development costs. Going for C.O.T.S. equipment that is also sold in other markets, would in that respect lower the equipment cost. That not any safeguards equipment can be obtained commercially off the shelf is clear, but in certain domains like digital surveillance, the functionality of C.O.T.S. equipment has been approaching the one needed for safeguards. That is why in 1998 the Euratom Safeguards Office published an open call for tender for the purchase of a digital surveillance system that is able to support up to 64 colour camera channels. In response to a successful bid for this call for tender a contract for the delivery of 3 prototype systems and 6

  2. Partitioning and transmutation - Technical feasibility, proliferation resistance and safeguardability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The advantages of partitioning and transmutation (P and T) of minor actinides and selected fission products are largely discussed and described in literature. The advantages of separation of the long-lived alpha-emitters for the long-term storage of highly radioactive waste have been highlighted. After separation, these nuclides shall be transmuted by means of a dedicated reactor or accelerator driven system into shorter-lived fission products that are less hazardous. This, however, requires the development and implementation of a P and T fuel cycle, involving chemical separation of the minor actinides and the fabrication of MA containing fuels or targets. Concepts for P and T fuel cycles have been developed and technical issues are being addressed in various research programs. With the recognition of the proliferation potential associated with the minor actinides by the IAEA, also the proliferation and safeguards aspects need to be addressed. It is important to raise these points at an early stage of process development, in order to identify potential problems and to develop appropriate solutions. The oxide fuels used worldwide in thermal reactor systems for energy production are reprocessed by aqueous techniques. Therefore these systems, primarily the PUREX process, are fully developed and implemented commercially. Furthermore, the safeguards approach is fully implemented in existing facilities, covering uranium and plutonium. Pyroprocess systems have largely been associated with fast reactors and metallic fuels and their development has therefore only reached the pilot-scale stage and the feasibility of minor actinide (MA) separation still needs to be demonstrated. Hydrometallurgical and pyrochemical reprocessing should however not be considered as competing but rather as complementary technologies. For instance in a so-called double strata concept (foreseen for instance in the Japanese OMEGA project), the PUREX process (first stratum) would be

  3. The International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A system of international safeguards has been established to provide assurance that nuclear materials in civilian use are not diverted from their peaceful purpose. The safeguards system is administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency/Department of Safeguards and devolves from treaties and other international agreements. Inspectors from the Agency verify reports from States about nuclear facilities by audits, observation, and measurements. (author)

  4. Safeguards planning in a plant design process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The safeguards efforts for the partitioning fuel cycle are considered. Included in the discussion are the organization of the safeguards study, the development of safeguards criteria, the expression of these criteria as requirements for facility design, and some preliminary details of the implementation of these requirements in facility and process layout

  5. Safeguards planning in a plant design process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heinrich, L.A.

    1977-01-01

    The safeguards efforts for the partitioning fuel cycle are considered. Included in the discussion are the organization of the safeguards study, the development of safeguards criteria, the expression of these criteria as requirements for facility design, and some preliminary details of the implementation of these requirements in facility and process layout. (LK)

  6. Numerical Overview and perspectives of the numerical simulation of NDA instruments for safeguards application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Numerical simulation of the transport of neutron and gamma has been used for measurement instrument design for decades. Improvement of the simulation codes combined with an increase in computer capability has led to the possibility of numerical calibration of instruments or interpretation of field measurements. This technique has become common practice in the nuclear industry and is being introduced in Safeguards. Typical examples are total neutron or coincidence neutron counters where availability of representative reference material may be difficult. In such cases, the main objectives for using numerical simulation are savings in manpower, money and time. The use of simulation for the direct interpretation of measurements is also an important issue. In some cases, like assay of nuclear material holdup in large and complex equipment, experimental calibration might be practically impossible and numerical calibration the only way to achieve quantitative results. In any case, the main issue is the validation of the simulation model, which remains based on reference materials. The point here is that reference materials do not have to be physically similar to assayed objects and therefore have larger availability and lower costs. In the future, advanced use of simulation could lead to a different approach of NDA referred to as finger printing. At present the concept of finger printing is limited to follow-up of NDA signatures and the demonstration that no change occurred. Simulation could help predicting the initial fingerprint and also its normal evolution due to decay. With prediction capability the concept of finger printing could be extended. One of the applications of this concept could be the verification of spent fuel casks by neutron measurements. Results of spent fuel individual verification could be used to verify input data used for the simulation of casks in order to predict neutron flux outside of the cask. In the field of gamma spectrometry, present use

  7. 77 FR 52977 - Regulatory Capital Rules: Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule; Market Risk Capital Rule

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-08-30

    ... must assume a margin period of risk under the IMM of 20 business days for netting sets where: (1) The... Regulatory Capital Rules: Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule; Market Risk Capital Rule; Proposed... 325 RIN 3064-AD97 Regulatory Capital Rules: Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule; Market...

  8. The future for safeguards technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The present paper presents some elements of an emerging vision of a new and updated potential role for safeguard instrumentation in the overall process of deterring the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The paper focusses on installed, transportable and portable measurement systems and in-situ techniques for maintaining continuity of knowledge. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  9. Nuclear safeguards and nuclear shutdowns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The issues involved in the California nuclear initiative (Proposition 15) are described. Some of the characteristics of the anti-nuclear lobby are outlined. Some do's and don'ts for the nuclear group are listed. The nuclear shutdown effort was concentrated on the safeguards and high-level waste disposal issues

  10. Safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It deserves re-emphasizing that the first and most important obstacle to the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of political judgement and determination. Safeguards cannot prevent a violation of obligations... any more than bank or company audits can prevent a misappropriation of funds. All they can do is expose infringements or arouse suspicions - in effect, sound the alarm. By submitting the whole of their nuclear energy sector to impartial international inspection, States can inspire great confidence on the part of the rest of the world in the exclusively peaceful nature of their programmes. Safeguards are today an essential precondition for imports of nuclear power technology, uranium fuel, and many different kinds of material for the nuclear energy sector. Without IAEA safeguards, the existing market in this sector would be unworkable. Potentially, the most important aspect of the acceptance of IAEA safeguards by nuclear-weapon States is that it shows their readiness to submit important installations within their territory to impartial inspection

  11. Instrument development for safeguards measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    New safeguards requirements, such as those resulting from industrial reprocessing activities, makes the faster and more accurate determination of the uranium enrichment and/or the isotopic composition of plutonium essential in measuring the fissile mass. In response to these needs, Canberra has developed several improved safeguards systems in the last few years. In this paper, we will present an overview of our newest safeguards systems and the improvements they contain. The portable systems include the U-Pu InSpector, the IMCA and the JSR-14 systems. All combine automatic control of acquisition electronics and rapid analysis with an integrated software package for ease of use. The U-Pu InSpector incorporates the MGA code used by the IAEA and Euratom for plutonium analysis. The IMCA complies with IAEA PMCN and PMCG procedures for uranium analysis. With the JSR-14, we are currently developing the procedures to provide compliance with the IAEA neutron counting procedures. In addition to portable safeguards systems, Canberra has designed and installed many installed systems such as the WDAS and PSMC systems at PNC Tokai in Japan, and the large unattended neutron/gamma systems at Cogema La Hague and the Melox reprocessing facility in France. (author)

  12. Nuclear safeguards and physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the present lecture two topics are covered: 1) the steps or the infrastructure which the operators of a nuclear facility have to foresee for the implementation of safeguards according to the NPT. 2) General features of a national physical protection system for nuclear materials in use, storage and transport. (orig./RW)

  13. DEVELOPMENT OF A CANDLE FILTER FAILURE SAFEGUARD DEVICE

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    G.J. Bruck; E.E. Smeltzer; Z.N. Sanjana

    2002-06-06

    Development, testing and optimization of advanced metal and ceramic, barrier and fiber safeguard devices (SGDs) is described. Metal barrier devices are found prone to manufacturing defects and premature blinding. Fiber devices are found to be satisfactory if fine fibers are used. Durable alloys are identified for both oxidation and gasification conditions. Ceramic honeycomb SGDs were found to perform as excellent barrier devices. Optimization has shown such devices to be durable. Field testing of ceramic honeycomb SGDs from two different manufacturers is being pursued.

  14. UKAEA Safeguards R and D Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This is the fifth report of work being carried out in the UK on Safeguards R and D in support of the IAEA. The tasks included in the current UK Safeguards R and D Programme cover a wide diversity of aspects in the Safeguards field, with the work on them being conducted at several locations within the UK. It is convenient to classify the tasks as follows: reprocessing and centrifuge enrichment plant safeguards, general application of safeguards (tasks concerned with the development of instruments and techniques for general application), service programmes (tasks which are of service to the IAEA, eg calibration, training courses) and exploratory and short term tasks. (U.K.)

  15. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

  16. Inspection technologies -Development of national safeguards technology-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    17 facility regulations prepared by nuclear facilities according to the Ministerial Notices were evaluated. Safeguards inspection activities under Safeguards are described. Safeguards inspection equipments and operation manuals to be used for national inspection are also described. Safeguards report are produced and submitted to MOST by using the computerized nuclear material accounting system at state level. National inspection support system are developed to produce the on-site information for domestic inspection. Planning and establishment of policy for nuclear control of nuclear materials, international cooperation for nuclear control, CTBT, strengthening of international safeguards system, and the supply of PWRs to North Korea are also described. (author). 43 tabs., 39 figs

  17. Waste management safeguards project: History of and recommendations for development activities in support of safeguards of final disposal of spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coordinated safeguards assessment and development activities in support of the U.S. Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS) and international safeguards objectives were initiated in Fiscal Year 1987. Initial technical support activities were performed at the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM); however, as the priority of support activities changed, direction for the support tasks was transferred to the U.S. Department of State (State), the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/IS-40), and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The direction for technical support activities was established at the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) advisory group meeting and subsequent consultants' meetings on safeguards related to the final disposal of nuclear material contained in waste and spent fuel. Task directions for the development of international safeguards in support of the final disposal of spent fuel are currently being provided by DOE/IS-40. A summary of safeguards activities performed by the Waste Management Safeguards Project is provided. Systems for design information verification for spent fuel consolidation and conditioning operations are needed immediately. Safeguards approaches for maintaining continuity of knowledge of spent fuel processed at the conditioning facility and for verification of the final disposal package will be needed within three years. Systems for design information verification of the repository facilities will be needed by the end of the decade

  18. Safeguards as catastrophic risk management: insights and projections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The system of international agreements designed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and to control the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies (collectively referred to as the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation regimes) is posited as humanity.s first attempt to mitigate a man-made global catastrophic risk. By extrapolating general principles of government response to risk from the arms control and nonproliferation regimes, a model of international regime building for catastrophic risk mitigation is constructed. This model provides the context for an examination of the system of safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which serves as the nuclear nonproliferation regime.s verification and enforcement mechanism and thereby constitutes the regime's most completely developed discrete mechanism for risk mitigation (a 'system within a system'). An assessment of the history, evolution and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system in the context of the regimes-as-risk-mitigation model reveals some general principles for risk-mitigation regimes which are then applied to the safeguards system to identify ways in which it may be strengthened. Finally, the IAEA safeguards system is posited as the prototype verification/enforcement mechanism for future risk mitigation regimes that governments will be compelled to create in the face of new global catastrophic risks that technological advance will inevitably create. (author)

  19. A conservation approach to pharyngeal carcinoma with advanced neck disease: optimizing neck management

    OpenAIRE

    Allal, Abdelkarim Said; Dulguerov, Pavel; Bieri, Sabine; Lehmann, Willy; Kurtz, John

    1999-01-01

    Surgical management of advanced neck disease remains controversial when a conservative approach based on radiotherapy is retained for primary tumors. The objective of this study was to evaluate retrospectively treatment results in pharyngeal cancers presenting with N2-N3 neck disease, using neck dissection followed by radical locoregional radiotherapy (RT) and to compare these results with those obtained in patients treated by radical RT alone.

  20. Water and Environmental Engineering: Embracing Multi-Disciplinary Approach through Advanced and Integrated Technologies for Sustainability

    OpenAIRE

    Suhaimi Abdul-Talib; Chia-Chay Tay; Nor-Azazi Zakaria; Aminuddin Ab-Ghani; Lariyah Mohd-Sidek; Ngai-Weng Chan

    2014-01-01

    This paper addresses how the current changes in climate and economic landscape affect the focus of engineers and scientists in managing the abundant but finite water resources. The important concept of sustainability where the delicate balance between human needs and protection of the environment is further stressed in light of emerging advanced technological platforms. The critical need to embrace these emerging platforms through multi-disciplinary approaches is highlighted through selected ...

  1. Technology guidance for safeguards information management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Manatt, D.R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Howell, J.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Steinmaus, K.; St. Pierre, D. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Deland, S.M.; Vandewart, R. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1994-09-01

    The Safeguards Information Management Systems project, SIMS, seeks to provide information access tools to the IAEA to assist in implementation of enhanced safeguards. The Technology and Systems Group advises the SIMS project in the selection of hardware and software, the integration of system components, and the evaluation of realistic information management approaches. The group`s guidance has led to reevaluation of the system hardware choices, visual data storage methods, and geographical data sources. Consultation with the Agency has resulted in a major realignment of the effort towards providing information access on Networked Microsoft Windows desk top computers rather than separate SUN workstations. The manner in which imagery is stored and presented is another developing area. Initial systems delivered to the Agency relied on analogue video disc recorders and VCRs. Future systems will store and manipulate digital images. The initial source of map data for the workstation was analogue video discs from the US Defense Mapping Agency. Many of these maps are restricted in their distribution, therefore additional map data sources were developed. The Technology map data sources were developed. The Technology and Systems Group`s efforts to steer a clear course through this ever changing mine-field is described.

  2. Process monitoring in support of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts touched on various concepts and a few specific applications, but none was comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report develops prototypical process monitoring concepts that can be incorporated into the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) general safeguards approach for fuel reprocessing plants. This effort considers existing approaches, recognizing limitations and needed improvements. Prototypical process monitoring applications are developed and proposed for implementation and demonstration in the Integrated Equipment Test facility, which is located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The specific information needed to accomplish the process monitoring objectives are defined, and the mechanics for obtaining that information are described. Effort is given to the identification and assessment of potential impacts and benefits associated with process monitoring concepts, with particular attention to IAEA, state, and plant operator interests. The historical development of process monitoring is described and the implications of using process monitoring in international safeguards are discussed. Specific process process monitoring applications for demonstration in the IET facility are developed in Sects. 6 through 14. 1 fig

  3. Safeguards and Security Research and Development progress report, October 1992--September 1993

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development program. Part 1 covers the three project phases that are part of the development of the technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. Examples include advanced portal monitor technology, digital image analysis for materials control, neutron multiplicity counting techniques, and development of a tomographic gamma-ray scanner. It treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 2 covers international safeguards activities, including technology developed for direct application in the international community, support to the IAEA, and bilateral technical exchanges with many other States, such as Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Japan, Russia, and the Ukraine. Part 3 highlights a variety of projects, including several in computer security R and D, direct support of the IAEA through the Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, and safeguards projects funded by the US Department of State, the DOE's Office of Technology Development, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Japan, and Germany. A few examples of these projects are the support to the Westinghouse Hanford Company efforts in data acquisition and control for the hydrogen mitigation tests on high-level-waste Tank 101-SY, nondestructive assay development for Warhead Dismantlement, and instrumentation system development for the Siemans mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plant in Germany. 75 refs

  4. The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Training and Human Resources

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Queirolo,A.

    2008-06-13

    The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) priority of training and human resources is aimed at providing the Department of Safeguards with an appropriate mixture of regular staff and extrabudgetary experts who are qualified to meet the IAEA's technical needs and to provide personnel with appropriate instruction to improve the technical basis and specific skills needed to perform their job functions. The equipment and methods used in inspection activities are unique, complex, and evolving. New and experienced safeguards inspectors need timely and effective training to perform required tasks and to learn new skills prescribed by new safeguards policies or agreements. The role of the inspector has changed from that of strictly an accountant to include that of a detective. New safeguards procedures are being instituted, and therefore, experienced inspectors must be educated on these new procedures. The USSP also recognizes the need for training safeguards support staff, particularly those who maintain and service safeguards equipment (SGTS), and those who perform information collection and analysis (SGIM). The USSP is committed to supporting the IAEA with training to ensure the effectiveness of all staff members and will continue to offer its assistance in the development and delivery of basic, refresher, and advanced training courses. This paper will discuss the USSP ongoing support in the area of training and IAEA staffing.

  5. Safeguards for final disposal of spent fuel in Finland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in the geological repository at Olkiluoto was accepted by the local municipality, State authorities, and finally endorsed by the Parliament of Finland in May 2001. The site investigations proceeded to the underground phase in 2004 when the excavation of the first underground tunnel for bedrock characterisation at repository site began. The Decision in Principle provides that the application for construction permit stipulated by the Nuclear Energy Law should be submitted as early as 2012. According the current plans the construction of the encapsulation plant and the final repository will start around 2014. The final disposal facility, i.e. an encapsulation plant and an underground repository, represents a new type of nuclear facility. No safeguards approach exists for this facility type, therefore, safeguards requirements need to be set. The national requirements are expected to meet both the IAEA and also the Euratom safeguards needs. The role of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is to provide the regulatory requirements, to review the operator plans and by using different tools to verify that the requirements will be complied in practice. Safeguards measures of STUK are based on the national legislation and regulations as well as Finland's international commitments. The requirements of final disposal safeguards differ considerably from those of conventional safeguards. Conventional safeguards are more or less based on the fact that nuclear material is available for re-verification, if needed, even though it might be difficult to access. In the geological disposal concept nuclear material in the underground repository cannot be included in this category. Re-verification of spent fuel will not be accessible for safeguards purposes due to safety limitations and the 'final' nature of the disposal. Finnish national requirement is that spent fuel will be comprehensively verified prior encapsulation and

  6. Safeguards system effectiveness modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A general methodology for the comparative evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness at nuclear facilities is presently under development. The approach is applicable to problems of sabotage or theft at fuel cycle facilities. In this paper, the overall methodology and the primary analytic techniques used to assess system effectiveness are briefly outlined

  7. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallucci, N. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  8. System aspects on safeguards for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This thesis has investigated system aspects of safeguarding the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. These aspects include the important notion of continuity of knowledge, the philosophy of verifying measurements and the need to consider the safeguards system as a whole when expanding it to include the encapsulation facility and the geological repository. The research has been analytical in method both in the identification of concrete challenges for the safeguards community in Paper 1, and in the diversion path analysis performed in Paper 2. This method of work is beneficial for example when abstract notions are treated. However, as a suggestion for further work along these lines, a formal systems analysis would be advantageous, and may even reveal properties of the safeguards system that the human mind so far has been to narrow to consider. A systems analysis could be used to model a proposed safeguards approach with the purpose of finding vulnerabilities in its detection probabilities. From the results, capabilities needed to overcome these vulnerabilities could be deduced, thereby formulating formal boundary conditions. These could include: The necessary partial defect level for the NDA measurement; The level of redundancy required in the C/S system to minimize the risk of inconclusive results due to equipment failure; and, Requirements on the capabilities of seismic methods, etc. The field of vulnerability assessment as a tool for systems analysis should be of interest for the safeguards community, as a formal approach could give a new dimension to the credibility of safeguards systems

  9. System aspects on safeguards for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fritzell, Anni (Dept. of Physics and Astronomy, Uppsala Univ., Uppsala (Sweden))

    2008-03-15

    This thesis has investigated system aspects of safeguarding the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. These aspects include the important notion of continuity of knowledge, the philosophy of verifying measurements and the need to consider the safeguards system as a whole when expanding it to include the encapsulation facility and the geological repository. The research has been analytical in method both in the identification of concrete challenges for the safeguards community in Paper 1, and in the diversion path analysis performed in Paper 2. This method of work is beneficial for example when abstract notions are treated. However, as a suggestion for further work along these lines, a formal systems analysis would be advantageous, and may even reveal properties of the safeguards system that the human mind so far has been to narrow to consider. A systems analysis could be used to model a proposed safeguards approach with the purpose of finding vulnerabilities in its detection probabilities. From the results, capabilities needed to overcome these vulnerabilities could be deduced, thereby formulating formal boundary conditions. These could include: The necessary partial defect level for the NDA measurement; The level of redundancy required in the C/S system to minimize the risk of inconclusive results due to equipment failure; and, Requirements on the capabilities of seismic methods, etc. The field of vulnerability assessment as a tool for systems analysis should be of interest for the safeguards community, as a formal approach could give a new dimension to the credibility of safeguards systems

  10. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Trond Bjornard PhD; Joseph Alexander; Robert Bean; Brian Castle; Scott DeMuth, Ph.D.; Phillip Durst; Michael Ehinger; Prof. Michael Golay, Ph.D.; Kevin Hase, Ph.D.; David J. Hebditch, DPhil; John Hockert, Ph.D.; Bruce Meppen; James Morgan; Jerry Phillips, Ph.D., PE

    2009-02-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD’s principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a “SBD design loop” that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A “Generic SBD Process” was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and

  11. A guide to mineral safeguarding in England

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McEvoy, F.M.; Cowley, J.; Hobden, K.; Bee, E.; Hannis, S.

    2007-10-15

    A key aspect of sustainable development is the conservation and safeguarding of non-renewable resources, such as minerals, for future generations. The UK is endowed with a wide range of indigenous minerals but these natural resources are finite. With increased pressure on land-use in the UK, there is a need to ensure that these natural resources are not needlessly sterilised by other development, leaving insufficient supplies for future generations. Safeguarding will also help ensure that the planning system retains the flexibility to identify sites which have the least impact on the environment. Safeguarding is the term that encompasses the process necessary to ensure that outcome. Mineral Policy Statement 1: Planning and minerals, published in November 2006, aims to prevent unnecessary sterilisation of mineral resources by providing national policy for mineral safeguarding. The 'Guide to mineral safeguarding' is designed to complement this policy which introduces an obligation on all Mineral Planning Authorities to define Mineral Safeguarding Areas. Defining Mineral Safeguarding Areas carries no presumption that the resources will be worked. The guide provides guidance on how current mineral safeguarding policy can be complied with and puts forward a relatively simple step-by-step methodology for delineating Mineral Safeguarding Areas, together with examples of policies through which they would have effect. When linked to appropriate local planing policies, Mineral Safeguarding Areas should ensure that mineral resources are adequately and effectively considered in making land-use planning decisions. 3 annexes.

  12. Comparison of a Traditional Probabilistic Risk Assessment Approach with Advanced Safety Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, Curtis L; Mandelli, Diego; Zhegang Ma

    2014-11-01

    As part of the Light Water Sustainability Program (LWRS) [1], the purpose of the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) [2] Pathway research and development (R&D) is to support plant decisions for risk-informed margin management with the aim to improve economics, reliability, and sustain safety of current NPPs. In this paper, we describe the RISMC analysis process illustrating how mechanistic and probabilistic approaches are combined in order to estimate a safety margin. We use the scenario of a “station blackout” (SBO) wherein offsite power and onsite power is lost, thereby causing a challenge to plant safety systems. We describe the RISMC approach, illustrate the station blackout modeling, and contrast this with traditional risk analysis modeling for this type of accident scenario. We also describe our approach we are using to represent advanced flooding analysis.

  13. An improved safeguards system and its application to large backend facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The evaluation criteria, which are commonly applicable to both Material Accountancy (MA) and Containment and Surveillance (C/S) and applicable to a large backend facilities, are discussed. It is analyzed that substantial increase of the proliferation resistance can be expected by improving the presently existing safeguards systems. The improved safeguards system described in this paper is expected to be applicable to large-scaled backend facilities without giving unnecessary economical and technical burdens. The main purpose of this approach is to move away from the present trend of too much reliance on MA and to develop the synthetical safeguards effects by harmonizing C/S and continuing MA effectively

  14. INL Human Resource Development and the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    It is the stated goal of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to promote the development of a strengthened nuclear safeguards base, one with the potential to advance the secure and peaceful implementation of nuclear energy world-wide. To meet this goal, the initiative, among other things, has sought to develop a revitalized effort to ensure the continued availability of next generation safeguards professionals. Accordingly, this paper serves to outline the human capital building strategies taken by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in line with the NGSI. Various components are presented in detail, including INL's efforts directed at university outreach, in particular the laboratory's summer internship program, along with the development of various innovative training programs and long-term oriented strategies for student professional development. Special highlights include a video training series, developed by INL in cooperation with LLNL and other laboratories, which sought to expose students and entry-level professionals to the concept and practice of international nuclear safeguards.

  15. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a fuel reprocessing plant. Volume I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A materials management system is described for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a fuel-reprocessing plant. Recently developed nondestructive-analysis techniques and process-monitoring devices are combined with conventional chemical analyses and process-control instrumentation for improved materials accounting data. Unit-process accounting based on dynamic material balances permits localization of diversion in time and space, and the application of advanced statistical methods supported by decision-analysis theory ensures optimum use of accounting information for detecting diversion. This coordinated safeguards system provides maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimum process interference. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to evaluate the sensitivity of the system to single and multiple thefts and to compare various safeguards options. The study identifies design criteria that would improve the safeguardability of future plants

  16. ABACC: A regional safeguards agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created as a common system of accounting and control. It is based on Bilateral Agreement between the two countries and the agreement with the IAEA. After a few years of experience it might be concluded that a regional system may contribute in many ways to enhance the safeguards system. The most relevant are: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards by sending as professionals who are experts in the process involved in installations that are to be inspected; to have much more information on nuclear activities in each of the two countries than available to the IAEA; and to maintain formal and informal channels of communication

  17. Safeguards Indexing Method for the Regulatory Assessment of Safeguards Culture at Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) has just introduced a safeguards indexing method for evaluation the safeguards culture at Hungarian nuclear facilities. The main goal of this indexing method is to provide a useful tool for the regulatory body to evaluate the safeguards culture at nuclear facilities. The evaluated parameters are e.g. educational requirement for safeguards staff, quality of safeguards reporting for IAEA and EC, results of safeguards inspections etc. Input of the method is for the one hand the outcome of the comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system consisting of regular comprehensive SSAC verifications of the facilities. The main goals of the comprehensive verification system are: (1) to assess the facilities safeguards system compliance with the relevant national legislation and recommendations, (2) to assess the activities of the facility aimed at maintaining and further developing its safeguards system and (3) to revise validity of data and information previously provided by the facility subject to safeguards licensing procedures. On the other hand the annual report of the nuclear facilities also supports the safeguards indexing method, which is a good indicator of the present and future effectiveness of the facility level safeguards system and the level of safeguards culture.

  18. Safeguards from the operators viewpoint

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Since its inception as a nuclear materials processing facility, nuclear materials accounting has been an integral part of process operations at Los Alamos. Accountability practices have been improved from largely destructive assay in 1950 to resolve inventory differences to heavy reliance on NDA today. Much of the NDA development at the plutonium processing facility has been made possible by a close physical and working relationship with the safeguards research and development personnel

  19. Environment and Safeguards Compliance Policy

    OpenAIRE

    Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

    2006-01-01

    This Environment and Safeguards Compliance Policy was approved by the IDB's Board of Executive Directors on January 19, 2006. It supersedes the Bank's previous environment policy, which dated to 1979, and reinforces the environmental mandates of the Eighth Capital Replenishment. The new Policy strengthens the Bank's commitment with environmental sustainability in the region. This Policy consists of a set of directives that will guide the Bank's work towards environmental sustainability throug...

  20. Designing Data Protection Safeguards Ethically

    OpenAIRE

    Ugo Pagallo

    2011-01-01

    Since the mid 1990s, lawmakers and scholars have worked on the idea of embedding data protection safeguards in information and communication technology (ICT) with the aim to access and control personal data in compliance with current regulatory frameworks. This effort has been strengthened by the capacities of computers to draw upon the tools of artificial intelligence (AI) and operations research. However, work on AI and the law entails crucial ethical issues concerning both values and modal...

  1. Safeguards against Takeover after Volkswagen

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Werlauff, Erik

    2009-01-01

    The article analyses the significance of the European Court's decision on the effects of the rules on the free movement of capital on the takeover safeguards in Volkswagen AG for restrictions on the right to vote, ownership ceilings, division into A and B share classes, increased majority require...... requirements etc. in listed companies, and the implications which the decision has for the state's participation in private companies....

  2. Safeguards uses of confirmatory measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An analysis is made of the role of shipper and receiver measurements in safeguarding special nuclear materials (SNM) transferred from one facility to another, with emphasis on the case where the receiver requires an analytical accounting measurement of the transferred SNM and does not need the material for process purposes at the time of receipt. Seven possible diversion periods are considered, ranging from the interval between the shipper's final accounting measurement on the material and the time it is placed in the shipper's vault, through the actual transport of the material between facilities, to the time the material is removed from the receiver's vault and placed in the process. The detection power of various combinations of six possible shipper/receiver measurements for these diversion opportunities is then evaluated; the measurements considered include the shipper's and receiver's accounting measurements, the latter at two possible times, and various nondestructive assay (NDA) confirmatory measurements. It is concluded that all safeguards measurement objectives can be met by a combination of a shipper's accounting measurement at the time the material is removed from the process, an appropriate shipper's NDA confirmatory measurement either immediately after canning or immediately before shipping, an equivalent receiver's NDA confirmatory measurement immediately after the material is received, and a receiver's accounting measurement when the material is placed in the process. Furthermore, it is found that a receiver's analytical accounting measurement immediately after receipt when the material is not yet required for process has dubious safeguards value

  3. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DUPIC safeguards R and D in the second phase has focused on the development of nuclear material measurement system and its operation and verification, the development of nuclear material control and accounting system, and the development of remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system. Of them, the nuclear material measurement system was authenticated from IAEA and officially used for IAEA and domestic safeguards activities in DFDF. It was also verified that the system could be used for quality control of DUPIC process. It is recognised that the diagnostic software using neural network and remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system developed here could be key technologies to go into remote and near-real time monitoring system. The result of this project will eventually contribute to similar nuclear fuel cycles like MOX and pyroprocessing facility as well as the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards. In addition, it will be helpful to enhance international confidence build-up in the peaceful use of spent fuel material

  4. Are xenotransplantation safeguards legally viable?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Florencio, P S; Ramanathan, E D

    2001-01-01

    Scientists agree on the need for robust public health safeguards to accompany the imminent introduction of xenotransplantation--clinical transplantation of animal tissue into humans. To protect society in the event of emerging infectious diseases, governments must devise a legally effective means of ensuring compliance with such safeguards. Neither consent law, the law of contracts, nor existing public health legislation can adequately enforce such compliance. Consent law serves as a mechanism of communicating the momentary waiver of legal rights, not as a durable enforcement doctrine. Because it would be essential for recipients personally to comply with public safety measures, the law of contracts would also be unable to compel compliance. Existing public health legislation would also likely be ineffective because it would need to be substantially amended to incorporate the heightened powers necessary for the periodic examination of asymptomatic xenotransplant recipients. Xenotransplantation-specific legislation would be a legally effective means of enforcing public health safeguards since it could require conforming behaviors and could impose monetary fines on those recipients who, having benefited from life-saving intervention, fail to comply. This Article argues that legislation implementing a post-xenotransplantation surveillance system should withstand constitutional scrutiny because it would not be discriminatory and because, although it would violate fundamental rights of recipients, such violations would be justified under existing constitutional doctrines. PMID:15212014

  5. Multicontroller: an object programming approach to introduce advanced control algorithms for the GCS large scale project

    CERN Document Server

    Cabaret, S; Coppier, H; Rachid, A; Barillère, R; CERN. Geneva. IT Department

    2007-01-01

    The GCS (Gas Control System) project team at CERN uses a Model Driven Approach with a Framework - UNICOS (UNified Industrial COntrol System) - based on PLC (Programming Language Controller) and SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) technologies. The first' UNICOS versions were able to provide a PID (Proportional Integrative Derivative) controller whereas the Gas Systems required more advanced control strategies. The MultiController is a new UNICOS object which provides the following advanced control algorithms: Smith Predictor, PFC (Predictive Function Control), RST* and GPC (Global Predictive Control). Its design is based on a monolithic entity with a global structure definition which is able to capture the desired set of parameters of any specific control algorithm supported by the object. The SCADA system -- PVSS - supervises the MultiController operation. The PVSS interface provides users with supervision faceplate, in particular it links any MultiController with recipes: the GCS experts are ab...

  6. Application of the LBB regulatory approach to the steamlines of advanced WWER 1000 reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kiselyov, V.A.; Sokov, L.M.

    1997-04-01

    The LBB regulatory approach adopted in Russia in 1993 as an extra safety barrier is described for advanced WWER 1000 reactor steamline. The application of LBB concept requires the following additional protections. First, the steamline should be a highly qualified piping, performed in accordance with the applicable regulations and guidelines, carefully screened to verify that it is not subjected to any disqualifying failure mechanism. Second, a deterministic fracture mechanics analysis and leak rate evaluation have been performed to demonstrate that postulated through-wall crack that yields 95 1/min at normal operation conditions is stable even under seismic loads. Finally, it has been verified that the leak detection systems are sufficiently reliable, diverse and sensitive, and that adequate margins exist to detect a through wall crack smaller than the critical size. The obtained results are encouraging and show the possibility of the application of the LBB case to the steamline of advanced WWER 1000 reactor.

  7. Sleepwalking Into Infertility: The Need for a Public Health Approach Toward Advanced Maternal Age.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lemoine, Marie-Eve; Ravitsky, Vardit

    2015-01-01

    In Western countries today, a growing number of women delay motherhood until their late 30s and even 40s, as they invest time in pursuing education and career goals before starting a family. This social trend results from greater gender equality and expanded opportunities for women and is influenced by the availability of contraception and assisted reproductive technologies (ART). However, advanced maternal age is associated with increased health risks, including infertility. While individual medical solutions such as ART and elective egg freezing can promote reproductive autonomy, they entail significant risks and limitations. We thus argue that women should be better informed regarding the risks of advanced maternal age and ART, and that these individual solutions need to be supplemented by a public health approach, including policy measures that provide women with the opportunity to start a family earlier in life without sacrificing personal career goals. PMID:26575814

  8. Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The SAFE procedure is an efficient method of evaluating the physical protection system of a nuclear facility. Since the algorithms used in SAFE for path generation and evaluation are analytical, many paths can be evaluated with a modest investment in computer time. SAFE is easy to use because the information required is well-defined and the interactive nature of this procedure lends itself to straightforward operation. The modular approach that has been taken allows other functionally equivalent modules to be substituted as they become available. The SAFE procedure has broad applications in the nuclear facility safeguards field as well as in the security field in general. Any fixed facility containing valuable materials or components to be protected from theft or sabotage could be analyzed using this same automated evaluation technique

  9. Advanced Pre-clinical Research Approaches and Models to Studying Pediatric Anesthetic Neurotoxicity

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Cheng eWang

    2012-10-01

    Full Text Available Advances in pediatric and obstetric surgery have resulted in an increase in the duration and complexity of anesthetic procedures. A great deal of concern has recently arisen regarding the safety of anesthesia in infants and children. Because of obvious limitations, it is not possible to thoroughly explore the effects of anesthetic agents on neurons in vivo in human infants or children. However, the availability of some advanced pre-clinical research approaches and models, such as imaging technology both in vitro and in vivo, stem cell and nonhuman primate experimental models, have provided potentially invaluable tools for examining the developmental effects of anesthetic agents. This review discusses the potential application of some sophisticaled research approaches, e.g., calcium imaging, in stem cell-derived in vitro models, especially human embryonic neural stem cells, along with their capacity for proliferation and their potential for differentiation, to dissect relevant mechanisms underlying the etiology of the neurotoxicity associated with developmental exposures to anesthetic agents. Also, this review attempts to discuss several advantages for using the developing rhesus monkey models (in vivo, when combined with dynamic molecular imaging approaches, in addressing critical issues related to the topic of pediatric sedation/anesthesia. These include the relationships between anesthetic-induced neurotoxicity, dose response, time-course and developmental stage at time of exposure (in vivo studies, serving to provide the most expeditious platform toward decreasing the uncertainty in extrapolating pre-clinical data to the human condition.

  10. Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards: An Introduction to Safeguards for Emerging Nuclear States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) hosted a workshop from May 4-22, 2009, on the fundamental elements of international safeguards. Entitled 'A Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards,' the workshop introduced post-graduate students from Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia to the fundamental issues and best practices associated with international safeguards and encouraged them to explore potential career paths in safeguards. Workshops like these strengthen the international safeguards regime by promoting the development of a 'safeguards culture' among young nuclear professionals within nascent nuclear countries. While this concept of safeguards culture is sometimes hard to define and even harder to measure, this paper will demonstrate that the promotion of safeguards cultures through workshops like these justifies the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

  11. Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ehinger, Michael H [ORNL; Johnson, Shirley [Tucker Creek Consulting

    2010-02-01

    The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

  12. A model to improve efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    verification of nuclear material inventories complemented by containment and surveillance measures and by non- traditional safeguard it is understood the qualitative measures stated in the A.P. The implementation of this integrated system will impact directly in the inspection effort, which will be limited by budget constraints. Besides, considering that the implementation of the new qualitative measures merely added to the traditional ones will substantially increase inspection costs related, not necessarily improving efficiency; it seems reasonable to attempt finding new ways of maintaining an adequate level of detection and deterrence. As a conclusion, an optimization in the distribution of a nearly fix budget must be strongly considered. A nuclear fuel cycle model is proposed where the nuclear power plants are fed with only natural uranium fuels assemblies. The model stated describes some generic sequential stages to be covered. In addition, a generic acquisition path of nuclear material with their strategic value associated is assumed. Many factors had been considered in this analysis, such as the diversion at any stage of the nuclear fuel cycle, the strategic value of the nuclear material and the cost related to make this hypothesis true. In our approach the cost of the detection measure, considerably vary from one stage to another in the nuclear fuel cycle. In this exercise some general bounded conditions are assumed and they are combined with the factors already mentioned. To carry on this study the stages at which the lowest detection probability is got are identified. Once these points had been found, it is possible to define the stages at which the traditional safeguards measures had better been complemented to the non traditional ones without getting as a result any significant decrease of the confidence in the total detection probability, improving safeguard effectiveness and efficiency. (author)

  13. Game theoretical analysis of safeguards effectiveness. Pt. 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In Part 1 of the present study on safeguards effectiveness it was shown that for attribute sampling problems the guaranteed probability of detection can be used as a measure for the effectiveness of safeguards procedures. In Part 2 this measure was used for variable sampling problems, with given false alarm probabilities as boundary conditions. In Part 3 we show that the measure can be justified by appropriate game theoretical models. Furthermore, we show that, for attribute sampling, the equilibrium strategy of the operator is legal behavior if appropriate effort conditions are fulfilled, whether or not the inspector announces his strategy in advance. For variable sampling, legal behavior is equilibrium strategy of the operator only if the inspector announces his strategy. (orig.)

  14. Safeguards experience at the Sandia Laboratories reactor site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sandia Laboratories has an extensive activity in the safeguards area with application to the Technical Area V reactors. The security, development, and operations groups are working together to establish systems which comply with the manual chapters as well as advanced safeguards systems. It appears that to bring an existing facility into compliance with current requirements may be expensive in terms of hardware, facility modifications, manpower, and loss of reactor operating time. The reactor operations and the security groups at Sandia are fortunate to the extent that we are reaping the benefit from DSS funding the work of the development group. The activities conducted thus far have had no measurable impact on the operational safety of the facility. However, we are currently at the midpoint of a five year program with many major modifications, systems development, and decisions yet to be made. Hopefully, the favorable experience will continue

  15. Advanced control approach for hybrid systems based on solid oxide fuel cells

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Highlights: • Advanced new control system for SOFC based hybrid plants. • Proportional–Integral approach with feed-forward technology. • Good control of fuel cell temperature. • All critical properties maintained inside safe conditions. - Abstract: This paper shows a new advanced control approach for operations in hybrid systems equipped with solid oxide fuel cell technology. This new tool, which combines feed-forward and standard proportional–integral techniques, controls the system during load changes avoiding failures and stress conditions detrimental to component life. This approach was selected to combine simplicity and good control performance. Moreover, the new approach presented in this paper eliminates the need for mass flow rate meters and other expensive probes, as usually required for a commercial plant. Compared to previous works, better performance is achieved in controlling fuel cell temperature (maximum gradient significantly lower than 3 K/min), reducing the pressure gap between cathode and anode sides (at least a 30% decrease during transient operations), and generating a higher safe margin (at least a 10% increase) for the Steam-to-Carbon Ratio. This new control system was developed and optimized using a hybrid system transient model implemented, validated and tested within previous works. The plant, comprising the coupling of a tubular solid oxide fuel cell stack with a microturbine, is equipped with a bypass valve able to connect the compressor outlet with the turbine inlet duct for rotational speed control. Following model development and tuning activities, several operative conditions were considered to show the new control system increased performance compared to previous tools (the same hybrid system model was used with the new control approach). Special attention was devoted to electrical load steps and ramps considering significant changes in ambient conditions

  16. Tracking and position recognition applied to remote monitoring to be used in integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    In the framework of the Strengthening and integrated Safeguards Systems new measures and tools are available to meet the safeguards objective. The credible assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities derived from the implementation of the Additional Protocol has an impact on the current safeguards approach to declared facilities thus their through review is advisable. Among these tools, a more intensive use of unattended systems and remote transmission of safeguards relevant information are considered, specifically for On Load Reactors (ORLs). A Remote Monitoring Systems (RMS) to cover the transfers of spent fuels from the ponds to a dry storage is being tested at Embalse nuclear power plant. In connection with the RMS, this paper describes some of the technologies involved: the Global Position System (GPS) and the Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID), which were implemented due to the requirement to ascertain the position of valuable elements. The main objective of this design aimed at safeguarding the spent fuels transfers from the welding cell to the silos field by a strict surveillance of the whereabouts. The bases for the development were settled by the specifications imposed by the integrated Safeguards of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in Argentina. The resultant tracking and position recognition system is based on GPS receivers operating in Differential Mode, with the aid of Radio Frequency Identification. In compliance with the safeguard requirement the whole system is able to operate in a continuous and remote mode, what means without human being attention. (author)

  17. Preparing for Future Verification Challenges. Summary of an International Safeguards Symposium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    IAEA safeguards symposia are important forums for substantive and detailed interaction between the Secretariat of the IAEA, its Member States and the international community on safeguards and verification issues. The 11th Symposium on International Safeguards, Preparing for Future Verification Challenges, was held in Vienna, from 1 to 5 November 2010. The symposium was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA). The aim of the symposium was to help the IAEA to prepare for future verification challenges by engaging in dialogue and information exchange with Member States, technical experts, the nuclear industry and members of the broader safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation community. The main topical areas of this symposium were drawn from the Department of Safeguards' Long Term Strategic Plan (2012-2023). Discussions ranged from conceptual considerations such as safeguards approaches and performance evaluation to issues of organizational culture, knowledge management and professional development. This book contains the addresses and statements given at the opening session and the closing session. It also summarizes the technical plenary session, the oral presentations, the forums and the panels at the 37 sessions of the symposium. The invited papers presented during the various topical sessions as well as papers exhibited at the poster sessions and the forum and panel summaries are available on the IAEA web site.

  18. Human-Centred Computing for Assisting Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    With the rapid evolution of enabling hardware and software, technologies including 3D simulation, virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), advanced user interfaces (UI), and geographical information systems (GIS) are increasingly employed in many aspects of modern life. In line with this, the nuclear industry is rapidly adopting emerging technologies to improve efficiency and safety by supporting planning and optimization of maintenance and decommissioning work, as well as for knowledge management, surveillance, training and briefing field operatives, education, etc. For many years, the authors have been involved in research and development (R&D) into the application of 3D simulation, VR, and AR, for mobile, desktop, and immersive 3D systems, to provide a greater sense of presence and situation awareness, for training, briefing, and in situ work by field operators. This work has resulted in a unique software base and experience (documented in numerous reports) from evaluating the effects of the design of training programmes and briefing sessions on human performance and training efficiency when applying various emerging technologies. In addition, the authors are involved in R&D into the use of 3D simulation, advanced UIs, mobile computing, and GIS systems to support realistic visualization of the combined radiological and geographical environment, as well as acquisition, analyzes, visualization and sharing of radiological and other data, within nuclear installations and their surroundings. The toolkit developed by the authors, and the associated knowledge base, has been successfully applied to various aspects of the nuclear industry, and has great potential within the safeguards domain. It can be used to train safeguards inspectors, brief inspectors before inspections, assist inspectors in situ (data registration, analyzes, and communication), support the design and verification of safeguards systems, conserve data and experience, educate future safeguards

  19. You, your facility and IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    During the seven year period since the ratification of the Safeguards Agreement between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the involved U.S. agencies and the IAEA have worked together to assure the effective implementation of international safeguards. There has been a continual effort to develop programs and procedures to improve performance and efficiency for the benefit of selected facilities and the IAEA. This paper discusses the implementation and economic impact of safeguards inspections on the IAEA and selected facilities and the ongoing effort to enhance performance and efficiency without compromising the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards

  20. Experiences and prospects of safeguards in PNC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) initiated nuclear safeguards activities in 1960. In 1965, PNC developed a nuclear material accounting system for the handling of plutonium. A participant in IAEA inspections since 1968, PNC enacted the nuclear safeguards provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1977. By that time, the methods and equipment used in the IAEA inspections were similar to those used today. New Safeguards Concepts for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Material, which Japan and the USA will sign shortly, clearly states that information on relevant safeguard features shall be supplied to the IAEA on a voluntary basis, starting from the early design stages of the facility. The information will permit the IAEA to identify the key techniques and measures needed to implement the relevant safeguard provisions agreed to between Japan and the USA. In compliance with the Safeguards Concepts, work is proceeding on the relevant safeguard provisions for the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility and MONJU. PNC's nuclear safeguards experience should prove useful in developing the safeguard provisions for new R and D programs and facilities. (author)

  1. The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  2. IAEA safeguards: Staying ahead of the game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    What are nuclear safeguards and why are they important? Answers are provided in the booklet, describing and explaining the fundamentals of the IAEA safeguards system and its role as a key element of international security, and addressing the system's implementation, costs, requirements, resources and historical development, with an emphasis on trends and strengthening measures over the past 10-15 years. Topics discussed include the safeguards State evaluation process and and the key requirements of the safeguards system including information sources (open source information, commercial satellite imagery and nuclear trade related information) and the state of the art equipment, techniques and technology (unattended and remote monitoring equipment, environmental sampling, etc.)

  3. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  4. Design of safeguards systems for authentication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Full text: To permit valid conclusions to be drawn from safeguards data, it is essential that this data be authentic. That is, it must be known that the data originated from the intended source, that the data was not changed in transit and that it is not a repeat or delayed copy of previous data. Furthermore a compromise of the source must not permit new trusted data to be generated and should not invalidate previous data. Authentication should be designed into safeguards systems instead of being added later. Failure to integrate authentication early in the design results in systems that are expensive or possibly impossible to deploy securely. This paper gives some of the factors that should be considered and some of the methods that can be employed for ensuring high security while minimizing cost. The paper is a compilation of some of the lessons learned by the authors during the last few years of working with the authentication of these systems. Examples are given of approaches that worked well and some that the authors found less successful. More use is being made of unattended and remote monitoring, and more facilities are becoming heavily automated. In some cases sensors and data generators may be deployed in many locations within a facility and may not be easily accessed (or may be located in hazardous locations). Because of these factors, physical access is becoming more limited, so safeguards systems must be designed to maximize reliability and to minimize inspection and maintenance time. For example, tamper indicating enclosures are only effective when they are adequately inspected, thus the number, size, and complexity of tamper indicating enclosures should be minimized. This might be accomplished by applying cryptographic data authentication at the sensor thus avoiding the need to install tamper indicating conduit (The inspection of long runs of conduit is difficult and expensive.) The proper use of standard internationally accepted protocols for data

  5. Integrated Safeguards proposal for Finland. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The IAEA has requested several member states to present their proposal of the application of the Integrated Safeguards (IS) system in their nuclear facilities. This report contains a IS proposal for Finland prepared under the Task FIN C 1264 of The Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. The comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been one of the main tools in the fight against nuclear proliferation since the entry-into-force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty three decades ago. In the 1990s some of the inherent weaknesses of this so-called traditional safeguards system were revealed first in Iraq and then in North Korea. Therefore, the member states of the LAEA decided to give the Agency additional legal authority in order to make its control system more effective as well as more efficient than before. This was accomplished by the approval of the so-called Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) in 1997. Straightforward implementation of new safeguards measures allowed by the Additional Protocol (INF-CIRC540) without careful review of the old procedures based on INFCIRC153 would only result in increased costs within the IAEA and in the member states. In order to avoid that kind of outcome the old and new means available to the Agency shall be combined to form an optimised integrated safeguards (IS) system. When creating an effective and efficient system a necessary approach is a state-level evaluation, which means that each state shall be assessed by the IAEA separately and as a whole. The assessment of a country's nuclear field shall result in credible assurance of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials to prohibited purposes and of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, facilities and materials. Having achieved that assurance and being able to maintain it in a state the LAEA can leave some traditional routine safeguards activities undone there. At present, the nuclear fuel cycle in

  6. Integrated Safeguards proposal for Finland. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anttila, M. [VTT Energy, Espoo (Finland)

    2000-08-01

    The IAEA has requested several member states to present their proposal of the application of the Integrated Safeguards (IS) system in their nuclear facilities. This report contains a IS proposal for Finland prepared under the Task FIN C 1264 of The Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. The comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been one of the main tools in the fight against nuclear proliferation since the entry-into-force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty three decades ago. In the 1990s some of the inherent weaknesses of this so-called traditional safeguards system were revealed first in Iraq and then in North Korea. Therefore, the member states of the LAEA decided to give the Agency additional legal authority in order to make its control system more effective as well as more efficient than before. This was accomplished by the approval of the so-called Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) in 1997. Straightforward implementation of new safeguards measures allowed by the Additional Protocol (INF-CIRC540) without careful review of the old procedures based on INFCIRC153 would only result in increased costs within the IAEA and in the member states. In order to avoid that kind of outcome the old and new means available to the Agency shall be combined to form an optimised integrated safeguards (IS) system. When creating an effective and efficient system a necessary approach is a state-level evaluation, which means that each state shall be assessed by the IAEA separately and as a whole. The assessment of a country's nuclear field shall result in credible assurance of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials to prohibited purposes and of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, facilities and materials. Having achieved that assurance and being able to maintain it in a state the LAEA can leave some traditional routine safeguards activities undone there. At present, the nuclear fuel cycle

  7. Unannounced inspection for integrated safeguards: A theoretical perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    formalize timeliness and allow its determination with regard to different interim inspection strategies. The following simple example will give the flavor of our approach: Over the course of a year and using an appropriate random number generator, an inspector decides on a daily basis whether or not to perform an interim inspection at a facility. He chooses the probabilities so that, on average, three interim inspections take place, and so that the end-of-year PIV inspection occurs with certainty. The inspectee is informed of this procedure, but not of the precise probabilities the inspectorate uses. The inspectee wishes to violate in the course of the year in such a way as to maximize the time interval between violation and the next inspection. The inspector wishes to minimize that time interval, so that the appropriate effectiveness measure is the average time to inspection after violation. An analysis leads to the following conclusions: 1. As formulated above, this inspection problem has no solution: the protagonists - inspector and inspectee - do not possess optimal strategies. In technical terms, the average time to inspection does not have a saddle point in the space of combined strategies. 2. If the inspector announces it in advance and in a credible way the probabilities he intends to use in generating his random inspections, optimal strategies exist and the problem has a solution. 3. The aforementioned solution states that the average time between illegal action and the next inspection is greater than or equal to that which would be achieved by performing exactly 3 interim inspections predictably and at 3-month intervals over the year. While the above example is an oversimplification of real interim inspections performed by the IAEA, the conclusions are non-trivial and relevant to any consideration of unannounced inspection regimes. We discuss several other models in our paper, with and without inclusion of measurement uncertainty and with and without allowance for

  8. Nonlinear approaches in engineering applications advanced analysis of vehicle related technologies

    CERN Document Server

    Dai, Liming

    2016-01-01

    This book looks at the broad field of engineering science through the lens of nonlinear approaches. Examples focus on issues in vehicle technology, including vehicle dynamics, vehicle-road interaction, steering, and control for electric and hybrid vehicles. Also included are discussions on train and tram systems, aerial vehicles, robot-human interaction, and contact and scratch analysis at the micro/nanoscale. Chapters are based on invited contributions from world-class experts in the field who advance the future of engineering by discussing the development of more optimal, accurate, efficient, and cost and energy effective systems. This book is appropriate for researchers, students, and practicing engineers who are interested in the applications of nonlinear approaches to solving engineering and science problems.

  9. Two approaches to meeting the economic challenge for advanced BWR designs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper presents the design overview and approach to addressing the aforementioned economic challenges for two Advanced BWR designs. The first plant is the ABWR and the second is the ESBWR. The ABWR relies on proven technology and components and an extensive infrastructure that has been built up over the last 20 years. Because it has proven and standards safety systems it has very limited uncertainty regarding licensing. Finally, it relies on the economies of scale and overall design flexibility to improve the overall economics of power generation. The ESBWR on the other hand has taken an innovative approach to reduce systems and components to simplify the overall plant to improve plant economics. The overall plant design is indeed simpler, but improved economics required reliance on some economies of scale also. This design embodied in the ESBWR, also has minimized the overall development cost by utilizing features and components from the ABWR and SBWR technology programs

  10. SARP-2: Safeguards accounting and reports program, revised

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A computer code, SARP (safeguards accounting and reports program), which will generate and maintain at-facility safeguards accounting records, and generate IAEA safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user, revision is described. 4 refs, 1 fig

  11. The Problems of Radiofrequency Ablation as an Approach for Advanced Unresectable Ductal Pancreatic Carcinoma

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Advanced ductal pancreatic carcinoma (PC) remains a challenge for current surgical and medical approaches. It has recently been claimed that radiofrequency ablation (RFA) may be beneficial for patients with locally advanced or metastatic PC. Using the MEDLINE database, we found seven studies involving 106 patients in which PC was treated using RFA. The PC was mainly located in the pancreatic head (66.9%) with a median size of 4.6 cm. RFA was carried out in 85 patients (80.1%) with locally advanced PC and in 21 (19.9%) with metastatic disease. Palliative surgical procedures were carried out in 41.5% of the patients. The average temperature used was 90 °C (with a temperature range of 30–105 °C) and the ratio between the number of passes of the probe and the size of the tumor in centimeters was 0.5 (range of 0.36–1). The median postoperative morbidity and mortality were 28.3% and 7.5%, respectively; the median survival was 6.5 months (range of 1–33 months). In conclusion, RFA is a feasible technique: however, its safety and long-term results are disappointing; Thus, the RFA procedure should not be recommended in clinical practice for a PC patient

  12. An Ontological-Fuzzy Approach to Advance Reservation in Multi-Cluster Grids

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Advance reservation is an important mechanism for a successful utilization of available resources in distributed multi-cluster environments. This mechanism allows, for example, a user to provide parameters aiming to satisfy requirements related to applications' execution time and temporal dependence. This predictability can lead the system to reach higher levels of QoS. However, the support for advance reservation has been restricted due to the complexity of large scale configurations and also dynamic changes verified in these systems. In this research work it is proposed an advance reservation method, based on a ontology-fuzzy approach. It allows a user to reserve a wide variety of resources and enable large jobs to be reserved among different nodes. In addition, it dynamically verifies the possibility of reservation with the local RMS, avoiding future allocation conflicts. Experimental results of the proposal, through simulation, indicate that the proposed mechanism reached a successful level of flexibility for large jobs and more appropriated distribution of resources in a distributed multi-cluster configuration.

  13. Cross-platform Approach to Advanced IP-Telephony Services using JAIN-SIP

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Amer Al-Canaan

    2010-07-01

    Full Text Available SIP is a call control and signalling protocol that was adopted by the 3GPP1 to deliver IP multimedia services to the mobile network. Cross platform IP-telephony service creation is a challenging task. Although, the emergence of JAIN-SIP2 has reinforced the development and implementation of platform-independent IP-telephony services, the development of advanced cross-platform SIP (Session Initiation Protocol services including video-enabled services is more challenging. Several solutions are discussed in order to extend the ability of JAIN-SIP to enhance advanced and video-enabled service creation on multiple platforms. This paper demonstrates the design and implementation of a few advanced services using JAIN-SIP in cross-platform environment including Windows, OS X and Solaris, providing more details on our proposed solution and proposing the use of Web services (WS to bring in more features to JAIN-SIP. Some simple and intermediate services are also presented for explanation of our approach.

  14. Verification and the safeguards legacy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    A number of inspection or monitoring systems throughout the world over the last decades have been structured drawing upon the IAEA experience of setting up and operating its safeguards system. The first global verification system was born with the creation of the IAEA safeguards system, about 35 years ago. With the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, inspections were to be performed under safeguards agreements, concluded directly between the IAEA and non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty. The IAEA developed the safeguards system within the limitations reflected in the Blue Book (INFCIRC 153), such as limitations of routine access by the inspectors to 'strategic points', including 'key measurement points', and the focusing of verification on declared nuclear material in declared installations. The system, based as it was on nuclear material accountancy. It was expected to detect a diversion of nuclear material with a high probability and within a given time and therefore determine also that there had been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes. The most vital element of any verification system is the inspector. Technology can assist but cannot replace the inspector in the field. Their experience, knowledge, intuition and initiative are invaluable factors contributing to the success of any inspection regime. The IAEA inspectors are however not part of an international police force that will intervene to prevent a violation taking place. To be credible they should be technically qualified with substantial experience in industry or in research and development before they are recruited. An extensive training program has to make sure that the inspectors retain their professional capabilities and that it provides them with new skills. Over the years, the inspectors and through them the safeguards verification system gained experience in: organization and management of large teams; examination of records and evaluation of material balances

  15. Defence plutonium inventories and international safeguards in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The UK Ministry of Defence's (MOD) publication Plutonium and Aldermaston: An Historical Account is a valuable report because it increases transparency and openness with regard to the UK's military fissile material holdings. The report does not fulfil the precise mandate set out in the government's 1998 Strategic Defence Review. The MOD then committed itself to providing an account of fissile material production. Instead, it has reported on fissile material transfers to and from the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston (AWE) in the period 1952 to 1999. On 31 March 1999, the UK defence stockpile of plutonium comprised 3.51 tonnes. The report also discloses that physical stocks of plutonium at Aldermaston exceed recorded net deliveries to the site by 0.29 tonne (the inventory difference). The study reveals that the AWE acted as the centre of plutonium processing for both civilian and military programmes in the UK. The civilian work was largely phased out in the 1970s. To further increase transparency and meet stated disarmament objectives, the Department of Trade and Industry and MOD should launch a joint study of defence fissile material production, encompassing both plutonium and highly enriched uranium. A new table shows that the coverage of international safeguards in the UK is extensive. France is the only other state with a recognised nuclear weapon programme that approaches the UK in its safeguards coverage. The UK's withdrawals of fissionable material from safeguards since 1978 have recently been made public. It would be a significant step to strengthen safeguards if the UK were to announce that in the future it will not withdraw any nuclear material from international safeguards. (author)

  16. A Critical Element to Successful Implementation Of Future Safeguards Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    As we look to the future of nuclear materials management and safeguards systems, it is essential to place significant emphasis on creation of a strong infrastructure to support and sustain modern systems. Traditionally, safeguards infrastructure development has focused on such elements as equipment development, strengthening of the national regulatory base, creation of state-of-the-art accounting and control systems, and procedure development. Less emphasis has been placed on recognition of the 'human element' as a primary component of the necessary infrastructure and the key to successful implementation of new or existing systems. The importance of the human element can be recognized by considering the broad span of influence and control, direction, regulation and implementation of safeguards systems exhibited by a large number of professionals: diplomats, scholars, politicians, facility managers, program directors and technical specialists. These individuals provide the connectivity or 'glue' that binds together a myriad of smaller safeguards program elements and ensures a holistic approach is fostered and maintained. The education and training of our future leaders and experts must receive the highest priority. In addition, this effort must consider factors beyond development of technical capabilities. Given the rapidly evolving world climate since the end of the cold war, our safeguards leaders and experts need education and training that will provide a well-developed understanding of the broader political dimensions of current nonproliferation challenges. They need to learn how to think, rather than what to think. A sustained effort is required to highlight the importance of the human dimension of safeguards and nuclear materials management and how these systems support international nonproliferation efforts. New educational initiatives are needed to better prepare the next generation of leaders and experts. Increased regional and national cooperation in the

  17. Performance Indices to Aid Nuclear Material Safeguard Management Decisions

    OpenAIRE

    Lathrop, J.W.

    1981-01-01

    The management of a national or international nuclear material safeguard system involves large numbers of very complex strategic and tactical decisions at several organizational levels. This report outlines a decision analytic approach to developing decision aids to assist the various decision makers in the material accounting part of that process. The intent of the report is to layout a very general simple conceptual framework for such decision aids. While the framework combines the most bas...

  18. Improving advanced cardiovascular life support skills in medical students: simulation-based education approach

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Hamidreza Reihani

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Objective: In this trial, we intend to assess the effect of simulation-based education approach on advanced cardiovascular life support skills among medical students. Methods: Through convenient sampling method, 40 interns of Mashhad University of Medical Sciences in their emergency medicine rotation (from September to December 2012 participated in this study. Advanced Cardiovascular Life Support (ACLS workshops with pretest and post-test exams were performed. Workshops and checklists for pretest and post-test exams were designed according to the latest American Heart Association (AHA guidelines. Results: The total score of the students increased significantly after workshops (24.6 out of 100 to 78.6 out of 100. This demonstrates 53.9% improvement in the skills after the simulation-based education (P< 0.001. Also the mean score of each station had a significant improvement (P< 0.001. Conclusion: Pretests showed that interns had poor performance in practical clinical matters while their scientific knowledge, such as ECG interpretation was acceptable. The overall results of the study highlights that Simulation based-education approach is highly effective in Improving ACLS skills among medical students.

  19. Design and Assessment Approach on Advanced SFR Safety with Emphasis on the Core Disruptive Accident Issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The safety of future sodium cooled fast reactors (SFRs) will be achieved at the same level as that achieved for future light water reactors (LWRs). The concept of defence in depth, as widely applied to the design of LWRs, will be applied to the safety design of advanced SFRs. Through the prevention, detection and control of accidents, core disruptive accidents (CDAs) will be excluded from design basis events. Considering that the SFR reactor core is not the most reactive configuration, unlike in LWRs, design measures to prevent CDAs and to mitigate the consequences of them are being considered as provisions for beyond design basis events. To meet future nuclear energy system safey goals effectively, advanced SFR designs should exploit passive safety features to increase safety margins and to enhance reliability, i.e. prevention and/or mitigation of CDAs. In particular, the safety approach needed to eliminate severe recriticality will be highly desirable, because with this approach, severe accidents in SFRs can be simply regarded as being similar to LWRs. In addition, it is easier to make full use of the excellent heat transport characteristics of sodium coolant in achieving in-vessel cooling and the retention of post-accident core debris. (author)

  20. The IAEA's safeguards system. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? What assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification?