WorldWideScience

Sample records for accident lessons learned

  1. Lessons learned from accidents investigations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zuniga-Bello, P. [Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia (CONACYT), Mexico City (Mexico); Croft, J. [National Radiological Protection Board (United Kingdom); Glenn, J

    1997-12-31

    Accidents from three main practices: medical applications, industrial radiography and industrial irradiators are used to illustrate some common causes of accidents and the main lessons to be learned. A brief description of some of these accidents is given. Lessons learned from the described accidents are approached by subjects covering: safety culture, quality assurance, human factors, good engineering practice, defence in depth, security of sources, safety assessment and monitoring and verification compliance. (author)

  2. Lessons learned from accident investigations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zuniga-Bello, P.; Croft, J.R.; Glenn, J.

    1998-01-01

    Accidents in three main practices - medical applications, industrial radiography and industrial irradiators - are used to illustrate some common causes of accidents and the main lessons to be learned from them. A brief description of some of these accidents is given. Lessons learned from the accidents described are approached bearing in mind: safety culture, quality assurance, human factors, good engineering practice, defence in depth, security of sources, safety assessment and monitoring and verification compliance. (author)

  3. Lessons learned from early criticality accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malenfant, R.E.

    1996-01-01

    Four accidents involving the approach to criticality occurred during the period July, 1945, through May, 1996. These have been described in the format of the OPERATING EXPERIENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY which is distributed by the Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety. Although the lessons learned have been incorporated in standards, codes, and formal procedures during the last fifty years, this is their first presentation in this format. It is particularly appropriate that they be presented in the forum of the Nuclear Criticality Technology Safety Project Workshop closest to the fiftieth anniversary of the last of the four accidents, and that which was most instrumental in demonstrating the need to incorporate lessons learned

  4. Lessons learned from MONJU sodium leak accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakai, Ryodai; Ito, Kazumoto; Nagata, Takashi

    2000-01-01

    MONJU sodium leak accident was a small accident with a large public impact. There was no injures or exposure to radiation, nor was there any loss of safety function such as reactor shutdown or reactor cooling. On the contrary a social impact is considerably large, whereby the plant remains shutdown. This paper describes the lessons learned from the accident, i.e. the impact of the accident and its cause, and the features on risk management in view of social aspect as well as technical aspect. (author)

  5. Low level waste shipment accident lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rast, D.M.; Rowe, J.G.; Reichel, C.W.

    1995-01-01

    On October 1, 1994 a shipment of low-level waste from the Fernald Environmental Management Project, Fernald, Ohio, was involved in an accident near Rolla, Missouri. The accident did not result in the release of any radioactive material. The accident did generate important lessons learned primarily in the areas of driver and emergency response communications. The shipment was comprised of an International Standards Organization (ISO) container on a standard flatbed trailer. The accident caused the low-level waste package to separate from the trailer and come to rest on its top in the median. The impact of the container with the pavement and median inflicted relatively minor damage to the container. The damage was not substantial enough to cause failure of container integrity. The success of the package is attributable to the container design and the packaging procedures used at the Fernald Environmental Management Project for low-level waste shipments. Although the container survived the initial wreck, is was nearly breached when the first responders attempted to open the ISO container. Even though the container was clearly marked and the shipment documentation was technically correct, this information did not identify that the ISO container was the primary containment for the waste. The lessons learned from this accident have DOE complex wide applicability. This paper is intended to describe the accident, subsequent emergency response operations, and the lessons learned from this incident

  6. Lessons learned from radiological accidents at medical exposures in radiotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fagundes, J.S.; Ferreira, A.F.; Lima, C.M.A.; Silva, F.C.A. da

    2017-01-01

    An exposure is considered accidental in radiotherapy when there is a substantial deviation in the prescription of treatment. In this work, an analysis of published radiological accidents, both in Brazil and internationally, was performed during medical exposures in radiotherapy treatments, removing the main lessons learned. Of the research carried out, we highlight Brazil with four radiological accidents and one death in the period between 2011 and 2014; the United States of America with 169 accidents with two deaths from 2000 to 2010 and France from 2001 to 2014 had 569 deaths without patients. Lessons learned have been described, for example, that maintenance personnel training should specify limitations or restrictions on the handling or adjustment of critical parts on the accelerator. It is recommended to apply the 10 main lessons learned due to radiological accidents during medical exposures in radiotherapy treatments to avoid future events

  7. Lessons learned from accidents in radiotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ortiz-Lopez, P.; Haywood, J.

    1996-01-01

    Radiotherapy is the only application of radiation which intentionally delivers very high doses to humans. A gross deviation from the prescribed dose or dose distribution can have severe, or even fatal consequences. Since the patient is placed directly in the beam or sources are inserted in the body, any mistake made with the beam or the sources leads almost certainly to an accidental exposure. Lessons learned from previous incidents can be used to test the vulnerability of a given facility, provided that these are adequately disseminated. The purpose of this paper is to present a summary of the lessons learned from a relatively large sample of events. The analysis has been presented as a short description followed by an identification of the triggering event and the contributing factors. These have been grouped as follows: errors in commissioning or calibration machines and sources affecting many patients; mistakes affecting individual patients such as irradiating the wrong patient, the wrong, field or site, and mistakes when entering data into or reading from the patient's chart; error due to unusual treatments or situations; equipment failure and human machine problems, including maintenance. (author). 1 ref

  8. Lessons learned from accidents in radiotherapy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ortiz-Lopez, P [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria). Div. of Nuclear Safety; Novotny, J [University Hospital St. Rafael, Leuven (Belgium); Haywood, J [South Cleveland Hospital (United Kingdom). Cleveland Medical Physics Unit

    1996-08-01

    Radiotherapy is the only application of radiation which intentionally delivers very high doses to humans. A gross deviation from the prescribed dose or dose distribution can have severe, or even fatal consequences. Since the patient is placed directly in the beam or sources are inserted in the body, any mistake made with the beam or the sources leads almost certainly to an accidental exposure. Lessons learned from previous incidents can be used to test the vulnerability of a given facility, provided that these are adequately disseminated. The purpose of this paper is to present a summary of the lessons learned from a relatively large sample of events. The analysis has been presented as a short description followed by an identification of the triggering event and the contributing factors. These have been grouped as follows: errors in commissioning or calibration machines and sources affecting many patients; mistakes affecting individual patients such as irradiating the wrong patient, the wrong, field or site, and mistakes when entering data into or reading from the patient`s chart; error due to unusual treatments or situations; equipment failure and human machine problems, including maintenance. (author). 1 ref.

  9. Lessons learned in the accident of contamination with Pu-239

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molina, G.; Ruiz C, M.; Angeles C, A.; Benitez S, J.A.

    2004-01-01

    This work describes the lessons learned during the accident by transuranic contamination in the National Institute of Nuclear Research happened between 1998 and 2003. The origin of the same one is the not authorized transfer of 0.51 g of plutonium metallic used as pattern source in the Department of Metrology to a laboratory which lacked of physical infrastructure, training and team to manipulate this source. (Author)

  10. Chernobyl accident: lessons learned for radiation protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kenigsberg, Jacov

    2008-01-01

    Full text: The long-term nature of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which was a major technological catastrophe in terms of its scope and complexity and created humanitarian, environmental, social, economic and health consequences. After more than twenty years we can conclude that Chernobyl accident was requested the big efforts of the national governments and international organisations for improvement new approaches to radiation safety, radiation protection, health care, emergency preparedness and response. During first years after accident some response actions did more harm than good because not based on international radiation protection principles, based on criteria developed during emergency and associated with mistrust, emotions, political pressure. As a result was inappropriate government reaction: unjustified relocation and decontamination - loss jobs, homes, billions of $ cost; unjustified compensation (high portion of annual national budgets). Non-radiological (e.g. detrimental economic, social and psychological) consequences was worse than direct radiological consequences. Psychological effects do not correlate with real exposure but with perception of risk. The affected people believe in threat to their health, doubt what has been reported about accident and resulted doses, got modification in life style, have somatic complains, got substance abuse (alcohol, tranquilizers, sleeping pills). The lack of accurate information and misperception of real radiation risk is believed also to have lead to change in behavior of some affected people. Possible long-term health effect due to the accidental exposure remains an issue. There is no doubt that excess thyroid cancer incidence results from exposure to radioactive iodines, mainly by iodine-131. Radiation induced thyroid cancer could easily be prevented by timely warning, effective thyroid blocking, timely restriction of consumption for contaminated food. The

  11. Lessons learned from accidents in industrial irradiation facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    Use of ionizing radiation in medicine, industry and research for technical development continues to increase throughout the world. One application with a high growth rate is irradiation suing high energy gamma photons and electron beams. There are currently more than 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation in almost all IAEA Member States. The most common uses of these facilities are to sterilize medical and pharmaceutical products, to preserve foodstuffs, to synthesize polymers and to eradicate insects. Although this industry has a good safety record, there is a potential for accidents with serious consequences to human health because of the high dose rates produced by these sources. Fatal accidents have occurred at installations in both developed and developing countries. Such accidents have prompted a review of several accidents, including five with fatalities, by a team of manufacturers, regulatory authorities and operating organizations. Having looked closely at the circumstances of each accident and the apparent deficiencies in design, safety and regulatory systems and personnel performance, the team made a number of recommendations on the ways in which the safety of irradiators can be improved. The findings of extensive research pertaining to the lessons that can be learned from irradiator accidents are presented. This publication is intended for manufacturers, regulatory authorities and operating organizations dealing with industrial irradiators. It was drafted by J.E. Glen, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, United States of America, and P. Zuniga-Bello, Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Technologia, Mexico

  12. Radiological accident and incident in Thailand: Lesson to be learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ya-anant, N.; Tiyapun, K.; Saiyut, K.

    2011-01-01

    Radioactive materials in Thailand have been used in medicine, research and industry for more than 50 y. Several radiological accident and incidents happened in the past 10 y. A serious one was the radiological accident that occurred in Samut Prakan (Thailand) in 2000. The serious radiological accident occurred when the 60 Co head was partially dismantled, taken from that storage to sell as scrap metal. Three victims died and 10 people received high dose from the source. The lesson learned from the radiological accident in Samut Prakan was to improve in many subjects, such as efficiency in Ministerial Regulations and Atomic Energy Act, emergency response and etc. In addition to the serious accident, there are also some small incidents that occurred, such as detection of contaminated scrap metals from the re-cycling of scrap metals from steel factories. Therefore, the radiation protection infrastructure was established after the accident. Laws and regulations of radiation safety and the relevant regulatory procedures must be revised. (authors)

  13. Learning lessons from Natech accidents - the eNATECH accident database

    Science.gov (United States)

    Krausmann, Elisabeth; Girgin, Serkan

    2016-04-01

    When natural hazards impact industrial facilities that house or process hazardous materials, fires, explosions and toxic releases can occur. This type of accident is commonly referred to as Natech accident. In order to prevent the recurrence of accidents or to better mitigate their consequences, lessons-learned type studies using available accident data are usually carried out. Through post-accident analysis, conclusions can be drawn on the most common damage and failure modes and hazmat release paths, particularly vulnerable storage and process equipment, and the hazardous materials most commonly involved in these types of accidents. These analyses also lend themselves to identifying technical and organisational risk-reduction measures that require improvement or are missing. Industrial accident databases are commonly used for retrieving sets of Natech accident case histories for further analysis. These databases contain accident data from the open literature, government authorities or in-company sources. The quality of reported information is not uniform and exhibits different levels of detail and accuracy. This is due to the difficulty of finding qualified information sources, especially in situations where accident reporting by the industry or by authorities is not compulsory, e.g. when spill quantities are below the reporting threshold. Data collection has then to rely on voluntary record keeping often by non-experts. The level of detail is particularly non-uniform for Natech accident data depending on whether the consequences of the Natech event were major or minor, and whether comprehensive information was available for reporting. In addition to the reporting bias towards high-consequence events, industrial accident databases frequently lack information on the severity of the triggering natural hazard, as well as on failure modes that led to the hazmat release. This makes it difficult to reconstruct the dynamics of the accident and renders the development of

  14. Outline of Fukushima nuclear accident and future action. Lessons learned from accident and countermeasure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fukuda, Toshihiko

    2012-01-01

    Fukushima nuclear accident was caused by loss of all AC power sources (SBO) and loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) hit by the Great East Japan Earthquake. This article reviewed outline of Fukushima nuclear accident progression when on year had passed since and referred to lessons learned from accident and countermeasure plan to prevent severe accident in SBO and LUHS events by earthquake and tsunami as future action. This countermeasure would be taken to (1) prevent serious flooding in case a tsunami overwhelms the breakwater, with improving water tightness of rooms for emergency diesel generator, batteries and power centers, (2) enhance emergency power supply and cooling function with mobile electricity generator, high pressure fire pump car and alternate water supply source, (3) mitigate environmental effects caused by core damage with installing containment filtered venting, and (4) enforce emergency preparedness in case of severe accident. Definite countermeasure plan for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPPs was enumerated. (T. Tanaka)

  15. Overview of Fukushima accident and the lessons learned from it

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawano, A.

    2012-01-01

    This paper is given in order to share the detailed information on the Fukushima Accident which occurred on March 11, 2011, and the lessons learned from it which worldwide nuclear experts might currently have more interest in. The paper first reflects how the facilities were damaged by a very strong earthquake and a series of beyond design-basis tsunamis. The earthquake caused loss of all off-site electric power at Fukushima Dacha Nuclear Power Station (1F), and the following series of tsunami made all emergency diesel generators except one for Unit 6 and most of DC batteries inoperable and severely damaged most of the facilities located on the ocean side. Thus all the units at 1a resulted in the loss of cooling function and ultimate heat sink for a long time period. TEPC focused on restoration of the instruments and lights in the Main Control Room (MCR), preparation of alternative water injection and venting of Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in the recovery process. However, the workers faced a lot of difficulties such as total darkness, repeated aftershocks, high radiation dose, a lot of debris on the ground, loss of communication means, etc. Massive damages by the tsunami and lack of necessary equipment and resources hampered a quick recovery. It eventually resulted in the severe core damage of Unit 1, 2 and 3 and also the hydrogen explosions in the reactor buildings of Unit 1, 3 and 4. This paper finally extracts the lessons learned from the accident and proposed the countermeasures, such as flood protection for essential facilities, preparation of practical and effective tools, securing communication means and so on. These would help the people involved in the nuclear industries all over the world properly understand the accident and develop their own countermeasures appropriately

  16. Lessons learned from our accident at Fukushima nuclear power stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawano, A.

    2012-01-01

    This paper is given in order to share the detailed information on the Fukushima Accident which occurred on March 11, 2011, and the lessons learned from it which worldwide nuclear experts might currently have more interest in. The paper first reflects how the facilities were damaged by a very strong earthquake and a series of beyond design-basis tsunamis. The earthquake caused loss of all off-site electric power at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (1F), and the following series of tsunami made all emergency diesel generators except one for Unit 6 and most of DC batteries inoperable and severely damaged most of the facilities located on the ocean side. Thus all the units at 1F resulted in the loss of cooling function and ultimate heat sink for a long time period. TEPCO focused on restoration of the instruments and lights in the Main Control Room (MCR), preparation of alternative water injection and venting of Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in the recovery process. However, the workers faced a lot of difficulties such as total darkness, repeated aftershocks, high radiation dose, a lot of debris on the ground, loss of communication means, etc. Massive damages by the tsunami and lack of necessary equipments and resources hampered a quick recovery. It eventually resulted in the severe core damage of Unit 1, 2, and 3 and also the hydrogen explosions in the reactor buildings of Unit 1, 3, and 4. This paper finally extracts the lessons learned from the accident and proposes the countermeasures, such as flood protection for essential facilities, preparation of practical and effective tools, securing communication means and so on. These would help the people involved in the nuclear industries all over the world properly understand the accident and develop their own countermeasures appropriately. (authors)

  17. Lessons learned from accidents in radiotherapy. An IAEA Safety Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ortiz, P.

    1998-01-01

    Radiotherapy is a very special application from the view point of protection because humans are deliberately exposed to high doses of radiation, and no physical barrier can be placed between the source and the patient. It deserves, therefore, special considerations from the point of view of potential exposure. An IAEA's Safety Report (in preparation) reviews a large collection of accident information, their initiating events and contributing factors, followed by a set of lessons learned and measures for prevention. The most important causes were: deficiencies in education and training, lack of procedures and protocols for essential tasks (such as commissioning, calibration, commissioning and treatment delivery), deficient communication and information transfer, absence of defence in depth and deficiencies in design, manufacture, testing and maintenance of equipment. Often a combination of more than one of these causes was present in an accident, thus pointing to a problem of management. Arrangements for a comprehensive quality assurance and accident prevention should be required by regulations and compliance be monitored by a Regulatory Authority. (author)

  18. Lessons learned and implications of the Fukushima NPP accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tokuhiro, A., E-mail: tokuhio@uidaho.edu [Univ. of Idaho, Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2014-07-01

    The global nuclear 'enterprise' is now 3-1/2 years (March 11, 2011) beyond the historic Tohoku earthquake (M9.0), subsequent tsunami (~14-15m waves), and unfortunately, the continuing consequences of the 'Fukushima nuclear power plant (NPP) accident. We now live in the post-Fukushima nuclear era. First let us pay our respects to this tragic loss-of-life (~16,000 fatalities) as a result of the earthquake and tsunami; also 10-years earlier in 2004, centered further south in the Indian Ocean (230,000+ fatalities). The movie, 'The Impossible', was a reminder that indeed, energy provides sustenance and socio-economic development for humankind. Energy will determine the state of AsiaPacific (AP) in years to come. Over the past 15-years, AP has clearly had increasing means to lead global economic growth, relative to stagnating economies of scale in Europe and U.S. AP also has both existing and emerging larger-scale industrial ambitions and capital to construct new nuclear power plants (NPPs). China has some 25-28 units under construction at 11 sites; the near-term goal is to establish 40GW of generating capacity by 2020 and to reach some 70-75GW approximately 10 years later. Although some investments are also being made in renewable energy, the demand for capacity clearly dictates further growth in nuclear power. However, unless high expectations for safety, safety culture are concurrently encouraged, we may face the next nuclear accident again in Asia. This work looks at the technical and non-technical lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the implications that we cannot afford to ignore. (author)

  19. Lessons learned and implications of the Fukushima NPP accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tokuhiro, A.

    2014-01-01

    The global nuclear 'enterprise' is now 3-1/2 years (March 11, 2011) beyond the historic Tohoku earthquake (M9.0), subsequent tsunami (~14-15m waves), and unfortunately, the continuing consequences of the 'Fukushima nuclear power plant (NPP) accident. We now live in the post-Fukushima nuclear era. First let us pay our respects to this tragic loss-of-life (~16,000 fatalities) as a result of the earthquake and tsunami; also 10-years earlier in 2004, centered further south in the Indian Ocean (230,000+ fatalities). The movie, 'The Impossible', was a reminder that indeed, energy provides sustenance and socio-economic development for humankind. Energy will determine the state of AsiaPacific (AP) in years to come. Over the past 15-years, AP has clearly had increasing means to lead global economic growth, relative to stagnating economies of scale in Europe and U.S. AP also has both existing and emerging larger-scale industrial ambitions and capital to construct new nuclear power plants (NPPs). China has some 25-28 units under construction at 11 sites; the near-term goal is to establish 40GW of generating capacity by 2020 and to reach some 70-75GW approximately 10 years later. Although some investments are also being made in renewable energy, the demand for capacity clearly dictates further growth in nuclear power. However, unless high expectations for safety, safety culture are concurrently encouraged, we may face the next nuclear accident again in Asia. This work looks at the technical and non-technical lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the implications that we cannot afford to ignore. (author)

  20. Summary of the Current Status of Lessons Learned From Fukushima Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pasamehmetoglu, Kemal

    2013-01-01

    This presentation introduced the current status of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, and in particular, the recommendations released by a NRC Near-term Task Force to enhance reactor safety in the 21. century. The near-term recommendations are focused on emergency power and emergency cooling availability during station blackout accidents

  1. Applicability of health physics lessons learned from the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident to the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bevelacqua, J J

    2012-02-01

    The TMI-2 and Fukushima Daiichi accidents appear to be dissimilar because they involve different reactor types. However, the health physics related lessons learned from TMI-2 are applicable, and can enhance the Fukushima Daiichi recovery effort. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  2. Accident at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ashrafi, A.; Farnoudi, F.; Tochai, M.T.M.; Mirhabibi, N.

    1986-01-01

    On March 28, 1979, the TMI, unit 2 nuclear power plant experienced a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) which has had a major impact among the others, upon the safety of nuclear power plants. Although a small part of the reactor core melted in this accident, but due to well performance of the vital safety equipment, there was no serious radioactivity release to the environment, and the accident has had no impact on the basic safety goals. A brief scenario of the accident, its consequences and the lessons learned are discussed

  3. Outline of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident. Lessons Learned and Safety Enhancements

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Hirano Masashi

    2017-01-01

    This paper briefly presents the outline of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and summarizes the major lessons learned having been drawn and safety enhancements having been done in Japan for the purpose of giving inputs to the discussions to be taken place in the Special Invited Session “Fukushima, 5 years after”.

  4. Chemical and nuclear emergencies: Interchanging lessons learned from planning and accident experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adler, V.; Sorensen, J.H.; Rogers, G.O.

    1989-01-01

    Because the goal of emergency preparedness for both chemical and nuclear hazards is to reduce human exposure to hazardous materials, this paper examines the interchange of lessons learned from emergency planning and accident experience in both industries. While the concerns are slightly different, sufficient similarity is found for each to draw implications from the others experience. Principally the chemical industry can learn from the dominant planning experience associated with nuclear power plants, while the nuclear industry can chiefly learn from the chemical industry's accident experience. 23 refs

  5. Safety Requirements / Design Criteria for SFR. Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yllera, Javier

    2013-01-01

    After the Fukushima event (March 2011) the IAEA has started an action to review and revise, if necessary, all Safety Standards to take into consideration the lessons learned from the accident. The Safety Standards that need to be revised have been identified. A Prioritization Approach has been established: The first priority is to review safety guides applicable for NPPs and spent fuel storage with focus on the measures for the prevention and mitigation of severe accident due to external hazards - ● Regulatory framework, Safety assessment, Management system, Radiation protection and Emergency Preparedness and response; ● Sitting, Design, Operation of NPPs ● Decommissioning and Waste Management. Original sources for lessons learned: IAE fact Finding Mission, Japan´s report to the Ministerial Conference, INSAG Report, etc. Later, other lesson sources considered

  6. Lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident and responses in NRA regulatory requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fuketa, Toyoshi

    2014-01-01

    The author would like to present significant lessons learned from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-ichi accident and responses in regulatory requirements developed by the Nuclear Regulation Authority for power-producing light water reactors. The presentation will cover prevention of structures, systems and components failures, measures to prevent common cause failures, prevention of core damage, mitigation of severe accidents, emergency preparedness, continuous improvement of safety, use of probabilistic risk assessment, and post-accident regulation on the Fukushima Dai-ichi. (author)

  7. Goiania radiation accident: activities carried out and lessons learned based on personal experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silva, F.C.A. da

    2017-01-01

    Goiânia Radiological Accident, on September 13, 1987, with a radioactive source of cesium-137 with 50.9 TBq, used in radiotherapy, is one of the most important accidents in the scientific area, representing a milestone for all workers in the areas of radiation protection and radiological emergency that worked during the event. A personal view of the Goiânia Radiological Accident is presented, showing some activities carried out in contaminated areas and lessons learned based on own experience during the event

  8. Learning Lessons from TMI to Fukushima and Other Industrial Accidents: Keys for Assessing Safety Management Practices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dechy, N.; Rousseau, J.-M.; Dien, Y.; Montmayeul, R.; Llory, M.

    2016-01-01

    The main objective of the paper is to discuss and to argue about transfer, from an industrial sector to another industrial sector, of lessons learnt from accidents. It will be achieved through the discussion of some theoretical foundations and through the illustration of examples of application cases in assessment of safety management practices in Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The nuclear energy production industry has faced three big ones in 30 years (TMI, Chernobyl, Fukushima) involving three different reactor technologies operated in three quite different cultural, organizational and regulatory contexts. Each of those accident has been the origin of questions, but also generator of lessons, some changing the worldview (see Wilpert and Fahlbruch, 1998) of what does cause an accident in addition to the engineering view about the importance of technical failures (human error, safety culture, sociotechnical interactions). Some of their main lessons were implemented such as improvements of human-machine interfaces ergonomics, recast of some emergency operating procedures, severe accident mitigation strategies and crisis management. Some lessons did not really provide deep changes. It is the case for organizational lessons such as, organizational complexity, management of production pressures, regulatory capture, and failure to learn, etc.

  9. Nuclear Security Summit and Workshop 2015: Preventing, Understanding and Recovering from Nuclear Accidents lessons learned from Chernobyl and Fukushima

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-09-01

    Workshop 2015 "Preventing, Understanding and Recovering from Nuclear Accidents"--lessons learned from Chernobyl and Fukushima Distribution Statement...by the factor to get the U.S. customary unit. “Preventing, Understanding and Recovering from Nuclear Accidents” – lessons learned from Chernobyl ...and Fukushima NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT & WORKSHOP 2015 2 Background The 1986 Chernobyl and the 2011 Fukushima accidents provoked world-wide concern

  10. BWR severe accident sequence analyses at ORNL - some lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hodge, S.A.

    1983-01-01

    Boiling water reactor severe accident sequence studies are being carried out using Browns Ferry Unit 1 as the model plant. Four accident studies were completed, resulting in recommendations for improvements in system design, emergency procedures, and operator training. Computer code improvements were an important by-product

  11. Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations of TEPCO. Outline and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanaka, Shun-ichi

    2012-01-01

    The severe accident that broke out at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations on March 11, 2011, caused seemingly infinite damage to the daily life of residents. Serious and wide-spread contamination of the environment occurred due to radioactive materials discharged from nuclear power stations (NPSs). At the same time, many issues were highlighted concerning countermeasures to severe nuclear accidents. The accident is outlined, and lessons learned are extracted with respect to the safety of NPSs, as well as radiation protection of residents under the emergency involving the accident. The materials of the current paper are those released by governmental agencies, academic societies, interim reports of committees under the government, and others. (author)

  12. Lessons for PHWRs learned from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waddington, J.G.; Molloy, T.J.

    1996-04-01

    The Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada examined its criteria for licensing nuclear power plants following the accident to the Chernobyl reactor in 1986. The causes of the accident were studied to ascertain whether they revealed any deficiencies in the safety of CANDU PHWRs. A report published in 1987 contained nine recommendations, and this paper revisits these to indicate how they were dealt with by plant owners and the regulatory authority. (author)

  13. Lessons for PHWRs learned from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waddington, J.G.; Molloy, T.J.

    1996-01-01

    The Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada examined its criteria for licensing nuclear power plants following the accident to the Chernobyl reactor in 1986. The causes of the accident were studied to ascertain whether they revealed any deficiencies in the safety of CANDU PHWRs. A report published in 1987 contained nine recommendations, and this paper revisits these to indicate how they were dealt with the plant owners and the regulatory authority

  14. Risk communication in the case of the Fukushima accident: Impact of communication and lessons to be learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perko, Tanja

    2016-10-01

    Risk communication about the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in 2011 was often not transparent, timely, clear, nor factually correct. However, lessons related to risk communication have been identified and some of them are already addressed in national and international communication programmes and strategies. The Fukushima accident may be seen as a practice scenario for risk communication with important lessons to be learned. As a result of risk communication failures during the accident, the world is now better prepared for communication related to nuclear emergencies than it was 5 years ago The present study discusses the impact of communication, as applied during the Fukushima accident, and the main lessons learned. It then identifies pathways for transparent, timely, clear and factually correct communication to be developed, practiced and applied in nuclear emergency communication before, during, and after nuclear accidents. Integr Environ Assess Manag 2016;12:683-686. © 2016 SETAC. © 2016 SETAC.

  15. The search for active learning: Lessons from a happy accident

    OpenAIRE

    Bashforth, Hedley; Parmar, Nitin R

    2010-01-01

    This article suggests that the concept of ‘active learning’ has different meanings. These meanings are created in the dynamic and variable relationships between the uses of learning technologies and approaches to pedagogy. Institutions play a key role in mediating these relationships, privileging some meanings of ‘active learning’ over others. More dialogical forms of active learning call for changes in the mediating role of the institution. This article draws on a case study of the use of El...

  16. Emergency operating procedures improvement based on the lesson learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wu, Wen-Hsiung, E-mail: whwu1127@aec.gov.tw [Atomic Energy Council, 2F., No. 80, Sec.1, Chenggong Rd., Yonghe Dist., New Taipei City 234, Taiwan (China); Institute of Nuclear Engineering and Science, National Tsing Hua University, No. 101, Sec. 2, Guangfu Rd., Hsinchu City 300, Taiwan (China); Liao, Lih-Yih, E-mail: lyliao@iner.gov.tw [Institute of Nuclear Energy Research, Atomic Energy Council, No. 1000, Wenhua Rd., Jiaan Village, Longtan Township, Taoyuan County 325, Taiwan (China)

    2016-12-01

    Highlights: • Discuss the problem of EOPs at the time of Fukushima accident to deal with the prolonged SBO. • Elaborate the potential risk accompanied with the emergency depressurization in the SBO. • Describe a special guideline to cope with Fukushima-like accidents and provide its technical basis. • Point out that Fukushima accident might have been prevented if improved EOPs had been used. • Propose key points and suggestions for improving the EOPs. - Abstract: One of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident is the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) have to be improved. The BWR Owners’ Group revised the emergency procedure guidelines and addressed the lesson learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident in revision 3 in order to avoid loss of turbine-driven makeup water systems during reactor depressurization. However, the improvement deserves much more attention. The existing EOPs at the time of the accident may not be adequate enough for the prolonged station blackout condition, because resources required for performing the EOPs are vastly unavailable or gradually exhausted. The improved EOPs must not only permit early reactor pressure vessel depressurization, but also address the risk accompanied with the emergency depressurization. For this reason, Taiwan Power Company proposed the Ultimate Response Guideline (URG) to cope with Fukushima-like accidents. The main content of the URG is a two-stage depressurization strategy, namely the controlled depressurization and the emergency depressurization. The technical basis of the two-stage depressurization strategy was discussed in this paper. The effectiveness of the URG was verified by using TRAC/RELAP Advanced Computational Engine (TRACE). Besides, the emergency responses performed by Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant (Fukushima Daini NPP) were found to be very similar to the URG. The consequences of Fukushima Daini NPP somehow demonstrate that the URG is effective for Fukushima

  17. Emergency operating procedures improvement based on the lesson learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, Wen-Hsiung; Liao, Lih-Yih

    2016-01-01

    Highlights: • Discuss the problem of EOPs at the time of Fukushima accident to deal with the prolonged SBO. • Elaborate the potential risk accompanied with the emergency depressurization in the SBO. • Describe a special guideline to cope with Fukushima-like accidents and provide its technical basis. • Point out that Fukushima accident might have been prevented if improved EOPs had been used. • Propose key points and suggestions for improving the EOPs. - Abstract: One of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident is the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) have to be improved. The BWR Owners’ Group revised the emergency procedure guidelines and addressed the lesson learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident in revision 3 in order to avoid loss of turbine-driven makeup water systems during reactor depressurization. However, the improvement deserves much more attention. The existing EOPs at the time of the accident may not be adequate enough for the prolonged station blackout condition, because resources required for performing the EOPs are vastly unavailable or gradually exhausted. The improved EOPs must not only permit early reactor pressure vessel depressurization, but also address the risk accompanied with the emergency depressurization. For this reason, Taiwan Power Company proposed the Ultimate Response Guideline (URG) to cope with Fukushima-like accidents. The main content of the URG is a two-stage depressurization strategy, namely the controlled depressurization and the emergency depressurization. The technical basis of the two-stage depressurization strategy was discussed in this paper. The effectiveness of the URG was verified by using TRAC/RELAP Advanced Computational Engine (TRACE). Besides, the emergency responses performed by Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant (Fukushima Daini NPP) were found to be very similar to the URG. The consequences of Fukushima Daini NPP somehow demonstrate that the URG is effective for Fukushima

  18. Lessons Learned after Nuclear Power Plants and Hydropower Plants Accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moskalenko, A., E-mail: gce@gce.ru [GCE Group, Saint Petersburg (Russian Federation)

    2014-10-15

    Full text: The World is becoming more open and free for communication. However, the experience (positive or negative) is still badly cross over sectorial borders. I would like to illustrate the point with the examples, even with several unexpected ones. I would like to start with a few words regarding the Sayano – Shushenskaya Hydro Power Plant accident and the factors that caused it. Sayano – Shushenskaya Hydro Power Plant is a unique Hydro Power Plant with efficiency factor of 96 %. Nevertheless, the efficiency factor, in particular, caused a series of restrictions: hydro-electric units vibration amplitude must not exceed 4 micron!!! (Slide 1: Vibration amplitude dependence on output capacity) As it is clearly seen, there is a so called “prohibited area”, which the hydro-electric unit must pass over. Operations in the area are prohibited in accordance with the regulatory documents. However, due to the changes that occurred in Russian power supply industry, the hydro-electric unit passed through the prohibited area more than 12 times, if we take into account only the day of the accident. The bolts keeping the turbine cover, keeping water apart from the machinery hall, were too much released. The mentioned above reasons led to the hydro-electric unit disruption and the machinery hall flooding. Water inflow was possible to stop by putting down the regulating valves. However, the regulating valves control console was in the flooded machinery hall. There was standby emergency control console, but it was in the machinery hall, as well. The machinery hall was flooded, consequently, main and standby systems were destroyed. Moreover, the machinery hall, where all the units were disposed, was a huge hall without dividing walls, etc. (Photo) Take a look at the next slide. (Photo – Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant machinery hall). Take note of Fukushima–1 Nuclear Power Plant: standby power supply source was situated in the same place and destroyed by water. All the

  19. Post-facta Analyses of Fukushima Accident and Lessons Learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tanabe, Fumiya [Sociotechnical Systems Safety Research Institute, Ichige (Japan)

    2014-08-15

    Independent analyses have been performed of the core melt behavior of the Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit 3 reactors of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on 11-15 March 2011. The analyses are based on a phenomenological methodology with measured data investigation and a simple physical model calculation. Estimated are time variation of core water level, core material temperature and hydrogen generation rate. The analyses have revealed characteristics of accident process of each reactor. In the case of Unit 2 reactor, the calculated result suggests little hydrogen generation because of no steam generation in the core for zirconium-steam reaction during fuel damage process. It could be the reason of no hydrogen explosion in the Unit 2 reactor building. Analyses have been performed also on the core material behavior in another chaotic period of 19-31 March 2011, and it resulted in a re-melt hypothesis that core material in each reactor should have melted again due to shortage of cooling water. The hypothesis is consistent with many observed features of radioactive materials dispersion into the environment.

  20. Risk Communication Strategies: Lessons Learned from Previous Disasters with a Focus on the Fukushima Radiation Accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Svendsen, Erik R; Yamaguchi, Ichiro; Tsuda, Toshihide; Guimaraes, Jean Remy Davee; Tondel, Martin

    2016-12-01

    It has been difficult to both mitigate the health consequences and effectively provide health risk information to the public affected by the Fukushima radiological disaster. Often, there are contrasting public health ethics within these activities which complicate risk communication. Although no risk communication strategy is perfect in such disasters, the ethical principles of risk communication provide good practical guidance. These discussions will be made in the context of similar lessons learned after radiation exposures in Goiania, Brazil, in 1987; the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, Ukraine, in 1986; and the attack at the World Trade Center, New York, USA, in 2001. Neither of the two strategies is perfect nor fatally flawed. Yet, this discussion and lessons from prior events should assist decision makers with navigating difficult risk communication strategies in similar environmental health disasters.

  1. Outline of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident. Lessons Learned and Safety Enhancements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hirano, Masashi

    2017-09-01

    Abstract. On March 11, 2011, an earthquake and subsequent tsunamis off the Pacific coastline of Japan's Tohoku region caused widespread devastation in Japan. As of June 10, 2016, it is reported that a total of 15,894 people lost their lives and 2,558 people are still unaccounted for. In Fukushima Prefecture, approximately 100,000 people are still obliged to live away from their homes due to the earthquake and tsunami as well as the Fukushima Daiichi accident. On the day, the earthquake and tsunami caused severe damages to the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)'s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS). All the units in operation, namely Units 1 to 3, were automatically shut down on seismic reactor protection system trips but the earthquake led to the loss of all off-site electrical power supplies to that site. The subsequent tsunami inundated the site up to 4 to 5 m above its ground level and caused, in the end, the loss of core cooling function in Units 1 to 3, resulting in severe core damages and containment vessel failures in these three units. Hydrogen was released from the containment vessels, leading to explosions in the reactor buildings of Units 1, 3 and 4. Radioactive materials were released to the atmosphere and were deposited on the land and in the ocean. One of the most important lessons learned is an importance to prevent such large scale common cause failures due to extreme natural events. This leads to a conclusion that application of the defense-in-depth philosophy be enhanced because the defense-in-depth philosophy has been and continues to be an effective way to account for uncertainties associated with risks. From the human and organizational viewpoints, the final report from the Investigation Committee of the Government pointed out so-called "safety myth" that existed among nuclear operators including TEPCO as well as the government, that serious severe accidents could never occur in nuclear power plants in Japan. After the accident, the

  2. Radiation protection lessons learned from the TEPCO Fukushima No.1 NPS accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Urabe, Itsumasa; Hattori, Takatoshi; Iimoto, Takeshi; Yokoyama, Sumi

    2014-01-01

    Lessons learned from the TEPCO Fukushima No.1 NPS accident are discussed from the viewpoint of radiation protection in the situation of nuclear emergency. It became clear from the discussion that the protective measures should be practiced by taking into account the time profiles of the radiological disaster after the nuclear accident and that the land and coastal sea areas monitoring had to be practiced immediately after the nuclear accident and the communication methods to tell the public about the radiation information and the meaning of protective measures should be developed for mitigation of the sociological aspects of disaster impacts. And it was pointed out from the view point of practicing countermeasures that application of the reference levels, above which it was judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposure to occur, played an important role for practicing protective measures in an optimized way and that the quantities and units used for quantifying radiation exposure of individuals in terms of radiation doses have caused considerable communication problems. Finally, the occupational exposures and the public exposures that have been reported so far are shown, and it is concluded that there is no conclusive evidence on low dose exposures that would justify a modification of the radiation risk recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. (author)

  3. Lessons Learned for Space Safety from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nogami, Manami; Miki, Masami; Mitsui, Masami; Kawada, Ysuhiro; Takeuchi, Nobuo

    2013-09-01

    On March 11 2011, Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake hit Japan and caused the devastating damage. The Fukushima Nuclear Power Station (NPS) was also severely damaged.The Japanese NPSs are designed based on the detailed safety requirements and have multiple-folds of hazard controls to the catastrophic hazards as in space system. However, according to the initial information from the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the Japanese government, the larger-than-expected tsunami and subsequent events lost the all hazard controls to the release of radioactive materials.At the 5th IAASS, Lessons Learned from this disaster was reported [1] mainly based on the "Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety" [2] published by Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters in June 2011, three months after the earthquake.Up to 2012 summer, the major investigation boards, including the Japanese Diet, the Japanese Cabinet and TEPCO, published their final reports, in which detailed causes of this accident and several recommendations are assessed from each perspective.In this paper, the authors examine to introduce the lessons learned to be applied to the space safety as findings from these reports.

  4. Lessons learned from the Fukushima accident to improve the performance of the national nuclear preparedness system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dewi Apriliani

    2013-01-01

    A study of emergency response failure in the early phase of a nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan has conducted. This study aimed to obtain lesson learned from the problems and constraints that exist at the time of the Fukushima emergency response. This lesson learned will be adjusted to the situation, conditions and problems in nuclear preparedness systems in Indonesia, so that it can obtain the necessary recommendations to improve the performance of SKNN (National Nuclear Emergency Preparedness System). Recommendations include: improvements in coordination and information systems, including early warning systems and dissemination of information; improvements in the preparation of emergency plans/contingency plan, which includes an integrated disaster management; improvement in the development of disaster management practice/field exercise, by extending the scenario and integrate it with nuclear disaster, chemical, biological, and acts of terrorism; and improvement in public education of nuclear emergency preparedness and also improvement in management for dissemination of information to the public and the mass media. These improvements need to be done as part of efforts in preparing a reliable nuclear emergency preparedness in order to support nuclear power plant development plan. (author)

  5. Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, Actions Taken and Challenges Ahead

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shimizu, Y.

    2016-01-01

    On 19 September, 2012, the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) was established in light of lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident of 11 March 2011, to ensure that such accidents never happen again, to restore public trust in regulator both in Japan and abroad and to rebuild and foster a genuine safety culture by placing the highest priority on public safety. The NRA, an independent administrative commission of the Ministry of the Environment, is organized to separate the regulatory functions from the promotional functions of the use of nuclear energy within the government, and to independently implement its duties from the perspectives of neutrality and fairness based on its expertise. Having learned the lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and with reference to IAEA safety standards, since its establishment, the NRA has endeavored to strengthen the regulatory requirements, in particular, for hazards such as tsunamis and earthquakes which may lead to common cause failures, and countermeasures against severe accidents. Under the new regulatory scheme, a back-fitting system was introduced. Emergency preparedness and response measures for nuclear facilities were also enhanced. As of end of March 2016, five reactors received NRA’s permission for changing their reactor installations based on the new regulatory requirements, and two nuclear power reactors have restarted their operations. In January 2016, at the request of Japan, the IAEA sent the IRRS mission team to Japan to assess the regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety. Through the self-assessment prior to the mission, the NRA has developed 22 action plans, including a) improvement of regulatory inspection, b) capacity building, and c) strengthening of safety research capability. The mission team has found that Japan’s nuclear regulator has demonstrated independence and transparency since it was set up in 2012. The team also noted that the NRA needs to improve the inspection

  6. Learning lessons from accidents with a human and organisational factors perspective: deficiencies and failures of operating experience feedback systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dechy, N.; Rousseau, J.M.; Jeffroy, F.

    2012-01-01

    This paper aims at reminding the failures of operating experience feedback (OEF) systems through the lessons of accidents and provides a framework for improving the efficiency of OEF processes. The risk is for example to miss lessons from other companies and industrial sectors, or to miss the implementation of adequate corrective actions with the risk to repeat accidents. Most of major accidents have been caused by a learning failure or other organisational factors as a contributing cause among several root causes. Some of the recurring organisational factors are: -) poor recognition of critical components, of critical activities or deficiency in anticipation and detection of errors, -) excessive production pressure, -) deficiency of communication or lack of quality of dialogue, -) Excessive formalism, -) organisational complexity, -) learning deficiencies (OEF, closing feedback loops, lack of listening of whistle-blowers). Some major accidents occurred in the nuclear industry. Although the Three Mile Island accident has multiple causes, in particular, an inappropriate design of the man-machine interface, it is a striking example of the loss of external lessons from incidents. As for Fukushima it is too early to have established evidence on learning failures. The systematic study and organisational analysis of OEF failures in industrial accidents whatever their sector has enabled us to provide a framework for OEF improvements. Five key OEF issues to improve in priority: 1) human and organisational factors analysis of the root causes of the events, 2) listening to the field staff, dissenting voices and whistle-blowers, 3) monitoring of the external events that provide generic lessons, 4) building an alive memory through a culture of accidents with people who become experiences pillars, and 5) the setting of external audit or organisational analysis of the OEF system by independent experts. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  7. Introduction of the Amendment of IAEA Safety Requirements Reflected Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahn, Sang-Kyu; Ahn, Hyung-Joon; Kim, Sun-Hae; Cheong, Jae-Hak [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The following five Safety Requirements publications were amended: Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety (GSR Part 1, 2010), Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (NS-R-3, 2003), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1, 2012), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (SSR-2/2, 2011), and Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4, 2009). Figure 1 shows IAEA Safety Standards Categories Major amendments of five Safety Requirements publications were introduced and analyzed in this study. The five IAEA safety requirements publications which are GSR Part 1 and 4, NS-R-3 and SSR-2/1 and 2, were amended to reflect the lesson learned from the Fukushima accident and other operating experiences. Specially, 36 provisions were modified and the new 29 provision with 1 requirement (No. 67: Emergency response facilities on the site) of the SSR-2/1 were established. Since the Fukushima accident happened, a new word, design extension conditions (DECs) which cover substantially the beyond design basis accidents (BDBA), including severe accident conditions, was created and more elaborated by the world nuclear experts. Design extension conditions could include conditions in events without significant fuel degradation and conditions with core melting. Figure 2 shows the range of the DECs. The amendment of the five IAEA safety requirements publications are focused at the prevention of initiating events, which would lead to the DECs, and mitigation of the consequences of DECs by the enhanced defense in depth principle. The following examples of the IAEA requirements to prevent the initiating events are: margins for withstanding external events; margins for avoiding cliff edge effects; safety assessment for multiple facilities or activities at a single site; safety assessment in cases where resources at a facility are shared; consideration of the potential occurrence of events in combination; establishing levels of hazard

  8. Lessons learned from the CEOG generic accident management guidelines confirmation (validation) exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khalil, Y.F.; Schneider, R.E.; Greene, M.A.

    1996-01-01

    In July 1995, the CE Owner's Group completed and issued Revision 0 of the Generic Accident Management Guidelines (AMG's) to the owners group task participants. This guidance provides a structured mechanism for the plant staff at CE utilities to respond to accidents that beyond the plant design basis and, possibly, the Emergency Operating Procedures. Prior to final issue of the generic AMGs, the CEOG conducted an AMG Confirmation Exercise to establish the ability of the AMGs to fulfill this important role. The specific objectives of the AMG Confirmation Exercise were to (1) clarify the interactions and transitions between the AMG/Technical Support Center (TSC) and the EOPS/Operations Personnel (2) validate the adequacy of the AMG data collection and plant condition diagnostic evaluation process and (3) assess the feasibility of the mechanical material and recommendations contained in the AMG's. The purpose of paper is to provide a detailed description of the AMG Confirmation Exercise as well as important lessons learned during the planning and implementation of the exercise. In addition, a discussion will be presented pertaining to the relationship between the AMG's (incumbent to the Technical Support Center) and the plants Emergency Operating Procedures (incumbent to the Control Room Operations Staff)

  9. Accidents in industrial radiography and lessons to be learned. A review of IAEA Safety Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Modupe, M.S.; Oresegun, O.

    1998-01-01

    This IAEA Safety Report Series publication is the result of a review of a large selection of accidents in industrial radiography which Regulatory Authorities, professional associations and scientific journals have reported. The review's objective was to draw lessons from the initiating events of the accidents, contributing factors and the consequences. A small, representative selection of accident descriptions is used to illustrate the primary causes of radiography accidents and a set of recommendations to prevent recurrence of such accidents or to mitigate the consequences of those that do occur is provided. By far the most common primary cause of over-exposure was 'Failure to follow operational procedures' and specifically failure to perform radiation monitoring to locate the position of the source. The information in the Safety Report is intended for use by Regulatory Authorities, operating organizations, workers manufacturers and client organizations having responsibilities for radiation protection and safety in industrial radiography. (author)

  10. Lessons learned in the accident of contamination with Pu-239; Lecciones aprendidas en el accidente de contaminacion con Pu-239

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Molina, G.; Ruiz C, M.; Angeles C, A.; Benitez S, J.A. [ININ, 52045 Estado de Mexico (Mexico)]. e-mail: gm@nuclear.inin.mx

    2004-07-01

    This work describes the lessons learned during the accident by transuranic contamination in the National Institute of Nuclear Research happened between 1998 and 2003. The origin of the same one is the not authorized transfer of 0.51 g of plutonium metallic used as pattern source in the Department of Metrology to a laboratory which lacked of physical infrastructure, training and team to manipulate this source. (Author)

  11. Lessons learnt from Fukushima Accident - What did McMaster Undergraduate Students learn?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nagasaki, S., E-mail: nagasas@mcmaster.ca [McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, (Canada)

    2015-07-01

    Nuclear communities not only in Japan but also around the world learnt a lot of lessons from the Fukushima accident. The direct cause of the accident from the viewpoint of traditional engineering is clear, and as a result various measures have been implemented around the world. The accident also provides many insights into the relationship between traditional engineering and Japanese society. In this paper, the root causes of the accident were studied by applying a psychological model for evocation of an individual's anxiety related to social affairs [1] to the discussions in an undergraduate course at McMaster University. In the last section, the challenges, which McMaster students considered Japanese nuclear community is now facing and Canadian nuclear community can contribute to in future, are summarized. (author)

  12. Lessons learnt from Fukushima Accident - What did McMaster Undergraduate Students learn?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nagasaki, S.

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear communities not only in Japan but also around the world learnt a lot of lessons from the Fukushima accident. The direct cause of the accident from the viewpoint of traditional engineering is clear, and as a result various measures have been implemented around the world. The accident also provides many insights into the relationship between traditional engineering and Japanese society. In this paper, the root causes of the accident were studied by applying a psychological model for evocation of an individual's anxiety related to social affairs [1] to the discussions in an undergraduate course at McMaster University. In the last section, the challenges, which McMaster students considered Japanese nuclear community is now facing and Canadian nuclear community can contribute to in future, are summarized. (author)

  13. Twenty years' application of agricultural countermeasures following the Chernobyl accident: lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fesenko, S V [International Atomic Energy Agency, 1400 Vienna (Austria); Alexakhin, R M [Russian Institute of Agricultural Radiology and Agroecology, 249020 Obninsk (Russian Federation); Balonov, M I [International Atomic Energy Agency, 1400 Vienna (Austria); Bogdevich, I M [Research Institute for Soil Science and Agrochemistry, Minsk (Belarus); Howard, B J [Centre for Ecology and Hydrology, Lancaster Environment Centre, Library Avenue, Bailrigg, Lancaster LAI 4AP (United Kingdom); Kashparov, V A [Ukrainian Institute of Agricultural Radiology (UIAR), Mashinostroiteley Street 7, Chabany, Kiev Region 08162 (Ukraine); Sanzharova, N I [Russian Institute of Agricultural Radiology and Agroecology, 249020 Obninsk (Russian Federation); Panov, A V [Russian Institute of Agricultural Radiology and Agroecology, 249020 Obninsk (Russian Federation); Voigt, G [International Atomic Energy Agency, 1400 Vienna (Austria); Zhuchenka, Yu M [Research Institute of Radiology, 246000 Gomel (Belarus)

    2006-12-15

    The accident at the Chernobyl NPP (nuclear power plant) was the most serious ever to have occurred in the history of nuclear energy. The consumption of contaminated foodstuffs in affected areas was a significant source of irradiation for the population. A wide range of different countermeasures have been used to reduce exposure of people and to mitigate the consequences of the Chernobyl accident for agriculture in affected regions in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. This paper for the first time summarises key data on countermeasure application over twenty years for all three countries and describes key lessons learnt from this experience. (review)

  14. Twenty years' application of agricultural countermeasures following the Chernobyl accident: lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fesenko, S V; Alexakhin, R M; Balonov, M I; Bogdevich, I M; Howard, B J; Kashparov, V A; Sanzharova, N I; Panov, A V; Voigt, G; Zhuchenka, Yu M

    2006-01-01

    The accident at the Chernobyl NPP (nuclear power plant) was the most serious ever to have occurred in the history of nuclear energy. The consumption of contaminated foodstuffs in affected areas was a significant source of irradiation for the population. A wide range of different countermeasures have been used to reduce exposure of people and to mitigate the consequences of the Chernobyl accident for agriculture in affected regions in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. This paper for the first time summarises key data on countermeasure application over twenty years for all three countries and describes key lessons learnt from this experience. (review)

  15. Considering lessons learned about safety culture and their reflection to activity. After Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Obu, Etsuji; Hamada, Jun; Fukano, Takuya

    2011-01-01

    Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident forced neighboring residents to evacuate for a long time and gave Public anxieties greatly and significant effects to social activities in Japan. Public trust of nuclear power was lost by not preventing the accident and future of nuclear power became reconsidered, which nuclear industry people regretted deeply. Japan Nuclear Technology Institute (JANTI) had conducted activities enhancing safety culture in nuclear industry. It would be necessary to consider improvements of accident prevention and mitigation measures after evaluating the accident in a viewpoint of 'safety culture'. Based on published information and knowledge accumulated by activities of JANTI, the accident was examined taking account of greatness of nuclear accident and its effects from the side of safety culture. Lessons learned about safety culture were pointed out as; (1) reconfirmation of specialty of nuclear technology. (2) reinforcement of questioning and learning attitudes and (3) improvement of evaluation capability of nuclear safety and safety assurance against external event. These were reflected in activities such as; (1) reconsideration of safety culture assessment, (2) strengthening further support to improve safety culture consciousness and (3) improvement of peer review activity. (T. Tanaka)

  16. Basic safety principles: Lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Erp, J.B. van [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1997-09-01

    The presentation reviews the following issues: basic safety principles and lessons learned; some conclusions from the Kemeny report on the accident at TMI; some recommendations from the Kemeny report on the accident at TMI; conclusions and recommendations from the Rogovin report on the accident on TMI; instrumentation deficiencies (from Rogovin report).

  17. Basic safety principles: Lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Erp, J.B. van

    1997-01-01

    The presentation reviews the following issues: basic safety principles and lessons learned; some conclusions from the Kemeny report on the accident at TMI; some recommendations from the Kemeny report on the accident at TMI; conclusions and recommendations from the Rogovin report on the accident on TMI; instrumentation deficiencies (from Rogovin report)

  18. FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE ACTIONS FROM THE RISK PERSPECTIVES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    JOON-EON YANG

    2014-02-01

    Full Text Available The Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident in 2011 has affected various aspects of the nuclear society worldwide. The accident revealed some problems in the conventional approaches used to ensure the safety of nuclear installations. To prevent such disastrous accidents in the future, we have to learn from them and improve the conventional approaches in a more systematic manner. In this paper, we will cover three issues. The first is to identify the key issues that affected the progress of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident greatly. We examine the accident from a defense-in-depth point of view to identify such issues. The second is to develop a more systematic approach to enhance the safety of nuclear installations. We reexamine nuclear safety from a risk point of view. We use the concepts of residual and unknown risks in classifying the risk space. All possible accident scenarios types are reviewed to clarify the characteristics of the identified issues. An approach is proposed to improve our conventional approaches used to ensure nuclear safety including the design of safety features and the safety assessments from a risk point of view. Finally, we address some issues to be improved in the conventional risk assessment and management framework and/or practices to enhance nuclear safety.

  19. Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident: Lessons Learned and Future Actions from the Risk Perspectives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yang, Jooneon [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-02-15

    The Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident in 2011 has affected various aspects of the nuclear society worldwide. The accident revealed some problems in the conventional approaches used to ensure the safety of nuclear installations. To prevent such disastrous accidents in the future, we have to learn from them and improve the conventional approaches in a more systematic manner. In this paper, we will cover three issues. The first is to identify the key issues that affected the progress of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident greatly. We examine the accident from a defense-in-depth point of view to identify such issues. The second is to develop a more systematic approach to enhance the safety of nuclear installations. We reexamine nuclear safety from a risk point of view. We use the concepts of residual and unknown risks in classifying the risk space. All possible accident scenarios types are reviewed to clarify the characteristics of the identified issues. An approach is proposed to improve our conventional approaches used to ensure nuclear safety including the design of safety features and the safety assessments from a risk point of view. Finally, we address some issues to be improved in the conventional risk assessment and management framework and/or practices to enhance nuclear safety.

  20. Post-processing activities after Chernobyl accident in Ukraine and lesson learned to the response Fukushima Dai-ichi accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujii, Yuzo

    2012-01-01

    After the accident of Chernobyl NPP no.4 1986, various activities including the construction of the shelter, prevention of the release of radioactive dust and liquid from the shelter, monitoring the condition of the damaged core, and disposal of radioactive waste have been implemented in the Chernobyl site for mitigating the nuclear and radioactive risks of damaged nuclear facilities, and the reducing radiation dose of working personnel. The construction of new shelter started for the decommissioning of the damaged unit no.4. facility. For reducing the radiation dose to the inhabitants from the contaminated land and feedstuff, the countermeasures including the set of the exclusive zone and permissible level of radionuclide in the foodstuff have been conducted for the countrywide. These activities include many valuable information about how to recover the condition of the site and maintain the social activities after the severe accident of NPP, and it would be important to learn the above activities in conducting the post-processing activities on the Fukushima-Daiichi accident successfully. (author)

  1. International Conference 'Fifteen Years after the Chornobyl Accident. Lessons Learned'. Abstracts Learning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon

    2001-01-01

    The main aims of the conference are: for the scientific community in the most affected countries, to develop a common vision with the international scientific community with regard to the consequences of the Chornobyl disaster (in ecological, medical, social and other areas 15 years post-Chornobyl); to drawing conclusions and providing recommendations to allow decision makers at both national and international level to take further steps to mitigate the effects of the disaster. For the results of the Conference, to represent a common international understanding of the current situation resulting from the accident and the future initiatives which will be necessary to counter its effects

  2. Analysis of emergency response after the Chernobyl accident in Belarus: observed and prevented medical consequences, lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buglova, E.; Kenigsberg, J.

    1997-01-01

    Belarus is one of the most contaminated Republic due to the Chernobyl accident. 23% of the entire area of Belarus was contaminated with radionuclides. To protect the population after the accident different types of protective actions were performed during all phases, based on various temporary dose limits. An analysis of conducted protective actions and lessons obtained during the emergency response is briefly presented

  3. Experience and lessons learned from emergency disposal of Fukushima nuclear power station accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xu Xiegu; Zhen Bei; Yang Xiaoming; Chen Xiaohua

    2012-01-01

    After Fukushima nuclear accident, we visited the related medical aid agencies for nuclear accidents and conducted investigations in disaster-affected areas in Japan. This article summarizes the problems with emergency disposal of Fukushima nuclear accident while disclosing problems should be solved during the emergency force construction for nuclear accidents. (authors)

  4. Design Safety Considerations for Water Cooled Small Modular Reactors Incorporating Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-03-01

    The global future deployment of advanced nuclear reactors for electricity generation depends primarily on the ability of nuclear industries, utilities and regulatory authorities to further enhance their reliability and economic competitiveness while satisfying stringent safety requirements. The IAEA has a project to help coordinate Member States efforts in the development and deployment of small and medium sized or small modular reactor (SMR) technology. This project aims simultaneously to facilitate SMR technology developers and potential SMR uses, particularly States embarking on a nuclear power programme, in identifying key enabling technologies and enhancing capacity building by resolving issues relevant to deployment, including nuclear reactor safety. The objective of this publication is to explore common practices for Member States, which will be an essential resource for future development and deployment of SMR technology. The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was caused by an unprecedented combination of natural events: a strong earthquake, beyond the design basis, followed by a series of tsunamis of heights exceeding the design basis tsunami considered in the flood analysis for the site. Consequently, all the operating nuclear power plants and advanced reactors under development, including SMRs, have been incorporating lessons learned from the accident to assure and enhance the performance of the engineered safety features in coping with such external events

  5. Analysis on the nitrogen drilling accident of Well Qionglai 1 (II: Restoration of the accident process and lessons learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yingfeng Meng

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available All the important events of the accident of nitrogen drilling of Well Qionglai 1 have been speculated and analyzed in the paper I. In this paper II, based on the investigating information, the well log data and some calculating and simulating results, according to the analysis method of the fault tree of safe engineering, the every possible compositions, their possibilities and time schedule of the events of the accident of Well Qionglai 1 have been analyzed, the implications of the logging data have been revealed, the process of the accident of Well Qionglai 1 has been restored. Some important understandings have been obtained: the objective causes of the accident is the rock burst and the induced events form rock burst, the subjective cause of the accident is that the blooie pipe could not bear the flow burden of the clasts from rock burst and was blocked by the clasts. The blocking of blooie pipe caused high pressure in wellhead, the high pressure made the blooie pipe burst, natural gas came out and flared fire. This paper also thinks that the rock burst in gas drilling in fractured tight sandstone gas zone is objective and not avoidable, but the accidents induced from rock burst can be avoidable by improving the performance of the blooie pipe, wellhead assemblies and drilling tool accessories aiming at the downhole rock burst.

  6. Lessons of the radiological accident in Goiania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alves, R.N.; Xavier, A.M.; Heilbron, P.F.L.

    1998-01-01

    On the basis of the lessons teamed from the radiological accident of Goiania, actions are described which a nuclear regulatory body should undertake while responding to an accident of this nature. (author)

  7. Analysis of emergency response after the Chernobyl accident in Belarus: observed and prevented medical consequences, lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buglova, E.; Kenigsberg, J. [Research Clinical Inst. of Radiation Medicine and Endocrinology, Minsk (Belarus)

    1997-12-31

    Belarus is one of the most contaminated Republic due to the Chernobyl accident. 23% of the entire area of Belarus was contaminated with radionuclides. To protect the population after the accident different types of protective actions were performed during all phases, based on various temporary dose limits. An analysis of conducted protective actions and lessons obtained during the emergency response is briefly presented 9 refs.

  8. Analysis of the CNSC Staffs Action Plan to Reflect Lessons Learned from Fukushima Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahn, Sangkyu; Yune, Young Gill; Ahn, Hyungjoon; Kim, Byungjik; Lee, Jinho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    On September 30, 2011, the Task Force completed its review and presented the public with the findings and recommendations in the CNSC Fukushima Task Force Report. The Task Force made 13 recommendations to further enhance the safety of nuclear power plants in Canada. After that, the CNSC established the CNSC Staffs Action Plan based on the Fukushima Task Force's recommendations. In Canada, 19 nuclear power reactor units are currently producing electric power, and all of them are pressurized heavy water-reactor (PHWR) types. Also, considering 2 power reactor units in Korea, Wolsung unit 1 and 2, are the same reactor type, the analysis of the CNSC Staffs Action Plan will be of benefit to determining recommendations of Korea to address lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Therefore, the CNSC Staffs Action Plan was introduced and analyzed in this study. From the results of the above analysis, it is recognized that the strengthening of defense in depth, emergency preparedness and the regulatory oversight of nuclear power plants in Canada were emphasized and much similar to practices of other countries. Public consultation process establishing the CNSC Staffs action plan has been carried out several times, in order to ensure regulatory transparency, by the CNSC staffs, and this is comparable with other countries. It is expected that the detail analysis results of the above plan will be helpful to enhance the safety of domestic operating nuclear power plants.

  9. Radiation accidents: occurrence, types, consequences, medical management, and the lessons to be learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turai, I.; Veress, K.

    2001-01-01

    The paper reviews the frequency, causes and occurrence of radiation accidents with some significant exposure to human. More detailed information is provided in tabulated form on the health consequences of those twenty severe radiation accidents that occurred in 1986-2000, world-wide. Reference is given to the very low cumulative incidence of significant radiation accidents, as during the last 57 years there were, in average, seven registered accidents annually in all countries of the world. Thus, the chance for most of the physicians to meet a patient with symptoms of acute radiation injury during their professional career is very low

  10. Lessons learned and evaluation of the impact from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cigna, A.

    1990-07-01

    The impact on society of the Chernobyl accident is assessed. The situation prior to Chernobyl with respect to regulations of radiation protection against the consequences of a major accident is considered. The development of the recommendations and regulations issued by the CEC for the Maximum Permitted Levels of different reactions to the accident are examined and some data on the average individual effective dose equivalents estimated in a number of countries are reported. Finally some main problems concerning the information of the public and the preparedness for possible future accidents are also summarized. (author)

  11. Lessons learned from major accidents relating to ageing of chemical plants

    OpenAIRE

    GYENES ZSUZSANNA; WOOD Maureen

    2016-01-01

    Major industrial accidents that occurred in the past and even recently, such as the Flixborough, UK in 1974, the ConocoPhillips, UK in 2001 and the Chevron, US in 2012 show that ageing is still a disturbing phenomenon present in chemical process industries. Further to these cases, it is estimated that 30 % of the major accidents reported in the eMARS accident database run by the Major Accident Hazards Bureau of the European Commission are connected to at least one ageing phenomenon. It is som...

  12. Lessons learned and evaluation of the impact from the Chernobyl accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cigna, A [ENEA - Area Energia, Ambiente e Salute, Centro Ricerche Energia, Saluggia, Vercelli (Italy)

    1990-07-15

    The impact on society of the Chernobyl accident is assessed. The situation prior to Chernobyl with respect to regulations of radiation protection against the consequences of a major accident is considered. The development of the recommendations and regulations issued by the CEC for the Maximum Permitted Levels of different reactions to the accident are examined and some data on the average individual effective dose equivalents estimated in a number of countries are reported. Finally some main problems concerning the information of the public and the preparedness for possible future accidents are also summarized. (author)

  13. Lessons learned and evaluation of the impact from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cigna, A.A.

    1990-01-01

    The impact on society of the Chernobyl accidents is assessed. The situation prior to Chernobyl with respect to regulations of radiation protection against the consequences of a major accident is considered. The development of the recommendations and regulations issued by the Commission of the European Communities for the Maximum Permitted Levels of different groups of radionuclides in foodstuffs is reviewed. The different reactions to the accident are examined and some data on the average individual effective dose equivalents estimated in a number of countries are also reported. Finally some main problems concerning the information of the public and the preparedness for possible future accidents are also summarized

  14. Key regulatory and safety issues emerging NEA activities. Lessons Learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Accident - Key Regulatory and Safety Issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakoski, John

    2013-01-01

    A presentation was provided on the key safety and regulatory issues and an update of activities undertaken by the NEA and its members in response to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power stations (NPS) on 11 March 2011. An overview of the accident sequence and the consequences was provided that identified the safety functions that were lost (electrical power, core cooling, and primary containment) that lead to units 1, 2, and 3 being in severe accident conditions with large off-site releases. Key areas identified for which activities of the NEA and member countries are in progress include accident management; defence-in-depth; crisis communication; initiating events; operating experience; deterministic and probabilistic assessments; regulatory infrastructure; radiological protection and public health; and decontamination and recovery. For each of these areas, a brief description of the on-going and planned NEA activities was provided within the three standing technical committees of the NEA with safety and regulatory mandates (the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities - CNRA, the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations - CSNI, and the Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health - CRPPH). On-going activities of CNRA include a review of enhancement being made to the regulatory aspects for the oversight of on-site accident management strategies and processes in light of the lessons learned from the accident; providing guidance to regulators on crisis communication; and supporting the peer review of the safety assessments of risk-significant research reactor facilities in light of the accident. Within the scope of the CSNI mandate, activities are being undertaken to better understand accident progression; characteristics of new fuel designs; and a benchmarking study of fast-running software for estimating source term under severe accident conditions to support protective measure recommendations. CSNI also has ongoing work in human

  15. Learned lessons of the radiological accident occurred in La Ciudadela of El Cementerio, Gran Caracas. September 2005

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lea, D.; Cubillan, Y.; Figuera, J.L.; Mora, G.; Pacheco, J.; Yanez, H.; Carrizales, L.

    2006-01-01

    On September 20, 2005 when a mission conformed by five (05) officials: two (02) belonging to the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEP) and three (03) of the Ministry of Health (MS) it was prepared to carry out a routine inspection in the one temporary warehouse of sources in disuse located in La Ciudadela of El Cementerio, identified administratively as Warehouse Number 5 (MS) Area X, noticed that those armor-plating that kept the radioactive sources of Cs-137 had been violated. Those people that entered to the warehouse were able to extract the armor-plating in whose interior its were found an important number of sources of Cs-137 in disuse, used in the decade of 70 and 80 in treatment of cancer of the uterine neck, by means of the Brachytherapy technique of Differed charge manual, low dose rate, as well as, lead sheets with the apparent intention of selling them as junk. The intruders extracted a total of 58 radioactive sources of Cs-137 of its armor-plating for then to disperse them inside warehouse and in the external areas to this. An important number of the dispersed sources its had lost it integrity what gave place to a combined scenario of exposed dispersed sources in a public area with the danger of radioactive contamination by Cs-137. A task force conformed by the following institutions: Ministry of Health (MS), Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MENPET), Venezuelan Institute of Scientific Investigations (IVIC), Unit of Dangerous Materials of the Metropolitan Firemen under the coordination of Civil Protection (PC) it was the one in charge of responding to the radiological accident, of conformity to the National Plan for the Answer to Radiological Accidents. All the radioactive sources dispersed in La Ciudadela achieved to be recovered. The experience of the accident and as learned lesson it was the importance of harmonizing the Generic Procedures for the Evaluation and Answer during Radiological Emergencies, IAEA-TECDOC-1162 technical document, Vienna, August

  16. How to manage forest environments after a nuclear accident? Lessons learned from the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-03-01

    Based on several published studies, this report proposes a synthetic overview of observations made on the fate of radionuclides in contaminated forests, like in forest environments which represent a great part of highly contaminated areas about Chernobyl and Fukushima. It appears that the main characteristics of forest ecosystems impacted by radioactive fallouts are different (there is no 'red' (dead) forest around Fukushima), that processes governing the fate of radionuclides in forest ecosystems imply a high remanence of radioactive contamination in these environments. It also appears that the interception of radioactive fallouts by the canopy and radionuclide transfers towards the litter and the soil are the most important processes during the early phase and during the first months after the accident. Thus, the soil becomes the main reservoir in which radio-caesium can be found. Some studies outline that the management of contaminated forest ecosystems after the Fukushima accident differs from that applied in the Chernobyl exclusion zone. Others notice that the fire risk is higher in the Chernobyl exclusion zone

  17. Accident on the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Getting over the consequences and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nosovskij, A.V.; Vasil'chenko, V.N.; Klyuchnikov, A.A.; Prister, B.S.

    2006-01-01

    The book is devoted to the 20 anniversary of the accident on the 4th Power Unit of the Chernobyl NPP. The power plant construction history, accident reasons, its consequences, the measures on its liquidation are represented. The current state of activity on the Chernobyl power unit decommission, the 'Shelter' object conversion into the ecologically safe system is described. The future of the Chernobyl NPP site and disposal zone is discussed

  18. Severe Accident Management Guidance: Lessons Still to be Learned after Fukushima

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vayssier, G.

    2016-01-01

    After the accidents in Three Mile Island (TMI) and Chernobyl, many countries decided to develop and implement guidelines specifically directed to mitigate accidents with core damage, so-called severe accidents. The guidelines are usually named Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG). In the USA, all operating plants had these guidelines in place at the end of 1998. Most other countries followed later, but today, it can be said that many nuclear power plants in the world have such guidelines in place. Typically, however, the guidelines were constructed under the assumption that many plant systems still will be available, i.e. there will be DC to feed the instruments, AC to feed equipment and water to restore cooling to the core. Typically, this was basically the situation at TMI: most equipment was functional, only the insight of what had happened had been lost and operators did not know how to respond. At Fukushima-Daiichi, a Site Disruptive Accident (SDA) occurred and it appeared that the situation was much more complex: much of the needed supportive equipment needed was unavailable, which greatly complicated the handling of the event. In this paper, the major shortcomings of the present existing SAMG are discussed, both from a technical, and an organisational viewpoint. It is concluded that, where proper regulation still is missing, the development of an industrial standard is recommended to define adequate tools and guidelines to mitigate severe accidents, including SDAs. (author).

  19. Lessons from the Fukushima nuclear power accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hatamura, Yotaro

    2013-01-01

    Through the investigation of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Accident as the chairman of the related Government's Committee, many things had been considered. Essence of the accident could be not only what occurred in the Fukushima nuclear power station, but also dispersed radioactive materials forced many residents to move and not to be returned. Such events as indication errors of water level meter occurring in severe accident could no be thought and remote mechanical operation of valves under high radiation environment were not prepared. Contamination by radioactive clouds caused the evacuation of residents for a long period. Lessons learned from the accident were described such as; (1) the verification of the road to failure connecting selected accident sequence and road to success with another supposed choice, (2) considering what might occur and then what should be needed on the contrary, (3) nuclear power, if should be continued, should be used with the premise of its hazards, and (4) advise to nuclear engineer for adequate information dissemination and technical explanation to the public and keeping nuclear technologies alive. (T. Tanaka)

  20. Strengthening safety of nuclear power by learning lessons from the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omoto, Akira

    2011-01-01

    The paper first discusses ongoing onsite stabilization activities at Fukushima-Daiichi NPP and a plan for onsite and offsite remedial actions including decontamination and defueling. Four key lessons learned (LL) are raised; safety regulation and safety culture, workable/executable severe accident management procedure, crisis management and design. Global actions for strengthening safety in post-Fukushima era would be built around the IAEA action plan, under recognition of national responsibility. For specific country and plant, a combination of the following may help; a) overall assessment of safety and reflection of Fukushima LL in the light of principles in INSAG-12, b) specific plant assessment of risks from internal, external and security-related events for identifying vulnerabilities and continuous safety improvement, and c) international peer review for comprehensiveness, objectivity and confidence building. In this context, the followings could be worth receiving attention; a) to revisit defense-in-depth, while utilizing risk information, for its completeness and effectiveness (especially, strengthened defense against environmental contamination by effective combination of provisions and management as well as attentiveness and careful attitude towards uncertainties across all layers of defense-in-depth), b) to restore public confidence, c) to cooperate for safety infrastructure in newcomers, d) to build internationally harmonized and cooperative scheme for liability. (author)

  1. Keynote on lessons from major radiation accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ortiz, P.; Oresegun, M.; Wheatley, J.

    2000-01-01

    Generic lessons have been learned from a relatively large number of accidents in the most relevant practices (a set of analysis have been made on about 90 radiotherapy events, 43 industrial radiography and nine from industrial irradiations); more specific lessons have been drawn from in-depth investigations of individual accidents. The body of knowledge is grouped as follows: a) radiotherapy is very unique in that humans (patients) are purposely given very high radiation doses (20-75 Gy) by placing them in the radiation beam or by placing radioactive sources in contact with tissues. Intended deterministic effects are the essence of the normal radiotherapy practice and relatively small deviation from the intended doses, i.e,, slightly higher or lower than intended may cause increased rate of severe complication or reduce probability of cure. Consequences of major accidents have been devastating, affecting tens, even hundreds of patients and causing death (directly or indirectly) to a large number of them; b) accidents involving industrial radiography are the most frequent cause of overexposure to workers (radiographers); c) accidents with industrial irradiators have lower probability of occurrence, however, they are deemed to be fatal, especially when whole body exposure to panoramic gamma irradiators occur; partial body irradiation from industrial or research accelerator beams has led to amputation of hands and legs; d) when control of sources was relinquished ('orphan' sources) this has resulted in severe injuries, in some cases death and widespread contamination of the environment. A tool for further dissemination of lessons will be an international reporting system of unusual radiation events (RADEV), being introduced world-wide. Accidents were rarely due to a single human error or isolated equipment failure. In most cases there was a combination of elements such as: a) unawareness of the potential for an accident, b) poor education, which usually did not

  2. Emergency planning lessons learned from a review of past major radiological accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stephan, J.G.; Selby, J.M.; Martin, J.B.; Moeller, D.W.; Vallario, E.J.

    1988-01-01

    In examining a range of nuclear accidents from the 1950s to the present that were reported in the literature, the authors have identified a number of contributing factors which affected human judgement during these events. One common thread found in a large number of accidents is the time of occurrence; a second is the adequacy of emergency training. The data show that events, whether severe accidents or operational incidents, appear to occur more frequently during off-normal hours such as the early morning shift, weekends, or holidays. Accidents seldom occur during the day shift when the full management team and senior operations personnel are present. As a result, those facility employees most expert in coping with the situation may not be available, and the normal chain of command may be disrupted. At several nuclear power plants, it was also observed that new or less experienced technicians are often assigned to night shifts. The lack of experienced human resources and the pressure of an accident situation can have an adverse impact on individuals who are faced with making important decisions

  3. Lessons Learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Amanda Phelan BNS, MSc, PhD

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available The public health nurses’ scope of practice explicitly includes child protection within their role, which places them in a prime position to identify child protection concerns. This role compliments that of other professions and voluntary agenices who work with children. Public health nurses are in a privileged position as they form a relationship with the child’s parent(s/guardian(s and are able to see the child in its own environment, which many professionals cannot. Child protection in Ireland, while influenced by other countries, has progressed through a distinct pathway that streamlined protocols and procedures. However, despite the above serious failures have occurred in the Irish system, and inquiries over the past 20 years persistently present similar contributing factors, namely, the lack of standardized and comprehensive service responses. Moreover, poor practice is compounded by the lack of recognition of the various interactional processes taking place within and between the different agencies of child protection, leading to psychological barriers in communication. This article will explore the lessons learned for public health nurses practice in safeguarding children in the Republic of Ireland.

  4. Lesson Learning at JPL

    Science.gov (United States)

    Oberhettinger, David

    2011-01-01

    A lessons learned system is a hallmark of a mature engineering organization A formal lessons learned process can help assure that valuable lessons get written and published, that they are well-written, and that the essential information is "infused" into institutional practice. Requires high-level institutional commitment, and everyone's participation in gathering, disseminating, and using the lessons

  5. 10 years from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident: consequences and lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    Published jointly by the Czech State Office for Nuclear Safety and the Czech National Radiation Protection Institute, the publication gives a succinct account of the cause of the Chernobyl accident and its impact on the former Soviet Union, and concentrates on the effects of the accident on the Czech Republic. The topics dealt with in this respect include, among others: radionuclide contents of foods with particular emphasis on milk products for babies, assessment of surface contamination of the Czech Republic due to the accident, internal contamination of the population as determined by whole-body measurements, assessment of the effective dose equivalents from external irradiation and effective dose equivalent commitments from internal irradiation, cesium radioisotopes in natural ecosystems, and the use of post-Chernobyl monitoring to test radionuclide migration models within the IAEA VAMP programme. (P.A.). 12 tabs., 30 figs., 64 refs

  6. JANSI’s Activities for Reflecting Lessons Learned from Fukushima Daiichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kugo, Akihide

    2014-01-01

    Conclusion: JANSI will continue to lay the groundwork for preventing an accident like the Fukushima Daiichi from ever happening again. JANSI will develop the system to provide an opportunity of “awareness” for operators to enhance nuclear safety and to follow-up their efforts continuously

  7. Lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ziedelis, S.; Zerger, B.

    2012-01-01

    Operational experience feedback can be a valuable tool for preventing recurrence of similar events at nuclear plants. However, human and organizational factors can significantly hamper accident investigations. (authors)

  8. Lessons learned from post-accident management at Chernobyl: the P.a.r.e.x. project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heriard Dubreuil, G.; Lochard, J.; Bataille, C.; Ollagnon, H.; Baude, St.

    2008-01-01

    Return of experience on Chernobyl post-accident management: the PAREX study Belarus is the country the most affected by the Chernobyl fallouts and is among the most significant experiences in the nuclear post-accident field. Despite specificities inherent to the political and social situation in Belarus, the experience of post-accidental management in this country holds a wealth of lessons in the perspective of preparation to a post-accidental situation in the French and European context. Through the PAREX project (2005-2006), the French Nuclear Safety Authority analysed the return of experience of Chernobyl post-accident management from 1986 to 2005 in order to draw its lessons in the perspective of a preparation policy. The study was led by a group of experts and involved the participation of a pluralistic group of about thirty participants (public authorities, local governments, NGOs, experts, operators). PAREX highlighted the complexity of a situation of long-lasting radioactive contamination (diversity of stakeholders and of dimensions at stake: health, environment, economy, society...). Beyond traditional public crisis management tools and frameworks, post-accident strategies also involves in the longer term a territorial and social response, which relies on local capacities of initiative. Preparation to such process requires experimenting new modes of operation that allow a diversity of local actors to take part to the response to a situation of contamination and to the surveillance system, with the support of public authorities. The conclusions of PAREX include a set of recommendations in this perspective. (authors)

  9. Lessons learned from radiological accidents at medical exposures in radiotherapy; Lições aprendidas com acidentes radiológicos nas exposições médicas em radioterapia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fagundes, J.S.; Ferreira, A.F. [Faculdade Casa Branca, SP (Brazil); Lima, C.M.A. [MAXIM Cursos, Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil); Silva, F.C.A. da, E-mail: franciscodasilva13uk@gmail.com [Instituto de Radioproteção e Dosimetria (IRD/CNEN-RJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2017-07-01

    An exposure is considered accidental in radiotherapy when there is a substantial deviation in the prescription of treatment. In this work, an analysis of published radiological accidents, both in Brazil and internationally, was performed during medical exposures in radiotherapy treatments, removing the main lessons learned. Of the research carried out, we highlight Brazil with four radiological accidents and one death in the period between 2011 and 2014; the United States of America with 169 accidents with two deaths from 2000 to 2010 and France from 2001 to 2014 had 569 deaths without patients. Lessons learned have been described, for example, that maintenance personnel training should specify limitations or restrictions on the handling or adjustment of critical parts on the accelerator. It is recommended to apply the 10 main lessons learned due to radiological accidents during medical exposures in radiotherapy treatments to avoid future events.

  10. Residents call for greater openness, accountability and involvement: Lessons learned from the JCO criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taniguchi, Taketoshi; Tsuchiya, Tomoko; Kosugi, Motoko

    2000-01-01

    This paper discusses the JCO (Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Co.) criticality accident from social viewpoints based on the detailed examination of the survey data and experience of participation into Tokai village office's surveys. We focus the mechanisms of amplifying anxieties of the local residents and clarify the key factors affected in the social amplification process. And we discuss the importance of communicating and deliberating among the lay people, public officials and professionals about health, safety and environmental risks associated with nuclear energy, referring to the public opinions about what kinds of information and actions are needed. (J.P.N.)

  11. 23. CLI national conference: the first lessons learned from the Fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lacoste, Andre-Claude; Niel, Jean-Christophe; Mourlon, Sophie; Dumont, Jean Jacques; Delalonde, Jean-Claude; Revol, Henri; Birraux, Claude; Miraucourt, Jean-Marc; Compagnat, Gilles; Pouleur, Yvan; Real, Juliette; Champion, Didier; Boilley, David; Chaumontet, Gerard; Giusti, Charles; Kessler, Emmanuel

    2011-12-01

    This document gathers contributions presented during a conference held in December 2011. After introduction speeches, a focus of some updates and an assessment of ANCCLI (the national association of CLIs) activities, this conference comprised two round tables. The first one addressed the INB safety assessment and the taking of the return on experience of Fukushima into account. Participants are members of the ASN, of the Parliamentary Office of assessment of scientific and technological choices, of EDF, of the HCTISN (the High committee for transparency and information on nuclear safety), of the Belgium agency for nuclear control (AFCN), and of a CLI. The second round table addressed the information and protection of populations in case of a nuclear accident in France or abroad. It gathers representatives of the ASN, of the IRSN, of an association for the control of radioactivity (ACRO), of a CLI, and of the Ministry of Home Affairs (for crisis planning and management)

  12. U. S. Department of energy actions to ensure nuclear safety at its nuclear facilities in response to lessons being learned from the Fukushima dacha accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chung, Dae; O' Brien, James [U. S. Department of Energy, Washington (United States)

    2012-03-15

    The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) has established a rigorous nuclear safety regulatory infrastructure for the protection of workers, the public, and the environment. An essential part of this infrastructure is a safety culture that promotes organizational learning and includes a commitment to safety by senior leaders that is demonstrated through their actions and behaviors. The tragic Fukushima Dacha accident presented an important challenge for DOE leaders to demonstrate a robust safety culture by critically examining the Department' s regulatory infrastructure and its implementation to ensure that appropriate safety provisions were in place. This paper discusses the actions DOE has taken to date in this regard and further planned action to ensure safety at DOE facilities in light of lessons being learned from the Fukushima Dacha accident.

  13. U. S. Department of energy actions to ensure nuclear safety at its nuclear facilities in response to lessons being learned from the Fukushima dacha accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chung, Dae; O'Brien, James

    2012-01-01

    The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) has established a rigorous nuclear safety regulatory infrastructure for the protection of workers, the public, and the environment. An essential part of this infrastructure is a safety culture that promotes organizational learning and includes a commitment to safety by senior leaders that is demonstrated through their actions and behaviors. The tragic Fukushima Dacha accident presented an important challenge for DOE leaders to demonstrate a robust safety culture by critically examining the Department' s regulatory infrastructure and its implementation to ensure that appropriate safety provisions were in place. This paper discusses the actions DOE has taken to date in this regard and further planned action to ensure safety at DOE facilities in light of lessons being learned from the Fukushima Dacha accident

  14. Lessons learned from accident simulation exercises and their implications for operation of the IPSN Centre Technique de Crise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manesse, D.; Ney, J.; Crabol, B.; Ginot, P.

    1990-01-01

    The Centre Technique de Crise (CTC) of the Institut de Protection et de Surete Nucleaire (IPSN) has an important role to play in the event of an accident at a nuclear installation of Electricite de France (EdF) concerning diagnosis of the situation and forecasting its evolution. For this purpose the CTS is organized into various groups; only that responsible for the evaluation of the radiological consequences is considered in the present paper. Since the beginning of the eighties numerous simulations of nuclear accidents have been organized both by the public authorities and by the nuclear operators. These exercises, of growing complexity, are distinguished according to the type of installation concerned, the scenario (with and without a simulator), the equipment involved, the participants (local and national officials), the accident phase used (at the time of the accident or post-accident), the use of actual or pre-determined meteorological conditions etc.. Different combinations are imposed as a function of the specific aims of each exercise. Numerous lessons have been drawn progressively from these very varied exercises for the operation of the CTC and, in particular, of the Radiological Consequences Group. The principal Lessons concern: development of calculation and mapping tools, specific liaison with the national meteorological services, modification of the centre's facilities, composition of the team and definition of the role of each of its members, improved liaison with the Site Evaluation Group and the provision of appropriate documentation. The need for continuous training of duty teams in the form of presentations and exercises has also been confirmed

  15. Lessons learned bulletin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-05-01

    During the past four years, the Department of Energy -- Savannah River Operations Office and the Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) Environmental Restoration (ER) Program completed various activities ranging from waste site investigations to closure and post closure projects. Critiques for lessons learned regarding project activities are performed at the completion of each project milestone, and this critique interval allows for frequent recognition of lessons learned. In addition to project related lessons learned, ER also performs lessons learned critiques. T'he Savannah River Site (SRS) also obtains lessons learned information from general industry, commercial nuclear industry, naval nuclear programs, and other DOE sites within the complex. Procedures are approved to administer the lessons learned program, and a database is available to catalog applicable lessons learned regarding environmental remediation, restoration, and administrative activities. ER will continue to use this database as a source of information available to SRS personnel

  16. Design requirements for innovative homogeneous reactor, lesson learned from Fukushima accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arbie, Bakri; Pinem, Suryan; Sembiring, Tagor; Subki, Iyos

    2012-06-01

    The Fukushima disaster is the largest nuclear accident since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, but it is more complex as multiple reactors and spent fuel pools are involved. The severity of the nuclear accident is rated 7 in the International Nuclear Events Scale. Expert said that "Fukushima is the biggest industrial catastrophe in the history of mankind". According to Mitsuru Obe, in The Wall Street Journal, May 16th of 2011, TEPCO estimates the nuclear fuel was exposed to the air less than five hours after the earthquake struck. Fuel rods melted away rapidly as the temperatures inside the core reached 2800 C within six hours. In less than 16 hours, the reactor core melted and dropped to the bottom of the pressure vessel. The information should be evaluated in detail. In Germany several nuclear power plant were shutdown, Italy postponed it's nuclear power program and China reviewed their nuclear power program. Different news come from Britain, in October 11, 2011, the Safety Committee said all clear for nuclear power in Britain, because there are no risk of strong earthquake and tsunami in the region. Due to this severe fact, many nuclear scientists and engineer from all over the world are looking for a new approach, such as homogeneous reactor which was developed in Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1960-ies, during Dr. Alvin Weinberg tenure as the Director of ORNL. The paper will describe the design requirement that will be used as the basis for innovative homogeneous reactor. Innovative Homogeneous Reactor is expected to reduce core melt by two decades (4), since the fuel is intermix homogeneously with coolant and secondly we eliminate the used fuel rod which need to be cooled for a long period of time. In order to be successful for its implementation of the innovative system, testing and validation, three phases of development will be introduced. The first phase is Low Level Goals is really the proof of concept;the Medium Level Goal is Technical Goalsand the High

  17. The French TSO and public communication during crisis: lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. First results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fassert, C.

    2012-01-01

    This paper presents the feedback experience of the TCC (Technical Crisis Centre) experts during the Fukushima accident. An important aspect of the job was answering questions coming from the public. It appeared that a majority of the calling persons had first read the information they asked during the call, but wanted to be told the information, as if the status of information was quite different when delivered by a human being. Another aspect is the trust in the information given by experts, the Chernobyl syndrome with 'the radioactive cloud stopped at the frontier' is still there: the general idea is 'the experts lied to us once why would they tell us the truth now?' A significant number of calls related to planned visits to Japan or stays in Japan and the information about health hazards and risks was not sufficient to the callers, they wanted a more 'digested' information, in fact they expected a decision: to go or not to go, to stay or to fly back. Another aspect is the vocabulary used by experts, it must be appropriate, simple and creative and must draw in the caller's mind a right picture of the situation concerning the aspects arisen by the caller's question. To have all the experts answering in the same room helped to have exchanges between them. (A.C.)

  18. Safety design criteria for the next generation Sodium-cooled fast reactors based on lessons learned from the Fukushima NPS accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sakai, Takaaki

    2012-01-01

    In this presentation, architecture of the safety design criteria as requirements for SFR system and the activities on safety research works to establish safety evaluation methods for the next generation SFRs are summarized with the basis on lessons learned from the Fukushima NPS accident. Nuclear safety is a grovel issue which should be achieved by the international cooperation. In respect of the development for the next generation reactor, it is necessary to build the harmonized safety criteria and evaluation methods to establish the next level of safety

  19. Advances in global development and deployment of small modular reactors and incorporating lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident into the designs of engineered safety features of advanced reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hadid Subki, M.; )

    2014-01-01

    The IAEA has been facilitating the Member States in incorporating the lessons-learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident into the designs of engineered safety features of advanced reactors, including small modular reactors. An extended assessment is required to address challenges for advancing reactor safety in the new evolving generation of SMR plants to preserve the historic lessons in safety, through: assuring the diversity in emergency core cooling systems following loss of onsite AC power; ensuring diversity in reactor depressurization following a transient or accident; confirming independence in reactor trip and safety systems for sensors, power supplies and actuation systems, and finally diversity in maintaining containment integrity following a severe accident

  20. To revisit economics of nuclear technology. Lessons from the learning of a complex technology by major accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finon, Dominique

    2012-05-01

    The Fukushima accident raises again the issue of the social and economic viability of nuclear technology. To re-evaluate this viability, we analyse the past process of internalisation of external costs of nuclear energy, which present the specificities to be chanted by accidents and has had a constant effect of complexification. This process has provoked a de-organisation of the classical learning process reflected in constant cost increases and the change of social preferences, to end up by the lack of competitiveness before climate policies. Independent institutions of safety regulation have become essential elements of the social embeddedness of nuclear technology at the expense of technology stability and standardization, condition of its competitiveness. In this perspective, the paper argues that the new sequence of social costs' internalization opened by Fukushima will have limited effects on costs, because of anterior steps of safety improvements. Nuclear technology complexification reaches its asymptote: it is being to overcome the challenge of 'learning by major accidents'. On the other hand nuclear institutions must be re-designed in such a way that it could guarantee maximum safety records and minimum residual risks by going to the other root of the safety issue, the degree of independence and capabilities of the safety authorities in every country, what cannot be decreed. It is nevertheless at this price that could be preserved the global public good of the social acceptance of nuclear technology by limiting drastically chance of new accidents. (author)

  1. Learning non-technical skill lessons from testimony given in the investigation of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hikono, Masaru; Sakuda, Hiroshi; Matsui, Yuko; Goto, Manabu; Kanayama, Masaki

    2016-01-01

    The Government Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations interviewed individuals concerned. The hearing records, published in 2014, are considered to have valuable lessons for power station managers who encounter severe accidents. In this study, descriptions from the hearing records were extracted as lessons for managers. The extractions were classified by the subject (for whom the lessons are intended), and the category of the non-technical skills. The results showed the possibility of pointing out the lessons in accordance with responsibilities. (author)

  2. Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dougan, A.D.; Blair, S.

    2006-01-01

    LLNL turned in 5 Declaration Line Items (DLI's) in 2006. Of these, one was declared completed. We made some changes to streamline our process from 2005, used less money, time and fewer team members. This report is a description of what changes we made in 2006 and what we learned. Many of our core review team had changed from last year, including our Laboratory Director, the Facility safety and security representatives, our Division Leader, and the OPSEC Committee Chair. We were able to hand out an AP Manual to some of them, and briefed all newcomers to the AP process. We first went to the OPSEC Committee and explained what the Additional Protocol process would be for 2006 and solicited their help in locating declarable projects. We utilized the 'three questions' from the AP meeting last year. LLNL has no single place to locate all projects at the laboratory. We talked to Resource Managers and key Managers in the Energy and Environment Directorate and in the Nonproliferation Homeland and International Security Directorate to find applicable projects. We also talked to the Principal Investigators who had projects last year. We reviewed a list of CRADA's and LDRD projects given to us by the Laboratory Site Office. Talking to the PI's proved difficult because of vacation or travel schedules. We were never able to locate one PI in town. Fortunately, collateral information allowed us to screen out his project. We had no problems in downloading new versions of the DWA and DDA. It was helpful for both Steve Blair and Arden Dougan to have write privileges. During the time we were working on the project, we had to tag-team the work to allow for travel and vacation schedules. We had some difficulty locating an 'activities block' in the software. This was mentioned as something we needed to fix from our 2005 declaration. Evidently the Activities Block has been removed from the current version of the software. We also had trouble finding the DLI Detail Report, which we included

  3. Introduction of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Activities to Reflect Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jongtae; Hong, Seong-Wan [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Gun Hong [Kyungwon E-C Co., Seongnam (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    The Charter requires the staff to highlight potential policy issues for the Commission and provide the Commission every 6 months an update on the review work conducted under the Charter. The recent status of NRC's activities and related program to reflect the lesson-learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant's severe accident are introduced in this paper. A wide variety of the U.S. NRC's activities to reflect lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accidents was investigated. From the investigation, it was found that most of NRC's activities, based on the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) recommendations, are being implemented in a comprehensive and systematic manner. The NRC staff initially prioritized the NTTF recommendations based on its judgment of the potential and relative safety enhancement which could be realized by each. As a result of the staff's prioritization and assessment process, the NTTF recommendations were prioritized into three tiers (i.e., Tier 1, 2 and 3). Tier 1 recommendations are which the staff determined should be started without unnecessary delay and for which sufficient resource flexibility, including availability of critical skill sets, exists. Tier 2 recommendations are which could not be initiated in the near term due to factors that include the need for further technical assessment and alignment, dependence on Tier 1 issues, or availability of critical skill sets. Tier 3 recommendations are that require further staff study to support a regulatory action, have an associated shorter term action that needs to be completed to inform the longer-term action, are dependent on the availability of critical skill sets, or are dependent on the resolution of NTTF Recommendation 1. Through the implementation of each tier activities, existing layers of defense in depth are expected to be gradually bolstered, and such a regulatory approach is much similar in the other countries. It was also found that

  4. Introduction of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Activities to Reflect Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jongtae; Hong, Seong-Wan; Kim, Gun Hong

    2014-01-01

    The Charter requires the staff to highlight potential policy issues for the Commission and provide the Commission every 6 months an update on the review work conducted under the Charter. The recent status of NRC's activities and related program to reflect the lesson-learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant's severe accident are introduced in this paper. A wide variety of the U.S. NRC's activities to reflect lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accidents was investigated. From the investigation, it was found that most of NRC's activities, based on the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) recommendations, are being implemented in a comprehensive and systematic manner. The NRC staff initially prioritized the NTTF recommendations based on its judgment of the potential and relative safety enhancement which could be realized by each. As a result of the staff's prioritization and assessment process, the NTTF recommendations were prioritized into three tiers (i.e., Tier 1, 2 and 3). Tier 1 recommendations are which the staff determined should be started without unnecessary delay and for which sufficient resource flexibility, including availability of critical skill sets, exists. Tier 2 recommendations are which could not be initiated in the near term due to factors that include the need for further technical assessment and alignment, dependence on Tier 1 issues, or availability of critical skill sets. Tier 3 recommendations are that require further staff study to support a regulatory action, have an associated shorter term action that needs to be completed to inform the longer-term action, are dependent on the availability of critical skill sets, or are dependent on the resolution of NTTF Recommendation 1. Through the implementation of each tier activities, existing layers of defense in depth are expected to be gradually bolstered, and such a regulatory approach is much similar in the other countries. It was also found that

  5. Lessons Fukushima 11032011 -- Lessons learned and points to be checked from the nuclear accidents in Fukushima; Lessons Fukushima 11032011 -- Lessons learned und Pruefpunkte aus den kerntechnischen Unfaellen in Fukushima

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2011-10-15

    Since a long time, severe accidents are one of the main areas in the surveillance activities of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI). The analysis of events all over the world and the evaluation of their relevance for the Swiss nuclear power plants belong to the permanent obligations of the regulatory authority. In Switzerland, for more than two decades, core melting accidents are studied using probabilistic safety assessment methods. Comprehensive risk analyses were set up for external events like earthquakes, sabotages or airplane crashes. Strategies for the mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents, so-called Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG), were written down by the regulatory authority and made available to the Swiss plant operators. In international comparison the Swiss nuclear power plants have reached a very high standard in the field of severe accidents. Moreover, the safety of the Swiss plants is continuously reviewed by means of permanent supervision and especially through the 10-year periodic safety review. However, the Fukushima accident justifies a renewed evaluation on whether the preparation against severe reactor accidents could be improved and additional measures be taken for the protection of the population. In the present report, ENSI indicates points to be checked, which were considered as important in the course of the analysis of the Fukushima accident, for the future improvement of the nuclear safety and radiation protection in Switzerland. These points were identified from the analysis of the behaviour of the plant staff, techniques and organisation during the accident. The resulting measures concern the plant design, the emergency management, the feed-back from the encountered events, the surveillance, the radiation protection and the safety culture, with a special emphasis on the emergency management in Switzerland. The implementation of the necessary short-term measures was launched by ENSI decrees and

  6. Lessons taught by the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2002-01-01

    On nuclear development, it is natural that safety is the most important condition. However, when occurring an accident in spite of earnest efforts on safety pursuit, it is essential for a technical developer to absorb some lessons from its contents as much as possible and show an attitude to use thereafter. The Chernobyl accident brought extraordinarily large damage in the history of nuclear technology development. Therefore, the edition group of the Japan Society of Atomic Energy introduced opinions of three groups of the Society (that is, groups on reactor physics, nuclear power generation, and human-machine system research) with some description on cause analysis of the accident and its result and effect. And, here was also shown four basic difference on design between RMBK type reactor in Chernobyl and LWR type reactor supplied in Japan. (G.K.)

  7. TMI-2 lessons have been learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Long, R.L.

    1994-01-01

    This paper is an introduction to the more detailed papers which are presented in this session titled ''Advanced Light Water Reactors -- 15 Years After TMI.'' Many of the advances in the design, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants are the direct result of applying lessons learned from the 1979 TMI-2 accident. The authors believe the ''reality awakening'' which occurred following the accident should never be forgotten. Thus, this paper briefly reviews the TMI-2 accident and identifies the broad lessons learned following the accident. Then it describes briefly some indicators which show the very impressive improvements in nuclear power plant performance that have occurred over the past 10-15 years. This sets the stage for Dr. Ransom's paper which shows the continuing need for nuclear power, Dr. Beckjord's paper which describes the ''final'' TMI-2 research project and the subsequent papers which focus on advanced light water reactor developments

  8. Review of the international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear security. Taking the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident to the 2012 Seoul nuclear security summit

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tazaki, Makiko; Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2012-06-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held '2011 International Forum on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security - Taking the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit-' on 8 and 9 December, 2011. It intended to articulate effective strategies and measures for strengthening nuclear security using lessons learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. Moreover, it was expected to explore comprehensive approaches which could contribute to enhancing both nuclear safety and security in order to support sustainable and appropriate development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summary of panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report, excepts presentation materials. (author)

  9. Review of the international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear security. Taking the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident to the 2012 Seoul nuclear security summit

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tazaki, Makiko; Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Department of Science and Technology for Nuclear Material Management, Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan)

    2012-06-15

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held '2011 International Forum on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security - Taking the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit-' on 8 and 9 December, 2011. It intended to articulate effective strategies and measures for strengthening nuclear security using lessons learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. Moreover, it was expected to explore comprehensive approaches which could contribute to enhancing both nuclear safety and security in order to support sustainable and appropriate development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summary of panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report, excepts presentation materials. (author)

  10. Report of the Fukushima nuclear accident by the National Academy of Science. Lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident for improving safety of U.S. nuclear plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nariai, Hideki

    2014-01-01

    U.S. National Academy of Science investigated the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant initiated by the Great East Japan Earthquake for two years and published a draft report in July 24, 2014. Investigation results were summarized in nine new findings and made ten recommendations in a wide horizon; (1) hardware countermeasures against severe accidents and training of operators, (2) upgrade of risk assessment capability for beyond design basis accident, (3) incorporation of new information about hazards in safety regulations, (4) needed improvement of off-site emergency preparedness, and (5) improvements of nuclear safety culture. New information about hazards related with tsunami assessment, new risk assessment for beyond design basis accident, advice of foreigner resident evacuations, regulatory capture, and safety culture and regulator's specialty were discussed as Japanese issues. (T. Tanaka)

  11. Lessons learned from on-site safety assessments performed by DOE in response to the Tomsk accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Witmer, F.E.

    1995-01-01

    In response to the accident, in April 1993, at the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant of the Siberian chemical Combine, Tomsk, Russia, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated concurrent efforts to understand the causes for the accident and to review potential vulnerabilities for similar occurrences across the DOE radiochemical complex. Because the accident occurred in the feed adjustment stage of a Purex type process, US facilities which contained significant inventories of TBP, organic diluent and nitric acid were evaluated by expert teams. From accident conditions, prior experience, modeling and experimental programs and confirmatory dialogue with the Russians, enhanced understanding was achieved and vulnerabilities (e.g., lack of safety analysis, organic layering, inadvertent acid addition, use of aromatic diluents, uncertain venting capability, no mitigative/emergency procedures, etc.) were identified and corrected

  12. DSCOVR Contamination Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Graziani, Larissa

    2015-01-01

    The Triana observatory was built at NASA GSFC in the late 1990's, then placed into storage. After approximately ten years it was removed from storage and repurposed as the Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR). This presentation outlines the contamination control program lessons learned during the integration, test and launch of DSCOVR.

  13. Lessoning of radiation exposure. Radiation effect on humans and points to be noticed learned by Fukushima nuclear power plant accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omori, Koichi

    2013-01-01

    Described are the process of medical measures taken along with the time after the Accident in the title (Mar. 12, 2011) and the present state (June, 2013) of Fukushima. The author at first presents the fundamental knowledge of radiation like unit, natural/medical doses, and the scale of the Accident compared with Chernobyl Accident (1986) involving observed diseases like thyroid cancer. On the day before the Accident, the Earthquake and Tsunami attacked Fukushima, and the University Hospital built up an anti-disaster medical headquarter. Until 15th, the hospital accepted about 500 persons for their contamination survey and subsequent de-contamination, then played a role for relaying 1,300 patients to other facilities and accepted 125 hospitalizations, during which communication by phone had been scarcely available, leading to complication and confusion. The radioisotope subjected to be noted was radioiodine earlier and then radiocesium. Emergent medical supports were conducted for various evacuation areas involving 20-30 km zone from the Plant by pediatric and infection teams with joint doctors from Thailand. The University had been defined to be the secondary emergent, expertized medical facility since 2001 and began to conduct the long-term project Fukushima Health Management Survey after the Accident for the fundamental and detailed studies of residents. The secondary facility at the emergency was inevitably the center of medicare as the primary hospitals were mostly in the radiological evacuation area and tertiary ones located afar. The University Hospital is now revising the formal manual for medical response to exposure. In Fukushima City, 60 km distant from the Plant, the ambient dose is about 0.5 mc-Sv and external exposure dose is lowering to 2-4 mSv/y. Decrease of medical staff like doctors and nurses is significant in the prefecture. (T.T.)

  14. Lessons Learned in Protection of the Public for the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Callen, Jessica; Homma, Toshimitsu

    2017-06-01

    What insights can the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant provide in the reality of decision making on actions to protect the public during a severe reactor and spent fuel pool emergency? In order to answer this question, and with the goal of limiting the consequences of any future emergencies at a nuclear power plant due to severe conditions, this paper presents the main actions taken in response to the emergency in the form of a timeline. The focus of this paper is those insights concerning the progression of an accident due to severe conditions at a light water reactor nuclear power plant that must be understood in order to protect the public.

  15. Lessons learned from the decommissioning process affected by an accident during operation. The case of A1 NPP in Slovakia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Daniska, Vladimir; Timulak, Jan; Pekar, Anton; Niznansky, Vojtech; Konecny, Ladislav

    2007-01-01

    Decommissioning of NPP's with standard shutdown is currently well known process. The A1 NPP in Slovakia was shutdown in 1977 after the accident in the core which caused the damage of the fuel and contamination of systems. Long period from 1977 to 2008 was needed to manage issues resulting from affecting the systems and structures of A1 NPP and the environment by the accident. Management of the damaged spent fuel, decontamination of the primary circuit and other processes generated large amounts of alpha bearing waste, mostly liquid, having sludge phases with specific physical-chemical and radiological properties. Up to 1994, the approach for eliminating the consequences of the accident was based on safety priorities. The systematic approach, which includes also the rehabilitation of the affected environment, was implemented in the period 1994-2008. The process includes also establishing of the decommissioning infrastructure, legislative and funding system with the aim to implement the standard decommissioning procedures after 2008. However, the specific aspects, especially the level and radio-nuclide composition of contamination of systems and structures will remain. For final decommissioning 2008-2033, the approach was selected which foresees four licensed phases. This approach enables proper planning and performing of individual decommissioning phases. (authors)

  16. Lessons learned from early direct measurements at Fukushima Medical University after the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miyazaki, Makoto; Ohba, Takashi; Ohtsuru, Akira [Fukushima Medical Univ., Dept. of Radiation Health Management, Fukushima, Fukushima (Japan)

    2012-11-15

    The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS) accident resulted in a month-long discharge of radioactive materials into the environment. These radioactive materials were detected at Fukushima Medical University (FMU), which is 57 km northwest of the FDNPS. Significant levels of six nuclides (i.e., {sup 131}I, {sup 132}Te, {sup 132}I, {sup 133}Xe, {sup 134}Cs, and {sup 137}Cs) were detected by a whole body counter (WBC) on March 15, 2011 when the ambient dose rate was suddenly elevated for the first time. This WBC has a dual detector system consisting of two NaI(Tl) detectors and two Ge detectors. We conducted periodical measurements of 32 humans and the background using the WBC. Because the three nuclides {sup 131}I, {sup 134}Cs and {sup 137}Cs were still detected in the background by the WBC a few months after the accident, accurate WBC measurements were difficult. Here we describe the limitations of our measurements conducted in the early stage of the FDNPS accident. (author)

  17. Lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident: efficient education items of radiation safety for general public.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ohno, K; Endo, K

    2015-07-01

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (FNP-1) accident, while as tragic as the tsunami, was a man-made disaster created by the ignorance of the effects of radiation and radioactive materials. Therefore, it is important that all specialists in radiation protection in medicine sympathize with the anxiety of the general public regarding the harmful effects of radiation and advise people accordingly. All questions and answers were collected related to inquiries from the general public that were posted to reliable websites, including those of the government and radiation-related organizations, from March 2011 to November 2012. The questions were summarized and classified by similarity of content. (1) The total number of questions is 372. The content was broadly classified into three categories: inquiries for radiation-related knowledge and about health effects and foods. The questions asked to obtain radiation-related knowledge were the most common, accounting for 38 %. Thirty-six percentage of the questions were related to health effects, and 26 % involved foods, whereas 18 % of the questions were related to children and pregnancy. (2) The change over time was investigated in 290 questions for which the time of inquiry was known. Directly after the earthquake, the questions were primarily from people seeking radiation-related knowledge. Later, questions related to health effects increased. The anxiety experienced by residents following the nuclear accident was caused primarily by insufficient knowledge related to radiation, concerns about health effects and uncertainties about food and water safety. The development of educational materials focusing on such content will be important for risk communication with the general public in countries with nuclear power plants. Physicians and medical physicist should possess the ability to respond to questions such as these and should continue with medical examinations and treatments in a safe and appropriate manner. © The

  18. Lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident: efficient education items of radiation safety for general public

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohno, K.; Endo, K.

    2015-01-01

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (FNP-1) accident, while as tragic as the tsunami, was a man-made disaster created by the ignorance of the effects of radiation and radioactive materials. Therefore, it is important that all specialists in radiation protection in medicine sympathize with the anxiety of the general public regarding the harmful effects of radiation and advise people accordingly. All questions and answers were collected related to inquiries from the general public that were posted to reliable web sites, including those of the government and radiation-related organizations, from March 2011 to November 2012. The questions were summarized and classified by similarity of content. (1) The total number of questions is 372. The content was broadly classified into three categories: inquiries for radiation-related knowledge and about health effects and foods. The questions asked to obtain radiation-related knowledge were the most common, accounting for 38 %. Thirty-six percentage of the questions were related to health effects, and 26 % involved foods, whereas 18 % of the questions were related to children and pregnancy. (2) The change over time was investigated in 290 questions for which the time of inquiry was known. Directly after the earthquake, the questions were primarily from people seeking radiation-related knowledge. Later, questions related to health effects increased. The anxiety experienced by residents following the nuclear accident was caused primarily by insufficient knowledge related to radiation, concerns about health effects and uncertainties about food and water safety. The development of educational materials focusing on such content will be important for risk communication with the general public in countries with nuclear power plants. Physicians and medical physicist should possess the ability to respond to questions such as these and should continue with medical examinations and treatments in a safe and appropriate manner

  19. Barriers to learning from incidents and accidents

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dechy, N.; Dien, Y.; Drupsteen, L.; Felicio, A.; Cunha, C.; Roed-Larsen, S.; Marsden, E.; Tulonen, T.; Stoop, J.; Strucic, M.; Vetere Arellano, A.L.; Vorm, J.K.J. van der; Benner, L.

    2015-01-01

    This document provides an overview of knowledge concerning barriers to learning from incidents and accidents. It focuses on learning from accident investigations, public inquiries and operational experience feedback, in industrial sectors that are exposed to major accident hazards. The document

  20. Sharing Lessons Learned Between Industries in EU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muehleisen, A.; Strucic, M.

    2012-01-01

    Recent events in nuclear industry remind us on importance of continuous sharing of the knowledge and experience gained through evaluations of incidents and accidents. We frequently use experience from our daily life activities to improve our performance and avoid some mistakes or unwanted events. In the similar way we can use other industries experience. These experiences can be applied to improve nuclear safety. For example, Safety Culture, which has a great influence on the level of nuclear power plants safety, is similarly presented in other industries. Mechanisms which led to accidents from weak safety culture in one branch of other industry could be comparable to those in nuclear industry. Some other industries have many more cumulative years of experience than nuclear industry. Aviation and Oil industries are typical representatives. Part of their experience can be used in nuclear industry too. Number of reports from nuclear power plants showed us that not only specific equipment related causes lay behind accidents; there are also other causes and contributors which are more common for all industries. Hence lessons learned in other industry should be assessed and used in nuclear industry too. In the European Union, a regional initiative has been set up in 2008 in support of EU Member State nuclear safety authorities, but also EU technical support organizations, international organizations and the broader nuclear community, to enhance nuclear safety through improvement of the use of lessons learned from operational experience of nuclear power plants (NPPs). The initiative, called ''the EU Clearinghouse on Operational Experience Feedback for NPP'', is organized as a network operated by a centralized office located at the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. The reduction of occurrence and significance of events in NPPs and their safe operation is its ultimate goal. Among others EU Clearinghouse provides services such as technical and scientific

  1. Biomass accident investigations – missed opportunities for learning and accident prevention

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hedlund, Frank Huess

    2017-01-01

    The past decade has seen a major increase in the production of energy from biomass. The growth has been mirrored in an increase of serious biomass related accidents involving fires, gas explosions, combustible dust explosions and the release of toxic gasses. There are indications that the number...... of bioenergy related accidents is growing faster than the energy production. This paper argues that biomass accidents, if properly investigated and lessons shared widely, provide ample opportunities for improving general hazard awareness and safety performance of the biomass industry. The paper examines...... selected serious accidents involving biogas and wood pellets in Denmark and argues that such opportunities for learning were missed because accident investigations were superficial, follow-up incomplete and information sharing absent. In one particularly distressing case, a facility saw a repeat accident...

  2. St. Louis FUSRAP Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eberlin, J.; Williams, D.; Mueller, D.

    2003-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to present lessons learned from fours years' experience conducting Remedial Investigation and Remedial Action activities at the St. Louis Downtown Site (SLDS) under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). Many FUSRAP sites are experiencing challenges conducting Remedial Actions within forecasted volume and budget estimates. The St. Louis FUSRAP lessons learned provide insight to options for cost effective remediation at FUSRAP sites. The lessons learned are focused on project planning (budget and schedule), investigation, design, and construction

  3. Lessons learned in radiology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goodenough, D.J.

    2001-01-01

    The paper reviews aspects of the history of radiology with the goal of identifying lessons learned, particularly in the area of radiological protection of the patient in diagnostic and interventional radiology, nuclear medicine and radiotherapy. It is pointed out that since the days of Roentgen there has been a need not only to control and quantify the amount of radiation reaching the patient but also to optimize the imaging process to offer the greatest diagnostic benefit within allowable levels of patient dose. To this end, in diagnostic radiology, one finds the development of better films, X rays tubes, grids, screens and processing techniques, while in fluoroscopy, one sees the increased luminance of calcium tungstate. In interventional radiology, one finds an improvement in catheterization techniques and contrast agents. In nuclear medicine, the development of tracer techniques into modern cameras and isotopes such as technetium can be followed. In radiotherapy, one sees the early superficial X rays and radium sources gradually replaced with radon seeds, supervoltage, 60 Co and today's linear accelerators. Along with the incredible advances in imaging and therapeutic technologies comes the growing realization of the potential danger of radiation and the need to protect the patient (as well as physicians, ancillary personnel and the general population) from unnecessary radiation. The important lesson learned is that we must walk a tightrope, balancing the benefits and risks of any technology utilizing radiation to produce the greatest benefits at the lowest acceptable risk. The alternative techniques using non-ionizing radiation will have to be considered as part of the general armamentarium for medical imaging whenever radiation consequences are unacceptable. (author)

  4. Lessons Learned from FUSRAP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Castillo, Darina [U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management; Carpenter, Cliff [U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management; Miller, Michele [Navarro Research and Engineering

    2016-03-06

    The US DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) is the long-term steward for 90 sites remediated under numerous regulatory regimes including the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) sites. In addition, LM holds considerable historical information, gathered in the 1970s, to determine site eligibility for remediation under FUSRAP. To date, 29 FUSRAP sites are in LM’s inventory of sites for long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS&M), and 25 are with the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for remediation or in the process of being transitioned to LM. It is forecasted that 13 FUSRAP sites will transfer from the USACE to LM over the next 10 years; however, the timing of the transfers is strongly dependent upon federal funding of the ongoing remedial actions. Historically, FUSRAP sites were generally cleaned up for “unrestricted” industrial use or remediated to the “cleanup standards” at that time, and their use remained unchanged. Today, these sites as well as the adjacent properties are now changing or envisioned to have changes in land use, typically from industrial to commercial or residential uses. The implication of land-use change affects DOE’s LTS&M responsibility for the sites under LM stewardship as well as the planning for the additional sites scheduled to transition in time. Coinciding with land-use changes at or near FUSRAP sites is an increased community awareness of these sites. As property development increases near FUSRAP sites, the general public and interested stakeholders regularly inquire about the sufficiency of cleanups that impact their neighborhoods and communities. LM has used this experience to address a series of lessons learned to improve our program management in light of the changing conditions of our sites. We describe these lessons learned as (1) improved stakeholder relations, (2) enhanced LTS&M requirements for the sites, and (3) greater involvement in the transition process.

  5. Higher Education ERP: Lessons Learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Swartz, Dave; Orgill, Ken

    2001-01-01

    Shares experiences and lessons learned by chief information officers of large universities about enterprise resource planning (ERP). Specifically, provides a framework for approaching an ERP that could save universities millions of dollars. (EV)

  6. Lessons of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident for PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumar, M.; Klug, J.; Alzbutas, R.; Burgazzi, L.; Farcasiu, M.; Nitoi, M.; Ivanov, I.; Bogdanov, D.; Hashimoto, K.; Hirata, K.; La Rovere, S.; Sevbo, O.; Vitazkova, J.; Hustak, S.; Wielenberg, A.; Raimond, E.

    2016-01-01

    The objective of this document is to identify some lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident for PSA. Based on the public information on the causes that have led to major radioactive release during the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident (initiating events, material and human response), the authors, ASAMPSA-E WP30 members have performed a review to examine the gaps/insufficiencies/incompleteness in the existing Level 1 and Level 2 PSAs. This is the aim of this report which is one of WP30 deliverables i.e. D30.2. The consideration of external initiating events for the different levels of defense-in-depth is one of the focal points in this review. Recommendations in the way of developing the different elements of PSAs have been proposed by the authors and were completed later during the ASAMPSA-E project. Moreover, first recommendations on the use of PSA information in decision making have been included as well. (authors)

  7. FRMAC-93 lessons learned report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerns, K.C.

    1994-03-01

    FRMAC-93 simulated a radiological accident at the Fort Calhoun nuclear power plant, 25 miles north of Omaha, Nebraska. The exercise involved the state Iowa and Nebraska, NRC as the lead Federal agency, FRMAC (Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center), and several federal agencies with statutory emergency responsibility. FRMAC-93 was a major 2-day field exercise designed to determine the effectiveness, coordination, and operations of a DOE-managed FRMAC. Other objectives were to ensure that appropriate priorities were established and assistance was provided to the states and the lead Federal agency by FRMAC. Day 1 involved the Fort Calhoun evaluated plume phase exercise. On Day 2, the flow of data, which was slow initially, improved so that confidence of states and other federal responders in FRMAC support capabilities was high. The impact and lessons learned from FRMAC-93 provided the necessary impetus to make organizational and operational changes to the FRMAC program, which were put into effect in the DOE exercise FREMONT at Hanford 3 months later

  8. Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Stations of TEPCO —Outline & lessons learned—

    OpenAIRE

    TANAKA, Shun-ichi

    2012-01-01

    The severe accident that broke out at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations on March 11, 2011, caused seemingly infinite damage to the daily life of residents. Serious and wide-spread contamination of the environment occurred due to radioactive materials discharged from nuclear power stations (NPSs). At the same time, many issues were highlighted concerning countermeasures to severe nuclear accidents. The accident is outlined, and lessons learned are extracted with respect to the safety o...

  9. Learning from nuclear accident experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaurio, J.K.

    1984-01-01

    Statistical procedures are developed to estimate accident occurrence rates from historical event records, to predict future rates and trends, and to estimate the accuracy of the rate estimates and predictions. Maximum likelihood estimation is applied to several learning models, and results are compared to earlier graphical and analytical estimates. The models are based on (1) the cumulative number of operating years, (2) the cumulative number of plants built, and (3) accidents (explicitly), with the accident rate distinctly different before and after an accident. The statistical accuracies of the parameters estimated are obtained in analytical form using the Fisher information matrix. Using data on core damage accidents in electricity producing plants, it is estimated that the probability for a plant to have a serious flaw has decreased from 0.1 to 0.01 during the developmental phase of the nuclear industry. At the same time the equivalent frequency of accidents has decreased from 0.04 per reactor year to 0.0004 per reactor year, partly due to the increasing population of plants. 10 references, 7 figures, 2 tables

  10. Chernobyl NPP accident. Overcoming experience. Acquired lessons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nosovskij, A.V.; Vasil'chenko, V.N.; Klyuchnikov, A.A.; Prister, B.S.

    2006-01-01

    This book is devoted to the 20 anniversary of accident on the Chernobyl NPP unit 4. History of construction, causes of the accident and its consequences, actions for its mitigation are described. Modern situation with Chernobyl NPP decommissioning and transferring of 'Ukryttya' shelter into ecologically safe system are mentioned. The future of Chernobyl site and exclusion zone was discussed

  11. Patient safety: lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bagian, James P.

    2006-01-01

    The traditional approach to patient safety in health care has ranged from reticence to outward denial of serious flaws. This undermines the otherwise remarkable advances in technology and information that have characterized the specialty of medical practice. In addition, lessons learned in industries outside health care, such as in aviation, provide opportunities for improvements that successfully reduce mishaps and errors while maintaining a standard of excellence. This is precisely the call in medicine prompted by the 1999 Institute of Medicine report ''To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System.'' However, to effect these changes, key components of a successful safety system must include: (1) communication, (2) a shift from a posture of reliance on human infallibility (hence ''shame and blame'') to checklists that recognize the contribution of the system and account for human limitations, and (3) a cultivation of non-punitive open and/or de-identified/anonymous reporting of safety concerns, including close calls, in addition to adverse events. (orig.)

  12. Our reflections and lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsuoka, Takeshi; Sawada, Takashi; Yagawa, Genki

    2017-01-01

    In order to investigate the cause of the accident that began on March 11, 2011 at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the Science Council of Japan set an investigation committee, the 'Sub-Committee on Fukushima Nuclear Accident (SCFNA)' under the Comprehensive Synthetic Engineering Committee. The committee has published a record entitled 'Reflections and Lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, (1st report)'. There are still many items about the accident for which the details are not clear. It is important to discuss the reasons why the severe accident could not be prevented and the possibilities that there might have been other proper operations and accident management to prevent or lessen the severity of the accident than those adopted at the time. SCFNA decided to continue its investigation by setting up our working group called the 'Working Group on Fukushima Nuclear Accident'. Our working group have published 'Reflection and Lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident (2nd Report)'. We investigated the issues of specific units. Unit 1 were validity of the operation of the isolation condenser, whether or not a loss of coolant accident occurred due to a failure of the cooling piping system by the seismic ground motion, and the cause of the loss of the emergency AC power supply, Unit 2 was the reason why a large amount of radioactive materials was emitted to the environment although the reactor building did not explode, Unit 3 was the reasons why the operator stopped running the high pressure coolant injection system, and Units 1 to 3 was validity of the venting operation. These items were considered to be the key issues in these units that would have prevented progression to the severe accident. (author)

  13. TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-10-01

    In its final report reviewing the Three Mile Island accident, the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force has suggested change in several fundamental aspects of basic safety policy for nuclear power plants. Changes in nuclear power plant design and operations and in the regulatory process are discussed in terms of general goals. The appendix sets forth specific recommendations for reaching these goals

  14. Constellation Program Lessons Learned. Volume 2; Detailed Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rhatigan, Jennifer; Neubek, Deborah J.; Thomas, L. Dale

    2011-01-01

    These lessons learned are part of a suite of hardware, software, test results, designs, knowledge base, and documentation that comprises the legacy of the Constellation Program. The context, summary information, and lessons learned are presented in a factual format, as known and described at the time. While our opinions might be discernable in the context, we have avoided all but factually sustainable statements. Statements should not be viewed as being either positive or negative; their value lies in what we did and what we learned that is worthy of passing on. The lessons include both "dos" and "don ts." In many cases, one person s "do" can be viewed as another person s "don t"; therefore, we have attempted to capture both perspectives when applicable and useful. While Volume I summarizes the views of those who managed the program, this Volume II encompasses the views at the working level, describing how the program challenges manifested in day-to-day activities. Here we see themes that were perhaps hinted at, but not completely addressed, in Volume I: unintended consequences of policies that worked well at higher levels but lacked proper implementation at the working level; long-term effects of the "generation gap" in human space flight development, the need to demonstrate early successes at the expense of thorough planning, and the consequences of problems and challenges not yet addressed because other problems and challenges were more immediate or manifest. Not all lessons learned have the benefit of being operationally vetted, since the program was cancelled shortly after Preliminary Design Review. We avoid making statements about operational consequences (with the exception of testing and test flights that did occur), but we do attempt to provide insight into how operational thinking influenced design and testing. The lessons have been formatted with a description, along with supporting information, a succinct statement of the lesson learned, and

  15. Lessons learned related to packaging and transportation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wallen, C.

    1995-01-01

    The use of lessons learned as a tool for learning from past experiences is well established, especially by many organizations within the nuclear industry. Every person has, at some time, used the principles of lessons learned to adopt good work practices based on their own experiences or the experiences of others. Lessons learned can also help to avoid the recurrence of adverse practices, which is often an area that most lessons-learned programs tend to focus on. This paper will discuss how lessons learned relate to packaging and transportation issues and events experienced at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities. It will also discuss the role performed by the Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety's Office of Operating Experience Analysis and Feedback in disseminating lessons learned and operating experience feedback to the DOE complex. The central concept of lessons learned is that any organization should be able to learn from its own experiences and events. In addition, organizations should implement methodologies to scan external environments for lessons learned, to analyze and determine the relevance of lessons learned, and to bring about the necessary changes learned from these experiences. With increased concerns toward facility safety, the importance of utilizing the lessons-learned principles and the establishment of lessons-learned programs can not be overstated

  16. Lessons learned? Selected public acceptance case studies since Three Mile Island

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blee, D. [NAC International, Atlanta Corporate Headquarters, Atlanta, GA (United States)

    2001-02-01

    This paper will present an overview of the present situation, some recent polling survey information, and then look at lessons learned in terms of selected case studies and some global issues over the 22 years since the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. That is quite an ambitious topic but there are some important lessons we can learn from the post-TMI era. (author)

  17. Lessons from Chernobyl post-accident management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, T.

    2012-01-01

    The Chernobyl accident has shown that the long-term management of its consequences is not straightforward. The management of the consequences has revealed the complexity of the situation to deal with. The long-term contamination of the environment has affected all the dimensions of the daily life of the inhabitants living in affected territories: health, environment, social life, education, work, distribution of foodstuffs and commodities... The experience from the Chernobyl accident shows 4 key issues that may be beneficial for the populations living in territories affected by the Fukushima accident: 1) the direct involvement of the inhabitants in their own protection, 2) the radiation monitoring system and health surveillance at the local level, 3) to develop a practical radiation protection culture among the population, and 4) the setting up of economic measures to favour the local development. (A.C.)

  18. Lessons drawn from serious accidents in nuclear power stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kosciusko-Morizet, F.; Tanguy, P.

    1981-01-01

    Taking a number of serious accidents considered to be particularly representative (Windscale, Enrico Fermi, Lucens, Browns Ferry, Three Mile Island and Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux), the paper analyses the conclusions reached in subsequent enquiries and the lessons drawn from them by the responsible authorities. While design problems sometimes come to light, it is much more generally operational safety - problems related to instructions, the training of operators, the man/machine relationship - which appears to be inadequate. The organization of relations between the different partners - builders, operators and safety bodies - likewise gives rise to some observations. Certain measures should be pursued on a broader scale in order to improve our ability to prevent serious accidents: (i) incidents important from the standpoint of safety must be identified; (ii) these incidents must be brought to the knowledge of all partners concerned, in all interested countries; (iii) the lessons drawn from them must be exchanged and compared; and (iv) the lessons must be made generally available in a directly usable form (i.e. as design modifications, changes in instructions and so on). Particular attention must be given to the problems of countries which are embarking on nuclear programmes and which, with a small number of installations, need direct and permanent access to all the lessons drawn from the operation of a large power station park, and must be able to call upon the assistance of teams from outside in the event of an accident. (author)

  19. EMU Lessons Learned Database

    Science.gov (United States)

    Matthews, Kevin M., Jr.; Crocker, Lori; Cupples, J. Scott

    2011-01-01

    As manned space exploration takes on the task of traveling beyond low Earth orbit, many problems arise that must be solved in order to make the journey possible. One major task is protecting humans from the harsh space environment. The current method of protecting astronauts during Extravehicular Activity (EVA) is through use of the specially designed Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). As more rigorous EVA conditions need to be endured at new destinations, the suit will need to be tailored and improved in order to accommodate the astronaut. The Objective behind the EMU Lessons Learned Database(LLD) is to be able to create a tool which will assist in the development of next-generation EMUs, along with maintenance and improvement of the current EMU, by compiling data from Failure Investigation and Analysis Reports (FIARs) which have information on past suit failures. FIARs use a system of codes that give more information on the aspects of the failure, but if one is unfamiliar with the EMU they will be unable to decipher the information. A goal of the EMU LLD is to not only compile the information, but to present it in a user-friendly, organized, searchable database accessible to all familiarity levels with the EMU; both newcomers and veterans alike. The EMU LLD originally started as an Excel database, which allowed easy navigation and analysis of the data through pivot charts. Creating an entry requires access to the Problem Reporting And Corrective Action database (PRACA), which contains the original FIAR data for all hardware. FIAR data are then transferred to, defined, and formatted in the LLD. Work is being done to create a web-based version of the LLD in order to increase accessibility to all of Johnson Space Center (JSC), which includes converting entries from Excel to the HTML format. FIARs related to the EMU have been completed in the Excel version, and now focus has shifted to expanding FIAR data in the LLD to include EVA tools and support hardware such as

  20. Lesson from a 60Co source radiation accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guo Yong; Zhang Wenzhong

    2002-01-01

    A serious radiation accident happened an a 60 Co irradiation facility in Shanghai. 7 workers were uniformly exposed acutely. An investigation was done after the accident and a conclusion was achieved that the irregular operation was the direct reason for the accident. The operation of these workers did not comply with the requirements specified in the national standards-- 60 irradiation facility>> which demands that the examination should be done every day before operation, and the irradiation facility does not stop running when the auto-lock safety system on that facility has been removed. Some lessons should be drawn from the accident: popularizing the culture of safety, enhancing the law of safety, and ensuring the operation of radiation devices within the demands of safety

  1. Revision of the AESJ Standard for Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Updating requirements based on the lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Accidents (3). Fragility evaluation and outline of the updated points

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamaguchi, Akira; Nakamura, Susumu; Mihara, Yoshinori

    2014-01-01

    Lessons learned from Great East Japan earthquake and other new findings had been accumulated on the fragility evaluation of buildings and components. And also new analysis and evaluation method had been proposed with the advancement of recent analysis and evaluation technology. These were reflected in revision of the AESJ Standard for Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Scope of the fragility evaluation were extended to all equipment on the site, severe accident management equipment including portable equipment and earthquake concomitant incident (such as tsunami) countermeasure equipment. This article described outlines of updating points of the fragility evaluation of the AESJ Standard for Seismic PRA; (1) requirements for seismic induced other risk evaluations such as fire, inundation and tsunami, (2) simulation technology based on recent findings such as three dimensional responses of buildings / structures and its effect on equipment, (3) requirements of the fragility evaluation for various failure mode of several equipment such as severe accident management equipment, fine failure mode of buildings / structures, failures of equipment related with earthquake concomitant incidents (embankment and seawall) and spent fuel pool, and (4) requirements for the fragility evaluation of aftershocks and soil deformation due to fault displacement. (T. Tanaka)

  2. Field observations and lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nielsen, Joh B [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01

    This presentation outlines observations and lessons learned from the Megaports program. It provides: (1) details of field and technical observations collected during LANL field activities at ports around the world and details of observations collected during radiation detections system testing at Los Alamos National Laboratory; (2) provides suggestions for improvement and efficiency; and (3) discusses possible program execution changes for more effective operations.

  3. Lessons learned in crisis management.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Olson, Chris

    2014-01-01

    This paper will explore lessons learned following a series of natural and man-made disasters affecting the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company and/or its subsidiaries. The company employs a team of certified continuity professionals who are charged with overseeing resilience on behalf of the enterprise and leading recovery activities wherever and whenever necessary.

  4. Constellation Lessons Learned Executive Summary

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thomas, L. Dale; Neubek, Deb

    2011-01-01

    This slide presentation reviews the lessons learned from the Constellation Program (CxP) and identified several factors that contributed to the inability of the CxP to meet the cost and schedule commitments. The review includes a significant section on the context in which the CxP operated since new programs are likely to experience the same constraints.

  5. The Fukushima accident: radiological consequences and first lessons. Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-02-01

    This document brings together the available presentations given at the conference organised by the French society of radiation protection about the Fukushima accident, its radiological consequences and the first lessons learnt. Sixteen presentations (slides) are compiled in this document and deal with: 1 - Accident progress and first actions (Thierry Charles, IRSN); 2 - Conditions and health monitoring of the Japanese intervention teams (Bernard Le Guen, EDF); 3 - The Intra Group action after the Fukushima accident (Michel Chevallier, Groupe Intra; Frederic Mariotte, CEA); 4 - Processing of effluents (Georges Pagis, Areva); 5 - Fukushima accident: impact on the terrestrial environment in Japan (Didier Champion, IRSN); 6 - Consequences of the Fukushima accident on the marine environment (Dominique Boust, IRSN); 7 - Territories decontamination perspectives (Pierre Chagvardieff, CEA); 8 - Actions undertaken by Japanese authorities (Florence Gallay, ASN); 9 - Japanese population monitoring and health stakes (Philippe Pirard, InVS); 10 - Citizen oversight actions implemented in Japan (David Boilley, ACRO); 11 - Implementation of ICRP's (International Commission on Radiological Protection) recommendations by Japanese authorities: first analysis (Jacques Lochard, CIPR); 12 - Control of Japan imported food stuff (David Brouque, DGAL); 13 - Questions asked by populations in France and in Germany (Florence-Nathalie Sentuc, GRS; Pascale Monti, IRSN); 14 - Labour law applicable to French workers working abroad (Thierry Lahaye, DGT); 15 - Protection of French workers working in Japan, Areva's experience (Patrick Devin, Areva); 16 - Fukushima accident experience feedback and post-accident nuclear doctrine (Jean-Luc Godet, ASN)

  6. Comparative analysis of the countermeasures taken to mitigate exposure of the public to radioiodine following the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents: lessons from both accidents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Uyba, Vladimir; Samoylov, Alexander; Shinkarev, Sergey

    2018-04-01

    In the case of a severe radiation accident at a nuclear power station, the most important radiation hazard for the public is internal exposure of the thyroid to radioiodine. The purposes of this paper were (i) to compare countermeasures conducted (following the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents) aimed at mitigation of exposure to the thyroid for the public, (ii) to present comparative estimates of doses to the thyroid and (iii) to derive lessons from the two accidents. The scale and time of countermeasures applied in the early phase of the accidents (sheltering, evacuation, and intake of stable iodine to block the thyroid) and at a later time (control of 131I concentration in foodstuffs) have been described. After the Chernobyl accident, the estimation of the thyroid doses for the public was mainly based on direct thyroid measurements of ~400 000 residents carried out within the first 2 months. The highest estimates of thyroid doses to children reached 50 Gy. After the Fukushima accident, the estimation of thyroid doses was based on radioecological models due to a lack of direct thyroid measurements (only slightly more than 1000 residents were measured). The highest estimates of thyroid doses to children were a few hundred mGy. Following the Chernobyl accident, ingestion of 131I through cows' milk was the dominant pathway. Following the Fukushima accident, it appears that inhalation of contaminated air was the dominant pathway. Some lessons learned following the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents have been presented in this paper.

  7. Value pricing pilot program : lessons learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-08-01

    This "Lessons Learned Report" provides a summary of projects sponsored by the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA's) Congestion and Value Pricing Pilot Programs from 1991 through 2006 and draws lessons from a sample of projects with the richest an...

  8. Shuttle Lesson Learned - Toxicology

    Science.gov (United States)

    James, John T.

    2010-01-01

    This is a script for a video about toxicology and the space shuttle. The first segment is deals with dust in the space vehicle. The next segment will be about archival samples. Then we'll look at real time on-board analyzers that give us a lot of capability in terms of monitoring for combustion products and the ability to monitor volatile organics on the station. Finally we will look at other issues that are about setting limits and dealing with ground based lessons that pertain to toxicology.

  9. Lessons learned from accidental exposures in radiotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The medical use of radiation is unique in that patients are intentionally exposed to radiation. The aim in radiation therapy is twofold: to deliver a dose and dose distribution that is adequate for tumour control, but which also minimizes complications in normal tissues. In therapeutic applications, the doses are high and a deviation from the prescribed dose may have severe or even fatal consequences. There is therefore a great need to ensure adequate radiation protection and safety in radiotherapy by verifying that all personnel involved are appropriately trained for their duties, that the equipment used meets relevant international specifications for radiation safety and that safety culture is embedded in routine activities in radiotherapy departments. Many individuals must interact and work together on highly technical measurements and calculations, and therefore the potential for mistakes is great. A review of the mistakes shows that most are due to human error. The International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and the Safety of Radiation Sources (IAEA Safety Series No. 115) require that a prompt investigation be conducted whenever an accidental medical exposure of patients occurs. The report of the investigation is to be disseminated to the appropriate parties so that lessons can be learned to prevent similar accidents or mitigate their consequences in the future. This Safety Report is a collection of a large number of events that may serve as a checklist against which to test the vulnerability of a facility to potential accidents, and to provide a basis for improving safety in the use of radiation in medical applications. A further purpose of this report is to encourage readers to develop a questioning and learning attitude, adopt measures for the prevention of accidents, and prepare for mitigation of the consequences of accidents if they occur

  10. Ecological lessons from the Chernobyl accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bell, J N B; Shaw, G

    2005-08-01

    The Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 not only caused serious ecological problems in both the Ukraine and Belarus, which continue to the present day, but also contaminated a large part of the higher latitudes of the northern hemisphere. In this paper an overview is given of the latter problems in upland UK, where ecological problems still remain some 17 years after initial contamination. Following deposition of radiocaesium and radioiodine in May 1986, measurements of radioactivity in grass and soil indicated a rapidly declining problem as the radioiodine decayed and the radiocaesium became immobilised by attachment to clay particles. However, these studies, as well as the advice received by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, were based on lowland agricultural soils, with high clay and low organic matter contents. The behaviour of radiocaesium in upland UK turned out to be dominated by high and persistent levels of mobility and bioavailability. This resulted in the free passage of radiocaesium through the food chain and into sheep. Consequently the Ministry banned the sale and movement of sheep over large areas of upland Britain, with bans remaining on some farms to the present day. Present day predictions suggest that these bans will continue in some cases for some years to come. The causes of radiocaesium mobility in upland areas have subsequently been the subject of intense investigation centred around vegetation and, in particular, soil characteristics. Soil types were identified which were particularly vulnerable in this respect and, where these coincided with high levels of deposition, sheep bans tended to be imposed. While much of the earlier work suggested that a low clay content was the main reason for continuing mobility, a very high organic matter content is now also believed to play a major role, this being a characteristic of wet and acidic upland UK soils. The overall message from this affair is the importance of a fundamental

  11. Learned lessons of the radiological accident occurred in La Ciudadela of El Cementerio, Gran Caracas. September 2005; Lecciones aprendidas del accidente radiologico ocurrido en La Ciudadela de El Cementerio, Gran Caracas. Septiembre 2005

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lea, D.; Cubillan, Y.; Figuera, J.L.; Mora, G.; Pacheco, J.; Yanez, H.; Carrizales, L. [Servicio de Radiofisica Sanitaria (RFS), Unidad de Tecnologia Nuclear, Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Cientificas (IVIC), Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia, Carretera Panamericana Km. 11, Altos del Pipe, Caracas (Venezuela)]. e-mail: dlea@ivic.ve

    2006-07-01

    On September 20, 2005 when a mission conformed by five (05) officials: two (02) belonging to the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEP) and three (03) of the Ministry of Health (MS) it was prepared to carry out a routine inspection in the one temporary warehouse of sources in disuse located in La Ciudadela of El Cementerio, identified administratively as Warehouse Number 5 (MS) Area X, noticed that those armor-plating that kept the radioactive sources of Cs-137 had been violated. Those people that entered to the warehouse were able to extract the armor-plating in whose interior its were found an important number of sources of Cs-137 in disuse, used in the decade of 70 and 80 in treatment of cancer of the uterine neck, by means of the Brachytherapy technique of Differed charge manual, low dose rate, as well as, lead sheets with the apparent intention of selling them as junk. The intruders extracted a total of 58 radioactive sources of Cs-137 of its armor-plating for then to disperse them inside warehouse and in the external areas to this. An important number of the dispersed sources its had lost it integrity what gave place to a combined scenario of exposed dispersed sources in a public area with the danger of radioactive contamination by Cs-137. A task force conformed by the following institutions: Ministry of Health (MS), Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MENPET), Venezuelan Institute of Scientific Investigations (IVIC), Unit of Dangerous Materials of the Metropolitan Firemen under the coordination of Civil Protection (PC) it was the one in charge of responding to the radiological accident, of conformity to the National Plan for the Answer to Radiological Accidents. All the radioactive sources dispersed in La Ciudadela achieved to be recovered. The experience of the accident and as learned lesson it was the importance of harmonizing the Generic Procedures for the Evaluation and Answer during Radiological Emergencies, IAEA-TECDOC-1162 technical document, Vienna, August

  12. Spent Fuel Storage Operation - Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-12-01

    , UK and USA attended the meeting. The responses to the second questionnaire, which was circulated at the International Conference on Management of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactor (2010), were reviewed at this meeting. Discussions on what was initially learned from the accident at Fukushima also took place. In response to the accident, an additional chapter (Chapter 4) has been added to detail the lessons learned from the remediation of severely damaged fuel at Three Mile Island unit 2 and at Paks

  13. Brentwood Lessons Learned Project Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rivkin, Carl H. [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Caton, Melanie C. [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Ainscough, Christopher D. [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Marcinkoski, Jason [Dept. of Energy (DOE), Washington DC (United States)

    2017-09-26

    The purpose of this report is to document lessons learned in the installation of the hydrogen fueling station at the National Park Service Brentwood site in Washington, D.C., to help further the deployment of hydrogen infrastructure required to support hydrogen and other fuel cell technologies. Hydrogen fueling is the most difficult infrastructure component to build and permit. Hydrogen fueling can include augmenting hydrogen fueling capability to existing conventional fuel fueling stations as well as building brand new hydrogen fueling stations. This report was produced as part of the Brentwood Lessons Learned project. The project consisted of transplanting an existing modular hydrogen fueling station from Connecticut to the National Park Service Brentwood site. This relocation required design and construction at the Brentwood site to accommodate the existing station design as well as installation and validation of the updated station. One of the most important lessons learned was that simply moving an existing modular station to an operating site was not necessarily straight-forward - performing the relocation required significant effort and cost. The station has to function at the selected operating site and this functionality requires a power supply, building supports connecting to an existing alarm system, electrical grounding and lighting, providing nitrogen for purging, and providing deionized water if an electrolyzer is part of the station package. Most importantly, the station has to fit into the existing site both spatially and operationally and not disrupt existing operations at the site. All of this coordination and integration requires logistical planning and project management. The idea that a hydrogen fueling station can be simply dropped onto a site and made immediately operational is generally not realistic. Other important lessons learned include that delineating the boundaries of the multiple jurisdictions that have authority over a project for

  14. Comparisons and Lessons Learned

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Jensen, PA; van der Voordt, Theo; Coenen, C; Sarasoja, AL; van der Voordt, DJM; Jensen, PA; Coenen, C

    2012-01-01

    Purpose: To create an overview and evaluation of the achievements of the contributions in this book by identifying, summarising and discussing cross-cutting themes and essential learning points across the former chapters.
    Methodology: Based on a purposeful reading of all chapters comparisons are

  15. Lessons Learnt from Past Incidents and Accidents in Radiation Oncology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Knöös, T

    2017-09-01

    The purpose of this report is to review and compile what have been and can be learnt from incidents and accidents in radiation oncology, especially in external beam and brachytherapy. Some major accidents from the last 20 years will be discussed. The relationship between major events and minor or so-called near misses is mentioned, leading to the next topic of exploring the knowledge hidden among them. The main lessons learnt from the discussion here and elsewhere are that a well-functioning and safe radiotherapy department should help staff to work with awareness and alertness and that documentation and procedures should be in place and known by everyone. It also requires that trained and educated staff with the required competences are in place and, finally, functions and responsibilities are defined and well known. Copyright © 2017 The Royal College of Radiologists. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  16. Summary of lessons learned in Japan from severe accidents: R&D programme for SA-Keisou in Japan. Annex I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    Instrumentation systems in a nuclear power plant are very important for monitoring plant conditions for safe operation and shutdown. The severe accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March 2011 caused several severe situations such as failure of the plant power supply for many monitoring instruments, core damage and hydrogen explosion, among other things. Many of the functions of the instrumentation systems were lost. Monitoring the plant’s conditions then became harder to perform. In the event that an accident similar to the one at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant were to occur in the future, measurements of the important variables, such as reactor water level or reactor pressure, are to be ensured. The development of SA-Keisou1 is needed to monitor these important variables, which contribute to preventing the escalation of an event into a severe accident, mitigating the consequences of a severe accident, achieving a safe state for the plant and confirming that the plant continues to be in a safe state over the long term

  17. Human Spaceflight Conjunction Assessment: Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Smith, Jason T.

    2011-01-01

    This viewgraph presentation reviews the process of a human space flight conjunction assessment and lessons learned from the more than twelve years of International Space Station (ISS) operations. Also, the application of these lessons learned to a recent ISS conjunction assessment with object 84180 on July 16, 2009 is also presented.

  18. Psychological and social impacts of post-accident situations: lessons from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lochard, J.

    1996-01-01

    This paper presents the main features, from the psychological and social points of view, of the post-accident situation in the contaminated areas around Chernobyl. This is based on a series of surveys performed in the concerned territories of the CIS republics. The high level of stress affecting a large segment of the population is related to the perception of the situation by those living in a durably contaminated environment but also to the side-effects of some of the countermeasures adopted to mitigate the radiological consequences or to compensate the affected population. The distinction between the accident and the post-accident phase is enlarged to take into account the various phases characterizing the dynamics of the social response. Although the size of the catastrophe as well as the economic and political conditions that were prevailing at the time and after the accident have resulted in a maximal intensity of the reactions of the population, many lessons can be drawn for the management of potential post-accident situations. (author)

  19. TEPCO's risk communication activities in Fukushima Prefecture in light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sagasaki, Yoshitoyo; Yamamoto, Takashi

    2015-01-01

    This paper introduces the risk communication activities of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) in Fukushima Prefecture. It analyzed the organizational cause as the background for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident, and concluded that the root cause of the accident is the thought that 'safety has already been secured, and operation rate and the like are important management issues, which incurred the insufficient preparedness for accident.' It has taken six measures as nuclear safety reform plans. One of these is the 'enhancement of risk communication activities.' The nuclear power leader take the initiative to disclose risk under the idea that 'there is no absolute safety (zero risk) in nuclear power,' and promote risk communication for continuously obtaining the understanding of the regional community and society about safety measures, etc. To implement risk communication, 'risk communicators' are installed, and they propose for the management and nuclear leader, about the risk perception and measures associated with public disclosure and its limit, and perform risk communication in accordance with the policy. As the examples of these initiatives, this paper introduces the cases of Fukushima Prefecture, questionnaire study, and evaluations by international organizations. (A.O.)

  20. Lessons Learned for Decommissioning Planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sohn, Wook; Kim, Young-gook; Kim, Hee-keun

    2015-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to introduce the U.S. nuclear industrial's some key lessons learned especially for decommissioning planning based on which well informed decommissioning planning can be carried out. For a successful decommissioning, it is crucial to carry out a well-organized decommissioning planning before the decommissioning starts. This paper discussed four key factors which should be decided or considered carefully during the decommissioning planning period with introduction of related decommissioning lessons learned of U.S. nuclear industry. Those factors which have been discussed in this paper include the end state of a site, the overall decommissioning strategy, the management of the spent fuels, and the spent fuel pool island. Among them, the end state of a site should be decided first as it directs the whole decommissioning processes. Then, decisions on the overall decommissioning strategy (DECON vs. SAFSTOR) and the management of the spent fuels (wet vs. dry) should follow. Finally, the spent fuel pool island should be given due consideration because its implementation will result in much cost saving. Hopefully, the results of this paper would provide useful inputs to performing the decommissioning planing for the Kori unit 1

  1. Lessons learned from post-accident management at Chernobyl: the P.a.r.e.x. project; Retour d'experience sur la gestion post-accidentelle de Tchernobyl: le projet Parex

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heriard Dubreuil, G. [Mutadis Consultants, 75 - Paris (France); Lochard, J.; Bataille, C. [CEPN, 92 - Fontenay aux Roses (France); Ollagnon, H. [AgroParisTech, 75 - Paris (France); Baude, St. [Mutadis, 75 - Paris (France)

    2008-07-15

    Return of experience on Chernobyl post-accident management: the PAREX study Belarus is the country the most affected by the Chernobyl fallouts and is among the most significant experiences in the nuclear post-accident field. Despite specificities inherent to the political and social situation in Belarus, the experience of post-accidental management in this country holds a wealth of lessons in the perspective of preparation to a post-accidental situation in the French and European context. Through the PAREX project (2005-2006), the French Nuclear Safety Authority analysed the return of experience of Chernobyl post-accident management from 1986 to 2005 in order to draw its lessons in the perspective of a preparation policy. The study was led by a group of experts and involved the participation of a pluralistic group of about thirty participants (public authorities, local governments, NGOs, experts, operators). PAREX highlighted the complexity of a situation of long-lasting radioactive contamination (diversity of stakeholders and of dimensions at stake: health, environment, economy, society...). Beyond traditional public crisis management tools and frameworks, post-accident strategies also involves in the longer term a territorial and social response, which relies on local capacities of initiative. Preparation to such process requires experimenting new modes of operation that allow a diversity of local actors to take part to the response to a situation of contamination and to the surveillance system, with the support of public authorities. The conclusions of PAREX include a set of recommendations in this perspective. (authors)

  2. Case examples of chemical plant accidents. What we learn from them?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakamura, Masayoshi

    2009-01-01

    Lessons learned from the JCO Nuclear Criticality Accident of 30 September 1999 in a uranium conversion test plant in Tokai-mura, Japan, are reviewed by referring some pertinent matters from the official report of this accident to remind of the universal characteristics among possible accidents of chemical plants. The paper discusses the responsibility of the establishment or institution to the demand alternation or request change from the client, how to respond to the proposal arising from the factory floor, and the safety control system of every-day maintenance of the factory which are important to prevent accidents in chemical plants. After explaining a background leading to the JCO accident, the author summarizes the lessons as follows: (1) changeable control system, (2) perfect provision of the manual considering the actual condition, and (3) clarification of the roles each played by the managers and the workers are most necessary and important. (S. Ohno)

  3. Implementing US Department of Energy lessons learned programs. Volume 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-08-01

    The DOE Lessons Learned Handbook is a two-volume publication developed to supplement the DOE Lessons Learned Standard (DOE-STD-7501-95) with information that will organizations in developing or improving their lessons learned programs. Volume 1 includes greater detail than the Standard in areas such as identification and documentation of lessons learned; it also contains sections on specific processes such as training and performance measurement. Volume 2 (this document) contains examples of program documents developed by existing lessons learned programs as well as communications material, functional categories, transmittal documents, sources of professional and industry lessons learned, and frequently asked questions about the Lessons Learned List Service.

  4. Lessons learned from a review of post-accident sampling systems, high range effluent monitors and high concentration particulate iodine samplers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hull, A.P.; Knox, W.H.; White, J.R.

    1987-01-01

    Post-accident sampling systems (PASS), high range gaseous effluent monitors and sampling systems for particulates and iodine in high concentrations have been reviewed at twenty-one licensee sites in Region I of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission which includes fifteen BWR's and fourteen PWR's. Although most of the installed PASS met the criteria, the highest operational readiness was found in on-line systems that were also used for routine sampling and analysis. The detectors used in the gaseous effluent monitors included external ion chambers, GM tubes, organic scintillators and Cd-Te solid state crystals. Although all were found acceptable, each had its own inherent limitations in the conversion of detector output to the time varying concentration of a post-accident mixture of noble gases. None of the installed particulate and iodine samplers fully met all of the criteria. Their principal limitations included a lack of documentation showing that they could obtain a representative sample and that many of them would collect of an excessive amount of activity at the design criteria. 10 refs., 4 figs., 5 tabs

  5. Lessons learned from external hazards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Peinador, Miguel; Zerger, Benoit [European Commisison Joint Research Centre, Petten (Netherlands). Inst. for Energy and Transport; Ramos, Manuel Martin [European Commission Joint Research Centre, Brussels (Belgium). Nuclear Safety and Security Coordination; Wattrelos, Didier [Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (IRSN), Fontenay-aux-Roses (France); Maqua, Michael [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Koeln (Germany)

    2014-01-15

    This paper presents a study performed by the European Clearinghouse of the Joint Research Centre on Operational Experience for nuclear power plants in cooperation with IRSN and GRS covering events reported by nuclear power plants in relation to external hazards. It summarizes the review of 235 event reports from 3 different databases. The events were grouped in 9 categories according to the nature of the external hazard involved, and the specific lessons learned and recommendations that can be derived from each of these categories are presented. Additional 'cross-cutting' recommendations covering several or all the external hazards considered are also discussed. These recommendations can be useful in preventing this type of events from happening again or in limiting their consequences. The study was launched in 2010 and therefore it does not cover the Fukushima event. This paper presents the main findings and recommendations raised by this study. (orig.)

  6. Lessons learned: wrong intraocular lens.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schein, Oliver D; Banta, James T; Chen, Teresa C; Pritzker, Scott; Schachat, Andrew P

    2012-10-01

    To report cases involving the placement of the wrong intraocular lens (IOL) at the time of cataract surgery where human error occurred. Retrospective small case series, convenience sample. Seven surgical cases. Institutional review of errors committed and subsequent improvements to clinical protocols. Lessons learned and changes in procedures adapted. The pathways to a wrong IOL are many but largely reflect some combination of poor surgical team communication, transcription error, lack of preoperative clarity in surgical planning or failure to match the patient, and IOL calculation sheet with 2 unique identifiers. Safety in surgery involving IOLs is enhanced both by strict procedures, such as an IOL-specific "time-out," and the fostering of a surgical team culture in which all members are encouraged to voice questions and concerns. Copyright © 2012 American Academy of Ophthalmology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  7. Planning geometry lessons with learning platforms

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Tamborg, Andreas Lindenskov

    mathematics teachers’ joint planning of a lesson in geometry with a learning platform called Meebook is analyzed using the instrumental approach. It is concluded that the interface in Meebook orients the teachers work toward what the students should do rather than what they should learn, although the latter......This paper investigates how mathematics teachers plan lessons with a recently implemented Danish learning platform designed to support teachers in planning lessons in line with a recent objective-oriented curriculum. Drawing on data from observations of and interviews with teachers, three...... is a key intention behind the implementation of the platform. It is also concluded that when the teachers succeed in using learning objectives actively in their planning, the objectives support the teachers in designing lessons that correspond with their intentions. The paper concludes with a discussion...

  8. Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Stations of TEPCO —Outline & lessons learned—

    Science.gov (United States)

    TANAKA, Shun-ichi

    2012-01-01

    The severe accident that broke out at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations on March 11, 2011, caused seemingly infinite damage to the daily life of residents. Serious and wide-spread contamination of the environment occurred due to radioactive materials discharged from nuclear power stations (NPSs). At the same time, many issues were highlighted concerning countermeasures to severe nuclear accidents. The accident is outlined, and lessons learned are extracted with respect to the safety of NPSs, as well as radiation protection of residents under the emergency involving the accident. The materials of the current paper are those released by governmental agencies, academic societies, interim reports of committees under the government, and others. PMID:23138450

  9. Lessons Learned from ISS Cooperation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jolly, C.

    2002-01-01

    Forty years of human spaceflight activities are now culminating in the International Space Station program (ISS). The ISS involves fifteen nations, working together to create a permanently occupied orbital facility that will support scientific and potentially, commercial endeavours. The assembly of the ISS is scheduled to be completed later in this decade, after which it will be operated for at least ten years. At the strategic level, such a complex international project is highly dependent on the fifteen Partners' respective internal politics and foreign policies. On the operational level, Partners still have certain difficulties in issuing and agreeing to common technical procedures. As with almost all aspects of International Space Station cooperation, the Partners are going through a constant learning process, where they have to deal with complex political, legal and operational differences. Intergovernmental Agreement and the Memoranda of Understanding, the instruments forming the legal backbone of the International Space Station cooperation, are still lacking a fair number of arrangements that need to be created for completing and operating the Station. The whole endeavour is also a constant learning process at the operational level, as astronauts, cosmonauts, engineers and technicians on the ground with different cultural and educational backgrounds, learn to work together. One recent Space Shuttle mission to the Station showed the importance of standardising even trivial system components such as packaging labels, as it took the astronauts half a day more than planned to correctly unpack the equipment. This paper will provide a synthesis of some of the main lessons learned during the first few years of International Space Station's lifetime. Important political, legal and operational issues will be addressed and combined. This analysis will provide some guidelines and recommendations for future international space projects, such as an international human

  10. Learning to observe mathematical learning in lesson studies

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Rasmussen, Klaus; Østergaard, Camilla Hellsten; Foss, Kristian Kildemoes

    2016-01-01

    This poster deals with lesson study (LS) in pre-service teacher education. In particular how to prepare for, carry out, and reflect upon, observations of pupil learning. Observation is of crucial importance to the lesson study process, and here we present a study of observation features which ena...... enable or hinder fruitful lesson study. While substantial research has been carried out in the general field of bserving pupils’ learning processes and teachers’ pedagogical practice, little is known about this in the particular setting of lesson study....

  11. N Reactor Lessons Learned workshop

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heaberlin, S.W.

    1993-07-01

    This report describes a workshop designed to introduce participants to a process, or model, for adapting LWR Safety Standards and Analysis Methods for use on rector designs significantly different than LWR. The focus of the workshop is on the ''Lessons Learned'' from the multi-year experience in the operation of N Reactor and the efforts to adapt the safety standards developed for commercial light water reactors to a graphite moderated, water cooled, channel type reactor. It must be recognized that the objective of the workshop is to introduce the participants to the operation of a non-LWR in a LWR regulatory world. The total scope of this topic would take weeks to provide a through overview. The objective of this workshop is to provide an introduction and hopefully establish a means to develop a longer term dialogue for technical exchange. This report provides outline of the workshop, a proposed schedule of the workshop, and a description of the tasks will be required to achieve successful completion of the project

  12. Science and Sandy: Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Werner, K.

    2013-12-01

    Following Hurricane Sandy's impact on the mid-Atlantic region, President Obama established a Task Force to '...ensure that the Federal Government continues to provide appropriate resources to support affected State, local, and tribal communities to improve the region's resilience, health, and prosperity by building for the future.' The author was detailed from NOAA to the Task Force between January and June 2013. As the Task Force and others began to take stock of the region's needs and develop plans to address them, many diverse approaches emerged from different areas of expertise including: infrastructure, management and construction, housing, public health, and others. Decision making in this environment was complex with many interests and variables to consider and balance. Although often relevant, science and technical expertise was not always at the forefront of this process. This talk describes the author's experience with the Sandy Task Force focusing on organizing scientific expertise to support the work of the Task Force. This includes a description of federal activity supporting Sandy recovery efforts, the role of the Task Force, and lessons learned from developing a science support function within the Task Force.

  13. EC6 safety enhancement - including impact of Fukushima lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yu, S.; Zemdegs, R.; Boyle, S.; Soulard, M., E-mail: stephen.yu@candu.com [Candu Energy Inc., Mississauga, Ontario (Canada)

    2012-09-15

    The Enhanced CANDU 6 (EC6) is the new Generation III CANDU reactor design that meets the most up to date regulatory requirements and customer expectations. EC6 builds on the proven high performance design inch as the Qinshan CANDU 6 units and has made improvements to safety and operational performance, and has incorporated extensive operational feedback including Fukushima. The Fukushima Dai-ichi March 11, 2011 event has demonstrated the importance of defence-in-depth considerations for beyond-design basis events, including severe accidents. The EC6 design is based on the defence-in-depth principles and provides further design features that address the lessons learned from Fukushima. (author)

  14. Interrogations to Learn from the Fukushima Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gisquet, E.; Jeffroy, F.

    2016-01-01

    On March 11, 2011, an earthquake in eastern Japan caused the reactors in operation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) to trip. The emergency generators started and then suddenly failed following the tsunami. The cooling water injection system no longer worked. Suddenly plunged into total darkness, the operators had to manage the accident. Starting from the official reports and testimonies on the Fukushima accident, IRSN has conducted a survey “Human and Organizational Factors Perspective on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident.” Four years after the accident, however, as more witness accounts become available, IRSN feels it useful to return to the human and organizational response to the accident inside the NPP itself. To what extent can the participants act and coordinate their actions when faced with such a dramatic situation? To what degree did their actions contribute to the disaster? Rather than looking at the causes of the accident, this study examines the unfolding of the crisis, particularly in the most urgent early stages, and draws lessons for safety culture from the decisions and actions of key actors. The main results would be presented in three key areas: 1. How to make sense of the situation? People had to make sense of what happened and create new indicators. Since instruments and controls, as well as many communication technologies, were knocked out by the tsunami, all the standard means of determining the status of the reactors were impossible. Although they were under normal circumstances almost completely dependent on these indicators, and although (or because) their lives were most directly at risk, the operators managed this uncertainty through various means that will be successively presented. 2. What are the challenges for the emergency structure? The Emergency Response Center (ERC) operations team was responsible for being in contact with the operators in the control rooms and providing them technical support as needed. The ERC

  15. Main lessons based on the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident liquidation experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vasil'chenko, V.N.; Nosovskij, A.V.

    2006-01-01

    The authors review the main lessons of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident and the liquidation of its consequences in the area of the nuclear reactors safety operation, any major accident management, liquidation accident consequences criteria, emergency procedures, preventative measures and treatment irradiated victims, the monitoring methods etc. The special emphasis is put on the questions of the emergency response and the antiaccidental measures planning in frame of international cooperation program

  16. Feedback of safety - related operational experience: Lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Elias, D [Commonwealth Edison Co. (United States)

    1997-09-01

    The presentation considers the following aspects of feedback of safety-related operational experience: lessons learned program, objectives, personnel characteristics; three types of documents for transmitting lessons learned issues.

  17. Feedback of safety - related operational experience: Lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elias, D.

    1997-01-01

    The presentation considers the following aspects of feedback of safety-related operational experience: lessons learned program, objectives, personnel characteristics; three types of documents for transmitting lessons learned issues

  18. TMI-2: Lessons learned by the US Department of Energy: A programmatic perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmitt, R.C.; Reno, H.W.; Bentley, K.J.; Owens, D.E.

    1990-03-01

    This report is a summary of the lessons learned by the US Department of Energy during its decade-long participation in the research and accident cleanup project at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. It is based on a review of a wide range of project documents and interviews with personnel from the many organizations involved. The lessons are organized into major subjects with a brief background section to orient the reader to that subject. The subjects are divided into sub-topics, each with a brief discussion and a series of lessons learned. The lessons are very brief and each is preceded with a keyword phrase to highlight its specific topic. References are given so that the details of the subject and the lesson can be further investigated. 99 refs., 24 figs

  19. Medical management of radiological accidents in non-specialized clinics: mistakes and lessons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jikia, D.

    2009-01-01

    In 1996-2002 three radiological accidents were developed in Georgia. There were some people injured in those accidents. During medical management of the injured some mistakes and errors were revealed both in diagnostics and scheme of the treatment. The goal of this article is to summarize medical management of the mentioned radiological accidents, to estimate reasons of mistakes and errors, to present the lessons drawn in result of Georgia radiological accidents. There was no clinic with specialized profile and experience. Accordingly due to having no relevant experience late diagnosis can be considered as the main error. It had direct influence on the patients' health and results of treatment. Lessons to be drawn after analyzing Georgian radiological accidents: 1. informing medical staff about radiological injuries (pathogenesis, types, symptoms, clinical course, principles of treatment and etc.); 2. organization of training and meetings in non-specialized clinics or medical institutions for medical staff; 3. preparation of informational booklets and guidelines.(author)

  20. Lessons Learned In Developing The VACIS Products

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Orphan, Victor J.

    2011-01-01

    SAIC's development of VACIS provides useful 'lessons learned' in bridging the gap from an idea to a security or contraband detection product. From a gamma densitometer idea for solving a specific Customs Service (CS) requirement (detection of drugs in near-empty tanker trucks) in mid-1990's, SAIC developed a broad line of vehicle and cargo inspections systems (over 500 systems deployed to date) based on a gamma-ray radiographic imaging technique. This paper analyzes the reasons for the successful development of VACIS and attempts to identify ''lessons learned'' useful for future security and contraband detection product developments.

  1. Lessons learned in CMAM implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dent, Nicky; Brown, Rebecca

    2014-01-01

    -going. Despite the need to adapt protocols and approaches to each specific context, there is a need for a common research agenda and sharing of what works and does not. Concerted efforts have been made to improve information-sharing and to draw on lessons learned to advance technical and organisational challenges. However many health workers have limited access to quality information due to barriers such as internet access and language. For example, one recent initiative identified less than 10% of resources are available in French, despite high caseloads of acute malnutrition in francophone West Africa. Key actions to address challenges in information-sharing include: -Improve availability of and access to translated information -Increase use of social media, e-learning and audio-visual materials for extended reach and use of information -Stimulate interactive dialogue and sharing between practitioners for improved problem solving and learning -Strengthen the collaboration between complementary initiatives. In one decade significant advances in the adaptation and implementation of community-based management of acute malnutrition approach have been made in various contexts, but challenges to quality service delivery, scale-up and sustainability remain. It is time to draw on what we know to support scale-up and have equitable access to treatment to the millions of children who still remain outside of existing services. (author)

  2. Lessons learned from failure analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Le May, I.

    2006-01-01

    Failure analysis can be a very useful tool to designers and operators of plant and equipment. It is not simply something that is done for lawyers and insurance companies, but is a tool from which lessons can be learned and by means of which the 'breed' can be improved. In this presentation, several failure investigations that have contributed to understanding will be presented. Specifically, the following cases will be discussed: 1) A fire at a refinery that occurred in a desulphurization unit. 2) The failure of a pipeline before it was even put into operation. 3) Failures in locomotive axles that took place during winter operation. The refinery fire was initially blamed on defective Type 321 seamless stainless steel tubing, but there were conflicting views between 'experts' involved as to the mechanism of failure and the writer was called upon to make an in-depth study. This showed that there were a variety of failure mechanism involved, including high temperature fracture, environmentally-induced cracking and possible manufacturing defects. The unraveling of the failure sequence is described and illustrated. The failure of an oil transmission was discovered when the line was pressure tested some months after it had been installed and before it was put into service. Repairs were made and failure occurred in another place upon the next pressure test being conducted. After several more repairs had been made the line was abandoned and a lawsuit was commenced on the basis that the steel was defective. An investigation disclosed that the material was sensitive to embrittlement and the causes of this were determined. As a result, changes were made in the microstructural control of the product to avoid similar problems in future. A series of axle failures occurred in diesel electric locomotives during winter. An investigation was made to determine the nature of the failures which were not by classical fatigue, nor did they correspond to published illustrations of Cu

  3. The Role of a Commander in Military Lessons Learned Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zenon Waliński

    2015-06-01

    Full Text Available The aim of the paper is to investigate the role of a commander in military Lessons Learned systems. In order to achieve the aim, the paper presents (1 the architecture of the Lessons Learned capabilities in the U.S. Army, NATO and the Polish Armed Forces, (2 the commander’s role in the Lessons Learned process (3 the commander’s role in fostering Lessons Learned organisation culture. The paper is based on multiple case study analysis including Lessons Learned systems in NATO, the U.S. Army and the Polish Armed Forces.

  4. Lessons learned on digital systems safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sivertsen, Terje

    2005-06-01

    A decade ago, in 1994, lessons learned from Halden research activities on digital systems safety were summarized in the reports HWR-374 and HWR-375, under the title 'A Lessons Learned Report on Software Dependability'. The reports reviewed all activities made at the Halden Project in this field since 1977. As such, the reports provide a wealth of information on Halden research. At the same time, the lessons learned from the different activities are made more accessible to the reader by being summarized in terms of results, conclusions and recommendations. The present report provides a new lessons learned report, covering the Halden Project research activities in this area from 1994 to medio 2005. As before, the emphasis is on the results, conclusions and recommendations made from these activities, in particular how they can be utilized by different types of organisations, such as licensing authorities, safety assessors, power companies, and software developers. The contents of the report have been edited on the basis of input from a large number of Halden work reports, involving many different authors. Brief summaries of these reports are included in the last part of the report. (Author)

  5. Two Approaches to Distance Education: Lessons Learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sedlak, Robert A.; Cartwright, G. Phillip

    1997-01-01

    Outlines lessons learned by the University of Wisconsin-Stout in implementing two distance education programs, a technology program using interactive television and a hospitality program using Lotus Notes to deliver courses. Topics discussed include program concept vs. technology as stimulus for innovation, program planning/administration,…

  6. Lessons Learned from the Private Sector

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robichaud, Robert J [National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Golden, CO (United States)

    2017-09-07

    This session is focused on lessons learned from private sector energy projects that could be applied to the federal sector. This presentation tees up the subsequent presentations by outlining the differences between private and federal sectors in objectives, metrics for determining success, funding resources/mechanisms, payback and ROI evaluation, risk tolerance/aversion, new technology adoption perspectives, and contracting mechanisms.

  7. Commissioning MMS: Challenges and Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wood, Paul; Gramling, Cheryl; Reiter, Jennifer; Smith, Patrick; Stone, John

    2016-01-01

    This paper discusses commissioning of NASA's Magnetospheric MultiScale (MMS) Mission. The mission includes four identical spacecraft with a large, complex set of instrumentation. The planning for and execution of commissioning for this mission is described. The paper concludes by discussing lessons learned.

  8. Library 101: Why, How, and Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Porter, Michael; King, David Lee

    2010-01-01

    This article describes how and why the Library 101 Project was created and the lessons that the developers learned out of this project. The Library 101 is a project that challenges librarians to revise the paradigm of "basic" library services in order to remain relevant in this technology-driven world. It was developed by Michael Porter,…

  9. Improving IT Project Portfolio Management: Lessons Learned

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Pedersen, Keld

    2013-01-01

    The IT PPM improvement process is not well understood, and our knowledge about what makes IT PPM improvement succeed or fail is not well developed. This article presents lessons learned from organizations trying to improve their IT PPM practice. Based on this research IT PPM practitioners are adv...

  10. Lessons learned from existing biomass power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wiltsee, G.

    2000-02-24

    This report includes summary information on 20 biomass power plants, which represent some of the leaders in the industry. In each category an effort is made to identify plants that illustrate particular points. The project experiences described capture some important lessons learned that lead in the direction of an improved biomass power industry.

  11. The Joint Lessons Learned System and Interoperability

    Science.gov (United States)

    1989-06-02

    Learned: 1988-1989 As mentioned in the introduction to this chaoter, the Organizacion of the JcinC Chiefs cf Staff .OJCS) ueren significant transformatioi...Organization and Functions Manual . Washington, D.C.: HQDA, Office of the Deputy Chief 0f Staff for Operations and Plans, June 1984. ’..S. Army. Concept...U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) User’s Manual . Orlando, Florida: University of Central Florida, Institute

  12. Lessons learned in terms of crisis management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This document outlines that nobody was prepared to the crisis which occurred after the Chernobyl accident, whether in Russia, Europe or France. In order to illustrate the fact that crisis management has been different from one country to another, the report describes how the crisis has been managed in Norway (which has been quickly reached by fallouts and with a rather high level) and in Switzerland. It comments radioactivity measurements performed in France during spring 1986 by the SCPRI, the CEA and the ISPN. It discusses the lessons drawn in France in terms of emergency situation management regarding the protection of the population, crisis management, and the French post-accidental doctrine. It comments the lessons drawn in eastern European countries, with the cooperative implication of the IRSN. International projects are evoked: the Chernobyl Centre, the French-German Initiative, the European projects (EURANOS, NERIS, FARMING, STRATEGY, MOSES and SAMEN)

  13. Functionality for learning networks: lessons learned from social web applications

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Berlanga, Adriana; Sloep, Peter; Brouns, Francis; Van Rosmalen, Peter; Bitter-Rijpkema, Marlies; Koper, Rob

    2007-01-01

    Berlanga, A. J., Sloep, P., Brouns, F., Van Rosmalen, P., Bitter-Rijpkema, M., & Koper, R. (2007). Functionality for learning networks: lessons learned from social web applications. Proceedings of the ePortfolio 2007 Conference. October, 18-19, 2007, Maastricht, The Netherlands. [See also

  14. Helping HSE Team in Learning from Accident by Using the Management Oversight and Risk Tree Analysis Method

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Iraj Mohammadfam

    2016-09-01

    Conclusion: The analysis using MORT method helped the organization with learning lessons from the accident especially at the management level. In order to prevent the similar and dissimilar accidents, the inappropriate informational network within the organization, inappropriate operational readiness, lack of proper implementation of work permit, the inappropriate and lack of updated technical information systems regarding equipments and working process, and the inappropriate barriers should be considered in a special way.

  15. Immediate medical consequences of nuclear accidents: lessons from Chernobyl

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gale, R.P.

    1987-01-01

    The immediate medical response to the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station involved containment of the radioactivity and evacuation of the nearby population. The next step consisted of assessment of the radiation dose received by individuals, based on biological dosimetry, and treatment of those exposed. Medical care involved treatment of skin burns; measures to support bone marrow failure, gastrointestinal tract injury, and other organ damage (i.e., infection prophylaxis and transfusions) for those with lower radiation dose exposure; and bone marrow transplantation for those exposed to a high dose of radiation. At Chernobyl, two victims died immediately and 29 died of radiation or thermal injuries in the next three months. The remaining victims of the accident are currently well. A nuclear accident anywhere is a nuclear accident everywhere. Prevention and cooperation in response to these accidents are essential goals

  16. SRMS History, Evolution and Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jorgensen, Glenn; Bains, Elizabeth

    2011-01-01

    . Evolution of the simulations, guided by the Math Model Working Group, showed the utility of input from multiple modeling groups with a structured forum for discussion.There were many unique development challenges in the areas of hardware, software, certification, modeling and simulation. Over the years, upgrades and enhancements were implemented to increase the capability, performance and safety of the SRMS. The history and evolution of the SRMS program provided many lessons learned that can be used for future space robotic systems.

  17. Social Media and Seamless Learning: Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Panke, Stefanie; Kohls, Christian; Gaiser, Birgit

    2017-01-01

    The paper discusses best practice approaches and metrics for evaluation that support seamless learning with social media. We draw upon the theoretical frameworks of social learning theory, transfer learning (bricolage), and educational design patterns to elaborate upon different ideas for ways in which social media can support seamless learning.…

  18. WHC significant lessons learned 1993--1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bickford, J.C.

    1997-12-12

    A lesson learned as defined in DOE-STD-7501-95, Development of DOE Lessons Learned Programs, is: A ``good work practice`` or innovative approach that is captured and shared to promote repeat applications or an adverse work practice or experience that is captured and shared to avoid a recurrence. The key word in both parts of this definition is ``shared``. This document was published to share a wide variety of recent Hanford experiences with other DOE sites. It also provides a valuable tool to be used in new employee and continuing training programs at Hanford facilities and at other DOE locations. This manual is divided into sections to facilitate extracting appropriate subject material when developing training modules. Many of the bulletins could be categorized into more than one section, however, so examination of other related sections is encouraged.

  19. The X-15 airplane - Lessons learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dana, William H.

    1993-01-01

    The X-15 rocket research airplane flew to an altitude of 354,000 ft and reached Mach 6.70. In almost 200 flights, this airplane was used to gather aerodynamic-heating, structural loads, stability and control, and atmospheric-reentry data. This paper describes the origins, design, and operation of the X-15 airplane. In addition, lessons learned from the X-15 airplane that are applicable to designing and testing the National Aero-Space Plane are discussed.

  20. CAT/RF Simulation Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    2003-06-11

    IVSS-2003-MAS-7 CAT /RF Simulation Lessons Learned Christopher Mocnik Vetronics Technology Area, RDECOM TARDEC Tim Lee DCS Corporation...developed a re- configurable Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) simulation for the Crew integration and Automation Test bed ( CAT ) and Robotics Follower (RF...Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) experiments. This simulation was developed as a component of the Embedded Simulation System (ESS) of the CAT

  1. Job Oriented Training ’Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-11-01

    Job Oriented Training ’Lessons Learned’ Job Oriented Training (JOT), een vorm van trainen waarbij de cursist zelfstandig, zonder theorie vooraf...39 77 lnfo-DenV@tno.nl TNO-rapportnummer TNO-DV 2008 A447 Opdrachtnummer Datum november 2008 Auteur (s) drs. H.E. Stubbe dr. A.H. van der...onderlinge discussie over achterliggende overwegingen te stimuleren. Zij hebben op dat moment nog geen theorie aangeboden gekregen en zijn niet op de hoogte

  2. Lessons learned in applying function analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mitchel, G.R.; Davey, E.; Basso, R.

    2001-01-01

    This paper summarizes the lessons learned in undertaking and applying function analysis based on the recent experience of utility, AECL and international design and assessment projects. Function analysis is an analytical technique that can be used to characterize and asses the functions of a system and is widely recognized as an essential component of a 'systematic' approach to design, on that integrated operational and user requirements into the standard design process. (author)

  3. Lessons learned from Spain's nuclear program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garcia Rodriguez, A.

    1993-01-01

    The commercial nuclear program in Spain dates back to the beginning of the 1960s. There are currently nine units in operation, one more has been decommissioned and a further five are in different phases of construction but under nuclear moratorium since 1983. This article gives a general overview of the program, the criteria applied, what it has meant to and required of the industry and, finally, what lessons have been learned. (author) 2 figs

  4. Organizational safety factors research lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryan, T.G.

    1995-01-01

    This Paper reports lessons learned and state of knowledge gained from an organizational factors research activity involving commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, through the end of 1991, as seen by the scientists immediately involved in the research. Lessons learned information was gathered from the research teams and individuals using a question and answer format. The following five questions were submitted to each team and individual: (1) What organizational factors appear to influence safety performance in some systematic way, (2) Should organizational factors research focus at the plant level, or should it extend beyond the plant level to the parent company, rate setting commissions, regulatory agencies, (3) How important is having direct access to plants for doing organizational factors research, (4) What lessons have been learned to date as the result of doing organizational factors research in a nuclear regulatory setting, and (5) What organizational research topics and issues should be pursued in the future? Conclusions based on the responses provided for this report are that organizational factors research can be conducted in a regulatory setting and produce useful results. Technologies pioneered in other academic, commercial, and military settings can be adopted for use in a nuclear regulatory setting. The future success of such research depends upon the cooperation of regulators, contractors, and the nuclear industry

  5. Research Data Curation Pilots: Lessons Learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    David Minor

    2014-07-01

    Full Text Available In the spring of 2011, the UC San Diego Research Cyberinfrastructure (RCI Implementation Team invited researchers and research teams to participate in a research curation and data management pilot program. This invitation took the form of a campus-wide solicitation. More than two dozen applications were received and, after due deliberation, the RCI Oversight Committee selected five curation-intensive projects. These projects were chosen based on a number of criteria, including how they represented campus research, varieties of topics, researcher engagement, and the various services required. The pilot process began in September 2011, and will be completed in early 2014. Extensive lessons learned from the pilots are being compiled and are being used in the on-going design and implementation of the permanent Research Data Curation Program in the UC San Diego Library. In this paper, we present specific implementation details of these various services, as well as lessons learned. The program focused on many aspects of contemporary scholarship, including data creation and storage, description and metadata creation, citation and publication, and long term preservation and access. Based on the lessons learned in our processes, the Research Data Curation Program will provide a suite of services from which campus users can pick and choose, as necessary. The program will provide support for the data management requirements from national funding agencies.

  6. Lessons Learned from Developing SAWA: A Situation Awareness Assistant

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Matheus, Christopher J; Kokar, Mieczyslaw M; Letkowski, Jerzy J; Call, Catherine; Baclawski, Kenneth; Hinman, Michael; Salerno, John; Boulware, Douglas

    2005-01-01

    .... During the process of its development several lessons were learned about advantages and limitations of certain approaches, techniques and technologies as they are applied to situation awareness...

  7. Dynasting Theory: Lessons in learning grounded theory

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Johnben Teik-Cheok Loy, MBA, MTS, Ph.D.

    2011-06-01

    Full Text Available This article captures the key learning lessons gleaned from the author’s experience learning and developing a grounded theory for his doctoral dissertation using the classic methodology as conceived by Barney Glaser. The theory was developed through data gathered on founders and successors of Malaysian Chinese family-own businesses. The main concern for Malaysian Chinese family businesses emerged as dynasting . the building, maintaining, and growing the power and resources of the business within the family lineage. The core category emerged as dynasting across cultures, where founders and successors struggle to transition from traditional Chinese to hybrid cultural and modernized forms of family business from one generation to the next. The key learning lessons were categorized under five headings: (a sorting through different versions of grounded theory, (b educating and managing research stakeholders, (c embracing experiential learning, (d discovering the core category: grounded intuition, and (e recognizing limitations and possibilities.Keywords: grounded theory, learning, dynasting, family business, Chinese

  8. Reperes, the information magazine of the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety - IRSN, No. 12 - January 2012, Special issue Fukushima - First lessons from the accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    A first set of articles addresses the nuclear crisis in Japan (description of the accident, information mission sent by France, and support actions undertaken by France in Japan in the fields of education, civilian security, culture, sailing, media, dosimeters, robotics). A second set discusses lessons learned in terms of nuclear safety (complementary safety assessments, stress test in Gravelines), radiological consequences (impact on Japanese population, the Symbiose software, the Teleray network), crisis management, and research

  9. Cesium-137 accident lessons in Goiania, Goias State, Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-11-01

    This document relates the experience obtained by several professionals which had an important role in the cesium-137 accident occurred in Goiania, Goias State, Brazil in September, 1987. It's divided into chapters, according to the action area - medical, nursing, social assistance, odontological and psychological. At first, some notions of radioprotection are explained, followed by the accident history and by the doctors and nurses action during the emergency phase and the medical, odontological, social and psychological assistance to the victims. The social assistance report shows some statistical data about the economic, occupational and social conditions of the accident victims. It is shown some information about the health institutions and the sanitary care in the ionizing radiation and about the occupational radiological protection in Goiania

  10. Lessons learned from EU stress tests evaluations with regard to external hazards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Misak, J.

    2014-01-01

    The presentation was oriented to critical review of the lessons learned from the European Union (EU) Stress Test focusing on NPP robustness against external hazards. These lessons addressed: - organization of the stress tests, - scope and objectives of the stress tests, - peer review findings, recommendations and implications on the design in the area of external hazards, - further studies recommended in the area of external hazards and PSA, - relevant research areas identified by the SNETP Task Group in response to Fukushima accident. Some important conclusions were made in the final part of the presentation: - Vulnerability to the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor accidents caused by external hazards and including their secondary effects was underestimated, - Lessons learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor accidents, from the EU Stress Test and from peer reviews are to be reflected in safety improvements of operating plants and considered in new designs, - while no completely new phenomena were revealed from the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor accidents, improvements in specific research areas (including external hazards and use of PSA) should be considered with high priority

  11. Lessons to be learned from an analysis of ammonium nitrate disasters in the last 100 years

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pittman, William; Han, Zhe; Harding, Brian; Rosas, Camilo; Jiang, Jiaojun; Pineda, Alba; Mannan, M. Sam, E-mail: mannan@tamu.edu

    2014-09-15

    Highlights: • Root causes and contributing factors from ammonium nitrate incidents are categorized into 10 lessons. • The lessons learned from the past 100 years of ammonium nitrate incidents can be used to improve design, operation, and maintenance procedures. • Improving organizational memory to help improve safety performance. • Combating and changing organizational cultures. - Abstract: Process safety, as well as the safe storage and transportation of hazardous or reactive chemicals, has been a topic of increasing interest in the last few decades. The increased interest in improving the safety of operations has been driven largely by a series of recent catastrophes that have occurred in the United States and the rest of the world. A continuous review of past incidents and disasters to look for common causes and lessons is an essential component to any process safety and loss prevention program. While analyzing the causes of an accident cannot prevent that accident from occurring, learning from it can help to prevent future incidents. The objective of this article is to review a selection of major incidents involving ammonium nitrate in the last century to identify common causes and lessons that can be gleaned from these incidents in the hopes of preventing future disasters. Ammonium nitrate has been involved in dozens of major incidents in the last century, so a subset of major incidents were chosen for discussion for the sake of brevity. Twelve incidents are reviewed and ten lessons from these incidents are discussed.

  12. Lessons to be learned from an analysis of ammonium nitrate disasters in the last 100 years

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pittman, William; Han, Zhe; Harding, Brian; Rosas, Camilo; Jiang, Jiaojun; Pineda, Alba; Mannan, M. Sam

    2014-01-01

    Highlights: • Root causes and contributing factors from ammonium nitrate incidents are categorized into 10 lessons. • The lessons learned from the past 100 years of ammonium nitrate incidents can be used to improve design, operation, and maintenance procedures. • Improving organizational memory to help improve safety performance. • Combating and changing organizational cultures. - Abstract: Process safety, as well as the safe storage and transportation of hazardous or reactive chemicals, has been a topic of increasing interest in the last few decades. The increased interest in improving the safety of operations has been driven largely by a series of recent catastrophes that have occurred in the United States and the rest of the world. A continuous review of past incidents and disasters to look for common causes and lessons is an essential component to any process safety and loss prevention program. While analyzing the causes of an accident cannot prevent that accident from occurring, learning from it can help to prevent future incidents. The objective of this article is to review a selection of major incidents involving ammonium nitrate in the last century to identify common causes and lessons that can be gleaned from these incidents in the hopes of preventing future disasters. Ammonium nitrate has been involved in dozens of major incidents in the last century, so a subset of major incidents were chosen for discussion for the sake of brevity. Twelve incidents are reviewed and ten lessons from these incidents are discussed

  13. Rock slopes and reservoirs - lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, D.P.

    1999-01-01

    Lessons learned about slope stability in the course of four decades of monitoring, and in some cases stabilizing, slopes along British Columbia's hydroelectric reservoirs are discussed. The lessons are illustrated by short case histories of some of the more important slopes such as Little Chief Slide, Dutchman's Ridge, Downie Slide, Checkerboard Creek and Wahleach. Information derived from the monitoring and other investigations are compared with early interpretations of geology and slope performance. The comparison serves as an indicator of progress in slope stability determination and as a measure of the value of accumulated experience in terms of the potential consequences to safety and cost savings over the long life-span of hydroelectric projects.14 refs., 2 tabs., 15 figs

  14. Introduction of new terms and lessons for radiological protection after Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Singh, Vishwanath P.; Managanvi, S.S.; Bhat, H.R.

    2012-01-01

    The nuclear accidents in the world are very few among various types of operating facilities. However when an accident happened, we have learnt a lot to improve the philosophy, term, definitions, document preparation, equipment's requirement, supporting systems, awareness program and restriction etc. After Fukushima Dai-ichi we have learnt a lot, in this view this paper has been prepared to discuss for radiological protection aspects. Discussion: The probability of nuclear accidents is negligible but when happens, it opens new doors of lessons for radiological protection practices for occupational workers, emergency workers for damage control to prevent catastrophic situation/rescue to life saving actions and the member of the public. The Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents have provided a lot experiences for management of emergency situations, documentation, radiation emergency preparedness, emergency equipment's, concept of defense-in-depth, emergency planning zone (EPZ), accidental dose limits, estimation of source term and public dose, intervention levels, decision supporting system, remedial actions in public domain; decontamination of person, houses/building and land and etc. Recent Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in Japan was managed in appreciable manner but still new definitions and lessons for radiological protection have been emerged out. The present paper discusses difficulties w. r. t. the radiological aspects observed/faced by Japanese during nuclear crises. The accident introduced new terms as Natural Dose Rate Unit (NDRU), voluntary evacuation, deliberate evacuation area, restricted area and difference between evacuation zone and EPZ. The Fukushima accident has enforced worldwide regulators and operators to review the individual dose limit and amendment for raise in the dose limit during accident, availability of efficient/adequate quantities of personal dosimeter in public domain, collection arrangement of bulk amount of radioactive wastes

  15. Lessons learned from AU PSO-missions in Africa

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Mandrup, Thomas

    The paper deals with the lessons learned from AU's PSO since 2002, and what that entails for the design of future PSO.......The paper deals with the lessons learned from AU's PSO since 2002, and what that entails for the design of future PSO....

  16. The Fernald Closure Project: Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murphy, Cornelius M.; Carr, Dennis

    2008-01-01

    For nearly 37 years, the U.S. Department of Energy site at Fernald - near Cincinnati, Ohio - produced 230,000 metric tons (250,000 short tons) of high-purity, low-enriched uranium for the U.S. Defense Program, generating more than 5.4 million metric tons (6 million short tons) of liquid and solid waste as it carried out its Cold War mission. The facility was shut down in 1989 and clean up began in 1992, when Fluor won the contract to clean up the site. Cleaning up Fernald and returning it to the people of Ohio was a $4.4 billion mega environmental-remediation project that was completed in October 2006. Project evolved through four phases: - Conducting remedial-investigation studies to determine the extent of damage to the environment and groundwater at, and adjacent to, the production facilities; - Selecting cleanup criteria - final end states that had to be met that protect human health and the environment; - Selecting and implementing the remedial actions to meet the cleanup goals; - Executing the work in a safe, compliant and cost-effective manner. In the early stages of the project, there were strained relationships - in fact total distrust - between the local community and the DOE as a result of aquifer contamination and potential health effects to the workers and local residents. To engage citizens and interested stakeholders groups in the decision-making process, the DOE and Fluor developed a public-participation strategy to open the channels of communication with the various parties: site leadership, technical staff and regulators. This approach proved invaluable to the success of the project, which has become a model for future environmental remediation projects. This paper will summarize the history and shares lessons learned: the completion of the uranium-production mission to the implementation of the Records of Decision defining the cleanup standards and the remedies achieved. Lessons learned fall into ten categories: - Regulatory approach with end

  17. Lessons learned from the quench-11 training exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hohorst, J.K.; Allison, C.M.

    2007-01-01

    16 organizations in 12 countries are participating in a RELAP/SCDAPSIM training exercise based on the Quench 11 experiment performed at Karlsruhe (Germany) in 2005. This exercise is being conducted in parallel to an International Standard Problem (ISP). Both the ISP and the RELAP/SCDAPSIM training exercise included a 'semi-blind' portion that was completed in the fall of 2006 and an 'open' portion that is to be completed in the summer of 2007. The RELAP/SCDAPSIM training exercise is coordinated by Innovative Systems Software with support by the International SCDAP Development and Training Program (SDTP). The Quench-11 experiment is based on an electrically heated fuel rod bundle representative of a PWR design. The bundle was subjected to a boil down transient, heat-up, and quenching with peak temperatures exceeding the melting point of the Zircaloy cladding. This experiment was chosen by the European Union as an International Benchmark exercise to compare the effectiveness of quenching models in the severe accident computer codes used today for accident analysis. This paper briefly describes (a) RELAP/SCDAPSIM/MOD3.4, (b) the Quench facility and experiments used in the training exercise, and (c) the training guidelines provided to the participants followed by a more detailed description of the lessons learned from the initial 'semi-blind' portion. The representative results demonstrate that good analysts can still have a difficult time predicting the thermal hydraulic response of a relative simple transient in a complex system

  18. Lessons Learned from the Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant-More than Basic Knowledge: Education and its Effects Improve the Preparedness and Response to Radiation Emergency.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hachiya, Misao; Akashi, Makoto

    2016-09-01

    A huge earthquake struck the northeast coast of the main island of Japan on 11 March 2011 triggering an extremely large tsunami to hit the area. The earthquake and tsunami caused serious damage to the Fukushima nuclear power plants (NPPs) of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), resulting in large amounts of radioactive materials being released into the environment. The major nuclides released were (131)I, (134)Cs and (137)Cs. The deposition of these radioactive materials on land resulted in a high ambient dose of radiation around the NPPs, especially within a 20-km radius. Dose assessments based on behavior survey and ambient dose rates revealed that external doses to most residents were lower than 5 mSv, with the maximum dose being 25 mSv. It was fortunate that no workers from the NPPs required treatment from the viewpoint of deterministic effects of radiation. However, a lack of exact knowledge of radiation and its effects prevented the system for medical care and transportation of contaminated personnel from functioning. After the accident, demands or requests for training courses have been increasing. We have learned from the response to this disaster that basic knowledge of radiation and its effects is extremely important for not only professionals such as health care providers but also for other professionals including teachers. © World Health Organisation 2016. All rights reserved. The World Health Organization has granted Oxford University Press permission for the reproduction of this article.

  19. Lessons Learned from Environmental Remediation Programmes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-03-15

    Several remediation projects have been developed to date, and experience with these projects has been accumulated. Lessons learned span from non-technical to technical aspects, and need to be shared with those who are beginning or are facing the challenge to implement environmental remediation works. This publication reviews some of these lessons. The key role of policy and strategies at the national level in framing the conditions in which remediation projects are to be developed and decisions made is emphasized. Following policy matters, this publication pays attention to the importance of social aspects and the requirement for fairness in decisions to be made, something that can only be achieved with the involvement of a broad range of interested parties in the decision making process. The publication also reviews the funding of remediation projects, planning, contracting, cost estimates and procurement, and issues related to long term stewardship. Lessons learned regarding technical aspects of remediation projects are reviewed. Techniques such as the application of cover systems and soil remediation (electrokinetics, phytoremediation, soil flushing, and solidification and stabilization techniques) are analysed with respect to performance and cost. After discussing soil remediation, the publication covers issues associated with water treatment, where techniques such as ‘pump and treat’ and the application of permeable barriers are reviewed. Subsequently, there is a section dedicated to reviewing briefly the lessons learned in the remediation of uranium mining and processing sites. Many of these sites throughout the world have become orphaned, and are waiting for remediation. The publication notes that little progress has been made in the management of some of these sites, particularly in the understanding of associated environmental and health risks, and the ability to apply prediction to future environmental and health standards. The publication concludes

  20. Lessons Learned from Environmental Remediation Programmes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    Several remediation projects have been developed to date, and experience with these projects has been accumulated. Lessons learned span from non-technical to technical aspects, and need to be shared with those who are beginning or are facing the challenge to implement environmental remediation works. This publication reviews some of these lessons. The key role of policy and strategies at the national level in framing the conditions in which remediation projects are to be developed and decisions made is emphasized. Following policy matters, this publication pays attention to the importance of social aspects and the requirement for fairness in decisions to be made, something that can only be achieved with the involvement of a broad range of interested parties in the decision making process. The publication also reviews the funding of remediation projects, planning, contracting, cost estimates and procurement, and issues related to long term stewardship. Lessons learned regarding technical aspects of remediation projects are reviewed. Techniques such as the application of cover systems and soil remediation (electrokinetics, phytoremediation, soil flushing, and solidification and stabilization techniques) are analysed with respect to performance and cost. After discussing soil remediation, the publication covers issues associated with water treatment, where techniques such as ‘pump and treat’ and the application of permeable barriers are reviewed. Subsequently, there is a section dedicated to reviewing briefly the lessons learned in the remediation of uranium mining and processing sites. Many of these sites throughout the world have become orphaned, and are waiting for remediation. The publication notes that little progress has been made in the management of some of these sites, particularly in the understanding of associated environmental and health risks, and the ability to apply prediction to future environmental and health standards. The publication concludes

  1. Microplastics: addressing ecological risk through lessons learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Syberg, Kristian; Khan, Farhan R; Selck, Henriette; Palmqvist, Annemette; Banta, Gary T; Daley, Jennifer; Sano, Larissa; Duhaime, Melissa B

    2015-05-01

    Plastic litter is an environmental problem of great concern. Despite the magnitude of the plastic pollution in our water bodies, only limited scientific understanding is available about the risk to the environment, particularly for microplastics. The apparent magnitude of the problem calls for quickly developing sound scientific guidance on the ecological risks of microplastics. The authors suggest that future research into microplastics risks should be guided by lessons learned from the more advanced and better understood areas of (eco) toxicology of engineered nanoparticles and mixture toxicity. Relevant examples of advances in these two fields are provided to help accelerate the scientific learning curve within the relatively unexplored area of microplastics risk assessment. Finally, the authors advocate an expansion of the "vector effect" hypothesis with regard to microplastics risk to help focus research of microplastics environmental risk at different levels of biological and environmental organization. © 2015 SETAC.

  2. Lessons learned from women in leadership positions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Elias, Eileen

    2018-01-01

    Eileen Elias has decades of experience in leadership positions within government and nongovernmental organizations. As the first female Commissioner for Mental Health in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the US in the early 1990s, Elias gained experience on navigating gender-based challenges to attain recognized performance outcomes. From lessons learned from women leaders, educate young women entering their careers on attaining leadership positions. Comprehensive research of literature from 2012 through 2017 and interviews with women leaders representing non-Fortune 500 companies including academia, research, non-profit, for-profit, and primary and secondary education. Interviewees included:1.Gail Bassin, Co-Chief Executive Officer and Treasurer, JBS International Inc.2.Jeri Epstein, Executive Director, The Ambit Foundation3.Valerie Fletcher, Executive Director, Institute for Human Centered Design4.Christine James-Brown, President and CEO, Child Welfare League of America5.Daria Mochly-Rosen, PhD, Professor and Fellow, Chemical and Systems Biology, Stanford University School of Medicine6.Eileen O'Keefe, MD, MPH, Clinical Associate Professor and Director, Boston University Health Sciences7.Jeri Shaw, President and Co-Chief Executive Officer, JBS International Inc. A comprehensive understanding of key women leaders' lessons learned and recommendations targeting young women as they assess leadership opportunities in the public or private sectors.

  3. Lessons Learned in Software Testing A Context-Driven Approach

    CERN Document Server

    Kaner, Cem; Pettichord, Bret

    2008-01-01

    Decades of software testing experience condensed into the most important lessons learned.The world's leading software testing experts lend you their wisdom and years of experience to help you avoid the most common mistakes in testing software. Each lesson is an assertion related to software testing, followed by an explanation or example that shows you the how, when, and why of the testing lesson. More than just tips, tricks, and pitfalls to avoid, Lessons Learned in Software Testing speeds you through the critical testing phase of the software development project without the extensive trial an

  4. Driver. D530.2 – Tools for the Lessons Learned Framework

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Schaik, M.G. van; et al

    2016-01-01

    In this deliverable D530.2 “Tools for the Lessons Learned Framework” the overall lessons learned framework will be clarified based on the delivery D53.1 “Lessons Learned Framework Concept” and aligned with the deliverable D52.1 “Harmonized competence framework”. The Tools for the Lessons Learned

  5. Mobile Learning vs. Traditional Classroom Lessons: A Comparative Study

    Science.gov (United States)

    Furió, D.; Juan, M.-C.; Seguí, I.; Vivó, R.

    2015-01-01

    Different methods can be used for learning, and they can be compared in several aspects, especially those related to learning outcomes. In this paper, we present a study in order to compare the learning effectiveness and satisfaction of children using an iPhone game for learning the water cycle vs. the traditional classroom lesson. The iPhone game…

  6. The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: What went wrong and what lessons are universal?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Omoto, Akira

    2013-12-01

    After a short summary of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, this paper discusses “what went wrong” by illustrating the problems of the specific layers of defense-in-depth (basic strategy for assuring nuclear safety) and “what lessons are universal.” Breaches in the multiple layers of defense were particularly significant in respective protection (a) against natural disasters (first layer of defense) as well as (b) against severe conditions, specifically in this case, a complete loss of AC/DC power and isolation from the primary heat sink (fourth layer of defense). Confusion in crisis management by the government and insufficient implementation of offsite emergency plans revealed problems in the fifth layer of defense. By taking into consideration managerial and safety culture that might have relevance to this accident, in the author's view, universal lessons are as follows: Resilience: the need to enhance organizational capabilities to respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn in changing conditions, especially to prepare for the unexpected. This includes increasing distance to cliff edge by knowing where it exists and how to increase safety margin. Responsibility: the operator is primarily responsible for safety, and the government is responsible for protecting public health and environment. For both, their right decisions are supported by competence, knowledge, and an understanding of the technology, as well as humble attitudes toward the limitations of what we know and what we can learn from others. Social license to operate: the need to avoid, as much as possible regardless of its probability of occurrence, the reasonably anticipated environmental impact (such as land contamination), as well as to build public confidence/trust and a renewed liability scheme.

  7. The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: What went wrong and what lessons are universal?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omoto, Akira

    2013-01-01

    After a short summary of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, this paper discusses “what went wrong” by illustrating the problems of the specific layers of defense-in-depth (basic strategy for assuring nuclear safety) and “what lessons are universal.” Breaches in the multiple layers of defense were particularly significant in respective protection (a) against natural disasters (first layer of defense) as well as (b) against severe conditions, specifically in this case, a complete loss of AC/DC power and isolation from the primary heat sink (fourth layer of defense). Confusion in crisis management by the government and insufficient implementation of offsite emergency plans revealed problems in the fifth layer of defense. By taking into consideration managerial and safety culture that might have relevance to this accident, in the author's view, universal lessons are as follows: a)Resilience: the need to enhance organizational capabilities to respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn in changing conditions, especially to prepare for the unexpected. This includes increasing distance to cliff edge by knowing where it exists and how to increase safety margin. b)Responsibility: the operator is primarily responsible for safety, and the government is responsible for protecting public health and environment. For both, their right decisions are supported by competence, knowledge, and an understanding of the technology, as well as humble attitudes toward the limitations of what we know and what we can learn from others. c)Social license to operate: the need to avoid, as much as possible regardless of its probability of occurrence, the reasonably anticipated environmental impact (such as land contamination), as well as to build public confidence/trust and a renewed liability scheme

  8. Social support and child protection: Lessons learned and learning.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thompson, Ross A

    2015-03-01

    Social support has been a topic of research for nearly 50 years, and its applications to prevention and intervention have grown significantly, including programs advancing child protection. This article summarizes the central conclusions of the 1994 review of research on social support and the prevention of child maltreatment prepared for the U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect, and surveys advances in the field since its publication. Among the lessons learned twenty years ago are (a) the diversity of the social support needs of at-risk families and their association with child endangerment, (b) the need to supplement the emotionally affirmative aspects of social support with efforts to socialize parenting practices and monitor child well-being, (c) the desirability of integrating formal and informal sources of social support for recipients, and (d) the importance of considering the complex recipient reactions to receiving support from others. The lessons we are now learning derive from research exploring the potential of online communication to enhance social support, the neurobiology of stress and its buffering through social support, and the lessons of evaluation research that are identifying the effective ingredients of social support interventions. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  9. 10 lessons learned by a misguided physician.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Levin, Barry E

    2017-07-01

    It was a great and humbling honor to receive the 2016 Distinguished Career Award from my SSIB colleagues. This paper summarizes the major points of my DCA talk at the 2016 annual meeting. It is a reflection on my 50year medical and research career and 10 lessons I have learned over those years which might be of help to young investigators near the beginning of their own research careers. These lessons include: the value of being receptive to the opportunities provided you; how clinician-scientists can serve as critical role models for young investigators like me and a history of how my career developed as a result of their influence; the importance of carefully examining your own data, particularly when it doesn't agree with your preconceived ideas; the critical role that students, postdocs and PhD (and even veterinarian) colleagues can play in developing one's career; the likelihood that your career path will have many interesting twists and turns determined by changes in your own scientific interests and how rewarding various areas of research focus are to you; the importance of building a close-knit laboratory staff family; the fact that science and romance can mix. Finally, I offer 3 somewhat self-evident free pieces of advice for building and maintaining a rewarding career. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  10. Bruce A restart (execution and lessons-learned)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soini, J.

    2011-01-01

    Lessons learned with the Bruce Units 3 and 4 restart have been incorporated into the current refurbishment of Units 1 and 2. In addition, lessons learned on the lead unit (U2) are aggressively applied on the lagging unit (U1) to maximize efficiency and productivity. There will be a discussion on how this internal OPEX, along with external lessons learned, are used to continuously improve all aspects of the Bruce A Restart project management cycle, from scope selection, through planning and scheduling, to execution.

  11. Considerations for implementing an organizational lessons learned process.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fosshage, Erik D

    2013-05-01

    This report examines the lessons learned process by a review of the literature in a variety of disciplines, and is intended as a guidepost for organizations that are considering the implementation of their own closed-loop learning process. Lessons learned definitions are provided within the broader context of knowledge management and the framework of a learning organization. Shortcomings of existing practices are summarized in an attempt to identify common pitfalls that can be avoided by organizations with fledgling experiences of their own. Lessons learned are then examined through a dual construct of both process and mechanism, with emphasis on integrating into organizational processes and promoting lesson reuse through data attributes that contribute toward changed behaviors. The report concludes with recommended steps for follow-on efforts.

  12. Pedagogy and second language learning: Lessons learned from Intensive French

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Joan Netten

    2005-12-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Through research and classroom observation undertaken while conceptualizing and implementing the Intensive French program in Canada, many new insights were gained into the development of communication skills in a classroom situation. Five lessons learned about the development of spontaneous oral communication are presented in this article: the ineffectiveness of core French in primary school; the minimum number of intensive hours necessary to develop spontaneous oral communication; the need to develop implicit competence rather than explicit knowledge; the distinction between accuracy as knowledge and accuracy as skill; and the importance of teaching strategies focusing on language use. These lessons have implications for our understanding of how oral competence in an L2 develops and for the improvement of communicative language pedagogy.

  13. Digital control for nuclear reactors - lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bernard, J.A.; Aviles, B.N.; Lanning, D.D.

    1992-01-01

    Lessons learned during the course of the now decade-old MIT program on the digital control of nuclear reactors are enumerated. Relative to controller structure, these include the importance of a separate safety system, the need for signal validation, the role of supervisory algorithms, the significance of command validation, and the relevance of automated reasoning. Relative to controller implementation, these include the value of nodal methods to the creation of real-time reactor physics and thermal hydraulic models, the advantages to be gained from the use of real-time system models, and the importance of a multi-tiered structure to the simultaneous achievement of supervisory, global, and local control. Block diagrams are presented of proposed controllers and selected experimental and simulation-study results are shown. In addition, a history is given of the MIT program on reactor digital control

  14. Lessons learned using Snodgrass hypospadias repair.

    LENUS (Irish Health Repository)

    O'Connor, K M

    2012-02-03

    BACKGROUND: This is a review of our experience with the Snodgrass technique for distal hypospadias repair and we point to lessons learned in improving results. METHODS: We reviewed all patients who underwent Snodgrass hypospadias repair for distal hypospadias over a four-year period by a single surgeon. Chart review followed by parental telephone interview was used to determine voiding function, cosmesis and complication rate. RESULTS: Thirty children and three adults were identified. Age at surgery ranged from seven months to 39 years. The urinary stream was straight in 94%, and 97% reported a good or satisfactory final cosmetic outcome. One patient (3.3%) developed a urethral fistula and 21% developed meatal stenosis which required general anaesthetic. CONCLUSION: The Snodgrass urethroplasty provides satisfactory cosmetic and functional results. High rates of meatal stenosis initially encountered have improved with modifications to technique which include modified meatoplasty and routine meatal dilatation by the parents.

  15. Lessons learned during Type A Packaging testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Brien, J.H.; Kelly, D.L.

    1995-11-01

    For the past 6 years, the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Facility Safety Analysis (EH-32) has contracted Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) to conduct compliance testing on DOE Type A packagings. The packagings are tested for compliance with the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 7A, general packaging, Type A requirements. The DOE has shared the Type A packaging information throughout the nuclear materials transportation community. During testing, there have been recurring areas of packaging design that resulted in testing delays and/or initial failure. The lessons learned during the testing are considered a valuable resource. DOE requested that WHC share this resource. By sharing what is and can be encountered during packaging testing, individuals will hopefully avoid past mistakes

  16. Sellafield Decommissioning Programme - Update and Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lutwyche, P. R.; Challinor, S. F.

    2003-01-01

    The Sellafield site in North West England has over 240 active facilities covering the full nuclear cycle from fuel manufacture through generation, reprocessing and waste treatment. The Sellafield decommissioning programme was formally initiated in the mid 1980s though several plants had been decommissioned prior to this primarily to create space for other plants. Since the initiation of the programme 7 plants have been completely decommissioned, significant progress has been made in a further 16 and a total of 56 major project phases have been completed. This programme update will explain the decommissioning arrangements and strategies and illustrate the progress made on a number of the plants including the Windscale Pile Chimneys, the first reprocessing plan and plutonium plants. These present a range of different challenges and requiring approaches from fully hands on to fully remote. Some of the key lessons learned will be highlighted

  17. Lessons learned from the 1994 Northridge Earthquake

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eli, M.W.; Sommer, S.C.

    1995-01-01

    Southern California has a history of major earthquakes and also has one of the largest metropolitan areas in the United States. The 1994 Northridge Earthquake challenged the industrial facilities and lifetime infrastructure in the northern Los Angeles (LA) area. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) sent a team of engineers to conduct an earthquake damage investigation in the Northridge area, on a project funded jointly by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) and the United States Department of Energy (USDOE). Many of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and lifelines that suffered damage are similar to those found in nuclear power plants and in USDOE facilities. Lessons learned from these experiences can have some applicability at commercial nuclear power plants

  18. XML technology planning database : lessons learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Some, Raphael R.; Neff, Jon M.

    2005-01-01

    A hierarchical Extensible Markup Language(XML) database called XCALIBR (XML Analysis LIBRary) has been developed by Millennium Program to assist in technology investment (ROI) analysis and technology Language Capability the New return on portfolio optimization. The database contains mission requirements and technology capabilities, which are related by use of an XML dictionary. The XML dictionary codifies a standardized taxonomy for space missions, systems, subsystems and technologies. In addition to being used for ROI analysis, the database is being examined for use in project planning, tracking and documentation. During the past year, the database has moved from development into alpha testing. This paper describes the lessons learned during construction and testing of the prototype database and the motivation for moving from an XML taxonomy to a standard XML-based ontology.

  19. LESSONS LEARNED IN TESTING OF SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, S.; Farnitano, M.; Carelli, J.; Hazeltine, J.; Bailey, D.

    2001-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Department of Safeguards uses complex instrumentation for the application of safeguards at nuclear facilities around the world. Often, this equipment is developed through cooperation with member state support programs because the Agency's requirements are unique and are not met by commercially available equipment. Before approving an instrument or system for routine inspection use, the IAEA subjects it to a series of tests designed to evaluate its reliability. In 2000, the IAEA began to observe operational failures in digital surveillance systems. In response to the observed failures, the IAEA worked with the equipment designer and manufacturer to determine the cause of failure. An action plan was developed to correct the performance issues and further test the systems to make sure that additional operational issues would not surface later. This paper addresses the steps taken to address operation issues related to digital image surveillance systems and the lessons learned during this process

  20. Software Engineering Team Project - lessons learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bogumiła Hnatkowska

    2013-06-01

    Full Text Available In the 2010/11 academic year the Institute of Informatics at Wroclaw University of Technology issued ’Software Engineering Team Project’ as a course being a part of the final exam to earn bachelor’s degree. The main assumption about the course was that it should simulate the real environment (a virtual IT company for its participants. The course was aimed to introduce issues regarding programming in the medium scale, project planning and management. It was a real challenge as the course was offered for more than 140 students. The number of staff members involved in its preparation and performance was more than 15. The paper presents the lessons learned from the first course edition as well as more detailed qualitative and quantitative course assessment.

  1. Learning lessons from natural disasters - sectorial or holistic perspectives?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johansson, M.; Blumenthal, B.; Nyberg, L.

    2009-04-01

    Lessons learning from systematic analyses of past natural disasters is of great importance for future risk reduction and vulnerability management. It is one crucial piece of a puzzle towards disaster resilient societies, together with e.g. models of future emerging climate-related risks, globalization or demographic changes. Systematic analyses of impact and management of past events have commonly been produced in many sectors, but the knowledge is seldom shared outside the own organization or produced for other actors. To increase the availability of reports and documents, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency has created the Swedish Natural Hazards Information System, in accordance with a government commission from 2005. The system gathers accident reports, investigations and in-depth analyses, together with societal additional costs and mappings of consequences from central and local governments, NGO's and private actors. Evaluation of the collection reveals large differences in quality, systematic approach, depth and extent, clearly consistent with the lack of coherent harmonization of investigation and reporting approaches. Type of hazard, degree of impact and time elapsed since present are decisive for the collected volume. LPHC (low probability high consequences) disasters usually comprise most data and analytical activities, since they often are met with surprise and highlight the failure to integrate resilience into normal societal planning. During the last 50 years, several LPHC events in Sweden have functioned as alarm clocks and entailed major changes and improvements in government policies or legislations, safety management systems, risk assessments, response training, stakeholder communication, etc. Such an event occurred in January 2005 when Northern Europe was confronted with one of the most severe storms in modern history. Accidents that caused 24 fatalities occurred (17 in Sweden), several regions in UK and Germany were flooded and extensive areas of

  2. M-learning in a geography lesson

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mirski, Katri

    2014-05-01

    their work in Google Earth where they did a tour of their journey. In the feedback students said that it was a very interesting and an educational practical task. A new opportunity in M-learning is to use QR codes. This means that you don't have to print out worksheets with questions. You can hide question in the code and students can read them with their own devices on site. From the Master's thesis I also developed a tutorial material named "M-learning in a geography lesson" (in Estonian: M-õpe geograafiatunnis), you can see it in the webpage katrimope@wordpress.com. The tutorial received a second place on the Estonian study material contest in 2013. This is only one example on how to use M-learning. In Gustav Adolf Grammar School we use M-learning in lots of different subjects because it's really important in modern school to link new technologies, surrounding environment and learning for the purpose of better obtainment of knowledge.

  3. Five Years after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Nuclear Safety Improvements and Lessons Learnt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Magwood, William D. IV; Niel, Jean-Christophe; Fuketa, Toyoshi; Sheron, Brian; Boyd, Michael; McGarry, Ann; Dussart-Desart, Roland; Reig, Javier; Hah, Yeonhee; Nieh, Ho; Vasquez-Maignan, Ximena; Salgado, Nancy; White, Andrew; Lazo, Edward; Creswell, Len; Leeds, Eric; Gannon-Picot, Cynthia; Griffiths, Janice

    2016-01-01

    Countries around the world continue to implement safety improvements and corrective actions based on lessons learnt from the 11 March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. This report provides a high-level summary and update on these activities, and outlines further lessons learnt and challenges identified for future consideration. It focuses on actions taken by NEA committees and NEA member countries, and as such is complementary to reports produced by other international organisations. It is in a spirit of openness and transparency that NEA member countries share this information to illustrate that appropriate actions are being taken to maintain and enhance the level of safety at their nuclear facilities. Nuclear power plants are safer today because of these actions. High-priority follow-on items identified by NEA committees are provided to assist countries in continuously benchmarking and improving their nuclear safety practices. (authors)

  4. Towards a lessons learned system for critical software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andrade, J.; Ares, J.; Garcia, R.; Pazos, J.; Rodriguez, S.; Rodriguez-Paton, A.; Silva, A.

    2007-01-01

    Failure can be a major driver for the advance of any engineering discipline and Software Engineering is no exception. But failures are useful only if lessons are learned from them. In this article we aim to make a strong defence of, and set the requirements for, lessons learned systems for safety-critical software. We also present a prototype lessons learned system that includes many of the features discussed here. We emphasize that, apart from individual organizations, lessons learned systems should target industrial sectors and even the Software Engineering community. We would like to encourage the Software Engineering community to use this kind of systems as another tool in the toolbox, which complements or enhances other approaches like, for example, standards and checklists

  5. Towards a lessons learned system for critical software

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andrade, J. [University of A Coruna. Campus de Elvina, s/n. 15071, A Coruna (Spain)]. E-mail: jag@udc.es; Ares, J. [University of A Coruna. Campus de Elvina, s/n. 15071, A Coruna (Spain)]. E-mail: juanar@udc.es; Garcia, R. [University of A Coruna. Campus de Elvina, s/n. 15071, A Coruna (Spain)]. E-mail: rafael@udc.es; Pazos, J. [Technical University of Madrid. Campus de Montegancedo, s/n. 28660, Boadilla del Monte, Madrid (Spain)]. E-mail: jpazos@fi.upm.es; Rodriguez, S. [University of A Coruna. Campus de Elvina, s/n. 15071, A Coruna (Spain)]. E-mail: santi@udc.es; Rodriguez-Paton, A. [Technical University of Madrid. Campus de Montegancedo, s/n. 28660, Boadilla del Monte, Madrid (Spain)]. E-mail: arpaton@fi.upm.es; Silva, A. [Technical University of Madrid. Campus de Montegancedo, s/n. 28660, Boadilla del Monte, Madrid (Spain)]. E-mail: asilva@fi.upm.es

    2007-07-15

    Failure can be a major driver for the advance of any engineering discipline and Software Engineering is no exception. But failures are useful only if lessons are learned from them. In this article we aim to make a strong defence of, and set the requirements for, lessons learned systems for safety-critical software. We also present a prototype lessons learned system that includes many of the features discussed here. We emphasize that, apart from individual organizations, lessons learned systems should target industrial sectors and even the Software Engineering community. We would like to encourage the Software Engineering community to use this kind of systems as another tool in the toolbox, which complements or enhances other approaches like, for example, standards and checklists.

  6. Winning the Peace: Building a Strategic Level Lessons Learned Program

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    French, Daniel L

    2007-01-01

    The U.S. military has developed a robust, comprehensive system to capture, analyze, and disseminate tactical-level and operational-level lessons learned from training events and ongoing conflict operations...

  7. Implementing a lessons learned process at Sandia National Laboratories

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fosshage, Erik D.; Drewien, Celeste A.; Eras, Kenneth; Hartwig, Ronald Craig; Post, Debra S.; Stoecker, Nora Kathleen

    2016-01-01

    The Lessons Learned Process Improvement Team was tasked to gain an understanding of the existing lessons learned environment within the major programs at Sandia National Laboratories, identify opportunities for improvement in that environment as compared to desired attributes, propose alternative implementations to address existing inefficiencies, perform qualitative evaluations of alternative implementations, and recommend one or more near-term activities for prototyping and/or implementation. This report documents the work and findings of the team.

  8. Our consistent countermeasure following up with lesson from Fukushima NPPs accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jae Rok [Korea Academy of Nuclear Safety, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Ro, Seung Gy [Sung woo E and T, Kyeonggi (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Si Hwan [UNIST, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of); Nam, Jang Soo [Korean Nuclear Society, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Yoo, Guk Hee [Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Soong Pyung [Chosun Univ., Gwangju (Korea, Republic of)

    2012-10-15

    Fukushima NPPs accident has not only resulted in driving out the nuclear Renaissance which is about to revive after several lean years, but also given humankind a very rigorous lessons in nuclear safety. Recently administrative systems were reorganized for stepping up further nuclear safety. Nuclear Safety and Security Commission(NSSC) as a governmental organization, directly under the jurisdiction of the president, which is responsible for a nuclear safety mission separated from Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. A beef up work of 50 safety related items for Korean NPPs identified after Fukushima NPPs accident has been implemented under the supervision of the commission. It has also been emphasized that sincere communications between the nuclear society and the people at large are essential for obtaining public acceptance of nuclear energy by ensuring the credibility of nuclear safety. The main points of lecture materials presented in the nuclear senior members' forum have been reviewed to derive invaluable guidelines.

  9. Lessons learned in NEPA public involvement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, A.D.; Glore, D.M.

    1995-01-01

    'In recent years Uncle Sam has been asking citizens for their help in improving the environment. The government is learning that with public input it can better prioritize environmental problems and more effectively direct limited funding.' The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), like many other government regulations, is a 'living law.' Although there are agency and Council guidelines, it is practical application, based on past practices and case law that refines the Act's broad concepts. The specifics of how to meet requirements are constantly being honed and melded to fit the unique situational needs of an agency, a project, or a public. This fluidity presents a challenge for stakeholder involvement activities. Communication practioners and project managers may have room for creativity and customized approaches, but they also find less than clear direction on what it takes to successfully avoid challenges of non-compliance. Because of the continuing uncertainty on how to involve the public meaningfully, it is vital to share important lessons learned from NEPA projects. The following practical suggestions are derived primarily from experiences with the Department of Energy's first ever complex-wide and site-specific environmental impact statement (EIS)-the Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs EIS (SNF ampersand INEL EIS)

  10. Strengthening Regulatory Effectiveness in India – Lessons Learnt from Fukushima Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solanki, R.

    2016-01-01

    Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan, one of the most important lessons learnt, among other things, was the issue of strengthening the effectiveness of the regulatory bodies. Immediately after the Fukushima accident, National level safety audits were conducted on all operating NPPs in India to review safety of NPPs in India. A national action plan has been prepared to implement the identified short term, midterm and long term measures. The assessment indicates that national response to the Fukushima Accident for safety assessment of NPPs and subsequent actions and initiatives taken for safety enhancement of the NPPs in India are in-line with the objectives of the IAEA Action plan. This paper highlights the actions taken by India in the light of Fukushima Daiichi accident in order to strengthen the regulatory effectiveness through improvements in the existing core processes, challenges faced, Insights gained from the recent initiatives on safety performance indicators and assessment of safety culture, relevant observations of IRRS mission report and Indian perspectives on the further cooperation among the member states for enhancing the regulatory effectiveness for nuclear oversight of regulated organizations. (author)

  11. Y2K lessons learned for electric grid stability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gueorguiev, B.; Ianev, I. L.; Purvis, E. E.

    2000-01-01

    Y2K was an example of a worldwide infrastructure threat. Actions to understand infrastructure risks and mitigate infrastructure threats are a continuing and increasing part of the worlds corporate, government, and international organizations systems, and the severe implications of infrastructure failures to the health, safety, and financial well being of people and organizations are the deriving force. The IAEA conducted a number of Y2K related activities in nuclear power and fuel cycle activities. A set of these activities address the interface between electric power generation facilities and electric power grids in the region of Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. This addressed a continuing infrastructure risks and actions to mitigate these risk. The results were shown by events to have made positive contributions. The potential loss of nuclear power plant generation is a significant risk to electric power grids, an important critical infrastructure. Not only does the threat constitute a problem with the potential loss of the grid, loss of the electric power grid increases the probability of accidents in nuclear power plants. Recognizing that these activities addressed only one area of infrastructure risk in one region, there are some key lessons that were learned that could have general applicability

  12. Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the STS-107 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stepaniak, Phillip C.; Patlach, Robert

    2014-01-01

    Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014 presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goal of this book is to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews. This poster presents an outline of Loss of Signal contents and highlights from each of five sections - the mission and mishap, the response, the investigation, the analysis and the future.

  13. Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned for the STS-I07 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

    Science.gov (United States)

    Patlach, Robert; Stepaniak, Philip C.; Lane, Helen W.

    2014-01-01

    Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014, presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goals of this book are to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews.

  14. Inadequacies of Belgium nuclear emergency plans: lessons from the Fukushima catastrophe have not been learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boilley, David; Josset, Mylene

    2015-01-01

    After having outlined that some Belgium regional authorities made some statements showing that they did not learn lessons neither from the Chernobyl catastrophe, nor from the Fukushima accident, this report aims at examining whether Belgium is well prepared to face a severe nuclear accident occurring within its borders or in neighbouring countries, whether all hypotheses have actually been taken into account, and whether existing emergency plans are realistic. After a presentation of Belgium's situation regarding nuclear plants (Belgium plants and neighbouring French plants), the report presents the content and organisation of the nuclear emergency plan for the Belgium territory at the national, provincial and municipal levels. While outlining inadequacies and weaknesses of the Belgium plan regarding the addressed issues, it discusses the main lessons learned from the Fukushima accident in terms of emergency planning areas, of population sheltering, of iodine-based prophylaxis, of population evacuation, of food supply, of tools (measurement instruments) and human resources, and of public information. In the next parts, the report addresses and discusses trans-border issues, and the commitment of stakeholders

  15. Existing facilities and past practices: Lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huizenga, D.; Tonkay, D.W.; Owens, K.

    2000-01-01

    Article 12 of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (Joint Convention) requires parties to the Joint Convention to review the safety of existing radioactive waste management facilities 'to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a facility'. Also required is a review of the results of past practices to determine 'whether any intervention is needed for reasons of radiation protection' and to consider whether the benefits of the intervention or remediation are sufficient, with regard to the costs and the impact on workers, the public and the environment. This paper discusses the experience of the United States Department of Energy in terms of the lessons learned from operating radioactive waste management facilities and from undertaking intervention or remedial action, and from decision making in an international context. Overarching safety principles are discussed, including integrating safety into all work practices and minimizing the generation of waste. Safety review lessons learned with existing facilities are discussed with respect to: applying new requirements to old facilities, taking a life-cycle perspective of waste management, improving high level waste facility management, and blending current and past practices with respect to the process used to arrive at decisions for intervention. Special emphasis is placed on the need to provide for early and substantive input from the involved regulatory agencies, Native American tribes, and those citizens and groups with an interest in the decisions. Examples of intervention decisions are discussed, including examples taken from uranium mill tailings operations, from cleanup of a former uranium processing plant site, from evaluation of pre-1970 buried 'transuranic waste' sites, and from decommissioning or closure of high level waste storage tanks. The paper concludes that on the

  16. Calibration Lessons Learned from Hyperion Experience

    Science.gov (United States)

    Casement, S.; Ho, K.; Sandor-Leahy, S.; Biggar, S.; Czapla-Myers, J.; McCorkel, J.; Thome, K.

    2009-12-01

    The use of hyperspectral imagers to provide climate-quality data sets, such as those expected from the solar reflective sensor on the Climate Absolute Radiance and Refractivity Observatory (CLARREO), requires stringent radiometric calibration requirements. These stringent requirements have been nearly met with broadband radiometers such as CERES, but high resolution spectrometers pose additional challenges. A review of the calibration processes for past space-based HSIs provide guidance on the calibration processes that will be needed for future sensors. In November 2000, the Earth Observer-1 (EO-1) platform was launched onboard a Boeing Delta II launch vehicle. The primary purpose of the EO-1 mission was to provide a technological testbed for spaceborne components. The platform has three sensors onboard, of which, the hyperspectral imager (HSI) Hyperion, is discussed here. The Hyperion sensor at the time had no comparable sensor in earth orbit, being the first grating-based, hyperspectral, civilian sensor in earth orbit. Ground and on-orbit calibration procedures including all cross-calibration activities have achieved an estimated instrument absolute radiometric error of 2.9% in the Visible channel (0.4 - 1.0 microns) and 3.4% in the shortwave infrared (SWIR, 0.9 - 2.5 microns) channel (EO-1/Hyperion Early Orbit Checkout Report Part II On-Orbit Performance Verification and Calibration). This paper describes the key components of the Hyperion calibration process that are applicable to future HSI missions. The pre-launch methods relied on then newly-developed, detector-based methods. Subsequent vicarious methods including cross-calibration with other sensors and the reflectance-based method showed significant differences from the prelaunch calibration. Such a difference demonstrated the importance of the vicarious methods as well as pointing to areas for improvement in the prelaunch methods. We also identify areas where lessons learned from Hyperion regarding

  17. Collecting lessons learned : How project-based organizations in the oil and gas industry learn from their projects

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Buttler, T.

    2016-01-01

    Project-based organizations collect lessons learned in order to improve the performance of projects. They aim to repeat successes by using positive lessons learned, and to avoid repeating negative experiences by using negative lessons learned. Cooke-Davies (2002) claimed that the ability to learn

  18. Lessons Learned in Risk Management on NCSX

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neilson, G.H.; Gruber, C.O.; Harris, Jeffrey H.; Rej, D.J.; Simmons, R.T.; Strykowsky, R.L.

    2010-01-01

    The National Compact Stellarator Experiment (NCSX) was designed to test physics principles of an innovative stellarator design developed by Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Construction of some of the major components and subassemblies was completed, but the estimated cost and schedule for completing the project grew as the technical requirements and risks became better understood, leading to its cancellation in 2008. The project's risks stemmed from its technical challenges, primarily the complex component geometries and tight tolerances that were required. The initial baseline, which was established in 2004, was supported by a risk management plan and risk-based contingencies, both of which proved to be inadequate. Technical successes were achieved in the construction of challenging components and subassemblies, but cost and schedule growth was experienced. As part of an effort to improve project performance, a new risk management program was devised and implemented in 2007-2008. It led to a better understanding of project risks, a sounder basis for contingency estimates, and improved management tools. Although the risks were ultimately unacceptable to the sponsor, valuable lessons in risk management were learned through the experiences with the NCSX project.

  19. The German Chernobyl project: Lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, P.; Hille, R.

    1999-01-01

    This report presents results and lessons learned by one of the so far largest assessments of a post-accidental situation. Funded by the Federal Republic of Germany the German Chernobyl Project investigated in the years 1991-1993 the radiological situation in contaminated regions of the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine. Measurements included a mass screening of the population in order to determine the Cesium body burdens of 250,000+ individuals in more than 240 settlements as well as the evaluation of external doses in selected settlements with soil contaminations varying from less than 74 kBq/m 2 to about 3700 kBq/m 2 including some, where decontamination measures had previously been taken. Also in many settlements environmental monitoring was undertaken. For most individuals doses did not exceed the international annual limits set for the general population. Open and comprehensive communication of results was favourably accepted by the public. In a few settlements the radiological situation has been followed up till to date. (author)

  20. Lessons Learned in Risk Management on NCSX

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neilson, G.H.; Gruber, C.O.; Harris, J.H.; Rej, D.J.; Simmons, R.T.; Strykowsky, R.L.

    2009-01-01

    The National Compact Stellarator Experiment (NCSX) was designed to test physics principles of an innovative stellarator design developed by the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Construction of some of the major components and sub-assemblies was completed, but the estimated cost and schedule for completing the project grew as the technical requirements and risks became better understood, leading to its cancellation in 2008. The project's risks stemmed from its technical challenges, primarily the complex component geometries and tight tolerances that were required. The initial baseline, established in 2004, was supported by a risk management plan and risk-based contingencies, both of which proved to be inadequate. Technical successes were achieved in the construction of challenging components and subassemblies, but cost and schedule growth was experienced. As part of an effort to improve project performance, a new risk management program was devised and implemented in 2007-08. It led to a better understanding of project risks, a sounder basis for contingency estimates, and improved management tools. Although the risks ultimately were unacceptable to the sponsor, valuable lessons in risk management were learned through the experiences with the NCSX project

  1. Value-Based Requirements Traceability: Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Egyed, Alexander; Grünbacher, Paul; Heindl, Matthias; Biffl, Stefan

    Traceability from requirements to code is mandated by numerous software development standards. These standards, however, are not explicit about the appropriate level of quality of trace links. From a technical perspective, trace quality should meet the needs of the intended trace utilizations. Unfortunately, long-term trace utilizations are typically unknown at the time of trace acquisition which represents a dilemma for many companies. This chapter suggests ways to balance the cost and benefits of requirements traceability. We present data from three case studies demonstrating that trace acquisition requires broad coverage but can tolerate imprecision. With this trade-off our lessons learned suggest a traceability strategy that (1) provides trace links more quickly, (2) refines trace links according to user-defined value considerations, and (3) supports the later refinement of trace links in case the initial value consideration has changed over time. The scope of our work considers the entire life cycle of traceability instead of just the creation of trace links.

  2. Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hansen, Keith A.

    2011-09-01

    Intelligence agencies play a fundamental role in the prevention of nuclear proliferation, as they help to understand other countries' intentions and assess their technical capabilities and the nature of their nuclear activities. The challenges in this area remain, however, formidable. Past experiences and the discoveries of Iraq's WMD programs, of North Korean nuclear weapon program, and of Iranian activities, have put into question the ability of intelligence to monitor small, clandestine proliferation activities from either states or non-state entities. This Proliferation Paper analyzes the complex challenges intelligence faces and the various roles it plays in supporting national and international nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and reviews its track record. In an effort to shed light on the role and contribution of intelligence in national and international efforts to halt, if not prevent, further nuclear weapon proliferation, this paper first analyzes the challenges intelligence faces in monitoring small, clandestine proliferation activities and the role it plays in supporting non-proliferation efforts. It then reviews the intelligence track record in monitoring proliferation including the lessons learned from Iraq. Finally, it addresses whether it is possible for intelligence to accurately monitor future clandestine proliferation efforts. (author)

  3. Constellation Program: Lessons Learned. Volume 1; Executive Summary

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rhatigan, Jennifer L. (Editor)

    2011-01-01

    This document (Volume I) provides an executive summary of the lessons learned from the Constellation Program. A companion Volume II provides more detailed analyses for those seeking further insight and information. In this volume, Section 1.0 introduces the approach in preparing and organizing the content to enable rapid assimilation of the lessons. Section 2.0 describes the contextual framework in which the Constellation Program was formulated and functioned that is necessary to understand most of the lessons. Context of a former program may seem irrelevant in the heady days of new program formulation. However, readers should take some time to understand the context. Many of the lessons would be different in a different context, so the reader should reflect on the similarities and differences in his or her current circumstances. Section 3.0 summarizes key findings developed from the significant lessons learned at the program level that appear in Section 4.0. Readers can use the key findings in Section 3.0 to peruse for particular topics, and will find more supporting detail and analyses in Section 4.0 in a topical format. Appendix A contains a white paper describing the Constellation Program formulation that may be of use to readers wanting more context or background information. The reader will no doubt recognize some very similar themes from previous lessons learned, blue-ribbon committee reviews, National Academy reviews, and advisory panel reviews for this and other large-scale human spaceflight programs; including Apollo, Space Shuttle, Shuttle/Mir, and the ISS. This could represent an inability to learn lessons from previous generations; however, it is more likely that similar challenges persist in the Agency structure and approach to program formulation, budget advocacy, and management. Perhaps the greatest value of these Constellation lessons learned can be found in viewing them in context with these previous efforts to guide and advise the Agency and its

  4. Crisis management during the SOCATRI incident in July 2008: lessons learned by the IRSN

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Champion, D.

    2010-01-01

    This report describes the successive events which occurred in July 2008 in the SOCATRI plant where a uranium-bearing solution was accidentally released, causing a temporary pollution of two rivers. Then, he reports how this event has been managed, firstly through a mobilization of public authorities and early decisions, secondly through sampling and measurements performed by the IRSN (the management of the obtained results is also commented), thirdly through expertise investigations by the IRSN, fourthly through relationship with local authorities, and finally through media and public information. For each of these aspects, the author discusses the lessons learned, and proposes ways to improve the management of such an accident

  5. TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force status report and short-term recommendations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-07-01

    Review of the Three Mile Island accident by the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force has disclosed a number of actions in the areas of design and analysis and plant operations that the Task Force recommends be required in the short term to provide substantial additional protection which is required for the public health and safety. All nuclear power plants in operation or in various stages of construction or licensing action are affected to varying degrees by the specific recommendations. The Task Force is continuing work in areas of general safety criteria, systems design requirements, nuclear power plant operations, and nuclear power plant licensing

  6. Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in a Deactivation and Decommissioning Environment [A Guide for Facility and Project Managers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nirider, L. Tom

    2003-08-06

    This document was designed as a reference and a primer for facility and project managers responsible for Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D) processes in facilities containing significant inventories of fissionable materials. The document contains lessons learned and guidance for the development and management of criticality safety programs. It also contains information gleaned from occurrence reports, assessment reports, facility operations and management, NDA program reviews, criticality safety experts, and criticality safety evaluations. This information is designed to assist in the planning process and operational activities. Sufficient details are provided to allow the reader to understand the events, the lessons learned, and how to apply the information to present or planned D&D processes. Information is also provided on general lessons learned including criticality safety evaluations and criticality safety program requirements during D&D activities. The document also explores recent and past criticality accidents in operating facilities, and it extracts lessons learned pertinent to D&D activities. A reference section is included to provide additional information. This document does not address D&D lessons learned that are not pertinent to criticality safety.

  7. Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in a Deactivation and Decommissioning Environment [A Guide for Facility and Project Managers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NIRIDER, L.T.

    2003-01-01

    This document was designed as a reference and a primer for facility and project managers responsible for Deactivation and Decommissioning (D and D) processes in facilities containing significant inventories of fissionable materials. The document contains lessons learned and guidance for the development and management of criticality safety programs. It also contains information gleaned from occurrence reports, assessment reports, facility operations and management, NDA program reviews, criticality safety experts, and criticality safety evaluations. This information is designed to assist in the planning process and operational activities. Sufficient details are provided to allow the reader to understand the events, the lessons learned, and how to apply the information to present or planned D and D processes. Information is also provided on general lessons learned including criticality safety evaluations and criticality safety program requirements during D and D activities. The document also explores recent and past criticality accidents in operating facilities, and it extracts lessons learned pertinent to D and D activities. A reference section is included to provide additional information. This document does not address D and D lessons learned that are not pertinent to criticality safety

  8. Learned from Chernobyl accident-intervention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yasuda, Hiroshi

    1997-01-01

    It is considered that health and social damage as seen in the Chernobyl accident could be avoided by establishing a clear framework for intervention against contamination. The framework must be easy to understand to be accepted by all the people concerned. This study presented a process of decision-making on countermeasures against a regional-scale soil contamination. This process put an emphasis on 1) Clarification of responsibility and intervention principles, 2) Application of probabilistic techniques into individual dose estimation, 3) Reduction of social burden. Examples of decision-making were also presented for a simulated ground surface contamination. (author)

  9. Let's Cooperate! Integrating Cooperative Learning Into a Lesson on Ethics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reineke, Patricia R

    2017-04-01

    Cooperative learning is an effective teaching strategy that promotes active participation in learning and can be used in academic, clinical practice, and professional development settings. This article describes that strategy and provides an example of its use in a lesson about ethics. J Contin Nurs Educ. 2017;48(4):154-156. Copyright 2017, SLACK Incorporated.

  10. A Text Mining Approach for Extracting Lessons Learned from Project Documentation: An Illustrative Case Study

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Benjamin Matthies

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available Lessons learned are important building blocks for continuous learning in project-based organisations. Nonetheless, the practical reality is that lessons learned are often not consistently reused for organisational learning. Two problems are commonly described in this context: the information overload and the lack of procedures and methods for the assessment and implementation of lessons learned. This paper addresses these problems, and appropriate solutions are combined in a systematic lesson learned process. Latent Dirichlet Allocation is presented to solve the first problem. Regarding the second problem, established risk management methods are adapted. The entire lessons learned process will be demonstrated in a practical case study

  11. Epidemiologic methods lessons learned from environmental public health disasters: Chernobyl, the World Trade Center, Bhopal, and Graniteville, South Carolina.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Svendsen, Erik R; Runkle, Jennifer R; Dhara, Venkata Ramana; Lin, Shao; Naboka, Marina; Mousseau, Timothy A; Bennett, Charles

    2012-08-01

    Environmental public health disasters involving hazardous contaminants may have devastating effects. While much is known about their immediate devastation, far less is known about long-term impacts of these disasters. Extensive latent and chronic long-term public health effects may occur. Careful evaluation of contaminant exposures and long-term health outcomes within the constraints imposed by limited financial resources is essential. Here, we review epidemiologic methods lessons learned from conducting long-term evaluations of four environmental public health disasters involving hazardous contaminants at Chernobyl, the World Trade Center, Bhopal, and Graniteville (South Carolina, USA). We found several lessons learned which have direct implications for the on-going disaster recovery work following the Fukushima radiation disaster or for future disasters. These lessons should prove useful in understanding and mitigating latent health effects that may result from the nuclear reactor accident in Japan or future environmental public health disasters.

  12. The Fukushima accident: radiological consequences and first lessons. Proceedings; L'accident de Fukushima: consequences radiologiques et premiers enseignements. Recueil des presentations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-02-15

    This document brings together the available presentations given at the conference organised by the French society of radiation protection about the Fukushima accident, its radiological consequences and the first lessons learnt. Sixteen presentations (slides) are compiled in this document and deal with: 1 - Accident progress and first actions (Thierry Charles, IRSN); 2 - Conditions and health monitoring of the Japanese intervention teams (Bernard Le Guen, EDF); 3 - The Intra Group action after the Fukushima accident (Michel Chevallier, Groupe Intra; Frederic Mariotte, CEA); 4 - Processing of effluents (Georges Pagis, Areva); 5 - Fukushima accident: impact on the terrestrial environment in Japan (Didier Champion, IRSN); 6 - Consequences of the Fukushima accident on the marine environment (Dominique Boust, IRSN); 7 - Territories decontamination perspectives (Pierre Chagvardieff, CEA); 8 - Actions undertaken by Japanese authorities (Florence Gallay, ASN); 9 - Japanese population monitoring and health stakes (Philippe Pirard, InVS); 10 - Citizen oversight actions implemented in Japan (David Boilley, ACRO); 11 - Implementation of ICRP's (International Commission on Radiological Protection) recommendations by Japanese authorities: first analysis (Jacques Lochard, CIPR); 12 - Control of Japan imported food stuff (David Brouque, DGAL); 13 - Questions asked by populations in France and in Germany (Florence-Nathalie Sentuc, GRS; Pascale Monti, IRSN); 14 - Labour law applicable to French workers working abroad (Thierry Lahaye, DGT); 15 - Protection of French workers working in Japan, Areva's experience (Patrick Devin, Areva); 16 - Fukushima accident experience feedback and post-accident nuclear doctrine (Jean-Luc Godet, ASN)

  13. Stand-alone photovoltaic applications. Lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loois, G.; Van Hemert, B.

    1999-02-01

    The IEA Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme (PVPS) is one of the collaborative R and D agreements established within the IEA. The objective of Task III is to promote and facilitate the exchange of information and experiences in the field of PV Systems in Stand-alone and Island Applications (SAPV). The book focuses on the practical experiences gained, and does not aim to provide a complete manual on SAPV. When Task III started its activities in 1993, a collection of 50 'State of the art' projects was published in the book 'Examples of Stand-Alone Photovoltaic Systems'. This publication marked the base line for the work of the task. Now, in 1998, the showcases from each country demonstrate the lessons learned in five years of cooperation. The book consists of two parts. The first part contains eight chapters dealing with a specific aspect of stand-alone PV. The second part introduces 14 national showcase projects in a systematic presentation. Each chapter and showcase can be read independently from the rest of the book. Chapter 2, contributed by The Netherlands, analyses the market for stand-alone PV systems. It gives an overview of the 'traditional' application of stand-alone PV, which is the electrification of remote buildings and which has been addressed in depth in other publications. The focus is on the market niches of service applications that are also interesting for more densely populated areas, e.g. in industrialised countries. The United Kingdom illustrates the economic aspects in Chapter 3. Cost comparisons are made, but more important is the illustration of the non-financial considerations that make PV the preferred choice as a power source for many applications. Switzerland explores in Chapter 4 (financing aspects) different financing mechanisms, and financial policies used to overcome the initial cost barrier. Most of these approaches have been applied in developing countries rather than in the western world. Using various examples from all over the

  14. Integrated Programme Control Systems: Lessons Learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brown, C. W. [Babcock International Group PLC (formerly UKAEA Ltd) B21 Forss, Thurso, Caithness, Scotland (United Kingdom)

    2013-08-15

    Dounreay was the UK's centre of fast reactor research and development from 1955 until 1994 and is now Scotland's largest nuclear clean up and demolition project. After four decades of research, Dounreay is now a site of construction, demolition and waste management, designed to return the site to as near as practicable to its original condition. Dounreay has a turnover in the region of Pounds 150 million a year and employs approximately 900 people. It subcontracts work to 50 or so companies in the supply chain and this provides employment for a similar number of people. The plan for decommissioning the site anticipates all redundant buildings will be cleared in the short term. The target date to achieve interim end state by 2039 is being reviewed in light of Government funding constraints, and will be subject to change through the NDA led site management competition. In the longer term, controls will be put in place on the use of contaminated land until 2300. In supporting the planning, management and organisational aspects for this complex decommissioning programme an integrated programme controls system has been developed and deployed. This consists of a combination of commercial and bespoke tools integrated to support all aspects of programme management, namely scope, schedule, cost, estimating and risk in order to provide baseline and performance management data based upon the application of earned value management principles. Through system evolution and lessons learned, the main benefits of this approach are management data consistency, rapid communication of live information, and increased granularity of data providing summary and detailed reports which identify performance trends that lead to corrective actions. The challenges of such approach are effective use of the information to realise positive changes, balancing the annual system support and development costs against the business needs, and maximising system performance. (author)

  15. A summary of lessons learned at the Shippingport Station Decommissioning Project (SSDP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crimi, F.P.; Mullee, G.R.

    1987-10-01

    This paper describes the lessons learned from a management perspective during decommissioning. The lessons learned are presented in a chronological sequence during the life of the project up to the present time. The careful analysis of the lessons learned and the implementation of corresponding actions have contributed toward improving the effectiveness of decommissioning as time progresses. The lessons learned should be helpful in planning future decommissioning projects

  16. The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: OECD/NEA Nuclear Safety Response and Lessons Learnt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    research programmes designed to improve understanding of how the accident progressed as well as to obtain safety-related information during the decommissioning and dismantling of the damaged facilities. This report outlines international efforts to strengthen nuclear regulation, safety, research and radiological protection in the post-Fukushima context. It also highlights key messages and lessons learnt, notably as related to assurance of safety, shared responsibilities, human and organisational factors, defence-in-depth, stakeholder engagement, crisis communication and emergency preparedness

  17. Generation IV reactors and the ASTRID prototype: lessons from the Fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gauche, F.

    2012-01-01

    In France, the ASTRID prototype is an industrial demonstrator of a sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor (SFR), fulfilling the criteria for Generation IV reactors. ASTRID will meet safety requirements as stringent as for third generation reactors, and it takes into account lessons from the Fukushima accident. The objectives are to reinforce the robustness of the safety demonstration for all safety functions. ASTRID will feature an innovative core with a negative sodium void coefficient, it will take advantage of the large thermal inertia of SFR for decay heat removal, and will provide for a design either eliminating the sodium-water reaction, or guaranteeing no consequences for safety in case such reaction would take place. (author)

  18. Shared Learning and the Drive to Improve Patient Safety: Lessons Learned from the Pittsburgh Regional Healthcare Initiative

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Sirio, Carl A; Keyser, Donna J; Norman, Heidi; Weber, Robert J; Muto, Carlene A

    2005-01-01

    Based on lessons learned through implementation of the Pittsburgh Regional Healthcare Initiative's region-wide shared learning model, we have identified the environmental, cultural, and infrastructure...

  19. True information on the late effect of radiation for medical doctors and general public is indispensable for unimpeded development of atomic industry. Lessons learned from psychological aspects of Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wainson, A.A.

    2010-01-01

    The development of atomic industry in Russia and other countries was practically stopped after the Chernobyl accident. The general public opinion was that the potential hazard from atomic energy stations tremendously outbalanced their benefit. Mass media supplied the public with a lot of negative information on the risk of cancer for the exposed persons, making virtually no reference to the dose-effects of cancer induction, and, more frighteningly, of hereditary consequences of the exposure. Importantly, mass media was only a distributor of negative information, which ion fact was generated in scientific and medical circles. Not so many medical doctors performed real epidemiological studies, comparing the incidence of different sickness in the exposed and control groups and thus receiving true information on the health of their patients. On the other hand, many biologists studied the effects of small doses on the cellular level, and a number of statements about the pronounced biological effects of small radiation doses appeared as a result in the literature. For instance, the effects of genetic instability, bystander effect, and the greater death of radioresistant cancer cells after smaller than larger doses can be mentioned. The discovered effects are real, but their direct extrapolation on the state of human health may lead to wrong conclusions. It is also necessary to be cautious in application of non-human data on the hereditary effect of radiation to humans: Such effects are pronounced in Drosophila, well documented in mice but have not practically been registered among the descendants of thousands of persons exposed to doses of several Gy at the Mayak plutonium production/processing factories, or in the settlements downstream Techa river consuming Mayak's sewage waters. It also obligatory for the scientific community to use proper controls while examining the reported cases of the elevated illness among the descendants of the exposed persons to clarify

  20. Implementation of Defence in Depth at Nuclear Power Plants. Lessons Learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lachaume, Jean-Luc; Miller, Douglass; Rzentkowski, Greg; Lahtinen, Nina; Valtonen, Keijo; Foucher, Laurent; Harikumar, Shri S.; Yamada, Tomoho; Sharafutdinov, Rashet; Kuznetsov, Mark; Carlsson, Lennart; Hanberg, Jan; Theiss, Klaus; Holahan, Gary; Williams, Donna; Nuenighoff, Kay; Wattelle, Emmanuel; Lazo, Edward; White, Andrew; Reig, Javier; Salgado, Nancy; Weightman, Mike

    2016-01-01

    Defence in depth (DiD) is a concept that has been used for many years alongside tools to optimise nuclear safety in reactor design, assessment and regulation. The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident raised many questions and gave unique insight into nuclear safety issues, including DiD. In June 2013, the NEA held a Joint Workshop on Challenges and Enhancements to DiD in Light of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident (NEA, 2014), organised by the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and the NEA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA). It was noted at the time that further work would be beneficial to enhance nuclear safety worldwide, especially with regard to the implementation of DiD. Accordingly, a senior-level task group (STG) was set up to produce a regulatory guidance booklet that would assist member countries in the use of DiD, taking into account lessons learnt from the 2011 accident. This regulatory guidance booklet builds on the work of this NEA workshop, of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) and of other members of the STG. It uses as its basis the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group's Defence in Depth in Nuclear Safety study (INSAG-10) (IAEA, 1996). The booklet provides insights into the implementation of DiD by regulators and emergency management authorities after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, aiming to enhance global harmonisation by providing guidance on: - the background to the DiD concept; - the need for independent effectiveness among the safety provisions for the various DiD levels, to the extent practicable; - the need for greater attention to reinforce prevention and mitigation at the various levels; - the vital importance of ensuring that common cause and common mode failures, especially external events acting in combination, do not lead to breaches of safety provisions at several DiD levels, taking note of the

  1. Institutional support of learning from accidents: some obstacles to getting a useful community-wide database in the EU

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hedlund, Frank Huess; Andersen, Henning Boje

    Union’s Major Accident Reporting System (MARS), which is created in conjunction with the EU regulatory instruments to prevent major industrial accidents, the Seveso-directive. We review some of the general requirements that a successful reporting system must meet and suggest that MARS may not live up...... to the noble intentions behind its creation. Our case example is a simple methanol tank storage installation which we believe can be found in most if not all EU member states. We demonstrate that the data in some of the Short Reports in MARS have a number of serious shortcomings. Causes are not identified...... and lessons learned are left blank. We argue that there are substantial opportunities foregone in the EU system that provides institutional support to learning from past experience. Over the course of 22 years the EU database has only accumulated about 600 Short Reports for all its member states. We consider...

  2. Lessons learned from the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Advisory Panel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lach, D.; Bolton, P.; Durbin, N.; Harty, R.

    1994-08-01

    In response to public concern about the cleanup of the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2) facility after an accident on March 28, 1979 involving a loss of reactor coolant and subsequent damage to the reactor fuel, twelve citizens were asked to serve on an independent Advisory Panel to consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on the decontamination and cleanup of the facility. The panel met 78 times over a period of thirteen years, holding public meetings in the vicinity of TMI-2 and meeting regularly with NRC Commissioners in Washington, DC. This report describes the results of a project designed to identify and describe the lessons learned from the Advisory Panel and place those lessons in the context of what we generally know about citizen advisory groups. A summary of the empirical literature on citizen advisory panels is followed by a brief history of the TMI-2 Advisory Panel. The body of the report contains the analysis of the lessons learned, preliminary conclusions about the effectiveness of the Panel, and implications for the NRC in the use of advisory panels. Data for the report include meeting transcripts and interviews with past and present Panel participants

  3. Learning Safety Assessment from Accidents in a University Environment

    OpenAIRE

    Jensen, Niels; Jørgensen, Sten Bay

    2013-01-01

    This contribution describes how a chemical engineering department started learning from accidents during experimental work and ended up implementing an industrially inspired system for risk assessment of new and existing experimental setups as well as a system for assessing potential risk from the chemicals used in the experimental work. These experiences have led to recent developments which focus increasingly on the a theoretical basis for modeling and reasoning on safety as well as operati...

  4. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations: Department of State’s Lessons Learned Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-06-10

    means for utilizing the lessons learned, in some form of rehearsal or exercise, will 4 make the lessons learned meaningful. A lesson should only...required by DOS policy. The Department agreed with the recommendations to establish certain procedures to address the need to constantly 44 update...doctrine.31 Futch also explained that CALL is constantly seeking to expand training and educational efforts about the lessons learned process and

  5. Denmark's Master of Public Governance Program: Assessment and Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Greve, Carsten; Pedersen, Anne Reff

    2017-01-01

    This paper focuses on Denmark's Master of Public Governance and its assessments and lessons learned. Denmark is seen to have an efficient economy and public sector, a digitalized public service delivery system, and an advanced work-life balance. The Danish government invested substantial resources into developing a Master of Public Governance…

  6. Lessons Learned from Becoming an Independent Standards Board.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Board, John C.

    This paper discusses lessons learned from becoming an independent standards board. It begins by explaining that teachers lacked adequate academic preparation during the two World Wars and shortly thereafter. At the end of World War II, public education had to deal with poor pay, little job security, inadequate pensions, and inadequate and…

  7. Writing Learning Outcomes for English Language Lessons in Multilingual Schools

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jones, Sally Ann

    2016-01-01

    This article proposes a pedagogic innovation in teacher education by articulating a method for writing learning outcomes for English language lessons in multilingual school contexts. The argument for this approach is founded on curriculum studies; however, the practice also draws specifically on applied psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic…

  8. Public perception of radioactive waste management and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Curd, J.

    1989-01-01

    Information officers from United Kingdom Nirex Ltd have been dealing with one of industry's most intractable public relations programmes for five years. Mistakes have been made but lessons have been learned and are now being applied to the Company's current programme - the deep underground disposal of solid low-level and intermediate-level radioactive waste. (author)

  9. Achieving Balance: Lessons Learned from University and College Presidents

    Science.gov (United States)

    Havice, Pamela A.; Williams, Frankie K.

    2005-01-01

    This study investigated strategies used by college and university presidents in balancing their professional and personal lives. The conceptual framework for this study comes from the work of Schein (1985, 1992). Lessons learned and words of wisdom from these presidents can enhance leadership effectiveness at all levels in higher education.

  10. Combat Trauma Lessons Learned from Military Operations of 2001 - 2013

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-03-09

    suspected tension pneumothorax  Longer needle for needle decompression  Lateral approach for needle decompression  Vented chest seals for open...Defense Health Board Combat Trauma Lessons Learned from Military Operations of 2001-2013 March 9, 2015 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF...

  11. Teaching about Terrorism: Lessons Learned at SWOTT

    Science.gov (United States)

    Miller, Gregory D.

    2009-01-01

    This article discusses some of the challenges and lessons for teaching undergraduate-level courses related to terrorism. The author outlines some of the primary issues that instructors can expect to face, and provides strategies for dealing with several of these challenges. The goal is to relay useful information to those teaching, or planning to…

  12. Jackie Steals Home. Learning Page Lesson Plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pulda, Arnold

    In this lesson, students draw on their previous studies of American history and culture as they analyze primary sources from "Jackie Robinson and Other Baseball Highlights, 1860s-1960s" in the American Memory collection. A close reading of two documents relating to Jackie Robinson's breaking of the racial barrier in professional baseball…

  13. Lessons Learned from a Consultation Process Overseas

    Science.gov (United States)

    Merino-Soto, César

    2014-01-01

    In this commentary I discuss three international school consultation experiences, highlighting aspects that serve as lessons for professional development and the implementation of effective and helpful strategies that meet the needs of children and youth in school systems. Relationships developed and maintained between the consulting teams and the…

  14. Twain's "Hannibal." Learning Page Lesson Plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wood, Jan; Thiese, Norma

    Writers are influenced by their environment including family, community, lifestyle, or location. One such writer was Mark Twain. With this lesson plan the learner will become familiar with and analyze life around Mark Twain's hometown, Hannibal, Missouri, during the latter half of the 19th century by using various online and print resources to…

  15. Reperes, the information magazine of the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety - IRSN, No. 12 - January 2012, Special issue Fukushima - First lessons from the accident; Reperes, le magazine d'information de l'Institut de radioprotection et de surete nucleaire - IRSN, No. 12 - janvier 2012, Special Fukushima - Premieres lecons de l'accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-01-15

    A first set of articles addresses the nuclear crisis in Japan (description of the accident, information mission sent by France, and support actions undertaken by France in Japan in the fields of education, civilian security, culture, sailing, media, dosimeters, robotics). A second set discusses lessons learned in terms of nuclear safety (complementary safety assessments, stress test in Gravelines), radiological consequences (impact on Japanese population, the Symbiose software, the Teleray network), crisis management, and research

  16. Some lessons on radiological protection learnt from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kai, M

    2012-01-01

    The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant released a large quantity of radioactive iodine and caesium into the environment. In terms of radiological protection, the evacuation and food restrictions that were adopted in a timely manner by the authorities effectively reduced the dose received by people living in the affected area. Since late March, the transition from an emergency to an existing exposure situation has been in progress. In selecting the reference exposure levels in some areas under an existing exposure situation, the authorities tried to follow the situation-based approach recommended by the ICRP. However, a mixture of emergency and post-emergency approaches confused the people living in the contaminated areas because the reactor conditions continued to be not completely stable. In deriving the criteria in an existing exposure situation, the regulatory authority selected 20 mSv y −1 . The mothers in the affected area believed that a dose of 20 mSv y −1 was unacceptably high for children since 1 mSv y −1 is the dose limit for the public under normal conditions. Internet information accelerated concern about the internal exposure to children and the related health effects. From some experiences after the accident the following lessons could be learned. The selection of reference doses in existing exposure situations after an accident must be openly communicated with the public using a risk-informed approach. The detriment-adjusted nominal risk coefficient was misused for calculating the hypothetical number of cancer deaths by some non-radiation experts. It would not be possible to resolve this problem unless the ICRP addressed an alternative risk assessment to convey the meaning and associated uncertainty of the risk to an exposed population. A situation-based approach in addition to a risk-informed approach needs to be disseminated properly in order to select the level of protection that would be the best possible under the

  17. Use of accident experience in developing criteria for teleoperator equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vallario, E.J.; Selby, J.M.

    1985-10-01

    The 1961 SL-1 reactor accident in Idaho and the Recuplex accident at Hanford are reviewed to identify problems common to emergency situations, lessons learned from accidents, criteria for emergency equipment, and recommendations for using robotics to solve problems during emergencies. Teleoperator equipment could be used to assess the extent of the damage and the condition of the reactor, retrieve dosimeters, evacuate and treat accident victims, clean up debris and decontaminate accident areas. 2 refs., 9 figs

  18. Lessons learned from the NREL village power program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Taylor, R.W. [National Renewable Energy Lab., Golden, CO (United States)

    1998-09-01

    Renewable energy solutions for village power applications can be economical, functional, and sustainable. Pilot projects are an appropriate step in the development of a commercially viable market for rural renewable energy solutions. Moreover, there are a significant number of rural electrification projects under way that employ various technologies, delivery mechanisms, and financing arrangements. These projects, if properly evaluated, communicated, and their lessons incorporated in future projects and programs, can lead the way to a future that includes a robust opportunity for cost-effective, renewable-based village power systems. This paper summarizes some of NREL`s recent experiences and lessons learned.

  19. Lessons Learned from the NREL Village Power Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Taylor, R.

    1998-07-01

    Renewable energy solutions for village power applications can be economical, functional, and sustainable. Pilot projects are an appropriate step in the development of a commercially viable market for rural renewable energy solutions. Moreover, there are a significant number of rural electrification projects under way that employ various technologies, delivery mechanisms, and financing arrangements. These projects, if properly evaluated, communicated, and their lessons incorporated in future projects and programs, can lead the way to a future that includes a robust opportunity for cost-effective, renewable-based village power systems. This paper summarizes some of NRELs recent experiences and lessons learned.

  20. Global polio eradication initiative: lessons learned and legacy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cochi, Stephen L; Freeman, Andrew; Guirguis, Sherine; Jafari, Hamid; Aylward, Bruce

    2014-11-01

    The world is on the verge of achieving global polio eradication. During >25 years of operations, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) has mobilized and trained millions of volunteers, social mobilizers, and health workers; accessed households untouched by other health initiatives; mapped and brought health interventions to chronically neglected and underserved communities; and established a standardized, real-time global surveillance and response capacity. It is important to document the lessons learned from polio eradication, especially because it is one of the largest ever global health initiatives. The health community has an obligation to ensure that these lessons and the knowledge generated are shared and contribute to real, sustained changes in our approach to global health. We have summarized what we believe are 10 leading lessons learned from the polio eradication initiative. We have the opportunity and obligation to build a better future by applying the lessons learned from GPEI and its infrastructure and unique functions to other global health priorities and initiatives. In so doing, we can extend the global public good gained by ending for all time one of the world's most devastating diseases by also ensuring that these investments provide public health dividends and benefits for years to come. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Infectious Diseases Society of America 2014. This work is written by (a) US Government employee(s) and is in the public domain in the US.

  1. Follow-up of delayed health consequences of acute radiation exposure. Lessons to be learned from their medical management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-07-01

    While the use of radioactive materials around the world offers a wide range of benefits in medicine, industry and research, safety precautions are essential to limit the exposure of persons to harmful radiation. When the quantity of radioactive material employed is substantial, as when radioactive sources are used for radiotherapy in medicine or for industrial radiography, extreme care is necessary to prevent accidents that may lead to severe health consequences for the individuals involved. Despite the fact that the precautions to be taken are clearly established, accidents with radiation sources continue to occur, albeit infrequently. The IAEA, as part of its 'Safety of Radiation Sources' and 'Emergency Response' subprogrammes, follows up severe accidents of this kind. In so doing, the IAEA attempts to document both the circumstances leading to the accident and the subsequent medical treatment in order to define the lessons to be learned from these events. The overall objective is to provide information that will be of benefit to organizations with responsibilities for radiation protection, the safety of radiation sources and the medical management of radiation accidents. The International Atomic Energy Agency has issued a number of publications on radiation accidents which have occurred in the past 15 years, reporting on the causes, radiation safety aspects and medical management of those affected particularly in the acute phase following an accident. These reports cover the accidents in Chernobyl, Ukraine (the Republic of the former Soviet Union) and Goiania (Brazil), and those in El Salvador, Vietnam, Belarus, Israel, Estonia, Costa Rica, Georgia, Russian Federation, Turkey, Peru and Panama. In 1998 the IAEA published three Safety Reports, co-sponsored by the World Health Organization, aimed at disseminating medical information on the recognition and treatment of radiation injuries, planning the medical response to radiation accidents and occupational health

  2. Follow-up of delayed health consequences of acute radiation exposure. Lessons to be learned from their medical management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-07-01

    While the use of radioactive materials around the world offers a wide range of benefits in medicine, industry and research, safety precautions are essential to limit the exposure of persons to harmful radiation. When the quantity of radioactive material employed is substantial, as when radioactive sources are used for radiotherapy in medicine or for industrial radiography, extreme care is necessary to prevent accidents that may lead to severe health consequences for the individuals involved. Despite the fact that the precautions to be taken are clearly established, accidents with radiation sources continue to occur, albeit infrequently. The IAEA, as part of its 'Safety of Radiation Sources' and 'Emergency Response' subprogrammes, follows up severe accidents of this kind. In so doing, the IAEA attempts to document both the circumstances leading to the accident and the subsequent medical treatment in order to define the lessons to be learned from these events. The overall objective is to provide information that will be of benefit to organizations with responsibilities for radiation protection, the safety of radiation sources and the medical management of radiation accidents. The International Atomic Energy Agency has issued a number of publications on radiation accidents which have occurred in the past 15 years, reporting on the causes, radiation safety aspects and medical management of those affected particularly in the acute phase following an accident. These reports cover the accidents in Chernobyl, Ukraine (the Republic of the former Soviet Union) and Goiania (Brazil), and those in El Salvador, Vietnam, Belarus, Israel, Estonia, Costa Rica, Georgia, Russian Federation, Turkey, Peru and Panama. In 1998 the IAEA published three Safety Reports, co-sponsored by the World Health Organization, aimed at disseminating medical information on the recognition and treatment of radiation injuries, planning the medical response to radiation accidents and occupational health

  3. Young Drivers Perceptual Learning Styles Preferences and Traffic Accidents

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Svetlana Čičević

    2011-05-01

    Full Text Available Young drivers are over-represented in crash and fatality statistics. One way of dealing with this problem is to achieve primary prevention through driver education and training. Factors of traffic accidents related to gender, age, driving experience, and self-assessments of safety and their relationship to perceptual learning styles (LS preferences have been analyzed in this study. The results show that auditory is the most prominent LS. Drivers in general, as well as drivers without traffic accidents favour visual and tactile LS. Both inexperienced and highly experienced drivers show relatively high preference of kinaesthetic style. Yet, taking into account driving experience we could see that the role of kinaesthetic LS is reduced, since individual LS has become more important. Based on the results of this study it can be concluded that a multivariate and multistage approach to driver education, taking into account differences in LS preferences, would be highly beneficial for traffic safety.

  4. Refueling Infrastructure for Alternative Fuel Vehicles: Lessons Learned for Hydrogen; Workshop Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Melaina, M. W.; McQueen, S.; Brinch, J.

    2008-07-01

    DOE sponsored the Refueling Infrastructure for Alternative Fuel Vehicles: Lessons Learned for Hydrogen workshop to understand how lessons from past experiences can inform future efforts to commercialize hydrogen vehicles. This report contains the proceedings from the workshop.

  5. Co-Creation Learning Procedures: Comparing Interactive Language Lessons for Deaf and Hearing Students.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hosono, Naotsune; Inoue, Hiromitsu; Tomita, Yutaka

    2017-01-01

    This paper discusses co-creation learning procedures of second language lessons for deaf students, and sign language lessons by a deaf lecturer. The analyses focus on the learning procedure and resulting assessment, considering the disability. Through questionnaires ICT-based co-creative learning technologies are effective and efficient and promote spontaneous learning motivation goals.

  6. Lessons from Learning to Have Rational Expectations

    OpenAIRE

    Lindh, Thomas

    1989-01-01

    This paper reviews a growing literature investigating how economic agents may learn rational expectations. Fully rational learning requires implausible initial information assumptions, therefore some form of bounded rationality has come into focus. Such learning models often converge to rational expectations equilibria within certain bounds. Convergence analysis has been much simplified by methods from adaptive control theory. Learning stability as a correspondence principle show some promise...

  7. Influences of Multimedia Lesson Contents On Effective Learning

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tuncay Yavuz Ozdemir

    2013-11-01

    Full Text Available In the information era that we experience today, there is a rapid change in the methods, techniques and materials used for education and teaching. The usage of information and communication technology-assisted teaching materials are becoming more commonplace. Parallel to these developments, the Ministry of National Education took steps to develop IT substructures of all schools in the country and implemented many projects. The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not the multimedia lesson content used by teachers affect effective learning. This study is a qualitative study, conducted with 45 teachers working in primary schools during the 2011-2012 academic year. According to the study findings, participants believe that using multimedia lesson content during lectures increases student motivation, makes students more curious and interested, and think that using multimedia lesson content has positive effects.

  8. Lessons drawn from the accidents occurred in the framework of conventional external radiotherapy;Lecons tirees des accidents survenus dans le cadre de la radiotherapie externe conventionnelle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Holmberg, O. [Agence Internationale de l' Energie Atomique, Unite de Radioprotection des Patients, Section Securite et Controle, Vienna (Austria); Czarwinski, R. [Agence Internationale de l' Energie Atomique, Unite de Radioprotection des Patients, Vienna (Austria)

    2009-12-15

    This study examines some radiation accidents occurred in the past. This information has been systematically assessed to get global lessons. The experience feedback shows that the most of accidents happened in certain conditions. These conditions can be distributed in four categories: 1- perception and vigilance in occupation: accidental exposure happened by lack of vigilance in details and lack of vigilance and perception; 2- procedures: accidental exposure happened following a lack of procedures or control that were not enough complete, not enough documented or not completely implemented; 3- training and understanding: accidental exposures happened because the personnel was not enough qualified and educated, did not get the general training nor the the necessary specialized training; 4- liabilities: accidental exposures happened following lacks and ambiguity in the definition of functions of the personnel and in the hierarchy liabilities. In these precise cases the safety tasks have not been enough covered. (N.C.)

  9. Integrating self-regulated learning and discovery learning into English lesson plan

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sayukti Ni Kadek Heny

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available The notion of learner-centeredness has been embedded in the National Curriculum of Indonesia, 2013 Curriculum. However, most of the teachers seem to be hardly acquainted with the concept of Self-Regulated Learning (SRL and discovery learning in the lesson planning. Considering the phenomenon, this study intends to explore the concept of Self-Regulated Learning in the lesson plan of English subject for a tenth-grade level by employing a qualitative design with data obtained from a teacher-made lesson plan and a semi-structured interview. The researcher used content analysis to analyze the lesson plan. Meanwhile, the qualitative data from interview result were preceded through a coding sheet and transcribed modified figure. The findings revealed an integration of SRL cyclical phase and discovery learning in the teacher-made lesson plan. Based on the discussion, the results need to be applied in a considerably large context, in order to see thoroughly dynamic integration between Self-Regulated Learning model, lesson planning and the concept of learner autonomy.

  10. Improving the quality of learning in science through optimization of lesson study for learning community

    Science.gov (United States)

    Setyaningsih, S.

    2018-03-01

    Lesson Study for Learning Community is one of lecturer profession building system through collaborative and continuous learning study based on the principles of openness, collegiality, and mutual learning to build learning community in order to form professional learning community. To achieve the above, we need a strategy and learning method with specific subscription technique. This paper provides a description of how the quality of learning in the field of science can be improved by implementing strategies and methods accordingly, namely by applying lesson study for learning community optimally. Initially this research was focused on the study of instructional techniques. Learning method used is learning model Contextual teaching and Learning (CTL) and model of Problem Based Learning (PBL). The results showed that there was a significant increase in competence, attitudes, and psychomotor in the four study programs that were modelled. Therefore, it can be concluded that the implementation of learning strategies in Lesson study for Learning Community is needed to be used to improve the competence, attitude and psychomotor of science students.

  11. Lessons learned in testing of Safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, Susan; Farnitano, Michael; Carelli, Joseph

    2001-01-01

    regime to ensure that all aspects of the equipment are fully functional. If problems exist it is better to know about them prior to implementation. This paper will discuss the results of the subtasks completed under Task E.125 and the progress of active subtasks. The cost/benefit of these subtasks will be addressed. Lessons learned by the U.S. Support Program in undertaking these tasks will be identified. (author)

  12. Lesson learned from the SARNET wall condensation benchmarks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ambrosini, W.; Forgione, N.; Merli, F.; Oriolo, F.; Paci, S.; Kljenak, I.; Kostka, P.; Vyskocil, L.; Travis, J.R.; Lehmkuhl, J.; Kelm, S.; Chin, Y.-S.; Bucci, M.

    2014-01-01

    Highlights: • The results of the benchmarking activity on wall condensation are reported. • The work was performed in the frame of SARNET. • General modelling techniques for condensation are discussed. • Results of University of Pisa and of other benchmark participants are discussed. • The lesson learned is drawn. - Abstract: The prediction of condensation in the presence of noncondensable gases has received continuing attention in the frame of the Severe Accident Research Network of Excellence, both in the first (2004–2008) and in the second (2009–2013) EC integrated projects. Among the different reasons for considering so relevant this basic phenomenon, coped with by classical treatments dated in the first decades of the last century, there is the interest for developing updated CFD models for reactor containment analysis, requiring validating at a different level the available modelling techniques. In the frame of SARNET, benchmarking activities were undertaken taking advantage of the work performed at different institutions in setting up and developing models for steam condensation in conditions of interest for nuclear reactor containment. Four steps were performed in the activity, involving: (1) an idealized problem freely inspired at the actual conditions occurring in an experimental facility, CONAN, installed at the University of Pisa; (2) a first comparison with experimental data purposely collected by the CONAN facility; (3) a second comparison with data available from experimental campaigns performed in the same apparatus before the inclusion of the activities in SARNET; (4) a third exercise involving data obtained at lower mixture velocity than in previous campaigns, aimed at providing conditions closer to those addressed in reactor containment analyses. The last step of the benchmarking activity required to change the configuration of the experimental apparatus to achieve the lower flow rates involved in the new test specifications. The

  13. Lessons Learned from Missing Flooding Barriers Operating Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simic, Z.; Veira, M. P.

    2016-01-01

    time or they do not provide sufficient instructions. Most of the events are related to deficiencies discovered during walk-down, review, maintenance and sometimes to incidents. Perhaps these lessons learned from recent events could help filling the missing gap to have most complete flooding protection. This paper presents results from the most recent activity related to the operational experience feedback for the nuclear power plant safety in the EC JRC Clearinghouse. (author).

  14. Learning Safety Assessment from Accidents in a University Environment

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jensen, Niels; Jørgensen, Sten Bay

    2013-01-01

    This contribution describes how a chemical engineering department started learning from accidents during experimental work and ended up implementing an industrially inspired system for risk assessment of new and existing experimental setups as well as a system for assessing potential risk from...... the chemicals used in the experimental work. These experiences have led to recent developments which focus increasingly on the a theoretical basis for modeling and reasoning on safety as well as operational aspects within a common framework. Presently this framework is being extended with barrier concepts both...

  15. Safety and Mission Assurance for In-House Design Lessons Learned from Ares I Upper Stage

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Joel M.

    2011-01-01

    This viewgraph presentation identifies lessons learned in the course of the Ares I Upper Stage design and in-house development effort. The contents include: 1) Constellation Organization; 2) Upper Stage Organization; 3) Presentation Structure; 4) Lesson-Importance of Systems Engineering/Integration; 5) Lesson-Importance of Early S&MA Involvement; 6) Lesson-Importance of Appropriate Staffing Levels; 7) Lesson-Importance S&MA Team Deployment; 8) Lesson-Understanding of S&MA In-Line Engineering versus Assurance; 9) Lesson-Importance of Close Coordination between Supportability and Reliability/Maintainability; 10) Lesson-Importance of Engineering Data Systems; 11) Lesson-Importance of Early Development of Supporting Databases; 12) Lesson-Importance of Coordination with Safety Assessment/Review Panels; 13) Lesson-Implementation of Software Reliability; 14) Lesson-Implementation of S&MA Technical Authority/Chief S&MA Officer; 15) Lesson-Importance of S&MA Evaluation of Project Risks; 16) Lesson-Implementation of Critical Items List and Government Mandatory Inspections; 17) Lesson-Implementation of Critical Items List Mandatory Inspections; 18) Lesson-Implementation of Test Article Safety Analysis; and 19) Lesson-Importance of Procurement Quality.

  16. Chapter 6: Accidents; Capitulo 6: Acidentes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-06-01

    The chapter 6 talks about the accidents with radiators all over the world, specifically, the Stimos, in Italy, 1975, San Salvador, in El Salvador, 1989, Soreq, in Israel, 1990, Nesvizh, in Byelorussian, 1991, in Illinois, US, 1965, in Maryland, US, 1991, Hanoi, Vietnam, 1992, Fleurus, in Belgium, 2006. Comments on the accidents and mainly the learned lessons.

  17. Lessons learned on stakeholder issues in decommissioning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Sullivan, P.; Pescatore, C.

    2008-01-01

    Issues of public concern during decommissioning and dismantling (D and D) are partly the same and partly different from those of the preceding phases (planning, construction and operation). While in the course of construction and operation the main challenges include meeting expectations of a higher quality of life, accommodating a growing population, mitigating construction nuisances, and assuring the safe operation of the facility, the main concerns in the D and D phase are decreasing employment rate, the eventual reduction of revenues for the municipality, the future use of the affected land and negative social impacts (e.g., out-migration). The decommissioning phase is characterised by heterogeneity of stakeholder interests and values, difficulties of reaching consensus or compromise, and difficulties in connection with the harmonization of energy production, environmental protection and sustainable socio-economic development considerations. Typically, there might also be tensions between local and regional decisions. As in other phases, the building of trust between stakeholder is crucial from the point of view of conflict management, and social lessons learnt from the siting and developments of nuclear facilities are widely applicable in the field of D and D as well. A review is presented of major lessons to be learnt from NEA activities in the field of decommissioning and stakeholder involvement. (author)

  18. Lessons learned on stakeholder issues in decommissioning

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O' Sullivan, P.; Pescatore, C. [OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 92 - Issy les Moulineaux (France)

    2008-07-01

    Issues of public concern during decommissioning and dismantling (D and D) are partly the same and partly different from those of the preceding phases (planning, construction and operation). While in the course of construction and operation the main challenges include meeting expectations of a higher quality of life, accommodating a growing population, mitigating construction nuisances, and assuring the safe operation of the facility, the main concerns in the D and D phase are decreasing employment rate, the eventual reduction of revenues for the municipality, the future use of the affected land and negative social impacts (e.g., out-migration). The decommissioning phase is characterised by heterogeneity of stakeholder interests and values, difficulties of reaching consensus or compromise, and difficulties in connection with the harmonization of energy production, environmental protection and sustainable socio-economic development considerations. Typically, there might also be tensions between local and regional decisions. As in other phases, the building of trust between stakeholder is crucial from the point of view of conflict management, and social lessons learnt from the siting and developments of nuclear facilities are widely applicable in the field of D and D as well. A review is presented of major lessons to be learnt from NEA activities in the field of decommissioning and stakeholder involvement. (author)

  19. Summary of Planned Implementation for the HTGR Lessons Learned Applicable to the NGNP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mckirdy, Ian

    2011-01-01

    This document presents a reconciliation of the lessons learned during a 2010 comprehensive evaluation of pertinent lessons learned from past and present high temperature gas-cooled reactors that apply to the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project along with current and planned activities. The data used are from the latest Idaho National Laboratory research and development plans, the conceptual design report from General Atomics, and the pebble bed reactor technology readiness study from AREVA. Only those lessons related to the structures, systems, and components of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP), as documented in the recently updated lessons learned report are addressed. These reconciliations are ordered according to plant area, followed by the affected system, subsystem, or component; lesson learned; and finally an NGNP implementation statement. This report (1) provides cross references to the original lessons learned document, (2) describes the lesson learned, (3) provides the current NGNP implementation status with design data needs associated with the lesson learned, (4) identifies the research and development being performed related to the lesson learned, and (5) summarizes with a status of how the lesson learned has been addressed by the NGNP Project.

  20. Planning for large-scale accidents: learning from the Three Mile Island accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.W.

    1981-01-01

    Decision-making issues raised at the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania are explored. The organizations involved, their interconnections, and decisions are described. The underlying issues bearing on allocation of effort to pre-accident planning and actual accident responses are also noted. Finally, a framework from this effort is used for guiding the planning of operations for future accidents. (author)

  1. Buried Waste Integrated Demonstration lessons learned: 1993 technology demonstrations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kostelnik, K.M.; Owens, K.J.

    1994-01-01

    An integrated technology demonstration was conducted by the Buried Waste Integrated Demonstration (BWID) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Cold Test Pit in the summer of 1993. This program and demonstration was sponsored by the US Department of Energy Office of Technology Development. The demonstration included six technologies representing a synergistic system for the characterization and retrieval of a buried hazardous waste site. The integrated technology demonstration proved very successful and a summary of the technical accomplishments is presented. Upon completion of the integrated technology demonstration, cognizant program personnel participated in a lessons learned exercise. This exercise was conducted at the Simplot Decision Support Center at Idaho State University and lessons learned activity captured additional information relative to the integration of technologies for demonstration purposes. This information will be used by BWID to enhance program planning and strengthen future technology demonstrations

  2. Wikiwijs: An unexpected journey and the lessons learned towards OER

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Robert Schuwer

    2014-04-01

    Full Text Available The Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science has funded a five years program to encourage the use, creation and sharing of Open Educational Resources (OER by teachers from various types of education. This program is known as Wikiwijs. Ultimo 2013, the program has come to an end. As some of the assumptions at the start of Wikiwijs proved to work out in unexpected ways the lessons learned could fuel the next steps in developing Wikiwijs. Besides, other national initiatives on opening up education may also benefit from the lessons learned reported here. The main conclusion from five years Wikiwijs was that to accomplish mainstreaming OER, the Wikiwijs program should go along with other interventions that are more oriented toward prescriptive policies and regulations. In particular: the Dutch government should be more directive in persuading executive boards and teachers on schools to adopt OER as an important part of educational reform and the acquisition of 21st century skills.

  3. LESSONS LEARNED Biosurveillance Mobile App Development Intern Competition (Summer 2013)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Noonan, Christine F. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Henry, Michael J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Corley, Courtney D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-01-14

    The purpose of the lessons learned document for the BEOWulf Biosurveillance Mobile App Development Intern Competition is to capture the project’s lessons learned in a formal document for use by other project managers on similar future projects. This document may be used as part of new project planning for similar projects in order to determine what problems occurred and how those problems were handled and may be avoided in the future. Additionally, this document details what went well with the project and why, so that other project managers may capitalize on these actions. Project managers may also use this document to determine who the project team members were in order to solicit feedback for planning their projects in the future. This document will be formally communicated with the organization and will become a part of the organizational assets and archives.

  4. QA lessons learned for parameter control from the WIPP Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richards, R.R.

    1998-01-01

    This paper provides a summary of lessons learned from experiences on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WJPP) Project in implementation of quality assurance controls surrounding inputs for performance assessment analysis. Since the performance assessment (PA) process is inherent in compliance determination for any waste repository, these lessons-learned are intended to be useful to investigators, analysts, and Quality Assurance (QA) practitioners working on high level waste disposal projects. On the WIPP Project, PA analyses for regulatory-compliance determination utilized several inter-related computer programs (codes) that mathematically modeled phenomena such as radionuclide release, retardation, and transport. The input information for those codes are the parameters that are the subject of this paper. Parameters were maintained in a computer database, which was then queried electronically by the PA codes whenever input was needed as the analyses were run

  5. MODIS Science Algorithms and Data Systems Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wolfe, Robert E.; Ridgway, Bill L.; Patt, Fred S.; Masuoka, Edward J.

    2009-01-01

    For almost 10 years, standard global products from NASA's Earth Observing System s (EOS) two Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) sensors are being used world-wide for earth science research and applications. This paper discusses the lessons learned in developing the science algorithms and the data systems needed to produce these high quality data products for the earth sciences community. Strong science team leadership and communication, an evolvable and scalable data system, and central coordination of QA and validation activities enabled the data system to grow by two orders of magnitude from the initial at-launch system to the current system able to reprocess data from both the Terra and Aqua missions in less than a year. Many of the lessons learned from MODIS are already being applied to follow-on missions.

  6. E-LEARNING FROM NATURE THROUGH E-LESSONS

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Anca Cristina COLIBABA

    2017-08-01

    Full Text Available The article is a study based on the e-Learning from Nature project (2015-1-IT02-KA201-015133 funded by the European Commission. The project’s main objectives are centred on improving students’ low achievement and stimulating secondary school students’ interest in science subjects. The article focuses on scientific education and its challenges and suggests an innovative approach which connects science with nature. It examines one of the most important project outputs: the e-lessons (short video lessons created within the European partnership and the way they can contribute to increasing students’ motivation to learn science. Participant teachers’ testimonials have also been considered in the general evaluation of this project output.

  7. How to learn and develop from both good and bad lessons- the 2011Tohoku tsunami case -

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sugimoto, Megumi; Okazumi, Toshio

    2013-04-01

    The 2011 Tohoku tsunami revealed Japan has repeated same mistakes in a long tsunami disaster history. After the disaster Japanese remember many old lessons and materials: an oral traditional evacuation method 'Tsunami TENDENKO' which is individual independent quick evacuation, a tsunami historical memorial stone "Don't construct houses below this stone to seaside" in Aneyoshi town Iwate prefecture, Namiwake-shrine naming from the story of protect people from tsunami in Sendai city, and so on. Tohoku area has created various tsunami historical cultures to descendent. Tohoku area had not had a tsunami disaster for 50 years after the 1960 Chilean tsunami. The 2010 Chilean tsunami damaged little fish industry. People gradually lost tsunami disaster awareness. At just the bad time the magnitude (M) 9 scale earthquake attacked Tohoku. It was for our generations an inexperienced scale disaster. People did not make use of the ancestor's lessons to survive. The 2004 Sumatra tsunami attacked just before 7 years ago. The magnitude scale is almost same as M 9 scale. Why didn't Tohoku people and Japanese tsunami experts make use of the lessons? Japanese has a character outside Japan. This lesson shows it is difficult for human being to learn from other countries. As for Three mile island accident case in US, it was same for Japan. To addition to this, there are similar types of living lessons among different hazards. For examples, nuclear power plantations problem occurred both the 2012 Hurricane Sandy in US and the 2011 Tohoku tsunami. Both local people were not informed about the troubles though Oyster creek nuclear power station case in US did not proceed seriously all. Tsunami and Hurricane are different hazard. Each exparts stick to their last. 1. It is difficult for human being to transfer living lessons through next generation over decades. 2. It is difficult for human being to forecast inexperienced events. 3. It is usually underestimated the danger because human being

  8. Learning in Plants: Lessons from Mimosa pudica

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Charles Ira Abramson

    2016-03-01

    Full Text Available This article provides an overview of the early Mimosa pudica literature; much of which is in journals not easily accessible to the reader. In contrast to the contemporary plant learning literature which is conducted primarily by plant biologists, this early literature was conducted by comparative psychologists whose goal was to search for the generality of learning phenomena such as habituation, and classical conditioning using experimental designs based on animal conditioning studies. In addition to reviewing the early literature, we hope to encourage collaborations between plant biologists and comparative psychologists by familiarizing the reader with issues in the study of learning faced by those working with animals. These issues include no consistent definition of learning phenomena and an overreliance on the use of cognition. We suggested that greater collaborative efforts be made between plant biologists and comparative psychologists if the study of plant learning is to be fully intergraded into the mainstream behavior theory.

  9. Importance Of Quality Control in Reducing System Risk, a Lesson Learned From The Shuttle and a Recommendation for Future Launch Vehicles

    Science.gov (United States)

    Safie, Fayssal M.; Messer, Bradley P.

    2006-01-01

    This paper presents lessons learned from the Space Shuttle return to flight experience and the importance of these lessons learned in the development of new the NASA Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV). Specifically, the paper discusses the relationship between process control and system risk, and the importance of process control in improving space vehicle flight safety. It uses the External Tank (ET) Thermal Protection System (TPS) experience and lessons learned from the redesign and process enhancement activities performed in preparation for Return to Flight after the Columbia accident. The paper also, discusses in some details, the Probabilistic engineering physics based risk assessment performed by the Shuttle program to evaluate the impact of TPS failure on system risk and the application of the methodology to the CLV.

  10. Lessons of nuclear robot history

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oomichi, Takeo

    2014-01-01

    Severe accidents occurred at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station stirred up people's great expectation of nuclear robot's deployment. However unexpected nuclear disaster, especially rupture of reactor building caused by core meltdown and hydrogen explosion, made it quite difficult to introduce nuclear robot under high radiation environment to cease accidents and dispose damaged reactor. Robotics Society of Japan (RSJ) set up committee to look back upon lessons learned from 50 year's past experience of nuclear robot development and summarized 'Lessons of nuclear robot history', which was shown on the home page website of RSJ. This article outlined it with personal comment. History of nuclear robot developed for inspection and maintenance at normal operation and for specific required response at nuclear accidents was reviewed with many examples at home and abroad for TMI, Chernobyl and JCO accidents. Present state of Fukushima accident response robot's introduction and development was also described with some comments on nuclear robot development from academia based on lessons. (T. Tanaka)

  11. Lessons learned from solar energy projects in Saudi Arabia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huraib, F.S.; Hasnain, S.M.; Alawaji, S.H.

    1996-01-01

    This paper describes the lessons learned from the major RD and D activities at Energy Research Institute (ERI), King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) in the field of solar energy. Photovoltaic, solar thermal dishes, solar water heating, solar water pumping and desalination, solar hydrogen production and utilization are some of the areas studied for solar energy applications. Recommendations and guidelines for future solar energy research, development, demonstration and dissemination in Saudi Arabia are also given. (Author)

  12. Reactor D and D at Argonne National Laboratory - lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fellhauer, C. R.

    1998-01-01

    This paper focuses on the lessons learned during the decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) of two reactors at Argonne National Laboratory-East (ANL-E). The Experimental Boiling Water Reactor (EBWR) was a 100 MW(t), 5 MSV(e) proof-of-concept facility. The Janus Reactor was a 200 kW(t) reactor located at the Biological Irradiation Facility and was used to study the effects of neutron radiation on animals

  13. Development of an HIV Prevention Videogame: Lessons Learned

    OpenAIRE

    Kimberly Hieftje; Lynn E. Fiellin; Tyra Pendergrass; Lindsay R Duncan

    2016-01-01

    The use of videogames interventions is becoming an increasingly popular and effective strategy in disease prevention and health promotion; however, few health videogame interventions have been scientifically rigorously evaluated for their efficacy. Moreover, few examples of the formative process used to develop and evaluate evidence-based health videogame interventions exist in the scientific literature. The following paper provides valuable insight into the lessons learned during the process...

  14. Creating the High-Resolution Settlement Layer - lessons learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gros, A.

    2017-12-01

    Facebook publishes the High-resolution Settlement Layer (HRSL: https://ciesin.columbia.edu/data/hrsl/) in collaboration with Columbia University's CIESIN institute and the World Bank. So far, data for 13 countries have been published over the past nine months. HRSL data for Burkina Faso, Ghana, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, The Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Uganda are available for download. We will present a status update and report on lessons learned.

  15. Savannah River Site environmental restoration lessons learned program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Plunkett, R.A.; Leibfarth, E.C.; Treger, T.M.; Blackmon, A.M.

    1993-01-01

    For the past three years environmental restoration has been formally consolidated at Savannah River Site. Accomplishments include waste site investigations to closure activities. Positive, as well as negatively impacting, events have occurred. Until recently, lessons learned were captured on a less than formal basis. Now, a program based upon critiques, evaluations and corrective actions is being used. This presentation reviews the development, implementation and use of that program

  16. Social Networking Sites and Addiction: Ten Lessons Learned

    OpenAIRE

    Kuss, Daria J.; Griffiths, Mark D.

    2017-01-01

    Online social networking sites (SNSs) have gained increasing popularity in the last decade, with individuals engaging in SNSs to connect with others who share similar interests. The perceived need to be online may result in compulsive use of SNSs, which in extreme cases may result in symptoms and consequences traditionally associated with substance-related addictions. In order to present new insights into online social networking and addiction, in this paper, 10 lessons learned concerning onl...

  17. Evaluation of a potential nuclear fuel repository criticality: Lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wilson, J.R.; Evans, D.

    1995-10-01

    This paper presents lessons learned from a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the potential for a criticality in a repository containing spent nuclear fuel with high enriched uranium. The insights gained consisted of remarkably detailed conclusions about design issues, failure mechanisms, frequencies and source terms for events up to 10,000 years in the future. Also discussed are the approaches taken by the analysts in presenting this very technical report to a nontechnical and possibly antagonistic audience.

  18. Evaluation of a potential nuclear fuel repository criticality: Lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilson, J.R.; Evans, D.

    1995-01-01

    This paper presents lessons learned from a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the potential for a criticality in a repository containing spent nuclear fuel with high enriched uranium. The insights gained consisted of remarkably detailed conclusions about design issues, failure mechanisms, frequencies and source terms for events up to 10,000 years in the future. Also discussed are the approaches taken by the analysts in presenting this very technical report to a nontechnical and possibly antagonistic audience

  19. The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: What went wrong and what lessons are universal?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Omoto, Akira, E-mail: akira.omoto@mac.com

    2013-12-11

    After a short summary of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, this paper discusses “what went wrong” by illustrating the problems of the specific layers of defense-in-depth (basic strategy for assuring nuclear safety) and “what lessons are universal.” Breaches in the multiple layers of defense were particularly significant in respective protection (a) against natural disasters (first layer of defense) as well as (b) against severe conditions, specifically in this case, a complete loss of AC/DC power and isolation from the primary heat sink (fourth layer of defense). Confusion in crisis management by the government and insufficient implementation of offsite emergency plans revealed problems in the fifth layer of defense. By taking into consideration managerial and safety culture that might have relevance to this accident, in the author's view, universal lessons are as follows: a)Resilience: the need to enhance organizational capabilities to respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn in changing conditions, especially to prepare for the unexpected. This includes increasing distance to cliff edge by knowing where it exists and how to increase safety margin. b)Responsibility: the operator is primarily responsible for safety, and the government is responsible for protecting public health and environment. For both, their right decisions are supported by competence, knowledge, and an understanding of the technology, as well as humble attitudes toward the limitations of what we know and what we can learn from others. c)Social license to operate: the need to avoid, as much as possible regardless of its probability of occurrence, the reasonably anticipated environmental impact (such as land contamination), as well as to build public confidence/trust and a renewed liability scheme.

  20. Lessons learned in wake of WPPSS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koenen, A.V.; Gillespie, J.W.

    1984-01-01

    Several fundamentals of public power financial management have become more critical in the wake of the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) default: the human and financial costs of trying to resolve problems of this complexity after they occur will require an almost unimaginable amount of time and money that could be productively employed elsewhere; the economic feasibility of the project is paramount, and is far more important than its legal security or its attractiveness to utility managers; the ratepayers' ability and willingness to pay is the key security in public power financing; management performance, not promises, will be the measure of the post WPPSS marketplace; financial flexibility is crucial. Using these lessons, the author outlines a five-step program of strategic planning for planning and managing long-term projects

  1. Case Study of Lessons Learned from the Operation of the Fast Flux Test Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wootan, D.; Omberg, R.; Grandy, C.

    2016-01-01

    Full text: The lessons learned approach being followed at the Fast Flux Test Facility is to have domain experts in each subject area develop a short write-up or report on each lesson learned. Each lesson learned write-up is on the order of 4–6 pages. Longer reports can be developed as needed. Each lessons learned summary discusses the problem and the resolution method employed to address the problem, and also tries to capture the essential “tacit knowledge” associated with each topic in a focused manner. All lessons learned write-ups are supported by more detailed documents. For example, references of more detailed reports are generally included, where available. Topics are selected as those most likely to apply to future design or operating problems. This lessons learned approach has been successful in capturing essential tacit knowledge about key events in FFTF history and providing a context for interpreting the existing data and references. (author

  2. Lessons learned -- NREL Village Power Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Flowers, L.

    1998-07-01

    In 1993, a workshop was convened at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) to discuss the issues of applying renewable energy in a sustainable manner to international rural development. One of the summary recommendations was that NREL could assist in the renewable energy for rural electrification effort by developing and supplying six related activities: resource assessment, comparative analysis and modeling, performance monitoring and analysis, pilot project development, internet-based project data, communications, and training. In response to this recommendation, NREL launched its Village Power Program consisting of these activities that cut across NREL technologies and disciplines. Currently NREL is active in 20 countries, with pilot projects in 12 of those countries. At this time the technologies include photovoltaics, wind, biomass, and hybrids. The rural applications include home lighting and communications, water pumping, schools and health posts, battery charging stations, ecotourism, and village systems. These pilot projects are central to the renewable energy village power development through the demonstration of three aspects critical to replication and implementation of the projects on a significant scale. The three aspects are technical functionality, economic competitiveness, and institutional sustainability. It is important to note that the pilot projects from which NREL's experience has been gained were funded and, in many cases, developed by other organizations and agencies. NREL's role has been one of technical assistance or project management or both. The purpose of this paper is to describe the lessons NREL staff has gleaned from their participation in the various pilot projects. The author hopes that these lessons will help the Renewable Energy-Based Rural Electrification (RERE) community in implementing sustainable projects that lead to replication.

  3. LESSONS LEARNED THROUGH OPTIMIZATION OF THE VOLUNTARY CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thacker, M. S.; Freshour, P.; McDonald, W.

    2002-01-01

    Valuable experience in environmental remediation was gained at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (Sandia) by concurrently conducting Voluntary Corrective Actions (VCAs) at three Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs). Sandia combined the planning, implementation, and reporting phases of three VCAs with the goal of realizing significant savings in both cost and schedule. The lessons learned through this process have been successfully implemented within the Sandia Environmental Restoration (ER) Project and could be utilized at other locations with multiple ER sites. All lessons learned resulted from successful teaming with the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) Hazardous Waste Bureau (HWB), Sandia management, a Sandia risk assessment team, and Sandia waste management personnel. Specific lessons learned included the following: (1) potential efficiencies can be exploited by reprioritization and rescheduling of activities; (2) cost and schedule reductions can be realized by combining similar work at contiguous sites into a single effort; (3) working with regulators to develop preliminary remediation goals (PRGs) and gain regulatory acceptance for VCA planning prior to project initiation results in significant time savings throughout the remediation and permit modification processes; (4) effective and thoughtful contingency planning removes uncertainties and defrays costs so that projects can be completed without interruption; (5) timely collection of waste characterization samples allows efficient disposal of waste streams, and (6) concurrent reporting of VCA activities results in significant savings in time for the authors and reviewers

  4. Scheduling lessons learned from the Autonomous Power System

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ringer, Mark J.

    1992-01-01

    The Autonomous Power System (APS) project at NASA LeRC is designed to demonstrate the applications of integrated intelligent diagnosis, control, and scheduling techniques to space power distribution systems. The project consists of three elements: the Autonomous Power Expert System (APEX) for Fault Diagnosis, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR); the Autonomous Intelligent Power Scheduler (AIPS) to efficiently assign activities start times and resources; and power hardware (Brassboard) to emulate a space-based power system. The AIPS scheduler was tested within the APS system. This scheduler is able to efficiently assign available power to the requesting activities and share this information with other software agents within the APS system in order to implement the generated schedule. The AIPS scheduler is also able to cooperatively recover from fault situations by rescheduling the affected loads on the Brassboard in conjunction with the APEX FDIR system. AIPS served as a learning tool and an initial scheduling testbed for the integration of FDIR and automated scheduling systems. Many lessons were learned from the AIPS scheduler and are now being integrated into a new scheduler called SCRAP (Scheduler for Continuous Resource Allocation and Planning). This paper will service three purposes: an overview of the AIPS implementation, lessons learned from the AIPS scheduler, and a brief section on how these lessons are being applied to the new SCRAP scheduler.

  5. Automated Reasoning Across Tactical Stories to Derive Lessons Learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    J. Wesley Regian

    2008-06-01

    Full Text Available The Military Analogical Reasoning System (MARS is a performance support system and decision aid for commanders in Tactical Operations Centers. MARS enhances and supports the innate human ability for using stories to reason about tactical goals, plans, situations, and outcomes. The system operates by comparing many instances of stored tactical stories, determining which have analogous situations and lessons learned, and then returning a description of the lessons learned. The description of the lessons learned is at a level of abstraction that can be generalized to an appropriate range of tactical situations. The machine-understandable story representation is based on a military operations data model and associated tactical situation ontology. Thus each story can be thought of, and reasoned about, as an instance of an unfolding tactical situation. The analogical reasoning algorithm is based on Gentner's Structure Mapping Theory. Consider the following two stories. In the first, a U.S. platoon in Viet Nam diverts around a minefield and subsequently comes under ambush from a large hill overlooking their new position. In the second, a U.S. task force in Iraq diverts around a biochemical hazard and subsequently comes under ambush from the roof of an abandoned building. MARS recognizes these stories as analogical, and derives the following abstraction: When enemy-placed obstacles force us into an unplanned route, beware of ambush from elevation or concealment. In this paper we describe the MARS interface, military operations data model, tactical situation ontology, and analogical reasoning algorithm.

  6. Worldwide Overview of Lessons Learned from Decommissioning Projects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laraia, Michele

    2008-01-01

    With an increasing number of radioactive facilities and reactors now reaching the end of their useful life and being taken out of service, there is a growing emphasis worldwide on the safe and efficient decommissioning of such plants. There is a wealth of experience already gained in decommissioning projects for all kinds of nuclear facilities. It is now possible to compare and discuss progress and accomplishments worldwide. In particular, rather than on the factual descriptions of projects, technologies and case histories, it is important to focus on lessons learned: in this way, the return of experience is felt to effectively contribute to progress. Key issues - inevitably based on a subjective ranking - are presented in this paper. Through the exchange of lessons learned, it is possible to achieve full awareness of the need for resources for and constraints of safe and cost-effective decommissioning. What remains now is the identification of specific, remaining issues that may hinder or delay the smooth progress of decommissioning. To this end, lessons learned provide the necessary background information; this paper tries to make extensive use of practical experience gained by the international community

  7. Reflections on Designing a MPA Service-Learning Component: Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Roman, Alexandru V.

    2015-01-01

    This article provides the "lessons learned" from the experience of redesigning two sections (face-to-face and online) of a core master of public administration class as a service-learning course. The suggestions made here can be traced to the entire process of the project, from the "seed idea" through its conceptualization and…

  8. Experiential Learning: Lessons Learned from the UND Business and Government Symposium

    Science.gov (United States)

    Harsell, Dana Michael; O'Neill, Patrick B.

    2010-01-01

    The authors describe lessons learned from a limited-duration experiential learning component of a Master's level course. The course is open to Master's in Business and Master's in Public Administration students and explores the relationships between government and business. A complete discussion of the Master's in Business and Master's in Public…

  9. Aviation Safety Risk Modeling: Lessons Learned From Multiple Knowledge Elicitation Sessions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Luxhoj, J. T.; Ancel, E.; Green, L. L.; Shih, A. T.; Jones, S. M.; Reveley, M. S.

    2014-01-01

    Aviation safety risk modeling has elements of both art and science. In a complex domain, such as the National Airspace System (NAS), it is essential that knowledge elicitation (KE) sessions with domain experts be performed to facilitate the making of plausible inferences about the possible impacts of future technologies and procedures. This study discusses lessons learned throughout the multiple KE sessions held with domain experts to construct probabilistic safety risk models for a Loss of Control Accident Framework (LOCAF), FLightdeck Automation Problems (FLAP), and Runway Incursion (RI) mishap scenarios. The intent of these safety risk models is to support a portfolio analysis of NASA's Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). These models use the flexible, probabilistic approach of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) and influence diagrams to model the complex interactions of aviation system risk factors. Each KE session had a different set of experts with diverse expertise, such as pilot, air traffic controller, certification, and/or human factors knowledge that was elicited to construct a composite, systems-level risk model. There were numerous "lessons learned" from these KE sessions that deal with behavioral aggregation, conditional probability modeling, object-oriented construction, interpretation of the safety risk results, and model verification/validation that are presented in this paper.

  10. A summary of lessons learned activities conducted at the OECD Halden Reactor Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hallbert, B.P.

    1997-01-01

    A series of lessons learned studies have been conducted at the OECD Halden Reactor Project. The purpose of these lessons learned reports are to summarize knowledge and experience gained across a number of research project. This paper presents a summary of main issues addressed in four of these lessons learned projects. These are concerned with software development and quality assurance, software reliability, methods for test and evaluation of developed systems, and the evaluation of system design features

  11. Considerations on Fail Safe Design for Design Basis Accident (DBA) vs. Design Extension Condition (DEC): Lesson Learnt from the Fukushima Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ha, Jun Su; Kim, Sungyeop

    2014-01-01

    The fail safety design is referred to as an inherently safe design concept where the failure of an SSC (System, Structure or Component) leads directly to a safe condition. Usually the fail safe design has been devised based on the design basis accident (DBAs), because the nuclear safety has been assured by securing the capability to safely cope with DBAs. Currently regards have been paid to the DEC (Design Extension Condition) as an extended design consideration. Hence additional attention should be paid to the concept of the fail safe design in order to consider the DEC, accordingly. In this study, a case chosen from the Fukushima accident is studied to discuss the issue associated with the fail safe design in terms of DBA and DEC standpoints. For the fail safe design to be based both on the DBA and the DEC, a Mode Changeable Fail Safe Design (MCFSD) is proposed in this study. Additional discussions on what is needed for the MCFSD to be applied in the nuclear safety are addressed as well. One of the lessons learnt from the Fukushima accident should include considerations on the fail-safe design in a changing regulatory framework. Currently the design extension condition (DEC) including severe accidents should be considered during designing and licensing NPPs. Hence concepts on the fail safe design need to be changed to be based on not only the DBA but also the DEC. In this study, a case on a fail-safe design chosen from the Fukushima accident is studied to discuss the issue associated with the fail safe design in terms of DBA and DEC conditions. For the fail safe design to be based both on the DBA and the DEC, a Mode Changeable Fail Safe Design (MCFSD) is proposed in this study. Additional discussions on what is needed for the MCFSD to be applied in the nuclear safety are addressed as well

  12. Lessons learned in communicating nuclear transportation issues - a case study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reilly, B.; Austin, P.

    1992-01-01

    Successful communication requires several key elements. They include a non-intimidating forum for exchanging information, two-way communication, advance preparation to identify what each party wants to learn, and feedback. There is no single approach that guarantees success. Factors such as technical complexity of the issue, level of support by the public, and trust and confidence among the parties all play a role in determining the most workable approach for any particular situation. This paper illustrates lessons learned by the US Department of Energy (DOE) in communicating nuclear waste disposal and transportation issues to the public

  13. Summary of the foreign countries reports on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants accident, on the lessons learnt and recommendation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nariai, Hideki

    2017-01-01

    This paper focused on the lessons and recommendations from the accident investigation reports prepared by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), IAEA, and OECD/NEA on the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station associated with the Great East Japan Earthquake. (1) As for the causes of the accident, the IAEA report pointed out as a technical factor that Japan's scientists did not think that the earthquake occurrence probability of the magnitude 9 as an external event was high. As for tsunami countermeasures, it reported that accident countermeasures would have been easier if only seawater pump flood protection and the high-elevation positioning of emergency power supply etc. were prepared. As for human organizational factor, it pointed out that nuclear regulations were performed by many divided organizations, and responsibility and authority were not clear. The NAS report pointed out that the regulatory agency and nuclear promotion agency were not functionally separated, and that the regulatory agency was not independent as a result of the relationship between the Japanese government agency and companies, and the agency became a captive of regulations. The following items were also reported; (2) safety measures and emergency preparedness, (3) off-site response during emergency, (4) radiation effects, (5) restoration after the accident, (6) international issues, and (7) issues of the spent fuel storage pool of NAS. Japan established the Nuclear Regulation Authority by integrating related organizations, but how to create a regulatory agency with advanced expertise is the future task. (A.O.)

  14. Lessons learned from case studies of inhalation exposures of workers to radioactive aerosols

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hoover, M.D.; Fencl, A.F.; Newton, G.J. [and others

    1995-12-01

    Various Department of Energy requirements, rules, and orders mandate that lessons learned be identified, evaluated, shared, and incorporated into current practices. The recently issued, nonmandatory DOE standard for Development of DOE Lessons Learned Program states that a DOE-wide lessons learned program will {open_quotes}help to prevent recurrences of negative experiences, highlight best practices, and spotlight innovative ways to solve problems or perform work more safely, efficiently, and cost effectively.{close_quotes} Additional information about the lessons learned program is contained in the recently issued DOE handbook on Implementing U.S. Department of Energy Lessons Learned Programs and in October 1995 DOE SAfety Notice on Lessons Learned Programs. This report summarizes work in progress at ITRI to identify lessons learned for worker exposures to radioactive aerosols, and describes how this work will be incorporated into the DOE lessons learned program, including a new technical guide for measuring, modeling, and mitigating airborne radioactive particles. Follow-on work is focusing on preparation of {open_quotes}lessons learned{close_quotes} training materials for facility designers, managers, health protection professionals, line supervisors, and workers.

  15. Impact of the Implementation of Information Technology on the Center for Army Lessons Learned

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Wizner, Anthony

    2001-01-01

    .... This research evaluates the impact that the implementation of an Information Technology infrastructure has had on the efficiency of Army's Lessons Learned Process and the overall effectiveness...

  16. The learning teacher in a collaborative lesson study team within the context of mathematics

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Goei, Sui Lin; Verhoef, Neeltje Cornelia

    2015-01-01

    This paper summarises results of two studies on teachers’ learning when participating in a collaborative Lesson Study team within the context of mathematics teaching. In study one, Lesson Study was used in the classic way of preparing, designing, executing and reflecting on the research lesson.

  17. Lessons Learned from Past and Ongoing Construction Projects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tabatabai, Omid

    2011-01-01

    Full text of publication follows: The nuclear industry in the U.S. faced many construction quality and design issues in the 1970's and 1980's. In 1984, the NRC issued NUREG-1055, 'Improving Quality and the Assurance of Quality in the Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants,' to document the lessons learned from nuclear power plant (NPP) construction in the U.S. In recent years, several countries have begun either planning for or actually constructing new NPPs. For instance, in the U.S., the nuclear industry has submitted several combined license and design certification applications to the NRC for licensing reviews and approval to build 30+ new NPP units. Latest construction experience from countries that are currently building new NPPs indicate that these countries are dealing with challenges that are similar to those issues that caused major quality assurance problems, delays, or even termination of several projects in U.S. in the 70's and 80's. The U.S. NRC is pro-actively taking measures to improve its regulatory programs as well as construction oversight activities before new NPPs construction begin in the U.S. In late 2007, the U.S. NRC's Office of New Reactors established a construction experience program (ConE) to obtain and evaluate construction and operating experience events and to identify the lessons learned from these events. In March 2009, the NRC published an Office Instruction to provide a process for incorporating the lessons learned and insights from the design, construction, and operation of the international and domestic NPPs into the licensing reviews, inspections, and construction of new reactors in the U.S. Additionally, the ConE program staff developed a Web-enabled database to store, manage, and make construction experience information available to all NRC technical reviewers as well as inspectors. Because this database contains information from other countries' regulators that are considered

  18. Covering techniques for severe burn treatment: lessons for radiological burn accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carsin, H.; Stephanazzi, J.; Lambert, F.; Curet, P.M.; Gourmelon, P.

    2002-01-01

    Covering techniques for severe burn treatment: lessons for radiological burn accidents. After a severe burn, the injured person is weakened by a risk of infection and a general inflammation. The necrotic tissues have to be removed because they are toxic for the organism. The injured person also needs to be covered by a cutaneous envelope, which has to be done by a treatment centre for burned people. The different techniques are the following: - auto grafts on limited burned areas; - cutaneous substitutes to cover temporary extended burned areas. Among them: natural substitutes like xenografts (pork skin, sheep skin,..) or allografts (human skin), - treated natural substitutes which only maintain the extracellular matrix. Artificial skins belong to this category and allow the development of high quality scars, - cell cultures in the laboratory: multiplying the individual cells and grafting them onto the patient. This technique is not common but allows one to heal severely injured patients. X-ray burns are still a problem. Their characteristics are analysed: intensive, permanent, antalgic resistant pain. They are difficult to compare with heat burns. In spite of a small number of known cases, we can give some comments and guidance on radio necrosis cures: the importance of the patients comfort, of ending the pain, of preventing infection, and nutritional balance. At the level of epidermic inflammation and phlyctena (skin blisters), the treatment may be completed by the use of growth factors. At the level of necrosis, after a temporary cover, an auto graft can be considered only if a healthy basis is guaranteed. The use of cellular cultures in order to obtain harmonious growth factors can be argued. (author)

  19. Involvement in Learning Revisited: Lessons We Have Learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Astin, Alexander W.

    1996-01-01

    Discusses interconnections between the following two national reports: (1) Involvement in Learning; and (2) The Student Learning Imperative. Reviews recent research on student development in order to demonstrate how student affairs professionals can use this information to enhance learning. (SNR)

  20. Chinese haze versus Western smog: lessons learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Junfeng Jim; Samet, Jonathan M

    2015-01-01

    Air pollution in many Chinese cities has been so severe in recent years that a special terminology, the "Chinese haze", was created to describe China's air quality problem. Historically, the problem of Chinese haze has developed several decades after Western high-income countries have significantly improved their air quality from the smog-laden days in the early- and mid-20(th) century. Hence it is important to provide a global and historical perspective to help China combat the current air pollution problems. In this regard, this article addresses the followings specific questions: (I) What is the Chinese haze in comparison with the sulfurous (London-type) smog and the photochemical (Los Angeles-type) smog? (II) How does Chinese haze fit into the current trend of global air pollution transition? (III) What are the major mitigation measures that have improved air quality in Western countries? and (IV) What specific recommendations for China can be derived from lessons and experiences from Western countries?

  1. Transradial access: lessons learned from cardiology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Snelling, Brian M; Sur, Samir; Shah, Sumedh Subodh; Marlow, Megan M; Cohen, Mauricio G; Peterson, Eric C

    2018-05-01

    Innovations in interventional cardiology historically predate those in neuro-intervention. As such, studying trends in interventional cardiology can be useful in exploring avenues to optimise neuro-interventional techniques. One such cardiology innovation has been the steady conversion of arterial puncture sites from transfemoral access (TFA) to transradial access (TRA), a paradigm shift supported by safety benefits for patients. While neuro-intervention has unique anatomical challenges, the access itself is identical. As such, examining the extensive cardiology literature on the radial approach has the potential to offer valuable lessons for the neuro-interventionalist audience who may be unfamiliar with this body of work. Therefore, we present here a report, particularly for neuro-interventionalists, regarding the best practices for TRA by reviewing the relevant cardiology literature. We focused our review on the data most relevant to our audience, namely that surrounding the access itself. By reviewing the cardiology literature on metrics such as safety profiles, cost and patient satisfaction differences between TFA and TRA, as well as examining the technical nuances of the procedure and post-procedural care, we hope to give physicians treating complex cerebrovascular disease a broader data-driven understanding of TRA. © Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.

  2. Lessons Learned from One-to-One

    Science.gov (United States)

    McLester, Susan

    2011-01-01

    When in 2002 Maine launched its pioneering Maine Learning Technology Initiative (MLTI) that equipped every one of the state's 30,000 seventh- and eighth-grade public school students and teachers with their own Apple iBook, all eyes were on the endeavor. As the first statewide one-to-one deployment, MLTI's $37 million education experiment…

  3. Lessons learned from the Apple stores.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pinkney, Henry; Baum, Neil

    2012-01-01

    Medical practices have an opportunity to improve the services that they offer their patients. Practices can look at other businesses and industries for examples of outstanding customer service. This article will discuss the services provided by Apple, Inc., and how medical practices can learn from this industry giant and improve the services that they offer patients.

  4. Lessons learned about ageing and gerontological nursing in South Africa

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Staja Q. Booker

    2015-07-01

    Full Text Available Background: The unprecedented global growth in older adults merits high-quality gerontological nursing care. As gerontological nursing grows in visibility in developed and developing countries, nurses must possess a broader worldview of ageing with knowledge of physiological, psychosocial, and cultural issues. Purpose: The purpose of this article is to: (1 highlight lessons learned on differences and similarities in ageing and care of older adults in the United States of America (USA and South Africa (SA; and (2 provide recommendations on how to advance gerontological nursingeducation in SA. Methods: A two-week international service-learning project was undertaken by visiting SA and learning about their nursing system and care of older adults. Service-learning is an innovative teaching-learning-service method that provided reflective and hands-on experience of gerontological nursing. This article provides a personal reflection of lessons learned about ageing and gerontological nursing during the service-learning project. Findings: Care of older adults in SA is in many ways different from and similar to that in the USA. Consequently global nurses should recognise those differences and provide culturally appropriate care. This service-learning experience also demonstrated the need for gerontological nursing education in SA. Based on this, recommendations on how to infuse and advance gerontological nursing education in SA are provided. Conclusion: Caring for older adults in a global context requires knowledge and understanding of cultures and their values and practices. With a growing population of diverse older adults, there is a need for incorporation

  5. Lessons learned from case studies of inhalation exposures of workers to radioactive aerosols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoover, M.D.; Fencl, A.F.; Newton, G.J.

    1995-01-01

    Various Department of Energy requirements, rules, and orders mandate that lessons learned be identified, evaluated, shared, and incorporated into current practices. The recently issued, nonmandatory DOE standard for Development of DOE Lessons Learned Program states that a DOE-wide lessons learned program will open-quotes help to prevent recurrences of negative experiences, highlight best practices, and spotlight innovative ways to solve problems or perform work more safely, efficiently, and cost effectively.close quotes Additional information about the lessons learned program is contained in the recently issued DOE handbook on Implementing U.S. Department of Energy Lessons Learned Programs and in October 1995 DOE SAfety Notice on Lessons Learned Programs. This report summarizes work in progress at ITRI to identify lessons learned for worker exposures to radioactive aerosols, and describes how this work will be incorporated into the DOE lessons learned program, including a new technical guide for measuring, modeling, and mitigating airborne radioactive particles. Follow-on work is focusing on preparation of open-quotes lessons learnedclose quotes training materials for facility designers, managers, health protection professionals, line supervisors, and workers

  6. Learning fire-fighting lessons after Chernobyl

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    Fire protection measures in Soviet nuclear power plants were set out in November 1987, in the Nuclear Power Plant Design Fire Protection Standards (VSN 01-87, USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy). The most important of these measures are. Avoiding as far as possible the use of combustible materials in plant structures and equipment. Dividing buildings and areas into suitable fire-fighting zones. Ensuring reliable fire protection of the control and safety systems. Protecting technical personnel from the dangers of a fire while they are performing essential accident-repair work and facilitating evacuation procedures (providing at least two evacuation routes and exits, anti-smoke protection of evacuation routes and control panel areas etc). Installing automatic fire-extinguishing and fire alarm systems. Providing various stationary facilities and equipment to assist the use of mobile fire-fighting appliances. In addition, a special fire-fighting division is being set up in every nuclear power plant while the first unit is still being constructed. These divisions work in close co-operation with the technical personnel management of the plant and with the bodies responsible for monitoring nuclear safety. (author)

  7. Lessons of the accident at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Veksler, L.M.

    1983-01-01

    Measures taken in the USA for improving safety of NPPs after the accident at ''Three Mile Island'' nuclear power plant are considered. Activities, related to elimination of accident consequences are analyzed. Perspectives of resuming the NPP operation are discussed

  8. Energy market reform - lessons learned and next steps

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doucet, G.

    2004-01-01

    This presentation will be based on the World Energy Council's recently published report, Energy Market Reform: Lessons Learned and Next Steps with Special Emphasis on the Energy Access Problems of Developing Countries. The report draws on practical lessons from past studies carried out by the World Energy Council and on current experiences on the desirable architecture of market reforms in electricity and natural gas. The approach of the study was not to further deepen the analysis or to provide technical recommendations but rather, to build a debate guided by the common thread of energy security and end-user e mpowerment , highlighting the possible areas of conflict of interest and the broad solutions that might be chosen depending on the local circumstances for different parts of the energy chains. The ambition was to identify key concerns and to initiate a debate on possible answers.(author)

  9. Improving the primary school science learning unit about force and motion through lesson study

    Science.gov (United States)

    Phaikhumnam, Wuttichai; Yuenyong, Chokchai

    2018-01-01

    The study aimed to develop primary school science lesson plan based on inquiry cycle (5Es) through lesson study. The study focused on the development of 4 primary school science lesson plans of force and motion for Grade 3 students in KKU Demonstration Primary School (Suksasart), first semester of 2015 academic year. The methodology is mixed method. The Inthaprasitha (2010) lesson study cycle was implemented in group of KKU Demonstration Primary School. Instruments of reflection of lesson plan developing included participant observation, meeting and reflection report, lesson plan and other document. The instruments of examining students' learning include classroom observation and achievement test. Data was categorized from these instruments to find the issues of changing and improving the good lesson plan of Thai primary school science learning. The findings revealed that teachers could develop the lesson plans through lesson study. The issues of changing and improving were disused by considering on engaging students related to societal issues, students' prior knowledge, scientific concepts for primary school students, and what they learned from their changing. It indicated that the Lesson Study allowed primary school science teachers to share ideas and develop ideas to improve the lesson. The study may have implications for Thai science teacher education through Lesson Study.

  10. The 2015 Nepal earthquake disaster: lessons learned one year on.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hall, M L; Lee, A C K; Cartwright, C; Marahatta, S; Karki, J; Simkhada, P

    2017-04-01

    The 2015 earthquake in Nepal killed over 8000 people, injured more than 21,000 and displaced a further 2 million. One year later, a national workshop was organized with various Nepali stakeholders involved in the response to the earthquake. The workshop provided participants an opportunity to reflect on their experiences and sought to learn lessons from the disaster. One hundred and thirty-five participants took part and most had been directly involved in the earthquake response. They included representatives from the Ministry of Health, local and national government, the armed forces, non-governmental organizations, health practitioners, academics, and community representatives. Participants were divided into seven focus groups based around the following topics: water, sanitation and hygiene, hospital services, health and nutrition, education, shelter, policy and community. Facilitated group discussions were conducted in Nepalese and the key emerging themes are presented. Participants described a range of issues encountered, some specific to their area of expertize but also more general issues. These included logistics and supply chain challenges, leadership and coordination difficulties, impacts of the media as well as cultural beliefs on population behaviour post-disaster. Lessons identified included the need for community involvement at all stages of disaster response and preparedness, as well as the development of local leadership capabilities and community resilience. A 'disconnect' between disaster management policy and responses was observed, which may result in ineffective, poorly planned disaster response. Finding time and opportunity to reflect on and identify lessons from disaster response can be difficult but are fundamental to improving future disaster preparedness. The Nepal Earthquake National Workshop offered participants the space to do this. It garnered an overwhelming sense of wanting to do things better, of the need for a Nepal-centric approach

  11. The roles of lesson study in the development of mathematics learning instrument based on learning trajectory

    Science.gov (United States)

    Misnasanti; Dien, C. A.; Azizah, F.

    2018-03-01

    This study is aimed to describe Lesson Study (LS) activity and its roles in the development of mathematics learning instruments based on Learning Trajectory (LT). This study is a narrative study of teacher’s experiences in joining LS activity. Data collecting in this study will use three methods such as observation, documentations, and deep interview. The collected data will be analyzed with Milles and Huberman’s model that consists of reduction, display, and verification. The study result shows that through LS activity, teachers know more about how students think. Teachers also can revise their mathematics learning instrument in the form of lesson plan. It means that LS activity is important to make a better learning instruments and focus on how student learn not on how teacher teach.

  12. Solid-State Lighting: Early Lessons Learned on the Way to Market

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sandahl, Linda J.; Cort, Katherine A.; Gordon, Kelly L.

    2013-12-31

    The purpose of this report is to document early challenges and lessons learned in the solid-state lighting (SSL) market development as part of the DOE’s SSL Program efforts to continually evaluate market progress in this area. This report summarizes early actions taken by DOE and others to avoid potential problems anticipated based on lessons learned from the market introduction of compact fluorescent lamps and identifies issues, challenges, and new lessons that have been learned in the early stages of the SSL market introduction. This study identifies and characterizes12 key lessons that have been distilled from DOE SSL program results.

  13. Lessons Learned in Student Venture Creation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Caner, Edward

    The Physics Entrepreneurship Master's Program (PEP) at Case Western Reserve University is now in its 15th year of operation. PEP is a 27 credit-hour Master of Science in Physics, Entrepreneurship Track. The curriculum can be tailored to the needs of each student. Coursework consists of graduate-level classes in science, business, intellectual property law, and innovation. A master's thesis is required that is based on a real-world project in innovation or entrepreneurship within an existing company or startup (possibly the student's). PEP faculty help students connect with mentors, advisors, partners, funding sources and job opportunities. In this talk I will chronicle several pitfalls that we have encountered with our ''real world'' student projects and start-up businesses, several of which met their complete demise despite showing great promise for success. I will discuss how we have learned to avoid most of these pitfalls by taking surprisingly simple actions.

  14. Lessons learned from man-made catastrophes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zebroski, E.L.

    1991-01-01

    Risk management is reminiscent of the parable of the blind men learning about the elephant by feeling about it from different directions. They had a wide range of perceptions. Several of the men felt tree trunks, others a huge snake, the sail of a boat, huge walls, or a rope. Imagine the symposium of these blind folks getting together and arguing about which are the most characteristic or essential parts of the elephant. Risk management is this kind of an elephant. It has many angles. GPU Nuclear, the sponsor of this symposium, seems to be one of the mall handful of organizations that is strongly directed and motivated to seek a whole vision of this very complex elephant. This paper reinforces some of Long's six steps of risk management. The intriguing problem is how to keep good advice from sounding like a series of cliches

  15. System 80+{trademark} standard design incorporates radiation protection lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Crom, T.D.; Naugle, C.L. [Duke Engineering & Services, Inc., Charlotte, NC (United States); Turk, R.S. [ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power, Windsor, CT (United States)

    1995-03-01

    Many lessons have been learned from the current generation of nuclear plants in the area of radiation protection. The following paper will outline how the lessons learned have been incorporated into the design and operational philosophy of the System 80+{trademark} Standard Design currently under development by ABB Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) with support from Duke Engineering and Services, Inc. and Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation in the Balance-of-Plant design. The System 80+{trademark} Standard Design is a complete nuclear power plant for national and international markets, designed in direct response to utility needs for the 1990`s, and scheduled for Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Design Certification under the new standardization rule (10 CFR Part 52). System 80+{trademark} is a natural extension of System 80{sup R} technology, an evolutionary change based on proven Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) in operation at Palo Verde in Arizona and under construction at Yonggwang in the Republic of Korea. The System 80+{trademark} Containment and much of the Balance of Plant design is based upon Duke Power Company`s Cherokee Plant, which was partially constructed in the late 1970`s, but, was later canceled (due to rapid declined in electrical load growth). The System 80+{trademark} Standard Design meets the requirements given in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Requirements Document. One of these requirements is to limit the occupational exposure to 100 person-rem/yr. This paper illustrates how this goal can be achieved through the incorporation of lessons learned, innovative design, and the implementation of a common sense approach to operation and maintenances practices.

  16. Solid-State Lighting. Early Lessons Learned on the Way to Market

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sandahl, L. J.; Cort, K. A.; Gordon, K. L.

    2014-01-01

    Analysis of issues and lessons learned during the early stages of solid-state lighting market introduction in the U.S., which also summarizes early actions taken to avoid potential problems anticipated based on lessons learned from the market introduction of compact fluorescent lamps.

  17. Lessons learned on utilizing the SEI/CMM in the federal government work for others environment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stewart, A.

    1997-11-01

    This report contains viewgraphs on lessons learned on utilizing the Software Engineering Institute Capability Maturity Model in the federal government work for others environment. These viewgraphs outline: data systems research and development; what is the SEI/CMM; Data Systems Research and Development process improvement approach; accomplishments; and lessons learned.

  18. Lessons from Goiania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nazari Alves, R.

    2000-01-01

    The lessons learned from the radiological accident of Goiania in 1987 derived from the observations from the Regulatory Agency which was in charge of the decontamination tasks may be consolidated into four classes: Preventive Actions, characterised as those that aim to minimise the probability of occurrence of a radiological accident; Minimisation of time between the moment of the accident occurrence and the beginning of intervention, in case a radiological accident does occur, despite all preventive measures; Intervention, which is correlated to the type of installation, its geographical location, the social classes involved and their contamination vectors; and Follow up, for which well established rules to allow continuing monitoring of the victims and rebuilding of homes are necessary. The greatest lesson of all was the need for integration of the professionals involved, from all organizations. (author)

  19. Lessons offered, lessons learned: reflections on how doing family therapy can affect therapists.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Heatherington, Laurie; Friedlander, Myrna L; Diamond, Gary M

    2014-08-01

    Only in working conjointly with couples and families do therapists literally witness clients struggling to improve their most intimate relationships. In writing this article, we realized that, in true systemic fashion, not only have many of our clients benefited from working with us, but also we have learned some invaluable lessons from them. Indeed, practicing couple and family therapy gives therapists many opportunities to learn about themselves, especially when it is done thoughtfully. In this article, we reflect on myriad ways in which couples and family therapy has affected each of us personally-as individuals, as partners, as parents, as adult children in our families of origin, and as educators. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  20. Space reactor safety, 1985--1995 lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, A.C.

    1995-01-01

    Space reactor safety activities and decisions have evolved over the last decade. Important safety decisions have been made in the SP-100, Space Exploration Initiative, NEPSTP, SNTP, and Bimodal Space Reactor programs. In addition, international guidance on space reactor safety has been instituted. Space reactor safety decisions and practices have developed in the areas of inadvertent criticality, reentry, radiological release, orbital operation, programmatic, and policy. In general, the lessons learned point out the importance of carefully reviewing previous safety practices for appropriateness to space nuclear programs in general and to the specific mission under consideration

  1. Ballistic trauma: lessons learned from iraq and afghanistan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shin, Emily H; Sabino, Jennifer M; Nanos, George P; Valerio, Ian L

    2015-02-01

    Management of upper extremity injuries secondary to ballistic and blast trauma can lead to challenging problems for the reconstructive surgeon. Given the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, advancements in combat-casualty care, combined with a high-volume experience in the treatment of ballistic injuries, has led to continued advancements in the treatment of the severely injured upper extremity. There are several lessons learned that are translatable to civilian trauma centers and future conflicts. In this article, the authors provide an overview of the physics of ballistic injuries and principles in the management of such injuries through experience gained from military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

  2. Vitrification operational experiences and lessons learned at the WVDP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamel, W.F. Jr.; Sheridan, M.J.; Valenti, P.J.

    1997-01-01

    The Vitrification Facility (VF) at the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) commenced full, high-level radioactive waste (HLW) processing activities in July 1996. The HLW consists of a blend of washed plutonium-uranium extraction (PUREX) sludge, neutralized thorium extraction (THOREX) waste, and cesium-loaded zeolite. The waste product is borosilicate glass contained in stainless steel canisters, sealed for eventual disposal in a federal repository. This paper discusses the WVDP vitrification process, focusing on operational experience and lessons learned during the first year of continuous, remote operation

  3. Closure of a mixed waste landfill: Lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phifer, M.A.

    1990-01-01

    Much experience has been gained during the closure of the Mixed Waste Management Facility (MWMF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and many lessons were learned. This knowledge was applied to other closures at SRS yielding decreased costs, schedule enhancement, and increased overall project efficiency. The next major area of experience to be gained at SRS in the field of waste site closures will be in the upkeep, maintenance, and monitoring of clay caps. Further test programs will be required to address these requirements

  4. Regional Stability & Lessons Learned in Regional Peace Building

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Vestenskov, David; Johnsen, Anton Asklund

    , as none of the countries is able to deal with the intrastate and interstate conflicts on its own. The conference Regional Stability & Lessons Learned in Regional Peace Building was the result of comprehensive cooperation between Pakistan’s National Defence University and the Royal Danish Defence College......The NATO-led intervention in Afghanistan is coming to an end, and the necessity of regional peace building solutions for the region’s security issues seems more exigent than ever before. Regional states have to come to terms with each other in some ways if violent extremists are to be countered...

  5. Lessons learned by southern states in transportation of radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-03-01

    This report has been prepared under a cooperative agreement with DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) and is a summary of the lessons learned by southern states regarding the transportation of radioactive materials including High-Level Radioactive Wastes (HLRW) and Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). Sources used in this publication include interviews of state radiological health and public safety officials that are members of the Southern States Energy Board (SSEB) Advisory Committee on Radioactive Materials Transportation, as well as the Board's Transuranic (TRU) Waste Transportation Working Group. Other sources include letters written by the above mentioned committees concerning various aspects of DOE shipment campaigns

  6. Designing a database for performance assessment: Lessons learned from WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martell, M.A.; Schenker, A.

    1997-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Compliance Certification Application (CCA) Performance Assessment (PA) used a relational database that was originally designed only to supply the input parameters required for implementation of the PA codes. Reviewers used the database as a point of entry to audit quality assurance measures for control, traceability, and retrievability of input information used for analysis, and output/work products. During these audits it became apparent that modifications to the architecture and scope of the database would benefit the EPA regulator and other stakeholders when reviewing the recertification application. This paper contains a discussion of the WPP PA CCA database and lessons learned for designing a database

  7. Development of an HIV Prevention Videogame: Lessons Learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kimberly Hieftje

    2016-06-01

    Full Text Available The use of videogames interventions is becoming an increasingly popular and effective strategy in disease prevention and health promotion; however, few health videogame interventions have been scientifically rigorously evaluated for their efficacy. Moreover, few examples of the formative process used to develop and evaluate evidence-based health videogame interventions exist in the scientific literature. The following paper provides valuable insight into the lessons learned during the process of developing the risk reduction and HIV prevention videogame intervention for young adolescents, PlayForward: Elm City Stories. 

  8. Tuberculin immunotherapy: its history and lessons to be learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vilaplana, Cristina; Cardona, Pere-Joan

    2010-02-01

    The use of tuberculin for the therapy of tuberculosis was attempted more than 100 years ago and abandoned because of its adverse reactions. In this historical review we point out that some of the intensive efforts to avoid the reactions were based on the best scientific rationale available at that time. Balancing the dosage and intervals of tuberculin delivery with clinical and laboratory monitoring of patients achieved a limited success, with implications, toward current research in the field. The role of economical and social aspects at that time is also a lesson to be learned toward current approaches to tuberculosis control. Copyright 2009 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.

  9. Evidence for Ancient Life in Mars Meteorites: Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    McKay, D. S.

    1998-01-01

    The lines of evidence we first proposed as supporting a hypothesis of early life on Mars are discussed by Treiman, who presents pros and cons of our hypothesis in the light of subsequent research by many groups. Our assessment of the current status of the many controversies over our hypothesis is given in reports by Gibson et al. Rather than repeat or elaborate on that information, I prefer to take an overview and present what I think are some of the "lessons learned" by our team in particular, and by the science community in general.

  10. PUREX/UO3 facilities deactivation lessons learned history

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gerber, M.S.

    1997-01-01

    In May 1997, a historic deactivation project at the PUREX (Plutonium URanium EXtraction) facility at the Hanford Site in south-central Washington State concluded its activities (Figure ES-1). The project work was finished at $78 million under its original budget of $222.5 million, and 16 months ahead of schedule. Closely watched throughout the US Department of Energy (DOE) complex and by the US Department of Defense for the value of its lessons learned, the PUREX Deactivation Project has become the national model for the safe transition of contaminated facilities to shut down status

  11. JLab SRF Cavity Fabrication Errors, Consequences and Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marhauser, Frank

    2011-01-01

    Today, elliptical superconducting RF (SRF) cavities are preferably made from deep-drawn niobium sheets as pursued at Jefferson Laboratory (JLab). The fabrication of a cavity incorporates various cavity cell machining, trimming and electron beam welding (EBW) steps as well as surface chemistry that add to forming errors creating geometrical deviations of the cavity shape from its design. An analysis of in-house built cavities over the last years revealed significant errors in cavity production. Past fabrication flaws are described and lessons learned applied successfully to the most recent in-house series production of multi-cell cavities.

  12. Space reactor safety, 1985--1995 lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marshall, A.C.

    1995-12-31

    Space reactor safety activities and decisions have evolved over the last decade. Important safety decisions have been made in the SP-100, Space Exploration Initiative, NEPSTP, SNTP, and Bimodal Space Reactor programs. In addition, international guidance on space reactor safety has been instituted. Space reactor safety decisions and practices have developed in the areas of inadvertent criticality, reentry, radiological release, orbital operation, programmatic, and policy. In general, the lessons learned point out the importance of carefully reviewing previous safety practices for appropriateness to space nuclear programs in general and to the specific mission under consideration.

  13. Job task analysis: lessons learned from application in course development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meredith, J.B.

    1985-01-01

    Those at Public Service Electric and Gas Company are committed to a systematic approach to training known as Instructional System Design. Our performance-based training emphasizes the ISD process to have trainees do or perform the task whenever and wherever it is possible for the jobs for which they are being trained. Included is a brief description of our process for conducting and validating job analyses. The major thrust of this paper is primarily on the lessons that we have learned in the design and development of training programs based upon job analysis results

  14. PUREX/UO{sub 3} facilities deactivation lessons learned: History

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gerber, M.S.

    1997-11-25

    In May 1997, a historic deactivation project at the PUREX (Plutonium URanium EXtraction) facility at the Hanford Site in south-central Washington State concluded its activities (Figure ES-1). The project work was finished at $78 million under its original budget of $222.5 million, and 16 months ahead of schedule. Closely watched throughout the US Department of Energy (DOE) complex and by the US Department of Defense for the value of its lessons learned, the PUREX Deactivation Project has become the national model for the safe transition of contaminated facilities to shut down status.

  15. Lessons Learned From Community-Based Approaches to Sodium Reduction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kane, Heather; Strazza, Karen; Losby PhD, Jan L.; Lane, Rashon; Mugavero, Kristy; Anater, Andrea S.; Frost, Corey; Margolis, Marjorie; Hersey, James

    2017-01-01

    Purpose This article describes lessons from a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention initiative encompassing sodium reduction interventions in six communities. Design A multiple case study design was used. Setting This evaluation examined data from programs implemented in six communities located in New York (Broome County, Schenectady County, and New York City); California (Los Angeles County and Shasta County); and Kansas (Shawnee County). Subjects Participants (n = 80) included program staff, program directors, state-level staff, and partners. Measures Measures for this evaluation included challenges, facilitators, and lessons learned from implementing sodium reduction strategies. Analysis The project team conducted a document review of program materials and semi structured interviews 12 to 14 months after implementation. The team coded and analyzed data deductively and inductively. Results Five lessons for implementing community-based sodium reduction approaches emerged: (1) build relationships with partners to understand their concerns, (2) involve individuals knowledgeable about specific venues early, (3) incorporate sodium reduction efforts and messaging into broader nutrition efforts, (4) design the program to reduce sodium gradually to take into account consumer preferences and taste transitions, and (5) identify ways to address the cost of lower-sodium products. Conclusion The experiences of the six communities may assist practitioners in planning community-based sodium reduction interventions. Addressing sodium reduction using a community-based approach can foster meaningful change in dietary sodium consumption. PMID:24575726

  16. Lessons learned from community-based approaches to sodium reduction.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kane, Heather; Strazza, Karen; Losby, Jan L; Lane, Rashon; Mugavero, Kristy; Anater, Andrea S; Frost, Corey; Margolis, Marjorie; Hersey, James

    2015-01-01

    This article describes lessons from a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention initiative encompassing sodium reduction interventions in six communities. A multiple case study design was used. This evaluation examined data from programs implemented in six communities located in New York (Broome County, Schenectady County, and New York City); California (Los Angeles County and Shasta County); and Kansas (Shawnee County). Participants (n = 80) included program staff, program directors, state-level staff, and partners. Measures for this evaluation included challenges, facilitators, and lessons learned from implementing sodium reduction strategies. The project team conducted a document review of program materials and semistructured interviews 12 to 14 months after implementation. The team coded and analyzed data deductively and inductively. Five lessons for implementing community-based sodium reduction approaches emerged: (1) build relationships with partners to understand their concerns, (2) involve individuals knowledgeable about specific venues early, (3) incorporate sodium reduction efforts and messaging into broader nutrition efforts, (4) design the program to reduce sodium gradually to take into account consumer preferences and taste transitions, and (5) identify ways to address the cost of lower-sodium products. The experiences of the six communities may assist practitioners in planning community-based sodium reduction interventions. Addressing sodium reduction using a community-based approach can foster meaningful change in dietary sodium consumption.

  17. Lessons learned from a great master!

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wagner Seixas da Silva

    2015-06-01

    Full Text Available Teaching Biochemistry is a huge challenge in the basic cycle of many undergraduate courses. How to convince students that this discipline is important for their academic degree so early in their college journeys? It may be hard to define in words a good teaching strategy for this purpose, but during the 70s'/80's a group of professors accepted this tough task! Professor Leopoldo de Meis paid particular attention to the way of teaching biochemistry. As a very sensitive person, he realized that the secret to a good teaching would be to keep the students motivated with doses of challenge.With this in mind, Prof. de Meis joined a small group of professors and graduate students from the former Department of Medical Biochemistry, now named Institute of Medical Biochemistry Leopoldo de Meis, at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, and proposed to use the Discovery learning method in classroom. The idea was to present the contents of the biochemistry course while challenging students to interpret the original data of the major biochemical findings. For this purpose, each biochemistry theme was shown through the experiments that led to the originally obtained conclusions currently present in the textbooks. Thus, students were motivated to ask questions and propose experiments that allow the interpretation of the scientists’ historical results. At first the methodology seemed very novel and difficult, but over the first few minutes the environment became a place for broad scientific discussion, where students enthusiastically participated and developed the ability to draw up the necessary questions to decipher the functioning of metabolic pathways. The parallel between the observed experimental facts and the physiological state of the experimental model used in classic experiments permitted the development of a broad and critical knowledge in the learning of biochemistry.To imagine that the students were motivated to develop the autonomy of

  18. What Needs to be Changed based on Lessons Learned from Chernobyl

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abramova, V. N.

    2016-01-01

    aspect, cognitive and operational structures and formalized notation about personnel regulation activity. The researches have shown that individual psychological data of Chernobyl NPP personnel, which could be a direct cause of wrong actions and lead to the accident, were not differ from another nuclear power plant personnel ones. Analysis of psychological aspects of Chernobyl accident and investigation of plant personnel motivation changes in the accident consequences elimination environment confirm the necessity to develop concept of careful relation to worker. It is necessary to develop psychological support methodology to form human capital both in two aspects: professional personality formation and human resource management. The history asks the following questions: have the Chernobyl lessons been learned? Are our contemporaries and next generation ready to provide safety in the nuclear power plants? The terrorist attacks, military actions in the states who have nuclear power plants makes more complex problem of nuclear power plant, all mankind safety. (author)

  19. Using Selective Redundancy and Testing to Optimize Learning from Multimedia Lessons

    OpenAIRE

    Yue, Carole Leigh

    2014-01-01

    Multimedia learning refers to learning from a combination of words and images. In the present dissertation, a multimedia lesson is defined as an animated, narrated educational video that depicts a scientific process--a format of instructional material becoming increasingly common in online, hybrid, and traditional classrooms. The overarching goal of the present research was to investigate how to optimize learning from multimedia lessons using two related theories of multimedia learning (the...

  20. Implementation of problem-based learning in geometry lessons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ahamad, S. N. S. H.; Li, H.-C.; Shahrill, M.; Prahmana, R. C. I.

    2017-12-01

    The aim of this study is twofold. Firstly, it aims to examine the effects of the Problem-Based Learning (PBL) approach on students’ performance in the learning of geometry. Secondly, it seeks to gain insights from the students regarding the implementation of PBL in geometry lessons. The participants were 22 students from one Year 10 class in a co-educational secondary school in Brunei Darussalam. A mixed method design was employed with data collected from the pre-, post- and retention tests, and interviews. The findings from this study revealed positive influences on students’ performance in learning geometry as gain and retention of knowledge was observed. Meanwhile, mixed responses from the interviews implied that in terms of 1) learning attitudes, students favoured the idea of independent learning but some critiqued that the process of PBL might be time-consuming; 2) learning difficulties, some students struggled in assimilating information leading to poor decision- making; and 3) knowledge and skills, some students believed to have nurtured some skills such as communication and research skills.

  1. Lessons learned from perinatal exposure to diethylstilbestrol

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Newbold, Retha R

    2004-09-01

    The synthetic estrogen diethylstilbestrol (DES) is well documented to be a perinatal carcinogen in both humans and experimental animals. Exposure to DES during critical periods of differentiation permanently alters the programming of estrogen target tissues resulting in benign and malignant abnormalities in the reproductive tract later in life. Using the perinatal DES-exposed rodent model, cellular and molecular mechanisms have been identified that play a role in these carcinogenic effects. Although DES is a potent estrogenic chemical, effects of low doses of the compound are being used to predict health risks of weaker environmental estrogens. Therefore, it is of particular interest that developmental exposure to very low doses of DES has been found to adversely affect fertility and to increase tumor incidence in murine reproductive tract tissues. These adverse effects are seen at environmentally relevant estrogen dose levels. New studies from our lab verify that DES effects are not unique; when numerous environmental chemicals with weak estrogenic activity are tested in the experimental neonatal mouse model, developmental exposure results in an increased incidence of benign and malignant tumors including uterine leiomyomas and adenocarcinomas that are similar to those shown following DES exposure. Finally, growing evidence in experimental animals suggests that some adverse effects can be passed on to subsequent generations, although the mechanisms involved in these trans-generational events remain unknown. Although the complete spectrum of risks to DES-exposed humans are uncertain at this time, the scientific community continues to learn more about cellular and molecular mechanisms by which perinatal carcinogenesis occurs. These advances in knowledge of both genetic and epigenetic mechanisms will be significant in ultimately predicting risks to other environmental estrogens and understanding more about the role of estrogens in normal and abnormal development.

  2. Lessons learned from perinatal exposure to diethylstilbestrol

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newbold, Retha R.

    2004-01-01

    The synthetic estrogen diethylstilbestrol (DES) is well documented to be a perinatal carcinogen in both humans and experimental animals. Exposure to DES during critical periods of differentiation permanently alters the programming of estrogen target tissues resulting in benign and malignant abnormalities in the reproductive tract later in life. Using the perinatal DES-exposed rodent model, cellular and molecular mechanisms have been identified that play a role in these carcinogenic effects. Although DES is a potent estrogenic chemical, effects of low doses of the compound are being used to predict health risks of weaker environmental estrogens. Therefore, it is of particular interest that developmental exposure to very low doses of DES has been found to adversely affect fertility and to increase tumor incidence in murine reproductive tract tissues. These adverse effects are seen at environmentally relevant estrogen dose levels. New studies from our lab verify that DES effects are not unique; when numerous environmental chemicals with weak estrogenic activity are tested in the experimental neonatal mouse model, developmental exposure results in an increased incidence of benign and malignant tumors including uterine leiomyomas and adenocarcinomas that are similar to those shown following DES exposure. Finally, growing evidence in experimental animals suggests that some adverse effects can be passed on to subsequent generations, although the mechanisms involved in these trans-generational events remain unknown. Although the complete spectrum of risks to DES-exposed humans are uncertain at this time, the scientific community continues to learn more about cellular and molecular mechanisms by which perinatal carcinogenesis occurs. These advances in knowledge of both genetic and epigenetic mechanisms will be significant in ultimately predicting risks to other environmental estrogens and understanding more about the role of estrogens in normal and abnormal development

  3. 241-SY-101 air lance removal lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, T.L.; Titzler, P.A.

    1994-01-01

    An emergency task was undertaken to remove four air lances and one thermocouple (TC) tree from tank 241-SY-101 (SY-101). This resulted from video observation that these pipes were being severely bent during periodic gas release events that regularly occurred every three to four months. At the time, the gas release events were considered to be the number one safety issue within the US Department of Energy (DOE) complex. This emergency removal task was undertaken on an extremely short schedule that required all activities possible to be completed in parallel. This approach and extremely short schedule, while successful, resulted in some undesirable consequences from less than desired time for design, reviews, equipment testing, operations training, and bad weather conditions. These consequences included leakage of liquid waste from the containers to the ground, higher than expected dose rates at the container surface, difficult field operations, and unexpected pipe configuration during removal. In addition, changes to environmental regulations and severe winter weather impacted the packaging and shipping activities required the prepare the removed pipes for storage at the Central Waste Complex (CWC). The purpose of this document is to identify lessons to be learned for future activities. In context of the emergency conditions that existed at the time and the urgency to remove these pipes, their removal was successfully completed under extremely difficult conditions and schedule. The success of the task should not be overshadowed by the desire to identify areas needing improvement and lessons to be learned. Many of the lessons identified in this document have already resulted in improved conduct of operations and engineering

  4. Cybernetic Service-Learning Course Development: Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Marx, Jonathan I.; Miller, Lee Q.

    2009-01-01

    Although the title of the course, Combating Loneliness among Older People in Contemporary Society, states a clear goal, our service-learning class was shaped by five guiding parameters. By avoiding certain things, we allowed the course to self-organize and evolve into a learning experience beyond the one originally envisioned. This paper…

  5. "Involvement in Learning" Revisited: Lessons We Have Learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Astin, Alexander W.

    1999-01-01

    Originally published in March/April 1996, reviews the interconnections between two national reports, "Involvement in Learning," and the "Student Learning Imperative." Focuses on the issue of shared values and demonstrates how student affairs professionals can utilize the most recent research to realize the full potential of the…

  6. Lessons from school: what nurse leaders can learn from education.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Davies, Nigel

    2015-07-01

    The drive to improve quality in the education sector is similar to that in health care, and lessons from the schools system are relevant to nursing leadership. This article discusses these shared traits, and details how school improvement was achieved in London and how a model of learning-centred leadership helped to transform pupil attainment in schools that had been performing poorly. Parallels are drawn between the education inspection system undertaken by Ofsted and the hospital inspections undertaken by the Care Quality Commission, and between the practice discipline-based managerial roles of nurse directors and head teachers. The article suggests that a learning-centred approach to improving the quality of patient care is needed, with a focus on the education and continuing professional development of staff.

  7. User observations on information sharing (corporate knowledge and lessons learned)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Montague, Ronald A.; Gregg, Lawrence A.; Martin, Shirley A.; Underwood, Leroy H.; Mcgee, John M.

    1993-01-01

    The sharing of 'corporate knowledge' and lessons learned in the NASA aerospace community has been identified by Johnson Space Center survey participants as a desirable tool. The concept of the program is based on creating a user friendly information system that will allow engineers, scientists, and managers at all working levels to share their information and experiences with other users irrespective of location or organization. The survey addresses potential end uses for such a system and offers some guidance on the development of subsequent processes to ensure the integrity of the information shared. This system concept will promote sharing of information between NASA centers, between NASA and its contractors, between NASA and other government agencies, and perhaps between NASA and institutions of higher learning.

  8. Lessons-Learned from an Event during Overhaul

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jitae [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-05-15

    The event frequency, also including portion of human errors, has been decreasing compared to last ten years. However, events due to human errors during overhaul occur every year. From analyzed results for human-related events during overhaul, similar problems were identified. And organizational and safety cultural factors were also identified. On the other hand, another event during overhaul is analyzed and Lessons-Learned is drawn in an aspect of the operators' situation awareness. There was an event during overhaul and the analyzed results drawn Lessons-Learned in the aspect of the operators' situation awareness. From the analysis, several alarms and variation of plant parameters during overhaul can occur due to various maintenance works and tests. And in the aspect of the situation awareness, operators can miss, neglect, or not recognize the abnormal situation due to other maintenance activities occurring simultaneously. Therefore, countermeasures such as operator education or training, development of operator support systems, and further researches should be necessary to cope with these problems.

  9. Risk management and lessons learned solutions for satellite product assurance

    Science.gov (United States)

    Larrère, Jean-Luc

    2004-08-01

    The historic trend of the space industry towards lower cost programmes and more generally a better economic efficiency raises a difficult question to the quality assurance community: how to achieve the same—or better—mission success rate while drastically reducing the cost of programmes, hence the cost and level of quality assurance activities. EADS Astrium Earth Observation and Science (France) Business Unit have experimented Risk Management and Lessons Learned on their satellite programmes to achieve this goal. Risk analysis and management are deployed from the programme proposal phase through the development and operations phases. Results of the analysis and the corresponding risk mitigation actions are used to tailor the product assurance programme and activities. Lessons learned have been deployed as a systematic process to collect positive and negative experience from past and on-going programmes and feed them into new programmes. Monitoring and justification of their implementation in programmes is done under supervision from the BU quality assurance function. Control of the system is ensured by the company internal review system. Deployment of these methods has shown that the quality assurance function becomes more integrated in the programme team and development process and that its tasks gain focus and efficiency while minimising the risks associated with new space programmes.

  10. Lessons learned from the PMI case study: the community perspective.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hare, M L; Orians, C E; Kennedy, M G; Goodman, K J; Wijesinha, S; Seals, B F

    2000-03-01

    This summary report presents the lessons learned during the two-part qualitative case study on the efficacy of the Prevention Marketing Initiative (PMI) in its implementation of an HIV prevention program. About 179 community participants were included in the PMI program, which discussed topics ranging from organizing initial planning committees to financially sustaining federal demonstration programs. One of the successes observed was the development of rapport with schools and churches; however, during the course of its implementation, the program realized the necessity of 1) approaching the program as an ongoing process; 2) going beyond studying the target population through formative research; 3) changing the role of a community coalition as the project matures; 4) reexamining the composition of coalition in the light of the target audience; 5) advocating the project as a community resource that promotes collaboration; 6) attending the needs of coalition members; and 7) using the media in the campaign. Likewise, several lessons were also learned in the areas of youth involvement, intervention development, program implementation, and maintenance of PMI activities.

  11. Lessons Learned In Aerosol Monitoring With The RASA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forrester, Joel B.; Bowyer, Ted W.; Carty, Fitz; Comes, Laura; Eslinger, Paul W.; Greenwood, Lawrence R.; Haas, Derek A.; Hayes, James C.; Kirkham, Randy R.; Lepel, Elwood A.; Litke, Kevin E.; Miley, Harry S.; Morris, Scott J.; Schrom, Brian T.; Van Davelaar, Peter; Woods, Vincent T.

    2011-01-01

    The Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer (RASA) is an automated aerosol collection and analysis system designed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in the 1990's and is deployed in several locations around the world as part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) required under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The RASA operates unattended, save for regularly scheduled maintenance, iterating samples through a three-step process on a 24-hour interval. In its 15-year history, much has been learned from the operation and maintenance of the RASA that can benefit engineering updates or future aerosol systems. On 11 March 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami rocked the eastern coast of Japan, resulting in power loss and cooling failures at the Daiichi nuclear power plants in Fukushima Prefecture. Aerosol collections were conducted with the RASA in Richland, WA. We present a summary of the lessons learned over the history of the RASA, including lessons taken from the Fukushima incident, regarding the RASA IMS stations operated by the United States.

  12. Operational experience - Lessons learned from IRS-reports in Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wetzel, N.; Maqua, M.

    2005-01-01

    The international Incident Reporting System (IRS), jointly operated by IAEA and OECD-NEA, is a main source of safety significant findings and lessons learned of nuclear operating experience. GRS (Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit mbH) is a scientific-technical expert and research organisation. On Behalf of the Federal Minister of Environment, Nature Conservation and Reactor Safety (BMU), GRS provides the IRS officer. The evaluation of IRS-Reports and the dissemination of the main findings including the assessment of the relevance for German NPPs is task of GRS. The value of IRS is among experts undoubted. But nevertheless, the reporting to IRS decreases since some years. This presentation is aimed to show the support of IRS in strengthening the safety of German NPPs. The evaluation of IRS-Reports at GRS is three-fold. It comprises initial screening, quarterly and yearly reporting and the development of specific German Information Notices on safety significant events with direct applicability to German NPPs. Some examples of lessons learned from recent international events are discussed below. These examples shall demonstrate that the use of the IRS enhances significantly the knowledge on operational events. (author)

  13. Psychosocial Rehabilitation: Some Lessons Learned From Natural Disaster in Iran

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Fardin Alipour

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Background: Disasters have adverse impacts on different aspects of human life. Psychosocial Rehabilitation is one of the fields which is usually overshadowed and ignored by physical rehabilitation or its importance does not receive proper attention. This research attempts to study some lessons learned from Psychosocial Rehabilitation based on disaster experiences in Iran. Materials and Methods: This study has a conventional qualitative content analysis design. The participants of study were 15 people with direct experience of earthquake and 12 experts in this field. The study sample was selected by purposeful sampling method and the data were collected by semi-structured interviews. Results: Lack of a suitable system to deliver Psychosocial Rehabilitation, challenge in establishing balance between short-term and long-term social and mental needs, lack of mental and social experts, inefficiency in using social capital and capacities are the most important lessons learned in this field. Conclusion: Lack of awareness of mental and social problems of affected people after disaster is one of the most important barriers in successful and stable rehabilitation. Psychosocial Rehabilitation requires a suitable structure and planning for all stages of disaster management.

  14. Lessons learned from decommissioning projects at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salazar, M.

    1995-01-01

    This paper describes lessons learned over the last 20 years from 12 decommissioning projects at Los Alamos National Laboratory. These lessons relate both to overall program management and to management of specific projects during the planning and operations phases. The issues include waste management; the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA); contracting; public involvement; client/customer interface; and funding. Key elements of our approach are to be proactive; follow the observation method; perform field activities concurrently; develop strategies to keep reportable incidents from delaying work; seek and use programs, methods, etc., in existence to shorten learning curves; network to help develop solutions; and avoid overstudying and overcharacterizing. This approach results in preliminary plans that require very little revision before implementation, reasonable costs and schedules, early acquisition of permits and NEPA documents, preliminary characterization reports, and contracting documents. Our track record is good -- the last four projects (uranium and plutonium-processing facility and three research reactors) have been on budget and on schedule

  15. Lessons learned from the decommissioning of NORM facility in Malaysia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kontol, Khairuddin M.; Omar, Muhamat; Ahmad, Syed H.S.S.

    2008-01-01

    Full text: Malaysia Decommissioning of Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) facility in Malaysia will run into unforeseeable complications and difficulties if there is no proper planning. The Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB) plays important role in guiding and assisting the operator/contractor in this NORM decommissioning project. A local Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) processing plant located in the northern region of peninsular Malaysia had ceased its operations and decided to decommission and remediate its site for the final release of the site. The remediated site is earmarked as an industrial site. During its operations, monazites are processed for rare earth elements such as cerium and lanthanum. It's plant capable of processing monazite to produce rare earth chloride and rare earth carbonate. The main by-product of monazite processing is the radioactive cake containing primarily thorium hydroxide. Operation of the monazite processing plant started in early eighties and terminated in early nineties. The decommissioning of the plant site started in late 2003 and completed its decommissioning and remediation works in early 2006. This paper described the lesson learned by Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuclear Malaysia) in conducting third party independent audit for the decommissioning of the NORM contaminated facility. By continuously reviewing the lessons learned, mistakes and/or inefficiencies in this plant decommissioning project, hopefully will result in a smoother, less costly and more productive future decommissioning works on NORM facilities in Malaysia. (author)

  16. Lessons learned by southern states in designating alternative routes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-08-01

    The purpose of this report is to discuss the ''lessons learned'' by the five states within the southem region that have designated alternative or preferred routes under the regulations of the Department of Transportation (DOT) established for the transportation of radioactive materials. The document was prepared by reviewing applicable federal laws and regulations, examining state reports and documents and contacting state officials and routing agencies involved in making routing decisions. In undertaking this project, the Southern States Energy Board hopes to reveal the process used by states that have designated alternative routes and thereby share their experiences (i.e., lessons learned) with other southern states that have yet to make designations. Under DOT regulations (49 CFR 177.826), carriers of highway route controlled quantities of radioactive materials (which include spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste) must use preferred routes selected to reduce time in transit. Such preferred routes consist of (1) an interstate system highway with use of an interstate system bypass or beltway around cities when available, and (2) alternate routes selected by a ''state routing agency.''

  17. Lessons-Learned from an Event during Overhaul

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jitae

    2013-01-01

    The event frequency, also including portion of human errors, has been decreasing compared to last ten years. However, events due to human errors during overhaul occur every year. From analyzed results for human-related events during overhaul, similar problems were identified. And organizational and safety cultural factors were also identified. On the other hand, another event during overhaul is analyzed and Lessons-Learned is drawn in an aspect of the operators' situation awareness. There was an event during overhaul and the analyzed results drawn Lessons-Learned in the aspect of the operators' situation awareness. From the analysis, several alarms and variation of plant parameters during overhaul can occur due to various maintenance works and tests. And in the aspect of the situation awareness, operators can miss, neglect, or not recognize the abnormal situation due to other maintenance activities occurring simultaneously. Therefore, countermeasures such as operator education or training, development of operator support systems, and further researches should be necessary to cope with these problems

  18. A summary of the Three Mile Island accident: from zero hour to lessons for the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliveira, L.F.S. de; Oliveira Barroso, A.C. de

    The accident that occured at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, unit 2 (TMI-2) in March 1979 is analysed. The main events that occured during the accident are described in detail. The main project features of TMI-2 and Angra-1 nuclear power plant, Brazil are compared and analysed. (L.F.S.) [pt

  19. The lessons from the radiation accidents in China over the past 40 years

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang, Y.; Ma, J.; Yang, J.

    1998-01-01

    A brief introduction and analysis of the radiological accidents in China during the past 40 years have been made in this paper. Statistical data provided by the competent authority show that a number of cases of radiological accidents and events happened in China from 1954 to 1994. Quite a few persons received abnormal exposure. Some serious accidents resulted in death of 8 victims. The reasons of these accidents are analyzed and some recommendations for reduction of potential exposure and accidents involving radiation sources and equipment generating ionization radiation have been given, such as perfecting and improving radiation safety infrastructure and system for the control of radiation sources. It is suggested that safety culture shall be fostered, each individual must be suitably trained and qualified and the management of spent sources should be strengthened. (author)

  20. WHY CANT WE LEARN FROM OUR MISTAKES LEARN THE LESSON TELL THE STORY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LANGSTAFF, D.C.

    2005-01-01

    Tell the story well and people can learn from the lesson. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) and its contractors are pursuing environmental remediation at the Hanford Site. This endeavor has been underway for a number of years, both at Hanford and at other sites across the DOE complex. Independently, the occurrence of two fatalities on two Sites at opposite ends of the country within two weeks raised the question, ''What is going on in the Field?'' Corporate EM management communicated directly with Field Office Managers to answer the question. As a result of this intense interest and focused communication, EM identified four areas that need additional exploration. One of those is, ''EM's ability to learn from its mistakes.'' The need to cultivate the ability to learn from our mistakes is not unique to DOE. A quick review of EM Lessons Learned reports shows that most of the reports in the EM system originate at the sites with the largest budgets doing the most work. Not surprising. A second look, however, reveals that many reports are repetitive, that many people might consider many reports trivial, and that reports on some of the more significant events sometimes take a long time to get distributed across the DOE Complex. Spot checks of event reports revealed frequent identification of symptoms rather than root causes. With a high percentage of identified root causes in the questionable category, it is highly unlikely that the real root causes of many events are being corrected, thus leading to recurrences of events. To learn the lesson from an event, people need to be aware of the root causes of the event. Someone has to tell a story the reader can learn from, i.e., include all the information needed to understand what happened and why it happened. Most importantly, they need to understand the lesson to be learned

  1. Epidemiologic Methods Lessons Learned from Environmental Public Health Disasters: Chernobyl, the World Trade Center, Bhopal, and Graniteville, South Carolina

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Timothy A. Mousseau

    2012-08-01

    Full Text Available Background: Environmental public health disasters involving hazardous contaminants may have devastating effects. While much is known about their immediate devastation, far less is known about long-term impacts of these disasters. Extensive latent and chronic long-term public health effects may occur. Careful evaluation of contaminant exposures and long-term health outcomes within the constraints imposed by limited financial resources is essential. Methods: Here, we review epidemiologic methods lessons learned from conducting long-term evaluations of four environmental public health disasters involving hazardous contaminants at Chernobyl, the World Trade Center, Bhopal, and Graniteville (South Carolina, USA. Findings: We found several lessons learned which have direct implications for the on-going disaster recovery work following the Fukushima radiation disaster or for future disasters. Interpretation: These lessons should prove useful in understanding and mitigating latent health effects that may result from the nuclear reactor accident in Japan or future environmental public health disasters.

  2. Report of Special Review Group, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, on lessons learned from Three Mile Island

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    The IE Special Review Group (SRG) was constituted by V. Stello, Jr., Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE), in a memorandum to IE Management dated July 12, 1979, to review the lessons learned from the Three Mile Island (TMI) Accident. This memorandum is enclosed as Appendix A to this report. The members of SRG were selected on the basis of their qualifications and experience in IE. SRG members were selected mainly from Regional Offices. Several of the members had been assigned to Three Mile Island following the accident. Several members had been assigned to the Incident Response Center in NRC Headquarters following the accident. Several other members had no direct involvement in responding to the accident. SRG was divided into two groups, one to review the preventive aspects and one to review the responsive aspects. This action was taken so that the qualifications of individual SRG members could be utilized most efficiently across the spectrum of matters considered. Although for the most part the two groups worked separately, each member of SRG has reviewed the entire report and concurs in its contents

  3. Analysis of Surface Water Pollution Accidents in China: Characteristics and Lessons for Risk Management

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yao, Hong; Zhang, Tongzhu; Liu, Bo; Lu, Feng; Fang, Shurong; You, Zhen

    2016-04-01

    Understanding historical accidents is important for accident prevention and risk mitigation; however, there are no public databases of pollution accidents in China, and no detailed information regarding such incidents is readily available. Thus, 653 representative cases of surface water pollution accidents in China were identified and described as a function of time, location, materials involved, origin, and causes. The severity and other features of the accidents, frequency and quantities of chemicals involved, frequency and number of people poisoned, frequency and number of people affected, frequency and time for which pollution lasted, and frequency and length of pollution zone were effectively used to value and estimate the accumulated probabilities. The probabilities of occurrences of various types based on origin and causes were also summarized based on these observations. The following conclusions can be drawn from these analyses: (1) There was a high proportion of accidents involving multi-district boundary regions and drinking water crises, indicating that more attention should be paid to environmental risk prevention and the mitigation of such incidents. (2) A high proportion of accidents originated from small-sized chemical plants, indicating that these types of enterprises should be considered during policy making. (3) The most common cause (49.8 % of the total) was intentional acts (illegal discharge); accordingly, efforts to increase environmental consciousness in China should be enhanced.

  4. Analysis of Surface Water Pollution Accidents in China: Characteristics and Lessons for Risk Management.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yao, Hong; Zhang, Tongzhu; Liu, Bo; Lu, Feng; Fang, Shurong; You, Zhen

    2016-04-01

    Understanding historical accidents is important for accident prevention and risk mitigation; however, there are no public databases of pollution accidents in China, and no detailed information regarding such incidents is readily available. Thus, 653 representative cases of surface water pollution accidents in China were identified and described as a function of time, location, materials involved, origin, and causes. The severity and other features of the accidents, frequency and quantities of chemicals involved, frequency and number of people poisoned, frequency and number of people affected, frequency and time for which pollution lasted, and frequency and length of pollution zone were effectively used to value and estimate the accumulated probabilities. The probabilities of occurrences of various types based on origin and causes were also summarized based on these observations. The following conclusions can be drawn from these analyses: (1) There was a high proportion of accidents involving multi-district boundary regions and drinking water crises, indicating that more attention should be paid to environmental risk prevention and the mitigation of such incidents. (2) A high proportion of accidents originated from small-sized chemical plants, indicating that these types of enterprises should be considered during policy making. (3) The most common cause (49.8% of the total) was intentional acts (illegal discharge); accordingly, efforts to increase environmental consciousness in China should be enhanced.

  5. Thirty years after the Chernobyl accident: What lessons have we learnt?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beresford, N.A.; Fesenko, S.; Konoplev, A.; Skuterud, L.; Smith, J.T.; Voigt, G.

    2016-01-01

    April 2016 sees the 30 th anniversary of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. As a consequence of the accident populations were relocated in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine and remedial measures were put in place to reduce the entry of contaminants (primarily 134+137 Cs) into the human food chain in a number of countries throughout Europe. Remedial measures are still today in place in a number of countries, and areas of the former Soviet Union remain abandoned. The Chernobyl accident led to a large resurgence in radioecological studies both to aid remediation and to be able to make future predictions on the post-accident situation, but, also in recognition that more knowledge was required to cope with future accidents. In this paper we discuss, what in the authors' opinions, were the advances made in radioecology as a consequence of the Chernobyl accident. The areas we identified as being significantly advanced following Chernobyl were: the importance of semi-natural ecosystems in human dose formation; the characterisation and environmental behaviour of ‘hot particles'; the development and application of countermeasures; the “fixation” and long term bioavailability of radiocaesium and; the effects of radiation on plants and animals. - Highlights: • A review of 30 years of radioecological studies following the 1986 Chernobyl accident. • Key contributions to radioecology from post-Chernobyl research are discussed.

  6. A brief review of the accident at Three Mile Island

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corey, G.R.

    1979-01-01

    A question-and-answer format is used to discuss the Three Mile Reactor accident and the lessons learned. The aspects touched upon include the hydrogen bubble, the radiation levels the public was exposed to, and the consequences of the accident to the nuclear power program

  7. The TMI-2 accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loureiro, L.A.

    1986-01-01

    A critical study about the technical and man-related facts in order to establish what is considered the worst commercial nuclear power accident until 1986. Radiological consequences and stress to the public are considered in contrast to antinuclear groups. This descriptive and technical study has the purpose to document written and oral opinions obtained abroad and then explain to the public in an easy language terminology. Preliminary study describing safety related systems fails and the accident itself with minute to minute description, conduct to the consequences and then, to learned lessons

  8. PUREX/UO3 Facilities deactivation lessons learned history

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gerber, M.S.

    1996-09-19

    accompanied by and were an integral part of sweeping ``culture changes,`` the story of the lessons learned during the PUREX Deactivation Project are worth recounting. Foremost among the lessons is recognizing the benefits of ``right to left`` project planning. A deactivation project must start by identifying its end points, then make every task, budget, and organizational decision based on reaching those end points. Along with this key lesson is the knowledge that project planning and scheduling should be tied directly to costing, and the project status should be checked often (more often than needed to meet mandated reporting requirements) to reflect real-time work. People working on a successful project should never be guessing about its schedule or living with a paper schedule that does not represent the actual state of work. Other salient lessons were learned in the PUREX/UO3 Deactivation Project that support these guiding principles. They include recognizing the value of independent review, teamwork, and reengineering concepts; the need and value of cooperation between the DOE, its contractors, regulators, and stakeholders; and the essential nature of early and ongoing communication. Managing a successful project also requires being willing to take a fresh look at safety requirements and to apply them in a streamlined and sensible manner to deactivating facilities; draw on the enormous value of resident knowledge acquired by people over years and sometimes decades of working in old plants; and recognize the value of bringing in outside expertise for certain specialized tasks.This approach makes possible discovering the savings that can come when many creative options are pursued persistently and the wisdom of leaving some decisions to the future. The essential job of a deactivation project is to place a facility in a safe, stable, low-maintenance mode, for an interim period. Specific end points are identified to recognize and document this state. Keeping the limited

  9. Unintended Learning in Primary School Practical Science Lessons from Polanyi's Perspective of Intellectual Passion

    Science.gov (United States)

    Park, Jisun; Song, Jinwoong; Abrahams, Ian

    2016-01-01

    This study explored, from the perspective of intellectual passion developed by Michael Polanyi, the unintended learning that occurred in primary practical science lessons. We use the term "unintended" learning to distinguish it from "intended" learning that appears in teachers' learning objectives. Data were collected using…

  10. Experimental analysis of the performance of machine learning algorithms in the classification of navigation accident records

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    REIS, M V. S. de A.

    2017-06-01

    Full Text Available This paper aims to evaluate the use of machine learning techniques in a database of marine accidents. We analyzed and evaluated the main causes and types of marine accidents in the Northern Fluminense region. For this, machine learning techniques were used. The study showed that the modeling can be done in a satisfactory manner using different configurations of classification algorithms, varying the activation functions and training parameters. The SMO (Sequential Minimal Optimization algorithm showed the best performance result.

  11. Involving users with learning difficulties in health improvement: lessons from inclusive learning disability research.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Walmsley, Jan

    2004-03-01

    In this paper the author considers the lessons to be drawn from what is termed "inclusive" learning disability research for user involvement around health improvement. Inclusive learning disability research refers to research where people with learning difficulties (intellectual disability) are involved as active participants, as opposed to passive subjects. There is by now a considerable body of such research, developed over the past 25 years. From the review, the author draws attention to areas which can inform practice in involvement of users in a way that adds value.

  12. Learning on governance in forest ecosystems: Lessons from recent research

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Catherine May Tucker

    2010-09-01

    Full Text Available Research on forest governance has intensified in recent decades with evidence that efforts to mitigate deforestation and encourage sustainable management have had mixed results. This article considers the progress that has been made in understanding the range of variation in forest governance and management experiences. It synthesizes findings of recent interdisciplinary research efforts, with particular attention to work conducted through the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change and the International Forestry Resources and Institution Research Program. By identifying areas of progress, lessons learned, and challenges for successful forest governance, the discussion points to policy implications and priorities for research.Research on forest governance has intensified in recent decades with evidence that efforts to mitigate deforestation and encourage sustainable management have had mixed results. This article considers the progress that has been made in understanding the range of variation in forest governance and management experiences. It synthesizes findings of recent interdisciplinary research efforts, which indicate that sustainable management of forest resources is associated with secure rights, institutions that fit the local context, and monitoring and enforcement. At the same time, the variability in local contexts and interactions of social, political, economic and ecological processes across levels and scales of analysis create uncertainties for the design and maintenance of sustainable forest governance.  By identifying areas of progress, lessons learned, and gaps in knowledge, the discussion suggests priorities for further research.Research on forest governance has intensified in recent decades with evidence that efforts to mitigate deforestation and encourage sustainable management have had mixed results. This article considers the progress that has been made in understanding the range of

  13. Lesson Study-Building Communities of Learning Among Pre-Service Science Teachers

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hamzeh, Fouada

    Lesson Study is a widely used pedagogical approach that has been used for decades in its country of origin, Japan. It is a teacher-led form of professional development that involves the collaborative efforts of teachers in co-planning and observing the teaching of a lesson within a unit for evidence that the teaching practices used help the learning process (Lewis, 2002a). The purpose of this research was to investigate if Lesson Study enables pre-service teachers to improve their own teaching in the area of science inquiry-based approaches. Also explored are the self-efficacy beliefs of one group of science pre-service teachers related to their experiences in Lesson Study. The research investigated four questions: 1) Does Lesson Study influence teacher preparation for inquiry-based instruction? 2) Does Lesson Study improve teacher efficacy? 3) Does Lesson Study impact teachers' aspiration to collaborate with colleagues? 4) What are the attitudes and perceptions of pre-service teachers to the Lesson Study idea in Science? The 12 participants completed two pre- and post-study surveys: STEBI- B, Science Teaching Efficacy Belief Instrument (Enochs & Riggs, 1990) and ASTQ, Attitude towards Science Teaching. Data sources included student teaching lesson observations, lesson debriefing notes and focus group interviews. Results from the STEBI-B show that all participants measured an increase in efficacy throughout the study. This study added to the body of research on teaching learning communities, professional development programs and teacher empowerment.

  14. Thirty years after the Chernobyl accident: What lessons have we learnt?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Beresford, N A; Fesenko, S; Konoplev, A; Skuterud, L; Smith, J T; Voigt, G

    2016-06-01

    April 2016 sees the 30(th) anniversary of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. As a consequence of the accident populations were relocated in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine and remedial measures were put in place to reduce the entry of contaminants (primarily (134+137)Cs) into the human food chain in a number of countries throughout Europe. Remedial measures are still today in place in a number of countries, and areas of the former Soviet Union remain abandoned. The Chernobyl accident led to a large resurgence in radioecological studies both to aid remediation and to be able to make future predictions on the post-accident situation, but, also in recognition that more knowledge was required to cope with future accidents. In this paper we discuss, what in the authors' opinions, were the advances made in radioecology as a consequence of the Chernobyl accident. The areas we identified as being significantly advanced following Chernobyl were: the importance of semi-natural ecosystems in human dose formation; the characterisation and environmental behaviour of 'hot particles'; the development and application of countermeasures; the "fixation" and long term bioavailability of radiocaesium and; the effects of radiation on plants and animals. Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

  15. Implementing and measuring safety goals and safety culture. 2. Extensive Efforts to Learn Lessons from Overseas Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maki, Nobuo

    2001-01-01

    The transfer of nuclear power plant (NPP) operating experiences is one of the important measures for the safe operation of NPPs. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO),World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), and Nuclear Information Center of Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry are the organizations providing Japanese utilities with useful information on incidents and accidents that have occurred at foreign NPPs. The Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) has established two organizations to make extensive efforts to learn lessons from overseas NPPs: One is the Nuclear Power Plant Maintenance Training Center (MTC), and the other is the Institute of Nuclear Safety System (INSS). This paper describes the function of these organizations in transferring knowledge and expertise to ensure the safe operation of Japanese NPPs as well as recent outcomes. MTC was set up in October 1983. Before its establishment, expertise on NPP maintenance was mainly transferred on an on-the-job basis through daily maintenance work. However, after various NPP incidents and accidents, the importance of off-site training for maintenance personnel was emphasized. MTC possesses full-sized or nearly full sized mockups of Mihama NPP Unit 3 and Takahama NPP Unit 3. Furthermore, many kinds of mechanical, electrical, and instrumental equipment are furnished for training. In 1999, more than 2400 (man/day) maintenance personnel in total had training at MTC. In the tube rupture accident of a steam generator of KEPCO's Mihama Unit 2 on February 9, 1991, the emergency core cooling system actuated for the first time in the history of NPP operation in Japan. The cause of the accident was a fault in the manufacturing process of the steam generator, which was not detected until the accident. After an in-depth evaluation of the accident, many corrective actions were taken to prevent the recurrence of a similar accident. As a part of the actions, KEPCO established INSS in March

  16. Lessons Learned from the Puerto Rico Battery Energy Storage System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BOYES, JOHN D.; DE ANA, MINDI FARBER; TORRES, WENCESLANO

    1999-09-01

    The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) installed a distributed battery energy storage system in 1994 at a substation near San Juan, Puerto Rico. It was patterned after two other large energy storage systems operated by electric utilities in California and Germany. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Energy Storage Systems Program at Sandia National Laboratories has followed the progress of all stages of the project since its inception. It directly supported the critical battery room cooling system design by conducting laboratory thermal testing of a scale model of the battery under simulated operating conditions. The Puerto Rico facility is at present the largest operating battery storage system in the world and is successfully providing frequency control, voltage regulation, and spinning reserve to the Caribbean island. The system further proved its usefulness to the PREPA network in the fall of 1998 in the aftermath of Hurricane Georges. The owner-operator, PREPA, and the architect/engineer, vendors, and contractors learned many valuable lessons during all phases of project development and operation. In documenting these lessons, this report will help PREPA and other utilities in planning to build large energy storage systems.

  17. Massachusetts nuclear power referendum: Lessons learned from the campaign trail

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allen, S.R.

    1989-01-01

    Last November, Massachusetts voters cast their ballots on a binding initiative which, if passed, would have prohibited the production of high-level waste, thereby permanently shutting down the state's two nuclear power plants: Yankee and Pilgrim. Question 4, as the initiative became known, posed an unprecedented challenge for the state's six major utilities. Essentially, Question 4 was defeated for two reasons: compelling arguments and a well-founded strategy for communicating those arguments. One part of that strategy was the use of debates and public-speaking engagements before both civic groups and on radio/television. These debates and presentations were clearly the most interesting part of the campaign and provided many insights that may be applied to long-term public policy and informational programs. Obviously, there is a significant difference between an intense, focused campaign and an ongoing, diverse public information program-but many of the principles are the same. The purpose of this paper is to review some of the key lessons learned from over 300 debates and presentations in the highly emotional atmosphere of the Question 4 campaign. Throughout the campaign, debaters and speakers submitted after action reports, and it is from these as well as the overall campaign results that the lessons and anecdotes are derived

  18. Preservation and Implementation of Decommissioning Lessons Learned in the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, Rafael L.

    2008-01-01

    Over the past several years, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has actively worked to capture and preserve lessons learned from the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. More recently, NRC has involved industry groups, the Organization of Agreement States (OAS), and the Department of Energy (DOE) in the effort to develop approaches to capture, preserve and disseminate decommissioning lessons learned. This paper discusses the accomplishments of the working group, some lessons learned by the NRC in the recent past, and how NRC will incorporate these lessons learned into its regulatory framework. This should help ensure that the design and operation of current and future nuclear facilities will result in less environmental impact and more efficient decommissioning. In summary, the NRC will continue capturing today's experience in decommissioning so that future facilities can take advantage of lessons learned from today's decommissioning projects. NRC, both individually and collectively with industry groups, OAS, and DOE, is aggressively working on the preservation and implementation of decommissioning lessons learned. The joint effort has helped to ensure the lessons from the whole spectrum of decommissioning facilities (i.e., reactor, fuel cycle, and material facilities) are better understood, thus maximizing the amount of knowledge and best practices obtained from decommissioning activities. Anticipated regulatory activities at the NRC will make sure that the knowledge gained from today's decommissioning projects is preserved and implemented to benefit the nuclear facilities that will decommission in the future

  19. Critical Steps in Learning From Incidents: Using Learning Potential in the Process From Reporting an Incident to Accident Prevention

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Drupsteen, L.; Groeneweg, J.; Zwetsloot, G.I.J.M.

    2013-01-01

    Many incidents have occurred because organisations have failed to learn from lessons of the past. This means that there is room for improvement in the way organisations analyse incidents, generate measures to remedy identified weaknesses and prevent reoccurrence: the learning from incidents process.

  20. PUREX/UO{sub 3} facilities deactivation lessons learned history

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hamrick, D.G.; Gerber, M.S.

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility operated from 1956-1972, from 1983-1988, and briefly during 1989-1990 to produce for national defense at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The Uranium Trioxide (UO{sub 3}) Facility operated at the Hanford Site from 1952-1972, 1984-1988, and briefly in 1993. Both plants were ordered to permanent shutdown by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in December 1992, thus initiating their deactivation phase. Deactivation is that portion of a facility`s life cycle that occurs between operations and final decontamination and decommissioning (D&D). This document details the history of events, and the lessons learned, from the time of the PUREX Stabilization Campaign in 1989-1990, through the end of the first full fiscal year (FY) of the deactivation project (September 30, 1994).

  1. Lessons learned on probabilistic methodology for precursor analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Babst, Siegfried; Wielenberg, Andreas; Gaenssmantel, Gerhard

    2016-01-01

    Based on its experience in precursor assessment of operating experience from German NPP and related international activities in the field, GRS has identified areas for enhancing probabilistic methodology. These are related to improving the completeness of PSA models, to insufficiencies in probabilistic assessment approaches, and to enhancements of precursor assessment methods. Three examples from the recent practice in precursor assessments illustrating relevant methodological insights are provided and discussed in more detail. Our experience reinforces the importance of having full scope, current PSA models up to Level 2 PSA and including hazard scenarios for precursor analysis. Our lessons learned include that PSA models should be regularly updated regarding CCF data and inclusion of newly discovered CCF mechanisms or groups. Moreover, precursor classification schemes should be extended to degradations and unavailabilities of the containment function. Finally, PSA and precursor assessments should put more emphasis on the consideration of passive provisions for safety, e. g. by sensitivity cases.

  2. Lessons learned on probabilistic methodology for precursor analyses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Babst, Siegfried [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH, Berlin (Germany); Wielenberg, Andreas; Gaenssmantel, Gerhard [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH, Garching (Germany)

    2016-11-15

    Based on its experience in precursor assessment of operating experience from German NPP and related international activities in the field, GRS has identified areas for enhancing probabilistic methodology. These are related to improving the completeness of PSA models, to insufficiencies in probabilistic assessment approaches, and to enhancements of precursor assessment methods. Three examples from the recent practice in precursor assessments illustrating relevant methodological insights are provided and discussed in more detail. Our experience reinforces the importance of having full scope, current PSA models up to Level 2 PSA and including hazard scenarios for precursor analysis. Our lessons learned include that PSA models should be regularly updated regarding CCF data and inclusion of newly discovered CCF mechanisms or groups. Moreover, precursor classification schemes should be extended to degradations and unavailabilities of the containment function. Finally, PSA and precursor assessments should put more emphasis on the consideration of passive provisions for safety, e. g. by sensitivity cases.

  3. Development of a public health reporting data warehouse: lessons learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rizi, Seyed Ali Mussavi; Roudsari, Abdul

    2013-01-01

    Data warehouse projects are perceived to be risky and prone to failure due to many organizational and technical challenges. However, often iterative and lengthy processes of implementation of data warehouses at an enterprise level provide an opportunity for formative evaluation of these solutions. This paper describes lessons learned from successful development and implementation of the first phase of an enterprise data warehouse to support public health surveillance at British Columbia Centre for Disease Control. Iterative and prototyping approach to development, overcoming technical challenges of extraction and integration of data from large scale clinical and ancillary systems, a novel approach to record linkage, flexible and reusable modeling of clinical data, and securing senior management support at the right time were the main factors that contributed to the success of the data warehousing project.

  4. Lessons learned from nuclear power plant posttrip monitoring systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barasa, W.A.

    1989-01-01

    This paper discusses a program to identify common causes of unit trips and cost-effective evaluation of the options for addressing the causes. The core of the program is a living historical data base of events, based on root-cause analysis of station-specific events, that provides a means of segregating common-cause failures from random failures. Once common-cause failures at a specific plant are identified, the payback periods of the options to address a specific unit trip cause - modification, procedural changes, or status quo - can be calculated by comparing the cost of the modifications with the cost of the lost electrical production, which is also determined from the historical data base. This paper describes how the information is developed and gives examples of how the lessons learned from previous trips can be applied to the elimination of the causes

  5. Controlling changes - lessons learned from waste management facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, B.M.; Koplow, A.S.; Stoll, F.E.; Waetje, W.D.

    1995-01-01

    This paper discusses lessons learned about change control at the Waste Reduction Operations Complex (WROC) and Waste Experimental Reduction Facility (WERF) of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). WROC and WERF have developed and implemented change control and an as-built drawing process and have identified structures, systems, and components (SSCS) for configuration management. The operations have also formed an Independent Review Committee to minimize costs and resources associated with changing documents. WROC and WERF perform waste management activities at the INEL. WROC activities include storage, treatment, and disposal of hazardous and mixed waste. WERF provides volume reduction of solid low-level waste through compaction, incineration, and sizing operations. WROC and WERF's efforts aim to improve change control processes that have worked inefficiently in the past

  6. Alzheimer's Disease: Lessons Learned from Amyloidocentric Clinical Trials.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Soejitno, Andreas; Tjan, Anastasia; Purwata, Thomas Eko

    2015-06-01

    Alzheimer's disease (AD) is one of the most debilitating neurodegenerative diseases and is predicted to affect 1 in 85 people by 2050. Despite much effort to discover a therapeutic strategy to prevent progression or to cure AD, to date no effective disease-modifying agent is available that can prevent, halt, or reverse the cognitive and functional decline of patients with AD. Several underlying etiologies to this failure are proposed. First, accumulating evidence from past trials suggests a preventive as opposed to therapeutic paradigm, and the precise temporal and mechanistic relationship of β-amyloid (Aβ) and tau protein should be elucidated to confirm this hypothesis. Second, we are in urgent need of revised diagnostic criteria to support future trials. Third, various technical and methodological improvements are required, based on the lessons learned from previous failed trials.

  7. Lessons learned in managing crowdsourced data in the Alaskan Arctic.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mastracci, Diana

    2017-04-01

    There is perhaps no place in which the consequences of global climate change can be felt more acutely than the Arctic. However, due to lack of measurements at the high latitudes, validation processes are often problematic. Citizen science projects, co-designed together with Native communities at the interface of traditional knowledge and scientific research, could play a major role in climate change adaptation strategies by advancing knowledge of the Arctic system, strengthening inter-generational bonds and facilitating improved knowledge transfer. This presentation will present lessons learned from a pilot project in the Alaskan Arctic, in which innovative approaches were used to design climate change adaptation strategies to support young subsistence hunters in taking in-situ measurements whilst out on the sea-ice. Both the socio-cultural and hardware/software challenges presented in this presentation, could provide useful guidance for future programs that aim to integrate citizens' with scientific data in Arctic communities.

  8. [Managing digital medical imaging projects in healthcare services: lessons learned].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rojas de la Escalera, D

    2013-01-01

    Medical imaging is one of the most important diagnostic instruments in clinical practice. The technological development of digital medical imaging has enabled healthcare services to undertake large scale projects that require the participation and collaboration of many professionals of varied backgrounds and interests as well as substantial investments in infrastructures. Rather than focusing on systems for dealing with digital medical images, this article deals with the management of projects for implementing these systems, reviewing various organizational, technological, and human factors that are critical to ensure the success of these projects and to guarantee the compatibility and integration of digital medical imaging systems with other health information systems. To this end, the author relates several lessons learned from a review of the literature and the author's own experience in the technical coordination of digital medical imaging projects. Copyright © 2012 SERAM. Published by Elsevier Espana. All rights reserved.

  9. Lessons Learned From Developing Reactor Pressure Vessel Steel Embrittlement Database

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wang, Jy-An John [ORNL

    2010-08-01

    Materials behaviors caused by neutron irradiation under fission and/or fusion environments can be little understood without practical examination. Easily accessible material information system with large material database using effective computers is necessary for design of nuclear materials and analyses or simulations of the phenomena. The developed Embrittlement Data Base (EDB) at ORNL is this comprehensive collection of data. EDB database contains power reactor pressure vessel surveillance data, the material test reactor data, foreign reactor data (through bilateral agreements authorized by NRC), and the fracture toughness data. The lessons learned from building EDB program and the associated database management activity regarding Material Database Design Methodology, Architecture and the Embedded QA Protocol are described in this report. The development of IAEA International Database on Reactor Pressure Vessel Materials (IDRPVM) and the comparison of EDB database and IAEA IDRPVM database are provided in the report. The recommended database QA protocol and database infrastructure are also stated in the report.

  10. Lessons learned form high-flux isotope reactor restart efforts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dahl, T.L.

    1989-01-01

    When the high-flux isotope reactor's (HFIR's) pressure vessel irradiation surveillance specimens were examined in December 1986, unexpected embrittlement was found. The resulting investigation disclosed widespread deficiencies in quality assurance and management practices. On March 24, 1987, the US Department of Energy (DOE) mandated a shutdown of all five Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) research reactors. Since the beginning of 1987, 18 different formal review groups have evaluated the management and operations of the HFIR. The root cause of the identified deficiencies in the HFIR program was defined as a lack of rigor in management practices and complacency built on twenty years of trouble-free operation. A number of lessons can be learned from the HFIR experience. Particular insight can be gained by comparing the HFIR organization prior to the shutdown with the organization that exists today. Key elements in such a comparison include staffing, funding, discipline, and formality in operations, maintenance, and management

  11. Nuclear Instrumentation and Control Cyber Testbed Considerations – Lessons Learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonathan Gray; Robert Anderson; Julio G. Rodriguez; Cheol-Kwon Lee

    2014-08-01

    Abstract: Identifying and understanding digital instrumentation and control (I&C) cyber vulnerabilities within nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities, is critical if nation states desire to operate nuclear facilities safely, reliably, and securely. In order to demonstrate objective evidence that cyber vulnerabilities have been adequately identified and mitigated, a testbed representing a facility’s critical nuclear equipment must be replicated. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has built and operated similar testbeds for common critical infrastructure I&C for over ten years. This experience developing, operating, and maintaining an I&C testbed in support of research identifying cyber vulnerabilities has led the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute of the Republic of Korea to solicit the experiences of INL to help mitigate problems early in the design, development, operation, and maintenance of a similar testbed. The following information will discuss I&C testbed lessons learned and the impact of these experiences to KAERI.

  12. Nuclear Instrumentation and Control Cyber Testbed Considerations - Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonathan, Peter Grey; Robert, S Anderson; Julio, G Rodriguez; Lee, Cheol Kwon

    2014-01-01

    Identifying and understanding digital instrumentation and control (I and C) cyber vulnerabilities within nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities is critical if nation states desire to operate nuclear facilities safely, reliably, and securely. To demonstrate objective evidence that cyber vulnerabilities have been adequately identified and mitigated, a test bed representing a facility's critical nuclear equipment must be replicated. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has built and operated similar test beds for common critical infrastructure I and C for over 10 years. This experience developing, operating, and maintaining an I and C test bed in support of research identifying cyber vulnerabilities has led the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute of the Republic of Korea to solicit the experiences of INL to help mitigate problems early in the design, development, operation, and maintenance of a similar test bed. The following information will discuss I and C test bed lessons learned and the impact of these experiences to KAERI

  13. Lessons learned: advantages and disadvantages of mixed method research

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Malina, Mary A.; Nørreklit, Hanne; Selto, Frank H.

    2011-01-01

    on the use and usefulness of a specialized balanced scorecard; and third, to encourage researchers to actually use multiple methods and sources of data to address the very many accounting phenomena that are not fully understood. Design/methodology/approach – This paper is an opinion piece based...... on the authors' experience conducting a series of longitudinal mixed method studies. Findings – The authors suggest that in many studies, using a mixed method approach provides the best opportunity for addressing research questions. Originality/value – This paper provides encouragement to those who may wish......Purpose – The purpose of this paper is first, to discuss the theoretical assumptions, qualities, problems and myopia of the dominating quantitative and qualitative approaches; second, to describe the methodological lessons that the authors learned while conducting a series of longitudinal studies...

  14. Lessons learned from different approaches towards classifying personal factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Müller, Rachel; Geyh, Szilvia

    2015-01-01

    To examine and compare existing suggestions towards a classification of Personal Factors (PF) of the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). Qualitative and quantitative content analyses of available categorizations of PF are conducted. While the eight categorizations greatly differ in their background and structure, the broad content areas covered seem to be similar and reflect the ICF definition of PF. They cover to various degrees 12 broad content areas: socio-demographic factors, behavioral and lifestyle factors, cognitive psychological factors, social relationships, experiences and biography, coping, emotional factors, satisfaction, other health conditions, biological/physiological factors, personality, motives/motivation. In comparing these categorizations, a common core of content issues for a potential ICF PF classification could be identified and valuable lessons learned. This can contribute to future classification development activities in relation to PF.

  15. Lessons Learned from the Puerto Rico Battery Energy Storage System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyes, John D.; De Anda, Mindi Farber; Torres, Wenceslao

    1999-08-11

    The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) installed a battery energy storage system in 1994 at a substation near San Juan, Puerto Rico. It was patterned after two other large energy storage systems operated by electric utilities in California and Germany. The Puerto Rico facility is presently the largest operating battery storage system in the world and has successfully provided frequency control, voltage regulation, and spinning reseme to the Caribbean island. The system further proved its usefulness to the PREPA network in the fall of 1998 in the aftermath of Hurricane Georges. However, the facility has suffered accelerated cell failures in the past year and PREPA is committed to restoring the plant to full capacity. This represents the first repowering of a large utility battery facility. PREPA and its vendors and contractors learned many valuable lessons during all phases of project development and operation, which are summarized in this paper.

  16. Small grant management in health and behavioral sciences: Lessons learned.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sakraida, Teresa J; D'Amico, Jessica; Thibault, Erica

    2010-08-01

    This article describes considerations in health and behavioral sciences small grant management and describes lessons learned during post-award implementation. Using the components by W. Sahlman [Sahlman, W. (1997). How to write a great business plan. Harvard Business Review, 75(4), 98-108] as a business framework, a plan was developed that included (a) building relationships with people in the research program and with external parties providing key resources, (b) establishing a perspective of opportunity for research advancement, (c) identifying the larger context of scientific culture and regulatory environment, and (d) anticipating problems with a flexible response and rewarding teamwork. Small grant management included developing a day-to-day system, building a grant/study program development plan, and initiating a marketing plan. Copyright 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  17. External Police Oversight in Mexico: Experiences, Challenges, and Lessons Learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rubén Guzmán Sánchez

    2014-11-01

    Full Text Available After nearly 20 years of ‘reformist’ measures, the police in Mexico continues to be an ineffective, unreliable, and ‘far from citizen’ institution. The efforts made so far have faded amongst political interests and agendas; multidimensional frameworks out-dated at both conceptual and interagency levels; short-sighted competition for resources; evaluation and performance monitors that are handicapped by bureaucratic inaction; and weak transparency and accountability that perpetuate the opacity in which the police operate. In this context, the agenda of external police oversight is still at a rudimentary stage. However, there are several initiatives that have managed to push the issue to the frontier of new knowledge and promising practices. This paper outlines the experiences and challenges of—as well as the lessons learned by—the Institute for Security and Democracy (Insyde A.C., one of the most recognised think tanks in Mexico.

  18. Conservation Genetics of the Cheetah: Lessons Learned and New Opportunities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    O'Brien, Stephen J; Johnson, Warren E; Driscoll, Carlos A; Dobrynin, Pavel; Marker, Laurie

    2017-09-01

    The dwindling wildlife species of our planet have become a cause célèbre for conservation groups, governments, and concerned citizens throughout the world. The application of powerful new genetic technologies to surviving populations of threatened mammals has revolutionized our ability to recognize hidden perils that afflict them. We have learned new lessons of survival, adaptation, and evolution from viewing the natural history of genomes in hundreds of detailed studies. A single case history of one species, the African cheetah, Acinonyx jubatus, is here reviewed to reveal a long-term story of conservation challenges and action informed by genetic discoveries and insights. A synthesis of 3 decades of data, interpretation, and controversy, capped by whole genome sequence analysis of cheetahs, provides a compelling tale of conservation relevance and action to protect this species and other threatened wildlife. © The American Genetic Association 2017. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  19. Lessons learned from the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McWilliam, C.; Curtis, S. [DOE, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    1994-12-31

    The Department of Energy sponsored Non-Proliferation Experiment (formerly known as the Chemical Kiloton) involved the detonation of blasting agent approximately equivalent to one kiloton of energy release on the Nevada Test Site in an effort to determine if (and if so, which) discriminators exist between conventional and nuclear detonations of similar yield. Coordination among hundreds of scientists from at least fifteen different organizations were required to design the experiments necessary to collect and interpret data from this unique and complex event. Stakeholders and members of the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament observed the progress of the experiment first hand. The experiment was a success in that a vast majority of the expected data was collected and shared quickly and efficiently throughout the international scientific community. The management of the project was discussed among the major co-sponsoring organizations and the significant {open_quotes}lessons learned{close_quotes} are presented.

  20. Lesson Learned About FPOs from a Customer`s Perspective

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gray, C.J.

    1998-12-31

    Conoco has undertaken three FPSO (Floating Production Storage and Off-loading) projects in the 1990s, Ukpokiti offshore Nigeria, and MacCulloch and Banff in the UK sector of the North Sea. They are different in the technical and commercial solutions they employed. This presentation describes the key features of each project from a commercial and technical perspective and summarizes the good practices and those aspects that could have been improved. The key commercial areas covered include project strategy, contractor selection and leasing issues. The technical areas include facility selection, reservoir characterization, and operations. Lessons learned about Safety Management are also identified. The information about each project is limited to key features only

  1. Lessons learned from a successful MEDRETE in El Salvador.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Post, James C; Melendez, Manuel E; Hershey, Donna N; Hakim, Abdul

    2003-04-01

    Medical readiness education and training exercises are short-term exercises designed to provide health care and preventive medicine education to underserved civilian populations overseas. These high profile missions provide superb training opportunities, build democracies, and can be a powerful incentive to retain soldiers in the Reserves. Despite this, the literature offers little guidance in terms of how to best conduct a MEDRETE, particularly with a unit that has not been recently deployed. A U.S. Army Reserve unit was deployed to El Salvador following two devastating earthquakes and treated 20,890 patients in 10 days. This patient volume was achieved by a close cooperative effort among an experienced Mission Coordinator and Reservists and superb host nation support. Lessons learned regarding predeployment, deployment, patient management, and safety issues are presented to assist future units in conducting successful medical readiness education and training exercises.

  2. Pollution prevention program for new projects -- Lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lum, J. [Dept. of Energy, Washington, DC (United States)

    1993-03-01

    The purpose of this presentation is to relay the experience of the Office of New Production Reactors (NP) in developing and implementing its pollution prevention program. NP was established to plan, design, and construct a new safe and environmentally acceptable nuclear reactor capacity necessary to provide an assured supply of tritium to maintain the nation`s long-term deterrent capability. The Program offered the Department of Energy an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to environmental protection via minimization of environmental releases; new design offers the best opportunity for pollution prevention. The NP pollution prevention program was never fully implemented because NP`s tritium production design activity was recovery terminated. The information in this paper represented lessons learned from the last three years of NP operation.

  3. Lessons Learned and Challenges in Building a Filipino Health Coalition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Aguilar, David E.; Abesamis-Mendoza, Noilyn; Ursua, Rhodora; Divino, Lily Ann M.; Cadag, Kara; Gavin, Nicholas P.

    2010-01-01

    In recent years, community-based coalitions have become an effective channel to addressing various health problems within specific ethnic communities. The purpose of this article is twofold: (a) to describe the process involved in building the Kalusugan Coalition (KC), a Filipino American health coalition based in New York City, and (b) to highlight the lessons learned and the challenges from this collaborative venture. The challenges described also offer insights on how the coalition development process can be greatly affected by the partnership with an academic institution on a community-based research project. Because each cultural group has unique issues and concerns, the theoretical framework used by KC offers creative alternatives to address some of the challenges regarding coalition infrastructures, leadership development, unexpected change of coalition dynamics, and cultural nuances. PMID:19098260

  4. PUREX/UO3 facilities deactivation lessons learned history

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamrick, D.G.; Gerber, M.S.

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility operated from 1956-1972, from 1983-1988, and briefly during 1989-1990 to produce for national defense at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The Uranium Trioxide (UO 3 ) Facility operated at the Hanford Site from 1952-1972, 1984-1988, and briefly in 1993. Both plants were ordered to permanent shutdown by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in December 1992, thus initiating their deactivation phase. Deactivation is that portion of a facility's life cycle that occurs between operations and final decontamination and decommissioning (D ampersand D). This document details the history of events, and the lessons learned, from the time of the PUREX Stabilization Campaign in 1989-1990, through the end of the first full fiscal year (FY) of the deactivation project (September 30, 1994)

  5. Remote maintenance ''lessons learned'' on prototypical reprocessing equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kring, C.T.; Schrock, S.L.

    1990-01-01

    Hardware representative of essentially every major equipment item necessary for reprocessing breeder reactor nuclear fuel has been installed and tested for remote maintainability. This testing took place in a cold mock-up of a remotely maintained hot cell operated by the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program (CFRP) within the Fuel Recycle Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The reprocessing equipment tested included a Disassembly System, a Shear System, a Dissolver System, an Automated Sampler System, removable Equipment Racks on which various chemical process equipment items were mounted, and an advanced servomanipulator (ASM). These equipment items were disassembled and reassembled remotely by using the remote handling systems that are available within the cold mock-up area. This paper summarizes the ''lessons learned'' as a result of the numerous maintenance activities associated with each of these equipment items. 4 refs., 3 figs., 1 tab

  6. Human Systems Integration in Practice: Constellation Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zumbado, Jennifer Rochlis

    2012-01-01

    NASA's Constellation program provided a unique testbed for Human Systems Integration (HSI) as a fundamental element of the Systems Engineering process. Constellation was the first major program to have HSI mandated by NASA's Human Rating document. Proper HSI is critical to the success of any project that relies on humans to function as operators, maintainers, or controllers of a system. HSI improves mission, system and human performance, significantly reduces lifecycle costs, lowers risk and minimizes re-design. Successful HSI begins with sufficient project schedule dedicated to the generation of human systems requirements, but is by no means solely a requirements management process. A top-down systems engineering process that recognizes throughout the organization, human factors as a technical discipline equal to traditional engineering disciplines with authority for the overall system. This partners with a bottoms-up mechanism for human-centered design and technical issue resolution. The Constellation Human Systems Integration Group (HSIG) was a part of the Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) organization within the program office, and existed alongside similar groups such as Flight Performance, Environments & Constraints, and Integrated Loads, Structures and Mechanisms. While the HSIG successfully managed, via influence leadership, a down-and-in Community of Practice to facilitate technical integration and issue resolution, it lacked parallel top-down authority to drive integrated design. This presentation will discuss how HSI was applied to Constellation, the lessons learned and best practices it revealed, and recommendations to future NASA program and project managers. This presentation will discuss how Human Systems Integration (HSI) was applied to NASA's Constellation program, the lessons learned and best practices it revealed, and recommendations to future NASA program and project managers on how to accomplish this critical function.

  7. Blended learning: strengths, challenges, and lessons learned in an interprofessional training program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lotrecchiano, G R; McDonald, P L; Lyons, L; Long, T; Zajicek-Farber, M

    2013-11-01

    This field report outlines the goals of providing a blended learning model for an interdisciplinary training program for healthcare professionals who care for children with disabilities. The curriculum blended traditional face-to-face or on-site learning with integrated online interactive instruction. Credit earning and audited graduate level online coursework, community engagement experiences, and on-site training with maternal and child health community engagement opportunities were blended into a cohesive program. The training approach emphasized adult learning principles in different environmental contexts integrating multiple components of the Leadership Education in Neurodevelopmental and Related Disabilities Program. This paper describes the key principles adopted for this blended approach and the accomplishments, challenges, and lessons learned. The discussion offers examples from training content, material gathered through yearly program evaluation, as well as university course evaluations. The lessons learned consider the process and the implications for the role of blended learning in this type of training program with suggestions for future development and adoption by other programs.

  8. The Value of Identifying and Recovering Lost GN&C Lessons Learned: Aeronautical, Spacecraft, and Launch Vehicle Examples

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dennehy, Cornelius J.; Labbe, Steve; Lebsock, Kenneth L.

    2010-01-01

    Within the broad aerospace community the importance of identifying, documenting and widely sharing lessons learned during system development, flight test, operational or research programs/projects is broadly acknowledged. Documenting and sharing lessons learned helps managers and engineers to minimize project risk and improve performance of their systems. Often significant lessons learned on a project fail to get captured even though they are well known 'tribal knowledge' amongst the project team members. The physical act of actually writing down and documenting these lessons learned for the next generation of NASA GN&C engineers fails to happen on some projects for various reasons. In this paper we will first review the importance of capturing lessons learned and then will discuss reasons why some lessons are not documented. A simple proven approach called 'Pause and Learn' will be highlighted as a proven low-impact method of organizational learning that could foster the timely capture of critical lessons learned. Lastly some examples of 'lost' GN&C lessons learned from the aeronautics, spacecraft and launch vehicle domains are briefly highlighted. In the context of this paper 'lost' refers to lessons that have not achieved broad visibility within the NASA-wide GN&C CoP because they are either undocumented, masked or poorly documented in the NASA Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS).

  9. Internal dose assessment due to large area contamination: Main lessons drawn from the Chernobyl accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andrasi, A [KFKI Atomic Energy Research Inst., Budapest (Hungary)

    1997-03-01

    The reactor accident at Chernobyl in 1986 beside its serious and tragic consequences provided also an excellent opportunity to check, test and validate all kind of environmental models and calculation tools which were available in the emergency preparedness systems of different countries. Assessment of internal and external doses due to the accident has been carried out for the population all over Europe using different methods. Dose predictions based on environmental model calculation considering various pathways have been compared with those obtained by more direct monitoring methods. One study from Hungary and one from the TAEA is presented shortly. (orig./DG)

  10. Lessons of TEPCO's Fukushima accident from human and organizational aspects and challenge for nuclear safety reform

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawano, Akira

    2013-01-01

    The author participated in international experts' meeting held by IAEA on May 21, 2013 and presented the paper focusing on human and organizational aspects of the Fukushima nuclear accident. It clarified TEPCO's basic recognition: 'The cause of the accident should not be treated merely as a natural disaster due to an enormous tsunami being something difficult to anticipate and we believe it is necessary to seriously acknowledge the result that TEPCO failed to avoid an accident which might have been avoided if ample preparations had been made in advance with thorough use of human intellect' and then reconsidered the Fukushima nuclear accident: 'could we predict an enormous tsunami and take whatever countermeasures?' and 'could we respond to the accident better?' for the worldwide operators to avoid such an accident, which moved meeting's participants deeply. Presentation's contents followed 'Reassessment of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Nuclear Safety Reform Plan' published by TEPCO on March 29. This article described outline of the presentation. Though the only way to explore the possibility to save Unit 1 was that operators could bravely go up to the 4th floor of reactor building and open the isolation valves to start IC, it was given up without any clear communication among key decision makers for confirming the IC operational status. As for Unit 3, operators could not achieve thorough focus on ensuring core cooling such that proactive transfer from RCIC/HPCI to low pressure water injection was not challenged, mainly because of low trust on Diesel/Driven Fire Protection Pump (DDFP). During the design stage and afterward, ample consideration was not given to common cause failures originating in external events, which led to a severe situation where almost all the power supplies and safety system functions were lost. Continuous efforts to reduce risks were not ample, including the collection, analysis and utilization of information on safety enhancement

  11. Internal dose assessment due to large area contamination: Main lessons drawn from the Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andrasi, A.

    1997-01-01

    The reactor accident at Chernobyl in 1986 beside its serious and tragic consequences provided also an excellent opportunity to check, test and validate all kind of environmental models and calculation tools which were available in the emergency preparedness systems of different countries. Assessment of internal and external doses due to the accident has been carried out for the population all over Europe using different methods. Dose predictions based on environmental model calculation considering various pathways have been compared with those obtained by more direct monitoring methods. One study from Hungary and one from the TAEA is presented shortly. (orig./DG)

  12. Media coverage of Fukushima accident in the Russian press. Lessons for radiation emergency risk communication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Melikhova, E.; Arutyunyan, R.

    2014-01-01

    The paper reviews recent results of content analysis of the Russian press and data of all-Russia public opinion polls on the subject of the Fukushima accident and discusses them in the wider context of challenges in communication of 'no risk' messages to the public in the case of a nuclear accident. Radiation risk regulation base in the low dose range is proposed to be one of the main obstacles for the communication and a new approach to emergency risk communication is proposed. (author)

  13. Lessons Learned from Ares I Upper Stage Structures and Thermal Design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ahmed, Rafiq

    2012-01-01

    The Ares 1 Upper Stage was part of the vehicle intended to succeed the Space Shuttle as the United States manned spaceflight vehicle. Although the Upper Stage project was cancelled, there were many lessons learned that are applicable to future vehicle design. Lessons learned that are briefly detailed in this Technical Memorandum are for specific technical areas such as tank design, common bulkhead design, thrust oscillation, control of flight and slosh loads, purge and hazardous gas system. In addition, lessons learned from a systems engineering and vehicle integration perspective are also included, such as computer aided design and engineering, scheduling, and data management. The need for detailed systems engineering in the early stages of a project is emphasized throughout this report. The intent is that future projects will be able to apply these lessons learned to keep costs down, schedules brief, and deliver products that perform to the expectations of their customers.

  14. Lessons Learned in Preparation and Review of Safety Analysis Report of PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor in Malaysia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maskin, Mazleha; Choi, Kwang Sik

    2010-01-01

    PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor (RTP) is the one and only research reactor in Malaysia. Since the day it was supplied by General Atomic (GA) in 1983, periodic safety reviews were carried out but not published in the form of a complete SAR. In fact, the original SAR (SAR 1983) document was provided by GA as soon as GA was selected as the supplier of RTP. The focus of this report is on the lessons learned from the preparation of SAR. The lessons learned were to address the preparation and regulatory review of the second SAR (SAR 2006). Realizing that safety is important as RTP is aging, the experiences and lessons learned from SAR development and updating processes are of great value for all parties involved. The purpose of this report is to consolidate and organize the lessons learned and suggest the best practice for the next SAR development both in preparation and regulatory review

  15. Lessons Learned in Preparation and Review of Safety Analysis Report of PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor in Malaysia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maskin, Mazleha [Korea Advanced Institute for Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Choi, Kwang Sik [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2010-05-15

    PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor (RTP) is the one and only research reactor in Malaysia. Since the day it was supplied by General Atomic (GA) in 1983, periodic safety reviews were carried out but not published in the form of a complete SAR. In fact, the original SAR (SAR 1983) document was provided by GA as soon as GA was selected as the supplier of RTP. The focus of this report is on the lessons learned from the preparation of SAR. The lessons learned were to address the preparation and regulatory review of the second SAR (SAR 2006). Realizing that safety is important as RTP is aging, the experiences and lessons learned from SAR development and updating processes are of great value for all parties involved. The purpose of this report is to consolidate and organize the lessons learned and suggest the best practice for the next SAR development both in preparation and regulatory review

  16. Deploying Serious Games for Management in Higher Education: lessons learned and good practices

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Baalsrud Hauge, Jannicke; Bellotti, Francesco; Nadolski, Rob; Kickmeier-Rust, Michael; Berta, Riccardo; Carvalho, Maria B.

    2013-01-01

    Baalsrud Hauge, J., Bellotti, F., Nadolski, R. J., Kickmeier-Rust, M., Berta, R., & Carvalho, M. B. (2013, 4 October). Deploying Serious Games for Management in Higher Education: lessons learned and good practices. Presentation at ECGBL 2013, Porto, Portugal.

  17. Lessons Learned from the Node 1 Temperature and Humidity Control Subsystem Design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Williams, David E.

    2010-01-01

    Node 1 flew to the International Space Station (ISS) on Flight 2A during December 1998. To date the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has learned a lot of lessons from this module based on its history of approximately two years of acceptance testing on the ground and currently its twelve years on-orbit. This paper will provide an overview of the ISS Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) design of the Node 1 Temperature and Humidity Control (THC) subsystem and it will document some of the lessons that have been learned to date for this subsystem and it will document some of the lessons that have been learned to date for these subsystems based on problems prelaunch, problems encountered on-orbit, and operational problems/concerns. It is hoped that documenting these lessons learned from ISS will help in preventing them in future Programs. 1

  18. Best Practices and Lessons Learned In LANL Approaches to Transportation Security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Drypolcher, Katherine Carr [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-10-24

    Presentation includes slides on Physical Protection of Material in Transit; Graded Approach for Implementation Controls; Security Requirements; LANL Lessons Learned; Shipping Violation; Unmonitored Shipment; Foreign shipment; and the Conclusion.

  19. IVHS Institutional Issues and Case Studies, Analysis and Lessons Learned, Final Report

    Science.gov (United States)

    1994-04-01

    This 'Analysis and Lessons Learned' report contains observations, conclusions, and recommendations based on the performance of six case studies of Intelligent Vehicle-Highway Systems (IVHS) projects. Information to support the development of the case...

  20. Systemwide Deployment of Medical Team Training: Lessons Learned in the Department of Defense

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    King, Heidi B; Kohsin, Beth; Salisbury, Mary

    2005-01-01

    .... Lessons learned within the U.S. Department of Defense indicate that for teamwork initiatives to be effective, they must possess a clear blueprint defining the solid steps for building the desired culture...

  1. Preparing for the Worst: Psychological Excellence of First Responders - A Katrina Lessons Learned Study

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Seong, Younho; Springs, Sherry; Chung, Yongchul; Avery-Epps, Regina

    2008-01-01

    ... formidable disaster. In fact, there have been several official lessons learned reports and the findings and recommendations from these reports of the response to Hurricane Katrina have been addressed...

  2. Evolutionary Acquisition of the Global Command and Control System: Lessons Learned

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Wallis, Johnathan

    1998-01-01

    This paper summarizes a "lessons learned" study that reviews DoD's approach to managing the GCCS program on behalf on the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/C3I...

  3. Lessons Learned from Developing and Operating the Kepler Science Pipeline and Building the TESS Science Pipeline

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jenkins, Jon M.

    2017-01-01

    The experience acquired through development, implementation and operation of the KeplerK2 science pipelines can provide lessons learned for the development of science pipelines for other missions such as NASA's Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite, and ESA's PLATO mission.

  4. SRS SLUDGE BATCH QUALIFICATION AND PROCESSING; HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND LESSONS LEARNED

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cercy, M.; Peeler, D.; Stone, M.

    2013-09-25

    This report provides a historical overview and lessons learned associated with the SRS sludge batch (SB) qualification and processing programs. The report covers the framework of the requirements for waste form acceptance, the DWPF Glass Product Control Program (GPCP), waste feed acceptance, examples of how the program complies with the specifications, an overview of the Startup Program, and a summary of continuous improvements and lessons learned. The report includes a bibliography of previous reports and briefings on the topic.

  5. The economics of nuclear energy revisited: lessons from the use of a complex technology subject to major accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finon, D.

    2012-01-01

    The Fukushima accident again raises the issue of the social and economic viability of nuclear technology. To reassess this viability, we analyze the methods used to internalize the external costs of nuclear energy. These have over time become increasingly complex technologically and specifically affected by major accidents. This combination has served to upset the classical learning curve, calling into question nuclear cost base, social acceptance in the face of climate change and profitability for investors. It has become essential to put in place independent institutions to regulate the safety aspect of nuclear technology and these form a hindrance to its standardization, in turn affecting competitiveness. Nevertheless, the paper argues that the new sequence of internalization of external costs triggered by Fukushima will have limited effects on overall costs, because of previous measures already taken to improve safety. The complexity of nuclear technology is reaching its asymptote: the challenge of 'learning from major accidents' will decrease. On the other hand, the independence and competence of nuclear safety authorities in all countries must be revamped to maximize safety and minimize residual risks. This cannot just be done by decree. However, it is the only way to preserve this global public good - the social acceptance of nuclear technology

  6. From the Games Industry: Ten Lessons for Game-Based Learning

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hollins, Paul; Whitton, Nicola

    2011-01-01

    This paper draws on lessons learned from the development process of the entertainment games industry and discusses how they can be applied to the field of game-based learning. This paper examines policy makers and those wishing to commission or develop games for learning and highlights potential opportunities as well as pitfalls. The paper focuses…

  7. Building Accessible Educational Web Sites: The Law, Standards, Guidelines, Tools, and Lessons Learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Ye; Palmer, Bart; Recker, Mimi

    2004-01-01

    Professional education is increasingly facing accessibility challenges with the emergence of webbased learning. This paper summarizes related U.S. legislation, standards, guidelines, and validation tools to make web-based learning accessible for all potential learners. We also present lessons learned during the implementation of web accessibility…

  8. Lessons learnt from clean-up of urban area after Chernobyl accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zlobenko, Borys

    2008-01-01

    The accident at Chernobyl NPP showed that huge territories including densely populated areas can be exposed to contamination as a result of unforeseen circumstances. The Chernobyl accident forced reconsidering of many regulations in the field of population protection and was a powerful incentive to development of many applied sciences. In 1992-1996, an international team of scientists carried out investigations on ECP-4 project 'Strategies of Decontamination'. Including of an independent sub-project 'Urban environment and countermeasures' into the project of French-German initiative on Chernobyl 'Radioecology' was the extension of work on study of urban environment contamination. The aim of the projects ware to synthesize the large body of experimental data received during elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident and in the course of special studies carried out in former USSR and later in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, and prediction on this basis of radionuclide behavior in the urban environment. In 2003 the EMRAS (Environmental Modelling for Radiation Safety) project was organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Urban Remediation Working Group of the EMRAS has focused on the assessment of the effectiveness of countermeasures employed in urban settings after releases of radioactivity. This review considers results of principally Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarus researchers who worked on these projects. Over the 20-year period a number of publications have reviewed the effectiveness of countermeasures, particularly those used after the Chernobyl accident. The general principles of radiological protection are based on radiation doses, intervention levels and effective countermeasures. Decontamination of densely built-up cities constructed of various building materials with total surface area significantly exceeding the administrative city area is an extremely difficult task. In the Late-Phase Response, 'classical' radiological

  9. Lessons Learned From Dynamic Simulations of Advanced Fuel Cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Piet, Steven J.; Dixon, Brent W.; Jacobson, Jacob J.; Matthern, Gretchen E.; Shropshire, David E.

    2009-01-01

    Years of performing dynamic simulations of advanced nuclear fuel cycle options provide insights into how they could work and how one might transition from the current once-through fuel cycle. This paper summarizes those insights from the context of the 2005 objectives and goals of the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI). Our intent is not to compare options, assess options versus those objectives and goals, nor recommend changes to those objectives and goals. Rather, we organize what we have learned from dynamic simulations in the context of the AFCI objectives for waste management, proliferation resistance, uranium utilization, and economics. Thus, we do not merely describe 'lessons learned' from dynamic simulations but attempt to answer the 'so what' question by using this context. The analyses have been performed using the Verifiable Fuel Cycle Simulation of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Dynamics (VISION). We observe that the 2005 objectives and goals do not address many of the inherently dynamic discriminators among advanced fuel cycle options and transitions thereof

  10. Tunneling on the Yucca Mountain Project: Progress and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hansmire, W.H.; Rogers, D.J.; Wightman, W.D.

    1996-01-01

    The Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project is the US's effort to confirm the technical acceptability of Yucca Mountain as a repository for high-level nuclear waste. A key part of the site characterization project is the construction of a 7.8-km-long, 7.6-m-diameter tunnel for in-depth geologic and other scientific investigations. The work is governed in varying degrees by the special requirements for nuclear quality assurance, which imposes uncommon and often stringent limitations on the materials which can be used in construction, the tunneling methods and procedures used, and record-keeping for many activities. This paper presents the current status of what has been learned, how construction has adapted to meet the requirements, and how the requirements were interpreted in a mitigating way to meet the legal obligations, yet build the tunnel as rapidly as possible. With regard to design methodologies and the realities of tunnel construction, ground support with a shielded Tunnel Boring Machine is discussed. Notable lessons learned include the need for broad design analyses for a wide variety of conditions and how construction procedures affect ground support

  11. Defining a risk-informed framework for whole-of-government lessons learned: A Canadian perspective.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Friesen, Shaye K; Kelsey, Shelley; Legere, J A Jim

    Lessons learned play an important role in emergency management (EM) and organizational agility. Virtually all aspects of EM can derive benefit from a lessons learned program. From major security events to exercises, exploiting and applying lessons learned and "best practices" is critical to organizational resilience and adaptiveness. A robust lessons learned process and methodology provides an evidence base with which to inform decisions, guide plans, strengthen mitigation strategies, and assist in developing tools for operations. The Canadian Safety and Security Program recently supported a project to define a comprehensive framework that would allow public safety and security partners to regularly share event response best practices, and prioritize recommendations originating from after action reviews. This framework consists of several inter-locking elements: a comprehensive literature review/environmental scan of international programs; a survey to collect data from end users and management; the development of a taxonomy for organizing and structuring information; a risk-informed methodology for selecting, prioritizing, and following through on recommendations; and standardized templates and tools for tracking recommendations and ensuring implementation. This article discusses the efforts of the project team, which provided "best practice" advice and analytical support to ensure that a systematic approach to lessons learned was taken by the federal community to improve prevention, preparedness, and response activities. It posits an approach by which one might design a systematic process for information sharing and event response coordination-an approach that will assist federal departments to institutionalize a cross-government lessons learned program.

  12. Ethical aspects of the effects of the Chernobyl accident: lessons and problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishatkina, T.V.; Mel'nov, S.B.; Sarana, Yu.V.

    2011-01-01

    The different aspects of observing of eco- and bioethics principles and requirements upon the attitude to human in the situations of emergency are discussed basing on the tragic lessons of the Chernobyl catastrophe. They are attitude to population located in the region influenced by the catastrophe, attitude to the liquidators, and attitude to the subjects of biomedical researches. The characteristics of the moral and psychological factors of radioecological stress are given. Ethical issues of estimation of low dose radiation effects are analyzed

  13. The layered learning practice model: Lessons learned from implementation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pinelli, Nicole R; Eckel, Stephen F; Vu, Maihan B; Weinberger, Morris; Roth, Mary T

    2016-12-15

    Pharmacists' views about the implementation, benefits, and attributes of a layered learning practice model (LLPM) were examined. Eligible and willing attending pharmacists at the same institution that had implemented an LLPM completed an individual, 90-minute, face-to-face interview using a structured interview guide developed by the interdisciplinary study team. Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim without personal identifiers. Three researchers independently reviewed preliminary findings to reach consensus on emerging themes. In cases where thematic coding diverged, the researchers discussed their analyses until consensus was reached. Of 25 eligible attending pharmacists, 24 (96%) agreed to participate. The sample was drawn from both acute and ambulatory care practice settings and all clinical specialty areas. Attending pharmacists described several experiences implementing the LLPM and perceived benefits of the model. Attending pharmacists identified seven key attributes for hospital and health-system pharmacy departments that are needed to design and implement effective LLPMs: shared leadership, a systematic approach, good communication, flexibility for attending pharmacists, adequate resources, commitment, and evaluation. Participants also highlighted several potential challenges and obstacles for organizations to consider before implementing an LLPM. According to attending pharmacists involved in an LLPM, successful implementation of an LLPM required shared leadership, a systematic approach, communication, flexibility, resources, commitment, and a process for evaluation. Copyright © 2016 by the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, Inc. All rights reserved.

  14. Lessons Learned and Regulatory Countermeasures of Nuclear Safety Issues Last Year

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Y. E. [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-05-15

    Competitiveness of nuclear as the electric resource in terms of the least cost and the carbon abatement has been debated. Some institutions insist that the radioactive wastes management cost, nuclear accident cost and cheap shale gas would make the nuclear energy less competitive, while others still address the ability of nuclear energy as economical and low-carbon electric resource. This situation reminds that ensuring nuclear safety is the most important prerequisite to use of nuclear energy. Therefore, this paper will compare the different views on future nuclear competitiveness discussed right after the Fukushima accident and summarize the lessons learned and regulatory countermeasures from nuclear safety issues last year. Korea has improved the effectiveness of safety regulation up to now and still has been making efforts on further enhancing nuclear safety. The outcomes of these efforts have resulted in a high level of safety in Korean NPPs and contributing largely to the global nuclear safety through sharing and exchanging the information and knowledge of our nuclear experiences. However, now we are faced with the new challenges such as decreasing the public. Additionally, public criticism of the regulatory activities demands more clear regulatory guides and transparent process. Recently, new president announced the 'Priority to Safety and Public Trust' as the precondition to utilize the nuclear energy. We will continue to make much more efforts for the improvement of the quality of regulatory activities and effectiveness of regulatory decision making process than we have done so far. Competence through effective capacity building would be a helpful pathway to build up the public trust and ensure the acceptable level of nuclear safety. We are set to prepare the action items to be taken in the near future for improving the technical competency and transparency as the essential components of the national safety and will make efforts to implement them

  15. The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station - occurrence of the accident, current situation and Future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirose, K.

    2013-01-01

    In this presentation author analyse course of accident on Fukushima Dai-chi NPPs as well as consequences of this disaster. The following parts are presented: (1) Occurrence of the accident; (2) Evacuation of the residential people; (3) Deterioration and protraction of the accident; (4) Impact on society; (5) Situation of decontamination; (6) Long-term steps towards decommissioning; (7) Situation of other nuclear power stations; (8) Conclusions and lessons learned.

  16. Supply chain management/ Some lessons learned the hard way.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nuttall, Stephen

    2013-01-01

    This paper will look at some of the experiences, lessons and frustrations experienced in managing supply chains for business continuity. No-one has time to make all the mistakes, nor to learn all the lessons on their own, so it is useful to share experiences. Over the last 25 years, the author has been involved in supply chain management as a contract manager; a programme and project manager; and as a business continuity manager. Although times change, there are some fundamental principles that are absolutely critical in making sure that supply chains do what they are needed to do/ to keep business going. Supply chains are here to stay. Indeed, with today's drive towards outsourcing, best-shoring and contracting out, they are becoming more important every year and this will only continue over time. Moreover, in the highly competitive markets in which all organisations operate, suppliers may well be carrying out operations that not all that long ago would have been considered to be part of core business. Getting the right relationship with the supply chain is more critical than ever before.1 What does this mean to business continuity professionals? They need to think not just about their own BC plans, but about the plans of their suppliers, and even those of their suppliers' suppliers. This may seem obvious, but unlike internal BC plans written by and for an organisation, it must be considered just what a supplier's plans are designed to achieve. What business outcomes will their plans deliver? If they recover their own business, how does that affect the business they serve? Are others' assumptions of how they will react in line with theirs?

  17. Polio Crisis in Costa Rica: Lessons Learned and Achievements

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gioconda Vargas-Morúa

    2015-05-01

    Full Text Available This presentation shows some of the consequences of the polio crisis in Costa Rica during the 1950’s, in order to preserve certain attitudes of Costa Ricans back then that are worth remembering: simplicity, solidarity and gratefulness. Hand in hand with highly service-oriented men and women, the country overcame the crisis and built one of the most iconic hospitals in Costa Rica: the National Children’s Hospital. It is worth rescuing the lessons learned and applying them to current times. This historical text was created based on the stories told by people who lived during the times of the crisis, on a 1956 notebook, on documents from the National Archive and the National Health and Social Security Library (BINASSS, for its name in Spanish, the Costa Rican Social Security System (CCSS, for its name in Spanish, Dr. Rodolfo Álvaro Murillo, and San Juan de Dios Hospital.  National and international newspapers were also reviewed. The consulted material confirms how the work of Costa Ricans, led by committed and service-oriented individuals, allowed for the construction of the National Children’s Hospital to take place -an institution that has served the Costa Rican people for fifty years. Costa Ricans also succeeded in eradicating polio long before several other countries around the world. The reactions of people in the 1950’s are lessons of solidarity and humanity that should not be forgotten; they should be remembered in order to value team work over individual work and make sure, no matter what our role in society is, to always stand by common well-being, as mid-century Costa Ricans did by overcoming their personal limitations and acting for the benefit of society.

  18. Bringing authentic service learning to the classroom: benefits and lessons learned

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chamberlain, Leslie C.

    2016-06-01

    Project-based learning, which has gained significant attention within K-12 education, provides rich hands-on experiences for students. Bringing an element of service to the projects allow students to engage in a local or global community, providing an abundance of benefits to the students’ learning. For example, service projects build confidence, increase motivation, and exercise problem-solving and communication skills in addition to developing a deep understanding of content. I will present lessons I have learned through four years of providing service learning opportunities in my classroom. I share ideas for astronomy projects, tips for connecting and listening to a community, and helpful guidelines to hold students accountable in order to ensure a productive and educational project.

  19. Probabilistic Analysis of Passive Safety System Reliability in Advanced Small Modular Reactors: Methodologies and Lessons Learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grabaskas, David; Bucknor, Matthew; Brunett, Acacia; Grelle, Austin

    2015-06-28

    Many advanced small modular reactor designs rely on passive systems to fulfill safety functions during accident sequences. These systems depend heavily on boundary conditions to induce a motive force, meaning the system can fail to operate as intended due to deviations in boundary conditions, rather than as the result of physical failures. Furthermore, passive systems may operate in intermediate or degraded modes. These factors make passive system operation difficult to characterize with a traditional probabilistic framework that only recognizes discrete operating modes and does not allow for the explicit consideration of time-dependent boundary conditions. Argonne National Laboratory has been examining various methodologies for assessing passive system reliability within a probabilistic risk assessment for a station blackout event at an advanced small modular reactor. This paper describes the most promising options: mechanistic techniques, which share qualities with conventional probabilistic methods, and simulation-based techniques, which explicitly account for time-dependent processes. The primary intention of this paper is to describe the strengths and weaknesses of each methodology and highlight the lessons learned while applying the two techniques while providing high-level results. This includes the global benefits and deficiencies of the methods and practical problems encountered during the implementation of each technique.

  20. The natech events during the 17 August 1999 Kocaeli earthquake: aftermath and lessons learned

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    S. Girgin

    2011-04-01

    Full Text Available Natural-hazard triggered technological accidents (natechs at industrial facilities have been recognized as an emerging risk. Adequate preparedness, proper emergency planning, and effective response are crucial for the prevention of natechs and mitigation of the consequences. Under the conditions of a natural disaster, the limited resources, the possible unavailability of mitigation measures, and the lack of adequate communication complicate the management of natechs. The analysis of past natechs is crucial for learning lessons and for preventing or preparing for future natechs. The 17 August 1999, Kocaeli earthquake, which was a devastating disaster hitting one of the most industrialized regions of Turkey, offers opportunities in this respect. Among many natechs that occurred due to the earthquake, the massive fire at the TUPRAS Izmit refinery and the acrylonitrile spill at the AKSA acrylic fiber production plant were especially important and highlight problems in the consideration of natechs in emergency planning, response to industrial emergencies during natural hazards, and information to the public during and following the incidents. The analysis of these events shows that even the largest and seemingly well-prepared facilities can be vulnerable to natechs if risks are not considered adequately.