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Sample records for safety shutdown system

  1. The Intelligent Safety System: could it introduce complex computing into CANDU shutdown systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hall, J.A.; Hinds, H.W.; Pensom, C.F.; Barker, C.J.; Jobse, A.H.

    1984-07-01

    The Intelligent Safety System is a computerized shutdown system being developed at the Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories (CRNL) for future CANDU nuclear reactors. It differs from current CANDU shutdown systems in both the algorithm used and the size and complexity of computers required to implement the concept. This paper provides an overview of the project, with emphasis on the computing aspects. Early in the project several needs leading to an introduction of computing complexity were identified, and a computing system that met these needs was conceived. The current work at CRNL centers on building a laboratory demonstration of the Intelligent Safety System, and evaluating the reliability and testability of the concept. Some fundamental problems must still be addressed for the Intelligent Safety System to be acceptable to a CANDU owner and to the regulatory authorities. These are also discussed along with a description of how the Intelligent Safety System might solve these problems

  2. Safety shutdown separators

    Science.gov (United States)

    Carlson, Steven Allen; Anakor, Ifenna Kingsley; Farrell, Greg Robert

    2015-06-30

    The present invention pertains to electrochemical cells which comprise (a) an anode; (b) a cathode; (c) a solid porous separator, such as a polyolefin, xerogel, or inorganic oxide separator; and (d) a nonaqueous electrolyte, wherein the separator comprises a porous membrane having a microporous coating comprising polymer particles which have not coalesced to form a continuous film. This microporous coating on the separator acts as a safety shutdown layer that rapidly increases the internal resistivity and shuts the cell down upon heating to an elevated temperature, such as 110.degree. C. Also provided are methods for increasing the safety of an electrochemical cell by utilizing such separators with a safety shutdown layer.

  3. Design philosophy of PFBR shutdown systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajan Babu, V.; Vijayashree, R.; Govindarajan, S.; Vaidyanathan, G.; Muralikrishna, G.; Shanmugam, T.K.; Chetal, S.C.; Raghavan, K.; Bhoje, S.B.

    1996-01-01

    This paper presents the overall design philosophy of shutdown system of 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR). It discusses design criteria, parameters calling for safety action, different safety actions and the concepts conceived for shutdown systems. In tune with the philosophy of defence-in-depth, additional passive shutdown features, viz., Self Actuating Device (SADE) and Curie Point Magnetic (CPM) switch and protective feature like absorber rod Stroke Limiting Device (SLD) are contemplated. It also discusses about suitability of Gas Expansion Module (GEM) as one of the safety devices in PFBR. (author). 3 refs, 3 figs, 1 tab

  4. Proceedings of workshop on reactor shutdown system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-03-01

    India has gained considerable experience in design, development, construction and operation of research and power reactors during the last four decades. Reactor shutdown system (RSS) is the most important engineered safety system of any reactor. A lot of technological developments have taken place to improve the reactor shutdown systems, particularly with advancement in reliability analysis and instrumentation and control. If the reactor is not shutdown, the fuel may melt, releasing radioactivity and possibly reactivity addition as in the case of Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR). Apart from radiological safety consequences, large investment has to be written off. The function of the RSS is to stop fission chain reaction and prevent breach of fuel. The design of RSS is multidisciplinary. It requires reactor physics analysis, design of absorber rods, drive mechanisms, safety logic to order shutdown and instrumentation to detect unsafe conditions. High reliability is essential and this requires two independent shutdown systems. This book contains the proceedings of the workshop on reactor shutdown system and papers relevant to INIS are indexed separately

  5. Safety aspects of unplanned shutdowns and trips

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-05-01

    The issue of unplanned shutdowns and trips is receiving increased attention worldwide in view of its importance to plant safety and availability. There exists significant variation in the number of forced shutdowns for nuclear power plants of the same type operating worldwide. The reduction of the frequency of these events will have safety benefits in terms of reducing the frequency of plant transients and the challenges to the safety systems, and the risks of possible incidents. This report provides an insight into the causes of unplanned shutdowns experienced in operating nuclear power plants worldwide, the good practices that have been found effective in minimizing their occurrence, and the measures that have been taken to reduce these events. Specific information on the experiences, approaches and practices of some countries in dealing with this issue is presented in Appendix A

  6. Safety analysis of Ignalina NPP during shutdown conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kaliatka, A.; Uspuras, E.

    2000-01-01

    The accident analysis for the Ignalina NPP with RBMK-1500 reactors at normal operating conditions and at minimum controlled power level (during startup of the reactor) has been performed in the frame of the project I n-Depth Safety Assessment of the Ignalina NPP , which was completed in 1996. However, the plant conditions during the reactor shutdown differ from conditions during reactor operation at full power (equipment status in protection systems, set points for actuation of safety and protection systems, etc.). Results of RELAP5 simulation of two worst initiating events during reactor shutdown - Pressure Header rupture in case of steam reactor cooldown as well as Pressure Header rupture in case of water reactor cooldown are discussed in the paper. Results of analysis shown that reactor are reliably cooled in both cases. Further analysis for all range of initial events during reactor shutdown and at shutdown conditions is recommended. (author)

  7. Shutdown Safety in NEK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gluhak, Mario; Senegovic, Marko

    2014-01-01

    Industry performance analysis since 2004 has revealed that 23% of the events reported to WANO occurred during outage periods. Given the fact that a plant is in the outage only 5 percent of the time, this emphasizes the importance of shutdown safety and measures station staffs undertake to maintain effective barriers to safety margins during the outage. Back in 1990s, the industry adopted guidance to meet safety requirements by focusing on safety functions. Both WANO and INPO released various documents, reports and guidelines to help accomplish those requirements. However, in the last decade inadequate 'defence in depth' has led to several events affecting shutdown safety and challenging one of the most important nuclear safety principles: 'The special characteristics of nuclear technology are taken into account in all decisions and actions. Reactivity control, continuity of core cooling, and integrity of fission product barriers are valued as essential, distinguishing attributes of nuclear station work environment'. NEK has recognized the importance of 'defence in depth'Industry performance analysis since 2004 has revealed that 23% of the events reported to WANO occurred during outage periods. Given the fact that a plant is in the outage only 5 percent of the time, this emphasizes the importance of shutdown safety and measures station staffs undertake to maintain effective barriers to safety margins during the outage. Back in 1990s, the industry adopted guidance to meet safety requirements by focusing on safety functions. Both WANO and INPO released various documents, reports and guidelines to help accomplish those requirements. However, in the last decade inadequate 'defence in depth' has led to several events affecting shutdown safety and challenging one of the most important nuclear safety principles: 'The special characteristics of nuclear technology are taken into account in all decisions and actions. Reactivity

  8. Analysis of solutions for passively activated safety shutdown devices for SFR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burgazzi, Luciano

    2013-01-01

    Highlights: • Innovative systems for emergency shut down of fast reactors are proposed. • The concepts of inherent and passive safety are put forward. • The relative analysis in terms of safety and reliability is presented. • A comparative assessment among the concepts is performed. • Path forward is tracked. -- Abstract: In order to enhance the inherent safety of fast reactors, innovative reactivity control systems have been proposed for intrinsic ultimate shut-down instead of conventional scram rods, to cope with the potential consequences of severe unprotected transient accidents, such as an energetic core disruptive accident, as in case of sodium fast reactors. The passive shut-down systems are designed to shut-down system only by inherent passive reactivity feedback mechanism, under unprotected accident conditions, implying failure of reactor protection system. They are conceived to be self-actuated without any signal elaboration, since the actuation of the system is triggered by the effects induced by the transient like material dilatation, in case of overheating of the coolant for instance, according to fast reactor design to meet the safety requirements. This article looks at different special shutdown systems specifically engineered for prevention of severe accidents, to be implemented on fast reactors, with main focus on the investigation of the performance of the self-actuated shutdown systems in sodium fast reactors

  9. CANDU passive shutdown systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hart, R S; Olmstead, R A [AECL CANDU, Sheridan Park Research Community, Mississauga, ON (Canada)

    1996-12-01

    CANDU incorporates two diverse, passive shutdown systems, independent of each other and from the reactor regulating system. Both shutdown systems function in the low pressure, low temperature, moderator which surrounds the fuel channels. The shutdown systems are functionally different, physically separate, and passive since the driving force for SDS1 is gravity and the driving force for SDS2 is stored energy. The physics of the reactor core itself ensures a degree of passive safety in that the relatively long prompt neutron generation time inherent in the design of CANDU reactors tend to retard power excursions and reduces the speed required for shutdown action, even for large postulated reactivity increases. All passive systems include a number of active components or initiators. Hence, an important aspect of passive systems is the inclusion of fail safe (activated by active component failure) operation. The mechanisms that achieve the fail safe action should be passive. Consequently the passive performance of the CANDU shutdown systems extends beyond their basic modes of operation to include fail safe operation based on natural phenomenon or stored energy. For example, loss of power to the SDS1 clutches results in the drop of the shutdown rods by gravity, loss of power or instrument air to the injection valves of SDS2 results in valve opening via spring action, and rigorous self checking of logic, data and timing by the shutdown systems computers assures a fail safe reactor trip through the collapse of a fluctuating magnetic field or the discharge of a capacitor. Event statistics from operating CANDU stations indicate a significant decrease in protection system faults that could lead to loss of production and elimination of protection system faults that could lead to loss of protection. This paper provides a comprehensive description of the passive shutdown systems employed by CANDU. (author). 4 figs, 3 tabs.

  10. Reactor shutdown system of prototype fast breeder reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Govindarajan, S.; Singh, Om Pal; Kasinathan, N.; Paramasivan Pillai, C.; Arul, A.J.; Chetal, S.C.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The shutdown system of PFBR is designed to assure a very high reliability by employing well known principles of redundancy, diversity and independence. The failure probability of the shutdown system limited to -6 / ry. Salient features of the shutdown system are: Two independent shutdown systems, each of them able to accommodate an additional single failure and made up of a trip system and an associated absorber rod group. Diversity between trip systems, rods and mechanisms. Initiation of SCRAM by two diverse physical parameters of the two shutdown systems for design events leading potentially to unacceptable conditions is the core. The first group of nine rods called control and safety rods (CSR) is used for both shutdown as well as power regulation. The second group consisting of three rods known as diverse safety rods (DSR) is used only for shutdown. Diversity between the two groups is ensured by varying the operating conditions of the electromagnets and the configurations of the mobile parts. The reactivity worth of the absorber rods have been chosen such that each group of rods would ensure cold shutdown on SCRAM even when the most reactive rod of the group fails to drop. Together the two groups ensure a shutdown margin of 5000 pcm. The speed and individual rod worth of the CSR is chosen from operational and safety considerations during reactor start up and raising of power. Required drop time of rods during SCRAM depends on the incident considered. For a severe reactivity incident of 3 $/s this has to be limited to 1s and is ensured by limiting electromagnet response time and facilitating drop by gravity. Design safety limits for core components have been determined and SCRAM parameters have been identified by plant dynamic analysis to restrict the temperatures of core components within the limits. The SCRAM parameters are distributed between the two systems appropriately. Fault tree analysis of the system has been carried out to determine the

  11. Italy: Analysis of Solutions for Passively Actuated Safety Shutdown Devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burgazzi, L.

    2015-01-01

    This article looks at different special shutdown systems specifically engineered for prevention of severe accidents, to be implemented on Fast Reactors, with main focus on the investigation of the performance of the self-actuated shutdown systems in Sodium Fast Reactors. The passive shut-down systems are designed to shut-down system only by inherent passive reactivity feedback mechanism, under unprotected accident conditions, implying failure of reactor protection system. They are conceived to be self-actuated without any signal elaboration, since the actuation of the system is triggered by the effects induced by the transient like material dilatation, in case of overheating of the coolant for instance, according to Fast Reactor design to meet the safety requirements

  12. CAREM-25 Reactor Second Shutdown System Consolidation Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gimenez, Marcelo; Zanocco, Pablo; Schlamp, Miguel

    2000-01-01

    CAREM Reactor Second Shutdown System (SSS) injects boron into the primary circuit in case of First Shutdown System failure in order to stop the nuclear reaction and to maintain the core in a safe condition during cold shutdown.It also has another safety function which is to inject water in the primary system at any pressure in case of LOCA.Different system requirements are analyzed during a SSS spurious trip and LOCA's transients.Two different alternatives are presented for the stand by condition pressurized system, they are solid mode and hot water layer. Both cases fulfill the design requirements from the safety point of view

  13. Potential improvement of CANDU NPP safety margins by shortening the response time of shutdown systems using FPGA based implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jingke She, E-mail: jshe2@uwo.ca [Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario N6A 5B9 (Canada); Jin Jiang, E-mail: jjiang@eng.uwo.ca [Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario N6A 5B9 (Canada)

    2012-03-15

    Highlights: Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Quantitative analysis of the safety margin improvement through thermalhydraulic simulation and analysis. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Hardware-in-the-loop simulation of realizing the improvement by an FPGA-based SDS1. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Verification of potential operating power upgrade without endangering the plant safety. - Abstract: The relationship between the peak values of critical reactor variables, such as neutronic power, inside a CANDU reactor and the speed of the response of its shutdown system has been analyzed in the event of a large loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The advantage of shortening the response time of the shutdown action has been demonstrated in term of the improved safety margin. A field programmable gate array (FPGA) platform has been chosen to implement such a shutdown system. Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulations have been performed to demonstrate the feasibility of this concept. Furthermore, connections between the speed of response of the shutdown system and the nominal operating power level of the reactor have been drawn to support for potential power upgrade for existing power plants.

  14. Safety considerations for research reactors in extended shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    According to the IAEA Research Reactor Database, in the last 20 years, 367 research reactors have been shut down. Of these, 109 have undergone decommissioning and the rest are in extended shutdown with no clear definition about their future. Still other research reactors are infrequently operated with no meaningful utilization programme. These two situations present concerns related to safety such as loss of corporate memory, personnel qualification, maintenance of components and systems and preparation and maintenance of documentation. There are many reasons to shut down a reactor; these may include: - the need to carry out modifications in the reactor systems; - the need for refurbishment to extend the lifetime of the reactor; - the need to repair reactor structures, systems, or components; - the need to remedy technical problems; - regulatory or public concerns; - local conflicts or wars; - political convenience; - the lack of resources. While any one of these reasons may lead to shutdown of a reactor, each will present unique problems to the reactor management. The large variations from one research reactor to the next also will contribute to the uniqueness of the problems. Any option that the reactor management adopts will affect the future of the facility. Options may include dealing with the cause of the shutdown and returning to normal operation, extending the shutdown period waiting a future decision, or decommissioning. Such options are carefully and properly analysed to ensure that the solution selected is the best in terms of reactor type and size, period of shutdown and legal, economic and social considerations. This publication provides information in support of the IAEA safety standards for research reactors

  15. LMFBR self-activated shutdown systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sowa, E.S.; Barthold, W.P.; Eggen, D.T.; Huebotter, P.R.; Josephson, J.; Pizzica, P.A.; Turski, R.B.; van Erp, J.B.

    1976-01-01

    Self-actuated shutdown systems (SASSs), fully contained within the dimensions of a fuel subassembly and installed in the core in judiciously chosen locations, can provide an important additional safety feature for LMFBRs. If actuated by phenomena inherent to the system and its immediate environment, these systems can contribute considerably to the total reliability of the overall plant protection system, in particular as regards protection against human error. It was shown that this type of shutdown system is capable of inserting a substantial amount of negative reactivity into the core with a relatively small impact on plant performance. Furthermore, it was shown that a coolable geometry can be maintained in LMFBRs of current design for a wide spectrum of accident initiators, and for a range of response times and insertion rates which appear to be achievable within practical design limits. Experiments showed that Curie-point-operated devices have considerable promise for application in self-actuated shutdown systems, in particular as regards meeting the requirements of testability and resettability

  16. On line testing of shutdown system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramnath, S.; Swaminathan, P.; Sreenivasan, P.

    1997-01-01

    For ensuring high reliability and availability, safety related Instrumentation channels are triplicated. Solid state electronics can fail in safe or unsafe mode. Hence, it is necessary to supervise the safety related Instrumentation channels from sensor to final shutdown system. Microprocessor/ Microcontroller/ ASIC based online supervision systems are detailed in this paper. (author)

  17. Reliability analysis of shutdown system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumar, C. Senthil; John Arul, A.; Pal Singh, Om; Suryaprakasa Rao, K.

    2005-01-01

    This paper presents the results of reliability analysis of Shutdown System (SDS) of Indian Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor. Reliability analysis carried out using Fault Tree Analysis predicts a value of 3.5 x 10 -8 /de for failure of shutdown function in case of global faults and 4.4 x 10 -8 /de for local faults. Based on 20 de/y, the frequency of shutdown function failure is 0.7 x 10 -6 /ry, which meets the reliability target, set by the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. The reliability is limited by Common Cause Failure (CCF) of actuation part of SDS and to a lesser extent CCF of electronic components. The failure frequency of individual systems is -3 /ry, which also meets the safety criteria. Uncertainty analysis indicates a maximum error factor of 5 for the top event unavailability

  18. Study on secondary shutdown systems in Tehran research reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jalali, H.R.; Fadaei, A.H., E-mail: Fadaei_amir@aut.ac.ir; Gharib, M.

    2015-09-15

    Highlights: • A study was undertaken to summarize the techniques for secondary shutdown systems (SSS). • Neutronic calculation performed for proposed systems as SSS. • Dumping the heavy water stored in the reflector vessel is capable to shut down reactor. • Neutronic and transient calculation was done for validating the selected SSS. • All calculation shown that this system has advantages in safety and neutron economy. - Abstract: One important safety aspect of any research reactor is the ability to shut down the reactor. Usually, research reactors, currently in operation, have a single shutdown system based on the simultaneous insertion of the all control rods into the reactor core through gravity. Nevertheless, the International Atomic Energy Agency currently recommends use of two shutdown systems which are fully independent from each other to guarantee secure shutdown when one of them fails. This work presents an investigative study into secondary shutdown systems, which will be an important safety component in the research reactor and will provide another alternative way to shut down the reactor emergently. As part of this project, a study was undertaken to summarize the techniques that are currently used at world-wide research reactors for recognizing available techniques to consider in research reactors. Removal of the reflector, removal of the fuels, change in critical shape of reactor core and insertion of neutron absorber between the core and reflector are selected as possible techniques in mentioned function. In the next step, a comparison is performed for these methods from neutronic aspects. Then, chosen method is studied from the transient behavior point of view. Tehran research reactor which is a 5 MW open-pool reactor selected as a case study and all calculations are carried out for it. It has 5 control rods which serve the purpose of both reactivity control and shutdown of reactor under abnormal condition. Results indicated that heavy

  19. Brief account of the design philosophy for third Qinshan NPP shutdown safety system based on practical application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xiong Weihua

    2005-01-01

    Qinshan CANDU power plant is uses the Canadian proven CANDU6 nuclear power technology. It has two characteristic: 1. heavy water-as moderator and coolant; 2. natural uranium as the fuel and change fuel during normal operating. CANDU6 include four special safety system: the No.1 shutdown system (SDS No.1), the No.2 shutdown system (SDS No.2), the containment system, the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). QinShan CANDU power plant is the first commercial PHWR nuclear power plant in China. And some aspect is not similar to everybody. The intention of the article is to introduce the basic design and functions. (authors)

  20. Optimal test intervals for shutdown systems for the Cernavoda nuclear power station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Negut, Gh.; Laslau, F.

    1993-01-01

    Cernavoda nuclear power station required a complete PSA study. As a part of this study, an important goal to enhance the effectiveness of the plant operation is to establish optimal test intervals for the important engineering safety systems. The paper presents, briefly, the current methods to optimize the test intervals. For this reason it was used Vesely methods to establish optimal test intervals and Frantic code to survey the influence of the test intervals on system availability. The applications were done on the Shutdown System no. 1, a shutdown system provided whit solid rods and on Shutdown System no. 2 provided with injecting poison. The shutdown systems receive nine total independent scram signals that dictate the test interval. Fault trees for the both safety systems were developed. For the fault tree solutions an original code developed in our Institute was used. The results, intended to be implemented in the technical specifications for test and operation of Cernavoda NPS are presented

  1. Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management of administrative controls to ensure safe operation of the facility

  2. Primary shutdown system monitoring unit for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khan, Tahir Kamal; Balasubramanian, R.; Agilandaeswari, K.

    2013-01-01

    Shut off rods made up of neutron absorbing material are used as Primary Shutdown System. To reduce the power of the reactor under certain abnormal operating conditions, these rods must go down into the core within a specified time. Any malfunctioning in the movement of rods cannot be tolerated and Secondary Shutdown System (SSS) must be actuated within stipulated time to reduce the reactor power. A special safety critical, hardwired electronics unit has been designed to detect failure of PSS Shut off rods movements and generate trip signals for initiating SSS. (author)

  3. Development of self-actuated shutdown system using curie point electromagnet

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Tae Ryong; Park, Jin Ho

    1999-01-01

    An innovative concept for a passive reactor shutdown system, so called self-actuated shutdown system (SASS), is inevitably required for the inherent safety in liquid metal reactor, which is designed with the totally different concept from the usual reactor shutdown system in LWR. SASS using Curie point electromagnet (CPEM) was selected as the passive reactor shutdown system for KALIMER (Korea Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor). A mock-up of the SASS was designed, fabricated and tested. From the test it was confirmed that the mockup was self-actuated at the Curie point of the temperature sensing material used in the mockup. An articulated control rod was also fabricated and assembled with the CPEM to confirm that the control rod can be inserted into core even when the control rod guide tube is deformed due to earthquake. The operability of SASS in the actual sodium environment should be confirmed in the future. All the design and test data will be applied to the KALIMER design. (author)

  4. Operating and maintenance experience of Dhruva secondary shutdown system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sharma, U.L.; Bharathan, R.

    1997-01-01

    Nine numbers of cadmium shut-off rods are used as primary fast acting shutdown devices while moderator dumping is used as secondary shutdown system. The secondary shutdown system in Dhruva reactor comprises of 3 dump valves and 3 control valves. Under normal operations, the control valves are used to control the moderator level and thereby the reactor power. Under Trip conditions the dump valves as well as the control valves open fully, dumping the moderator to the dump tank, thereby acting as secondary shutdown devices. While the failure of any of these valves to close fully is an incident, the failure of any of these valves to open on a demand is a safety related unusual occurrence and needs to be viewed seriously. During the last 11 years of operation of these valves, there was one incidence of a valve not closing fully and there were two instances of a valve not opening fully on demand. The possible causes, the corrective action taken to rehabilitate these valves and the elaborate system preparations undertaken to enable maintenance jobs are described. (author)

  5. Technical Meeting on Passive Shutdown Systems for Liquid Metal-Cooled Fast Reactors. Working Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    A major focus of the design of modern fast reactor systems is on inherent and passive safety. Specific systems to improve reactor safety performance during accidental transients have been developed in nearly all fast reactor programs, and a large number of proposed systems have reached various stages of maturity. This Technical Meeting on Passive Shutdown Systems for Fast Reactors, which was recommended by the Technical Working Group on Fast Reactors (TWG-FR), addressed Member States’ expressed need for information exchange on projects and programs in the field, as well as for the identification of priorities based on the analysis of technology gaps to be covered through R&D activities. This meeting was limited to shutdown systems only, and did not include other passive features such as natural circulation decay heat removal systems etc.; however the meeting catered to passive shutdown safety devices applicable to all types of fast neutron systems. It was agreed to initiate a new study and produce a Nuclear Energy Series (NES) Technical Report to collect information about the existing operational systems as well as innovative concepts under development. This will be a useful source for member states interested in gaining technical expertise to develop passive shutdown systems as well as to highlight the importance and development in this area

  6. Fuel supply shutdown facility interim operational safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Besser, R.L.; Brehm, J.R.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

    1995-01-01

    These Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSR) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls to ensure safe operation. The IOSRs apply to the fuel material storage buildings in various modes (operation, storage, surveillance)

  7. Probabilistic safety assessments of nuclear power plants for low power and shutdown modes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-03-01

    Within the past several years the results of nuclear power plant operating experience and performance of probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) for low power and shutdown operating modes have revealed that the risk from operating modes other than full power may contribute significantly to the overall risk from plant operations. These early results have led to an increased focus on safety during low power and shutdown operating modes and to an increased interest of many plant operators in performing shutdown and low power PSAs. This publication was developed to provide guidance and insights on the performance of PSA for shutdown and low power operating modes. The preparation of this publication was initiated in 1994. Two technical consultants meetings were conducted in 1994 and one in February 1999 in support of the development of this report

  8. The analysis of pressurizer safety valve stuck open accident for low power and shutdown PSA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lim, Ho Gon; Park, Jin Hee; Jang, Seong Chul; Kim, Tae Woon

    2005-01-01

    The PSV (Pressurizer Safety Valve) popping test carried out practically in the early phase of a refueling outage has a little possibility of triggering a test-induced LOCA due to a PSV not fully closed or stuck open. According to a KSNP (Korea Standard Nuclear Power Plant) low power and shutdown PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment), the failure of a HPSI (High Pressure Safety Injection) following a PSV stuck open was identified as a dominant accident sequence with a significant contribution to low power and shutdown risks. In this study, we aim to investigate the consequences of the NPP for the various accident sequences following the PSV stuck open as an initiating event through the thermal-hydraulic system code calculations. Also, we search the accident mitigation method for the sequence of HPSI failure, then, the applicability of the method is verified by the simulations using T/H system code.

  9. The Alternative Design Features for Safety Enhancement in Shutdown Operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oh, Hae Cheol; Kim, Myung Ki; Chung, Bag Soon; Seo, Mi Ro

    2009-01-01

    PSA can be used to confirm that the new plant design is complied with the applicable safety goals, and to select among the alternate design options. A shutdown PSA provides insight for outage planning schedule, outage management practices, and design modifications. Considering the results of both LPSD PSA studies and operating experiences for low power and shutdown, the improvements can be proposed to reduce the high risk contribution. The improvements/enhancements during shutdown operation may be divided into categories such as hardware, administrative management, and operational procedure. This paper presents on an example how the risk related to an accidental situation can be reduced, focusing the hardware design changes for the newly designed NPPs

  10. Reload safety evaluation of boron dilution accident related to shutdown margin proportional to boron concentration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zee, Sung Kyun; Lee, Ki Bog; Song, Jae Woong

    1993-06-01

    This report investigates the efficient safety evaluation method and analysis procedure on Boron Dilution Accident(BDA) under the proportional shutdown margin to boron concentration. Also investigated are problems caused by applying this shutdown margin limit. Through this investigation, the safety of Kori-3 Cycle-8, Yonggwang-2 Cycle-7, Kori-4 Cycle-8 and Yonggwang-1 Cycle-8 with respect to BDA is verified. In order to satisfy the shutdown margin requirement in the Technical Specifications, it is shown that the High Flux Alarm at Shutdown Setting for Kori-4 Cycle-8 and Yonggwang-1 Cycle-8 at Mode 5 should be set at 2 or the Technical Specification should be revised. (Author)

  11. Certificate for Safe Emergency Shutdown of Wind Turbines

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Wisniewski, Rafal; Svenstrup, Mikael; Pedersen, Andreas Søndergaard

    2013-01-01

    To avoid damage to a wind turbine in the case of a fault or a large wind gust, a detection scheme for emergency shutdown is developed. Specifically, the concept of a safety envelope is introduced. Within the safety envelope, the system can be shutdown without risking structural damage to the turb...

  12. Simulation of Darlington shutdown and regulation systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-10-01

    This report describes the development of a simulation of the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station shutdown and regulating systems, DARSIM. The DARSIM program simulates the spatial neutron dynamics, the regulation of the reactor power, and Shutdown System 1, SDS1, and Shutdown System 2, SDS2, software. The DARSIM program operates in the interactive simulation (INSIM) program environment

  13. Safety and regulation aspects of nuclear facilities shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clement, B.

    1977-01-01

    Technical dispositions that safety authorities will accept after shutdown of a nuclear installation and reglementation to use are examined. The different solutions from surveillance and maintenance, after removal of fissile materials and radioactive fluids, to dismantling are discussed especially for reactors. In each case the best solution has to be studied to ensure protection of public health and environment [fr

  14. Failure and Reliability Analysis for the Master Pump Shutdown System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BEVINS, R.R.

    2000-01-01

    The Master Pump Shutdown System (MPSS) will be installed in the 200 Areas of the Hanford Site to monitor and control the transfer of liquid waste between tank farms and between the 200 West and 200 East areas through the Cross-Site Transfer Line. The Safety Function provided by the MPSS is to shutdown any waste transfer process within or between tank farms if a waste leak should occur along the selected transfer route. The MPSS, which provides this Safety Class Function, is composed of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), interconnecting wires, relays, Human to Machine Interfaces (HMI), and software. These components are defined as providing a Safety Class Function and will be designated in this report as MPSS/PLC. Input signals to the MPSS/PLC are provided by leak detection systems from each of the tank farm leak detector locations along the waste transfer route. The combination of the MPSS/PLC, leak detection system, and transfer pump controller system will be referred to as MPSS/SYS. The components addressed in this analysis are associated with the MPSS/SYS. The purpose of this failure and reliability analysis is to address the following design issues of the Project Development Specification (PDS) for the MPSS/SYS (HNF 2000a): (1) Single Component Failure Criterion, (2) System Status Upon Loss of Electrical Power, (3) Physical Separation of Safety Class cables, (4) Physical Isolation of Safety Class Wiring from General Service Wiring, and (5) Meeting the MPSS/PLC Option 1b (RPP 1999) Reliability estimate. The failure and reliability analysis examined the system on a component level basis and identified any hardware or software elements that could fail and/or prevent the system from performing its intended safety function

  15. Identification of passive shutdown system parameters in a metal fueled LMR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vilim, R.B.

    1992-01-01

    This document discusses periodic testing of the passive shutdown system in a metal fueled liquid metal reactor which has been proposed as a Technical Specification requirement. In the approach to testing considered in this paper, perturbation experiments performed at normal operation are used to predict an envelope that bounds reactor response to flowrate, inlet temperature and external reactivity forcing functions. When the envelope for specific upsets lies within safety limits, one concludes that the passive shutdown system is operation properly for those upsets. Simulation results for the EBR-II reactor show that the response envelope for loss of flow and rod reactivity insertion events does indeed bound these events

  16. The use of digital computers in CANDU shutdown systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilbert, R.S.; Komorowski, C.W.

    1986-01-01

    This paper summarizes the application of computers in CANDU shutdown systems. A general description of systems that are already in service is presented along with a description of a fully computerized shutdown system which is scheduled to enter service in 1987. In reviewing the use of computers in the shutdown systems there are three functional areas where computers have been or are being applied. These are (i) shutdown system monitoring, (ii) parameter display and testing and (iii) shutdown initiation. In recent years various factors (References 1 and 2) have influenced the development and deployment of systems which have addressed two of these functions. At the present time a system is also being designed which addresses all of these areas in a comprehensive manner. This fully computerized shutdown system reflects the previous design, and licensing experience which was gained in earlier applications. Prior to describing the specific systems which have been designed a short summary of CANDU shutdown system characteristics is presented

  17. Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) Methodology and Application to the Shutdown Cooling System for APR-1400 Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Faragalla, Mohamed M.; Emmanuel, Efenji; Alhammadi, Ibrahim; Awwal, Arigi M.; Lee, Yong Kwan [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) is a safety-related system that is used in conjunction with the Main Steam and Main or Auxiliary Feedwater Systems to reduce the temperature of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) in post shutdown periods from the hot shutdown operating temperature to the refueling temperature. In this paper RCM methodology is applied to (SCS). RCM analysis is performed based on evaluation of Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FME and CA) on the component, system and plant. The Logic Tree Analysis (LTA) is used to determine the optimum maintenance tasks. The main objectives of RCM is the safety, preserve the System function, the cost-effective maintenance of the plant components and increase the reliability and availability value. The RCM methodology is useful for improving the equipment reliability by strengthening the management of equipment condition, and leads to a significant decrease in the number of periodical maintenance, extended maintenance cycle, longer useful life of equipment, and decrease in overall maintenance cost. It also focuses on the safety of the system by assigning criticality index to the various components and further selecting maintenance activities based on the risk of failure involved. Therefore, it can be said that RCM introduces a maintenance plan designed for maximum safety in an economical manner and making the system more reliable. For the SCP, increasing the number of condition monitoring tasks will improve the availability of the SCP. It is recommended to reduce the number of periodic maintenance activities.

  18. Safety logic systems of PFBR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sambasivan, S. Ilango

    2004-01-01

    Full text : PFBR is provided with two independent, fast acting and diverse shutdown systems to detect any abnormalities and to initiate safety action. Each system consists of sensors, signal processing systems, logics, drive mechanisms and absorber rods. The absorber rods of the first system are Control and Safety Rods (CSR) and that of the second are called as Diverse Safety Rods (DSR). There are nine CSR and three DSR. While CSR are used for startup, control of reactor power, controlled shutdown and SCRAM, the DSR are used only for SCRAM. The respective drive mechanisms are called as CSRDM and DSRDM. Each of these two systems is capable of executing the shutdown satisfactorily with single failure criteria. Two independent safety logic systems based on diverse principles have been designed for the two shut down systems. The analog outputs of the sensors of Core Monitoring Systems comprising of reactor flux monitoring, core temperature monitoring, failed fuel detection and core flow monitoring systems are processed and converted into binary signals depending on their instantaneous values. Safety logic systems receive the binary signals from these core-monitoring systems and process them logically to protect the reactor against postulated initiating events. Neutronic and power to flow (P/Q) signals form the inputs to safety logic system-I and temperature signals are inputs to the safety logic system II. Failed fuel detection signals are processed by both the shut down systems. The two logic systems to actuate the safety rods are also based on two diverse designs and implemented with solid-state devices to meet all the requirements of safety systems. Safety logic system I that caters to neutronic and P/Q signals is designed around combinational logic and has an on-line test facility to detect struck at faults. The second logic system is based on dynamic logic and hence is inherently safe. This paper gives an overview of the two logic systems that have been

  19. Supplementary shutdown system of 220 MWe standard PHWR in India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muktibodh, U.C.

    1997-01-01

    The design objective of the shutdown system is to make the reactor subcritical and hold it in that state for an extended period of time. This objective must be realised under all anticipated operational occurrences and postulated abnormal conditions even during most reactive state of the core. PHWR design criteria for shutdown stipulates requirement of two independent diverse and fast acting shutdown systems, either of which acting alone should meet the above objectives. This requirement would normally call for a large number of reactivity mechanism penetrations into the calandria. From the point of view of space availability at the reactivity mechanism area on top of calandria, for the relatively small core of 220 MWe PHWRs, and ease of maintenance realisation of the total worth by either of the shutdown systems acting alone was difficult. To overcome this engineering constraint and at the same time to satisfy the design criteria, a unique approach to meet the reactivity demands for shutdown was adopted. The reactivity requirements of the shutdown consists of fast and slow reactivity changes. For the shutdown system of 220 MWe PHWRs, the approach of realizing fast reactivity changes with dual redundant, diverse, fast acting shutdown systems aided by a slow acting shutdown system to counter delayed reactivity changes was conceived. The supplementary slow acting shutdown system is called upon to act after actuation of either of the two redundant fast acting systems and is referred to as Liquid Poison Injection System (LPIS). The system adds bulk amount of neutron poison (boric acid), equivalent to 45 mk, directly into the moderator through two nozzles in calandria using pneumatic pressure. This paper describes the design of LPIS as envisaged for the standardised 220 MWe PHWRs. (author)

  20. Safety shutdowns and failures of the RA reactor equipment; Sigurnosna zaustavljanja i kvarovi opreme na reaktoru RA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mitrovic, S [Institut za nuklearne nauke ' Boris Kidric' , Vinca, Belgrade (Yugoslavia)

    1966-07-01

    This report is an attempt of statistical analysis of the failures occurred during RA reactor operation. A list of failures occurred on the RA equipment during 1965 is included. Failures were related to the following systems: dosimetry system (22%), safety and control system (7%), heavy water system (2%), technical water (4%), helium system (2%), measuring instruments (30%), transport, ventilation, power supply systems (32%). A review of safety shutdowns from 1962 to 1966 is included as well, as a comparison with three similar reactors. Although the number of events used for statistical analysis was not adequate, it has been concluded that RA reactor operation was stable and reliable.

  1. TRACG-CFD analysis of ESBWR reactor water cleanup shutdown cooling system mixing coefficient

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gallardo, J.; Marquino, W.; Mistreanu, A.; Yang, J.

    2015-09-01

    The ESBWR is a 1520 nominal [M We] Generation III+ natural circulation boiling water reactor designed to high levels of safety utilizing features that have been successfully used before in operating BWRs, as well as standard features common to A BWR. In September of 2014, the US NRC has certified the ESBWR design for use in the USA. The RWCU/Sdc is an auxiliary system for the ESBWR nuclear island. Basic functions it performs include purifying the reactor coolant during normal operation and shutdown and providing shutdown cooling and cooldown to cold shutdown conditions. The performance of the RWCU system during shutdown cooling is directly related to the temperature of the water removed through the outlets, which is coupled with the vessel and F W temperatures through a thermal mixing coefficient. The complex three-dimensional (3-D) geometry of the BWR downcomer and lower plenum has a great impact on the flow mixing. Only a fine mesh technique like CFD can predict the 3-D temperature distribution in the RPV during shutdown and provide the RWCU/Sdc system inlet temperature. Plant shutdown is an unsteady event by nature and was modeled as a succession of CFD steady-state simulations. It is required to establish the mixing coefficient (which is a function of the heat balance and the core flow) during the operation of the RWCU system in the multiple shutdown cooling modes, and therefore a range of core flows needs to be estimated using quasi steady states obtained with TRACG. The lower end of that range is obtained from a system with minimal power decay heat and core flow; while the higher end corresponds to the power at the beginning of RWCU/Sdc operation when the cooldown is transferred to the RWCU/Sdc after the initial depressurization via the turbine bypass valves. Because the ESBWR RWCU/Sdc return and suction designs provide good mixing, the uniform mixing energy balance was found to be an adequate alternative for deriving the mixing coefficient. The CFD mass flow

  2. TRACG-CFD analysis of ESBWR reactor water cleanup shutdown cooling system mixing coefficient

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallardo, J. [UNAM, Facultad de Ingenieria, Ciudad Universitaria, 04510 Ciudad de Mexico (Mexico); Marquino, W.; Mistreanu, A.; Yang, J., E-mail: euqrop@hotmail.com [General Electric Hitachi Nuclear Energy, Wilmington, 28401 North Carolina (United States)

    2015-09-15

    The ESBWR is a 1520 nominal [M We] Generation III+ natural circulation boiling water reactor designed to high levels of safety utilizing features that have been successfully used before in operating BWRs, as well as standard features common to A BWR. In September of 2014, the US NRC has certified the ESBWR design for use in the USA. The RWCU/Sdc is an auxiliary system for the ESBWR nuclear island. Basic functions it performs include purifying the reactor coolant during normal operation and shutdown and providing shutdown cooling and cooldown to cold shutdown conditions. The performance of the RWCU system during shutdown cooling is directly related to the temperature of the water removed through the outlets, which is coupled with the vessel and F W temperatures through a thermal mixing coefficient. The complex three-dimensional (3-D) geometry of the BWR downcomer and lower plenum has a great impact on the flow mixing. Only a fine mesh technique like CFD can predict the 3-D temperature distribution in the RPV during shutdown and provide the RWCU/Sdc system inlet temperature. Plant shutdown is an unsteady event by nature and was modeled as a succession of CFD steady-state simulations. It is required to establish the mixing coefficient (which is a function of the heat balance and the core flow) during the operation of the RWCU system in the multiple shutdown cooling modes, and therefore a range of core flows needs to be estimated using quasi steady states obtained with TRACG. The lower end of that range is obtained from a system with minimal power decay heat and core flow; while the higher end corresponds to the power at the beginning of RWCU/Sdc operation when the cooldown is transferred to the RWCU/Sdc after the initial depressurization via the turbine bypass valves. Because the ESBWR RWCU/Sdc return and suction designs provide good mixing, the uniform mixing energy balance was found to be an adequate alternative for deriving the mixing coefficient. The CFD mass flow

  3. Reactor Shutdown Mechanism by Top-mounted Hydraulic System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Sang Haun; Cho, Yeong Garp; Choi, Myoung Hwan; Lee, Jin Haeng; Huh, Hyung; Kim, Jong In [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2012-05-15

    There are two types of reactor shutdown mechanisms in HANARO. One is the mechanism driven by a hydraulic system, and the other is driven by a stepping motor. In HANARO, there are four Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs) with an individual step motor and four Shutoff (SO) Units with an individual hydraulic system located at the top of reactor pool. The absorber rods in SO units are poised at the top of the core by the hydraulic force during normal operation. The rods of SO units drop by gravity as the first reactor showdown mechanism when a trip is commended by the reactor protection system (RPS). The rods in CRDMs also drop by gravity together as a redundant shutdown mechanism. When a trip is commended by the reactor regulating system (RRS), the absorber rods of CRDM only drop; while the absorber rods of SO units stay at the top of the core by the hydraulic system. The reactivity control mechanisms of in JRTR, one of the new research reactor with plate type fuels, consist of four CRDMs driven by an individual step motor and two second shutdown drive mechanisms (SSDMs) driven by an individual hydraulic system as shown in Fig. 1. The CRDMs act as the first reactor shutdown mechanism and reactor regulating as well. The top-mounted SSDM driven by the hydraulic system for the JRTR is under design in KAERI. The SSDM provides an alternate and independent means of reactor shutdown. The second shutdown rods (SSRs) of the SSDM are poised at the top of the core by the hydraulic system during the normal operation and drop by gravity for the reactor trip. Based on the proven technology of the design, operation and maintenance for HANARO, the SSDM for the JRTR has been optimized by the design improvement from the experience and test. This paper aims for the introduction of the SSDM in the process of the basic design. The major differences of the shutdown mechanisms by the hydraulic system are compared between HANARO and JRTR, and the design features, system, structure and

  4. CANDU 6 liquid injection shutdown system waterhammer analysis using PTRAN

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, Deuk Yoon; Kim, Eun Ki; Ko, Yong Sang; Park, Byung Ho; Kim, Seok Bum

    1996-06-01

    An in-core LOCA could result in flooding of the helium header in the liquid injection shutdown system. Flooding of the helium header will result in severe pressure transients (waterhammer) in the liquid injection shutdown system when the shutdown signal is initiated. To evaluate the impact of the dynamic effects of this event, a pressure transient analysis has been performed. This analysis is performed using PTRAN, which is a computer program based on the method of characteristics. The results of this analysis are used in the stress analysis of the piping and pipe supports to ensure that the liquid injection shutdown system can withstand the pressure transient loadings. This analysis report documents the results of waterhammer analysis performed for the liquid injection shutdown system for the Wolsung nuclear power plant unit 2, 3 and 4. 4 tabs., 11 figs., 15 refs. (Author)

  5. CANDU 6 liquid injection shutdown system waterhammer analysis using PTRAN

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ko, Deuk Yoon; Kim, Eun Ki; Ko, Yong Sang; Park, Byung Ho; Kim, Seok Bum [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1996-06-01

    An in-core LOCA could result in flooding of the helium header in the liquid injection shutdown system. Flooding of the helium header will result in severe pressure transients (waterhammer) in the liquid injection shutdown system when the shutdown signal is initiated. To evaluate the impact of the dynamic effects of this event, a pressure transient analysis has been performed. This analysis is performed using PTRAN, which is a computer program based on the method of characteristics. The results of this analysis are used in the stress analysis of the piping and pipe supports to ensure that the liquid injection shutdown system can withstand the pressure transient loadings. This analysis report documents the results of waterhammer analysis performed for the liquid injection shutdown system for the Wolsung nuclear power plant unit 2, 3 and 4. 4 tabs., 11 figs., 15 refs. (Author).

  6. Outcomes of an international initiative for harmonization of low power and shutdown probabilistic safety assessment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Manna Giustino

    2010-01-01

    Full Text Available Many probabilistic safety assessment studies completed to the date have demonstrated that the risk dealing with low power and shutdown operation of nuclear power plants is often comparable with the risk of at-power operation, and the main contributors to the low power and shutdown risk often deal with human factors. Since the beginning of the nuclear power generation, human performance has been a very important factor in all phases of the plant lifecycle: design, commissioning, operation, maintenance, surveillance, modification, decommissioning and dismantling. The importance of this aspect has been confirmed by recent operating experience. This paper provides the insights and conclusions of a workshop organized in 2007 by the IAEA and the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, on Harmonization of low power and shutdown probabilistic safety assessment for WWER nuclear power plants. The major objective of the workshop was to provide a comparison of the approaches and the results of human reliability analyses and gain insights in the enhanced handling of human factors.

  7. Firefighter safety for PV systems: Overview of future requirements and protection systems

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Spataru, Sergiu; Sera, Dezso; Blaabjerg, Frede

    2013-01-01

    for operators during maintenance or fire-fighting. One of the solutions is individual module shutdown by short-circuiting or disconnecting each PV module from the PV string. However, currently no standards have been adopted either for implementing or testing these methods, or doing an evaluation of the module...... shutdown procedures. This paper gives an overview on the most recent fire - and firefighter safety requirements for PV systems, with focus on system and module shutdown systems. Several solutions are presented, analyzed and compared by considering a number of essential characteristics, including......An important and highly discussed safety issue for photovoltaic systems is that, as long as they are illuminated, a high voltage is present at the PV string terminals and cables between the string and inverters, independent of the state of the inverter's dc disconnection switch, which poses a risk...

  8. Shutdown risk monitoring in TEPCO

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, Hiroki; Masuda, Takahiro; Denda, Yasutaka; Yoneyama, Mitsuru; Imai, Shun-ichi; Miyata, Koichi

    2009-01-01

    At present, we are introducing risk monitors into our all three nuclear power stations; Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima Daini and Kashiwazaki Kariwa, with technical support of TEPSYS. By monitoring shutdown risk of each unit, we are trying to optimize risks during outage inspection, and raising staff's awareness for reactor safety. This paper presents our recent shutdown risk monitoring activities in Fukushima Daiichi NPS. Shutdown risk monitoring has been carried out for the past five outages of Fukushima Daiichi NPS. Daily-changing shutdown risk is evaluated in the form of core damage frequency (CDF [/day/reactor]). We also examine high-risk point of outage plan if CDF is greater than the threshold at anytime of outage. The results are delivered to operational and maintenance staff before outage. The threshold value is set ten times as much as CDF of unit in operation. As CDF exceeds the threshold, we try to either change the system configuration, or let workers pay more attention to their works during the high-risk period. We already have some examples of outage plan modification to reduce CDF using the risk monitoring information. Greater number of station staff tends to pay more attention to shutdown risk thanks to these activities. (author)

  9. Probabilistic analysis of 900 MWe PWR. Shutdown technical specifications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mattei, J.M.; Bars, G.

    1987-11-01

    During annual shutdown, preventive maintenance and modifications which are made on PWRs cause scheduled unavailabilities of equipment or systems which might harm the safety of the installation, in spite of the low level of decay heat during this period. The pumps in the auxiliary feedwater system, component cooling water system, service water system, the water injection arrays (LPIS, HPIS, CVCS), and the containment spray system may have scheduled unavailability, as well as the power supply of the electricity boards. The EDF utility is aware of the risks related to these situations for which accident procedures have been set up and hence has proposed limiting downtime for this equipment during the shutdown period, through technical specifications. The project defines the equipment required to ensure the functions important for safety during the various shutdown phases (criticality, water inventory, evacuation of decay heat, containment). In order to be able to judge the acceptability of these specifications, the IPSN, the technical support of the Service Central de Surete des Installations Nucleaires, has used probabilistic methodology to analyse the impact on the core melt probability of these specifications, for a French 900 MWe PWR

  10. Design and analysis of shutdown mechanisms of PFBR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vijayashree, R.; Rajan Babu, V.; Puthiyavinayagam, P.; Chellapandi, P.; Chetal, S.C.

    2009-01-01

    Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) is equipped with two independent, fast acting and diverse shutdown systems. The absorber rod of the first system is called Control and Safety Rod (CSR) and that of the second system is called Diverse Safety Rod (DSR). The respective drive mechanisms are called Control and Safety Rod Drive Mechanism (CSRDM) and Diverse Safety Rod Drive Mechanism (DSRDM). The conceptual features of the Absorber Rods (ARs) and Absorber Rod Drive Mechanisms (ARDMs) are given in the figures. The functions and design specifications of the ARDMs are listed. The theoretical results of the performance of the shutdown systems during scram are presented. The design was always backed up with testing and design validation. The individual subassemblies testing and the design have proceeded side by side, the efforts finally culminated into the manufacturing of 1:1 scale prototype ARDMs and ARs. The prototypes were extensively tested in air, water and sodium to qualify them for reactor application. A companion paper in this conference gives the details of design validation by testing. This paper gives a brief account of the design of ARDMs and ARs. (author)

  11. Report of a consultants meeting on accidents during shutdown conditions for WWER nuclear power plants. Extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-07-01

    The main objectives of the meeting were to exchange information on the operational occurrences, studies performed and countermeasures taken for the accidents during shutdown for WWERs, and to define the necessity and directions of the further activities which may promote the improvement of WWER safety under shutdown conditions. The consultants have discussed some aspects concerning vulnerability of safety functions during shutdown conditions, several steps required to performed accident analysis and selected operational aspects for shutdown conditions. The discussion was supported by an evaluation of selected operational occurrences. The consultants have agreed that the discussion during the meeting in major parts is relevant to all the WWER designs (i.e. WWER-1000, WWER-440/213 and WWER-440/230). As for the plant conditions, the consultants have agreed to bound the discussion mainly by the cold shutdown and refuelling modes. Refs, figs, tabs

  12. First LHC Shutdown: Coordination and Schedule Issues

    CERN Document Server

    Coupard, J; Grillot, S

    2010-01-01

    The first LHC shutdown started in fall 2008, just after the incident on the 19th of September 2008. In addition to the typical work of a shutdown, a large number of interventions, related to the “consolidation after the incident” were performed in the LHC loop. Moreover the amount of work increased during the shutdown, following the recommendations and conclusions of the different working groups in charge of the safety of the personnel and of the machine. This paper will give an overview of the work performed, the organization of the coordination, emphasizing the new safety risks (electrical and cryogenic), and how the interventions were implemented in order to ensure both the safety of personnel and a minimized time window.

  13. Comparison of Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Results for Shutdown Operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oh, Hae Cheol; Kim, Myung Ki; Chung, Bag Soon; Seo, Mi Ro; Hong, Sung Yull

    2006-01-01

    The Defense-In-Depth philosophy is a fundamental concept of nuclear safety. The objective of Defense-In- Depth (DID) evaluation is to assess the level of Defense- In-Depth maintained during the various plant maintenance activities. Especially for shutdown and outage operations, the Defense-In-Depth might be challenged due to the reduction in redundancy and diversity resulting from the maintenance. The qualitative defense-in-depth evaluation using deterministic trees such as SFAT (Safety Function Assessment Tree), can provide 'Safety' related information on the levels of defense-in-depth according to the plant configuration including the levels of redundancy and diversity. For the more reasonable color decision of SFAT, it is necessary to identify the risk impact of degradation of redundancy and diversity of mitigation systems. The probabilistic safety analysis for the shutdown status can provide risk information related on the degradation of redundancy and diversity level for the safety functions during outage. Insights from the both methods for the plant status can be the same or different. The results of DID approach and PSA for the shutdown state are compared in this paper

  14. Evaluation of the safety margins during shutdown for NPP Krsko

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bencik, V.; Sadek, S.; Bajs, T.

    2004-01-01

    In the paper the results of RELAP5/mod3.3 calculations of critical parameters during shutdown for NPP Krsko are presented. Conservative evaluations have been performed at NPP Krsko to determine the minimum configuration of systems required for the safe shutdown operation. Critical parameters in these evaluations are defined as the time to start of the boiling and the time of the core dry-out. In order to have better insight into the available margins, the best estimate code RELAP5/mod3.3 has been used to calculate the same parameters. The analyzed transient is the loss of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system, which is used to remove decay heat during shutdown conditions. Several configurations that include open and closed Reactor Coolant System (RCS) were considered in the evaluation. The RELAP5/mod3.3 analysis of the loss of the RHR system has been performed for the following cases: 1) RCS closed and water solid, 2) RCS closed and partially drained, 3) Pressurizer manway open, Steam Generator (SG) U tubes partially drained, 4) Pressurizer and SG manways open, SG U tubes completely drained, 5) Pressurizer manway open, SGs drained, SG nozzle dams installed and 6) SG nozzle dams installed, pressurizer manway open, 1 inch break at RHR pump discharge in the loop with pressurizer. Both RHR trains were assumed in operation prior to start of the transient. The maximum average steady state temperature for all analyzed cases was limited to 333 K. (author)

  15. Development of Risk Assessment Technology for Low Power, Shutdown and Digital I and C System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jang, Seung Cheol; Kang, Hyun Gook; Lim, Ho Gon; Park, Jin Hee; Kang, Dae Il; Eom, Heung Sub; Kim, Man Cheol; Lee, Ho Joong; Kim, Jae Whan; Ha, Jae Joo

    2007-06-01

    There are two technical areas to deal with in the project: the low power and shutdown probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), and the digital I and C PSA. The scope and contents of each area could be summarized as follows: The LPSD PSA Area Ο Quality improvement of the KSNP LPSD PSA model in the following four technical areas; human reliability analysis (HR), system analysis (SY), data analysis (DA) and accident sequence quantification (QU) Ο Development of the LPSD configuration risk management(CRM) model - Study on the methodology for developing a CRM model, so-called ASLOC (Autonomous Shutdown LOgic Creation) - Development of the LPSD CRM model for the units of Ulchin 3 and 4 The Digital I and C PSA Area Ο Development of impact model of ESF-CCS on plant risks - Unavailability analysis of ESF-CCS for APR-1400 - Digital plant risk models for evaluating core damage frequency (CDF) Ο Study on the methodologies for treating digital-specific problems in the digital I and C PSA - Study on the methodology for evaluating safety-critical SW reliability by BBN techniques, including a feasibility study of reliability growth model - Study on the methodology for the safety-critical network system by Markov chain

  16. Backup passive reactivity shutdown systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ashurko, Yu.M.; Kuznetsov, L.A.

    1996-01-01

    The paper reviews self-actuated shutdown systems (SASSs) for liquid metal-cooled fast reactors (LMFRs). Principles of operation are described, advantages and drawbacks analyzed, and prospects for application in advanced fast reactors examined. Ways to improve reactor self-protection via reactivity feedback amplification and related problems are discussed. (author). 9 refs, 12 figs

  17. Backup passive reactivity shutdown systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ashurko, Yu M; Kuznetsov, L A [Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, Obninsk (Russian Federation)

    1996-12-01

    The paper reviews self-actuated shutdown systems (SASSs) for liquid metal-cooled fast reactors (LMFRs). Principles of operation are described, advantages and drawbacks analyzed, and prospects for application in advanced fast reactors examined. Ways to improve reactor self-protection via reactivity feedback amplification and related problems are discussed. (author). 9 refs, 12 figs.

  18. Shutdowns/scrams at BWRs reported under new 1984 LER rule

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mays, G.T.

    1985-01-01

    Operating experience data from nuclear power plants are essential for safety and reliability analyses. The Licensee Event Reports (LERs), submitted to the NRC by nuclear power plant utilities, contain much of this data. One of the significant aspects of the new LER rule includes the requirement to report all plant shutdowns whereas prior to 1984, not all shutdowns were reported as LERs. This paper reviews the shutdowns and scrams occurring during the first six months of 1984 at BWRs as reported under the new LER rule. The review focused on systems involved, causes, and personnel interactions

  19. Uncertainty evaluation of reliability of shutdown system of a medium size fast breeder reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zeliang, Chireuding; Singh, Om Pal, E-mail: singhop@iitk.ac.in; Munshi, Prabhat

    2016-11-15

    Highlights: • Uncertainty analysis of reliability of Shutdown System is carried out. • Monte Carlo method of sampling is used. • The effect of various reliability improvement measures of SDS are accounted. - Abstract: In this paper, results are presented on the uncertainty evaluation of the reliability of Shutdown System (SDS) of a Medium Size Fast Breeder Reactor (MSFBR). The reliability analysis results are of Kumar et al. (2005). The failure rate of the components of SDS are taken from International literature and it is assumed that these follow log-normal distribution. Fault tree method is employed to propagate the uncertainty in failure rate from components level to shutdown system level. The beta factor model is used to account different extent of diversity. The Monte Carlo sampling technique is used for the analysis. The results of uncertainty analysis are presented in terms of the probability density function, cumulative distribution function, mean, variance, percentile values, confidence intervals, etc. It is observed that the spread in the probability distribution of SDS failure rate is less than SDS components failure rate and ninety percent values of the failure rate of SDS falls below the target value. As generic values of failure rates are used, sensitivity analysis is performed with respect to failure rate of control and safety rods and beta factor. It is discovered that a large increase in failure rate of SDS rods is not carried to SDS system failure proportionately. The failure rate of SDS is very sensitive to the beta factor of common cause failure between the two systems of SDS. The results of the study provide insight in the propagation of uncertainty in the failure rate of SDS components to failure rate of shutdown system.

  20. On the functional failures concept and probabilistic safety margins: challenges in application for evaluation of effectiveness of shutdown systems - 15318

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Serghiuta, D.; Tholammakkil, J.

    2015-01-01

    The use of level-3 reliability approach and the concept of functional failure probability could provide the basis for defining a safety margin metric which would include a limit for the probability of functional failure, in line with the definition of a reliability-based design. It can also allow a quantification of level of confidence, by explicit modeling and quantification of uncertainties, and provide a better framework for representation of actual design and optimization of design margins within an integrated probabilistic-deterministic model. This paper reviews the attributes and challenges in application of functional failure concept in evaluation of risk-informed safety margins using as illustrative example the case of CANDU reactors shutdown systems effectiveness. A risk-informed formulation is first introduced for estimation of a reasonable limit for the functional failure probability using a Swiss cheese model. It is concluded that more research is needed in this area and a deterministic - probabilistic approach may be a reasonable intermediate step for evaluation of functional failure probability at the system level. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of CNSC, or any part thereof. (authors)

  1. Effect of dc-power-system reliability on reactor-shutdown cooling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kolaczkowski, A.M.; Baranowsky, P.W.; Hickman, J.W.

    1981-01-01

    The DC power systems in a nuclear power plant provide control and motive power to valves, instrumentation, emergency diesel generators, and many other components and systems during all phases of plant operation including abnormal shutdowns and accident situations. A specific area of concern is the adequacy of the minimum design requirements for DC power systems, particularly with regard to multiple and common cause failures. This concern relates to the application of the single failure criterion for assuring a reliable DC power supply which may be required for the functionability of shutdown cooling systems. The results are presented of a reliability based study performed to assess the adequacy of DC power supply design requirements for currently operating light water reactors with particular attention to shutdown cooling requirements

  2. On the speed of response of an FPGA-based shutdown system in CANDU nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    She Jingke, E-mail: jshe2@uwo.ca [Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, N6A 5B9 (Canada); Jiang Jin, E-mail: jjiang@eng.uwo.ca [Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, N6A 5B9 (Canada)

    2011-06-15

    Highlights: > Design and implementation of an FPGA-based CANDU SDS1. > Hardware-in-the-loop simulation for performance evaluation involved with an NPP simulator. > Comparison of the response time between FPGA-based trip channel and software-based PLC. - Abstract: Several issues in an FPGA based implementation of shutdown systems in CANDU nuclear power plants have been investigated in this paper. A particular attention is on the response time of an FPGA implementation of safety shutdown systems in comparison with operating system based software solutions as in existing CANDU plants. The trip decision logic under 'steam generator (SG) level low' condition has been examined in detail. The design and implementation of this logic on an FPGA platform have been carried out. The functionality tests are performed in a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) environment by connecting the FPGA based system to an NPP simulator, and replacing one channel of Shutdown System Number 1 (SDS1) in the simulator by the FPGA implementation. The response time of the designed system is also measured through multiple tests under different conditions, and statistical data analysis has been performed. The results of the response time tests are compared against those of a software-based implementation of the same trip logic.

  3. Nuclear reactor shutdown system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mangus, J.D.; Cooper, M.H.

    1982-01-01

    An improved nuclear reactor shutdown system is described comprising a temperature sensitive device connected to control the electric power supply to a magnetic latch holding a body of a neutron absorbing material. The temperature sensitive device is exposed to the reactor coolant so that when the reactor coolant temperature rises above a specific level, the temperature sensitive device will cause deenergization of the magnetic latch to allow the body of neutron absorbing material to enter the reactor core. (author)

  4. Updating of the program for simulation of Darlington shutdown and regulation systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-07-01

    This report describes the current status of the developments of a simulation of the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station shutdown and regulating systems, DARSIM done under contract to the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB). The DARSIM program simulates the spatial neutron dynamics, the regulation of the reactor power, and shutdown system 1 and shutdown system 2 software. The DARSIM program operates in the interactive simulation program environment. DARSIM was installed on the APOLLO computer at the AECB and a version for an IBM-PC was also provided for the exclusive use of the AECB. Shutdown system software was updated to incorporate the latest revisions in the functional specifications. Additional developments have been provided to assist in the use and interpretation of the DARSIM results

  5. Letter report seismic shutdown system failure mode and effect analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KECK, R.D.

    1999-01-01

    The Supply Ventilation System Seismic Shutdown ensures that the 234-52 building supply fans, the dry air process fans and vertical development calciner are shutdown following a seismic event. This evaluates the failure modes and determines the effects of the failure modes

  6. Fluid shut-down system for a nuclear reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barclay, F.W.; Frey, J.R.; Wilson, J.N.; Besant, R.W.

    1975-01-01

    A nuclear reactor shut-down system is described which comprises a fluidic vortex valve for releasably maintaining a liquid neutron poison outside of the reactor core, the poison being contained by a reservoir and biased by pressure for flow into poison tubes within the reactor. The upper ends of the poison tubes communicate with the supply port of the vortex valve. A continuous gas flow into the control port maintains normal controlled operation. Shut-down is effected by interruption of the control input. One embodiment comprises three groups of poison tubes and one vortex valve associated with each group wherein shut-down is effected by poison release in two out of the three groups. Preferably, each vortex valve comprises three control ports which operate on a ''voting'' or two-out-of-three basis. (Official Gazette)

  7. Development of Risk Assessment Technology for Low Power, Shutdown and Digital I and C Systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jang, Seung Cheol; Kang, Hyung Gook; Lim, Ho Gon; Park, Jin Hee; Eom, Heung Sub; Kim, Tae Woon; Ha, Jae Joo

    2005-04-15

    There are two technical areas to deal with in the project; the low power and shutdown probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), and the digital I and C PSA. The scope and contents of each area could be summarized as follows: Quality assessment of a LPSD PSA model for a Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KSNP), Quality improvement of the KSNP LPSD PSA model in the following four technical areas; plant operating status (POS), initiating event analysis, determination of success criteria, accident sequence analysis, Development of the LPSD risk management technologies, Unavailability analysis of Digital safety systems such as Digital Plant Protection System (DPPS) and Digital Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (DESFAS), Impact analysis of the digital safety systems on plant risks throughout of the digital plant risk models for evaluating core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF), Study on the methodologies for treating digital-specific problems in the digital I and C PSA such as reliability of safety-critical software, common cause failure (CCF) of digital components, fault coverage, etc.

  8. Development of Risk Assessment Technology for Low Power, Shutdown and Digital I and C Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jang, Seung Cheol; Kang, Hyung Gook; Lim, Ho Gon; Park, Jin Hee; Eom, Heung Sub; Kim, Tae Woon; Ha, Jae Joo

    2005-04-01

    There are two technical areas to deal with in the project; the low power and shutdown probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), and the digital I and C PSA. The scope and contents of each area could be summarized as follows: Quality assessment of a LPSD PSA model for a Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KSNP), Quality improvement of the KSNP LPSD PSA model in the following four technical areas; plant operating status (POS), initiating event analysis, determination of success criteria, accident sequence analysis, Development of the LPSD risk management technologies, Unavailability analysis of Digital safety systems such as Digital Plant Protection System (DPPS) and Digital Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (DESFAS), Impact analysis of the digital safety systems on plant risks throughout of the digital plant risk models for evaluating core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF), Study on the methodologies for treating digital-specific problems in the digital I and C PSA such as reliability of safety-critical software, common cause failure (CCF) of digital components, fault coverage, etc

  9. Design criteria for a self-actuated shutdown system to ensure limitation of core damage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deane, N.A.; Atcheson, D.B.

    1981-09-01

    Safety-based functional requirements and design criteria for a self-actuated shutdown system (SASS) are derived in accordance with LOA-2 success criteria and reliability goals. The design basis transients have been defined and evaluated for the CDS Phase II design, which is a 2550 MWt mixed oxide heterogeneous core reactor. A partial set of reactor responses for selected transients is provided as a function of SASS characteristics such as reactivity worth, trip points, and insertion times

  10. Shutdown Chemistry Process Development for PWR Primary System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sung, K.B. [Korea Electric Power Research Institute, Taejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    1997-12-31

    This study report presents the shutdown chemistry of PWR primary system to reduce and remove the radioactive corrosion products which were deposited on the nuclear fuel rods surface and the outside of core like steam generator channel head, RCS pipings etc. The major research results are the follows ; the deposition radioactive mechanism of corrosion products, the radiochemical composition, the condition of coolant chemistry to promote the dissolution of radioactive cobalt and nickel ferrite, the control method of dissolved hydrogen concentration in the coolant by the mechanical and chemical methods. The another part of study is to investigate the removal characteristics of corrosion product ions and particles by the demineralization system to suggest the method which the system could be operate effectively in shut-down purification period. (author). 19 refs., 25 figs., 48 tabs.

  11. Seismic qualification of SPX1 shutdown systems - tests and calculations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brochard, D.; Buland, P.

    1988-01-01

    The SUPERPHENIX 1 shutdown system is composed of two main systems: the Complementary Shutdown System SAC (Systeme d'Arret Complementaire) and the Primary Shutdown System (SCP) (Systeme de Commande Principal). In case of a seismic event, the insertability of the different shutdown systems has to be demonstrated. Tests have been performed on the SAC and have shown that this system was not sensitive to the seismic excitation (the drop time increases of 10% at SSE level). For the SCP, as an analytical demonstration was felt difficult to achieve, it was decided to perform a full scale testing program. These tests have been performed for the two types of SCP which are present in Superphenix: SCP 1 (Creusot Loire design), SCP 2 (Novatome design). As there was no existing facility in France to test this kind of slender structure (21 metres high) a new facility named VESUBIE was designed and installed in an existing pit located at the Saclay nuclear research center. The objectives of the tests were the following: to demonstrate insertability of control rod; to demonstrate absence of seismic induced damage to the SCP; to measure increase of scram time; to measure seismic induced stresses; to obtain data for code correlation. After completion of the tests, measurements have been correlated with results obtained from a non-linear finite element model. Time history correlations were achieved for SCP 1. Afterwards a calculation was performed in hot condition to find if there was some effect of temperature on SCP seismic response. 2 refs, 8 figs

  12. Republic of Korea: Design Study for Passive Shutdown System of the PGSFR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, J.H.

    2015-01-01

    There have been no experiences of implementing a passive shutdown system in operating or operated SFRs around the world. However, new SFRs are considered to adopt a self-actuated shutdown system (SASS) in the future to provide an alternate means of passively shutting down the reactor. The Prototype Gen-IV SFR (PGSFR) developed by KAERI also adopts this system for the same reason. This passive shutdown design concept is combined with a group of secondary control rod drive mechanisms (SCRDM). The system automatically releases the control rod assembly (CRA) around the set temperature, and then drops the CRA by gravity without any external control signals and any actuating power in an emergency of the reactor. This paper describes the parametric design study of a passive shutdown system, which consists of a thermal expansion device, an electromagnet, and a secondary control rod assembly head. The conceptual design values of each component are also suggested. Parametric calculations are performed to check the suitability of the performance requirements of the thermal expansion device and electromagnets

  13. Reliability analysis of self-actuated shutdown system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Itooka, S.; Kumasaka, K.; Okabe, A.; Satoh, K.; Tsukui, Y.

    1991-01-01

    An analytical study was performed for the reliability of a self-actuated shutdown system (SASS) under the unprotected loss of flow (ULOF) event in a typical loop-type liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) by the use of the response surface Monte Carlo analysis method. Dominant parameters for the SASS, such as Curie point characteristics, subassembly outlet coolant temperature, electromagnetic surface condition, etc., were selected and their probability density functions (PDFs) were determined by the design study information and experimental data. To get the response surface function (RSF) for the maximum coolant temperature, transient analyses of ULOF were performed by utilizing the experimental design method in the determination of analytical cases. Then, the RSF was derived by the multi-variable regression analysis. The unreliability of the SASS was evaluated as a probability that the maximum coolant temperature exceeded an acceptable level, employing the Monte Carlo calculation using the above PDFs and RSF. In this study, sensitivities to the dominant parameter were compared. The dispersion of subassembly outlet coolant temperature near the SASS-was found to be one of the most sensitive parameters. Fault tree analysis was performed using this value for the SASS in order to evaluate the shutdown system reliability. As a result of this study, the effectiveness of the SASS on the reliability improvement in the LMFBR shutdown system was analytically confirmed. This study has been performed as a part of joint research and development projects for DFBR under the sponsorship of the nine Japanese electric power companies, Electric Power Development Company and the Japan Atomic Power Company. (author)

  14. Logical safety system for triggering off the protection action of a safety actuator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Plaige, Yves.

    1982-01-01

    This invention applies in particular to the emergency triggering of safety actuators controlling the shutdown of a nuclear reactor. This logical safety system includes four redundant lines each composed, inter alia, of a logical circuit for controlling the triggering of a protection action, a logical alarm circuit connected to the control circuit and a logical inhibiting circuit making it impossible to inhibit several alarm circuits simultaneously [fr

  15. Application of PSA to reduce frequency of unplanned shutdown of the reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanipanichskul, P.

    1988-08-01

    The relative importance of all the operating and safety systems of the reactor TRR-1/M1 as well as the major failure modes of the systems are pointed out. The average unavailability of the reactor is 3·3 E-2 per cycle of operation which is in the range value of the actual reactor shutdown recorded during normal operation. Some guidance for annual maintenance and also suggestions for system development to increase safety systems reliability are determined. PSA was applied to improve the safety systems reliability of an operating research reactor. Refs, tabs

  16. Pilot Operation of Ex-core Neutron Sensors of Divers Shutdown System (DSS) Unit 2 Ignalina NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jakshtonis, Z.; Krivoshei, G.

    2006-01-01

    The Ignalina Safety Assessment, which was completed in December 1996, recommended the installation of a diverse shutdown system on the 2nd unit at Ignalina. During the PPR-2004 in the DSS project are created two independent shutdown systems by separating the absorber rods into two independent groups as follows: 1. One system (designated AZ) consists of the existing 24 BAZ rods and 49 AZ/BSM rods that together are used for reliable reactor shutdown (including Control and Protection System (CPS) circuit voiding accident). This system performs the emergency protection function. 2. The other system (designated BSM) comprises the remaining absorber rods and the 49 AZ/BSM rods. Thus 49 AZ/BSM rods are actuated from AZ initiating equipment as well as from BSM initiating equipment. The BSM system performs the normal reactor shutdown function and is able to ensure long-term maintenance of the reactor in the sub-critical state. Along with implementation of DSS was modernized existing Emergency Process Protection System, which was divided into two independent Sets of initiating equipment. The DSS is independent and diverse initiating equipment from the existing 1st Set equipment; with each set having its own independent in-core and ex-core sensors for measurement of neutron flux and process parameters. The 2nd Set of initiating equipment for measuring ex-core neutron flux, was modernized with new design of 4 Ex-Core detectors each have a single low level neutron flux detector and two high range neutron detectors. They are comprising: 1. A fission chamber which operates in pulse mode to cover the low flux levels. 2. A compensated ionisation chamber in current mode to operate at high flux level. This detector is doubled to give a measurement of the axial deviation. Two detectors are enough to produce the axial power deviation. The results of testing and analysis of pilot operation of ex-core neutron sensors of DSS will be shown on the Report. (author)

  17. The shutdown reactor: Optimizing spent fuel storage cost

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pennington, C.W.

    1995-01-01

    Several studies have indicated that the most prudent way to store fuel at a shutdown reactor site safely and economically is through the use of a dry storage facility licensed under 10CFR72. While such storage is certainly safe, is it true that the dry ISFSI represents the safest and most economical approach for the utility? While no one is really able to answer that question definitely, as yet, Holtec has studied this issue for some time and believes that both an economic and safety case can be made for an optimization strategy that calls for the use of both wet and dry ISFSI storage of spent fuel at some plants. For the sake of brevity, this paper summarizes some of Holtec's findings with respect to the economics of maintaining some fuel in wet storage at a shutdown reactor. The safety issue, or more importantly the perception of safety of spent fuel in wet storage, still varies too much with the eye of the beholder, and until a more rigorous presentation of safety analyses can be made in a regulatory setting, it is not practically useful to argue about how many angels can sit on the head of a safety-related pin. Holtec is prepared to present such analyses, but this does not appear to be the proper venue. Thus, this paper simply looks at certain economic elements of a wet ISFSI at a shutdown reactor to make a prima facie case that wet storage has some attractiveness at a shutdown reactor and should not be rejected out of hand. Indeed, an optimization study at certain plants may well show the economic vitality of keeping some fuel in the pool and converting the NRC licensing coverage from 10CFR50 to 10CFR72. If the economics look attractive, then the safety issue may be confronted with a compelling interest

  18. Design of shutdown system no.2 liquid poison injection system for 500 MWe PHWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bhatnagar, S.; Balasubrahmanian, A.K.; Pillai, A.V.

    1997-01-01

    Defence in depth and two group system concepts form the basic design philosophy for the shutdown systems. There are two independent, diverse and fast acting shutdown systems provided for the 500 MWe PHWR. The design is based on fail-safe principle, sufficient component redundancy and on-line testing. Liquid poison injection system, as shutdown system 2, is newly developed for the 500 MWe PHWRs. The system operates by rapidly injecting gadolinium nitrate solution into bulk moderator using stored helium pressure thereby inserting negative reactivity. A high pressure helium supply tank which provides the energy for system actuation, is connected, through an array of fast acting valves in series-parallel arrangement, to the individual poison tanks storing gadolinium nitrate solution. The valves, belonging to three different channels of reactor Protection System 2, are the only active components in the system. The valves are fail safe and are periodically tested on-line without actually firing the system. The system comprising of in-core assemblies and the external process system has been engineered. Experimental work is being carried out by BARC for design validation and data generation. This paper describes the conceptual development, design basis, design parameters and detailed engineering of the system. (author)

  19. Probabilities of inherent shutdown of unprotected events in innovative liquid metal reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, C.J.; Wade, D.C.

    1988-01-01

    The uncertainty in predicting the effectiveness of inherent shutdown in innovative liquid metal cooled reactors with metallic fuel results from three broad contributing areas of uncertainty: (1) the inability to exactly predict the frequency of ATWS events with potential to challenge the safety systems and require inherent shutdown; (2) the approximation of representing all such events by a selected set of ''generic scenarios''; and (3) the inability to exactly calculate the core response to the selected generic scenarios. This paper discusses the work being done to address each of these contributing areas, identifies the design and research approaches being used at Argonne National Laboratory to reducing the key contributions to uncertainties in inherent shutdown, and presents results. The conditional probabilities (given ATWS initiation) of achieving temperatures capable of defeating inherent shutdown are shown to range from /approximately/0.1% to negligible for current designs

  20. Self-actuated shutdown system for a commercial size LMFBR. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dupen, C.F.G.

    1978-08-01

    A Self-Actuated Shutdown System (SASS) is defined as a reactor shutdown system in which sensors, release mechanisms and neutron absorbers are contained entirely within the reactor core structure, where they respond inherently to abnormal local process conditions, by shutting down the reactor, independently of the plant protection system (PPS). It is argued that a SASS, having a response time similar to that of the PPS, would so reduce the already very low probability of a failure-to-scram event that costly design features, derived from core disruptive accident analysis, could be eliminated. However, the thrust of the report is the feasibility and reliability of the in-core SASS hardware to achieve sufficiently rapid shutdown. A number of transient overpower and transient undercooling-responsive systems were investigated leading to the selection of a primary candidate and a backup concept. During a transient undercooling event, the recommended device is triggered by the associated rate of change of pressure, whereas the alternate concept responds to the reduction in core pressure drop and requires calibration and adjustment by the operators to accommodate changes in reactor power.

  1. Self-actuated shutdown system for a commercial size LMFBR. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupen, C.F.G.

    1978-08-01

    A Self-Actuated Shutdown System (SASS) is defined as a reactor shutdown system in which sensors, release mechanisms and neutron absorbers are contained entirely within the reactor core structure, where they respond inherently to abnormal local process conditions, by shutting down the reactor, independently of the plant protection system (PPS). It is argued that a SASS, having a response time similar to that of the PPS, would so reduce the already very low probability of a failure-to-scram event that costly design features, derived from core disruptive accident analysis, could be eliminated. However, the thrust of the report is the feasibility and reliability of the in-core SASS hardware to achieve sufficiently rapid shutdown. A number of transient overpower and transient undercooling-responsive systems were investigated leading to the selection of a primary candidate and a backup concept. During a transient undercooling event, the recommended device is triggered by the associated rate of change of pressure, whereas the alternate concept responds to the reduction in core pressure drop and requires calibration and adjustment by the operators to accommodate changes in reactor power

  2. Tricon hardware controller implementation of CANDU nuclear power plant shutdown system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zahedi, P.

    2007-01-01

    This paper introduces the implementation of logic functions associated with the shutdown systems of CANDU nuclear power plants. The experimental aspects of this work include development of control program embedded in shutdown systems of CANDU based NPPs. A physical test environment is designed to simulate the measurements of in-core flux detector (ICFD) and ion chamber (I/C) signals. The programmable logic used in this experimentation provides Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) architecture as well as a voting mechanism used upon execution of control program on each independent channel. (author)

  3. Reliability analysis of diverse safety logic systems of fast breeder reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ravi Kumar, Bh.; Apte, P.R.; Srivani, L.; Ilango Sambasivan, S.; Swaminathan, P.

    2006-01-01

    Safety Logic for Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) is designed to initiate safety action against Design Basis Events. Based on the outputs of various processing circuits, Safety logic system drives the control rods of the shutdown system. So, Safety Logic system is classified as safety critical system. Therefore, reliability analysis has to be performed. This paper discusses the Reliability analysis of Diverse Safety logic systems of FBRs. For this literature survey on safety critical systems, system reliability approach and standards to be followed like IEC-61508 are discussed in detail. For Programmable Logic device based systems, Hardware Description Languages (HDL) are used. So this paper also discusses the Verification and Validation for HDLs. Finally a case study for the Reliability analysis of Safety logic is discussed. (author)

  4. FPGA Implementation of the stepwise shutdown system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lotjonen, L.

    2012-01-01

    This report elaborates the design process of applications for field-programmable gate array (FPGA) devices. Brief introductions to EPGA technology and the design process are first given and then the design phases are walked through with the aid of a case study. FPGA is a programmable logic device that is programmed by the customer rather than the manufacturer. They are also usually re-programmable which enables updating their programming and otherwise modifying the design. There are also one-time programmable FPGAs that can be used when security issues require it. FPGA is said to be 'hardware designed like software', which means that the design process resembles software development but the end-product is considered a hardware application because the execution of the functions is entirely different from a microprocessor. This duality can give both the flexibility of software and the reliability of hardware. The FPGA design and verification and validation (V and V) methods for NPP safety systems have not yet matured because the technology is rather new in the field. Software development methods and standards can be used to some extent but the hardware aspects bring new challenges that cannot be tackled using purely software methods. International efforts are being made to development formal and consistent design and V and V methodology regulations for FPGA devices. A preventive safety function called Stepwise Shutdown System (SWS) was implemented on an Actel M1 IGLOO field-programmable gate array (FPGA) device. SWS is used to drive a process into a normal state if the process measurements deviate from the desired operating values. This can happen in case of process disturbances. The SWS implementation process from the requirements to the functional device is elaborated. The design is tested via simulation and hardware testing. The case study is to be further expanded as a part of a master's thesis. (orig.)

  5. FPGA Implementation of the stepwise shutdown system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lotjonen, L.

    2012-07-01

    This report elaborates the design process of applications for field-programmable gate array (FPGA) devices. Brief introductions to EPGA technology and the design process are first given and then the design phases are walked through with the aid of a case study. FPGA is a programmable logic device that is programmed by the customer rather than the manufacturer. They are also usually re-programmable which enables updating their programming and otherwise modifying the design. There are also one-time programmable FPGAs that can be used when security issues require it. FPGA is said to be 'hardware designed like software', which means that the design process resembles software development but the end-product is considered a hardware application because the execution of the functions is entirely different from a microprocessor. This duality can give both the flexibility of software and the reliability of hardware. The FPGA design and verification and validation (V and V) methods for NPP safety systems have not yet matured because the technology is rather new in the field. Software development methods and stanfards can be used to some extent but the hardware aspects bring new challenges that cannot be tacled using purely software methods. International efforts are being made to development formal and consistent design and V and V methodology regulations for FPGA devices. A preventive safety function called Stepwise Shutdown System (SWS) was implemented on an Actel M1 IGLOO field-programmable gate array (FPGA) device. SWS is used to drive a process into a normal state if the process measurements deviate from the desired operating values. This can happen in case of process disturbances. The SWS implementation processfrom the reguirements to the functional device is elaborated. The design is tested via simulation and hardware testing. The case study is to be further expanded as a part of a master's thesis. (orig.)

  6. Study on the Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Analysis for CANDU NPPs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, In Hwan; Kim, Yun Jung; Park, Mun Hee [KHNP Central Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The purpose of this paper is to study a method of the Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Analysis in order to apply to CANDU NPPs when one group of the Safety Structures, Systems and Components(SCCs) is failed by Fire. The purpose of Fire Protection is prevention, suppression of the fire and mitigation of the effect on the Nuclear Safety. When fire takes place at the Nuclear Power Plants(NPPs), the reactor should achieve and maintain safe shut-down condition and minimize radioactive material release to an environment. The purpose of the Post-Fire SSA process is an evaluation process during a fire at NPPs. At this study, the process was conceptually adopted for control room complex of CANDU NPPs. The Core Damage Frequency of the Reactor will be evaluated more accurately if the SSA is adopted adequately at a fire.

  7. Safe shutdown analysis for submerged equipment inside containment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, Dong Soo; Lee, Seung Chan; Yoon, Duk Joo; Ha, Sang Jun

    2017-01-01

    The purpose of the paper is to analyze internal flooding effects on the submerged safety-related components inside containment building. Safe shutdown analysis has been performed based on the criteria, assumptions and guideline provided in ANSI/ANS-56.11-1988 and ANSI/ANS-58.11-1988. Flooding can be postulated from a failure of several systems located inside the containment. Loss of coolant accident (LOCA), Feed water line break (FWLB), and other pipe breaks/cracks are assumed. The worst case flooding scenario is a large break LOCA. The maximum flood level for a large break LOCA is calculated based on the combined inventory of the reactor coolant system, the three accumulators, the boron injection tank (BIT), the chemical additive tank (CAT), and the refueling water storage tank (RWST) flooding the containment. The maximum flood level that could occur from all of the water which is available in containment is 2.3 m from the base elevation. A detailed flooding analysis for the components has been performed to demonstrate that internal flooding resulting from a postulated initiating event does not cause the loss of equipment required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown of the plant, emergency core cooling capability, or equipment whose failure could result in unacceptable offsite radiological consequences. The flood height can be calculated as h = (dh/dt) x (t-t 0 ) + h 0 , where h = time dependent flood height and subscript 0 means the initial value and height slope dh/dt. In summary, the submerged components inside containment are acceptable because they complete the mission of safety injection (SI) prior to submeregency or have no safe shutdown function including containment isolation during an accident. (author)

  8. Report on the use of programmable digital computers in the shutdown systems of the Darlington G.S

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-06-01

    This report considers the use of large, programmable computers in the shutdown system at the planned Darlington Generating Station. After a review of the document submitted to the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Engineering Company in support of gaining AECB's agreement in principle to such a system, the ACNS concludes that no fundamental principle will be challenged by the introduction of computer technology into safety systems. It cautions, however, that the AECB should ensure that existing principles particularly those of independence and redundancy, will not be compromised in the application

  9. Improvements of primary coolant shutdown chemistry and reactor coolant system cleanup

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gaudard, G.; Gilles, B.; Mesnage, F.; Cattant, F.

    2002-01-01

    In the framework of a radiation exposure management program entitled >, EDF aims at decreasing the mass dosimetry of nuclear power plants workers. So, the annual dose per unit, which has improved from 2.44 m.Sv in 1991 to 1.08 in 2000, should target 0.8 mSv in the year 2005 term in order to meet the results of the best nuclear operators. One of the guidelines for irradiation source term reduction is the optimization of operation parameters, including reactor coolant system (RCS) chemistry in operation, RCS shutdown chemistry and RCS cleanup improvement. This paper presents the EDF strategy for the shutdown and start up RCS chemistry optimization. All the shutdown modes have been reviewed and for each of them, the chemical specifications will be fine tuned. A survey of some US PWRs shutdown practices has been conducted for an acid and reducing shutdown chemistry implementation test at one EDF unit. This survey shows that deviating from the EPRI recommended practice for acid and reducing shutdown chemistry is possible and that critical path impact can be minimized. The paper also presents some investigations about soluble and insoluble species behavior and characterization; the study focuses here on 110m Ag, 122 Sb, 124 Sb and iodine contamination. Concerning RCS cleanup improvement, the paper presents two studies. The first one highlights some limited design modifications that are either underway or planned, for an increased flow rate during the most critical periods of the shutdown. The second one focuses on the strategy EDF envisions for filters and resins selection criteria. Matching the study on contaminants behavior with the study of filters and resins selection criteria should allow improving the cleanup efficiency. (authors)

  10. The accidents during shutdown conditions Temelin NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sykora, M.; Mlady, O.

    1996-01-01

    Two parallel activities oriented for the accidents during shutdown conditions are performed at Temelin NPP: Development of symptom based emergency operating procedures (EOPs) applicable for the accidents which could occur during operational modes 1 through 4; independent evaluation of plant safety as part of the Temelin Shutdown probabilistic assessment to define the accidents which could occur during mode 5 and 6 for which the EOPs must be extended. Both these activities are in progress now because Temelin plant is still in the construction phase

  11. Programmable Electronic Safety Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parry, R.

    1993-05-01

    Traditionally safety systems intended for protecting personnel from electrical and radiation hazards at particle accelerator laboratories have made extensive use of electromechanical relays. These systems have the advantage of high reliability and allow the designer to easily implement failsafe circuits. Relay based systems are also typically simple to design, implement, and test. As systems, such as those presently under development at the Superconducting Super Collider Laboratory (SSCL), increase in size, and the number of monitored points escalates, relay based systems become cumbersome and inadequate. The move toward Programmable Electronic Safety Systems is becoming more widespread and accepted. In developing these systems there are numerous precautions the designer must be concerned with. Designing fail-safe electronic systems with predictable failure states is difficult at best. Redundancy and self-testing are prime examples of features that should be implemented to circumvent and/or detect failures. Programmable systems also require software which is yet another point of failure and a matter of great concern. Therefore the designer must be concerned with both hardware and software failures and build in the means to assure safe operation or shutdown during failures. This paper describes features that should be considered in developing safety systems and describes a system recently installed at the Accelerator Systems String Test (ASST) facility of the SSCL

  12. ORNL Isotopes Facilities Shutdown Program Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gibson, S.M.; Patton, B.D.; Sears, M.B.

    1990-10-01

    This plan presents the results of a technical and economic assessment for shutdown of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) isotopes production and distribution facilities. On December 11, 1989, the Department of Energy (DOE), Headquarters, in a memorandum addressed to DOE Oak Ridge Operations Office (DOE-ORO), gave instructions to prepare the ORNL isotopes production and distribution facilities, with the exception of immediate facility needs for krypton-85, tritium, and yttrium-90, for safe shutdown. In response to the memorandum, ORNL identified 17 facilities for shutdown. Each of these facilities is located within the ORNL complex with the exception of Building 9204-3, which is located at the Y-12 Weapons Production Plant. These facilities have been used extensively for the production of radioactive materials by the DOE Isotopes Program. They currently house a large inventory of radioactive materials. Over the years, these aging facilities have inherited the problems associated with storing and processing highly radioactive materials (i.e., facilities' materials degradation and contamination). During FY 1990, ORNL is addressing the requirements for placing these facilities into safe shutdown while maintaining the facilities under the existing maintenance and surveillance plan. The day-to-day operations associated with the surveillance and maintenance of a facility include building checks to ensure that building parameters are meeting the required operational safety requirements, performance of contamination control measures, and preventative maintenance on the facility and facility equipment. Shutdown implementation will begin in FY 1993, and shutdown completion will occur by the end of FY 1994

  13. Reactor shutdown back-up system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirao, Seizo; Sakashita, Motoaki.

    1982-01-01

    Purpose: To prevent back flow of poison upon injection to a moderator recycling pipeway. Constitution: In a nuclear reactor comprising a moderator recycling system for recycling and cooling moderator through a control rod guide pipe and a rapid poison injection system for rapidly injecting a poison solution at high density into the moderator by way of the same control rod guide pipe as a reactor shutdown back-up system, a mechanism is provided for preventing the back flow of a poison solution at high density into the moderator recycling system upon rapid injection of poison. An orifice provided in the joining pipeway to the control rod guide pipe on the side of the moderator recycling system is utilized as the back flow preventing device for the poison solution and the diameter for the orifice is determined so as to provide a constant ratio between the pressure loss in the control rod guide pipe and the pressure loss in the moderator recycling system pipe line upon usual reactor operation. (Kawakami, Y.)

  14. Reactivity Accidents in CAREM-25 Core with and Without Safety Systems Actuation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gimenez, Marcelo; Vertullo, Alicia; Schlamp, Miguel

    2000-01-01

    A reactivity accident in CAREM core can be provoked by different initiating events, a cold water injection in pressure vessel, a secondary side steam line breakage and a failure in the absorbing rods drive system.The present work analyses inadverted control rod withdraws transients.Maximum worth control rod (2.5 $) at normal velocity (1 cm/s) is adopted for the simulations (Reactivity ramp of 0.018 $/s).Different scenarios considering actuation of first shutdown system (FSS), second shutdown system (SSS) and selflimiting conditions were modeled.Results of the accident with actuation of FSS show that safety margins are well above critical values (DNBR and CPR).In the cases with failure of the FSS and success of SSS or selflimited, safety margins are below critical values, however, the SSS provides a reduction of elapsed time under advised margins

  15. Concepts in developing technical means of accident shutdown of nuclear reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ionajtis, R.R.; Mikhajlov, M.P.; Cherkashov, Yu.M.

    1992-01-01

    Logic for realization of multistage (echelon) reactor accident shutdown system (ASS) is proposed on the basis of general safety concepts (OPB-88). ASS includes the basis stage with traditional composition of member systems (executive, control, providing ones), auxiliary (doubling) on the other principle of action and insuring (with direct action). Structural schemes of the system as a whole and member subsystems are presented. Recommendations on developing executive and control subsystems are given

  16. Magnetic disconnect for secondary shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lessor, D.L.

    1972-01-01

    A description is given of studies to develop a magnetic holding clutch in the control rod drive line as an alternate shutdown device for the FFTF. Results indicate that a three-phase disconnect, hold, and backup shutdown system can be designed to operate satisfactorily. (U.S.)

  17. Probabilities of inherent shutdown of unprotected events in innovative liquid metal reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, C.J.

    1987-01-01

    The uncertainty in predicting the effectiveness of inherent shutdown (ISD) in innovative designs results from three broad contributing areas of uncertainty: (1) the inability to exactly predict the frequency of ATWS events with potential to challenge the safety systems and require ISD; (2) the approximation of representing all such ATWS events by a selected set of ''generic scenarios''; and (3) the inability to exactly calculate the core response to the selected generic scenarios. In this summary, the methodology and associated results of work used to establish probabilities of failure of inherent shutdown of innovative LMRs to the unprotected loss-of-flow (LOF) accident are discussed

  18. Reactivity control in HTR power plants with respect to passive safety system. Summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barnert, H; Kugeler, K [Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH (Germany). Inst. fuer Sicherheitsforschung und Reaktortechnik

    1996-12-01

    The R and D and Demonstration of the High Temperature Reactor (HTR) is described in overview. The HTR-MODULE power plant, as the most advanced concept, is taken for the description of the reactivity control in general. The idea of the ``modularization of the core`` of the HTR has been developed as the answer on the experiences of the core melt accident at Three Miles Island. The HTR module has two shutdown systems: The ``6 rods``-system for hot shutdown at the ``18 small absorber pebbles units`` - system for cold shutdown. With respect to the definition of ``Passive Systems`` of IAEA-TECDOC-626 the total reactivity control system of the HTR-MODULE is a passive system of category D, because it is an emergency reactor shutdown system based on gravity driven rods, and devices, activated by fail-safe trip logic. But reactivity control of the HTR does not only consist of these engineered safety system but does have a self-acting stabilization by the negative temperature coefficient of the reactivity, being rather effective in reactivity control. Examples from computer calculations are presented, and, in addition, experimental results from the ``Stuck Rod Experiment`` at the AVR reactor in Juelich. On the basis of this the proposal is made that ``self-acting stabilization as a quality of the function`` should be discussed as a new category in addition to the active and passive engineered safety systems, structures and components of IAEA-TECDOC-626. The requirements for a future ``catastrophe-free`` nuclear technology are presented. In the appendix the 7th amendment of the atomic energy act of the Federal Republic of Germany, effective 28 July 94, is given. (author).

  19. Alternative Shutdown Panel. Amaraz Nuclear Power Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Saenz de Santa Maria Valin, J.

    2016-07-01

    Between 2010 and 2014 the Nuclear Power Plant of Almaraz conducted one of the most complex projects in its history: The installation of an Alternative Shutdown Panel with the capability to stop the plant in case of fire in the Control room or in the Cable room. This project represented a great economic and organizational effort for the plant, but at the same time has been a great improvement in the safety of the installation, which was demonstrated by the achievement of a major milestone in the history of Almaraz: The actual shutdown from outside of the Control room. (Author)

  20. Programmable electronic safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parry, R.R.

    1993-01-01

    Traditionally safety systems intended for protecting personnel from electrical and radiation hazards at particle accelerator laboratories have made extensive use of electromechanical relays. These systems have the advantage of high reliability and allow the designer to easily implement fail-safe circuits. Relay based systems are also typically simple to design, implement, and test. As systems, such as those presently under development at the Superconducting Super Collider Laboratory (SSCL), increase in size, and the number of monitored points escalates, relay based systems become cumbersome and inadequate. The move toward Programmable Electronic Safety Systems is becoming more widespread and accepted. In developing these systems there are numerous precautions the designer must be concerned with. Designing fail-safe electronic systems with predictable failure states is difficult at best. Redundancy and self-testing are prime examples of features that should be implemented to circumvent and/or detect failures. Programmable systems also require software which is yet another point of failure and a matter of great concern. Therefore the designer must be concerned with both hardware and software failures and build in the means to assure safe operation or shutdown during failures. This paper describes features that should be considered in developing safety systems and describes a system recently installed at the Accelerator Systems String Test (ASST) facility of the SSCL

  1. CERN Vacuum-System Activities during the Long Shutdown 1: The LHC Beam Vacuum

    CERN Document Server

    Baglin, V; Chiggiato, P; Jimenez, JM; Lanza, G

    2014-01-01

    After the Long Shutdown 1 (LS1) and the consolidation of the magnet bus bars, the CERN Large Hadron Collider (LHC) will operate with nominal beam parameters. Larger beam energy, beam intensities and luminosity are expected. Despite the very good performance of the beam vacuum system during the 2010-12 physics run (Run 1), some particular areas require attention for repair, consolidation and upgrade. Among the main activities, a large campaign aiming at the repair of the RF bridges of some vacuum modules is conducted. Moreover, consolidation of the cryogenic beam vacuum systems with burst disk for safety reasons is implemented. In addition, NEG cartridges, NEG coated inserts and new instruments for the vacuum system upgrade are installed. Besides these activities, repair, consolidation and upgrades of other beam equipment such as collimators, kickers and beam instrumentations are carried out. In this paper, the motivation and the description for such activities, together with the expected beam vacuum performa...

  2. SNR 2 core dynamics and shut-down signals in a protected loss-of-flow incident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kleefeldt, K.

    1982-01-01

    The dynamic behavior of a 1300 MWe Core during a loss-of-flow incident has been analyzed by use of the SAS3D code for a given pump coast down characteristic and constant core inlet temperature. Emphasis was placed on the questions: How fast and via which monitored parameters can the incident be recognized by the reactor protection system. What is the tolerable time span for the shut-down action without exceeding safety limits. Key prameters and limit values as well as conceivable reactivity feed-back effects are discussed. The result is, that three out of four choosen monitored parameters are capable of initiating a shut-down action in time. In addition, the amount of shut-down reactivity required for a successful scram was briefly investigated

  3. Trends vs. reactor size of passive reactivity shutdown and control performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wade, D.C.; Fujita, E.K.

    1988-01-01

    The focus of the US advanced reactor program since the cancellation of CRBR has been on inherent safety and cost reduction. The notion is to so design the reactor that in the event of an off normal condition, it brings itself to a safe shutdown condition and removes decay heat by reliance on ''inherent processes'' i.e., without reliance on devices requiring switching and outside sources of power. Such a reactor design would offer the potential to eliminate costly ''Engineered Safety Features,'' to lower capital costs, and to assuage public unease concerning reactor safety. For LMR concepts, the goal of passive reactivity shutdown has been approached in the US by designing the reactors for favorable relationships among the power, power/flow, and inlet temperature coefficients of reactivity, for high internal conversion ratio (yielding small burnup control swing), and for a primary pump coastdown time appropriately matched to the delayed neutron hold back of power decay upon negative reactivity input. The use of sodium bonded metallic fuel pins has facilitated the achievement of the passive shutdown design goals as a consequence of their high thermal conductivity and high effective heavy metal density. Alternately, core designs based on derated oxide pins may be able to achieve the passive shutdown features at the cost of larger core volume and increased initial fissile inventory. 8 refs., 12 figs., 1 tab

  4. Technical Specification action statements requiring shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mankamo, T.; Kim, I.S.; Samanta, P.K.

    1993-11-01

    When safety systems fail during power operation, the limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) and associated action statements of technical specifications typically require that the plant be shut down within the limits of allowed outage time (AOT). However, when a system needed to remove decay heat, such as the residual heat removal (RHR) system, is inoperable or degraded, shutting down the plant may not necessarily be preferable, from a risk perspective, to continuing power operation over a usual repair time, giving priority to the repairs. The risk impact of the basic operational alternatives, i.e., continued operation or shutdown, was evaluated for failures in the RHR and standby service water (SSW) systems of a boiling-water reactor (BWR) nuclear power plant. A complete or partial failure of the SSW system fails or degrades not only the RHR system but other front-line safety systems supported by the SSW system. This report presents the methodology to evaluate the risk impact of LCOs and associated AOT; the results of risk evaluation from its application to the RHR and SSW systems of a BWR; the findings from the risk-sensitivity analyses to identify alternative operational policies; and the major insights and recommendations to improve the technical specifications action statements

  5. The Upgrade of the CMS RPC System during the First LHC Long Shutdown

    CERN Document Server

    Tytgat, M.; Verwilligen, P.; Zaganidis, N.; Aleksandrov, A.; Genchev, V.; Iaydjiev, P.; Rodozov, M.; Shopova, M.; Sultanov, G.; Assran, Y.; Abbrescia, M.; Calabria, C.; Colaleo, A.; Iaselli, G.; Loddo, F.; Maggi, M.; Pugliese, G.; Benussi, L.; Bianco, S.; Caponero, M.; Colafranceschi, S.; Felli, F.; Piccolo, D.; Saviano, G.; Carrillo, C.; Berzano, U.; Gabusi, M.; Vitulo, P.; Kang, M.; Lee, K.S.; Park, S.K.; Shin, S.; Sharma, A.

    2012-01-01

    The CMS muon system includes in both the barrel and endcap region Resistive Plate Chambers (RPC). They mainly serve as trigger detectors and also improve the reconstruction of muon parameters. Over the years, the instantaneous luminosity of the Large Hadron Collider gradually increases. During the LHC Phase 1 (~first 10 years of operation) an ultimate luminosity is expected above its design value of 10^34/cm^2/s at 14 TeV. To prepare the machine and also the experiments for this, two long shutdown periods are scheduled for 2013-2014 and 2018-2019. The CMS Collaboration is planning several detector upgrades during these long shutdowns. In particular, the muon detection system should be able to maintain a low-pT threshold for an efficient Level-1 Muon Trigger at high particle rates. One of the measures to ensure this, is to extend the present RPC system with the addition of a 4th layer in both endcap regions. During the first long shutdown, these two new stations will be equipped in the region |eta|<1.6 with...

  6. Evolution of shutdown mechanism for PHWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Singh, Manjit; Govindarajan, G.

    1997-01-01

    In 500 MWe PHWR, there are two independent fast acting shutdown systems namely (1) mechanical shut-off rod system and (2) liquid poison injection system. Both systems are independently capable of keeping the reactor in sub-critical condition during long shutdown. Mechanical shut-off rod system being primary shutdown system calls for a very high reliability of operation as well as effectiveness, which are mainly governed by its ability to operate within a very short time and the magnitude of negative reactivity worth it can provide. Mechanical shut-off rods are normally parked above the core by shut-off rod drive mechanism. On receiving a scram signal, shut-off rods are released from the holding electromagnetic clutch and fall under gravity into the core. This paper discusses the salient features of mechanical shut-off rod system. A brief account of detailed design and development of sub-assemblies of shut-off rod drive mechanism is also presented. (author)

  7. Rodded shutdown system for a nuclear reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Golden, M.P.; Govi, A.R.

    1978-01-01

    A top mounted nuclear reactor diverse rodded shutdown system utilizing gas fed into a pressure bearing bellows region sealed at the upper extremity to an armature is described. The armature is attached to a neutron absorber assembly by a series of shafts and connecting means. The armature is held in an uppermost position by an electromagnet assembly or by pressurized gas in a second embodiment. Deenergizing the electromagnet assembly, or venting the pressurized gas, causes the armature to fall by the force of gravity, thereby lowering the attached absorber assembly into the reactor core

  8. Inherently safe SNR shutdown system with Curie point controlled sensor/switch unit

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, K.; Norajitra, P.; Reiser, H.

    1987-02-01

    Inherent shutdown due to increase in the sodium temperature at the core outlet is triggered by interruption of the current supply to the electromagnet coupling of absorber elements via curie point controlled sensor/switch units. These switches are arranged above suitable fuel element positions and spatially independent of the shutdown elements. Compared with other similar systems very short response times are achieved. A prototype switch unit has already undergone extensive testing. These tests have confirmed that switching takes place in a very narrow temperature range. (orig./HP) [de

  9. Experimental and analytical studies of a passive shutdown heat removal system for advanced LMRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heineman, J.; Kraimer, M.; Lottes, P.; Pedersen, D.; Stewart, R.; Tessier, J.

    1988-01-01

    A facility designed and constructed to demonstrate the viability of natural convection passive heat removal systems as a key feature of innovative LMR Shutdown Heat Removal (SHR) systems is in operation at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). This Natural Convection Shutdown Heat Removal Test Facility (NSTF) is being used to investigate the heat transfer performance of the GE/PRISM and the RI/SAFR passive designs. This paper presents a description of the NSTF, the pretest analysis of the Radiant Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) in support of the GE/PRISM IFR concept, and experiment results for the RVACS simulation. Preliminary results show excellent agreement with predicted system performance

  10. Experimental and analytical studies of a passive shutdown heat removal system for advanced LMRs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heineman, J.; Kraimer, M.; Lottes, P.; Pedersen, D.; Stewart, R.; Tessier, J.

    1988-01-01

    A facility designed and constructed to demonstrate the viability of natural convection passive heat removal systems as a key feature of innovative LMR Shutdown Heat Removal (SHR) systems is in operation at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). This Natural Convection Shutdown Heat Removal Test Facility (NSTF) is being used to investigate the heat transfer performance of the GE/PRISM and the RI/SAFR passive designs. This paper presents a description of the NSTF, the pretest analysis of the Radiant Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) in support of the GE/PRISM IFR concept, and experiment results for the RVACS simulation. Preliminary results show excellent agreement with predicted system performance.

  11. Analysis of HFETR shut-down state caused by loss of off-site power supply

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang Jinghu

    1997-01-01

    During the last 15 years, there are more than 40 unplanned shut-downs caused by loss of off-site power in HFETR. Because HFETR is a special research reactor, the author describes the shut-down state as three period. The author also discusses the influence of the number of shut-down due to loss of off-site power supply on the reactor safety, and propose some suggestions and measures to reduce the effects

  12. PSA for the shutdown mode for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-06-01

    The meeting, which was attended by more than 75 participants from 20 countries, provided a broad discussion forum where all the currently active major shutdown PSA programmes were reviewed. The meeting also addressed the issues related to actual performance of shutdown PSA studies as well as insight gained from the studies. This document, which was prepared during the TCM, contains the results of extensive discussions which were held in specific working groups. The papers presented at the meeting provide a comprehensive overview of the state of the art of shutdown risk assessment and remedial measures taken to reduce the risk in outages. It is hoped that this document will be very useful to all individuals with interest in increasing safety during outages at NPPs. Refs, figs and tabs

  13. Improved safety of the system 80+TM standard plants design through increased diversity and redundancy of safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matzie, Regis A.; Carpentino, Frederick L.; Robertson, James E.

    1996-01-01

    Safely systems in the System 80+ TM Standard Plant are designed with more redundancy, diversity and simplicity than earlier nuclear power plant designs. These gains were accomplished by an evolutionary process that preserved the desirable and proven features in currently operating nuclear plants, while improving reliability and defense-in-depth. The System 80+ safety systems are the primary contributors to a core damage frequency that is more than 100 times lower than 1980's vintage U. S. designs, including the predecessor System 80 R standard nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) design. The System 80+ design includes significant improvements to the safety injection system, emergency feedwater system, shutdown cooling system, containment spray system, reactor coolant gas vent system, and to their vital support systems. These improvements enhance performance for traditional design basis events and significantly reduce the probability of a severe accident. The System 80+ design also incorporates safety systems to mitigate a severe accident. The added systems include the rapid depressurization system, the in-containment refueling water storage tank, the cavity flooding system. These systems fully address the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (US NRC) severe accident policy. The System 80+ safety systems are integrated with the System 80+ Nuclear Island (NI) design. The NI general arrangement provides quadrant separation of the safety systems for protection from fire and flooding, and large equipment pull spaces and lay down areas for maintenance. This paper will describe the System 80+ safety systems advanced design features, the improved accident prevention and mitigation capabilities, and startup, operating and maintenance benefits

  14. Safety assessment principles for reactor protection systems in the United Kingdom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Philp, W.

    1990-01-01

    The duty of Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) is to see that the appropriate standards are developed, achieved and maintained by the plant operators, and to monitor and regulate the safety of the plant by means of its powers under the licence. It does not issue standards or codes of practice for NPPs, but it requires each plant operator to develop its own safety criteria and requirements. The following relevant issues are described: NII assessment principles and societal risks; principles and guidance for the assessment of rector protection systems; assessment of reactor shutdown systems

  15. Safety assessment principles for reactor protection systems in the United Kingdom

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philp, W

    1990-07-01

    The duty of Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) is to see that the appropriate standards are developed, achieved and maintained by the plant operators, and to monitor and regulate the safety of the plant by means of its powers under the licence. It does not issue standards or codes of practice for NPPs, but it requires each plant operator to develop its own safety criteria and requirements. The following relevant issues are described: NII assessment principles and societal risks; principles and guidance for the assessment of rector protection systems; assessment of reactor shutdown systems.

  16. Role of computers in CANDU safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hepburn, G.A.; Gilbert, R.S.; Ichiyen, N.M.

    1985-01-01

    Small digital computers are playing an expanding role in the safety systems of CANDU nuclear generating stations, both as active components in the trip logic, and as monitoring and testing systems. The paper describes three recent applications: (i) A programmable controller was retro-fitted to Bruce ''A'' Nuclear Generating Station to handle trip setpoint modification as a function of booster rod insertion. (ii) A centralized monitoring computer to monitor both shutdown systems and the Emergency Coolant Injection system, is currently being retro-fitted to Bruce ''A''. (iii) The implementation of process trips on the CANDU 600 design using microcomputers. While not truly a retrofit, this feature was added very late in the design cycle to increase the margin against spurious trips, and has now seen about 4 unit-years of service at three separate sites. Committed future applications of computers in special safety systems are also described. (author)

  17. Improving the action requirements of technical specifications: A risk-comparison of continued operation and plant shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, I.S.; Samanta, P.K.

    1994-01-01

    When the systems needed to remove decay heat are inoperable or degraded, the risk of shutting down the plant may be comparable to, or even higher than, that of continuing power operation with the equipment inoperable while giving priority to repairs. This concern arises because the plant may not have sufficient capability for removing decay heat during the shutdown. However, Technical Specifications (TSs) often require ''immediate'' shutdown of the plant. In this paper, the authors present risk-based analyses of the various operational policy alternatives available in such situations, with an example application to the standby service water (SSW) system of a BWR. These analyses can be used to define risk-effective requirements for those standby safety systems under discussion

  18. Improving the action requirements of technical specifications: A risk-comparison of continued operation and plant shutdown

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, I.S.; Samanta, P.K. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Mankamo, T.

    1995-04-01

    When the systems needed to remove decay heat are inoperable or degraded, the risk of shutting down the plant may be comparable to, or even higher than, that of continuing power operation with the equipment inoperable while giving priority to repairs. This concern arises because the plant may not have sufficient capability for removing decay heat during the shutdown. However, Technical Specifications (TSs) often require {open_quotes}immediate{close_quotes} shutdown of the plant. In this paper, we present risk-based analyses of the various operational policy alternatives available in such situations, with an example application to the standby service water (SSW) system of a BWR. These analyses can be used to define risk-effective requirements for those standby safety systems under discussion.

  19. Pulse coded safety logic for PFBR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anwer, Md. Najam; Satheesh, N.; Nagaraj, C.P.; Krishnakumar, B.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Reactor safety logic is designed to initiate safety action against design basis events. The reactor is shutdown by de-energizing electromagnets and dropping the absorber rods under gravity. In prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR), shutdown is affected by two independent shutdown systems, viz., control and safety rod drive mechanism (CSRDM) and diverse safety rod drive mechanism (DSRDM). Two separate safety logics are proposed for CSRDM and DSRDM, i.e. solid state logic with on-line fine impulse test (FIT) for CSRDM and pulse coded safety logic (PCSL) for DSRDM. The PCSL primarily utilizes the fact that the vast majority of faults in the logic circuitry result in static conditions at the output. It is arranged such that the presence of pulses are required to hold the shutdown actuators and any DC logic state, either logic 0 or logic 1 releases them. It is a dynamic, self-testing logic and used in a number of reactors. This paper describes the principle of operation of PCSL, its advantages, the concept of guard line logic (GLL), detection of stuck at 0 and stuck at 1 faults, fail safe and diversity features. The implementation of PCSL using Altera Max+Plus II software for PFBR trip signals and the results of simulation are discussed. This paper also describes a test jig using 80186 based system for testing PCSL for various input parameter's combinations and monitoring the outputs

  20. Assessment of shutdown management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marion, A.

    1992-01-01

    Over the past several years, there has been a number of events that have occurred during nuclear plant outages. These events included losses of AC power, losses of decay heat removal capability, reductions in shutdown margin, and losses of reactor coolant system inventory. Individually, these events have not posed nor indicated an undue risk to public health and safety. Collectively however, they contributed to a perception that outage activities are not being controlled effectively. This paper reports that for many of these same reasons, events that occur during outages have also been of concern to the industry. These events can have a significant economic impact on a company in addition to their being disruptive to the conduct of an efficient outage. And while we have expended industry resources reviewing these events, we have not been fully effective at addressing the root cause of the problem

  1. Study of methodology for low power/shutdown fire PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yan Zhen; Li Zhaohua; Li Lin; Song Lei

    2014-01-01

    As a risk assessment technology based on probability, the fire PSA is accepted abroad by nuclear industry in its application in the risk assessment for nuclear power plants. Based on the industry experience, the fire-induced impact on the plant safety during low power and shutdown operation cannot be neglected, therefore fire PSA can be used to assess the corresponding fire risk. However, there is no corresponding domestic guidance/standard as well as accepted analysis methodology up to date. Through investigating the latest evolvement on fire PSA during low power and shutdown operation, and integrating its characteristic with the corresponding engineering experience, an engineering methodology to evaluate the fire risk during low power and shutdown operation for nuclear power plant is established in this paper. In addition, an analysis demonstration as an example is given. (authors)

  2. Cyber Security Risk Assessment for the KNICS Safety Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, C. K.; Park, G. Y.; Lee, Y. J.; Choi, J. G.; Kim, D. H.; Lee, D. Y.; Kwon, K. C.

    2008-01-01

    In the Korea Nuclear I and C Systems Development (KNICS) project the platforms for plant protection systems are developed, which function as a reactor shutdown, actuation of engineered safety features and a control of the related equipment. Those are fully digitalized through the use of safety-grade programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and communication networks. In 2006 the Regulatory Guide 1.152 (Rev. 02) was published by the U.S. NRC and it describes the application of a cyber security to the safety systems in the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Therefore it is required that the new requirements are incorporated into the developed platforms to apply to NPP, and a cyber security risk assessment is performed. The results of the assessment were input for establishing the cyber security policies and planning the work breakdown to incorporate them

  3. Training simulator for advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR) shutdown sequence equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shankland, J.P.; Nixon, G.L.

    1978-01-01

    Successful shutdown of nuclear plant is of prime importance for both safety and economic reasons and large sums of money are spent on equipment to make shutdowns fully automatic, thus removing the possibility of operator errors. While this aim can largely be realized, one must consider the possibility of automatic equipment or plant failures when operators are required to take manual action, and off-line training facilities should be available to operating staff to minimize the risk of incorrect actions being taken. This paper presents the practice adopted at Hunterston 'B' Nuclear Power Station to solve this problem and concerns the computer-based training simulator for the Reactor Shutdown Sequence Equipment (RSSE) which was commissioned in January 1977. The plant associated with shutdown is briefly described and the reasoning which shows the need for a simulator is outlined. The paper also gives details of the comprehensive facilities available on the simulator and goes on to describe the form that shutdown training takes and the experience gained at this time. (author)

  4. Advances in the physics modelling of CANDU liquid injection shutdown systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, H.J.; Robinson, R.; Guertin, C.

    1993-01-01

    The physics modelling of liquid poison injection shutdown systems in CANDU reactors accounts for the major phenomena taking place by combining the effects of both moderator hydraulics and neutronics. This paper describes the advances in the physics modelling of liquid poison injection shutdown systems (LISS), discusses some of the effects of the more realistic modelling, and briefly describes the automation methodology. Modifications to the LISS methodology have improved the realism of the physics modelling, showing that the previous methodology significantly overestimated energy deposition during the simulation of a loss of coolant transient in Bruce A, by overestimating the reactivity transient. Furthermore, the automation of the modelling process has reduced the time needed to carry put LISS evaluations to the same level as required for shutoff-rod evaluations, while at the same time minimizing the amount of input, and providing a method for tracing all files used, thus adding a level of quality assurance to the calculation. 5 refs., 11 figs

  5. Development of embedded Control System for Control and Safety Rod Drive Mechanisms (CSRDMs) of PFBR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kameswari, K.; Palanisami, K.; Thirugnana Murthy, D.; Murali, N.; Satyamurty, S.A.V.

    2013-01-01

    Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), a 500 MWe, Sodium cooled, fast breeder reactor is nearing completion at Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu. PFBR has two independent, fast acting and diverse shutdown systems, one with nine Control and Safety Rods (CSRs) and another with three Diverse Safety Rods (DSRs), with independent driving mechanisms called CSRDMs and DSRDMs respectively. This paper deals with the development of Real Time Computer based Control system for controlling nine CSRDMs with model based software development environment - SCADE (Safety Critical Application Development Environment). (author)

  6. The LHC personnel safety system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ninin, P.; Valentini, F.; Ladzinski, T.

    2011-01-01

    Large particle physics installations such as the CERN Large Hadron Collider require specific Personnel Safety Systems (PSS) to protect the personnel against the radiological and industrial hazards. In order to fulfill the French regulation in matter of nuclear installations, the principles of IEC 61508 and IEC 61513 standard are used as a methodology framework to evaluate the criticality of the installation, to design and to implement the PSS.The LHC PSS deals with the implementation of all physical barriers, access controls and interlock devices around the 27 km of underground tunnel, service zones and experimental caverns of the LHC. The system shall guarantee the absence of personnel in the LHC controlled areas during the machine operations and, on the other hand, ensure the automatic accelerator shutdown in case of any safety condition violation, such as an intrusion during beam circulation. The LHC PSS has been conceived as two separate and independent systems: the LHC Access Control System (LACS) and the LHC Access Safety System (LASS). The LACS, using off the shelf technologies, realizes all physical barriers and regulates all accesses to the underground areas by identifying users and checking their authorizations.The LASS has been designed according to the principles of the IEC 61508 and 61513 standards, starting from a risk analysis conducted on the LHC facility equipped with a standard access control system. It consists in a set of safety functions realized by a dedicated fail-safe and redundant hardware guaranteed to be of SIL3 class. The integration of various technologies combining electronics, sensors, video and operational procedures adopted to establish an efficient personnel safety system for the CERN LHC accelerator is presented in this paper. (authors)

  7. Shutdown problems in large tokamaks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weldon, D.M.

    1978-01-01

    Some of the problems connected with a normal shutdown at the end of the burn phase (soft shutdown) and with a shutdown caused by disruptive instability (hard shutdown) have been considered. For a soft shutdown a cursory literature search was undertaken and methods for controlling the thermal wall loading were listed. Because shutdown computer codes are not widespread, some of the differences between start-up codes and shutdown codes were discussed along with program changes needed to change a start-up code to a shutdown code. For a hard shutdown, the major problems are large induced voltages in the ohmic-heating and equilibrium-field coils and high first wall erosion. A literature search of plasma-wall interactions was carried out. Phenomena that occur at the plasma-wall interface can be quite complicated. For example, material evaporated from the wall can form a virtual limiter or shield protecting the wall from major damage. Thermal gradients that occur during the interaction can produce currents whose associated magnetic field also helps shield the wall

  8. Performance Evaluation of SMART Passive Safety System for Small Break LOCA Using MARS Code

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chun, Ji Han; Lee, Guy Hyung; Bae, Kyoo Hwan; Chung, Young Jong; Kim, Keung Koo

    2013-01-01

    SMART has significantly enhanced safety by reducing its core damage frequency to 1/10 that of a conventional nuclear power plant. KAERI is developing a passive safety injection system to replace the active safety injection pump in SMART. It consists of four trains, each of which includes gravity-driven core makeup tank (CMT) and safety injection tank (SIT). This system is required to meet the passive safety performance requirements, i.e., the capability to maintain a safe shutdown condition for a minimum of 72 hours without an AC power supply or operator action in the case of design basis accidents (DBAs). The CMT isolation valve is opened by the low pressurizer pressure signal, and the SIT isolation valve is opened at 2 MPa. Additionally, two stages of automatic depressurization systems are used for rapid depressurization. Preliminary safety analysis of SMART passive safety system in the event of a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) was performed using MARS code. In this study, the safety analysis results of a guillotine break of safety injection line which was identified as the limiting SBLOCA in SMART are given. The preliminary safety analysis of a SBLOCA for the SMART passive safety system was performed using the MARS code. The analysis results of the most limiting SI line guillotine break showed that the collapsed liquid level inside the core support barrel was maintained sufficiently high above the top of core throughout the transient. This means that the passive safety injection flow from the CMT and SIT causes no core uncovery during the 72 hours following the break with no AC power supply or operator action, which in turn results in a consistent decrease in the fuel cladding temperature. Therefore, the SMART passive safety system can meet the passive safety performance requirement of maintaining the plant at a safe shutdown condition for a minimum of 72 hours without AC power or operator action for a representing accident of SBLOCA

  9. Development and validation of the shutdown cooling system CATHENA model for Gentilly-2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lecuyer, H.; Hasnaoui, C.; Sabourin, G.; Chapados, S.

    2008-01-01

    A CATHENA representation of the Gentilly-2 Shutdown Cooling system has been developed for Hydro-Quebec. The model includes the SDCS circuit piping, valves, pumps and heat exchangers. The model is integrated in the G2 CATHENA overall plant model and coupled with the plant control software simulator TROLG2 to allow the simulation of various plant operational modes using the SDCS. Results have been obtained for normal cooling of the primary heat transport system following a planned shut down (transition from full power to shutdown) and for two special SDCS configurations that were used on September 14 and 15, 2006 at Gentilly-2. The results show close match with values measured at Gentilly-2 during either steady or transient states. (author)

  10. Development and validation of the shutdown cooling system CATHENA model for Gentilly-2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lecuyer, H.; Hasnaoui, C. [Nucleonex Inc., Westmount, Quebec (Canada); Sabourin, G. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Montreal, Quebec (Canada); Chapados, S. [Hydro-Quebec, Unite Analyse et Fiabilite, Montreal, Quebec (Canada)

    2008-07-01

    A CATHENA representation of the Gentilly-2 Shutdown Cooling system has been developed for Hydro-Quebec. The model includes the SDCS circuit piping, valves, pumps and heat exchangers. The model is integrated in the G2 CATHENA overall plant model and coupled with the plant control software simulator TROLG2 to allow the simulation of various plant operational modes using the SDCS. Results have been obtained for normal cooling of the primary heat transport system following a planned shut down (transition from full power to shutdown) and for two special SDCS configurations that were used on September 14 and 15, 2006 at Gentilly-2. The results show close match with values measured at Gentilly-2 during either steady or transient states. (author)

  11. Cyber Security Penetration Test for Digital Safety I and C Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, C. K.; Kim, D. H.; Kwon, K. C.; Joo, H. K.; Song, J. S.

    2010-01-01

    In the Korea Nuclear I and C Systems Development project the platforms for plant protection systems are developed, which function as a reactor shutdown, actuation of engineered safety features and a control of the related equipment. Those are fully digitalized through the use of safety-grade programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and few types of communication network. However the Regulatory Guide 1.152 (Rev. 02) was published by the U.S. NRC in 2006 and it recommended the application of a cyber security to the safety systems in the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Therefore to incorporate the new licensing requirement, a cyber security risk assessment is performed for the platforms. Then the vulnerabilities identified by the risk assessment are validated by penetration test. This paper summarizes test scenario, test results and their incorporation into system design

  12. Analysis of shutdown and aftercooling cycles of the A-1 nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, V.; Vopatril, M.

    1977-01-01

    A new concept is described of the emergency shut-down and after-cooling of the A-1 reactor based on the elimination of pressure shock and minimization of thermal shock. After-cooling is effected by all circulators which had not been defective before shut-down. During shut-down the pumps run at reduced speed. A diesel generator is used as a self-contained power supply. The after-cooling is classified into three types depending on the machinery power consumption, i.e., normal, emergency and super-emergency. The selection of the power supply and the after-cooling conditions proceeds automatically. A mathematical model is described of A-1 reactor behaviour during different accidents requiring the shut-down and after-cooling. Computer programmes are briefly indicated for the analysis of transients in the primary coolant circuit (ZVJE-73-23, SHOCK A-1), for the analysis of transients resulting from a neutron power controller failure or from a circulator failure (HAZARD), for the analysis of after-cooling processes (DENDEL), and programme SAULIS as an auxiliary programme for processing the results and for the print-out of the DENDEL programme. Steady-state parameters before the failure were found as initial conditions for the calculation of transients. The mathematical model was solved using a system of three computer programmes linked by interprogramme communication. The analysis is described of the cooperation of reactor safety circuits and of the automatic equipment for the reduction of thermal shock in the primary coolant circuit, as is the analysis of reactor accidents related to reactor control and to the safety circuits. Theoretical results are compared with experimental values obtained during the experimental A-1 reactor shut-down and after-cooling. The accuracy of the calculated value for the cooling gas temperature at the central and marginal channel outputs is -10 to +15% during the first 30 s of after-cooling. (J.P.)

  13. Methodology for identifying boundaries of systems important to safety in CANDU nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Therrien, S.; Komljenovic, D.; Therrien, P.; Ruest, C.; Prevost, P.; Vaillancourt, R.

    2007-01-01

    This paper presents a methodology developed to identify the boundaries of the systems important to safety (SIS) at the Gentilly-2 Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), Hydro-Quebec. The SIS boundaries identification considers nuclear safety only. Components that are not identified as important to safety are systematically identified as related to safety. A global assessment process such as WANO/INPO AP-913 'Equipment Reliability Process' will be needed to implement adequate changes in the management rules of those components. The paper depicts results in applying the methodology to the Shutdown Systems 1 and 2 (SDS 1, 2), and to the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). This validation process enabled fine tuning the methodology, performing a better estimate of the effort required to evaluate a system, and identifying components important to safety of these systems. (author)

  14. Stabilization and shutdown of Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Radioisotopes Production Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eversole, R.E.

    1992-01-01

    The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has been involved in the production and distribution of a variety of radioisotopes for medical, scientific and industrial applications since the late 1940s. Production of these materials was concentrated in a number of facilities primarily built in the 1950s and 1960s. Due to the age and deteriorating condition of these facilities, it was determined in 1989 that it would not be cost effective to upgrade these facilities to bring them into compliance with contemporary environmental, safety and health standards. The US Department of Energy (DOE) instructed ORNL to halt the production of isotopes in these facilities and maintain the facilities in safe standby condition while preparing a stabilization and shutdown plan. The goal was to place the former isotope production facilities in a radiologically and industrially safe condition to allow a 5-year deferral of the initiation of environmental restoration (ER) activities. In response to DOE's instructions, ORNL identified 17 facilities for shutdown, addressed the shutdown requirements for each facility, and prepared and implemented a three-phase, 4-year plan for shutdown of the facilities. The Isotopes Facilities Shutdown Program (IFSP) office was created to execute the stabilization and shutdown plan. The program is entering its third year in which the actual shutdown of the facilities is initiated. Accomplishments to date have included consolidation of all isotopes inventory into one facility, DOE approval of the IFSP Environmental Assessment (EA), and implementation of a detailed management plan for the shutdown of the facilities

  15. Seismic design margin evaluation of systems and equipment required for safe shutdown of North Anna, Units 1 and 2, following an SSE (safe-shutdown earthquake) event. Technical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Desai, K.D.

    1981-06-01

    The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards recommended that the NRC staff review in detail the capability and available seismic design margin of fluid systems and equipment used in North Anna, Units 1 and 2 to achieve safe shutdown following a site-design safe-shutdown earthquake (SSE). The staff conducted a series of plant visits and meetings with the licensee to view and discuss the seismic design methodology used for systems, equipment and their supports. The report is a description and evaluation of the seismic design criteria, design conservatisms and seismic design margin for North Anna, Units 1 and 2

  16. Questions and answers about the reactor shutdown at the Barsebaeck plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    At a scram at the Barsebaeck 2 reactor on July 28 1992, a safety valve open unintentionally, and steam was released from the reactor vessel into the containment. The emergency spray system started sprinkling the vessel (the core spray system was also active for a short while). After one hour, the sprinkling was interupted, and at about the same time it was found that the steam jet had tore off insulation material (from the containment walls) which started to clog the sieves for the emergency sprinkling water, disturbing the pumping. The clogging appeared much more rapidly than expected (1 h in stead of 10 h). Five Swedish reactors for similar design have been shutdown pending a reconstruction of the emergency spray feed system. This pamphlet is directed to the general public, explaining the problems and commenting on nuclear safety issues

  17. Reliability modeling of Clinch River breeder reactor electrical shutdown systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schatz, R.A.; Duetsch, K.L.

    1974-01-01

    The initial simulation of the probabilistic properties of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant (CRBRP) electrical shutdown systems is described. A model of the reliability (and availability) of the systems is presented utilizing Success State and continuous-time, discrete state Markov modeling techniques as significant elements of an overall reliability assessment process capable of demonstrating the achievement of program goals. This model is examined for its sensitivity to safe/unsafe failure rates, sybsystem redundant configurations, test and repair intervals, monitoring by reactor operators; and the control exercised over system reliability by design modifications and the selection of system operating characteristics. (U.S.)

  18. Nuclear reactor unit shutdown planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gardais, J.P.

    1994-01-01

    In order to optimize the reactor maintenance shutdown efficiency and the reactor availability, an audit had been performed on the shutdown organization at EDF: management, skills, methods and experience feedback have been evaluated; several improvement paths have been identified: project management, introduction of shutdown management professionals, shutdown permanent industrialization, and experience feedback engineering

  19. Plant Operation Station for HTR-PM Low Power and Shutdown operation Probabilistic safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Tao; Tong Jiejuan

    2014-01-01

    Full range Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) is one of key conditions for nuclear power plant (NPP) licensing according to the requirement of nuclear safety regulatory authority. High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor Pebble-bed Module (HTR-PM) has developed construction design and prepared for the charging license application. So after the normal power operation PSA submitted for review, the Low power and Shutdown operation Probabilistic safety analysis (LSPSA) also begin. The results of LSPSA will together with prior normal power PSA results to demonstrate the safety level of HTR-PM NPP Plant Operation Station (POS) is one of important terms in LSPSA. The definition of POS lays the foundation for LSPSA modeling. POS provides initial and boundary conditions for the following event tree and fault tree model development. The aim of this paper is to describe the state-of-the-art of POS definition for HTR-PM LSPSA. As for the first attempt to the high temperature gas cooled reactor module plant, the methodology and procedure of POS definition refers to the LWR LSPSA guidance, and adds to plant initial status analysis due to the HTR-PM characteristics. A specific set of POS grouping vectors is investigate and suggested for HTR-PM NPP, which reflects the characteristics of plant modularization and on-line refueling. As a result, seven POSs are given according to the grouping vectors at the end of the paper. They will be used to the LSPSA modelling and adjusted if necessary. The papers ’work may provide reference to the analogous NPP LSPSA. (author)

  20. Impacts of reactivity feedback uncertainties on inherent shutdown in innovative designs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, C.J.

    1986-01-01

    The concept of inherent shutdown is emphasized in the approach to the design of innovative, small pool-type liquid-metal reactors (LMRs). This paper reports an evaluation of reactivity feedback uncertainties used in the analyses of anticipated transients without scram for innovative LMRs, and the associated impacts on safety margins and inherent shutdown success probabilities on unprotected loss-of-flow (LOF) events. It then assesses the ultimate importance of these uncertainties on LOF and transient overpower events in evolving metal and oxide innovative designs

  1. Impacts of reactivity feedback uncertainties on inherent shutdown in innovative designs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, C.J.

    1986-01-01

    The concept of ''inherent shutdown'' is emphasized in the approach to the design of innovative, small pool-type liquid metal reactors (LMRs). This paper reports an evaluation of reactivity feedback uncertainties used in the analyses of anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) for innovative LMRs, and the associated impacts on safety margins and inherent shutdown success probabilities on unprotected loss-of-flow (LOF) events. It then assesses the ultimate importance of these uncertainties on LOF and transient overpower (TOP) events in evolving metal and oxide innovative designs

  2. Management of accidental scenarios involving the loss of RHRS under shutdown conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Serradell, V.; Villanueva, J.F.; Martorell, S.; Carlos, S.; Pelayo, F.; Mendizabal, R.; Sol, I.

    2009-01-01

    Results from current Probabilistic Safety Assessment studies of Nuclear Power Plants show the importance of some risky scenarios with the plant at low power and shutdown conditions as compared to the accident scenarios with the plant operating at full power. Technical Specifications establish the Limiting Conditions for operation to assure the plant integrity in each Plant Operational State (POS). Moreover, the plant configuration may differ from the beginning to the end of a certain Plant Operational State, so the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) established could be revised as, depending on the plant configuration, the transient evolution may be slightly different. For a PWR plant, one of the most risky accidental sequences in shutdown is the loss of the residual heat removal system, Using the information provided by the plant low power probabilistic safety analysis (LPSA), which should address the Limiting Conditions for Operation imposed by the current Technical Specification, two situations are distinguished: Main Reactor Cooling System (RCS) fully filled with water and RCS partially filled. In addition, while the primary system is partially filled in Cold Shutdown, two different plant configurations can be distinguished, which depend on the particular POS: RCS open and closed. For each case, the corresponding Technical Specification establishes the path to evacuate the residual heat generated. This paper explores the possibility of having alternative or complementary sources for heat removal others than the ones established in the Technical Specification. Especial attention is paid to the role of Steam Generators as an effective heat sink and the possibility of restart of the redundant RHR train. Such alternatives will influence LPSA implementation results. To perform this analysis the loss of the RHR system in a PWR plant has been simulated using RELAP-5 considering the plant in different plant operational states. One of the main results of this work

  3. Engineering safety features for high power experimental reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doval, A.; Villarino, E.; Vertullo, A.

    2000-01-01

    In the present analysis we will focus our attention in the way engineering safety features are designed in order to prevent fuel damage in case of abnormal or accidental situations. To prevent fuel damage two main facts must be considered, the shutdown of the reactor and the adequate core cooling capacity, it means that both, neutronic and thermohydraulic aspects must be analysed. Some neutronic safety features are common to all power ranges like negative feedback reactivity coefficients and the required number of control rods containing the proper absorber material to shutdown the reactor. From the thermohydraulic point of view common features are siphon-breaker devices and flap valves for those powers requiring cooling in the forced convection regime. For the high power reactor group, the engineering safety features specially designed for a generic reactor of 20 MW, will be presented here. From the neutronic point of view besides the common features, and to comply with our National Regulatory Authority, a Second Shutdown System was designed as a redundant shutdown system in case the control plates fail. Concerning thermohydraulic aspects besides the pump flywheels and the flap valves providing the natural convection loop, a metallic Chimney and a Chimney Water Injection System were supplied. (author)

  4. Engineered safeguards and passive safety features (safety analysis detailed report no. 6)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1988-01-15

    The Safety-Analysis Summary lists the reactor's safety aspects for passive and active prevention of severe accidents and mitigation of accident consequences, i.e., intrinsic and passive protections of the plant; intrinsic and passive protections of the core; inherent decay-heat removal systems; rapid-shutdown systems; four physical containment barriers. This report goes into further details regarding some of this aspects.

  5. Safety considerations in the design of PFBR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaidyanathan, G.; Om Pal Singh; Govindarajan, S.; Chellapandi, P.; Chetal, S.C.; Shankar Singh, R.; Bhoje, S.B.

    1996-01-01

    Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) is a 500 MWe reactor under design in India. The overall safety approach adopted is based on the defence-in-depth principle. Design features have been incorporated to minimize occurrence of unsafe conditions. A plant protection system comprising reliable core monitoring to detect the off-normal condition, a reliable shutdown system to ensure safe shutdown and a passive decay heat removal system are provided. Containment is provided to prevent any release of radioactivity to the environment in case of failure of the protective devices. This paper provides a brief outline of the safety considerations in the design of PFBR. (author). 5 refs, 1 tab

  6. Use of digital computing devices in systems important to safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    The incorporation of digital computing devices in systems important to safety now is progressing fast in several countries, including Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, USA. There are now reactors with microprocessors in some trip systems. The major functions of those systems are: reactor trip initiation, display, monitoring, testing, re-calibration of detectors. The benefits of moving to a fully computerized shut-down system should be improved reliability, greater flexibility, better man-machine interface, improved testing, higher reactor output and lower overall cost. With the introduction of computer devices in systems important to safety, plant availability and safety are improved because disturbances are treated before they lead to safety action, in this way helping the operator to avoid errors. The Meeting presentations were divided into sessions devoted to the following topics: Needs for the use of digital devices (DCD) in safety important systems (SIS) (5 papers); Problems raised by the integration SIS in the NPP control (7 papers); Description and presentation of DCD of SIS (6 papers); Results of experiences in engineering, manufacture, qualification operation of DCD hardware and software (5 papers). A separate abstract was prepared for each of these papers

  7. Impact of shutdown risk on risk-based assessment of technical specifications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deriot, S.

    1992-10-01

    This paper describes the current work performed by the Research and Development Division of EDF concerning risk-based assessment of Operating Technical Specifications (OTS). The current risk-based assessment of OTS at EDF is presented. Then, the level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment of unit 3 of the Paluel nuclear power station (called PSA 1300) is described. It is fully computerized and takes into account the risk in shutdown states. A case study is presented. It shows that the fact of considering shutdown risk suggests that the current OTS should be modified

  8. Pius, self-protective thermohydraulics transient without safety system intervention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fredell, J.; Bredolt, V.

    1989-01-01

    In this paper, the self-protective thermohydraulic feedback of the PIUS reactor system is illustrated by an in-depth discussion of one typical transient. The selected transient is an undetected total loss of feedwater in the complete absence of conventional safety system intervention. The reactor shuts itself down to residual power in two steps. First, the power decreases due to the strongly negative moderator temperature reactivity coefficient, and then a complete shutdown occurs by ingress of cold, highly borated water from the reactor pool. The transient is terminated without any harm to the fuel or paint systems

  9. Document status for 1 and 2 Kozloduy NPP decommissioning activities -Phase 'Final Shutdown'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vangev, A.; Boyadjiev, Z.

    1997-01-01

    Decommissioning process (D and D) is the final phase of each nuclear reactor life cycle. The first nuclear reactor generation has reached his expiration life date. Decommissioning working documentation had not been taken into account at the project and construction stage. The decommissioning activities, planning and legislation has to develop along their operation. Most of developed nuclear energetic countries have gathered good experience and have create their own decommissioning strategy. This report represents in brief an overview of different country's approaches and the Kozloduy NPP decommissioning activity intention in near future and reviews the D and D working document status for 1 and 2 Kozloduy NPP Units decommissioning. Kozloduy NPP D and D task to the moment is to plan the first stage of the decommissioning process - 'The Final Shutdown' and to prepare the working documents for the phase execution. The Final Shutdown of Kozloduy NPP - 1 is the termination of operation of the Units 1 and 2 and the electricity production cessation after their useful life exhaust. In accordance with the legal legislation in Bulgaria only the normal planned termination of operation on units 1 and 2 should be prescribed. The project results concern the initial condition of the equipment and systems, their preparation and sequence for defueling, decontamination and dismantling. A plan for activities' organization for D and D and Complex Characterization of the Site under consideration will contain the following documents: 1. Time-schedule for the sequence of activities during the stages of the Final Shutdown and Safe Enclosure preparation. Technical project for organization of work related to Final Shutdown; 2. Complex Characterization Programme for a condition investigation of the Units 1 and 2 equipment and systems. 3. Technical project for design modifications and dismantling of equipment and systems which violate the radiation and nuclear safety during the Final Shutdown

  10. Safety Analysis for Power Reactor Protection System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eisawy, E.A.; Sallam, H.

    2012-01-01

    The main function of a Reactor Protection System (RPS) is to safely shutdown the reactor and prevents the release of radioactive materials. The purpose of this paper is to present a technique and its application for used in the analysis of safety system of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). A more advanced technique has been presented to accurately study such problems as the plant availability assessments and Technical Specifications evaluations that are becoming increasingly important. The paper provides the Markov model for the Reactor Protection System of the NPP and presents results of model evaluations for two testing policies in technical specifications. The quantification of the Markov model provides the probability values that the system will occupy each of the possible states as a function of time.

  11. TRIGA forced shutdowns analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Negut, Gheorghe; Laslau, Florica

    2008-01-01

    The need for improving the operation leads us to use new methods and strategies. Probabilistic safety assessments and statistical analysis provide insights useful for our reactor operation. This paper is dedicated to analysis of the forced shutdowns during the first reactor operation period, between 1980 to 1989. A forced shutdown data base was designed using data on forced shutdowns collected from the reactor operation logbooks. In order to sort out the forced shutdowns the records have the following fields: - current number, date, equipment failed, failure type (M for mechanical, E for electrical, D for irradiation device, U for human factor failure; - scram mode, SE for external scram, failure of reactor cooling circuits and/or irradiation devices, SR for reactor scram, exceeding of reactor nuclear parameters, SB for reactor scram by control rod drop, SM for manual scram required by the abnormal reactor status; - scram cause, giving more information on the forced shutdown. This data base was processed using DBase III. The data processing techniques are presented. To sort out the data, one of the criteria was the number of scrams per year, failure type, scram mode, etc. There are presented yearly scrams, total operation time in hours, total unavailable time, median unavailable time period, reactor availability A. There are given the formulae used to calculate the reactor operational parameters. There are shown the scrams per year in the 1980 to 1989 period, the reactor operation time per year, the reactor shutdown time per year and the operating time versus down time per year. Total number of scrams in the covered period was 643 which caused a reactor down time of 4282.25 hours. In a table the scrams as sorted on the failure type is shown. Summarising, this study emphasized some problems and difficulties which occurred during the TRIGA reactor operation at Pitesti. One main difficulty in creating this data base was the unstandardized scram record mode. Some times

  12. On line test of trip channels and actuators in primary shutdown system for RAPP-3,4/KAIGA-1,2 reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pramanik, M.; Gupta, P.K.; Ravi Prakash

    1997-01-01

    Several types of system design and logic arrangements have been used for reactor shutdown systems to avoid the possibility that a single failure within the trip channels/shutdown system actuators can prevent a shutdown system actuation. The trip channels and the logic arrangements associated with the shutdown systems use redundancy to allow them to continue to operate successfully even after having a certain number of failures. A periodic test is thus needed to detect and repair/replace failed elements to prevent accumulation and eventual system failure. The test must be capable of detecting the first failure. The design initiates shutdown system actuation by deenergising the logic relays and turning off the power to the final electrical actuators. Thus, the systems are fail safe with respect to loss of electrical power to the instruments, logic channels and the actuators. Several system/logic arrangements are used to reduce the chances of spurious actuation caused by the loss of a single power supply and other single failures. In general, the systems use coincidence of instrument channel trips and have separate power supplies for the individual instrument channel and dual power supplies where a single final control element is used. These features also permit on line test of instrument channels and logic train. On line test detects component failures not found by other means. The test determines whether gross failure has occurred rather than perform a calibration. As far as practicable the whole channel from sensors to logic and final control element is to be tested. (author)

  13. Radiochemical guidelines and process specifications for reactor shutdown: the EDF strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mole, D.; Wintergerst, M.; Meylogan, Th.; Rocher, A.; Sagot, M.J.; Bonelli, V.; Bonnefon, J.; Dupont, B.

    2012-09-01

    Changes to French nuclear regulations made in June 2006 [1.] have made it necessary for EDF to modify its ruling principles. These modifications required the restructuring of radiochemical guidelines to better reflect their impact on nuclear safety, the environment and radioprotection. In accordance with these aims, a new authoritative document has been produced. This ruling document identifies all parameters with a potential impact on nuclear safety, radiological releases to the environment and personnel dose rates. These diagnostic and control parameters have been identified for a reactor in production and for a reactor during shutdown. For parameters related to a reactor in production, some indicators are used to evaluate impacts on availability, radioprotection and the environment during shutdown and on outage and to anticipate mitigation ways. On the other side, several parameters related to the stages of shutdown were also directly evaluated in order to minimize the impacts. This paper describes the EDF methodology used to establish operational documents: radiochemical guidelines and process specifications, and includes the following: - description of monitored parameters and their associated areas of risk; - justification of target values, frequencies of inspection and the required actions for the monitored parameters. The sizing methodology is based on theoretical studies and on EDF operational experience analysis. By implementing in the operational and technical specifications requirements linked to nuclear safety, radioprotection and environment respect, EDF will benefit from an improved compromise between these areas as well as an increased focus. (authors)

  14. Technical Specification action statements requiring shutdown. A risk perspective with application to the RHR/SSW systems of a BWR

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mankamo, T. [Avaplan Oy, Espoo (Finland); Kim, I.S.; Samanta, P.K. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)

    1993-11-01

    When safety systems fail during power operation, the limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) and associated action statements of technical specifications typically require that the plant be shut down within the limits of allowed outage time (AOT). However, when a system needed to remove decay heat, such as the residual heat removal (RHR) system, is inoperable or degraded, shutting down the plant may not necessarily be preferable, from a risk perspective, to continuing power operation over a usual repair time, giving priority to the repairs. The risk impact of the basic operational alternatives, i.e., continued operation or shutdown, was evaluated for failures in the RHR and standby service water (SSW) systems of a boiling-water reactor (BWR) nuclear power plant. A complete or partial failure of the SSW system fails or degrades not only the RHR system but other front-line safety systems supported by the SSW system. This report presents the methodology to evaluate the risk impact of LCOs and associated AOT; the results of risk evaluation from its application to the RHR and SSW systems of a BWR; the findings from the risk-sensitivity analyses to identify alternative operational policies; and the major insights and recommendations to improve the technical specifications action statements.

  15. Evaluation of slow shutdown system flux detectors in Point Lepreau Generating Station - I: dynamic response characterization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anghel, V.N.P. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, Ontario (Canada); Comeau, D. [New Brunswick Power Nuclear, Point Lepreau, New Brunswick (Canada); McKay, J.; Sur, B. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, Ontario (Canada); Taylor, D. [New Brunswick Power Nuclear, Point Lepreau, New Brunswick (Canada)

    2009-07-01

    CANDU reactors are protected against reactor overpower by two independent shutdown systems: Shut Down System 1 and 2 (SDS1 and SDS2). At the Point Lepreau Generating Station (PLGS), the shutdown systems can be actuated by measurements of the neutron flux by Platinum-clad Inconel In-Core Flux Detectors (ICFDs). These detectors have a complex dynamic behaviour, characterized by 'prompt' and 'delayed' components with respect to immediate changes in the in-core neutron flux. The dynamic response components need to be determined accurately in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the detectors for actuating the shutdown systems. The amplitudes of the prompt and the delayed components of individual detectors were estimated over a period of several years by comparison of archived detector response data with the computed local neutron flux evolution for SDS1 and SDS2 reactor trips. This was achieved by custom-designed algorithms. The results of this analysis show that the dynamic response of the detectors changes with irradiation, with the SDS2 detectors having 'prompt' signal components that decreased significantly with irradiation. Some general conclusions about detector aging effects are also drawn. (author)

  16. Development of Abnormal Operating Strategies for Station Blackout in Shutdown Operating Mode in Pressurized Water Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yoon, Duk-Joo; Lee, Seung-Chan; Sung, Je-Joong; Ha, Sang-Jun [KHNP CRI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Hwang, Su-Hyun [FNC Tech. Co., Yongin (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Loss of all AC power is classified as one of multiple failure accident by regulatory guide of Korean accident management program. Therefore we need develop strategies for the abnormal operating procedure both of power operating and shutdown mode. This paper developed abnormal operating guideline for loss of all AC power by analysis of accident scenario in pressurized water reactor. This paper analyzed the loss of ultimate heat sink (LOUHS) in shutdown operating mode and developed the operating strategy of the abnormal procedure. Also we performed the analysis of limiting scenarios that operator actions are not taken in shutdown LOUHS. Therefore, we verified the plant behavior and decided operator action to taken in time in order to protect the fuel of core with safety. From the analysis results of LOUHS, the fuel of core maintained without core uncovery for 73 minutes respectively for opened RCS states after the SBO occurred. Therefore, operator action for the emergency are required to take in 73 minutes for opened RCS state. Strategy is to cooldown by using spent fuel pool cooling system. This method required to change the plant design in some plant. In RCS boundary closed state, first abnormal operating strategy in shutdown LOUHS is first abnormal operating strategy in shutdown LOUHS is to remove the residual heat of core by steam dump flow and auxiliary feedwater of SG.

  17. Licensing safety critical software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Archinoff, G.H.; Brown, R.A.

    1990-01-01

    Licensing difficulties with the shutdown system software at the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station contributed to delays in starting up the station. Even though the station has now been given approval by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) to operate, the software issue has not disappeared - Ontario Hydro has been instructed by the AECB to redesign the software. This article attempts to explain why software based shutdown systems were chosen for Darlington, why there was so much difficulty licensing them, and what the implications are for other safety related software based applications

  18. MCR2S unstructured mesh capabilities for use in shutdown dose rate analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eade, T.; Stonell, D.; Turner, A.

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • Advancements in shutdown dose rate calculations will be needed as fusion moves from experimental reactors to full scale demonstration reactors in order to ensure the safety of personnel. • The MCR2S shutdown dose rate tool has been modified to allow shutdown dose rates calculations using an unstructured mesh. • The unstructured mesh capability of MCR2S was used on three shutdown dose rate models, a simple sphere, the ITER computational benchmark and the DEMO computational benchmark. • The results showed a reasonable agreement between an unstructured mesh approach and the CSG approach and highlighted the need to carefully choose the unstructured mesh resolution. - Abstract: As nuclear fusion progresses towards a sustainable energy source and the power of tokamak devices increases, a greater understanding of the radiation fields will be required. As well as on-load radiation fields, off-load or shutdown radiation field are an important consideration for the safety and economic viability of a commercial fusion reactor. Previously codes such as MCR2S have been written in order to predict the shutdown dose rates within, and in regions surrounding, a fusion reactor. MCR2S utilises a constructive solid geometry (CSG) model and a superimposed structured mesh to calculate 3-D maps of the shutdown dose rate. A new approach to MCR2S calculations is proposed and implemented using a single unstructured mesh to replace both the CSG model and the superimposed structured mesh. This new MCR2S approach has been demonstrated on three models of increasing complexity. These models were: a sphere, the ITER computational shutdown dose rate benchmark and the DEMO computational shutdown dose rate benchmark. In each case the results were compared to MCR2S calculations performed using MCR2S with CSG geometry and a superimposed structured mesh. It was concluded that the results from the unstructured mesh implementation of MCR2S compared well to the CSG structured mesh

  19. Reactor protection and shut-down system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klar

    1980-01-01

    The reactor protection system being a part of the reactor safety system. The requirements on the reactor protection system are: high safety with regard to signal processing, high availability, self-reporting of faults etc. The functional sections of the reactor protection system are the analog section, the logic section and the generating of output signals. Description of the operation characteristics and of the extension of function. (orig.)

  20. Summary view on demonstration reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Satoh, Kazuziro; Kotake, Shoji; Tsukui, Yutaka; Inagaki, Tatsutoshi; Miura, Masanori

    1991-01-01

    This work presents a summary view on safety design approaches for the demonstration fast breeder reactor (DFBR). The safety objective of DFBR is to be at lea as safe as a LWR. Major safety issues discussed in this paper are; reduction of sodium void reactivity worth, adoption of self-actuated mechanism in the backup shutdown system, use of the direct reactor auxiliary cooling system (DRACS), provision of the containment system. (author)

  1. Nuclear Reactor RA Safety Report, Vol. 14, Safety protection measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-11-01

    Nuclear reactor accidents can be caused by three type of errors: failure of reactor components including (1) control and measuring instrumentation, (2) errors in operation procedure, (3) natural disasters. Safety during reactor operation are secured during its design and construction and later during operation. Both construction and administrative procedures are applied to attain safe operation. Technical safety features include fission product barriers, fuel elements cladding, primary reactor components (reactor vessel, primary cooling pipes, heat exchanger in the pump), reactor building. Safety system is the system for safe reactor shutdown and auxiliary safety system. RA reactor operating regulations and instructions are administrative acts applied to avoid possible human error caused accidents [sr

  2. Experience with after-shutdown decay heat removal - BWRs and PWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haugh, J.J.; Mollerus, F.J.; Booth, H.R.

    1992-01-01

    Boiling-water reactors (BWRs) and pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) make use of residual heat removal systems (RHRSs) during reactor shutdown. RHRS operational events involving an actual loss or significant degradation of an RHRS during shutdown heat removal are often prompted or aggravated by complex, changing plant conditions and by concurrent maintenance operations. Events involving loss of coolant inventory, loss of decay heat removal capability, or inadvertent pressurization while in cold shutdown have occurred. Because fewer automatic protective fetures are operative during cold shutdowns, both prevention and termination of events depend heavily on operator action. The preservation of RHRS cooling should be an important priority in all shutdown operations, particularly where there is substantial decay heat and a reduced water inventory. 13 refs., 3 figs., 4 tabs

  3. Development of a safety and regulation systems simulation program II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-05-01

    This report describes the development of a safety and regulation systems simulation program under contract to the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada. A systems logic interaction simulation (SLISIM) program was developed for the AECB's HP-1000 computer which operates in the interactive simulation (INSIM) program environment. The SLISIM program simulates the spatial neutron dynamics, the regulation of the reactor power and in this version the CANDU-PHW 600 MW(e) computerized shutdown systems' trip parameters. The modular concept and interactive capability of the INSIM environment provides the user with considerable flexibility of the setup and control of the simulation

  4. Ontario Hydro experience in the identification and mitigation of potential failures in safety critical software systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huget, R.G.; Viola, M.; Froebel, P.A.

    1995-01-01

    Ontario Hydro has had experience in designing and qualifying safety critical software used in the reactor shutdown systems of its nuclear generating stations. During software design, an analysis of system level hazards and potential hardware failure effects provide input to determining what safeguards will be needed. One form of safeguard, called software self checks, continually monitor the health of the computer on line. The design of self checks usually is a trade off between the amount of computing resources required, the software complexity, and the level of safeguarding provided. As part of the software verification activity, a software hazards analysis is performed, which identifiers any failure modes that could lead to the software causing an unsafe state, and which recommends changes to mitigate that potential. These recommendations may involve a re-structuring of the software to be more resistant to failure, or the introduction of other safeguarding measures. This paper discusses how Ontario Hydro has implemented these aspects of software design and verification into safety critical software used in reactor shutdown systems

  5. Preliminary aseismic analysis on bolts of driving mechanism in absorption sphere shutdown system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen Feng; Li Tianjin; Zhang Zhengming; Huang Zhiyong; Bo Hanliang

    2012-01-01

    The absorption sphere shutdown system performs an important role in reactivity regulating and control. Driving mechanism is a set of key mechanical moving parts which is used to control falling of absorption spheres in absorption sphere shutdown system. It is about 5 m for driving mechanism with the slim structure, which is connected with the upper supported plate of metal reactor internals through storage vessel with bolts. Both the storage vessel and driving mechanism are equipment of seismic classification I. It is significant to calculate and check the bolts strength of driving mechanism. In this paper, complicate structure of driving mechanism was simplified to three variable cross sections and statically indeterminate problem was solved. The bolts at the bottom and on the top of the storage vessel were calculated and checked. The preliminary results indicate that the bolts strength is reliable and safe, and the supporting force at the most weak point of driving mechanism is as well obtained. (authors)

  6. BWR shutdown analyzer using artificial intelligence (AI) techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cain, D.G.

    1986-01-01

    A prototype alarm system for detecting abnormal reactor shutdowns based on artificial intelligence technology is described. The system incorporates knowledge about Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) plant design and component behavior, as well as knowledge required to distinguish normal, abnormal, and ATWS accident conditions. The system was developed using a software tool environment for creating knowledge-based applications on a LISP machine. To facilitate prototype implementation and evaluation, a casual simulation of BWR shutdown sequences was developed and interfaced with the alarm system. An intelligent graphics interface for execution and control is described. System performance considerations and general observations relating to artificial intelligence application to nuclear power plant problems are provided

  7. Evaluation of slow shutdown system flux detectors in Point Lepreau Generating Station - II: dynamic compensation error analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anghel, V.N.P.; Sur, B. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, Ontario (Canada); Taylor, D. [New Brunswick Power Nuclear, Point Lepreau, New Brunswick (Canada)

    2009-07-01

    CANDU reactors are protected against reactor overpower by two independent shutdown systems: Shut Down System 1 and 2 (SDS1 and SDS2). At the Point Lepreau Generating Station (PLGS), the shutdown systems can be actuated by measurements of the neutron flux from Platinum-clad Inconel In-Core Flux Detectors. These detectors have a complex dynamic behaviour, characterized by 'prompt' and 'delayed' components with respect to immediate changes in the in-core neutron flux. It was shown previously (I: Dynamic Response Characterization by Anghel et al., this conference) that the dynamic responses of the detectors changed with irradiation, with the SDS2 detectors having 'prompt' signal components that decreased significantly. In this paper we assess the implication of these changes for detector dynamic compensation errors by comparing the compensated detector response with the power-to-fuel and the power-to-coolant responses to neutron flux ramps as assumed by previous error analyses. The dynamic compensation error is estimated at any given trip time for all possible accident flux ramps. Some implications for the shutdown system trip set points, obtained from preliminary results, are discussed. (author)

  8. Development and implementation of setpoint tolerances for special safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliva, A.F.; Balog, G.; Parkinson, D.G.; Archinoff, G.H.

    1991-01-01

    The establishment of tolerances and impairment limits for special safety system setpoints is part of the process whereby the plant operator demonstrates to the regulatory authority that the plant operates safely and within the defined plant licensing envelope. The licensing envelope represents the set of limits and plant operating state and for which acceptably safe plant operation has been demonstrated by the safety analysis. By definition, operation beyond this envelope contributes to overall safety system unavailability. Definition of the licensing envelope is provided in a wide range of documents including the plant operating licence, the safety report, and the plant operating policies and principles documents. As part of the safety analysis, limits are derived for each special safety system initiating parameter such that the relevant safety design objectives are achieved for all design basis events. If initiation on a given parameter occurs at a level beyond its limit, there is a potential reduction in safety system effectiveness relative to the performance credited in the plant safety analysis. These safety system parameter limits, when corrected for random and systematic instrument errors and other errors inherent in the process of periodic testing or calibration, are then used to derive parameter impairment levels and setpoint tolerances. This paper describes the methodology that has evolved at Ontario Hydro for developing and implementing tolerances for special safety system parameters (i.e., the shutdown systems, emergency coolant injection system and containment system). Tolerances for special safety system initiation setpoints are addressed specifically, although many of the considerations discussed here will apply to performance limits for other safety system components. The first part of the paper deals with the approach that has been adopted for defining and establishing setpoint limits and tolerances. The remainder of the paper addresses operational

  9. Dynamic Response of AP1000 Nuclear Island Due to Safe Shutdown Earthquake Loading

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gan Buntara S.

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available AP1000 is a standard nuclear power plant developed by Westinghouse and its partners by using an advanced passive safety feature. Among the five principle building structures, namely the nuclear island, turbine building, annex building, diesel generator building and radwaste building, the safety of the nuclear island building is the most concerned. This paper investigates the dynamic response of the nuclear island building of the AP1000 plant subjected to safe shutdown earthquake loadings. A finite element model for the building, which is assumed to be built in a hard-rock base, is developed and its dynamic response is computed with the aid of the commercial finite element package ANSYS. The dynamic characteristics, including the natural frequencies, the vibration modes, and the time histories for displacements, velocities, and accelerations of the building are obtained for two typical safe shutdown earthquakes, El Centro and Kobe earthquakes. The dynamic behavior of the building due to the earthquakes and its safety is examined and highlighted.

  10. Preliminary Calculations of Shutdown Dose Rate for the CTS Diagnostics System

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Klinkby, Esben Bryndt; Nonbøl, Erik; Lauritzen, Bent

    2015-01-01

    DTU and IST 2 are partners in the design of a collective Thomson Scattering (CTS) diagnostics for ITER through a contract with F4E. The CTS diagnostic utilizes probing radiation of ~60 GHz emitted into the plasma and, using a mirror, collects the scattered radiation by an array of receivers. Having...... on supplying input which affect the system design. Examples include: - Heatloads on plasma facing mirrors and preliminary stress and thermal analysis - Port plug cooling requirements and it's dependence on system design (in particular blanket cut-out) - Shutdown dose-rate calculations (relative analysis...

  11. Procedures for analysis of accidents in shutdown modes for WWER nuclear power plants. A publication of the extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER and RBMK nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-07-01

    Operational events occurring during shutdown conditions contribute significantly to the NPP risk due to the fact that both preventive and mitigatory capabilities of the plant are somehow degraded. The need for detailed information in the performance and review of accident analysis for WWER type NPPs was identified as a priority within IAEA Extrabudgetary Program on Safety of WWER and RBMK NPPs. The present guidelines were developed through two consultants meetings in 1995 and 1996. The guidelines establish a set of criteria for performing deterministic analysis of accidents, initiated by events occurring under shutdown conditions. This report is mostly relevant for licensing type calculations, and may to a certain extent, also used for development, improvement or justification of the plant limits and conditions, emergency operating procedures, operator training programs and probabilistic safety studies. The guidelines apply to all WWER plants in operation and/or under construction

  12. Station blackout with failure of wired shutdown system for AHWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Srivastava, A.; Contractor, A.D.; Chatterjee, B.; Kumar, Rajesh

    2015-01-01

    Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) is a vertical pressure tube type boiling light water cooled and heavy water moderated reactor. This reactor has several advance safety features. One of the important passive design features of this reactor is that the heat removal is achieved through natural circulation of primary coolant at all power level without primary coolant pumps. Station blackout (SBO) scenario has become very important in aftermath of Fukushima event. The existing reactor has to demonstrate that design features are sufficient to mitigate the scenario whereas the new reactor design are adding specific features to tackle such scenario for prolonged period. The present study demonstrates the design features of AHWR to mitigate the SBO scenario along with failure of wired shutdown system. SBO event leads to feed water pump trip and loss of condenser vacuum which in turn results into loss of feed water and turbine trip on low condenser vacuum signal. Stoppage of steam flow to the turbine and bypass to the condenser lead to bottling up of the system, causing MHT pressure to rise. In the absence of reactor scram, the pressure continues to rise. Isolation Condenser (IC) valve starts opening at a pressure of 7.65 MPa. The pressure continues to rise as IC system is designed for decay heat removal and reactor power is brought down to decay power level through Passive Poison Injection System (PPIS) when the pressure reaches 8.4 MPa. The analysis shows that the event do not lead to undesirable clad surface temperature rise due to reactor trip by PPIS and decay heat removal for prolonged time by IC system. Thermal hydraulic response of different parameters like pressure, temperatures, and flows in MHT system is analyzed for this scenario. Pressure during transient is found to be well below the system pressure criteria of 110% of design pressure. This analysis highlights the design robustness of AHWR. (author)

  13. Regulatory Considerations for the Long Term Cooling Safe Shutdown Requirements of the Passive Residual Heat Removal Systems in Advanced Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sim, S. K.; Bae, S. H.; Kim, Y. S.; Hwang, Min Jeong; Bang, Young Seok; Hwang, Taesuk

    2016-01-01

    USNRC approved safe shutdown at 215.6 .deg. C for a safe and long term cooling state for the redundant passive RHRSs by SECY-94-084. USNRC issued COLA(Combined Construction and Operating License) for the Levy County NP Unit-1/2 for the AP1000 passive RHRSs in 2014. Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power(KHNP) is developing APR+ and adopted Passive Auxiliary Feedwater System(PAFS) as a new passive RHRS design. Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety(KINS) has been developing regulatory guides for the advanced safety design features of the advanced ALWRs which has plan to construct in near future in Korea[5]. Safety and regulatory issues as well as the safe shut down requirements of the passive RHRS are discussed and considerations in developing regulatory guides for the passive RHRS are presented herein. Passive RHRSs have been introduced as new safety design features for the advanced reactors under development in Korea. These passive RHRSs have potential advantages over existing active RHRS, however, their functions are limited due to inherent ability of passive heat removal processes. It is high time to evaluate the performance of the passive PRHRs and develop regulatory guides for the safety as well as the performance analyses of the passive RHRS

  14. Shutdown channels and fitted interlocks in atomic reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furet, J.; Landauer, C.

    1968-01-01

    This catalogue consists of tables (one per reactor) giving the following information: number and type of detectors, range of the shutdown channels, nature of the associated electronics, thresholds setting off the alarms, fitted interlocks. These cards have been drawn up with a view to an examination of the reactors safety by the 'Reactor Safety Sub-Commission', they take into account the latest decisions. The reactors involved in this review are: Azur, Cabri, Castor-Pollux, Cesar-Marius-2, Edf-2, EL3, EL4, Eole, G1, G2-G3, Harmonie, Isis, Masurca, Melusine, Minerve, Osiris, Pegase, Peggy, PAT, Rapsodie, SENA, Siloe, Siloette, Triton-Nereide, and Ulysse. (authors) [fr

  15. Design of emergency shutdown system for the Tehran Research Reactor; Part I: Neutronics investigation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safarinia, M.; Faghihi, F.; Mirvakili, S.M.; Fakhraei, A.

    2017-01-01

    Highlights: • An emergency shutdown system for the TRR is carried out based on a heavy water tank. • The performance of the heavy water tank are carried out based on “first and equilibrium cores”. • Heavy water discharging flow rate is also studied in the current research. • Thermal flux in the radioisotope channel with and without the heavy water tank are studied. • A core with and without the heavy water tank for the cases of 5 × 6, 5 × 5, 5 × 4, and 4 × 4 fuel assemblies are investigated (for two types of fuel loading—first and equilibrium cores). - Abstract: In this paper, a neutronics design of the secondary (i.e., emergency) shutdown system for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) is carried out based on a heavy water tank design. The heavy water tank in a cylindrical shape is around the core, and calculations for the optimized radius and height of the tank are performed. The performance of the heavy water tank calculations are carried out based on two types of fuel loading, which are called the “first and equilibrium cores” of the TRR. For both cases, neutronics and standard safety analysis are taken into account, benchmarked, and described herein. Heavy water discharging flow rate is also studied in the current research, and the results are compared with the IAEA criteria. Moreover, thermal flux in the radioisotope channel with and without the heavy water tank (as the reflector) are studied herein. Specifically, a core with and without the heavy water tank for the cases of 5 × 6, 5 × 5, 5 × 4, and 4 × 4 fuel assemblies are investigated (for two types of fuel loading—first and equilibrium cores). Based on our optimization, the 5 × 5 fuel assembly, which is called “B configuration,” has better performance and efficiency than that of the other described layouts.

  16. Definition and means of maintaining the supply ventilation system seismic shutdown portion of the PFP safety envelope. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keck, R.D.

    1995-01-01

    This report describes the modifications to the ventilation system for the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Topics discussed in this report include; system functional requirements, evaluations of equipment, a list of drawings showing the safety envelope boundaries; list of safety envelope equipment, functional requirements for individual safety envelope equipment, and a list of the operational, maintenance and surveillance procedures necessary to operate and maintain the system equipment

  17. Multi-unit shutdown due to boiler feedwater chemical excursion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Diebel, M.E.

    1991-01-01

    Ontario Hydro's Bruce Nuclear Generating Station 'B' consists of four 935 W CANDU units located on the east shore of Lake Huron in the province of Ontario, Canada. On July 25 and 26, 1989 three of the four operating units were shutdown due to boiler feedwater chemical excursions initiated by a process upset in the Water Treatment Plant that provides demineralized make-up water to all four units. The chemicals that escaped from an ion exchange vessel during a routine regeneration very quickly spread through the condensate make-up system and into the boiler feedwater systems. This resulted in boiler sulfate levels exceeding shutdown limits. A total of 260 GWH of electrical generation was unexpectedly made unavailable to the grid at a time of peak seasonal demand. This event exposed several unforeseen deficiencies and vulnerabilities in the automatic demineralized water make-up quality protection scheme, system designs, operating procedures and the ability of operating personnel to recognize and appropriately respond to such an event. The combination of these factors contributed towards turning a minor system upset into a major multi-unit shutdown. This paper provides the details of the actual event initiation in the Water Treatment Plant and describes the sequence of events that led to the eventual shutdown of three units and near shutdown of the fourth. The design inadequacies, procedural deficiencies and operating personnel responses and difficulties are described. The process of recovering from this event, the flushing out of system piping, boilers and the feedwater train is covered as well as our experiences with setting up supplemental demineralized water supplies including trucking in water and the use of rental trailer mounted demineralizing systems. System design, procedural and operational changes that have been made and that are still being worked on in response to this event are described. The latest evidence of the effect of this event on boiler tube

  18. Causes of extended shutdown state of 'RA' research reactor in Vinca Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M.; Kolundzija, V.; Ljubenov, V.; Cupac, S.

    2001-01-01

    This paper describes the causes and reasons for extended shutdown state of RA research reactor in the 'Vinca' Institute of Nuclear Sciences. Technical and legal matters that led to decision to stop RA reactor operation in 1984 and further problems related to maintenance and preparation for continuation of operation are given. Influence of nuclear policy of Yugoslav government and the 'Vinca' Institute at prolongation of the reactor shutdown state, as consequence of changing of nuclear programme in the country and the world are discussed and underlined. An overview of the legislation in the field of nuclear safety and regulatory control of radiation sources and radioactive materials in Yugoslavia is presented. (author)

  19. Evolving the JET virtual reality system for delivering the JET EP2 shutdown remote handling tasks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williams, Adrian, E-mail: adrian.williams@oxfordtechnologies.co.uk [Oxford Technologies Ltd., 7 Nuffield Way, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 1RJ (United Kingdom); JET-EFDA, Culham Science Centre, Abingdon, OX14 3DB (United Kingdom); Sanders, Stephen [Oxford Technologies Ltd., 7 Nuffield Way, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 1RJ (United Kingdom); JET-EFDA, Culham Science Centre, Abingdon, OX14 3DB (United Kingdom); Weder, Gerard [Tree-C Technology BV, Buys Ballotstraat 8, 6716 BL Ede (Netherlands); JET-EFDA, Culham Science Centre, Abingdon, OX14 3DB (United Kingdom); Bastow, Roger; Allan, Peter; Hazel, Stuart [CCFE, Culham Science Centre, Abingdon, OX14 3DB (United Kingdom); JET-EFDA, Culham Science Centre, Abingdon, OX14 3DB (United Kingdom)

    2011-10-15

    The quality, functionality and performance of the virtual reality (VR) system used at JET for preparation and implementation of remote handling (RH) operations has been progressively enhanced since its first use in the original JET remote handling shutdown in 1998. As preparation began for the JET EP2 (Enhanced Performance 2) shutdown it was recognised that the VR system being used was unable to cope with the increased functionality and the large number of 3D models needed to fully represent the JET in-vessel components and tooling planned for EP2. A bespoke VR software application was developed in collaboration with the OEM, which allowed enhancements to be made to the VR system to meet the requirements of JET remote handling in preparation for EP2. Performance improvements required to meet the challenges of EP2 could not be obtained from the development of the new VR software alone. New methodologies were also required to prepare source, CATIA models for use in the VR using a collection of 3D software packages. In collaboration with the JET drawing office, techniques were developed within CATIA using polygon reduction tools to reduce model size, while retaining surface detail at required user limits. This paper will discuss how these developments have played an essential part in facilitating EP2 remote handling task development and examine their impact during the EP2 shutdown.

  20. Evolving the JET virtual reality system for delivering the JET EP2 shutdown remote handling tasks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, Adrian; Sanders, Stephen; Weder, Gerard; Bastow, Roger; Allan, Peter; Hazel, Stuart

    2011-01-01

    The quality, functionality and performance of the virtual reality (VR) system used at JET for preparation and implementation of remote handling (RH) operations has been progressively enhanced since its first use in the original JET remote handling shutdown in 1998. As preparation began for the JET EP2 (Enhanced Performance 2) shutdown it was recognised that the VR system being used was unable to cope with the increased functionality and the large number of 3D models needed to fully represent the JET in-vessel components and tooling planned for EP2. A bespoke VR software application was developed in collaboration with the OEM, which allowed enhancements to be made to the VR system to meet the requirements of JET remote handling in preparation for EP2. Performance improvements required to meet the challenges of EP2 could not be obtained from the development of the new VR software alone. New methodologies were also required to prepare source, CATIA models for use in the VR using a collection of 3D software packages. In collaboration with the JET drawing office, techniques were developed within CATIA using polygon reduction tools to reduce model size, while retaining surface detail at required user limits. This paper will discuss how these developments have played an essential part in facilitating EP2 remote handling task development and examine their impact during the EP2 shutdown.

  1. Reactor shutdown device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Inoue, Toyokazu.

    1982-01-01

    Purpose: To obtain a highly reliable reactor shutdown device capable of checking its function irrespective of the state whether shutdown or operation in a gas-cooled type reactor. Constitution: A hopper is disposed above a guide tube inserted into the reactor core and particulate neutron absorbers are contained in the hopper. An opening for falling particles is disposed to the bottom of the hopper in opposition to the upper end of the guide pipe and the opening is closed by a plug suspended by way of a weld line so as to be capable of dropping. A power source for supplying electrical current to the weld line is disposed. Accordingly, if the current is supplied to the weld line, the line is cut by welding to fall the plug so that the neutron-absorbing particles fall from the opening into the guide pipe to shutdown the reactor, whereby high reliability is obtained for the operation. (Seki, T.)

  2. Low Power Shutdown PSA for CANDU Type Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bae, Yeon Kyoung; Kim, Myung Su [KHNP CRI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    KHNP also have concentrated on full power PSA. Some recently constructed OPR1000 type plants and APR1400 type plants have performed the low power and shutdown (LPSD) PSA. The purpose of LPSD PSA is to identify the main contributors on the accident sequences of core damage and to find the measure of safety improvement. After the Fukushima accident, Korean regulatory agency required the shutdown severe accident management guidelines (SSAMG) development for safety enhancement. For the reliability of SSAMG, KHNP should develop the LPSD PSA. Especially, the LPSD PSA for CANDU type plant had developed for the first time in Korea. This paper illustrates how the LPSD PSA for CANDU type developed and the core damage frequency (CDF) is different with that of full power PSA. KHNP performed LPSD PSA to develop the SSAMG after the Fukushima accidents. The results show that risk at the specific operation mode during outage is higher than that of full power operation. Also, the results indicated that recovery failure of class 4 power at the POS 5A, 5B contribute dominantly to the total CDF from importances analysis. LPSD PSA results such as CDF with initiating events and POSs, risk results with plant damage state, and containment failure probability and frequency with POSs can be used by inputs for developing the SSAMG.

  3. Safety related considerations for operation with defected elements in EBR-II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fryer, R.M.; Sackett, J.I.; Lambert, J.D.B.

    1976-01-01

    Traditionally, EBR-II has employed the 'shutdown and remove' philosophy when breached fuel elements are encountered. This mode of operation maintained in-plant inventories of fission products at low levels and allowed certain fission product detection systems to be employed as automatic plant shutdown devices. Information from fuel failure propagation studies and fast reactor operation indicates that shutdown under these conditions is unwarranted. Analytical studies, as well as fast reactor experience, further indicate that failure propagation, if it occurs at all, will not cross adjacent subassembly boundaries. Therefore, the 'shutdown and remove' philosophy can be liberalized to allow the demonstration of safety during a run-beyond-clad-breach mode of operation. This mode of operation is essential to the demonstration of the economics of commercial LMFBR systems

  4. FFTF [Fast Flux Test Facility] reactor shutdown system reliability reevaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pierce, B.F.

    1986-07-01

    The reliability analysis of the Fast Flux Test Facility reactor shutdown system was reevaluated. Failure information based on five years of plant operating experience was used to verify original reliability numbers or to establish new ones. Also, system modifications made subsequent to performance of the original analysis were incorporated into the reevaluation. Reliability calculations and sensitivity analyses were performed using a commercially available spreadsheet on a personal computer. The spreadsheet was configured so that future failures could be tracked and compared with expected failures. A number of recommendations resulted from the reevaluation including both increased and decreased surveillance intervals. All recommendations were based on meeting or exceeding existing reliability goals. Considerable cost savings will be incurred upon implementation of the recommendations

  5. Software Safety Analysis of Digital Protection System Requirements Using a Qualitative Formal Method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jang-Soo; Kwon, Kee-Choon; Cha, Sung-Deok

    2004-01-01

    The safety analysis of requirements is a key problem area in the development of software for the digital protection systems of a nuclear power plant. When specifying requirements for software of the digital protection systems and conducting safety analysis, engineers find that requirements are often known only in qualitative terms and that existing fault-tree analysis techniques provide little guidance on formulating and evaluating potential failure modes. A framework for the requirements engineering process is proposed that consists of a qualitative method for requirements specification, called the qualitative formal method (QFM), and a safety analysis method for the requirements based on causality information, called the causal requirements safety analysis (CRSA). CRSA is a technique that qualitatively evaluates causal relationships between software faults and physical hazards. This technique, extending the qualitative formal method process and utilizing information captured in the state trajectory, provides specific guidelines on how to identify failure modes and the relationship among them. The QFM and CRSA processes are described using shutdown system 2 of the Wolsong nuclear power plants as the digital protection system example

  6. Development of safety analysis methodology for moderator system failure of CANDU-6 reactor by thermal-hydraulics/physics coupling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jong Hyun; Jin, Dong Sik; Chang, Soon Heung

    2013-01-01

    Highlights: • Developed new safety analysis methodology of moderator system failures for CANDU-6. • The new methodology used the TH-physics coupling concept. • Thermalhydraulic code is CATHENA, physics code is RFSP-IST. • Moderator system failure ends to the subcriticality through self-shutdown. -- Abstract: The new safety analysis methodology for the CANDU-6 nuclear power plant (NPP) moderator system failure has been developed by using the coupling technology with the thermalhydraulic code, CATHENA and reactor core physics code, RFSP-IST. This sophisticated methodology can replace the legacy methodology using the MODSTBOIL and SMOKIN-G2 in the field of the thermalhydraulics and reactor physics, respectively. The CATHENA thermalhydraulic model of the moderator system can simulate the thermalhydraulic behaviors of all the moderator systems such as the calandria tank, head tank, moderator circulating circuit and cover gas circulating circuit and can also predict the thermalhydraulic property of the moderator such as moderator density, temperature and water level in the calandria tank as the moderator system failures go on. And these calculated moderator thermalhydraulic properties are provided to the 3-dimensional neutron kinetics solution module – CERBRRS of RFSP-IST as inputs, which can predict the change of the reactor power and provide the calculated reactor power to the CATHENA. These coupling calculations are performed at every 2 s time steps, which are equivalent to the slow control of CANDU-6 reactor regulating systems (RRS). The safety analysis results using this coupling methodology reveal that the reactor operation enters into the self-shutdown mode without any engineering safety system and/or human interventions for the postulated moderator system failures of the loss of heat sink and moderator inventory, respectively

  7. BWR startup and shutdown activity transport control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Garcia, S.E., E-mail: sgarcia@epri.com [Electric Power Research Inst. (EPRI), Palo Alto, California (United States); Giannelli, J.F.; Jarvis, A.J., E-mail: jgiannelli@finetech.com, E-mail: ajarvis@finetech.com [Finetech, Inc., Parsippany, New Jersey (United States)

    2010-07-01

    This paper summarizes BWR industry experience on good practices for controlling the transport of corrosion product activity during shutdowns, particularly refueling outages, and for startup chemistry control to minimize IGSCC (intergranular stress corrosion cracking). For shutdown, overall goals are to minimize adverse impacts of crud bursts and the time required to remove activated corrosion products from the reactor coolant during the shutdown process prior to refueling, and to assist plants in predicting and controlling radiation exposure during outages. For startup, the overall goals are to highlight conditions during early heatup and startup when sources of reactor coolant oxidants are high, when there is a greater likelihood for chemical excursions associated with refueling outage work activities, and when hydrogen injection is not available to mitigate IGSCC due to system design limitations. BWR water chemistry has changed significantly in recent years with the adoption of hydrogen water chemistry, zinc addition and noble metal chemical applications. These processes have, in some instances, resulted in significant activity increases during shutdown evolutions, which together with reduced time for cleanup because of shorter outages, has consequently increased outage radiation exposure. A review several recent outages shows that adverse effects from these conditions can be minimized, leading to the set of good practice recommendations for shutdown chemistry control. Most plants lose the majority of their hydrogen availability hours during early startup because feedwater hydrogen injection systems were not originally designed to inject hydrogen below 20% power. Hydrogen availability has improved through modifications to inject hydrogen at lower power levels, some near 5%. However, data indicate that IGSCC is accelerated during early startup, when dissolved oxygen and hydrogen peroxide levels are high and reactor coolant temperatures are in the 300 to 400 {sup o

  8. 235U Holdup Measurement Program in support of facility shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomason, R.S.; Griffin, J.C.; Lien, O.G.; McElroy, R.D.

    1991-01-01

    In 1989, the Department of Energy directed shutdown of an enriched uranium processing facility at Savannah River Site. As part of the shutdown requirements, deinventory and cleanout of process equipment and nondestructive measurement of the remaining 235 U holdup were required. The holdup measurements had safeguards, accountability, and nuclear criticality safety significance; therefore, a technically defensible and well-documented holdup measurement program was needed. Appropriate standards were fabricated, measurement techniques were selected, and an aggressive schedule was followed. Early in the program, offsite experts reviewed the measurement program, and their recommendations were adopted. Contact and far-field methods were used for most measurements, but some process equipment required special attention. All holdup measurements were documented, and each report was subjected to internal peer review. Some measured values were checked against values obtained by other methods; agreement was generally good

  9. Controlled shutdown of a fuel cell

    Science.gov (United States)

    Clingerman, Bruce J.; Keskula, Donald H.

    2002-01-01

    A method is provided for the shutdown of a fuel cell system to relieve system overpressure while maintaining air compressor operation, and corresponding vent valving and control arrangement. The method and venting arrangement are employed in a fuel cell system, for instance a vehicle propulsion system, comprising, in fluid communication, an air compressor having an outlet for providing air to the system, a combustor operative to provide combustor exhaust to the fuel processor.

  10. Modelling of liquid injection shutdown system (LISS) in ACR-1000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boubcher, M.; Colton, A.; Donnelly, J.V.

    2008-01-01

    Modelling of the Liquid Injection Shutdown System (LISS) in the ACR-1000 reactor core must account for the major phenomena that occur following its activation, namely the moderator hydraulics and core neutronics. The former requires modelling of the poison volumes, their time of entry into the reactor, and their propagation into the moderator after emission from the nozzle. The latter requires the reactivity worth of varying volumes and geometries of poisoned moderator fluid in order to simulate the reactivity effect of the injected poison. The time-dependent poison map is generated from hydraulic calculations, and then the neutronics data for standard geometries and concentrations is constructed using DRAGON. (author)

  11. Review of cause-based decision tree approach for the development of domestic standard human reliability analysis procedure in low power/shutdown operation probabilistic safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, D. I.; Jung, W. D.

    2003-01-01

    We review the Cause-Based Decision Tree (CBDT) approach to decide whether we incorporate it or not for the development of domestic standard Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) procedure in low power/shutdown operation Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). In this paper, we introduce the cause based decision tree approach, quantify human errors using it, and identify merits and demerits of it in comparision with previously used THERP. The review results show that it is difficult to incorporate the CBDT method for the development of domestic standard HRA procedure in low power/shutdown PSA because the CBDT method need for the subjective judgment of HRA analyst like as THERP. However, it is expected that the incorporation of the CBDT method into the development of domestic standard HRA procedure only for the comparision of quantitative HRA results will relieve the burden of development of detailed HRA procedure and will help maintain consistent quantitative HRA results

  12. Maintenance, repair and operation (MRO) of shutdown facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kenny, S.

    2006-01-01

    What level of maintenance does one apply to a shutdown facility? Well it depends on who you ask. Operations staff sees facilities that have completed their useful life cycle as a cost drain while Decommissioning staff sees this as the start of a new life cycle. Based on the decommissioning plan for the particular facility the building could complete another full life cycle while under decommissioning whether it is in storage with surveillance mode or under active decommissioning. This paper will explore how you maintain a facility and systems for many years after its useful life until final decommissioning is completed. When a building is declared redundant, who looks after it until the final decommissioning end state is achieved? At the AECL, Chalk River Labs site the safe shutdown and turnover process is one key element that initiates the decommissioning process. The real trick is orchestrating maintenance, repair and operation plans for a facility that has been poorly invested in during its last years of useful life cycle. To add to that usually shutdowns are prolonged for many years beyond the expected turnover period. During this presentation I will cover what AECL is doing to ensure that the facilities are maintained in a proper state until final decommissioning can be completed. All facilities or systems travel through the same life cycle, design, construction, commissioning, operation, shutdown and demolition. As we all know, nuclear facilities add one more interesting twist to this life cycle called Decommissioning that lands between shutdown and demolition. As a facility nears the shutdown phase, operations staff loose interest in the facility and stop investing in upgrades, repairs and maintenance but continue to invest and focus on maximizing operations. Facility maintenance standards produced by the International Facility Maintenance Association (IFMA) based on a survey done every year state that 2.2% of the total operating costs for the site should be

  13. Management of refuelling, modifications and accidental shut-down of nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    This document is the appendix of HAF 0300 (91) 'Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plant Operation', which was promulgated by the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) on March 2, 1994, and has the same legal effect. This appendix is applicable to establish the administrative management procedures for refuelling, modifications and accidental shut-down in the period of operation of pressurized water thermal neutron reactor of nuclear power plants. The NNSA shall be responsible for interpretation of this document

  14. Specialists' meeting on passive and active safety features of LMFRs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1991-07-01

    The objective of the meeting was to discuss and exchange information on passive and active safety concepts and to find some reasonable coupling of these concept, aiming at firmer establishment of plant safety and at the same time of plant cost reduction. The following main topical areas were discussed by delegates: (1) Overview - review of national status on the safety design approaches of LMFRs (2) Safety characteristics of decay heat removal system (DHRS) (3) Safety characteristics of reactor protection system (RPS) and reactor shutdown system (RSS) (4) Core safety characteristics.

  15. Specialists' meeting on passive and active safety features of LMFRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    The objective of the meeting was to discuss and exchange information on passive and active safety concepts and to find some reasonable coupling of these concept, aiming at firmer establishment of plant safety and at the same time of plant cost reduction. The following main topical areas were discussed by delegates: (1) Overview - review of national status on the safety design approaches of LMFRs (2) Safety characteristics of decay heat removal system (DHRS) (3) Safety characteristics of reactor protection system (RPS) and reactor shutdown system (RSS) (4) Core safety characteristics

  16. Probabilistic safety assessment of the Fugen NPS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sotsu, Masutake; Iguchi, Yukihiro; Mizuno, Kouichi; Sato, Shinichirou; Shimizu, Miwako

    1999-01-01

    We performed a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) on the Fugen NPS. The main topic of assessment was internal factors. We assessment core damage frequency (level 1 PSA) and containment damage frequency (level 2 PSA) during rated operation, and core damage frequency during shutdown (PSA during shutdowns). Our assessment showed that the core damage frequency of Fugen is well below the IAEA criteria for existing plants, that the conditional containment damage during shutdown is almost the target value of 0.1, and that the core damage frequency during shutdown is almost the same as that assessed during operation. These results confirm that the Fugen plant maintains a sufficient safety margin during shutdowns for regular inspections and for refueling. We developed and verified the effectiveness of an accident management plan incorporating the results of the assessment. (author)

  17. PRISM reactor system design and analysis of postulated unscrammed events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van Tuyle, G.J.; Slovik, G.C.

    1991-01-01

    Key safety characteristics of the PRISM reactor system include the passive reactor shutdown characteristic and the passive shutdown heat removal system, RVACS. While these characteristics are simple in principle, the physical processes are fairly complex, particularly for the passive reactor shutdown. It has been possible to adapt independent safety analysis codes originally developed for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor review, although some limitations remain. In this paper, the analyses of postulated unscrammed events are discussed, along with limitations in the predictive capabilities and plans to correct the limitations in the near future. (author)

  18. Identification of human-induced initiating events in the low power and shutdown operation using the commission error search and assessment method

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Yong Chan; Kim, Jong Hyun [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School (KINGS), Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-03-15

    Human-induced initiating events, also called Category B actions in human reliability analysis, are operator actions that may lead directly to initiating events. Most conventional probabilistic safety analyses typically assume that the frequency of initiating events also includes the probability of human-induced initiating events. However, some regulatory documents require Category B actions to be specifically analyzed and quantified in probabilistic safety analysis. An explicit modeling of Category B actions could also potentially lead to important insights into human performance in terms of safety. However, there is no standard procedure to identify Category B actions. This paper describes a systematic procedure to identify Category B actions for low power and shutdown conditions. The procedure includes several steps to determine operator actions that may lead to initiating events in the low power and shutdown stages. These steps are the selection of initiating events, the selection of systems or components, the screening of unlikely operating actions, and the quantification of initiating events. The procedure also provides the detailed instruction for each step, such as operator's action, information required, screening rules, and the outputs. Finally, the applicability of the suggested approach is also investigated by application to a plant example.

  19. The enhancement of Ignalina NPP in design and operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Negrivoda, G.

    1999-01-01

    Enhancement of Ignalina NPP design include: core design improvements; fuel channel integrity (multiple pressure tube rupture); improvements of shutdown systems; improvements of instrumentation and control devices; containment strength and tightness; design basis accident analysis; improvements of safety and support systems; seismic safety enhancement; Year 2000 project; cracks in pipes. Enhancement of operational safety includes: quality assurance; configuration management; safety management and safety culture; emergency operating procedures; training and full scope simulator; in-service inspection; fire protection and ageing monitoring and management

  20. An overview of process instrumentation, protective safety interlocks and alarm system at the JET facilities active gas handling system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Skinner, N.; Brennan, P.; Brown, K.; Gibbons, C.; Jones, G.; Knipe, S.; Manning, C.; Perevezentsev, A.; Stagg, R.; Thomas, R.; Yorkshades, J.

    2003-01-01

    The Joint European Torus (JET) Facilities Active Gas Handling System (AGHS) comprises ten interconnected processing sub-systems that supply, process and recover tritium from gases used in the JET Machine. Operations require a diverse range of process instrumentation to carry out a multiplicity of monitoring and control tasks and approximately 500 process variables are measured. The different types and application of process instruments are presented with specially adapted or custom-built versions highlighted. Forming part of the Safety Case for tritium operations, a dedicated hardwired interlock and alarm system provides an essential safety function. In the event of failure modes, each hardwired interlock will back-up software interlocks and shutdown areas of plant to a failsafe condition. Design of the interlock and alarm system is outlined and general methodology described. Practical experience gained during plant operations is summarised and the methods employed for routine functional testing of essential instrument systems explained

  1. Safety system upgrades to a research reactor: A regulatory perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lamarre, G.B.; Martin, W.G.

    2003-01-01

    The NRU (National Research Universal) reactor, located at the Chalk River Laboratories of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), first achieved criticality November 3, 1957. AECL continues to operate NRU for research to support safety and reliability studies for CANDU reactors and as a major supplier of medical radioisotopes. Following a detailed systematic review and assessment of NRU's design and the condition of its primary systems, AECL formally notified the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission's (CNSC) predecessor - the Atomic Energy Control Board - in 1992 of its intention to upgrade NRU's safety systems. AECL proposed seven major upgrades to provide improvements in shutdown capability, heat removal, confinement, and reactor monitoring, particularly during and after a seismic event. From a CNSC perspective, these upgrades were necessary to meet modern safety standards. From the start of the upgrades project, the CNSC provided regulatory oversight aimed at ensuring that AECL maintained a structured approach to the upgrades. The elements of the approach include, but are not limited to, the determination of project milestones and target dates; the formalization of the design process and project quality assurance requirements; the requirements for updated documentation, including safety reports, safety notes and commissioning reports; and the approval and authorization process. This paper details, from a regulatory perspective, the structured approach used in approving the design, construction, commissioning and subsequent operation of safety system upgrades for an existing and operating research reactor, including the many challenges faced when attempting to balance the requirements of the upgrades project with AECL's need to keep NRU operating to meet its important research and production objectives. (author)

  2. Novel hybrid Monte Carlo/deterministic technique for shutdown dose rate analyses of fusion energy systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ibrahim, Ahmad M.; Peplow, Douglas E.; Peterson, Joshua L.; Grove, Robert E.

    2014-01-01

    Highlights: •Develop the novel Multi-Step CADIS (MS-CADIS) hybrid Monte Carlo/deterministic method for multi-step shielding analyses. •Accurately calculate shutdown dose rates using full-scale Monte Carlo models of fusion energy systems. •Demonstrate the dramatic efficiency improvement of the MS-CADIS method for the rigorous two step calculations of the shutdown dose rate in fusion reactors. -- Abstract: The rigorous 2-step (R2S) computational system uses three-dimensional Monte Carlo transport simulations to calculate the shutdown dose rate (SDDR) in fusion reactors. Accurate full-scale R2S calculations are impractical in fusion reactors because they require calculating space- and energy-dependent neutron fluxes everywhere inside the reactor. The use of global Monte Carlo variance reduction techniques was suggested for accelerating the R2S neutron transport calculation. However, the prohibitive computational costs of these approaches, which increase with the problem size and amount of shielding materials, inhibit their ability to accurately predict the SDDR in fusion energy systems using full-scale modeling of an entire fusion plant. This paper describes a novel hybrid Monte Carlo/deterministic methodology that uses the Consistent Adjoint Driven Importance Sampling (CADIS) method but focuses on multi-step shielding calculations. The Multi-Step CADIS (MS-CADIS) methodology speeds up the R2S neutron Monte Carlo calculation using an importance function that represents the neutron importance to the final SDDR. Using a simplified example, preliminary results showed that the use of MS-CADIS enhanced the efficiency of the neutron Monte Carlo simulation of an SDDR calculation by a factor of 550 compared to standard global variance reduction techniques, and that the efficiency enhancement compared to analog Monte Carlo is higher than a factor of 10,000

  3. Transient safety performance of the PRISM innovative liquid metal reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Magee, P.M.; Dubberley, A.E.; Rhow, S.K.; Wu, T.

    1988-01-01

    The PRISM sodium-cooled reactor concept utilizes passive safety characteristics and modularity to increase performance margins, improve licensability, reduce owner's risk and reduce costs. The relatively small size of each reactor module (471 MWt) facilitates the use of passive self-shutdown and shutdown heat removal features, which permit design simplification and reduction of safety-related systems. Key to the transient performance is the inherent negative reactivity feedback characteristics of the core design resulting from the use of metal (U-Pu-Zr) swing, and very low control rod runout worth. Selected beyond design basis events relying only on these core design features are analyzed and the design margins summarized to demonstrate the advancement in reactor safety achieved with the PRISM design concept

  4. Failure of PWR-RHRS under cold shutdown conditions: Experimental results from the PKL test facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mandl, R.M.; Umminger, K.J.; Logt, J.V.D.

    1991-01-01

    The Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) of a PWR is designed to transfer thermal energy from the core after plant shutdown and maintain the plant in cold shutdown or refuelling conditions for extended periods of time. Initial reactor cooling after shutdown is achieved by dissipating heat through the steam generators (SGs) and discharging steam to the condenser by means of the Turbine Bypass System (TBS). When the reactor coolant temperature has dropped to about 160C and pressure has been reduced to 30 bar the RHRS is placed into operation. it reduces the coolant temperature to 50C within 20 hours after shutdown. The time margin for establishing alternate methods of heat removal following a failure of the RHRS depends on the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature, the decay heat rate and the amount of RCS inventory. During some shutdown operations the RCS may be partially drained (e. g. to perform SG inspections). Decreased primary system inventory can significantly reduce the time available to recover the RHRS's function prior to bulk boiling and possible core uncovery. In the PKL test facility, which simulates a 1,300 MWe 4-loop PWR on a scale 1:145, a failure of RHRS under cold shutdown conditions was performed. This presentation gives a brief description of the test facility followed by the test objectives and results of this experiment

  5. Prism reactor system design and analysis of postulated unscrammed events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van Tuyle, G.J.; Slovik, G.C.

    1991-08-01

    Key safety characteristics of the PRISM reactor system include the passive reactor shutdown characteristic and the passive shutdown heat removal system, RVACS. While these characteristics are simple in principle, the physical processes are fairly complex, particularly for the passive reactor shutdown. It has been possible to adapt independent safety analysis codes originally developed for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor review, although some limitations remain. In this paper, the analyses of postulated unscrammed events are discussed, along with limitations in the predictive capabilities and plans to correct the limitations in the near future. 6 refs., 4 figs

  6. PRISM reactor system design and analysis of postulated unscrammed events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van Tuyle, G.J.; Slovik, G.C.; Rosztoczy, Z.; Lane, J.

    1991-01-01

    Key safety characteristics of the PRISM reactor system include the passive reactor shutdown characteristics and the passive shutdown heat removal system, RVACS. While these characteristics are simple in principle, the physical processes are fairly complex, particularly for the passive reactor shutdown. It has been possible to adapt independent safety analysis codes originally developed for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor review, although some limitations remain. In this paper, the analyses of postulated unscrammed events are discussed, along with limitations in the predictive capabilities and plans to correct the limitations in the near future. 6 refs., 4 figs

  7. Some aspects of operational reliability of the JET central interlock and safety system (CISS) in the period March 1984 to December 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montfoort, Joop van.

    1987-01-01

    The Central Interlock and Safety System (CISS) provides basic safety functions for the JET plant. It monitors the status of emergency push buttons, access doors and plant equipment and takes corrective shutdown actions in the case that plant conditions are not compatible with safe operation. CISS consists of a hierarchical network of PLCs (programmable logic controllers) paralleling the CODAS architecture. It has been successfully in operation since June 1983 and has intervened many times and halted operation to protect JET from (further) damage or personnel against danger. The note will analyse genuine CISS failures only, and as will be shown, these failures are all due to malfunctioning of PLC hardware. All CISS failures have failed-safe and resulted in the expected shutdown action. Hence CISS failures have never resulted in a dangerous situation but they have restricted operational availability of JET. (author)

  8. Trends vs. reactor size of passive reactivity shutdown and control performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wade, D.C.; Fujita, E.K.

    1987-01-01

    For LMR concepts, the goal of passive reactivity shutdown has been approached in the US by designing the reactors for favorable relationships among the power, power/flow, and inlet temperature coefficients of reactivity, for high internal conversion ratio (yielding small burnup control swing), and for a primary pump coastdown time appropriately matched to the delayed neutron hold back of power decay upon negative reactivity input. The use of sodium bonded metallic fuel pins has facilitated the achievement of the massive shutdown design goals as a consequence of their high thermal conductivity and high effective heavy metal density. Alternately, core designs based on derated oxide pins may be able to achieve the passive shutdown features at the cost of larger core volume and increased initial fissile inventory. For LMR concepts, the passive decay heat removal goal of inherent safety has been approached in US designs by use of pool layouts, larger surface to volume ratio of the reactor vessel with natural draft air cooling of the vessel surface, elevations and redans which promote natural circulation through the core, and thermal mass of the pool contents sufficient to absorb that initial transient decay heat which exceeds the natural draft air cooling capacity. This paper describes current US ''inherently safe'' reactor design

  9. Fire protection of safe shutdown capability at commercial nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, K.

    1993-01-01

    The comprehensive industrial safety standards and codes that exist today have evolved from lessons learned through past experience, research results, and improvements in technological capabilities. The current requirements for fire safety features of commercial nuclear power stations operated in the U.S. are a notable example of this practice. Although fire protection has always been an important design requirement, from the aftermath of a serious fire that occurred in 1975 at the Browns Ferry plant, it was learned that the life safety and property protection concerns of the major fire insurance underwriters may not sufficiently encompass nuclear safety issues, particularly with regard to the potential for fire damage to result in the common mode failure of redundant trains of systems, and composites important to the safe shutdown of the reactor. Following its investigations into the Browns Ferry fire, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) promulgated guidance documents, which ultimately developed into mandatory regulations, necessary to assure the implementation of a fire protection program that would address nuclear safety concerns. The new criteria that evolved, contain prescriptive design features, as well as personnel and administrative requirements the Commission determined to be necessary to provide a defense-in-depth level of protection against the hazards of fire and its associated effects on safety related equipment. These criteria are primarily contained in Appendix R of Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50)

  10. A Study on the Risk Reduction Effect by MLCS (Mid-loop Level Control System) of EUAPR using the Low-Power and Shutdown PSA Result

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Keunsung; Choi, Sunmi; Kim, Eden

    2016-01-01

    The EU-APR design has been developed in order to expand and diversify the global nuclear power market of APR1400. For the improvement of shutdown risk for the EUAPR, the mid-loop level control system (MLCS) is considered during mid-loop operation for the EU-APR, which is not incorporated into SKN 3 and 4 (APR1400 Type) in Korea. Commonly, the risk associated with the NPP can be identified through the PSA. Thus, this paper discusses the low power and shutdown (LPSD) risk reduction effect by MLCS using the Low-Power and Shutdown PSA Result. LPSD level 1 PSA models for EU-APR have been developed. The risk reduction effect by MLCS is discussed. Because the loss of shutdown cooling function during mid-loop is one of the most vulnerable events, the MLCS have a significant influence on CDF in LPSD PSA. The shutdown risk of domestic power plants would likely be reduced if the MLCS is adopted in all operating NPPs in Korea during the mid-loop operation. It is expected that this work will contribute to reduce shutdown risk of domestic power plants

  11. A concept of JAERI passive safety light water reactor system (JPSR)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Murao, Y.; Araya, F.; Iwamura, T. [Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, Tokai-mura (Japan)

    1995-09-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) proposed a passive safety reactor system concept, JPSR, which was developed for reducing manpower in operation and maintenance and influence of human errors on reactor safety. In the concept the system was extremely simplified. The inherent matching nature of core generation and heat removal rate within a small volume change of the primary coolant is introduced by eliminating chemical shim and adopting in-vessel control rod drive mechanism units, a low power density core and once-through steam generators. In order to simplify the system, a large pressurizer, canned pumps, passive engineered-safety-features-system (residual heat removal system and coolant injection system) are adopted and the total system can be significantly simplified. The residual heat removal system is completely passively actuated in non-LOCAs and is also used for depressurization of the primary coolant system to actuate accumulators in small break LOCAs and reactor shutdown cooling system in normal operation. All of systems for nuclear steam supply system are built in the containment except for the air coolers as a the final heat sink of the passive residual heat removal system. Accordingly the reliability of the safety system and the normal operation system is improved, since most of residual heat removal system is always working and a heat sink for normal operation system is {open_quotes}safety class{close_quotes}. In the passive coolant injection system, depressurization of the primary cooling system by residual heat removal system initiates injection from accumulators designed for the MS-600 in medium pressure and initiates injection from the gravity driven coolant injection pool at low pressure. Analysis with RETRAN-02/MOD3 code demonstrated the capability of passive load-following, self-power-controllability, cooling and depressurization.

  12. Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis Using a Fault Tree Logic Model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yim, Hyun Tae; Park, Jun Hyun

    2005-01-01

    Every nuclear power plant should have its own fire hazard analysis including the fire safe shutdown analysis. A safe shutdown (SSD) analysis is performed to demonstrate the capability of the plant to safely shut down for a fire in any given area. The basic assumption is that there will be fire damage to all cables and equipment located within a common fire area. When evaluating the SSD capabilities of the plant, based on a review of the systems, equipment and cables within each fire area, it should be determined which shutdown paths are either unaffected or least impacted by a postulated fire within the fire area. Instead of seeking a success path for safe shutdown given all cables and equipment damaged by a fire, there can be an alternative approach to determine the SSD capability: fault tree analysis. This paper introduces the methodology for fire SSD analysis using a fault tree logic model

  13. CAREM-25: Residual heat removal system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arvia, Roberto P.; Coppari, Norberto R.; Gomez de Soler, Susana M.; Ramilo, Lucia B.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of this work was the definition and consolidation of the residual heat removal system for the CAREM 25 reactor. The function of this system is cool down the primary circuit, removing the core decay heat from hot stand-by to cold shutdown and during refueling. In addition, this system heats the primary water from the cold shutdown condition to hot stand-by condition during the reactor start up previous to criticality. The system has been designed according to the requirements of the standards: ANSI/ANS 51.1 'Nuclear safety criteria for the design of stationary PWR plants'; ANSI/ANS 58.11 'Design criteria for safe shutdown following selected design basis events in light water reactors' and ANSI/ANS 58.9 'Single failure criteria for light water reactor safety-related fluid systems'. The suggested design fulfills the required functions and design criteria standards. (author)

  14. Review of occupational radiation exposures in all biennial shutdown maintenance of Kaiga generating station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murukan, E.K.; Vinod Kumar, T.; Austine, N.X.; Soumia Menon, M.; Girish Kumar, K.; Rao, M.M.L.N.; Venkataramana, K.

    2008-01-01

    Full text: Kaiga generating station 1 and 2 consists of twin units of 220 M We pressurized heavy water reactors located in Karnataka, India. Major maintenance activities of one of the twin units are taken up once in two years (biennial shutdown) to execute system maintenance, system up gradation, surveillance and in-service inspection (ISI) jobs. BSDs are mandatory activities to comply with regulatory requirement to ensure the safety and reliability of plant system equipment. More than 65% of the station collective dose is contributed by biennial shutdown (BSD) jobs. It is observed that the man rem consumed during normal operation of the plant is less than 35% of the total man rem consumed. Since BSD jobs contributes significantly to station collective dose, an effective implementation of radiation protection programme specific to BSD is the key to control the occupational exposure. Various improvements in the field of radiation protection practices and process systems are adopted to achieve lowest collective dose at par with international standards. The key areas identified for application of various strategies to achieve ALARA were Man rem budgeting, Radiological condition monitoring, Radiation protection practices, Identification of critical jobs and Work groups, Work planning and execution, and Radioactive waste management. Review of collective doses of all the BSD jobs performed in the station since year 2004 and various measures incorporated to achieve ALARA exposures to plant personnel are briefly discussed in this paper. (author)

  15. Recommended safety objectives, principles and requirements for mini-reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-05-01

    Canadian and international publications containing objectives, principles and requirements for the safety of nuclear facilities in general and nuclear power plants in particular have been reviewed for their relevance to mini-reactors. Most of the individual recommendations, sometimes with minor wording changes, are applicable to mini-reactors. However, some prescriptive requirements for the shutdown, emergency core cooling and containment systems of power reactors are considered inappropriate for mini-reactors. The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety favours a generally non-prescriptive approach whereby the applicant for a mini-reactor license is free to propose any means of satisfying the fundamental objectives, but must convince the regulatory agency to that effect. To do so, a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) would be the favoured procedure. A generic PSA for all mini-reactors of the same design would be acceptable. Notwithstanding this non-prescriptive approach, the ACNS considers that it would be prudent to require the existence of at least one independent shutdown system and two physically independent locations from which the reactor can be shut down and the shutdown condition monitored, and to require provision for an assumed loss of integrity of the primary cooling system's boundary unless convincing arguments to the contrary are presented. The ACNS endorses in general the objectives and fundamental principles proposed by the interorganizational Small Reactor Criteria working group, and intends to review and comment on the documents on specific applications to be issued by that working group

  16. PSA-operations synergism for the advanced test reactor shutdown operations PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Atkinson, S.A.

    1996-01-01

    The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for shutdown operations, cask handling, and canal draining is a successful example of the importance of good PSA-operations synergism for achieving a realistic and accepted assessment of the risks and for achieving desired risk reduction and safety improvement in a best and cost-effective manner. The implementation of the agreed-upon upgrades and improvements resulted in the reductions of the estimated mean frequency for core or canal irradiated fuel uncovery events, a total reduction in risk by a factor of nearly 1000 to a very low and acceptable risk level for potentially severe events

  17. Comparison of three small-break loss-of-coolant accident tests with different break locations using the system-integrated modular advanced reactor-integral test loop facility to estimate the safety of the smart design

    OpenAIRE

    Hwang Bae; Dong Eok Kim; Sung-Uk Ryu; Sung-Jae Yi; Hyun-Sik Park

    2017-01-01

    Three small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) tests with safety injection pumps were carried out using the integral-effect test loop for SMART (System-integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor), i.e., the SMART-ITL facility. The types of break are a safety injection system line break, shutdown cooling system line break, and pressurizer safety valve line break. The thermal–hydraulic phenomena show a traditional behavior to decrease the temperature and pressure whereas the local phenomena are s...

  18. Evaluation of Pressure Changes in HANARO Reactor Hall after a Reactor Shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Geeyang; Han, Jaesam; Ahn, Gukhoon; Jung, Hoansung

    2013-01-01

    The major objective of this work is intended to evaluate the characteristics of the thermal behavior regarding how the decay heat will be affected by the reactor hall pressure change and the increase of pool water temperature induced in the primary coolant after a reactor shutdown. The particular reactor pool water temperature at the surface where it is evaporated owing to the decay heat resulting in the local heat transfer rate is related to the pressure change response in the reactor hall associated with the primary cooling system because of the reduction of the heat exchanger to remove the heat. The increase in the pool water temperature is proportional to the heat transfer rate in the reactor pool. Consequently, any limit on the reactor pool water temperature imposes a corresponding limit on the reactor hall pressure. At HANARO, the decay heat after a reactor shutdown is mainly removed by the natural circulation cooling in the reactor pool. This paper is written for the safety feature of the pressure change related leakage rate from the reactor hall. The calculation results show that the increase of pressure in the reactor hall will not cause any serious problems to the safety limits although the reactor hall pressure is slightly increased. Therefore, it was concluded that the pool water temperature increase is not so rapid as to cause the pressure to vary significantly in the reactor hall. Furthermore, the mathematical model developed in this work can be a useful analytical tool for scoping and parametric studies in the area of thermal transient analysis, with its proper representation of the interaction between the temperature and pressure in the reactor hall

  19. Test rig overview for validation and reliability testing of shutdown system software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhao, M.; McDonald, A.; Dick, P.

    2007-01-01

    The test rig for Validation and Reliability Testing of shutdown system software has been upgraded from the AECL Windows-based test rig previously used for CANDU6 stations. It includes a Virtual Trip Computer, which is a software simulation of the functional specification of the trip computer, and a real-time trip computer simulator in a separate chassis, which is used during the preparation of trip computer test cases before the actual trip computers are available. This allows preparation work for Validation and Reliability Testing to be performed in advance of delivery of actual trip computers to maintain a project schedule. (author)

  20. Main Steam Line Break Analysis for the Fully Passive Safety System of SMART

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Seong Wook; Chun, Ji Han; Bae, Kyoo Hwan; Kim, Keung Koo

    2013-01-01

    The standard design approval of SMART (System-integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor) developed by KAERI and KEPCO consortium was issued on July 4, 2012. Although SMART has enhanced safety compared to the conventional reactor, there is a demand to meet the 'passive safety performance requirements' after the Fukushima accident. The passive safety performance requirements are the capabilities to maintain the plant at a safe shutdown condition for a minimum of 72 hours without AC power supply or operator action in case of design basis accident (DBA). To satisfy the requirements, KAERI is developing a safety enhanced SMART by adopting a passive safety injection system. The passive safety injection system developed for SMART is a gravity-driven injection system, which consists of four trains, each of which includes a pressure balance line, core makeup tank (CMT), safety injection tank (SIT) and injection line. The CMT plays an important role to inject borated water into the RCS to prevent or dissolve the return to power (re-criticality) condition during the event of increase in heat removal by the secondary system. The main steam line break accident (MSLB) is the most limiting accident for an increase in heat removal by the secondary system. In this study, the safety analysis results of MSLBs at hot full power condition and at hot zero power condition in view of re-criticality are given. The MSLB accident has been analyzed for the SMART adopting fully passive safety system in the aspect of re-criticality. The results show that the core remains subcritical condition throughout the transient due to the borated water injected by the CMT. As further works, many kinds of analyses and sensitivity studies should be performed for the design establishment and improvement of the fully passive system of SMART

  1. Decay Power Calculation for Safety Analysis of Innovative Reactor Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shwageraus, E.; Fridman, E.

    2008-01-01

    In this work, we verified the decay heat calculation capabilities of BGCore computer code system developed recently at Ben-Gurion University. Decay power was calculated for a typical UO 2 fuel in Pressurized Water Reactor environment using BGCore code and using procedure prescribed by the ANS/ANSI-2005 standard. Very good agreement between the two methods was obtained. Once BGCore calculation capabilities were verified, we calculated decay power as a function of time after shutdown for various reactors with innovative fuels, for which no standard procedure is currently available. Notable differences were observed for decay power of the advanced reactors as compared with conventional UO 2 LWR. The observed differences suggest that the design of new reactors safety systems must be based on corresponding decay power curves for each individual case in order to assure the desired performance of such systems. (authors)

  2. Nuclear safety - Topical issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The following topical issues related to nuclear safety are discussed: steam generators; maintenance strategies; control rod drive nozzle cracks; core shrouds cracks; sump strainer blockage; fire protection; computer software important for safety; safety during shutdown; operational safety experience; external hazards and other site related issues. 5 figs, 5 tabs

  3. Plasma shutdown device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hosogane, Nobuyuki; Nakayama, Takahide.

    1985-01-01

    Purpose: To prevent concentration of plasma currents to the plasma center upon plasma shutdown in a torus type thermonuclear device by the injection of fuels to the plasma center thereby prevent plasma disruption at the plasma center. Constitution: The plasma shutdown device comprises a plasma current measuring device that measures the current distribution of plasmas confined within a vacuum vessel and outputs a control signal for cooling the plasma center when the plasma currents concentrate to the plasma center and a fuel supply device that supplies fuels to the plasma center for cooling the center. The fuels are injected in the form of pellets into the plasmas. The direction and the velocity of the injection are set such that the pellets are ionized at the center of the plasmas. (Horiuchi, T.)

  4. Examination of risk significant configuration during low power and shutdown with ORION and PSA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Chul Kyu; Oh, Seung Jong [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    This paper suggests an approach to calculate the increased CDF corresponding to Orange and Red states in ORION program and analyzed the result of calculation. This approach is expected to be useful for checking the adequacy of the LPSD PSA. And also, the result of this calculation can provide the information about which SSCs for certain SF are more sensitive to risk in particular POS. Defense-in-depth is a safety philosophy in which multiple lines of defense and conservative design and evaluation methods are applied to ensure the safety of the public. Based on this philosophy EPRI developed Outage Risk Assessment and Management (ORAM) program as a qualitative assessment to better manage the risk during low power and shutdown event after the Vogtle loss of vital AC power and RHR event in 1990. Each risk level of RED, ORANGE color status caused by the degradation of each key safety function might be different depend on the importance of each key safety function. However we can't know how much different. If we know the quantitative information about the risk level represented by color, we can take and prepare concrete actions to reduce the risk level of the plant with rescheduling maintenance, strengthen surveillance for important safety function, and developing outage management strategy. The probabilistic safety analysis for low power and shutdown period can provide risk information with quantitative value related on the degradation of redundancy and diversity level for the safety functions during outage. In this study, we calculated the increased Core Damage frequency (CDF) of each RED and ORANGE states in ORION program caused by the degradation of each key safety function by modifying LPSD PSA model. The result of calculation and analysis could be effective to check adequacy and find improvement for these two methods.

  5. An analysis of multiple particle settling for LMR backup shutdown systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brock, R.W.

    1992-05-01

    Backup shutdown systems proposed for future LMRs may employ discreet absorber particles to provide the negative reactivity insertion. When actuated, these systems release a dense packing of particles from an out-of-core region to settle into an in-core region. The multiple particle settling behavior is analyzed by the method of continuity waves. This method provides predictions of the dynamic response of the system including the average particle velocity and volume fraction of particles vs. time. Although hindered settling problems have been previously analyzed using continuity wave theory, this application represents an extension of the theory to conditions of unrestrained settling. Typical cases are analyzed and numerical results are calculated based on a semi-empirical drift-flux model. For 1/4-inch diameter boron-carbide particles in hot liquid sodium, the unrestrained settling problem assumes a steady-state solution when the average volume fraction of particles is 0.295 and the average particle velocity is 26.0 cm/s

  6. MAPLE research reactor safety uncertainty assessment methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sills, H.E.; Duffey, R.B.; Andres, T.H.

    1999-01-01

    The MAPLE (multipurpose Applied Physics Lattice Experiment) reactor is a low pressure, low temperature, open-tank-in pool type research reactor that operates at a power level of 5 to 35 MW. MAPLE is designed for ease of operation, maintenance, and to meet today's most demanding requirements for safety and licensing. The emphasis is on the use of passive safety systems and environmentally qualified components. Key safety features include two independent and diverse shutdown systems, two parallel and independent cooling loops, fail safe operation, and a building design that incorporates the concepts of primary containment supported by secondary confinement

  7. Compositional Safety Analysis using Barrier Certificates

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Sloth, Christoffer; Pappas, George J.; Wisniewski, Rafael

    2012-01-01

    This paper proposes a compositional method for verifying the safety of a dynamical system, given as an interconnection of subsystems. The safety verification is conducted by the use of the barrier certificate method; hence, the contribution of this paper is to show how to obtain compositional...... conditions for safety verification. We show how to formulate the verification problem, as a composition of coupled subproblems, each given for one subsystem. Furthermore, we show how to find the compositional barrier certificates via linear and sum of squares programming problems. The proposed method makes...... it possible to verify the safety of higher dimensional systems, than the method for centrally computed barrier certificates. This is demonstrated by verifying the safety of an emergency shutdown of a wind turbine....

  8. An SBLOCA Test for Shutdown Cooling Line Break Using the SMART-ITL Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bae, Hwang; Kim, Dong Eok; Ryu, Sung Uk; Shin, Yong Cheol; Ko, Yung Joo; Yi, Sung Jae; Park, Hyun Sik [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-10-15

    The objectives of SMART-ITL are to investigate and understand the integral performance of the reactor systems and components, and the thermalhydraulic phenomena occurring in the system during normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions, and to verify the system safety during various design basis events of SMART. Its height was preserved and its area and volume were scaled down to 1/49 compared with the SMART prototype plant. The SMART-ITL consists of a primary system including a reactor pressure vessel with a pressurizer, four steam generators and four main coolant pumps, a secondary system, a safety system, and an auxiliary system. The SMART was installed at KAERI and several transient tests were recently finished. In this paper, the test results for a steady-state operation and a transient of the small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) are discussed. An SBLOCA test simulating the shutdown cooling line break was performed using SMART-ITL properly. All parameters were in good agreement with the target values during the steady-state operation period. The pressures and temperatures show reasonable behaviors during the SBLOCA test. SMART (System-integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor) which was designed by KAERI is an integral type reactor. The standard design approval for the SMART design was issued on July 4th of 2012 by a Korean regulatory body, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC). The main components including a pressurizer, steam generators, and reactor coolant pumps are installed in a reactor pressure vessel, and there are no large-size pipes. The safety systems could be simplified as an LBLOCA (Large-Break Loss of Coolant Accident) scenario is inherently excluded. An integral-effect test loop for SMART (SMART-ITL, or FESTA) was designed to simulate the integral thermal-hydraulic behavior of SMART. The SMART-ITL has been designed using a volume scaling methodology.

  9. Selected component failure rate values from fusion safety assessment tasks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cadwallader, L.C.

    1998-09-01

    This report is a compilation of component failure rate and repair rate values that can be used in magnetic fusion safety assessment tasks. Several safety systems are examined, such as gas cleanup systems and plasma shutdown systems. Vacuum system component reliability values, including large vacuum chambers, have been reviewed. Values for water cooling system components have also been reported here. The report concludes with the examination of some equipment important to personnel safety, atmospheres, combustible gases, and airborne releases of radioactivity. These data should be useful to system designers to calculate scoping values for the availability and repair intervals for their systems, and for probabilistic safety or risk analysts to assess fusion systems for safety of the public and the workers.

  10. Selected Component Failure Rate Values from Fusion Safety Assessment Tasks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cadwallader, Lee Charles

    1998-09-01

    This report is a compilation of component failure rate and repair rate values that can be used in magnetic fusion safety assessment tasks. Several safety systems are examined, such as gas cleanup systems and plasma shutdown systems. Vacuum system component reliability values, including large vacuum chambers, have been reviewed. Values for water cooling system components have also been reported here. The report concludes with the examination of some equipment important to personnel safety, atmospheres, combustible gases, and airborne releases of radioactivity. These data should be useful to system designers to calculate scoping values for the availability and repair intervals for their systems, and for probabilistic safety or risk analysts to assess fusion systems for safety of the public and the workers.

  11. Selected component failure rate values from fusion safety assessment tasks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadwallader, L.C.

    1998-01-01

    This report is a compilation of component failure rate and repair rate values that can be used in magnetic fusion safety assessment tasks. Several safety systems are examined, such as gas cleanup systems and plasma shutdown systems. Vacuum system component reliability values, including large vacuum chambers, have been reviewed. Values for water cooling system components have also been reported here. The report concludes with the examination of some equipment important to personnel safety, atmospheres, combustible gases, and airborne releases of radioactivity. These data should be useful to system designers to calculate scoping values for the availability and repair intervals for their systems, and for probabilistic safety or risk analysts to assess fusion systems for safety of the public and the workers

  12. Impact of Passive Safety on FHR Instrumentation Systems Design and Classification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holcomb, David Eugene

    2015-01-01

    Fluoride salt-cooled high-temperature reactors (FHRs) will rely more extensively on passive safety than earlier reactor classes. 10CFR50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, establishes minimum design requirements to provide reasonable assurance of adequate safety. 10CFR50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors, provides guidance on how the safety significance of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) should be reflected in their regulatory treatment. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has provided 10 CFR 50.69 SSC Categorization Guideline (NEI-00-04) that factors in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model insights, as well as deterministic insights, through an integrated decision-making panel. Employing the PRA to inform deterministic requirements enables an appropriately balanced, technically sound categorization to be established. No FHR currently has an adequate PRA or set of design basis accidents to enable establishing the safety classification of its SSCs. While all SSCs used to comply with the general design criteria (GDCs) will be safety related, the intent is to limit the instrumentation risk significance through effective design and reliance on inherent passive safety characteristics. For example, FHRs have no safety-significant temperature threshold phenomena, thus enabling the primary and reserve reactivity control systems required by GDC 26 to be passively, thermally triggered at temperatures well below those for which core or primary coolant boundary damage would occur. Moreover, the passive thermal triggering of the primary and reserve shutdown systems may relegate the control rod drive motors to the control system, substantially decreasing the amount of safety-significant wiring needed. Similarly, FHR decay heat removal systems are intended to be running continuously to minimize the amount of safety-significant instrumentation needed to initiate

  13. 40 CFR 52.271 - Malfunction, startup, and shutdown regulations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Malfunction, startup, and shutdown..., startup, and shutdown regulations. (a) The following regulations are disapproved because they would permit... malfunctions and/or fail to sufficiently limit startup and shutdown exemptions to those periods where it is...

  14. Requirements Analysis Study for Master Pump Shutdown System Project Development Specification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BEVINS, R.R.

    2000-01-01

    This study is a requirements document that presents analysis for the functional description for the master pump shutdown system. This document identifies the sources of the requirements and/or how these were derived. Each requirement is validated either by quoting the source or an analysis process involving the required functionality, performance characteristics, operations input or engineering judgment. The requirements in this study apply to the first phase of the W314 Project. This document has been updated during the definitive design portion of the first phase of the W314 Project to capture additional software requirements and is planned to be updated during the second phase of the W314 Project to cover the second phase of the project's scope

  15. Operating experiences of reactor shutdown system at MAPS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kotteeswaran, T.J.; Subramani, V.A.; Hariharan, K.

    1997-01-01

    The reactors in Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS), Kalpakkam are Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) similar to RAPS, Kota. The moderator heavy water is pumped into the calandria from dump tank to make the reactor critical. Later with the calandria level held constant at 92% FT, the further power changes are being done with the movement of adjuster rods. The moderator is held in calandria by means of helium gas pressure differential between top of calandria and dump tank located below. The shutdown of the reactor is effected by dumping the moderator water to dump tank by fast equalizing of helium gas pressure. In the revised mode of operation of moderator circuit after the moderator inlet manifold failure, the dump timing was observed to be more compared to the normal value. This was investigated and observed to be due to accumulation of D 2 O in the gas space above dump valves, which was affecting the helium equalizing flow. Also some of Indicating Alarm Meters (IAM) in protective system initiating the trip signals have failed in the unsafe mode. They have been modified to avoid the recurrence of the failures. (author)

  16. Decay Power Calculation for Safety Analysis of Innovative Reactor Systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shwageraus, E.; Fridman, E. [Department of Nuclear Engineering, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Beer-Sheva 84105 (Israel)

    2008-07-01

    In this work, we verified the decay heat calculation capabilities of BGCore computer code system developed recently at Ben-Gurion University. Decay power was calculated for a typical UO{sub 2} fuel in Pressurized Water Reactor environment using BGCore code and using procedure prescribed by the ANS/ANSI-2005 standard. Very good agreement between the two methods was obtained. Once BGCore calculation capabilities were verified, we calculated decay power as a function of time after shutdown for various reactors with innovative fuels, for which no standard procedure is currently available. Notable differences were observed for decay power of the advanced reactors as compared with conventional UO{sub 2} LWR. The observed differences suggest that the design of new reactors safety systems must be based on corresponding decay power curves for each individual case in order to assure the desired performance of such systems. (authors)

  17. Oak Ridge Research reactor shutdown maintenance and surveillance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coleman, G.H.; Laughlin, D.L.

    1991-05-01

    The Department of Energy ordered the Oak Ridge Research Reactor to be placed in permanent shutdown on July 14, 1987. The paper outlines routine maintenance activities and surveillance tests performed April through September, 1990, on the reactor instrumentation and controls, process system, and the gaseous waste filter system. Preparations are being made to transfer the facility to the Remedial Action Program. 6 tabs

  18. A methodology for Level 2 PSA evaluation with consideration of specific features for Low Power Shutdown Probabilistic Safety Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jae Gab; Seok, Ho [KEPCO-ENC, Yongin (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    The primary objective of the Level 2 PSA during Lower Power/Shutdown (LPSD) operation is to provide insights into potential plant vulnerabilities with regard to accident progression. The shutdown risk information can be used to provide the information to develop outage risk management guidelines. The LPSD Level 2 analysis utilizes much of the at-power Level 2 analysis for bounding, conservative treatment of severe accident phenomena. But, for some portions of the analysis including Plant Operational States (POSs), LPSD-specific evaluations such as UPC related to the containment Equipment Hatch (E/H) with 4 bolts, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Not Intact for severe accident phenomena are desired for realistic evaluation. All POSs are evaluated for their Large Release Frequency (LRF). Some POSs are evaluated conservatively utilizing the at-power models, and other POSs are evaluated in specific analysis. The overall LPSD Level 2 model is evaluated. If the containment E/H and one of the two doors on each of the personal air locks are closed as containment is operable at reduced RCS inventory operation, LRF is expected to be less than 10% of LPSD CDF.

  19. High-temperature gas-cooled reactor steam-cycle/cogeneration lead plant. Plant Protection and Instrumentation System design description

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-01-01

    The Plant Protection and Instrumentation System provides plant safety system sense and command features, actuation of plant safety system execute features, preventive features which maintain safety system integrity, and safety-related instrumentation which monitors the plant and its safety systems. The primary function of the Plant Protection and Instrumentation system is to sense plant process variables to detect abnormal plant conditions and to provide input to actuation devices directly controlling equipment required to mitigate the consequences of design basis events to protect the public health and safety. The secondary functions of the Plant Protection and Instrumentation System are to provide plant preventive features, sybsystems that monitor plant safety systems status, subsystems that monitor the plant under normal operating and accident conditions, safety-related controls which allow control of reactor shutdown and cooling from a remote shutdown area

  20. New trends in pile safety instrumentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furet, J.

    1961-01-01

    This report addresses the protection of nuclear piles against damages due to operation incidents. The author discusses the current trends in the philosophy of safety of atomic power piles, identifies the parameters which define safety systems, presents tests to be performed on safety chains, comments the relationship between safety and the decrease of the number of pile inadvertent shutdowns, discusses the issues of instrument failures and chain multiplicity, comments the possible improvement of the operation of elements which build up safety chains (design simplification, development of semiconductors, replacement of electromechanical relays by static relays), the role of safety logical computers and the development of automatics in pile safety, presents automatic control as a safety factor (example of automatic start-up), and finally comments the use of fuses

  1. Influence of Non-safety Important Component on Maintenance Rule

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ju, Tae Young; Kim, Wang Bae

    2016-01-01

    The Maintenance Rule (MR) programs in KHNP have been implemented since Jan 2009. KHNP is currently developing MR program for new built plant which has been constructed from December 2011. It is required to utilize plant-specific probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) result as risk significant criteria to determine which components are significantly important to safety. The criteria consist of three PSA risk values which are risk reduction worth (RRW), risk achievement worth (RAW) and core damage frequency (CDF) contribution. Most safety related components are classified as high risk significant, and non-safety related components as low safety significant in MR program. This paper presents the influence of the non-safety related component which has high PSA risk value on MR program of new built plant. It is considered that safety related system has at least one or more safety functions and some non-safety functions, but non-safety system doesn't have any safety function. The safety functions are defined as three functions which are required to maintain 1) integrity of reactor coolant pressure boundary, 2) capability to shut-down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown, and 3) capability to prevent or mitigate the accident that could result in potential offsite exposure. The Maintenance Rule program is developed based on PSA result. Safety functions have high risk value in PSA program and considered HSS function in MR program. On the contrary, non-safety functions are generally has low risk value in PSA program and they are determined as LSS function in MR program. The AAC DG and its supporting systems are designed as non-safety systems which mean they don't have any safety function. But, AAC DG is treated as an important measure to mitigate accident in PSA program. It is determined as HSS function in MR program because it has high risk value in PSA program. AAC DG supporting systems does not have high risk value in operating plant's PSA program

  2. Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maheras, Steven J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Best, Ralph E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Ross, Steven B. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Buxton, Kenneth A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); England, Jeffery L. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); McConnell, Paul E. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Massaro, Lawrence M. [Fermi Research Alliance (FRA), Batavia, IL (United States); Jensen, Philip J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2016-09-30

    important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. Additional conclusions from this evaluation include: The 13 shutdown sites use designs from 4 different suppliers involving 11 different (horizontal and vertical) dry storage systems that would require the use of 9 different transportation cask designs to remove the SNF and GTCC waste from the shutdown sites. Although some changes to transportation certificates of compliance will be required, the SNF at the initial 9 shutdown sites (Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion) is in dual purpose dry storage canisters that can be transported, including a small amount of high-burnup fuel. Most sites indicated that 2-3 years of advance time would be required for its preparations before shipments could begin. Some sites could be ready in less time. As additional sites such as Fort Calhoun, Clinton, Quad Cities, Pilgrim, Oyster Creek, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation.

  3. Design of control and safety rod and its drive mechanism of PFBR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajan Babu, V.; Govindarajan, S.; Chetal, S.C.

    1997-01-01

    Control and Safety Rod (CSR) is one of the two types of absorber rods in shutdown systems of PFBR. Control and Safety Rod Drive Mechanism (CSRDM) actuates CSR to have vertical translatory motion in reactor core. The dual responsibilities entrusted on CSR to control reactor power during normal operating condition and to shutdown the reactor by scram action during abnormal condition, necessitate highly reliable design, analysis, testing and surveillance of CSR and CSRDM. The paper discusses on the salient features of CSR and CSRDM and design and analysis of individual sub-assemblies, viz., gripper, scram-release electromagnet, hydraulic dash pot, seals. Also it discusses on the developmental activities proposed and surveillance test requirements. (author)

  4. Risks Associated with Shutdown in PWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grlicarev, I.

    1996-01-01

    The selected set of risks associated with reactor shutdown in PWRs are outlined and discussed (e. g. outage planning, residual heat removal capability, rapid boron dilution, containment integrity, fire protection). The contribution of different outage strategies to overall core damage risk during shutdown is assessed for a particular basic outage plan. The factors which increase or minimize the probability of reactor coolant boiling or core damage are analysed. (author)

  5. Utilization of the safety functional analysis techniques to optimize the separation requirements in case of fire

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alvarez, L.M.

    1983-01-01

    The present philosophy for the fire protection of the safe shutdown capability in nuclear power plants is based on the separation of the safety-related systems in different fire areas in such a way that the redundant systems are not subject to damage from a single fire risk. The purpose ofthis paper is to show the experience gained in the application of a symmetric method of analysis to minimize the number of fire barriers being compatible with the regulatory requirements and with capability of achieving and maintaining the safe plant shutdown in the event of a fire. As a conclusion of the analysis, the separation criteria for the divisions involved in the safe plant shutdown are obtained

  6. Outage Risk Assessment and Management (ORAM) technology to improve outage safety and economics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kalra, S.P.

    2004-01-01

    The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has undertaken an aggressive program, called ORAM (Outage Risk Assessment and Management), to provide utilities with tools and technology to assist in managing risk during the planning and conduct of outages. The ORAM program consists of the following 6 steps: i) Perform utility surveys and visits on shutdown risk management needs, ii) Perform probabilistic shutdown safety assessments (PSSAs) to identify generic insights that can be incorporated into risk management guidelines and identify selected areas for the development of contingency actions, iii) Develop risk management guidelines (RMG's) that provide a systematic approach to the planning and conduct of outages from a safety perspective. Incorporate insights from the shutdown safety assessments and other operating experience into the RMG's. iv) Develop selected contingency actions including a thermalhydraulic tool kit to address higher risk time periods and activities identified in the shutdown safety assessments, v) Develop computer software that integrates all of the above capability into an easy to use tool for effective shutdown operation management for utilities, vi) Provide assistance in the transfer of this technology and the application of these tools. This paper briefly describes the technical approach and tools developed under EPRI's ORAM program and its applications for improving outage safety and economics. (author)

  7. Lithium Hideout and Return in the CANDU Heat Transport System during Shutdown and Start-up

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Qiu, L.; Snaglewski, A.P.

    2012-09-01

    Lithium hydroxide is used to control the pH a (pH apparent) of the Heat Transport System (HTS) coolant in CANDU R reactors. The recommended range of the lithium concentration in the coolant is between 0.38 ppm (5.5x10 -5 m) and 0.60 ppm (8.7x10 -5 m) to minimize carbon steel corrosion in the HTS and magnetite deposition in the core during normal operation; this corresponds to pH a values between 10.2 and 10.4. Similar pH a and lithium concentrations should be maintained during shutdown and start-up. However, maintaining the pH a of the HTS coolant within specification during shutdown and start-up has been difficult for some CANDU stations, especially when the HTS is taken to a Low Level Drain State (LLDS), because of lithium hideout and return. This paper presents the results from lithium adsorption and desorption studies on iron oxides under relevant shutdown and start-up chemistry conditions performed to elucidate the mechanisms of the observed lithium hideout and return. The results show that lithium hideout and return are driven largely by changes in the solubility of magnetite as the HTS coolant chemistry changes during shutdown; changes in lithium concentration were inversely correlated with the solubility of magnetite. When the HTS system is de-pressurized and drained to a low coolant level, the ingress of air rapidly oxidizes the dissolved Fe (II) in the coolant, 2Fe +2 + 1 / 2 O 2 + 3 H 2 = 2FEOOH + 4 H + , resulting in the formation of lepidocrocite or maghemite, which have much lower solubilities but larger surface areas than does magnetite. The large surface area of the Fe (III) oxides can adsorb significant quantities of lithium from the coolant, leading to lithium hideout and a pH a decrease. During start-up, the chemistry of the coolant changes from oxidizing to reducing, and lepidocrocite and other Fe (III) oxides are reduced to Fe (II), gradually dissolving as their solubility increases with increasing temperature. The adsorbed lithium is released

  8. Conceptual design of safety instrumentation for PFBR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muralikrishna, G.; Seshadri, U.; Raghavan, K.

    1996-01-01

    Instrumentation systems enable monitoring of the process which in turn enables control and shutdown of the process as per the requirements. Safety Instrumentation due to its vital importance has a stringent role and this needs to be designed methodically. This paper presents the details of the conceptual design for PFBR. (author). 4 figs, 3 tabs

  9. Revisiting the analysis of passive plasma shutdown during an ex-vessel loss of coolant accident in ITER blanket

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rivas, J.C.; Dies, J.; Fajarnés, X.

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • We have repeated the safety analysis for the hypothesis of passive plasma shutdown for beryllium evaporation during an ex-vessel LOCA of ITER first wall, with AINA code. • We have performed a sensitivity analysis over some key parameters that represents uncertainties in physics and engineering, to identify cliff edge effects. • The obtained results for the 500 MW inductive scenario, with an ex-vessel LOCA affecting a third of first wall surface are similar to those of previous studies and point to the possibility of a passive plasma shutdown during this safety case, before a serious damage is inflicted to the ITER wall. • The sensitivity analysis revealed a new scenario potentially damaging for the first wall if we increase fusion power and time delay for impurity transport, and decrease fraction of affected first wall area and initial beryllium fraction in plasma. • After studying the 700 MW inductive scenario, with an ex-vessel LOCA affecting 10% of first wall surface, with 0.5% of Be in plasma and a time delay twice the energy confinement time, it was found that affected area of first wall would melt before a passive plasma shutdown occurs. - Abstract: In this contribution, the analysis of passive safety during an ex-vessel loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in the first wall/shield blanket of ITER has been studied with AINA safety code. In the past, this case has been studied using robust safety arguments, based on simple 0D models for plasma balance equations and 1D models for wall heat transfer. The conclusion was that, after first wall heating up due to the loss of all coolant, the beryllium evaporation in the wall surface would induce a growing impurity flux into core plasma that finally would end in a passive shut down of the discharge. The analysis of plasma-wall transients in this work is based in results from AINA code simulations. AINA (Analyses of IN vessel Accidents) code is a safety code developed at Fusion Energy Engineering

  10. Evolution of the ATLAS Distributed Computing system during the LHC Long shutdown

    CERN Document Server

    Campana, S; The ATLAS collaboration

    2014-01-01

    The ATLAS Distributed Computing project (ADC) was established in 2007 to develop and operate a framework, following the ATLAS computing model, to enable data storage, processing and bookkeeping on top of the WLCG distributed infrastructure. ADC development has always been driven by operations and this contributed to its success. The system has fulfilled the demanding requirements of ATLAS, daily consolidating worldwide up to 1PB of data and running more than 1.5 million payloads distributed globally, supporting almost one thousand concurrent distributed analysis users. Comprehensive automation and monitoring minimized the operational manpower required. The flexibility of the system to adjust to operational needs has been important to the success of the ATLAS physics program. The LHC shutdown in 2013-2015 affords an opportunity to improve the system in light of operational experience and scale it to cope with the demanding requirements of 2015 and beyond, most notably a much higher trigger rate and event pileu...

  11. Armenian nuclear power plant: US NRC assistance programme for seismic upgrade and safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simos, N.; Perkins, K.; Jo, J.; Carew, J.; Ramsey, J.

    2003-01-01

    This paper summarizes the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (US NRC) technical support program activities associated with the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) safety upgrade. The US NRC program, integrated within the overall IAEA-led initiative for safety re-evaluation of the WWER plants, has as its main thrust the technical support to the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ANRA) through close collaboration with the scientific staff at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). Several major technical areas of support to ANRA form the basis of the NRC program. These include the seismic re-evaluation and upgrade of the ANPP, safety evaluation of critical systems, and the generation of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Specifically, the seismic re-evaluation of the ANPP is part of a broader activity that involves the re-assessment of the seismic hazard at the site, the identification of the Safe Shutdown Equipment at the plant and the evaluation of their seismic capacity, the detailed modeling and analysis of the critical facilities at ANPP, and the generation of the Floor Response Spectra (FRS). Based on the new spectra that incorporate all new findings (hazard, site soil, structure, etc.), the overall capacity of the main structures and the seismic capacity of the critical systems are being re-evaluated. In addition, analyses of critical safe shutdown systems and safe shutdown processes are being performed to ensure both the capabilities of the operating systems and the enhancement of safety due to system upgrades. At present, one of the principal goals of the US NRC's regulatory assistance activities with ANRA is enhancing ANRA's regulatory oversight of high-priority safety issues (both generic and plant-specific) associated with operation of the ANPP. As such, assisting ANRA in understanding and assessing plant-specific seismic and other safety issues associated with the ANPP is a high priority given the ANPP's being located in a seismically active area

  12. Simulation of an SBLOCA Test of Shutdown Cooling System Line Break with the SMARTITL Facility using the MARS-KS Code

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cho, Yeon-Sik; Suh, Jae-Seung [System Engineering and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Bae, Hwang; Ryu, Sung-Uk; Yi, Sung-Jae; Park, Hyun-Sik [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    An LBLOCA (Large-Break Loss of Coolant Accident) was inherently eliminated in the design stage. The SMART design has a thermal power of 330MW. Its core exit temperature and pressurizer pressure are 323 .deg. C and 15MPa during normal operating conditions, respectively. An integral-effect test loop for SMART (SMARTITL), called FESTA (Facility for Experimental Simulation of Transients and Accidents), was designed to simulate the integral thermal-hydraulic behavior of SMART. The objectives of SMART-ITL are to investigate and understand the integral performance of reactor systems and components, and the thermal-hydraulic phenomena occurring in the system during normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions, and to verify the system safety during various design basis events of SMART. SMART-ITL with four steam generators and PRHRS, has an advantage for a multi-loop effect compared with VISTA-ITL with a single loop. The integral-effect test data will also be used to validate the related thermal-hydraulic models of the safety analysis code such as TASS/SMR-S which is used for a performance and accident analysis of the SMART design. In addition, a scoping analysis on the scaling difference between the standard design of SMART and the basic design of SMART-ITL was performed for an SBLOCA (Small-Break Loss of Coolant Accident) scenario using a best-estimate safety analysis code, MARS-KS. This paper introduces a comparison of an SBLOCA test of a shutdown cooling system line break using SMART-ITL with its post-test calculation using the MARS-KS code. An SBLOCA test and its post-test calculation were successfully performed using the SMART-ITL facility and MARS-KS code. The SBLOCA break is a guillotine break, and its location is on the SCS line (nozzle part of the RCP suction). The steady-state conditions were achieved to satisfy the initial test conditions presented in the test requirement and its boundary conditions were properly simulated.

  13. Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel From Nine Shutdown Sites

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maheras, Steven J.; Best, Ralph; Ross, Steven B.; Buxton, Kenneth A.; England, Jeffery L.; McConnell, Paul

    2013-04-30

    The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future identified removal of stranded used nuclear fuel at shutdown sites as a priority so that these sites may be completely decommissioned and put to other beneficial uses. In this report, a preliminary evaluation of removing used nuclear fuel from nine shutdown sites was conducted. The shutdown sites included Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion. At these sites a total of 7649 used nuclear fuel assemblies and a total of 2813.2 metric tons heavy metal (MTHM) of used nuclear fuel are contained in 248 storage canisters. In addition, 11 canisters containing greater-than-Class C (GTCC) low-level radioactive waste are stored at these sites. The evaluation was divided in four components: • characterization of the used nuclear fuel and GTCC low-level radioactive waste inventory at the shutdown sites • an evaluation of the onsite transportation conditions at the shutdown sites • an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and experience relevant to the shipping of transportation casks containing used nuclear fuel from the shutdown sites • an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove used nuclear fuel and GTCC low-level radioactive waste from the shutdown sites. Using these evaluations the authors developed time sequences of activities and time durations for removing the used nuclear fuel and GTCC low-level radioactive waste from a single shutdown site, from three shutdown sites located close to each other, and from all nine shutdown sites.

  14. Passive and engineered safety features of the prototype fast reactor (PFR), Dounreay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gregory, C.V.

    1991-01-01

    Prototype fast reactor (PFR) combines passive and engineered safety features. Natural convection, a strong negative power coefficient, the decay heat removal system, and a fuel design able to operate beyond failure are all inherent and passive safety features of the PFR. The reliable shutdown system and the protection provided against SGU leaks are example of engineered protection. Experience at PFR demonstrates the worth and potential of a range of passive and engineered safeguards

  15. The main safety problems encountered at Creys-Malville power station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saitcevsky, Boris

    1980-01-01

    The 1200 MW. Creys-Malville nuclear power station, situated on the upper Rhone river, in the Isere department, is the largest unit in construction of the fast neutrons sodium-cooled reactor channel. Realized within a European framework, this power station of a specific character, requires special safety dispositions, owing to the utilization of sodium. Safety rests on a thorough preventive system, particularly at the level of the sodium circuits, the shut-down system and the devices for the evacuation of residual power [fr

  16. LHC Detector Vacuum System Consolidation for Long Shutdown 1 (LS1) in 2013-2014

    CERN Document Server

    Gallilee, M; Cruikshank, P; Gallagher, J; Garion, C; Jimenez, J M; Kersevan, R; Kos, H; Leduc, L; Lepeule, P; Provot, N; Rambeau, H; Veness, R

    2012-01-01

    The LHC has ventured into unchartered territory for Particle Physics accelerators. A dedicated consolidation program is required between 2013 and 2014 to ensure optimal physics performance. The experiments, ALICE, ATLAS, CMS, and LHCb, will utilise this shutdown, along with the gained experience of three years of physics running, to make optimisations to their detectors. New vacuum technologies have been developed for the experimental areas, to be integrated during this first phase shutdown. These technologies include bellows, vacuum chambers and ion pumps in aluminium, new beryllium vacuum chambers, and composite mechanical supports. An overview of this first phase consolidation program for the LHC experiments is presented.

  17. The roles of the seismic safety and monitoring systems in the PEC fast reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Masoni, P.; Di Tullio, E.M.; Massa, B.; Martelli, A.; Sano, T.

    1988-01-01

    Two different seismic systems are foreseen in the case of PEC: the seismic safety system, that provides the automatic scram, and the seismic monitoring system. During earthquake, three triaxial seismic switches are triggered if a threshold value of the ground acceleration is exceeded. In this case, the signals from the seismic switches are processed by the safety system (with a 2/3 logic) and the shutdown system is triggered. Peak acceleration is the parameter used by the safety system to quantify the seismic event. This way, however, no information is obtained with regard to earthquake frequency content. Thus, reactor safety is guaranteed by adopting a threshold considerably lower than the Z.P.A. of the Design Basis Earthquake. Furthermore, in the case of significant earthquakes, the seismic motion is measured by about 20 triaxial accelerometers, located both in the free field and on the plant's structures. Data are digitazed and recordered by the seismic monitoring system. This system also elaborates the recordered time-histories providing floor response spectra and compares such spectra to the design values. The above-mentioned elaborations and comparisons are performed in short time for two triaxial measuring positions, thus allowing the Operator to immediately get a more complete information on the seismic event. The complete set of data recorded by the seismic monitoring system also allows the actual dynamic response of the plant to be determined and compared to the design values. On the basis of this comparison the necessary safety analysis can be carried out to verify whether the design limits of the plant were respected: in the positive case the reactor can be restarted. (author)

  18. Basis for Interim Operation for Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2003-01-01

    This document establishes the Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility (FSS) as managed by the 300 Area Deactivation Project (300 ADP) organization in accordance with the requirements of the Project Hanford Management Contract procedure (PHMC) HNF-PRO-700, ''Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements''. A hazard classification (Benecke 2003a) has been prepared for the facility in accordance with DOE-STD-1027-92 resulting in the assignment of Hazard Category 3 for FSS Facility buildings that store N Reactor fuel materials (303-B, 3712, and 3716). All others are designated Industrial buildings. It is concluded that the risks associated with the current and planned operational mode of the FSS Facility (uranium storage, uranium repackaging and shipment, cleanup, and transition activities, etc.) are acceptable. The potential radiological dose and toxicological consequences for a range of credible uranium storage building have been analyzed using Hanford accepted methods. Risk Class designations are summarized for representative events in Table 1.6-1. Mitigation was not considered for any event except the random fire event that exceeds predicted consequences based on existing source and combustible loading because of an inadvertent increase in combustible loading. For that event, a housekeeping program to manage transient combustibles is credited to reduce the probability. An additional administrative control is established to protect assumptions regarding source term by limiting inventories of fuel and combustible materials. Another is established to maintain the criticality safety program. Additional defense-in-depth controls are established to perform fire protection system testing, inspection, and maintenance to ensure predicted availability of those systems, and to maintain the radiological control program. It is also concluded that because an accidental nuclear criticality is not credible based on the low uranium enrichment

  19. Technical evaluation of the susceptibility of safety-related systems to flooding caused by the failure of non-category 1 systems for the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Epps, R.C.

    1980-11-01

    This report documents the technical evaluation of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station. The purpose of this evaluation was to determine whether the failure of any non-Class I (seismic) equipment could result in a condition, such as flooding, that might adversely affect the performance of the safety-related equipment required for the safe shutdown of the facility, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Criteria developed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission were used to evaluate the acceptability of the existing protection system as well as measures taken by Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPC) to minimize the danger of flooding and to protect safety-related equipment

  20. Technical Assessment: WRAP 1 HVAC Passive Shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ball, D.E.; Nash, C.R.; Stroup, J.L.

    1993-01-01

    As the result of careful interpretation of DOE Order 6430.lA and other DOE Orders, the HVAC system for WRAP 1 has been greatly simplified. The HVAC system is now designed to safely shut down to Passive State if power fails for any reason. The fans cease functioning, allowing the Zone 1 and Zone 2 HVAC Confinement Systems to breathe with respect to atmospheric pressure changes. Simplifying the HVAC system avoided overdesign. Construction costs were reduced by eliminating unnecessary equipment. This report summarizes work that was done to define the criteria, physical concepts, and operational experiences that lead to the passive shutdown design for WRAP 1 confinement HVAC systems

  1. Site investigations, design, construction, operation, shutdown and surveillance of repositories for low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes in rock cavities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The report provides an overview and technical guidelines for considerations and for activities to be undertaken for safety assessment, site investigations, design, construction, operation, shutdown and surveillance of repositories for the disposal of low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes in rock cavities. A generalized sequence of investigations is introduced which proceeds through region and site selection to the stage where the site is confirmed by detailed geoscientific investigations as being suitable for a waste repository. The different procedures and somewhat specific investigative needs with respect to existing mines are dealt with separately. General design, as well as specific requirements with respect to the different stages of design and construction, are dealt with. A review of activities related to the operational and post-operational stages of repositories in rock cavities is presented. The report describes in general terms the procedures related to different stages of disposal operation; also the conditions for shutdown together with essential shutdown and sealing activities and the related safety assessment requirements. Guidance is also given on the surveillance programme which will allow for inspection, testing, maintenance and security of a disposal facility during the operational phase, as well as for the post-operational stage for periods determined as necessary by the national authorities

  2. Fire protection of safe shutdown capability at commercial nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, K.

    1993-01-01

    The comprehensive industrial safety standards and codes that exist today have evolved from lessons learned through past experience, research results, and improvements in technological capabilities. The current requirements for fire safety features of commercial nuclear power stations operated in the US are a notable example of this practice. Although fire protection has always been an important design requirement, from the aftermath of a serious fire that occurred in 1975 at the Browns Ferry plant, it was learned that the life safety and property protection concerns of the major fire insurance underwriters may not sufficiently encompass nuclear safety issues, particularly with regard to the potential for fire damage to result in the common mode failure of redundant trains of systems, and components important to the safe shutdown of the reactor. Following its investigations into the Browns Ferry fire, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) promulgated guidance documents, which ultimately developed into mandatory regulations, necessary to assure the implementation of a fire protection program that would address nuclear safety concerns. The new criteria that evolved, contain prescriptive design features, as well as personnel and administrative requirements the Commission determined to be necessary to provide a defense-in-depth level of protection against the hazards of fire and its associated effects on safety related equipment. These criteria are primarily contained in Appendix R of Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50). Since 1983, various members of the Department of Nuclear Energy (DNE) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) have provided technical assistance to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in support of its evaluations of fire protection features implemented at commercial nuclear power stations operated in the US. This paper presents a discussion of the insights gained by the author during his active participation in this area

  3. Seismic analysis of control and safety rod drive mechanism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meher Prasad, A.; Jaya, K.P.; Chellapandi, P.; Rajan Babu, V.; Selvaraj, T.

    2003-01-01

    Control rod and its driving mechanism for a Fast Breeder Reactor is to facilitate safe shutdown of the reactor in case of emergency. A theoretical study on the seismic qualification of control and safety rod driving mechanism is carried out. Earthquake excitations under Operational Basis (ORE) and Safe Shutdown condition (SSE) are considered. The time required for the control rod to reach the bottom position in order to shut down the reaction under excited condition is traced out. The maximum displaced positions and extreme stresses in various parts of the system under excitations are evaluated. The system modeled using beam elements. The connections between different parts are modeled through rigid elements. The interaction between various parts are modeled using GAP elements. (author)

  4. Radiological safety system based on real-time tritium-in-air monitoring indoors and in effluents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bidica, N.; Sofalca, N; Balteanu, O.; Srefan, I.

    2006-01-01

    Exposure to tritium is an important health hazard in any tritium processing facility so that implementing a real-time tritium monitoring system is necessary for its operation in safety conditions. The tritium processing facility operators need to be informed at any time about the in-air tritium concentration indoors or in the stack effluents, in order to detect immediately any leaks in tritium containments, or any releases inside the buildings or to the environment. This information is very important for adopting if necessary protection measures and correcting actions as quickly as possible. In this paper we describe an improved real-time tritium monitoring system designed for the Heavy Water Detritiation Pilot Plant of National Institute for Cryogenics and Isotopes Separation, Rm. Valcea, Romania. The design of the Radiological Safety System implemented for the ICIT Water Detritiation Pilot Plant is intended to provide the maximum safety level based on the ALARA concept. The main functions of tritium monitoring system are: - monitoring the working areas and gaseous effluents by determination of the tritium-in-air activity concentration; - local and remote data display; - assessing of environment dose equivalent rates and dose equivalents in the working environment (for personnel exposure control and work planning); - assessing the total tritium activity released to the environment through ventilation exhaust stack; - safety functions, i.e., local and remote, locking/unlocking personnel access, process shut-down in emergency conditions and start of the air cleaning systems. With all these features our tritium monitoring system is really a safety system adequate for personnel and environmental protection. (authors)

  5. Shutdown decay heat removal analysis: Plant case studies and special issues: Summary report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Cramond, W.R.; Sanders, G.A.; Hatch, S.W.

    1989-04-01

    Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Requirements has been designated as Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-45. The overall objectives of the USI A-45 program were to evaluate the safety adequacy of decay heat removal (DHR) systems in existing light water reactor nuclear power plants and to assess the value and impact (benefit-cost) of alternative measures for improving the overall reliability of the DHR function. To provide the technical data required to meet these objectives a program was developed that examined the state of DHR system reliability in a sample of existing plants. This program identified potential vulnerabilities and identified and established the feasibility of potential measures to improve the reliability of the DHR function. A value/impact (V/I) analysis of the more promising of such measures was conducted and documented. This report summarizes those studies. In addition, because of the evolving nature of V/I analyses in support of regulation, a number of supporting studies related to appropriate procedures and measures for the V/I analyses were also conducted. These studies are also summarized herein. This report only summarizes findings of technical studies performed by Sandia National Laboratories as part of the program to resolve this issue. 46 refs., 7 figs., 124 tabs

  6. Criteria for remote shutdown for light water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1983-01-01

    This Standard provides design criteria which require that: (1) specific controls and monitoring equipment shall be provided for achieving and maintaining the plant in a safe shutdown condition; (2) these controls be installed at a location (or locations) that is physically remote from the control room and cable spreading areas; (3) simultaneous control from both locations shall be prevented by administrative controls or devices for transfer of control from the control room to the remote location(s); and (4) the remote controls be used as defense-in-depth measure in addition to the control room shutdown controls and as a minimum shall provide for one complete channel of shutdown equipment

  7. Quantitative Safety Impact of Severe Accident Management Systems for EU-APR during Low Power Shutdown Operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Keunsung; Hwang, Do Hun; Chang, Hyun-bin

    2016-01-01

    In order to enlarge and to diversify the export market of APR1400, the EU-APR design was developed based on the APR1400 design to comply with the latest version of the European Utility Requirements (EUR) revision D. The EU-APR design has the distinguished and advanced severe accident management systems taken from the APR1400 to obtain a containment integrity for the beyond design basis accident, such as the Passive Ex-vessel retaining and Cooling System (PECS), the Severe Accident Containment Spray System (SACSS) and the Containment Filtered Vent System (CFVS). The risk associated with the nuclear power plant can be identified through the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). In the EUR chapter 1 and 17 of volume 2, the Criteria for Limited Impact (CLI) should be applied to the Level 2 PSA as a risk metrics. The fraction of exceeding CLI for the EU-APR during LPSD operation was calculated as 4.52% of the CDF under the condition that all severe accident management systems are credited. The PECS, SACSS and CFVS are considered as the severe accident management system which is EU-APR dedicated system. The exemption of each system leads to increase the fraction of exceeding CLI to 54.18%, 89.74% and 21.32% respectively. In case if all these systems are unavailable, the fraction of exceeding CLI is increased to 100%. The most effective system is the SACSS that the system reduces containment pressure and temperature

  8. Quantitative Safety Impact of Severe Accident Management Systems for EU-APR during Low Power Shutdown Operation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Keunsung; Hwang, Do Hun [KHNP CRI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Chang, Hyun-bin [Future and Challenge Technology Co., Yongin (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    In order to enlarge and to diversify the export market of APR1400, the EU-APR design was developed based on the APR1400 design to comply with the latest version of the European Utility Requirements (EUR) revision D. The EU-APR design has the distinguished and advanced severe accident management systems taken from the APR1400 to obtain a containment integrity for the beyond design basis accident, such as the Passive Ex-vessel retaining and Cooling System (PECS), the Severe Accident Containment Spray System (SACSS) and the Containment Filtered Vent System (CFVS). The risk associated with the nuclear power plant can be identified through the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). In the EUR chapter 1 and 17 of volume 2, the Criteria for Limited Impact (CLI) should be applied to the Level 2 PSA as a risk metrics. The fraction of exceeding CLI for the EU-APR during LPSD operation was calculated as 4.52% of the CDF under the condition that all severe accident management systems are credited. The PECS, SACSS and CFVS are considered as the severe accident management system which is EU-APR dedicated system. The exemption of each system leads to increase the fraction of exceeding CLI to 54.18%, 89.74% and 21.32% respectively. In case if all these systems are unavailable, the fraction of exceeding CLI is increased to 100%. The most effective system is the SACSS that the system reduces containment pressure and temperature.

  9. Proceedings of 2nd PHWR operating safety experience meeting

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1991-04-01

    Papers presented during the eight sessions of the meeting were devoted to the impact of PHWR operating experience on design of civil structures (reactor building integrity); operating experiences related to pressure tubes, nuclear steam supply system, plant stability; reactor maintenance and control systems, reactor operational safety. Some events concerned with reactor shutdown due to power failures are described, as well as action undertaken to prevent major damage.

  10. Proceedings of 2nd PHWR operating safety experience meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-04-01

    Papers presented during the eight sessions of the meeting were devoted to the impact of PHWR operating experience on design of civil structures (reactor building integrity); operating experiences related to pressure tubes, nuclear steam supply system, plant stability; reactor maintenance and control systems, reactor operational safety. Some events concerned with reactor shutdown due to power failures are described, as well as action undertaken to prevent major damage

  11. Risk-based evaluation of Allowed Outage Times (AOTs) considering risk of shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mankamo, T.; Kim, I.S.; Samanta, P.K.

    1992-01-01

    When safety systems fail during power operation, Technical Specifications (TS) usually limit the repair within Allowed Outage Time (AOT). If the repair cannot be completed within the AOT, or no AOT is allowed, the plant is required to be shut down for the repair. However, if the capability to remove decay heat is degraded, shutting down the plant with the need to operate the affected decay-heat removal systems may impose a substantial risk compared to continued power operation over a usual repair time. Thus, defining a proper AOT in such situations can be considered as a risk-comparison between the repair in frill power state with a temporarily increased level of risk, and the altemative of shutting down the plant for the repair in zero power state with a specific associated risk. The methodology of the risk-comparison approach, with a due consideration of the shutdown risk, has been further developed and applied to the AOT considerations of residual heat removal and standby service water systems of a boiling water reactor (BWR) plant. Based on the completed work, several improvements to the TS requirements for the systems studied can be suggested

  12. Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maheras, Steven J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Best, Ralph E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Ross, Steven B. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Buxton, Kenneth A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); England, Jeffery L. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); McConnell, Paul E. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Massaro, Lawrence M. [Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) (United States); Jensen, Philip J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-10-01

    visits. Every site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its UNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. Additional conclusions from this evaluation include: The 12 shutdown sites use designs from 4 different suppliers involving 9 different (horizontal and vertical) dry storage systems that would require the use of 8 different transportation cask designs to remove the UNF and GTCC waste from the shutdown sites; Although there are common aspects, each site has some unique features and/or conditions; Although some regulatory actions will be required, all UNF at the initial 9 shutdown sites (Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion) is in licensed systems that can be transported, including a small amount of high-burnup fuel; Each site indicated that 2-3 years of advance time would be required for its preparations before shipments could begin; Most sites have more than one transportation option, e.g., rail, barge, or heavy haul truck, as well as constraints and preferences. It is expected that additional site visits will be conducted to add to the information presented in the evaluation.

  13. LHC Report: The shutdown work nearing completion

    CERN Multimedia

    CERN Bulletin

    2011-01-01

    The work planned for the LHC injector chain during the winter shutdown is nearing completion. The PS Booster (PSB) and PS will be closed to access next week, and the control of machine access will be transferred to the CERN Control Centre in preparation for the resumption of machine operation. Hardware tests are being performed in all the machines.   Tests are under way in the LHC tunnel. The technical teams are putting the finishing touches to the work planned for the winter shutdown. At the Linac2, the PS Booster and the PS, work will be completed next week and hardware tests will be carried out soon after. POPS, the new powering system for the PS, will be commissioned for the first time in the coming days after the necessary preliminary tests have been carried out. At the SPS, various magnets have been replaced over recent weeks and the performance tests on the main power supply and other hardware tests will be able to start shortly. After that, the machine will be ready for operation with b...

  14. Results of the 1986 FFTF inherent safety tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burke, T.M.; Campbell, L.R.; Franz, G.R.; Knecht, W.L.

    1987-01-01

    A series of tests was recently completed at the 400-MW (thermal) Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) to further demonstrate the passive safety characteristics of liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors. Earlier FFTF testing of decay heat removal by sodium natural circulation was reported in 1981. The main purpose of the 1986 test series was to demonstrate passive reactor shutdown during a loss-of-flow event when several inherent shutdown devices called gas expansion modules (GEMs) were installed in the reactor. However, these tests also provide further data on the natural circulation performance of the primary system, in particular the reactor core, and thus add to the data base available for checking the validity of available analytical tools

  15. Perspectives on Low Power and Shutdown Risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Camp, Allen L.; Whitehead, Donnie W.; Wheeler, Timothy A.; Lehner, John; Chu, Tsong-Lun; Lois, Erasmai; Drouin, Mary

    2000-01-01

    This paper presents results from a program sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to examine the risks from low power and shutdown operations. Significant progress has been made by the industry in reducing such risks; however, important operational events continue to occur. Current perceptions of low power and shutdown risks are discussed in the paper along with an assessment of the current methods for understanding important events and quantifying their associated risk

  16. Safety system in a heavy water detritiation plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balteanu, O.; Stefan, I.; Retevoi, C.

    2003-01-01

    In a CANDU 6 type reactor a quantity of 55·10 15 Bq/year of tritium is generated, 95% being in the D 2 O moderator which can achieve a radioactivity of 2.5-3.5·10 12 Bq/kg. Tritium in heavy water contributes with 30-50% to the doses received by operation personnel and up to 20% to the radioactivity released in the environment. The large quantity of heavy water used in this type of reactors (500 tones) make storage very difficult, especially for environment. The extraction of tritium from tritiated heavy water of CANDU reactors solve the following problems: the radiation level in the operation area, the costs of maintenance and repair reduction due to reduction of personnel protection measures, the increase of NPP utilisation factor by shutdown time reduction for maintenance and repair, use the extracted tritium for fusion reactors and not for the last, lower costs and risk for storage heavy water waste. Heavy water detritiation methods, which currently are used in the industrial or experimental plant, are based on catalytic isotope exchange or electrolysis followed cryogenic distillation or permeation. The technology developed at Institute of Cryogenics and Isotope Separation is based upon catalytic exchange between tritiated water and deuterium, followed by cryogenic distillation of hydrogen isotopes. The nature of the fluids that are processed in detritiation requires the operation of the plant in safety conditions. The paper presents the safety system solution chose in order to solve this task, as well as a simulation of an incident and safety system response. The application software is using LabView platform that is specialised on control and factory automation applications. (author)

  17. Thermosyphon Phenomenon as an alternate heat sink of Shutdown Cooling System for the CANDU reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jonghyun [GNEST, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Kwangho; Oh, Haechol; Jun, Hwangyong [KEPRI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2006-07-01

    During the outage(overhaul) of the CANDU plant, there is a period when the coolant is partially drained to the reactor header level and the coolant is cooled and depressurized by Shutdown Cooling System(SDCS) other than PHTS pump. In the postulated accident of the loss of SDCS-the PHTS pump failure, the primary coolant system should be cooled by the alternate heat sink using the thermosyphon pheonomenon(TS) through the steam generator(SG) This study was aimed at verification and analyzing the core cooling ability of the TS. And the sensitivity analysis was done for the number of SGs used in the TS. As an analysis tool, RELAP5/CANDU was used.

  18. Reactivity shimming in FFTF with safety rods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, C.L.

    1986-01-01

    The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) reactor demonstrated operation at a 65% annual capacity factor in 1984 and a 70% annual capacity factor in 1985. This was achieved in part by extending the cycle lengths beyond the originally designed 100-day cycles. The advent of extended cycle lengths at the FFTF reactor led to the development of a contingency plan to shim some of the installed excess reactivity at the beginning of the cycle with the primary control rod bank (safety rods) in order to maintain the minimum required shutdown margin in the secondary shutdown system. This paper describes both the implementation of this plan in terms of the licensing aspects and the actual use of primary shim during cycles 5 and 6 operation at FFTF

  19. Analysis of criticality safety of coupled fast-thermal core 'HERBE'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M.

    1991-01-01

    Power excursion during possible fast core flooding is analyzed as serious accident. Model gives short filling time of fast zone with moderator after break of fast core tank. Reactivity increase is determined by computer codes and verified in specific experiments. Measurements of safety rods drop time and reactivity worth are performed. Coupled core kinetics parameters are determined according to model of Avery. Power excursion study, depending on power level threshold and safety instrumentation response time is performed. It was shown that safety system can shut-down reactor safely even in case of highly set power thresholds and partially failure of safety chain. (author)

  20. Atucha I nuclear power plant: Probabilistic safety study. Loss-of-coolant accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perez, S.S.

    1987-01-01

    The plant response to the group of events 'large coolant loss' in order to evaluate the associated risk is analyzed. The event that covers all events of similar sequence due to its evolution features, being also the most demanded, is selected as starting event. The representative event is the 'guillotine type rupture of cold primary branch'. An annual occurrence frequency of 10/year is assumed for this event. The safety systems, when the event occurs, must assure the reactor shutdown and the core cooling, creating a heat sink to remove the decay heat. The annual frequency of core meltdown due to great loss of coolant is obtained multiplying the annual frequency of the starting event by the probability of failure of involved safety systems. By means of failure trees, the following is obtained: a) probability of failure to demand of the boron injection shutdown system = 4 x 10 -2 ; b) probability of failure to demand of the high pressure safety injection = 3 x 10 -3 ; c) probability of emergency cooling system failure = 4.4 x 10 -2 . Therefore, the three possible sequences of core meltdown have the following frequencies: λ 1 = 4 x 10 -6 /year λ 2 = 3 x 10 -7 /year λ 3 = 4.4 x 10 -6 /year. (Author)

  1. Prevention device for rapid reactor core shutdown in BWR type reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koshi, Yuji; Karatsu, Hiroyuki.

    1986-01-01

    Purpose: To surely prevent rapid shutdown of a nuclear reactor upon partial load interruption due to rapid increase in the system frequency. Constitution: If a partial load interruption greater than the sum of the turbine by-pass valve capacity and the load setting bias portion is applied in a BWR type power plant, the amount of main steams issued from the reactor is decreased, the thermal input/output balance of the reactor is lost, the reactor pressure is increased, the void is collapsed, the neutron fluxes are increased and the reactor power rises to generate rapid reactor shutdown. In view of the above, the turbine speed signal is compared with a speed setting value in a recycling flowrate control device and the recycling pump is controlled to decrease the recycling flowrate in order to compensate the increase in the neutron fluxes accompanying the reactor power up. In this way, transient changes in the reactor core pressure and the neutron fluxes are kept within a setting point for the rapid reactor shutdown operation thereby enabling to continue the plant operation. (Horiuchi, T.)

  2. RECAP, Replacement Energy Cost for Short-Term Reactor Plant Shut-Down

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    VanKuiken, J.C.; Daun, C.J.; Jusko, M.J.

    1995-01-01

    1 - Description of program or function: RECAP (Replacement Energy Cost Analysis Package) determines the replacement energy costs associated with short-term shutdowns or de-ratings of one or more nuclear reactors. Replacement energy cost refers to the change in generating-system production cost that results from shutting down a reactor. The cost calculations are based on the seasonal, unit-specific cost estimates for 1988-1991 for all 117 nuclear electricity-generating units in the U.S. RECAP is menu-driven, allowing the user to define specific case studies in terms of parameters such as the units to be included, the length and timing of the shutdown or de-rating period, the unit capacity factors, and the reference year for reporting cost results. In addition to simultaneous shutdown cases, more complicated situations, such as overlapping shutdown periods or shutdowns that occur in different years, can be examined through use of a present-worth calculation option. 2 - Method of solution: The user selects a set of units for analysis, defines a shutdown (or de-rating) period, and specifies any planned maintenance outages, delays in unit start-ups, or changes in default capacity factors. The program then determines which seasonal cost numbers to apply, estimates total and daily costs, and makes the appropriate adjustments for multiple outages if they are encountered. The change in production cost is determined from the difference between the total variable costs (variable fuel cost, variable operation and maintenance cost, and purchased energy cost) when the reactor is available for generation and when it is not. Changes in reference-year dollars are based on gross national product (GNP) price deflators or on optional use inputs. Once RECAP has completed the initial cost estimates for a case study (or series of case studies), present-worth analysis can be conducted using different reference-year dollars and discount rates, as specified by the user. The program uses

  3. Optimization of reactor coolant shutdown chemistry practices for crud inventory management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fellers, B.; Barnette, J.; Stevens, J.; Perkins, D.

    2002-01-01

    This report describes reactor coolant shutdown chemistry control practices at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES, TXU-Generation, USA). The shutdown evolution is managed from a process control perspective to achieve conditions most favorable to crud decomposition and to avoiding re-precipitation of metals. The report discusses the evolution of current industry practices and the necessity for greater emphasis on shutdown chemistry control in response to Axial Offset Anomaly and growth of ex-core radiation fields during outage conditions. Nuclear Industry experience with axial offset anomaly (AOA), radiation field growth and unexpected behavior of crud during reactor shutdowns has encouraged the refinement of chemistry control practices during plant shutdown and startup. The strong implication of nickel rich crud as a cause of AOA and unexpected crud behavior has resulted in a focus on nickel inventory management. The goals for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) include maintaining solubility of metals and radioisotopes, maximizing nickel removal and effective cleanup with demineralizers. This paper provides results and lessons learned from long term efforts to optimize the shutdown process. (authors)

  4. Startup, Shutdown, & Malfunction (SSM) Emissions

    Science.gov (United States)

    EPA issued a final action to ensure states have plans in place that are fully consistent with the Clean Air Act and recent court decisions concerning startup, shutdown and malfunction (SSM) operations.

  5. Tokamak reactor systems studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    A summary of work completed on the ARIES project during this report period is given. The main areas of effort were: neutronics, shield optimization and design, safety, systems, startup and shutdown, and ripple loss

  6. An analysis on water hammer in liquid injection shutdown system of CANDU-9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, T. H.; Heo, J.; Han, S. K.; Choi, H. Y.; No, T. S.

    2000-01-01

    The water hammer analysis code, PTRAN, is used for computation of transient pressures and pressure differentials in the Liquid Injection Shutdown System(LISS) piping network of CANDU-9 to ensure that the design allowables for LEVEL C Service Limit are met for the water hammer loads resulting from the water hammer. The LISS piping network of CANDU-9 has incorporated design improvement in considering the water hammer, such as declining the horizontal part of helium header, and raising the elevation of the overall system piping configuration, etc. The maximum pressure in the LISS piping network is found to be 7.92 MPa(a) at the closed valve in the vent line, which is below the allowable working pressure and the valve design pressure under Level C service conditions. And it is also shown that the maximum pressure in CANDU-9 is much lower than that in CANDU-6

  7. Design, construction, operation, shutdown and surveillance of repositories for solid radioactive wastes in shallow ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    This report is a part of the IAEA publications under its Programme on Underground Disposal of Radioactive Wastes and is addressed to administrative and technical authorities and specialists who consider the shallow-ground disposal of low- and intermediate-level solid radioactive wastes of short half-lives. The report emphasizes the technological aspects, however it briefly discusses the safety philosophy and regulatory considerations too. The design, construction, operation, shutdown and surveillance of the repositories in shallow ground are considered in some detail, paying special attention to their interrelated aspects. In particular, a review is given of the following aspects: main design and construction considerations in relation to the natural features of the site; design and construction aspects during the repository development process; activities related to operational and post-operational stages of the repository; major steps in repository operation and essential activities in shutdown and operational and post-operational surveillance

  8. Ultrasonic measurement of gap between calandria tube and liquid injection shutdown system tube in PHWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Tae Ryong; Sohn, Seok Man; Lee, Jun Shin; Lee, Sun Ki; Lee, Jong Po

    2001-01-01

    Sag of CT or liquid injection shutdown system tubes in pressurized heavy water reactor is known to occur due to irradiation creep and growth during plant operation. When the sag of CT is big enough, the CT tube possibly comes in contact with liquid injection shutdown system tube (LIN) crossing beneath the CT, which subsequently may prevent the safe operation. It is therefore necessary to check the gap between the two tubes in order to confirm no contacts when using a proper measure periodically during the plant life. An ultrasonic gap measuring probe assembly which can be fed through viewing port installed on the calandria was developed and utilized to measure the sags of both tubes in a pressurized heavy water reactor in Korea. It was found that the centerlines of CT and LIN can be precisely detected by ultrasonic wave. The gaps between two tubes were easily obtained from the relative distance of the measured centerline elevations of the tubes. But the measured gap data observed at the viewing port were actually not the data at the crossing point of CT and LIN. To get the actual gap between two tubes, mathematical modeling for the deflection curves of two tubes was used. The sags of CT and LIN tubes were also obtained by comparison of the present centerlines with the initial elevations at the beginning of plant operation. The gaps between two tubes in the unmeasurable regions were calculated based on the measurement data and the channel power distribution

  9. Development and study of a control and reactor shutdown device for FBR-type reactors with a modified open core

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goswami, S.

    1983-01-01

    The doctoral thesis at hand presents a newly designed control and shutdown device to be used for output control and fast shutdown of modified open core FBR-type reactors. The task was the design of a new control and shutdown device having economic and operation advantages, using reactor components time-tested under reactor conditions. This control and shutdown device was adapted to the specific needs concerning dimensions and design. The actuation is based on the magnetic-jack principle, which has been upgraded for the purpose. The principle is now combined with pneumatic acceleration. The improvements mainly concern a smaller number of piece parts and system simplification. (orig./RW) [de

  10. Criticality safety study of shutdown diffusion cascade coolers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paschal, L.S.; Basoglu, B.; Bentley, C.L.; Dunn, M.E.

    1996-01-01

    Gaseous diffusion plants use cascade coolers in the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to remove heat from the enriched stream of UF 6 . The cascade coolers operate like shell and tube heat exchangers with the UF 6 on the shell side and Freon on the tube side. Recirculating cooling water (RCW) in condensers is used to cool the Freon. A criticality safety analysis was previously performed for cascade coolers during normal operation. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate several different hypothetical accidents regarding RCW ingress into the cooler to determine whether criticality safety concerns exist

  11. Shutdown cooling temperature perturbation test for analysis of potential flow blockages

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Handbury, J.; Newman, C.; Shynot, T.

    1996-01-01

    This paper details the methods and results of the 'shutdown cooling test' in October 1995. This novel test was conducted at PLGS while the reactor was shutdown and shutdown cooling (SDC) waster was recirculating to find potential channel blockages resulting from the introduction of wood debris. This test discovered most of the channels that contained major wood and metal debris. (author)

  12. Engineered safety in development of liquid poison injection system (shut down system-2) for 500 MWe PHWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sapra, M.K.; Kundu, S.N.; Mohan, L.R.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The provision of shut down systems (SDS) is a mandatory requirement for safety of any nuclear reactor. The SDS shall be capable of making and holding the core adequately subcritical in the event of any anticipated operational occurrence and postulated accident conditions. The shut down function will perform as intended when its design and components are thoroughly evaluated for their reliability and effectiveness. A full scale mock up for one injection unit was designed and developed at Hall No.7, BARC. Experimental studies were carried out to qualify the design and evolve process parameters such as gas tank pressure, poison discharge rate and poison injection time. In liquid poison injection system i.e. shutdown system -2, there is no physical barrier, between the two liquids i.e. the poison and the moderator. A liquid in liquid interface, called poison moderator interface (PMI) separates these fluids. Extensive lab scale studies have been carried out on PMI movement study i.e. the interface movement due to molecular diffusion and due to process disturbances under simulated reactor condition. On the basis of lab scale results, a full-scale PMI setup has been designed and developed to generate plant data. From reactor safety consideration, the floating ball in poison tank is designed in such a way that it prevents the over pressurisation of calandria. For this purpose a non-intrusive ultrasonic ball detection system (U-BDS) has been developed. This paper covers the PMI system for 500 MWe PHWR with relevant safety aspects and describes in detail, the experimental results of PMI study. The engineered safety in design, methodology and qualification of U-BDS and its role intended in performance of SDS-2 have been also discussed in the paper

  13. Comparison of three small-break loss-of-coolant accident tests with different break locations using the system-integrated modular advanced reactor-integral test loop facility to estimate the safety of the smart design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bae, Hwang; Ryu, Sung Uk; Yi, Sung Jae; Park, Hyun Sik [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Dong Eok [Dept. of Precision Mechanical Engineering, Kyungpook National University, Sangju (Korea, Republic of)

    2017-08-15

    Three small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) tests with safety injection pumps were carried out using the integral-effect test loop for SMART (System-integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor), i.e., the SMART-ITL facility. The types of break are a safety injection system line break, shutdown cooling system line break, and pressurizer safety valve line break. The thermal–hydraulic phenomena show a traditional behavior to decrease the temperature and pressure whereas the local phenomena are slightly different during the early stage of the transient after a break simulation. A safety injection using a high-pressure pump effectively cools down and recovers the inventory of a reactor coolant system. The global trends show reproducible results for an SBLOCA scenario with three different break locations. It was confirmed that the safety injection system is robustly safe enough to protect from a core uncovery.

  14. Guidance of reactor operators and TSC personnel with the severe accident management guidance under shutdown and low power conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van Haesendonck, M.F.; Prior, R.P.

    2000-01-01

    The Westinghouse Owners Group Severe Accident Management Guidance (WOG SAMG) was developed between 1991 and 1994. The primary goals for severe accident management that form the basis of the WOG SAMG are to terminate any radioactive releases to the environment; to prevent failure of any containment fission product boundary and to return the plant to a controlled stable condition. The WOG SAMG is primarily a TSC tool for mitigation of low probability core damage events. The philosophy is that control room operators should remain focused on the prevention of core damage, whereas the TSC personnel should concentrate on the mitigation of the severe accident. The symptom based package is built up as a structured process for choosing appropriate actions based on actual plant conditions. No detailed knowledge of severe accident phenomena is required. The scope of the WOG SAMG is limited to severe accidents resulting from initiating events occurring during full power operation. However, a number of studies such as the EdF EPS 1300 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA), the shutdown Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for Surry, the BERA shutdown PRA for Beznau, the EPRI/ Westinghouse ORAM methodology etc. have shown that the frequency of core damage (a severe accident) during shutdown and low power operation can be of the same order of magnitude as for full power operation. The at-power SAMG is viewed as the resolution of the severe accident issue. Similarly, it is expected that as shutdown PRAs mature, the final resolution of the severe accident issue will lie in SAMG for low power and shutdown operation. Therefore in resolution of this issue, Westinghouse has developed the Shutdown Severe Accident Management Guidance (SSAMG) which gives guidance for both control room and TSC personnel to mitigate a severe accident under shutdown or low power conditions. In the last few years, many LWR plants have been implementing SAMG. In the US, all plants have developed SAMG, and many

  15. A safety design approach for sodium cooled fast reactor core toward commercialization in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kubo, Shigenobu

    2012-01-01

    JAEA’s safety approach for SFR core design is based on defence‐in‐depth concept, which includes DBAs and DECs (prevention and mitigation): • The reactor core is designed to have inherent reactivity feedback characteristics with negative power coefficient. • Operation temperature range is set sufficiently below the coolant boiling temperature so as to avoid coolant boiling against anticipated operational occurrences and DBAs. • If the plant state deviates from operational states, the safe reactor shutdown is achieved by automatic insertion of control rods. 2 active reactor shutdown systems are provided. • Failure of active reactor shutdown is assumed in a design extension condition . Passive shutdown capability is provided by SASS under such condition. • As a design extension condition, core disruptive accident is assumed. In order to prevent severe mechanical energy release which might cause containment function failure, core sodium void worth is limited below 6 dollars and molten fuel discharge capability is utilized by FAIDUS. (author)

  16. Design-related inherent safety characteristics in large LMFBR power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tzanos, C.P.; Barthold, W.P.; Bowers, C.H.; Ferguson, D.R.; Prohammer, F.G.; van Erp, J.B.

    1976-01-01

    Design-related safety-enhancing features such as (1) extended pump coastdown, (2) increased negative reactivity feedbacks, (3) reduced sodium void reactivity, and (4) self-actuated shutdown systems are evaluated. Primary emphasis is placed on preventing or limiting core damage. Attention is also given to features aimed at mitigation of the energetics potential of hypothetical core-disruptive accidents

  17. Anode protection system for shutdown of solid oxide fuel cell system

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Bob X; Grieves, Malcolm J; Kelly, Sean M

    2014-12-30

    An Anode Protection Systems for a SOFC system, having a Reductant Supply and safety subsystem, a SOFC anode protection subsystem, and a Post Combustion and slip stream control subsystem. The Reductant Supply and safety subsystem includes means for generating a reducing gas or vapor to prevent re-oxidation of the Ni in the anode layer during the course of shut down of the SOFC stack. The underlying ammonia or hydrogen based material used to generate a reducing gas or vapor to prevent the re-oxidation of the Ni can be in either a solid or liquid stored inside a portable container. The SOFC anode protection subsystem provides an internal pressure of 0.2 to 10 kPa to prevent air from entering into the SOFC system. The Post Combustion and slip stream control subsystem provides a catalyst converter configured to treat any residual reducing gas in the slip stream gas exiting from SOFC stack.

  18. Reactor shutdown device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsumiya, Hirohito; Endo, Hiroshi; Tsuboi, Yasushi.

    1993-01-01

    The present invention concerns a reactor shutdown device capable of suppressing change of a core insertion amount relative to temperature change during normal operation and having a great extension amount due to thermal expansion and high mechanical strength. A control rod main body is contained vertically movably in a guide tube disposed in a reactor core. An extension member extends upward from the upper end of a control rod main body and suspends the control rod main body. A shrinkable member intervenes at a midway of the extension member and is made shrinkable. A temperature sensitive member contains coolants at the inside and surrounds the shrinkable member. Thus, if the temperature of external coolants rises abruptly, the shrinkable member is extended by thermal expansion of the coolants in the temperature sensitive member. Upon usual reactor startup, the coolants in the temperature sensitive member cause no substantial thermal expansion by temperature elevation from a cold shutdown temperature to a rated power operation temperature, and the shrinkable member maintains its original state, so that the control rod main body is not inserted into the reactor core. However, upon abrupt temperature elevation, the control rod main body is inserted into the reactor core. (I.S.)

  19. Decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance to regulatory bodies and operating organizations on planning and provision for the safe management of the decommissioning of non-reactor nuclear fuel cycle facilities. While the basic safety considerations for the decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities are similar to those for nuclear power plants, there are important differences, notably in the design and operating parameters for the facilities, the type of radioactive material and the support systems available. It is the objective of this Safety Guide to provide guidance for the shutdown and eventual decommissioning of such facilities, their individual characteristics being taken into account

  20. Behavior of ruthenium in the case of shutdown of the cooling system of HLLW storage tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Philippe, M.; Mercier, J.P.; Gue, J.P.

    1990-01-01

    The consequences of the failure of the cooling system of fission product storage tanks over a variable period were investigated as part of the safety analysis of the La Hague spent fuel reprocessing plant. Due to the considerable heat release, induced by the fission products, a prolonged shutdown of the tank cooling system could cause the progressive evaporation of the solutions to dryness, and culminate in the formation of volatile species of ruthenium and their release in the tank venting circuit. To determine the fraction of ruthenium likely to be transferred from the storage tanks in volatile or aerosol form during the failure, evaporation tests were conducted by evaporating samples of actual nitric acid solutions of fission products, obtained on the laboratory scale after the reprocessing of several kilograms of MOX fuels irradiated to 30,000 MWday.t -1 . A distillation apparatus was designed to operate with small volume solution samples, reproducing the heating conditions existing in the reprocessing plant within a storage tank for fission products. The main conclusions drawn from these experiments are as follows: - ruthenium is only volatilized in the final phase of evaporation, just before desiccation, - for a final temperature limited to 160 0 C, the total fraction of volatilized ruthenium reaches 12%, in the presence of H 2 0, HN0 3 , N0 x and 0 2 , the volatilized ruthenium recombines mainly in the form of ruthenium nitrosyl nitrates, or decomposes into ruthenium oxide on the walls of the apparatus. Assuming a heating power density of 10 W/liter of concentrate, and a perfectly adiabatic storage system, the minimum time required to reach dryness can be estimated at 90 h, allowing substantial time to take action to restore a cooling source

  1. Behavior of ruthenium in the case of shutdown of the cooling system of HLLW storage tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Philippe, M.; Mercier, J.P.; Gue, J.P.

    1991-01-01

    The consequences of the failure of the cooling system of fission product storage tanks over a variable period were investigated as part of the safety analysis of the La Hague spent fuel reprocessing plant. Due to the considerable heat release, induced by the fission products, a prolonged shutdown of the tank cooling system could cause the progressive evaporation of the solutions to dryness, and culminate in the formation of volatile species of ruthenium and their release in the tank venting circuit. To determine the fraction of ruthenium likely to be transferred from the storage tanks in volatile or aerosol form during the failure, evaporation tests were conducted by evaporating samples of actual nitric acid solutions of fission products, obtained on the laboratory scale after the reprocessing of several kilograms of MOX fuels irradiated to 30,000 MW day·t -1 . A distillation apparatus was designed to operate with small-volume solution samples, reproducing the heating conditions existing in the reprocessing plant within a storage tank for fission products. The main conclusions drawn from these experiments are as follows: ruthenium is only volatilized in the final phase of evaporation, just before desiccation; for a final temperature limited to 160 degree C, the total fraction of volatilized ruthenium reaches 12%; in the presence of H 2 O, HNO 3 , NO x and O 2 , the volatilized ruthenium recombines mainly in the form of ruthenium nitrosyl nitrates, or decomposes into ruthenium oxide (probably RuO 2 ) on the walls of the apparatus. Assuming a heating power density of 10 W/liter of concentrate, and a perfectly adiabatic storage system, the minimum time required to reach dryness can be estimated at 90 h, allowing substantial time to take action to restore a cooling source

  2. Industry shutdown rates and permanent layoffs: evidence from firm-worker matched data

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kim P. Huynh

    2017-06-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Firm shutdown creates a turbulent situation for workers as it leads directly to layoffs for its workers. An additional consideration is whether a firm’s shutdown within an industry creates turbulence for workers at other continuing firms. Using data drawn from the Longitudinal Worker File, a Canadian firm-worker matched employment database, we investigate the impact of industry shutdown rates on workers at continuing firm. This paper exploits variation in shutdown rates across industries and within an industry over time to explain the rate of permanent layoffs and the growth of workers’ earnings. We find an increase in industry shutdown rates increases the probability of permanent layoffs and decreases earnings growth for workers at continuing firms.

  3. Recommendations relating to safety-critical real-time software in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety (ACNS) has reviewed safety issues associated with the software for the digital computers in the safety shutdown systems for the Darlington NGS. From this review the ACNS has developed four recommendations for safety-critical real-time software in nuclear power plants. These recommendations cover: the completion of the present efforts to develop an overall standard and sub-tier standards for safety-critical real-time software; the preparation of schedules and lists of responsibilities for this development; the concentration of AECB efforts on ensuring the scrutability of safety-critical real-time software; and, the collection of data on reliability and causes of failure (error) of safety-critical real-time software systems and on the probability and causes of common-mode failures (errors). (9 refs.)

  4. Startup and shutdown of the PULSAR Tokamak Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werley, K.A.; Bathke, C.G.

    1994-01-01

    Start-up conditions are examined for a pulsed tokamak reactor that uses only inductive plasma current drive for startup, burn and shutdown. A zero-dimensional (profile-averaged) model that describes plasma power and particle balance equations is used to study several aspects of plasma startup and shutdown, including optimization of the startup pathway tradeoff of auxiliary startup heating power versus startup time, volt-second consumtion, thermal stability and partial-power operations

  5. Neutron physical investigations on the shutdown effect of small boronated absorbing spheres for pebble-bed high-temperature gas-cooled reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sgouridis, S.; Schurrer, F.; Muller, H.; Ninaus, W.; Oswald, K.; Neef, R.D.; Schaal, H.

    1987-01-01

    An emergency shutdown system for high-temperature gas-cooled pebble-bed reactors is proposed in addition to the common absorber rod shutdown system. This system is based on the strongly absorbing effect of small boronated graphite spheres (called KLAK), which trickle in case of emergency by gravity from the top reflector into the reactor core. The inner reflector of the Siemens-Argonaut reactor was substituted by an assembly of spherical Arbeitsgemeinschaft Versuchsreaktor fuel elements, and the shutdown effect was examined by installing well-defined KLAK nests inside this assembly. The purpose was to develop and prove a calculational procedure for determining criticality values for assemblies of large fuel spheres and small absorbing spheres

  6. Methods for nondestructive assay holdup measurements in shutdown uranium enrichment facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagenauer, R.C.; Mayer, R.L. II.

    1991-09-01

    Measurement surveys of uranium holdup using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques are being conducted for shutdown gaseous diffusion facilities at the Oak Ridge K-25 Site (formerly the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant). When in operation, these facilities processed UF 6 with enrichments ranging from 0.2 to 93 wt % 235 U. Following final shutdown of all process facilities, NDA surveys were initiated to provide process holdup data for the planning and implementation of decontamination and decommissioning activities. A three-step process is used to locate and quantify deposits: (1) high-resolution gamma-ray measurements are performed to generally define the relative abundances of radioisotopes present, (2) sizable deposits are identified using gamma-ray scanning methods, and (3) the deposits are quantified using neutron measurement methods. Following initial quantitative measurements, deposit sizes are calculated; high-resolution gamma-ray measurements are then performed on the items containing large deposits. The quantitative estimates for the large deposits are refined on the basis of these measurements. Facility management is using the results of the survey to support a variety of activities including isolation and removal of large deposits; performing health, safety, and environmental analyses; and improving facility nuclear material control and accountability records. 3 refs., 1 tab

  7. Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maheras, Steven J.; Best, Ralph E.; Ross, Steven B.; Buxton, Kenneth A.; England, Jeffery L.; McConnell, Paul E.

    2013-09-30

    This report fulfills the M2 milestone M2FT-13PN0912022, “Stranded Sites De-Inventorying Report.” In January 2013, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued the Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste (DOE 2013). Among the elements contained in this strategy is an initial focus on accepting used nuclear fuel from shutdown reactor sites. This focus is consistent with the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, which identified removal of stranded used nuclear fuel at shutdown sites as a priority so that these sites may be completely decommissioned and put to other beneficial uses (BRC 2012). Shutdown sites are defined as those commercial nuclear power reactor sites where the nuclear power reactors have been shut down and the site has been decommissioned or is undergoing decommissioning. In this report, a preliminary evaluation of removing used nuclear fuel from 12 shutdown sites was conducted. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, and San Onofre. These sites have no other operating nuclear power reactors at their sites and have also notified the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission that their reactors have permanently ceased power operations and that nuclear fuel has been permanently removed from their reactor vessels. Shutdown reactors at sites having other operating reactors are not included in this evaluation.

  8. A Study on Fire Ignition Frequency of UCN 3 during Shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Kilyoo; Kang, DaeIl; Jang, Seung-Cheol

    2014-01-01

    A fire ignition frequency of UCN 3 during shutdown, i.e., during POS 3, 4, 5, 6 was calculated by using the new fire PSA method suggested in NUREG/CR-7114. As the fire ignition frequency during full power is calculated by the fixed ignition source and the transient ignition source, the one during shutdown is also calculated by the fixed and the transient ignition source. Since the fixed ignition source was already verified through the walkdown although the walkdown is for the fixed ignition source during full power, additional walkdown for the one during shutdown is not necessary. In the paper, how the fire ignition frequency of UCN 3 during shutdown was calculated is described. A fire ignition frequency of UCN 3 during shutdown, i.e., during POS 3, 4, 5, 6 was calculated by using the new fire PSA method suggested in NUREG/CR-7114. We make the transient ignition fire frequency of each BIN vary according to the daily work order of each POS

  9. Dynamic modeling of the tradeoff between productivity and safety in critical engineering systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cowing, Michelle M.; Elisabeth Pate-Cornell, M.; Glynn, Peter W.

    2004-01-01

    Short-term tradeoffs between productivity and safety often exist in the operation of critical facilities such as nuclear power plants, offshore oil platforms, or simply individual cars. For example, interruption of operations for maintenance on demand can decrease short-term productivity but may be needed to ensure safety. Operations are interrupted for several reasons: scheduled maintenance, maintenance on demand, response to warnings, subsystem failure, or a catastrophic accident. The choice of operational procedures (e.g. timing and extent of scheduled maintenance) generally affects the probabilities of both production interruptions and catastrophic failures. In this paper, we present and illustrate a dynamic probabilistic model designed to describe the long-term evolution of such a system through the different phases of operation, shutdown, and possibly accident. The model's parameters represent explicitly the effects of different components' performance on the system's safety and reliability through an engineering probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). In addition to PRA, a Markov model is used to track the evolution of the system and its components through different performance phases. The model parameters are then linked to different operations strategies, to allow computation of the effects of each management strategy on the system's long-term productivity and safety. Decision analysis is then used to support the management of the short-term trade-offs between productivity and safety in order to maximize long-term performance. The value function is that of plant managers, within the constraints set by local utility commissions and national (e.g. energy) agencies. This model is illustrated by the case of outages (planned and unplanned) in nuclear power plants to show how it can be used to guide policy decisions regarding outage frequency and plant lifetime, and more specifically, the choice of a reactor tripping policy as a function of the state of the

  10. Human Reliability Analysis. Applicability of the HRA-concept in maintenance shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Obenius, Aino

    2007-08-01

    Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) is performed for Swedish nuclear power plants in order to make predictions and improvements of system safety. The analysis of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents contributed to broaden the approach to nuclear power plant safety. A system perspective focusing on the interaction between aspects of Man, Technology and Organization (MTO) emerged in addition to the development of Human Factors knowledge. To take the human influence on the technical system into consideration when performing PSAs, a Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is performed. PSA is performed for different stages and plant operating states, and the current state of Swedish analyses is Low power and Shutdown (LPSD), also called Shutdown PSA (SPSA). The purpose of this master's thesis is to describe methods and basic models used when analysing human reliability for the LPSD state. The following questions are at issue: 1. How can the LPSD state be characterised and defined? 2. What is important to take into consideration when performing a LPSD HRA? 3. How can human behaviour be modelled for a LPSD risk analysis? 4. According to available empirical material, how are the questions above treated in performed analysis of human operation during LPSD? 5. How does the result of the questions above affect the way methods for analysis of LPSD could and/or should be developed? The procedure of this project has mainly consisted of literature studies of available theory for modelling of human behaviour and risk analysis of the LPSD state. This study regards analysis of planned outages when maintenance, fuel change, tests and inspections are performed. The outage period is characterised by planned maintenance activities performed in rotating 3-shifts, around the clock, as well as many of the persons performing work tasks on the plant being external contractors. The working conditions are characterised by stress due to heat, radiation and physically demanding or monotonous

  11. Shutdown chemistry optimization at Maanshan NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sun Yuanlung; Chuang Benjamin; Su Kouhwa; Kao Jueiting

    2009-01-01

    At Maanshan PWRs, a significant piping radiation buildup caused by crud burst from fuel surface in the beginning of RFO used to be blamed as a contribution to high personal exposures during outage. Therefore, several modifications on shutdown chemistry procedures such as, early lithium removal, rapid boration, dissolved hydrogen removal, extended RCP operation, and maintaining maximum let down flow, have been consecutively conducted since no.1RFO-16, 2006. The important operational and chemical parameters of modified shutdown chemistry procedures adopted in no.2 RFO-17, 2008 and superiority in low reading (2 mSv/hr) from let down heat exchangers area radiation monitor over 11mSv/hr of no.1 RFO-16 at the same area will be addressed in this paper. At the end of no.2 RFO-17, low personal exposures of 765 man-mSv (TLD)verified the absence of crud burst during shutdown chemistry process and broke records of Maanshan NPP as well. Even with a new job on PZR pre-emptive dissimilar weld overlay which exhausting 17.37% of total 797 man-mSv(TLD) in the latest no.1 RFO-18, 659 man-mSv (TLD) made another record low in the history of Maanshan. (author)

  12. Evaluation of power behavior during startup and shutdown procedures of the IPR-R1 Triga Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zangirolami, Dante M.; Mesquita, Amir Z.; Ferreira, Andrea V.

    2009-01-01

    The IPR-R1 nuclear reactor of Centro de Desenvolvimento da Tecnologia Nuclear - CDTN/CNEN is a TRIGA Mark I pool type reactor cooled by natural circulation of light water. In the IPR-R1, the power is measured by four nuclear channels, neutron-sensitive chambers, which are mounted around the reactor core: the Startup Channel for power indication during reactor startup; the Logarithmic Wide Range Power Monitoring Channel; the Linear Multi-Range Power Monitoring Channel and the Percent Power Safety Channel. A data acquisition system automatically does the monitoring and storage of all the reactor operational parameters including the reactor power. The startup procedure is manual and the time to reach the desired reactor power level is different on each irradiation which may introduces differences in induced activity of samples irradiated in different irradiations. In this work, the power evolution during startup and shutdown periods of IPR-R1 operation was evaluated and the mean values of reactor energy production in these operational phases were obtained. The analyses were performed on basis of the Linear Multi-Range Channel data. The results show that the sum of startup and shutdown periods corresponds to 1% of released energy for irradiations during 1h at 100kW. This value may be useful to correct experimental data in neutron activation experiments. (author)

  13. High-temperature gas-cooled reactor safety studies. Progress report for January 1, 1974--June 30, 1975

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cole, T.E.; Sanders, J.P.; Kasten, P.R.

    1977-07-01

    Progress is reported in the following areas: systems and safety analysis; fission product technology; primary coolant technology; seismic and vibration technology; confinement components; primary system materials technology; safety instrumentation; loss of flow accident analysis using HEATUP code; use of coupled-conduction-convection model for core thermal analysis; development of multichannel conduction-convection program HEXEREI; cooling system performance after shutdown; core auxiliary cooling system performance; development of FLODIS code; air ingress into primary systems following DBDA; performance of PCRV thermal barrier cover plates; temperature limits for fuel particle coating failure; tritium distribution and release in HTGR; energy release to PCRV during DBDA; and mathematical models for HTGR reactor safety studies

  14. Requirements Analysis Study for Master Pump Shutdown System Project Development Specification [SEC 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BEVINS, R.R.

    2000-01-01

    This document has been updated during the definitive design portion of the first phase of the W-314 Project to capture additional software requirements and is planned to be updated during the second phase of the W-314 Project to cover the second phase of the Project's scope. The objective is to provide requirement traceability by recording the analysis/basis for the functional descriptions of the master pump shutdown system. This document identifies the sources of the requirements and/or how these were derived. Each requirement is validated either by quoting the source or an analysis process involving the required functionality, performance characteristics, operations input or engineering judgment

  15. Comparison of three small-break loss-of-coolant accident tests with different break locations using the system-integrated modular advanced reactor-integral test loop facility to estimate the safety of the smart design

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Hwang Bae

    2017-08-01

    Full Text Available Three small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA tests with safety injection pumps were carried out using the integral-effect test loop for SMART (System-integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor, i.e., the SMART-ITL facility. The types of break are a safety injection system line break, shutdown cooling system line break, and pressurizer safety valve line break. The thermal–hydraulic phenomena show a traditional behavior to decrease the temperature and pressure whereas the local phenomena are slightly different during the early stage of the transient after a break simulation. A safety injection using a high-pressure pump effectively cools down and recovers the inventory of a reactor coolant system. The global trends show reproducible results for an SBLOCA scenario with three different break locations. It was confirmed that the safety injection system is robustly safe enough to protect from a core uncovery.

  16. Accident diagnosis system based on real-time decision tree expert system

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nicolau, Andressa dos S.; Augusto, João P. da S. C.; Schirru, Roberto

    2017-06-01

    Safety is one of the most studied topics when referring to power stations. For that reason, sensors and alarms develop an important role in environmental and human protection. When abnormal event happens, it triggers a chain of alarms that must be, somehow, checked by the control room operators. In this case, diagnosis support system can help operators to accurately identify the possible root-cause of the problem in short time. In this article, we present a computational model of a generic diagnose support system based on artificial intelligence, that was applied on the dataset of two real power stations: Angra1 Nuclear Power Plant and Santo Antônio Hydroelectric Plant. The proposed system processes all the information logged in the sequence of events before a shutdown signal using the expert's knowledge inputted into an expert system indicating the chain of events, from the shutdown signal to its root-cause. The results of both applications showed that the support system is a potential tool to help the control room operators identify abnormal events, as accidents and consequently increase the safety.

  17. Changing nuclear plant operating limits during startup and shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arnold, E.C.; Carlson, R.W.; Ray, N.K.; Roarty, D.H.

    1990-01-01

    During startup and shutdown operation of pressurized water reactor (PWR) nuclear power plants, a low pressure decay heat removal system is used to maintain core cooling. During these phases of operation, there are numerous operating practices and design limits to meet special and sometimes conflicting requirements unique to these operations. This paper evaluates the impact and interdependencies of recent issues on plant operation and design

  18. Inspection maintenance and planning of shutdown in thermal electric generating plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dezordi, W.L.; Correa, D.A.; Kina, M.

    1984-01-01

    The schedule shutdown of an industrial plant and, more specifically, of an electrical generating station, is becoming increasingly important. The major parameters to be taken into account for the planning of such a shutdown are basically of economic-financial nature such as costs of the related services (materials, equipment, manpower, etc), loss of revenue caused by the station's shutdown as well as by the station availability, and other requirements expected from it by the Load Dispatch and consumers. Improving the equipment's performances and the station's availability are the fundamental objectives to be strived for. The authors present in this paper, in an abridged form, the planning tools used for thermal electric generating plants shutdowns for inspections, maintenance and design changes implementation. (Author) [pt

  19. 77 FR 75198 - Standard Format and Content for Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-19

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2012-0299] Standard Format and Content for Post-Shutdown... regulatory guide (DG), DG-1272, ``Standard Format and Content for Post-shutdown Decommissioning Activities... Content for Post-shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report,'' which was issued in July 2000. DG-1271...

  20. 40 CFR 63.310 - Requirements for startups, shutdowns, and malfunctions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 9 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Requirements for startups, shutdowns, and malfunctions. 63.310 Section 63.310 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY... CATEGORIES National Emission Standards for Coke Oven Batteries § 63.310 Requirements for startups, shutdowns...

  1. 76 FR 81998 - Methodology for Low Power/Shutdown Fire PRA

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-12-29

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2011-0295] Methodology for Low Power/Shutdown Fire PRA AGENCY..., ``Methodology for Low Power/Shutdown Fire PRA--Draft Report for Comment.'' DATES: Submit comments by March 01... risk assessment (PRA) method for quantitatively analyzing fire risk in commercial nuclear power plants...

  2. Lessons from feedback of safety operating experience for reactor physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suchomel, J.; Rapavy, S.

    1999-01-01

    Analyses of events in WWER operations as a part of safety experience feedback provide a valuable source of lessons for reactor physics. Examples of events from Bohunice operation will be shown such as events with inadequate approach to criticality, positive reactivity insertions, expulsion of a control rod from shut-down reactor, problems with reactor protection system and control rods. (Authors)

  3. Safety analysis for reactivity insertion on ADS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Santos, Marcia S.; Velasquez, Carlos E.; Pereira, Claubia; Veloso, Maria Auxiliadora F.; Costa, Antonella L. [Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG), Belo Horizonte, MG (Brazil). Departamento de Engenharia Nuclear; Barros, Graiciany de P. [Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2017-07-01

    In this work, an accelerator driven system (ADS) has been studied to fuel regeneration, partitioning and transmutation using fuel removed from LWR-spent fuel. This spent fuel was reprocessed by GANEX and then spiked with thorium. Monteburns 2.0 (MCNP5/ORIGEN 2.1) code was used to simulate burnup and neutronic parameters of the systems. However, these systems might be interrupted for some technical problems during few days or long periods to perform maintenance of accelerator systems without shutdown the fission system. Therefore, in this work, the aim was to investigate the nuclear fuel evolution in three different cases with reactivity insertions and variations in the functionality of the ADS. The evaluation has been performed for a burnup of 3 years, which are the most dangerous years in case of reactivity insertions. Therefore, in the first case the ADS during its burnup the external source (spallation source) is cutting off from the system several times during the first year of burnup. In the second case, it is simulated the reactor at different power from 0 (shutdown) to 1.5 times the 515MWt. The results shows the safety limits of the ADS for different situation. (author)

  4. MAPLE-X10 reactor digital control system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deverno, M.T.; Hinds, H.W.

    1991-10-01

    The MAPLE-X10 reactor, currently under construction at the Chalk River Laboratories of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, is a 10 MW t , pool-type, light-water reactor. It will be used for radioisotope production and silicon neutron transmutation doping. The reactor is controlled by a Digital Control System (DCS) and protected against abnormal process events by two independent safety systems. The DCS is an integrated control system used to regulate the reactor power and process systems. The safety philosophy for the control system is to minimize unsafe events arising from system failures and operational errors. this is achieved through redundancy, fail-safe design, automatic fault detection, and the selection of highly reliable components. The DCS provides both computer-controlled reactor regulation from the shutdown state to full power and automated reactor shutdown if safe limits are exceeded or critical sensors malfunction. The use of commercially available hardware with enhanced quality assurance makes the system cost effective while providing a high degree of reliability

  5. 77 FR 10576 - Methodology for Low Power/Shutdown Fire PRA

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-02-22

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2011-0295] Methodology for Low Power/Shutdown Fire PRA AGENCY.../Shutdown Fire PRA.'' In response to request from members of the public, the NRC is extending the public... risk assessment (PRA) method for quantitatively analyzing fire risk in commercial nuclear power plants...

  6. Retrofit of AECL CAN6 seals into the Pickering shutdown cooling pumps

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rhodes, D.; Metcalfe, R.; Brown, G.

    1997-01-01

    The existing mechanical seals in the shutdown cooling (SDC) pumps at the eight-unit Pickering Nuclear Generating Station have caused as least seven forced outages in the last fifteen years. The SDC pumps were originally intended to run only during shutdowns, mostly at low pressure, except for short periods during routine testing of SDC isolation valves while the plant is operating at full pressure to verify that the emergency core injection system is available. Unfortunately, in practice, some SDC pumps must be run much more frequently than this to prevent overheating or freezing of components in the system while the plant is at power. This more severe service has decreased seal lifetime from about 8000 running hours to about 3000 running hours. Rather than tackling the difficult task of eliminating on-power running of the pumps, Pickering decided to install a more robust seal design that could withstand this. Through the process of competitive tender, AECL's CAN6 seal was chosen. This seal has a successful history in similarly demanding conditions in boiling water reactors in the USA. To supplement this and demonstrate there would be no 'surprises,' a 2000-hour test program was conducted. Testing consisted of simulating all the expected conditions, plus some special tests under abnormal conditions. This has given assurance that the seal will operate reliably in the Pickering shutdown cooling pumps. (author)

  7. Retrofit of AECL CAN6 seals into the Pickering shutdown cooling pumps

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rhodes, D.; Metcalfe, R.; Brown, G.; Kiameh, P.; Burchett, P.

    1997-01-01

    The existing mechanical seals in the shutdown cooling (SDC) pumps at the eight-unit Pickering Nuclear Generating Station have caused at least seven forced outages in the last fifteen years. The SDC pumps were originally intended to run only during shutdowns, mostly at low pressure, except for short periods during routine testing of SDC isolation valves while the plant is operating at full pressure to verify that the emergency core injection system is available. Unfortunately, in practice, some SDC pumps must be run much more frequently than this to prevent overheating or freezing of components in the system while the plant is at power. This more severe service has decreased seal lifetime from about 8000 running hours to about 3000 running hours. Rather than tackling the difficult task of eliminating on-power running of the pumps, Pickering decided to install a more robust seal design that could withstand this. Through the process of competitive tender, AECL's CAN6 seal was chosen. This seal has a successful history in similarly demanding conditions in boiling water reactors in the USA. To supplement this and demonstrate there would be no 'surprises,' a 2000-hour test program was conducted. Testing consisted of simulating all the expected conditions, plus some special tests under abnormal conditions. This has given assurance that the seal will operate reliably in the Pickering shutdown cooling pumps. (author)

  8. With its magnet rolled back during a shut-down of the Proton Synchrotron in 1969, the body of the 2 m hydrogen bubble chamber becomes visible

    CERN Multimedia

    CERN PhotoLab

    1969-01-01

    The 2 m hydrogen bubble chamber is undergoing modifications during the annual PS shutdown. For this, the two halves of the magnet, which normally hide the chamber, safety tanks, cooling pipes etc, are rolled back.

  9. Safety strategy and its technical realization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1981-01-01

    Main goal of the nuclear safety strategy is to avoid an unbalance between heat generation and heat removal in all operating states. Such unbalance could result from transient in which either the heat generation exceeds the nominal values or the heat removal falls below these values. Another cause could be loss of coolant accident in which the coolant required for the heat removal is lost, totally or partially. The available safety systems provide, eventually after shutdown of the reactor, for the re-establishment of the balance between heat generation and heat removal. They serve as back-up for the normal process system which are already contributing to safety. Generally speaking, the very essence of the safety provisions is to make the occurrence of accident conditions unprobable and to prevent the occurence of emergency situations. In the implementation of this strategy, the defence-in-depth approach is applied. Its first line can be described with such terms as 'basic safety and quality assurance', the second line with 'accident prevention' and the third line with 'consequence mitigation'. (orig.)

  10. Quality assurance program plan fuel supply shutdown project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metcalf, I.L.

    1998-01-01

    This Quality Assurance Program plan (QAPP) describes how the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) project organization implements the quality assurance requirements of HNF-MP-599, Project Hanford Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD) and the B and W Hanford Company Quality Assurance Program Plan (QAPP), FSP-MP-004. The QAPP applies to facility structures, systems, and components and to activities (e.g., design, procurement, testing, operations, maintenance, etc.) that could affect structures, systems, and components. This QAPP also provides a roadmap of applicable Project Hanford Policies and Procedures (PHPP) which may be utilized by the FSS project organization to implement the requirements of this QAPP

  11. Safety design approach for JSFR toward the realization of GEN IV SFR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kubo, S.; Yamano, H.; Chikazawa, Y.; Shimakawa, Y.

    2013-01-01

    Conclusion: Safety Design Approach for JSFR: • Based on the safety design criteria for Generation-IV SFR • DECs, Situations practically eliminated and related design measures are identified and selected with due consideration of the safety features of SFR and the lessons learned from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plants accident Safety Design Concept of JSFR: • For failure to shutdown: Passive shutdown capability, Mitigation of core damage (Prevention of severe mechanical energy release, In-Vessel Retention) • For failure to remove heat: Prevention of significant core damage (Natural circulation DHR, Alternative cooling measures) • Containment: Prevention of sever dynamic loads by design measures (IVR, double boundary concept, inertization)

  12. Comparisons of RELAP5-3D Analyses to Experimental Data from the Natural Convection Shutdown Heat Removal Test Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bucknor, Matthew; Hu, Rui; Lisowski, Darius; Kraus, Adam

    2016-04-17

    The Reactor Cavity Cooling System (RCCS) is an important passive safety system being incorporated into the overall safety strategy for high temperature advanced reactor concepts such as the High Temperature Gas- Cooled Reactors (HTGR). The Natural Convection Shutdown Heat Removal Test Facility (NSTF) at Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) reflects a 1/2-scale model of the primary features of one conceptual air-cooled RCCS design. The project conducts ex-vessel, passive heat removal experiments in support of Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s Advanced Reactor Technology (ART) program, while also generating data for code validation purposes. While experiments are being conducted at the NSTF to evaluate the feasibility of the passive RCCS, parallel modeling and simulation efforts are ongoing to support the design, fabrication, and operation of these natural convection systems. Both system-level and high fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analyses were performed to gain a complete understanding of the complex flow and heat transfer phenomena in natural convection systems. This paper provides a summary of the RELAP5-3D NSTF model development efforts and provides comparisons between simulation results and experimental data from the NSTF. Overall, the simulation results compared favorably to the experimental data, however, further analyses need to be conducted to investigate any identified differences.

  13. CERN Vacuum-System Activities during the Long Shutdown 1: The LHC’s Injector Chain

    CERN Document Server

    Ferreira, J A

    2014-01-01

    During the long shutdown 1 (LS1), several maintenance, consolidation and upgrade activities have been carried out in LHC’s injector chain. Each machine has specific vacuum requirements and different history, which determine the present status of the vacuum components, their maintenance and consolidation needs. The present work presents the priorities agreed at the beginning of the LS1 period and their implementation. Of particular relevance are the interventions in radioactive controlled areas where several leaks due to stress corrosions stopped the operations in the past years. The strategy to reduce the collective dose is presented, in particular the use of remote controlled robots. An important part of the work performed during this period involves supporting other teams (acceptance tests, new equipment installation, etc.). Finally, as a result of the LS1 experience, a medium to long term strategy is depicted, focusing on the preparation of the next shutdown (LS2) and the integration of LINAC4 in the in...

  14. 30 CFR 57.8534 - Shutdown or failure of auxiliary fans.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Shutdown or failure of auxiliary fans. 57.8534... Ventilation Underground Only § 57.8534 Shutdown or failure of auxiliary fans. (a) Auxiliary fans installed and... fan maintenance or fan adjustments where air quality is maintained in compliance with the applicable...

  15. Shutdown risk management applied at Philadelphia Electric Company

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dagan, William J.; True, Douglas E.; Wilson, Thomas; Truax, William

    2004-01-01

    The development and implementation of an effective risk management program requires basic risk or safety knowledge and the conversion of such information into effective management tools. ERIN Engineering and Research, Inc., under contract to the Electric Power Research Institute, has developed an effective program. Outage Risk Assessment and Management (ORAM), to provide plant and management personnel with understandable results of shutdown risk studies. With this tool, the impact of plans and decision options can be readily determined and displayed for the decision maker. This paper describes these methods and their application to the Limerick Nuclear Station of Philadelphia Electric Company. It also sets forth a broader application of these methods to include support of management decisions at-power and following forced outages. The result is an integrated risk management framework which can allow management and technical personnel to utilize readily available and understandable risk insights to optimize each activity. This paper addresses the resolution of several key issues in detail: How was the ORAM risk management method employed to represent the existing plant shutdown procedures and policies? How did the ORAM risk management method enhance the decision-making ability of the outage management staff? How was the ORAM software efficiently integrated with the outage scheduling software? How is quantitative risk information generated and used for outage planning and control? The ORAM risk management philosophy utilizes a series of colors to depict various risk configurations. Each such configuration has associated with it clear guidance. By modifying the conditions existing in the plant it is possible to impact the type of risk being encountered as well as the guidance which is appropriate for that period. In addition, the duration of a particular configuration can be effectively managed to reduce the overall risk impact. These are achieved with minimal

  16. Emergency reactor shutdown device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ikehara, Morihiko.

    1982-01-01

    Purpose: To smoothen the emergency operation of the control rod in a BWR type reactor and to eliminate the external discharge of radioactively contaminated water. Constitution: A drain receiving tank is connected through a scram valve to the top of a cylinder which is containing a hydraulic piston connected to a trombone-shaped control rod and an accumulator is connected through another scram valve to the bottom of the cylinder. The respective scram valves are constructed to be opened by the reactor emergency shutdown signal from a reactor control system in such a manner that drain valve and a vent valve of the tank normally opened at the standby time are closed after approx. 10 seconds from the opening of the scram valves. In this manner, back pressure is not applied to the hydraulic piston at the emergency time, thereby smoothly operating the control rod. (Sikiya, K.)

  17. Safety of intrinsically safe and economical reactor (ISER)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asahi, Y.; Sugawara, I.; Yamanaka, K.

    1988-01-01

    Inherent safety of a reactor may be quantified by the grace period at various safety levels such as maintenance of fuel integrity, maintenance of fuel coolability and avoidance of core-melt. It is important to find out the grace period especially at the safety level of maintenance of fuel integrity. It has been conducted to design the ISER, which is characterized by the steel-made reactor pressure vessel. In addition to the passive nature of the safety design of the reactor itself, the ISER is equipped in the secondary system with a subsystem called the passive safety and shutdown system (PSSS), which will help to increase the grace period. It was found by the null transient analysis that check valves are needed at the top hot/cold interface. The analysis of the station blackout, which is one of the severest accident conceivable for the ISER, was made to examine inherent safety of the ISER with and without the PSSS. This paper reports that found out that the PSSS enhances inherent safety of the ISER

  18. Study on the identification of main drivers affecting the performance of human operators during low power and shutdown operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Ar Ryum; Park, Jinkyun; Kim, Ji Tae; Kim, Jaewhan; Seong, Poong Hyun

    2016-01-01

    Highlights: • The performance of human operator during LPSD operation is significantly important. • Human performance is affected by drivers such as procedure, training, and etc. • Main drivers during LPSD operation at domestic NPPs were suggested. • It is expected that it will be used for estimating human reliability during LPSD operation. - Abstract: In the past, many researchers believed that a reactor during low power and shutdown operation was sufficiently safe. This belief has been changed by the number of accidents during such types of operation, which is significantly high. Also, it was pointed out that one of the main differences between low power and shutdown operation and full power operation is the significance of human action because there are huge amounts of human actions due to extensive maintenance and testing while automatic control and safety functions may be disabled and procedures are insufficient or incomplete. This paper suggests the main drivers in performing human reliability analysis. For this study, we reviewed eight reports relating to human performance during low power and shutdown operation and applied a root cause analysis method for 53 human or human-related events at domestic nuclear power plants to derive the main drivers that affect the occurrence of those events. As a result, several main drivers were derived, such as procedures, training, experience of personnel, and workload/stress. It is expected that these main drivers will be used to perform human reliability analysis for low power and shutdown operation.

  19. Safety Case for Safe-store

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woollam, Paul B.

    2002-01-01

    Magnox Electric plc (Magnox), a wholly owned subsidiary of BNFL, owns 26 gas-cooled, graphite-moderated units on 11 sites in the UK. Eight units have been permanently shutdown and the remainder will shut this decade in a currently declared closure programme. The first of these reactors went to power in 1952 and the fleet has generated typically 9% of the UK's electricity during the last five decades. In accordance with UK Government policy, BNFL aims for a systematic and progressive reduction in hazards on its decommissioning sites. The end-point of the decommissioning process is that the reactors will be dismantled and their sites de-licensed. This will be done through minimising both the risks to the public, workers and the environment and also the lifetime cost, consistent with world class safety. There will be passive safe storage during deferment periods and it is BNFL's clear intent that the reactors will not be Safe-stored indefinitely. The main hazard associated with any decommissioned nuclear site is the spent fuel. Hence the reactors will be de-fuelled as soon as practicable after shutdown. After this work is complete, Cs-137 contaminated plant (e.g. fuel pools, effluent plant, and drains) will be dismantled when it is no longer needed. All other plant and buildings will also be dismantled when they are no longer needed, except for the reactor buildings which will be put into passive safe storage. Co-60 contaminated plant, such as steam generators, will be dismantled with the reactors. The reactors will be dismantled in a sequenced programme, with a notional start time around 100 years from shutdown. Magnox Electric is ensuring that the reactors and primary circuits on all its sites are well characterised. We have carried out a detailed, peer reviewed hazard identification on the lead site from which we have generated a rolling 25-year basic safety case. We have then searched for cliff edge effects and possible long-term changes to generate the 100-year

  20. Core shutdown report: Subcycle K-14.1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gough, S.T.

    1992-05-01

    When a reactor is shut down, there is a set of rules that must be followed to guarantee that the reactor remains in a safe shutdown state. Some of these rules involve the cooling of heat generating assemblies before, during, and after charge-discharge (C ampersand D) operations. These rules ensure that C ampersand D operations will not endanger the integrity of the fuel or targets by allowing them to overheat. DPSOL 105-1225, Assembly Discharge and Forced Cooling Requirements, is the primary operations procedure that governs these cooling rules. The specific shutdown cooling limits that are input into this procedure are contained within this report

  1. Mobility problems at the KNK II shut-down systems, cause investigations and valuation in comparison with the experience at other plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hess, B.

    1992-12-01

    During the operation of the second core of the fast test reactor KNK II the shutdown systems showed repeatedly problems with their mobility, which also caused to be reported events. The present report gives a summary description of the events in chronological order. The investigations to remove the mobility problems and the resulting design modifications are described together with the comments of the licensing authorities on the way to the restart of the plant. The results of the post-irradiation investigations in the hot cells and of sodium-chemical investigations are also described. In addition to the comparison of the events at the KNK plant itself and a review of the experiences at comparable plants it will be shown that all known cases of mobility problems did only influence the availability of the plant but that the safe shut-down of the plant was never at risk [de

  2. SCAR - Post-Accident Simulator SIPA with safety analysis code CATHARE-2 and PWR cold shutdown state simulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farvacque, M.; Faydide, B.; Dufeil, Ph.; Raimond, E.

    2003-01-01

    The use of Cathare in the simulators of pressurized water reactors has been effective since the beginning of the nineties. Scar project is the second stage of the Cathare strategy for the simulators, its main objective is the extension of the field of simulation to the accident situations in cold shutdown states. Work was carried out in 3 major areas: modelling, optimization and integration in the simulator. Throughout the project, the developments were part of a 3 stages validation strategy: -) elementary tests of the developments of new model on the N4 (1450 MW PWR); -) analytical tests and systems to ensure non regression of the validation of the physical laws of the Cathare code during the modifications carried out within the optimization stage; and -) overall tests of the SIPA-CP1 (900 MW PWR) simulator, controlled automatically by programmed scenarios including the transients which are carried out in PWR, the transients of the Regulatory Guides and the accident transients

  3. Preliminary Analysis of a Steam Line Break Accident with the MARS-KS code for the SMART Design with Passive Safety Systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kang, Doohyuk; Ko, Yungjoo; Suh, Jaeseung [Hannam Univ., Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Bae, Hwang; Ryu, Sunguk; Yi, Sungjae; Park, Hyunsik [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    SMART has been developed by KAERI, and SMART-Standard Design Approval (SDA) was recently granted in 2012. A SMART design with Passive Safety System (PSS) features (called SMART-PSS) is being developed and added to the standard design of SMART by KAERI to improve its safety system. Active safety systems such as safety injection pumps will be replaced by a passive safety system, which is actuated only by the gravity force caused by the height difference. All tanks for the passive safety systems are higher than the injection nozzle, which is located around the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). In this study, a preliminary analysis of the main steam line break accident (MSLB) was performed using the MARS-KS code to understand the general behavior of the SMART-PSS design and to prepare its validation test with the SMART-ITL (FESTA) facility. An anticipated accident for the main steam line break (MSLB) was performed using the MARS-KS code to understand the thermal-hydraulic behaviors of the SMART-PSS design. The preliminary analysis provides good insight into the passive safety system design features of the SMART-PSS and the thermal-hydraulic characteristics of the SMART design. The analysis results of the MSLB showed that the core water collapsed level inside the core support barrel was maintained high over the active core top level during the transient period. Therefore, the SMART-PSS design has satisfied the requirements to maintain the plant at a safe shutdown condition during 72 hours without AC power or operator action after an anticipated accident.

  4. Analysis of failure dependent test, repair and shutdown strategies for redundant trains

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Uryasev, S.; Samanta, P.

    1994-09-01

    Failure-dependent testing implies a test of a redundant components (or trains) when failure of one component has been detected. The purpose of such testing is to detect any common cause failures (CCFs) of multiple components so that a corrective action such as repair or plant shutdown can be taken to reduce the residence time of multiple failures, given a failure has been detected. This type of testing focuses on reducing the conditional risk of CCFs. Formulas for calculating the conditional failure probability of a two train system with different test, repair and shutdown strategies are developed. A methodology is presented with an example calculation showing the risk-effectiveness of failure-dependent strategies for emergency diesel generators (EDGs) in nuclear power plants (NPPs)

  5. Electrospun Nanofibers for Sandwiched Polyimide/Poly (vinylidene fluoride)/Polyimide Separators with the Thermal Shutdown Function

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, Dezhi; Shi, Chuan; Huang, Shaohua; Qiu, Xiaochun; Wang, Huan; Zhan, Zhan; Zhang, Peng; Zhao, Jinbao; Sun, Daoheng; Lin, Liwei

    2015-01-01

    Nanofibers fabricated by the electrospinning process have been used to construct sandwich-type Polyimide/Poly (vinylidene fluoride)/Polyimide (PI/PVDF/PI) separators with the thermal shutdown function for lithium ion batteries. This architecture uses the good thermal stability of PI as the top and bottom structure layers. Under high temperature operations, the middle layer made of PVDF nanofibers can melt and form a pore-free film to shut down the battery operation. The electrolyte uptake and ionic conductivity of the PI/PVDF/PI separator are superior to those of commercial polyolefin separators at 476% and 3.46 mS cm −1 , respectively, resulting better battery performances in terms of impedance, discharge capacity and cycle life. Under high temperature treatments above 170 °C, the self-shutdown function of the PI/PVDF/PI has been observed within 10 minutes, which could serve as the safety mechanism to defend the thermal runaway issue of lithium ion batteries. The effects of heating temperature and different time on the morphologies of each layer and electrolyte uptake of the separator are characterized as well

  6. Passive shut-down of ITER plasma by Be evaporation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amano, Tsuneo.

    1996-02-01

    In an accident event where the cooling system of first wall of the ITER fails, the first wall temperature continues to rise as long as the ignited state of the core plasma persists. In this paper, a passive shut-down scheme of the ITER from this accident by evaporated Be from the first wall is examined. It is shown the estimated Be influx 5 10 24 /sec is sufficient to quench the ignition. (author)

  7. Fuse and application of said fuse to the construction of an emergency shutdown system for a nuclear reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taulier, H.H.L.; Brugeille, G.

    1978-01-01

    A fuse device for an automatic emergency shutdown system in fast reactors provides a coupling between a casing tube placed within a fuel can and a series of neutron-absorbing masses held together above the reactor core under normal operating conditions but released in free fall to the lower portion of the casing tube at the level of the reactor core as a result of melting of the fuse when operating characteristics such as temperature or neutron flux attain a level which exceeds a predetermined threshold

  8. Fuse and application of said fuse to the construction of an emergency shutdown system for a nuclear reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taulier, H.H.L.; Brugeilles, G.

    1976-01-01

    A fuse device for an automatic emergency shutdown system in fast reactors provides a coupling between a casing tube placed within a fuel can and a series of neutron-absorbing masses held together above the reactor core under normal operating conditions. They are released in free fall to the lower portion of the casing tube at the level of the reactor core as a result of melting of the fuse when operating characteristics such as temperature or neutron flux attain a level which exceeds a predetermined threshold

  9. Approaches to passive safety in advanced thermal reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moses, D.L.

    1986-01-01

    Since 1980, there has been a proliferation of thermal reactor designs which incorporate passive safety features. The evolution of this trend is briefly traced, and the nature of various passive safety features is discussed with regard to how they have been incorporated into evolving design concepts. The key aspects of the passive safety features include reduced core power density, enhanced passive heat sinks, inherent assured shutdown mechanisms, elimination/minimization of potential leak paths from the primary coolant systems, enhanced robustness of fuel elements and improved coolant chemistry and component materials. An increased reliance on purely passive safety features typically translates into larger reactor structures at reduced power ratings. Proponents of the most innovative concepts seek to offset the increased costs by simplifying licensing requirements and reducing construction time

  10. Level 1 shutdown and low power operation of Mochovce NPP, Unit 1, Slovakia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halada, P.; Cillik, I.; Stojka, T.; Kuzma, M.; Prochaska, J.; Vrtik, L.

    2004-01-01

    The paper presents general approach, used methods and form of documentation of the results that have been applied within the shutdown and low power PSA (SPSA) study for Mochovce NPP, Unit 1, Slovakia. The SPSA project was realized by VUJE Trnava Inc., Slovakia in 2001-2002 years. The Level 1 SPSA study for Mochovce NPP Unit 1 covers internal events as well as internal (fires, floods and heavy load drop) and external (aircraft crash, extreme meteorological conditions, seismic event and influence of surrounding industry) hazards. Mochovce NPP consists of two operating units equipped with VVER 440/V213 reactors safety upgraded before construction finishing and operation start. 87 safety measures based on VVER 440 operational experience and international mission insights were implemented to enhance its operational and nuclear safety. The SPSA relates to full power PSA (FPSA) as a continuation of the effort to create a harmonized level 1 PSA model for all operational modes of the plant with the goal to use it for further purposes as follows: Real Time Risk Monitor, Maintenance Optimization, Technical Specifications Optimization, Living PSA. (author)

  11. Post shut-down decay heat removal from nuclear reactor core by natural convection loops in sodium pool

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rajamani, A. [Department of Mechanical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai 600036 (India); Sundararajan, T., E-mail: tsundar@iitm.ac.in [Department of Mechanical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai 600036 (India); Prasad, B.V.S.S.S. [Department of Mechanical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai 600036 (India); Parthasarathy, U.; Velusamy, K. [Nuclear Engineering Group, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam 603102 (India)

    2016-05-15

    Highlights: • Transient simulations are performed for a worst case scenario of station black-out. • Inter-wrapper flow between various sub-assemblies reduces peak core temperature. • Various natural convection paths limits fuel clad temperatures below critical level. - Abstract: The 500 MWe Indian pool type Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) has a passive core cooling system, known as the Safety Grade Decay Heat Removal System (SGDHRS) which aids to remove decay heat after shut down phase. Immediately after reactor shut down the fission products in the core continue to generate heat due to beta decay which exponentially decreases with time. In the event of a complete station blackout, the coolant pump system may not be available and the safety grade decay heat removal system transports the decay heat from the core and dissipates it safely to the atmosphere. Apart from SGDHRS, various natural convection loops in the sodium pool carry the heat away from the core and deposit it temporarily in the sodium pool. The buoyancy driven flow through the small inter-wrapper gaps (known as inter-wrapper flow) between fuel subassemblies plays an important role in carrying the decay heat from the sub-assemblies to the hot sodium pool, immediately after reactor shut down. This paper presents the transient prediction of flow and temperature evolution in the reactor subassemblies and the sodium pool, coupled with the safety grade decay heat removal system. It is shown that with a properly sized decay heat exchanger based on liquid sodium and air chimney stacks, the post shutdown decay heat can be safely dissipated to atmospheric air passively.

  12. Overview of Indian position: Passive and active safety features of LMFBRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paranjpe, S.R.

    1991-01-01

    Since PWR and BWR type reactors are considered to have acceptable level of safety, there is a general statement that LMFBR type reactors should be designed to be 'at least as safe' as PWRs and BWRs. Nuclear safety issues considered include the following: flexibility of operation over the entire power range, effectiveness of steps ensuring the safety as well as plant availability under foreseeable incident conditions; guaranteed safe shut-down of the reactor; ability to remove safely and reliably the decay heat under shut-down conditions; containment capability including protection of the reactor from external events. It is concluded that liquid metal fast breeder reactors (LMFBRs) can be designed very easily to eliminate anxieties about their safety and no difficulties are expected in the licensing procedure of this type of reactors

  13. System safety education focused on flight safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    Holt, E.

    1971-01-01

    The measures necessary for achieving higher levels of system safety are analyzed with an eye toward maintaining the combat capability of the Air Force. Several education courses were provided for personnel involved in safety management. Data include: (1) Flight Safety Officer Course, (2) Advanced Safety Program Management, (3) Fundamentals of System Safety, and (4) Quantitative Methods of Safety Analysis.

  14. Defence-in-depth strategy of fire protection and its relevance after final shutdown (by the example of Germany)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beesen, Michael; Ernst, Benjamin; Fischer, Guenter [TUeV SUeD Industrie Service GmbH (Germany)

    2015-12-15

    Nuclear power plants (NPP) are protected against internal and external fires by a fire protection defence-in-depth concept including the following precautionary measures: operational, structural and equipment related fire protection measures as well as manual fire fighting. The fire protection measures are designed in consideration of fires to be expected (from fire loads permanently and temporarily present together with potential ignition sources) in order to prevent a violation of both the protection goals of public law and the nuclear protection goals / radiological safety objectives in case of internal and external fires. The aspect ''What is the future significance of the fire protection defence-in-depth concept?'' needs to be considered with regard to the situation following the final shutdown. From our point of view as a TSO (technical safety organization) both the non-nuclear protection goals (e.g. prevent occurrence of a fire; ensure escape and rescue of humans) as well as the nuclear ones have to be ensured after final shutdown of a nuclear plant. The protection goals of public law will almost completely remain after the plant has stopped commercial operation while the nuclear safety objectives will be stepwise reduced in consideration of the decommissioning status until the end of the nuclear supervision. Nevertheless, the fire protection concept must clearly specify those fire protection measures that are necessary to ensure the plants' safety. The situation on site regularly needs to be under examination to check if the fire protection concept covers all conditions to be considered and if the existing fire protection measures are sufficient or if an adaption is necessary.

  15. On safety 1E qualification of electrical equipment for nuclear power stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Segarceanu, D.; Geambasu, C.; Avramescu, M.

    1995-01-01

    Electrical equipment and systems for the emergency shutdown of a nuclear reactor are qualified according to safety class 1E. Methods of qualification meeting the requirements should be used, either individually or in combination include, type-test qualification, qualification by operating experience, qualification by analysis, combined qualification. These methods qualification principles, procedures and documents are discussed. (N.T.). 1 fig

  16. Behaviour of ruthenium in the case of shutdown of the cooling system of HLLW storage tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Philippe, M.; Gue, J.P.; Mercier, J.P.

    1990-12-01

    The consequences of the failure of the cooling system of fission product storage tanks over a variable period were investigated as part of the safety analysis of the La Hague spent fuel reprocessing plant. Due to the considerable heat release, induced by the fission products, a prolonged shutdown of the tank cooling system could cause the progressive evaporation of the solutions to dryness, and culminate in the formation of volatile species of ruthenium and their release in the tank venting circuit. To determine the fraction of ruthenium likely to be transferred from the storage tanks in volatile or aerosol form during the failure, evaporation tests were conducted by evaporating samples of actual nitric acid solutions of fission products, obtained on the laboratory scale after the reprocessing of several kilograms of MOX fuels irradiated to 30.000 MW day ·t -1 . A distillation apparatus was designed to operate with small-volume solution samples, reproducing the heating conditions existing in the reprocessing plant within a storage tank for fission products. The main conclusions drawn from these experiments are as follows: - ruthenium is only volatilized in the final phase of evaporation, just before desiccation, - for a final temperature limited to 160 deg. C, the total fraction of volatilized ruthenium reaches 12%, - in the presence of H 2 O, HNO 3 , NO x and O 2 , the volatilized ruthenium recombines mainly in the form of ruthenium nitrosyl nitrates, or decomposes into ruthenium oxide (probably RuO 2 ) on the walls of the apparatus. Assuming a heating power density of 10 W/liter of concentrate, and a perfectly adiabatic storage system, the minimum time required to reach dryness can be estimated at 90 h, allowing substantial time to take action to restore a cooling source. It is probable that, in an industrial storage tank, the heat losses from the tank and the offgas discharge ducts will cause recondensation and internal reflux, which will commensurately delay

  17. Risk impact of BWR technical specifications requirements during shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staple, B.D.; Kirk, H.K.; Yakle, J.

    1994-10-01

    This report presents an application of probabilistic models and risk based criteria for determining the risk impact of the Limiting Conditions of Operations (LCOs) in the Technical Specifications (TSs) of a boiling water reactor during shutdown. This analysis studied the risk impact of the current requirements of Allowed Outage Times (AOTs) and Surveillance Test Intervals (STIs) in eight Plant Operational States (POSs) which encompass power operations, shutdown, and refueling. This report also discusses insights concerning TS action statements

  18. Loss-of-benefits analysis for nuclear power plant shutdowns: methodology and illustrative case study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peerenboom, J.P.; Buehring, W.A.; Guziel, K.A.

    1983-11-01

    A framework for loss-of-benefits analysis and a taxomony for identifying and categorizing the effects of nuclear power plant shutdowns or accidents are presented. The framework consists of three fundamental steps: (1) characterizing the shutdown; (2) identifying benefits lost as a result of the shutdown; and (3) quantifying effects. A decision analysis approach to regulatory decision making is presented that explicitly considers the loss of benefits. A case study of a hypothetical reactor shutdown illustrates one key loss of benefits: net replacement energy costs (i.e., change in production costs). Sensitivity studies investigate the responsiveness of case study results to changes in nuclear capacity factor, load growth, fuel price escalation, and discount rate. The effects of multiple reactor shutdowns on production costs are also described

  19. Design aspects of safety critical instrumentation of nuclear installations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Swaminathan, P. [Electronics Group, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam 603 102, Tamil Nadu (India)]. E-mail: swamy@igcar.ernet.in

    2005-07-01

    Safety critical instrumentation systems ensure safe shutdown/configuration of the nuclear installation when process status exceeds the safety threshold limits. Design requirements for safety critical instrumentation such as functional and electrical independence, fail-safe design, and architecture to ensure the specified unsafe failure rate and safe failure rate, human machine interface (HMI), etc., are explained with examples. Different fault tolerant architectures like 1/2, 2/2, 2/3 hot stand-by are compared for safety critical instrumentation. For embedded systems, software quality assurance is detailed both during design phase and O and M phase. Different software development models such as waterfall model and spiral model are explained with examples. The error distribution in embedded system is detailed. The usage of formal method is outlined to reduce the specification error. The guidelines for coding of application software are outlined. The interface problems of safety critical instrumentation with sensors, actuators, other computer systems, etc., are detailed with examples. Testability and maintainability shall be taken into account during design phase. Online diagnostics for safety critical instrumentation is detailed with examples. Salient details of design guides from Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, International Atomic Energy Agency and standards from IEEE, BIS are given towards the design of safety critical instrumentation systems. (author)

  20. Design aspects of safety critical instrumentation of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swaminathan, P.

    2005-01-01

    Safety critical instrumentation systems ensure safe shutdown/configuration of the nuclear installation when process status exceeds the safety threshold limits. Design requirements for safety critical instrumentation such as functional and electrical independence, fail-safe design, and architecture to ensure the specified unsafe failure rate and safe failure rate, human machine interface (HMI), etc., are explained with examples. Different fault tolerant architectures like 1/2, 2/2, 2/3 hot stand-by are compared for safety critical instrumentation. For embedded systems, software quality assurance is detailed both during design phase and O and M phase. Different software development models such as waterfall model and spiral model are explained with examples. The error distribution in embedded system is detailed. The usage of formal method is outlined to reduce the specification error. The guidelines for coding of application software are outlined. The interface problems of safety critical instrumentation with sensors, actuators, other computer systems, etc., are detailed with examples. Testability and maintainability shall be taken into account during design phase. Online diagnostics for safety critical instrumentation is detailed with examples. Salient details of design guides from Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, International Atomic Energy Agency and standards from IEEE, BIS are given towards the design of safety critical instrumentation systems. (author)

  1. Major results from safety-related integral effect tests with VISTA-ITL for the SMART design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, H. S.; Min, B. Y.; Shin, Y. C.; Yi, S. J.

    2012-01-01

    A series of integral effect tests (IETs) was performed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Inst. (KAERI) using the VISTA integral test loop (VISTA-ITL) as a small-scale IET program. Among them this paper presents major results acquired from the safety-related IETs with the VISTA-ITL facility for the SMART design. Three small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) tests of safety injection system (SIS) line break, shutdown cooling system (SCS) line break and pressurizer safety valve (PSV) line break were successfully performed and the transient characteristics of a complete loss of flowrate (CLOF) was simulated properly with the VISTA-ITL facility. (authors)

  2. 40 CFR 65.6 - Startup, shutdown, and malfunction plan and procedures.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 15 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Startup, shutdown, and malfunction... (CONTINUED) AIR PROGRAMS (CONTINUED) CONSOLIDATED FEDERAL AIR RULE General Provisions § 65.6 Startup... Group 2A or Group 2B process vents. (b) Startup, shutdown, and malfunction plan—(1) Description and...

  3. Oak Ridge Research Reactor shutdown maintenance and surveillance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coleman, G.H.; Laughlin, D.L.

    1990-10-01

    The Department of Energy ordered the Oak Ridge Research Center Reactor to be placed in permanent shutdown on July 14, 1987. Maintenance activities, both mechanical and instrument, were essentially routine in nature. The performance of the instrumentation for the facility was satisfactory, and maintenance required is provided. The performance of the process system was satisfactory, and maintenance required is indicated. The results of efficiency tests of the various gaseous-waste filters have been summarized and preparations for transfer of the facility to the remedial action program is also indicated

  4. Loss of benefits resulting from mandated nuclear plant shutdowns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peerenboom, J.P.; Buehring, W.A.

    1982-01-01

    This paper identifies and discusses some of the important consequences of nuclear power plant unavailability, and quantifies a number of technical measures of loss of benefits that result from regulatory actions such as licensing delays and mandated nuclear plant outages. The loss of benefits that accompany such regulatory actions include increased costs of systems generation, increased demand for nonnuclear and often scarce fuels, and reduced system reliability. This paper is based on a series of case studies, supplemented by sensitivity studies, on hypothetical nuclear plant shutdowns. These studies were developed by Argonne in cooperation with four electric utilities

  5. Reliability of Offshore Wind Turbine Drivetrains based on Measured Shut-down Events

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Natarajan, Anand; Buhl, Thomas

    2015-01-01

    by initiating blade pitching to feather and also sometimes using the generator torqueas a brake mechanism. The shutdowns due to wind speed variation nearcut-out are predicted using an Inverse First Order Reliability Model(IFORM) whereby an expected annual frequency of normal shutdownsat cut-out is put forth...... normal operation and with shutdowns. The maximum coefficient of variation (CoV) due to varying wind conditions was found on the low speed shaft torsion, but the shutdowns by themselves were not seento significantly change the fatigue loads....

  6. Kinetic analyses on startup and shutdown chemistry of BWR plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Domae, Masafumi; Fujiwara, Kazutoshi; Inagaki, Hiromitsu

    2012-09-01

    During startup and shutdown of Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) plants, temperature and dissolved oxygen (DO) concentration of reactor water change in a wide range. The changes result in variation of conductivity and pH of the reactor water. It has been speculated that the water chemistry change is due to dissolution of the oxides on fuel claddings and structural materials. However, detailed mechanism is not known. In the present paper, trend of recent water chemistry in several BWR plants during startup and shutdown is presented. Conductivity and pH are convenient indication of coolant purity. We tried to clarify the mechanism of the change in the conductivity and the pH value during startup and shutdown, based on the water chemistry data measured. In the water chemistry data, change in chromate concentration and Ni 2+ concentration is rather large. It is assumed that change in the chromate concentration and the Ni 2+ concentration results in the time variation of the conductivity and the pH value. It is reasonable to consider that the increase in the chromate concentration and the Ni 2+ concentration is ascribed to dissolution of Cr oxides and Ni oxides, respectively. A model of dissolution of the Cr oxides and the Ni oxides is proposed. A concept of finite inventory of the Cr oxides and the Ni oxides in the coolant system is introduced. The model is as follows. Chromate is generated by oxidation of the Cr oxides and the Cr dissolution rate depends on the DO concentration. The dissolution rate of chromate is in proportion to DO concentration, the inventory of Cr and difference between solubility limit and the chromate concentration. On the other hand, Ni 2+ is formed by dissolution of the Ni oxides, and DO is not necessary in this process. The dissolution rate of Ni 2+ is in proportion to the inventory of Ni and difference between solubility limit and the Ni 2+ concentration. Coolant is continuously purified, and the chromate concentration and the Ni 2+ concentration

  7. 40 CFR 62.15150 - What happens to the operating requirements during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... requirements during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction? 62.15150 Section 62.15150 Protection of... § 62.15150 What happens to the operating requirements during periods of startup, shutdown, and... municipal waste combustion unit startup, shutdown, or malfunction. (b) Each startup, shutdown, or...

  8. European protection principles against external hazards by means of Emergency Power Supply and Control Safety System Building in Nuclear Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallinat, Dipl Ing [Max Aicher Engineering GmbH, Freilassing (Germany)

    2016-10-15

    One of the most important nuclear power plant safety requirements is a redundant and independent power system. This requires such a design of emergency power systems that failure of one will not adversely impact the other. External hazards of natural origin or linked to human activity could potentially affect plant safety. The general objective of the design provisions is to ensure that the safety functions of the systems and components required to return the plant to a safe shutdown state and to prevent and limit radioactive release are not adversely affected. As external hazards are site dependent, Technical Guidelines specify that 'it is not necessary to take all of the hazards in a standardized design; such external hazards as external flooding, drought, ice formation and toxic, corrosive or combustible gases may be dealt with only for a specific plant, on a plant specific basis'. In accordance with the Technical Guidelines, external hazards are taken into consideration at the design stage consistently with internal events or hazards. The basic design principle is to protect against external hazards in accordance with the Technical Guidelines using a 'load case' procedure.

  9. A Fast Shutdown Technique for Large Tokamaks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fredrickson, E.; Schmidt, G.L.; Hill, K.; Jardin, S.C.

    1999-01-01

    A practical method is proposed for the fast shutdown of a large ignited tokamak. The method consists of injecting a rapid series of 30-50 deuterium pellets doped with a small ( 0.0005%) concentration of Krypton impurity, and simultaneously ramping the plasma current and shaping fields down over a period of several seconds using the poloidal field system. Detailed modeling with the Tokamak Simulation Code using a newly developed pellet mass deposition model shows that this method should terminate the discharge in a controlled and stable way without producing significant numbers of runaway electrons. A partial prototyping of this technique was accomplished in TFTR

  10. 40 CFR 60.1695 - What happens to the operating requirements during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... requirements during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction? 60.1695 Section 60.1695 Protection of... Requirements § 60.1695 What happens to the operating requirements during periods of startup, shutdown, and... municipal waste combustion unit startup, shutdown, or malfunction. (b) Each startup, shutdown, or...

  11. The automatic programming for safety-critical software in nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jang Yeol; Eom, Heung Seop; Choi, You Rark

    1998-06-01

    We defined the Korean unique safety-critical software development methodology by modifying Dr. Harel`s statechart-based on formal methods in order to digitalized the reactor protection system. It is suggested software requirement specification guideline to specify design specification which is basis for requirement specification and automatic programming by the caused by shutdown parameter logic of the steam generator water level for Wolsung 2/3/4 unit SDS no.1 and simulated it by binding the Graphic User Interface (GUI). We generated the K and R C code automatically by utilizing the Statemate MAGNUM Sharpshooter/C code generator. Auto-generated K and R C code is machine independent code and has high productivity, quality and provability. The following are the summaries of major research and development. - Set up the Korean unique safety-critical software development methodology - Developed software requirement specification guidelines - Developed software design specification guidelines - Reactor trip modeling for steam generator waster level Wolsung 2/3/4 SDS no. 1 shutdown parameter logic - Graphic panel binding with GUI. (author). 20 refs., 12 tabs., 15 figs

  12. The automatic programming for safety-critical software in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jang Yeol; Eom, Heung Seop; Choi, You Rark

    1998-06-01

    We defined the Korean unique safety-critical software development methodology by modifying Dr. Harel's statechart-based on formal methods in order to digitalized the reactor protection system. It is suggested software requirement specification guideline to specify design specification which is basis for requirement specification and automatic programming by the caused by shutdown parameter logic of the steam generator water level for Wolsung 2/3/4 unit SDS no.1 and simulated it by binding the Graphic User Interface (GUI). We generated the K and R C code automatically by utilizing the Statemate MAGNUM Sharpshooter/C code generator. Auto-generated K and R C code is machine independent code and has high productivity, quality and provability. The following are the summaries of major research and development. - Set up the Korean unique safety-critical software development methodology - Developed software requirement specification guidelines - Developed software design specification guidelines - Reactor trip modeling for steam generator waster level Wolsung 2/3/4 SDS no. 1 shutdown parameter logic - Graphic panel binding with GUI. (author). 20 refs., 12 tabs., 15 figs

  13. Maintenance of shutdown system in the reactor core to minimize the radioactive waste generation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ponzoni Filho, P.; Fernandes, V.B.

    1988-01-01

    This paper recommends a modification on the actual strategy of going from Cold-Shutdown to Critical, that will save about 6000 liter of boric acid and 30,000 liters of demineralized water for each reactor criticalization. This strategy will reduce the radioactive waste disposal volume to only about 5% of what would be generated following the actual strategy. (author) [pt

  14. 77 FR 73968 - Reconsideration of Certain New Source and Startup/Shutdown Issues: National Emission Standards...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-12

    ...; FRL-9762-1] RIN 2060-AR62 Reconsideration of Certain New Source and Startup/Shutdown Issues: National... Source and Startup/Shutdown Issues: National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal... November 30, 2012, proposed ``Reconsideration of Certain New Source and Startup/Shutdown Issues: National...

  15. 40 CFR 60.1220 - What happens to the emission limits during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction? 60.1220 Section 60.1220 Protection of Environment... Emission Limits § 60.1220 What happens to the emission limits during periods of startup, shutdown, and... waste combustion unit startup, shutdown, or malfunction. (b) Each startup, shutdown, or malfunction must...

  16. Software Safety Risk in Legacy Safety-Critical Computer Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hill, Janice L.; Baggs, Rhoda

    2007-01-01

    Safety Standards contain technical and process-oriented safety requirements. Technical requirements are those such as "must work" and "must not work" functions in the system. Process-Oriented requirements are software engineering and safety management process requirements. Address the system perspective and some cover just software in the system > NASA-STD-8719.13B Software Safety Standard is the current standard of interest. NASA programs/projects will have their own set of safety requirements derived from the standard. Safety Cases: a) Documented demonstration that a system complies with the specified safety requirements. b) Evidence is gathered on the integrity of the system and put forward as an argued case. [Gardener (ed.)] c) Problems occur when trying to meet safety standards, and thus make retrospective safety cases, in legacy safety-critical computer systems.

  17. SEPRA - shutdown PSA for the OLKILUOTO nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Himanen, R.

    1995-01-01

    The utility TVO has extended the PSA study to the analysis of refueling, shutdown and startup. The Shutdown Event PRA (SEPRA) was reported to the authority in September 1992. The study consists of the analysis of leaks and loss of decay heat removal in the planned shutdown conditions. Special studies were performed for the cold pressurization, for local criticality events, for heavy load transport and for the transients during startup and shutdown. A remarkable effort was put to identify risks, i.e. to the qualitative analysis. The regular preventive maintenance tasks in the refueling outages were analyzed and the important tasks were selected for further studies. Besides the severe core damage risk the utility was interested in less grave consequences, e.g. the economic risks, causing significant extension of outages. The plant specific screening of initiators consisted of a study on the incident history and of interviewing the plant personnel on selected tasks. A number of thermohydraulic calculations were carried out to support the analysis of accident sequences. The operator actions after an initiating event were verified with the operating staff. The annual core damage risk from the refueling outage is about one forth of the total annual risk. The modifications decreased significantly the core damage frequency. It is foreseen that the SEPRA will form a basis of the procedure enhancement for the low power states. (author) 5 figs., 1 tab., 10 refs

  18. Synergistic behaviour of nuclear radiation, temperature-humidity extremes and LOCA situation on safety and safety-related equipment in Indian nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kulkarni, R.D.; Bora, J.S.; Prakash, Ravi; Agarwal, Vivek; Sundersingh, V.P.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The general philosophy for the instrumentation in nuclear power plants is based on the use of equipment/instruments which are capable of continuous satisfactory operation over a long period of time with minimum attention. Long term reliability under varying service conditions is of prime importance. The reliability of nuclear power plant depends on the reliability of safety and safety-related electronic instruments/ equipment used for performing the crucial tasks. The electrical and electronic systems/ circuits/ components of the equipment used in reactor safety systems (e.g. reactor protection system, emergency core cooling system, etc.) and reactor safety-related systems (e.g. reactor containment isolation and cooling system, reactor shutdown system, etc.) are responsible for safe and reliable operation of a nuclear power plant. The performance of reactor safety and safety-related equipment/instruments viz. pressure and differential pressure transmitter, amplifier for ion chamber, etc. has been evaluated under synergistic atmosphere including LOCA to find out the critical link in the circuits and subsequent modifications are suggested. The mathematical representation of the generated database has been done to estimate the life span of the instruments and accordingly the guidelines has been prepared for the operational staff to avoid the forced outage of the plant. All the details are included and mathematical models are presented to predict the future performances

  19. Evolution of the ATLAS distributed computing system during the LHC long shutdown

    Science.gov (United States)

    Campana, S.; Atlas Collaboration

    2014-06-01

    The ATLAS Distributed Computing project (ADC) was established in 2007 to develop and operate a framework, following the ATLAS computing model, to enable data storage, processing and bookkeeping on top of the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid (WLCG) distributed infrastructure. ADC development has always been driven by operations and this contributed to its success. The system has fulfilled the demanding requirements of ATLAS, daily consolidating worldwide up to 1 PB of data and running more than 1.5 million payloads distributed globally, supporting almost one thousand concurrent distributed analysis users. Comprehensive automation and monitoring minimized the operational manpower required. The flexibility of the system to adjust to operational needs has been important to the success of the ATLAS physics program. The LHC shutdown in 2013-2015 affords an opportunity to improve the system in light of operational experience and scale it to cope with the demanding requirements of 2015 and beyond, most notably a much higher trigger rate and event pileup. We will describe the evolution of the ADC software foreseen during this period. This includes consolidating the existing Production and Distributed Analysis framework (PanDA) and ATLAS Grid Information System (AGIS), together with the development and commissioning of next generation systems for distributed data management (DDM/Rucio) and production (Prodsys-2). We will explain how new technologies such as Cloud Computing and NoSQL databases, which ATLAS investigated as R&D projects in past years, will be integrated in production. Finally, we will describe more fundamental developments such as breaking job-to-data locality by exploiting storage federations and caches, and event level (rather than file or dataset level) workload engines.

  20. Evolution of the ATLAS distributed computing system during the LHC long shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campana, S

    2014-01-01

    The ATLAS Distributed Computing project (ADC) was established in 2007 to develop and operate a framework, following the ATLAS computing model, to enable data storage, processing and bookkeeping on top of the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid (WLCG) distributed infrastructure. ADC development has always been driven by operations and this contributed to its success. The system has fulfilled the demanding requirements of ATLAS, daily consolidating worldwide up to 1 PB of data and running more than 1.5 million payloads distributed globally, supporting almost one thousand concurrent distributed analysis users. Comprehensive automation and monitoring minimized the operational manpower required. The flexibility of the system to adjust to operational needs has been important to the success of the ATLAS physics program. The LHC shutdown in 2013-2015 affords an opportunity to improve the system in light of operational experience and scale it to cope with the demanding requirements of 2015 and beyond, most notably a much higher trigger rate and event pileup. We will describe the evolution of the ADC software foreseen during this period. This includes consolidating the existing Production and Distributed Analysis framework (PanDA) and ATLAS Grid Information System (AGIS), together with the development and commissioning of next generation systems for distributed data management (DDM/Rucio) and production (Prodsys-2). We will explain how new technologies such as Cloud Computing and NoSQL databases, which ATLAS investigated as R and D projects in past years, will be integrated in production. Finally, we will describe more fundamental developments such as breaking job-to-data locality by exploiting storage federations and caches, and event level (rather than file or dataset level) workload engines.

  1. The Nordic programme for nuclear safety 1990-1993

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-02-01

    The report, covering the year 1991 of the Nordic Programme for Nuclear Safety 1990-1993, presents 18 projects divided into 4 main areas: preparedness in abnormal radiation situations, nuclear wastes and shutdowns, radioecology and reactor safety - knowledge preparedness. The main areas are briefly described and the status of each project is presented. (CLS) (118 refs.)

  2. Non-safety piping operability review case study -- Today and tomorrow

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flensburg, W.C.; Adams, T.M.

    1995-01-01

    During a 1993 Outage at the Perry Nuclear Power Station, a condition report was issued which identified potential intersystem loss of water between the Emergency Closed Cooling Water System and the Nuclear Closed Cooling Water System during a design basis event. The review of this condition report indicated that if a SSE (safe shutdown earthquake) event were to occur during a design basis event components important to plant safety could potentially be adversely affected if non-seismic/non-safety portions of the Nuclear Closed Cooling Water System could not maintain pressure boundary integrity as a result of the seismic loadings. Presented in this paper are steps, criteria, and methodology used to demonstrate the seismic acceptability of the affected portion of the Nuclear Closed Cooling Water System Piping. Also discussed are the potential benefits and applicability of a recently developed EPRI non-safety, non-seismic operability procedure. This discussion includes the potential cost savings which could have arisen from application of this recently developed procedure

  3. The Bulgaria before shut-down of next two blocks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dobak, D.

    2005-01-01

    The Ministry of Trade and Industry of United Kingdom in the frame of realization of programmes for the Middle and East Europe in the area of nuclear energetics during October 5 - 7, 2005 in Kozloduj has organized the Second International Conference on the theme 'Liquidation, social and economic changes'. In this paper author informs about Kozloduj NPP and plans for shut-down of this NPP as well as consequences of the shut-down. One of them the increase of unemployment and social impact for this region are presented

  4. Electricity-market price and nuclear power plant shutdown: Evidence from California

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woo, C.K.; Ho, T.; Zarnikau, J.; Olson, A.; Jones, R.; Chait, M.; Horowitz, I.; Wang, J.

    2014-01-01

    Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster, triggered by the March 11, 2011 earthquake, has led to calls for shutting down existing nuclear plants. To maintain resource adequacy for a grid's reliable operation, one option is to expand conventional generation, whose marginal unit is typically fueled by natural-gas. Two timely and relevant questions thus arise for a deregulated wholesale electricity market: (1) what is the likely price increase due to a nuclear plant shutdown? and (2) what can be done to mitigate the price increase? To answer these questions, we perform a regression analysis of a large sample of hourly real-time electricity-market price data from the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) for the 33-month sample period of April 2010–December 2012. Our analysis indicates that the 2013 shutdown of the state's San Onofre plant raised the CAISO real-time hourly market prices by $6/MWH to $9/MWH, and that the price increases could have been offset by a combination of demand reduction, increasing solar generation, and increasing wind generation. - Highlights: • Japan's disaster led to calls for shutting down existing nuclear plants. • We perform a regression analysis of California's real-time electricity-market prices. • We estimate that the San Onofre plant shutdown has raised the market prices by $6/MWH to $9/MWH. • The price increases could be offset by demand reduction and renewable generation increase

  5. Standardization of the time for the execution of HANARO start-up and shutdown procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, H. Y.; Lim, I. C.; Hwang, S. R.; Kang, T. J.; Youn, D. B.

    2003-01-01

    For the standardization of the time to execute HANARO start-up and shutdown procedures, code names were assigned to the individual procedures and the work time were investigated. The data recorded by the operators during start-up and shutdown were statistically analyzed. The analysis results will be used for the standardization of start-up and shutdown procedures and it will be reflected in the procedure document

  6. NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 2: System Safety Concepts, Guidelines, and Implementation Examples

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dezfuli, Homayoon; Benjamin, Allan; Everett, Christopher; Feather, Martin; Rutledge, Peter; Sen, Dev; Youngblood, Robert

    2015-01-01

    This is the second of two volumes that collectively comprise the NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 1 (NASASP-210-580) was prepared for the purpose of presenting the overall framework for System Safety and for providing the general concepts needed to implement the framework. Volume 2 provides guidance for implementing these concepts as an integral part of systems engineering and risk management. This guidance addresses the following functional areas: 1.The development of objectives that collectively define adequate safety for a system, and the safety requirements derived from these objectives that are levied on the system. 2.The conduct of system safety activities, performed to meet the safety requirements, with specific emphasis on the conduct of integrated safety analysis (ISA) as a fundamental means by which systems engineering and risk management decisions are risk-informed. 3.The development of a risk-informed safety case (RISC) at major milestone reviews to argue that the systems safety objectives are satisfied (and therefore that the system is adequately safe). 4.The evaluation of the RISC (including supporting evidence) using a defined set of evaluation criteria, to assess the veracity of the claims made therein in order to support risk acceptance decisions.

  7. Time Delay for the Initiation of an Emergency Shutdown at the Peruvian Nuclear Reactor RP-10

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramon, A.; Ovalle, E.; Canaza, D.; Salazar, A.; Zapata, A.; Felix, J.; Arrieta, R.; Vela, M.

    2008-01-01

    In this paper we show the measurement of the time delay for the initiation of an emergency shutdown state at the RP-10 Reactor. This time delay is the one corresponding to the delay between the detection of a signal of any fixed limit and the start of a protective action to get the reactor in a safety state. The experimental method used is based on monitoring two signals in an oscilloscope, one signal is the elected initiate event and the other is the de-energizing of electromagnets of the security bars. The time delay for each safety and control rods, was measured for seven energizing current values in a range of 36 - 52 mA. The results showed that the minimum value is (84 ± 1.26) ms and the maximum is (108 ± 1.60) ms. In all cases it is noted that, the delay time is less than the limit values prefixed down in the reactor safety report. (authors)

  8. New trends in pile safety instrumentation; Les tendances nouvelles dans l'instrumentation de securite des piles

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Furet, J.

    1961-04-19

    This report addresses the protection of nuclear piles against damages due to operation incidents. The author discusses the current trends in the philosophy of safety of atomic power piles, identifies the parameters which define safety systems, presents tests to be performed on safety chains, comments the relationship between safety and the decrease of the number of pile inadvertent shutdowns, discusses the issues of instrument failures and chain multiplicity, comments the possible improvement of the operation of elements which build up safety chains (design simplification, development of semiconductors, replacement of electromechanical relays by static relays), the role of safety logical computers and the development of automatics in pile safety, presents automatic control as a safety factor (example of automatic start-up), and finally comments the use of fuses.

  9. Performance Monitoring for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation at PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor (RTP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zareen Khan Abdul Jalil Khan; Ridzuan Abdul Mutalib; Mohd Sabri Minhat

    2015-01-01

    The Reactor TRIGA PUSPATI (RTP) at Malaysia Nuclear Agency is a TRIGA Mark II type reactor and pool type cooled by natural circulation of light water. This paper describe on performance monitoring for nuclear safety related instrumentation in TRIGA PUSPATI Reactor (RTP) of based on various parameter of reactor safety instrument channel such as log power, linear power, Fuel temperature, coolant temperature will take into consideration. Methodology of performance on estimation and monitoring is to evaluate and analysis of reactor parameters which is important of reactor safety and control. And also to estimate power measurement, differential of log and linear power and fuel temperature during reactor start-up, operation and shutdown .This study also focus on neutron power fluctuation from fission chamber during reactor start-up and operation. This work will present result of performance monitoring from RTP which indicated the safety parameter identification and initiate safety action on crossing the threshold set point trip. Conclude that performance of nuclear safety related instrumentation will improved the reactor control and safety parameter during reactor start-up, operation and shutdown. (author)

  10. PSA in design of passive/active safety reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, T.; Tanabe, A.; Kondo, S.

    1995-01-01

    PSAs in the design of advanced reactors are applied mainly in level 1 PSA areas. However, even in level 1 PSA, there are certain areas where special care must be taken depending on plant design concepts. This paper identifies these areas both for passive and active safety reactor concepts. For example, 'long-term PSA' and shutdown PSA are very important for a passive safety reactor concept from the standpoint of effectiveness of a grace period and passive safety systems. External events are also important for an active safety reactor concept. These kinds of special PSAs are difficult to conduct precisely in a conceptual design stage. This paper shows methods of conducting these kinds of special PSAs simply and conveniently and the use of acquired insights for the design of advanced reactors. This paper also clarifies the meaning or definition of a grace period from the standpoint of PSA

  11. 78 FR 38739 - Standard Format and Content for Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-27

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2012-0299] Standard Format and Content for Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Regulatory guide; issuance..., ``Standard Format and Content for Post-shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report.'' This guide describes a...

  12. Development of Start-up and Shutdown Procedure for the HANARO Fuel Test Loop

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, S. K.; Sim, B. S.; Chi, D. Y.; Lee, J. M.; Lee, C. Y.; Ahn, S. H.

    2009-06-01

    A start-up and shutdown procedure for the HANARO fuel test loop has been developed. This is a facility for fuel and material irradiation tests. The facility provides experimental conditions similar to the normal operational pressures and temperatures of commercial PWR and CANDU plants. The normal operation modes of the HANARO fuel test loop are classified into loop shutdown, cold stand-by 1, cold stand-by 2, hot stand-by, and hot operation. The operation modes depend on the fission power of test fuels and the coolant temperature at the inlet of the in-pile test section. The HANARO must maintain a shutdown mode if the HANARO fuel test loop is loop shutdown, cold stand-by 1, cold stand-by 2, or hot stand-by. As the HANARO becomes power operation mode, the operation mode of the HANARO fuel test loop comes to hot operation from hot stand-by. The procedure for the HANARO fuel test loop consists of four main parts such as check of initial conditions, stat-up operation procedure, shutdown operation procedure, and check lists for operations. Several hot test operations ensure that the procedure is appropriate

  13. Reactor safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kafka, P.

    1975-01-01

    The spectrum of possible accidents may become characterized by the 'maximum credible accident', which will/will not happen. Similary, the performance of safety systems in a multitude of situations is sometimes simplified to 'the emergency system will/will not work' or even 'reactors are/ are not safe'. In assessing safety, one must avoid this fallacy of reducing a complicated situation to the simple black-and-white picture of yes/no. Similarly, there is a natural tendency continually to improve the safety of a system to assure that it is 'safe enough'. Any system can be made safer and there is usually some additional cost. It is important to balance the increased safety against the increased costs. (orig.) [de

  14. Some topics on safety analysis and accident nodalization of CAREM-25

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gimenez, Marcelo O.; Zanocco, Pablo; Schlamp, Miguel A.; Ottaviani, Anahi; Garcia, Alicia

    2000-01-01

    The main goal of nuclear safety area in the CAREM Project Phase I, carried out during 1999, was to consolidate the safety systems design through an integral analysis of the reactor and the safety systems response to different accidental sequences. A primary circuit nodalization, including the steam generators, was done with RELAP5 code. The modeling of System 230 (absorber rods drive feed water system), System 1400 (purification and control volume system) and steam condensation on the absorber rods drive system and on RPV wall is implemented through boundary conditions. Also the Residual Heat Removal System and the Second Shutdown system are modeled. The reactor steady state at full power was calculated. The results agree quite well with design values. It can be said from the accident analysis that the nodalization responds properly. Further analysis should be done in order to qualify the nodalization and to compare benchmarks with other codes and experimental data. On the other hand, the steam dome model should be improved with more precise data about absorber rods drive system condensation, loss of heat and inner components layout. (author)

  15. US nuclear safety. Review and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hanauer, S.H.

    1977-01-01

    The paper deals with the evolution of reactor safety principles, design bases, regulatory requirements, and experience in the United States. Safety concerns have evolved over the years, from reactivity transients and shut-down systems, to blowdowns and containment, to severe design basis accidents and mitigating systems, to the performance of actual materials, systems and humans. The primary safety concerns of one epoch have been superseded in considerable measure by those of later times. Successive plateaus of technical understanding are achieved by solutions being found to earlier problems. Design studies, research, operating experience and regulatory imperatives all contribute to the increased understanding and thus to the safety improvements adopted and accepted. The improvement of safety with time, and the ability of existing reactors to operate safely in the face of new concerns, has confirmed the correctness and usefulness of the defence-in-depth approach and safety margins used in safety design in the United States of America. A regulatory programme such as the one in the United States justifies its great cost by its important contributions to safety. Yet only the designers, constructors and operators of nuclear power plants can actually achieve public safety. The regulatory programme audits, assesses and spot-checks the actual work. Since neither materials nor human beings are flawless, mistakes will be made; that is why defence-in-depth and safety margins are provided. The regulatory programme should enhance safety by decreasing the frequency of uncorrected mistakes. Maintenance of public safety also requires technical and managerial competence and attention in the organizations responsible for nuclear plants as well as regulatory organizations. (author)

  16. Reactor system safety assurance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mattson, R.J.

    1984-01-01

    The philosophy of reactor safety is that design should follow established and conservative engineering practices, there should be safety margins in all modes of plant operation, special systems should be provided for accidents, and safety systems should have redundant components. This philosophy provides ''defense in depth.'' Additionally, the safety of nuclear power plants relies on ''safety systems'' to assure acceptable response to design basis events. Operating experience has shown the need to study plant response to more frequent upset conditions and to account for the influence of operators and non-safety systems on overall performance. Defense in depth is being supplemented by risk and reliability assessment

  17. Technical specification optimization program - engineered safety features

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andre, G.R.; Jansen, R.L.

    1986-01-01

    The Westinghouse Technical Specification Program (TOP) was designed to evaluate on a quantitative basis revisions to Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications. The revisions are directed at simplifying plant operation, and reducing unnecessary transients, shutdowns, and manpower requirements. In conjunction with the Westinghouse Owners Group, Westinghouse initiated a program to develop a methodology to justify Technical Specification revisions; particularly revisions related to testing and maintenance requirements on plant operation for instrumentation systems. The methodology was originally developed and applied to the reactor trip features of the reactor protection system (RPS). The current study further refined the methodology and applied it to the engineered safety features of the RPS

  18. Global shutdown dose rate maps for a DEMO conceptual design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leichtle, D.; Pereslavtsev, P.; Sanz, J.; Catalan, J.P.; Juarez, R.

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • Application of R2S-method on high-resolution full torus sector mesh for DEMO. • Absorbed dose rates after shutdown for a variely of RH equipment at typical locations. • Idenification of radiation levels at several port based locations. - Abstract: For the calculations of highly reliable shutdown dose rate (SDR) maps in fusion devices like a DEMO plant, the Rigorous-2-step (R2S) method is nowadays routinely applied using high-resolution decay gamma sources from initial high-resolution neutron flux meshes activating all materials in the system. This approach has been utilized in the present paper with the objective to provide SDR results relevant for RH systems of a conceptual DEMO design developed in the EU. The primary objective was to assess specific locations of interest for RH equipment inside the vessel and along the extension of maintenance ports. To this end, a provisional DEMO MCNP model has been used, featuring HCLL-type blankets, tungsten/copper divertor, manifolds, vacuum vessel with ports and toroidal field coils. The operational scenario assumed 2.1 GW fusion power and a life-time of 20 years with plant availability of 30%, where removable parts will be extracted after 5.2 years. Results of absorbed dose rate distributions for several relevant materials are presented and discussed in terms of the different contributions from the various activated components.

  19. Global shutdown dose rate maps for a DEMO conceptual design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Leichtle, D., E-mail: dieter.leichtle@f4e.europa.eu [Karlsruhe Institute of Technology KIT, Institute for Neutron Physics and Reactor Technology, Hermann-von-Helmholtz-Platz 1, 76344 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen (Germany); Pereslavtsev, P. [Karlsruhe Institute of Technology KIT, Institute for Neutron Physics and Reactor Technology, Hermann-von-Helmholtz-Platz 1, 76344 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen (Germany); Sanz, J.; Catalan, J.P.; Juarez, R. [Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia(UNED), E.T.S. Ingenieros Industriales, C/ Juan del Rosal 12, 28040 Madrid (Spain)

    2015-10-15

    Highlights: • Application of R2S-method on high-resolution full torus sector mesh for DEMO. • Absorbed dose rates after shutdown for a variely of RH equipment at typical locations. • Idenification of radiation levels at several port based locations. - Abstract: For the calculations of highly reliable shutdown dose rate (SDR) maps in fusion devices like a DEMO plant, the Rigorous-2-step (R2S) method is nowadays routinely applied using high-resolution decay gamma sources from initial high-resolution neutron flux meshes activating all materials in the system. This approach has been utilized in the present paper with the objective to provide SDR results relevant for RH systems of a conceptual DEMO design developed in the EU. The primary objective was to assess specific locations of interest for RH equipment inside the vessel and along the extension of maintenance ports. To this end, a provisional DEMO MCNP model has been used, featuring HCLL-type blankets, tungsten/copper divertor, manifolds, vacuum vessel with ports and toroidal field coils. The operational scenario assumed 2.1 GW fusion power and a life-time of 20 years with plant availability of 30%, where removable parts will be extracted after 5.2 years. Results of absorbed dose rate distributions for several relevant materials are presented and discussed in terms of the different contributions from the various activated components.

  20. Design of diverse safety rod and its drive mechanism of PFBR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vijayashree, R.; Govindarajan, S.; Chetal, S.C.

    1997-01-01

    In Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), there are two types of absorber rods for control and shutdown of the reactor in the event of any abnormal event. They are: (i) Control and Safety Rod (CSR) and (ii) the Diverse Safety Rod (DSR). Of these, the former (CSR) caters to the control function of the reactor during normal operating conditions and to the shutdown during abnormal situations. The DSR, on the other hand is meant essentially for the reactor shutdown to take care of any abnormal transient. It is rather important to note that functionally the DSR is independent of CSR in the sense, that it can bring the reactor to a cold shutdown state and maintain it even under the hypothetical condition of the failure of CSR. From the design point of view, this stipulates a failure probability of less than 10 -4 per demand. The DSR is normally parked above the core by the Diverse Safety Rod Drive Mechanism (DSRDM). On receiving a scram signal it gets released from the holding electromagnet and falls under the gravity into the core. Diverse features are incorporated both in the absorber rods and in the drive mechanisms to avoid common mode failures. This paper discusses the salient features of DSR and DSRDM. A brief account of detailed design, analysis and development of two important subassemblies viz. electromagnet and sodium dash pot is also presented. In addition, a brief comparison between CSR and DSR including their drive mechanisms is also provided. (author)

  1. CV activities on the LHC complex during the long shutdown

    CERN Document Server

    Deleval, S; Body, Y; Obrecht, M; Moccia, S; Peon, G

    2011-01-01

    The presentation gives an overview of the major projects and work foreseen to be performed during next long shutdown on cooling and ventilation plants. Several projects are needed following the experience of the last years when LHC was running, in particular the modifications in the water cooling circuits presently in overflow. Some other projects are linked to the CV consolidation plan. Finally, most of the work shall be done to respond to additional requests: SR buildings air conditioning, the need to be able to clean and maintain the LHC cooling towers without a complete stop of cooling circuits, the upgrade of the air conditioning of the CCC rack room cooling etc. For all these activities, the author will detail constraints and the impact on the schedule and on the operation of the plants that will however need to run for most of the shutdown duration. The consequence of postponing the long shutdown from 2012 to 2013 will be also covered.

  2. Criticality safety and facility design considerations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waltz, W.R.

    1991-06-01

    Operations with fissile material introduce the risk of a criticality accident that may be lethal to nearby personnel. In addition, concerns over criticality safety can result in substantial delays and shutdown of facility operations. For these reasons, it is clear that the prevention of a nuclear criticality accident should play a major role in the design of a nuclear facility. The emphasis of this report will be placed on engineering design considerations in the prevention of criticality. The discussion will not include other important aspects, such as the physics of calculating limits nor criticality alarm systems

  3. WNP-2 outage safety review methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chiang, Albert; Fu, James

    2004-01-01

    A practical and versatile method was developed in the flow chart and checklist forms to show the defense-in-depth for various key safety functions of a nuclear power plant during shutdown. Using four different colors (green, yellow, orange, and red) for indication of levels of defense-in-depth is visually impressive, easy to understand, and was adopted by the outage management personnel as a convenient reference tool for maintenance activity planning before the outage, and schedule changes during the outage. This paper describes the method and its application at Washington Public Power Supply System's Nuclear Project 2 (WNP-2). (author)

  4. Technical evaluation of the susceptibility of safety-related systems to flooding caused by the failure of non-category I systems for Palisades nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Collins, E.K.

    1979-10-01

    The technical evaluation is presented of Consumers Power Company's Palisades nuclear power plant to determine whether the failure of any non-Category I (seismic) equipment could result in a condition, such as flooding, that might potentially adversely affect the performance of safety-related equipment required for the safe shutdown of the facility or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Criteria developed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission were used to evaluate the acceptability of the existing protection as well as measures taken by Consumers Power Company to minimize the danger of flooding and to protect safety-related equipment

  5. 40 CFR 63.2852 - What is a startup, shutdown, and malfunction plan?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 12 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true What is a startup, shutdown, and... Production Compliance Requirements § 63.2852 What is a startup, shutdown, and malfunction plan? You must...)(2) malfunction period, or the § 63.2850(c)(2) or (d)(2) initial startup period. The SSM plan must...

  6. Comprehensive safety analysis code system for nuclear fusion reactors III: Ex-vessel LOCA analyses considering passive safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Honda, T.; Okazaki, T.; Maki, K.; Uda, T.; Seki, Y.; Aoki, I.; Kunugi, T.

    1996-01-01

    Ex-vessel loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) in a fusion reactor have been analyzed to investigate the possibility of passive plasma shutdown. For this purpose, a hybrid code of the plasma dynamics and thermal characteristics of the reactor structures, which has been modified to include the impurity emission from plasma-facing components (PFCs), has been developed. Ex-vessel LOCAs of the cooling system during the ignition operation in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), in which graphite PFCs were employed in conceptual design activity, were assumed. When double-ended break occurs at the cold leg of the divertor cooling system, the copper cooling tube begins to melt within 3 s after the LOCA, even though the plasma is passively shut down at nearly 4 s. An active plasma shutdown system will be needed for such rapid transient accidents. On the other hand, when a small (1%) break LOCA occurs there, the plasma is passively shut down at nearly 36 s, which happens before the copper cooling tube begins to melt. When the double-ended break LOCA occurs at the cold leg of the first-wall cooling system, there is enough time (nearly 100 s) to shut down the plasma with a controllable method before the reactor structures are damaged. 21 refs., 8 figs

  7. 40 CFR 60.2918 - What happens during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 6 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What happens during periods of startup... of startup, shutdown, and malfunction? The emission limitations and operating limits apply at all times except during OSWI unit startups, shutdowns, or malfunctions. Performance Testing ...

  8. Calculation of the negative reactivity inserted by the shutdown system number two (SDS2) of a CANDU reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Arsenault, B [Ecole Polytechnique, Montreal, PQ (Canada)

    1994-12-31

    The secondary shutdown system (SDS2) of a CANDU reactor consists of liquid poison injection through nozzles disposed horizontally across the core. The nominal concentration of gadolinium nitrate poison is 8000 ppm. With the methods available to the nuclear industry for calculating the negative reactivity inserted by the SDS2, some approximations are needed, and a simplified model of poison propagation has to be used to calculate the differential cross sections. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the errors introduced by the approximations in the supercell and core calculations. The MULTICELL and EXCELL codes gave different power distributions, and further work was recommended. 9 refs., 2 tabs., 4 figs.

  9. Using dew points to estimate savings during a planned cooling shutdown

    Science.gov (United States)

    Friedlein, Matthew T.; Changnon, David; Musselman, Eric; Zielinski, Jeff

    2005-12-01

    In an effort to save money during the summer of 2003, Northern Illinois University (NIU) administrators instituted a four-day working week and stopped air conditioning buildings for the three-day weekends (Friday through Sunday). Shutting down the air conditioning systems caused a noticeable drop in electricity usage for that part of the campus that features in our study, with estimated total electricity savings of 1,268,492 kilowatt-hours or 17% of the average usage during that eight-week period. NIU's air conditioning systems, which relied on evaporative cooling to function, were sensitive to dew point levels. Greatest savings during the shutdown period occurred on days with higher dew points. An examination of the regional dew point climatology (1959 2003) indicated that the average summer daily dew point for 2003 was 14.9°C (58.8°F), which fell in the lowest 20% of the distribution. Based on the relationship between daily average dew points and electrical usage, a predictive model that could estimate electrical daily savings was created. This model suggests that electrical savings related to any future three-day shutdowns over summer could be much greater in more humid summers. Studies like this demonstrate the potential value of applying climatological information and of integrating this information into practical decision-making.

  10. 78 FR 49553 - Three Mile Island, Unit 2; Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-14

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 50-320; NRC-2013-0183] Three Mile Island, Unit 2; Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Notice of receipt... Shutdown Decommissioning Activity Report (PSDAR) for Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2). The PSDAR provides...

  11. Startup, Shutdown, & Malfunction (SSM) Emissions at Industrial Facilities

    Science.gov (United States)

    EPA issued a final action to ensure states have plans in place that are fully consistent with the Clean Air Act and recent court decisions concerning startup, shutdown and malfunction (SSM) operations.

  12. Refurbishment and safety management of JMTR in extended showdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ide, Hiroshi; Hori, Naohiko; Gorai, Shigeru; Kusunoki, Tsuyoshi

    2011-06-01

    Japan Materials Testing Reactor (JMTR) is a testing reactor dedicated to the irradiation tests of materials and fuels. The reactor type of the JMTR is light water moderated and cooled tank type. It achieved first criticality in 1968. Operation was started in 1970. The JMTR had been being operated for 38 years from first criticality to the JMTR No.165 cycle finished. Periodic Safety Review (PSR) was carried out with confirming the integrity inspection of the JMTR reactor facilities. And the 10 years maintenance plan was made in 2004. After that, the restart of the JMTR has been strongly requested from various users as the only irradiation testing reactor in Japan. Finally, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) decided the refurbishment and restart of the JMTR in December 2006, and the refurbishment works was started from FY 2007. The equipment to remain in use and that which needs replacing before the restart of the JMTR was selected after having been evaluated on its damage and wear due to aging significance in safety functions, past safety-related maintenance date, and the enhancement of facility operation. The renewal work of power supply system, boiler, radioactive waste facility, etc. was already carried out as scheduled. The renewal work of reactor control system, nuclear instrumentation system and so on is being carried out. As for the safety management during reactor operation, the facility periodical own inspection and daily inspection is carried out for the purpose of maintaining soundness and reliability of facilities and equipments. And it is confirmed that the performance of facilities and equipments is maintained. As for the radiation control, irradiation dose limit determined by the law is obeyed. Based on the Concept of radiation protection of the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP), reduction of dose is endeavored. The safety management during reactor shutdown is also carried out as well as it of reactor operation term. However, the

  13. LMFBR safety and sodium boiling

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hinkle, W.D.; Tschamper, P.M.; Fontana, M.H.; Henry, R.E.; Padilla, A. Jr.

    1978-01-01

    Within the U.S. Fast Breeder Reactor Safety R and D Work Breakdown Structure for Line of Assurance 2, Limit Core Damage, the influence of sodium boiling upon the progression and termination of accidents is being studied in loss of flow, transient overpower, loss of piping integrity, loss of shutdown heat removal system and local fault situations. The pertinent analytical and experimental results of this research to date are surveyed and compared with the requirements for demonstrating the effectiveness of this line of assurance. A discussion of specific technical issues concerned with sodium boiling and the need for future development work is also presented.

  14. Elementary calculation of the shutdown delay of a pile

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yvon, J.

    1949-04-01

    This study analyzes theoretically the progress of the shutdown of a nuclear pile (reactor) when a cadmium rod is introduced instantaneously. For simplification reasons, the environment of the pile is considered as homogenous and only thermal neutrons are considered (delayed neutrons are neglected). Calculation is made first for a plane configuration (plane vessel, plane multiplier without reflector, and plane multiplier with reflector), and then for a cylindrical configuration (multiplier without reflector, multiplier with infinitely thick reflector, finite cylindrical piles without reflector and with reflector). The self-sustain conditions are calculated for each case and the multiplication length and the shutdown delay are deduced. (J.S.)

  15. 40 CFR 60.2685 - What happens during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 6 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What happens during periods of startup... happens during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction? (a) The emission limitations and operating limits apply at all times except during CISWI unit startups, shutdowns, or malfunctions. (b) Each...

  16. 40 CFR 60.3025 - What happens during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 6 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What happens during periods of startup... during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction? The emission limitations and operating limits apply at all times except during OSWI unit startups, shutdowns, or malfunctions. Model Rule—Performance...

  17. Safety system status monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lewis, J.R.; Morgenstern, M.H.; Rideout, T.H.; Cowley, P.J.

    1984-03-01

    The Pacific Northwest Laboratory has studied the safety aspects of monitoring the preoperational status of safety systems in nuclear power plants. The goals of the study were to assess for the NRC the effectiveness of current monitoring systems and procedures, to develop near-term guidelines for reducing human errors associated with monitoring safety system status, and to recommend a regulatory position on this issue. A review of safety system status monitoring practices indicated that current systems and procedures do not adequately aid control room operators in monitoring safety system status. This is true even of some systems and procedures installed to meet existing regulatory guidelines (Regulatory Guide 1.47). In consequence, this report suggests acceptance criteria for meeting the functional requirements of an adequate system for monitoring safety system status. Also suggested are near-term guidelines that could reduce the likelihood of human errors in specific, high-priority status monitoring tasks. It is recommended that (1) Regulatory Guide 1.47 be revised to address these acceptance criteria, and (2) the revised Regulatory Guide 1.47 be applied to all plants, including those built since the issuance of the original Regulatory Guide

  18. Safety system status monitoring

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lewis, J.R.; Morgenstern, M.H.; Rideout, T.H.; Cowley, P.J.

    1984-03-01

    The Pacific Northwest Laboratory has studied the safety aspects of monitoring the preoperational status of safety systems in nuclear power plants. The goals of the study were to assess for the NRC the effectiveness of current monitoring systems and procedures, to develop near-term guidelines for reducing human errors associated with monitoring safety system status, and to recommend a regulatory position on this issue. A review of safety system status monitoring practices indicated that current systems and procedures do not adequately aid control room operators in monitoring safety system status. This is true even of some systems and procedures installed to meet existing regulatory guidelines (Regulatory Guide 1.47). In consequence, this report suggests acceptance criteria for meeting the functional requirements of an adequate system for monitoring safety system status. Also suggested are near-term guidelines that could reduce the likelihood of human errors in specific, high-priority status monitoring tasks. It is recommended that (1) Regulatory Guide 1.47 be revised to address these acceptance criteria, and (2) the revised Regulatory Guide 1.47 be applied to all plants, including those built since the issuance of the original Regulatory Guide.

  19. 40 CFR 60.1710 - What happens to the emission limits during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction? 60.1710 Section 60.1710 Protection of Environment... during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction? (a) The emission limits of this subpart apply at all times except during periods of municipal waste combustion unit startup, shutdown, or malfunction...

  20. 40 CFR 60.1205 - What happens to the operating requirements during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... requirements during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction? 60.1205 Section 60.1205 Protection of... requirements during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction? (a) The operating requirements of this subpart apply at all times except during periods of municipal waste combustion unit startup, shutdown, or...

  1. Traceability of Software Safety Requirements in Legacy Safety Critical Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hill, Janice L.

    2007-01-01

    How can traceability of software safety requirements be created for legacy safety critical systems? Requirements in safety standards are imposed most times during contract negotiations. On the other hand, there are instances where safety standards are levied on legacy safety critical systems, some of which may be considered for reuse for new applications. Safety standards often specify that software development documentation include process-oriented and technical safety requirements, and also require that system and software safety analyses are performed supporting technical safety requirements implementation. So what can be done if the requisite documents for establishing and maintaining safety requirements traceability are not available?

  2. Shutdown and low-power operation at commercial nuclear power plants in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    The report contains the results of the NRC Staff's evaluation of shutdown and low-power operations at US commercial nuclear power plants. The report describes studies conducted by the staff in the following areas: Operating experience related to shutdown and low-power operations, probabilistic risk assessment of shutdown and low-power conditions and utility programs for planning and conducting activities during periods the plant is shut down. The report also documents evaluations of a number of technical issues regarding shutdown and low-power operations performed by the staff, including the principal findings and conclusions. Potential new regulatory requirements are discussed, as well as potential changes in NRC programs. A draft report was issued for comment in February 1992. This report is the final version and includes the responses to the comments along with the staff regulatory analysis of potential new requirements

  3. 40 CFR 62.14645 - What happens during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 8 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What happens during periods of startup... Limits § 62.14645 What happens during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction? (a) The emission limitations and operating limits apply at all times except during periods of CISWI unit startup, shutdown, or...

  4. 40 CFR 62.15165 - What happens to the emission limits during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction? 62.15165 Section 62.15165 Protection of Environment... emission limits during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction? (a) The emission limits of this subpart apply at all times except during periods of municipal waste combustion unit startup, shutdown, or...

  5. Risk-informed, performance-based safety-security interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mrowca, B.; Eltawila, F.

    2012-01-01

    Safety-security interface is a term that is used as part of the commercial nuclear power security framework to promote coordination of the many potentially adverse interactions between plant security and plant safety. Its object is to prevent the compromise of either. It is also used to describe the concept of building security into a plant's design similar to the long standing practices used for safety therefore reducing the complexity of the operational security while maintaining or enhancing overall security. With this in mind, the concept of safety-security interface, when fully implemented, can influence a plant's design, operation and maintenance. It brings the approach use for plant security to one that is similar to that used for safety. Also, as with safety, the application of risk-informed techniques to fully implement and integrate safety and security is important. Just as designers and operators have applied these techniques to enhance and focus safety, these same techniques can be applied to security to not only enhance and focus the security but also to aid in the implementation of effective techniques to address the safety-security interfaces. Implementing this safety-security concept early within the design process can prevent or reduce security vulnerabilities through low cost solutions that often become difficult and expensive to retrofit later in the design and/or post construction period. These security considerations address many of the same issues as safety in ensuring that the response of equipment and plant personnel are adequate. That is, both safety and security are focused on reaching safe shutdown and preventing radiological release. However, the initiation of challenges and the progression of actions in response these challenges and even the definitions of safe shutdown can be considerably different. This paper explores the techniques and limitations that are employed to fully implement a risk-informed, safety-security interface

  6. Extending reactor time-to-poison and reducing poison shutdown time by pre-shutdown power alterations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kerr, Edward

    1963-10-15

    Manipulation of reactor power prior to shutdown and increasing the time- to-poison a sufficient amount to enable the required maintenance work to be completed and the reactor immediately restarted are discussed. The method employed in the NRU Reactor to gain the maximum timeto-poison with the least production loss is outlined. The method is based on intuition and is described by means of an analog of the iodine--xenon equations rather than the equations themselves. (C.E.S.)

  7. Safety of CANDU nuclear power stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Snell, V.G.

    1978-11-01

    A nuclear plant contains a large amount of radioactive material which could be a potential threat to public health. The plant is therefore designed, built and operated so that the risk to the public is low. Careful design of the normal reactor systems is the first line of defense. These systems are highly resistant to an accident happening in the first place, and can also be effective in stopping it if it does happen. Independent and redundant safety sytems minimize the effects of an accident, or stop it completely. They include shutdown systems, emergency core cooling systems, and containment systems. Massive impairment of any one safety system together with an accident can be tolerated. This 'defence in depth' approach recognizes that men and machines are imperfect and that the unexpected happens. The nuclear power plant need not be perfect to be safe. To allow meaningful judgements we must know how safe the plant is. The Atomic Energy Control Board guidelines give one such measure, but they may overestimate the true risk. We interpret these guidelines as an upper limit to the total risk, and trace their evolution. (author)

  8. Philosophy of safety evaluation on fast breeder reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This is the report submitted from the special subcommittee on reactor safety standard to the Nuclear Safety Commission on October 14, 1980, and it was decided to temporarily apply this concept to the safety examination on fast breeder reactors. The examination and discussion of this report were performed by taking the prototype reactor ''Monju'' into consideration, which is to be the present target, referring to the philosophy of the safety evaluation on fast breeder reactors in foreign countries and based on the experiences in the fast experimental reactor ''Joyo''. The items applicable to the safety evaluation for liquid metal-cooled fast breeder reactors (LMFBR) as they are among the existing safety examination guidelines are applied. In addition to the existing guidelines, the report describes the matters to be considered specifically for core, fuel, sodium, sodium void, reactor shut-down system, reactor coolant boundary, cover gas boundary and others, intermediate cooling system, removal of decay heat, containment vessels, high temperature structures, and aseismatic property in the safety design of LMFBR's. For the safety evaluation for LMFBR's, the abnormal transient changes in operation and the phenomena to be evaluated as accidents are enumerated. In order to judge the propriety of the criteria of locating LMFBR facilities, the serious and hypothetical accidents are decided to be evaluated in accordance with the guideline for reactor location investigation. (Wakatsuki, Y.)

  9. Safety design guide for safety related systems for CANDU 9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young; A. C. D. Wright

    1996-03-01

    In general, two types of safety related systems and structures exist in the nuclear plant; The one is a systems and structures which perform safety functions during the normal operation of the plant, and the other is a systems and structures which perform safety functions to mitigate events caused by failure of the normally operating systems or by naturally occurring phenomena. In this safety design guide, these systems are identified in detail, and the major events for which the safety functions are required and the major safety requirements are identified in the list. As the probabilistic safety assessments are completed during the course of the project, additions or deletions to the list may be justified. 3 tabs. (Author) .new

  10. Safety design guide for safety related systems for CANDU 9

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daeduk (Korea, Republic of); Wright, A.C.D. [Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., Toronto (Canada)

    1996-03-01

    In general, two types of safety related systems and structures exist in the nuclear plant; The one is a systems and structures which perform safety functions during the normal operation of the plant, and the other is a systems and structures which perform safety functions to mitigate events caused by failure of the normally operating systems or by naturally occurring phenomena. In this safety design guide, these systems are identified in detail, and the major events for which the safety functions are required and the major safety requirements are identified in the list. As the probabilistic safety assessments are completed during the course of the project, additions or deletions to the list may be justified. 3 tabs. (Author) .new.

  11. Nuclear Reactor RA Safety Report, Vol. 16, Maximum hypothetical accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-11-01

    Fault tree analysis of the maximum hypothetical accident covers the basic elements: accident initiation, phase development phases - scheme of possible accident flow. Cause of the accident initiation is the break of primary cooling pipe, heavy water system. Loss of primary coolant causes loss of pressure in the primary circuit at the coolant input in the reactor vessel. This initiates safety protection system which should automatically shutdown the reactor. Separate chapters are devoted to: after-heat removal, coolant and moderator loss; accident effects on the reactor core, effects in the reactor building, and release of radioactive wastes [sr

  12. Safety system function trends

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, C.

    1989-01-01

    This paper describes research to develop risk-based indicators of plant safety performance. One measure of the safety-performance of operating nuclear power plants is the unavailability of important safety systems. Brookhaven National Laboratory and Science Applications International Corporation are evaluating ways to aggregate train-level or component-level data to provide such an indicator. This type of indicator would respond to changes in plant safety margins faster than the currently used indicator of safety system unavailability (i.e., safety system failures reported in licensee event reports). Trends in the proposed indicator would be one indication of trends in plant safety performance and maintenance effectiveness. This paper summarizes the basis for such an indicator, identifies technical issues to be resolved, and illustrates the potential usefullness of such indicators by means of computer simulations and case studies

  13. Safety class methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donner, E.B.; Low, J.M.; Lux, C.R.

    1992-01-01

    DOE Order 6430.1A, General Design Criteria (GDC), requires that DOE facilities be evaluated with respect to ''safety class items.'' Although the GDC defines safety class items, it does not provide a methodology for selecting safety class items. The methodology described in this paper was developed to assure that Safety Class Items at the Savannah River Site (SRS) are selected in a consistent and technically defensible manner. Safety class items are those in the highest of four categories determined to be of special importance to nuclear safety and, merit appropriately higher-quality design, fabrication, and industrial test standards and codes. The identification of safety class items is approached using a cascading strategy that begins at the 'safety function' level (i.e., a cooling function, ventilation function, etc.) and proceeds down to the system, component, or structure level. Thus, the items that are required to support a safety function are SCls. The basic steps in this procedure apply to the determination of SCls for both new project activities, and for operating facilities. The GDC lists six characteristics of SCls to be considered as a starting point for safety item classification. They are as follows: 1. Those items whose failure would produce exposure consequences that would exceed the guidelines in Section 1300-1.4, ''Guidance on Limiting Exposure of the Public,'' at the site boundary or nearest point of public access 2. Those items required to maintain operating parameters within the safety limits specified in the Operational Safety Requirements during normal operations and anticipated operational occurrences. 3. Those items required for nuclear criticality safety. 4. Those items required to monitor the release of radioactive material to the environment during and after a Design Basis Accident. Those items required to achieve, and maintain the facility in a safe shutdown condition 6. Those items that control Safety Class Item listed above

  14. Development and validation of a model for high pressure liquid poison injection for CANDU-6 shutdown system no.2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rhee, B.-W.; Jeong, C.J.; Choi, J.H.; Yoo, S.-Y.

    2002-01-01

    In CANDU reactor one of the two reactor shutdown systems is the liquid poison injection system which injects the highly pressurized liquid neutron poison into the moderator tank via small holes on the nozzle pipes. To ensure the safe shutdown of a reactor it is necessary for the poison curtains generated by jets provide quick, and enough negative reactivity to the reactor during the early stage of the accident. In order to produce the neutron cross section necessary to perform this work, the poison concentration distribution during the transient is necessary. In this study, a set of models for analyzing the transient poison concentration induced by this high pressure poison injection jet activated upon the reactor trip in a CANDU-6 reactor moderator tank has been developed and used to generate the poison concentration distribution of the poison curtains induced by the high pressure jets injected into the vacant region between the calandria tube banks. The poison injection rate through the jet holes drilled on the nozzle pipes is obtained by a 1-D transient hydrodynamic code called, ALITRIG, and this injection rate is used to provide the inlet boundary condition to a 3-D CFD model of the moderator tank based on CFX4.3, an AEA Technology CFD code, to simulate the formation and growth of the poison jet curtain inside the moderator tank. For validation, the current model is validated against a poison injection experiment performed at BARC, India and another poison jet experiment for Generic CANDU-6 performed at AECL, Canada. In conclusion this set of models is considered to predict the experimental results in a physically reasonable and consistent manner. (author)

  15. Improvement on models associated with LOCA and loss of RHR accidents during shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, W. P.; Chung, Y. J.; Kim, W. S.; Kim, K. D.; Lee, S. J.; Jung, J. J.; Ha, G. S.; Son, Y. S.; Chung, B. D.; Han, D. H.; Lee, Y. J.; Hwang, T. S.; Lee, S. Y.; Park, C. Y.; Choi, H. R.; Lee, S. Y.; Choi, J. H.; Ban, C. H.; Bae, G. H.

    1997-07-01

    The characteristics of the best estimate codes available in Korea have been studied through literature surveys for the reliability on LOCA analyses and then, a feasibility study on reduction of capacities of existing safety systems in YGN 3/4 have been carried out using the codes. Since it has been expected to adopt DVI + 4 -Train HPSI in the next generation reactor, the core uncoveries under one DVI line break and 6 cold leg break, which is a requirement for advance d reactor by EPRI, in addition to LBLOCA for reduction effect of SIT capacity, have been analyzed. Finally, an effort on finding the way how the system could be simplified, has been made through the analysis of SIT injection characteristics. On the other hand, the best estimate methodology consisting of uncertainties of the code itself, bias, and application have been developed first and quantification of the uncertainty has been made the case of KORI unit 3 afterward. The prediction capabilities of the best estimate codes and major physical models on the accident under loss of RHR during shutdown have been assessed suing the large scale experimental data delivered from France and then, the assessed codes have been used to provide essential data required for description of operation procedures in YGN 3/4. (author). 64 refs., 45 figs

  16. An investigation of scramming the outer shutdown rods of the ANS with no reversal of flow in the manifold inlet lines

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morsk, K.

    1992-10-01

    This report provides calculations and calculation checks on the outer shutdown system, consisting of eight shutdown rods located on the outside of the core. The function of the system is to scram the reactor, or to break the chain reaction of the fission process. The shutdown rods are clad with a neutron-absorbing material (i.e., hafnium) to achieve scram. During normal operation, the outer shutdown rods (Fig. 1) are in a nonscram, withdrawn position. This means that they are not close enough to the core to absorb a significant number of the neutrons that cause the fission process. In the case of a malfunction or an emergency, the outer control rods are moved to a position near the core. The outer shutdown system is operated with the use of springs and hydraulics. During normal operation, a constant flow of heavy water is circulated through the reflector vessel. A part of this flow provides a pressure high enough to keep the rods in their withdrawn or upper position, a nonscram status. If any signs of abnormal operation occur, the valves in the hydraulic system cut off the flow, and the springs push the rods into the scram position, stopping the chain reaction. Once the flow is restarted, the rods can be withdrawn to the nonscram position. Calculations of the mass of the outer control rod, the scram spring data, and the hydraulic pressure to hold the rods in the withdrawn position have been checked. In the case of a malfunction of the flow/pressure relief valves, a calculation was needed to show that the scram time would not exceed the time allowed. The scram time has been determined based on different values of the rod insertion length and the outside radius of the annulus was calculated. The effective force pushing the rod into the scram position, the rate of acceleration, and the actual scram time was then determined

  17. Development of a Seismic Setpoint Calculation Methodology Using a Safety System Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chang Jae; Baik, Kwang Il; Lee, Sang Jeong

    2013-01-01

    The Automatic Seismic Trip System (ASTS) automatically actuates reactor trip when it detects seismic activities whose magnitudes are comparable to a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), which is the maximum hypothetical earthquake at the nuclear power plant site. To ensure that the reactor is tripped before the magnitude of earthquake exceeds the SSE, it is crucial to reasonably determine the seismic setpoint. The trip setpoint and allowable value for the ASTS for Advanced Power Reactor (APR) 1400 Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) were determined by the methodology presented in this paper. The ASTS that trips the reactor when a large earthquake occurs is categorized as a non safety system because the system is not required by design basis event criteria. This means ASTS has neither specific analytical limit nor dedicated setpoint calculation methodology. Therefore, we developed the ASTS setpoint calculation methodology by conservatively considering that of PPS. By incorporating the developed methodology into the ASTS for APR1400, the more conservative trip setpoint and allowable value were determined. In addition, the ZPA from the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) FRS of the floor where the sensor module is located is 0.1g. Thus, the allowance of 0.17g between OBE of 0.1 g and ASTS trip setpoint of 0.27 g is sufficient to prevent the reactor trip before the magnitude of the earthquake exceeds the OBE. In result, the developed ASTS setpoint calculation methodology is evaluated as reasonable in both aspects of the safety and performance of the NPPs. This will be used to determine the ASTS trip setpoint and allowable for newly constructed plants

  18. Evaluation of reactivity shutdown margin for nuclear fuel reload optimization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wong, Hing-Ip; Maldonado, G.I.

    1995-01-01

    The FORMOSA-P code is a nuclear fuel management optimization package that combines simulated annealing (SA) and nodal generalized perturbation theory (GPT). Recent studies at Electricite de France (EdF-Clamart) have produced good results for power-peaking minimizations under multiple limiting control rod configurations. However, since the reactivity shutdown margin is not explicitly treated as an objective or constraint function, then any optimal loading patterns (LPs) are not guaranteed to yield an adequate shutdown margin (SDM). This study describes the implementation of the SDM calculation within a FORMOSA-P optimization. Maintaining all additional computational requirements to a minimum was a key consideration

  19. Coolant clean-up and recycle systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ito, Takao.

    1979-01-01

    Purpose: To increase the service life of mechanical seals in a shaft sealing device, eliminate leakages and improve the safety by providing a recycle pump for feeding coolants to a coolant clean-up device upon reactor shut-down and adapting the pump treat only low temperature and low pressure coolants. Constitution: The system is adapted to partially take out coolants from the pipeways of a recycling pump upon normal operation and feed them to a clean-up device. Upon reactor shut-down, the recycle pump is stopped and coolants are extracted by the recycle pump for shut-down into the clean-up device. Since the coolants are not fed to the clean-up device by the recycle pump during normal operation as conducted so far, high temperature and high pressure coolants are not directly fed to the recycle pump, thereby enabling to avoid mechanical problems in the pump. (Kamimura, M.)

  20. Probabilistic safety analysis of DC power supply requirements for nuclear power plants. Technical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baranowsky, P.W.; Kolaczkowski, A.M.; Fedele, M.A.

    1981-04-01

    A probabilistic safety assessment was performed as part of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission generic safety task A-30, Adequacy of Safety Related DC Power Supplies. Event and fault tree analysis techniques were used to determine the relative contribution of DC power related accident sequences to the total core damage probability due to shutdown cooling failures. It was found that a potentially large DC power contribution could be substantially reduced by augmenting the minimum design and operational requirements. Recommendations included (1) requiring DC power divisional independence, (2) improved test, maintenance, and surveillance, and (3) requiring core cooling capability be maintained following the loss of one DC power bus and a single failure in another system

  1. IAEA Safety Standards on Management Systems and Safety Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persson, Kerstin Dahlgren

    2007-01-01

    The IAEA has developed a new set of Safety Standard for applying an integrated Management System for facilities and activities. The objective of the new Safety Standards is to define requirements and provide guidance for establishing, implementing, assessing and continually improving a Management System that integrates safety, health, environmental, security, quality and economic related elements to ensure that safety is properly taken into account in all the activities of an organization. With an integrated approach to management system it is also necessary to include the aspect of culture, where the organizational culture and safety culture is seen as crucial elements of the successful implementation of this management system and the attainment of all the goals and particularly the safety goals of the organization. The IAEA has developed a set of service aimed at assisting it's Member States in establishing. Implementing, assessing and continually improving an integrated management system. (author)

  2. Annual report ''nuclear safety in France''

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    This document is the 2001 annual report of the French authority of nuclear safety (ASN). It summarizes the highlights of the year 2000 and details the following aspects: the nuclear safety in France, the organization of the control of nuclear safety, the regulation relative to basic nuclear facilities, the control of facilities, the information of the public, the international relations, the organisation of emergencies, the radiation protection, the transport of radioactive materials, the radioactive wastes, the PWR reactors, the experimental reactors and other laboratories and facilities, the nuclear fuel cycle facilities, and the shutdown and dismantling of nuclear facilities. (J.S.)

  3. Component failures that lead to manual shutdowns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The data for this report are taken from a population of thirty-five LWRs, al of which differ appreciably in size, design, and age. Appendix A provides a graphical display of the number of manual shutdowns per operating year as a function of plant age, with the frequency adjusted to reflect plant availability

  4. Reactor safety instrumentation of Paks NPP (experience and perspective)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elo, S.; Hamar, K.

    1993-01-01

    The majority of the existing control and protection systems in nuclear power plants use old analog technology and design philosophy. Maintenance and the procurement of spare parts is becoming increasingly difficult. In general there is an age degradation concern. Aging degradation in nuclear power plants must be effectively managed to avoid a loss of vital safety function, shutdown of the station, a reduced power generation, or any failure leading to expensive repair. Even with the best efforts in developing reliable and long life instrumentation and control systems for nuclear power plants it is expected that these systems for most plants will require replacements during the life of the plants. The instrumentation and control system of the nuclear power plants designed during the 70's and constructed in the 80's went out-of-date since nuclear safety is not a static concept and the digital computer technology has undergone rapid improvements during the 70's and 80's. Simultaneously the operation and the maintenance of the I ampersand C system of those plants described above becomes more and more difficult and expensive. In this context the pure quality of the former Soviet designed process instrumentation system increases the needs of upgrading this system. The author reviews the main design characteristics of the reactor safety instrumentation of the Paks NPP. Further he attempts to convey the perspective on upgrading the reactor safety instrumentation as seen by the HAEC and its Nuclear Safety Inspectorate

  5. Transient fission-product release during reactor shutdown and startup

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunt, C.E.L.; Lewis, B.J.; Dickson, L.W.

    1997-12-01

    Sweep-gas experiments performed at AECL's Chalk River Laboratories from 1979 to 1985 have been further analysed to determine the fraction of the gaseous fission-product inventory that is released on reactor shutdown and startup. Empirical equations were derived and applied to calculate the stable xenon release from companion fuel elements and from a well-documented experimental fuel bundle irradiated in the NRU reactor. The calculated gas release could be matched to the measured values within about a factor of two for an experimental irradiation with a burnup of 217 MWh/kgU. There was also limited information on the fraction of the radioactive iodine that was exposed, but not released, on reactor shutdown. An empirical equation is proposed for calculating this fraction. (author)

  6. Cadmium safety rod thermal tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, J.K.; Iyer, N.C.; Peacock, H.B.

    1992-01-01

    Thermal testing of cadmium safety rods was conducted as part of a program to define the response of Savannah River Site (SRS) production reactor core components to a hypothetical LOCA leading to a drained reactor tank. The safety rods are present in the reactor core only during shutdown and are not used as a control mechanism during operation; thus, their response to the conditions predicted for the LOCA is only of interest to the extent that it could impact the progression of the accident. This document provides a description of this testing

  7. Derivation of main drivers affecting the possibility of human errors during low power and shutdown operation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ar Ryum; Seong, Poong Hyun [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Park, Jin Kyun; Kim, Jae Whan [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    In order to estimate the possibility of human error and identify its nature, human reliability analysis (HRA) methods have been implemented. For this, various HRA methods have been developed so far: techniques for human error rate prediction (THERP), cause based decision tree (CBDT), the cognitive reliability and error analysis method (CREAM) and so on. Most HRA methods have been developed with a focus on full power operation of NPPs even though human performance may more largely affect the safety of the system during low power and shutdown (LPSD) operation than it would when the system is in full power operation. In this regard, it is necessary to conduct a research for developing HRA method to be used in LPSD operation. For the first step of the study, main drivers which affect the possibility of human error have been developed. Drivers which are commonly called as performance shaping factors (PSFs) are aspects of the human's individual characteristics, environment, organization, or task that specifically decrements or improves human performance, thus respectively increasing or decreasing the likelihood of human errors. In order to estimate the possibility of human error and identify its nature, human reliability analysis (HRA) methods have been implemented. For this, various HRA methods have been developed so far: techniques for human error rate prediction (THERP), cause based decision tree (CBDT), the cognitive reliability and error analysis method (CREAM) and so on. Most HRA methods have been developed with a focus on full power operation of NPPs even though human performance may more largely affect the safety of the system during low power and shutdown (LPSD) operation than it would when the system is in full power operation. In this regard, it is necessary to conduct a research for developing HRA method to be used in LPSD operation. For the first step of the study, main drivers which affect the possibility of human error have been developed. Drivers

  8. Derivation of main drivers affecting the possibility of human errors during low power and shutdown operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Ar Ryum; Seong, Poong Hyun; Park, Jin Kyun; Kim, Jae Whan

    2016-01-01

    In order to estimate the possibility of human error and identify its nature, human reliability analysis (HRA) methods have been implemented. For this, various HRA methods have been developed so far: techniques for human error rate prediction (THERP), cause based decision tree (CBDT), the cognitive reliability and error analysis method (CREAM) and so on. Most HRA methods have been developed with a focus on full power operation of NPPs even though human performance may more largely affect the safety of the system during low power and shutdown (LPSD) operation than it would when the system is in full power operation. In this regard, it is necessary to conduct a research for developing HRA method to be used in LPSD operation. For the first step of the study, main drivers which affect the possibility of human error have been developed. Drivers which are commonly called as performance shaping factors (PSFs) are aspects of the human's individual characteristics, environment, organization, or task that specifically decrements or improves human performance, thus respectively increasing or decreasing the likelihood of human errors. In order to estimate the possibility of human error and identify its nature, human reliability analysis (HRA) methods have been implemented. For this, various HRA methods have been developed so far: techniques for human error rate prediction (THERP), cause based decision tree (CBDT), the cognitive reliability and error analysis method (CREAM) and so on. Most HRA methods have been developed with a focus on full power operation of NPPs even though human performance may more largely affect the safety of the system during low power and shutdown (LPSD) operation than it would when the system is in full power operation. In this regard, it is necessary to conduct a research for developing HRA method to be used in LPSD operation. For the first step of the study, main drivers which affect the possibility of human error have been developed. Drivers which

  9. Dependability Assessment by Static Analysis of Software Important to Nuclear Power Plant Safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ourghanlian, Alain [EDF Lab, Chatou (France)

    2014-08-15

    We describe a practical experimentation of safety assessment of safety-critical software used in Nuclear Power Plants. To enhance the credibility of safety assessments and to optimize safety justification costs, Electricite de France (EDF) investigates the use of methods and tools for source code semantic analysis, to obtain indisputable evidence and help assessors focus on the most critical issues. EDF has been using the PolySpace tool for more than 10 years. Today, new industrial tools, based on the same formal approach, Abstract Interpretation, are available. Practical experimentation with these new tools shows that the precision obtained on one of our shutdown systems software is very significantly improved. In a first part, we present the analysis principles of the tools used in our experimentation. In a second part, we present the main characteristics of protection-system software, and why these characteristics are well adapted for the new analysis tools. In the last part, we present an overview of the results and the limitation of the tools.

  10. Accident sequence analysis for a BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] during low power and shutdown operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitehead, D.W.; Hake, T.M.

    1990-01-01

    Most previous Probabilistic Risk Assessments have excluded consideration of accidents initiated in low power and shutdown modes of operation. A study of the risk associated with operation in low power and shutdown is being performed at Sandia National Laboratories for a US Boiling Water Reactor (BWR). This paper describes the proposed methodology for the analysis of the risk associated with the operation of a BWR during low power and shutdown modes and presents preliminary information resulting from the application of the methodology. 2 refs., 2 tabs

  11. Loss of shutdown cooling during degassing in Doel 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The presentation describes loss of shutdown cooling event during degassing in Doel 1 reactor, including description of Doel 1 features,status of plant prior to incident, event sequence and incident causes

  12. Safety of mechanical devices. Safety of automation systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pahl, G.; Schweizer, G.; Kapp, K.

    1985-01-01

    The paper deals with the classic procedures of safety engineering in the sectors mechanical engineering, electrical and energy engineering, construction and transport, medicine technology and process technology. Particular stress is laid on the safety of automation systems, control technology, protection of mechanical devices, reactor safety, mechanical constructions, transport systems, railway signalling devices, road traffic and protection at work in chemical plans. (DG) [de

  13. The case for nuclear energy. Chapter 2. Nuclear safety and energy security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Trosman, G.

    2010-01-01

    The U.S. nuclear safety assistance activities have had a direct and substantial impact on improving safe operations of 67 Soviet-designed commercial nuclear power plants in Armenia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The U.S. Department of Energy worked with these host countries both to improve safe nuclear operations and in some cases assist in plant shutdown. Independent international safety reviews have identified significant progress in the Eastern European countries to improve the safety of their nuclear power plants since the early 1990s. In addition, all of the probabilistic risk assessments conducted at these plants show a major reduction in the frequency of core damage accidents since U.S. assistance to improve safety at these reactors began. Improved operational safety follows from the combined efforts to improve operator performance. These efforts include providing simulators for operators to practice handling emergency scenarios, developing emergency operating instructions that guide operators calmly through emergencies, providing safety parameter display systems that give operators immediate graphical information on the status of plant systems and training the operators on the safety basis for the plants they operate

  14. A Simple Fully Passive Safety Option for SMART SBLOCA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Won Jae

    2012-01-01

    SMART reactor, an integral pressurized water reactor (iPWR), is developed by KAERI and now under standard design licensing review. Integral reactor design of the SMART has small diameter penetrations below 2 inches at upper parts of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the core is located at very lower part. Amount of reactor coolant inventory is around 0.55tons/MWth during normal operations, which is seven times more than that of conventional PWRs. Such intrinsic safety features of the SMART can provide prolonged core cooling during a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA). As an engineered safety feature for SBLOCA, electrically two-train and mechanically four-train active safety injection (SI) systems are provided to refill the RPV, whose safety been proven through safety analysis and experiments. In addition, four-train passive residual heat removal systems (PRHRSs) are provided to remove core decay heat by natural circulation in the secondary side of steam generators during transient and accident conditions. After Fukushima disaster, a passive safety of nuclear power plants has become more emphasized than conventional active safety, even though there are still debates whether it can really insure the realistic safety. Passive safety is defined such that the core safety is ensured for 72 hours after accidents without any active safety systems and operator actions. In light of this, a simple fully passive safety option for SBLOCA is proposed: low-pressure safety injection tanks (SITs) and heat pipes submerged in the PRHRS emergency coolant tanks (ECTs). Post-LOCA long-term cooling after 72 hours is provided by sump recirculation using shutdown cooling system. Realistic analysis method using MARS3.1 is used to derive fully passive safety option, and then to screen design and operating parameters and to demonstrate the safety performance of SITs. SI line break is selected as a reference SBLOCA scenario

  15. Evaluation of reactivity shutdown margin for nuclear fuel reload optimization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engrand, P.; Wong, H. I.; Maldonado, G.I.

    1996-01-01

    The FORMOSA-P code is a nuclear fuel management optimization package which combines simulated annealing (SA) and nodal generalized perturbation theory (GPT). Recent studies at Electricite de France have produced good results for power peaking minimizations under multiple limiting control rod configurations. However, since the reactivity shutdown margin is not explicitly treated as an objective or constraint function, then any optimal loading patterns (LPs) are not guaranteed to yield an adequate shutdown margin (SDM). This study describes the implementation of the SDM calculation within a FORMOSA-P optimization. Maintaining all additional computational requirements to a minimum was a key consideration. (authors). 4 refs., 2 figs

  16. Complement of existing ASAMPSA2 guidance for Level 2 PSA for shutdown states of reactors, Spent Fuel Pool and recent R and D results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumar, M.; Olsson, A.; Loeffler, H.; Morandi, S.; Gumenyuk, D.; Dejardin, P.; Yu, S.; Jan, P.; Kubicek, J.; Serrano, C.; Raimond, E.; Dirksen, G.; Ivanov, I.; Groudev, P.; Kowal, K.; Prosek, Andrej; Nitoi, M.; Vitazkova, J.; Hirata, K.; Burgazzi, L.

    2016-01-01

    This report can be considered as an addendum to the existing ASAMPSA2 guidance for Level 2 PSA. It provides complementary guidance for Level 2 PSA for accident in the NPP shutdown states and on spent fuel pool and comments on the importance of these accidents on nuclear safety. It includes also information on recent research and development useful for Level 2 PSA developments. The conclusions of the ASAMPSA-E end-users survey and of technical meetings of WP10, WP21, WP22, and WP30 at Vienna University in September 2014 which are relevant for Level 2 PSA have been reflected and are taken into account as much as it is possible with the current status of knowledge. For Level 2 PSA in shutdown states, two plant conditions are to be distinguished: - accident sequences with RPV head closed, - accident sequences with RPV head open. When the RPV head is closed, core melt accident phenomena are very similar to the sequences going on in full power mode. Therefore, the large body of guidance which is available for full power mode is basically applicable to shutdown mode with RPV closed as well. When the RPV is open, some of the L2 PSA issues become irrelevant compared to full power mode, while others come into existence. The situation is different for aspects which do not exist or which are less pronounced in sequences with RPV closed. The report also covers containment issues in shutdown states and discusses the applicability of existing guidance, potential gaps and deficiencies and recommendations are provided. For spent fuel pool accidents in Level 2 PSA, a set of issues is identified and addressed. If the spent fuel pool is located inside the containment, the potential release paths to the environment are almost the same as for core melt accidents in the RPV. If the spent fuel pool is located outside the containment, the potential release paths to the environment depend very much on plant specific properties, e.g. ventilation systems, building doors, roof under thermal

  17. Type and timing of childhood maltreatment and severity of shutdown dissociation in patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorder.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Inga Schalinski

    Full Text Available Dissociation, particularly the shutting down of sensory, motor and speech systems, has been proposed to emerge in susceptible individuals as a defensive response to traumatic stress. In contrast, other individuals show signs of hyperarousal to acute threat. A key question is whether exposure to particular types of stressful events during specific stages of development can program an individual to have a strong dissociative response to subsequent stressors. Vulnerability to ongoing shutdown dissociation was assessed in 75 inpatients (46 M/29 F, M = 31 ± 10 years old with schizophrenia spectrum disorder and related to number of traumatic events experienced or witnessed during childhood or adulthood. The Maltreatment and Abuse Chronology of Exposure (MACE scale was used to collect retrospective recall of exposure to ten types of maltreatment during each year of childhood. Severity of shutdown dissociation was related to number of childhood but not adult traumatic events. Random forest regression with conditional trees indicated that type and timing of childhood maltreatment could predictably account for 31% of the variance (p < 0.003 in shutdown dissociation, with peak vulnerability occurring at 13-14 years of age and with exposure to emotional neglect followed by various forms of emotional abuse. These findings suggest that there may be windows of vulnerability to the development of shutdown dissociation. Results support the hypothesis that experienced events are more important than witnessed events, but challenge the hypothesis that "life-threatening" events are a critical determinant.

  18. Safety rule evolution for future LMFBRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Justin, F.; Wiesner

    1986-06-01

    After safety rules for operating reactors and for built reactors in France and Germany, this report presents the main points of the safety rules for future reactors. It is generally agreed that future LMFBRs will have to show the same safety level as other commercial nuclear power plants. The demonstration is to be partly based on deterministic criteria, or ''safety rules'', and partly on risk considerations, for rare events. In that respect, a high effort on preventive measures, especially to reinforce the reliability of essential safety functions (shutdown, decay heat removal) could be sufficient, if all conditions are considered. So the containment of a hypothetical core disruptive accident is no longer required. Nevertheless, low probability events gave some feedback on the SPX.2 design

  19. Reserves for shutdown/dismantling and disposal in nuclear technology. Theses and recommendations on reform options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meyer, Bettina

    2012-01-01

    The study on reserves for shutdown, dismantling and disposal of nuclear facilities covers the following topics: cost for shutdown, dismantling and disposal and amount and transparency of nuclear reserves, solution by y stock regulated by public law for long-term liabilities, and improvement of the protection in the event of insolvency for the remaining EVU reserves for short- and intermediate-term liabilities. The appendix includes estimations and empirical values for the cost of shutdown and dismantling, estimation of disposal costs, and a summary of Swiss studies on dismantling and disposal and transfer to Germany.

  20. Evaluating safety management system implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Preuss, M.

    2009-01-01

    Canada is committed to not only maintaining, but also improving upon our record of having one of the safest aviation systems in the world. The development, implementation and maintenance of safety management systems is a significant step towards improving safety performance. Canada is considered a world leader in this area and we are fully engaged in implementation. By integrating risk management systems and business practices, the aviation industry stands to gain better safety performance with less regulatory intervention. These are important steps towards improving safety and enhancing the public's confidence in the safety of Canada's aviation system. (author)

  1. 300 Area fuel supply shutdown facility hazards assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, L.R.

    1998-01-01

    This document establishes the technical basis in support of Emergency Planning activities for the 300 Area Fuel Supply Shutdown Facilities on the Hanford Site. Through this document, the technical basis for the development of facility specific Emergency Action Levels and Emergency Planning Zone, is demonstrated

  2. System Design and the Safety Basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellingson, Darrel

    2008-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to present the Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC (BJC) Lessons Learned for system design as it relates to safety basis documentation. BJC has had to reconcile incomplete or outdated system description information with current facility safety basis for a number of situations in recent months. This paper has relevance in multiple topical areas including documented safety analysis, decontamination and decommissioning (D and D), safety basis (SB) implementation, safety and design integration, potential inadequacy of the safety analysis (PISA), technical safety requirements (TSR), and unreviewed safety questions. BJC learned that nuclear safety compliance relies on adequate and well documented system design information. A number of PIS As and TSR violations occurred due to inadequate or erroneous system design information. As a corrective action, BJC assessed the occurrences caused by systems design-safety basis interface problems. Safety systems reviewed included the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) Fluorination System, K-1065 fire alarm system, and the K-25 Radiation Criticality Accident Alarm System. The conclusion was that an inadequate knowledge of system design could result in continuous non-compliance issues relating to nuclear safety. This was especially true with older facilities that lacked current as-built drawings coupled with the loss of 'historical knowledge' as personnel retired or moved on in their careers. Walkdown of systems and the updating of drawings are imperative for nuclear safety compliance. System design integration with safety basis has relevance in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. This paper presents the BJC Lessons Learned in this area. It will be of benefit to DOE contractors that manage and operate an aging population of nuclear facilities

  3. Critical safety function guidelines for experimental fusion facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadwallader, L.C.

    1989-01-01

    As fusion experiments proceed toward deuterium-tritium operation, more attention is being given to public safety. This paper presents the four classes of functions that fusion experiments must provide to assure safe, stable shutdown and retention of radionuclides. These functions are referred to as critical safety functions (CSFs). Selecting CSFs is an important step in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). An example of CSF selection and usage for the Compact Ignition Tokamak (CIT) is also presented

  4. Directly acting spring loaded safety valves as shock reducing measure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ismaier, A.; Schluecker, E.

    2010-01-01

    Hydraulic shocks as induced by fast closure of armatures or by sudden pump failures are massive impacts in piping systems and require extensive measures to absorb the generated load. Basically the avoidance of water hammers are preferable but in case of emergency shutdowns unavoidable hydraulic shocks have to be reduced by appropriate measures. The authors describe experiments with spring loaded safety valves as shock reducing measures. It was shown that the vale dimensions is essential for the efficacy. A realistic modeling is possible using the one-dimensional fluid mechanics code ROLAST.

  5. SASSYS validation with the EBR-II shutdown heat removal tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herzog, J.P.

    1989-01-01

    SASSYS is a coupled neutronic and thermal hydraulic code developed for the analysis of transients in liquid metal cooled reactors (LMRs). The code is especially suited for evaluating of normal reactor transients -- protected (design basis) and unprotected (anticipated transient without scram) transients. Because SASSYS is heavily used in support of the IFR concept and of innovative LMR designs, such as PRISM, a strong validation base for the code must exist. Part of the validation process for SASSYS is analysis of experiments performed on operating reactors, such as the metal fueled Experimental Breeder Reactor -- II (EBR-II). During the course of a series of historic whole-plant experiments, EBR-II illustrated key safety features of metal fueled LMRs. These experiments, the Shutdown Heat Removal Tests (SHRT), culminated in unprotected loss of flow and loss of heat sink transients from full power and flow. Analysis of these and earlier SHRT experiments constitutes a vital part of SASSYS validation, because it facilitates scrutiny of specific SASSYS models and of integrated code capability. 12 refs., 11 figs

  6. Safety Information System Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bullock, M.G.

    1977-03-01

    This Guide provides guidelines for the design and evaluation of a working safety information system. For the relatively few safety professionals who have already adopted computer-based programs, this Guide may aid them in the evaluation of their present system. To those who intend to develop an information system, it will, hopefully, inspire new thinking and encourage steps towards systems safety management. For the line manager who is working where the action is, this Guide may provide insight on the importance of accident facts as a tool for moving ideas up the communication ladder where they will be heard and acted upon; where what he has to say will influence beneficial changes among those who plan and control his operations. In the design of a safety information system, it is suggested that the safety manager make friends with a computer expert or someone on the management team who has some feeling for, and understanding of, the art of information storage and retrieval as a new and better means for communication

  7. Architecture Level Safety Analyses for Safety-Critical Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    K. S. Kushal

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The dependency of complex embedded Safety-Critical Systems across Avionics and Aerospace domains on their underlying software and hardware components has gradually increased with progression in time. Such application domain systems are developed based on a complex integrated architecture, which is modular in nature. Engineering practices assured with system safety standards to manage the failure, faulty, and unsafe operational conditions are very much necessary. System safety analyses involve the analysis of complex software architecture of the system, a major aspect in leading to fatal consequences in the behaviour of Safety-Critical Systems, and provide high reliability and dependability factors during their development. In this paper, we propose an architecture fault modeling and the safety analyses approach that will aid in identifying and eliminating the design flaws. The formal foundations of SAE Architecture Analysis & Design Language (AADL augmented with the Error Model Annex (EMV are discussed. The fault propagation, failure behaviour, and the composite behaviour of the design flaws/failures are considered for architecture safety analysis. The illustration of the proposed approach is validated by implementing the Speed Control Unit of Power-Boat Autopilot (PBA system. The Error Model Annex (EMV is guided with the pattern of consideration and inclusion of probable failure scenarios and propagation of fault conditions in the Speed Control Unit of Power-Boat Autopilot (PBA. This helps in validating the system architecture with the detection of the error event in the model and its impact in the operational environment. This also provides an insight of the certification impact that these exceptional conditions pose at various criticality levels and design assurance levels and its implications in verifying and validating the designs.

  8. Safety management: a few techniques and their application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soundararajan, S.

    2016-01-01

    Industrial safety practice has grown in its stature tremendously since the age of industrial revolution. A number of modern techniques are available to strengthen design safety features, to review operational safety, and to critically appraise and upgrade practices of occupational safety and health management. This talk focuses on three prominent yet simple techniques and their usefulness in the overall safety management of a workplace. Any industrial set-up undergoes different stages in its life cycle-conceptual design, actual design, construction, fabrication and installation, commissioning, operation, shutdown/re-start up and decommissioning. Checklist procedure is a safety tool that can be applied at any of these stages. Thus it is a quite useful technique in safety management and accident prevention. It can serve as a form of approval from one step to another in the course of any routine or specific task. Safety Audit or Safety Review is a critical safety management appraisal tool. It gives a reasonable indication of how well a company's safety programme works, how hazards are recognised, how well employees are motivated and so on. It gives a clear picture about where a company stands as far as framing and implementation of its SHE policy is concerned. Each of the above tools is complementing each other and required to be applied at appropriate juncture in sustaining good safety management system at the workplace

  9. Plant operational states analysis in low power and shutdown PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    He Jiandong; Qiu Yongping; Zhang Qinfang; An Hongzhen; Li Maolin

    2013-01-01

    The purpose of Plant Operational States (POS) analysis is to disperse the continuous and dynamic process of low power and shutdown operation, which is the basis of developing event tree models for accident sequence analysis. According to the design of a 300 MW Nuclear Power Plant Project, operating experience and procedures of the reference plant, a detailed POS analysis is carried out based on relative criteria. Then, several kinds of POS are obtained, and the duration of each POS is calculated according to the operation records of the reference plant. The POS analysis is an important element in low power and shutdown PSA. The methodology and contents provide reference for POS analysis. (authors)

  10. Current status of low power/shutdown PSA and accident sequence analysis for loss of RHR during mid-loop operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Chang Kyu; Choi, Young; Kim, Tae Woon; Jin, Young Ho

    1994-07-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has been applied to only full-power operation of nuclear power plant (NPP), but some events which were recently occurred could reach severe plant damage state. Thus, various countries around the world have focused their interests on the evaluation for low power/shutdown (LP/S) operation. This report covers the main stream of LP/S PSA methodology, current status of LP/S PSA practices and results, and accident sequence analysis for loss of RHR during mid-loop operation. Therefore this report would be helpful for us to practice LP/S PSA for YGN 5,6 NPP which will be built in the near future. Also the results of accident sequence analysis show that operator's mis-diagnosis and failure of recovery action would initiate core damage during LP/S operation. In summary, overall environmental improvements (equipments, procedures, Tech Spec, etc, ...) and operating support system will be very useful to reduce risk during LP/S operation. (Author) 5 figs., 9 tabs

  11. FOOD SAFETY CONTROL SYSTEM IN CHINA

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Liu Wei-jun; Wei Yi-min; Han Jun; Luo Dan; Pan Jia-rong

    2007-01-01

    Most countries have expended much effort to develop food safety control systems to ensure safe food supplies within their borders. China, as one of the world's largest food producers and consumers,pays a lot of attention to food safety issues. In recent years, China has taken actions and implemented a series of plans in respect to food safety. Food safety control systems including regulatory, supervisory,and science and technology systems, have begun to be established in China. Using, as a base, an analysis of the current Chinese food safety control system as measured against international standards, this paper discusses the need for China to standardize its food safety control system. We then suggest some policies and measures to improve the Chinese food safety control system.

  12. The assessment of technological and safety aspects of small power reactor SMART

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Antariksawan, A.R.; Ekariansyah, Andi S.; Sony, D.T.; Suharno; Hastowo, Hudi

    2002-01-01

    This paper describes and discusses the technology and safety of small nuclear power plant SMART. The reactor SMART produces 300 MWth of power is cooled and moderated with light water and integral PWR type developed by KAERI. At present, the development activities had reached the end of basic design stage. The concept design of reactor SMART is based on safety enhancement, economic competitiveness and high performance. The fuel is uranium oxide with approximately 5% w/o enrichment. The safety characteristics of the core are shown with low power density around 62.6 W/cc, high negative reactivity coefficient, and high shutdown and thermal margin. Besides the inherent safety characteristics, SMART is equipped with engineered safety features and severe accident management system which are in compliance with the IAEA recommendations. The application of SMART for dual-purpose produces 90 Mwe and 40,000 to fresh water a day. Based on the technology and core characteristics of the reactor SMART, it is very interesting to be deeply assessed

  13. Performance of the prism reactor's passive decay heat removal system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Magee, P.M.; Hunsbedt, A.

    1989-01-01

    The PRISM modular reactor concept has a totally passive safety-grade decay heat removal system referred to as the Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) that rejects heat from the reactor by radiation and natural convection of air. The system is inherently reliable and is not subject to the failure modes commonly associated with active cooling systems. The thermal performance of RVACS exceeds requirements and significant thermal margins exist. RVACS has been shown to perform its function under many postulated accident conditions. The PRISM power plant is equipped with three methods for shutdown: condenser cooling in conjunction with intermediate sodium and steam generator systems, and auxiliary cooling system (ACS) which removes heat from the steam generator by natural convection of air and transport of heat from the core by natural convection in the primary and intermediate systems, and a safety- grade reactor vessel auxiliary cooling system (RVACS) which removes heat passively from the reactor containment vessel by natural convection of air. The combination of one active and two passive systems provides a highly reliable and economical shutdown heat removal system. This paper provides a summary of the RVACS thermal performance for expected operating conditions and postulated accident events. The supporting experimental work, which substantiates the performance predictions, is also summarized

  14. Applying formal method to design of nuclear power plant embedded protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jin Hyun; Kim, Il Gon; Sung, Chang Hoon; Choi, Jin Young; Lee, Na Young

    2001-01-01

    Nuclear power embedded protection systems is a typical safety-critical system, which detects its failure and shutdowns its operation of nuclear reactor. These systems are very dangerous so that it absolutely requires safety and reliability. Therefore nuclear power embedded protection system should fulfill verification and validation completely from the design stage. To develop embedded system, various V and V method have been provided and especially its design using Formal Method is studied in other advanced country. In this paper, we introduce design method of nuclear power embedded protection systems using various Formal-Method in various respect following nuclear power plant software development guideline

  15. Management of individual and collective dosimetry at Fessenheim nuclear plant. Evaluation after refueling shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lamarre, D.; Waller, A.

    1980-01-01

    The principle of dosimetry management chosen by Fessenheim nuclear power station was originally consisted of two phases: - an automatic acquisition of individual doses realized by stylodosimeter readers; - a deferred data processing by computer. The whole system has not been used during the shutdown for the first refuelling of unit number one in view of encountered difficulties with perfecting of automatic readers prototype, this last phase has been replaced by a manual acquisition of doses. The dosimetry data processing has two main objects: - supervision of individual dosimetry for people who work in the nuclear power station; - knowledge of doses assigned for each working and equipment. Moreover, a first dosimetric result of the shutdown for refuelling of unit number one, enables to notice the workings which doses are the most important and written in percentage of total doses: regulatory controls: about 19%; - steam generators working: 16%; - working decontamination and making health physics screen (lock chamber) 10% [fr

  16. Reactor shutdown device

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harada, Kiyoshi; Aono, Hidehiro [Hitachi Ltd., Tokyo (Japan); Fujita, Kaoru; Ishikawa, Tsuyoshi

    1996-02-20

    The present invention concerns a reactor shutdown device of a LMFBR type reactor, and provides a magnetic circuit having a sharp changing property of holding force relative to temperature change. Namely, a magnetic bridge is attached to a portion of the magnetic circuit. Then, required conditions are satisfied. Alternatively, even if the temperature dependent change of magnetic saturation of a temperature sensing alloy itself is somewhat moderated, the holding force from an erroneous dropping preventive temperature to a separating temperature can be abruptly reduced while keeping the holding force at a temperature lower than the erroneous dropping preventive temperature. Provision of the magnetic bridge increases the temperature dependent change of the holding force of the entire magnetic circuit. As a result, margin for the design of the temperature sensing alloy is extended. Actual design is enabled, and the range for selecting the temperature sensing alloy can be enlarged. (I.S.).

  17. Reactor shutdown device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harada, Kiyoshi; Aono, Hidehiro; Fujita, Kaoru; Ishikawa, Tsuyoshi.

    1996-01-01

    The present invention concerns a reactor shutdown device of a LMFBR type reactor, and provides a magnetic circuit having a sharp changing property of holding force relative to temperature change. Namely, a magnetic bridge is attached to a portion of the magnetic circuit. Then, required conditions are satisfied. Alternatively, even if the temperature dependent change of magnetic saturation of a temperature sensing alloy itself is somewhat moderated, the holding force from an erroneous dropping preventive temperature to a separating temperature can be abruptly reduced while keeping the holding force at a temperature lower than the erroneous dropping preventive temperature. Provision of the magnetic bridge increases the temperature dependent change of the holding force of the entire magnetic circuit. As a result, margin for the design of the temperature sensing alloy is extended. Actual design is enabled, and the range for selecting the temperature sensing alloy can be enlarged. (I.S.)

  18. Critical safety function guidelines for experimental fusion facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadwallader, L.C.

    1989-01-01

    As fusion experiments proceed toward deuterium-tritium operation, more attention is being given to public safety. This paper presents the four classes of functions that fusion experiments must provide to assure safe, stable shutdown and retention of radionuclides. These functions are referred to as critical safety functions (CSFs). Selecting CSFs is an important step in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). An example of CSF selection and usage for the Compact Ignition Tokamak (CIT) is also presented. 10 refs., 6 figs

  19. NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 1; System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dezfuli, Homayoon; Benjamin, Allan; Everett, Christopher; Smith, Curtis; Stamatelatos, Michael; Youngblood, Robert

    2011-01-01

    System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual

  20. Experience relevant to safety obtained from reactor decommissioning operations in the French Atomic Energy Commission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Giraudel, B.; Langlois, G.

    1979-01-01

    From among the nuclear facilities constructed in France the authors cite eight large reactors, ranging from critical assemblies to power reactors, that have been finally shut-down since 1965. A brief account is given of the way in which the various operations were carried out after the final control rod drop, a distinction being drawn between the shut-down proper and the containment and dismantling work. A description is also given, from the technical and regulatory standpoint, of the final stage attained, and mention is made of French safety arrangements and of the part played by the safety services during decommissioning operations. Among the lessons derived from French experience, the authors mention the completion of operations without any serious safety problems, and with guarantees for the protection of personnel and the population as a whole, by conventional techniques; the advantage of planning decommissioning operations from the very beginning of construction of the facilities; and the importance of filing descriptive documents. In view of the experience gained, the French Atomic Energy Commission has devised internal procedures for facilitating the application of regulations governing the shut-down and decommissioning phases, which are aimed at preserving surveillance procedures similar to those in force during normal operation. (author)

  1. Analysis of activation and shutdown contact dose rate for EAST neutral beam port

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Yuqing; Wang, Ji; Zhong, Guoqiang; Li, Jun; Wang, Jinfang; Xie, Yahong; Wu, Bin; Hu, Chundong

    2017-12-01

    For the safe operation and maintenance of neutral beam injector (NBI), specific activity and shutdown contact dose rate of the sample material SS316 are estimated around the experimental advanced superconducting tokamak (EAST) neutral beam port. Firstly, the neutron emission intensity is calculated by TRANSP code while the neutral beam is co-injected to EAST. Secondly, the neutron activation and shutdown contact dose rates for the neutral beam sample materials SS316 are derived by the Monte Carlo code MCNP and the inventory code FISPACT-2007. The simulations indicate that the primary radioactive nuclides of SS316 are 58Co and 54Mn. The peak contact dose rate is 8.52 × 10-6 Sv/h after EAST shutdown one second. That is under the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) design values 1 × 10-5 Sv/h.

  2. Post Chernobyl safety review at Ontario Hydro

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frescura, G.M.; Luxat, J.C.; Jobe, C.

    1991-01-01

    It is generally recognized that the Chernobyl Unit 4 accident did not reveal any new phenomena which had not been previously identified in safety analyses. However, the accident provided a tragic reminder of the potential consequences of reactivity initiated accidents (RIAs) and stimulated nuclear plant operators to review their safety analyses, operating procedures and various operational and management aspects of nuclear safety. Concerning Ontario Hydro, the review of the accident performed by the corporate body responsible for nuclear safety policy and by the Atomic Energy Control Board (the Regulatory Body) led to a number of specific recommendations for further action by various design, analysis and operation groups. These recommendations are very comprehensive in terms of reactor safety issues considered. The general conclusion of the various studies carried out in response to the recommendations, is that the CANDU safety design and the procedures in place to identify and mitigate the consequences of accidents are adequate. Improvements to the reliability of the Pickering NGSA shutdown system and to some aspects of safety management and staff training, although not essential, are possible and would be pursued. In support of this conclusion, the paper describes some of the studies that were carried out and discusses the findings. The first part of the paper deals with safety design aspects. While the second is concerned with operational aspects

  3. Effects of shutdown chemistry on steam generator radiation levels at Point Beach Unit 2. Interim report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kormuth, J.W.

    1982-05-01

    A refueling shutdown chemistry test was conducted at a PWR, Point Beach Unit 2. The objective was to yield reactor coolant chemistry data during the cooldown/shutdown process which might establish a relationship between shutdown chemistry and its effects on steam generator radiation fields. Of particular concern were the effects of the presence of hydrogen in the coolant as contrasted to an oxygenated coolant. Analysis of reactor coolant samples showed a rapid soluble release (spike) in Co-58, Co-60, and nickel caused by oxygenation of the coolant. The measurement of radioisotope specific activities indicates that the material undergoing dissolution during the shutdown originated from different sources which had varying histories of activation. The test program developed no data which would support theories that oxygenation of the coolant while the steam generators are full of water contributes to increased steam generator radiation levels

  4. An attempt for economic estimate of the shutdown of uranium production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonchev, L.

    1997-01-01

    Uranium ore has been obtained since the end of 30s till 1992. No measures for protection of the environment and restricting the risk for the population during the production have been taken. Among the three possible models of shutting down the most inexpedient from economic point of view has been applied . It meant that the beginning of closing down took place far behind ceasing the production itself and the expenses for restoration were as big as fourteen times more in comparison to the two ones. The investments for prospecting and preparing new resources were lost. The whole process was made extremely inefficiently and unprofessionally. Because of the sudden closing down of production activities there was no enough time for gathering, processing and analyzing of necessary data, even the radioecological and hydro-ecological evaluations were doubtfully reliable. The shutdown of uranium production as worldwide practice takes place considering ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle. The aim is to achieve maximum possible results by minimum investments taking into account the radioecological risk, socially accounted for and psychologically conditioned expenses. There is no statement of the radioecological risk in the preliminary evaluations of the uranium mines in Bulgaria. The investment funds for the period 1992-1996 were about 2.1 bill. leva, (equally allocated for each year) which was about 46.5 mil. US$. Because of inflation process the investments crucially decreased during the last years when most capital-intensive activities had to be carried out - the engineering shutdown and land-reclamations procedures. The biggest share of investments (about 30 mil. US$) was for environmental status maintenance, 2.5 times less (about 13 mil. US$) - for technical shutdown and only 2.1 mil. US$ - for land reclamation. The investments for the shutdown process referred to the whole production obtained were only 2.5 US$/kg U 3 O 8 while the most effective model

  5. Analytical prediction and experimental verification of reactor safety system injection transient

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roy, B.N.; Nomm, E.

    1991-01-01

    This paper describes the computer code that was developed for thermal hydraulic transient analysis of mixed phase fluid system and the flow tests that were carried out to validate the Code. A full scale test facility was designed to duplicate the Supplementary Shutdown System (SSS) of Savannah River Production Reactors. Several steady state and dynamic flow tests were conducted simulating the actual reactor injection transients. A dynamic multiphase fluid flow code was developed and validated with experimental results and utilized for system performance predictions and development of technical specifications for reactors. 3 refs

  6. Instrumentation and control systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for establishing safety standards for nuclear power plants. It supplements Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-1: Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (the Requirements for Design), which establishes the design requirements for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. This Safety Guide describes how the requirements should be met for instrumentation and control (I and C) systems important to safety. This publication is a revision and combination of two previous Safety Guides: Safety Series Nos 50-SG-D3 and 50-SG-D8, which are superseded by this new Safety Guide. The revision takes account of developments in I and C systems important to safety since the earlier Safety Guides were published in 1980 and 1984, respectively. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the design of I and C systems important to safety in nuclear power plants, including all I and C components, from the sensors allocated to the mechanical systems to the actuated equipment, operator interfaces and auxiliary equipment. This Safety Guide deals mainly with design requirements for those I and C systems that are important to safety. It expands on paragraphs of Ref in the area of I and C systems important to safety. This publication is intended for use primarily by designers of nuclear power plants and also by owners and/or operators and regulators of nuclear power plants. This Safety Guide provides general guidance on I and C systems important to safety which is broadly applicable to many nuclear power plants. More detailed requirements and limitations for safe operation specific to a particular plant type should be established as part of the design process. The present guidance is focused on the design principles for systems important to safety that warrant particular attention, and should be applied to both the design of new I and C systems and the modernization of existing systems. Guidance is provided on how design

  7. Research on the improvement of nuclear safety -Improvement of level 1 PSA computer code package-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Chang Kyoo; Kim, Tae Woon; Kim, Kil Yoo; Han, Sang Hoon; Jung, Won Dae; Jang, Seung Chul; Yang, Joon Un; Choi, Yung; Sung, Tae Yong; Son, Yung Suk; Park, Won Suk; Jung, Kwang Sub; Kang Dae Il; Park, Jin Heui; Hwang, Mi Jung; Hah, Jae Joo

    1995-07-01

    This year is the third year of the Government-sponsored mid- and long-term nuclear power technology development project. The scope of this sub project titled on 'The improvement of level-1 PSA computer codes' is divided into three main activities : (1) Methodology development on the underdeveloped fields such as risk assessment technology for plant shutdown and low power situations, (2) Computer code package development for level-1 PSA, (3) Applications of new technologies to reactor safety assessment. At first, in this area of shutdown risk assessment technology development, plant outage experiences of domestic plants are reviewed and plant operating states (POS) are decided. A sample core damage frequency is estimated for over draining event in RCS low water inventory i.e. mid-loop operation. Human reliability analysis and thermal hydraulic support analysis are identified to be needed to reduce uncertainty. Two design improvement alternatives are evaluated using PSA technique for mid-loop operation situation: one is use of containment spray system as backup of shutdown cooling system and the other is installation of two independent level indication system. Procedure change is identified more preferable option to hardware modification in the core damage frequency point of view. Next, level-1 PSA code KIRAP is converted to PC-windows environment. For the improvement of efficiency in performing PSA, the fast cutest generation algorithm and an analytical technique for handling logical loop in fault tree modeling are developed. 48 figs, 15 tabs, 59 refs. (Author)

  8. Research on the improvement of nuclear safety -Improvement of level 1 PSA computer code package-

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Chang Kyoo; Kim, Tae Woon; Kim, Kil Yoo; Han, Sang Hoon; Jung, Won Dae; Jang, Seung Chul; Yang, Joon Un; Choi, Yung; Sung, Tae Yong; Son, Yung Suk; Park, Won Suk; Jung, Kwang Sub; Kang Dae Il; Park, Jin Heui; Hwang, Mi Jung; Hah, Jae Joo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1995-07-01

    This year is the third year of the Government-sponsored mid- and long-term nuclear power technology development project. The scope of this sub project titled on `The improvement of level-1 PSA computer codes` is divided into three main activities : (1) Methodology development on the underdeveloped fields such as risk assessment technology for plant shutdown and low power situations, (2) Computer code package development for level-1 PSA, (3) Applications of new technologies to reactor safety assessment. At first, in this area of shutdown risk assessment technology development, plant outage experiences of domestic plants are reviewed and plant operating states (POS) are decided. A sample core damage frequency is estimated for over draining event in RCS low water inventory i.e. mid-loop operation. Human reliability analysis and thermal hydraulic support analysis are identified to be needed to reduce uncertainty. Two design improvement alternatives are evaluated using PSA technique for mid-loop operation situation: one is use of containment spray system as backup of shutdown cooling system and the other is installation of two independent level indication system. Procedure change is identified more preferable option to hardware modification in the core damage frequency point of view. Next, level-1 PSA code KIRAP is converted to PC-windows environment. For the improvement of efficiency in performing PSA, the fast cutest generation algorithm and an analytical technique for handling logical loop in fault tree modeling are developed. 48 figs, 15 tabs, 59 refs. (Author).

  9. How could intelligent safety transport systems enhance safety ?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Wiethoff, M. Heijer, T. & Bekiaris, E.

    2017-01-01

    In Europe, many deaths and injured each years are the cost of today's road traffic. Therefore, it is wise to look for possible solutions for enhancing traffic safety. Some Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) are expected to increase safety, but they may also evoke new safety hazards. Only

  10. Review of SFR Design Safety using Preliminary Regulatory PSA Model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Na, Hyun Ju; Lee, Yong Suk; Shin, Andong; Suh, Nam Duk

    2013-01-01

    The major objective of this research is to develop a risk model for regulatory verification of the SFR design, and thereby, make sure that the SFR design is adequate from a risk perspective. In this paper, the development result of preliminary regulatory PSA model of SFR is discussed. In this paper, development and quantification result of preliminary regulatory PSA model of SFR is discussed. It was confirmed that the importance PDRC and ADRC dampers is significant as stated in the result of KAERI PSA model. However, the importance can be changed significantly depending on assumption of CCCG and CCF factor of PDRC and ADRC dampers. SFR (sodium-cooled fast reactor) which is Gen-IV nuclear energy system, is designed to accord with the concept of stability, sustainability and proliferation resistance. KALIMER-600, which is under development in Korea, includes passive safety systems (e. g. passive reactor shutdown, passive residual heat removal, and etc.) as well as active safety systems. Risk analysis from a regulatory perspective is needed to support the regulatory body in its safety and licensing review for SFR (KALIMER-600). Safety issues should be identified in the early design phase in order to prevent the unexpected cost increase and delay of the SFR licensing schedule that may be caused otherwise

  11. Safety Review related to Commercial Grade Digital Equipment in Safety System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yu, Yeongjin; Park, Hyunshin; Yu, Yeongjin; Lee, Jaeheung

    2013-01-01

    The upgrades or replacement of I and C systems on safety system typically involve digital equipment developed in accordance with non-nuclear standards. However, the use of commercial grade digital equipment could include the vulnerability for software common-mode failure, electromagnetic interference and unanticipated problems. Although guidelines and standards for dedication methods of commercial grade digital equipment are provided, there are some difficulties to apply the methods to commercial grade digital equipment for safety system. This paper focuses on regulatory guidelines and relevant documents for commercial grade digital equipment and presents safety review experiences related to commercial grade digital equipment in safety system. This paper focuses on KINS regulatory guides and relevant documents for dedication of commercial grade digital equipment and presents safety review experiences related to commercial grade digital equipment in safety system. Dedication including critical characteristics is required to use the commercial grade digital equipment on safety system in accordance with KEPIC ENB 6370 and EPRI TR-106439. The dedication process should be controlled in a configuration management process. Appropriate methods, criteria and evaluation result should be provided to verify acceptability of the commercial digital equipment used for safety function

  12. Modelling the fluid structure interaction produced by a waterhammer during shutdown of high-pressure pumps

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Erath, W.; Nowotny, B.; Maetz, J.

    1999-01-01

    Measurements of an experiment in a pipe system with pump shutdown and valve closing have been performed in the nuclear power plant KRB II (Gundremmingen, Germany). Comparative calculations of fluid and structure including interaction show an excellent agreement with the measured results. Theory and implementation of the fluid structure interaction (FSI) and the results of the comparison are described. The following measurements have been compared with calculations: (1) experiments in Delft, Netherlands to analyse the FSI; and (2) experiment with pump shutdown and valve closing in the nuclear power plant KRB II has been performed. It turns out, that the consideration of the FSI is necessary for an exact calculation of 'soft' piping systems. It has significant application in current waterhammer problems. For example, water column closure, vapour collapse, check valve slamming continues to create waterhammers in the energy industry. An important consequence of the FSI is mostly a significant increase of the effective structural damping. This mitigates - so far in all KED's calculations the FSI has taken into account - an amplification of pipe movements due to pressure waves in resonance with structural eigenvalues. To investigate the integrity of pipe systems pipe stresses are calculated. Taking FSI into account they are reduced by 10-40% in the actual case. (orig.)

  13. Safety parameter display system: an operator support system for enhancement of safety in Indian PHWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subramaniam, K.; Biswas, T.

    1994-01-01

    Ensuring operational safety in nuclear power plants is important as operator errors are observed to contribute significantly to the occurrence of accidents. Computerized operator support systems, which process and structure information, can help operators during both normal and transient conditions, and thereby enhance safety and aid effective response to emergency conditions. An important operator aid being developed and described in this paper, is the safety parameter display system (SPDS). The SPDS is an event-independent, symptom-based operator aid for safety monitoring. Knowledge-based systems can provide operators with an improved quality of information. An information processing model of a knowledge based operator support system (KBOSS) developed for emergency conditions using an expert system shell is also presented. The paper concludes with a discussion of the design issues involved in the use of a knowledge based systems for real time safety monitoring and fault diagnosis. (author). 8 refs., 4 figs., 1 tab

  14. Functional and performance evaluation of 28 bar hot shutdown passive valve (HSPV) at integral test loop (ITL) for advanced heavy water reactor (AHWR)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sapra, M.K.; Kundu, S.; Pal, A.K.; Sharma, B.S.V.G.

    2007-02-01

    During reactor shutdown in advanced heavy water reactor (AHWR), core decay heat is removed by eight isolation condensers (IC) submerged in gravity driven water pool. Passive valves are provided on the down stream of each isolation condenser. On increase in steam drum pressure beyond a set value, these passive valves start opening and establish steam flow by natural circulation between the four steam drums and corresponding isolation condensers under hot shutdown and therefore they are termed as Hot Shut Down Passive Valves (HSPVs). The HSPV is a self acting type valve requiring no external energy, i.e. neither air nor electric supply for actuation. This feature makes the valve functioning independent of external systems such as compressed air supply or electric power supply, thereby providing inherent safety feature in line with reactor design philosophy. The high pressure and high temperature HSPV s for nuclear reactor use, are non-standard valves and therefore not manufactured by the valve industry worldwide. In the process of design and development of a prototype valve for AHWR, a 28 bar HSPV was configured and successfully tested at Integral Test Loop (ITL) at Engineering Hall No.7. During ten continuous experiments spread over 14 days, the HSPV has proved its functional capabilities and its intended use in decay heat removal system. The in-situ pressure setting and calibration aspect of HSPV has also been successfully established during these experiments. This report gives an insight into the HSPV's functional behavior and role in reactor decay heat removal system. The report not only provides the quantitative measure of performance for 28 bar HSPV in terms of valve characteristics, pressure controllability, linearity and hysteresis but also sets qualitative indicators for prototype 80 bar HSPV, being developed for AHWR. (author)

  15. Technical evaluation of the susceptibility of safety-related systems to flooding caused by the failure of non-category 1 systems for the San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Latorre, V.R.; Victor, R.A.

    1980-11-01

    This report documents the technical evaluation of Southern California Edison Company's San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, to determine whether the failure of any non-Category 1 (seismic) equipment could result in a condition, such as flooding, that might potentially adversely affect the performance of safety-related equipment required for the safe shutdown of the facility or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Criteria developed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission were used to evaluate the acceptability of the existing protection as well as measures taken by Southern California Edison Company to minimize the danger of flooding and to protect safety-related equipment

  16. Inventory of radioactive corrosion products on the primary surfaces and release during shutdown in Ringhals 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aronsson, O.

    1994-01-01

    In Ringhals 2 a retrospective study using gamma scans of system surfaces, fuel crud sampling and reactor coolant analyses during operation and shutdown has been done. The data have been used to prepare a balance of activity inventory. The inventory has been fairly stable from 1986 to 1993, expressed as a gamma source term. The steam generator replacement in 1989 removed some 40-50% of the Co-60 inventory in the reactor system. After the steam generator replacement, the gamma source term has got an increasing contribution from Co-58, absolutely as well as relatively. The reason for this is probably the switch from high pH operation to modified pH operation. Corrosion from fresh alloy 690 surfaces in the new steam generators is probably another contributing factor. The inventory and production rate of Co-60 is decreasing over the years. It has also been found that clean-up of the reactor coolant during start-up, operation, and shutdown as well as the fuel pool during refuelling removes about the same amounts of Co-60. (author). 11 figs., 15 refs

  17. Integration of the functional reliability of two passive safety systems to mitigate a SBLOCA+BO in a CAREM-like reactor PSA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mezio, Federico, E-mail: federico.mezio@cab.cnea.gov.ar [CNEA, Sede Central, Av. Del Libertador 8250, CABA (Argentina); Grinberg, Mariela [CNEA, Centro Atómico Bariloche, S.C. de Bariloche, Río Negro (Argentina); Lorenzo, Gabriel [CNEA, Sede Central, Av. Del Libertador 8250, CABA (Argentina); Giménez, Marcelo [CNEA, Centro Atómico Bariloche, S.C. de Bariloche, Río Negro (Argentina)

    2014-04-01

    Highlights: • An estimation of the Functional Unreliability was performed using RMPS methodology. • The methodology uses an improved response surface in order to estimate the FU. • The FU may become relevant to be analyzed in the Passive Safety Systems. • There were proposed two ways to incorporate the FU into an APS. - Abstract: This paper describes a case study of a methodological approach for assessing the functional reliability of passive safety systems (PSS) and its treatment within a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The functional unreliability (FU) can be understood as the failure probability of PSS to fulfill its mission due to the impairment of the related passive safety function. The safety function accomplishment is characterized and quantified by a performance indicator (PI), which is a measure of how far the system is from verifying its mission. PI uncertainties are estimated from uncertainty propagation of selected parameters. A methodology based on the reliability methodology for passive system (RMPS) one is used to estimate the FU associated to the isolation condensers (ICs) in combination with the accumulators (medium pressure injection system) of a CAREM-like integral advanced reactor. A small break loss of coolant accident with black-out is selected as an evaluation case. This implies success of reactor shut-down (inherent) and failure of residual heat removal by active systems. The safety function to accomplish is to refill the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) in order to avoid core damage. For this case, to allow the discharge of accumulators into RPV, the pressure must be reduced by the IC. The methodology for passive safety function assessment considers uncertainties in code parameters, besides uncertainties in engineering parameters (design, construction, operation and maintenance), in order to perform Monte Carlo simulations based on best estimate (B-E) plant model. Then, response surfaces based on PI are used for improving the

  18. Shutdown dose rate contribution from diagnostics in ITER upper port 18

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cheon, M.S., E-mail: munseong@nfri.re.kr [National Fusion Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Pak, S.; An, Y.H.; Seon, C.R.; Lee, H.G. [National Fusion Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Bertalot, L.; Krasilnikov, V. [ITER Organization, St Paul-lez-Durance (France); Zvonkov, A. [Agency ITER-RF, Moscow (Russian Federation)

    2016-11-01

    Highlights: • The Shutdown Dose Rate in the interspace of ITER upper port 18 was evaluated. • VUV spectrometer is the dominant contributor to the average SDR. • The existence and size of the blanket cooling pipes impacts significantly on SDR. - Abstract: D-T operation of ITER plasma will produce high-energy fusion neutrons those can activate materials around the place where human-access is necessary. The interspace of the diagnostic port is one of the area where human-access is necessary for the maintenance of diagnostic systems installed at the port, so it is important to evaluate a dose rate of the interspace area in order to comply with ALARA principle. The shutdown dose rate (SDR) in the interspace of ITER upper port 18 was evaluated by the Direct 1-Step (D1S) method using MCNP5 code. This port contains three diagnostics: Vacuum Ultra-Violet (VUV) Spectrometer, Neutron Activation System (NAS), and Upper Vertical Neutron Camera (UVNC). The contribution of each diagnostic in the port was evaluated by running separate upper port MCNP models those contain individual diagnostic only, and the total dose rate contribution was evaluated with the model which was fully integrated with all the diagnostics. The effect of the opening around the upper port plug and of the other ports was also investigated. The purpose of this assessment is to provide the shielding design basis for the preliminary design of the diagnostic integration in the port. The method and result of the calculation will be presented in this paper.

  19. Comprehensive Lifecycle for Assuring System Safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    Knight, John C.; Rowanhill, Jonathan C.

    2017-01-01

    CLASS is a novel approach to the enhancement of system safety in which the system safety case becomes the focus of safety engineering throughout the system lifecycle. CLASS also expands the role of the safety case across all phases of the system's lifetime, from concept formation to decommissioning. As CLASS has been developed, the concept has been generalized to a more comprehensive notion of assurance becoming the driving goal, where safety is an important special case. This report summarizes major aspects of CLASS and contains a bibliography of papers that provide additional details.

  20. Physics related to control and safety of hybrid systems; Physique associee au controle et a la surete des systemes hybrides

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gueton, O

    2001-12-01

    Regarding nuclear waste management, ADS can be considered as large minor actinides burners. In a first part, a critical analysis of different reactor types shows that fast spectrum, helium coolant and nitride fuel, containing 100% minor actinides, agree perfectly with the high transmutation requirements of ADS. The control and safety demonstration of this system represents the main purpose of this study. Understanding spatial and dynamic behaviour of ADS flux is absolutely necessary. For this purpose, we have defined an indicator to quantify spatial decoupling. It shows, on the one hand, point kinetic deficiency to study local transients, and on the other hand, perturbations propagation differences between ADS and critical cores. Then, in a more concrete approach, accidental sequences (source transient, beam de-focalization, reactivity insertions, loss of flow, depressurization) are evaluated for this core, strongly loaded with minor actinides. It is shown that the automatic beam shutdown leads to preserve large safety margins for all studied transients. The accelerator emergency stop is induced by an unexpected evolution of the core control parameters. These parameters, except reactivity, can be directly measured in subcritical systems like in critical ones. Concerning reactivity, we suggest a new method for its absolute determination in ADS: at the time of reactor start-up, the reactivity must be calibrated by coupling two methods of relative reactivity measurements (pulsed source and Approached Source Multiplication) for successive subcritical levels. After that, the on-line follow-up of reactivity is obtained from this calibration like in a critical core. (authors)