WorldWideScience

Sample records for accident lessons learned

  1. Lessons learned from accidents investigations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zuniga-Bello, P. [Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia (CONACYT), Mexico City (Mexico); Croft, J. [National Radiological Protection Board (United Kingdom); Glenn, J

    1997-12-31

    Accidents from three main practices: medical applications, industrial radiography and industrial irradiators are used to illustrate some common causes of accidents and the main lessons to be learned. A brief description of some of these accidents is given. Lessons learned from the described accidents are approached by subjects covering: safety culture, quality assurance, human factors, good engineering practice, defence in depth, security of sources, safety assessment and monitoring and verification compliance. (author)

  2. Lessons learned from accident investigations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zuniga-Bello, P.; Croft, J.R.; Glenn, J.

    1998-01-01

    Accidents in three main practices - medical applications, industrial radiography and industrial irradiators - are used to illustrate some common causes of accidents and the main lessons to be learned from them. A brief description of some of these accidents is given. Lessons learned from the accidents described are approached bearing in mind: safety culture, quality assurance, human factors, good engineering practice, defence in depth, security of sources, safety assessment and monitoring and verification compliance. (author)

  3. Lessons learned from early criticality accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malenfant, R.E.

    1996-01-01

    Four accidents involving the approach to criticality occurred during the period July, 1945, through May, 1996. These have been described in the format of the OPERATING EXPERIENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY which is distributed by the Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety. Although the lessons learned have been incorporated in standards, codes, and formal procedures during the last fifty years, this is their first presentation in this format. It is particularly appropriate that they be presented in the forum of the Nuclear Criticality Technology Safety Project Workshop closest to the fiftieth anniversary of the last of the four accidents, and that which was most instrumental in demonstrating the need to incorporate lessons learned

  4. Low level waste shipment accident lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rast, D.M.; Rowe, J.G.; Reichel, C.W.

    1995-01-01

    On October 1, 1994 a shipment of low-level waste from the Fernald Environmental Management Project, Fernald, Ohio, was involved in an accident near Rolla, Missouri. The accident did not result in the release of any radioactive material. The accident did generate important lessons learned primarily in the areas of driver and emergency response communications. The shipment was comprised of an International Standards Organization (ISO) container on a standard flatbed trailer. The accident caused the low-level waste package to separate from the trailer and come to rest on its top in the median. The impact of the container with the pavement and median inflicted relatively minor damage to the container. The damage was not substantial enough to cause failure of container integrity. The success of the package is attributable to the container design and the packaging procedures used at the Fernald Environmental Management Project for low-level waste shipments. Although the container survived the initial wreck, is was nearly breached when the first responders attempted to open the ISO container. Even though the container was clearly marked and the shipment documentation was technically correct, this information did not identify that the ISO container was the primary containment for the waste. The lessons learned from this accident have DOE complex wide applicability. This paper is intended to describe the accident, subsequent emergency response operations, and the lessons learned from this incident

  5. Learning lessons from Natech accidents - the eNATECH accident database

    Science.gov (United States)

    Krausmann, Elisabeth; Girgin, Serkan

    2016-04-01

    When natural hazards impact industrial facilities that house or process hazardous materials, fires, explosions and toxic releases can occur. This type of accident is commonly referred to as Natech accident. In order to prevent the recurrence of accidents or to better mitigate their consequences, lessons-learned type studies using available accident data are usually carried out. Through post-accident analysis, conclusions can be drawn on the most common damage and failure modes and hazmat release paths, particularly vulnerable storage and process equipment, and the hazardous materials most commonly involved in these types of accidents. These analyses also lend themselves to identifying technical and organisational risk-reduction measures that require improvement or are missing. Industrial accident databases are commonly used for retrieving sets of Natech accident case histories for further analysis. These databases contain accident data from the open literature, government authorities or in-company sources. The quality of reported information is not uniform and exhibits different levels of detail and accuracy. This is due to the difficulty of finding qualified information sources, especially in situations where accident reporting by the industry or by authorities is not compulsory, e.g. when spill quantities are below the reporting threshold. Data collection has then to rely on voluntary record keeping often by non-experts. The level of detail is particularly non-uniform for Natech accident data depending on whether the consequences of the Natech event were major or minor, and whether comprehensive information was available for reporting. In addition to the reporting bias towards high-consequence events, industrial accident databases frequently lack information on the severity of the triggering natural hazard, as well as on failure modes that led to the hazmat release. This makes it difficult to reconstruct the dynamics of the accident and renders the development of

  6. Lessons learned from radiological accidents at medical exposures in radiotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fagundes, J.S.; Ferreira, A.F.; Lima, C.M.A.; Silva, F.C.A. da

    2017-01-01

    An exposure is considered accidental in radiotherapy when there is a substantial deviation in the prescription of treatment. In this work, an analysis of published radiological accidents, both in Brazil and internationally, was performed during medical exposures in radiotherapy treatments, removing the main lessons learned. Of the research carried out, we highlight Brazil with four radiological accidents and one death in the period between 2011 and 2014; the United States of America with 169 accidents with two deaths from 2000 to 2010 and France from 2001 to 2014 had 569 deaths without patients. Lessons learned have been described, for example, that maintenance personnel training should specify limitations or restrictions on the handling or adjustment of critical parts on the accelerator. It is recommended to apply the 10 main lessons learned due to radiological accidents during medical exposures in radiotherapy treatments to avoid future events

  7. Lessons learned from MONJU sodium leak accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakai, Ryodai; Ito, Kazumoto; Nagata, Takashi

    2000-01-01

    MONJU sodium leak accident was a small accident with a large public impact. There was no injures or exposure to radiation, nor was there any loss of safety function such as reactor shutdown or reactor cooling. On the contrary a social impact is considerably large, whereby the plant remains shutdown. This paper describes the lessons learned from the accident, i.e. the impact of the accident and its cause, and the features on risk management in view of social aspect as well as technical aspect. (author)

  8. Summary of the Current Status of Lessons Learned From Fukushima Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pasamehmetoglu, Kemal

    2013-01-01

    This presentation introduced the current status of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, and in particular, the recommendations released by a NRC Near-term Task Force to enhance reactor safety in the 21. century. The near-term recommendations are focused on emergency power and emergency cooling availability during station blackout accidents

  9. Chemical and nuclear emergencies: Interchanging lessons learned from planning and accident experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adler, V.; Sorensen, J.H.; Rogers, G.O.

    1989-01-01

    Because the goal of emergency preparedness for both chemical and nuclear hazards is to reduce human exposure to hazardous materials, this paper examines the interchange of lessons learned from emergency planning and accident experience in both industries. While the concerns are slightly different, sufficient similarity is found for each to draw implications from the others experience. Principally the chemical industry can learn from the dominant planning experience associated with nuclear power plants, while the nuclear industry can chiefly learn from the chemical industry's accident experience. 23 refs

  10. Accident at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ashrafi, A.; Farnoudi, F.; Tochai, M.T.M.; Mirhabibi, N.

    1986-01-01

    On March 28, 1979, the TMI, unit 2 nuclear power plant experienced a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) which has had a major impact among the others, upon the safety of nuclear power plants. Although a small part of the reactor core melted in this accident, but due to well performance of the vital safety equipment, there was no serious radioactivity release to the environment, and the accident has had no impact on the basic safety goals. A brief scenario of the accident, its consequences and the lessons learned are discussed

  11. Safety Requirements / Design Criteria for SFR. Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yllera, Javier

    2013-01-01

    After the Fukushima event (March 2011) the IAEA has started an action to review and revise, if necessary, all Safety Standards to take into consideration the lessons learned from the accident. The Safety Standards that need to be revised have been identified. A Prioritization Approach has been established: The first priority is to review safety guides applicable for NPPs and spent fuel storage with focus on the measures for the prevention and mitigation of severe accident due to external hazards - ● Regulatory framework, Safety assessment, Management system, Radiation protection and Emergency Preparedness and response; ● Sitting, Design, Operation of NPPs ● Decommissioning and Waste Management. Original sources for lessons learned: IAE fact Finding Mission, Japan´s report to the Ministerial Conference, INSAG Report, etc. Later, other lesson sources considered

  12. Risk communication in the case of the Fukushima accident: Impact of communication and lessons to be learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perko, Tanja

    2016-10-01

    Risk communication about the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in 2011 was often not transparent, timely, clear, nor factually correct. However, lessons related to risk communication have been identified and some of them are already addressed in national and international communication programmes and strategies. The Fukushima accident may be seen as a practice scenario for risk communication with important lessons to be learned. As a result of risk communication failures during the accident, the world is now better prepared for communication related to nuclear emergencies than it was 5 years ago The present study discusses the impact of communication, as applied during the Fukushima accident, and the main lessons learned. It then identifies pathways for transparent, timely, clear and factually correct communication to be developed, practiced and applied in nuclear emergency communication before, during, and after nuclear accidents. Integr Environ Assess Manag 2016;12:683-686. © 2016 SETAC. © 2016 SETAC.

  13. Nuclear Security Summit and Workshop 2015: Preventing, Understanding and Recovering from Nuclear Accidents lessons learned from Chernobyl and Fukushima

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-09-01

    Workshop 2015 "Preventing, Understanding and Recovering from Nuclear Accidents"--lessons learned from Chernobyl and Fukushima Distribution Statement...by the factor to get the U.S. customary unit. “Preventing, Understanding and Recovering from Nuclear Accidents” – lessons learned from Chernobyl ...and Fukushima NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT & WORKSHOP 2015 2 Background The 1986 Chernobyl and the 2011 Fukushima accidents provoked world-wide concern

  14. Outline of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident. Lessons Learned and Safety Enhancements

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Hirano Masashi

    2017-01-01

    This paper briefly presents the outline of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and summarizes the major lessons learned having been drawn and safety enhancements having been done in Japan for the purpose of giving inputs to the discussions to be taken place in the Special Invited Session “Fukushima, 5 years after”.

  15. Radiological accident and incident in Thailand: Lesson to be learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ya-anant, N.; Tiyapun, K.; Saiyut, K.

    2011-01-01

    Radioactive materials in Thailand have been used in medicine, research and industry for more than 50 y. Several radiological accident and incidents happened in the past 10 y. A serious one was the radiological accident that occurred in Samut Prakan (Thailand) in 2000. The serious radiological accident occurred when the 60 Co head was partially dismantled, taken from that storage to sell as scrap metal. Three victims died and 10 people received high dose from the source. The lesson learned from the radiological accident in Samut Prakan was to improve in many subjects, such as efficiency in Ministerial Regulations and Atomic Energy Act, emergency response and etc. In addition to the serious accident, there are also some small incidents that occurred, such as detection of contaminated scrap metals from the re-cycling of scrap metals from steel factories. Therefore, the radiation protection infrastructure was established after the accident. Laws and regulations of radiation safety and the relevant regulatory procedures must be revised. (authors)

  16. Lessons learned in the accident of contamination with Pu-239

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molina, G.; Ruiz C, M.; Angeles C, A.; Benitez S, J.A.

    2004-01-01

    This work describes the lessons learned during the accident by transuranic contamination in the National Institute of Nuclear Research happened between 1998 and 2003. The origin of the same one is the not authorized transfer of 0.51 g of plutonium metallic used as pattern source in the Department of Metrology to a laboratory which lacked of physical infrastructure, training and team to manipulate this source. (Author)

  17. Goiania radiation accident: activities carried out and lessons learned based on personal experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silva, F.C.A. da

    2017-01-01

    Goiânia Radiological Accident, on September 13, 1987, with a radioactive source of cesium-137 with 50.9 TBq, used in radiotherapy, is one of the most important accidents in the scientific area, representing a milestone for all workers in the areas of radiation protection and radiological emergency that worked during the event. A personal view of the Goiânia Radiological Accident is presented, showing some activities carried out in contaminated areas and lessons learned based on own experience during the event

  18. Outline of Fukushima nuclear accident and future action. Lessons learned from accident and countermeasure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fukuda, Toshihiko

    2012-01-01

    Fukushima nuclear accident was caused by loss of all AC power sources (SBO) and loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) hit by the Great East Japan Earthquake. This article reviewed outline of Fukushima nuclear accident progression when on year had passed since and referred to lessons learned from accident and countermeasure plan to prevent severe accident in SBO and LUHS events by earthquake and tsunami as future action. This countermeasure would be taken to (1) prevent serious flooding in case a tsunami overwhelms the breakwater, with improving water tightness of rooms for emergency diesel generator, batteries and power centers, (2) enhance emergency power supply and cooling function with mobile electricity generator, high pressure fire pump car and alternate water supply source, (3) mitigate environmental effects caused by core damage with installing containment filtered venting, and (4) enforce emergency preparedness in case of severe accident. Definite countermeasure plan for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPPs was enumerated. (T. Tanaka)

  19. Learning Lessons from TMI to Fukushima and Other Industrial Accidents: Keys for Assessing Safety Management Practices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dechy, N.; Rousseau, J.-M.; Dien, Y.; Montmayeul, R.; Llory, M.

    2016-01-01

    The main objective of the paper is to discuss and to argue about transfer, from an industrial sector to another industrial sector, of lessons learnt from accidents. It will be achieved through the discussion of some theoretical foundations and through the illustration of examples of application cases in assessment of safety management practices in Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The nuclear energy production industry has faced three big ones in 30 years (TMI, Chernobyl, Fukushima) involving three different reactor technologies operated in three quite different cultural, organizational and regulatory contexts. Each of those accident has been the origin of questions, but also generator of lessons, some changing the worldview (see Wilpert and Fahlbruch, 1998) of what does cause an accident in addition to the engineering view about the importance of technical failures (human error, safety culture, sociotechnical interactions). Some of their main lessons were implemented such as improvements of human-machine interfaces ergonomics, recast of some emergency operating procedures, severe accident mitigation strategies and crisis management. Some lessons did not really provide deep changes. It is the case for organizational lessons such as, organizational complexity, management of production pressures, regulatory capture, and failure to learn, etc.

  20. Lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident and responses in NRA regulatory requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fuketa, Toyoshi

    2014-01-01

    The author would like to present significant lessons learned from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-ichi accident and responses in regulatory requirements developed by the Nuclear Regulation Authority for power-producing light water reactors. The presentation will cover prevention of structures, systems and components failures, measures to prevent common cause failures, prevention of core damage, mitigation of severe accidents, emergency preparedness, continuous improvement of safety, use of probabilistic risk assessment, and post-accident regulation on the Fukushima Dai-ichi. (author)

  1. Applicability of health physics lessons learned from the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident to the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bevelacqua, J J

    2012-02-01

    The TMI-2 and Fukushima Daiichi accidents appear to be dissimilar because they involve different reactor types. However, the health physics related lessons learned from TMI-2 are applicable, and can enhance the Fukushima Daiichi recovery effort. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  2. Lessons learned from accidents in industrial irradiation facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    Use of ionizing radiation in medicine, industry and research for technical development continues to increase throughout the world. One application with a high growth rate is irradiation suing high energy gamma photons and electron beams. There are currently more than 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation in almost all IAEA Member States. The most common uses of these facilities are to sterilize medical and pharmaceutical products, to preserve foodstuffs, to synthesize polymers and to eradicate insects. Although this industry has a good safety record, there is a potential for accidents with serious consequences to human health because of the high dose rates produced by these sources. Fatal accidents have occurred at installations in both developed and developing countries. Such accidents have prompted a review of several accidents, including five with fatalities, by a team of manufacturers, regulatory authorities and operating organizations. Having looked closely at the circumstances of each accident and the apparent deficiencies in design, safety and regulatory systems and personnel performance, the team made a number of recommendations on the ways in which the safety of irradiators can be improved. The findings of extensive research pertaining to the lessons that can be learned from irradiator accidents are presented. This publication is intended for manufacturers, regulatory authorities and operating organizations dealing with industrial irradiators. It was drafted by J.E. Glen, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, United States of America, and P. Zuniga-Bello, Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Technologia, Mexico

  3. Learning lessons from accidents with a human and organisational factors perspective: deficiencies and failures of operating experience feedback systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dechy, N.; Rousseau, J.M.; Jeffroy, F.

    2012-01-01

    This paper aims at reminding the failures of operating experience feedback (OEF) systems through the lessons of accidents and provides a framework for improving the efficiency of OEF processes. The risk is for example to miss lessons from other companies and industrial sectors, or to miss the implementation of adequate corrective actions with the risk to repeat accidents. Most of major accidents have been caused by a learning failure or other organisational factors as a contributing cause among several root causes. Some of the recurring organisational factors are: -) poor recognition of critical components, of critical activities or deficiency in anticipation and detection of errors, -) excessive production pressure, -) deficiency of communication or lack of quality of dialogue, -) Excessive formalism, -) organisational complexity, -) learning deficiencies (OEF, closing feedback loops, lack of listening of whistle-blowers). Some major accidents occurred in the nuclear industry. Although the Three Mile Island accident has multiple causes, in particular, an inappropriate design of the man-machine interface, it is a striking example of the loss of external lessons from incidents. As for Fukushima it is too early to have established evidence on learning failures. The systematic study and organisational analysis of OEF failures in industrial accidents whatever their sector has enabled us to provide a framework for OEF improvements. Five key OEF issues to improve in priority: 1) human and organisational factors analysis of the root causes of the events, 2) listening to the field staff, dissenting voices and whistle-blowers, 3) monitoring of the external events that provide generic lessons, 4) building an alive memory through a culture of accidents with people who become experiences pillars, and 5) the setting of external audit or organisational analysis of the OEF system by independent experts. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  4. Overview of Fukushima accident and the lessons learned from it

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawano, A.

    2012-01-01

    This paper is given in order to share the detailed information on the Fukushima Accident which occurred on March 11, 2011, and the lessons learned from it which worldwide nuclear experts might currently have more interest in. The paper first reflects how the facilities were damaged by a very strong earthquake and a series of beyond design-basis tsunamis. The earthquake caused loss of all off-site electric power at Fukushima Dacha Nuclear Power Station (1F), and the following series of tsunami made all emergency diesel generators except one for Unit 6 and most of DC batteries inoperable and severely damaged most of the facilities located on the ocean side. Thus all the units at 1a resulted in the loss of cooling function and ultimate heat sink for a long time period. TEPC focused on restoration of the instruments and lights in the Main Control Room (MCR), preparation of alternative water injection and venting of Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in the recovery process. However, the workers faced a lot of difficulties such as total darkness, repeated aftershocks, high radiation dose, a lot of debris on the ground, loss of communication means, etc. Massive damages by the tsunami and lack of necessary equipment and resources hampered a quick recovery. It eventually resulted in the severe core damage of Unit 1, 2 and 3 and also the hydrogen explosions in the reactor buildings of Unit 1, 3 and 4. This paper finally extracts the lessons learned from the accident and proposed the countermeasures, such as flood protection for essential facilities, preparation of practical and effective tools, securing communication means and so on. These would help the people involved in the nuclear industries all over the world properly understand the accident and develop their own countermeasures appropriately

  5. Lessons learned from our accident at Fukushima nuclear power stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawano, A.

    2012-01-01

    This paper is given in order to share the detailed information on the Fukushima Accident which occurred on March 11, 2011, and the lessons learned from it which worldwide nuclear experts might currently have more interest in. The paper first reflects how the facilities were damaged by a very strong earthquake and a series of beyond design-basis tsunamis. The earthquake caused loss of all off-site electric power at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (1F), and the following series of tsunami made all emergency diesel generators except one for Unit 6 and most of DC batteries inoperable and severely damaged most of the facilities located on the ocean side. Thus all the units at 1F resulted in the loss of cooling function and ultimate heat sink for a long time period. TEPCO focused on restoration of the instruments and lights in the Main Control Room (MCR), preparation of alternative water injection and venting of Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in the recovery process. However, the workers faced a lot of difficulties such as total darkness, repeated aftershocks, high radiation dose, a lot of debris on the ground, loss of communication means, etc. Massive damages by the tsunami and lack of necessary equipments and resources hampered a quick recovery. It eventually resulted in the severe core damage of Unit 1, 2, and 3 and also the hydrogen explosions in the reactor buildings of Unit 1, 3, and 4. This paper finally extracts the lessons learned from the accident and proposes the countermeasures, such as flood protection for essential facilities, preparation of practical and effective tools, securing communication means and so on. These would help the people involved in the nuclear industries all over the world properly understand the accident and develop their own countermeasures appropriately. (authors)

  6. Outline of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident. Lessons Learned and Safety Enhancements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hirano, Masashi

    2017-09-01

    Abstract. On March 11, 2011, an earthquake and subsequent tsunamis off the Pacific coastline of Japan's Tohoku region caused widespread devastation in Japan. As of June 10, 2016, it is reported that a total of 15,894 people lost their lives and 2,558 people are still unaccounted for. In Fukushima Prefecture, approximately 100,000 people are still obliged to live away from their homes due to the earthquake and tsunami as well as the Fukushima Daiichi accident. On the day, the earthquake and tsunami caused severe damages to the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)'s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS). All the units in operation, namely Units 1 to 3, were automatically shut down on seismic reactor protection system trips but the earthquake led to the loss of all off-site electrical power supplies to that site. The subsequent tsunami inundated the site up to 4 to 5 m above its ground level and caused, in the end, the loss of core cooling function in Units 1 to 3, resulting in severe core damages and containment vessel failures in these three units. Hydrogen was released from the containment vessels, leading to explosions in the reactor buildings of Units 1, 3 and 4. Radioactive materials were released to the atmosphere and were deposited on the land and in the ocean. One of the most important lessons learned is an importance to prevent such large scale common cause failures due to extreme natural events. This leads to a conclusion that application of the defense-in-depth philosophy be enhanced because the defense-in-depth philosophy has been and continues to be an effective way to account for uncertainties associated with risks. From the human and organizational viewpoints, the final report from the Investigation Committee of the Government pointed out so-called "safety myth" that existed among nuclear operators including TEPCO as well as the government, that serious severe accidents could never occur in nuclear power plants in Japan. After the accident, the

  7. Lessons learned from accidents in radiotherapy. An IAEA Safety Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ortiz, P.

    1998-01-01

    Radiotherapy is a very special application from the view point of protection because humans are deliberately exposed to high doses of radiation, and no physical barrier can be placed between the source and the patient. It deserves, therefore, special considerations from the point of view of potential exposure. An IAEA's Safety Report (in preparation) reviews a large collection of accident information, their initiating events and contributing factors, followed by a set of lessons learned and measures for prevention. The most important causes were: deficiencies in education and training, lack of procedures and protocols for essential tasks (such as commissioning, calibration, commissioning and treatment delivery), deficient communication and information transfer, absence of defence in depth and deficiencies in design, manufacture, testing and maintenance of equipment. Often a combination of more than one of these causes was present in an accident, thus pointing to a problem of management. Arrangements for a comprehensive quality assurance and accident prevention should be required by regulations and compliance be monitored by a Regulatory Authority. (author)

  8. Basic safety principles: Lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Erp, J.B. van

    1997-01-01

    The presentation reviews the following issues: basic safety principles and lessons learned; some conclusions from the Kemeny report on the accident at TMI; some recommendations from the Kemeny report on the accident at TMI; conclusions and recommendations from the Rogovin report on the accident on TMI; instrumentation deficiencies (from Rogovin report)

  9. Basic safety principles: Lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Erp, J.B. van [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1997-09-01

    The presentation reviews the following issues: basic safety principles and lessons learned; some conclusions from the Kemeny report on the accident at TMI; some recommendations from the Kemeny report on the accident at TMI; conclusions and recommendations from the Rogovin report on the accident on TMI; instrumentation deficiencies (from Rogovin report).

  10. Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations of TEPCO. Outline and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanaka, Shun-ichi

    2012-01-01

    The severe accident that broke out at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations on March 11, 2011, caused seemingly infinite damage to the daily life of residents. Serious and wide-spread contamination of the environment occurred due to radioactive materials discharged from nuclear power stations (NPSs). At the same time, many issues were highlighted concerning countermeasures to severe nuclear accidents. The accident is outlined, and lessons learned are extracted with respect to the safety of NPSs, as well as radiation protection of residents under the emergency involving the accident. The materials of the current paper are those released by governmental agencies, academic societies, interim reports of committees under the government, and others. (author)

  11. Emergency operating procedures improvement based on the lesson learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wu, Wen-Hsiung, E-mail: whwu1127@aec.gov.tw [Atomic Energy Council, 2F., No. 80, Sec.1, Chenggong Rd., Yonghe Dist., New Taipei City 234, Taiwan (China); Institute of Nuclear Engineering and Science, National Tsing Hua University, No. 101, Sec. 2, Guangfu Rd., Hsinchu City 300, Taiwan (China); Liao, Lih-Yih, E-mail: lyliao@iner.gov.tw [Institute of Nuclear Energy Research, Atomic Energy Council, No. 1000, Wenhua Rd., Jiaan Village, Longtan Township, Taoyuan County 325, Taiwan (China)

    2016-12-01

    Highlights: • Discuss the problem of EOPs at the time of Fukushima accident to deal with the prolonged SBO. • Elaborate the potential risk accompanied with the emergency depressurization in the SBO. • Describe a special guideline to cope with Fukushima-like accidents and provide its technical basis. • Point out that Fukushima accident might have been prevented if improved EOPs had been used. • Propose key points and suggestions for improving the EOPs. - Abstract: One of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident is the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) have to be improved. The BWR Owners’ Group revised the emergency procedure guidelines and addressed the lesson learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident in revision 3 in order to avoid loss of turbine-driven makeup water systems during reactor depressurization. However, the improvement deserves much more attention. The existing EOPs at the time of the accident may not be adequate enough for the prolonged station blackout condition, because resources required for performing the EOPs are vastly unavailable or gradually exhausted. The improved EOPs must not only permit early reactor pressure vessel depressurization, but also address the risk accompanied with the emergency depressurization. For this reason, Taiwan Power Company proposed the Ultimate Response Guideline (URG) to cope with Fukushima-like accidents. The main content of the URG is a two-stage depressurization strategy, namely the controlled depressurization and the emergency depressurization. The technical basis of the two-stage depressurization strategy was discussed in this paper. The effectiveness of the URG was verified by using TRAC/RELAP Advanced Computational Engine (TRACE). Besides, the emergency responses performed by Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant (Fukushima Daini NPP) were found to be very similar to the URG. The consequences of Fukushima Daini NPP somehow demonstrate that the URG is effective for Fukushima

  12. Emergency operating procedures improvement based on the lesson learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, Wen-Hsiung; Liao, Lih-Yih

    2016-01-01

    Highlights: • Discuss the problem of EOPs at the time of Fukushima accident to deal with the prolonged SBO. • Elaborate the potential risk accompanied with the emergency depressurization in the SBO. • Describe a special guideline to cope with Fukushima-like accidents and provide its technical basis. • Point out that Fukushima accident might have been prevented if improved EOPs had been used. • Propose key points and suggestions for improving the EOPs. - Abstract: One of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident is the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) have to be improved. The BWR Owners’ Group revised the emergency procedure guidelines and addressed the lesson learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident in revision 3 in order to avoid loss of turbine-driven makeup water systems during reactor depressurization. However, the improvement deserves much more attention. The existing EOPs at the time of the accident may not be adequate enough for the prolonged station blackout condition, because resources required for performing the EOPs are vastly unavailable or gradually exhausted. The improved EOPs must not only permit early reactor pressure vessel depressurization, but also address the risk accompanied with the emergency depressurization. For this reason, Taiwan Power Company proposed the Ultimate Response Guideline (URG) to cope with Fukushima-like accidents. The main content of the URG is a two-stage depressurization strategy, namely the controlled depressurization and the emergency depressurization. The technical basis of the two-stage depressurization strategy was discussed in this paper. The effectiveness of the URG was verified by using TRAC/RELAP Advanced Computational Engine (TRACE). Besides, the emergency responses performed by Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant (Fukushima Daini NPP) were found to be very similar to the URG. The consequences of Fukushima Daini NPP somehow demonstrate that the URG is effective for Fukushima

  13. Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, Actions Taken and Challenges Ahead

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shimizu, Y.

    2016-01-01

    On 19 September, 2012, the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) was established in light of lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident of 11 March 2011, to ensure that such accidents never happen again, to restore public trust in regulator both in Japan and abroad and to rebuild and foster a genuine safety culture by placing the highest priority on public safety. The NRA, an independent administrative commission of the Ministry of the Environment, is organized to separate the regulatory functions from the promotional functions of the use of nuclear energy within the government, and to independently implement its duties from the perspectives of neutrality and fairness based on its expertise. Having learned the lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and with reference to IAEA safety standards, since its establishment, the NRA has endeavored to strengthen the regulatory requirements, in particular, for hazards such as tsunamis and earthquakes which may lead to common cause failures, and countermeasures against severe accidents. Under the new regulatory scheme, a back-fitting system was introduced. Emergency preparedness and response measures for nuclear facilities were also enhanced. As of end of March 2016, five reactors received NRA’s permission for changing their reactor installations based on the new regulatory requirements, and two nuclear power reactors have restarted their operations. In January 2016, at the request of Japan, the IAEA sent the IRRS mission team to Japan to assess the regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety. Through the self-assessment prior to the mission, the NRA has developed 22 action plans, including a) improvement of regulatory inspection, b) capacity building, and c) strengthening of safety research capability. The mission team has found that Japan’s nuclear regulator has demonstrated independence and transparency since it was set up in 2012. The team also noted that the NRA needs to improve the inspection

  14. Lessons learned from radiological accidents at medical exposures in radiotherapy; Lições aprendidas com acidentes radiológicos nas exposições médicas em radioterapia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fagundes, J.S.; Ferreira, A.F. [Faculdade Casa Branca, SP (Brazil); Lima, C.M.A. [MAXIM Cursos, Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil); Silva, F.C.A. da, E-mail: franciscodasilva13uk@gmail.com [Instituto de Radioproteção e Dosimetria (IRD/CNEN-RJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2017-07-01

    An exposure is considered accidental in radiotherapy when there is a substantial deviation in the prescription of treatment. In this work, an analysis of published radiological accidents, both in Brazil and internationally, was performed during medical exposures in radiotherapy treatments, removing the main lessons learned. Of the research carried out, we highlight Brazil with four radiological accidents and one death in the period between 2011 and 2014; the United States of America with 169 accidents with two deaths from 2000 to 2010 and France from 2001 to 2014 had 569 deaths without patients. Lessons learned have been described, for example, that maintenance personnel training should specify limitations or restrictions on the handling or adjustment of critical parts on the accelerator. It is recommended to apply the 10 main lessons learned due to radiological accidents during medical exposures in radiotherapy treatments to avoid future events.

  15. TMI-2 lessons have been learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Long, R.L.

    1994-01-01

    This paper is an introduction to the more detailed papers which are presented in this session titled ''Advanced Light Water Reactors -- 15 Years After TMI.'' Many of the advances in the design, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants are the direct result of applying lessons learned from the 1979 TMI-2 accident. The authors believe the ''reality awakening'' which occurred following the accident should never be forgotten. Thus, this paper briefly reviews the TMI-2 accident and identifies the broad lessons learned following the accident. Then it describes briefly some indicators which show the very impressive improvements in nuclear power plant performance that have occurred over the past 10-15 years. This sets the stage for Dr. Ransom's paper which shows the continuing need for nuclear power, Dr. Beckjord's paper which describes the ''final'' TMI-2 research project and the subsequent papers which focus on advanced light water reactor developments

  16. Lessons Learned for Space Safety from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nogami, Manami; Miki, Masami; Mitsui, Masami; Kawada, Ysuhiro; Takeuchi, Nobuo

    2013-09-01

    On March 11 2011, Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake hit Japan and caused the devastating damage. The Fukushima Nuclear Power Station (NPS) was also severely damaged.The Japanese NPSs are designed based on the detailed safety requirements and have multiple-folds of hazard controls to the catastrophic hazards as in space system. However, according to the initial information from the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the Japanese government, the larger-than-expected tsunami and subsequent events lost the all hazard controls to the release of radioactive materials.At the 5th IAASS, Lessons Learned from this disaster was reported [1] mainly based on the "Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety" [2] published by Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters in June 2011, three months after the earthquake.Up to 2012 summer, the major investigation boards, including the Japanese Diet, the Japanese Cabinet and TEPCO, published their final reports, in which detailed causes of this accident and several recommendations are assessed from each perspective.In this paper, the authors examine to introduce the lessons learned to be applied to the space safety as findings from these reports.

  17. Keynote on lessons from major radiation accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ortiz, P.; Oresegun, M.; Wheatley, J.

    2000-01-01

    Generic lessons have been learned from a relatively large number of accidents in the most relevant practices (a set of analysis have been made on about 90 radiotherapy events, 43 industrial radiography and nine from industrial irradiations); more specific lessons have been drawn from in-depth investigations of individual accidents. The body of knowledge is grouped as follows: a) radiotherapy is very unique in that humans (patients) are purposely given very high radiation doses (20-75 Gy) by placing them in the radiation beam or by placing radioactive sources in contact with tissues. Intended deterministic effects are the essence of the normal radiotherapy practice and relatively small deviation from the intended doses, i.e,, slightly higher or lower than intended may cause increased rate of severe complication or reduce probability of cure. Consequences of major accidents have been devastating, affecting tens, even hundreds of patients and causing death (directly or indirectly) to a large number of them; b) accidents involving industrial radiography are the most frequent cause of overexposure to workers (radiographers); c) accidents with industrial irradiators have lower probability of occurrence, however, they are deemed to be fatal, especially when whole body exposure to panoramic gamma irradiators occur; partial body irradiation from industrial or research accelerator beams has led to amputation of hands and legs; d) when control of sources was relinquished ('orphan' sources) this has resulted in severe injuries, in some cases death and widespread contamination of the environment. A tool for further dissemination of lessons will be an international reporting system of unusual radiation events (RADEV), being introduced world-wide. Accidents were rarely due to a single human error or isolated equipment failure. In most cases there was a combination of elements such as: a) unawareness of the potential for an accident, b) poor education, which usually did not

  18. Lessons learned and implications of the Fukushima NPP accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tokuhiro, A.

    2014-01-01

    The global nuclear 'enterprise' is now 3-1/2 years (March 11, 2011) beyond the historic Tohoku earthquake (M9.0), subsequent tsunami (~14-15m waves), and unfortunately, the continuing consequences of the 'Fukushima nuclear power plant (NPP) accident. We now live in the post-Fukushima nuclear era. First let us pay our respects to this tragic loss-of-life (~16,000 fatalities) as a result of the earthquake and tsunami; also 10-years earlier in 2004, centered further south in the Indian Ocean (230,000+ fatalities). The movie, 'The Impossible', was a reminder that indeed, energy provides sustenance and socio-economic development for humankind. Energy will determine the state of AsiaPacific (AP) in years to come. Over the past 15-years, AP has clearly had increasing means to lead global economic growth, relative to stagnating economies of scale in Europe and U.S. AP also has both existing and emerging larger-scale industrial ambitions and capital to construct new nuclear power plants (NPPs). China has some 25-28 units under construction at 11 sites; the near-term goal is to establish 40GW of generating capacity by 2020 and to reach some 70-75GW approximately 10 years later. Although some investments are also being made in renewable energy, the demand for capacity clearly dictates further growth in nuclear power. However, unless high expectations for safety, safety culture are concurrently encouraged, we may face the next nuclear accident again in Asia. This work looks at the technical and non-technical lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the implications that we cannot afford to ignore. (author)

  19. Lessons learned and implications of the Fukushima NPP accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tokuhiro, A., E-mail: tokuhio@uidaho.edu [Univ. of Idaho, Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2014-07-01

    The global nuclear 'enterprise' is now 3-1/2 years (March 11, 2011) beyond the historic Tohoku earthquake (M9.0), subsequent tsunami (~14-15m waves), and unfortunately, the continuing consequences of the 'Fukushima nuclear power plant (NPP) accident. We now live in the post-Fukushima nuclear era. First let us pay our respects to this tragic loss-of-life (~16,000 fatalities) as a result of the earthquake and tsunami; also 10-years earlier in 2004, centered further south in the Indian Ocean (230,000+ fatalities). The movie, 'The Impossible', was a reminder that indeed, energy provides sustenance and socio-economic development for humankind. Energy will determine the state of AsiaPacific (AP) in years to come. Over the past 15-years, AP has clearly had increasing means to lead global economic growth, relative to stagnating economies of scale in Europe and U.S. AP also has both existing and emerging larger-scale industrial ambitions and capital to construct new nuclear power plants (NPPs). China has some 25-28 units under construction at 11 sites; the near-term goal is to establish 40GW of generating capacity by 2020 and to reach some 70-75GW approximately 10 years later. Although some investments are also being made in renewable energy, the demand for capacity clearly dictates further growth in nuclear power. However, unless high expectations for safety, safety culture are concurrently encouraged, we may face the next nuclear accident again in Asia. This work looks at the technical and non-technical lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the implications that we cannot afford to ignore. (author)

  20. Key regulatory and safety issues emerging NEA activities. Lessons Learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Accident - Key Regulatory and Safety Issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakoski, John

    2013-01-01

    A presentation was provided on the key safety and regulatory issues and an update of activities undertaken by the NEA and its members in response to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power stations (NPS) on 11 March 2011. An overview of the accident sequence and the consequences was provided that identified the safety functions that were lost (electrical power, core cooling, and primary containment) that lead to units 1, 2, and 3 being in severe accident conditions with large off-site releases. Key areas identified for which activities of the NEA and member countries are in progress include accident management; defence-in-depth; crisis communication; initiating events; operating experience; deterministic and probabilistic assessments; regulatory infrastructure; radiological protection and public health; and decontamination and recovery. For each of these areas, a brief description of the on-going and planned NEA activities was provided within the three standing technical committees of the NEA with safety and regulatory mandates (the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities - CNRA, the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations - CSNI, and the Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health - CRPPH). On-going activities of CNRA include a review of enhancement being made to the regulatory aspects for the oversight of on-site accident management strategies and processes in light of the lessons learned from the accident; providing guidance to regulators on crisis communication; and supporting the peer review of the safety assessments of risk-significant research reactor facilities in light of the accident. Within the scope of the CSNI mandate, activities are being undertaken to better understand accident progression; characteristics of new fuel designs; and a benchmarking study of fast-running software for estimating source term under severe accident conditions to support protective measure recommendations. CSNI also has ongoing work in human

  1. Lessons learned from accidents in radiotherapy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ortiz-Lopez, P [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria). Div. of Nuclear Safety; Novotny, J [University Hospital St. Rafael, Leuven (Belgium); Haywood, J [South Cleveland Hospital (United Kingdom). Cleveland Medical Physics Unit

    1996-08-01

    Radiotherapy is the only application of radiation which intentionally delivers very high doses to humans. A gross deviation from the prescribed dose or dose distribution can have severe, or even fatal consequences. Since the patient is placed directly in the beam or sources are inserted in the body, any mistake made with the beam or the sources leads almost certainly to an accidental exposure. Lessons learned from previous incidents can be used to test the vulnerability of a given facility, provided that these are adequately disseminated. The purpose of this paper is to present a summary of the lessons learned from a relatively large sample of events. The analysis has been presented as a short description followed by an identification of the triggering event and the contributing factors. These have been grouped as follows: errors in commissioning or calibration machines and sources affecting many patients; mistakes affecting individual patients such as irradiating the wrong patient, the wrong, field or site, and mistakes when entering data into or reading from the patient`s chart; error due to unusual treatments or situations; equipment failure and human machine problems, including maintenance. (author). 1 ref.

  2. Lessons learned from accidents in radiotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ortiz-Lopez, P.; Haywood, J.

    1996-01-01

    Radiotherapy is the only application of radiation which intentionally delivers very high doses to humans. A gross deviation from the prescribed dose or dose distribution can have severe, or even fatal consequences. Since the patient is placed directly in the beam or sources are inserted in the body, any mistake made with the beam or the sources leads almost certainly to an accidental exposure. Lessons learned from previous incidents can be used to test the vulnerability of a given facility, provided that these are adequately disseminated. The purpose of this paper is to present a summary of the lessons learned from a relatively large sample of events. The analysis has been presented as a short description followed by an identification of the triggering event and the contributing factors. These have been grouped as follows: errors in commissioning or calibration machines and sources affecting many patients; mistakes affecting individual patients such as irradiating the wrong patient, the wrong, field or site, and mistakes when entering data into or reading from the patient's chart; error due to unusual treatments or situations; equipment failure and human machine problems, including maintenance. (author). 1 ref

  3. Considering lessons learned about safety culture and their reflection to activity. After Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Obu, Etsuji; Hamada, Jun; Fukano, Takuya

    2011-01-01

    Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident forced neighboring residents to evacuate for a long time and gave Public anxieties greatly and significant effects to social activities in Japan. Public trust of nuclear power was lost by not preventing the accident and future of nuclear power became reconsidered, which nuclear industry people regretted deeply. Japan Nuclear Technology Institute (JANTI) had conducted activities enhancing safety culture in nuclear industry. It would be necessary to consider improvements of accident prevention and mitigation measures after evaluating the accident in a viewpoint of 'safety culture'. Based on published information and knowledge accumulated by activities of JANTI, the accident was examined taking account of greatness of nuclear accident and its effects from the side of safety culture. Lessons learned about safety culture were pointed out as; (1) reconfirmation of specialty of nuclear technology. (2) reinforcement of questioning and learning attitudes and (3) improvement of evaluation capability of nuclear safety and safety assurance against external event. These were reflected in activities such as; (1) reconsideration of safety culture assessment, (2) strengthening further support to improve safety culture consciousness and (3) improvement of peer review activity. (T. Tanaka)

  4. Lessons from the Fukushima nuclear power accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hatamura, Yotaro

    2013-01-01

    Through the investigation of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Accident as the chairman of the related Government's Committee, many things had been considered. Essence of the accident could be not only what occurred in the Fukushima nuclear power station, but also dispersed radioactive materials forced many residents to move and not to be returned. Such events as indication errors of water level meter occurring in severe accident could no be thought and remote mechanical operation of valves under high radiation environment were not prepared. Contamination by radioactive clouds caused the evacuation of residents for a long period. Lessons learned from the accident were described such as; (1) the verification of the road to failure connecting selected accident sequence and road to success with another supposed choice, (2) considering what might occur and then what should be needed on the contrary, (3) nuclear power, if should be continued, should be used with the premise of its hazards, and (4) advise to nuclear engineer for adequate information dissemination and technical explanation to the public and keeping nuclear technologies alive. (T. Tanaka)

  5. Biomass accident investigations – missed opportunities for learning and accident prevention

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hedlund, Frank Huess

    2017-01-01

    The past decade has seen a major increase in the production of energy from biomass. The growth has been mirrored in an increase of serious biomass related accidents involving fires, gas explosions, combustible dust explosions and the release of toxic gasses. There are indications that the number...... of bioenergy related accidents is growing faster than the energy production. This paper argues that biomass accidents, if properly investigated and lessons shared widely, provide ample opportunities for improving general hazard awareness and safety performance of the biomass industry. The paper examines...... selected serious accidents involving biogas and wood pellets in Denmark and argues that such opportunities for learning were missed because accident investigations were superficial, follow-up incomplete and information sharing absent. In one particularly distressing case, a facility saw a repeat accident...

  6. Radiation protection lessons learned from the TEPCO Fukushima No.1 NPS accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Urabe, Itsumasa; Hattori, Takatoshi; Iimoto, Takeshi; Yokoyama, Sumi

    2014-01-01

    Lessons learned from the TEPCO Fukushima No.1 NPS accident are discussed from the viewpoint of radiation protection in the situation of nuclear emergency. It became clear from the discussion that the protective measures should be practiced by taking into account the time profiles of the radiological disaster after the nuclear accident and that the land and coastal sea areas monitoring had to be practiced immediately after the nuclear accident and the communication methods to tell the public about the radiation information and the meaning of protective measures should be developed for mitigation of the sociological aspects of disaster impacts. And it was pointed out from the view point of practicing countermeasures that application of the reference levels, above which it was judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposure to occur, played an important role for practicing protective measures in an optimized way and that the quantities and units used for quantifying radiation exposure of individuals in terms of radiation doses have caused considerable communication problems. Finally, the occupational exposures and the public exposures that have been reported so far are shown, and it is concluded that there is no conclusive evidence on low dose exposures that would justify a modification of the radiation risk recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. (author)

  7. Sharing Lessons Learned Between Industries in EU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muehleisen, A.; Strucic, M.

    2012-01-01

    Recent events in nuclear industry remind us on importance of continuous sharing of the knowledge and experience gained through evaluations of incidents and accidents. We frequently use experience from our daily life activities to improve our performance and avoid some mistakes or unwanted events. In the similar way we can use other industries experience. These experiences can be applied to improve nuclear safety. For example, Safety Culture, which has a great influence on the level of nuclear power plants safety, is similarly presented in other industries. Mechanisms which led to accidents from weak safety culture in one branch of other industry could be comparable to those in nuclear industry. Some other industries have many more cumulative years of experience than nuclear industry. Aviation and Oil industries are typical representatives. Part of their experience can be used in nuclear industry too. Number of reports from nuclear power plants showed us that not only specific equipment related causes lay behind accidents; there are also other causes and contributors which are more common for all industries. Hence lessons learned in other industry should be assessed and used in nuclear industry too. In the European Union, a regional initiative has been set up in 2008 in support of EU Member State nuclear safety authorities, but also EU technical support organizations, international organizations and the broader nuclear community, to enhance nuclear safety through improvement of the use of lessons learned from operational experience of nuclear power plants (NPPs). The initiative, called ''the EU Clearinghouse on Operational Experience Feedback for NPP'', is organized as a network operated by a centralized office located at the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. The reduction of occurrence and significance of events in NPPs and their safe operation is its ultimate goal. Among others EU Clearinghouse provides services such as technical and scientific

  8. Risk Communication Strategies: Lessons Learned from Previous Disasters with a Focus on the Fukushima Radiation Accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Svendsen, Erik R; Yamaguchi, Ichiro; Tsuda, Toshihide; Guimaraes, Jean Remy Davee; Tondel, Martin

    2016-12-01

    It has been difficult to both mitigate the health consequences and effectively provide health risk information to the public affected by the Fukushima radiological disaster. Often, there are contrasting public health ethics within these activities which complicate risk communication. Although no risk communication strategy is perfect in such disasters, the ethical principles of risk communication provide good practical guidance. These discussions will be made in the context of similar lessons learned after radiation exposures in Goiania, Brazil, in 1987; the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, Ukraine, in 1986; and the attack at the World Trade Center, New York, USA, in 2001. Neither of the two strategies is perfect nor fatally flawed. Yet, this discussion and lessons from prior events should assist decision makers with navigating difficult risk communication strategies in similar environmental health disasters.

  9. Lessons learned? Selected public acceptance case studies since Three Mile Island

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blee, D. [NAC International, Atlanta Corporate Headquarters, Atlanta, GA (United States)

    2001-02-01

    This paper will present an overview of the present situation, some recent polling survey information, and then look at lessons learned in terms of selected case studies and some global issues over the 22 years since the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. That is quite an ambitious topic but there are some important lessons we can learn from the post-TMI era. (author)

  10. Lessons learned in the accident of contamination with Pu-239; Lecciones aprendidas en el accidente de contaminacion con Pu-239

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Molina, G.; Ruiz C, M.; Angeles C, A.; Benitez S, J.A. [ININ, 52045 Estado de Mexico (Mexico)]. e-mail: gm@nuclear.inin.mx

    2004-07-01

    This work describes the lessons learned during the accident by transuranic contamination in the National Institute of Nuclear Research happened between 1998 and 2003. The origin of the same one is the not authorized transfer of 0.51 g of plutonium metallic used as pattern source in the Department of Metrology to a laboratory which lacked of physical infrastructure, training and team to manipulate this source. (Author)

  11. Lessons learnt from Fukushima Accident - What did McMaster Undergraduate Students learn?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nagasaki, S., E-mail: nagasas@mcmaster.ca [McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, (Canada)

    2015-07-01

    Nuclear communities not only in Japan but also around the world learnt a lot of lessons from the Fukushima accident. The direct cause of the accident from the viewpoint of traditional engineering is clear, and as a result various measures have been implemented around the world. The accident also provides many insights into the relationship between traditional engineering and Japanese society. In this paper, the root causes of the accident were studied by applying a psychological model for evocation of an individual's anxiety related to social affairs [1] to the discussions in an undergraduate course at McMaster University. In the last section, the challenges, which McMaster students considered Japanese nuclear community is now facing and Canadian nuclear community can contribute to in future, are summarized. (author)

  12. Lessons learnt from Fukushima Accident - What did McMaster Undergraduate Students learn?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nagasaki, S.

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear communities not only in Japan but also around the world learnt a lot of lessons from the Fukushima accident. The direct cause of the accident from the viewpoint of traditional engineering is clear, and as a result various measures have been implemented around the world. The accident also provides many insights into the relationship between traditional engineering and Japanese society. In this paper, the root causes of the accident were studied by applying a psychological model for evocation of an individual's anxiety related to social affairs [1] to the discussions in an undergraduate course at McMaster University. In the last section, the challenges, which McMaster students considered Japanese nuclear community is now facing and Canadian nuclear community can contribute to in future, are summarized. (author)

  13. Lessons learned from the CEOG generic accident management guidelines confirmation (validation) exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khalil, Y.F.; Schneider, R.E.; Greene, M.A.

    1996-01-01

    In July 1995, the CE Owner's Group completed and issued Revision 0 of the Generic Accident Management Guidelines (AMG's) to the owners group task participants. This guidance provides a structured mechanism for the plant staff at CE utilities to respond to accidents that beyond the plant design basis and, possibly, the Emergency Operating Procedures. Prior to final issue of the generic AMGs, the CEOG conducted an AMG Confirmation Exercise to establish the ability of the AMGs to fulfill this important role. The specific objectives of the AMG Confirmation Exercise were to (1) clarify the interactions and transitions between the AMG/Technical Support Center (TSC) and the EOPS/Operations Personnel (2) validate the adequacy of the AMG data collection and plant condition diagnostic evaluation process and (3) assess the feasibility of the mechanical material and recommendations contained in the AMG's. The purpose of paper is to provide a detailed description of the AMG Confirmation Exercise as well as important lessons learned during the planning and implementation of the exercise. In addition, a discussion will be presented pertaining to the relationship between the AMG's (incumbent to the Technical Support Center) and the plants Emergency Operating Procedures (incumbent to the Control Room Operations Staff)

  14. Lessons learned from EU stress tests evaluations with regard to external hazards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Misak, J.

    2014-01-01

    The presentation was oriented to critical review of the lessons learned from the European Union (EU) Stress Test focusing on NPP robustness against external hazards. These lessons addressed: - organization of the stress tests, - scope and objectives of the stress tests, - peer review findings, recommendations and implications on the design in the area of external hazards, - further studies recommended in the area of external hazards and PSA, - relevant research areas identified by the SNETP Task Group in response to Fukushima accident. Some important conclusions were made in the final part of the presentation: - Vulnerability to the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor accidents caused by external hazards and including their secondary effects was underestimated, - Lessons learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor accidents, from the EU Stress Test and from peer reviews are to be reflected in safety improvements of operating plants and considered in new designs, - while no completely new phenomena were revealed from the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor accidents, improvements in specific research areas (including external hazards and use of PSA) should be considered with high priority

  15. Lessons of the radiological accident in Goiania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alves, R.N.; Xavier, A.M.; Heilbron, P.F.L.

    1998-01-01

    On the basis of the lessons teamed from the radiological accident of Goiania, actions are described which a nuclear regulatory body should undertake while responding to an accident of this nature. (author)

  16. Advances in global development and deployment of small modular reactors and incorporating lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident into the designs of engineered safety features of advanced reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hadid Subki, M.; )

    2014-01-01

    The IAEA has been facilitating the Member States in incorporating the lessons-learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident into the designs of engineered safety features of advanced reactors, including small modular reactors. An extended assessment is required to address challenges for advancing reactor safety in the new evolving generation of SMR plants to preserve the historic lessons in safety, through: assuring the diversity in emergency core cooling systems following loss of onsite AC power; ensuring diversity in reactor depressurization following a transient or accident; confirming independence in reactor trip and safety systems for sensors, power supplies and actuation systems, and finally diversity in maintaining containment integrity following a severe accident

  17. Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Stations of TEPCO —Outline & lessons learned—

    OpenAIRE

    TANAKA, Shun-ichi

    2012-01-01

    The severe accident that broke out at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations on March 11, 2011, caused seemingly infinite damage to the daily life of residents. Serious and wide-spread contamination of the environment occurred due to radioactive materials discharged from nuclear power stations (NPSs). At the same time, many issues were highlighted concerning countermeasures to severe nuclear accidents. The accident is outlined, and lessons learned are extracted with respect to the safety o...

  18. Lessons learned from the Fukushima accident to improve the performance of the national nuclear preparedness system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dewi Apriliani

    2013-01-01

    A study of emergency response failure in the early phase of a nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan has conducted. This study aimed to obtain lesson learned from the problems and constraints that exist at the time of the Fukushima emergency response. This lesson learned will be adjusted to the situation, conditions and problems in nuclear preparedness systems in Indonesia, so that it can obtain the necessary recommendations to improve the performance of SKNN (National Nuclear Emergency Preparedness System). Recommendations include: improvements in coordination and information systems, including early warning systems and dissemination of information; improvements in the preparation of emergency plans/contingency plan, which includes an integrated disaster management; improvement in the development of disaster management practice/field exercise, by extending the scenario and integrate it with nuclear disaster, chemical, biological, and acts of terrorism; and improvement in public education of nuclear emergency preparedness and also improvement in management for dissemination of information to the public and the mass media. These improvements need to be done as part of efforts in preparing a reliable nuclear emergency preparedness in order to support nuclear power plant development plan. (author)

  19. Twenty years' application of agricultural countermeasures following the Chernobyl accident: lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fesenko, S V; Alexakhin, R M; Balonov, M I; Bogdevich, I M; Howard, B J; Kashparov, V A; Sanzharova, N I; Panov, A V; Voigt, G; Zhuchenka, Yu M

    2006-01-01

    The accident at the Chernobyl NPP (nuclear power plant) was the most serious ever to have occurred in the history of nuclear energy. The consumption of contaminated foodstuffs in affected areas was a significant source of irradiation for the population. A wide range of different countermeasures have been used to reduce exposure of people and to mitigate the consequences of the Chernobyl accident for agriculture in affected regions in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. This paper for the first time summarises key data on countermeasure application over twenty years for all three countries and describes key lessons learnt from this experience. (review)

  20. Case examples of chemical plant accidents. What we learn from them?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakamura, Masayoshi

    2009-01-01

    Lessons learned from the JCO Nuclear Criticality Accident of 30 September 1999 in a uranium conversion test plant in Tokai-mura, Japan, are reviewed by referring some pertinent matters from the official report of this accident to remind of the universal characteristics among possible accidents of chemical plants. The paper discusses the responsibility of the establishment or institution to the demand alternation or request change from the client, how to respond to the proposal arising from the factory floor, and the safety control system of every-day maintenance of the factory which are important to prevent accidents in chemical plants. After explaining a background leading to the JCO accident, the author summarizes the lessons as follows: (1) changeable control system, (2) perfect provision of the manual considering the actual condition, and (3) clarification of the roles each played by the managers and the workers are most necessary and important. (S. Ohno)

  1. Learning non-technical skill lessons from testimony given in the investigation of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hikono, Masaru; Sakuda, Hiroshi; Matsui, Yuko; Goto, Manabu; Kanayama, Masaki

    2016-01-01

    The Government Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations interviewed individuals concerned. The hearing records, published in 2014, are considered to have valuable lessons for power station managers who encounter severe accidents. In this study, descriptions from the hearing records were extracted as lessons for managers. The extractions were classified by the subject (for whom the lessons are intended), and the category of the non-technical skills. The results showed the possibility of pointing out the lessons in accordance with responsibilities. (author)

  2. Lessons learned bulletin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-05-01

    During the past four years, the Department of Energy -- Savannah River Operations Office and the Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) Environmental Restoration (ER) Program completed various activities ranging from waste site investigations to closure and post closure projects. Critiques for lessons learned regarding project activities are performed at the completion of each project milestone, and this critique interval allows for frequent recognition of lessons learned. In addition to project related lessons learned, ER also performs lessons learned critiques. T'he Savannah River Site (SRS) also obtains lessons learned information from general industry, commercial nuclear industry, naval nuclear programs, and other DOE sites within the complex. Procedures are approved to administer the lessons learned program, and a database is available to catalog applicable lessons learned regarding environmental remediation, restoration, and administrative activities. ER will continue to use this database as a source of information available to SRS personnel

  3. Twenty years' application of agricultural countermeasures following the Chernobyl accident: lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fesenko, S V [International Atomic Energy Agency, 1400 Vienna (Austria); Alexakhin, R M [Russian Institute of Agricultural Radiology and Agroecology, 249020 Obninsk (Russian Federation); Balonov, M I [International Atomic Energy Agency, 1400 Vienna (Austria); Bogdevich, I M [Research Institute for Soil Science and Agrochemistry, Minsk (Belarus); Howard, B J [Centre for Ecology and Hydrology, Lancaster Environment Centre, Library Avenue, Bailrigg, Lancaster LAI 4AP (United Kingdom); Kashparov, V A [Ukrainian Institute of Agricultural Radiology (UIAR), Mashinostroiteley Street 7, Chabany, Kiev Region 08162 (Ukraine); Sanzharova, N I [Russian Institute of Agricultural Radiology and Agroecology, 249020 Obninsk (Russian Federation); Panov, A V [Russian Institute of Agricultural Radiology and Agroecology, 249020 Obninsk (Russian Federation); Voigt, G [International Atomic Energy Agency, 1400 Vienna (Austria); Zhuchenka, Yu M [Research Institute of Radiology, 246000 Gomel (Belarus)

    2006-12-15

    The accident at the Chernobyl NPP (nuclear power plant) was the most serious ever to have occurred in the history of nuclear energy. The consumption of contaminated foodstuffs in affected areas was a significant source of irradiation for the population. A wide range of different countermeasures have been used to reduce exposure of people and to mitigate the consequences of the Chernobyl accident for agriculture in affected regions in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. This paper for the first time summarises key data on countermeasure application over twenty years for all three countries and describes key lessons learnt from this experience. (review)

  4. Safety design criteria for the next generation Sodium-cooled fast reactors based on lessons learned from the Fukushima NPS accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sakai, Takaaki

    2012-01-01

    In this presentation, architecture of the safety design criteria as requirements for SFR system and the activities on safety research works to establish safety evaluation methods for the next generation SFRs are summarized with the basis on lessons learned from the Fukushima NPS accident. Nuclear safety is a grovel issue which should be achieved by the international cooperation. In respect of the development for the next generation reactor, it is necessary to build the harmonized safety criteria and evaluation methods to establish the next level of safety

  5. Review of the international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear security. Taking the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident to the 2012 Seoul nuclear security summit

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tazaki, Makiko; Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2012-06-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held '2011 International Forum on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security - Taking the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit-' on 8 and 9 December, 2011. It intended to articulate effective strategies and measures for strengthening nuclear security using lessons learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. Moreover, it was expected to explore comprehensive approaches which could contribute to enhancing both nuclear safety and security in order to support sustainable and appropriate development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summary of panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report, excepts presentation materials. (author)

  6. Review of the international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear security. Taking the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident to the 2012 Seoul nuclear security summit

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tazaki, Makiko; Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Department of Science and Technology for Nuclear Material Management, Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan)

    2012-06-15

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held '2011 International Forum on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security - Taking the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit-' on 8 and 9 December, 2011. It intended to articulate effective strategies and measures for strengthening nuclear security using lessons learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. Moreover, it was expected to explore comprehensive approaches which could contribute to enhancing both nuclear safety and security in order to support sustainable and appropriate development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summary of panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report, excepts presentation materials. (author)

  7. Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Stations of TEPCO —Outline & lessons learned—

    Science.gov (United States)

    TANAKA, Shun-ichi

    2012-01-01

    The severe accident that broke out at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations on March 11, 2011, caused seemingly infinite damage to the daily life of residents. Serious and wide-spread contamination of the environment occurred due to radioactive materials discharged from nuclear power stations (NPSs). At the same time, many issues were highlighted concerning countermeasures to severe nuclear accidents. The accident is outlined, and lessons learned are extracted with respect to the safety of NPSs, as well as radiation protection of residents under the emergency involving the accident. The materials of the current paper are those released by governmental agencies, academic societies, interim reports of committees under the government, and others. PMID:23138450

  8. TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-10-01

    In its final report reviewing the Three Mile Island accident, the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force has suggested change in several fundamental aspects of basic safety policy for nuclear power plants. Changes in nuclear power plant design and operations and in the regulatory process are discussed in terms of general goals. The appendix sets forth specific recommendations for reaching these goals

  9. Comparative analysis of the countermeasures taken to mitigate exposure of the public to radioiodine following the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents: lessons from both accidents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Uyba, Vladimir; Samoylov, Alexander; Shinkarev, Sergey

    2018-04-01

    In the case of a severe radiation accident at a nuclear power station, the most important radiation hazard for the public is internal exposure of the thyroid to radioiodine. The purposes of this paper were (i) to compare countermeasures conducted (following the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents) aimed at mitigation of exposure to the thyroid for the public, (ii) to present comparative estimates of doses to the thyroid and (iii) to derive lessons from the two accidents. The scale and time of countermeasures applied in the early phase of the accidents (sheltering, evacuation, and intake of stable iodine to block the thyroid) and at a later time (control of 131I concentration in foodstuffs) have been described. After the Chernobyl accident, the estimation of the thyroid doses for the public was mainly based on direct thyroid measurements of ~400 000 residents carried out within the first 2 months. The highest estimates of thyroid doses to children reached 50 Gy. After the Fukushima accident, the estimation of thyroid doses was based on radioecological models due to a lack of direct thyroid measurements (only slightly more than 1000 residents were measured). The highest estimates of thyroid doses to children were a few hundred mGy. Following the Chernobyl accident, ingestion of 131I through cows' milk was the dominant pathway. Following the Fukushima accident, it appears that inhalation of contaminated air was the dominant pathway. Some lessons learned following the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents have been presented in this paper.

  10. Accidents in industrial radiography and lessons to be learned. A review of IAEA Safety Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Modupe, M.S.; Oresegun, O.

    1998-01-01

    This IAEA Safety Report Series publication is the result of a review of a large selection of accidents in industrial radiography which Regulatory Authorities, professional associations and scientific journals have reported. The review's objective was to draw lessons from the initiating events of the accidents, contributing factors and the consequences. A small, representative selection of accident descriptions is used to illustrate the primary causes of radiography accidents and a set of recommendations to prevent recurrence of such accidents or to mitigate the consequences of those that do occur is provided. By far the most common primary cause of over-exposure was 'Failure to follow operational procedures' and specifically failure to perform radiation monitoring to locate the position of the source. The information in the Safety Report is intended for use by Regulatory Authorities, operating organizations, workers manufacturers and client organizations having responsibilities for radiation protection and safety in industrial radiography. (author)

  11. Analysis of emergency response after the Chernobyl accident in Belarus: observed and prevented medical consequences, lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buglova, E.; Kenigsberg, J.

    1997-01-01

    Belarus is one of the most contaminated Republic due to the Chernobyl accident. 23% of the entire area of Belarus was contaminated with radionuclides. To protect the population after the accident different types of protective actions were performed during all phases, based on various temporary dose limits. An analysis of conducted protective actions and lessons obtained during the emergency response is briefly presented

  12. U. S. Department of energy actions to ensure nuclear safety at its nuclear facilities in response to lessons being learned from the Fukushima dacha accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chung, Dae; O' Brien, James [U. S. Department of Energy, Washington (United States)

    2012-03-15

    The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) has established a rigorous nuclear safety regulatory infrastructure for the protection of workers, the public, and the environment. An essential part of this infrastructure is a safety culture that promotes organizational learning and includes a commitment to safety by senior leaders that is demonstrated through their actions and behaviors. The tragic Fukushima Dacha accident presented an important challenge for DOE leaders to demonstrate a robust safety culture by critically examining the Department' s regulatory infrastructure and its implementation to ensure that appropriate safety provisions were in place. This paper discusses the actions DOE has taken to date in this regard and further planned action to ensure safety at DOE facilities in light of lessons being learned from the Fukushima Dacha accident.

  13. U. S. Department of energy actions to ensure nuclear safety at its nuclear facilities in response to lessons being learned from the Fukushima dacha accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chung, Dae; O'Brien, James

    2012-01-01

    The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) has established a rigorous nuclear safety regulatory infrastructure for the protection of workers, the public, and the environment. An essential part of this infrastructure is a safety culture that promotes organizational learning and includes a commitment to safety by senior leaders that is demonstrated through their actions and behaviors. The tragic Fukushima Dacha accident presented an important challenge for DOE leaders to demonstrate a robust safety culture by critically examining the Department' s regulatory infrastructure and its implementation to ensure that appropriate safety provisions were in place. This paper discusses the actions DOE has taken to date in this regard and further planned action to ensure safety at DOE facilities in light of lessons being learned from the Fukushima Dacha accident

  14. Lessons learned from post-accident management at Chernobyl: the P.a.r.e.x. project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heriard Dubreuil, G.; Lochard, J.; Bataille, C.; Ollagnon, H.; Baude, St.

    2008-01-01

    Return of experience on Chernobyl post-accident management: the PAREX study Belarus is the country the most affected by the Chernobyl fallouts and is among the most significant experiences in the nuclear post-accident field. Despite specificities inherent to the political and social situation in Belarus, the experience of post-accidental management in this country holds a wealth of lessons in the perspective of preparation to a post-accidental situation in the French and European context. Through the PAREX project (2005-2006), the French Nuclear Safety Authority analysed the return of experience of Chernobyl post-accident management from 1986 to 2005 in order to draw its lessons in the perspective of a preparation policy. The study was led by a group of experts and involved the participation of a pluralistic group of about thirty participants (public authorities, local governments, NGOs, experts, operators). PAREX highlighted the complexity of a situation of long-lasting radioactive contamination (diversity of stakeholders and of dimensions at stake: health, environment, economy, society...). Beyond traditional public crisis management tools and frameworks, post-accident strategies also involves in the longer term a territorial and social response, which relies on local capacities of initiative. Preparation to such process requires experimenting new modes of operation that allow a diversity of local actors to take part to the response to a situation of contamination and to the surveillance system, with the support of public authorities. The conclusions of PAREX include a set of recommendations in this perspective. (authors)

  15. Analysis of emergency response after the Chernobyl accident in Belarus: observed and prevented medical consequences, lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buglova, E.; Kenigsberg, J. [Research Clinical Inst. of Radiation Medicine and Endocrinology, Minsk (Belarus)

    1997-12-31

    Belarus is one of the most contaminated Republic due to the Chernobyl accident. 23% of the entire area of Belarus was contaminated with radionuclides. To protect the population after the accident different types of protective actions were performed during all phases, based on various temporary dose limits. An analysis of conducted protective actions and lessons obtained during the emergency response is briefly presented 9 refs.

  16. Lessons of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident for PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumar, M.; Klug, J.; Alzbutas, R.; Burgazzi, L.; Farcasiu, M.; Nitoi, M.; Ivanov, I.; Bogdanov, D.; Hashimoto, K.; Hirata, K.; La Rovere, S.; Sevbo, O.; Vitazkova, J.; Hustak, S.; Wielenberg, A.; Raimond, E.

    2016-01-01

    The objective of this document is to identify some lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident for PSA. Based on the public information on the causes that have led to major radioactive release during the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident (initiating events, material and human response), the authors, ASAMPSA-E WP30 members have performed a review to examine the gaps/insufficiencies/incompleteness in the existing Level 1 and Level 2 PSAs. This is the aim of this report which is one of WP30 deliverables i.e. D30.2. The consideration of external initiating events for the different levels of defense-in-depth is one of the focal points in this review. Recommendations in the way of developing the different elements of PSAs have been proposed by the authors and were completed later during the ASAMPSA-E project. Moreover, first recommendations on the use of PSA information in decision making have been included as well. (authors)

  17. TMI-2: Lessons learned by the US Department of Energy: A programmatic perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmitt, R.C.; Reno, H.W.; Bentley, K.J.; Owens, D.E.

    1990-03-01

    This report is a summary of the lessons learned by the US Department of Energy during its decade-long participation in the research and accident cleanup project at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. It is based on a review of a wide range of project documents and interviews with personnel from the many organizations involved. The lessons are organized into major subjects with a brief background section to orient the reader to that subject. The subjects are divided into sub-topics, each with a brief discussion and a series of lessons learned. The lessons are very brief and each is preceded with a keyword phrase to highlight its specific topic. References are given so that the details of the subject and the lesson can be further investigated. 99 refs., 24 figs

  18. Introduction of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Activities to Reflect Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jongtae; Hong, Seong-Wan [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Gun Hong [Kyungwon E-C Co., Seongnam (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    The Charter requires the staff to highlight potential policy issues for the Commission and provide the Commission every 6 months an update on the review work conducted under the Charter. The recent status of NRC's activities and related program to reflect the lesson-learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant's severe accident are introduced in this paper. A wide variety of the U.S. NRC's activities to reflect lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accidents was investigated. From the investigation, it was found that most of NRC's activities, based on the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) recommendations, are being implemented in a comprehensive and systematic manner. The NRC staff initially prioritized the NTTF recommendations based on its judgment of the potential and relative safety enhancement which could be realized by each. As a result of the staff's prioritization and assessment process, the NTTF recommendations were prioritized into three tiers (i.e., Tier 1, 2 and 3). Tier 1 recommendations are which the staff determined should be started without unnecessary delay and for which sufficient resource flexibility, including availability of critical skill sets, exists. Tier 2 recommendations are which could not be initiated in the near term due to factors that include the need for further technical assessment and alignment, dependence on Tier 1 issues, or availability of critical skill sets. Tier 3 recommendations are that require further staff study to support a regulatory action, have an associated shorter term action that needs to be completed to inform the longer-term action, are dependent on the availability of critical skill sets, or are dependent on the resolution of NTTF Recommendation 1. Through the implementation of each tier activities, existing layers of defense in depth are expected to be gradually bolstered, and such a regulatory approach is much similar in the other countries. It was also found that

  19. Introduction of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Activities to Reflect Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jongtae; Hong, Seong-Wan; Kim, Gun Hong

    2014-01-01

    The Charter requires the staff to highlight potential policy issues for the Commission and provide the Commission every 6 months an update on the review work conducted under the Charter. The recent status of NRC's activities and related program to reflect the lesson-learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant's severe accident are introduced in this paper. A wide variety of the U.S. NRC's activities to reflect lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accidents was investigated. From the investigation, it was found that most of NRC's activities, based on the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) recommendations, are being implemented in a comprehensive and systematic manner. The NRC staff initially prioritized the NTTF recommendations based on its judgment of the potential and relative safety enhancement which could be realized by each. As a result of the staff's prioritization and assessment process, the NTTF recommendations were prioritized into three tiers (i.e., Tier 1, 2 and 3). Tier 1 recommendations are which the staff determined should be started without unnecessary delay and for which sufficient resource flexibility, including availability of critical skill sets, exists. Tier 2 recommendations are which could not be initiated in the near term due to factors that include the need for further technical assessment and alignment, dependence on Tier 1 issues, or availability of critical skill sets. Tier 3 recommendations are that require further staff study to support a regulatory action, have an associated shorter term action that needs to be completed to inform the longer-term action, are dependent on the availability of critical skill sets, or are dependent on the resolution of NTTF Recommendation 1. Through the implementation of each tier activities, existing layers of defense in depth are expected to be gradually bolstered, and such a regulatory approach is much similar in the other countries. It was also found that

  20. Lessons drawn from serious accidents in nuclear power stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kosciusko-Morizet, F.; Tanguy, P.

    1981-01-01

    Taking a number of serious accidents considered to be particularly representative (Windscale, Enrico Fermi, Lucens, Browns Ferry, Three Mile Island and Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux), the paper analyses the conclusions reached in subsequent enquiries and the lessons drawn from them by the responsible authorities. While design problems sometimes come to light, it is much more generally operational safety - problems related to instructions, the training of operators, the man/machine relationship - which appears to be inadequate. The organization of relations between the different partners - builders, operators and safety bodies - likewise gives rise to some observations. Certain measures should be pursued on a broader scale in order to improve our ability to prevent serious accidents: (i) incidents important from the standpoint of safety must be identified; (ii) these incidents must be brought to the knowledge of all partners concerned, in all interested countries; (iii) the lessons drawn from them must be exchanged and compared; and (iv) the lessons must be made generally available in a directly usable form (i.e. as design modifications, changes in instructions and so on). Particular attention must be given to the problems of countries which are embarking on nuclear programmes and which, with a small number of installations, need direct and permanent access to all the lessons drawn from the operation of a large power station park, and must be able to call upon the assistance of teams from outside in the event of an accident. (author)

  1. Lesson Learning at JPL

    Science.gov (United States)

    Oberhettinger, David

    2011-01-01

    A lessons learned system is a hallmark of a mature engineering organization A formal lessons learned process can help assure that valuable lessons get written and published, that they are well-written, and that the essential information is "infused" into institutional practice. Requires high-level institutional commitment, and everyone's participation in gathering, disseminating, and using the lessons

  2. Lessons taught by the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2002-01-01

    On nuclear development, it is natural that safety is the most important condition. However, when occurring an accident in spite of earnest efforts on safety pursuit, it is essential for a technical developer to absorb some lessons from its contents as much as possible and show an attitude to use thereafter. The Chernobyl accident brought extraordinarily large damage in the history of nuclear technology development. Therefore, the edition group of the Japan Society of Atomic Energy introduced opinions of three groups of the Society (that is, groups on reactor physics, nuclear power generation, and human-machine system research) with some description on cause analysis of the accident and its result and effect. And, here was also shown four basic difference on design between RMBK type reactor in Chernobyl and LWR type reactor supplied in Japan. (G.K.)

  3. Our reflections and lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsuoka, Takeshi; Sawada, Takashi; Yagawa, Genki

    2017-01-01

    In order to investigate the cause of the accident that began on March 11, 2011 at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the Science Council of Japan set an investigation committee, the 'Sub-Committee on Fukushima Nuclear Accident (SCFNA)' under the Comprehensive Synthetic Engineering Committee. The committee has published a record entitled 'Reflections and Lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, (1st report)'. There are still many items about the accident for which the details are not clear. It is important to discuss the reasons why the severe accident could not be prevented and the possibilities that there might have been other proper operations and accident management to prevent or lessen the severity of the accident than those adopted at the time. SCFNA decided to continue its investigation by setting up our working group called the 'Working Group on Fukushima Nuclear Accident'. Our working group have published 'Reflection and Lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident (2nd Report)'. We investigated the issues of specific units. Unit 1 were validity of the operation of the isolation condenser, whether or not a loss of coolant accident occurred due to a failure of the cooling piping system by the seismic ground motion, and the cause of the loss of the emergency AC power supply, Unit 2 was the reason why a large amount of radioactive materials was emitted to the environment although the reactor building did not explode, Unit 3 was the reasons why the operator stopped running the high pressure coolant injection system, and Units 1 to 3 was validity of the venting operation. These items were considered to be the key issues in these units that would have prevented progression to the severe accident. (author)

  4. Design Safety Considerations for Water Cooled Small Modular Reactors Incorporating Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-03-01

    The global future deployment of advanced nuclear reactors for electricity generation depends primarily on the ability of nuclear industries, utilities and regulatory authorities to further enhance their reliability and economic competitiveness while satisfying stringent safety requirements. The IAEA has a project to help coordinate Member States efforts in the development and deployment of small and medium sized or small modular reactor (SMR) technology. This project aims simultaneously to facilitate SMR technology developers and potential SMR uses, particularly States embarking on a nuclear power programme, in identifying key enabling technologies and enhancing capacity building by resolving issues relevant to deployment, including nuclear reactor safety. The objective of this publication is to explore common practices for Member States, which will be an essential resource for future development and deployment of SMR technology. The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was caused by an unprecedented combination of natural events: a strong earthquake, beyond the design basis, followed by a series of tsunamis of heights exceeding the design basis tsunami considered in the flood analysis for the site. Consequently, all the operating nuclear power plants and advanced reactors under development, including SMRs, have been incorporating lessons learned from the accident to assure and enhance the performance of the engineered safety features in coping with such external events

  5. Lesson from a 60Co source radiation accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guo Yong; Zhang Wenzhong

    2002-01-01

    A serious radiation accident happened an a 60 Co irradiation facility in Shanghai. 7 workers were uniformly exposed acutely. An investigation was done after the accident and a conclusion was achieved that the irregular operation was the direct reason for the accident. The operation of these workers did not comply with the requirements specified in the national standards-- 60 irradiation facility>> which demands that the examination should be done every day before operation, and the irradiation facility does not stop running when the auto-lock safety system on that facility has been removed. Some lessons should be drawn from the accident: popularizing the culture of safety, enhancing the law of safety, and ensuring the operation of radiation devices within the demands of safety

  6. Introduction of the Amendment of IAEA Safety Requirements Reflected Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahn, Sang-Kyu; Ahn, Hyung-Joon; Kim, Sun-Hae; Cheong, Jae-Hak [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The following five Safety Requirements publications were amended: Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety (GSR Part 1, 2010), Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (NS-R-3, 2003), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1, 2012), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (SSR-2/2, 2011), and Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4, 2009). Figure 1 shows IAEA Safety Standards Categories Major amendments of five Safety Requirements publications were introduced and analyzed in this study. The five IAEA safety requirements publications which are GSR Part 1 and 4, NS-R-3 and SSR-2/1 and 2, were amended to reflect the lesson learned from the Fukushima accident and other operating experiences. Specially, 36 provisions were modified and the new 29 provision with 1 requirement (No. 67: Emergency response facilities on the site) of the SSR-2/1 were established. Since the Fukushima accident happened, a new word, design extension conditions (DECs) which cover substantially the beyond design basis accidents (BDBA), including severe accident conditions, was created and more elaborated by the world nuclear experts. Design extension conditions could include conditions in events without significant fuel degradation and conditions with core melting. Figure 2 shows the range of the DECs. The amendment of the five IAEA safety requirements publications are focused at the prevention of initiating events, which would lead to the DECs, and mitigation of the consequences of DECs by the enhanced defense in depth principle. The following examples of the IAEA requirements to prevent the initiating events are: margins for withstanding external events; margins for avoiding cliff edge effects; safety assessment for multiple facilities or activities at a single site; safety assessment in cases where resources at a facility are shared; consideration of the potential occurrence of events in combination; establishing levels of hazard

  7. Spent Fuel Storage Operation - Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-12-01

    , UK and USA attended the meeting. The responses to the second questionnaire, which was circulated at the International Conference on Management of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactor (2010), were reviewed at this meeting. Discussions on what was initially learned from the accident at Fukushima also took place. In response to the accident, an additional chapter (Chapter 4) has been added to detail the lessons learned from the remediation of severely damaged fuel at Three Mile Island unit 2 and at Paks

  8. Lessons learned related to packaging and transportation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wallen, C.

    1995-01-01

    The use of lessons learned as a tool for learning from past experiences is well established, especially by many organizations within the nuclear industry. Every person has, at some time, used the principles of lessons learned to adopt good work practices based on their own experiences or the experiences of others. Lessons learned can also help to avoid the recurrence of adverse practices, which is often an area that most lessons-learned programs tend to focus on. This paper will discuss how lessons learned relate to packaging and transportation issues and events experienced at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities. It will also discuss the role performed by the Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety's Office of Operating Experience Analysis and Feedback in disseminating lessons learned and operating experience feedback to the DOE complex. The central concept of lessons learned is that any organization should be able to learn from its own experiences and events. In addition, organizations should implement methodologies to scan external environments for lessons learned, to analyze and determine the relevance of lessons learned, and to bring about the necessary changes learned from these experiences. With increased concerns toward facility safety, the importance of utilizing the lessons-learned principles and the establishment of lessons-learned programs can not be overstated

  9. Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in a Deactivation and Decommissioning Environment [A Guide for Facility and Project Managers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nirider, L. Tom

    2003-08-06

    This document was designed as a reference and a primer for facility and project managers responsible for Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D) processes in facilities containing significant inventories of fissionable materials. The document contains lessons learned and guidance for the development and management of criticality safety programs. It also contains information gleaned from occurrence reports, assessment reports, facility operations and management, NDA program reviews, criticality safety experts, and criticality safety evaluations. This information is designed to assist in the planning process and operational activities. Sufficient details are provided to allow the reader to understand the events, the lessons learned, and how to apply the information to present or planned D&D processes. Information is also provided on general lessons learned including criticality safety evaluations and criticality safety program requirements during D&D activities. The document also explores recent and past criticality accidents in operating facilities, and it extracts lessons learned pertinent to D&D activities. A reference section is included to provide additional information. This document does not address D&D lessons learned that are not pertinent to criticality safety.

  10. Inadequacies of Belgium nuclear emergency plans: lessons from the Fukushima catastrophe have not been learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boilley, David; Josset, Mylene

    2015-01-01

    After having outlined that some Belgium regional authorities made some statements showing that they did not learn lessons neither from the Chernobyl catastrophe, nor from the Fukushima accident, this report aims at examining whether Belgium is well prepared to face a severe nuclear accident occurring within its borders or in neighbouring countries, whether all hypotheses have actually been taken into account, and whether existing emergency plans are realistic. After a presentation of Belgium's situation regarding nuclear plants (Belgium plants and neighbouring French plants), the report presents the content and organisation of the nuclear emergency plan for the Belgium territory at the national, provincial and municipal levels. While outlining inadequacies and weaknesses of the Belgium plan regarding the addressed issues, it discusses the main lessons learned from the Fukushima accident in terms of emergency planning areas, of population sheltering, of iodine-based prophylaxis, of population evacuation, of food supply, of tools (measurement instruments) and human resources, and of public information. In the next parts, the report addresses and discusses trans-border issues, and the commitment of stakeholders

  11. Programmatic changes due to TMI-2 [Three Mile Island Unit 2]: Accident planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wingert, V.L.

    1988-01-01

    The focus of the paper is lessons learned for emergency planning and preparedness form the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident. The lessons learned are examined from two perspectives: (a) lessons learned that have resulted in programmatic changes, and (b) lessons learned that have not been adequately addressed. There is no doubt that the TMI-2 accident is the pivotal event that caused a major rethinking of the pre-TMI emergency preparedness posture and led to a fundamentally different approach to emergency preparedness for commercial nuclear power plant accidents. While this new approach has evolved into a comprehensive, systematic, and even prototypical national program, it has also generated new problems: escalating costs for state and local governments and leveraging of the federal licensing process by state and local governments who do not want specific nuclear power plants to operate. A discussion of the primary lessons learned on emergency preparedness is presented under the following topics: beyond defense-in-depth, predetermined action, mandatory emergency planning and preparedness, and federal coordination

  12. Constellation Program Lessons Learned. Volume 2; Detailed Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rhatigan, Jennifer; Neubek, Deborah J.; Thomas, L. Dale

    2011-01-01

    These lessons learned are part of a suite of hardware, software, test results, designs, knowledge base, and documentation that comprises the legacy of the Constellation Program. The context, summary information, and lessons learned are presented in a factual format, as known and described at the time. While our opinions might be discernable in the context, we have avoided all but factually sustainable statements. Statements should not be viewed as being either positive or negative; their value lies in what we did and what we learned that is worthy of passing on. The lessons include both "dos" and "don ts." In many cases, one person s "do" can be viewed as another person s "don t"; therefore, we have attempted to capture both perspectives when applicable and useful. While Volume I summarizes the views of those who managed the program, this Volume II encompasses the views at the working level, describing how the program challenges manifested in day-to-day activities. Here we see themes that were perhaps hinted at, but not completely addressed, in Volume I: unintended consequences of policies that worked well at higher levels but lacked proper implementation at the working level; long-term effects of the "generation gap" in human space flight development, the need to demonstrate early successes at the expense of thorough planning, and the consequences of problems and challenges not yet addressed because other problems and challenges were more immediate or manifest. Not all lessons learned have the benefit of being operationally vetted, since the program was cancelled shortly after Preliminary Design Review. We avoid making statements about operational consequences (with the exception of testing and test flights that did occur), but we do attempt to provide insight into how operational thinking influenced design and testing. The lessons have been formatted with a description, along with supporting information, a succinct statement of the lesson learned, and

  13. Lessons learned from accident simulation exercises and their implications for operation of the IPSN Centre Technique de Crise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manesse, D.; Ney, J.; Crabol, B.; Ginot, P.

    1990-01-01

    The Centre Technique de Crise (CTC) of the Institut de Protection et de Surete Nucleaire (IPSN) has an important role to play in the event of an accident at a nuclear installation of Electricite de France (EdF) concerning diagnosis of the situation and forecasting its evolution. For this purpose the CTS is organized into various groups; only that responsible for the evaluation of the radiological consequences is considered in the present paper. Since the beginning of the eighties numerous simulations of nuclear accidents have been organized both by the public authorities and by the nuclear operators. These exercises, of growing complexity, are distinguished according to the type of installation concerned, the scenario (with and without a simulator), the equipment involved, the participants (local and national officials), the accident phase used (at the time of the accident or post-accident), the use of actual or pre-determined meteorological conditions etc.. Different combinations are imposed as a function of the specific aims of each exercise. Numerous lessons have been drawn progressively from these very varied exercises for the operation of the CTC and, in particular, of the Radiological Consequences Group. The principal Lessons concern: development of calculation and mapping tools, specific liaison with the national meteorological services, modification of the centre's facilities, composition of the team and definition of the role of each of its members, improved liaison with the Site Evaluation Group and the provision of appropriate documentation. The need for continuous training of duty teams in the form of presentations and exercises has also been confirmed

  14. Medical management of radiological accidents in non-specialized clinics: mistakes and lessons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jikia, D.

    2009-01-01

    In 1996-2002 three radiological accidents were developed in Georgia. There were some people injured in those accidents. During medical management of the injured some mistakes and errors were revealed both in diagnostics and scheme of the treatment. The goal of this article is to summarize medical management of the mentioned radiological accidents, to estimate reasons of mistakes and errors, to present the lessons drawn in result of Georgia radiological accidents. There was no clinic with specialized profile and experience. Accordingly due to having no relevant experience late diagnosis can be considered as the main error. It had direct influence on the patients' health and results of treatment. Lessons to be drawn after analyzing Georgian radiological accidents: 1. informing medical staff about radiological injuries (pathogenesis, types, symptoms, clinical course, principles of treatment and etc.); 2. organization of training and meetings in non-specialized clinics or medical institutions for medical staff; 3. preparation of informational booklets and guidelines.(author)

  15. IRSN-Ancli seminar on the post-accident context

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Didier, Damien; Leroyer, Veronique; Gariel, Jean-Christophe; Meier, Christine; Petitfrere, Michael; Meraux-Netillard, Isabelle; Lerouxel, Roland; Gandouen, Gael; Boutin, Dominique; Charre, Jean-Pierre; Noe, Maite; Quenneville, Celine; Farandeau, Sebastien; Mouchet, Chantal; Pineau, Coralie; Rollinger, Francois; GARIEL, Jean-Christophe; Ando, Ryoko; Nishida, Shoshi; Miazaki, Makoto; Hayano, Ryugo; Lheureux, Yves; Lochard, Jacques; Boilley, David; Godet, Jean-Luc

    2014-10-01

    The first session addressed the context of post-accident management: main challenges of radiation protection in case of nuclear accident, management of energy situations (specific intervention plans of nuclear plants), elements of doctrine for the post-accident management of an accident. The second session addressed the preparedness of territories to post-accident management: preparation to post-accident management in the Montbeliard district, emergency and post-accidental situation (preparedness at the district scale, example of Loiret), and return on experience from the post-accident exercise in Cattenom. The third session addressed the action undertaken by the ANCCLI and IRSN for the awareness of post-accidental problematic (experiments in Saclay, Marcoule, Gravelines and Golfech, lessons learned from the pilot phase and perspectives). The last session addressed the post-accidental management of the Fukushima accident: approach of the IRSN to learn lessons from the dialogue initiative in Fukushima, round table on challenges on the long term of post-accidental management, Japanese witnesses

  16. Helping HSE Team in Learning from Accident by Using the Management Oversight and Risk Tree Analysis Method

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Iraj Mohammadfam

    2016-09-01

    Conclusion: The analysis using MORT method helped the organization with learning lessons from the accident especially at the management level. In order to prevent the similar and dissimilar accidents, the inappropriate informational network within the organization, inappropriate operational readiness, lack of proper implementation of work permit, the inappropriate and lack of updated technical information systems regarding equipments and working process, and the inappropriate barriers should be considered in a special way.

  17. Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in a Deactivation and Decommissioning Environment [A Guide for Facility and Project Managers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NIRIDER, L.T.

    2003-01-01

    This document was designed as a reference and a primer for facility and project managers responsible for Deactivation and Decommissioning (D and D) processes in facilities containing significant inventories of fissionable materials. The document contains lessons learned and guidance for the development and management of criticality safety programs. It also contains information gleaned from occurrence reports, assessment reports, facility operations and management, NDA program reviews, criticality safety experts, and criticality safety evaluations. This information is designed to assist in the planning process and operational activities. Sufficient details are provided to allow the reader to understand the events, the lessons learned, and how to apply the information to present or planned D and D processes. Information is also provided on general lessons learned including criticality safety evaluations and criticality safety program requirements during D and D activities. The document also explores recent and past criticality accidents in operating facilities, and it extracts lessons learned pertinent to D and D activities. A reference section is included to provide additional information. This document does not address D and D lessons learned that are not pertinent to criticality safety

  18. Psychological and social impacts of post-accident situations: lessons from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lochard, J.

    1996-01-01

    This paper presents the main features, from the psychological and social points of view, of the post-accident situation in the contaminated areas around Chernobyl. This is based on a series of surveys performed in the concerned territories of the CIS republics. The high level of stress affecting a large segment of the population is related to the perception of the situation by those living in a durably contaminated environment but also to the side-effects of some of the countermeasures adopted to mitigate the radiological consequences or to compensate the affected population. The distinction between the accident and the post-accident phase is enlarged to take into account the various phases characterizing the dynamics of the social response. Although the size of the catastrophe as well as the economic and political conditions that were prevailing at the time and after the accident have resulted in a maximal intensity of the reactions of the population, many lessons can be drawn for the management of potential post-accident situations. (author)

  19. Lessons from Goiania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nazari Alves, R.

    2000-01-01

    The lessons learned from the radiological accident of Goiania in 1987 derived from the observations from the Regulatory Agency which was in charge of the decontamination tasks may be consolidated into four classes: Preventive Actions, characterised as those that aim to minimise the probability of occurrence of a radiological accident; Minimisation of time between the moment of the accident occurrence and the beginning of intervention, in case a radiological accident does occur, despite all preventive measures; Intervention, which is correlated to the type of installation, its geographical location, the social classes involved and their contamination vectors; and Follow up, for which well established rules to allow continuing monitoring of the victims and rebuilding of homes are necessary. The greatest lesson of all was the need for integration of the professionals involved, from all organizations. (author)

  20. FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE ACTIONS FROM THE RISK PERSPECTIVES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    JOON-EON YANG

    2014-02-01

    Full Text Available The Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident in 2011 has affected various aspects of the nuclear society worldwide. The accident revealed some problems in the conventional approaches used to ensure the safety of nuclear installations. To prevent such disastrous accidents in the future, we have to learn from them and improve the conventional approaches in a more systematic manner. In this paper, we will cover three issues. The first is to identify the key issues that affected the progress of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident greatly. We examine the accident from a defense-in-depth point of view to identify such issues. The second is to develop a more systematic approach to enhance the safety of nuclear installations. We reexamine nuclear safety from a risk point of view. We use the concepts of residual and unknown risks in classifying the risk space. All possible accident scenarios types are reviewed to clarify the characteristics of the identified issues. An approach is proposed to improve our conventional approaches used to ensure nuclear safety including the design of safety features and the safety assessments from a risk point of view. Finally, we address some issues to be improved in the conventional risk assessment and management framework and/or practices to enhance nuclear safety.

  1. Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident: Lessons Learned and Future Actions from the Risk Perspectives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yang, Jooneon [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-02-15

    The Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident in 2011 has affected various aspects of the nuclear society worldwide. The accident revealed some problems in the conventional approaches used to ensure the safety of nuclear installations. To prevent such disastrous accidents in the future, we have to learn from them and improve the conventional approaches in a more systematic manner. In this paper, we will cover three issues. The first is to identify the key issues that affected the progress of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident greatly. We examine the accident from a defense-in-depth point of view to identify such issues. The second is to develop a more systematic approach to enhance the safety of nuclear installations. We reexamine nuclear safety from a risk point of view. We use the concepts of residual and unknown risks in classifying the risk space. All possible accident scenarios types are reviewed to clarify the characteristics of the identified issues. An approach is proposed to improve our conventional approaches used to ensure nuclear safety including the design of safety features and the safety assessments from a risk point of view. Finally, we address some issues to be improved in the conventional risk assessment and management framework and/or practices to enhance nuclear safety.

  2. Main lessons based on the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident liquidation experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vasil'chenko, V.N.; Nosovskij, A.V.

    2006-01-01

    The authors review the main lessons of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident and the liquidation of its consequences in the area of the nuclear reactors safety operation, any major accident management, liquidation accident consequences criteria, emergency procedures, preventative measures and treatment irradiated victims, the monitoring methods etc. The special emphasis is put on the questions of the emergency response and the antiaccidental measures planning in frame of international cooperation program

  3. Lessons of nuclear robot history

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oomichi, Takeo

    2014-01-01

    Severe accidents occurred at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station stirred up people's great expectation of nuclear robot's deployment. However unexpected nuclear disaster, especially rupture of reactor building caused by core meltdown and hydrogen explosion, made it quite difficult to introduce nuclear robot under high radiation environment to cease accidents and dispose damaged reactor. Robotics Society of Japan (RSJ) set up committee to look back upon lessons learned from 50 year's past experience of nuclear robot development and summarized 'Lessons of nuclear robot history', which was shown on the home page website of RSJ. This article outlined it with personal comment. History of nuclear robot developed for inspection and maintenance at normal operation and for specific required response at nuclear accidents was reviewed with many examples at home and abroad for TMI, Chernobyl and JCO accidents. Present state of Fukushima accident response robot's introduction and development was also described with some comments on nuclear robot development from academia based on lessons. (T. Tanaka)

  4. Lessons to be learned from an analysis of ammonium nitrate disasters in the last 100 years

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pittman, William; Han, Zhe; Harding, Brian; Rosas, Camilo; Jiang, Jiaojun; Pineda, Alba; Mannan, M. Sam, E-mail: mannan@tamu.edu

    2014-09-15

    Highlights: • Root causes and contributing factors from ammonium nitrate incidents are categorized into 10 lessons. • The lessons learned from the past 100 years of ammonium nitrate incidents can be used to improve design, operation, and maintenance procedures. • Improving organizational memory to help improve safety performance. • Combating and changing organizational cultures. - Abstract: Process safety, as well as the safe storage and transportation of hazardous or reactive chemicals, has been a topic of increasing interest in the last few decades. The increased interest in improving the safety of operations has been driven largely by a series of recent catastrophes that have occurred in the United States and the rest of the world. A continuous review of past incidents and disasters to look for common causes and lessons is an essential component to any process safety and loss prevention program. While analyzing the causes of an accident cannot prevent that accident from occurring, learning from it can help to prevent future incidents. The objective of this article is to review a selection of major incidents involving ammonium nitrate in the last century to identify common causes and lessons that can be gleaned from these incidents in the hopes of preventing future disasters. Ammonium nitrate has been involved in dozens of major incidents in the last century, so a subset of major incidents were chosen for discussion for the sake of brevity. Twelve incidents are reviewed and ten lessons from these incidents are discussed.

  5. Lessons to be learned from an analysis of ammonium nitrate disasters in the last 100 years

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pittman, William; Han, Zhe; Harding, Brian; Rosas, Camilo; Jiang, Jiaojun; Pineda, Alba; Mannan, M. Sam

    2014-01-01

    Highlights: • Root causes and contributing factors from ammonium nitrate incidents are categorized into 10 lessons. • The lessons learned from the past 100 years of ammonium nitrate incidents can be used to improve design, operation, and maintenance procedures. • Improving organizational memory to help improve safety performance. • Combating and changing organizational cultures. - Abstract: Process safety, as well as the safe storage and transportation of hazardous or reactive chemicals, has been a topic of increasing interest in the last few decades. The increased interest in improving the safety of operations has been driven largely by a series of recent catastrophes that have occurred in the United States and the rest of the world. A continuous review of past incidents and disasters to look for common causes and lessons is an essential component to any process safety and loss prevention program. While analyzing the causes of an accident cannot prevent that accident from occurring, learning from it can help to prevent future incidents. The objective of this article is to review a selection of major incidents involving ammonium nitrate in the last century to identify common causes and lessons that can be gleaned from these incidents in the hopes of preventing future disasters. Ammonium nitrate has been involved in dozens of major incidents in the last century, so a subset of major incidents were chosen for discussion for the sake of brevity. Twelve incidents are reviewed and ten lessons from these incidents are discussed

  6. St. Louis FUSRAP Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eberlin, J.; Williams, D.; Mueller, D.

    2003-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to present lessons learned from fours years' experience conducting Remedial Investigation and Remedial Action activities at the St. Louis Downtown Site (SLDS) under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). Many FUSRAP sites are experiencing challenges conducting Remedial Actions within forecasted volume and budget estimates. The St. Louis FUSRAP lessons learned provide insight to options for cost effective remediation at FUSRAP sites. The lessons learned are focused on project planning (budget and schedule), investigation, design, and construction

  7. Learning to observe mathematical learning in lesson studies

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Rasmussen, Klaus; Østergaard, Camilla Hellsten; Foss, Kristian Kildemoes

    2016-01-01

    This poster deals with lesson study (LS) in pre-service teacher education. In particular how to prepare for, carry out, and reflect upon, observations of pupil learning. Observation is of crucial importance to the lesson study process, and here we present a study of observation features which ena...... enable or hinder fruitful lesson study. While substantial research has been carried out in the general field of bserving pupils’ learning processes and teachers’ pedagogical practice, little is known about this in the particular setting of lesson study....

  8. Lessons learned from the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Advisory Panel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lach, D.; Bolton, P.; Durbin, N.; Harty, R.

    1994-08-01

    In response to public concern about the cleanup of the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2) facility after an accident on March 28, 1979 involving a loss of reactor coolant and subsequent damage to the reactor fuel, twelve citizens were asked to serve on an independent Advisory Panel to consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on the decontamination and cleanup of the facility. The panel met 78 times over a period of thirteen years, holding public meetings in the vicinity of TMI-2 and meeting regularly with NRC Commissioners in Washington, DC. This report describes the results of a project designed to identify and describe the lessons learned from the Advisory Panel and place those lessons in the context of what we generally know about citizen advisory groups. A summary of the empirical literature on citizen advisory panels is followed by a brief history of the TMI-2 Advisory Panel. The body of the report contains the analysis of the lessons learned, preliminary conclusions about the effectiveness of the Panel, and implications for the NRC in the use of advisory panels. Data for the report include meeting transcripts and interviews with past and present Panel participants

  9. Importance Of Quality Control in Reducing System Risk, a Lesson Learned From The Shuttle and a Recommendation for Future Launch Vehicles

    Science.gov (United States)

    Safie, Fayssal M.; Messer, Bradley P.

    2006-01-01

    This paper presents lessons learned from the Space Shuttle return to flight experience and the importance of these lessons learned in the development of new the NASA Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV). Specifically, the paper discusses the relationship between process control and system risk, and the importance of process control in improving space vehicle flight safety. It uses the External Tank (ET) Thermal Protection System (TPS) experience and lessons learned from the redesign and process enhancement activities performed in preparation for Return to Flight after the Columbia accident. The paper also, discusses in some details, the Probabilistic engineering physics based risk assessment performed by the Shuttle program to evaluate the impact of TPS failure on system risk and the application of the methodology to the CLV.

  10. Learned lessons of the radiological accident occurred in La Ciudadela of El Cementerio, Gran Caracas. September 2005

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lea, D.; Cubillan, Y.; Figuera, J.L.; Mora, G.; Pacheco, J.; Yanez, H.; Carrizales, L.

    2006-01-01

    On September 20, 2005 when a mission conformed by five (05) officials: two (02) belonging to the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEP) and three (03) of the Ministry of Health (MS) it was prepared to carry out a routine inspection in the one temporary warehouse of sources in disuse located in La Ciudadela of El Cementerio, identified administratively as Warehouse Number 5 (MS) Area X, noticed that those armor-plating that kept the radioactive sources of Cs-137 had been violated. Those people that entered to the warehouse were able to extract the armor-plating in whose interior its were found an important number of sources of Cs-137 in disuse, used in the decade of 70 and 80 in treatment of cancer of the uterine neck, by means of the Brachytherapy technique of Differed charge manual, low dose rate, as well as, lead sheets with the apparent intention of selling them as junk. The intruders extracted a total of 58 radioactive sources of Cs-137 of its armor-plating for then to disperse them inside warehouse and in the external areas to this. An important number of the dispersed sources its had lost it integrity what gave place to a combined scenario of exposed dispersed sources in a public area with the danger of radioactive contamination by Cs-137. A task force conformed by the following institutions: Ministry of Health (MS), Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MENPET), Venezuelan Institute of Scientific Investigations (IVIC), Unit of Dangerous Materials of the Metropolitan Firemen under the coordination of Civil Protection (PC) it was the one in charge of responding to the radiological accident, of conformity to the National Plan for the Answer to Radiological Accidents. All the radioactive sources dispersed in La Ciudadela achieved to be recovered. The experience of the accident and as learned lesson it was the importance of harmonizing the Generic Procedures for the Evaluation and Answer during Radiological Emergencies, IAEA-TECDOC-1162 technical document, Vienna, August

  11. Lessons learned from accidental exposures in radiotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The medical use of radiation is unique in that patients are intentionally exposed to radiation. The aim in radiation therapy is twofold: to deliver a dose and dose distribution that is adequate for tumour control, but which also minimizes complications in normal tissues. In therapeutic applications, the doses are high and a deviation from the prescribed dose may have severe or even fatal consequences. There is therefore a great need to ensure adequate radiation protection and safety in radiotherapy by verifying that all personnel involved are appropriately trained for their duties, that the equipment used meets relevant international specifications for radiation safety and that safety culture is embedded in routine activities in radiotherapy departments. Many individuals must interact and work together on highly technical measurements and calculations, and therefore the potential for mistakes is great. A review of the mistakes shows that most are due to human error. The International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and the Safety of Radiation Sources (IAEA Safety Series No. 115) require that a prompt investigation be conducted whenever an accidental medical exposure of patients occurs. The report of the investigation is to be disseminated to the appropriate parties so that lessons can be learned to prevent similar accidents or mitigate their consequences in the future. This Safety Report is a collection of a large number of events that may serve as a checklist against which to test the vulnerability of a facility to potential accidents, and to provide a basis for improving safety in the use of radiation in medical applications. A further purpose of this report is to encourage readers to develop a questioning and learning attitude, adopt measures for the prevention of accidents, and prepare for mitigation of the consequences of accidents if they occur

  12. Chapter 6: Accidents; Capitulo 6: Acidentes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-06-01

    The chapter 6 talks about the accidents with radiators all over the world, specifically, the Stimos, in Italy, 1975, San Salvador, in El Salvador, 1989, Soreq, in Israel, 1990, Nesvizh, in Byelorussian, 1991, in Illinois, US, 1965, in Maryland, US, 1991, Hanoi, Vietnam, 1992, Fleurus, in Belgium, 2006. Comments on the accidents and mainly the learned lessons.

  13. Planning geometry lessons with learning platforms

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Tamborg, Andreas Lindenskov

    mathematics teachers’ joint planning of a lesson in geometry with a learning platform called Meebook is analyzed using the instrumental approach. It is concluded that the interface in Meebook orients the teachers work toward what the students should do rather than what they should learn, although the latter......This paper investigates how mathematics teachers plan lessons with a recently implemented Danish learning platform designed to support teachers in planning lessons in line with a recent objective-oriented curriculum. Drawing on data from observations of and interviews with teachers, three...... is a key intention behind the implementation of the platform. It is also concluded that when the teachers succeed in using learning objectives actively in their planning, the objectives support the teachers in designing lessons that correspond with their intentions. The paper concludes with a discussion...

  14. Chernobyl accident: lessons learned for radiation protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kenigsberg, Jacov

    2008-01-01

    Full text: The long-term nature of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which was a major technological catastrophe in terms of its scope and complexity and created humanitarian, environmental, social, economic and health consequences. After more than twenty years we can conclude that Chernobyl accident was requested the big efforts of the national governments and international organisations for improvement new approaches to radiation safety, radiation protection, health care, emergency preparedness and response. During first years after accident some response actions did more harm than good because not based on international radiation protection principles, based on criteria developed during emergency and associated with mistrust, emotions, political pressure. As a result was inappropriate government reaction: unjustified relocation and decontamination - loss jobs, homes, billions of $ cost; unjustified compensation (high portion of annual national budgets). Non-radiological (e.g. detrimental economic, social and psychological) consequences was worse than direct radiological consequences. Psychological effects do not correlate with real exposure but with perception of risk. The affected people believe in threat to their health, doubt what has been reported about accident and resulted doses, got modification in life style, have somatic complains, got substance abuse (alcohol, tranquilizers, sleeping pills). The lack of accurate information and misperception of real radiation risk is believed also to have lead to change in behavior of some affected people. Possible long-term health effect due to the accidental exposure remains an issue. There is no doubt that excess thyroid cancer incidence results from exposure to radioactive iodines, mainly by iodine-131. Radiation induced thyroid cancer could easily be prevented by timely warning, effective thyroid blocking, timely restriction of consumption for contaminated food. The

  15. Post-processing activities after Chernobyl accident in Ukraine and lesson learned to the response Fukushima Dai-ichi accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujii, Yuzo

    2012-01-01

    After the accident of Chernobyl NPP no.4 1986, various activities including the construction of the shelter, prevention of the release of radioactive dust and liquid from the shelter, monitoring the condition of the damaged core, and disposal of radioactive waste have been implemented in the Chernobyl site for mitigating the nuclear and radioactive risks of damaged nuclear facilities, and the reducing radiation dose of working personnel. The construction of new shelter started for the decommissioning of the damaged unit no.4. facility. For reducing the radiation dose to the inhabitants from the contaminated land and feedstuff, the countermeasures including the set of the exclusive zone and permissible level of radionuclide in the foodstuff have been conducted for the countrywide. These activities include many valuable information about how to recover the condition of the site and maintain the social activities after the severe accident of NPP, and it would be important to learn the above activities in conducting the post-processing activities on the Fukushima-Daiichi accident successfully. (author)

  16. The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station - occurrence of the accident, current situation and Future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirose, K.

    2013-01-01

    In this presentation author analyse course of accident on Fukushima Dai-chi NPPs as well as consequences of this disaster. The following parts are presented: (1) Occurrence of the accident; (2) Evacuation of the residential people; (3) Deterioration and protraction of the accident; (4) Impact on society; (5) Situation of decontamination; (6) Long-term steps towards decommissioning; (7) Situation of other nuclear power stations; (8) Conclusions and lessons learned.

  17. Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned for the STS-I07 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

    Science.gov (United States)

    Patlach, Robert; Stepaniak, Philip C.; Lane, Helen W.

    2014-01-01

    Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014, presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goals of this book are to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews.

  18. Implementing US Department of Energy lessons learned programs. Volume 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-08-01

    The DOE Lessons Learned Handbook is a two-volume publication developed to supplement the DOE Lessons Learned Standard (DOE-STD-7501-95) with information that will organizations in developing or improving their lessons learned programs. Volume 1 includes greater detail than the Standard in areas such as identification and documentation of lessons learned; it also contains sections on specific processes such as training and performance measurement. Volume 2 (this document) contains examples of program documents developed by existing lessons learned programs as well as communications material, functional categories, transmittal documents, sources of professional and industry lessons learned, and frequently asked questions about the Lessons Learned List Service.

  19. Research investigation report on Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-03-01

    This report was issued in February 2012 by Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation's Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, which consisted of six members from the private sector in independent positions and with no direct interest in the business of promoting nuclear power. Commission aimed to determine the truth behind the accident by clarifying the various problems and reveal systematic problems behind these issues so as to create a new starting point by identifying clear lessons learned. Report composed of four chapters; (1) progression of Fukushima accident and resulting damage (accident management after Fukushima accident, and effects and countermeasure of radioactive materials discharged into the environment), (2) response against Fukushima accident (emergency response of cabinet office against nuclear disaster, risk communication and on-site response against nuclear disaster), (3) analysis of historical and structural factors (technical philosophy of nuclear safety, problems of nuclear safety regulation of Fukushima accident, safety regulatory governance and social background of 'Safety Myth'), (4) Global Context (implication in nuclear security, Japan in nuclear safety regime, U.S.-Japan relations for response against Fukushima accident, lessons learned from Fukushima accident - aiming at creation of resilience). Report could identify causes of Fukushima accident and factors related to resulting damages, show the realities behind failure to prevent the spread of damage, and analyze the overall structural and historical background behind the accidents. (T. Tanaka)

  20. Integrating self-regulated learning and discovery learning into English lesson plan

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sayukti Ni Kadek Heny

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available The notion of learner-centeredness has been embedded in the National Curriculum of Indonesia, 2013 Curriculum. However, most of the teachers seem to be hardly acquainted with the concept of Self-Regulated Learning (SRL and discovery learning in the lesson planning. Considering the phenomenon, this study intends to explore the concept of Self-Regulated Learning in the lesson plan of English subject for a tenth-grade level by employing a qualitative design with data obtained from a teacher-made lesson plan and a semi-structured interview. The researcher used content analysis to analyze the lesson plan. Meanwhile, the qualitative data from interview result were preceded through a coding sheet and transcribed modified figure. The findings revealed an integration of SRL cyclical phase and discovery learning in the teacher-made lesson plan. Based on the discussion, the results need to be applied in a considerably large context, in order to see thoroughly dynamic integration between Self-Regulated Learning model, lesson planning and the concept of learner autonomy.

  1. Barriers to learning from incidents and accidents

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dechy, N.; Dien, Y.; Drupsteen, L.; Felicio, A.; Cunha, C.; Roed-Larsen, S.; Marsden, E.; Tulonen, T.; Stoop, J.; Strucic, M.; Vetere Arellano, A.L.; Vorm, J.K.J. van der; Benner, L.

    2015-01-01

    This document provides an overview of knowledge concerning barriers to learning from incidents and accidents. It focuses on learning from accident investigations, public inquiries and operational experience feedback, in industrial sectors that are exposed to major accident hazards. The document

  2. Lessons for PHWRs learned from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waddington, J.G.; Molloy, T.J.

    1996-01-01

    The Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada examined its criteria for licensing nuclear power plants following the accident to the Chernobyl reactor in 1986. The causes of the accident were studied to ascertain whether they revealed any deficiencies in the safety of CANDU PHWRs. A report published in 1987 contained nine recommendations, and this paper revisits these to indicate how they were dealt with the plant owners and the regulatory authority

  3. Lessons for PHWRs learned from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waddington, J.G.; Molloy, T.J.

    1996-04-01

    The Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada examined its criteria for licensing nuclear power plants following the accident to the Chernobyl reactor in 1986. The causes of the accident were studied to ascertain whether they revealed any deficiencies in the safety of CANDU PHWRs. A report published in 1987 contained nine recommendations, and this paper revisits these to indicate how they were dealt with by plant owners and the regulatory authority. (author)

  4. A brief review of the accident at Three Mile Island

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corey, G.R.

    1979-01-01

    A question-and-answer format is used to discuss the Three Mile Reactor accident and the lessons learned. The aspects touched upon include the hydrogen bubble, the radiation levels the public was exposed to, and the consequences of the accident to the nuclear power program

  5. The Fukushima accident: radiological consequences and first lessons. Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-02-01

    This document brings together the available presentations given at the conference organised by the French society of radiation protection about the Fukushima accident, its radiological consequences and the first lessons learnt. Sixteen presentations (slides) are compiled in this document and deal with: 1 - Accident progress and first actions (Thierry Charles, IRSN); 2 - Conditions and health monitoring of the Japanese intervention teams (Bernard Le Guen, EDF); 3 - The Intra Group action after the Fukushima accident (Michel Chevallier, Groupe Intra; Frederic Mariotte, CEA); 4 - Processing of effluents (Georges Pagis, Areva); 5 - Fukushima accident: impact on the terrestrial environment in Japan (Didier Champion, IRSN); 6 - Consequences of the Fukushima accident on the marine environment (Dominique Boust, IRSN); 7 - Territories decontamination perspectives (Pierre Chagvardieff, CEA); 8 - Actions undertaken by Japanese authorities (Florence Gallay, ASN); 9 - Japanese population monitoring and health stakes (Philippe Pirard, InVS); 10 - Citizen oversight actions implemented in Japan (David Boilley, ACRO); 11 - Implementation of ICRP's (International Commission on Radiological Protection) recommendations by Japanese authorities: first analysis (Jacques Lochard, CIPR); 12 - Control of Japan imported food stuff (David Brouque, DGAL); 13 - Questions asked by populations in France and in Germany (Florence-Nathalie Sentuc, GRS; Pascale Monti, IRSN); 14 - Labour law applicable to French workers working abroad (Thierry Lahaye, DGT); 15 - Protection of French workers working in Japan, Areva's experience (Patrick Devin, Areva); 16 - Fukushima accident experience feedback and post-accident nuclear doctrine (Jean-Luc Godet, ASN)

  6. Human Spaceflight Conjunction Assessment: Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Smith, Jason T.

    2011-01-01

    This viewgraph presentation reviews the process of a human space flight conjunction assessment and lessons learned from the more than twelve years of International Space Station (ISS) operations. Also, the application of these lessons learned to a recent ISS conjunction assessment with object 84180 on July 16, 2009 is also presented.

  7. Impact of the accident at TMI-2 on new safety regulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Collins, J.T.

    1981-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been very busy, since the accident, looking into the causes surrounding the events that occurred on the morning of March 28, 1979. To date, the Commission has implemented the Short-Term Lessons Learned and has provided a schedule for implementing the Long-Term Lessons Learned. Some of these requirements have resulted in delays in licensing of new plants and the temporary shutdown of some operating plants. However, the NRC believes these new requirements are essential to increase the safety of nuclear power plants and to protect the health and safety of the public. Although the accident occurred almost 19 months ago, the cleanup of TMI-2 continues and will continue for the next 5 to 7 years. As the cleanup progresses and ultimately the fuel removed, the Commission will continue to learn from the information generated by this program. This information will be factored into the licensing process. If nuclear power is to remain a viable option as a source of electrical power in the United States, then NRC must continue to assure the general public that these plants can be operated safely from the lessons learned at TMI and that systems required to mitigate the consequences of accidents will indeed perform their intended functions

  8. Bruce A restart (execution and lessons-learned)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soini, J.

    2011-01-01

    Lessons learned with the Bruce Units 3 and 4 restart have been incorporated into the current refurbishment of Units 1 and 2. In addition, lessons learned on the lead unit (U2) are aggressively applied on the lagging unit (U1) to maximize efficiency and productivity. There will be a discussion on how this internal OPEX, along with external lessons learned, are used to continuously improve all aspects of the Bruce A Restart project management cycle, from scope selection, through planning and scheduling, to execution.

  9. Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the STS-107 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stepaniak, Phillip C.; Patlach, Robert

    2014-01-01

    Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014 presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goal of this book is to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews. This poster presents an outline of Loss of Signal contents and highlights from each of five sections - the mission and mishap, the response, the investigation, the analysis and the future.

  10. Considerations for implementing an organizational lessons learned process.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fosshage, Erik D

    2013-05-01

    This report examines the lessons learned process by a review of the literature in a variety of disciplines, and is intended as a guidepost for organizations that are considering the implementation of their own closed-loop learning process. Lessons learned definitions are provided within the broader context of knowledge management and the framework of a learning organization. Shortcomings of existing practices are summarized in an attempt to identify common pitfalls that can be avoided by organizations with fledgling experiences of their own. Lessons learned are then examined through a dual construct of both process and mechanism, with emphasis on integrating into organizational processes and promoting lesson reuse through data attributes that contribute toward changed behaviors. The report concludes with recommended steps for follow-on efforts.

  11. The Role of a Commander in Military Lessons Learned Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zenon Waliński

    2015-06-01

    Full Text Available The aim of the paper is to investigate the role of a commander in military Lessons Learned systems. In order to achieve the aim, the paper presents (1 the architecture of the Lessons Learned capabilities in the U.S. Army, NATO and the Polish Armed Forces, (2 the commander’s role in the Lessons Learned process (3 the commander’s role in fostering Lessons Learned organisation culture. The paper is based on multiple case study analysis including Lessons Learned systems in NATO, the U.S. Army and the Polish Armed Forces.

  12. Introduction of the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident, Investigation Details, Findings and Crew Survival Investigation Report

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chandler, Michael

    2010-01-01

    As the Space Shuttle Program comes to an end, it is important that the lessons learned from the Columbia accident be captured and understood by those who will be developing future aerospace programs and supporting current programs. Aeromedical lessons learned from the Accident were presented at AsMA in 2005. This Panel will update that information, closeout the lessons learned, provide additional information on the accident and provide suggestions for the future. To set the stage, an overview of the accident is required. The Space Shuttle Columbia was returning to Earth with a crew of seven astronauts on 1Feb, 2003. It disintegrated along a track extending from California to Louisiana and observers along part of the track filmed the breakup of Columbia. Debris was recovered from Littlefield, Texas to Fort Polk, Louisiana, along a 567 statute mile track; the largest ever recorded debris field. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded its investigation in August 2003, and released their findings in a report published in February 2004. NASA recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew and the Space Shuttle Program managers commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT) to accomplish this. Their task was to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training and procedures intended to protect the crew. NASA released the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report in December 2008. Key personnel have been assembled to give you an overview of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the medical response, the medico-legal issues, the SCSIIT findings and recommendations and future NASA flight surgeon spacecraft accident response training. Educational Objectives: Set the stage for the Panel to address the

  13. Use of accident experience in developing criteria for teleoperator equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vallario, E.J.; Selby, J.M.

    1985-10-01

    The 1961 SL-1 reactor accident in Idaho and the Recuplex accident at Hanford are reviewed to identify problems common to emergency situations, lessons learned from accidents, criteria for emergency equipment, and recommendations for using robotics to solve problems during emergencies. Teleoperator equipment could be used to assess the extent of the damage and the condition of the reactor, retrieve dosimeters, evacuate and treat accident victims, clean up debris and decontaminate accident areas. 2 refs., 9 figs

  14. Japanese Nuclear Accident and U.S. Response

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Douet, Randy

    2011-01-01

    U.S. Government response to the Fukushima accident: • Multi-agency task force (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy, Department of Defense) supporting Japan recovery efforts; • President Obama directed the NRC to perform a comprehensive review of U.S. reactors; • NRC established agency task force to develop lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi accident to provide short-term and long-term analysis of the events

  15. EC6 safety enhancement - including impact of Fukushima lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yu, S.; Zemdegs, R.; Boyle, S.; Soulard, M., E-mail: stephen.yu@candu.com [Candu Energy Inc., Mississauga, Ontario (Canada)

    2012-09-15

    The Enhanced CANDU 6 (EC6) is the new Generation III CANDU reactor design that meets the most up to date regulatory requirements and customer expectations. EC6 builds on the proven high performance design inch as the Qinshan CANDU 6 units and has made improvements to safety and operational performance, and has incorporated extensive operational feedback including Fukushima. The Fukushima Dai-ichi March 11, 2011 event has demonstrated the importance of defence-in-depth considerations for beyond-design basis events, including severe accidents. The EC6 design is based on the defence-in-depth principles and provides further design features that address the lessons learned from Fukushima. (author)

  16. Feedback of safety - related operational experience: Lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Elias, D [Commonwealth Edison Co. (United States)

    1997-09-01

    The presentation considers the following aspects of feedback of safety-related operational experience: lessons learned program, objectives, personnel characteristics; three types of documents for transmitting lessons learned issues.

  17. Feedback of safety - related operational experience: Lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elias, D.

    1997-01-01

    The presentation considers the following aspects of feedback of safety-related operational experience: lessons learned program, objectives, personnel characteristics; three types of documents for transmitting lessons learned issues

  18. Driver. D530.2 – Tools for the Lessons Learned Framework

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Schaik, M.G. van; et al

    2016-01-01

    In this deliverable D530.2 “Tools for the Lessons Learned Framework” the overall lessons learned framework will be clarified based on the delivery D53.1 “Lessons Learned Framework Concept” and aligned with the deliverable D52.1 “Harmonized competence framework”. The Tools for the Lessons Learned

  19. Towards a lessons learned system for critical software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andrade, J.; Ares, J.; Garcia, R.; Pazos, J.; Rodriguez, S.; Rodriguez-Paton, A.; Silva, A.

    2007-01-01

    Failure can be a major driver for the advance of any engineering discipline and Software Engineering is no exception. But failures are useful only if lessons are learned from them. In this article we aim to make a strong defence of, and set the requirements for, lessons learned systems for safety-critical software. We also present a prototype lessons learned system that includes many of the features discussed here. We emphasize that, apart from individual organizations, lessons learned systems should target industrial sectors and even the Software Engineering community. We would like to encourage the Software Engineering community to use this kind of systems as another tool in the toolbox, which complements or enhances other approaches like, for example, standards and checklists

  20. Towards a lessons learned system for critical software

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andrade, J. [University of A Coruna. Campus de Elvina, s/n. 15071, A Coruna (Spain)]. E-mail: jag@udc.es; Ares, J. [University of A Coruna. Campus de Elvina, s/n. 15071, A Coruna (Spain)]. E-mail: juanar@udc.es; Garcia, R. [University of A Coruna. Campus de Elvina, s/n. 15071, A Coruna (Spain)]. E-mail: rafael@udc.es; Pazos, J. [Technical University of Madrid. Campus de Montegancedo, s/n. 28660, Boadilla del Monte, Madrid (Spain)]. E-mail: jpazos@fi.upm.es; Rodriguez, S. [University of A Coruna. Campus de Elvina, s/n. 15071, A Coruna (Spain)]. E-mail: santi@udc.es; Rodriguez-Paton, A. [Technical University of Madrid. Campus de Montegancedo, s/n. 28660, Boadilla del Monte, Madrid (Spain)]. E-mail: arpaton@fi.upm.es; Silva, A. [Technical University of Madrid. Campus de Montegancedo, s/n. 28660, Boadilla del Monte, Madrid (Spain)]. E-mail: asilva@fi.upm.es

    2007-07-15

    Failure can be a major driver for the advance of any engineering discipline and Software Engineering is no exception. But failures are useful only if lessons are learned from them. In this article we aim to make a strong defence of, and set the requirements for, lessons learned systems for safety-critical software. We also present a prototype lessons learned system that includes many of the features discussed here. We emphasize that, apart from individual organizations, lessons learned systems should target industrial sectors and even the Software Engineering community. We would like to encourage the Software Engineering community to use this kind of systems as another tool in the toolbox, which complements or enhances other approaches like, for example, standards and checklists.

  1. Lessons learned on digital systems safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sivertsen, Terje

    2005-06-01

    A decade ago, in 1994, lessons learned from Halden research activities on digital systems safety were summarized in the reports HWR-374 and HWR-375, under the title 'A Lessons Learned Report on Software Dependability'. The reports reviewed all activities made at the Halden Project in this field since 1977. As such, the reports provide a wealth of information on Halden research. At the same time, the lessons learned from the different activities are made more accessible to the reader by being summarized in terms of results, conclusions and recommendations. The present report provides a new lessons learned report, covering the Halden Project research activities in this area from 1994 to medio 2005. As before, the emphasis is on the results, conclusions and recommendations made from these activities, in particular how they can be utilized by different types of organisations, such as licensing authorities, safety assessors, power companies, and software developers. The contents of the report have been edited on the basis of input from a large number of Halden work reports, involving many different authors. Brief summaries of these reports are included in the last part of the report. (Author)

  2. Strengthening safety of nuclear power by learning lessons from the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omoto, Akira

    2011-01-01

    The paper first discusses ongoing onsite stabilization activities at Fukushima-Daiichi NPP and a plan for onsite and offsite remedial actions including decontamination and defueling. Four key lessons learned (LL) are raised; safety regulation and safety culture, workable/executable severe accident management procedure, crisis management and design. Global actions for strengthening safety in post-Fukushima era would be built around the IAEA action plan, under recognition of national responsibility. For specific country and plant, a combination of the following may help; a) overall assessment of safety and reflection of Fukushima LL in the light of principles in INSAG-12, b) specific plant assessment of risks from internal, external and security-related events for identifying vulnerabilities and continuous safety improvement, and c) international peer review for comprehensiveness, objectivity and confidence building. In this context, the followings could be worth receiving attention; a) to revisit defense-in-depth, while utilizing risk information, for its completeness and effectiveness (especially, strengthened defense against environmental contamination by effective combination of provisions and management as well as attentiveness and careful attitude towards uncertainties across all layers of defense-in-depth), b) to restore public confidence, c) to cooperate for safety infrastructure in newcomers, d) to build internationally harmonized and cooperative scheme for liability. (author)

  3. The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: What went wrong and what lessons are universal?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Omoto, Akira

    2013-12-01

    After a short summary of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, this paper discusses “what went wrong” by illustrating the problems of the specific layers of defense-in-depth (basic strategy for assuring nuclear safety) and “what lessons are universal.” Breaches in the multiple layers of defense were particularly significant in respective protection (a) against natural disasters (first layer of defense) as well as (b) against severe conditions, specifically in this case, a complete loss of AC/DC power and isolation from the primary heat sink (fourth layer of defense). Confusion in crisis management by the government and insufficient implementation of offsite emergency plans revealed problems in the fifth layer of defense. By taking into consideration managerial and safety culture that might have relevance to this accident, in the author's view, universal lessons are as follows: Resilience: the need to enhance organizational capabilities to respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn in changing conditions, especially to prepare for the unexpected. This includes increasing distance to cliff edge by knowing where it exists and how to increase safety margin. Responsibility: the operator is primarily responsible for safety, and the government is responsible for protecting public health and environment. For both, their right decisions are supported by competence, knowledge, and an understanding of the technology, as well as humble attitudes toward the limitations of what we know and what we can learn from others. Social license to operate: the need to avoid, as much as possible regardless of its probability of occurrence, the reasonably anticipated environmental impact (such as land contamination), as well as to build public confidence/trust and a renewed liability scheme.

  4. Epidemiologic methods lessons learned from environmental public health disasters: Chernobyl, the World Trade Center, Bhopal, and Graniteville, South Carolina.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Svendsen, Erik R; Runkle, Jennifer R; Dhara, Venkata Ramana; Lin, Shao; Naboka, Marina; Mousseau, Timothy A; Bennett, Charles

    2012-08-01

    Environmental public health disasters involving hazardous contaminants may have devastating effects. While much is known about their immediate devastation, far less is known about long-term impacts of these disasters. Extensive latent and chronic long-term public health effects may occur. Careful evaluation of contaminant exposures and long-term health outcomes within the constraints imposed by limited financial resources is essential. Here, we review epidemiologic methods lessons learned from conducting long-term evaluations of four environmental public health disasters involving hazardous contaminants at Chernobyl, the World Trade Center, Bhopal, and Graniteville (South Carolina, USA). We found several lessons learned which have direct implications for the on-going disaster recovery work following the Fukushima radiation disaster or for future disasters. These lessons should prove useful in understanding and mitigating latent health effects that may result from the nuclear reactor accident in Japan or future environmental public health disasters.

  5. FRMAC-93 lessons learned report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerns, K.C.

    1994-03-01

    FRMAC-93 simulated a radiological accident at the Fort Calhoun nuclear power plant, 25 miles north of Omaha, Nebraska. The exercise involved the state Iowa and Nebraska, NRC as the lead Federal agency, FRMAC (Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center), and several federal agencies with statutory emergency responsibility. FRMAC-93 was a major 2-day field exercise designed to determine the effectiveness, coordination, and operations of a DOE-managed FRMAC. Other objectives were to ensure that appropriate priorities were established and assistance was provided to the states and the lead Federal agency by FRMAC. Day 1 involved the Fort Calhoun evaluated plume phase exercise. On Day 2, the flow of data, which was slow initially, improved so that confidence of states and other federal responders in FRMAC support capabilities was high. The impact and lessons learned from FRMAC-93 provided the necessary impetus to make organizational and operational changes to the FRMAC program, which were put into effect in the DOE exercise FREMONT at Hanford 3 months later

  6. The TMI-2 accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loureiro, L.A.

    1986-01-01

    A critical study about the technical and man-related facts in order to establish what is considered the worst commercial nuclear power accident until 1986. Radiological consequences and stress to the public are considered in contrast to antinuclear groups. This descriptive and technical study has the purpose to document written and oral opinions obtained abroad and then explain to the public in an easy language terminology. Preliminary study describing safety related systems fails and the accident itself with minute to minute description, conduct to the consequences and then, to learned lessons

  7. Implementing and measuring safety goals and safety culture. 2. Extensive Efforts to Learn Lessons from Overseas Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maki, Nobuo

    2001-01-01

    The transfer of nuclear power plant (NPP) operating experiences is one of the important measures for the safe operation of NPPs. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO),World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), and Nuclear Information Center of Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry are the organizations providing Japanese utilities with useful information on incidents and accidents that have occurred at foreign NPPs. The Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) has established two organizations to make extensive efforts to learn lessons from overseas NPPs: One is the Nuclear Power Plant Maintenance Training Center (MTC), and the other is the Institute of Nuclear Safety System (INSS). This paper describes the function of these organizations in transferring knowledge and expertise to ensure the safe operation of Japanese NPPs as well as recent outcomes. MTC was set up in October 1983. Before its establishment, expertise on NPP maintenance was mainly transferred on an on-the-job basis through daily maintenance work. However, after various NPP incidents and accidents, the importance of off-site training for maintenance personnel was emphasized. MTC possesses full-sized or nearly full sized mockups of Mihama NPP Unit 3 and Takahama NPP Unit 3. Furthermore, many kinds of mechanical, electrical, and instrumental equipment are furnished for training. In 1999, more than 2400 (man/day) maintenance personnel in total had training at MTC. In the tube rupture accident of a steam generator of KEPCO's Mihama Unit 2 on February 9, 1991, the emergency core cooling system actuated for the first time in the history of NPP operation in Japan. The cause of the accident was a fault in the manufacturing process of the steam generator, which was not detected until the accident. After an in-depth evaluation of the accident, many corrective actions were taken to prevent the recurrence of a similar accident. As a part of the actions, KEPCO established INSS in March

  8. Value pricing pilot program : lessons learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-08-01

    This "Lessons Learned Report" provides a summary of projects sponsored by the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA's) Congestion and Value Pricing Pilot Programs from 1991 through 2006 and draws lessons from a sample of projects with the richest an...

  9. Epidemiologic Methods Lessons Learned from Environmental Public Health Disasters: Chernobyl, the World Trade Center, Bhopal, and Graniteville, South Carolina

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Timothy A. Mousseau

    2012-08-01

    Full Text Available Background: Environmental public health disasters involving hazardous contaminants may have devastating effects. While much is known about their immediate devastation, far less is known about long-term impacts of these disasters. Extensive latent and chronic long-term public health effects may occur. Careful evaluation of contaminant exposures and long-term health outcomes within the constraints imposed by limited financial resources is essential. Methods: Here, we review epidemiologic methods lessons learned from conducting long-term evaluations of four environmental public health disasters involving hazardous contaminants at Chernobyl, the World Trade Center, Bhopal, and Graniteville (South Carolina, USA. Findings: We found several lessons learned which have direct implications for the on-going disaster recovery work following the Fukushima radiation disaster or for future disasters. Interpretation: These lessons should prove useful in understanding and mitigating latent health effects that may result from the nuclear reactor accident in Japan or future environmental public health disasters.

  10. Lessons learned from major accidents relating to ageing of chemical plants

    OpenAIRE

    GYENES ZSUZSANNA; WOOD Maureen

    2016-01-01

    Major industrial accidents that occurred in the past and even recently, such as the Flixborough, UK in 1974, the ConocoPhillips, UK in 2001 and the Chevron, US in 2012 show that ageing is still a disturbing phenomenon present in chemical process industries. Further to these cases, it is estimated that 30 % of the major accidents reported in the eMARS accident database run by the Major Accident Hazards Bureau of the European Commission are connected to at least one ageing phenomenon. It is som...

  11. To revisit economics of nuclear technology. Lessons from the learning of a complex technology by major accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finon, Dominique

    2012-05-01

    The Fukushima accident raises again the issue of the social and economic viability of nuclear technology. To re-evaluate this viability, we analyse the past process of internalisation of external costs of nuclear energy, which present the specificities to be chanted by accidents and has had a constant effect of complexification. This process has provoked a de-organisation of the classical learning process reflected in constant cost increases and the change of social preferences, to end up by the lack of competitiveness before climate policies. Independent institutions of safety regulation have become essential elements of the social embeddedness of nuclear technology at the expense of technology stability and standardization, condition of its competitiveness. In this perspective, the paper argues that the new sequence of social costs' internalization opened by Fukushima will have limited effects on costs, because of anterior steps of safety improvements. Nuclear technology complexification reaches its asymptote: it is being to overcome the challenge of 'learning by major accidents'. On the other hand nuclear institutions must be re-designed in such a way that it could guarantee maximum safety records and minimum residual risks by going to the other root of the safety issue, the degree of independence and capabilities of the safety authorities in every country, what cannot be decreed. It is nevertheless at this price that could be preserved the global public good of the social acceptance of nuclear technology by limiting drastically chance of new accidents. (author)

  12. BWR severe accident sequence analyses at ORNL - some lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hodge, S.A.

    1983-01-01

    Boiling water reactor severe accident sequence studies are being carried out using Browns Ferry Unit 1 as the model plant. Four accident studies were completed, resulting in recommendations for improvements in system design, emergency procedures, and operator training. Computer code improvements were an important by-product

  13. The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: What went wrong and what lessons are universal?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omoto, Akira

    2013-01-01

    After a short summary of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, this paper discusses “what went wrong” by illustrating the problems of the specific layers of defense-in-depth (basic strategy for assuring nuclear safety) and “what lessons are universal.” Breaches in the multiple layers of defense were particularly significant in respective protection (a) against natural disasters (first layer of defense) as well as (b) against severe conditions, specifically in this case, a complete loss of AC/DC power and isolation from the primary heat sink (fourth layer of defense). Confusion in crisis management by the government and insufficient implementation of offsite emergency plans revealed problems in the fifth layer of defense. By taking into consideration managerial and safety culture that might have relevance to this accident, in the author's view, universal lessons are as follows: a)Resilience: the need to enhance organizational capabilities to respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn in changing conditions, especially to prepare for the unexpected. This includes increasing distance to cliff edge by knowing where it exists and how to increase safety margin. b)Responsibility: the operator is primarily responsible for safety, and the government is responsible for protecting public health and environment. For both, their right decisions are supported by competence, knowledge, and an understanding of the technology, as well as humble attitudes toward the limitations of what we know and what we can learn from others. c)Social license to operate: the need to avoid, as much as possible regardless of its probability of occurrence, the reasonably anticipated environmental impact (such as land contamination), as well as to build public confidence/trust and a renewed liability scheme

  14. Lessons learned and evaluation of the impact from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cigna, A.

    1990-07-01

    The impact on society of the Chernobyl accident is assessed. The situation prior to Chernobyl with respect to regulations of radiation protection against the consequences of a major accident is considered. The development of the recommendations and regulations issued by the CEC for the Maximum Permitted Levels of different reactions to the accident are examined and some data on the average individual effective dose equivalents estimated in a number of countries are reported. Finally some main problems concerning the information of the public and the preparedness for possible future accidents are also summarized. (author)

  15. Lessons learned and evaluation of the impact from the Chernobyl accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cigna, A [ENEA - Area Energia, Ambiente e Salute, Centro Ricerche Energia, Saluggia, Vercelli (Italy)

    1990-07-15

    The impact on society of the Chernobyl accident is assessed. The situation prior to Chernobyl with respect to regulations of radiation protection against the consequences of a major accident is considered. The development of the recommendations and regulations issued by the CEC for the Maximum Permitted Levels of different reactions to the accident are examined and some data on the average individual effective dose equivalents estimated in a number of countries are reported. Finally some main problems concerning the information of the public and the preparedness for possible future accidents are also summarized. (author)

  16. Lessons learned from AU PSO-missions in Africa

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Mandrup, Thomas

    The paper deals with the lessons learned from AU's PSO since 2002, and what that entails for the design of future PSO.......The paper deals with the lessons learned from AU's PSO since 2002, and what that entails for the design of future PSO....

  17. Radiological accidents/incidents with caesium-137 in Estonia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sinisoo, M.

    1998-01-01

    A report is provided of an accident and an incident involving radioactive sources in Estonia. In the 1994 occurrence, looters of a depository of radioactive waste manipulated a source containing 137 Cs and received dangerous doses of radiation. One of the persons involved died, others suffered minor burns. Another event, which occurred in early 1995, did not have a tragic outcome: an abandoned 137 Cs source was found in the vicinity of the highway linking Tallinn and Narva and was disposed of safely. Both these accidents draw attention to the potential dangers caused by the insufficient survey of the territory, radiation protection structures not yet fully operable, and the lack of equipment and know-how. The lessons to be drawn from these events are considered on the basis of the chronologies and factual data. The report contains concise descriptions of the accidents, a medical overview of the fate of the injured persons and the lessons learned from these accidents. (author)

  18. Collecting lessons learned : How project-based organizations in the oil and gas industry learn from their projects

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Buttler, T.

    2016-01-01

    Project-based organizations collect lessons learned in order to improve the performance of projects. They aim to repeat successes by using positive lessons learned, and to avoid repeating negative experiences by using negative lessons learned. Cooke-Davies (2002) claimed that the ability to learn

  19. Aviation Safety Risk Modeling: Lessons Learned From Multiple Knowledge Elicitation Sessions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Luxhoj, J. T.; Ancel, E.; Green, L. L.; Shih, A. T.; Jones, S. M.; Reveley, M. S.

    2014-01-01

    Aviation safety risk modeling has elements of both art and science. In a complex domain, such as the National Airspace System (NAS), it is essential that knowledge elicitation (KE) sessions with domain experts be performed to facilitate the making of plausible inferences about the possible impacts of future technologies and procedures. This study discusses lessons learned throughout the multiple KE sessions held with domain experts to construct probabilistic safety risk models for a Loss of Control Accident Framework (LOCAF), FLightdeck Automation Problems (FLAP), and Runway Incursion (RI) mishap scenarios. The intent of these safety risk models is to support a portfolio analysis of NASA's Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). These models use the flexible, probabilistic approach of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) and influence diagrams to model the complex interactions of aviation system risk factors. Each KE session had a different set of experts with diverse expertise, such as pilot, air traffic controller, certification, and/or human factors knowledge that was elicited to construct a composite, systems-level risk model. There were numerous "lessons learned" from these KE sessions that deal with behavioral aggregation, conditional probability modeling, object-oriented construction, interpretation of the safety risk results, and model verification/validation that are presented in this paper.

  20. Radiation protection issues raised in Korea since Fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Byeongsoo

    2014-01-01

    For the past 3 years since Fukushima accident, various issues related to nuclear safety and radiation safety were raised in Korea. This presentation focuses radiation protection (RP) issues among the various issues and has the purpose to share experiences and lessons-learned related to the RP issues. Special safety inspections on NPPs in Korea were performed immediately after Fukushima accident and 50 follow-up measures were established in May, 2011 to improve the nuclear safety. Some of them were related to radiation protection and emergency responses. Recently, in March, 2014, additional follow-up measures were decided to be taken in additionally strengthening safety-related equipment and emergency response organization. The 50 Fukushima-accident-follow-up measures include radiation protection for members of the public in emergency responses. Based on the follow-up measures, expansion of emergency planning zone (EPZ) is to be made according to the approval of legislation by National Assembly on May 2, 2014. For the past 3 years, the degree of the public concerns on radiation risk has been the highest. Spontaneous activities for radiation monitoring happened in the public. Some members of the public found some contaminated paved roads in November, 2011 and a contaminated kitchen ware in January, 2012. These findings suggest the importance of the management of recycled metal scraps imported from other countries. Fukushima accident gave much impact on Korean society all. The public gets very sensitive to issues about nuclear safety and radiation safety. Most parts of RP issues raised are related to the public. The lessons-learned are that as an issue is raised, it has a chance to be solved. However, RP issues related to radiation workers in accident conditions in NPPs are difficult to be raised enough to confirm and improve the robustness of radiation protection programs in accident conditions. It is necessary to share RP issues raised in each country as well as

  1. Lessons learned from case studies of inhalation exposures of workers to radioactive aerosols

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hoover, M.D.; Fencl, A.F.; Newton, G.J. [and others

    1995-12-01

    Various Department of Energy requirements, rules, and orders mandate that lessons learned be identified, evaluated, shared, and incorporated into current practices. The recently issued, nonmandatory DOE standard for Development of DOE Lessons Learned Program states that a DOE-wide lessons learned program will {open_quotes}help to prevent recurrences of negative experiences, highlight best practices, and spotlight innovative ways to solve problems or perform work more safely, efficiently, and cost effectively.{close_quotes} Additional information about the lessons learned program is contained in the recently issued DOE handbook on Implementing U.S. Department of Energy Lessons Learned Programs and in October 1995 DOE SAfety Notice on Lessons Learned Programs. This report summarizes work in progress at ITRI to identify lessons learned for worker exposures to radioactive aerosols, and describes how this work will be incorporated into the DOE lessons learned program, including a new technical guide for measuring, modeling, and mitigating airborne radioactive particles. Follow-on work is focusing on preparation of {open_quotes}lessons learned{close_quotes} training materials for facility designers, managers, health protection professionals, line supervisors, and workers.

  2. Summary of Planned Implementation for the HTGR Lessons Learned Applicable to the NGNP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mckirdy, Ian

    2011-01-01

    This document presents a reconciliation of the lessons learned during a 2010 comprehensive evaluation of pertinent lessons learned from past and present high temperature gas-cooled reactors that apply to the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project along with current and planned activities. The data used are from the latest Idaho National Laboratory research and development plans, the conceptual design report from General Atomics, and the pebble bed reactor technology readiness study from AREVA. Only those lessons related to the structures, systems, and components of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP), as documented in the recently updated lessons learned report are addressed. These reconciliations are ordered according to plant area, followed by the affected system, subsystem, or component; lesson learned; and finally an NGNP implementation statement. This report (1) provides cross references to the original lessons learned document, (2) describes the lesson learned, (3) provides the current NGNP implementation status with design data needs associated with the lesson learned, (4) identifies the research and development being performed related to the lesson learned, and (5) summarizes with a status of how the lesson learned has been addressed by the NGNP Project.

  3. Brentwood Lessons Learned Project Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rivkin, Carl H. [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Caton, Melanie C. [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Ainscough, Christopher D. [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Marcinkoski, Jason [Dept. of Energy (DOE), Washington DC (United States)

    2017-09-26

    The purpose of this report is to document lessons learned in the installation of the hydrogen fueling station at the National Park Service Brentwood site in Washington, D.C., to help further the deployment of hydrogen infrastructure required to support hydrogen and other fuel cell technologies. Hydrogen fueling is the most difficult infrastructure component to build and permit. Hydrogen fueling can include augmenting hydrogen fueling capability to existing conventional fuel fueling stations as well as building brand new hydrogen fueling stations. This report was produced as part of the Brentwood Lessons Learned project. The project consisted of transplanting an existing modular hydrogen fueling station from Connecticut to the National Park Service Brentwood site. This relocation required design and construction at the Brentwood site to accommodate the existing station design as well as installation and validation of the updated station. One of the most important lessons learned was that simply moving an existing modular station to an operating site was not necessarily straight-forward - performing the relocation required significant effort and cost. The station has to function at the selected operating site and this functionality requires a power supply, building supports connecting to an existing alarm system, electrical grounding and lighting, providing nitrogen for purging, and providing deionized water if an electrolyzer is part of the station package. Most importantly, the station has to fit into the existing site both spatially and operationally and not disrupt existing operations at the site. All of this coordination and integration requires logistical planning and project management. The idea that a hydrogen fueling station can be simply dropped onto a site and made immediately operational is generally not realistic. Other important lessons learned include that delineating the boundaries of the multiple jurisdictions that have authority over a project for

  4. Lessons learned and evaluation of the impact from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cigna, A.A.

    1990-01-01

    The impact on society of the Chernobyl accidents is assessed. The situation prior to Chernobyl with respect to regulations of radiation protection against the consequences of a major accident is considered. The development of the recommendations and regulations issued by the Commission of the European Communities for the Maximum Permitted Levels of different groups of radionuclides in foodstuffs is reviewed. The different reactions to the accident are examined and some data on the average individual effective dose equivalents estimated in a number of countries are also reported. Finally some main problems concerning the information of the public and the preparedness for possible future accidents are also summarized

  5. A summary of lessons learned at the Shippingport Station Decommissioning Project (SSDP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crimi, F.P.; Mullee, G.R.

    1987-10-01

    This paper describes the lessons learned from a management perspective during decommissioning. The lessons learned are presented in a chronological sequence during the life of the project up to the present time. The careful analysis of the lessons learned and the implementation of corresponding actions have contributed toward improving the effectiveness of decommissioning as time progresses. The lessons learned should be helpful in planning future decommissioning projects

  6. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations: Department of State’s Lessons Learned Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-06-10

    means for utilizing the lessons learned, in some form of rehearsal or exercise, will 4 make the lessons learned meaningful. A lesson should only...required by DOS policy. The Department agreed with the recommendations to establish certain procedures to address the need to constantly 44 update...doctrine.31 Futch also explained that CALL is constantly seeking to expand training and educational efforts about the lessons learned process and

  7. Lessons learned from case studies of inhalation exposures of workers to radioactive aerosols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoover, M.D.; Fencl, A.F.; Newton, G.J.

    1995-01-01

    Various Department of Energy requirements, rules, and orders mandate that lessons learned be identified, evaluated, shared, and incorporated into current practices. The recently issued, nonmandatory DOE standard for Development of DOE Lessons Learned Program states that a DOE-wide lessons learned program will open-quotes help to prevent recurrences of negative experiences, highlight best practices, and spotlight innovative ways to solve problems or perform work more safely, efficiently, and cost effectively.close quotes Additional information about the lessons learned program is contained in the recently issued DOE handbook on Implementing U.S. Department of Energy Lessons Learned Programs and in October 1995 DOE SAfety Notice on Lessons Learned Programs. This report summarizes work in progress at ITRI to identify lessons learned for worker exposures to radioactive aerosols, and describes how this work will be incorporated into the DOE lessons learned program, including a new technical guide for measuring, modeling, and mitigating airborne radioactive particles. Follow-on work is focusing on preparation of open-quotes lessons learnedclose quotes training materials for facility designers, managers, health protection professionals, line supervisors, and workers

  8. Institutional support of learning from accidents: some obstacles to getting a useful community-wide database in the EU

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hedlund, Frank Huess; Andersen, Henning Boje

    Union’s Major Accident Reporting System (MARS), which is created in conjunction with the EU regulatory instruments to prevent major industrial accidents, the Seveso-directive. We review some of the general requirements that a successful reporting system must meet and suggest that MARS may not live up...... to the noble intentions behind its creation. Our case example is a simple methanol tank storage installation which we believe can be found in most if not all EU member states. We demonstrate that the data in some of the Short Reports in MARS have a number of serious shortcomings. Causes are not identified...... and lessons learned are left blank. We argue that there are substantial opportunities foregone in the EU system that provides institutional support to learning from past experience. Over the course of 22 years the EU database has only accumulated about 600 Short Reports for all its member states. We consider...

  9. Safety Enhancements for PHWRs Based on Macroscopic Losses of the Fukushima Accident

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sang Ho Kim

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available The role of nuclear energy is to supply electric power on a stable basis to meet increasing demands, reduce carbon dioxide emissions, and maintain stable electric power costs while ensuring safety. The Fukushima accident taught us many lessons for creating safer nuclear power plants. Considering the design of systems, the areas of weakness at the Fukushima nuclear power plants can be divided into three categories: plant protection, electricity supply, and cooling of the nuclear fuel. In this paper, focusing on these three areas, the lessons learned are proposed and applied for pressurized heavy water reactors. Firstly, hard protection against external risks ensures the integrity of components and systems such that they can perform their original functions. Secondly, additional emergency power supply systems for electrical redundancy and diversity can improve the response capabilities for an accident by increasing the availability of active components. Thirdly, cooling for removing decay heat can be augmented by adopting diverse safety systems derived from other types of reactors. This study is expected to contribute to the safety enhancement of pressurized heavy water reactors by applying design changes based on the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident.

  10. TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force status report and short-term recommendations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-07-01

    Review of the Three Mile Island accident by the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force has disclosed a number of actions in the areas of design and analysis and plant operations that the Task Force recommends be required in the short term to provide substantial additional protection which is required for the public health and safety. All nuclear power plants in operation or in various stages of construction or licensing action are affected to varying degrees by the specific recommendations. The Task Force is continuing work in areas of general safety criteria, systems design requirements, nuclear power plant operations, and nuclear power plant licensing

  11. Overview of Brazilian industrial radiography accidents with cutaneous radiation syndrome

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lima, C.M.A.; Silva, F.C.A. da

    2017-01-01

    It is well documented that industrial radiography is related to radiological accidents, which makes it the highest potential risk for human health. More than 80 radiological accidents happened in the world that includes 6 Brazilian accidents with Cutaneous Radiation Syndrome. Five of them happened with 192 Ir and one with 60 Co radioactive sources. Nineteen members of the public and 8 radiographers were involved. All of them suffered severe hands and fingers injuries. The Brazilian radiological accident happened in 1985 with 16 persons is analyzed showing causes, consequences, radiation doses and lessons learned. (author)

  12. Post-Fukushima lessons and safety orientations for ASTRID

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carluec, B.; Sauvage, J.F.; Pariteau, Patrick; Lo Pinto, P.

    2013-01-01

    Lessons learned from the Fukushima accident: → Reinforcement of demonstrations of “practical elimination” of situations leading to important radiological releases in the environment. → Reinforcement of consideration of loss of some supplies, the objective is to prevent severe accident: • Loss of all AC power; • Loss of I&C; • Failure of operator action. → Reinforcement of the capability to prevent severe accident by natural behavior: • Favorable neutronic feedback effects; • Natural circulation capability to remove the decay heat

  13. Strengthening Regulatory Effectiveness in India – Lessons Learnt from Fukushima Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solanki, R.

    2016-01-01

    Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan, one of the most important lessons learnt, among other things, was the issue of strengthening the effectiveness of the regulatory bodies. Immediately after the Fukushima accident, National level safety audits were conducted on all operating NPPs in India to review safety of NPPs in India. A national action plan has been prepared to implement the identified short term, midterm and long term measures. The assessment indicates that national response to the Fukushima Accident for safety assessment of NPPs and subsequent actions and initiatives taken for safety enhancement of the NPPs in India are in-line with the objectives of the IAEA Action plan. This paper highlights the actions taken by India in the light of Fukushima Daiichi accident in order to strengthen the regulatory effectiveness through improvements in the existing core processes, challenges faced, Insights gained from the recent initiatives on safety performance indicators and assessment of safety culture, relevant observations of IRRS mission report and Indian perspectives on the further cooperation among the member states for enhancing the regulatory effectiveness for nuclear oversight of regulated organizations. (author)

  14. Constellation Program: Lessons Learned. Volume 1; Executive Summary

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rhatigan, Jennifer L. (Editor)

    2011-01-01

    This document (Volume I) provides an executive summary of the lessons learned from the Constellation Program. A companion Volume II provides more detailed analyses for those seeking further insight and information. In this volume, Section 1.0 introduces the approach in preparing and organizing the content to enable rapid assimilation of the lessons. Section 2.0 describes the contextual framework in which the Constellation Program was formulated and functioned that is necessary to understand most of the lessons. Context of a former program may seem irrelevant in the heady days of new program formulation. However, readers should take some time to understand the context. Many of the lessons would be different in a different context, so the reader should reflect on the similarities and differences in his or her current circumstances. Section 3.0 summarizes key findings developed from the significant lessons learned at the program level that appear in Section 4.0. Readers can use the key findings in Section 3.0 to peruse for particular topics, and will find more supporting detail and analyses in Section 4.0 in a topical format. Appendix A contains a white paper describing the Constellation Program formulation that may be of use to readers wanting more context or background information. The reader will no doubt recognize some very similar themes from previous lessons learned, blue-ribbon committee reviews, National Academy reviews, and advisory panel reviews for this and other large-scale human spaceflight programs; including Apollo, Space Shuttle, Shuttle/Mir, and the ISS. This could represent an inability to learn lessons from previous generations; however, it is more likely that similar challenges persist in the Agency structure and approach to program formulation, budget advocacy, and management. Perhaps the greatest value of these Constellation lessons learned can be found in viewing them in context with these previous efforts to guide and advise the Agency and its

  15. Reperes, the information magazine of the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety - IRSN, No. 12 - January 2012, Special issue Fukushima - First lessons from the accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    A first set of articles addresses the nuclear crisis in Japan (description of the accident, information mission sent by France, and support actions undertaken by France in Japan in the fields of education, civilian security, culture, sailing, media, dosimeters, robotics). A second set discusses lessons learned in terms of nuclear safety (complementary safety assessments, stress test in Gravelines), radiological consequences (impact on Japanese population, the Symbiose software, the Teleray network), crisis management, and research

  16. Lessons Learned in Software Testing A Context-Driven Approach

    CERN Document Server

    Kaner, Cem; Pettichord, Bret

    2008-01-01

    Decades of software testing experience condensed into the most important lessons learned.The world's leading software testing experts lend you their wisdom and years of experience to help you avoid the most common mistakes in testing software. Each lesson is an assertion related to software testing, followed by an explanation or example that shows you the how, when, and why of the testing lesson. More than just tips, tricks, and pitfalls to avoid, Lessons Learned in Software Testing speeds you through the critical testing phase of the software development project without the extensive trial an

  17. Severe Accident Management Guidance: Lessons Still to be Learned after Fukushima

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vayssier, G.

    2016-01-01

    After the accidents in Three Mile Island (TMI) and Chernobyl, many countries decided to develop and implement guidelines specifically directed to mitigate accidents with core damage, so-called severe accidents. The guidelines are usually named Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG). In the USA, all operating plants had these guidelines in place at the end of 1998. Most other countries followed later, but today, it can be said that many nuclear power plants in the world have such guidelines in place. Typically, however, the guidelines were constructed under the assumption that many plant systems still will be available, i.e. there will be DC to feed the instruments, AC to feed equipment and water to restore cooling to the core. Typically, this was basically the situation at TMI: most equipment was functional, only the insight of what had happened had been lost and operators did not know how to respond. At Fukushima-Daiichi, a Site Disruptive Accident (SDA) occurred and it appeared that the situation was much more complex: much of the needed supportive equipment needed was unavailable, which greatly complicated the handling of the event. In this paper, the major shortcomings of the present existing SAMG are discussed, both from a technical, and an organisational viewpoint. It is concluded that, where proper regulation still is missing, the development of an industrial standard is recommended to define adequate tools and guidelines to mitigate severe accidents, including SDAs. (author).

  18. Lessons Learnt from Past Incidents and Accidents in Radiation Oncology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Knöös, T

    2017-09-01

    The purpose of this report is to review and compile what have been and can be learnt from incidents and accidents in radiation oncology, especially in external beam and brachytherapy. Some major accidents from the last 20 years will be discussed. The relationship between major events and minor or so-called near misses is mentioned, leading to the next topic of exploring the knowledge hidden among them. The main lessons learnt from the discussion here and elsewhere are that a well-functioning and safe radiotherapy department should help staff to work with awareness and alertness and that documentation and procedures should be in place and known by everyone. It also requires that trained and educated staff with the required competences are in place and, finally, functions and responsibilities are defined and well known. Copyright © 2017 The Royal College of Radiologists. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  19. Emergency response to a highway accident in Springfield, Massachusetts, on December 16, 1991

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-06-01

    On December 16, 1991, a truck carrying unirradiated (fresh) nuclear fuel was involved in an accident on US Interstate 91, in Springfield, Massachusetts. This report describes the emergency response measures undertaken by local, State, Federal, and private parties. The report also discusses ''lessons learned'' from the response to the accident and suggests areas where improvements might be made

  20. Societal and ethical aspects of the Fukushima accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Oughton, Deborah

    2016-10-01

    The Fukushima Nuclear Power Station accident in Japan in 2011 was a poignant reminder that radioactive contamination of the environment has consequences that encompass far more than health risks from exposure to radiation. Both the accident and remediation measures have resulted in serious societal impacts and raise questions about the ethical aspects of risk management. This article presents a brief review of some of these issues and compares similarities and differences with the lessons learned from the 1986 Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident in Ukraine. Integr Environ Assess Manag 2016;12:651-653. © 2016 SETAC. © 2016 SETAC.

  1. Accident Case Study of Organizational Silence Communication Breakdown: Shuttle Columbia, Mission STS-107

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rocha, Rodney

    2011-01-01

    This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) ESMD Risk and Knowledge Management team. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of key lessons learned derived from the official Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document. This report is accompanied by a video that will be sent at request

  2. Overview of Brazilian industrial radiography accidents with cutaneous radiation syndrome

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lima, C.M.A.; Silva, F.C.A. da, E-mail: dasilva@ird.gov.br [Instituto de Radioproteção e Dosimetria (IRD/CNEN-RJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2017-07-01

    It is well documented that industrial radiography is related to radiological accidents, which makes it the highest potential risk for human health. More than 80 radiological accidents happened in the world that includes 6 Brazilian accidents with Cutaneous Radiation Syndrome. Five of them happened with {sup 192}Ir and one with {sup 60}Co radioactive sources. Nineteen members of the public and 8 radiographers were involved. All of them suffered severe hands and fingers injuries. The Brazilian radiological accident happened in 1985 with 16 persons is analyzed showing causes, consequences, radiation doses and lessons learned. (author)

  3. Learning from nuclear accident experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaurio, J.K.

    1984-01-01

    Statistical procedures are developed to estimate accident occurrence rates from historical event records, to predict future rates and trends, and to estimate the accuracy of the rate estimates and predictions. Maximum likelihood estimation is applied to several learning models, and results are compared to earlier graphical and analytical estimates. The models are based on (1) the cumulative number of operating years, (2) the cumulative number of plants built, and (3) accidents (explicitly), with the accident rate distinctly different before and after an accident. The statistical accuracies of the parameters estimated are obtained in analytical form using the Fisher information matrix. Using data on core damage accidents in electricity producing plants, it is estimated that the probability for a plant to have a serious flaw has decreased from 0.1 to 0.01 during the developmental phase of the nuclear industry. At the same time the equivalent frequency of accidents has decreased from 0.04 per reactor year to 0.0004 per reactor year, partly due to the increasing population of plants. 10 references, 7 figures, 2 tables

  4. Response to the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nei, Hisanori

    2012-01-01

    This article was reading from the author's plenary lecture at the thermal and nuclear power generation convention 2011, which was summary of the author edited report of Japanese government to IAEA ministerial conference on nuclear safety. The article consisted of (1) outlines of occurrence and development of the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), (2) comparison of Fukushima Daiichi NPPs with other NPPs (Fukushima Daini, Onagawa and Tokai Daini NPPs), (3) major countermeasures to settle the situation regarding the accident, (4) comprehensive safety evaluation of other NPPs as response to the accident and (5) lessons learned from the accident so far. It was highly important to ensure power supplies and robust cooling functions of reactors, pressure containment vessels and spent fuel pools. 28 lessons were categorized into five groups such as (1) strengthen preventive measures against a severe accident, (2) enhancement of response measures against severe accidents, (3) enhancement of nuclear emergency responses, (4) reinforcement of safety infrastructure and (5) thoroughness of safety culture. (T. Tanaka)

  5. The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: What went wrong and what lessons are universal?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Omoto, Akira, E-mail: akira.omoto@mac.com

    2013-12-11

    After a short summary of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, this paper discusses “what went wrong” by illustrating the problems of the specific layers of defense-in-depth (basic strategy for assuring nuclear safety) and “what lessons are universal.” Breaches in the multiple layers of defense were particularly significant in respective protection (a) against natural disasters (first layer of defense) as well as (b) against severe conditions, specifically in this case, a complete loss of AC/DC power and isolation from the primary heat sink (fourth layer of defense). Confusion in crisis management by the government and insufficient implementation of offsite emergency plans revealed problems in the fifth layer of defense. By taking into consideration managerial and safety culture that might have relevance to this accident, in the author's view, universal lessons are as follows: a)Resilience: the need to enhance organizational capabilities to respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn in changing conditions, especially to prepare for the unexpected. This includes increasing distance to cliff edge by knowing where it exists and how to increase safety margin. b)Responsibility: the operator is primarily responsible for safety, and the government is responsible for protecting public health and environment. For both, their right decisions are supported by competence, knowledge, and an understanding of the technology, as well as humble attitudes toward the limitations of what we know and what we can learn from others. c)Social license to operate: the need to avoid, as much as possible regardless of its probability of occurrence, the reasonably anticipated environmental impact (such as land contamination), as well as to build public confidence/trust and a renewed liability scheme.

  6. Introduction of new terms and lessons for radiological protection after Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Singh, Vishwanath P.; Managanvi, S.S.; Bhat, H.R.

    2012-01-01

    The nuclear accidents in the world are very few among various types of operating facilities. However when an accident happened, we have learnt a lot to improve the philosophy, term, definitions, document preparation, equipment's requirement, supporting systems, awareness program and restriction etc. After Fukushima Dai-ichi we have learnt a lot, in this view this paper has been prepared to discuss for radiological protection aspects. Discussion: The probability of nuclear accidents is negligible but when happens, it opens new doors of lessons for radiological protection practices for occupational workers, emergency workers for damage control to prevent catastrophic situation/rescue to life saving actions and the member of the public. The Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents have provided a lot experiences for management of emergency situations, documentation, radiation emergency preparedness, emergency equipment's, concept of defense-in-depth, emergency planning zone (EPZ), accidental dose limits, estimation of source term and public dose, intervention levels, decision supporting system, remedial actions in public domain; decontamination of person, houses/building and land and etc. Recent Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in Japan was managed in appreciable manner but still new definitions and lessons for radiological protection have been emerged out. The present paper discusses difficulties w. r. t. the radiological aspects observed/faced by Japanese during nuclear crises. The accident introduced new terms as Natural Dose Rate Unit (NDRU), voluntary evacuation, deliberate evacuation area, restricted area and difference between evacuation zone and EPZ. The Fukushima accident has enforced worldwide regulators and operators to review the individual dose limit and amendment for raise in the dose limit during accident, availability of efficient/adequate quantities of personal dosimeter in public domain, collection arrangement of bulk amount of radioactive wastes

  7. Follow-up of delayed health consequences of acute radiation exposure. Lessons to be learned from their medical management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-07-01

    While the use of radioactive materials around the world offers a wide range of benefits in medicine, industry and research, safety precautions are essential to limit the exposure of persons to harmful radiation. When the quantity of radioactive material employed is substantial, as when radioactive sources are used for radiotherapy in medicine or for industrial radiography, extreme care is necessary to prevent accidents that may lead to severe health consequences for the individuals involved. Despite the fact that the precautions to be taken are clearly established, accidents with radiation sources continue to occur, albeit infrequently. The IAEA, as part of its 'Safety of Radiation Sources' and 'Emergency Response' subprogrammes, follows up severe accidents of this kind. In so doing, the IAEA attempts to document both the circumstances leading to the accident and the subsequent medical treatment in order to define the lessons to be learned from these events. The overall objective is to provide information that will be of benefit to organizations with responsibilities for radiation protection, the safety of radiation sources and the medical management of radiation accidents. The International Atomic Energy Agency has issued a number of publications on radiation accidents which have occurred in the past 15 years, reporting on the causes, radiation safety aspects and medical management of those affected particularly in the acute phase following an accident. These reports cover the accidents in Chernobyl, Ukraine (the Republic of the former Soviet Union) and Goiania (Brazil), and those in El Salvador, Vietnam, Belarus, Israel, Estonia, Costa Rica, Georgia, Russian Federation, Turkey, Peru and Panama. In 1998 the IAEA published three Safety Reports, co-sponsored by the World Health Organization, aimed at disseminating medical information on the recognition and treatment of radiation injuries, planning the medical response to radiation accidents and occupational health

  8. Follow-up of delayed health consequences of acute radiation exposure. Lessons to be learned from their medical management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-07-01

    While the use of radioactive materials around the world offers a wide range of benefits in medicine, industry and research, safety precautions are essential to limit the exposure of persons to harmful radiation. When the quantity of radioactive material employed is substantial, as when radioactive sources are used for radiotherapy in medicine or for industrial radiography, extreme care is necessary to prevent accidents that may lead to severe health consequences for the individuals involved. Despite the fact that the precautions to be taken are clearly established, accidents with radiation sources continue to occur, albeit infrequently. The IAEA, as part of its 'Safety of Radiation Sources' and 'Emergency Response' subprogrammes, follows up severe accidents of this kind. In so doing, the IAEA attempts to document both the circumstances leading to the accident and the subsequent medical treatment in order to define the lessons to be learned from these events. The overall objective is to provide information that will be of benefit to organizations with responsibilities for radiation protection, the safety of radiation sources and the medical management of radiation accidents. The International Atomic Energy Agency has issued a number of publications on radiation accidents which have occurred in the past 15 years, reporting on the causes, radiation safety aspects and medical management of those affected particularly in the acute phase following an accident. These reports cover the accidents in Chernobyl, Ukraine (the Republic of the former Soviet Union) and Goiania (Brazil), and those in El Salvador, Vietnam, Belarus, Israel, Estonia, Costa Rica, Georgia, Russian Federation, Turkey, Peru and Panama. In 1998 the IAEA published three Safety Reports, co-sponsored by the World Health Organization, aimed at disseminating medical information on the recognition and treatment of radiation injuries, planning the medical response to radiation accidents and occupational health

  9. Higher Education ERP: Lessons Learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Swartz, Dave; Orgill, Ken

    2001-01-01

    Shares experiences and lessons learned by chief information officers of large universities about enterprise resource planning (ERP). Specifically, provides a framework for approaching an ERP that could save universities millions of dollars. (EV)

  10. Experience and lessons learned from emergency disposal of Fukushima nuclear power station accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xu Xiegu; Zhen Bei; Yang Xiaoming; Chen Xiaohua

    2012-01-01

    After Fukushima nuclear accident, we visited the related medical aid agencies for nuclear accidents and conducted investigations in disaster-affected areas in Japan. This article summarizes the problems with emergency disposal of Fukushima nuclear accident while disclosing problems should be solved during the emergency force construction for nuclear accidents. (authors)

  11. Solid-State Lighting: Early Lessons Learned on the Way to Market

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sandahl, Linda J.; Cort, Katherine A.; Gordon, Kelly L.

    2013-12-31

    The purpose of this report is to document early challenges and lessons learned in the solid-state lighting (SSL) market development as part of the DOE’s SSL Program efforts to continually evaluate market progress in this area. This report summarizes early actions taken by DOE and others to avoid potential problems anticipated based on lessons learned from the market introduction of compact fluorescent lamps and identifies issues, challenges, and new lessons that have been learned in the early stages of the SSL market introduction. This study identifies and characterizes12 key lessons that have been distilled from DOE SSL program results.

  12. Report of Special Review Group, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, on lessons learned from Three Mile Island

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    The IE Special Review Group (SRG) was constituted by V. Stello, Jr., Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE), in a memorandum to IE Management dated July 12, 1979, to review the lessons learned from the Three Mile Island (TMI) Accident. This memorandum is enclosed as Appendix A to this report. The members of SRG were selected on the basis of their qualifications and experience in IE. SRG members were selected mainly from Regional Offices. Several of the members had been assigned to Three Mile Island following the accident. Several members had been assigned to the Incident Response Center in NRC Headquarters following the accident. Several other members had no direct involvement in responding to the accident. SRG was divided into two groups, one to review the preventive aspects and one to review the responsive aspects. This action was taken so that the qualifications of individual SRG members could be utilized most efficiently across the spectrum of matters considered. Although for the most part the two groups worked separately, each member of SRG has reviewed the entire report and concurs in its contents

  13. Improving the quality of learning in science through optimization of lesson study for learning community

    Science.gov (United States)

    Setyaningsih, S.

    2018-03-01

    Lesson Study for Learning Community is one of lecturer profession building system through collaborative and continuous learning study based on the principles of openness, collegiality, and mutual learning to build learning community in order to form professional learning community. To achieve the above, we need a strategy and learning method with specific subscription technique. This paper provides a description of how the quality of learning in the field of science can be improved by implementing strategies and methods accordingly, namely by applying lesson study for learning community optimally. Initially this research was focused on the study of instructional techniques. Learning method used is learning model Contextual teaching and Learning (CTL) and model of Problem Based Learning (PBL). The results showed that there was a significant increase in competence, attitudes, and psychomotor in the four study programs that were modelled. Therefore, it can be concluded that the implementation of learning strategies in Lesson study for Learning Community is needed to be used to improve the competence, attitude and psychomotor of science students.

  14. Runaway reactions. Part 2 Causes of Accidents in selected CSB case histories Part 2

    OpenAIRE

    GYENES ZSUZSANNA; CARSON PHILLIP

    2017-01-01

    Part 1 briefly discussed the basic thermochemistry of reactive chemicals, the statistics of accidents involving runaway reactions, and general control measures to minimise risk and mitigate the consequences. The present paper highlights the main causes of major accidents from runaway reactions with illustrative case histories to link theory and practice. It also discusses lessons learned from these accidents, which are very similar in the cases studied. The main causes are management deficien...

  15. Functionality for learning networks: lessons learned from social web applications

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Berlanga, Adriana; Sloep, Peter; Brouns, Francis; Van Rosmalen, Peter; Bitter-Rijpkema, Marlies; Koper, Rob

    2007-01-01

    Berlanga, A. J., Sloep, P., Brouns, F., Van Rosmalen, P., Bitter-Rijpkema, M., & Koper, R. (2007). Functionality for learning networks: lessons learned from social web applications. Proceedings of the ePortfolio 2007 Conference. October, 18-19, 2007, Maastricht, The Netherlands. [See also

  16. Crisis management during the SOCATRI incident in July 2008: lessons learned by the IRSN

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Champion, D.

    2010-01-01

    This report describes the successive events which occurred in July 2008 in the SOCATRI plant where a uranium-bearing solution was accidentally released, causing a temporary pollution of two rivers. Then, he reports how this event has been managed, firstly through a mobilization of public authorities and early decisions, secondly through sampling and measurements performed by the IRSN (the management of the obtained results is also commented), thirdly through expertise investigations by the IRSN, fourthly through relationship with local authorities, and finally through media and public information. For each of these aspects, the author discusses the lessons learned, and proposes ways to improve the management of such an accident

  17. Structural aspects of the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murray, R.C.; Cummings, G.E.

    1988-01-01

    On April 26, 1986 the world's worst nuclear power plant accident occurred at the Unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station in the USSR. This paper presents a discussion of the design of the Chernobyl Power Plant, the sequence of events that led to the accident and the damage caused by the resulting explosion. The structural design features that contributed to the accident and resulting damage will be highlighted. Photographs and sketches obtained from various worldwide news agencies will be shown to try and gain a perspective of the extent of the damage. The aftermath, clean-up, and current situation will be discussed and the important lessons learned for the structural engineer will be presented. 15 refs., 10 figs

  18. DSCOVR Contamination Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Graziani, Larissa

    2015-01-01

    The Triana observatory was built at NASA GSFC in the late 1990's, then placed into storage. After approximately ten years it was removed from storage and repurposed as the Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR). This presentation outlines the contamination control program lessons learned during the integration, test and launch of DSCOVR.

  19. Emergency planning lessons learned from a review of past major radiological accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stephan, J.G.; Selby, J.M.; Martin, J.B.; Moeller, D.W.; Vallario, E.J.

    1988-01-01

    In examining a range of nuclear accidents from the 1950s to the present that were reported in the literature, the authors have identified a number of contributing factors which affected human judgement during these events. One common thread found in a large number of accidents is the time of occurrence; a second is the adequacy of emergency training. The data show that events, whether severe accidents or operational incidents, appear to occur more frequently during off-normal hours such as the early morning shift, weekends, or holidays. Accidents seldom occur during the day shift when the full management team and senior operations personnel are present. As a result, those facility employees most expert in coping with the situation may not be available, and the normal chain of command may be disrupted. At several nuclear power plants, it was also observed that new or less experienced technicians are often assigned to night shifts. The lack of experienced human resources and the pressure of an accident situation can have an adverse impact on individuals who are faced with making important decisions

  20. A Text Mining Approach for Extracting Lessons Learned from Project Documentation: An Illustrative Case Study

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Benjamin Matthies

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available Lessons learned are important building blocks for continuous learning in project-based organisations. Nonetheless, the practical reality is that lessons learned are often not consistently reused for organisational learning. Two problems are commonly described in this context: the information overload and the lack of procedures and methods for the assessment and implementation of lessons learned. This paper addresses these problems, and appropriate solutions are combined in a systematic lesson learned process. Latent Dirichlet Allocation is presented to solve the first problem. Regarding the second problem, established risk management methods are adapted. The entire lessons learned process will be demonstrated in a practical case study

  1. Lessons Learned In Developing The VACIS Products

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Orphan, Victor J.

    2011-01-01

    SAIC's development of VACIS provides useful 'lessons learned' in bridging the gap from an idea to a security or contraband detection product. From a gamma densitometer idea for solving a specific Customs Service (CS) requirement (detection of drugs in near-empty tanker trucks) in mid-1990's, SAIC developed a broad line of vehicle and cargo inspections systems (over 500 systems deployed to date) based on a gamma-ray radiographic imaging technique. This paper analyzes the reasons for the successful development of VACIS and attempts to identify ''lessons learned'' useful for future security and contraband detection product developments.

  2. Dynasting Theory: Lessons in learning grounded theory

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Johnben Teik-Cheok Loy, MBA, MTS, Ph.D.

    2011-06-01

    Full Text Available This article captures the key learning lessons gleaned from the author’s experience learning and developing a grounded theory for his doctoral dissertation using the classic methodology as conceived by Barney Glaser. The theory was developed through data gathered on founders and successors of Malaysian Chinese family-own businesses. The main concern for Malaysian Chinese family businesses emerged as dynasting . the building, maintaining, and growing the power and resources of the business within the family lineage. The core category emerged as dynasting across cultures, where founders and successors struggle to transition from traditional Chinese to hybrid cultural and modernized forms of family business from one generation to the next. The key learning lessons were categorized under five headings: (a sorting through different versions of grounded theory, (b educating and managing research stakeholders, (c embracing experiential learning, (d discovering the core category: grounded intuition, and (e recognizing limitations and possibilities.Keywords: grounded theory, learning, dynasting, family business, Chinese

  3. Learning from Fukushima: Institutional Isomorphism as Constraining and Contributing Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ylönen, M.

    2016-01-01

    This paper is an analysis of the international institutional isomorphic pressures and lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. The recent upgrading of nuclear safety requirements at the international and national level, as well as harmonisation attempts of nuclear reactor safety by the Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA), show serious efforts to improve nuclear safety and implement lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. After Fukushima new requirements for the new nuclear power plants were set, such as preparedness for natural hazards, multiple failure and core melt situations. In addition, improvement of safety culture was emphasised, as well as strengthening of independence of the regulatory body from external pressures, and increasing of independence between different levels of defence in depth safety. However, learning from accidents is often affected by institutional factors, which may both contribute and hamper safety and learning.

  4. Lessons Fukushima 11032011 -- Lessons learned and points to be checked from the nuclear accidents in Fukushima; Lessons Fukushima 11032011 -- Lessons learned und Pruefpunkte aus den kerntechnischen Unfaellen in Fukushima

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2011-10-15

    Since a long time, severe accidents are one of the main areas in the surveillance activities of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI). The analysis of events all over the world and the evaluation of their relevance for the Swiss nuclear power plants belong to the permanent obligations of the regulatory authority. In Switzerland, for more than two decades, core melting accidents are studied using probabilistic safety assessment methods. Comprehensive risk analyses were set up for external events like earthquakes, sabotages or airplane crashes. Strategies for the mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents, so-called Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG), were written down by the regulatory authority and made available to the Swiss plant operators. In international comparison the Swiss nuclear power plants have reached a very high standard in the field of severe accidents. Moreover, the safety of the Swiss plants is continuously reviewed by means of permanent supervision and especially through the 10-year periodic safety review. However, the Fukushima accident justifies a renewed evaluation on whether the preparation against severe reactor accidents could be improved and additional measures be taken for the protection of the population. In the present report, ENSI indicates points to be checked, which were considered as important in the course of the analysis of the Fukushima accident, for the future improvement of the nuclear safety and radiation protection in Switzerland. These points were identified from the analysis of the behaviour of the plant staff, techniques and organisation during the accident. The resulting measures concern the plant design, the emergency management, the feed-back from the encountered events, the surveillance, the radiation protection and the safety culture, with a special emphasis on the emergency management in Switzerland. The implementation of the necessary short-term measures was launched by ENSI decrees and

  5. Accident management insights after the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Degueldre, Didier; Viktorov, Alexandre; Tuomainen, Minna; Ducamp, Francois; Chevalier, Sophie; Guigueno, Yves; Tasset, Daniel; Heinrich, Marcus; Schneider, Matthias; Funahashi, Toshihiro; Hotta, Akitoshi; Kajimoto, Mitsuhiro; Chung, Dae-Wook; Kuriene, Laima; Kozlova, Nadezhda; Zivko, Tomi; Aleza, Santiago; Jones, John; McHale, Jack; Nieh, Ho; Pascal, Ghislain; ); Nakoski, John; Neretin, Victor; Nezuka, Takayoshi; )

    2014-01-01

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident, that took place on 11 March 2011, initiated a significant number of activities at the national and international levels to reassess the safety of existing NPPs, evaluate the sufficiency of technical means and administrative measures available for emergency response, and develop recommendations for increasing the robustness of NPPs to withstand extreme external events and beyond design basis accidents. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is working closely with its member and partner countries to examine the causes of the accident and to identify lessons learnt with a view to the appropriate follow-up actions to be taken by the nuclear safety community. Accident management is a priority area of work for the NEA to address lessons being learnt from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP following the recommendations of Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA), Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI), and Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH). Considering the importance of these issues, the CNRA authorised the formation of a task group on accident management (TGAM) in June 2012 to review the regulatory framework for accident management following the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. The task group was requested to assess the NEA member countries needs and challenges in light of the accident from a regulatory point of view. The general objectives of the TGAM review were to consider: - enhancements of on-site accident management procedures and guidelines based on lessons learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident; - decision-making and guiding principles in emergency situations; - guidance for instrumentation, equipment and supplies for addressing long-term aspects of accident management; - guidance and implementation when taking extreme measures for accident management. The report is built on the existing bases for capabilities to respond to design basis

  6. Lessons learned from the quench-11 training exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hohorst, J.K.; Allison, C.M.

    2007-01-01

    16 organizations in 12 countries are participating in a RELAP/SCDAPSIM training exercise based on the Quench 11 experiment performed at Karlsruhe (Germany) in 2005. This exercise is being conducted in parallel to an International Standard Problem (ISP). Both the ISP and the RELAP/SCDAPSIM training exercise included a 'semi-blind' portion that was completed in the fall of 2006 and an 'open' portion that is to be completed in the summer of 2007. The RELAP/SCDAPSIM training exercise is coordinated by Innovative Systems Software with support by the International SCDAP Development and Training Program (SDTP). The Quench-11 experiment is based on an electrically heated fuel rod bundle representative of a PWR design. The bundle was subjected to a boil down transient, heat-up, and quenching with peak temperatures exceeding the melting point of the Zircaloy cladding. This experiment was chosen by the European Union as an International Benchmark exercise to compare the effectiveness of quenching models in the severe accident computer codes used today for accident analysis. This paper briefly describes (a) RELAP/SCDAPSIM/MOD3.4, (b) the Quench facility and experiments used in the training exercise, and (c) the training guidelines provided to the participants followed by a more detailed description of the lessons learned from the initial 'semi-blind' portion. The representative results demonstrate that good analysts can still have a difficult time predicting the thermal hydraulic response of a relative simple transient in a complex system

  7. Our consistent countermeasure following up with lesson from Fukushima NPPs accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jae Rok [Korea Academy of Nuclear Safety, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Ro, Seung Gy [Sung woo E and T, Kyeonggi (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Si Hwan [UNIST, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of); Nam, Jang Soo [Korean Nuclear Society, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Yoo, Guk Hee [Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Soong Pyung [Chosun Univ., Gwangju (Korea, Republic of)

    2012-10-15

    Fukushima NPPs accident has not only resulted in driving out the nuclear Renaissance which is about to revive after several lean years, but also given humankind a very rigorous lessons in nuclear safety. Recently administrative systems were reorganized for stepping up further nuclear safety. Nuclear Safety and Security Commission(NSSC) as a governmental organization, directly under the jurisdiction of the president, which is responsible for a nuclear safety mission separated from Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. A beef up work of 50 safety related items for Korean NPPs identified after Fukushima NPPs accident has been implemented under the supervision of the commission. It has also been emphasized that sincere communications between the nuclear society and the people at large are essential for obtaining public acceptance of nuclear energy by ensuring the credibility of nuclear safety. The main points of lecture materials presented in the nuclear senior members' forum have been reviewed to derive invaluable guidelines.

  8. Case Study of Lessons Learned from the Operation of the Fast Flux Test Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wootan, D.; Omberg, R.; Grandy, C.

    2016-01-01

    Full text: The lessons learned approach being followed at the Fast Flux Test Facility is to have domain experts in each subject area develop a short write-up or report on each lesson learned. Each lesson learned write-up is on the order of 4–6 pages. Longer reports can be developed as needed. Each lessons learned summary discusses the problem and the resolution method employed to address the problem, and also tries to capture the essential “tacit knowledge” associated with each topic in a focused manner. All lessons learned write-ups are supported by more detailed documents. For example, references of more detailed reports are generally included, where available. Topics are selected as those most likely to apply to future design or operating problems. This lessons learned approach has been successful in capturing essential tacit knowledge about key events in FFTF history and providing a context for interpreting the existing data and references. (author

  9. Using Selective Redundancy and Testing to Optimize Learning from Multimedia Lessons

    OpenAIRE

    Yue, Carole Leigh

    2014-01-01

    Multimedia learning refers to learning from a combination of words and images. In the present dissertation, a multimedia lesson is defined as an animated, narrated educational video that depicts a scientific process--a format of instructional material becoming increasingly common in online, hybrid, and traditional classrooms. The overarching goal of the present research was to investigate how to optimize learning from multimedia lessons using two related theories of multimedia learning (the...

  10. Solid-State Lighting. Early Lessons Learned on the Way to Market

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sandahl, L. J.; Cort, K. A.; Gordon, K. L.

    2014-01-01

    Analysis of issues and lessons learned during the early stages of solid-state lighting market introduction in the U.S., which also summarizes early actions taken to avoid potential problems anticipated based on lessons learned from the market introduction of compact fluorescent lamps.

  11. Scientific aspects of the Tohoku earthquake and Fukushima nuclear accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Koketsu, Kazuki

    2016-04-01

    We investigated the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, the accident of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, and assessments conducted beforehand for earthquake and tsunami potential in the Pacific offshore region of the Tohoku District. The results of our investigation show that all the assessments failed to foresee the earthquake and its related tsunami, which was the main cause of the accident. Therefore, the disaster caused by the earthquake, and the accident were scientifically unforeseeable at the time. However, for a zone neighboring the reactors, a 2008 assessment showed tsunamis higher than the plant height. As a lesson learned from the accident, companies operating nuclear power plants should be prepared using even such assessment results for neighboring zones.

  12. Research Data Curation Pilots: Lessons Learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    David Minor

    2014-07-01

    Full Text Available In the spring of 2011, the UC San Diego Research Cyberinfrastructure (RCI Implementation Team invited researchers and research teams to participate in a research curation and data management pilot program. This invitation took the form of a campus-wide solicitation. More than two dozen applications were received and, after due deliberation, the RCI Oversight Committee selected five curation-intensive projects. These projects were chosen based on a number of criteria, including how they represented campus research, varieties of topics, researcher engagement, and the various services required. The pilot process began in September 2011, and will be completed in early 2014. Extensive lessons learned from the pilots are being compiled and are being used in the on-going design and implementation of the permanent Research Data Curation Program in the UC San Diego Library. In this paper, we present specific implementation details of these various services, as well as lessons learned. The program focused on many aspects of contemporary scholarship, including data creation and storage, description and metadata creation, citation and publication, and long term preservation and access. Based on the lessons learned in our processes, the Research Data Curation Program will provide a suite of services from which campus users can pick and choose, as necessary. The program will provide support for the data management requirements from national funding agencies.

  13. Organizational safety factors research lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryan, T.G.

    1995-01-01

    This Paper reports lessons learned and state of knowledge gained from an organizational factors research activity involving commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, through the end of 1991, as seen by the scientists immediately involved in the research. Lessons learned information was gathered from the research teams and individuals using a question and answer format. The following five questions were submitted to each team and individual: (1) What organizational factors appear to influence safety performance in some systematic way, (2) Should organizational factors research focus at the plant level, or should it extend beyond the plant level to the parent company, rate setting commissions, regulatory agencies, (3) How important is having direct access to plants for doing organizational factors research, (4) What lessons have been learned to date as the result of doing organizational factors research in a nuclear regulatory setting, and (5) What organizational research topics and issues should be pursued in the future? Conclusions based on the responses provided for this report are that organizational factors research can be conducted in a regulatory setting and produce useful results. Technologies pioneered in other academic, commercial, and military settings can be adopted for use in a nuclear regulatory setting. The future success of such research depends upon the cooperation of regulators, contractors, and the nuclear industry

  14. Radiation accidents: occurrence, types, consequences, medical management, and the lessons to be learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turai, I.; Veress, K.

    2001-01-01

    The paper reviews the frequency, causes and occurrence of radiation accidents with some significant exposure to human. More detailed information is provided in tabulated form on the health consequences of those twenty severe radiation accidents that occurred in 1986-2000, world-wide. Reference is given to the very low cumulative incidence of significant radiation accidents, as during the last 57 years there were, in average, seven registered accidents annually in all countries of the world. Thus, the chance for most of the physicians to meet a patient with symptoms of acute radiation injury during their professional career is very low

  15. Lessons learned from post-accident management at Chernobyl: the P.a.r.e.x. project; Retour d'experience sur la gestion post-accidentelle de Tchernobyl: le projet Parex

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heriard Dubreuil, G. [Mutadis Consultants, 75 - Paris (France); Lochard, J.; Bataille, C. [CEPN, 92 - Fontenay aux Roses (France); Ollagnon, H. [AgroParisTech, 75 - Paris (France); Baude, St. [Mutadis, 75 - Paris (France)

    2008-07-15

    Return of experience on Chernobyl post-accident management: the PAREX study Belarus is the country the most affected by the Chernobyl fallouts and is among the most significant experiences in the nuclear post-accident field. Despite specificities inherent to the political and social situation in Belarus, the experience of post-accidental management in this country holds a wealth of lessons in the perspective of preparation to a post-accidental situation in the French and European context. Through the PAREX project (2005-2006), the French Nuclear Safety Authority analysed the return of experience of Chernobyl post-accident management from 1986 to 2005 in order to draw its lessons in the perspective of a preparation policy. The study was led by a group of experts and involved the participation of a pluralistic group of about thirty participants (public authorities, local governments, NGOs, experts, operators). PAREX highlighted the complexity of a situation of long-lasting radioactive contamination (diversity of stakeholders and of dimensions at stake: health, environment, economy, society...). Beyond traditional public crisis management tools and frameworks, post-accident strategies also involves in the longer term a territorial and social response, which relies on local capacities of initiative. Preparation to such process requires experimenting new modes of operation that allow a diversity of local actors to take part to the response to a situation of contamination and to the surveillance system, with the support of public authorities. The conclusions of PAREX include a set of recommendations in this perspective. (authors)

  16. The radiological accident in Cochabamba

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-07-01

    In April 2002 an accident involving an industrial radiography source containing 192 Ir occurred in Cochabamba, Bolivia, some 400 km from the capital, La Paz. A faulty radiography source container had been sent back to the headquarters of the company concerned in La Paz together with other equipment as cargo on a passenger bus. This gave rise to a potential for serious exposure for the bus passengers as well as for the company employees who were using and transporting the source. The Government of Bolivia requested the assistance of the IAEA under the terms of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The IAEA in response assembled and sent to Bolivia a team composed of senior radiation safety experts and radiation pathology experts from Brazil, the United Kingdom and the IAEA to investigate the accident. The IAEA is grateful to the Government of Bolivia for the opportunity to report on this accident in order to disseminate the valuable lessons learned and help prevent similar accidents in the future

  17. A Review of Criticality Accidents 2000 Revision

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomas P. McLaughlin; Shean P. Monahan; Norman L. Pruvost; Vladimir V. Frolov; Boris G. Ryazanov; Victor I. Sviridov

    2000-05-01

    Criticality accidents and the characteristics of prompt power excursions are discussed. Sixty accidental power excursions are reviewed. Sufficient detail is provided to enable the reader to understand the physical situation, the chemistry and material flow, and when available the administrative setting leading up to the time of the accident. Information on the power history, energy release, consequences, and causes are also included when available. For those accidents that occurred in process plants, two new sections have been included in this revision. The first is an analysis and summary of the physical and neutronic features of the chain reacting systems. The second is a compilation of observations and lessons learned. Excursions associated with large power reactors are not included in this report.

  18. A Review of Criticality Accidents 2000 Revision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, Thomas P.; Monahan, Shean P.; Pruvost, Norman L.; Frolov, Vladimir V.; Ryazanov, Boris G.; Sviridov, Victor I.

    2000-01-01

    Criticality accidents and the characteristics of prompt power excursions are discussed. Sixty accidental power excursions are reviewed. Sufficient detail is provided to enable the reader to understand the physical situation, the chemistry and material flow, and when available the administrative setting leading up to the time of the accident. Information on the power history, energy release, consequences, and causes are also included when available. For those accidents that occurred in process plants, two new sections have been included in this revision. The first is an analysis and summary of the physical and neutronic features of the chain reacting systems. The second is a compilation of observations and lessons learned. Excursions associated with large power reactors are not included in this report

  19. Reflections on Designing a MPA Service-Learning Component: Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Roman, Alexandru V.

    2015-01-01

    This article provides the "lessons learned" from the experience of redesigning two sections (face-to-face and online) of a core master of public administration class as a service-learning course. The suggestions made here can be traced to the entire process of the project, from the "seed idea" through its conceptualization and…

  20. Lessons learned and advice from Vietnam war nurses: a qualitative study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Scannell-Desch, Elizabeth A

    2005-03-01

    The aim of this paper is to describe guidance for nurses today from the lessons learned by nurses who served in the Vietnam War. There is little research focusing on nurses' experiences in the Vietnam War. Lessons learned and subsequent advice from nurses who served in Vietnam may be helpful to those serving in current and future wars. A Husserlian phenomenological approach was taken, using interviews with a purposive sample of Registered Nurses who were female, and had served in the United States of America armed forces in Vietnam during the war. Seven theme clusters described the lesson learned and guidance offered by the Vietnam War nurses: advice about journaling, training, caring for yourself, use of support systems, talking about your experiences, understanding the mission, and lack of preparation for war. Much can be learned from the lessons learned and advice given by Vietnam War nurses. These lessons stress that nurses need to take a pro-active role in preparing themselves for deployment to a war zone, and that institutional training for war needs to be intensive and realistic. The environmental, cultural, technological, clinical and psychosocial demands of war nursing need to be comprehensively addressed before nurses deploy to a war.

  1. Blended learning: strengths, challenges, and lessons learned in an interprofessional training program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lotrecchiano, G R; McDonald, P L; Lyons, L; Long, T; Zajicek-Farber, M

    2013-11-01

    This field report outlines the goals of providing a blended learning model for an interdisciplinary training program for healthcare professionals who care for children with disabilities. The curriculum blended traditional face-to-face or on-site learning with integrated online interactive instruction. Credit earning and audited graduate level online coursework, community engagement experiences, and on-site training with maternal and child health community engagement opportunities were blended into a cohesive program. The training approach emphasized adult learning principles in different environmental contexts integrating multiple components of the Leadership Education in Neurodevelopmental and Related Disabilities Program. This paper describes the key principles adopted for this blended approach and the accomplishments, challenges, and lessons learned. The discussion offers examples from training content, material gathered through yearly program evaluation, as well as university course evaluations. The lessons learned consider the process and the implications for the role of blended learning in this type of training program with suggestions for future development and adoption by other programs.

  2. Implementing a lessons learned process at Sandia National Laboratories

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fosshage, Erik D.; Drewien, Celeste A.; Eras, Kenneth; Hartwig, Ronald Craig; Post, Debra S.; Stoecker, Nora Kathleen

    2016-01-01

    The Lessons Learned Process Improvement Team was tasked to gain an understanding of the existing lessons learned environment within the major programs at Sandia National Laboratories, identify opportunities for improvement in that environment as compared to desired attributes, propose alternative implementations to address existing inefficiencies, perform qualitative evaluations of alternative implementations, and recommend one or more near-term activities for prototyping and/or implementation. This report documents the work and findings of the team.

  3. Lessons Learned from Ares I Upper Stage Structures and Thermal Design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ahmed, Rafiq

    2012-01-01

    The Ares 1 Upper Stage was part of the vehicle intended to succeed the Space Shuttle as the United States manned spaceflight vehicle. Although the Upper Stage project was cancelled, there were many lessons learned that are applicable to future vehicle design. Lessons learned that are briefly detailed in this Technical Memorandum are for specific technical areas such as tank design, common bulkhead design, thrust oscillation, control of flight and slosh loads, purge and hazardous gas system. In addition, lessons learned from a systems engineering and vehicle integration perspective are also included, such as computer aided design and engineering, scheduling, and data management. The need for detailed systems engineering in the early stages of a project is emphasized throughout this report. The intent is that future projects will be able to apply these lessons learned to keep costs down, schedules brief, and deliver products that perform to the expectations of their customers.

  4. The Fukushima accident: radiological consequences and first lessons. Proceedings; L'accident de Fukushima: consequences radiologiques et premiers enseignements. Recueil des presentations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-02-15

    This document brings together the available presentations given at the conference organised by the French society of radiation protection about the Fukushima accident, its radiological consequences and the first lessons learnt. Sixteen presentations (slides) are compiled in this document and deal with: 1 - Accident progress and first actions (Thierry Charles, IRSN); 2 - Conditions and health monitoring of the Japanese intervention teams (Bernard Le Guen, EDF); 3 - The Intra Group action after the Fukushima accident (Michel Chevallier, Groupe Intra; Frederic Mariotte, CEA); 4 - Processing of effluents (Georges Pagis, Areva); 5 - Fukushima accident: impact on the terrestrial environment in Japan (Didier Champion, IRSN); 6 - Consequences of the Fukushima accident on the marine environment (Dominique Boust, IRSN); 7 - Territories decontamination perspectives (Pierre Chagvardieff, CEA); 8 - Actions undertaken by Japanese authorities (Florence Gallay, ASN); 9 - Japanese population monitoring and health stakes (Philippe Pirard, InVS); 10 - Citizen oversight actions implemented in Japan (David Boilley, ACRO); 11 - Implementation of ICRP's (International Commission on Radiological Protection) recommendations by Japanese authorities: first analysis (Jacques Lochard, CIPR); 12 - Control of Japan imported food stuff (David Brouque, DGAL); 13 - Questions asked by populations in France and in Germany (Florence-Nathalie Sentuc, GRS; Pascale Monti, IRSN); 14 - Labour law applicable to French workers working abroad (Thierry Lahaye, DGT); 15 - Protection of French workers working in Japan, Areva's experience (Patrick Devin, Areva); 16 - Fukushima accident experience feedback and post-accident nuclear doctrine (Jean-Luc Godet, ASN)

  5. Severe accident tests and development of domestic severe accident system codes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    According to lessons learned from Fukushima-Daiichi NPS accidents, the safety evaluation will be started based on the NRA's New Safety Standards. In parallel with this movement, reinforcement of Severe Accident (SA) Measures and Accident Managements (AMs) has been undertaken and establishments of relevant regulations and standards are recognized as urgent subjects. Strengthening responses against nuclear plant hazards, as well as realistic protection measures and their standardization is also recognized as urgent subjects. Furthermore, decommissioning of Fukushima-Daiichi Unit1 through Unit4 is promoted diligently. Taking into account JNES's mission with regard to these SA Measures, AMs and decommissioning, movement of improving SA evaluation methodologies inside and outside Japan, and prioritization of subjects based on analyses of sequences of Fukushima-Daiichi NPS accidents, three viewpoints was extracted. These viewpoints were substantiated as the following three groups of R and D subjects: (1) Obtaining near term experimental subjects: Containment venting, Seawater injection, Iodine behaviors. (2) Obtaining mid and long experimental subjects: Fuel damage behavior at early phase of core degradation, Core melting and debris formation. (3) Development of a macroscopic level SA code for plant system behaviors and a mechanistic level code for core melting and debris formation. (author)

  6. Severe accident tests and development of domestic severe accident system codes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    According to lessons learned from Fukushima-Daiichi NPS accidents, the safety evaluation will be started based on the NRA's New Safety Standards. In parallel with this movement, reinforcement of Severe Accident (SA) Measures and Accident Managements (AMs) has been undertaken and establishments of relevant regulations and standards are recognized as urgent subjects. Strengthening responses against nuclear plant hazards, as well as realistic protection measures and their standardization is also recognized as urgent subjects. Furthermore, decommissioning of Fukushima-Daiichi Unit1 through Unit4 is promoted diligently. Taking into account JNES's mission with regard to these SA Measures, AMs and decommissioning, movement of improving SA evaluation methodologies inside and outside Japan, and prioritization of subjects based on analyses of sequences of Fukushima-Daiichi NPS accidents, three viewpoints was extracted. These viewpoints were substantiated as the following three groups of R and D subjects: (1) Obtaining near term experimental subjects: Containment venting, Seawater injection, Iodine behaviors. (2) Obtaining mid and long experimental subjects: Fuel damage behavior at early phase of core degradation, Core melting and debris formation. (3) Development of a macroscopic level SA code for plant system behaviors and a mechanistic level code for core melting and debris formation. (author)

  7. E-LEARNING FROM NATURE THROUGH E-LESSONS

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Anca Cristina COLIBABA

    2017-08-01

    Full Text Available The article is a study based on the e-Learning from Nature project (2015-1-IT02-KA201-015133 funded by the European Commission. The project’s main objectives are centred on improving students’ low achievement and stimulating secondary school students’ interest in science subjects. The article focuses on scientific education and its challenges and suggests an innovative approach which connects science with nature. It examines one of the most important project outputs: the e-lessons (short video lessons created within the European partnership and the way they can contribute to increasing students’ motivation to learn science. Participant teachers’ testimonials have also been considered in the general evaluation of this project output.

  8. An analysis on human factor issues in criticality accident at a uranium processing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sasou, Kunihide; Goda, Hidenori; Hirotsu, Yuko

    2000-01-01

    This report analyses latent factors of a human behavior directly contributing to the criticality accident. It is pouring some 16 kg-U with an enrichment of 18.8% into the precipitation tank. It is the fact that the direct cause of this accident is the workers' unsafe act. However, the authors find lots of latent factors relating to the production-biased company's policy, the poor climate for safety in the work place, the inadequate safety management and the unsuitable equipment. This accident was caused by many organizational factors. This paper also discusses lessons learned from this accident. (author)

  9. BLENDED LEARNING: STUDENT PERCEPTION OF FACE-TO-FACE AND ONLINE EFL LESSONS

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Brenda M. Wright

    2017-05-01

    Full Text Available With the ever-increasing development of technology, online teaching is more readily accepted as a viable component in teaching and learning, and blended learning, the combining of online and face-to-face learning, is becoming commonplace in many higher education institutions. Blended learning is, particularly in developing countries, in its early stages and not without its challenges. Asynchronous online lessons are currently still more prevalent in many areas of South-East Asia, perhaps due to potential difficulty in obtaining strong Internet connections, which may deter educators from synchronous options. Technological media have the potential to broaden the scope of resources available in teaching and to enhance the language learning experience. Although research to date shows some focus on blended learning, literature on distance online teaching seems more prevalent. This study exposed 112 Malaysian undergraduate EFL students' responses to an online lesson as part of an English grammar course, and investigates common student perceptions of the online lesson as compared with face-to-face lessons. Questionnaires using qualitative (Likert scale questions and quantitative (open-ended questions approaches provided data for content analysis to determine common student perceptions, with particular reference to motivation and interest. In general, more students associated in-class lessons with higher motivation and more interest, due to better understanding, valued classroom interaction with the lecturer and peers, and input from the lecturer. Students preferring the online lesson cited speed and convenience of study and flexibility of time and place of study as reasons for their choice. Skilful implementation of online lessons can enhance a language course but should not undermine the value of face-to-face instruction with EFL teachers.

  10. The Value of Identifying and Recovering Lost GN&C Lessons Learned: Aeronautical, Spacecraft, and Launch Vehicle Examples

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dennehy, Cornelius J.; Labbe, Steve; Lebsock, Kenneth L.

    2010-01-01

    Within the broad aerospace community the importance of identifying, documenting and widely sharing lessons learned during system development, flight test, operational or research programs/projects is broadly acknowledged. Documenting and sharing lessons learned helps managers and engineers to minimize project risk and improve performance of their systems. Often significant lessons learned on a project fail to get captured even though they are well known 'tribal knowledge' amongst the project team members. The physical act of actually writing down and documenting these lessons learned for the next generation of NASA GN&C engineers fails to happen on some projects for various reasons. In this paper we will first review the importance of capturing lessons learned and then will discuss reasons why some lessons are not documented. A simple proven approach called 'Pause and Learn' will be highlighted as a proven low-impact method of organizational learning that could foster the timely capture of critical lessons learned. Lastly some examples of 'lost' GN&C lessons learned from the aeronautics, spacecraft and launch vehicle domains are briefly highlighted. In the context of this paper 'lost' refers to lessons that have not achieved broad visibility within the NASA-wide GN&C CoP because they are either undocumented, masked or poorly documented in the NASA Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS).

  11. Lessons learned at Lower East Fork Poplar Creek, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burch, K.L.; Page, D.G.

    1996-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) used several innovative strategies and technologies in conducting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) activities for the Lower East Fork Poplar Creek (EFPC) Operable Unit (OU) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. These innovations helped to cost-effectively characterize the 270-ha (670-acre), 23.3-km (14.5-mile) floodplain and to obtain a 400-parts per million (ppm) cleanup level for mercury in soil. Lessons learned during the project involve management, investigation, and risk assessment strategies and techniques. Management lessons learned include (a) how to handle the large OU, (b) how to effectively involve the community in decisions, and (c) how to select a remedy that incorporates the needs of many involved agencies. Investigation lessons learned include (a) how to design an effective sampling strategy for the site, (b) how to cost-effectively analyze a large number of samples, and (c) which of several treatment technologies is best-suited to the site. Risk assessment lessons learned include (a) how to determine an appropriate cleanup level for human health and the environment, (b) how to quantify uncertainty in the human health risk assessment, (c) how to reconcile different solubilities of different mercury species, and (d) how to best conduct the ecological risk assessment. Other CERCLA sites can benefit from lessons learned during this project whether still in the investigative stage or further along in the process. Applying these lessons can substantially reduce costs and make more efficient use of Superfund resources

  12. Co-Creation Learning Procedures: Comparing Interactive Language Lessons for Deaf and Hearing Students.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hosono, Naotsune; Inoue, Hiromitsu; Tomita, Yutaka

    2017-01-01

    This paper discusses co-creation learning procedures of second language lessons for deaf students, and sign language lessons by a deaf lecturer. The analyses focus on the learning procedure and resulting assessment, considering the disability. Through questionnaires ICT-based co-creative learning technologies are effective and efficient and promote spontaneous learning motivation goals.

  13. WHC significant lessons learned 1993--1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bickford, J.C.

    1997-12-12

    A lesson learned as defined in DOE-STD-7501-95, Development of DOE Lessons Learned Programs, is: A ``good work practice`` or innovative approach that is captured and shared to promote repeat applications or an adverse work practice or experience that is captured and shared to avoid a recurrence. The key word in both parts of this definition is ``shared``. This document was published to share a wide variety of recent Hanford experiences with other DOE sites. It also provides a valuable tool to be used in new employee and continuing training programs at Hanford facilities and at other DOE locations. This manual is divided into sections to facilitate extracting appropriate subject material when developing training modules. Many of the bulletins could be categorized into more than one section, however, so examination of other related sections is encouraged.

  14. Social support and child protection: Lessons learned and learning.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thompson, Ross A

    2015-03-01

    Social support has been a topic of research for nearly 50 years, and its applications to prevention and intervention have grown significantly, including programs advancing child protection. This article summarizes the central conclusions of the 1994 review of research on social support and the prevention of child maltreatment prepared for the U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect, and surveys advances in the field since its publication. Among the lessons learned twenty years ago are (a) the diversity of the social support needs of at-risk families and their association with child endangerment, (b) the need to supplement the emotionally affirmative aspects of social support with efforts to socialize parenting practices and monitor child well-being, (c) the desirability of integrating formal and informal sources of social support for recipients, and (d) the importance of considering the complex recipient reactions to receiving support from others. The lessons we are now learning derive from research exploring the potential of online communication to enhance social support, the neurobiology of stress and its buffering through social support, and the lessons of evaluation research that are identifying the effective ingredients of social support interventions. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  15. Experiential Learning: Lessons Learned from the UND Business and Government Symposium

    Science.gov (United States)

    Harsell, Dana Michael; O'Neill, Patrick B.

    2010-01-01

    The authors describe lessons learned from a limited-duration experiential learning component of a Master's level course. The course is open to Master's in Business and Master's in Public Administration students and explores the relationships between government and business. A complete discussion of the Master's in Business and Master's in Public…

  16. A summary of lessons learned activities conducted at the OECD Halden Reactor Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hallbert, B.P.

    1997-01-01

    A series of lessons learned studies have been conducted at the OECD Halden Reactor Project. The purpose of these lessons learned reports are to summarize knowledge and experience gained across a number of research project. This paper presents a summary of main issues addressed in four of these lessons learned projects. These are concerned with software development and quality assurance, software reliability, methods for test and evaluation of developed systems, and the evaluation of system design features

  17. Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, Michael H.; Johnson, Shirley

    2010-01-01

    The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

  18. Lessons learned in terms of crisis management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This document outlines that nobody was prepared to the crisis which occurred after the Chernobyl accident, whether in Russia, Europe or France. In order to illustrate the fact that crisis management has been different from one country to another, the report describes how the crisis has been managed in Norway (which has been quickly reached by fallouts and with a rather high level) and in Switzerland. It comments radioactivity measurements performed in France during spring 1986 by the SCPRI, the CEA and the ISPN. It discusses the lessons drawn in France in terms of emergency situation management regarding the protection of the population, crisis management, and the French post-accidental doctrine. It comments the lessons drawn in eastern European countries, with the cooperative implication of the IRSN. International projects are evoked: the Chernobyl Centre, the French-German Initiative, the European projects (EURANOS, NERIS, FARMING, STRATEGY, MOSES and SAMEN)

  19. Lessons Learned from the Node 1 Temperature and Humidity Control Subsystem Design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Williams, David E.

    2010-01-01

    Node 1 flew to the International Space Station (ISS) on Flight 2A during December 1998. To date the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has learned a lot of lessons from this module based on its history of approximately two years of acceptance testing on the ground and currently its twelve years on-orbit. This paper will provide an overview of the ISS Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) design of the Node 1 Temperature and Humidity Control (THC) subsystem and it will document some of the lessons that have been learned to date for this subsystem and it will document some of the lessons that have been learned to date for these subsystems based on problems prelaunch, problems encountered on-orbit, and operational problems/concerns. It is hoped that documenting these lessons learned from ISS will help in preventing them in future Programs. 1

  20. Lessons learned applying CASE methods/tools to Ada software development projects

    Science.gov (United States)

    Blumberg, Maurice H.; Randall, Richard L.

    1993-01-01

    This paper describes the lessons learned from introducing CASE methods/tools into organizations and applying them to actual Ada software development projects. This paper will be useful to any organization planning to introduce a software engineering environment (SEE) or evolving an existing one. It contains management level lessons learned, as well as lessons learned in using specific SEE tools/methods. The experiences presented are from Alpha Test projects established under the STARS (Software Technology for Adaptable and Reliable Systems) project. They reflect the front end efforts by those projects to understand the tools/methods, initial experiences in their introduction and use, and later experiences in the use of specific tools/methods and the introduction of new ones.

  1. Lessons learned in crisis management.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Olson, Chris

    2014-01-01

    This paper will explore lessons learned following a series of natural and man-made disasters affecting the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company and/or its subsidiaries. The company employs a team of certified continuity professionals who are charged with overseeing resilience on behalf of the enterprise and leading recovery activities wherever and whenever necessary.

  2. 10 years from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident: consequences and lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    Published jointly by the Czech State Office for Nuclear Safety and the Czech National Radiation Protection Institute, the publication gives a succinct account of the cause of the Chernobyl accident and its impact on the former Soviet Union, and concentrates on the effects of the accident on the Czech Republic. The topics dealt with in this respect include, among others: radionuclide contents of foods with particular emphasis on milk products for babies, assessment of surface contamination of the Czech Republic due to the accident, internal contamination of the population as determined by whole-body measurements, assessment of the effective dose equivalents from external irradiation and effective dose equivalent commitments from internal irradiation, cesium radioisotopes in natural ecosystems, and the use of post-Chernobyl monitoring to test radionuclide migration models within the IAEA VAMP programme. (P.A.). 12 tabs., 30 figs., 64 refs

  3. Commissioning MMS: Challenges and Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wood, Paul; Gramling, Cheryl; Reiter, Jennifer; Smith, Patrick; Stone, John

    2016-01-01

    This paper discusses commissioning of NASA's Magnetospheric MultiScale (MMS) Mission. The mission includes four identical spacecraft with a large, complex set of instrumentation. The planning for and execution of commissioning for this mission is described. The paper concludes by discussing lessons learned.

  4. Occupational Radiation Protection in Severe Accident Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    protection job coverage during severe accident response. The IAEA defines a 'Severe Accident' as a beyond design basis accident comprising of accident conditions more severe than a design basis accident, involving significant core degradation. Preparation of the report The expert group met several times to share their experience and develop an interim (preliminary) report by the end of 2013. The content of the report is thus based on current reflections and action plans undertaken by the ISOE participating utilities and regulatory authorities to improve the emergency response plans in the event of a severe nuclear accident from the point of view of occupational radiation protection. A specific attention has been given to the analysis of past nuclear accidents (TMI-2, USA-1979; Chernobyl, USSR-1986 and Fukushima Daiichi, Japan-2011) and to the integration of the occupational radiation protection (ORP) lessons learned from these accidents into the various chapters of the report (See synthesis of these lessons learned in Appendix-1). To finalize the report, an international workshop was organized in 2014 to present and discuss the content of the interim version and share national experiences on best occupational RP management practices and protocols for optimum RP job coverage during severe accident, initial response and recovery efforts (see Appendix-2). The workshop notably allowed to improve and complete the report which has then be submitted to the ISOE Management Board for approval. This report comprises five main chapters. Chapter 2 provides essential information on radiation protection management and organisation. Chapter 3 establishes the goal of radiation protection training and exercises related to severe accident management. Chapter 4 discusses facility characteristics that must be considered when planning actions in response to a severe accident. Chapter 5 introduces an overall approach for the protection of workers / responders with its interpretation and

  5. Five Years after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Nuclear Safety Improvements and Lessons Learnt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Magwood, William D. IV; Niel, Jean-Christophe; Fuketa, Toyoshi; Sheron, Brian; Boyd, Michael; McGarry, Ann; Dussart-Desart, Roland; Reig, Javier; Hah, Yeonhee; Nieh, Ho; Vasquez-Maignan, Ximena; Salgado, Nancy; White, Andrew; Lazo, Edward; Creswell, Len; Leeds, Eric; Gannon-Picot, Cynthia; Griffiths, Janice

    2016-01-01

    Countries around the world continue to implement safety improvements and corrective actions based on lessons learnt from the 11 March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. This report provides a high-level summary and update on these activities, and outlines further lessons learnt and challenges identified for future consideration. It focuses on actions taken by NEA committees and NEA member countries, and as such is complementary to reports produced by other international organisations. It is in a spirit of openness and transparency that NEA member countries share this information to illustrate that appropriate actions are being taken to maintain and enhance the level of safety at their nuclear facilities. Nuclear power plants are safer today because of these actions. High-priority follow-on items identified by NEA committees are provided to assist countries in continuously benchmarking and improving their nuclear safety practices. (authors)

  6. Constellation Lessons Learned Executive Summary

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thomas, L. Dale; Neubek, Deb

    2011-01-01

    This slide presentation reviews the lessons learned from the Constellation Program (CxP) and identified several factors that contributed to the inability of the CxP to meet the cost and schedule commitments. The review includes a significant section on the context in which the CxP operated since new programs are likely to experience the same constraints.

  7. Worldwide Overview of Lessons Learned from Decommissioning Projects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laraia, Michele

    2008-01-01

    With an increasing number of radioactive facilities and reactors now reaching the end of their useful life and being taken out of service, there is a growing emphasis worldwide on the safe and efficient decommissioning of such plants. There is a wealth of experience already gained in decommissioning projects for all kinds of nuclear facilities. It is now possible to compare and discuss progress and accomplishments worldwide. In particular, rather than on the factual descriptions of projects, technologies and case histories, it is important to focus on lessons learned: in this way, the return of experience is felt to effectively contribute to progress. Key issues - inevitably based on a subjective ranking - are presented in this paper. Through the exchange of lessons learned, it is possible to achieve full awareness of the need for resources for and constraints of safe and cost-effective decommissioning. What remains now is the identification of specific, remaining issues that may hinder or delay the smooth progress of decommissioning. To this end, lessons learned provide the necessary background information; this paper tries to make extensive use of practical experience gained by the international community

  8. Human Factors in Accidents Involving Remotely Piloted Aircraft

    Science.gov (United States)

    Merlin, Peter William

    2013-01-01

    This presentation examines human factors that contribute to RPA mishaps and provides analysis of lessons learned. RPA accident data from U.S. military and government agencies were reviewed and analyzed to identify human factors issues. Common contributors to RPA mishaps fell into several major categories: cognitive factors (pilot workload), physiological factors (fatigue and stress), environmental factors (situational awareness), staffing factors (training and crew coordination), and design factors (human machine interface).

  9. Improving the primary school science learning unit about force and motion through lesson study

    Science.gov (United States)

    Phaikhumnam, Wuttichai; Yuenyong, Chokchai

    2018-01-01

    The study aimed to develop primary school science lesson plan based on inquiry cycle (5Es) through lesson study. The study focused on the development of 4 primary school science lesson plans of force and motion for Grade 3 students in KKU Demonstration Primary School (Suksasart), first semester of 2015 academic year. The methodology is mixed method. The Inthaprasitha (2010) lesson study cycle was implemented in group of KKU Demonstration Primary School. Instruments of reflection of lesson plan developing included participant observation, meeting and reflection report, lesson plan and other document. The instruments of examining students' learning include classroom observation and achievement test. Data was categorized from these instruments to find the issues of changing and improving the good lesson plan of Thai primary school science learning. The findings revealed that teachers could develop the lesson plans through lesson study. The issues of changing and improving were disused by considering on engaging students related to societal issues, students' prior knowledge, scientific concepts for primary school students, and what they learned from their changing. It indicated that the Lesson Study allowed primary school science teachers to share ideas and develop ideas to improve the lesson. The study may have implications for Thai science teacher education through Lesson Study.

  10. Global polio eradication initiative: lessons learned and legacy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cochi, Stephen L; Freeman, Andrew; Guirguis, Sherine; Jafari, Hamid; Aylward, Bruce

    2014-11-01

    The world is on the verge of achieving global polio eradication. During >25 years of operations, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) has mobilized and trained millions of volunteers, social mobilizers, and health workers; accessed households untouched by other health initiatives; mapped and brought health interventions to chronically neglected and underserved communities; and established a standardized, real-time global surveillance and response capacity. It is important to document the lessons learned from polio eradication, especially because it is one of the largest ever global health initiatives. The health community has an obligation to ensure that these lessons and the knowledge generated are shared and contribute to real, sustained changes in our approach to global health. We have summarized what we believe are 10 leading lessons learned from the polio eradication initiative. We have the opportunity and obligation to build a better future by applying the lessons learned from GPEI and its infrastructure and unique functions to other global health priorities and initiatives. In so doing, we can extend the global public good gained by ending for all time one of the world's most devastating diseases by also ensuring that these investments provide public health dividends and benefits for years to come. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Infectious Diseases Society of America 2014. This work is written by (a) US Government employee(s) and is in the public domain in the US.

  11. Analysis on the nitrogen drilling accident of Well Qionglai 1 (II: Restoration of the accident process and lessons learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yingfeng Meng

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available All the important events of the accident of nitrogen drilling of Well Qionglai 1 have been speculated and analyzed in the paper I. In this paper II, based on the investigating information, the well log data and some calculating and simulating results, according to the analysis method of the fault tree of safe engineering, the every possible compositions, their possibilities and time schedule of the events of the accident of Well Qionglai 1 have been analyzed, the implications of the logging data have been revealed, the process of the accident of Well Qionglai 1 has been restored. Some important understandings have been obtained: the objective causes of the accident is the rock burst and the induced events form rock burst, the subjective cause of the accident is that the blooie pipe could not bear the flow burden of the clasts from rock burst and was blocked by the clasts. The blocking of blooie pipe caused high pressure in wellhead, the high pressure made the blooie pipe burst, natural gas came out and flared fire. This paper also thinks that the rock burst in gas drilling in fractured tight sandstone gas zone is objective and not avoidable, but the accidents induced from rock burst can be avoidable by improving the performance of the blooie pipe, wellhead assemblies and drilling tool accessories aiming at the downhole rock burst.

  12. WHY CANT WE LEARN FROM OUR MISTAKES LEARN THE LESSON TELL THE STORY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LANGSTAFF, D.C.

    2005-01-01

    Tell the story well and people can learn from the lesson. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) and its contractors are pursuing environmental remediation at the Hanford Site. This endeavor has been underway for a number of years, both at Hanford and at other sites across the DOE complex. Independently, the occurrence of two fatalities on two Sites at opposite ends of the country within two weeks raised the question, ''What is going on in the Field?'' Corporate EM management communicated directly with Field Office Managers to answer the question. As a result of this intense interest and focused communication, EM identified four areas that need additional exploration. One of those is, ''EM's ability to learn from its mistakes.'' The need to cultivate the ability to learn from our mistakes is not unique to DOE. A quick review of EM Lessons Learned reports shows that most of the reports in the EM system originate at the sites with the largest budgets doing the most work. Not surprising. A second look, however, reveals that many reports are repetitive, that many people might consider many reports trivial, and that reports on some of the more significant events sometimes take a long time to get distributed across the DOE Complex. Spot checks of event reports revealed frequent identification of symptoms rather than root causes. With a high percentage of identified root causes in the questionable category, it is highly unlikely that the real root causes of many events are being corrected, thus leading to recurrences of events. To learn the lesson from an event, people need to be aware of the root causes of the event. Someone has to tell a story the reader can learn from, i.e., include all the information needed to understand what happened and why it happened. Most importantly, they need to understand the lesson to be learned

  13. A digest of the Nuclear Safety Division report on the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident seminar (4). Issues identified by the accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moriyama, Kumiaki; Abe, Kiyoharu

    2013-01-01

    AESJ Nuclear Safety Division published 'Report on the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Seminar - what was wrong and what should been down in future-' which would be published as five special articles of the AESJ journal. The Fukushima Dai-ichi accident identified issues of several activities directly related with nuclear safety in the areas of safety design, severe accident management and safety regulations. PRA, operational experiences and safety research could not always contribute safety assurance of nuclear power plant so much. This article (4) summarized technical issues based on related facts of the accident as much as possible and discussed' what was wrong and what should be down in future'. Important issues were identified from defense-in-depth philosophy and lessons learned on safety design were obtained from accident progression analysis. Activities against external events and continuous improvements of safety standards based on latest knowledge were most indispensable. Strong cooperation among experts in different areas was also needed. (T. Tanaka)

  14. Analysis of Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1979-01-01

    NSAC is conducting a detailed review of this accident and of the lessons to be learned. So far it has concentrated primarily on events during the sixteen hours following initiation of the accident. A sequence of events has been developed and is being verified and annotated by comparing oral and written statements with instrumentation records, data logs, operator logs, and inferences which can be made from these records. This report is being developed with the expectation that, while not completed or fully verified, it may be useful at this time. Supplements may be issued later as the analyses which are still under way are completed

  15. Revision of the AESJ Standard for Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Updating requirements based on the lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Accidents (3). Fragility evaluation and outline of the updated points

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamaguchi, Akira; Nakamura, Susumu; Mihara, Yoshinori

    2014-01-01

    Lessons learned from Great East Japan earthquake and other new findings had been accumulated on the fragility evaluation of buildings and components. And also new analysis and evaluation method had been proposed with the advancement of recent analysis and evaluation technology. These were reflected in revision of the AESJ Standard for Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Scope of the fragility evaluation were extended to all equipment on the site, severe accident management equipment including portable equipment and earthquake concomitant incident (such as tsunami) countermeasure equipment. This article described outlines of updating points of the fragility evaluation of the AESJ Standard for Seismic PRA; (1) requirements for seismic induced other risk evaluations such as fire, inundation and tsunami, (2) simulation technology based on recent findings such as three dimensional responses of buildings / structures and its effect on equipment, (3) requirements of the fragility evaluation for various failure mode of several equipment such as severe accident management equipment, fine failure mode of buildings / structures, failures of equipment related with earthquake concomitant incidents (embankment and seawall) and spent fuel pool, and (4) requirements for the fragility evaluation of aftershocks and soil deformation due to fault displacement. (T. Tanaka)

  16. Preservation and Implementation of Decommissioning Lessons Learned in the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, Rafael L.

    2008-01-01

    Over the past several years, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has actively worked to capture and preserve lessons learned from the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. More recently, NRC has involved industry groups, the Organization of Agreement States (OAS), and the Department of Energy (DOE) in the effort to develop approaches to capture, preserve and disseminate decommissioning lessons learned. This paper discusses the accomplishments of the working group, some lessons learned by the NRC in the recent past, and how NRC will incorporate these lessons learned into its regulatory framework. This should help ensure that the design and operation of current and future nuclear facilities will result in less environmental impact and more efficient decommissioning. In summary, the NRC will continue capturing today's experience in decommissioning so that future facilities can take advantage of lessons learned from today's decommissioning projects. NRC, both individually and collectively with industry groups, OAS, and DOE, is aggressively working on the preservation and implementation of decommissioning lessons learned. The joint effort has helped to ensure the lessons from the whole spectrum of decommissioning facilities (i.e., reactor, fuel cycle, and material facilities) are better understood, thus maximizing the amount of knowledge and best practices obtained from decommissioning activities. Anticipated regulatory activities at the NRC will make sure that the knowledge gained from today's decommissioning projects is preserved and implemented to benefit the nuclear facilities that will decommission in the future

  17. Mobile Learning vs. Traditional Classroom Lessons: A Comparative Study

    Science.gov (United States)

    Furió, D.; Juan, M.-C.; Seguí, I.; Vivó, R.

    2015-01-01

    Different methods can be used for learning, and they can be compared in several aspects, especially those related to learning outcomes. In this paper, we present a study in order to compare the learning effectiveness and satisfaction of children using an iPhone game for learning the water cycle vs. the traditional classroom lesson. The iPhone game…

  18. Field observations and lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nielsen, Joh B [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01

    This presentation outlines observations and lessons learned from the Megaports program. It provides: (1) details of field and technical observations collected during LANL field activities at ports around the world and details of observations collected during radiation detections system testing at Los Alamos National Laboratory; (2) provides suggestions for improvement and efficiency; and (3) discusses possible program execution changes for more effective operations.

  19. CAT/RF Simulation Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    2003-06-11

    IVSS-2003-MAS-7 CAT /RF Simulation Lessons Learned Christopher Mocnik Vetronics Technology Area, RDECOM TARDEC Tim Lee DCS Corporation...developed a re- configurable Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) simulation for the Crew integration and Automation Test bed ( CAT ) and Robotics Follower (RF...Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) experiments. This simulation was developed as a component of the Embedded Simulation System (ESS) of the CAT

  20. Radiological Cs-137 accidents/incidents in Estonia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sinisso, Mark

    1997-01-01

    Two radiological accidents/incidents in Estonia are reported. The first -21 October 1994, three brothers entered the Tammiku repository and stole a radioactive Cs-137 source and received dangerous doses of radiation. The other incident (early 1995) involved an abandoned source - a discarded metal cylinder containing Cs-137. Chronologies and factual data are considered for both events. Concise descriptions of the incidents, a medical overview of the fate of injured people and lessons learned are presented

  1. Radiological Cs-137 accidents/incidents in Estonia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sinisso, Mark [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tallin (Estonia)

    1997-12-31

    Two radiological accidents/incidents in Estonia are reported. The first -21 October 1994, three brothers entered the Tammiku repository and stole a radioactive Cs-137 source and received dangerous doses of radiation. The other incident (early 1995) involved an abandoned source - a discarded metal cylinder containing Cs-137. Chronologies and factual data are considered for both events. Concise descriptions of the incidents, a medical overview of the fate of injured people and lessons learned are presented

  2. Learning lessons from natural disasters - sectorial or holistic perspectives?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johansson, M.; Blumenthal, B.; Nyberg, L.

    2009-04-01

    Lessons learning from systematic analyses of past natural disasters is of great importance for future risk reduction and vulnerability management. It is one crucial piece of a puzzle towards disaster resilient societies, together with e.g. models of future emerging climate-related risks, globalization or demographic changes. Systematic analyses of impact and management of past events have commonly been produced in many sectors, but the knowledge is seldom shared outside the own organization or produced for other actors. To increase the availability of reports and documents, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency has created the Swedish Natural Hazards Information System, in accordance with a government commission from 2005. The system gathers accident reports, investigations and in-depth analyses, together with societal additional costs and mappings of consequences from central and local governments, NGO's and private actors. Evaluation of the collection reveals large differences in quality, systematic approach, depth and extent, clearly consistent with the lack of coherent harmonization of investigation and reporting approaches. Type of hazard, degree of impact and time elapsed since present are decisive for the collected volume. LPHC (low probability high consequences) disasters usually comprise most data and analytical activities, since they often are met with surprise and highlight the failure to integrate resilience into normal societal planning. During the last 50 years, several LPHC events in Sweden have functioned as alarm clocks and entailed major changes and improvements in government policies or legislations, safety management systems, risk assessments, response training, stakeholder communication, etc. Such an event occurred in January 2005 when Northern Europe was confronted with one of the most severe storms in modern history. Accidents that caused 24 fatalities occurred (17 in Sweden), several regions in UK and Germany were flooded and extensive areas of

  3. Safety upgrading activities against tsunami, earthquake, and severe accident at Hamaoka NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watanabe, Tetsuya; Wakunaga, Takao; Ishida, Takahisa

    2013-01-01

    As the lessons learned by the Fukushima Daiichi NPPs accident, Chubu Electric Power carried out the Emergency Safety Measures at Hamaoka NPPs immediately, and announced the plan for tsunami countermeasures including the construction of 18m-height tsunami protection wall in July 2011. Furthermore, the company announced the additional severe accident and tsunami countermeasures, and etc. in December 2012 and in April 2013, such as the installation of Filtered Containment Venting System and increasing the height of the tsunami protection wall from 18m to 22m. In this paper, we present major safety upgrading activities against tsunami, earthquake and severe accident at Hamaoka NPPs. (author)

  4. High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors Lessons Learned Applicable to the Next Generation Nuclear Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    J. M. Beck; L. F. Pincock

    2011-04-01

    The purpose of this report is to identify possible issues highlighted by these lessons learned that could apply to the NGNP in reducing technical risks commensurate with the current phase of design. Some of the lessons learned have been applied to the NGNP and documented in the Preconceptual Design Report. These are addressed in the background section of this document and include, for example, the decision to use TRISO fuel rather than BISO fuel used in the Peach Bottom reactor; the use of a reactor pressure vessel rather than prestressed concrete found in Fort St. Vrain; and the use of helium as a primary coolant rather than CO2. Other lessons learned, 68 in total, are documented in Sections 2 through 6 and will be applied, as appropriate, in advancing phases of design. The lessons learned are derived from both negative and positive outcomes from prior HTGR experiences. Lessons learned are grouped according to the plant, areas, systems, subsystems, and components defined in the NGNP Preconceptual Design Report, and subsequent NGNP project documents.

  5. Lessons Learned for Decommissioning Planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sohn, Wook; Kim, Young-gook; Kim, Hee-keun

    2015-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to introduce the U.S. nuclear industrial's some key lessons learned especially for decommissioning planning based on which well informed decommissioning planning can be carried out. For a successful decommissioning, it is crucial to carry out a well-organized decommissioning planning before the decommissioning starts. This paper discussed four key factors which should be decided or considered carefully during the decommissioning planning period with introduction of related decommissioning lessons learned of U.S. nuclear industry. Those factors which have been discussed in this paper include the end state of a site, the overall decommissioning strategy, the management of the spent fuels, and the spent fuel pool island. Among them, the end state of a site should be decided first as it directs the whole decommissioning processes. Then, decisions on the overall decommissioning strategy (DECON vs. SAFSTOR) and the management of the spent fuels (wet vs. dry) should follow. Finally, the spent fuel pool island should be given due consideration because its implementation will result in much cost saving. Hopefully, the results of this paper would provide useful inputs to performing the decommissioning planing for the Kori unit 1

  6. Reperes, the information magazine of the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety - IRSN, No. 12 - January 2012, Special issue Fukushima - First lessons from the accident; Reperes, le magazine d'information de l'Institut de radioprotection et de surete nucleaire - IRSN, No. 12 - janvier 2012, Special Fukushima - Premieres lecons de l'accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-01-15

    A first set of articles addresses the nuclear crisis in Japan (description of the accident, information mission sent by France, and support actions undertaken by France in Japan in the fields of education, civilian security, culture, sailing, media, dosimeters, robotics). A second set discusses lessons learned in terms of nuclear safety (complementary safety assessments, stress test in Gravelines), radiological consequences (impact on Japanese population, the Symbiose software, the Teleray network), crisis management, and research

  7. Lesson Study-Building Communities of Learning Among Pre-Service Science Teachers

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hamzeh, Fouada

    Lesson Study is a widely used pedagogical approach that has been used for decades in its country of origin, Japan. It is a teacher-led form of professional development that involves the collaborative efforts of teachers in co-planning and observing the teaching of a lesson within a unit for evidence that the teaching practices used help the learning process (Lewis, 2002a). The purpose of this research was to investigate if Lesson Study enables pre-service teachers to improve their own teaching in the area of science inquiry-based approaches. Also explored are the self-efficacy beliefs of one group of science pre-service teachers related to their experiences in Lesson Study. The research investigated four questions: 1) Does Lesson Study influence teacher preparation for inquiry-based instruction? 2) Does Lesson Study improve teacher efficacy? 3) Does Lesson Study impact teachers' aspiration to collaborate with colleagues? 4) What are the attitudes and perceptions of pre-service teachers to the Lesson Study idea in Science? The 12 participants completed two pre- and post-study surveys: STEBI- B, Science Teaching Efficacy Belief Instrument (Enochs & Riggs, 1990) and ASTQ, Attitude towards Science Teaching. Data sources included student teaching lesson observations, lesson debriefing notes and focus group interviews. Results from the STEBI-B show that all participants measured an increase in efficacy throughout the study. This study added to the body of research on teaching learning communities, professional development programs and teacher empowerment.

  8. The Fernald Closure Project: Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murphy, Cornelius M.; Carr, Dennis

    2008-01-01

    For nearly 37 years, the U.S. Department of Energy site at Fernald - near Cincinnati, Ohio - produced 230,000 metric tons (250,000 short tons) of high-purity, low-enriched uranium for the U.S. Defense Program, generating more than 5.4 million metric tons (6 million short tons) of liquid and solid waste as it carried out its Cold War mission. The facility was shut down in 1989 and clean up began in 1992, when Fluor won the contract to clean up the site. Cleaning up Fernald and returning it to the people of Ohio was a $4.4 billion mega environmental-remediation project that was completed in October 2006. Project evolved through four phases: - Conducting remedial-investigation studies to determine the extent of damage to the environment and groundwater at, and adjacent to, the production facilities; - Selecting cleanup criteria - final end states that had to be met that protect human health and the environment; - Selecting and implementing the remedial actions to meet the cleanup goals; - Executing the work in a safe, compliant and cost-effective manner. In the early stages of the project, there were strained relationships - in fact total distrust - between the local community and the DOE as a result of aquifer contamination and potential health effects to the workers and local residents. To engage citizens and interested stakeholders groups in the decision-making process, the DOE and Fluor developed a public-participation strategy to open the channels of communication with the various parties: site leadership, technical staff and regulators. This approach proved invaluable to the success of the project, which has become a model for future environmental remediation projects. This paper will summarize the history and shares lessons learned: the completion of the uranium-production mission to the implementation of the Records of Decision defining the cleanup standards and the remedies achieved. Lessons learned fall into ten categories: - Regulatory approach with end

  9. Lessons Learned from Past and Ongoing Construction Projects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tabatabai, Omid

    2011-01-01

    Full text of publication follows: The nuclear industry in the U.S. faced many construction quality and design issues in the 1970's and 1980's. In 1984, the NRC issued NUREG-1055, 'Improving Quality and the Assurance of Quality in the Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants,' to document the lessons learned from nuclear power plant (NPP) construction in the U.S. In recent years, several countries have begun either planning for or actually constructing new NPPs. For instance, in the U.S., the nuclear industry has submitted several combined license and design certification applications to the NRC for licensing reviews and approval to build 30+ new NPP units. Latest construction experience from countries that are currently building new NPPs indicate that these countries are dealing with challenges that are similar to those issues that caused major quality assurance problems, delays, or even termination of several projects in U.S. in the 70's and 80's. The U.S. NRC is pro-actively taking measures to improve its regulatory programs as well as construction oversight activities before new NPPs construction begin in the U.S. In late 2007, the U.S. NRC's Office of New Reactors established a construction experience program (ConE) to obtain and evaluate construction and operating experience events and to identify the lessons learned from these events. In March 2009, the NRC published an Office Instruction to provide a process for incorporating the lessons learned and insights from the design, construction, and operation of the international and domestic NPPs into the licensing reviews, inspections, and construction of new reactors in the U.S. Additionally, the ConE program staff developed a Web-enabled database to store, manage, and make construction experience information available to all NRC technical reviewers as well as inspectors. Because this database contains information from other countries' regulators that are considered

  10. The accidents due to ionizing radiations - the situation on a half century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-02-01

    This report takes stock updated in 2006, serious accidents occurred in the four sectors in civil, industrial, medical and military. Its goal is to provide an explanatory and critical review of the most representative accident that caused serious harm to victims. The report analyses for each accident, and whenever reliable data exist, the reasons for its occurrence, consequences for victims and possibly to the environment, remedial actions that have been made and medical treatments when they were innovative. Using a combination of accidents with common features, the report offers key lessons to be learned from these tragic events. This report is intended for practitioners of radiation protection in general and does not target particular experts in any technical or medical specialty. (N.C.)

  11. Kinesthetic Astronomy: Significant Upgrades to the Sky Time Lesson that Support Student Learning

    Science.gov (United States)

    Morrow, C. A.; Zawaski, M.

    2004-12-01

    This paper will report on a significant upgrade to the first in a series of innovative, experiential lessons we call Kinesthetic Astronomy. The Sky Time lesson reconnects students with the astronomical meaning of the day, year, and seasons. Like all Kinesthetic Astronomy lessons, it teaches basic astronomical concepts through choreographed bodily movements and positions that provide educational sensory experiences. They are intended for sixth graders up through adult learners in both formal and informal educational settings. They emphasize astronomical concepts and phenomenon that people can readily encounter in their "everyday" lives such as time, seasons, and sky motions of the Sun, Moon, stars, and planets. Kinesthetic Astronomy lesson plans are fully aligned with national science education standards, both in content and instructional practice. Our lessons offer a complete learning cycle with written assessment opportunities now embedded throughout the lesson. We have substantially strengthened the written assessment options for the Sky Time lesson to help students translate their kinesthetic and visual learning into the verbal-linguistic and mathematical-logical realms of expression. Field testing with non-science undergraduates, middle school science teachers and students, Junior Girl Scouts, museum education staff, and outdoor educators has been providing evidence that Kinesthetic Astronomy techniques allow learners to achieve a good grasp of concepts that are much more difficult to learn in more conventional ways such as via textbooks or even computer animation. Field testing of the Sky Time lesson has also led us to significant changes from the previous version to support student learning. We will report on the nature of these changes.

  12. Lessons learned from the NRU vessel leak repair and return to service projects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heeney, P.; Turcotte, J.

    2011-01-01

    In May 2009 the National Research Universal (NRU) reactor was shut down due to a small leak detected from the reactor vessel into the annulus surrounding the reactor. What ensued was a challenging, yet successful, 15 month long Repair and Return to Service Outage. This Repair and Return to Service Outage presented many first-of-a-kind challenges that provide learning opportunities which have been incorporated into subsequent planned outages. These lessons learned are invaluable tools to be used in the planning and execution of future outages. Following the repair of the NRU vessel, AECL was required to conduct annual inspections of the vessel wall. These inspections require an annual Extended Outage (up to 4 weeks in length). A planned Extended Outage was conducted in May/June 2011 and provided an opportunity to implement some of the lessons learned during the Repair and Return to Service Outage. Lessons learned from that Extended Outage have been incorporated in the subsequent monthly maintenance outages, with lessons learned sessions being held after each outage to ensure that the execution of outages is constantly improving. (author)

  13. SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUES RAISED BY THE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT AND IMPROVEMENTS SUGGESTED

    OpenAIRE

    SONG, JIN HO; KIM, TAE WOON

    2014-01-01

    This paper revisits the Fukushima accident to draw lessons in the aspect of nuclear safety considering the fact that the Fukushima accident resulted in core damage for three nuclear power plants simultaneously and that there is a high possibility of a failure of the integrity of reactor vessel and primary containment vessel. A brief review on the accident progression at Fukushima nuclear power plants is discussed to highlight the nature and characteristic of the event. As the severe accide...

  14. Interrogations to Learn from the Fukushima Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gisquet, E.; Jeffroy, F.

    2016-01-01

    On March 11, 2011, an earthquake in eastern Japan caused the reactors in operation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) to trip. The emergency generators started and then suddenly failed following the tsunami. The cooling water injection system no longer worked. Suddenly plunged into total darkness, the operators had to manage the accident. Starting from the official reports and testimonies on the Fukushima accident, IRSN has conducted a survey “Human and Organizational Factors Perspective on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident.” Four years after the accident, however, as more witness accounts become available, IRSN feels it useful to return to the human and organizational response to the accident inside the NPP itself. To what extent can the participants act and coordinate their actions when faced with such a dramatic situation? To what degree did their actions contribute to the disaster? Rather than looking at the causes of the accident, this study examines the unfolding of the crisis, particularly in the most urgent early stages, and draws lessons for safety culture from the decisions and actions of key actors. The main results would be presented in three key areas: 1. How to make sense of the situation? People had to make sense of what happened and create new indicators. Since instruments and controls, as well as many communication technologies, were knocked out by the tsunami, all the standard means of determining the status of the reactors were impossible. Although they were under normal circumstances almost completely dependent on these indicators, and although (or because) their lives were most directly at risk, the operators managed this uncertainty through various means that will be successively presented. 2. What are the challenges for the emergency structure? The Emergency Response Center (ERC) operations team was responsible for being in contact with the operators in the control rooms and providing them technical support as needed. The ERC

  15. Lessons Learned from Developing a Patient Engagement Panel: An OCHIN Report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arkind, Jill; Likumahuwa-Ackman, Sonja; Warren, Nate; Dickerson, Kay; Robbins, Lynn; Norman, Kathy; DeVoe, Jennifer E

    2015-01-01

    There is renewed interest in patient engagement in clinical and research settings, creating a need for documenting and publishing lessons learned from efforts to meaningfully engage patients. This article describes early lessons learned from the development of OCHIN's Patient Engagement Panel (PEP). OCHIN supports a national network of more than 300 community health centers (CHCs) and other primary care settings that serve over 1.5 million patients annually across nearly 20 states. The PEP was conceived in 2009 to harness the CHC tradition of patient engagement in this new era of patient-centered outcomes research and to ensure that patients were engaged throughout the life cycle of our research projects, from conception to dissemination. Developed by clinicians and researchers within our practice-based research network, recruitment of patients to serve as PEP members began in early 2012. The PEP currently has a membership of 18 patients from 3 states. Over the past 24 months, the PEP has been involved with 12 projects. We describe developing the PEP and challenges and lessons learned (eg, recruitment, funding model, creating value for patient partners, compensation). These lessons learned are relevant not only for research but also for patient engagement in quality improvement efforts and other clinical initiatives. © Copyright 2015 by the American Board of Family Medicine.

  16. The roles of lesson study in the development of mathematics learning instrument based on learning trajectory

    Science.gov (United States)

    Misnasanti; Dien, C. A.; Azizah, F.

    2018-03-01

    This study is aimed to describe Lesson Study (LS) activity and its roles in the development of mathematics learning instruments based on Learning Trajectory (LT). This study is a narrative study of teacher’s experiences in joining LS activity. Data collecting in this study will use three methods such as observation, documentations, and deep interview. The collected data will be analyzed with Milles and Huberman’s model that consists of reduction, display, and verification. The study result shows that through LS activity, teachers know more about how students think. Teachers also can revise their mathematics learning instrument in the form of lesson plan. It means that LS activity is important to make a better learning instruments and focus on how student learn not on how teacher teach.

  17. Defining a risk-informed framework for whole-of-government lessons learned: A Canadian perspective.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Friesen, Shaye K; Kelsey, Shelley; Legere, J A Jim

    Lessons learned play an important role in emergency management (EM) and organizational agility. Virtually all aspects of EM can derive benefit from a lessons learned program. From major security events to exercises, exploiting and applying lessons learned and "best practices" is critical to organizational resilience and adaptiveness. A robust lessons learned process and methodology provides an evidence base with which to inform decisions, guide plans, strengthen mitigation strategies, and assist in developing tools for operations. The Canadian Safety and Security Program recently supported a project to define a comprehensive framework that would allow public safety and security partners to regularly share event response best practices, and prioritize recommendations originating from after action reviews. This framework consists of several inter-locking elements: a comprehensive literature review/environmental scan of international programs; a survey to collect data from end users and management; the development of a taxonomy for organizing and structuring information; a risk-informed methodology for selecting, prioritizing, and following through on recommendations; and standardized templates and tools for tracking recommendations and ensuring implementation. This article discusses the efforts of the project team, which provided "best practice" advice and analytical support to ensure that a systematic approach to lessons learned was taken by the federal community to improve prevention, preparedness, and response activities. It posits an approach by which one might design a systematic process for information sharing and event response coordination-an approach that will assist federal departments to institutionalize a cross-government lessons learned program.

  18. JANSI’s Activities for Reflecting Lessons Learned from Fukushima Daiichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kugo, Akihide

    2014-01-01

    Conclusion: JANSI will continue to lay the groundwork for preventing an accident like the Fukushima Daiichi from ever happening again. JANSI will develop the system to provide an opportunity of “awareness” for operators to enhance nuclear safety and to follow-up their efforts continuously

  19. Rock slopes and reservoirs - lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, D.P.

    1999-01-01

    Lessons learned about slope stability in the course of four decades of monitoring, and in some cases stabilizing, slopes along British Columbia's hydroelectric reservoirs are discussed. The lessons are illustrated by short case histories of some of the more important slopes such as Little Chief Slide, Dutchman's Ridge, Downie Slide, Checkerboard Creek and Wahleach. Information derived from the monitoring and other investigations are compared with early interpretations of geology and slope performance. The comparison serves as an indicator of progress in slope stability determination and as a measure of the value of accumulated experience in terms of the potential consequences to safety and cost savings over the long life-span of hydroelectric projects.14 refs., 2 tabs., 15 figs

  20. Scheduling lessons learned from the Autonomous Power System

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ringer, Mark J.

    1992-01-01

    The Autonomous Power System (APS) project at NASA LeRC is designed to demonstrate the applications of integrated intelligent diagnosis, control, and scheduling techniques to space power distribution systems. The project consists of three elements: the Autonomous Power Expert System (APEX) for Fault Diagnosis, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR); the Autonomous Intelligent Power Scheduler (AIPS) to efficiently assign activities start times and resources; and power hardware (Brassboard) to emulate a space-based power system. The AIPS scheduler was tested within the APS system. This scheduler is able to efficiently assign available power to the requesting activities and share this information with other software agents within the APS system in order to implement the generated schedule. The AIPS scheduler is also able to cooperatively recover from fault situations by rescheduling the affected loads on the Brassboard in conjunction with the APEX FDIR system. AIPS served as a learning tool and an initial scheduling testbed for the integration of FDIR and automated scheduling systems. Many lessons were learned from the AIPS scheduler and are now being integrated into a new scheduler called SCRAP (Scheduler for Continuous Resource Allocation and Planning). This paper will service three purposes: an overview of the AIPS implementation, lessons learned from the AIPS scheduler, and a brief section on how these lessons are being applied to the new SCRAP scheduler.

  1. [Development and effect analysis of web-based instruction program to prevent elementary school students from safety accidents].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chung, Eun-Soon; Jeong, Ihn-Sook; Song, Mi-Gyoung

    2004-06-01

    This study was aimed to develop a WBI(Web Based Instruction) program on safety for 3rd grade elementary school students and to test the effects of it. The WBI program was developed using Macromedia flash MX, Adobe Illustrator 10.0 and Adobe Photoshop 7.0. The web site was http://www.safeschool.co.kr. The effect of it was tested from Mar 24, to Apr 30, 2003. The subjects were 144 students enrolled in the 3rd grade of an elementary school in Gyungju. The experimental group received the WBI program lessons while each control group received textbook-based lessons with visual presenters and maps, 3 times. Data was analyzed with descriptive statistics, and chi2 test, t-test, and repeated measure ANOVA. First, the WBI group reported a longer effect on knowledge and practice of accident prevention than the textbook-based lessons, indicating that the WBI is more effective. Second, the WBI group was better motivated to learn the accident prevention lessons, showing that the WBI is effective. As a result, the WBI group had total longer effects on knowledge, practice and motivation of accident prevention than the textbook-based instruction. We recommend that this WBI program be used in each class to provide more effective safety instruction in elementary schools.

  2. Safety regulations regarding to accident monitoring and accident sampling at Russian NPPs with VVER type reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sharafutdinov, Rachet; Lankin, Michail; Kharitonova, Nataliya

    2014-01-01

    The paper describes a tendency by development of regulatory document requirements related to accident monitoring and accident sampling at Russia's NPPs. Lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident pointed at the importance and necessary to carry out an additional safety check at Russia's nuclear power plants in the preparedness for management of severe accidents at NPPs. Planned measures for improvement of severe accidents management include development and implementation of the accident instrumentation systems, providing, monitoring, management and storage of information in a severe accident conditions. The draft of Safety Guidelines <accident monitoring system of nuclear power plants with VVER reactors' prepared by Scientific and Engineering Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SEC NRS) established the main criteria for accident monitoring instrumentation that can monitor relevant plant parameters in the reactor and inside containment during and after a severe accident in nuclear power plants. Development of these safety guidelines is in line with the recommendations of IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety in response to the Fukushima Daiichi event and recommendations of the IAEA Nuclear Energy series Report <<Accident Monitoring Systems for Nuclear Power Plants' (Draft V 2.7). The paper presents the principles, which are used as the basis for selection of plant parameters for accident monitoring and for establishing of accident monitoring instrumentation. The recommendations to the accident sampling system capable to obtain the representative reactor coolant and containment air and fluid samples that support accurate analytical results for the parameters of interest are considered. The radiological and chemistry parameters to be monitored for primary coolant and sump and for containment air are specified. (author)

  3. The Joint Lessons Learned System and Interoperability

    Science.gov (United States)

    1989-06-02

    Learned: 1988-1989 As mentioned in the introduction to this chaoter, the Organizacion of the JcinC Chiefs cf Staff .OJCS) ueren significant transformatioi...Organization and Functions Manual . Washington, D.C.: HQDA, Office of the Deputy Chief 0f Staff for Operations and Plans, June 1984. ’..S. Army. Concept...U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) User’s Manual . Orlando, Florida: University of Central Florida, Institute

  4. SRS SLUDGE BATCH QUALIFICATION AND PROCESSING; HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND LESSONS LEARNED

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cercy, M.; Peeler, D.; Stone, M.

    2013-09-25

    This report provides a historical overview and lessons learned associated with the SRS sludge batch (SB) qualification and processing programs. The report covers the framework of the requirements for waste form acceptance, the DWPF Glass Product Control Program (GPCP), waste feed acceptance, examples of how the program complies with the specifications, an overview of the Startup Program, and a summary of continuous improvements and lessons learned. The report includes a bibliography of previous reports and briefings on the topic.

  5. Lessons Learned from the Private Sector

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robichaud, Robert J [National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Golden, CO (United States)

    2017-09-07

    This session is focused on lessons learned from private sector energy projects that could be applied to the federal sector. This presentation tees up the subsequent presentations by outlining the differences between private and federal sectors in objectives, metrics for determining success, funding resources/mechanisms, payback and ROI evaluation, risk tolerance/aversion, new technology adoption perspectives, and contracting mechanisms.

  6. MODIS Science Algorithms and Data Systems Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wolfe, Robert E.; Ridgway, Bill L.; Patt, Fred S.; Masuoka, Edward J.

    2009-01-01

    For almost 10 years, standard global products from NASA's Earth Observing System s (EOS) two Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) sensors are being used world-wide for earth science research and applications. This paper discusses the lessons learned in developing the science algorithms and the data systems needed to produce these high quality data products for the earth sciences community. Strong science team leadership and communication, an evolvable and scalable data system, and central coordination of QA and validation activities enabled the data system to grow by two orders of magnitude from the initial at-launch system to the current system able to reprocess data from both the Terra and Aqua missions in less than a year. Many of the lessons learned from MODIS are already being applied to follow-on missions.

  7. Thyroid side effects prophylaxis in front of nuclear power plant accidents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Agopiantz, Mikaël; Elhanbali, Ouifak; Demore, Béatrice; Cuny, Thomas; Demarquet, Léa; Ndiaye, Cumba; Barbe, Françoise; Brunaud, Laurent; Weryha, Georges; Klein, Marc

    2016-02-01

    The better knowledge of the mechanisms of nuclear incidents and lessons learned from accidents in the recent past to improve the effectiveness of measures taken following a nuclear accident exposure to fallout of radioactive iodine isotopes. Thus, immediate, passive measures, such as containment, and stopping consumption of contaminated products are paramount. The earliest possible administration of stable iodine as potassium iodide (KI) reduces significantly (up to 90% if taken at the same time of the accident) thyroid radioactive contamination. These tablets should be given in priority to children and pregnant women. The side effects are minor. KI is not recommended for persons aged over 60 years, or for adults suffering from cardiovascular disorders. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.

  8. Generation IV reactors and the ASTRID prototype: lessons from the Fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gauche, F.

    2012-01-01

    In France, the ASTRID prototype is an industrial demonstrator of a sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor (SFR), fulfilling the criteria for Generation IV reactors. ASTRID will meet safety requirements as stringent as for third generation reactors, and it takes into account lessons from the Fukushima accident. The objectives are to reinforce the robustness of the safety demonstration for all safety functions. ASTRID will feature an innovative core with a negative sodium void coefficient, it will take advantage of the large thermal inertia of SFR for decay heat removal, and will provide for a design either eliminating the sodium-water reaction, or guaranteeing no consequences for safety in case such reaction would take place. (author)

  9. Two Approaches to Distance Education: Lessons Learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sedlak, Robert A.; Cartwright, G. Phillip

    1997-01-01

    Outlines lessons learned by the University of Wisconsin-Stout in implementing two distance education programs, a technology program using interactive television and a hospitality program using Lotus Notes to deliver courses. Topics discussed include program concept vs. technology as stimulus for innovation, program planning/administration,…

  10. International Conference 'Fifteen Years after the Chornobyl Accident. Lessons Learned'. Abstracts Learning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon

    2001-01-01

    The main aims of the conference are: for the scientific community in the most affected countries, to develop a common vision with the international scientific community with regard to the consequences of the Chornobyl disaster (in ecological, medical, social and other areas 15 years post-Chornobyl); to drawing conclusions and providing recommendations to allow decision makers at both national and international level to take further steps to mitigate the effects of the disaster. For the results of the Conference, to represent a common international understanding of the current situation resulting from the accident and the future initiatives which will be necessary to counter its effects

  11. Lessons-Learned from an Event during Overhaul

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jitae [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-05-15

    The event frequency, also including portion of human errors, has been decreasing compared to last ten years. However, events due to human errors during overhaul occur every year. From analyzed results for human-related events during overhaul, similar problems were identified. And organizational and safety cultural factors were also identified. On the other hand, another event during overhaul is analyzed and Lessons-Learned is drawn in an aspect of the operators' situation awareness. There was an event during overhaul and the analyzed results drawn Lessons-Learned in the aspect of the operators' situation awareness. From the analysis, several alarms and variation of plant parameters during overhaul can occur due to various maintenance works and tests. And in the aspect of the situation awareness, operators can miss, neglect, or not recognize the abnormal situation due to other maintenance activities occurring simultaneously. Therefore, countermeasures such as operator education or training, development of operator support systems, and further researches should be necessary to cope with these problems.

  12. Lessons-Learned from an Event during Overhaul

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jitae

    2013-01-01

    The event frequency, also including portion of human errors, has been decreasing compared to last ten years. However, events due to human errors during overhaul occur every year. From analyzed results for human-related events during overhaul, similar problems were identified. And organizational and safety cultural factors were also identified. On the other hand, another event during overhaul is analyzed and Lessons-Learned is drawn in an aspect of the operators' situation awareness. There was an event during overhaul and the analyzed results drawn Lessons-Learned in the aspect of the operators' situation awareness. From the analysis, several alarms and variation of plant parameters during overhaul can occur due to various maintenance works and tests. And in the aspect of the situation awareness, operators can miss, neglect, or not recognize the abnormal situation due to other maintenance activities occurring simultaneously. Therefore, countermeasures such as operator education or training, development of operator support systems, and further researches should be necessary to cope with these problems

  13. Learning from Lessons: studying the structure and construction of mathematics teacher knowledge in Australia, China and Germany

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chan, Man Ching Esther; Clarke, David J.; Clarke, Doug M.; Roche, Anne; Cao, Yiming; Peter-Koop, Andrea

    2018-03-01

    The major premise of this project is that teachers learn from the act of teaching a lesson. Rather than asking "What must a teacher already know in order to practice effectively?", this project asks "What might a teacher learn through their activities in the classroom and how might this learning be optimised?" In this project, controlled conditions are created utilising purposefully designed and trialled lesson plans to investigate the process of teacher knowledge construction, with teacher selective attention proposed as a key mediating variable. In order to investigate teacher learning through classroom practice, the project addresses the following questions: To what classroom objects, actions and events do teachers attend and with what consequence for their learning? Do teachers in different countries attend to different classroom events and consequently derive different learning benefits from teaching a lesson? This international project combines focused case studies with an online survey of mathematics teachers' selective attention and consequent learning in Australia, China and Germany. Data include the teacher's adaptation of a pre-designed lesson, the teacher's actions during the lesson, the teacher's reflective thoughts about the lesson and, most importantly, the consequences for the planning and delivery of a second lesson. The combination of fine-grained, culturally situated case studies and large-scale online survey provides mutually informing benefits from each research approach. The research design, so constituted, offers the means to a new and scalable vision of teacher learning and its promotion.

  14. Shared Learning and the Drive to Improve Patient Safety: Lessons Learned from the Pittsburgh Regional Healthcare Initiative

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Sirio, Carl A; Keyser, Donna J; Norman, Heidi; Weber, Robert J; Muto, Carlene A

    2005-01-01

    Based on lessons learned through implementation of the Pittsburgh Regional Healthcare Initiative's region-wide shared learning model, we have identified the environmental, cultural, and infrastructure...

  15. Lessons Learned from Developing SAWA: A Situation Awareness Assistant

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Matheus, Christopher J; Kokar, Mieczyslaw M; Letkowski, Jerzy J; Call, Catherine; Baclawski, Kenneth; Hinman, Michael; Salerno, John; Boulware, Douglas

    2005-01-01

    .... During the process of its development several lessons were learned about advantages and limitations of certain approaches, techniques and technologies as they are applied to situation awareness...

  16. Analysis of Three Mile Island - Unit 2 accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-07-01

    The Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) of the Electric Power Research Institute is analyzing the Three Mile Island-2 accident. An early result of this analysis was a brief narrative summary, issued in mid May 1979. The present report contains a revised version of that narrative summary, a highly detailed sequence of events, a standard reference list, a list of abbreviations and acronyms, and several appendices. The appendices serve either to describe plant features which are pertinent to the understanding of the sequence of events, or indicate how certain inferences and conclusions in the report were reached. Supplementing the appendices contained herein, additional appendices are in preparation; these will be issued when available (e.g., the appendices Hydrogen Phenomena and Operator Actions during Initial Transient will follow later). Also in preparation is a matrix of equipment and systems actions during the accident. This report together with future supplements and a separate Core Damage Assessment report, will embody the principal results of that phase of NSAC work which is devoted to learning and understanding what happened during the accident. Subsequent phases will concentrate on causes, lessons learned and generic remedial or preventive measures which may be appropriate

  17. Analysis of Three Mile Island-Unit 2 accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-07-01

    The Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) of the Electic Power Research Institute is analyzing the Three Mile Island-2 accident. An early result of this analysis was a brief narrative summary, issued in mid-May 1979. The present report contains a revised version of that narrative summary, a highly detailed sequence of events, a standard reference list, a list of abbreviations and acronyms, and several appendices. The appendices serve either to describe plant features which are pertinent to the understanding of the sequence of events, or indicate how certain inferences and conclusions in the report were reached. Supplementing the appendices contained herein, additional appendices are in preparation; these will be issued when available (e.g., the appendices Hydrogen Phenomena and Operator Actions duing Initial Transient will follow later). Also in preparation is a matrix of equipment and systems actions during the accident. This report together with future supplements and a separate Core Damage Assessment report, will embody the principal results of that phase of NSAC's work which is devoted to learning and understanding what happened during the accident. Subsequent phases will concentrate on causes, lessons learned and generic remedial or preventive measures which may be appropriate

  18. Refueling Infrastructure for Alternative Fuel Vehicles: Lessons Learned for Hydrogen; Workshop Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Melaina, M. W.; McQueen, S.; Brinch, J.

    2008-07-01

    DOE sponsored the Refueling Infrastructure for Alternative Fuel Vehicles: Lessons Learned for Hydrogen workshop to understand how lessons from past experiences can inform future efforts to commercialize hydrogen vehicles. This report contains the proceedings from the workshop.

  19. Improving IT Project Portfolio Management: Lessons Learned

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Pedersen, Keld

    2013-01-01

    The IT PPM improvement process is not well understood, and our knowledge about what makes IT PPM improvement succeed or fail is not well developed. This article presents lessons learned from organizations trying to improve their IT PPM practice. Based on this research IT PPM practitioners are adv...

  20. Core fusion accidents in nuclear power reactors. Knowledge review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bentaib, Ahmed; Bonneville, Herve; Clement, Bernard; Cranga, Michel; Fichot, Florian; Koundy, Vincent; Meignen, Renaud; Corenwinder, Francois; Leteinturier, Denis; Monroig, Frederique; Nahas, Georges; Pichereau, Frederique; Van-Dorsselaere, Jean-Pierre; Cenerino, Gerard; Jacquemain, Didier; Raimond, Emmanuel; Ducros, Gerard; Journeau, Christophe; Magallon, Daniel; Seiler, Jean-Marie; Tourniaire, Bruno

    2013-01-01

    This reference document proposes a large and detailed review of severe core fusion accidents occurring in nuclear power reactors. It aims at presenting the scientific aspects of these accidents, a review of knowledge and research perspectives on this issue. After having recalled design and operation principles and safety principles for reactors operating in France, and the main studied and envisaged accident scenarios for the management of severe accidents in French PWRs, the authors describe the physical phenomena occurring during a core fusion accident, in the reactor vessel and in the containment building, their sequence and means to mitigate their effects: development of the accident within the reactor vessel, phenomena able to result in an early failure of the containment building, phenomena able to result in a delayed failure with the corium-concrete interaction, corium retention and cooling in and out of the vessel, release of fission products. They address the behaviour of containment buildings during such an accident (sizing situations, mechanical behaviour, bypasses). They review and discuss lessons learned from accidents (Three Mile Island and Chernobyl) and simulation tests (Phebus-PF). A last chapter gives an overview of software and approaches for the numerical simulation of a core fusion accident

  1. From the Games Industry: Ten Lessons for Game-Based Learning

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hollins, Paul; Whitton, Nicola

    2011-01-01

    This paper draws on lessons learned from the development process of the entertainment games industry and discusses how they can be applied to the field of game-based learning. This paper examines policy makers and those wishing to commission or develop games for learning and highlights potential opportunities as well as pitfalls. The paper focuses…

  2. Implications of the Chernobyl accident for Protective Action Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, Charles W.; Pepper, Andrea J.

    1989-01-01

    The accident that occurred at Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on April 26, 1986, was the worst accident in the history of nuclear power. Thirty-one workers and emergency personnel died and more than 200 site personnel were hospitalized as a result of this event Approximately 135,000 persons within 30 km around the reactor were evacuated, and radioactive debris was spread throughout the Northern Hemisphere. There was much public concern generated around the world, and an increased risk of fatal cancel in the world's population is possible as a result of exposure to Chernobyl fallout (USNRC, 1987a). Since the time the Chernobyl accident occurred, many authoritative studies have been published, e.g. USNRC, 1987a. In these studies, differences in design between commercial U.S. reactors and the RBMK pressure-tube reactor at Chernobyl have been emphasized, e.g. USNRC, 1987b. While significant differences in design do exist between these reactors, we believe there are still significant lessons to be learned from the Chernobyl accident for U.S. reactors. The purpose of this paper is to summarize some of the major lessons to be learned related to protective action guidance. The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) has identified three areas related to protective action guidance for food and water where implications can be drawn from Chernobyl for the U.S.: (1) uniformity of Protective Action Guides (PAGs), (2) incompleteness of U.S. PAGs, and (3) international communications. Following the Chernobyl accident, a variety of protective actions were undertaken by various nations. Furthermore, these actions were initiated, modified, and terminated at different times in different places and, in some instances, were applied on a local or regional basis rather than a national basis (Goldman et al., 1987). One result of this differing application of PAGs was the generation of considerable confusion among decision

  3. Recovery operations in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    Much progress has been made over the last decade in the field of emergency planning and preparedness, including the development of guidance, criteria, training programmes, regulations and comprehensive plans in the support of nuclear facilities. To provide a forum for international review and discussion of actual experiences gained and lessons learned from the different aspects of recovery techniques and operations in response to serious accidents at nuclear facilities and accidents associated with radioactive materials, the IAEA organized the International Symposium on Recovery Operations in the Event of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The symposium was held from 6 to 10 November 1989 in Vienna, Austria, and was attended by over 250 experts from 35 Member State and 7 international organizations. Although the prime focus was on on-site and off-site recovery from nuclear reactor accidents and on recovery from radiological accidents unrelated to nuclear power plants, development of emergency planning and preparedness resources was covered as well. From the experiences reported, lessons learned were identified. While further work remains to be done to improve concepts, plans, materials, communications and mechanisms to assemble quickly all the special resources needed in the event of an accident, there was general agreement that worldwide preparations to handle any possible future radiological emergencies had vastly improved. A special feature of the symposium programme was the inclusion of a full session on an accident involving a chemical explosion in a high level waste tank a a plutonium extraction plant in the Southern Urals in the USSR in 1957. Information was presented on the radioactive release, its dissemination and deposition, the resultant radiation situation, dose estimates, health effects follow-up, and the rehabilitation of contaminated land. This volume contains the full text of the 49 papers presented at the symposium together with a

  4. Lessons Learned from Environmental Remediation Programmes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-03-15

    Several remediation projects have been developed to date, and experience with these projects has been accumulated. Lessons learned span from non-technical to technical aspects, and need to be shared with those who are beginning or are facing the challenge to implement environmental remediation works. This publication reviews some of these lessons. The key role of policy and strategies at the national level in framing the conditions in which remediation projects are to be developed and decisions made is emphasized. Following policy matters, this publication pays attention to the importance of social aspects and the requirement for fairness in decisions to be made, something that can only be achieved with the involvement of a broad range of interested parties in the decision making process. The publication also reviews the funding of remediation projects, planning, contracting, cost estimates and procurement, and issues related to long term stewardship. Lessons learned regarding technical aspects of remediation projects are reviewed. Techniques such as the application of cover systems and soil remediation (electrokinetics, phytoremediation, soil flushing, and solidification and stabilization techniques) are analysed with respect to performance and cost. After discussing soil remediation, the publication covers issues associated with water treatment, where techniques such as ‘pump and treat’ and the application of permeable barriers are reviewed. Subsequently, there is a section dedicated to reviewing briefly the lessons learned in the remediation of uranium mining and processing sites. Many of these sites throughout the world have become orphaned, and are waiting for remediation. The publication notes that little progress has been made in the management of some of these sites, particularly in the understanding of associated environmental and health risks, and the ability to apply prediction to future environmental and health standards. The publication concludes

  5. Lessons Learned from Environmental Remediation Programmes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    Several remediation projects have been developed to date, and experience with these projects has been accumulated. Lessons learned span from non-technical to technical aspects, and need to be shared with those who are beginning or are facing the challenge to implement environmental remediation works. This publication reviews some of these lessons. The key role of policy and strategies at the national level in framing the conditions in which remediation projects are to be developed and decisions made is emphasized. Following policy matters, this publication pays attention to the importance of social aspects and the requirement for fairness in decisions to be made, something that can only be achieved with the involvement of a broad range of interested parties in the decision making process. The publication also reviews the funding of remediation projects, planning, contracting, cost estimates and procurement, and issues related to long term stewardship. Lessons learned regarding technical aspects of remediation projects are reviewed. Techniques such as the application of cover systems and soil remediation (electrokinetics, phytoremediation, soil flushing, and solidification and stabilization techniques) are analysed with respect to performance and cost. After discussing soil remediation, the publication covers issues associated with water treatment, where techniques such as ‘pump and treat’ and the application of permeable barriers are reviewed. Subsequently, there is a section dedicated to reviewing briefly the lessons learned in the remediation of uranium mining and processing sites. Many of these sites throughout the world have become orphaned, and are waiting for remediation. The publication notes that little progress has been made in the management of some of these sites, particularly in the understanding of associated environmental and health risks, and the ability to apply prediction to future environmental and health standards. The publication concludes

  6. Bringing authentic service learning to the classroom: benefits and lessons learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chamberlain, Leslie C.

    2016-06-01

    Project-based learning, which has gained significant attention within K-12 education, provides rich hands-on experiences for students. Bringing an element of service to the projects allow students to engage in a local or global community, providing an abundance of benefits to the students’ learning. For example, service projects build confidence, increase motivation, and exercise problem-solving and communication skills in addition to developing a deep understanding of content. I will present lessons I have learned through four years of providing service learning opportunities in my classroom. I share ideas for astronomy projects, tips for connecting and listening to a community, and helpful guidelines to hold students accountable in order to ensure a productive and educational project.

  7. Lessons learned from existing biomass power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wiltsee, G.

    2000-02-24

    This report includes summary information on 20 biomass power plants, which represent some of the leaders in the industry. In each category an effort is made to identify plants that illustrate particular points. The project experiences described capture some important lessons learned that lead in the direction of an improved biomass power industry.

  8. Pedagogy and second language learning: Lessons learned from Intensive French

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Joan Netten

    2005-12-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Through research and classroom observation undertaken while conceptualizing and implementing the Intensive French program in Canada, many new insights were gained into the development of communication skills in a classroom situation. Five lessons learned about the development of spontaneous oral communication are presented in this article: the ineffectiveness of core French in primary school; the minimum number of intensive hours necessary to develop spontaneous oral communication; the need to develop implicit competence rather than explicit knowledge; the distinction between accuracy as knowledge and accuracy as skill; and the importance of teaching strategies focusing on language use. These lessons have implications for our understanding of how oral competence in an L2 develops and for the improvement of communicative language pedagogy.

  9. The learning teacher in a collaborative lesson study team within the context of mathematics

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Goei, Sui Lin; Verhoef, Neeltje Cornelia

    2015-01-01

    This paper summarises results of two studies on teachers’ learning when participating in a collaborative Lesson Study team within the context of mathematics teaching. In study one, Lesson Study was used in the classic way of preparing, designing, executing and reflecting on the research lesson.

  10. The radiological accident in Goiania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    The report is based on a meeting held in Brazil, 19-27 July 1988. It describes how the accident occurred, examines how it was managed and how its consequences were contained, and sets out observations and recommendations based upon lessons learned. Many people received large doses of radiation, due to both external and internal exposure. Four of the casualties ultimately died and 28 people suffered radiation burns. Residences and public places were contaminated. The decontamination necessitated the demolition of seven residences and various other buildings, and the removal of the topsoil from large areas. In total 3,500 m 3 of radioactive waste was generated. Refs, figs, tabs and photographs

  11. Accidents in nuclear facilities: classification, incidence and impact

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Galicia A, J.; Paredes G, L. C.

    2012-10-01

    A general analysis of the 146 accidents reported officially in nuclear facilities from 1945 to 2012 is presented, among them some took place in: power or research nuclear reactors, critical and subcritical nuclear assemblies, handling of nuclear materials inside laboratories belonging to institutes or universities, in radiochemistry industrial plants and nuclear fuel factories. In form graph the incidence of these accidents is illustrated classified for; category, decades, geographical localization, country classification before the OECD, failure type, and the immediate or later victims. On the other hand, the main learned lessons of the nuclear accidents of Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima are stood out, among those that highlight; the human factors, the necessity of designs more innovative and major technology for the operation, control and surveillance of the nuclear facilities, to increase the criterions of nuclear, radiological and physics safety applied to these facilities, the necessity to carry out probabilistic analysis of safety more detailed for cases of not very probable accidents and their impact, to revalue the selection criterions of the sites for nuclear locations, the methodology of post-accident sites recovery and major instrumentation for parameters evaluation and the radiological monitoring among others. (Author)

  12. Studies of severe accidents in light-water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    From 10 to 12 November 1986 some 80 delegates met under the auspices of the CEC working group on the safety of light-water reactors. The participants from EC Member States were joined by colleagues from Sweden, Finland and the USA and met to discuss the subject of severe accidents in LWRs. Although this seminar had been planned well before Chernobyl, the ''severe-accident-that-really-happened'' made its mark on the seminar. The four main seminar topics were: (i) high source-term accident sequences identified in PSAs, (ii) containment performance, (iii) mitigation of core melt consequences, (iv) severe accident management in LWRs. In addition to the final panel discussion there was also a separate panel discussion on lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident. These proceedings include the papers presented during the seminar and they are arranged following the seminar programme outline. The presentations and discussions of the two panels are not included in the proceedings. The general conclusions and directions following from these two panels were, however, considered in a seminar review paper which was published in the March 1987 issue of Nuclear Engineering International

  13. Licence renewal in the United States - enhancing the process through lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walters, D.J.

    2000-01-01

    The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is the Washington based policy organisation representing the broad and varied interests of the diverse nuclear energy industry. It comprises nearly 300 corporate members in 15 countries with a budget last year of about USD 26.5 million. It has been working for 10 years with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), colleagues in the industry and others to demonstrate that license renewal is a safe and workable process. The first renewed license was issued on 24 March to BGE for the the Calvert Cliffs plant. One month later the NRC issued the renewed license for the Ocoenne plant. By 'Enhancing the process through lessons learned', we mean reducing the uncertainty in the license renewal process. This is achieved through lessons learned from the net wave of applicants and the reviews of the Calvert Cliffs and Ocoenne applications. Three areas will be covered: - Incentive for minimising uncertainty as industry interest in license renewal is growing dramatically. - Rigorous reviews by Nuclear Regulatory Commission assure continued safety: process put in place by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to assure safety throughout the license renewal term, specifically areas where the lessons learned suggest improvements can be made. - Lessons learned have identified enhancements to the process: numerous benefits associated with renewal of nuclear power plant licenses for consumers of electricity, the environment, the nuclear operating companies and the nation. (author)

  14. Hydrogen Fuel Cell Analysis: Lessons Learned from Stationary Power Generation Final Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Scott E. Grasman; John W. Sheffield; Fatih Dogan; Sunggyu Lee; Umit O. Koylu; Angie Rolufs

    2010-04-30

    This study considered opportunities for hydrogen in stationary applications in order to make recommendations related to RD&D strategies that incorporate lessons learned and best practices from relevant national and international stationary power efforts, as well as cost and environmental modeling of pathways. The study analyzed the different strategies utilized in power generation systems and identified the different challenges and opportunities for producing and using hydrogen as an energy carrier. Specific objectives included both a synopsis/critical analysis of lessons learned from previous stationary power programs and recommendations for a strategy for hydrogen infrastructure deployment. This strategy incorporates all hydrogen pathways and a combination of distributed power generating stations, and provides an overview of stationary power markets, benefits of hydrogen-based stationary power systems, and competitive and technological challenges. The motivation for this project was to identify the lessons learned from prior stationary power programs, including the most significant obstacles, how these obstacles have been approached, outcomes of the programs, and how this information can be used by the Hydrogen, Fuel Cells & Infrastructure Technologies Program to meet program objectives primarily related to hydrogen pathway technologies (production, storage, and delivery) and implementation of fuel cell technologies for distributed stationary power. In addition, the lessons learned address environmental and safety concerns, including codes and standards, and education of key stakeholders.

  15. Accident on the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Getting over the consequences and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nosovskij, A.V.; Vasil'chenko, V.N.; Klyuchnikov, A.A.; Prister, B.S.

    2006-01-01

    The book is devoted to the 20 anniversary of the accident on the 4th Power Unit of the Chernobyl NPP. The power plant construction history, accident reasons, its consequences, the measures on its liquidation are represented. The current state of activity on the Chernobyl power unit decommission, the 'Shelter' object conversion into the ecologically safe system is described. The future of the Chernobyl NPP site and disposal zone is discussed

  16. Y2K lessons learned for electric grid stability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gueorguiev, B.; Ianev, I. L.; Purvis, E. E.

    2000-01-01

    Y2K was an example of a worldwide infrastructure threat. Actions to understand infrastructure risks and mitigate infrastructure threats are a continuing and increasing part of the worlds corporate, government, and international organizations systems, and the severe implications of infrastructure failures to the health, safety, and financial well being of people and organizations are the deriving force. The IAEA conducted a number of Y2K related activities in nuclear power and fuel cycle activities. A set of these activities address the interface between electric power generation facilities and electric power grids in the region of Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. This addressed a continuing infrastructure risks and actions to mitigate these risk. The results were shown by events to have made positive contributions. The potential loss of nuclear power plant generation is a significant risk to electric power grids, an important critical infrastructure. Not only does the threat constitute a problem with the potential loss of the grid, loss of the electric power grid increases the probability of accidents in nuclear power plants. Recognizing that these activities addressed only one area of infrastructure risk in one region, there are some key lessons that were learned that could have general applicability

  17. Development of Northeast Asia Nuclear Power Plant Accident Simulator.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kim, Juyub; Kim, Juyoul; Po, Li-Chi Cliff

    2017-06-15

    A conclusion from the lessons learned after the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident was that Korea needs a tool to estimate consequences from a major accident that could occur at a nuclear power plant located in a neighboring country. This paper describes a suite of computer-based codes to be used by Korea's nuclear emergency response staff for training and potentially operational support in Korea's national emergency preparedness and response program. The systems of codes, Northeast Asia Nuclear Accident Simulator (NANAS), consist of three modules: source-term estimation, atmospheric dispersion prediction and dose assessment. To quickly assess potential doses to the public in Korea, NANAS includes specific reactor data from the nuclear power plants in China, Japan and Taiwan. The completed simulator is demonstrated using data for a hypothetical release. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  18. Evolution of regulation related to the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anisimova, L.I.; Belyaev, S.T.; Demin, V.F.; Kutkov, V.A.

    1997-01-01

    The 'classical' pattern of radiological protection considers mostly the radiation factor. The choice of protective measures is governed by effective doses, both received and projected, also established and adopted intervention levels, respectively. The effectiveness of the countermeasures is measured by the value of an averted dose. The lessons learned from Chernobyl show that the above single-factor pattern of radiological protection is appropriate only at an acute post-accident phase. In that period (days and weeks after an accident) the radiation factor prevails and bas countermeasures are proceeded from prearranged intervention levels. At the next long-term phase (months, years after the accident) there is enough time for a human factor to come fully into force. This factor implies the psychological and social acceptance, by the public, of the countermeasures to be implemented. It implies the response of the public to their implementation, the reflection of the situation by mass media, the reaction of Legislative and Administrative Bodies too

  19. Lessons learned in radiology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goodenough, D.J.

    2001-01-01

    The paper reviews aspects of the history of radiology with the goal of identifying lessons learned, particularly in the area of radiological protection of the patient in diagnostic and interventional radiology, nuclear medicine and radiotherapy. It is pointed out that since the days of Roentgen there has been a need not only to control and quantify the amount of radiation reaching the patient but also to optimize the imaging process to offer the greatest diagnostic benefit within allowable levels of patient dose. To this end, in diagnostic radiology, one finds the development of better films, X rays tubes, grids, screens and processing techniques, while in fluoroscopy, one sees the increased luminance of calcium tungstate. In interventional radiology, one finds an improvement in catheterization techniques and contrast agents. In nuclear medicine, the development of tracer techniques into modern cameras and isotopes such as technetium can be followed. In radiotherapy, one sees the early superficial X rays and radium sources gradually replaced with radon seeds, supervoltage, 60 Co and today's linear accelerators. Along with the incredible advances in imaging and therapeutic technologies comes the growing realization of the potential danger of radiation and the need to protect the patient (as well as physicians, ancillary personnel and the general population) from unnecessary radiation. The important lesson learned is that we must walk a tightrope, balancing the benefits and risks of any technology utilizing radiation to produce the greatest benefits at the lowest acceptable risk. The alternative techniques using non-ionizing radiation will have to be considered as part of the general armamentarium for medical imaging whenever radiation consequences are unacceptable. (author)

  20. Lessons learned from the NREL village power program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Taylor, R.W. [National Renewable Energy Lab., Golden, CO (United States)

    1998-09-01

    Renewable energy solutions for village power applications can be economical, functional, and sustainable. Pilot projects are an appropriate step in the development of a commercially viable market for rural renewable energy solutions. Moreover, there are a significant number of rural electrification projects under way that employ various technologies, delivery mechanisms, and financing arrangements. These projects, if properly evaluated, communicated, and their lessons incorporated in future projects and programs, can lead the way to a future that includes a robust opportunity for cost-effective, renewable-based village power systems. This paper summarizes some of NREL`s recent experiences and lessons learned.

  1. Lessons Learned from the NREL Village Power Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Taylor, R.

    1998-07-01

    Renewable energy solutions for village power applications can be economical, functional, and sustainable. Pilot projects are an appropriate step in the development of a commercially viable market for rural renewable energy solutions. Moreover, there are a significant number of rural electrification projects under way that employ various technologies, delivery mechanisms, and financing arrangements. These projects, if properly evaluated, communicated, and their lessons incorporated in future projects and programs, can lead the way to a future that includes a robust opportunity for cost-effective, renewable-based village power systems. This paper summarizes some of NRELs recent experiences and lessons learned.

  2. Lessons learned on utilizing the SEI/CMM in the federal government work for others environment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stewart, A.

    1997-11-01

    This report contains viewgraphs on lessons learned on utilizing the Software Engineering Institute Capability Maturity Model in the federal government work for others environment. These viewgraphs outline: data systems research and development; what is the SEI/CMM; Data Systems Research and Development process improvement approach; accomplishments; and lessons learned.

  3. Influences of Multimedia Lesson Contents On Effective Learning

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tuncay Yavuz Ozdemir

    2013-11-01

    Full Text Available In the information era that we experience today, there is a rapid change in the methods, techniques and materials used for education and teaching. The usage of information and communication technology-assisted teaching materials are becoming more commonplace. Parallel to these developments, the Ministry of National Education took steps to develop IT substructures of all schools in the country and implemented many projects. The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not the multimedia lesson content used by teachers affect effective learning. This study is a qualitative study, conducted with 45 teachers working in primary schools during the 2011-2012 academic year. According to the study findings, participants believe that using multimedia lesson content during lectures increases student motivation, makes students more curious and interested, and think that using multimedia lesson content has positive effects.

  4. Library 101: Why, How, and Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Porter, Michael; King, David Lee

    2010-01-01

    This article describes how and why the Library 101 Project was created and the lessons that the developers learned out of this project. The Library 101 is a project that challenges librarians to revise the paradigm of "basic" library services in order to remain relevant in this technology-driven world. It was developed by Michael Porter,…

  5. Reinforcement of Defence-in-Depth: Modification Practice After the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wang, Y.; Tang, H.; Mao, Q., E-mail: wangyuhong@cgnpc.com.cn [China Nuclear Power Design Co., Ltd Xia Meilin, Futian District, Shenzhen, Guangdong Province (China)

    2014-10-15

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident revealed the importance and demand for further reinforcement of defence in- depth. CGN (China General Nuclear Power Group) has made a complete safety assessment on CPR1000 nuclear power plants under construction in China. Dozens of modifications have been implemented based on the assessment findings and lessons learned from Fukushima nuclear accident, taking into account of PSA (Probabilistic Safety Analysis) and comparison analysis of the latest regulations and standards. These modifications help to enhance nuclear safety significantly for nuclear power plants under construction in China, and provide helpful modification guidance for nuclear power plants in operation of the same type. (author)

  6. Accidents in chemical industry: are they foreseeable?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Sonnemans, P.J.M.; Körvers, P.M.W.

    2006-01-01

    Accidents recur,’ which is what Kletz [Kletz T. (1993). Lessons from disasters, how organisations have no memory and accidents recur. UK: Institution of Chemical Engineers] wrote in 1993. Indeed, despite all measures taken accidents may re-occur, but ‘disruptions’ in a process reoccur much more

  7. The Fukushima accident and its consequences. Facts, explanations and comments; L'accident de Fukushima et ses consequences. Faits, explications et commentaires

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-03-06

    This document proposes an overview of the present situation in the different reactors of the Fukushima power station and discusses its control by the operator. It also describes what went on, the causes of the accident, and what occurred on the accident day (earthquake, tsunami, flooding). It discusses whether some mistakes regarding the design and the protection of reactors could explain the accident. It presents the various measures which have been immediately implemented to protect the populations and to confine the accident. It proposes an assessment of damages for the ground and marine environment in terms of contamination. It addresses the consequences of the released radioactivity on population health and on personnel intervening within the site. It discusses the restoration perspectives for contaminated areas and the possible return of evacuated population. Then, it describes the different phases for the station dismantling. It evokes the issue of fallouts beyond Japan and in Europe, outlines some lessons learned from the accident and new safety measures to be implemented in France. It discusses how nuclear risk management is organised in France and its efficiency. It addresses the consequences for the development of nuclear energy in the world

  8. Radiation exposure and breast cancer: lessons from Chernobyl.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ogrodnik, Aleksandra; Hudon, Tyler W; Nadkarni, Prakash M; Chandawarkar, Rajiv Y

    2013-04-01

    The lessons learned from the Chernobyl disaster have become increasingly important after the second anniversary of the Fukushima, Japan nuclear accident. Historically, data from the Chernobyl reactor accident 27 years ago demonstrated a strong correlation with thyroid cancer, but data on the radiation effects of Chernobyl on breast cancer incidence have remained inconclusive. We reviewed the published literature on the effects of the Chernobyl disaster on breast cancer incidence, using Medline and Scopus from the time of the accident to December of 2010. Our findings indicate limited data and statistical flaws. Other confounding factors, such as discrepancies in data collection, make interpretation of the results from the published literature difficult. Re-analyzing the data reveals that the incidence of breast cancer in Chernobyl-disaster-exposed women could be higher than previously thought. We have learned little of the consequences of radiation exposure at Chernobyl except for its effects on thyroid cancer incidence. Marking the 27th year after the Chernobyl event, this report sheds light on a specific, crucial and understudied aspect of the results of radiation from a gruesome nuclear power plant disaster.

  9. Radiological protection issues arising during and after the Fukushima nuclear reactor accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    González, Abel J; Akashi, Makoto; Sakai, Kazuo; Yonekura, Yoshiharu; Boice Jr, John D; Chino, Masamichi; Homma, Toshimitsu; Ishigure, Nobuhito; Kai, Michiaki; Kusumi, Shizuyo; Lee, Jai-Ki; Menzel, Hans-Georg; Niwa, Ohtsura; Yamashita, Shunichi; Weiss, Wolfgang

    2013-01-01

    Following the Fukushima accident, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) convened a task group to compile lessons learned from the nuclear reactor accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, with respect to the ICRP system of radiological protection. In this memorandum the members of the task group express their personal views on issues arising during and after the accident, without explicit endorsement of or approval by the ICRP. While the affected people were largely protected against radiation exposure and no one incurred a lethal dose of radiation (or a dose sufficiently large to cause radiation sickness), many radiological protection questions were raised. The following issues were identified: inferring radiation risks (and the misunderstanding of nominal risk coefficients); attributing radiation effects from low dose exposures; quantifying radiation exposure; assessing the importance of internal exposures; managing emergency crises; protecting rescuers and volunteers; responding with medical aid; justifying necessary but disruptive protective actions; transiting from an emergency to an existing situation; rehabilitating evacuated areas; restricting individual doses of members of the public; caring for infants and children; categorising public exposures due to an accident; considering pregnant women and their foetuses and embryos; monitoring public protection; dealing with ‘contamination’ of territories, rubble and residues and consumer products; recognising the importance of psychological consequences; and fostering the sharing of information. Relevant ICRP Recommendations were scrutinised, lessons were collected and suggestions were compiled. It was concluded that the radiological protection community has an ethical duty to learn from the lessons of Fukushima and resolve any identified challenges. Before another large accident occurs, it should be ensured that inter alia: radiation risk coefficients of

  10. Radiological protection issues arising during and after the Fukushima nuclear reactor accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    González, Abel J; Akashi, Makoto; Boice, John D; Chino, Masamichi; Homma, Toshimitsu; Ishigure, Nobuhito; Kai, Michiaki; Kusumi, Shizuyo; Lee, Jai-Ki; Menzel, Hans-Georg; Niwa, Ohtsura; Sakai, Kazuo; Weiss, Wolfgang; Yamashita, Shunichi; Yonekura, Yoshiharu

    2013-09-01

    Following the Fukushima accident, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) convened a task group to compile lessons learned from the nuclear reactor accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, with respect to the ICRP system of radiological protection. In this memorandum the members of the task group express their personal views on issues arising during and after the accident, without explicit endorsement of or approval by the ICRP. While the affected people were largely protected against radiation exposure and no one incurred a lethal dose of radiation (or a dose sufficiently large to cause radiation sickness), many radiological protection questions were raised. The following issues were identified: inferring radiation risks (and the misunderstanding of nominal risk coefficients); attributing radiation effects from low dose exposures; quantifying radiation exposure; assessing the importance of internal exposures; managing emergency crises; protecting rescuers and volunteers; responding with medical aid; justifying necessary but disruptive protective actions; transiting from an emergency to an existing situation; rehabilitating evacuated areas; restricting individual doses of members of the public; caring for infants and children; categorising public exposures due to an accident; considering pregnant women and their foetuses and embryos; monitoring public protection; dealing with 'contamination' of territories, rubble and residues and consumer products; recognising the importance of psychological consequences; and fostering the sharing of information. Relevant ICRP Recommendations were scrutinised, lessons were collected and suggestions were compiled. It was concluded that the radiological protection community has an ethical duty to learn from the lessons of Fukushima and resolve any identified challenges. Before another large accident occurs, it should be ensured that inter alia: radiation risk coefficients of potential

  11. Lessons learned in applying function analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mitchel, G.R.; Davey, E.; Basso, R.

    2001-01-01

    This paper summarizes the lessons learned in undertaking and applying function analysis based on the recent experience of utility, AECL and international design and assessment projects. Function analysis is an analytical technique that can be used to characterize and asses the functions of a system and is widely recognized as an essential component of a 'systematic' approach to design, on that integrated operational and user requirements into the standard design process. (author)

  12. Lessons learned from Spain's nuclear program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garcia Rodriguez, A.

    1993-01-01

    The commercial nuclear program in Spain dates back to the beginning of the 1960s. There are currently nine units in operation, one more has been decommissioned and a further five are in different phases of construction but under nuclear moratorium since 1983. This article gives a general overview of the program, the criteria applied, what it has meant to and required of the industry and, finally, what lessons have been learned. (author) 2 figs

  13. IAEA and WANO Mark Anniversary of Fukushima Accident, Increase Cooperation, 5 March 2012, Vienna/London

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    Full text: Next Sunday, 11 March 2012, marks the first anniversary of the devastating earthquake and tsunami that struck the east coast of Japan. One year on, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) are increasing their mutual cooperation to maximise nuclear safety efforts around the globe. The two organisations are revising their Memorandum of Understanding in light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, and will be stepping up their efforts to share expertise and knowledge between operators and governments. There will be greater coordination between WANO peer reviews and IAEA OSART missions, in which international experts assess the safety of individual nuclear power plants, and discussions are under way to examine further areas to improve information sharing. This is in addition to the other work each organisation is doing to reinforce nuclear safety worldwide. IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano said: 'The IAEA is delighted to strengthen its coordination and cooperation with WANO. One of the lessons of Fukushima is the need for strong and effective communication between governments, regulators and nuclear operators. The IAEA's Action Plan on Nuclear Safety underlines the need for all stakeholders to work together to put these lessons into practice as tangibly and swiftly as possible, to deliver concrete results. By working more closely together, we can help to ensure that practical experience is properly shared to reinforce nuclear safety everywhere'. Laurent Stricker, Chairman of WANO, commented: 'While the terrible events of last year had a major lasting impact on the industry, they have also served as the catalyst for huge change. WANO has shifted from primarily focusing on accident prevention, to an emphasis on both prevention and mitigation, and has redoubled its efforts to promote excellence in nuclear safety in each and every plant across the world. All nuclear plants have carefully

  14. Unintended Learning in Primary School Practical Science Lessons from Polanyi's Perspective of Intellectual Passion

    Science.gov (United States)

    Park, Jisun; Song, Jinwoong; Abrahams, Ian

    2016-03-01

    This study explored, from the perspective of intellectual passion developed by Michael Polanyi, the unintended learning that occurred in primary practical science lessons. We use the term `unintended' learning to distinguish it from `intended' learning that appears in teachers' learning objectives. Data were collected using video and audio recordings of a sample of twenty-four whole class practical science lessons, taught by five teachers, in Korean primary schools with 10- to 12-year-old students. In addition, video and audio recordings were made for each small group of students working together in order to capture their activities and intra-group discourse. Pre-lesson interviews with the teachers were undertaken and audio-recorded to ascertain their intended learning objectives. Selected key vignettes, including unintended learning, were analysed from the perspective of intellectual passion developed by Polanyi. What we found in this study is that unintended learning could occur when students got interested in something in the first place and could maintain their interest. In addition, students could get conceptual knowledge when they tried to connect their experience to their related prior knowledge. It was also found that the processes of intended learning and of unintended learning were different. Intended learning was characterized by having been planned by the teacher who then sought to generate students' interest in it. In contrast, unintended learning originated from students' spontaneous interest and curiosity as a result of unplanned opportunities. Whilst teachers' persuasive passion comes first in the process of intended learning, students' heuristic passion comes first in the process of unintended learning. Based on these findings, we argue that teachers need to be more aware that unintended learning, on the part of individual students, can occur during their lesson and to be able to better use this opportunity so that this unintended learning can be

  15. Some lessons on radiological protection learnt from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kai, M

    2012-01-01

    The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant released a large quantity of radioactive iodine and caesium into the environment. In terms of radiological protection, the evacuation and food restrictions that were adopted in a timely manner by the authorities effectively reduced the dose received by people living in the affected area. Since late March, the transition from an emergency to an existing exposure situation has been in progress. In selecting the reference exposure levels in some areas under an existing exposure situation, the authorities tried to follow the situation-based approach recommended by the ICRP. However, a mixture of emergency and post-emergency approaches confused the people living in the contaminated areas because the reactor conditions continued to be not completely stable. In deriving the criteria in an existing exposure situation, the regulatory authority selected 20 mSv y −1 . The mothers in the affected area believed that a dose of 20 mSv y −1 was unacceptably high for children since 1 mSv y −1 is the dose limit for the public under normal conditions. Internet information accelerated concern about the internal exposure to children and the related health effects. From some experiences after the accident the following lessons could be learned. The selection of reference doses in existing exposure situations after an accident must be openly communicated with the public using a risk-informed approach. The detriment-adjusted nominal risk coefficient was misused for calculating the hypothetical number of cancer deaths by some non-radiation experts. It would not be possible to resolve this problem unless the ICRP addressed an alternative risk assessment to convey the meaning and associated uncertainty of the risk to an exposed population. A situation-based approach in addition to a risk-informed approach needs to be disseminated properly in order to select the level of protection that would be the best possible under the

  16. Automated Reasoning Across Tactical Stories to Derive Lessons Learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    J. Wesley Regian

    2008-06-01

    Full Text Available The Military Analogical Reasoning System (MARS is a performance support system and decision aid for commanders in Tactical Operations Centers. MARS enhances and supports the innate human ability for using stories to reason about tactical goals, plans, situations, and outcomes. The system operates by comparing many instances of stored tactical stories, determining which have analogous situations and lessons learned, and then returning a description of the lessons learned. The description of the lessons learned is at a level of abstraction that can be generalized to an appropriate range of tactical situations. The machine-understandable story representation is based on a military operations data model and associated tactical situation ontology. Thus each story can be thought of, and reasoned about, as an instance of an unfolding tactical situation. The analogical reasoning algorithm is based on Gentner's Structure Mapping Theory. Consider the following two stories. In the first, a U.S. platoon in Viet Nam diverts around a minefield and subsequently comes under ambush from a large hill overlooking their new position. In the second, a U.S. task force in Iraq diverts around a biochemical hazard and subsequently comes under ambush from the roof of an abandoned building. MARS recognizes these stories as analogical, and derives the following abstraction: When enemy-placed obstacles force us into an unplanned route, beware of ambush from elevation or concealment. In this paper we describe the MARS interface, military operations data model, tactical situation ontology, and analogical reasoning algorithm.

  17. Winning the Peace: Building a Strategic Level Lessons Learned Program

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    French, Daniel L

    2007-01-01

    The U.S. military has developed a robust, comprehensive system to capture, analyze, and disseminate tactical-level and operational-level lessons learned from training events and ongoing conflict operations...

  18. Considerations on Fail Safe Design for Design Basis Accident (DBA) vs. Design Extension Condition (DEC): Lesson Learnt from the Fukushima Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ha, Jun Su; Kim, Sungyeop

    2014-01-01

    The fail safety design is referred to as an inherently safe design concept where the failure of an SSC (System, Structure or Component) leads directly to a safe condition. Usually the fail safe design has been devised based on the design basis accident (DBAs), because the nuclear safety has been assured by securing the capability to safely cope with DBAs. Currently regards have been paid to the DEC (Design Extension Condition) as an extended design consideration. Hence additional attention should be paid to the concept of the fail safe design in order to consider the DEC, accordingly. In this study, a case chosen from the Fukushima accident is studied to discuss the issue associated with the fail safe design in terms of DBA and DEC standpoints. For the fail safe design to be based both on the DBA and the DEC, a Mode Changeable Fail Safe Design (MCFSD) is proposed in this study. Additional discussions on what is needed for the MCFSD to be applied in the nuclear safety are addressed as well. One of the lessons learnt from the Fukushima accident should include considerations on the fail-safe design in a changing regulatory framework. Currently the design extension condition (DEC) including severe accidents should be considered during designing and licensing NPPs. Hence concepts on the fail safe design need to be changed to be based on not only the DBA but also the DEC. In this study, a case on a fail-safe design chosen from the Fukushima accident is studied to discuss the issue associated with the fail safe design in terms of DBA and DEC conditions. For the fail safe design to be based both on the DBA and the DEC, a Mode Changeable Fail Safe Design (MCFSD) is proposed in this study. Additional discussions on what is needed for the MCFSD to be applied in the nuclear safety are addressed as well

  19. Let's Cooperate! Integrating Cooperative Learning Into a Lesson on Ethics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reineke, Patricia R

    2017-04-01

    Cooperative learning is an effective teaching strategy that promotes active participation in learning and can be used in academic, clinical practice, and professional development settings. This article describes that strategy and provides an example of its use in a lesson about ethics. J Contin Nurs Educ. 2017;48(4):154-156. Copyright 2017, SLACK Incorporated.

  20. Buried Waste Integrated Demonstration lessons learned: 1993 technology demonstrations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kostelnik, K.M.; Owens, K.J.

    1994-01-01

    An integrated technology demonstration was conducted by the Buried Waste Integrated Demonstration (BWID) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Cold Test Pit in the summer of 1993. This program and demonstration was sponsored by the US Department of Energy Office of Technology Development. The demonstration included six technologies representing a synergistic system for the characterization and retrieval of a buried hazardous waste site. The integrated technology demonstration proved very successful and a summary of the technical accomplishments is presented. Upon completion of the integrated technology demonstration, cognizant program personnel participated in a lessons learned exercise. This exercise was conducted at the Simplot Decision Support Center at Idaho State University and lessons learned activity captured additional information relative to the integration of technologies for demonstration purposes. This information will be used by BWID to enhance program planning and strengthen future technology demonstrations

  1. How to manage forest environments after a nuclear accident? Lessons learned from the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-03-01

    Based on several published studies, this report proposes a synthetic overview of observations made on the fate of radionuclides in contaminated forests, like in forest environments which represent a great part of highly contaminated areas about Chernobyl and Fukushima. It appears that the main characteristics of forest ecosystems impacted by radioactive fallouts are different (there is no 'red' (dead) forest around Fukushima), that processes governing the fate of radionuclides in forest ecosystems imply a high remanence of radioactive contamination in these environments. It also appears that the interception of radioactive fallouts by the canopy and radionuclide transfers towards the litter and the soil are the most important processes during the early phase and during the first months after the accident. Thus, the soil becomes the main reservoir in which radio-caesium can be found. Some studies outline that the management of contaminated forest ecosystems after the Fukushima accident differs from that applied in the Chernobyl exclusion zone. Others notice that the fire risk is higher in the Chernobyl exclusion zone

  2. Industrial Safety and Utopia: Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Travadel, Sébastien; Guarnieri, Franck; Portelli, Aurélien

    2018-01-01

    Feedback from industrial accidents is provided by various state or even international, institutions, and lessons learned can be controversial. However, there has been little research into organizational learning at the international level. This article helps to fill the gap through an in-depth review of official reports of the Fukushima Daiichi accident published shortly after the event. We present a new method to analyze the arguments contained in these voluminous documents. Taking an intertextual perspective, the method focuses on the accident narratives, their rationale, and links between "facts," "causes," and "recommendations." The aim is to evaluate how the findings of the various reports are consistent with (or contradict) "institutionalized knowledge," and identify the social representations that underpin them. We find that although the scientific controversy surrounding the results of the various inquiries reflects different ethical perspectives, they are integrated into the same utopian ideal. The involvement of multiple actors in this controversy raises questions about the public construction of epistemic authority, and we highlight the special status given to the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard. © 2017 The Authors Risk Analysis published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Society for Risk Analysis.

  3. Lessons Learned in Preparation and Review of Safety Analysis Report of PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor in Malaysia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maskin, Mazleha [Korea Advanced Institute for Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Choi, Kwang Sik [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2010-05-15

    PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor (RTP) is the one and only research reactor in Malaysia. Since the day it was supplied by General Atomic (GA) in 1983, periodic safety reviews were carried out but not published in the form of a complete SAR. In fact, the original SAR (SAR 1983) document was provided by GA as soon as GA was selected as the supplier of RTP. The focus of this report is on the lessons learned from the preparation of SAR. The lessons learned were to address the preparation and regulatory review of the second SAR (SAR 2006). Realizing that safety is important as RTP is aging, the experiences and lessons learned from SAR development and updating processes are of great value for all parties involved. The purpose of this report is to consolidate and organize the lessons learned and suggest the best practice for the next SAR development both in preparation and regulatory review

  4. Lessons Learned in Preparation and Review of Safety Analysis Report of PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor in Malaysia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maskin, Mazleha; Choi, Kwang Sik

    2010-01-01

    PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor (RTP) is the one and only research reactor in Malaysia. Since the day it was supplied by General Atomic (GA) in 1983, periodic safety reviews were carried out but not published in the form of a complete SAR. In fact, the original SAR (SAR 1983) document was provided by GA as soon as GA was selected as the supplier of RTP. The focus of this report is on the lessons learned from the preparation of SAR. The lessons learned were to address the preparation and regulatory review of the second SAR (SAR 2006). Realizing that safety is important as RTP is aging, the experiences and lessons learned from SAR development and updating processes are of great value for all parties involved. The purpose of this report is to consolidate and organize the lessons learned and suggest the best practice for the next SAR development both in preparation and regulatory review

  5. The X-15 airplane - Lessons learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dana, William H.

    1993-01-01

    The X-15 rocket research airplane flew to an altitude of 354,000 ft and reached Mach 6.70. In almost 200 flights, this airplane was used to gather aerodynamic-heating, structural loads, stability and control, and atmospheric-reentry data. This paper describes the origins, design, and operation of the X-15 airplane. In addition, lessons learned from the X-15 airplane that are applicable to designing and testing the National Aero-Space Plane are discussed.

  6. Lessons learned from on-site safety assessments performed by DOE in response to the Tomsk accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Witmer, F.E.

    1995-01-01

    In response to the accident, in April 1993, at the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant of the Siberian chemical Combine, Tomsk, Russia, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated concurrent efforts to understand the causes for the accident and to review potential vulnerabilities for similar occurrences across the DOE radiochemical complex. Because the accident occurred in the feed adjustment stage of a Purex type process, US facilities which contained significant inventories of TBP, organic diluent and nitric acid were evaluated by expert teams. From accident conditions, prior experience, modeling and experimental programs and confirmatory dialogue with the Russians, enhanced understanding was achieved and vulnerabilities (e.g., lack of safety analysis, organic layering, inadvertent acid addition, use of aromatic diluents, uncertain venting capability, no mitigative/emergency procedures, etc.) were identified and corrected

  7. Post-facta Analyses of Fukushima Accident and Lessons Learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tanabe, Fumiya [Sociotechnical Systems Safety Research Institute, Ichige (Japan)

    2014-08-15

    Independent analyses have been performed of the core melt behavior of the Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit 3 reactors of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on 11-15 March 2011. The analyses are based on a phenomenological methodology with measured data investigation and a simple physical model calculation. Estimated are time variation of core water level, core material temperature and hydrogen generation rate. The analyses have revealed characteristics of accident process of each reactor. In the case of Unit 2 reactor, the calculated result suggests little hydrogen generation because of no steam generation in the core for zirconium-steam reaction during fuel damage process. It could be the reason of no hydrogen explosion in the Unit 2 reactor building. Analyses have been performed also on the core material behavior in another chaotic period of 19-31 March 2011, and it resulted in a re-melt hypothesis that core material in each reactor should have melted again due to shortage of cooling water. The hypothesis is consistent with many observed features of radioactive materials dispersion into the environment.

  8. Lessons from Fukushima - February 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morris-Suzuki, Tessa; Boilley, David; McNeill, David; Gundersen, Arnie; Beranek, Jan; Blomme, Brian; Hanaoka, Wakao; Schulz, Nina; Stensil, Shawn-Patrick; Teule, Rianne; Tumer, Aslihan; McCann, Christine; Otani, Nanako; Hirsch, Helmut

    2012-01-01

    It has been almost 12 months since the Fukushima nuclear disaster began. Although the Great East Japan earthquake and the following tsunami triggered it, the key causes of the nuclear accident lie in the institutional failures of political influence and industry-led regulation. It was a failure of human institutions to acknowledge real reactor risks, a failure to establish and enforce appropriate nuclear safety standards and a failure to ultimately protect the public and the environment. This report, commissioned by Greenpeace International, addresses what lessons can be taken away from this catastrophe. The one-year memorial of the Fukushima accident offers a unique opportunity to ask ourselves what the tragedy - which is far from being over for hundreds of thousands of Japanese people - has taught us. And it also raises the question, are we prepared to learn? There are broader issues and essential questions that still deserve our attention: - How it is possible that - despite all assurances - a major nuclear accident on the scale of the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 happened again, in one of the world's most industrially advanced countries? - Why did emergency and evacuation plans not work to protect people from excessive exposure to the radioactive fallout and resulting contamination? Why is the government still failing to better protect its citizens from radiation one year later? - Why are the over 100,000 people who suffer the most from the impacts of the nuclear accident still not receiving adequate financial and social support to help them rebuild their homes, lives and communities? These are the fundamental questions that we need to ask to be able to learn from the Fukushima nuclear disaster. This report looks into them and draws some important conclusions: 1. The Fukushima nuclear accident marks the end of the 'nuclear safety' paradigm. 2. The Fukushima nuclear accident exposes the deep and systemic failure of the very institutions that are supposed to

  9. Lessons Learned from Becoming an Independent Standards Board.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Board, John C.

    This paper discusses lessons learned from becoming an independent standards board. It begins by explaining that teachers lacked adequate academic preparation during the two World Wars and shortly thereafter. At the end of World War II, public education had to deal with poor pay, little job security, inadequate pensions, and inadequate and…

  10. LESSONS LEARNED THROUGH OPTIMIZATION OF THE VOLUNTARY CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thacker, M. S.; Freshour, P.; McDonald, W.

    2002-01-01

    Valuable experience in environmental remediation was gained at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (Sandia) by concurrently conducting Voluntary Corrective Actions (VCAs) at three Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs). Sandia combined the planning, implementation, and reporting phases of three VCAs with the goal of realizing significant savings in both cost and schedule. The lessons learned through this process have been successfully implemented within the Sandia Environmental Restoration (ER) Project and could be utilized at other locations with multiple ER sites. All lessons learned resulted from successful teaming with the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) Hazardous Waste Bureau (HWB), Sandia management, a Sandia risk assessment team, and Sandia waste management personnel. Specific lessons learned included the following: (1) potential efficiencies can be exploited by reprioritization and rescheduling of activities; (2) cost and schedule reductions can be realized by combining similar work at contiguous sites into a single effort; (3) working with regulators to develop preliminary remediation goals (PRGs) and gain regulatory acceptance for VCA planning prior to project initiation results in significant time savings throughout the remediation and permit modification processes; (4) effective and thoughtful contingency planning removes uncertainties and defrays costs so that projects can be completed without interruption; (5) timely collection of waste characterization samples allows efficient disposal of waste streams, and (6) concurrent reporting of VCA activities results in significant savings in time for the authors and reviewers

  11. Post accident training program design at Three Mile Island

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lawyer, L.L.

    1981-01-01

    The TMI preaccident training staff typically consisted of 9 professional and 3 administrative support persons. Procedures were prepared and facilities designated for operator training. The thrust of the post accident effort was directed to expanding the training function to include all other personnel while modifying the operator training to address lessons learned. Significant experiences were encountered in part task simulation, job and task analysis, decision analysis and with various external committees. These experiences led to specific opinions on industry needs in the areas of staffing, regulation, importance of training and contractor assistance

  12. Lessons Learned for the MICE Coupling Solenoid from the MICE Spectrometer Solenoids

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Green, Michael A.; Wang, Li; Pan, Heng; Wu, Hong; Guo, Xinglong; Li, S.Y.; Zheng, S.X.; Virostek, Steve P.; DeMello, Allen J.; Li, Derun; Trillaud, Frederick; Zisman, Michael S.

    2010-01-01

    Tests of the spectrometer solenoids have taught us some important lessons. The spectrometer magnet lessons learned fall into two broad categories that involve the two stages of the coolers that are used to cool the magnets. On the first spectrometer magnet, the problems were centered on the connection of the cooler 2nd-stage to the magnet cold mass. On the first test of the second spectrometer magnet, the problems were centered on the cooler 1st-stage temperature and its effect on the operation of the HTS leads. The second time the second spectrometer magnet was tested; the cooling to the cold mass was still not adequate. The cryogenic designs of the MICE and MuCOOL coupling magnets are quite different, but the lessons learned from the tests of the spectrometer magnets have affected the design of the coupling magnets.

  13. Two decades of radiological accidents direct causes, roots causes and consequences

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rozental Jose de Julio

    2002-01-01

    Full Text Available Practically all Countries utilize radioisotopes in medicine, industry, agriculture and research. The extent to which ionizing radiation practices are employed varies considerably, depending largely upon social and economic conditions and the level of technical skills available in the country. An overview of the majority of practices and the associated hazards will be found in the Table IV to VII of this document. The practices in normal and abnormal operating conditions should follow the basic principles of radiation protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources, considering the IAEA Radiation Protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety Series 120 and the IAEA Recommendation of the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection, Safety Series Nº 115. The Standards themselves underline the necessity to be able to predict the radiological consequences of emergency conditions and the investigations that should need to be done. This paper describes the major accidents that had happened in the last two decades, provides a methodology for analyses and gives a collection of lessons learned. This will help the Regulatory Authority to review the reasons of vulnerabilities, and to start a Radiation safety and Security Programme to introduce measurescapable to avoid the recurrence of similar events. Although a number of accidents with fatalities have caught the attention of the public in recent year, a safety record has accompanied the widespread use of radiation sources. However, the fact that accidents are uncommon should not give grounds for complacency. No radiological accident is acceptable. From a radiation safety and security of the sources standpoint, accident investigation is necessary to determine what happened, why, when, where and how it occurred and who was (were involved and responsible. The investigation conclusion is an important process toward alertness and feedback to avoid careless attitudes by improving the comprehension

  14. Lessons Learned from Introducing Social Media Use in Undergraduate Economics Research

    Science.gov (United States)

    O'Brien, Martin; Freund, Katarina

    2018-01-01

    The research process and associated literacy requirements are often unfamiliar and daunting obstacles for undergraduate students. The use of social media has the potential to assist research training and encourage active learning, social inclusion and student engagement. This paper documents the lessons learned from developing a blended learning…

  15. Improvement of the severe accident practice tool

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawasaki, Ikuo; Takahashi, Shunsuke

    2016-01-01

    We developed the severe accident (SA) practice tool based on lessons learned in the accident at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. We utilized the developed SA practice tool and carried out the SA training for some employees of Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. Afterwards, we examined the opinions given by trainees attending the training lecture and improved the SA practice tool to achieve a better educational effect. The main changes we made were improvement of the practice scenario for EAL judgments and addition of functions to the practice tool such as the EAL explanation document indication. As a result of having carried out the SA education using this practice tool, we determined the tool users could make the right EAL judgment and report the communication vote. Finally, we confirmed that the knowledge necessary for SA correspondence could be given satisfactorily by this practice tool. (author)

  16. Development and application of the practice tool to deal with severe accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawasaki, Ikuo; Yoshida, Yoshitaka; Iwasaki, Yoshito

    2014-01-01

    We developed the practice tool to simulate communications between operators at a nuclear power station and persons at the headquarters at the time of severe accident (SA). The tool was developed from considering the lessons learned in dealing with the accident at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, especially related to making appropriate responses to events. The tool allows users at headquarters to learn about the constitution of a specific plant and to make a reply and state a judgment based on knowledge about SA. The situations used for the practice tool were made using SPDS data from past disaster prevention drills. In a test, SA education of headquarters workers was carried out using this practice tool, and we confirmed that users were able to make the right phenomenon judgment and communicate it effectively based on the knowledge given by this practice tool. (author)

  17. Designing a lessons learned model to improve the success of new product development in project oriented organizations

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ahmad

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available Nowadays, project-based organizations need to utilize intellectual capital and knowledge to become leader in their business activities. The new approach to use knowledge based skills from one side and development of the new complicated products from the other side have increased the need for designing a lessons learned model. The purpose of this paper is to design a lessons learned model to improve the success of new product development for project oriented organizations. The study designs a questionnaire in Likert scale and distributes it among 56 experts who were well informed about various techniques of new product development and lessons learned. Cronbach alphas for all components of the survey were well above the desirable level. The results of the survey have indicated that there were positive and meaningful relationships between lessons learned components and the success of the new product development.

  18. Lessons drawn from the accidents occurred in the framework of conventional external radiotherapy;Lecons tirees des accidents survenus dans le cadre de la radiotherapie externe conventionnelle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Holmberg, O. [Agence Internationale de l' Energie Atomique, Unite de Radioprotection des Patients, Section Securite et Controle, Vienna (Austria); Czarwinski, R. [Agence Internationale de l' Energie Atomique, Unite de Radioprotection des Patients, Vienna (Austria)

    2009-12-15

    This study examines some radiation accidents occurred in the past. This information has been systematically assessed to get global lessons. The experience feedback shows that the most of accidents happened in certain conditions. These conditions can be distributed in four categories: 1- perception and vigilance in occupation: accidental exposure happened by lack of vigilance in details and lack of vigilance and perception; 2- procedures: accidental exposure happened following a lack of procedures or control that were not enough complete, not enough documented or not completely implemented; 3- training and understanding: accidental exposures happened because the personnel was not enough qualified and educated, did not get the general training nor the the necessary specialized training; 4- liabilities: accidental exposures happened following lacks and ambiguity in the definition of functions of the personnel and in the hierarchy liabilities. In these precise cases the safety tasks have not been enough covered. (N.C.)

  19. Learning with multiple representations: an example of a revision lesson in mechanics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wong, Darren; Poo, Sng Peng; Eng Hock, Ng; Loo Kang, Wee

    2011-03-01

    We describe an example of learning with multiple representations in an A-level revision lesson on mechanics. The context of the problem involved the motion of a ball thrown vertically upwards in air and studying how the associated physical quantities changed during its flight. Different groups of students were assigned to look at the ball's motion using various representations: motion diagrams, vector diagrams, free-body diagrams, verbal description, equations and graphs, drawn against time as well as against displacement. Overall, feedback from students about the lesson was positive. We further discuss the benefits of using computer simulation to support and extend student learning.

  20. How to learn and develop from both good and bad lessons- the 2011Tohoku tsunami case -

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sugimoto, Megumi; Okazumi, Toshio

    2013-04-01

    The 2011 Tohoku tsunami revealed Japan has repeated same mistakes in a long tsunami disaster history. After the disaster Japanese remember many old lessons and materials: an oral traditional evacuation method 'Tsunami TENDENKO' which is individual independent quick evacuation, a tsunami historical memorial stone "Don't construct houses below this stone to seaside" in Aneyoshi town Iwate prefecture, Namiwake-shrine naming from the story of protect people from tsunami in Sendai city, and so on. Tohoku area has created various tsunami historical cultures to descendent. Tohoku area had not had a tsunami disaster for 50 years after the 1960 Chilean tsunami. The 2010 Chilean tsunami damaged little fish industry. People gradually lost tsunami disaster awareness. At just the bad time the magnitude (M) 9 scale earthquake attacked Tohoku. It was for our generations an inexperienced scale disaster. People did not make use of the ancestor's lessons to survive. The 2004 Sumatra tsunami attacked just before 7 years ago. The magnitude scale is almost same as M 9 scale. Why didn't Tohoku people and Japanese tsunami experts make use of the lessons? Japanese has a character outside Japan. This lesson shows it is difficult for human being to learn from other countries. As for Three mile island accident case in US, it was same for Japan. To addition to this, there are similar types of living lessons among different hazards. For examples, nuclear power plantations problem occurred both the 2012 Hurricane Sandy in US and the 2011 Tohoku tsunami. Both local people were not informed about the troubles though Oyster creek nuclear power station case in US did not proceed seriously all. Tsunami and Hurricane are different hazard. Each exparts stick to their last. 1. It is difficult for human being to transfer living lessons through next generation over decades. 2. It is difficult for human being to forecast inexperienced events. 3. It is usually underestimated the danger because human being

  1. Consequences and countermeasures in a nuclear power accident: Chernobyl experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kirichenko, Vladimir A; Kirichenko, Alexander V; Werts, Day E

    2012-09-01

    Despite the tragic accidents in Fukushima and Chernobyl, the nuclear power industry will continue to contribute to the production of electric energy worldwide until there are efficient and sustainable alternative sources of energy. The Chernobyl nuclear accident, which occurred 26 years ago in the former Soviet Union, released an immense amount of radioactivity over vast territories of Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation, extending into northern Europe, and became the most severe accident in the history of the nuclear industry. This disaster was a result of numerous factors including inadequate nuclear power plant design, human errors, and violation of safety measures. The lessons learned from nuclear accidents will continue to strengthen the safety design of new reactor installations, but with more than 400 active nuclear power stations worldwide and 104 reactors in the Unites States, it is essential to reassess fundamental issues related to the Chernobyl experience as it continues to evolve. This article summarizes early and late events of the incident, the impact on thyroid health, and attempts to reduce agricultural radioactive contamination.

  2. Lessons Learned In Aerosol Monitoring With The RASA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forrester, Joel B.; Bowyer, Ted W.; Carty, Fitz; Comes, Laura; Eslinger, Paul W.; Greenwood, Lawrence R.; Haas, Derek A.; Hayes, James C.; Kirkham, Randy R.; Lepel, Elwood A.; Litke, Kevin E.; Miley, Harry S.; Morris, Scott J.; Schrom, Brian T.; Van Davelaar, Peter; Woods, Vincent T.

    2011-01-01

    The Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer (RASA) is an automated aerosol collection and analysis system designed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in the 1990's and is deployed in several locations around the world as part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) required under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The RASA operates unattended, save for regularly scheduled maintenance, iterating samples through a three-step process on a 24-hour interval. In its 15-year history, much has been learned from the operation and maintenance of the RASA that can benefit engineering updates or future aerosol systems. On 11 March 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami rocked the eastern coast of Japan, resulting in power loss and cooling failures at the Daiichi nuclear power plants in Fukushima Prefecture. Aerosol collections were conducted with the RASA in Richland, WA. We present a summary of the lessons learned over the history of the RASA, including lessons taken from the Fukushima incident, regarding the RASA IMS stations operated by the United States.

  3. The Fukushima accident and its consequences. Facts, explanations and comments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This document proposes an overview of the present situation in the different reactors of the Fukushima power station and discusses its control by the operator. It also describes what went on, the causes of the accident, and what occurred on the accident day (earthquake, tsunami, flooding). It discusses whether some mistakes regarding the design and the protection of reactors could explain the accident. It presents the various measures which have been immediately implemented to protect the populations and to confine the accident. It proposes an assessment of damages for the ground and marine environment in terms of contamination. It addresses the consequences of the released radioactivity on population health and on personnel intervening within the site. It discusses the restoration perspectives for contaminated areas and the possible return of evacuated population. Then, it describes the different phases for the station dismantling. It evokes the issue of fallouts beyond Japan and in Europe, outlines some lessons learned from the accident and new safety measures to be implemented in France. It discusses how nuclear risk management is organised in France and its efficiency. It addresses the consequences for the development of nuclear energy in the world

  4. Emergency preparedness lessons from Chernobyl

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, J.B.

    1987-09-01

    Emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants in the US has been considerably enhanced since the Three Mile Island accident. The Chernobyl accident has provided valuable data that can be used to evaluate the merit of some of these enhancements and to determine the need for additional improvements. For example, the USSR intervention levels of 25 rem and 75 rem for evacuation are contrasted with US Environmental Protection Agency protective action guides. The manner in which 135,000 persons were evacuated from the 30-km zone around Chernobyl is constrasted with typical US evacuation plans. Meteorological conditions and particulate deposition patterns were studied to infer characteristics of the radioactive plume from Chernobyl. Typical plume monitoring techniques are examined in light of lessons learned by the Soviets about plume behavior. This review has indicated a need for additional improvements in utility and government emergency plans, procedures, equipment, and training. 12 refs., 1 fig., 2 tabs

  5. Lessons from Chernobyl post-accident management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, T.

    2012-01-01

    The Chernobyl accident has shown that the long-term management of its consequences is not straightforward. The management of the consequences has revealed the complexity of the situation to deal with. The long-term contamination of the environment has affected all the dimensions of the daily life of the inhabitants living in affected territories: health, environment, social life, education, work, distribution of foodstuffs and commodities... The experience from the Chernobyl accident shows 4 key issues that may be beneficial for the populations living in territories affected by the Fukushima accident: 1) the direct involvement of the inhabitants in their own protection, 2) the radiation monitoring system and health surveillance at the local level, 3) to develop a practical radiation protection culture among the population, and 4) the setting up of economic measures to favour the local development. (A.C.)

  6. The accident in Fukushima. Preliminary report on the accident progress in the nuclear power plants as a consequence of the earth quake on 11th March 2011; Der Unfall in Fukushima. Zwischenbericht zu den Ablaeufen in den Kernkraftwerken nach dem Erdbeben vom 11. Maerz 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Borghoff, Stefan; Brueck, Benjamin; Kilian-Huelsmeyer, Yvonne; Maqua, Michael; Mildenberger, Oliver; Quester, Claudia; Stahl, Thorsten; Thuma, Gernot; Wetzel, Norbert; Wild, Volker

    2011-08-15

    The preliminary report on the accident progress in the nuclear power plants as a consequence of the earth quake on 11th March 2011 describes the chronologic sequence of the accident in the different units of the power plant. The measures for mitigation of the accident impact at the site of Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini included the efforts to reach and maintain stable plant conditions. The issue radiological situation includes an estimation of the air-borne radionuclide release, the contamination of the environment and the sea water, measures for protection of the public. The lessons learned following the NISA and IAEA fact finding missions and the open questions are summarized.

  7. Learning from Iraq and Afghanistan: Four Lessons for Building More Effective Coalitions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    White Nathan

    2016-06-01

    Full Text Available Despite many tactical and operational successes by brave military and civilian personnel, post-9/11 operations by U.S. led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan did not achieve their intended outcomes. Although many efforts are underway by discrete organizations within coalition countries to identify and learn their own lessons from these conflicts, comparatively less attention is paid to broader lessons for successful coalitions. Given that the U.S. and its allies will most certainly form coalitions in the future for a range of different contingency scenarios, these lessons are equally deserving of close examination. This article identifies four interrelated lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan that can be utilized to inform more effective coalition development and employment.

  8. Lessons Learned from the Response to Radiation Emergencies (1945-2010)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    occurred, most notably, the Windscale fire in 1957, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the Sarov accident in 1997 and the Tokaimura accident in 1999. Radiological emergencies have occurred throughout the world, and when invited by the country concerned, the IAEA has undertaken comprehensive reviews of the events, the purpose of which is to compile information about the causes of the accidents, the subsequent emergency response including medical management, dose reconstruction, public communication, etc., so that any lessons can be shared with national authorities and regulatory organizations, emergency planners and a broad range of specialists, including physicists, technicians and medical specialists, and persons responsible for radiation protection. It is appropriate to analyze the findings of these and other reports on the response to radiation emergencies in order to consolidate these lessons.

  9. Lessons Learned from the Response to Radiation Emergencies (1945-2010)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-08-15

    occurred, most notably, the Windscale fire in 1957, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the Sarov accident in 1997 and the Tokaimura accident in 1999. Radiological emergencies have occurred throughout the world, and when invited by the country concerned, the IAEA has undertaken comprehensive reviews of the events, the purpose of which is to compile information about the causes of the accidents, the subsequent emergency response including medical management, dose reconstruction, public communication, etc., so that any lessons can be shared with national authorities and regulatory organizations, emergency planners and a broad range of specialists, including physicists, technicians and medical specialists, and persons responsible for radiation protection. It is appropriate to analyze the findings of these and other reports on the response to radiation emergencies in order to consolidate these lessons.

  10. Lessons Learned and Flight Results from the F15 Intelligent Flight Control System Project

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bosworth, John

    2006-01-01

    A viewgraph presentation on the lessons learned and flight results from the F15 Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) project is shown. The topics include: 1) F-15 IFCS Project Goals; 2) Motivation; 3) IFCS Approach; 4) NASA F-15 #837 Aircraft Description; 5) Flight Envelope; 6) Limited Authority System; 7) NN Floating Limiter; 8) Flight Experiment; 9) Adaptation Goals; 10) Handling Qualities Performance Metric; 11) Project Phases; 12) Indirect Adaptive Control Architecture; 13) Indirect Adaptive Experience and Lessons Learned; 14) Gen II Direct Adaptive Control Architecture; 15) Current Status; 16) Effect of Canard Multiplier; 17) Simulated Canard Failure Stab Open Loop; 18) Canard Multiplier Effect Closed Loop Freq. Resp.; 19) Simulated Canard Failure Stab Open Loop with Adaptation; 20) Canard Multiplier Effect Closed Loop with Adaptation; 21) Gen 2 NN Wts from Simulation; 22) Direct Adaptive Experience and Lessons Learned; and 23) Conclusions

  11. Lessons Learned in Pilot Testing Specialty Consultations to Benefit Individuals with Lower Limb Loss

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Christine Elnitsky

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available Telerehabilitation technologies enable the delivery of rehabilitation services from providers to people with disabilities as well as specialty care consultations. This article discusses the barriers experienced when planning and pilot testing a telerehabilitation multi-site specialty consultation for specialists in their medical centers, and the lessons learned. The barriers included integration and participation, coordination across organizational units, and privacy and information security. Lessons learned included the need for collaboration across multiple departments, telerehabilitation equipment back-ups, and anonymous and private communication protocols. Despite delays resulting from coordination at multiple levels of a national organization, we developed a program plan and successfully implemented a pilot test of the southeast region program.  Specialty consultation using telerehabilitation delivery methods requires identifying provider preferences for technological features. Lessons learned could inform development of outpatient telerehabilitation for patients with amputations and studies of patients and providers involved in telerehabilitation.

  12. Building Accessible Educational Web Sites: The Law, Standards, Guidelines, Tools, and Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Ye; Palmer, Bart; Recker, Mimi

    2004-01-01

    Professional education is increasingly facing accessibility challenges with the emergence of webbased learning. This paper summarizes related U.S. legislation, standards, guidelines, and validation tools to make web-based learning accessible for all potential learners. We also present lessons learned during the implementation of web accessibility…

  13. Unintended Learning in Primary School Practical Science Lessons from Polanyi's Perspective of Intellectual Passion

    Science.gov (United States)

    Park, Jisun; Song, Jinwoong; Abrahams, Ian

    2016-01-01

    This study explored, from the perspective of intellectual passion developed by Michael Polanyi, the unintended learning that occurred in primary practical science lessons. We use the term "unintended" learning to distinguish it from "intended" learning that appears in teachers' learning objectives. Data were collected using…

  14. Involving users with learning difficulties in health improvement: lessons from inclusive learning disability research.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Walmsley, Jan

    2004-03-01

    In this paper the author considers the lessons to be drawn from what is termed "inclusive" learning disability research for user involvement around health improvement. Inclusive learning disability research refers to research where people with learning difficulties (intellectual disability) are involved as active participants, as opposed to passive subjects. There is by now a considerable body of such research, developed over the past 25 years. From the review, the author draws attention to areas which can inform practice in involvement of users in a way that adds value.

  15. Critical Steps in Learning From Incidents: Using Learning Potential in the Process From Reporting an Incident to Accident Prevention

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Drupsteen, L.; Groeneweg, J.; Zwetsloot, G.I.J.M.

    2013-01-01

    Many incidents have occurred because organisations have failed to learn from lessons of the past. This means that there is room for improvement in the way organisations analyse incidents, generate measures to remedy identified weaknesses and prevent reoccurrence: the learning from incidents process.

  16. Best Practices and Lessons Learned In LANL Approaches to Transportation Security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Drypolcher, Katherine Carr [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-10-24

    Presentation includes slides on Physical Protection of Material in Transit; Graded Approach for Implementation Controls; Security Requirements; LANL Lessons Learned; Shipping Violation; Unmonitored Shipment; Foreign shipment; and the Conclusion.

  17. Accident investigation practices in Europe--main responses from a recent study of accidents in industry and transport.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Roed-Larsen, Sverre; Valvisto, T; Harms-Ringdahl, L; Kirchsteiger, C

    2004-07-26

    Europe has during recent years been shocked by disasters from natural events and technical breakdowns. The consequences have been comprehensive, measured by lost lives, injuries, and material and environmental damage. ESReDA wanted in 2000--by setting up a special expert group on accident investigation--to clarify the state of art of accident investigation practices and to map the use of thoroughly accident investigation in order to learn lessons from past disasters and prevent new ones. The scope was to cover three sectors in the society: transport, production processes and storage of hazardous materials, and energy production. The main method used was a questionnaire, which was sent in 2001 to about 150 organisations. About 50 replies were analysed. The replies showed great variations but also similarities, among others in definition of accident and incident, the objectives of the investigation team, criteria used to start an investigation, the status of the investigation organisation, the flow of information, the composition of the investigation team, and the use of internal or international procedures or rules. Several methods (in total 14 different methods were mentioned) were used for carrying out accident /incident investigations. Most of the respondents were willing to co-operate in one or another way with ESReDA. Although there are important biases in the material, the results from questionnaire are important inputs to the future work of ESReDA Expert group in this field. 3 safety approaches have been identified.

  18. Lessons learned from women in leadership positions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Elias, Eileen

    2018-01-01

    Eileen Elias has decades of experience in leadership positions within government and nongovernmental organizations. As the first female Commissioner for Mental Health in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the US in the early 1990s, Elias gained experience on navigating gender-based challenges to attain recognized performance outcomes. From lessons learned from women leaders, educate young women entering their careers on attaining leadership positions. Comprehensive research of literature from 2012 through 2017 and interviews with women leaders representing non-Fortune 500 companies including academia, research, non-profit, for-profit, and primary and secondary education. Interviewees included:1.Gail Bassin, Co-Chief Executive Officer and Treasurer, JBS International Inc.2.Jeri Epstein, Executive Director, The Ambit Foundation3.Valerie Fletcher, Executive Director, Institute for Human Centered Design4.Christine James-Brown, President and CEO, Child Welfare League of America5.Daria Mochly-Rosen, PhD, Professor and Fellow, Chemical and Systems Biology, Stanford University School of Medicine6.Eileen O'Keefe, MD, MPH, Clinical Associate Professor and Director, Boston University Health Sciences7.Jeri Shaw, President and Co-Chief Executive Officer, JBS International Inc. A comprehensive understanding of key women leaders' lessons learned and recommendations targeting young women as they assess leadership opportunities in the public or private sectors.

  19. Analysis of the CNSC Staffs Action Plan to Reflect Lessons Learned from Fukushima Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahn, Sangkyu; Yune, Young Gill; Ahn, Hyungjoon; Kim, Byungjik; Lee, Jinho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    On September 30, 2011, the Task Force completed its review and presented the public with the findings and recommendations in the CNSC Fukushima Task Force Report. The Task Force made 13 recommendations to further enhance the safety of nuclear power plants in Canada. After that, the CNSC established the CNSC Staffs Action Plan based on the Fukushima Task Force's recommendations. In Canada, 19 nuclear power reactor units are currently producing electric power, and all of them are pressurized heavy water-reactor (PHWR) types. Also, considering 2 power reactor units in Korea, Wolsung unit 1 and 2, are the same reactor type, the analysis of the CNSC Staffs Action Plan will be of benefit to determining recommendations of Korea to address lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Therefore, the CNSC Staffs Action Plan was introduced and analyzed in this study. From the results of the above analysis, it is recognized that the strengthening of defense in depth, emergency preparedness and the regulatory oversight of nuclear power plants in Canada were emphasized and much similar to practices of other countries. Public consultation process establishing the CNSC Staffs action plan has been carried out several times, in order to ensure regulatory transparency, by the CNSC staffs, and this is comparable with other countries. It is expected that the detail analysis results of the above plan will be helpful to enhance the safety of domestic operating nuclear power plants.

  20. Analysis of nuclear accidents and associated problems relevant to public perception of risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naschi, G.; Petrangeli, G.

    1993-01-01

    The analytical study of nuclear accidents, even if they are limited in number, forms a significant part of the vast discipline of industrial plant risk analysis. The retrospective analysis of the causes and various elements which contributed to the evolution of real accidents, as well as, the evaluation of the consequences and lessons learned, constitute a bank of information which, when suitably elaborated through a process of rational synthesis, can strongly influence the preparation of safety normatives, plant design specifications, environmental impacts assessments, and the perception of risk. This latter aspect is gaining importance today as growing public awareness and sensitivity towards the development and use of new technologies now bear heavily on new plant decision making. This paper examines how the public perception of risk regarding nuclear energy has been influenced by the events surrounding the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents and the way in which information dissemination concerning these accidents was handled by mass media

  1. What Needs to be Changed based on Lessons Learned from Chernobyl

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abramova, V. N.

    2016-01-01

    aspect, cognitive and operational structures and formalized notation about personnel regulation activity. The researches have shown that individual psychological data of Chernobyl NPP personnel, which could be a direct cause of wrong actions and lead to the accident, were not differ from another nuclear power plant personnel ones. Analysis of psychological aspects of Chernobyl accident and investigation of plant personnel motivation changes in the accident consequences elimination environment confirm the necessity to develop concept of careful relation to worker. It is necessary to develop psychological support methodology to form human capital both in two aspects: professional personality formation and human resource management. The history asks the following questions: have the Chernobyl lessons been learned? Are our contemporaries and next generation ready to provide safety in the nuclear power plants? The terrorist attacks, military actions in the states who have nuclear power plants makes more complex problem of nuclear power plant, all mankind safety. (author)

  2. Stereotype Threat Effects on Learning From a Cognitively Demanding Mathematics Lesson.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lyons, Emily McLaughlin; Simms, Nina; Begolli, Kreshnik N; Richland, Lindsey E

    2018-03-01

    Stereotype threat-a situational context in which individuals are concerned about confirming a negative stereotype-is often shown to impact test performance, with one hypothesized mechanism being that cognitive resources are temporarily co-opted by intrusive thoughts and worries, leading individuals to underperform despite high content knowledge and ability (see Schmader & Beilock, ). We test here whether stereotype threat may also impact initial student learning and knowledge formation when experienced prior to instruction. Predominantly African American fifth-grade students provided either their race or the date before a videotaped, conceptually demanding mathematics lesson. Students who gave their race retained less learning over time, enjoyed the lesson less, reported a diminished desire to learn more, and were less likely to choose to engage in an optional math activity. The detrimental impact was greatest among students with high baseline cognitive resources. While stereotype threat has been well documented to harm test performance, the finding that effects extend to initial learning suggests that stereotype threat's contribution to achievement gaps may be greatly underestimated. Copyright © 2017 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.

  3. Problems of probabilistic safety assessment after Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sugiyama, Naoki

    2011-01-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) methodology to assure nuclear safety is had great expectations of lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident and on the other hand this accident made actualized technical problems of PSA. Effectiveness of current PSA methodology for risk assessment was confirmed by comparing the accident development with accident scenario of PSA and equipment failure rate. From a viewpoint of nuclear safety objective and defense in depth approach of IAEA, technical problems of PSA were (1) extension of PSA for spent fuel pool and waste disposal system as well as level 3PSA for broader environmental contamination and (2) overlapping of accident scenario of plural unit site, balance of high quality plant management and preceding negation, treatment of uncertainty of external events, severe accident measure and human reliability analysis and reflection of disaster prevention capability to level 3PSA. In order to upgrade PSA technology, six proposals were described for nuclear safety and defense in depth, comprehensive evaluation scope and catch-up of latest technology, necessity of strategic preparation of PSA standard, human resources fostering and risk communication. (T. Tanaka)

  4. Lessons learned from the post-emergency TABLETOP exercise in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on August 28 and September 18, 1990

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-07-01

    On August 28 and September 18, 1990, Gulf States Utilities, the States of Louisiana and Mississippi, five local parishes, six Federal agencies, and the American Nuclear Insurers participated in a post-emergency TABLETOP exercise in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The purpose of the exercise was to examine the post-emergency roles, responsibilities, and resources of utility, State, local, Federal and insurance organizations in response to a hypothetical accident at the River Bend Station in Louisiana resulting in a significant release of radiation to the environment. In pursuit of this goal, five major focus areas were addressed: (1) ingestion pathway response; (2) reentry, relocation and return; (3) decontamination of recovery; (4) indemnification of financial losses; and (5) deactivation of the emergency response. This report documents the lessons learned from that exercise

  5. LESSONS LEARNED Biosurveillance Mobile App Development Intern Competition (Summer 2013)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Noonan, Christine F. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Henry, Michael J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Corley, Courtney D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-01-14

    The purpose of the lessons learned document for the BEOWulf Biosurveillance Mobile App Development Intern Competition is to capture the project’s lessons learned in a formal document for use by other project managers on similar future projects. This document may be used as part of new project planning for similar projects in order to determine what problems occurred and how those problems were handled and may be avoided in the future. Additionally, this document details what went well with the project and why, so that other project managers may capitalize on these actions. Project managers may also use this document to determine who the project team members were in order to solicit feedback for planning their projects in the future. This document will be formally communicated with the organization and will become a part of the organizational assets and archives.

  6. QA lessons learned for parameter control from the WIPP Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richards, R.R.

    1998-01-01

    This paper provides a summary of lessons learned from experiences on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WJPP) Project in implementation of quality assurance controls surrounding inputs for performance assessment analysis. Since the performance assessment (PA) process is inherent in compliance determination for any waste repository, these lessons-learned are intended to be useful to investigators, analysts, and Quality Assurance (QA) practitioners working on high level waste disposal projects. On the WIPP Project, PA analyses for regulatory-compliance determination utilized several inter-related computer programs (codes) that mathematically modeled phenomena such as radionuclide release, retardation, and transport. The input information for those codes are the parameters that are the subject of this paper. Parameters were maintained in a computer database, which was then queried electronically by the PA codes whenever input was needed as the analyses were run

  7. The search for active learning: Lessons from a happy accident

    OpenAIRE

    Bashforth, Hedley; Parmar, Nitin R

    2010-01-01

    This article suggests that the concept of ‘active learning’ has different meanings. These meanings are created in the dynamic and variable relationships between the uses of learning technologies and approaches to pedagogy. Institutions play a key role in mediating these relationships, privileging some meanings of ‘active learning’ over others. More dialogical forms of active learning call for changes in the mediating role of the institution. This article draws on a case study of the use of El...

  8. Safety and Mission Assurance for In-House Design Lessons Learned from Ares I Upper Stage

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Joel M.

    2011-01-01

    This viewgraph presentation identifies lessons learned in the course of the Ares I Upper Stage design and in-house development effort. The contents include: 1) Constellation Organization; 2) Upper Stage Organization; 3) Presentation Structure; 4) Lesson-Importance of Systems Engineering/Integration; 5) Lesson-Importance of Early S&MA Involvement; 6) Lesson-Importance of Appropriate Staffing Levels; 7) Lesson-Importance S&MA Team Deployment; 8) Lesson-Understanding of S&MA In-Line Engineering versus Assurance; 9) Lesson-Importance of Close Coordination between Supportability and Reliability/Maintainability; 10) Lesson-Importance of Engineering Data Systems; 11) Lesson-Importance of Early Development of Supporting Databases; 12) Lesson-Importance of Coordination with Safety Assessment/Review Panels; 13) Lesson-Implementation of Software Reliability; 14) Lesson-Implementation of S&MA Technical Authority/Chief S&MA Officer; 15) Lesson-Importance of S&MA Evaluation of Project Risks; 16) Lesson-Implementation of Critical Items List and Government Mandatory Inspections; 17) Lesson-Implementation of Critical Items List Mandatory Inspections; 18) Lesson-Implementation of Test Article Safety Analysis; and 19) Lesson-Importance of Procurement Quality.

  9. Lessons learned about ageing and gerontological nursing in South Africa

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Staja Q. Booker

    2015-07-01

    Full Text Available Background: The unprecedented global growth in older adults merits high-quality gerontological nursing care. As gerontological nursing grows in visibility in developed and developing countries, nurses must possess a broader worldview of ageing with knowledge of physiological, psychosocial, and cultural issues. Purpose: The purpose of this article is to: (1 highlight lessons learned on differences and similarities in ageing and care of older adults in the United States of America (USA and South Africa (SA; and (2 provide recommendations on how to advance gerontological nursingeducation in SA. Methods: A two-week international service-learning project was undertaken by visiting SA and learning about their nursing system and care of older adults. Service-learning is an innovative teaching-learning-service method that provided reflective and hands-on experience of gerontological nursing. This article provides a personal reflection of lessons learned about ageing and gerontological nursing during the service-learning project. Findings: Care of older adults in SA is in many ways different from and similar to that in the USA. Consequently global nurses should recognise those differences and provide culturally appropriate care. This service-learning experience also demonstrated the need for gerontological nursing education in SA. Based on this, recommendations on how to infuse and advance gerontological nursing education in SA are provided. Conclusion: Caring for older adults in a global context requires knowledge and understanding of cultures and their values and practices. With a growing population of diverse older adults, there is a need for incorporation

  10. Job Oriented Training ’Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-11-01

    Job Oriented Training ’Lessons Learned’ Job Oriented Training (JOT), een vorm van trainen waarbij de cursist zelfstandig, zonder theorie vooraf...39 77 lnfo-DenV@tno.nl TNO-rapportnummer TNO-DV 2008 A447 Opdrachtnummer Datum november 2008 Auteur (s) drs. H.E. Stubbe dr. A.H. van der...onderlinge discussie over achterliggende overwegingen te stimuleren. Zij hebben op dat moment nog geen theorie aangeboden gekregen en zijn niet op de hoogte

  11. PUREX/UO3 Facilities deactivation lessons learned history

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gerber, M.S.

    1996-09-19

    accompanied by and were an integral part of sweeping ``culture changes,`` the story of the lessons learned during the PUREX Deactivation Project are worth recounting. Foremost among the lessons is recognizing the benefits of ``right to left`` project planning. A deactivation project must start by identifying its end points, then make every task, budget, and organizational decision based on reaching those end points. Along with this key lesson is the knowledge that project planning and scheduling should be tied directly to costing, and the project status should be checked often (more often than needed to meet mandated reporting requirements) to reflect real-time work. People working on a successful project should never be guessing about its schedule or living with a paper schedule that does not represent the actual state of work. Other salient lessons were learned in the PUREX/UO3 Deactivation Project that support these guiding principles. They include recognizing the value of independent review, teamwork, and reengineering concepts; the need and value of cooperation between the DOE, its contractors, regulators, and stakeholders; and the essential nature of early and ongoing communication. Managing a successful project also requires being willing to take a fresh look at safety requirements and to apply them in a streamlined and sensible manner to deactivating facilities; draw on the enormous value of resident knowledge acquired by people over years and sometimes decades of working in old plants; and recognize the value of bringing in outside expertise for certain specialized tasks.This approach makes possible discovering the savings that can come when many creative options are pursued persistently and the wisdom of leaving some decisions to the future. The essential job of a deactivation project is to place a facility in a safe, stable, low-maintenance mode, for an interim period. Specific end points are identified to recognize and document this state. Keeping the limited

  12. Lessons Learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Amanda Phelan BNS, MSc, PhD

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available The public health nurses’ scope of practice explicitly includes child protection within their role, which places them in a prime position to identify child protection concerns. This role compliments that of other professions and voluntary agenices who work with children. Public health nurses are in a privileged position as they form a relationship with the child’s parent(s/guardian(s and are able to see the child in its own environment, which many professionals cannot. Child protection in Ireland, while influenced by other countries, has progressed through a distinct pathway that streamlined protocols and procedures. However, despite the above serious failures have occurred in the Irish system, and inquiries over the past 20 years persistently present similar contributing factors, namely, the lack of standardized and comprehensive service responses. Moreover, poor practice is compounded by the lack of recognition of the various interactional processes taking place within and between the different agencies of child protection, leading to psychological barriers in communication. This article will explore the lessons learned for public health nurses practice in safeguarding children in the Republic of Ireland.

  13. Lessons Learned from FUSRAP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Castillo, Darina [U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management; Carpenter, Cliff [U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management; Miller, Michele [Navarro Research and Engineering

    2016-03-06

    The US DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) is the long-term steward for 90 sites remediated under numerous regulatory regimes including the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) sites. In addition, LM holds considerable historical information, gathered in the 1970s, to determine site eligibility for remediation under FUSRAP. To date, 29 FUSRAP sites are in LM’s inventory of sites for long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS&M), and 25 are with the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for remediation or in the process of being transitioned to LM. It is forecasted that 13 FUSRAP sites will transfer from the USACE to LM over the next 10 years; however, the timing of the transfers is strongly dependent upon federal funding of the ongoing remedial actions. Historically, FUSRAP sites were generally cleaned up for “unrestricted” industrial use or remediated to the “cleanup standards” at that time, and their use remained unchanged. Today, these sites as well as the adjacent properties are now changing or envisioned to have changes in land use, typically from industrial to commercial or residential uses. The implication of land-use change affects DOE’s LTS&M responsibility for the sites under LM stewardship as well as the planning for the additional sites scheduled to transition in time. Coinciding with land-use changes at or near FUSRAP sites is an increased community awareness of these sites. As property development increases near FUSRAP sites, the general public and interested stakeholders regularly inquire about the sufficiency of cleanups that impact their neighborhoods and communities. LM has used this experience to address a series of lessons learned to improve our program management in light of the changing conditions of our sites. We describe these lessons learned as (1) improved stakeholder relations, (2) enhanced LTS&M requirements for the sites, and (3) greater involvement in the transition process.

  14. The role of failure/problems in engineering: A commentary of failures experienced - lessons learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ryan, R. S.

    1992-03-01

    The written version of a series of seminars given to several aerospace companies and three NASA centers are presented. The results are lessons learned through a study of the problems experienced in 35 years of engineering. The basic conclusion is that the primary cause of problems has not been mission technologies, as important as technology is, but the neglect of basic principles. Undergirding this is the lack of a systems focus from determining requirements through design, verification, and operations phases. Many of the concepts discussed are fundamental to total quality management (TQM) and can be used to augment this product enhanced philosophy. Fourteen principles are addressed with problems experienced and are used as examples. Included is a discussion of the implication of constraints, poorly defined requirements, and schedules. Design guidelines, lessons learned, and future tasks are listed. Two additional sections are included that deal with personal lessons learned and thoughts on future thrusts (TQM).

  15. The role of failure/problems in engineering: A commentary of failures experienced - lessons learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ryan, R. S.

    1992-01-01

    The written version of a series of seminars given to several aerospace companies and three NASA centers are presented. The results are lessons learned through a study of the problems experienced in 35 years of engineering. The basic conclusion is that the primary cause of problems has not been mission technologies, as important as technology is, but the neglect of basic principles. Undergirding this is the lack of a systems focus from determining requirements through design, verification, and operations phases. Many of the concepts discussed are fundamental to total quality management (TQM) and can be used to augment this product enhanced philosophy. Fourteen principles are addressed with problems experienced and are used as examples. Included is a discussion of the implication of constraints, poorly defined requirements, and schedules. Design guidelines, lessons learned, and future tasks are listed. Two additional sections are included that deal with personal lessons learned and thoughts on future thrusts (TQM).

  16. Achieving Balance: Lessons Learned from University and College Presidents

    Science.gov (United States)

    Havice, Pamela A.; Williams, Frankie K.

    2005-01-01

    This study investigated strategies used by college and university presidents in balancing their professional and personal lives. The conceptual framework for this study comes from the work of Schein (1985, 1992). Lessons learned and words of wisdom from these presidents can enhance leadership effectiveness at all levels in higher education.

  17. Learned lessons of the radiological accident occurred in La Ciudadela of El Cementerio, Gran Caracas. September 2005; Lecciones aprendidas del accidente radiologico ocurrido en La Ciudadela de El Cementerio, Gran Caracas. Septiembre 2005

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lea, D.; Cubillan, Y.; Figuera, J.L.; Mora, G.; Pacheco, J.; Yanez, H.; Carrizales, L. [Servicio de Radiofisica Sanitaria (RFS), Unidad de Tecnologia Nuclear, Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Cientificas (IVIC), Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia, Carretera Panamericana Km. 11, Altos del Pipe, Caracas (Venezuela)]. e-mail: dlea@ivic.ve

    2006-07-01

    On September 20, 2005 when a mission conformed by five (05) officials: two (02) belonging to the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEP) and three (03) of the Ministry of Health (MS) it was prepared to carry out a routine inspection in the one temporary warehouse of sources in disuse located in La Ciudadela of El Cementerio, identified administratively as Warehouse Number 5 (MS) Area X, noticed that those armor-plating that kept the radioactive sources of Cs-137 had been violated. Those people that entered to the warehouse were able to extract the armor-plating in whose interior its were found an important number of sources of Cs-137 in disuse, used in the decade of 70 and 80 in treatment of cancer of the uterine neck, by means of the Brachytherapy technique of Differed charge manual, low dose rate, as well as, lead sheets with the apparent intention of selling them as junk. The intruders extracted a total of 58 radioactive sources of Cs-137 of its armor-plating for then to disperse them inside warehouse and in the external areas to this. An important number of the dispersed sources its had lost it integrity what gave place to a combined scenario of exposed dispersed sources in a public area with the danger of radioactive contamination by Cs-137. A task force conformed by the following institutions: Ministry of Health (MS), Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MENPET), Venezuelan Institute of Scientific Investigations (IVIC), Unit of Dangerous Materials of the Metropolitan Firemen under the coordination of Civil Protection (PC) it was the one in charge of responding to the radiological accident, of conformity to the National Plan for the Answer to Radiological Accidents. All the radioactive sources dispersed in La Ciudadela achieved to be recovered. The experience of the accident and as learned lesson it was the importance of harmonizing the Generic Procedures for the Evaluation and Answer during Radiological Emergencies, IAEA-TECDOC-1162 technical document, Vienna, August

  18. Perceived Advantages of 3D Lessons in Constructive Learning for South African Student Teachers Encountering Learning Barriers

    Science.gov (United States)

    de Jager, Thelma

    2017-01-01

    Research shows that three-dimensional (3D)-animated lessons can contribute to student teachers' effective learning and comprehension, regardless of the learning barriers they experience. Student teachers majoring in the subject Life Sciences in General Subject Didactics viewed 3D images of the heart during lectures. The 3D images employed in the…

  19. MDEP Design-Specific Common Position CP-APR1400WG-01. Common position addressing Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-05-01

    The MDEP APR1400 Working Group (APR1400WG) members consist of members from Republic of Korea, United Arab Emirates, and the United States. A main objectives of MDEP is to encourage convergence of code, standard and safety goals with exploring the opportunities for harmonization of regulatory practice and cooperation on safety review of APR-1400 specific designs. This common position addressing is aimed at sharing knowledge, information and experience on safety improvement related to lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident or Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident-related issues amongst APR-1400 WG member states to achieve the MEDP goal. Because not all of these Regulators have completed the regulatory review of their APR1400 applications yet, this paper identifies common preliminary approaches to address potential safety improvements for APR1400 plants, as well as common general expectations for new nuclear power plants, as related to lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident or Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident-related issues. While some asymmetry exists among those of three Regulators in terms of design, regulatory practice and licensing milestone sharing information and common understanding on post-Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident enhancement would be promote resilient design for countering beyond design extreme external event like Fukushima Daiichi NPP nuclear disaster. This common position paper aims at identifying characteristics of post-Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident enhancements putting in place by each country and setting common position to achieve balanced and harmonized APR-1400 design. After the safety reviews of the APR1400 design applications that are currently in review are completed, the regulators will update this paper to reflect their safety conclusions regarding the APR1400 design and how the design could be enhanced to address Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident-related issues. The common preliminary approaches are organised into

  20. Lessons offered, lessons learned: reflections on how doing family therapy can affect therapists.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Heatherington, Laurie; Friedlander, Myrna L; Diamond, Gary M

    2014-08-01

    Only in working conjointly with couples and families do therapists literally witness clients struggling to improve their most intimate relationships. In writing this article, we realized that, in true systemic fashion, not only have many of our clients benefited from working with us, but also we have learned some invaluable lessons from them. Indeed, practicing couple and family therapy gives therapists many opportunities to learn about themselves, especially when it is done thoughtfully. In this article, we reflect on myriad ways in which couples and family therapy has affected each of us personally-as individuals, as partners, as parents, as adult children in our families of origin, and as educators. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  1. ADVANTAGES, DISADVANTAGES, AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM MULTI-REACTOR DECOMMISSIONING PROJECTS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morton, M.R.; Nielson, R.R.; Trevino, R.A.

    2003-01-01

    This paper discusses the Reactor Interim Safe Storage (ISS) Project within the decommissioning projects at the Hanford Site and reviews the lessons learned from performing four large reactor decommissioning projects sequentially. The advantages and disadvantages of this multi-reactor decommissioning project are highlighted

  2. Combat Trauma Lessons Learned from Military Operations of 2001 - 2013

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-03-09

    suspected tension pneumothorax  Longer needle for needle decompression  Lateral approach for needle decompression  Vented chest seals for open...Defense Health Board Combat Trauma Lessons Learned from Military Operations of 2001-2013 March 9, 2015 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF...

  3. Moving Forward with Lessons Learned About Long-term Radioactive Waste Management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Atherton, Elizabeth; Dalton, John [UK Nirex Ltd., Harwell (United Kingdom)

    2006-09-15

    A range of lessons have been identified from previous attempts to implement long term radioactive waste management policy in the UK and internationally. Many of these relate to the way the decision-making process is undertaken and the fact that there needs to be an open, transparent process that enables continuous stakeholder involvement. Nirex believes that using the SEA and EIA frameworks will help to incorporate the lessons learned into the future decision-making process relating to long-term radioactive waste management.

  4. Moving Forward with Lessons Learned About Long-term Radioactive Waste Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Atherton, Elizabeth; Dalton, John

    2006-01-01

    A range of lessons have been identified from previous attempts to implement long term radioactive waste management policy in the UK and internationally. Many of these relate to the way the decision-making process is undertaken and the fact that there needs to be an open, transparent process that enables continuous stakeholder involvement. Nirex believes that using the SEA and EIA frameworks will help to incorporate the lessons learned into the future decision-making process relating to long-term radioactive waste management

  5. Community emergency response to nuclear power plant accidents: A selected and partially annotated bibliography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Youngen, G.

    1988-10-01

    The role of responding to emergencies at nuclear power plants is often considered the responsibility of the personnel onsite. This is true for most, if not all, of the incidents that may happen during the course of the plant's operating lifetime. There is however, the possibility of a major accident occurring at anytime. Major nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island have taught their respective countries and communities a significant lesson in local emergency preparedness and response. Through these accidents, the rest of the world can also learn a great deal about planning, preparing and responding to the emergencies unique to nuclear power. This bibliography contains books, journal articles, conference papers and government reports on emergency response to nuclear power plant accidents. It does not contain citations for ''onsite'' response or planning, nor does it cover the areas of radiation releases from transportation accidents. The compiler has attempted to bring together a sampling of the world's collective written experience on dealing with nuclear reactor accidents on the sate, local and community levels. Since the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, that written experience has grown enormously

  6. Community emergency response to nuclear power plant accidents: A selected and partially annotated bibliography

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Youngen, G.

    1988-10-01

    The role of responding to emergencies at nuclear power plants is often considered the responsibility of the personnel onsite. This is true for most, if not all, of the incidents that may happen during the course of the plant`s operating lifetime. There is however, the possibility of a major accident occurring at anytime. Major nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island have taught their respective countries and communities a significant lesson in local emergency preparedness and response. Through these accidents, the rest of the world can also learn a great deal about planning, preparing and responding to the emergencies unique to nuclear power. This bibliography contains books, journal articles, conference papers and government reports on emergency response to nuclear power plant accidents. It does not contain citations for ``onsite`` response or planning, nor does it cover the areas of radiation releases from transportation accidents. The compiler has attempted to bring together a sampling of the world`s collective written experience on dealing with nuclear reactor accidents on the sate, local and community levels. Since the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, that written experience has grown enormously.

  7. Development of an HIV Prevention Videogame: Lessons Learned

    OpenAIRE

    Kimberly Hieftje; Lynn E. Fiellin; Tyra Pendergrass; Lindsay R Duncan

    2016-01-01

    The use of videogames interventions is becoming an increasingly popular and effective strategy in disease prevention and health promotion; however, few health videogame interventions have been scientifically rigorously evaluated for their efficacy. Moreover, few examples of the formative process used to develop and evaluate evidence-based health videogame interventions exist in the scientific literature. The following paper provides valuable insight into the lessons learned during the process...

  8. Facilitating relative comparisons of health impacts from postulated accidents in environmental impact statements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, C.J.

    1996-01-01

    Current US Department of Energy (DOE) guidance on the performance of accident analyses supported an environmental impact statement (EIS) stresses a graded approach that emphasizes the most important risks, calls for the evaluation of frequencies as well as consequences for severe accident scenarios, and discourages the use of bounding analyses that confound risk comparisons among EIS alternatives. This paper discusses methods in probabilistic risk analysis that were developed and applied in defining accidents and generating radiological source terms for the DOE Draft Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (WM PEIS); publication of the Final WM PEIS is due in late summer 1996. The strengths and shortcomings of the cited probabilistic risk analysis methods used to evaluate facility accidents are addressed, both as they relate to the WM PEIS and as they relate to more general EIS applications. Key guidance is discussed that was developed by DOE and used in shaping the techniques cited herein for application in an EIS. Related perceptions on accidents observed from the public comment process for the WM PEIS are cited. Finally, recommendations are made on the basis of needs as well as lessons learned in implementing the accident analysis for the WM PEIS

  9. Lessons Learned and Regulatory Countermeasures of Nuclear Safety Issues Last Year

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Y. E. [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-05-15

    Competitiveness of nuclear as the electric resource in terms of the least cost and the carbon abatement has been debated. Some institutions insist that the radioactive wastes management cost, nuclear accident cost and cheap shale gas would make the nuclear energy less competitive, while others still address the ability of nuclear energy as economical and low-carbon electric resource. This situation reminds that ensuring nuclear safety is the most important prerequisite to use of nuclear energy. Therefore, this paper will compare the different views on future nuclear competitiveness discussed right after the Fukushima accident and summarize the lessons learned and regulatory countermeasures from nuclear safety issues last year. Korea has improved the effectiveness of safety regulation up to now and still has been making efforts on further enhancing nuclear safety. The outcomes of these efforts have resulted in a high level of safety in Korean NPPs and contributing largely to the global nuclear safety through sharing and exchanging the information and knowledge of our nuclear experiences. However, now we are faced with the new challenges such as decreasing the public. Additionally, public criticism of the regulatory activities demands more clear regulatory guides and transparent process. Recently, new president announced the 'Priority to Safety and Public Trust' as the precondition to utilize the nuclear energy. We will continue to make much more efforts for the improvement of the quality of regulatory activities and effectiveness of regulatory decision making process than we have done so far. Competence through effective capacity building would be a helpful pathway to build up the public trust and ensure the acceptable level of nuclear safety. We are set to prepare the action items to be taken in the near future for improving the technical competency and transparency as the essential components of the national safety and will make efforts to implement them

  10. OSSA - An optimized approach to severe accident management: EPR application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sauvage, E. C.; Prior, R.; Coffey, K.; Mazurkiewicz, S. M.

    2006-01-01

    There is a recognized need to provide nuclear power plant technical staff with structured guidance for response to a potential severe accident condition involving core damage and potential release of fission products to the environment. Over the past ten years, many plants worldwide have implemented such guidance for their emergency technical support center teams either by following one of the generic approaches, or by developing fully independent approaches. There are many lessons to be learned from the experience of the past decade, in developing, implementing, and validating severe accident management guidance. Also, though numerous basic approaches exist which share common principles, there are differences in the methodology and application of the guidelines. AREVA/Framatome-ANP is developing an optimized approach to severe accident management guidance in a project called OSSA ('Operating Strategies for Severe Accidents'). There are still numerous operating power plants which have yet to implement severe accident management programs. For these, the option to use an updated approach which makes full use of lessons learned and experience, is seen as a major advantage. Very few of the current approaches covers all operating plant states, including shutdown states with the primary system closed and open. Although it is not necessary to develop an entirely new approach in order to add this capability, the opportunity has been taken to develop revised full scope guidance covering all plant states in addition to the fuel in the fuel building. The EPR includes at the design phase systems and measures to minimize the risk of severe accident and to mitigate such potential scenarios. This presents a difference in comparison with existing plant, for which severe accidents where not considered in the design. Thought developed for all type of plants, OSSA will also be applied on the EPR, with adaptations designed to take into account its favourable situation in that field

  11. Evolutionary Acquisition of the Global Command and Control System: Lessons Learned

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Wallis, Johnathan

    1998-01-01

    This paper summarizes a "lessons learned" study that reviews DoD's approach to managing the GCCS program on behalf on the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/C3I...

  12. The Implementation of Lesson Study in English Language Learning: A Case Study

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wakhid Nashruddin

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available Lesson Study as a growing interest in the education world has attracted educators, experts, and professionals in the area to make use of it in improving the lessons—it also happens in Indonesia. Originally applied in the teaching of mathematics in Japan, now it turns to be used in other fields, and English is one of them. This paper highlights the guideline on Lesson Study and pictures its application in a private senior high school in Malang, East Java, Indonesia. The adaptation of Lesson Study is interesting since Japan and Indonesia have different cultural background. How Lesson Study is usually implemented in Japan and the US and how it is applied in Indonesia will be seen here. As this is a case study, it will only focus on a school and the result should not be used to generalize Lesson Study applications in Indonesia. Interview and observation were instruments used in this study. The interview was used to gain information on how Lesson Study was normally conducted and observation (and the researchers’ involvements was used to see the real implementation of Lesson Study. What happened during the implementation of Lesson Study and during the teaching and learning process become a great attention here.

  13. Public perception of radioactive waste management and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Curd, J.

    1989-01-01

    Information officers from United Kingdom Nirex Ltd have been dealing with one of industry's most intractable public relations programmes for five years. Mistakes have been made but lessons have been learned and are now being applied to the Company's current programme - the deep underground disposal of solid low-level and intermediate-level radioactive waste. (author)

  14. Development of Parameter Network for Accident Management Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pak, Sukyoung; Ahemd, Rizwan; Heo, Gyunyoung [Kyung Hee Univ., Yongin (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Jung Taek; Park, Soo Yong; Ahn, Kwang Il [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-10-15

    When a severe accident happens, it is hard to obtain the necessary information to understand of internal status because of the failure or damage of instrumentation and control systems. We learned the lessons from Fukushima accident that internal instrumentation system should be secured and must have ability to react in serious conditions. While there might be a number of methods to reinforce the integrity of instrumentation systems, we focused on the use of redundant behavior of plant parameters without additional hardware installation. Specifically, the objective of this study is to estimate the replaced value which is able to identify internal status by using set of available signals when it is impossible to use instrumentation information in a severe accident, which is the continuation of the paper which was submitted at the last KNS meeting. The concept of the VPN was suggested to improve the quality of parameters particularly to be logged during severe accidents in NPPs using a software based approach, and quantize the importance of each parameter for further maintenance. In the future, we will continue to perform the same analysis to other accident scenarios and extend the spectrum of initial conditions so that we are able to get more sets of VPNs and ANN models to predict the behavior of accident scenarios. The suggested method has the uncertainty underlain in the analysis code for severe accidents. However, In case of failure to the safety critical instrumentation, the information from the VPN would be available to carry out safety management operation.

  15. Chernobyl NPP accident. Overcoming experience. Acquired lessons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nosovskij, A.V.; Vasil'chenko, V.N.; Klyuchnikov, A.A.; Prister, B.S.

    2006-01-01

    This book is devoted to the 20 anniversary of accident on the Chernobyl NPP unit 4. History of construction, causes of the accident and its consequences, actions for its mitigation are described. Modern situation with Chernobyl NPP decommissioning and transferring of 'Ukryttya' shelter into ecologically safe system are mentioned. The future of Chernobyl site and exclusion zone was discussed

  16. Lessons learned by southern states in designating alternative routes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-08-01

    The purpose of this report is to discuss the ''lessons learned'' by the five states within the southem region that have designated alternative or preferred routes under the regulations of the Department of Transportation (DOT) established for the transportation of radioactive materials. The document was prepared by reviewing applicable federal laws and regulations, examining state reports and documents and contacting state officials and routing agencies involved in making routing decisions. In undertaking this project, the Southern States Energy Board hopes to reveal the process used by states that have designated alternative routes and thereby share their experiences (i.e., lessons learned) with other southern states that have yet to make designations. Under DOT regulations (49 CFR 177.826), carriers of highway route controlled quantities of radioactive materials (which include spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste) must use preferred routes selected to reduce time in transit. Such preferred routes consist of (1) an interstate system highway with use of an interstate system bypass or beltway around cities when available, and (2) alternate routes selected by a ''state routing agency.''

  17. Lessons learned after three years of legalized, recreational marijuana: The Colorado experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ghosh, Tista S; Vigil, Daniel I; Maffey, Ali; Tolliver, Rickey; Van Dyke, Mike; Kattari, Leonardo; Krug, Heather; Reed, Jack K; Wolk, Larry

    2017-11-01

    In November 2012 Colorado voters approved legalized recreational marijuana. On January 1, 2014 Colorado became the first state to allow legal sales of non-medical marijuana for adults over the age of 21. Since that time, the state has been monitoring potential impacts on population health. In this paper we present lessons learned in the first three years following legal sales of recreational marijuana. These lessons pertain to health behaviors and health outcomes, as well as to health policy issues. Our intent is to share these lessons with other states as they face the prospect of recreational marijuana legalization. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  18. MDEP Common Position CP-STC-02. Common Position Addressing Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-09-01

    Following the nuclear accident in Japan as a consequence of the earthquake and tsunami, the MDEP Members provide the following information, based on initial information available, to ensure adequate safety of new reactor design activities being undertaken pursuant to the MDEP program of work. Due to the extensive nature of the magnitude and duration of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, it is important to consider lessons learnt at an early stage of the design. In this context, the extensive work done by the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, is also acknowledged. Vendors, licensees and applicants involved in New Design activities should examine the implications of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident and identify relevant issues to be taken into account to strengthen defense in depth. Those lessons learnt should include, but not be limited to, plans to assess the following: - Provisions taken in the design basis concerning flooding, earthquake, other extreme natural phenomena and combinations of external event hazards appropriate to each country, - The robustness of the plant to maintain its safety functions beyond the design basis hazards, - The capability of the plant to withstand extended loss of all electrical power supplies as well as prolonged loss of ultimate heat sink and other essential supplies, and - The capability of the plant to cope with such extreme situations, including provisions to manage severe accidents (such as combustible gas management). In assessing these areas, the effect of multiple units and nuclear fuel storages should be considered. The MDEP regulators will strive to harmonize approaches to incorporate lessons learnt in their ongoing national safety reviews of new reactors. Based on the design-specific common positions, this paper identifies the approaches to address potential safety improvements for several designs as related to lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident or related issues. Designs being

  19. Providing Simulated Online and Mobile Learning Experiences in a Prison Education Setting: Lessons Learned from the PLEIADES Pilot Project

    Science.gov (United States)

    Farley, Helen; Murphy, Angela; Bedford, Tasman

    2014-01-01

    This article reports on the preliminary findings, design criteria and lessons learned while developing and piloting an alternative to traditional print-based education delivery within a prison environment. PLEIADES (Portable Learning Environments for Incarcerated Distance Education Students), was designed to provide incarcerated students with…

  20. 241-SY-101 air lance removal lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, T.L.; Titzler, P.A.

    1994-01-01

    An emergency task was undertaken to remove four air lances and one thermocouple (TC) tree from tank 241-SY-101 (SY-101). This resulted from video observation that these pipes were being severely bent during periodic gas release events that regularly occurred every three to four months. At the time, the gas release events were considered to be the number one safety issue within the US Department of Energy (DOE) complex. This emergency removal task was undertaken on an extremely short schedule that required all activities possible to be completed in parallel. This approach and extremely short schedule, while successful, resulted in some undesirable consequences from less than desired time for design, reviews, equipment testing, operations training, and bad weather conditions. These consequences included leakage of liquid waste from the containers to the ground, higher than expected dose rates at the container surface, difficult field operations, and unexpected pipe configuration during removal. In addition, changes to environmental regulations and severe winter weather impacted the packaging and shipping activities required the prepare the removed pipes for storage at the Central Waste Complex (CWC). The purpose of this document is to identify lessons to be learned for future activities. In context of the emergency conditions that existed at the time and the urgency to remove these pipes, their removal was successfully completed under extremely difficult conditions and schedule. The success of the task should not be overshadowed by the desire to identify areas needing improvement and lessons to be learned. Many of the lessons identified in this document have already resulted in improved conduct of operations and engineering

  1. Environmental Studies, Section V: Oceanography. Learning Carrel Lesson 6.15: Pollution of the Oceans. Study Guide and Script.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Boyer, Robert; And Others

    This is one of a series of 14 instructional components of a semester-long, environmental earth science course developed for undergraduate students. The course includes lectures, discussion sessions, and individual learning carrel lessons. Presented are the study guide and script for a learning carrel lesson on pollution of the oceans. The slides,…

  2. Writing Learning Outcomes for English Language Lessons in Multilingual Schools

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jones, Sally Ann

    2016-01-01

    This article proposes a pedagogic innovation in teacher education by articulating a method for writing learning outcomes for English language lessons in multilingual school contexts. The argument for this approach is founded on curriculum studies; however, the practice also draws specifically on applied psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic…

  3. Implementation of problem-based learning in geometry lessons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ahamad, S. N. S. H.; Li, H.-C.; Shahrill, M.; Prahmana, R. C. I.

    2017-12-01

    The aim of this study is twofold. Firstly, it aims to examine the effects of the Problem-Based Learning (PBL) approach on students’ performance in the learning of geometry. Secondly, it seeks to gain insights from the students regarding the implementation of PBL in geometry lessons. The participants were 22 students from one Year 10 class in a co-educational secondary school in Brunei Darussalam. A mixed method design was employed with data collected from the pre-, post- and retention tests, and interviews. The findings from this study revealed positive influences on students’ performance in learning geometry as gain and retention of knowledge was observed. Meanwhile, mixed responses from the interviews implied that in terms of 1) learning attitudes, students favoured the idea of independent learning but some critiqued that the process of PBL might be time-consuming; 2) learning difficulties, some students struggled in assimilating information leading to poor decision- making; and 3) knowledge and skills, some students believed to have nurtured some skills such as communication and research skills.

  4. Wikiwijs: An unexpected journey and the lessons learned towards OER

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Robert Schuwer

    2014-04-01

    Full Text Available The Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science has funded a five years program to encourage the use, creation and sharing of Open Educational Resources (OER by teachers from various types of education. This program is known as Wikiwijs. Ultimo 2013, the program has come to an end. As some of the assumptions at the start of Wikiwijs proved to work out in unexpected ways the lessons learned could fuel the next steps in developing Wikiwijs. Besides, other national initiatives on opening up education may also benefit from the lessons learned reported here. The main conclusion from five years Wikiwijs was that to accomplish mainstreaming OER, the Wikiwijs program should go along with other interventions that are more oriented toward prescriptive policies and regulations. In particular: the Dutch government should be more directive in persuading executive boards and teachers on schools to adopt OER as an important part of educational reform and the acquisition of 21st century skills.

  5. Savannah River Site environmental restoration lessons learned program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Plunkett, R.A.; Leibfarth, E.C.; Treger, T.M.; Blackmon, A.M.

    1993-01-01

    For the past three years environmental restoration has been formally consolidated at Savannah River Site. Accomplishments include waste site investigations to closure activities. Positive, as well as negatively impacting, events have occurred. Until recently, lessons learned were captured on a less than formal basis. Now, a program based upon critiques, evaluations and corrective actions is being used. This presentation reviews the development, implementation and use of that program

  6. Reconstruction of the Chernobyl emergency and accident management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schinner, F.; Andreev, I.; Andreeva, I.; Fritsche, F.; Hofer, P.; Lettner, E.; Seidelberger, E.; Kromp-Kolb, H.; Kromp, W.

    1998-01-01

    Full text of publication follows: on April 26, 1986 the most serious civil technological accident in the history of mankind occurred of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) in the former Soviet Union. As a direct result of the accident, the reactor was severely destroyed and large quantities of radionuclides were released. Some 800000 persons, also called 'liquidators' - including plant operators, fire-fighters, scientists, technicians, construction workers, emergency managers, volunteers, as well as medical and military personnel - were part of emergency measurements and accident management efforts. Activities included measures to prevent the escalation of the accident, mitigation actions, help for victims as well as activities in order to provide a basic infrastructure for this unprecedented and overwhelming task. The overall goal of the 'Project Chernobyl' of the Institute of Risk Research of the University of Vienna was to preserve for mankind the experience and knowledge of the experts among the 'liquidators' before it is lost forever. One method used to reconstruct the emergency measures of Chernobyl was the direct cooperation with liquidators. Simple questionnaires were distributed among liquidators and a database of leading accident managers, engineers, medical experts etc. was established. During an initial struggle with a number of difficulties, the response was sparse. However, after an official permit had been issued, the questionnaires delivered a wealth of data. Furthermore a documentary archive was established, which provided additional information. The multidimensional problem in connection with the severe accident of Chernobyl, the clarification of the causes of the accident, as well as failures and successes and lessons to be learned from the Chernobyl emergency measures and accident management are discussed. (authors)

  7. Implementation of Defence in Depth at Nuclear Power Plants. Lessons Learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lachaume, Jean-Luc; Miller, Douglass; Rzentkowski, Greg; Lahtinen, Nina; Valtonen, Keijo; Foucher, Laurent; Harikumar, Shri S.; Yamada, Tomoho; Sharafutdinov, Rashet; Kuznetsov, Mark; Carlsson, Lennart; Hanberg, Jan; Theiss, Klaus; Holahan, Gary; Williams, Donna; Nuenighoff, Kay; Wattelle, Emmanuel; Lazo, Edward; White, Andrew; Reig, Javier; Salgado, Nancy; Weightman, Mike

    2016-01-01

    Defence in depth (DiD) is a concept that has been used for many years alongside tools to optimise nuclear safety in reactor design, assessment and regulation. The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident raised many questions and gave unique insight into nuclear safety issues, including DiD. In June 2013, the NEA held a Joint Workshop on Challenges and Enhancements to DiD in Light of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident (NEA, 2014), organised by the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and the NEA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA). It was noted at the time that further work would be beneficial to enhance nuclear safety worldwide, especially with regard to the implementation of DiD. Accordingly, a senior-level task group (STG) was set up to produce a regulatory guidance booklet that would assist member countries in the use of DiD, taking into account lessons learnt from the 2011 accident. This regulatory guidance booklet builds on the work of this NEA workshop, of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) and of other members of the STG. It uses as its basis the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group's Defence in Depth in Nuclear Safety study (INSAG-10) (IAEA, 1996). The booklet provides insights into the implementation of DiD by regulators and emergency management authorities after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, aiming to enhance global harmonisation by providing guidance on: - the background to the DiD concept; - the need for independent effectiveness among the safety provisions for the various DiD levels, to the extent practicable; - the need for greater attention to reinforce prevention and mitigation at the various levels; - the vital importance of ensuring that common cause and common mode failures, especially external events acting in combination, do not lead to breaches of safety provisions at several DiD levels, taking note of the

  8. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident. Technical Volume 2/5. Safety Assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-08-01

    safety systems. Section 2.4 describes the accident management provisions and their implementation. All components of accident management are discussed, both preventive (before core melt) and mitigative (after core melt or severe accident). The section covers hardware provisions, emergency operating procedures, severe accident operating procedures, human resources and organizational arrangements, including training and drills. Interface with the off-site emergency arrangements is also discussed. Section 2.5 deals with the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for nuclear safety in Japan up to the time of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. It evaluates this framework and its contribution to the accident, and identifies lessons learned. Section 2.6 analyses the human and organizational aspects of the accident. It examines the main stakeholders of nuclear safety in Japan and shows how their actions were interrelated and interconnected, thereby reinforcing basic assumptions about nuclear safety that prevented them from adequately preparing for such an accident. The section analyses why the accident happened despite advancements in nuclear safety in areas such as solid design, peer reviews, regulatory frameworks, safety assessment methodologies, years of successful operating experience, defence in depth, emergency preparedness, severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs) and a strong international commitment to nuclear safety. Finally, Section 2.7 addresses the role of operating experience in improving plant design and operation in order to continuously improve nuclear safety and support defence in depth. The section assesses the TEPCO operating experience programme and the extent to which lessons were learned from events both in Japan and internationally, and the design changes made

  9. Improving the Identification, Dissemination and Implementation of Deactivation and Decommissioning Lessons Learned and Best Practices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waisley, Sandra L.; Lackey, Michael B.; Dusek, Lansing G.

    2008-01-01

    Approximately $150 billion of work currently remains in the United States Department of Energy's (DoE's) Office of Environmental Management (EM) life cycle budget for U.S. projects. Contractors who manage facilities for the DOE have been challenged to identify transformational changes to reduce the life cycle costs and to develop a knowledge-management system that identifies, disseminates, and tracks the implementation of lessons learned and best practices. This paper discusses DoE's rationale for using lessons learned and best practices to improve safety and performance while reducing life cycle costs for Deactivation and Decommissioning (D and D) projects. It also provides an update on the Energy Facility Contractors Group's (EFCOG's) progress in supporting DoE's efforts. At this juncture the best practice efforts described are in developmental stages; however, the commitment to and the concrete nature of the work thus far is noteworthy in regard to improving the way D and D lessons learned and best practices are identified, disseminated and implemented across the DOE Complex

  10. Shaping Interpersonal Learning in the Jazz Improvisation Lesson: Observing a Dynamic Systems Approach

    Science.gov (United States)

    de Bruin, Leon Rene

    2018-01-01

    Music institutions predominantly utilize the one-to-one lesson in developing and supporting music students' learning of skill and knowledge. This article explores the effect that interpersonal interaction plays in shaping pedagogical applications between teacher and student. Observing the learning of improvisation within this individualized social…

  11. Novice Teachers' Perspectives on Learning in Lesson Rehearsals in Second Language Teacher Preparation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Troyan, Francis John; Peercy, Megan Madigan

    2016-01-01

    Although scholars working in core practices have put forth lesson rehearsals as central to novice teachers' learning and development, there is little work on how novice teachers experience rehearsals. This qualitative research investigated learning opportunities for novice teachers of language learners during rehearsals. The analysis examines two…

  12. The five essential ('key') elements of severe accident management. To be developed as part of a SAMG industry standard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vayssier, George

    2017-01-01

    The Fukushima-Daiichi accident has caused a renewed interest in tools and guidelines to mitigate severe accidents. Notably, industry approaches have been reviewed and features added from the lessons learned. The various severe accident management approaches vary considerably: they have different measures, different priorities for the various actions, different staff responsibilities and different sorts of communication to the off-site authorities. It appears that there is no common basis from which the approaches have been developed. In this paper, the five elements are treated which the author considers essential for proper tools to terminate severe accidents and mitigate their consequences. These five elements should be trained in well-developed drills/exercises, involving all functions of accident management. An industrial standard to define a minimum common basis, to which individual approaches should adhere and so decrease the large scatter in these approaches present now.

  13. The five essential ('key') elements of severe accident management. To be developed as part of a SAMG industry standard

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vayssier, George [NSC Netherlands, Hansweert (Netherlands)

    2017-07-15

    The Fukushima-Daiichi accident has caused a renewed interest in tools and guidelines to mitigate severe accidents. Notably, industry approaches have been reviewed and features added from the lessons learned. The various severe accident management approaches vary considerably: they have different measures, different priorities for the various actions, different staff responsibilities and different sorts of communication to the off-site authorities. It appears that there is no common basis from which the approaches have been developed. In this paper, the five elements are treated which the author considers essential for proper tools to terminate severe accidents and mitigate their consequences. These five elements should be trained in well-developed drills/exercises, involving all functions of accident management. An industrial standard to define a minimum common basis, to which individual approaches should adhere and so decrease the large scatter in these approaches present now.

  14. Learning with and about Advertising in Chemistry Education with a Lesson Plan on Natural Cosmetics--A Case Study

    Science.gov (United States)

    Belova, Nadja; Eilks, Ingo

    2015-01-01

    This paper describes a case study on the chemistry behind natural cosmetics in five chemistry learning groups (grades 7-11, age range 13-17) in a German comprehensive school. The lesson plan intends to promote critical media literacy in the chemistry classroom and specifically emphasizes learning with and about advertising. The lessons of four…

  15. Development of a harmonized approach to safety assessment of decommissioning: Lessons learned from international experience (DeSa project)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Percival, K.; Nokhamzon, J.-G.; Ferch, R.; Batandjieva, B.

    2006-01-01

    The number of nuclear facilities being or planned to be shutdown as they reach the end of their design life, due to accidents or other political and social factors has been increasing worldwide. This has led to an increase in the awareness of regulators and operators of the importance of development and implementation of adequate safety requirements and criteria for decommissioning of these facilities. A general requirement at international and national levels, even for new facilities to be commissioned, is the development of a decommissioning plan, which includes evaluation of potential radiological consequences to public and workers during planned and accidental decommissioning activities. Experience has been gained in the safety assessment of decommissioning at various sites with different complexities and hazard potentials. This experience shows that various approaches have been used in conducting safety assessments and that there is a need for harmonisation of these approaches and for transferring the good practice and lessons learned to other countries, in particular developing countries with limited financial and human resources. The IAEA launched an international project on Evaluation and Demonstration of Safety during Decommissioning (DeSa) in 2004 to provide a forum for exchange of lessons learned between site operators, regulators, safety assessors and other specialists in safety assessment of decommissioning of nuclear power plants, research reactors, laboratories, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, etc. This paper presents the lessons learned through the project up to date, i.e.; (i) a common approach to safety assessment is being applied worldwide with the following steps - establishment of assessment framework; description of the facility; definition of decommissioning activities; hazard identification and analysis; calculation of consequences; and analysis of results; (ii) a deterministic approach to safety assessment is most commonly applied; (iii) a

  16. Fourteen lessons learned from the successful nuclear power program of the Republic of Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Sungyeol; Jun, Eunju; Hwang, IlSoon; Starz, Anne; Mazour, Tom; Chang, SoonHeung; Burkart, Alex R.

    2009-01-01

    This paper summarized a development history and lessons of Korean nuclear power infrastructures from the beginning of the nuclear power program in 1956 to the localization of complete scope of PWR technology in 1990. The objective of this paper is to show the guideline on the issues that the development of a national infrastructure for nuclear power using the realistic experiences in order to help the developing countries newly starting nuclear power program as a long-term energy supply option. Development strategies and lessons learned from the successful Korean experience have been presented based on milestones structure of IAEA in order to help decision makers, advisers, senior managers and national planners of nuclear power program. Lessons for national nuclear power programs include considerations before launching a program, preparation and decision making, and the construction of the first nuclear power plant. Scope of these lessons includes knowledge and human resources management, financial and industrial infrastructure development, nuclear safety, legislative and regulatory experiences, fuel cycle and waste management, international cooperation. Fourteen lessons learned either positive or not are derived from the Korean case and are suggested for incorporation in the IAEA's efforts in support of developing countries' development of nuclear infrastructure and planning.

  17. Design requirements for innovative homogeneous reactor, lesson learned from Fukushima accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arbie, Bakri; Pinem, Suryan; Sembiring, Tagor; Subki, Iyos

    2012-06-01

    The Fukushima disaster is the largest nuclear accident since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, but it is more complex as multiple reactors and spent fuel pools are involved. The severity of the nuclear accident is rated 7 in the International Nuclear Events Scale. Expert said that "Fukushima is the biggest industrial catastrophe in the history of mankind". According to Mitsuru Obe, in The Wall Street Journal, May 16th of 2011, TEPCO estimates the nuclear fuel was exposed to the air less than five hours after the earthquake struck. Fuel rods melted away rapidly as the temperatures inside the core reached 2800 C within six hours. In less than 16 hours, the reactor core melted and dropped to the bottom of the pressure vessel. The information should be evaluated in detail. In Germany several nuclear power plant were shutdown, Italy postponed it's nuclear power program and China reviewed their nuclear power program. Different news come from Britain, in October 11, 2011, the Safety Committee said all clear for nuclear power in Britain, because there are no risk of strong earthquake and tsunami in the region. Due to this severe fact, many nuclear scientists and engineer from all over the world are looking for a new approach, such as homogeneous reactor which was developed in Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1960-ies, during Dr. Alvin Weinberg tenure as the Director of ORNL. The paper will describe the design requirement that will be used as the basis for innovative homogeneous reactor. Innovative Homogeneous Reactor is expected to reduce core melt by two decades (4), since the fuel is intermix homogeneously with coolant and secondly we eliminate the used fuel rod which need to be cooled for a long period of time. In order to be successful for its implementation of the innovative system, testing and validation, three phases of development will be introduced. The first phase is Low Level Goals is really the proof of concept;the Medium Level Goal is Technical Goalsand the High

  18. The radiological accident at the irradiation facility in Nesvizh

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    More than 40 years of experience in radiation processing has shown that such technology is generally used safely, and steady improvement in the design of facilities and careful selection and training of operators have contributed to this good safety record. However, some cases of circumvention of safety systems have been registered and it is documented that the consequences of radiological accidents at industrial radiation facilities can be extremely serious. The causes of accidents may have some points in common, but at the same time may be highly specific. A detailed study of these common and specific features seems to be of great importance for further improvements in safety systems. One such event occurred on 26 October 1991 at an industrial sterilization facility in Nesvizh, Belarus, when the operator entered the irradiation chamber and was severely exposed to a lethal dose of radiation. The significant feature of this case was related to the medical management. It should be underlined that some circumstances of the accident only came to light during the post-accident review made by the IAEA. To document the causes and consequences of the accident and to define the lessons learned are of help to those people with responsibility for the safety of such facilities and to those medical authorities who might be involved in the management of a radiation event. 16 refs, figs, tabs, photographs

  19. Army, Presidential, and Corporate Strategic Transitions: The Importance of Transition Teams and the Application of Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    2006-05-25

    accessed from http://www.american.edu/15pointplan/WhatIsABestPractice.html on 17 Feb 2006. Argenti , Paul A., Corporate Communication . 3rd ed. Boston...Army, Presidential, and Corporate Strategic Transitions: The Importance of Transition Teams and the Application of Lessons Learned A Monograph...SUBTITLE Army, Presidential, and Corporate Strategic Transitions: The Importance of Transition Teams and the Application of Lessons Learned 5c

  20. System 80+{trademark} standard design incorporates radiation protection lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Crom, T.D.; Naugle, C.L. [Duke Engineering & Services, Inc., Charlotte, NC (United States); Turk, R.S. [ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power, Windsor, CT (United States)

    1995-03-01

    Many lessons have been learned from the current generation of nuclear plants in the area of radiation protection. The following paper will outline how the lessons learned have been incorporated into the design and operational philosophy of the System 80+{trademark} Standard Design currently under development by ABB Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) with support from Duke Engineering and Services, Inc. and Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation in the Balance-of-Plant design. The System 80+{trademark} Standard Design is a complete nuclear power plant for national and international markets, designed in direct response to utility needs for the 1990`s, and scheduled for Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Design Certification under the new standardization rule (10 CFR Part 52). System 80+{trademark} is a natural extension of System 80{sup R} technology, an evolutionary change based on proven Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) in operation at Palo Verde in Arizona and under construction at Yonggwang in the Republic of Korea. The System 80+{trademark} Containment and much of the Balance of Plant design is based upon Duke Power Company`s Cherokee Plant, which was partially constructed in the late 1970`s, but, was later canceled (due to rapid declined in electrical load growth). The System 80+{trademark} Standard Design meets the requirements given in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Requirements Document. One of these requirements is to limit the occupational exposure to 100 person-rem/yr. This paper illustrates how this goal can be achieved through the incorporation of lessons learned, innovative design, and the implementation of a common sense approach to operation and maintenances practices.

  1. Opening the black box of energy modelling: Strategies and lessons learned

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Pfenninger, Stefan; Hirth, Lion; Schlecht, Ingmar

    2018-01-01

    and appropriate modelling languages, distributing code and data, and providing support and building communities. After illustrating these decisions with examples and lessons learned from the community, we conclude that even though individual researchers' choices are important, institutional changes are still also...

  2. Process Improvement for Next Generation Space Flight Vehicles: MSFC Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Housch, Helen

    2008-01-01

    This viewgraph presentation reviews the lessons learned from process improvement for Next Generation Space Flight Vehicles. The contents include: 1) Organizational profile; 2) Process Improvement History; 3) Appraisal Preparation; 4) The Appraisal Experience; 5) Useful Tools; and 6) Is CMMI working?

  3. Safety requirement of the nuclear power plants, after TMI-2 accident and their possible implementation on Bushehr NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mirhabibi, N.; Tochai, M.T.M.; Ashrafi, A.; Farnoudi, E.

    1985-01-01

    Based on the lessons learned from the TMI-2 accident and other research and developments, many improvements have been required for the design, manufacturing and operation of nuclear power plants in recent years. These requirements have already been implemented to the plants in operation and considered as new safety requirements for new plants. In the present paper these requirements and their possible implementation on Bushehr NPP are discussed. (Author)

  4. Lessons Learned from the Node 1 Atmosphere Control and Storage and Water Recovery and Management Subsystem Design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Williams, David E.

    2011-01-01

    Node 1 flew to the International Space Station (ISS) on Flight 2A during December 1998. To date the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has learned a lot of lessons from this module based on its history of approximately two years of acceptance testing on the ground and currently its twelve years on-orbit. This paper will provide an overview of the ISS Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) design of the Node 1 Atmosphere Control and Storage (ACS) and Water Recovery and Management (WRM) subsystems and it will document some of the lessons that have been learned to date for these subsystems based on problems prelaunch, problems encountered on-orbit, and operational problems/concerns. It is hoped that documenting these lessons learned from ISS will help in preventing them in future Programs.

  5. The Human Aspect of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anegawa, T.; Kawano, A.

    2016-01-01

    situation where a large number of aftershocks were observed and associated tsunami cautions were announced from time to time. Due to the occurrence of the SBO (Station Black Out), first responders had to engage in field works in the complete darkness while the field were scattered with damaged equipment, vehicles and other debris caused by the tsunami and explosions. Eventual loss of effective communication tools such as paging and PHS also hampered communication between the field, main control rooms and the ERC. In spite of the loss of effective communication tool and other equipment prepared for emergency response, the ERC personnel and shift crew members had to deal with concurrent event progress at six units at the same time; where sometimes the accident progress at one unit (e.g., explosion of the reactor building) also inversely affected the accident response at the adjacent units. Communication within the ERC and between the site and the Headquarters as well as outside the company (e.g., Cabinet, regulatory authority) became more and more complicated and caused further confusion as the progress of accident at 6 units in Fukushima Daiichi and 4 units in Fukushima Daini NPSs. The presentation will describe actions and decisions being taken in such extreme circumstances, to highlight the key lessons learned; such as importance of establishing strong command and control functions, data sharing system etc. Learning from the accident, TEPCO has introduced new command and control system and staff are being trained with the new system. Also, reflecting the lessons from the accident response by shift crew at main control rooms and the field, training program for shift workers and first responders has been revised and more extensive and frequent emergency drills are conducted. In the presentation, such activities currently performed by TEPCO will be addressed. (author)

  6. Empirically Derived Lessons Learned about What Makes Peer-Led Exercise Groups Flourish.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fletcher, Kathlyn E; Ertl, Kristyn; Ruffalo, Leslie; Harris, LaTamba; Whittle, Jeff

    2017-01-01

    Physical exercise confers many health benefits, but it is difficult to motivate people to exercise. Although community exercise groups may facilitate initiation and persistence in an exercise program, reports regarding factors that allow such groups to flourish are limited. We performed a prospective qualitative evaluation of our experience starting a program of community-based, peer-led exercise groups for military veterans to identify important lessons learned. We synthesized data from structured observations, post-observation debriefings, and focus groups. Our participants were trained peer leaders and exercise group members. Our main outcomes consisted of empirically derived lessons learned during the implementation of a peer-led group exercise program for veterans at multiple community sites. We collected and analyzed data from 40 observation visits (covering 14 sites), 7 transcribed debriefings, and 5 focus groups. We identified five lessons learned. (1) The camaraderie and social aspect of the exercise groups provided motivation for people to stay involved. (2) Shared responsibility and commitment to each other by the group members was instrumental to success. (3) Regular meeting times encouraged participation. (4) Variety, especially getting outdoors, was very popular for some groups. (5) Modest involvement of professionals encouraged ongoing engagement with the program. Both social and programmatic issues influence implementation of group exercise programs for older, predominantly male, veterans. These results should be confirmed in other settings.

  7. Increased Accident Tolerance of Fuels for Light Water Reactors - Workshop Proceedings, OECD/NEA Headquarters, Issy-les-Moulineaux, France, 10-12 December 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Fukushima accident in March 2011 raised concerns about the safety of current and future nuclear power plants both inside and outside the international nuclear energy community. With a view to learning lessons from this accident a large consensus emerged on the need to strengthen each level of Defence-In-Depth, reinforcing both prevention and mitigation. The fuel performance characteristics identified as being central to increased accident tolerance for long-term loss of coolant include reduced clad-steam reactions, reduced hydrogen production and improved fission product retention. New fuel designs which offered the potential to incorporate these characteristics, while retaining the operational performance of existing designs, would therefore be considered as suitable candidates for further investigation. Under the auspices of the NEA Nuclear Science Committee, a workshop has been organised to bring together international experts from the modelling, safety, operations and regulatory technical disciplines to discuss the various issues related to increased accident tolerance of fuels for Light Water Reactors and to help establish a co-ordinated international approach in this field. The organisation of this workshop was also supported by the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations. These proceedings include all the abstract papers presented at this workshop. The programme was comprised of 4 sessions: - Session 1: Lessons learned from the Fukushima accident; - Session 2: Accident-tolerant fuel design; - Session 3: Reactor operation, safety, fuel cycle constraints, economics and licensing; - Session 4: Synthesis and future programmes. A total of 55 participants from 16 countries attended the workshop, with 26 technical presentations and 2 breakout parallel sessions (one on safety issues, the other on reactor performance, R and D and technological issues). The attendees represented a broad spectrum of stakeholders involved in different nuclear energy

  8. Results of stress tests of European nuclear power plants after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kovacs, Zoltan; Novakova, Helena

    2012-01-01

    In response to the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, the European Council laid down the requirement that a transparent and comprehensive risk assessment exercise ('stress tests') be carried out at each European nuclear power plant. The stress tests concentrated on the nuclear power plants' safety margins in the light of the lessons learned from the accident. The reviews focused on natural external events including earthquake, tsunami and extreme weather, loss of safety functions, and severe accident management. The stress test procedure comprised 3 steps: (i) The nuclear facility operators performed the stress tests and prepared proposals for safety improvements. (ii) The national regulators performed independent reviews of the stress tests and prepared national reports. (iii) The reports submitted by the national regulators were subjected to review at a European level. The article describes the scope of the stress tests and their results, verified at the European level. (orig.)

  9. Social Networking Sites and Addiction: Ten Lessons Learned

    OpenAIRE

    Kuss, Daria J.; Griffiths, Mark D.

    2017-01-01

    Online social networking sites (SNSs) have gained increasing popularity in the last decade, with individuals engaging in SNSs to connect with others who share similar interests. The perceived need to be online may result in compulsive use of SNSs, which in extreme cases may result in symptoms and consequences traditionally associated with substance-related addictions. In order to present new insights into online social networking and addiction, in this paper, 10 lessons learned concerning onl...

  10. Denmark's Master of Public Governance Program: Assessment and Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Greve, Carsten; Pedersen, Anne Reff

    2017-01-01

    This paper focuses on Denmark's Master of Public Governance and its assessments and lessons learned. Denmark is seen to have an efficient economy and public sector, a digitalized public service delivery system, and an advanced work-life balance. The Danish government invested substantial resources into developing a Master of Public Governance…

  11. Project-Based Learning Using Discussion and Lesson-Learned Methods via Social Media Model for Enhancing Problem Solving Skills

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jewpanich, Chaiwat; Piriyasurawong, Pallop

    2015-01-01

    This research aims to 1) develop the project-based learning using discussion and lesson-learned methods via social media model (PBL-DLL SoMe Model) used for enhancing problem solving skills of undergraduate in education student, and 2) evaluate the PBL-DLL SoMe Model used for enhancing problem solving skills of undergraduate in education student.…

  12. The Fukushima Accident: A Station Blackout and the Consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schäfer, F.; Tusheva, P.; Kliem, S.

    2012-01-01

    Lessons learned from Fukushima: • Underestimation of the role of the natural hazards • Insufficient protection of the emergency power and service water systems • Protection of fuel assembly storage pools insufficient • Safety review for Station Blackout and seismic evaluation needed • Diverse power supply systems, diverse sources for water delivery • Role of passive safety systems, they must work in a real passive manner and without electricity to open valves • Backup systems for reactor parameters monitoring • Revision of Severe Accident Management Guidelines and countermeasures for specific “rare” events • Early/late phase operators’ actions / Effectiveness of the operators’ actions

  13. Transition and Closeout of the Former DOE Mound Plant Site: Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carpenter, C. P.; Marks, M. L.; Smiley, S.L.; Gallaher, D. M.

    2006-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Environmental Management (EM) manages the Miamisburg Closure Project (MCP) by cleaning up the Mound site, located in Miamisburg, Ohio, to specific environmental standards, conveying all excess land parcels to the Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation, and transferring all continuing DOE post-closure responsibilities to the Office of Legacy Management (LM). Presently, the EM cleanup contract of the Mound site with CH2M Hill Mound Inc. is scheduled for completion on March 31, 2006. LM manages the Mound transition efforts and also post-closure responsibilities at other DOE sites via a contract with the S.M. Stoller Corporation. The programmatic transfer from EM to LM is scheduled to take place on October 1, 2006. The transition of the Mound site has required substantial integration and coordination between the EM and LM. Several project management principles have been implemented to help facilitate the transfer of programmatic responsibility. As a result, several lessons learned have been identified to help streamline and improve integration and coordination of the transfer process. Lessons learned from the Mound site transition project are considered a work in progress and have been summarized according to a work breakdown structure for specific functional areas in the transition schedule. The functional areas include program management, environmental, records management, information technology, property management, stakeholder and regulatory relations, procurement, worker pension and benefits, and project closeout. Specific improvements or best practices have been recognized and documented by the Mound transition team. The Mound site is one of three major cleanup sites within the EM organization scheduled for completion in 2006. EM, EM cleanup contractor, LM, and LM post-closure contractor have identified lessons learned during the transition and closure of the Mound site. The transition effort from

  14. Analysis of Fukushima Daiichi Accident Using HFACS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mohamed, Saeed Almheiri

    2013-01-01

    The shadow of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident is still too big and will last long. On the other hand, it could still teach us lots of lessons to better design and operate nuclear power plants. In this paper, we will be focusing on the Fukushima Daiichi accident, especially on human organizational factors. We will analyze the accident using Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) in order to better understand the organizational climate of TEPCO 1 and NISA 2 that led to Fukushima Daiichi Accident. HFACS was developed for the U. S. aviation industry and has been used at many industries like the rail and mining industries. We found that the HFACS to be greatly beneficial in investigating the latent and organizational causes for the accident. The application results show that the causes of Fukushima Daiichi accident were spread out from sharp end (i.e. Unsafe Act) to blunt end (i. e. Organizational Influences). This means that the corresponding countermeasures should cover from front line staff to management. Thus, we managed to develop a better understanding on how to prevent similar errors or violations. The incident and near-miss have a lot of helpful information because it may show the actual and latent deficiencies of complex systems. We applied the HFACS into Fukushima Daiichi accident to better locate the causes related to both sharp and blunt ends of operation of NPP. In order to derive useful lessons from the accident analysis, the analyst should try to find the similarities not differences from the incident. It is imperative that whatever accident/incident analysis systems we use, we should fully utilize the disastrous Fukushima accident

  15. Analysis of Fukushima Daiichi Accident Using HFACS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mohamed, Saeed Almheiri [Korea Advanced Institue of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-10-15

    The shadow of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident is still too big and will last long. On the other hand, it could still teach us lots of lessons to better design and operate nuclear power plants. In this paper, we will be focusing on the Fukushima Daiichi accident, especially on human organizational factors. We will analyze the accident using Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) in order to better understand the organizational climate of TEPCO{sup 1} and NISA{sup 2} that led to Fukushima Daiichi Accident. HFACS was developed for the U. S. aviation industry and has been used at many industries like the rail and mining industries. We found that the HFACS to be greatly beneficial in investigating the latent and organizational causes for the accident. The application results show that the causes of Fukushima Daiichi accident were spread out from sharp end (i.e. Unsafe Act) to blunt end (i. e. Organizational Influences). This means that the corresponding countermeasures should cover from front line staff to management. Thus, we managed to develop a better understanding on how to prevent similar errors or violations. The incident and near-miss have a lot of helpful information because it may show the actual and latent deficiencies of complex systems. We applied the HFACS into Fukushima Daiichi accident to better locate the causes related to both sharp and blunt ends of operation of NPP. In order to derive useful lessons from the accident analysis, the analyst should try to find the similarities not differences from the incident. It is imperative that whatever accident/incident analysis systems we use, we should fully utilize the disastrous Fukushima accident.

  16. The CanMars Analogue Mission: Lessons Learned for Mars Sample Return

    Science.gov (United States)

    Osinski, G. R.; Beaty, D.; Battler, M.; Caudill, C.; Francis, R.; Haltigin, T.; Hipkin, V.; Pilles, E.

    2018-04-01

    We present an overview and lessons learned for Mars Sample Return from CanMars — an analogue mission that simulated a Mars 2020-like cache mission. Data from 39 sols of operations conducted in the Utah desert in 2015 and 2016 are presented.

  17. IVHS Institutional Issues and Case Studies, Analysis and Lessons Learned, Final Report

    Science.gov (United States)

    1994-04-01

    This 'Analysis and Lessons Learned' report contains observations, conclusions, and recommendations based on the performance of six case studies of Intelligent Vehicle-Highway Systems (IVHS) projects. Information to support the development of the case...

  18. Lesson Learned from the Recent Operating Experience of Domestic Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chang-Ju; Kim, Min-Chull; Koo, Bon-Hyun; Kim, Sang-Jae; Lee, Kyung-Won; Kim, Ji-Tae; Lee, Durk-Hun

    2007-01-01

    According to the public concerns, it seems that one of the main missions of a nuclear regulatory body is to collect operational experiences from various nuclear facilities, and to analyze their follow-up information. The extensive use of lessons learned from operating experiences to back fit safety systems, improve operator training and emergency procedures, and to focus more attention on human factors, safety culture and quality management systems are also desired. Collecting operational experiences has been mainly done regarding the incidents and major failures of components (so called 'event'), which usually demands lots of regulatory resources. This paper concentrates on new information, i.e. lesson learned from recent investigation results of domestic events which contain 5 years' experience. This information can induce many insights for improving operational safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs)

  19. Identifying different methods for creating knowledge from lessons learned in project oriented organizations

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ahmad Norang

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Nowadays, the increase in competition has increased the relative importance of innovation for most firms and many managers believe a good innovation must be knowledge oriented. This paper has tried to determine different methods for creating knowledge in project oriented organizations. The study designs a questionnaire in Likert scale and distributes it among 32 experts who were well informed about different methods of knowledge creation and lessons learned. Cronbach alphas for all components of the survey were well above the desirable level. The study has detected 11 methods for knowledge creation and lessons learned. In terms of preliminary assessment, business transactions has received the highest impact while knowledge team has received the highest effect in terms of necessary assessment. The results of this survey have indicated that although there are several methods for detecting knowledge within organizations, in most cases, it is not easy to gain value added knowledge within an organization, quickly. The people who participated in our survey have indicated that organizational commitment, brainstorming, Delphi and storytelling also have played important role for creation of knowledge. The results have also shown that brainstorming, knowledge brokers, map knowledge and work experience were easier to use for knowledge creation and lessons learned compared with other forms of knowledge creation.

  20. Incorporation of severe accidents in the licensing of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alvarenga, Marco Antonio Bayout; Rabello, Sidney Luiz

    2011-01-01

    Severe accidents are the result of multiple faults that occur in nuclear power plants as a consequence from the combination of latent failures and active faults, such as equipment, procedures and operator failures, which leads to partial or total melting of the reactor core. Regardless of active and latent failures related to the plant management and maintenance, aspects of the latent failures related to the plant design still remain. The lessons learned from the TMI accident in the U.S.A., Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union and, more recently, in Fukushima, Japan, suggest that severe accidents must necessarily be part of design-basis of nuclear power plants. This paper reviews the normative basis of the licensing of nuclear power plants concerning to severe accidents in countries having nuclear power plants under construction or in operation. It was addressed not only the new designs of nuclear power plants in the world, but also the design changes in plants that are in operation for decades. Included in this list are the Brazilian nuclear power plants, Angra-1, Angra-2, and Angra-3. This paper also reviews the current status of licensing in Brazil and Brazilian standards related to severe accidents. It also discusses the impact of severe accidents in the emergency plans of nuclear power plants. (author)

  1. Status and functioning of the European Commission's major accident reporting system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kirchsteiger, C.

    1999-01-01

    This paper describes the background, functioning and status of the European Commission's Major Accident Reporting System (MARS), dedicated to collect, in a consistent way, data on major industrial accidents involving dangerous substances from the Member States of the European Union, to analyse and statistically process them, and to create subsets of all non-confidential accidents data and analysis results for export to all Member States. This modern information exchange and analysis tool is made up of two connected parts: one for each local unit (i.e., for the Competent Authority of each EU Member State), and one central part for the European Commission. The local, as well as the central parts of this information network, can serve both as data logging systems and, on different levels of complexity, as data analysis tools. The central database allows complex cluster and pattern analysis, identifying and analysing the succession of the disruptive factors leading to an accident. On this basis, 'lessons learned' can be formulated for the industry for the purposes of further accident prevention. Further, results from analysing data of major industrial accidents reported to MARS are presented. It can be shown that some of the main assumptions in the new 'Seveso II Directive' can directly be validated from MARS data. (Copyright (c) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam. All rights reserved.)

  2. Incorporation of severe accidents in the licensing of nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alvarenga, Marco Antonio Bayout; Rabello, Sidney Luiz, E-mail: bayout@cnen.gov.b, E-mail: sidney@cnen.gov.b [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN) Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2011-07-01

    Severe accidents are the result of multiple faults that occur in nuclear power plants as a consequence from the combination of latent failures and active faults, such as equipment, procedures and operator failures, which leads to partial or total melting of the reactor core. Regardless of active and latent failures related to the plant management and maintenance, aspects of the latent failures related to the plant design still remain. The lessons learned from the TMI accident in the U.S.A., Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union and, more recently, in Fukushima, Japan, suggest that severe accidents must necessarily be part of design-basis of nuclear power plants. This paper reviews the normative basis of the licensing of nuclear power plants concerning to severe accidents in countries having nuclear power plants under construction or in operation. It was addressed not only the new designs of nuclear power plants in the world, but also the design changes in plants that are in operation for decades. Included in this list are the Brazilian nuclear power plants, Angra-1, Angra-2, and Angra-3. This paper also reviews the current status of licensing in Brazil and Brazilian standards related to severe accidents. It also discusses the impact of severe accidents in the emergency plans of nuclear power plants. (author)

  3. Space reactor safety, 1985--1995 lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, A.C.

    1995-01-01

    Space reactor safety activities and decisions have evolved over the last decade. Important safety decisions have been made in the SP-100, Space Exploration Initiative, NEPSTP, SNTP, and Bimodal Space Reactor programs. In addition, international guidance on space reactor safety has been instituted. Space reactor safety decisions and practices have developed in the areas of inadvertent criticality, reentry, radiological release, orbital operation, programmatic, and policy. In general, the lessons learned point out the importance of carefully reviewing previous safety practices for appropriateness to space nuclear programs in general and to the specific mission under consideration

  4. Space reactor safety, 1985--1995 lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marshall, A.C.

    1995-12-31

    Space reactor safety activities and decisions have evolved over the last decade. Important safety decisions have been made in the SP-100, Space Exploration Initiative, NEPSTP, SNTP, and Bimodal Space Reactor programs. In addition, international guidance on space reactor safety has been instituted. Space reactor safety decisions and practices have developed in the areas of inadvertent criticality, reentry, radiological release, orbital operation, programmatic, and policy. In general, the lessons learned point out the importance of carefully reviewing previous safety practices for appropriateness to space nuclear programs in general and to the specific mission under consideration.

  5. Evaluating Failures and near Misses in Human Spaceflight History for Lessons for Future Human Spaceflight

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barr, Stephanie

    2010-01-01

    Studies done in the past have drawn on lessons learned with regard to human loss-of-life events. However, an examination of near-fatal accidents can be equally useful, not only in detecting causes, both proximate and systemic, but also for determining what factors averted disaster, what design decisions and/or operator actions prevented catastrophe. Binary pass/fail launch history is often used for risk, but this also has limitations. A program with a number of near misses can look more reliable than a consistently healthy program with a single out-of-family failure. Augmenting reliability evaluations with this near miss data can provide insight and expand on the limitations of a strictly pass/fail evaluation. This paper intends to show how near-miss lessons learned can provide crucial data for any new human spaceflight programs that are interested in sending man into space

  6. Operational experience - Lessons learned from IRS-reports in Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wetzel, N.; Maqua, M.

    2005-01-01

    The international Incident Reporting System (IRS), jointly operated by IAEA and OECD-NEA, is a main source of safety significant findings and lessons learned of nuclear operating experience. GRS (Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit mbH) is a scientific-technical expert and research organisation. On Behalf of the Federal Minister of Environment, Nature Conservation and Reactor Safety (BMU), GRS provides the IRS officer. The evaluation of IRS-Reports and the dissemination of the main findings including the assessment of the relevance for German NPPs is task of GRS. The value of IRS is among experts undoubted. But nevertheless, the reporting to IRS decreases since some years. This presentation is aimed to show the support of IRS in strengthening the safety of German NPPs. The evaluation of IRS-Reports at GRS is three-fold. It comprises initial screening, quarterly and yearly reporting and the development of specific German Information Notices on safety significant events with direct applicability to German NPPs. Some examples of lessons learned from recent international events are discussed below. These examples shall demonstrate that the use of the IRS enhances significantly the knowledge on operational events. (author)

  7. Radiation Exposure and Thyroid Cancer Risk After the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident in Comparison with the Chernobyl Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamashita, S.; Takamura, N.; Ohtsuru, A.; Suzuki, S.

    2016-01-01

    The actual implementation of the epidemiological study on human health risk from low dose and low-dose rate radiation exposure and the comprehensive long-term radiation health effects survey are important especially after radiological and nuclear accidents because of public fear and concern about the long-term health effects of low-dose radiation exposure have increased considerably. Since the Great East Japan earthquake and the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident in Japan, Fukushima Prefecture has started the Fukushima Health Management Survey Project for the purpose of long-term health care administration and medical early diagnosis/treatment for the prefectural residents. Especially on a basis of the lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident, both thyroid examination and mental health care are critically important irrespective of the level of radiation exposure. There are considerable differences between Chernobyl and Fukushima regarding radiation dose to the public, and it is very difficult to estimate retrospectively internal exposure dose from the short-lived radioactive iodines. Therefore, the necessity of thyroid ultrasound examination in Fukushima and the intermediate results of this survey targeting children will be reviewed and discussed in order to avoid any misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the high detection rate of childhood thyroid cancer. (authors)

  8. Energy market reform - lessons learned and next steps

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doucet, G.

    2004-01-01

    This presentation will be based on the World Energy Council's recently published report, Energy Market Reform: Lessons Learned and Next Steps with Special Emphasis on the Energy Access Problems of Developing Countries. The report draws on practical lessons from past studies carried out by the World Energy Council and on current experiences on the desirable architecture of market reforms in electricity and natural gas. The approach of the study was not to further deepen the analysis or to provide technical recommendations but rather, to build a debate guided by the common thread of energy security and end-user e mpowerment , highlighting the possible areas of conflict of interest and the broad solutions that might be chosen depending on the local circumstances for different parts of the energy chains. The ambition was to identify key concerns and to initiate a debate on possible answers.(author)

  9. Summary of the foreign countries reports on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants accident, on the lessons learnt and recommendation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nariai, Hideki

    2017-01-01

    This paper focused on the lessons and recommendations from the accident investigation reports prepared by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), IAEA, and OECD/NEA on the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station associated with the Great East Japan Earthquake. (1) As for the causes of the accident, the IAEA report pointed out as a technical factor that Japan's scientists did not think that the earthquake occurrence probability of the magnitude 9 as an external event was high. As for tsunami countermeasures, it reported that accident countermeasures would have been easier if only seawater pump flood protection and the high-elevation positioning of emergency power supply etc. were prepared. As for human organizational factor, it pointed out that nuclear regulations were performed by many divided organizations, and responsibility and authority were not clear. The NAS report pointed out that the regulatory agency and nuclear promotion agency were not functionally separated, and that the regulatory agency was not independent as a result of the relationship between the Japanese government agency and companies, and the agency became a captive of regulations. The following items were also reported; (2) safety measures and emergency preparedness, (3) off-site response during emergency, (4) radiation effects, (5) restoration after the accident, (6) international issues, and (7) issues of the spent fuel storage pool of NAS. Japan established the Nuclear Regulation Authority by integrating related organizations, but how to create a regulatory agency with advanced expertise is the future task. (A.O.)

  10. Regulatory analysis and lessons learned from the LLRW [low-level radioactive waste] disposal area at West Valley, New York: Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-12-01

    The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority has sponsored a project to develop an integrated set of site management plans for the West Valley low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal area. The plans were directed to upgrade the disposal area so that passive custodial care and monitoring activities would be sufficient to protect public health and safety and the environment. Tasks 5 and 6, Regulatory Analysis and Lessons Learned, are the subject of this report. The regulatory analysis identified areas of inconsistencies between the historic site operations and the current state and federal LLRW disposal regulations and guidelines. The lessons learned task identified the causes of the disposal problems at West Valley, discussed the lessons learned, and described the responses developed by the NRC and industry to the lessons learned. 85 refs., 6 figs., 19 tabs

  11. The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: OECD/NEA Nuclear Safety Response and Lessons Learnt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    research programmes designed to improve understanding of how the accident progressed as well as to obtain safety-related information during the decommissioning and dismantling of the damaged facilities. This report outlines international efforts to strengthen nuclear regulation, safety, research and radiological protection in the post-Fukushima context. It also highlights key messages and lessons learnt, notably as related to assurance of safety, shared responsibilities, human and organisational factors, defence-in-depth, stakeholder engagement, crisis communication and emergency preparedness

  12. The 2015 Nepal earthquake disaster: lessons learned one year on.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hall, M L; Lee, A C K; Cartwright, C; Marahatta, S; Karki, J; Simkhada, P

    2017-04-01

    The 2015 earthquake in Nepal killed over 8000 people, injured more than 21,000 and displaced a further 2 million. One year later, a national workshop was organized with various Nepali stakeholders involved in the response to the earthquake. The workshop provided participants an opportunity to reflect on their experiences and sought to learn lessons from the disaster. One hundred and thirty-five participants took part and most had been directly involved in the earthquake response. They included representatives from the Ministry of Health, local and national government, the armed forces, non-governmental organizations, health practitioners, academics, and community representatives. Participants were divided into seven focus groups based around the following topics: water, sanitation and hygiene, hospital services, health and nutrition, education, shelter, policy and community. Facilitated group discussions were conducted in Nepalese and the key emerging themes are presented. Participants described a range of issues encountered, some specific to their area of expertize but also more general issues. These included logistics and supply chain challenges, leadership and coordination difficulties, impacts of the media as well as cultural beliefs on population behaviour post-disaster. Lessons identified included the need for community involvement at all stages of disaster response and preparedness, as well as the development of local leadership capabilities and community resilience. A 'disconnect' between disaster management policy and responses was observed, which may result in ineffective, poorly planned disaster response. Finding time and opportunity to reflect on and identify lessons from disaster response can be difficult but are fundamental to improving future disaster preparedness. The Nepal Earthquake National Workshop offered participants the space to do this. It garnered an overwhelming sense of wanting to do things better, of the need for a Nepal-centric approach

  13. Lessons Learned after Nuclear Power Plants and Hydropower Plants Accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moskalenko, A., E-mail: gce@gce.ru [GCE Group, Saint Petersburg (Russian Federation)

    2014-10-15

    Full text: The World is becoming more open and free for communication. However, the experience (positive or negative) is still badly cross over sectorial borders. I would like to illustrate the point with the examples, even with several unexpected ones. I would like to start with a few words regarding the Sayano – Shushenskaya Hydro Power Plant accident and the factors that caused it. Sayano – Shushenskaya Hydro Power Plant is a unique Hydro Power Plant with efficiency factor of 96 %. Nevertheless, the efficiency factor, in particular, caused a series of restrictions: hydro-electric units vibration amplitude must not exceed 4 micron!!! (Slide 1: Vibration amplitude dependence on output capacity) As it is clearly seen, there is a so called “prohibited area”, which the hydro-electric unit must pass over. Operations in the area are prohibited in accordance with the regulatory documents. However, due to the changes that occurred in Russian power supply industry, the hydro-electric unit passed through the prohibited area more than 12 times, if we take into account only the day of the accident. The bolts keeping the turbine cover, keeping water apart from the machinery hall, were too much released. The mentioned above reasons led to the hydro-electric unit disruption and the machinery hall flooding. Water inflow was possible to stop by putting down the regulating valves. However, the regulating valves control console was in the flooded machinery hall. There was standby emergency control console, but it was in the machinery hall, as well. The machinery hall was flooded, consequently, main and standby systems were destroyed. Moreover, the machinery hall, where all the units were disposed, was a huge hall without dividing walls, etc. (Photo) Take a look at the next slide. (Photo – Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant machinery hall). Take note of Fukushima–1 Nuclear Power Plant: standby power supply source was situated in the same place and destroyed by water. All the

  14. Managing a front-line field hospital in Libya: Description of case mix and lessons learned for future humanitarian emergencies

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Adam C. Levine

    2012-06-01

    Full Text Available Between June and August 2011, International Medical Corps deployed a field hospital near the front-line of the fighting between government troops and opposition fighters in Western Libya. The field hospital cared for over 1300 combatants and non-combatants from both sides of the conflict during that time period, the vast majority of them presenting with war-related injuries. Over 60% of battle-related injuries were due to shrapnel wounds and blast injuries from exploding small mortars, with smaller percentages due to battle-related motor vehicle accidents, gun shot wounds, burns, and other causes. The most pertinent lessons learned from our experience were the importance of dedicating significant resources to logistics and supply chain management, the rewards garnered from building strong ties with the local community early in the deployment of the field hospital, and the need to pay careful attention to basic principles of humanitarian ethics.

  15. Creating the High-Resolution Settlement Layer - lessons learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gros, A.

    2017-12-01

    Facebook publishes the High-resolution Settlement Layer (HRSL: https://ciesin.columbia.edu/data/hrsl/) in collaboration with Columbia University's CIESIN institute and the World Bank. So far, data for 13 countries have been published over the past nine months. HRSL data for Burkina Faso, Ghana, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, The Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Uganda are available for download. We will present a status update and report on lessons learned.

  16. Addressing the Challenges of Sharing Lessons Learned Amongst Suppliers in a Fragmented and Competitive Marketplace

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dennier, D.

    2016-01-01

    Historically, COG member utilities largely drew from in-house supporting functions or the original plant designers, allowing active sharing of operational and human performance experience amongst a small number of relevant parties. As the industry has evolved, utilities have increasingly drawn upon a greater number of independent external suppliers to provide goods and services. This diversification in supplier base within a competitive environment changes operating dynamics, as a safety culture-focused supplier must remain mindful of developing and retaining competitive advantages over other suppliers. A market-driven perspective may undermine the likelihood of sharing certain lessons learned and best practices for fear of weakening competitive position. Utility procurement procedures must ensure fair markets to be effective, but in doing so may limit opportunity for collaboration between supplier and utility compared to historic levels. Vibrant competitive markets attract a large number of suppliers, which adds to the complexity of effective sharing and absorption of industry lessons learned. This paper will explain the activities underway through the COG Supplier Participant program to remove impediments and share industry-wide operational lessons learned and best practices. (author)

  17. DDG Opening Remarks [International Experts’ Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Vienna (Austria), 19-22 March 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flory, Denis

    2012-01-01

    The challenge for us all this week is therefore to analyse what is known about the Fukushima accident to-date in the specific areas associated with reactor and spent fuel safety. You will have the opportunity to share your expert perspectives on the Fukushima accident with your peers. You will also be able to share your respective national experiences in implementing measures to strengthen nuclear safety in the light of the accident. We need to identify what lessons have been learned up till now and to identify any necessary further actions to extract lessons in the future. The outcomes of this meeting will be widely disseminated and shared with all Member States. It is important for all, nuclear regulators, plant operators, governments or international organisations, to maintain the momentum gained over the last 12 months in our collective drive to improve nuclear safety around the world

  18. Lessons Learned from the Response to Radiation Emergencies (1945-2010) (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    occurred, most notably, the Windscale fire in 1957, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the Sarov accident in 1997 and the Tokaimura accident in 1999. Radiological emergencies have occurred throughout the world, and when invited by the country concerned, the IAEA has undertaken comprehensive reviews of the events, the purpose of which is to compile information about the causes of the accidents, the subsequent emergency response including medical management, dose reconstruction, public communication, etc., so that any lessons can be shared with national authorities and regulatory organizations, emergency planners and a broad range of specialists, including physicists, technicians and medical specialists, and persons responsible for radiation protection. It is appropriate to analyze the findings of these and other reports on the response to radiation emergencies in order to consolidate these lessons

  19. Lessons Learned from the Response to Radiation Emergencies (1945-2010) (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    occurred, most notably, the Windscale fire in 1957, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the Sarov accident in 1997 and the Tokaimura accident in 1999. Radiological emergencies have occurred throughout the world, and when invited by the country concerned, the IAEA has undertaken comprehensive reviews of the events, the purpose of which is to compile information about the causes of the accidents, the subsequent emergency response including medical management, dose reconstruction, public communication, etc., so that any lessons can be shared with national authorities and regulatory organizations, emergency planners and a broad range of specialists, including physicists, technicians and medical specialists, and persons responsible for radiation protection. It is appropriate to analyze the findings of these and other reports on the response to radiation emergencies in order to consolidate these lessons

  20. Lessons Learned from the Response to Radiation Emergencies (1945-2010) (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    occurred, most notably, the Windscale fire in 1957, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the Sarov accident in 1997 and the Tokaimura accident in 1999. Radiological emergencies have occurred throughout the world, and when invited by the country concerned, the IAEA has undertaken comprehensive reviews of the events, the purpose of which is to compile information about the causes of the accidents, the subsequent emergency response including medical management, dose reconstruction, public communication, etc., so that any lessons can be shared with national authorities and regulatory organizations, emergency planners and a broad range of specialists, including physicists, technicians and medical specialists, and persons responsible for radiation protection. It is appropriate to analyze the findings of these and other reports on the response to radiation emergencies in order to consolidate these lessons.

  1. Lessons Learned from the Response to Radiation Emergencies (1945-2010) (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    occurred, most notably, the Windscale fire in 1957, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the Sarov accident in 1997 and the Tokaimura accident in 1999. Radiological emergencies have occurred throughout the world, and when invited by the country concerned, the IAEA has undertaken comprehensive reviews of the events, the purpose of which is to compile information about the causes of the accidents, the subsequent emergency response including medical management, dose reconstruction, public communication, etc., so that any lessons can be shared with national authorities and regulatory organizations, emergency planners and a broad range of specialists, including physicists, technicians and medical specialists, and persons responsible for radiation protection. It is appropriate to analyze the findings of these and other reports on the response to radiation emergencies in order to consolidate these lessons.

  2. Immediate medical consequences of nuclear accidents: lessons from Chernobyl

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gale, R.P.

    1987-01-01

    The immediate medical response to the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station involved containment of the radioactivity and evacuation of the nearby population. The next step consisted of assessment of the radiation dose received by individuals, based on biological dosimetry, and treatment of those exposed. Medical care involved treatment of skin burns; measures to support bone marrow failure, gastrointestinal tract injury, and other organ damage (i.e., infection prophylaxis and transfusions) for those with lower radiation dose exposure; and bone marrow transplantation for those exposed to a high dose of radiation. At Chernobyl, two victims died immediately and 29 died of radiation or thermal injuries in the next three months. The remaining victims of the accident are currently well. A nuclear accident anywhere is a nuclear accident everywhere. Prevention and cooperation in response to these accidents are essential goals

  3. The natech events during the 17 August 1999 Kocaeli earthquake: aftermath and lessons learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    S. Girgin

    2011-04-01

    Full Text Available Natural-hazard triggered technological accidents (natechs at industrial facilities have been recognized as an emerging risk. Adequate preparedness, proper emergency planning, and effective response are crucial for the prevention of natechs and mitigation of the consequences. Under the conditions of a natural disaster, the limited resources, the possible unavailability of mitigation measures, and the lack of adequate communication complicate the management of natechs. The analysis of past natechs is crucial for learning lessons and for preventing or preparing for future natechs. The 17 August 1999, Kocaeli earthquake, which was a devastating disaster hitting one of the most industrialized regions of Turkey, offers opportunities in this respect. Among many natechs that occurred due to the earthquake, the massive fire at the TUPRAS Izmit refinery and the acrylonitrile spill at the AKSA acrylic fiber production plant were especially important and highlight problems in the consideration of natechs in emergency planning, response to industrial emergencies during natural hazards, and information to the public during and following the incidents. The analysis of these events shows that even the largest and seemingly well-prepared facilities can be vulnerable to natechs if risks are not considered adequately.

  4. Occupational Radiation Protection in Severe Accident Management. EG-SAM Interim Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    phases. In line with the agreed timeline for preparation, the expert group was motivated to develop an interim (preliminary) report before the end of 2013 (with a general perspective and discussion of specific severe accident management worker dose issues), and to finalize the report by organizing an international workshop in 2014 to address national experiences on best occupational RP management practices and protocols for optimum RP job coverage during severe accident, initial response and recovery efforts to identify good RP practices and RP lessons learned from previous reactor accidents, which will be submitted to the ISOE Management Board for approval. This interim report comprises six main chapters. Chapter 2 provides essential information on radiation protection management and organisation. Chapter 3 establishes the goal of radiation protection training and exercises related to severe accident management. Chapter 4 discusses facility characteristics that must be considered when planning actions in response to a severe accident. Chapter 5 provides for the interpretation and application of an overall approach for the protection of workers. Chapter 6 discusses radioactive materials, contamination controls and logistics during the emergency phase. Chapter 7 addresses key lessons learned from past accidents, including Chernobyl and Fukushima. (authors)

  5. Lessons that Last: Former Youth Organizers' Reflections on What and How They Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Conner, Jerusha

    2014-01-01

    This study examines the learning outcomes and learning environment of a youth organizing program that has been effective in promoting individual as well as social change. Drawing on interviews with 25 former youth organizers from the program, this study explores the lessons that stay with them as they transition to young adulthood and the factors…

  6. Lessons learned from decommissioning projects at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salazar, M.

    1995-01-01

    This paper describes lessons learned over the last 20 years from 12 decommissioning projects at Los Alamos National Laboratory. These lessons relate both to overall program management and to management of specific projects during the planning and operations phases. The issues include waste management; the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA); contracting; public involvement; client/customer interface; and funding. Key elements of our approach are to be proactive; follow the observation method; perform field activities concurrently; develop strategies to keep reportable incidents from delaying work; seek and use programs, methods, etc., in existence to shorten learning curves; network to help develop solutions; and avoid overstudying and overcharacterizing. This approach results in preliminary plans that require very little revision before implementation, reasonable costs and schedules, early acquisition of permits and NEPA documents, preliminary characterization reports, and contracting documents. Our track record is good -- the last four projects (uranium and plutonium-processing facility and three research reactors) have been on budget and on schedule

  7. Lessons learned from the PMI case study: the community perspective.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hare, M L; Orians, C E; Kennedy, M G; Goodman, K J; Wijesinha, S; Seals, B F

    2000-03-01

    This summary report presents the lessons learned during the two-part qualitative case study on the efficacy of the Prevention Marketing Initiative (PMI) in its implementation of an HIV prevention program. About 179 community participants were included in the PMI program, which discussed topics ranging from organizing initial planning committees to financially sustaining federal demonstration programs. One of the successes observed was the development of rapport with schools and churches; however, during the course of its implementation, the program realized the necessity of 1) approaching the program as an ongoing process; 2) going beyond studying the target population through formative research; 3) changing the role of a community coalition as the project matures; 4) reexamining the composition of coalition in the light of the target audience; 5) advocating the project as a community resource that promotes collaboration; 6) attending the needs of coalition members; and 7) using the media in the campaign. Likewise, several lessons were also learned in the areas of youth involvement, intervention development, program implementation, and maintenance of PMI activities.

  8. Patient safety: lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bagian, James P.

    2006-01-01

    The traditional approach to patient safety in health care has ranged from reticence to outward denial of serious flaws. This undermines the otherwise remarkable advances in technology and information that have characterized the specialty of medical practice. In addition, lessons learned in industries outside health care, such as in aviation, provide opportunities for improvements that successfully reduce mishaps and errors while maintaining a standard of excellence. This is precisely the call in medicine prompted by the 1999 Institute of Medicine report ''To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System.'' However, to effect these changes, key components of a successful safety system must include: (1) communication, (2) a shift from a posture of reliance on human infallibility (hence ''shame and blame'') to checklists that recognize the contribution of the system and account for human limitations, and (3) a cultivation of non-punitive open and/or de-identified/anonymous reporting of safety concerns, including close calls, in addition to adverse events. (orig.)

  9. Towards a realistic estimation for the risk to the public derived from a nuclear accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carrillo, D; Diaz de la Cruz, F.

    1985-01-01

    The controversy arised during the last decade around civil uses of nuclear energy has been focalized, principally, in its questionability as energetic resource, basing on the safety aspects and consequently on the risk magnitude associated with a nuclear accident, from which could arise significative releases of radioactivity to the environment. The reactor safety studies developed in the last decade overestimated, in some orders of magnitude, the radiological consequences, and therefore the nuclear risk derived from the operation of such installations. In this moment, after the lessons learned from Three Mile Island accident and the studies and researches, starting afterwards, it is considered suitable to develop a comparison of the above mentioned risk which allows an approach between its real value and that one derived from social perception.

  10. The effect of application of contextual teaching and learning (CTL model-based on lesson study with mind mapping media to assess student learning outcomes on chemistry on colloid systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Annisa Fadillah

    2017-08-01

    Full Text Available The research was conducted to determine the effect of the application of CTL learning model based on lesson study with mind mapping media to the learning outcomes of students on colloid systems. The population of this research was all students of grade XI of SMA N 1 Sunggal. The sample was taken using on the purposive random sampling. The Experiment class was taught with Contextual Teaching and Learning (CTL model based on Lesson Study with Mind Mapping media and the control class taught with conventional learning model. The data was collected using an objective test was consisting of 20 questions which validity, reliability, level of difficulty and power of difference had been tested. T test results showed that tcalculate = 2.1 and ttable = 1.6697 thus tcalculate> ttable which means that Ha is accepted and Ho is rejected. The enhancement of the student learning outcomes showed that the results of experiment class are g = 72.88%, while the control class is 68.97%. From the percentage, it can be seen that learning outcomes of the experiment class are greater than the control class. The analysis of developing cognitive aspects pointed out that C1 = 70.02%, C2 = 73.58%, C3 = 68.63%, Thus the domain of cognitive level are on the cognitive aspects of C2. The result of Lesson Study Analysis showed the results of 71.09% at the first lesson and 88.28% at the second lesson. It means that there is increasing adherence to the indicators after two lessons. Based on the above results, it can be concluded that the result of studying chemistry of the students of class XI of SMA Negeri I Sunggal TA 2014/2015 taught by a CTL model based  on Lesson Study with Mind Mapping media was higher (72.88% than those taught by conventional learning models (68.97% in the subject matter of colloids System.

  11. Special nuclear materials cutoff exercise: Issues and lessons learned. Volume 3

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Libby, R.A.; Segal, J.E.; Stanbro, W.D.; Davis, C.

    1995-08-01

    This document is appendices D-J for the Special Nuclear Materials Cutoff Exercise: Issues and Lessons Learned. Included are discussions of the US IAEA Treaty, safeguard regulations for nuclear materials, issue sheets for the PUREX process, and the LANL follow up activity for reprocessing nuclear materials.

  12. Special nuclear materials cutoff exercise: Issues and lessons learned. Volume 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Libby, R.A.; Segal, J.E.; Stanbro, W.D.; Davis, C.

    1995-08-01

    This document is appendices D-J for the Special Nuclear Materials Cutoff Exercise: Issues and Lessons Learned. Included are discussions of the US IAEA Treaty, safeguard regulations for nuclear materials, issue sheets for the PUREX process, and the LANL follow up activity for reprocessing nuclear materials

  13. Planning lessons with learning platforms - problem and prospects for mathematics education

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Tamborg, Andreas Lindenskov

    2018-01-01

    is a key intention behind the implementation of the platform. It is also concluded that when the teachers succeed in using learning objectives actively in their planning, the objectives support the teachers in designing lessons that correspond with their intentions. The paper concludes with a discussion...

  14. E-Learning and the iNtegrating Technology for InQuiry (NTeQ) Model Lesson Design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Flake, Lee Hatch

    2017-01-01

    The author reflects on the history of technology in education and e-learning and introduces the iNtegrating Technology for inQuiry (NTeQ) model of lesson design authored by Morrison and Lowther (2005). The NTeQ model lesson design is a new pedagogy for academic instruction in response to the growth of the Internet and technological advancements in…

  15. Goiania radiation accident: 30 years - a half-life for a whole life..

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reis, R.G.; Lucena, E.A.; Arantes, R.R.; Silva, A.A.; Reis, A.A.

    2017-01-01

    The radiological accident in Goiânia, Brazil, considered the largest urban radiological accident in the world, generated several publications in the technical area that are widely disseminated in the scientific literature, given the importance of the lessons learned. However, in a simple conversation with people who worked on that accident, it is noted that many reports have not been recorded. In this year in which 30 years of the event is completed, it will be of great value to record personal testimonies that are not in technical or scientific books. And what can we tell after a half-life that lasted for a lifetime? The lived stories, the situations, the improvisations, the way to solve, the overcoming, the human side, the emotions, happy or sad, short or long, funny or not. The objective of this work is to preserve, maintain and divulge reports and situations experienced by people who worked on the radiological accident with Cs-137 in Goiânia. Audio or video recordings about experiences lived in Goiânia by people who worked in that emergency situation were carried out. The reports are free and the form of registration is always at the discretion of the narrator. Storing records allows to preserve, maintain, and disclose the accident to other generations

  16. Lesson learned from two radiological incidents in industrial radiography in Iran

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Samimi, Bijan; Deevband Mohammad, Reza; Kardan Mohammad, Reza; Eshraghi, Ahmad

    2006-01-01

    This paper discussed two incidents occurred in Iran, follow-up investigations as well as lessons learned. Two Industrial Gamma Radiography Projectors (I.G.R.P.) included Ir-192 source with activities 24 and 30 Curies respectively were stolen. One of them was stolen in an industrial area with high security provision and the other one has been stolen at the home town without any security provision. The lessons learned from these incidents are discussed and the results are proposed as recommendations. Investigations show that the reasons for these incidents are as follows: 1. Insufficient training programs for radiographers. 2. Lack of specific emergency procedure for this type of incident in the company. 3. Not efficient National Emergency Plan for this type of threat. 4. Lack of technical and administrative measures to separate radioactive sources from unauthorized persons. 5. Lack of security plan in the company. 6. Insufficient supervision of Radiation Protection Officer (R.P.O.) or responsible person at the site. (authors)

  17. Lesson learned from two radiological incidents in industrial radiography in Iran

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Samimi, Bijan; Deevband Mohammad, Reza; Kardan Mohammad, Reza; Eshraghi, Ahmad [National Radiation Protection Department (NRPD) Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) (Iran, Islamic Republic of)

    2006-07-01

    This paper discussed two incidents occurred in Iran, follow-up investigations as well as lessons learned. Two Industrial Gamma Radiography Projectors (I.G.R.P.) included Ir-192 source with activities 24 and 30 Curies respectively were stolen. One of them was stolen in an industrial area with high security provision and the other one has been stolen at the home town without any security provision. The lessons learned from these incidents are discussed and the results are proposed as recommendations. Investigations show that the reasons for these incidents are as follows: 1. Insufficient training programs for radiographers. 2. Lack of specific emergency procedure for this type of incident in the company. 3. Not efficient National Emergency Plan for this type of threat. 4. Lack of technical and administrative measures to separate radioactive sources from unauthorized persons. 5. Lack of security plan in the company. 6. Insufficient supervision of Radiation Protection Officer (R.P.O.) or responsible person at the site. (authors)

  18. Lessons learned implementing environmental regulations at non-Department of Energy sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Craig, R.B.; Dippo, G.L.

    1991-01-01

    The Hazardous Waste Remedial Actions Program (HAZWRAP) has been involved in the implementation of environmental regulations at non-Department of Energy (DOE) facilities for > 5 years. If any common thread has been identified in working at these sites, it is that no two sites can be treated the same. Each site and its associated wastes, governing regulations, and environmental conditions are different. The list of technical lessons learned is long, and their applicability to other sites must be looked at for each specific case. That is far too large a task to undertake here. The most important lesson HAZWRAP learned is not technical. Implementing environmental regulations at non-DOE sites is not any different from implementing regulations or anything else done at DOE facilities. The key to success lies in quality, planning, and communication. Taking the time to implement a good quality program based on sound planning and open communication will ensure program success

  19. SOCAP: Lessons learned in applying SIPE-2 to the military operations crisis action planning domain

    Science.gov (United States)

    Desimone, Roberto

    1992-01-01

    This report describes work funded under the DARPA Planning and Scheduling Initiative that led to the development of SOCAP (System for Operations Crisis Action Planning). In particular, it describes lessons learned in applying SIPE-2, the underlying AI planning technology within SOCAP, to the domain of military operations deliberate and crisis action planning. SOCAP was demonstrated at the U.S. Central Command and at the Pentagon in early 1992. A more detailed report about the lessons learned is currently being prepared. This report was presented during one of the panel discussions on 'The Relevance of Scheduling to AI Planning Systems.'

  20. Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation: An Examination of Potential Lessons Learned From Prior Shipping Campaigns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    M. Keister; K, McBride

    2006-01-01

    The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), as amended, assigned the Department of Energy (DOE) responsibility for developing and managing a Federal system for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for accepting, transporting, and disposing of SNF and HLW at the Yucca Mountain repository (if licensed) in a manner that protects public health, safety, and the environment; enhances national and energy security; and merits public confidence. OCRWM faces a near-term challenge--to develop and demonstrate a transportation system that will sustain safe and efficient shipments of SNF and HLW to a repository. To better inform and improve its current planning, OCRWM has extensively reviewed plans and other documents related to past high-visibility shipping campaigns of SNF and other radioactive materials within the United States. This report summarizes the results of this review and, where appropriate, lessons learned. The objective of this lessons learned study was to identify successful, best-in-class trends and commonalities from past shipping campaigns, which OCRWM could consider when planning for the development and operation of a repository transportation system. Note: this paper is for analytical and discussion purposes only, and is not an endorsement of, or commitment by, OCRWM to follow any of the comments or trends. If OCRWM elects to make such commitments at a future time, they will be appropriately documented in formal programmatic policy statements, plans and procedures. Reviewers examined an extensive study completed in 2003 by DOE's National Transportation Program (NTP), Office of Environmental Management (EM), as well as plans and documents related to SNF shipments since issuance of the NTP report. OCRWM examined specific planning, business, institutional and operating practices that have been identified by DOE, its transportation contractors