WorldWideScience

Sample records for safety requirements procedure

  1. Risk and safety requirements for diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kowalski, Marek L; Ansotegui, Ignacio; Aberer, Werner

    2016-01-01

    One of the major concerns in the practice of allergy is related to the safety of procedures for the diagnosis and treatment of allergic disease. Management (diagnosis and treatment) of hypersensitivity disorders involves often intentional exposure to potentially allergenic substances (during skin...... attempted to present general requirements necessary to assure the safety of these procedures. Following review of available literature a group of allergy experts within the World Allergy Organization (WAO), representing various continents and areas of allergy expertise, presents this report on risk...... associated with diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology and proposes a consensus on safety requirements for performing procedures in allergy offices. Optimal safety measures including appropriate location, type and required time of supervision, availability of safety equipment, access...

  2. Risk and safety requirements for diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology: World Allergy Organization Statement

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marek L. Kowalski

    2016-10-01

    Full Text Available Abstract One of the major concerns in the practice of allergy is related to the safety of procedures for the diagnosis and treatment of allergic disease. Management (diagnosis and treatment of hypersensitivity disorders involves often intentional exposure to potentially allergenic substances (during skin testing, deliberate induction in the office of allergic symptoms to offending compounds (provocation tests or intentional application of potentially dangerous substances (allergy vaccine to sensitized patients. These situations may be associated with a significant risk of unwanted, excessive or even dangerous reactions, which in many instances cannot be completely avoided. However, adverse reactions can be minimized or even avoided if a physician is fully aware of potential risk and is prepared to appropriately handle the situation. Information on the risk of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergic diseases has been accumulated in the medical literature for decades; however, except for allergen specific immunotherapy, it has never been presented in a systematic fashion. Up to now no single document addressed the risk of the most commonly used medical procedures in the allergy office nor attempted to present general requirements necessary to assure the safety of these procedures. Following review of available literature a group of allergy experts within the World Allergy Organization (WAO, representing various continents and areas of allergy expertise, presents this report on risk associated with diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology and proposes a consensus on safety requirements for performing procedures in allergy offices. Optimal safety measures including appropriate location, type and required time of supervision, availability of safety equipment, access to specialized emergency services, etc. for various procedures have been recommended. This document should be useful for allergists with already established

  3. Safety analysis procedures for PHWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Min, Byung Joo; Kim, Hyoung Tae; Yoo, Kun Joong

    2004-03-01

    The methodology of safety analyses for CANDU reactors in Canada, a vendor country, uses a combination of best-estimate physical models and conservative input parameters so as to minimize the uncertainty of the plant behavior predictions. As using the conservative input parameters, the results of the safety analyses are assured the regulatory requirements such as the public dose, the integrity of fuel and fuel channel, the integrity of containment and reactor structures, etc. However, there is not the comprehensive and systematic procedures for safety analyses for CANDU reactors in Korea. In this regard, the development of the safety analyses procedures for CANDU reactors is being conducted not only to establish the safety analyses system, but also to enhance the quality assurance of the safety assessment. In the first phase of this study, the general procedures of the deterministic safety analyses are developed. The general safety procedures are covered the specification of the initial event, selection of the methodology and accident sequences, computer codes, safety analysis procedures, verification of errors and uncertainties, etc. Finally, These general procedures of the safety analyses are applied to the Large Break Loss Of Coolant Accident (LBLOCA) in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for Wolsong units 2, 3, 4

  4. Supplement to safety analysis report. 306-W building operations safety requirement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richey, C.R.

    1979-08-01

    The operations safety requirements (OSRs) presented in this report define the conditions, safe boundaries, and management control needed for safely conducting operations with radioactive materials in the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) 306-W building. The safety requirements are organized in five sections. Safety limits are safety-related process variables that are observable and measurable. Limiting conditions cover: equipment and technical conditions and characteristics of the facility and operations necessary for continued safe operation. Surveillance requirements prescribe the requirements for checking systems and components that are essential to safety. Equipment design controls require that changes to process equipment and systems be independently checked and approved to assure that the changes will have no adverse effect on safety. Administrative controls describe and discuss the organization and administrative systems and procedures to be used for safe operation of the facility. Details of the implementation of the operations safety requirements are prescribed by internal PNL documents such as criticality safety specifications and radiation work procedures

  5. Operating procedures and safety culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnino, A.

    1993-01-01

    The development of new technologies in recent years has led to a tremendous increase in the information to be mastered by operators in industrial processes. The information at operators disposal both in routine situations and accidental ones needs to be well prepared and organized to ensure reliability and safety. The man-machine interface should give operators all the necessary and clear indications on the process status and evolution so that the operators can operate the installation through adequate procedures. Procedures represent the real interface and mode of action of the operators on the machine, and they are of prime importance. Although they are by essence quite different, the routine, accident, and emergency procedures have in common one attribute: They all require a good safety culture both in their development and their implementation. From the definition given by the members of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), open-quotes Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance,close quotes one can see that two aspects are embedded, a collective attitude that in fact is reflected in the managerial framework and an individual one that is linked to personnel behavior and work practices

  6. Radiation safety requirements for radionuclide laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    In accordance with the section 26 of the Finnish Radiation Act (592/91) the safety requirements to be taken into account in planning laboratories and other premises, which affect safety in the use of radioactive materials, are confirmed by the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. The guide specifies the requirements for laboratories and storage rooms in which radioactive materials are used or stored as unsealed sources. There are also some general instructions concerning work procedures in a radionuclide laboratory

  7. Safety of nuclear power plants: Design. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The present publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (Safety Series No. 50-C-D (Rev. 1), issued in 1988). It takes account of developments relating to the safety of nuclear power plants since the Code on Design was last revised. These developments include the issuing of the Safety Fundamentals publication, The Safety of Nuclear Installations, and the present revision of various safety standards and other publications relating to safety. Requirements for nuclear safety are intended to ensure adequate protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear power plants. It is recognized that technology and scientific knowledge advance, and nuclear safety and what is considered adequate protection are not static entities. Safety requirements change with these developments and this publication reflects the present consensus. This Safety Requirements publication takes account of the developments in safety requirements by, for example, including the consideration of severe accidents in the design process. Other topics that have been given more detailed attention include management of safety, design management, plant ageing and wearing out effects, computer based safety systems, external and internal hazards, human factors, feedback of operational experience, and safety assessment and verification. This publication establishes safety requirements that define the elements necessary to ensure nuclear safety. These requirements are applicable to safety functions and the associated structures, systems and components, as well as to procedures important to safety in nuclear power plants. It is expected that this publication will be used primarily for land based stationary nuclear power plants with water cooled reactors designed for electricity generation or for other heat production applications (such as district heating or desalination). It is recognized that in the case of

  8. Safety of nuclear power plants: Design. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The present publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (Safety Series No. 50-C-D (Rev. 1), issued in 1988). It takes account of developments relating to the safety of nuclear power plants since the Code on Design was last revised. These developments include the issuing of the Safety Fundamentals publication, The Safety of Nuclear Installations, and the present revision of various safety standards and other publications relating to safety. Requirements for nuclear safety are intended to ensure adequate protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear power plants. It is recognized that technology and scientific knowledge advance, and nuclear safety and what is considered adequate protection are not static entities. Safety requirements change with these developments and this publication reflects the present consensus. This Safety Requirements publication takes account of the developments in safety requirements by, for example, including the consideration of severe accidents in the design process. Other topics that have been given more detailed attention include management of safety, design management, plant ageing and wearing out effects, computer based safety systems, external and internal hazards, human factors, feedback of operational experience, and safety assessment and verification. This publication establishes safety requirements that define the elements necessary to ensure nuclear safety. These requirements are applicable to safety functions and the associated structures, systems and components, as well as to procedures important to safety in nuclear power plants. It is expected that this publication will be used primarily for land based stationary nuclear power plants with water cooled reactors designed for electricity generation or for other heat production applications (such as district heating or desalination). It is recognized that in the case of

  9. Health and Safety Procedures Manual for hazardous waste sites

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thate, J.E.

    1992-09-01

    The Oak Ridge National Laboratory Chemical Assessments Team (ORNL/CAT) has developed this Health and Safety Procedures Manual for the guidance, instruction, and protection of ORNL/CAT personnel expected to be involved in hazardous waste site assessments and remedial actions. This manual addresses general and site-specific concerns for protecting personnel, the general public, and the environment from any possible hazardous exposures. The components of this manual include: medical surveillance, guidance for determination and monitoring of hazards, personnel and training requirements, protective clothing and equipment requirements, procedures for controlling work functions, procedures for handling emergency response situations, decontamination procedures for personnel and equipment, associated legal requirements, and safe drilling practices.

  10. In-Office Endoscopic Laryngeal Laser Procedures: A Patient Safety Initiative.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Jennifer; Bensoussan, Yael; Townsley, Richard; Kell, Erika

    2018-05-01

    Objective To review complications of in-office endoscopic laryngeal laser procedures after implementation of standardized safety protocol. Methods A retrospective review was conducted of the first 2 years of in-office laser procedures at St Michaels Hospital after the introduction of a standardized safety protocol. The protocol included patient screening, procedure checklist with standardized reporting of processes, medications, and complications. Primary outcomes measured were complication rates of in-office laryngeal laser procedures. Secondary outcomes included hemodynamic changes, local anesthetic dose, laser settings, total laser/procedure time, and incidence of sedation. Results A total of 145 in-office KTP procedures performed on 65 patients were reviewed. In 98% of cases, the safety protocol was fully implemented. The overall complication rate was 4.8%. No major complications were encountered. Minor complications included vasovagal episodes and patient intolerance. The rate of patient intolerance resulting early termination of anticipated procedure was 13.1%. Total local anesthetic dose averaged 172.9 mg lidocaine per procedure. The mean amount of laser energy dispersed was 261.2 J, with mean total procedure time of 48.3 minutes. Sixteen percent of patients had preprocedure sedation. Vital signs were found to vary modestly. Systolic blood pressure was lower postprocedure in 13.8% and symptomatic in 4.1%. Discussion The review of our standardized safety protocol has revealed that in-office laser treatment for laryngeal pathology has extremely low complication rates with safe patient outcomes. Implications for Practice The trend of shifting procedures out of the operating room into the office/clinic setting requires new processes designed to promote patient safety.

  11. Evaluation procedure of software requirements specification for digital I and C of KNGR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jang Soo; Park, Jong Kyun; Lee, Ki Young; Kim, Jang Yeol; Cheon, Se Woo

    2001-06-01

    The accuracy of the specification of requirements of a digital system is of prime importance to the acceptance and success of the system. The development, use, and regulation of computer systems in nuclear reactor Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems to enhance reliability and safety is a complex issue. This report is one of a series of reports from the Korean Next Generation Reactor (KNGR) Software Safety Verification and Validation (SSVV) Task, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, which investigates different aspects of computer software in reactor I and C systems, and describes the engineering procedures for developing such a software. The purpose of this guideline is to give the software safety evaluator the trail map between the code and standards layer and the design methodology and documents layer for the software important to safety in nuclear power plants. Recently, the requirements specification of safety-critical software systems and safety analysis of them are being recognized as one of the important issues in the software life cycle, and being developed new regulatory positions and standards by the regulatory and the standardization organizations such as IAEA, IEC, and IEEE. We presented the procedure for evaluating the software requirements specifications of the KNGR protection systems. We believe it can be useful for both licenser and licensee to conduct an evaluation of the safety in the requirements phase of developing the software. The guideline consists of the requirements engineering for software of KNGR protection systems in chapter 1, the evaluation checklist of software requirements specification in chapter2.3, and the safety evaluation procedure of KNGR software requirements specification in chapter 2.4

  12. 77 FR 51943 - Procedures for Safety Investigations

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-08-28

    ... rule, Procedures for Safety Investigations, which published July 27, 2012 in the Federal Register, 77... DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 10 CFR Part 1708 Procedures for Safety Investigations AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. ACTION: Proposed rule; extension of comment period...

  13. Bilateral effects of hospital patient-safety procedures on nurses' job satisfaction.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Inoue, T; Karima, R; Harada, K

    2017-09-01

    The aim of this study was to examine how hospital patient-safety procedures affect the job satisfaction of hospital nurses. Additionally, we investigated the association between perceived autonomy and hospital patient-safety procedures and job satisfaction. Recently, measures for patient safety have been recognized as an essential requirement in hospitals. Hospital patient-safety procedures may enhance the job satisfaction of nurses by improving the quality of their work. However, such procedures may also decrease their job satisfaction by imposing excessive stress on nurses because they cannot make mistakes. The participants included 537 nurses at 10 private hospitals in Japan (The surveys were collected from March to July 2012). Factors related to hospital patient-safety procedures were demonstrated using factor analysis, and the associations between these factors and nurses' self-perceived autonomy and job satisfaction were examined using structural equation modelling. Five factors regarding hospital patient-safety procedures were extracted. Additionally, structural equation modelling revealed statistically significant associations between these factors and the nurses' self-perceived autonomy and job satisfaction. The findings showed that nurses' perceived autonomy of the workplace enhanced their job satisfaction and that their perceptions of hospital patient-safety procedures promoted their job satisfaction. However, some styles of chief nurses' leadership regarding patient safety restrict nurses' independent and autonomous decision-making and actions, resulting in a lowering of job satisfaction. This study demonstrated that hospital patient-safety procedures have ambiguous effects on nurses' job satisfaction. In particular, chief nurses' leadership relating to patient safety can have a positive or negative effect on nurses' job satisfaction. The findings indicated that hospital managers should demonstrate positive attitudes to improve patient safety for

  14. 47 CFR 80.305 - Watch requirements of the Communications Act and the Safety Convention.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... and the Safety Convention. 80.305 Section 80.305 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFETY AND SPECIAL RADIO SERVICES STATIONS IN THE MARITIME SERVICES Safety Watch Requirements and Procedures Ship Station Safety Watches § 80.305 Watch requirements of the Communications Act and the Safety...

  15. Safety of Research Reactors. Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The main objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to provide a basis for safety and a basis for safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Another objective is to establish requirements on aspects relating to regulatory control, the management of safety, site evaluation, design, operation and decommissioning. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives. This Safety Requirements publication is intended for use by organizations engaged in the site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, operation and decommissioning of research reactors as well as by regulatory bodies

  16. 16 CFR 1501.4 - Size requirements and test procedure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 16 Commercial Practices 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Size requirements and test procedure. 1501.4 Section 1501.4 Commercial Practices CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION FEDERAL HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES ACT.... The metric approximations are included only for convenience.) (b)(1) Place the article, without...

  17. Safety and efficacy of procedural sedation and analgesia (PSA ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Safety and efficacy of procedural sedation and analgesia (PSA) conducted by medical officers in a level 1 hospital in Cape Town. ... Respiratory complications were treated with simple airway manoeuvres; no patient required intubation or experienced respiratory problems after waking up. There was no significant difference ...

  18. Radiation safety in nuclear medicine procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cho, Sang Geon; Kim, Ja Hae; Song, Ho Chun

    2017-01-01

    Since the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011, radiation safety has become an important issue in nuclear medicine. Many structured guidelines or recommendations of various academic societies or international campaigns demonstrate important issues of radiation safety in nuclear medicine procedures. There are ongoing efforts to fulfill the basic principles of radiation protection in daily nuclear medicine practice. This article reviews important principles of radiation protection in nuclear medicine procedures. Useful references, important issues, future perspectives of the optimization of nuclear medicine procedures, and diagnostic reference level are also discussed

  19. Radiation safety in nuclear medicine procedures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cho, Sang Geon; Kim, Ja Hae; Song, Ho Chun [Dept. of Nuclear Medicine, Medical Radiation Safety Research Center, Chonnam National University Hospital, Gwangju (Korea, Republic of)

    2017-03-15

    Since the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011, radiation safety has become an important issue in nuclear medicine. Many structured guidelines or recommendations of various academic societies or international campaigns demonstrate important issues of radiation safety in nuclear medicine procedures. There are ongoing efforts to fulfill the basic principles of radiation protection in daily nuclear medicine practice. This article reviews important principles of radiation protection in nuclear medicine procedures. Useful references, important issues, future perspectives of the optimization of nuclear medicine procedures, and diagnostic reference level are also discussed.

  20. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  1. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  2. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations; to be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources; and to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  3. Safety requirements and safety experience of nuclear facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schnurer, H.L.

    1977-01-01

    Peaceful use of nuclear energy within the F.R.G. is rapidly growing. The Energy Programme of the Federal Government forecasts a capacity of up to 50.000 MW in 1985. Whereas most of this capacity will be of the LWR-Type, other activities are related to LMFBR - and HTGR - development, nuclear ships, and facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle. Safety of nuclear energy is the pacemaker for the realization of nuclear programmes and projects. Due to a very high population - and industrialisation density, safety has the priority before economical aspects. Safety requirements are therefore extremely stringent, which will be shown for the legal, the technical as well as for the organizational area. They apply for each nuclear facility, its site and the nuclear energy system as a whole. Regulatory procedures differ from many other countries, assigning executive power to state authorities, which are supervised by the Federal Government. Another particularity of the regulatory process is the large scope of involvement of independent experts within the licensing procedures. The developement of national safety requirements in different countries generates a necessity to collaborate and harmonize safety and radiation protection measures, at least for facilities in border areas, to adopt international standards and to assist nuclear developing countries. However, different nationally, regional or local situations might raise problems. Safety experience with nuclear facilities can be concluded from the positive construction and operation experience, including also a few accidents and incidents and the conclusions, which have been drawn for the respective factilities and others of similar design. Another tool for safety assessments will be risk analyses, which are under development by German experts. Final, a scope of future problems and developments shows, that safety of nuclear installations - which has reached a high performance - nevertheless imposes further tasks to be solved

  4. Linking Safety Analysis to Safety Requirements

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hansen, Kirsten Mark

    Software for safety critical systems must deal with the hazards identified by safety analysistechniques: Fault trees, event trees,and cause consequence diagrams can be interpreted as safety requirements and used in the design activity. We propose that the safety analysis and the system design use...

  5. Operational limits and conditions and operating procedures for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared as part of the Agency's programme for establishing safety standards relating to nuclear power plants. The present Safety Guide supersedes the IAEA Safety Guide on Operational Limits and Conditions for Nuclear Power Plants which was issued in 1979 as Safety Series No. 50-SG-O3. For a nuclear power plant to be operated in a safe manner, the provisions made in the final design and subsequent modifications shall be reflected in limitations on plant operating parameters and in the requirements on plant equipment and personnel. Under the responsibility of the operating organization, these shall be developed during the design safety evaluation as a set of operational limits and conditions (OLCs). A major contribution to compliance with the OLCs is made by the development and utilization of operating procedures (OPs) that are consistent with and fully implement the OLCs. The requirements for the OLCs and OPs are established in Section 5 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which this Safety Guide supplements. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the development, content and implementation of OLCs and OPs. The Safety Guide is directed at both regulators and owners/operators. This Safety Guide covers the concept of OLCs, their content as applicable to land based stationary power plants with thermal neutron reactors, and the responsibilities of the operating organization regarding their establishment, modification, compliance and documentation. The OPs to support the implementation of the OLCs and to ensure their observance are also within the scope of this Safety Guide. The particular aspects of the procedures for maintenance, surveillance, in-service inspection and other safety related activities in connection with the safe operation of nuclear power plants are outside the scope of this Safety Guide but can be found in other IAEA Safety Guides. Section 2 indicates the

  6. Operational limits and conditions and operating procedures for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared as part of the Agency's programme for establishing safety standards relating to nuclear power plants. The present Safety Guide supersedes the IAEA Safety Guide on Operational Limits and Conditions for Nuclear Power Plants which was issued in 1979 as Safety Series No. 50-SG-O3. For a nuclear power plant to be operated in a safe manner, the provisions made in the final design and subsequent modifications shall be reflected in limitations on plant operating parameters and in the requirements on plant equipment and personnel. Under the responsibility of the operating organization, these shall be developed during the design safety evaluation as a set of operational limits and conditions (OLCs). A major contribution to compliance with the OLCs is made by the development and utilization of operating procedures (OPs) that are consistent with and fully implement the OLCs. The requirements for the OLCs and OPs are established in Section 5 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which this Safety Guide supplements. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the development, content and implementation of OLCs and OPs. The Safety Guide is directed at both regulators and owners/operators. This Safety Guide covers the concept of OLCs, their content as applicable to land based stationary power plants with thermal neutron reactors, and the responsibilities of the operating organization regarding their establishment, modification, compliance and documentation. The OPs to support the implementation of the OLCs and to ensure their observance are also within the scope of this Safety Guide. The particular aspects of the procedures for maintenance, surveillance, in-service inspection and other safety related activities in connection with the safe operation of nuclear power plants are outside the scope of this Safety Guide but can be found in other IAEA Safety Guides. Section 2 indicates the

  7. Traceability of Software Safety Requirements in Legacy Safety Critical Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hill, Janice L.

    2007-01-01

    How can traceability of software safety requirements be created for legacy safety critical systems? Requirements in safety standards are imposed most times during contract negotiations. On the other hand, there are instances where safety standards are levied on legacy safety critical systems, some of which may be considered for reuse for new applications. Safety standards often specify that software development documentation include process-oriented and technical safety requirements, and also require that system and software safety analyses are performed supporting technical safety requirements implementation. So what can be done if the requisite documents for establishing and maintaining safety requirements traceability are not available?

  8. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  9. Safety code 19: recommended safety procedures for the selection, installation and use of x-ray diffraction equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    This document is one of a series of Safety Codes prepared by the Radiation Protection Bureau to set out requirements for the safe use of radiation emitting devices. The equipment and installation guidelines and safety procedures detailed in this Code are primarily for the instruction and guidance of persons employed in Federal Public Service Departments and Agencies, as well as those coming under the jurisdiction of the Canada Labour Code. This Safety Code is also intended to assist other users of X-ray diffraction equipment to select safe equipment and to install and use it so that the radiation hazard to the operator and other persons in its vicinity is negligible. It should be noted that facilities under provincial jurisdiction may be subject to requirements specified under provincial statutes. This Code supersedes Safety Code RPD-SC-7, entitled 'Requirements For Non-Medical X-Ray Equipment, Use and Installation', insofar as X-ray diffraction equipment is concerned, and it is intended to complement X-ray equipment design, construction and performance standards promulgated under the Radiation Emitting Devices Act

  10. Development to requirements for a procedures software tool

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yasutake, J.Y.; Hachiro Isoda

    1993-01-01

    In 1989, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and the Central Research Institute of the Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) in Japan initiated a joint research program to investigate various interventions to reduce personnel errors and inefficiencies in the maintenance of nuclear power plants. This program, consisting of several interrelated projects, was initiated because of the mutual recognition of the importance of the human element in the efficient and safe operation of utilities and the continuing need to enhance personnel performance to sustain plant safety and availability. This paper summarizes one of the projects, jointly funded by EPRI and CRIEPI, to analyze the requirements for, and prepare a functional description of, a procedures software tool (PST). The primary objective of this project was to develop a description of the features and functions of a software tool that would help procedure writers to improve the quality of maintenance and testing procedures, thereby enhancing the performance of both procedure writers and maintenance personnel

  11. Safety of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements for all main areas of safety for research reactors, with particular emphasis on requirements for design and operation. It explains the safety objectives and concepts that form the basis for safety and safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of new research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives and concepts, and they are to be applied to the extent practicable for existing research reactors. The safety requirements established in this publication for the management of safety and regulatory supervision apply to site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, commissioning, operation (including utilization and modification), and planning for decommissioning of research reactors (including critical assemblies and subcritical assemblies). The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies and other organizations with responsibilities in these areas and in safety analysis, verification and review, and the provision of technical support.

  12. Standards for radiation protection instrumentation: design of safety standards and testing procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meissner, Frank

    2008-01-01

    This paper describes by means of examples the role of safety standards for radiation protection and the testing and qualification procedures. The development and qualification of radiation protection instrumentation is a significant part of the work of TUV NORD SysTec, an independent expert organisation in Germany. The German Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (KTA) establishes regulations in the field of nuclear safety. The examples presented may be of importance for governments and nuclear safety authorities, for nuclear operators and for manufacturers worldwide. They demonstrate the advantage of standards in the design of radiation protection instrumentation for new power plants, in the upgrade of existing instrumentation to nuclear safety standards or in the application of safety standards to newly developed equipment. Furthermore, they show how authorities may proceed when safety standards for radiation protection instrumentation are not yet established or require actualization. (author)

  13. Safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific reference include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. The safety objective, concepts and safety principles; 3. Legal framework and regulatory supervision; 4. The management system and verification of safety; 5. Siting of the facility; 6. Design of the facility; 7. Construction of the facility; 8. Commissioning of the facility; 9. Operation of the facility; 10. Decommissioning of the facility; Appendix I: Requirements specific to uranium fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix II: Requirements specific to mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix III: Requirements specific to conversion facilities and enrichment facilities

  14. The impact of a medical procedure service on patient safety, procedure quality and resident training opportunities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tukey, Melissa H; Wiener, Renda Soylemez

    2014-03-01

    At some academic hospitals, medical procedure services are being developed to provide supervision for residents performing bedside procedures in hopes of improving patient safety and resident education. There is limited knowledge of the impact of such services on procedural complication rates and resident procedural training opportunities. To determine the impact of a medical procedure service (MPS) on patient safety and resident procedural training opportunities. Retrospective cohort analysis comparing characteristics and outcomes of procedures performed by the MPS versus the primary medical service. Consecutive adults admitted to internal medicine services at a large academic hospital who underwent a bedside medical procedure (central venous catheterization, thoracentesis, paracentesis, lumbar puncture) between 1 July 2010 and 31 December 2011. The primary outcome was a composite rate of major complications. Secondary outcomes included resident participation in bedside procedures and use of "best practice" safety process measures. We evaluated 1,707 bedside procedures (548 by the MPS, 1,159 by the primary services). There were no differences in the composite rate of major complications (1.6 % vs. 1.9 %, p = 0.71) or resident participation in bedside procedures (57.0 % vs. 54.3 %, p = 0.31) between the MPS and the primary services. Procedures performed by the MPS were more likely to be successfully completed (95.8 % vs. 92.8 %, p = 0.02) and to use best practice safety process measures, including use of ultrasound guidance when appropriate (96.8 % vs. 90.0 %, p = 0.0004), avoidance of femoral venous catheterization (89.5 vs. 82.7 %, p = 0.02) and involvement of attending physicians (99.3 % vs. 57.0 %, p < 0.0001). Although use of a MPS did not significantly affect the rate of major complications or resident opportunities for training in bedside procedures, it was associated with increased use of best practice safety process measures.

  15. 77 FR 44174 - Procedures for Safety Investigations

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-07-27

    ... of safety investigations. The rule is intended to state clearly the Board's policy and procedures for... statutory authority, when appropriate, following standard safety investigation policies, practices, and... has adhered to the regulatory philosophy and the applicable principles of regulation as set forth in...

  16. Safety and application of procedures or: how do ''they'' have to use operating procedures in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dien, Y.

    1993-03-01

    Emergency procedures are inescapable aspects of safety. They can be seen as the laws to be respected in an accident situation. But as for all laws, there remains the problem of their application: should strict adherence to the procedure be imposed under all circumstances. Is this possible. Are there any potential risks with such a requirement. Or, on the contrary, should application be more ''open'', more flexible, allowing for adaptation to the actual situation. But what are the potential risks involved in this approach. Are these two approaches to the application of procedures mutually exclusive, or are they complementary. This paper analyzes the nature of the problem of application of procedures and proposes orientations for further thought on the matter. (author). 11 refs

  17. Development of a draft of human factors safety review procedures for the Korean Next Generation Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jung Woon; Moon, B. S.; Park, J. C.; Lee, Y. H.; Oh, I. S.; Lee, H. C.

    2000-02-01

    In this study, a draft of Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Safety Review Procedures (SRP) was developed for the safety review of KNGR based on HFE Safety and Regulatory Requirements and Guidelines (SRRG). This draft includes acceptance criteria, review procedure, and evaluation findings for the areas of review including HFE program management, human factors analyses, human factors design, and HFE verification and validation, based on section 15.1 'human factors engineering design process' and 15.2 'control room human factors engineering' of KNGR specific safety requirements and chapter 15 'human factors engineering' of KNGR safety regulatory guides. For the effective review, human factors concerns or issues related to advanced HSI design that have been reported so far should be extensively examined. In this study, a total of 384 human factors issues related to the advanced HSI design were collected through our review of a total of 145 documents. A summary of each issue was described and the issues were identified by specific features of HSI design. These results were implemented into a database system

  18. Safety procedures for radiography works

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abd Nasir Ibrahim; Azali Muhammad; Ab Razak Hamzah; Abd Aziz Mohamed; Mohammad Pauzi Ismail

    2004-01-01

    The following subjects are discussed - Work preparation: before exposure, during exposure, after work completion. Radiographic work at the open site: types of open sites, establishment of radiographic boundary, storage of radiographic equipment at sites. Safety procedures for radiography works; radiographic works in exposure room

  19. Aviation Safety Reporting System: Process and Procedures

    Science.gov (United States)

    Connell, Linda J.

    1997-01-01

    The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) was established in 1976 under an agreement between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). This cooperative safety program invites pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendants, maintenance personnel, and others to voluntarily report to NASA any aviation incident or safety hazard. The FAA provides most of the program funding. NASA administers the program, sets its policies in consultation with the FAA and aviation community, and receives the reports submitted to the program. The FAA offers those who use the ASRS program two important reporting guarantees: confidentiality and limited immunity. Reports sent to ASRS are held in strict confidence. More than 350,000 reports have been submitted since the program's beginning without a single reporter's identity being revealed. ASRS removes all personal names and other potentially identifying information before entering reports into its database. This system is a very successful, proof-of-concept for gathering safety data in order to provide timely information about safety issues. The ASRS information is crucial to aviation safety efforts both nationally and internationally. It can be utilized as the first step in safety by providing the direction and content to informed policies, procedures, and research, especially human factors. The ASRS process and procedures will be presented as one model of safety reporting feedback systems.

  20. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factor, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations (registrants and licensees) and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks

  1. Trapping safety into rules how desirable or avoidable is proceduralization?

    CERN Document Server

    Bourrier, Mathilde

    2013-01-01

    Rules and procedures are key features for a modern organization to function. It is no surprise to see them to be paramount in safety management. As some sociologists argue, routine and rule following is not always socially resented. It can bring people comfort and reduce anxieties of newness and uncertainty. Facing constant unexpected events entails fatigue and exhaustion. There is also no doubt that proceduralization and documented activities have brought progress, avoided recurrent mistakes and allowed for 'best practices' to be adopted. However, it seems that the exclusive and intensive use of procedures today is in fact a threat to new progress in safety. There is an urgent need to consider this issue because there is doubt that the path chosen by many hazardous industries and activities is the most effective, safety wise, considering the safety level achieved today. As soon as safety is involved, there seems to be an irresistible push towards a wider scope of norms, procedures and processes, whatever the...

  2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Chinese Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  3. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  4. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  5. Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-05-01

    This Standard identifies safety requirements for magnetic fusion facilities. Safety functions are used to define outcomes that must be achieved to ensure that exposures to radiation, hazardous materials, or other hazards are maintained within acceptable limits. Requirements applicable to magnetic fusion facilities have been derived from Federal law, policy, and other documents. In addition to specific safety requirements, broad direction is given in the form of safety principles that are to be implemented and within which safety can be achieved

  6. Radiation protection in dentistry. Recommended safety procedures for the use of dental x-ray equipment. Safety code 30

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The Radiation Protection Bureau has prepared a series of documents on safety codes to set out requirements for the safe use of radiation-emitting equipment. This Safety Code has been prepared to provide specific guidance to the dentist, dental hygienist, dental assistant and other support personnel concerned with safety procedures and equipment performance. Dental radiography is one of the most valuable tools used in modern dental health care. It makes possible the diagnosis of physical conditions that would otherwise be difficult to identify. The use of dental radiological procedures must be carefully managed, because x-radiation has the potential for damaging healthy cells and tissues. Although no known occurrence of cancer or genetic damage has been observed from radiation doses delivered in modern dentistry, and until more evidence is available, one should practice radiation hygiene with the same care as would be dictated if a hazard were known to exist. The aim of radiation protection in dentistry is to obtain the desired clinical information with minimal radiation exposure to patients, dental personnel and the public. 15 tabs

  7. Radiation protection in dentistry. Recommended safety procedures for the use of dental x-ray equipment. Safety code 30

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1994-12-31

    The Radiation Protection Bureau has prepared a series of documents on safety codes to set out requirements for the safe use of radiation-emitting equipment. This Safety Code has been prepared to provide specific guidance to the dentist, dental hygienist, dental assistant and other support personnel concerned with safety procedures and equipment performance. Dental radiography is one of the most valuable tools used in modern dental health care. It makes possible the diagnosis of physical conditions that would otherwise be difficult to identify. The use of dental radiological procedures must be carefully managed, because x-radiation has the potential for damaging healthy cells and tissues. Although no known occurrence of cancer or genetic damage has been observed from radiation doses delivered in modern dentistry, and until more evidence is available, one should practice radiation hygiene with the same care as would be dictated if a hazard were known to exist. The aim of radiation protection in dentistry is to obtain the desired clinical information with minimal radiation exposure to patients, dental personnel and the public. 15 tabs.

  8. IAEA safety requirements for safety assessment of fuel cycle facilities and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, G.

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorises the Agency to establish standards of safety for protection of health and minimisation of danger to life and property. In that respect, the IAEA has established a Safety Fundamentals publication which contains ten safety principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment from the harmful effects of ionising radiation. A number of these principles require safety assessments to be carried out as a means of evaluating compliance with safety requirements for all nuclear facilities and activities and to determine the measures that need to be taken to ensure safety. The safety assessments are required to be carried out and documented by the organisation responsible for operating the facility or conducting the activity, are to be independently verified and are to be submitted to the regulatory body as part of the licensing or authorisation process. In addition to the principles of the Safety Fundamentals, the IAEA establishes requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the environment and which are governed by the principles in the Safety Fundamentals. The IAEA's Safety Requirements publication 'Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities', establishes the safety requirements that need to be fulfilled in conducting and maintaining safety assessments for the lifetime of facilities and activities, with specific attention to defence in depth and the requirement for a graded approach to the application of these safety requirements across the wide range of fuel cycle facilities and activities. Requirements for independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the operating organisation, including the requirement for the safety assessment to be periodically reviewed and updated are also covered. For many fuel cycle facilities and activities, environmental impact assessments and non-radiological risk assessments will be required. The

  9. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  10. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  11. Development of a draft of human factors safety review procedures for the Korean next generation reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jung Woon; Moon, B. S.; Park, J. C.; Lee, Y. H.; Oh, I. S.; Lee, H. C. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejeon (Korea)

    2000-02-01

    In this study, a draft of human factors engineering (HFE) safety review procedures (SRP) was developed for the safety review of KNGR based on HFE Safety and Regulatory Requirements and Guidelines (SRRG). This draft includes acceptance criteria, review procedure, and evaluation findings for the areas of review including HFE Program Management, Human Factors Analyses, Human Factors Design, and HFE Verification and Validation, based on Section 15.1 'Human Factors Engineering Design Process' and 15.2 'Control Room Human Factors Engineering' of KNGR Specific Safety Requirements and Chapter 15 'Human Factors Engineering' of KNGR Safety Regulatory Guides. For the effective review, human factors concerns or issues related to advanced HSI design that have been reported so far should be extensively examined. In this study, a total of 384 human factors issues related to the advanced HSI design were collected through our review of a total of 145 documents. A summary of each issue was described and the issues were identified by specific features of HSI design. These results were implemented into a database system. 8 refs., 2 figs. (Author)

  12. Safety design requirements for safety systems and components of JSFR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kubo, Shigenobu; Shimakawa, Yoshio; Yamano, Hidemasa; Kotake, Shoji

    2011-01-01

    Safety design requirements for JSFR were summarized taking the development targets of the FaCT project and design feature of JSFR into account. The related safety principle and requirements for Monju, CRBRP, PRISM, SPX, LWRs, IAEA standards, goals of GIF, basic principle of INPRO etc. were also taken into account so that the safety design requirements can be a next-generation global standard. The development targets for safety and reliability are set based on those of FaCT, namely, ensuring safety and reliability equal to future LWR and related fuel cycle facilities. In order to achieve these targets, the defence-in-depth concept is used as the basic safety design principle. General features of the safety design requirements are 1) Achievement of higher reliability, 2) Achievement of higher inspectability and maintainability, 3) Introduction of passive safety features, 4) Reduction of operator action needs, 5) Design consideration against Beyond Design Basis Events, 6) In-Vessel Retention of degraded core materials, 7) Prevention and mitigation against sodium chemical reactions, and 8) Design against external events. The current specific requirements for each system and component are summarized taking the basic design concept of JSFR into account, which is an advanced loop-type large-output power plant with a mixed-oxide-fuelled core. (author)

  13. Procedure for the determination of gap and base ground surface configurations beneath the bottom plate of storage tanks using neutron gauging inspection techniques : including radiation safety procedure and emergency procedure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaafar Abdullah

    1993-01-01

    The procedure is intended for the neutron gauging inspection of gap between the bottom plate and the foundation of bulk storage tanks, which potentially exhibit uneven sinking of the bottom plate and the foundation. Its describes the requirements for the performance of neutron back scattered inspection techniques (or radiometric non-destructive evaluation techniques), using an isotopic neutron source associated with neutron detecting systems, to detect and size the gap between the bottom plate and the foundations as well as to quantify the presence of hydrogenous materials (e.g. oil or water) underneath the bottom plate. This procedure is not only outline the requirements for the neutron gauging inspection, but also describes the requirements which shall be taken into account in formulating the radiation safety and emergency procedures for the neutron gauging inspection works

  14. Improvement of Safety Features in Standard Operation Procedure of Tc-99m Generator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manisah Saedon; Mohd Khairul Hakimi; Shyen, A.K.S.

    2011-01-01

    This paper describes the improvements proposed to the original production procedures for Tc-99m generators. Improvements are intended to add safety and health features for workers into the existing procedures. The difference between the new safe work procedures from the original work procedures; is the concern about the safety and health of employees other than the product safety. One of the suggested safety characteristics is by using the visual aid so that the workers can easily see and read the procedures when they perform their duties, whereas the previous procedures are kept in the manual and difficult to access. The purpose of this paper is to share information about the importance of safety and health features for the workers in the procedures established in addition to provide awareness to all parties involved. (author)

  15. An approach toward estimating the safety significance of normal and abnormal operating procedures in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grant, T.F.; Harris, M.S.

    1989-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's TMI Action Plan calls for a long-term plan to upgrade operating procedures in nuclear power plants. The scope of Generic Issue Human Factors 4.4, which stems from this requirement, includes the recommendation of improvements in nuclear power plant normal and abnormal operating procedures (NOPs and AOPs) and the implementation of appropriate regulatory action. This paper will describe the objectives, methodologies, and results of a Battelle-conducted value impact assessment to determine the costs and benefits of having the NRC implement regulatory action that would specify requirements for the preparation of acceptable NOPs and AOPs by the Commission's nuclear power plant licensees. The results of this value impact assessment are expressed in terms of ten cost/benefit attributes that can be affected by the NRC regulatory action. Five of these attributes require the calculation of change in public risk that could be expected to result from the action which, in this case, required determining the safety significance of NOPs and AOPs. In order to estimate this safety significance, a multi-step methodology was created that relies on an existing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to provide a quantitative framework for modeling the role of operating procedures. The purpose of this methodology is to determine what impact the improvement of NOPs and AOPs would have on public health and safety

  16. Verification of a primary-to-secondary leaking safety procedure in a nuclear power plant using coloured Petri nets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nemeth, E.; Bartha, T.; Fazekas, Cs.; Hangos, K.M.

    2009-01-01

    This paper deals with formal and simulation-based verification methods of a PRImary-to-SEcondary leaking (abbreviated as PRISE) safety procedure. The PRISE safety procedure controls the draining of the contaminated water in a faulty steam generator when a non-compensable leaking from the primary to the secondary circuit occurs. Because of the discrete nature of the verification, a Coloured Petri Net (CPN) representation is proposed for both the procedure and the plant model. We have proved by using a non-model-based strategy that the PRISE safety procedure is safe, there are no dead markings in the state space, and all transitions are live; being either impartial or fair. Further analysis results have been obtained using a model-based verification approach. We created a simple, low dimensional, nonlinear dynamic model of the primary circuit in a VVER-type pressurized water nuclear power plant for the purpose of the model-based verification. This is in contrast to the widely used safety analysis that requires an accurate detailed model. Our model also describes the relevant safety procedures, as well as all of the major leaking-type faults. We propose a novel method to transform this model to a CPN form by discretization. The composed plant and PRISE safety procedure system has also been analysed by simulation using CPN analysis tools. We found by the model-based analysis-using both single and multiple faults-that the PRISE safety procedure initiates the draining when the PRISE event occurs, and no false alarm will be initiated

  17. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication

  18. Regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material, 2005 edition. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This publication includes amendments to the 1996 Edition (As Amended 2003) arising from the second cycle of the biennial review and revision process, as agreed by the Transport Safety Standards Committee (TRANSSC) at its ninth meeting in March 2004, as endorsed by the Commission on Safety Standards at its meeting in June 2004 and as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in November 2004. Although this publication is identified as a new edition, there are no changes that affect the administrative and approval requirements in Section VIII. The fields covered are General Provisions (radiation protection; emergency response; quality assurance; compliance assurance; non-compliance; special arrangement and training); Activity Limits and Materials Restrictions, Requirement and Controls for Transport , Requirements for Radioactive Materials and for Packagings and Packages, Test Procedures, Approval and Administrative Requirements

  19. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  20. Current trends in codal requirements for safety in operation of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Srivasista, K.; Shah, Y.K.; Gupta, S.K.

    2006-01-01

    The Code of practice on safety in nuclear power plant operation states the requirements to be met during operation of a nuclear power plant for assuring safety. Among various stages of authorization, regulatory body issues authorization for operation of a nuclear power plant, monitors and enforces regulatory requirements. The responsible organization shall have overall responsibility and the plant management shall have the primary responsibility for ensuring safe and efficient operation of its nuclear power plants. A set of codal requirements covering technical and administrative aspects are mandatory for the plant management to implement to ensure that the nuclear power plant is operated in accordance with the design intent. Requirements on operating procedures and instructions establish operation and maintenance, inspection and testing of the plant in a planned and systematic way. The requirements on emergency preparedness programme establish with a reasonable assurance that, in the event of an emergency situation, appropriate measures can be taken to mitigate the consequences. Commissioning requirements verify performance criteria during commissioning to ensure that the design intent and QA requirements are met. Several modifications in systems important to safety required during operation of a nuclear power plant are regulated. However new operational codal requirements arising out of periodic safety review, operational experience feedback, life management, probabilistic safety assessment, physical security, safety convention and obligations and decommissioning are not covered in the present code of practice for safety in nuclear power plant operation. Codal provisions on 'Review by operating organization on aspects of design having implications on operability' are also required to be addressed. The merits in developing such a methodology include acceptance of the design by operating organization, ensuring maintainability, proper layout etc. in the new designs

  1. Recommendations to improve radiation safety during invasive cardiovascular procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miranda, Patricia; Ubeda, Carlos; Vano, Eliseo; Nocetti, Diego

    2014-01-01

    In this paper we present guidelines aimed to improve radiation safety during invasive cardiovascular procedures. Unwanted effects upon patients and medical personnel are conventionally classified. A program of Quality Assurance is proposed, an aspect of which is a program for radiologic protection, including operator protection, radiation monitoring, shielding and personnel training. Permanent and specific actions should be taken at every cardiovascular lab, before, during and after interventions. In order to implement these guidelines and actions, a fundamental step is a review of current legislation. Specific programs for quality control and radiologic protection along with a definition of acceptable radiation exposure doses are required

  2. Recommended safety objectives, principles and requirements for mini-reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-05-01

    Canadian and international publications containing objectives, principles and requirements for the safety of nuclear facilities in general and nuclear power plants in particular have been reviewed for their relevance to mini-reactors. Most of the individual recommendations, sometimes with minor wording changes, are applicable to mini-reactors. However, some prescriptive requirements for the shutdown, emergency core cooling and containment systems of power reactors are considered inappropriate for mini-reactors. The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety favours a generally non-prescriptive approach whereby the applicant for a mini-reactor license is free to propose any means of satisfying the fundamental objectives, but must convince the regulatory agency to that effect. To do so, a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) would be the favoured procedure. A generic PSA for all mini-reactors of the same design would be acceptable. Notwithstanding this non-prescriptive approach, the ACNS considers that it would be prudent to require the existence of at least one independent shutdown system and two physically independent locations from which the reactor can be shut down and the shutdown condition monitored, and to require provision for an assumed loss of integrity of the primary cooling system's boundary unless convincing arguments to the contrary are presented. The ACNS endorses in general the objectives and fundamental principles proposed by the interorganizational Small Reactor Criteria working group, and intends to review and comment on the documents on specific applications to be issued by that working group

  3. Site evaluation for nuclear installations. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Siting, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-S (Rev. 1). It takes account of developments relating to site evaluations for nuclear installations since the Code on Siting was last revised. These developments include the issuing of the Safety Fundamentals publication on The Safety of Nuclear Installations, and the revision of various safety standards and other publications relating to safety. Requirements for site evaluation are intended to ensure adequate protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear installations. It is recognized that there are steady advances in technology and scientific knowledge, in nuclear safety and in what is considered adequate protection. Safety requirements change with these advances and this publication reflects the present consensus among States. This Safety Requirements publication was prepared under the IAEA programme on safety standards for nuclear installations. It establishes requirements and provides criteria for ensuring safety in site evaluation for nuclear installations. The Safety Guides on site evaluation listed in the references provide recommendations on how to meet the requirements established in this Safety Requirements publication. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements for the elements of a site evaluation for a nuclear installation so as to characterize fully the site specific conditions pertinent to the safety of a nuclear installation. The purpose is to establish requirements for criteria, to be applied as appropriate to site and site-installation interaction in operational states and accident conditions, including those that could lead to emergency measures for: (a) Defining the extent of information on a proposed site to be presented by the applicant; (b) Evaluating a proposed site to ensure that the site

  4. Range Flight Safety Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Loftin, Charles E.; Hudson, Sandra M.

    2018-01-01

    The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to provide the technical requirements for the NPR 8715.5, Range Flight Safety Program, in regards to protection of the public, the NASA workforce, and property as it pertains to risk analysis, Flight Safety Systems (FSS), and range flight operations. This standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers, including Component Facilities and Technical and Service Support Centers, and may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical requirement. This standard may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory or to other contractors, grant recipients, or parties to agreements to the extent specified or referenced in their contracts, grants, or agreements, when these organizations conduct or participate in missions that involve range flight operations as defined by NPR 8715.5.1.2.2 In this standard, all mandatory actions (i.e., requirements) are denoted by statements containing the term “shall.”1.3 TailoringTailoring of this standard for application to a specific program or project shall be formally documented as part of program or project requirements and approved by the responsible Technical Authority in accordance with NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements.

  5. Evaluation procedure of software safety plan for digital I and C of KNGR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jang Soo; Park, Jong Kyun; Lee, Ki Young; Kwon, Ki Choon; Kim, Jang Yeol; Cheon, Se Woo

    2000-05-01

    The development, use, and regulation of computer systems in nuclear reactor instrumentation and control (I and C) systems to enhance reliability and safety is a complex issue. This report is one of a series of reports from the Korean next generation reactor (KNGR) software safety verification and validation (SSVV) task, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, which investigates different aspects of computer software in reactor I and C systems, and describes the engineering procedures for developing such a software. The purpose of this guideline is to give the software safety evaluator the trail map between the code and standards layer and the design methodology and documents layer for the software important to safety in nuclear power plants. Recently, the safety planning for safety-critical software systems is being recognized as the most important phase in the software life cycle, and being developed new regulatory positions and standards by the regulatory and the standardization organizations. The requirements for software important to safety of nuclear reactor are described in such positions and standards, for example, the new standard review plan (SRP), IEC 880 supplements, IEEE standard 1228-1994, IEEE standard 7-4.3.2-1993, and IAEA safety series No. 50-SG-D3 and D8. We presented the guidance for evaluating the safety plan of the software in the KNGR protection systems. The guideline consists of the regulatory requirements for software safety in chapter 2, the evaluation checklist of software safety plan in chapter3, and the evaluation results of KNGR software safety plan in chapter 4

  6. Evaluation procedure of software safety plan for digital I and C of KNGR

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jang Soo; Park, Jong Kyun; Lee, Ki Young; Kwon, Ki Choon; Kim, Jang Yeol; Cheon, Se Woo

    2000-05-01

    The development, use, and regulation of computer systems in nuclear reactor instrumentation and control (I and C) systems to enhance reliability and safety is a complex issue. This report is one of a series of reports from the Korean next generation reactor (KNGR) software safety verification and validation (SSVV) task, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, which investigates different aspects of computer software in reactor I and C systems, and describes the engineering procedures for developing such a software. The purpose of this guideline is to give the software safety evaluator the trail map between the code and standards layer and the design methodology and documents layer for the software important to safety in nuclear power plants. Recently, the safety planning for safety-critical software systems is being recognized as the most important phase in the software life cycle, and being developed new regulatory positions and standards by the regulatory and the standardization organizations. The requirements for software important to safety of nuclear reactor are described in such positions and standards, for example, the new standard review plan (SRP), IEC 880 supplements, IEEE standard 1228-1994, IEEE standard 7-4.3.2-1993, and IAEA safety series No. 50-SG-D3 and D8. We presented the guidance for evaluating the safety plan of the software in the KNGR protection systems. The guideline consists of the regulatory requirements for software safety in chapter 2, the evaluation checklist of software safety plan in chapter3, and the evaluation results of KNGR software safety plan in chapter 4.

  7. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to all types of radioactive waste disposal facility. It is linked to the fundamental safety principles for each disposal option and establishes a set of strategic requirements that must be in place before facilities are developed. Consideration is also given to the safety of existing facilities developed prior to the establishment of present day standards. The requirements will be complemented by Safety Guides that will provide guidance on good practice for meeting the requirements for different types of waste disposal facility. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of people and the environment; 3. Safety requirements for planning for the disposal of radioactive waste; 4. Requirements for the development, operation and closure of a disposal facility; 5. Assurance of safety; 6. Existing disposal facilities; Appendices.

  8. 23 CFR 630.1106 - Policy and procedures for work zone safety management.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 23 Highways 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Policy and procedures for work zone safety management... Policy and procedures for work zone safety management. (a) Each agency's policy and processes, procedures, and/or guidance for the systematic consideration and management of work zone impacts, to be...

  9. Safety requirements to be met in final storage of heat-producing waste an evaluation of the BMU draft

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomauske, B.

    2008-01-01

    The German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU) on August 12, 2008 published a July 29, 2008 draft of the ''Safety Requirements to Be Met in Final Storage of Heat-producing Radioactive Waste.'' As announced by the BMU, these safety requirements are to bring up to the state of the art the safety criteria of 1983. Over a couple of years, efforts had been made to adapt the criteria to the internationally accepted standard as demanded by the Advisory Committees on Reactor Safeguards (RSK) and Radiation Protection (SSK). The main changes made by the BMU are the introduction of a phased procedure in building repositories. A phased plans approval procedure under the Atomic Energy Act has been foreseen by the Ministry for this purpose. In addition, the draft provides for the introduction of a risk-based goal of protection. To ensure retrievability of the waste, the casks are to have a demonstrated service life of 500 years. The BMU draft safety requirements are unable to bring the safety criteria of 1983 up to the current state of the art. Here are the key points of criticism: - A risk-based goal of protection is introduced. The yardstick to be applied is to be defined in a guideline yet to be elaborated. As a consequence, the draft lacks substance. - As in licensing of nuclear facilities, the licensing procedure provides for a phased plans approval procedure for exploration. This analogy does not exist, as exploration is not the first phase of the plant to be built but a measure which is a precondition for obtaining a permit for construction and operation. - The information contained in the draft indicates that, contrary to international recommendations, it tightens the goal of protection by more than one order of magnitude. - The requirements to be met by the casks because of retrievability impose constraints on solutions optimized for safety in emplacement technology. - The risk-based approach is not mature and is

  10. Development of Small UAS Beyond-Visual-Line-of-Sight (BVLOS Flight Operations: System Requirements and Procedures

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Scott Xiang Fang

    2018-04-01

    Full Text Available Due to safety concerns of integrating small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS into non-segregated airspace, aviation authorities have required a set of detect and avoid (DAA systems to be equipped on small UAS for beyond-visual-line-of-sight (BVLOS flight operations in civil airspace. However, the development of small UAS DAA systems also requires BVLOS flights for testing and validation. To mitigate operational risks for small UAS BVLOS flight operations, this paper proposes to initially test small UAS DAA systems in BVLOS flights in a restricted airspace with additional safety features. Later, this paper further discusses the operating procedures and emergency action plans for small UAS BVLOS flight operations. The testing results show that these safety systems developed can help improve operational safety for small UAS BVLOS flight operations.

  11. Transition to Office-based Obstetric and Gynecologic Procedures: Safety, Technical, and Financial Considerations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Peacock, Lisa M; Thomassee, May E; Williams, Valerie L; Young, Amy E

    2015-06-01

    Office-based surgery is increasingly desired by patients and providers due to ease of access, overall efficiency, reimbursement, and satisfaction. The adoption of office-based surgery requires careful consideration of safety, efficacy, cost, and feasibility within a providers practice. This article reviews the currently available data regarding patient and provider satisfaction as well as practical considerations of staffing, equipment, and supplies. To aid the practitioner, issues of office-based anesthesia and safety with references to currently available national guidelines and protocols are provided. Included is a brief review of billing, coding, and reimbursement. Technical procedural aspects with information and recommendations are summarized.

  12. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  13. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  14. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  15. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    his Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  16. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  17. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  18. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  19. Safety evaluation by living probabilistic safety assessment. Procedures and applications for planning of operational activities and analysis of operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johanson, Gunnar; Holmberg, J.

    1994-01-01

    Living Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is a daily safety management system and it is based on a plant-specific PSA and supporting information systems. In the living use of PSA, plant status knowledge is used to represent actual plant safety status in monitoring or follow-up perspective. The PSA model must be able to express the risk at a given time and plant configuration. The process, to update the PSA model to represent the current or planned configuration and to use the model to evaluate and direct the changes in the configuration, is called living PSA programme. The main purposes to develop and increase the usefulness of living PSA are: Long term safety planning: To continue the risk assessment process started with the basic PSA by extending and improving the basic models and data to provide a general risk evaluation tool for analyzing the safety effects of changes in plant design and procedures. Risk planning of operational activities: To support the operational management by providing means for searching optimal operational maintenance and testing strategies from the safety point of view. The results provide support for risk decision making in the short term or in a planning mode. The operational limits and conditions given by technical specifications can be analyzed by evaluating the risk effects of alternative requirements in order to balance the requirements with respect to operational flexibility and plant economy. Risk analysis of operating experience: To provide a general risk evaluation tool for analyzing the safety effects of incidents and plant status changes. The analyses are used to: identify possible high risk situations, rank the occurred events from safety point of view, and get feedback from operational events for the identification of risk contributors. This report describes the methods, models and applications required to continue the process towards a living use of PSA. 19 tabs, 20 figs

  20. Lessons learned - development of the tritium facilities 5480.23 safety analysis report and technical safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.; Bowman, M.E.; Goff, L.

    1997-01-01

    A review was performed which identified open-quotes Lessons Learnedclose quotes from the development of the 5480.23 Tritium Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Tritium Facilities (TF). The open-quotes Lessons Learnedclose quotes were based on an evaluation of the use of the SRS procedures, processes, and work practices which contributed to the success or lack thereof. This review also identified recommendations and suggestions for improving the development of SARs and TSRs at SRS. The 5480.23 SAR describes the site for the TF, the various process systems in the process buildings, a complete hazards and accident analysis of the most significant hazards affecting the nearby offsite population, and the selection of safety systems, structures, and components to protect both the public and site workers. It also provides descriptions of important programs and processes which add defense in depth to public and worker protection

  1. The development of safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jorel, M.

    2009-01-01

    This document describes the safety approach followed in France for the design of nuclear reactors. This safety approach is based on safety principles from which stem safety requirements that set limiting values for specific parameters. The improvements in computerized simulation, the use of more adequate new materials, a better knowledge of the concerned physical processes, the changes in the reactor operations (higher discharge burnups for instance) have to be taken into account for the definition of safety criteria and the setting of limiting values. The developments of the safety criteria linked to the risks of cladding failure and loss of primary coolant are presented. (A.C.)

  2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  3. Safety Design Approach for the Development of Safety Requirements for Design of Commercial HTGR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohashi, Hirofumi; Sato, Hiroyuki; Nakagawa, Shigeaki; Tachibana, Yukio; Nishihara, Tetsuo; Yan, Xing; Sakaba, Nariaki; Kunitomi, Kazuhiko

    2014-01-01

    The research committee on “Safety requirements for HTGR design” was established in 2013 under the Atomic Energy Society of Japan to develop the draft safety requirements for the design of commercial High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGRs), which incorporate the HTGR safety features demonstrated using the High Temperature Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR), lessons learned from the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and requirements for the integration of the hydrogen production plants. The safety design approach for the commercial HTGRs which is a basement of the safety requirements is determined prior to the development of the safety requirements. The safety design approaches for the commercial HTGRs are to confine the radioactive materials within the coated fuel particles not only during normal operation but also during accident conditions, and the integrity of the coated fuel particles and other requiring physical barriers are protected by the inherent and passive safety features. This paper describes the main topics of the research committee, the safety design approaches and the safety functions of the commercial HTGRs determined in the research committee. (author)

  4. Safety assessment for facilities and activities. General safety requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF 6 ; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

  5. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

  6. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

  7. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation.? read more The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are

  8. Requirements of safety and reliability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1977-01-01

    The safety strategy for nuclear power plants is characterized by the fact that the high level of safety was attained not as a result of experience, but on the basis of preventive accident analyses and the findings derived from such analyses. Although, in these accident analyses, the deterministic approach is predominant it is supplemented by reliability analyses. The accidents analyzed in nuclear licensing procedures cover a wide spectrum from minor incidents to the design basis accidents which determine the design of the safety devices. The initial and boundary conditions, which are essential for accident analyses, and the determination of the loads occuring in various states during regular operation and in accidents flow into the design of the individual systems and components. The inevitable residual risk and its origins are discussed. (orig./HP) [de

  9. Probabilistic safety analysis procedures guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Papazoglou, I.A.; Bari, R.A.; Buslik, A.J.

    1984-01-01

    A procedures guide for the performance of probabilistic safety assessment has been prepared for interim use in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission programs. The probabilistic safety assessment studies performed are intended to produce probabilistic predictive models that can be used and extended by the utilities and by NRC to sharpen the focus of inquiries into a range of tissues affecting reactor safety. This guide addresses the determination of the probability (per year) of core damage resulting from accident initiators internal to the plant and from loss of offsite electric power. The scope includes analyses of problem-solving (cognitive) human errors, a determination of importance of the various core damage accident sequences, and an explicit treatment and display of uncertainties for the key accident sequences. Ultimately, the guide will be augmented to include the plant-specific analysis of in-plant processes (i.e., containment performance) and the risk associated with external accident initiators, as consensus is developed regarding suitable methodologies in these areas. This guide provides the structure of a probabilistic safety study to be performed, and indicates what products of the study are essential for regulatory decision making. Methodology is treated in the guide only to the extent necessary to indicate the range of methods which is acceptable; ample reference is given to alternative methodologies which may be utilized in the performance of the study

  10. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  11. Impact of New Radiation Safety Standards on Licensing Requirements of Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strohal, P.; Subasic, D.; Valcic, I.

    1996-01-01

    As the outcomes of the newly introduced safety philosophies, new and more strict safety design requirements for nuclear installation are expected to be introduced. New in-depth defence measures should be incorporated into the design and operation procedure for a nuclear installation, to compensate for potential failures in protection or safety measures. The new requirements will also apply to licensing of NPP's operation as well as to licensing of nuclear sites, especially for radioactive waste disposal sites. This paper intends to give an overview of possible impacts of new internationally agreed basic safety standards with respect to NPP and related technologies. Recently issued new basic safety standards for radiation protection are introducing some new safety principles which may have essential impact on future licensing requirements regarding nuclear power plants and radioactive waste installations. These new standards recognize exposures under normal conditions ('practices') and intervention conditions. The term interventions describes the human activities that seek to reduce the existing radiation exposure or existing likelihood of incurring exposure which is not part of a controlled practice. The other new development in safety standards is the introduction of so called potential exposure based on the experience gained from a number of radiation accidents. This exposure is not expected to be delivered with certainty but it may result from an accident at a source or owing to an event or sequence of events of a probabilistic nature, including equipment failures and operating errors. (author)

  12. Investigation on regulatory requirements for radiation safety management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Eun Ok; Choi, Yoon Seok; Cho, Dae Hyung

    2013-01-01

    NRC recognizes that efficient management of radiation safety plan is an important factor to achieve radiation safety service. In case of Korea, the contents to perform the actual radiation safety management are legally contained in radiation safety management reports based on the Nuclear Safety Act. It is to prioritize the importance of safety regulations in each sector in accordance with the current situation of radiation and radioactive isotopes-used industry and to provide a basis for deriving safety requirements and safety regulations system maintenance by the priority of radiation safety management regulations. It would be helpful to achieve regulations to conform to reality based on international standards if consistent safety requirements is developed for domestic users, national standards and international standards on the basis of the results of questions answered by radiation safety managers, who lead on-site radiation safety management, about the priority of important factors in radioactive sources use, sales, production, moving user companies, to check whether derived configuration requirements for radiation safety management are suitable for domestic status

  13. Evaluating North Carolina Food Pantry Food Safety-Related Operating Procedures.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chaifetz, Ashley; Chapman, Benjamin

    2015-11-01

    Almost one in seven American households were food insecure in 2012, experiencing difficulty in providing enough food for all family members due to a lack of resources. Food pantries assist a food-insecure population through emergency food provision, but there is a paucity of information on the food safety-related operating procedures used in the pantries. Food pantries operate in a variable regulatory landscape; in some jurisdictions, they are treated equivalent to restaurants, while in others, they operate outside of inspection regimes. By using a mixed methods approach to catalog the standard operating procedures related to food in 105 food pantries from 12 North Carolina counties, we evaluated their potential impact on food safety. Data collected through interviews with pantry managers were supplemented with observed food safety practices scored against a modified version of the North Carolina Food Establishment Inspection Report. Pantries partnered with organized food bank networks were compared with those that operated independently. In this exploratory research, additional comparisons were examined for pantries in metropolitan areas versus nonmetropolitan areas and pantries with managers who had received food safety training versus managers who had not. The results provide a snapshot of how North Carolina food pantries operate and document risk mitigation strategies for foodborne illness for the vulnerable populations they serve. Data analysis reveals gaps in food safety knowledge and practice, indicating that pantries would benefit from more effective food safety training, especially focusing on formalizing risk management strategies. In addition, new tools, procedures, or policy interventions might improve information actualization by food pantry personnel.

  14. Evaluation and qualification of novel control techniques with safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gossner, S.; Wach, D.

    1985-01-01

    The paper discusses the questions related to the assessment and qualification of new I and C-systems. The tasks of nuclear power plant I and Cs as well as the efficiency of the new techniques are reflected. Problems with application of new I and Cs and the state of application in Germany and abroad are addressed. Starting from the essential differencies between conventional and new I and C-systems it is evaluated, if and in which way existing safety requirements can be met and to what extent new requirements need to be formulated. An overall concept has to be developed comprising the definition of graded requirement profiles for design and qualification. Associated qualification procedures and tools have to be adapted, developed and tuned upon each other. (orig./HP) [de

  15. Identifying environmental safety and health requirements for an Environmental Restoration Management Contractor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beckman, W.H.; Cossel, S.C.; Alhadeff, N.; Lindamood, S.B.; Beers, J.A.

    1993-10-01

    The purpose of the Standards/Requirements Identification Program, developed partially in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-2, was to identify applicable requirements that established the Environmental Restoration Management Contractor's (ERMC) responsibilities and authorities under the Environmental Restoration Management Contract, determine the adequacy of these requirements, ascertain a baseline level of compliance with them, and implement a maintenance program that would keep the program current as requirements or compliance levels change. The resultant Standards/Requirements Identification Documents (S/RIDs) consolidate the applicable requirements. These documents govern the development of procedures and manuals to ensure compliance with the requirements. Twenty-four such documents, corresponding with each functional area identified at the site, are to be issued. These requirements are included in the contractor's management plan

  16. Safety requirements applicable to the SMART design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seul, Kwang Won; Kim, Wee Kyong; Kim, Hho Jung

    1999-01-01

    The 330 MW thermal power of integral reactor, named SMART (System integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor), is under development at KAERI for seawater desalination application and electricity generation. The final product of nuclear desalination plant (NDP) is electricity and fresh water. Thus, in addition to the protection of the public around the plant facility from the possible release of radioactive materials, the fresh water should be prevented from radioactivity contamination. In this study, to ensure the safety of SMART reactor in the early stage of design development, the safety requirements applicable to the SMART design were investigated, based on the current regulatory requirements for the existing NPPs and the advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs. The interface requirements related to the desalination facility were also investigated, based on the recent IAEA research activities pertaining to the NDP. As a result, it was found that the current regulatory requirements and guidance for the existing NPPs and advanced LWR designs are applicable to the SMART design and its safety evaluation. However, the safety requirements related to the SMART-specific design and the desalination plant are needed to develop in the future to assure the safety of the SMART reactor

  17. HTR-PM Safety requirement and Licensing experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Fu; Zhang Zuoyi; Dong Yujie; Wu Zongxin; Sun Yuliang

    2014-01-01

    HTR-PM is a 200MWe modular pebble bed high temperature reactor demonstration plant which is being built in Shidao Bay, Weihai, Shandong, China. The main design parameters of HTR-PM were fixed in 2006, the basic design was completed in 2008. The review of Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) of HTR-PM was started in April 2008, completed in September 2009. In general, HTR- PM design complies with the current safety requirement for nuclear power plant in China, no special standards are developed for modular HTR. Anyway, Chinese Nuclear Safety Authority, together with the designers, developed some dedicated design criteria for key systems and components and published the guideline for the review of safety analysis report of HTR-PM, based on the experiences from licensing of HTR-10 and new development of nuclear safety. The probabilistic safety goal for HTR-PM was also defined by the safety authority. The review of HTR-PM PSAR lasted for one and a half years, with 3 dialogues meetings and 8 topics meetings, with more than 2000 worksheets and answer sheets. The heavily discussed topics during the PSAR review process included: the requirement for the sub-atmospheric ventilation system, the utilization of PSA in design process, the scope of beyond design basis accidents, the requirement for the qualification of TRISO coating particle fuel, and etc. Because of the characteristics of first of a kind for the demonstration plant, the safety authority emphasized the requirement for the experiment and validation, the PSAR was licensed with certain licensing conditions. The whole licensing process was under control, and was re-evaluated again after Fukushima accident to be shown that the design of HTR-PM complies with current safety requirement. This is a good example for how to license a new reactor. (author)

  18. Geological disposal of radioactive waste. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication is concerned with providing protection to people and the environment from the hazards associated with waste management activities related to disposal, i.e. hazards that could arise during the operating period and following closure. It sets out the protection objectives and criteria for geological disposal and establishes the requirements that must be met to ensure the safety of this disposal option, consistent with the established principles of safety for radioactive waste management. It is intended for use by those involved in radioactive waste management and in making decisions in relation to the development, operation and closure of geological disposal facilities, especially those concerned with the related regulatory aspects. This publication contains 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. The safety requirements for geological disposal; 4. Requirements for the development, operation and closure of geological disposal facilities; Appendix: Assurance of compliance with the safety objective and criteria; Annex I: Geological disposal and the principles of radioactive waste management; Annex II: Principles of radioactive waste management

  19. Nuclear power plant's safety and risk (requirements of safety and reliability)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1977-01-01

    Starting out from the given safety objectives as they have evolved during the past few years and from the present legal and regulatory provisions for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, the hazards involved in regular operation, accidents and emergency situations are discussed. In compliance with the positive safety balance of nuclear power plants in the FRG, special attention is focused on the preventive safety analysis within the frame of the nuclear licensing procedure. Reference is made to the beginnings of a comprehensive hazard concept for an unbiased plant assessment. Emergency situations are discussed from the point of view of general hazard comparisons. (orig.) [de

  20. 46 CFR 67.171 - Deletion; requirement and procedure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Deletion; requirement and procedure. 67.171 Section 67...; Requirement for Exchange, Replacement, Deletion, Cancellation § 67.171 Deletion; requirement and procedure. (a... provided in § 67.161, and the vessel is subject to deletion from the roll of actively documented vessels...

  1. Site safety requirements for high level waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen Weiming; Wang Ju

    2006-01-01

    This paper outlines the content, status and trend of site safety requirements of International Atomic Energy Agency, America, France, Sweden, Finland and Japan. Site safety requirements are usually represented as advantageous vis-a-vis disadvantagous conditions, and potential advantage vis-a-vis disadvantage conditions, respectively in aspects of geohydrology, geochemistry, lithology, climate and human intrusion etc. Study framework and steps of site safety requirements for China are discussed under the view of systems science. (authors)

  2. Processes and Procedures for Application of CFD to Nuclear Reactor Safety Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richard W. Johnson; Richard R. Schultz; Patrick J. Roache; Ismail B. Celik; William D. Pointer; Yassin A. Hassan

    2006-01-01

    Traditionally, nuclear reactor safety analysis has been performed using systems analysis codes such as RELAP5, which was developed at the INL. However, goals established by the Generation IV program, especially the desire to increase efficiency, has lead to an increase in operating temperatures for the reactors. This increase pushes reactor materials to operate towards their upper temperature limits relative to structural integrity. Because there will be some finite variation of the power density in the reactor core, there will be a potential for local hot spots to occur in the reactor vessel. Hence, it has become apparent that detailed analysis will be required to ensure that local ''hot spots'' do not exceed safety limits. It is generally accepted that computational fluid dynamics (CFD) codes are intrinsically capable of simulating fluid dynamics and heat transport locally because they are based on ''first principles''. Indeed, CFD analysis has reached a fairly mature level of development, including the commercial level. However, CFD experts are aware that even though commercial codes are capable of simulating local fluid and thermal physics, great care must be taken in their application to avoid errors caused by such things as inappropriate grid meshing, low-order discretization schemes, lack of iterative convergence and inaccurate time-stepping. Just as important is the choice of a turbulence model for turbulent flow simulation. Turbulence models model the effects of turbulent transport of mass, momentum and energy, but are not necessarily applicable for wide ranges of flow types. Therefore, there is a well-recognized need to establish practices and procedures for the proper application of CFD to simulate flow physics accurately and establish the level of uncertainty of such computations. The present document represents contributions of CFD experts on what the basic practices, procedures and guidelines should be to aid CFD analysts to obtain accurate estimates

  3. New requirements on safety of nuclear power plants according to the IAEA safety standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Misak, J.

    2005-01-01

    In this presentation author presents new requirements on safety of nuclear power plants according to the IAEA safety standards. It is concluded that: - New set of IAEA Safety Standards is close to completion: around 40 standards for NPPs; - Different interpretation of IAEA Safety Standards at present: best world practices instead of previous 'minimum common denominator'; - A number of safety improvements required for NPPs; - Requirements related to BDBAs and severe accidents are the most demanding due to degradation of barriers: hardware modifications and accident management; - Large variety between countries in implementation of accident management programmes: from minimum to major hardware modifications; -Distinction between existing and new NPPs is essential from the point of view of the requirements; WWER 440 reactors have potential to reflect IAEA Safety Standards for existing NPPs; relatively low reactor power offers broader possibilities

  4. Requirements on the provisional safety analyses and technical comparison of safety measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-04-01

    The concept of a Geological Underground Repository (SGT) was adopted by the Swiss Federal Council on April 2 nd , 2008. It fixes the goals and the safety technical criteria as well as the procedures for the choice of the site for an underground repository. Those responsible for waste management evaluate possible site regions according to the present status of geological knowledge and based on the safety criteria defined in SGT as well as on technical feasibility. In a first step, they propose geological repository sites for high level (HAA) and for low and intermediate level (SMA) radioactive wastes and justify their choice in a report delivered to the Swiss Federal Office of Energy. The Swiss Federal Council reviews the choices presented and, in the case of positive evaluation, approves them and considers them as an initial orientation. In a second step, based on the possible sites according to step 1, the waste management institution responsible has to reduce the repositories chosen for HAA and SMA by taking into account safety aspects, technical feasibility as well as space planning and socio-economical aspects. In making this choice, safety aspects have the highest priority. The criteria used for the evaluation in the first step have to be defined using provisional quantitative safety analyses. On the basis of the whole appraisal, including space planning and socio-economical aspects, those responsible for waste management propose at least two repository sites for HAA- and SMA-waste. Their selection is then reviewed by the authorities and, in the case of a positive assesment, the selection is taken as an intermediate result. The remaining sites are further studied to examine site choice and the delivery of a request for a design license. If necessary, the requested geological knowledge has to be confirmed by new investigations. Based on the results of the choosing process and a positive evaluation by the safety authorities, the Swiss Federal Council has to

  5. Human Factors Evaluation of Procedures for Periodic Safety Review of Yonggwang Unit no. 1, 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Yong Hee; Lee, Jung Woon; Park, Jae Chang (and others)

    2006-01-15

    This report describes the results of human factors assessment on the plant operating procedures as part of Periodic Safety Review(PSR) of Yonggwang Nuclear Power Plant Unit no. 1, 2. The suitability of item and appropriateness of format and structure in the key operating procedures of nuclear power plants were investigated by the review of plant operating experiences and procedure documents, field survey, and experimental assessment on some part of procedures. A checklist was used to perform this assessment and record the review results. The reviewed procedures include EOP(Emergency Operating Procedures), GOP(General Operating Procedures), AOP(Abnormal Operating Procedures), and management procedures of some technical departments. As results of the assessments, any significant problem challenging the safety was not found on the human factors in the operating procedures. However, several small items to be changed and improved were discovered. An action plan is recommended to accommodate the suggestions and review comments. It will enhance the plant safety on the operating procedure.

  6. Improvement of the safety level of installations with the generalization of procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cornille, Y.; Dupraz, B.; Schektman, N.

    1986-06-01

    The generalization of control procedures to the largest possible spectra of accidental situations which is being developed on pressurized water reactor units will allow to increase the safety level of these installations. This improvement has been quantified for some situations pointing out an appreciable mitigation of meltdown risk which could result. A new improvement is aimed with the definition and the utilization of new procedures ''by states'' which will allow an optimized treatment of situations resulting from multiple failures, now treated in the procedures SPI - SPU - U1. The needs related to these procedures and their development led to joint research and development programs between Electricite de France and the Institute of Protection and Nuclear Safety [fr

  7. NSPWG-recommended safety requirements and guidelines for SEI nuclear propulsion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, A.C.; Lee, J.H.; McCulloch, W.H.; Sawyer, J.C. Jr.; Bari, R.A.; Brown, N.W.; Cullingford, H.S.; Hardy, A.C.; Remp, K.; Sholtis, J.A.

    1992-01-01

    An Interagency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) nuclear propulsion program to facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG developed a top- level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the nuclear propulsion safety program and the development of Safety Functional Requirements. In addition the NSPWG reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top-level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. Safety requirements were developed for reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, and safeguards. Guidelines were recommended for risk/reliability, operational safety, flight trajectory and mission abort, space debris and meteoroids, and ground test safety. In this paper the specific requirements and guidelines will be discussed

  8. The procedures used to review safety analysis reports for packagings submitted to the US Department of Energy for certification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popper, G.F.; Raske, D.T.; Turula, P.

    1988-01-01

    This paper presents an overview of the procedures used at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) to review Safety Analysis Reports for Packagings (SARPs) submitted to the US Department of Energy (DOE) for issuance of a Certificate of Compliance. Prior to certification and shipment of a packaging for the transport of radioactive materials, a SARP must be prepared describing the design, contents, analyses, testing, and safety features of the packaging. The SARP must be reviewed to ensure that the specific packaging meets all DOE orders and federal regulations for safe transport. The ANL SARP review group provides an independent review and evaluation function for the DOE to ensure that the packaging meets all the prescribed requirements. This review involves many disciplines and includes evaluating the general information, drawings, construction details, operating procedures, maintenance and test programs, and the quality assurance plan for compliance with requirements. 14 refs., 6 figs

  9. Regulatory requirements and administrative practice in safety of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Servant, J.

    1977-01-01

    This paper reviews the current situation of the France regulatory rules and procedures dealing with the safety of the main nuclear facilities and, more broadly, the nuclear security. First, the author outlines the policy of the French administration which requires that the licensee responsible for an installation has to demonstrate that all possible measures are taken to ensure a sufficient level of safety, from the early stage of the project to the end of the operation of the plant. Thus, the administration performs the assessment on a case-by-case basis, of the safety of each installation before granting a nuclear license. On the other hand, the administration settles overall safety requirements for specific categories of installations or components, which determine the ultimate safety performances, but avoid, as far as possible, to detail the technical specifications to be applied in order to comply with these goals. This approach, which allows the designers and the licensees to rely upon sound codes and standards, gains the advantage of a great flexibility without imparing the nuclear safety. The author outlines the licensing progress for the main categories of installations: nuclear power plants of the PWR type, fast breeders, uranium isotope separation plants, and irradiated fuel processing plants. Emphasis is placed on the most noteworthy points: standardization of projects, specific risks of each site, problems of advanced type reactors, etc... The development of the technical regulations is presented with emphasis on the importance of an internationally concerned action within the nuclear international community. The second part of this paper describes the France operating experience of nuclear installations from the safety point of view. Especially, the author examines the technical and administrative utilization of data from safety significant incidents in reactors and plants, and the results of the control performed by the nuclear installations

  10. Analyzing Software Requirements Errors in Safety-Critical, Embedded Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lutz, Robyn R.

    1993-01-01

    This paper analyzes the root causes of safety-related software errors in safety-critical, embedded systems. The results show that software errors identified as potentially hazardous to the system tend to be produced by different error mechanisms than non- safety-related software errors. Safety-related software errors are shown to arise most commonly from (1) discrepancies between the documented requirements specifications and the requirements needed for correct functioning of the system and (2) misunderstandings of the software's interface with the rest of the system. The paper uses these results to identify methods by which requirements errors can be prevented. The goal is to reduce safety-related software errors and to enhance the safety of complex, embedded systems.

  11. Meeting the maglev system's safety requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pierick, K

    1983-12-01

    The author shows how the safety requirements of the maglev track system derive from the general legal conditions for the safety of tracked transport. It is described how their compliance beyond the so-called ''development-accompanying'' and ''acceptance-preparatory'' safety work can be assured for the Transrapid test layout (TVE) now building in Emsland and also for later application as public transport system in Germany within the meaning of the General Railway Act.

  12. Generic Safety Requirements for Developing Safe Insulin Pump Software

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Yi; Jetley, Raoul; Jones, Paul L; Ray, Arnab

    2011-01-01

    Background The authors previously introduced a highly abstract generic insulin infusion pump (GIIP) model that identified common features and hazards shared by most insulin pumps on the market. The aim of this article is to extend our previous work on the GIIP model by articulating safety requirements that address the identified GIIP hazards. These safety requirements can be validated by manufacturers, and may ultimately serve as a safety reference for insulin pump software. Together, these two publications can serve as a basis for discussing insulin pump safety in the diabetes community. Methods In our previous work, we established a generic insulin pump architecture that abstracts functions common to many insulin pumps currently on the market and near-future pump designs. We then carried out a preliminary hazard analysis based on this architecture that included consultations with many domain experts. Further consultation with domain experts resulted in the safety requirements used in the modeling work presented in this article. Results Generic safety requirements for the GIIP model are presented, as appropriate, in parameterized format to accommodate clinical practices or specific insulin pump criteria important to safe device performance. Conclusions We believe that there is considerable value in having the diabetes, academic, and manufacturing communities consider and discuss these generic safety requirements. We hope that the communities will extend and revise them, make them more representative and comprehensive, experiment with them, and use them as a means for assessing the safety of insulin pump software designs. One potential use of these requirements is to integrate them into model-based engineering (MBE) software development methods. We believe, based on our experiences, that implementing safety requirements using MBE methods holds promise in reducing design/implementation flaws in insulin pump development and evolutionary processes, therefore improving

  13. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Technical Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRAHN, D.E.

    2000-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt of multi-canister overpacks (MCOs) containing spent nuclear fuel. removal of free water from the MCOs using the cold vacuum drying process, and inerting and testing of the MCOs before transport to the Canister Storage Building. Controls required for public safety, significant defense in depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological and toxicological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines are included

  14. 78 FR 46560 - Pipeline Safety: Class Location Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-01

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part... class location requirements for gas transmission pipelines. Section 5 of the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory... and, with respect to gas transmission pipeline facilities, whether applying IMP requirements to...

  15. Safety research needs for Russian-designed reactors. Requirements situation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, R. Allan; Holmstrom, Heikki; Reocreux, Michel; Schulz, Helmut; Liesch, Klaus; Santarossa, Giampiero; Hayamizu, Yoshitaka; Asmolov, Vladimir; Bolshov, Leonid; Strizhov, Valerii; Bougaenko, Sergei; Nikitin, Yuri N.; Proklov, Vladimir; Potapov, Alexandre; Kinnersly, Stephen R.; Voronin, Leonid M.; Honekamp, John R.; Frescura, Gianni M.; Maki, Nobuo; Reig, Javier; ); Bekjord, Eric S.; Rosinger, Herbert E.

    1998-01-01

    integrity must be verified, and material property data bases extended. - VVER severe accident research should focus on validation of codes for accident management procedures, and on extension and qualification of an appropriate data base for materials properties and their interactions. - RBMK thermal-hydraulic research is needed to improve the technical basis for further development of RBMK safety criteria. - Assessment of the integrity of the RBMK primary coolant circuit, and especially the fuel channel, requires urgent research. Methods of assessing RBMK pressure boundary integrity must be verified, and material property data bases extended. - RBMK severe accident research should focus on prevention of accidents and Accident Management for cases of loss of heat sink and Beyond Design-Basis Loss-of-Coolant Accidents. For these purposes, simple physical models and parametric codes need development and should be systematically used in plant specific analysis. Recommendations; - A Safety Research Strategic Plan should be developed. Such a plan sets goals, defines products, and describes when and how work will be done, including determination of research priorities. - Key players, including regulators, operators, plant designers and researchers should be involved in developing and implementing this plan and its execution and applying the results. - International cooperation in safety research should be encouraged for purposes of improving quality, preventing technical isolation and cost sharing. - New approaches, such as technical fora for specific technical topics, should be established to make safety research information in OECD countries available to researchers working on the safety of Russian-designed reactors

  16. 47 CFR 80.319 - Radiotelegraph distress call and message transmission procedure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ...) SAFETY AND SPECIAL RADIO SERVICES STATIONS IN THE MARITIME SERVICES Safety Watch Requirements and Procedures Distress, Alarm, Urgency and Safety Procedures § 80.319 Radiotelegraph distress call and message...

  17. Safety: Preventive Medicine.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kotula, John R.; Digenakis, Anthony

    1985-01-01

    Underscores the need for community colleges to practice safety within the institutions and to instruct students in workplace safety procedures and requirements. Reviews Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) regulations and their impact on industry and education. Looks at the legal responsibilities of colleges for safety. (DMM)

  18. Technical Support Section Instrument Support Program for nuclear and nonnuclear facilities with safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adkisson, B.P.; Allison, K.L.

    1995-01-01

    This document describes requirements, procedures, and supervisory responsibilities of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Instrumentation and Controls (I ampersand C) Division's Technical Support Section (TSS) for instrument surveillance and maintenance in nonreactor nuclear facilities having identified Operational Safety Requirements (OSRs) or Limiting Conditions Document (LCDs). Implementation of requirements comply with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Orders 5480.5, 5480.22, and 5481.1B; Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems), Policy Procedure ESS-FS-201; and ORNL SPP X-ESH-15. OSRs and LCDs constitute an agreement or contract between DOE and the facility operating management regarding the safe operation of the facility. One basic difference between OSRs and LCDs is that violation of an OSR is considered a Category II occurrence, whereas violation of an LCD requirement is considered a Category III occurrence (see Energy Systems Standard ESS-OP-301 and ORNL SPP X-GP-13). OSRs are required for high- and moderate-hazard nuclear facilities, whereas the less-rigorous LCDs are required for low-hazard nuclear facilities and selected open-quotes generally acceptedclose quotes operations. Hazard classifications are determined through a hazard screening process, which each division conducts for its facilities

  19. International standardization of safety requirements for fast reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is conducting the FaCT (Fast Reactor Cycle Technology Development) project in cooperation with Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC) and Mitsubishi FBR systems inc. (MFBR), where an advanced loop-type fast reactor named JSFR (Japan Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor) is being developed. It is important to develop software technologies (a safety guideline, safety design criteria, safety design standards etc.) of FBRs as well as hardware ones (a reactor plant itself) in order to address prospective worldwide utilization of FBR technology. Therefore, it is expected to establish a rational safety guideline applicable to the JSFR and harmonized with national nuclear-safety regulations as well, including Japan, the United States and the European Union. This report presents domestic and international status of safety guideline development for sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs), results of comparative study for safety requirements provided in existing documents and a proposal for safety requirements of future SFRs with a roadmap for their refinement and worldwide utilization. (author)

  20. Safety design guides for seismic requirements for CANDU 9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young; A. C. D. Wright

    1996-03-01

    This safety design guide for seismic requirements for CANDU 9 describes the seismic design philosophy, defines the applicable earthquakes and identifies the structures and systems requiring seismic qualification to ensure that the essential safety function can be adequately satisfied following earthquake. The detailed requirements for structures, systems and components which must be seismically qualified are specified in the Appendix. The change status of the regulatory requirements, code and standards should be traced and this safety design guide shall be updated accordingly. 1 fig., (Author) .new

  1. NASA Spinoff Article: Automated Procedures To Improve Safety on Oil Rigs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Garud, Sumedha

    2013-01-01

    On May 11th, 2013, two astronauts emerged from the interior of the International Space Station (ISS) and worked their way toward the far end of spacecraft. Over the next 51/2 hours, the two replaced an ammonia pump that had developed a significant leak a few days before. On the ISS, ammonia serves the vital role of cooling components-in this case, one of the station's eight solar arrays. Throughout the extravehicular activity (EVA), the astronauts stayed in constant contact with mission control: every movement, every action strictly followed a carefully planned set of procedures to maximize crew safety and the chances of success. Though the leak had come as a surprise, NASA was prepared to handle it swiftly thanks in part to the thousands of procedures that have been written to cover every aspect of the ISS's operations. The ISS is not unique in this regard: Every NASA mission requires well-written procedures-or detailed lists of step-by-step instructions-that cover how to operate equipment in any scenario, from normal operations to the challenges created by malfunctioning hardware or software. Astronauts and mission control train and drill extensively in procedures to ensure they know what the proper procedures are and when they should be used. These procedures used to be exclusively written on paper, but over the past decade, NASA has transitioned to digital formats. Electronic-based documentation simplifies storage and use, allowing astronauts and flight controllers to find instructions more quickly and display them through a variety of media. Electronic procedures are also a crucial step toward automation: once instructions are digital, procedure display software can be designed to assist in authoring, reviewing, and even executing them.

  2. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication applies to the disposal of radioactive waste of all types by means of emplacement in designed disposal facilities, subject to the necessary limitations and controls being placed on the disposal of the waste and on the development, operation and closure of facilities. The classification of radioactive waste is discussed. This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements to provide assurance of the radiation safety of the disposal of radioactive waste, in the operation of a disposal facility and especially after its closure. The fundamental safety objective is to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. This is achieved by setting requirements on the site selection and evaluation and design of a disposal facility, and on its construction, operation and closure, including organizational and regulatory requirements.

  3. Fire safety requirements for electrical cables towards nuclear reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raju, M.R.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Electrical power supply forms a very important part of any nuclear reactor. Power supplies have been categorized in to class I, II, III and IV from reliability point. The safety related equipment are provided with highly reliable power supply to achieve the safety of very high order. Vast network of cables in a nuclear reactor are grouped and segregated to ensure availability of power to at least one group under all anticipated occurrences. Since fire can result in failures leading to unavailability of power caused by common cause, both passive and active fire protection methods are adopted in addition to fire detection system. The paper describes the requirement for passive fire protection to electrical cables viz. fire barrier and fire breaks. The paper gives an account of the tests required to standardize the products. Fire safety implementation for cables in research reactors is described

  4. Quality and safety of nuclear installations: the role of administration, and, nuclear safety and regulatory procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Queniart, D.

    1979-12-01

    In the first paper the author defines the concepts of safety and quality and describes the means of intervention by the Public Authorities in safety matters of nuclear installations. These include individual authorisations, definition and application of technical rules and surveillance of installations. In the second paper he defines the distinction between radiation protection and safety and presents the legislative and regulatory plan for nuclear safety in France. A central safety service for nuclear installations was created in March 1973 within the Ministry of Industrial and Scientific Development, where, amongst other tasks, it draws up regulatory procedures and organizes inspections of the installations. The main American regulations for light water reactors are outlined and the French regulatory system for different types of reactors discussed

  5. Safety and efficacy of rivaroxaban compared with warfarin in patients undergoing peripheral arterial procedures.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Talukdar, Anjan; Wang, S Keisin; Czosnowski, Lauren; Mokraoui, Nassim; Gupta, Alok; Fajardo, Andres; Dalsing, Michael; Motaganahalli, Raghu

    2017-10-01

    Rivaroxaban is a United States Food and Drug Administration-approved oral anticoagulant for venous thromboembolic disease; however, there is no information regarding the safety and its efficacy to support its use in patients after open or endovascular arterial interventions. We report the safety and efficacy of rivaroxaban vs warfarin in patients undergoing peripheral arterial interventions. This single-institution retrospective study analyzed all sequential patients from December 2012 to August 2014 (21 months) who were prescribed rivaroxaban or warfarin after a peripheral arterial procedure. Our study population was then compared using American College of Chest Physicians guidelines with patients then stratified as low, medium, or high risk for bleeding complications. Statistical analyses were performed using the Student t-test and χ 2 test to compare demographics, readmissions because of bleeding, and the need for secondary interventions. Logistic regression models were used for analysis of variables associated with bleeding complications and secondary interventions. The Fisher exact test was used for power analysis. There were 44 patients in the rivaroxaban group and 50 patients in the warfarin group. Differences between demographics and risk factors for bleeding between groups or reintervention rate were not statistically significant (P = .297). However, subgroup evaluation of the safety profile suggests that patients who were aged ≤65 years and on warfarin had an overall higher incidence of major bleeding (P = .020). Patients who were aged >65 years, undergoing open operation, had a significant risk for reintervention (P = .047) when they received rivaroxaban. Real-world experience using rivaroxaban and warfarin in patients after peripheral arterial procedures suggests a comparable safety and efficacy profile. Subgroup analysis of those requiring an open operation demonstrated a decreased bleeding risk when rivaroxaban was used (in those aged <65

  6. Framework conditions and requirements to ensure the technical functional safety of reprocessed medical devices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kraft, Marc

    2008-09-03

    Testing and restoring technical-functional safety is an essential part of medical device reprocessing. Technical functional tests have to be carried out on the medical device in the course of the validation of reprocessing procedures. These ensure (in addition to the hygiene tests) that the reprocessing procedure is suitable for the medical device. Functional tests are, however, also a part of reprocessing procedures. As a stage in the reprocessing, they ensure for the individual medical device that no damage or other changes limit the performance. When determining which technical-functional tests are to be carried out, the current technological standard has to be taken into account in the form of product-specific and process-oriented norms. Product-specific norms primarily define safety-relevant requirements. The risk management method described in DIN EN ISO 14971 is the basis for recognising hazards; the likelihood of such hazards arising can be minimised through additional technical-functional tests, which may not yet have been standardised. Risk management is part of a quality management system, which must be bindingly certified for manufacturers and processors of critical medical devices with particularly high processing demands by a body accredited by the competent authority.

  7. The main requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Webb, G.A.M.

    1998-01-01

    The main requirements of the new international basic safety standards are discussed, including such topics as health effects of ionizing radiations, the revision of basic safety standards, the requirements for radiation protection practices, the requirements for intervention,and the field of regulatory infrastructures. (A.K.)

  8. 47 CFR 80.310 - Watch required by voluntary vessels.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... Section 80.310 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFETY AND SPECIAL RADIO SERVICES STATIONS IN THE MARITIME SERVICES Safety Watch Requirements and Procedures Ship Station Safety...] Distress, Alarm, Urgency and Safety Procedures ...

  9. 42 CFR 3.106 - Security requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... ORGANIZATIONS AND PATIENT SAFETY WORK PRODUCT PSO Requirements and Agency Procedures § 3.106 Security requirements. (a) Application. A PSO must secure patient safety work product in conformance with the security... the confidentiality and security of patient safety work product. (2) Distinguishing patient safety...

  10. Safety Requirements and Modern Technical Requirements in Human Information Systems in Amman Hotels

    OpenAIRE

    Farouq Ahmad Alazzam; Sattam Rakan Allahawiah; Mohammad Nayef Alsarayreh; Kafa Hmoud Abdallah al Nawaiseh

    2015-01-01

    This study aimed to demonstrate the availability of Safety requirements and modern technical requirements in human information systems in Amman hotels. an the most important results of this study is the availability of security and safety requirements in human information systems In Amman hotels and The adequacy of the information that it provided .and show that all departments are not connected by appropriate and effective communication networks in adequate form . Also sophisticated operatin...

  11. Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility interim operational safety requirements

    CERN Document Server

    Covey, L I

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSRs) for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt and inspection of cesium and strontium capsules from private irradiators; decontamination of the capsules and equipment; surveillance of the stored capsules; and maintenance activities. Controls required for public safety, significant defense-in-depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines (EGs) are included.

  12. Splash Safety During Dermatologic Procedures Among US Dermatology Residents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Korta, Dorota Z; Chapman, Lance W; Lee, Patrick K; Linden, Kenneth G

    2017-07-01

    Dermatologists are at potential risk of acquiring infections from contamination of the mucous membranes by blood and body fluids. However, there are little data on splash safety during procedural dermatology. To determine dermatology resident perceptions about splash risk during dermatologic procedures and to quantify the rate of protective equipment use. An anonymous on-line survey was sent to 108 United States ACGME-approved dermatology residency programs assessing frequency of facial protection during dermatologic procedures, personal history of splash injury, and, if applicable, reasons for not always wearing facial protection. A total of 153 dermatology residents responded. Rates of facial protection varied by procedure, with the highest rates during surgery and the lowest during local anesthetic injection. Over 54% of respondents reported suffering facial splash while not wearing facial protection during a procedure. In contrast, 88.9% of respondents correctly answered that there is a small risk of acquiring infection from mucosal splash. Residency program recommendations for facial protection seem to vary by procedure. The authors' results demonstrate that although facial splash is a common injury, facial protection rates and protective recommendations vary significantly by procedure. These data support the recommendation for enhanced facial protection guidelines during procedural dermatology.

  13. Laser safety and practice

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Low, K.S.

    1995-01-01

    Lasers are finding increasing routine applications in many areas of science, medicine and industry. Though laser radiation is non-ionizing in nature, the usage of high power lasers requires specific safety procedures. This paper briefly outlines the properties of laser beams and various safety procedures necessary in their handling and usage. (author)

  14. Metrics design for safety assessment

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Luo, Yaping; van den Brand, M.G.J.

    2016-01-01

    Context:In the safety domain, safety assessment is used to show that safety-critical systems meet the required safety objectives. This process is also referred to as safety assurance and certification. During this procedure, safety standards are used as development guidelines to keep the risk at an

  15. OSHA safety requirements for hazardous chemicals in the workplace.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dohms, J

    1992-01-01

    This article outlines the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements set forth by the Hazard Communication Standard, which has been in effect for the healthcare industry since 1987. Administrators who have not taken concrete steps to address employee health and safety issues relating to hazardous chemicals are encouraged to do so to avoid the potential of large fines for cited violations. While some states administer their own occupational safety and health programs, they must adopt standards and enforce requirements that are at least as effective as federal requirements.

  16. Firefighter safety for PV systems: Overview of future requirements and protection systems

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Spataru, Sergiu; Sera, Dezso; Blaabjerg, Frede

    2013-01-01

    for operators during maintenance or fire-fighting. One of the solutions is individual module shutdown by short-circuiting or disconnecting each PV module from the PV string. However, currently no standards have been adopted either for implementing or testing these methods, or doing an evaluation of the module...... shutdown procedures. This paper gives an overview on the most recent fire - and firefighter safety requirements for PV systems, with focus on system and module shutdown systems. Several solutions are presented, analyzed and compared by considering a number of essential characteristics, including......An important and highly discussed safety issue for photovoltaic systems is that, as long as they are illuminated, a high voltage is present at the PV string terminals and cables between the string and inverters, independent of the state of the inverter's dc disconnection switch, which poses a risk...

  17. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission's financial guarantee requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferch, R.

    2006-01-01

    The Nuclear Safety and Control Act gives the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) the legal authority to require licensees to provide financial guarantees in order to meet the purposes of the Act. CNSC policy and guidance with regard to financial guarantees is outlined, and the current status of financial guarantee requirements as applied to various CNSC licensees is described. (author)

  18. Operating procedure automation to enhance safety of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Husseiny, A.A.; Sabri, Z.A.; Adams, S.K.; Rodriguez, R.J.; Packer, D.; Holmes, J.W.

    1989-01-01

    Use of logic statements and computer assist are explored as means for automation and improvement on design of operating procedures including those employed in abnormal and emergency situations. Operating procedures for downpower and loss of forced circulation are used for demonstration. Human-factors analysis is performed on generic emergency operating procedures for three strategies of control; manual, semi-automatic and automatic, using standard emergency operating procedures. Such preliminary analysis shows that automation of procedures is feasible provided that fault-tolerant software and hardware become available for design of the controllers. Recommendations are provided for tests to substantiate the promise of enhancement of plant safety. Adequate design of operating procedures through automation may alleviate several major operational problems of nuclear power plants. Also, automation of procedures is necessary for partial or overall automatic control of plants. Fully automatic operations are needed for space applications while supervised automation of land-based and offshore plants may become the thrust of new generation of nulcear power plants. (orig.)

  19. Preliminary Assessment of Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements for Airborne Trajectory Management (ABTM) Roadmap Applications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cotton, William B.; Hilb, Robert; Koczo, Stefan, Jr.; Wing, David J.

    2016-01-01

    A set of five developmental steps building from the NASA TASAR (Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests) concept are described, each providing incrementally more efficiency and capacity benefits to airspace system users and service providers, culminating in a Full Airborne Trajectory Management capability. For each of these steps, the incremental Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements are identified for later use in future formal safety assessments intended to lead to certification and operational approval of the equipment and the associated procedures. Two established safety assessment methodologies that are compliant with the FAA's Safety Management System were used leading to Failure Effects Classifications (FEC) for each of the steps. The most likely FEC for the first three steps, Basic TASAR, Digital TASAR, and 4D TASAR, is "No effect". For step four, Strategic Airborne Trajectory Management, the likely FEC is "Minor". For Full Airborne Trajectory Management (Step 5), the most likely FEC is "Major".

  20. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition); Bezopasnost' atomnykh ehlektrostantsij: proektirovanie. Konkretnye trebovaniya bezopasnosti

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-04-15

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  1. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI action plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, a program was established whereby an annual NUREG report would be published on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was compiled and reported in three NUREG volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). This annual NUREG report combines these volumes into a single report and provides updated information as of September 30, 1991. The data contained in these NUREG reports are a product of the NRC's Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) database, which is maintained by the Project Management Staff in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and by NRC regional personnel. This report is to provide a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan Requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, and GSIs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. An additional purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  2. High-Speed Maglev Trains; German Safety Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    1991-12-31

    This document is a translation of technology-specific safety requirements developed : for the German Transrapid Maglev technology. These requirements were developed by a : working group composed of representatives of German Federal Railways (DB), Tes...

  3. Uncodified safety norms and procedural compliance in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ignatov, M.

    2000-01-01

    The mechanism of procedural compliance in operational teams is analysed. It is investigated the interrelationship between codified (institutional or officials) rules and uncodified safety norm and their influence on the job performance, social behaviour and social interaction of the operational personnel

  4. Functional safety requirements of the propulsion and power supply equipment of the MAGLEV system; Umgang mit funktionalen Sicherheitsanforderungen bei Antrieb und Energieversorgung der Magnetbahn

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stephan, A. [IFB Inst. fuer Bahntechnik GmbH, Dresden (Germany)

    2008-07-01

    In the Transrapid high-speed MAGLEV railway system, the operating control subsystem provides for the higher-level safety function. Within the system also selected components of the stationary linear-motor drive have important safety functions. Under the approval procedure, the safety-relevant functions must be certified. This makes specific requirements on the development and integration of the components used. (orig.)

  5. Development of High-Level Safety Requirements for a Pyroprocessing Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seo, Seok Jun; Jo, Woo Jin; You, Gil Sung; Choung, Won Myung; Lee, Ho Hee; Kim, Hyun Min; Jeon, Hong Rae; Ku, Jeong Hoe; Lee, Hyo Jik [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing a pyroproceesing technology to reduce the waste volume and recycle some elements. The pyroprocessing includes several treatment processes which are related with not only radiological and physical but also chemical and electrochemical properties. Thus, it is of importance to establish safety design requirements considering all the aspects of those properties for a reliable pyroprocessing facility. In this study, high-level requirements are presented in terms of not only radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, and seismic safety but also confinement and chemical safety for the unique characteristics of a pyroprocessing facility. Several high-level safety design requirements such as radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, seismic, confinement, and chemical processing were presented for a pyroprocessing facility. The requirements must fulfill domestic and international safety technology standards for a nuclear facility. Furthermore, additional requirements should be considered for the unique electrochemical treatments in a pyroprocessing facility.

  6. Specification of requirements for the implementation of ASICs and FPGA in instrumentation and control systems important to safety in German NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schnurer, G.

    2007-01-01

    This paper gives an overview concerning the design as well as the verification and validation of Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) and Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) in German NPPs which are applied to carry out I and C functions. The qualification procedures dealt with restricted on ASICs without any microcontroller core. Dependent on the different safety categories, recommendations concerning the qualification level and procedures are elaborated which have to be achieved for ASICs and FPGA. Important aspects within the framework of the expert judgement for upgrading of safety relevant I and C by ASICs and FPGA are dealt with. These aspects are of general character and are mainly focused on suitability test procedures and robustness requirements of ASICs and FPGA

  7. Convention on nuclear safety. Rules of procedure and financial rules

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document is the first revision of the Rules of Procedures and Financial Rules that apply mutatis mutandis to any meetings of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/573), convened in accordance with the Chapter 3 of the Convention

  8. Convention on Nuclear Safety. Rules of procedure and financial rules

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The document is the second revision of the Rules of Procedures and Financial Rules that apply mutatis mutandis to any meetings of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/573), convened in accordance with the Chapter 3 of the Convention

  9. Discussion on several important safety requirements for the new nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yan Tianwen; Li Jigen; Zhang Lin; Feng Youcai; Jia Xiang; Li Wenhong

    2013-01-01

    Post the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Chinese government raised higher safety goals and safety requirements for the new nuclear power plant to be constructed. The paper expounded the important indicators of safety requirements and the aspects of safety modification that had been developed for the new NPPs. It also discussed and analyzed the main fields required by the new NPPs safety requirements in the safety goals, safety evaluation of sites, defenses of internal and external events, severe accident prevention and mitigation, design of reactor core, containment system and I and C system, and optimization of engineering measure, which gave some references to the design, construction and safety modifications of new NPPs in China. (authors)

  10. Information requirements of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's safety, environmental health, and occupational medicine programs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Whyte, A. A.

    1978-01-01

    A survey of the internal and external reporting and recordkeeping procedures of these programs was conducted and the major problems associated with them are outlined. The impact of probable future requirements on existing information systems is evaluated. This report also presents the benefits of combining the safety and health information systems into one computerized system and recommendations for the development and scope of that system.

  11. Westinghouse Hanford Company safety analysis reports and technical safety requirements upgrade program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Busche, D.M.

    1995-09-01

    During Fiscal Year 1992, the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) separately transmitted the following US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) for compliance: DOE 5480.21, ''Unreviewed Safety Questions,'' DOE 5480.22, ''Technical Safety Requirements,'' and DOE 5480.23, ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.'' WHC has proceeded with its impact assessment and implementation process for the Orders. The Orders are closely-related and contain some requirements that are either identical, similar, or logically-related. Consequently, WHC has developed a strategy calling for an integrated implementation of the three Orders. The strategy is comprised of three primary objectives, namely: Obtain DOE approval of a single list of DOE-owned and WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities, Establish and/or upgrade the ''Safety Basis'' for each Nuclear Facility, and Establish a functional Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process to govern the management and preservation of the Safety Basis for each Nuclear Facility. WHC has developed policy-revision and facility-specific implementation plans to accomplish near-term tasks associated with the above strategic objectives. This plan, which as originally submitted in August 1993 and approved, provided an interpretation of the new DOE Nuclear Facility definition and an initial list of WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities. For each current existing Nuclear Facility, existing Safety Basis documents are identified and the plan/status is provided for the ISB. Plans for upgrading SARs and developing TSRs will be provided after issuance of the corresponding Rules

  12. Design requirements of communication architecture of SMART safety system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, H. Y.; Kim, D. H.; Sin, Y. C.; Lee, J. Y.

    2001-01-01

    To develop the communication network architecture of safety system of SMART, the evaluation elements for reliability and performance factors are extracted from commercial networks and classified the required-level by importance. A predictable determinacy, status and fixed based architecture, separation and isolation from other systems, high reliability, verification and validation are introduced as the essential requirements of safety system communication network. Based on the suggested requirements, optical cable, star topology, synchronous transmission, point-to-point physical link, connection-oriented logical link, MAC (medium access control) with fixed allocation are selected as the design elements. The proposed architecture will be applied as basic communication network architecture of SMART safety system

  13. Safety management procedures and practices at Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rodriguez, P.; Lee, S.M.; Kapoor, R.P.; Raghunath, V.M.; Karthikeyan, S.V. [Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam 603 102 (India)]. E-mail: kapoor@igcar.ernet.in

    2004-07-01

    The Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) operates FBTR (Fast Breeder Test Reactor), KAMINI (neutron source reactor), radiometallurgical laboratory, radiochemical laboratory, reprocessing plant, industrial scale sodium loops, advanced research laboratories, workshops, etc. Codified safety management procedures with systematic surveillance are essential for safe and reliable operations and these are described under the classifications of radiation safety, industrial safety and reactor operations with special emphasis on the human factor. Health physics teams, independent of the plant facility, supervise the radioactive facilities of the centre. Industrial safety standards are maintained by another independent section. Safety management for the reactors include a clear organisational structure, adequate documentation, compulsory training and licencing, safe working methods taking into account human factors and review by independent safety authorities. (author)

  14. Safety management procedures and practices at Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, P.; Lee, S.M.; Kapoor, R.P.; Raghunath, V.M.; Karthikeyan, S.V.

    2004-01-01

    The Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) operates FBTR (Fast Breeder Test Reactor), KAMINI (neutron source reactor), radiometallurgical laboratory, radiochemical laboratory, reprocessing plant, industrial scale sodium loops, advanced research laboratories, workshops, etc. Codified safety management procedures with systematic surveillance are essential for safe and reliable operations and these are described under the classifications of radiation safety, industrial safety and reactor operations with special emphasis on the human factor. Health physics teams, independent of the plant facility, supervise the radioactive facilities of the centre. Industrial safety standards are maintained by another independent section. Safety management for the reactors include a clear organisational structure, adequate documentation, compulsory training and licencing, safe working methods taking into account human factors and review by independent safety authorities. (author)

  15. TWRS safety SSCs: Requirements and characteristics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith-Fewell, M.A.

    1997-01-01

    Safety Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) have been identified from hazard and accident analyses. These analyses were performed to support the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Basis for Interim Operation (BID). The text identifies and evaluates the SSCs and their supporting SSCs to show that they either prevent the occurrence of the accident or mitigate the consequences of the accident to below the acceptance guidelines. The requirements for the SSCs to fulfill these tasks are described

  16. Requirement and prospect of nuclear data activities for nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimura, Itsuro

    2000-01-01

    Owing to continuous efforts by the members of JNDC (Japanese Nuclear Data Committee) and Nuclear Data Center in JAERI (Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute), several superb evaluated nuclear data files, such as JENDL, FP (fission product) yields and decay heat, have been compiled in Japan and opened to the world. However, they are seldom adopted in safety design and safety evaluation of light water reactors and are hardly found in related safety regulatory guidelines and standards except the decay heat. In this report, shown are a few examples of presently used nuclear data in the safety design and the safety evaluation of PWRs (pressurized water reactors) and so forth. And then, several procedures are recommended in order to enhance more utilization of Japanese evaluated nuclear data files for nuclear safety. (author)

  17. Space station pressurized laboratory safety guidelines

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mcgonigal, Les

    1990-01-01

    Before technical safety guidelines and requirements are established, a common understanding of their origin and importance must be shared between Space Station Program Management, the User Community, and the Safety organizations involved. Safety guidelines and requirements are driven by the nature of the experiments, and the degree of crew interaction. Hazard identification; development of technical safety requirements; operating procedures and constraints; provision of training and education; conduct of reviews and evaluations; and emergency preplanning are briefly discussed.

  18. Technical safety requirements for the Annular Core Research Reactor Facility (ACRRF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boldt, K.R.; Morris, F.M.; Talley, D.G.; McCrory, F.M.

    1998-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) document is prepared and issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.22, Technical Safety Requirements. The bases for the TSR are established in the ACRRF Safety Analysis Report issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The TSR identifies the operational conditions, boundaries, and administrative controls for the safe operation of the facility

  19. 44 CFR 17.630 - Certification requirements and procedures.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Certification requirements and procedures. 17.630 Section 17.630 Emergency Management and Assistance FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY GENERAL GOVERNMENTWIDE REQUIREMENTS FOR DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE...

  20. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered.

  1. A combined deterministic and probabilistic procedure for safety assessment of components with cracks - Handbook.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dillstroem, Peter; Bergman, Mats; Brickstad, Bjoern; Weilin Zang; Sattari-Far, Iradj; Andersson, Peder; Sund, Goeran; Dahlberg, Lars; Nilsson, Fred (Inspecta Technology AB, Stockholm (Sweden))

    2008-07-01

    SSM has supported research work for the further development of a previously developed procedure/handbook (SKI Report 99:49) for assessment of detected cracks and tolerance for defect analysis. During the operative use of the handbook it was identified needs to update the deterministic part of the procedure and to introduce a new probabilistic flaw evaluation procedure. Another identified need was a better description of the theoretical basis to the computer program. The principal aim of the project has been to update the deterministic part of the recently developed procedure and to introduce a new probabilistic flaw evaluation procedure. Other objectives of the project have been to validate the conservatism of the procedure, make the procedure well defined and easy to use and make the handbook that documents the procedure as complete as possible. The procedure/handbook and computer program ProSACC, Probabilistic Safety Assessment of Components with Cracks, has been extensively revised within this project. The major differences compared to the last revision are within the following areas: It is now possible to deal with a combination of deterministic and probabilistic data. It is possible to include J-controlled stable crack growth. The appendices on material data to be used for nuclear applications and on residual stresses are revised. A new deterministic safety evaluation system is included. The conservatism in the method for evaluation of the secondary stresses for ductile materials is reduced. A new geometry, a circular bar with a circumferential surface crack has been introduced. The results of this project will be of use to SSM in safety assessments of components with cracks and in assessments of the interval between the inspections of components in nuclear power plants

  2. Investigational new drug safety reporting requirements for human drug and biological products and safety reporting requirements for bioavailability and bioequivalence studies in humans. Final rule.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-29

    The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is amending its regulations governing safety reporting requirements for human drug and biological products subject to an investigational new drug application (IND). The final rule codifies the agency's expectations for timely review, evaluation, and submission of relevant and useful safety information and implements internationally harmonized definitions and reporting standards. The revisions will improve the utility of IND safety reports, reduce the number of reports that do not contribute in a meaningful way to the developing safety profile of the drug, expedite FDA's review of critical safety information, better protect human subjects enrolled in clinical trials, subject bioavailability and bioequivalence studies to safety reporting requirements, promote a consistent approach to safety reporting internationally, and enable the agency to better protect and promote public health.

  3. Operating safety requirements for the intermediate level liquid waste system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-07-01

    The operation of the Intermediate Level Liquid Waste (ILW) System, which is described in the Final Safety Analysis, consists of two types of operations, namely: (1) the operation of a tank farm which involves the storage and transportation through pipelines of various radioactive liquids; and (2) concentration of the radioactive liquids by evaporation including rejection of the decontaminated condensate to the Waste Treatment Plant and retention of the concentrate. The following safety requirements in regard to these operations are presented: safety limits and limiting control settings; limiting conditions for operation; and surveillance requirements. Staffing requirements, reporting requirements, and steps to be taken in the event of an abnormal occurrence are also described

  4. The effect of facility characteristics on patient safety, patient experience, and service availability for procedures in non-hospital-affiliated outpatient settings: A systematic review.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Berglas, Nancy F; Battistelli, Molly F; Nicholson, Wanda K; Sobota, Mindy; Urman, Richard D; Roberts, Sarah C M

    2018-01-01

    Over recent decades, numerous medical procedures have migrated out of hospitals and into freestanding ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) and physician offices, with possible implications for patient outcomes. In response, states have passed regulations for office-based surgeries, private organizations have established standards for facility accreditation, and professional associations have developed clinical guidelines. While abortions have been performed in office setting for decades, states have also enacted laws requiring that facilities that perform abortions meet specific requirements. The extent to which facility requirements have an impact on patient outcomes-for any procedure-is unclear. We conducted a systematic review to examine the effect of outpatient facility type (ASC vs. office) and specific facility characteristics (e.g., facility accreditation, emergency response protocols, clinician qualifications, physical plant characteristics, other policies) on patient safety, patient experience and service availability in non-hospital-affiliated outpatient settings. To identify relevant research, we searched databases of the published academic literature (PubMed, EMBASE, Web of Science) and websites of governmental and non-governmental organizations. Two investigators reviewed 3049 abstracts and full-text articles against inclusion/exclusion criteria and assessed the quality of 22 identified articles. Most studies were hampered by methodological challenges, with 12 of 22 not meeting minimum quality criteria. Of 10 studies included in the review, most (6) examined the effect of facility type on patient safety. Existing research appears to indicate no difference in patient safety for outpatient procedures performed in ASCs vs. physician offices. Research about specific facility characteristics is insufficient to draw conclusions. More and higher quality research is needed to determine if there is a public health problem to be addressed through facility

  5. Philosophy and safety requirements for land-based nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kellermann, Otto

    1978-01-01

    The main ideas of safety philosophy for land-based nuclear installations are presented together with their background of protection goals. Today's requirements for design and quality assurance are deductively shown. Finally a proposition is made for a new balancing of safety philosophy according to the high safety level that nuclear installations have reached

  6. Safety integrity requirements for computer based I ampersand C systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thuy, N.N.Q.; Ficheux-Vapne, F.

    1997-01-01

    In order to take into account increasingly demanding functional requirements, many instrumentation and control (I ampersand C) systems in nuclear power plants are implemented with computers. In order to ensure the required safety integrity of such equipment, i.e., to ensure that they satisfactorily perform the required safety functions under all stated conditions and within stated periods of time, requirements applicable to these equipment and to their life cycle need to be expressed and followed. On the other hand, the experience of the last years has led EDF (Electricite de France) and its partners to consider three classes of systems and equipment, according to their importance to safety. In the EPR project (European Pressurized water Reactor), these classes are labeled E1A, E1B and E2. The objective of this paper is to present the outline of the work currently done in the framework of the ETC-I (EPR Technical Code for I ampersand C) regarding safety integrity requirements applicable to each of the three classes. 4 refs., 2 figs

  7. A comparison of the difference of requirements between functional safety and nuclear safety controllers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chen, C.K.; Lee, C.L.; Shyu, S.S. [Inst. of Nuclear Energy Research, Taoyuan, Taiwan (China)

    2014-07-01

    In order to establish self-reliant capabilities of nuclear I&C systems in Taiwan, Taiwan's Nuclear I&C System (TNICS) project had been established by Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER). A Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) safety controller (SCS-2000) has been completed and gone through the IEC 61508 Safety Integrity Level 3 (SIL3) certification of Functional Safety for industries. Based on the certification processes, the difference of requirements between Functional Safety and Nuclear Safety controllers in term of hardware and software are addressed in this study. Besides, the measures used to determine and verify the reliability of the safety control system design are presented. (author)

  8. Predisposal management of radioactive waste. General safety requirements. Pt. 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish, the requirements that must be satisfied in the predisposal management of radioactive waste. This publication sets out the objectives, criteria and requirements for the protection of human health and the environment that apply to the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and shutdown of facilities for the predisposal management of radioactive waste, and the requirements that must be met to ensure the safety of such facilities and activities. This Safety Requirements publication applies to the predisposal management of radioactive waste of all types and covers all the steps in its management from its generation up to its disposal, including its processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning), storage and transport. Such waste may arise from the commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities; the use of radionuclides in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and education; the processing of materials that contain naturally occurring radionuclides; and the remediation of contaminated areas. The introduction of the document (Section 1) informs about its objective, scope and structure. The protection of human health and the environment is considered in Section 2 of this publication. Section 3 establishes requirements for the responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste. Requirements for the principal approaches to and the elements of the predisposal management of radioactive waste are established in Section 4. Section 5 establishes requirements for the safe development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and safe conduct of activities. The Annex presents a discussion of the consistency of the safety requirements established in this publication with the fundamental safety principles

  9. Recommended general safety requirements for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-06-01

    This report presents recommendations for a set of general safety requirements that could form the basis for the licensing of nuclear power plants by the Atomic Energy Control Board. In addition to a number of recommended deterministic requirements the report includes criteria for the acceptability of the design of such plants based upon the calculated probability and consequence (in terms of predicted radiation dose to members of the public) of potential fault sequences. The report also contains a historical review of nuclear safety principles and practices in Canada

  10. Evaluation of safety, an unavoidable requirement in the applications of ionizing radiations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jova Sed, Luis Andres

    2013-01-01

    The safety assessments should be conducted as a means to evaluate compliance with safety requirements (and thus the application of fundamental safety principles) for all facilities and activities in order to determine the measures to be taken to ensure safety. It is an essential tool in decision making. For long time we have linked the safety assessment to nuclear facilities and not to all practices involving the use of ionizing radiation in daily life. However, the main purpose of the safety assessment is to determine if it has reached an appropriate level of safety for an installation or activity and if it has fulfilled the objectives of safety and basic safety criteria set by the designer, operating organization and the regulatory body under the protection and safety requirements set out in the International Basic safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. This paper presents some criteria and personal experiences with the new international recommendations on this subject and its practical application in the region and demonstrates the importance of this requirement. Reflects the need to train personnel of the operator and the regulatory body in the proportional application of this requirement in practice with ionizing radiation

  11. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities. Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific relevance include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal

  12. Cognition and procedure representational requirements for predictive human performance models

    Science.gov (United States)

    Corker, K.

    1992-01-01

    Models and modeling environments for human performance are becoming significant contributors to early system design and analysis procedures. Issues of levels of automation, physical environment, informational environment, and manning requirements are being addressed by such man/machine analysis systems. The research reported here investigates the close interaction between models of human cognition and models that described procedural performance. We describe a methodology for the decomposition of aircrew procedures that supports interaction with models of cognition on the basis of procedures observed; that serves to identify cockpit/avionics information sources and crew information requirements; and that provides the structure to support methods for function allocation among crew and aiding systems. Our approach is to develop an object-oriented, modular, executable software representation of the aircrew, the aircraft, and the procedures necessary to satisfy flight-phase goals. We then encode in a time-based language, taxonomies of the conceptual, relational, and procedural constraints among the cockpit avionics and control system and the aircrew. We have designed and implemented a goals/procedures hierarchic representation sufficient to describe procedural flow in the cockpit. We then execute the procedural representation in simulation software and calculate the values of the flight instruments, aircraft state variables and crew resources using the constraints available from the relationship taxonomies. The system provides a flexible, extensible, manipulative and executable representation of aircrew and procedures that is generally applicable to crew/procedure task-analysis. The representation supports developed methods of intent inference, and is extensible to include issues of information requirements and functional allocation. We are attempting to link the procedural representation to models of cognitive functions to establish several intent inference methods

  13. Requirements to be met by a safety philosophy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hahn, L.

    1990-01-01

    The author's assessment of the use of safety philosophies is that, since 'safety philosophers' still are not certain whether a safety philosophy ought to be applicable to just one, particular technology, or rather to a variety of different technologies, there is reason to state that the required ethical, philosophical and political foundations to build a safety philosophy on are still missing. And this, the author presumes, is one of the reasons why our society to a far extent is incapable of acting, faced not only with the nuclear issue, but also with the present and future ecological challenge. (orig./DG) [de

  14. Defence-in-depth and development of safety requirements for advanced nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnino, A.; Gasparini, M.

    2002-01-01

    The paper addresses a general approach for the preparation of the design safety requirements using the IAEA Safety Objectives and the strategy of defence-in-depth. It proposes a general method (top-down approach) to prepare safety requirements for a given kind of reactor using the IAEA requirements for nuclear power plants as a starting point through a critical interpretation and application of the strategy of defence-in-depth. The IAEA has recently developed a general methodology for screening the defence-in-depth of nuclear power plants starting from the fundamental safety objectives as proposed in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals. This methodology may provide a useful tool for the preparation of safety requirements for the design and operation of any kind of reactor. Currently the IAEA is preparing the technical basis for the development of safety requirements for Modular High Temperature Gas Reactors, with the aim of showing the viability of the method. A draft TECDOC has been prepared and circulated among several experts for comments. This paper is largely based on the content of the draft TECDOC. (authors)

  15. Convention on nuclear safety. Rules of procedure and financial rules

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document presents the Rules of Procedure and Financial Rules that apply mutatis mutandis to any meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/449) convened in accordance with Chapter 3 of the Convention. It includes four parts: General provisions, Preparatory process for review meetings, Review meetings, and Amendment and interpretation of rules

  16. Research on advanced system safety assessment procedures (4)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Kazuhiko; Shimada, Yukiyasu

    2001-03-01

    The past research reports in the area of safety engineering proposed the Computer-aided HAZOP system to be applied to Nuclear Reprocessing Facilities. Automated HAZOP system has great advantage compared with human analysts in terms of accuracy of the results, and time required to conduct HAZOP studies. This report surveys the literature on risk assessment and safety design based on the concept of independent protection layers (IPLs). Furthermore, to improve HAZOP System, tool is proposed to construct the basic model and the internal state model. Such HAZOP system is applied to analyze two kinds of processes, where the ability of the proposed system is verified. In addition, risk assessment support system is proposed to integrate safety design environment and assessment result to be used by other plants as well as to enable the underline plant to use other plants' information. This technique can be implemented using web-based safety information systems. (author)

  17. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1, Revision 1 (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  18. EPR meets the next generation PWR safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bouteille, Francois; Czech, Juergen; Sloan, Sandra

    2006-01-01

    At the origin was the common decision in 1989 of Framatome and Siemens to cooperate to design a Nuclear Island which meets the future needs of utilities. EDF and a group of main German Utilities joined this effort in 1991 and from that point were completely involved in the progress of the work. Compliance of the EPR with the European Utility Requirements (EUR) was verified to ensure a large acceptability of the design by other participating utilities. In addition, the entire process was backed up to the end of 1998 by the French and the German Safety Authorities which engaged into a long-lasting cooperation to define common requirements applicable to future Nuclear Power Plants. Upon signature of the Olkiluoto 3 contract, STUK, the Finnish safety and radiation authority, began reviewing the design of the EPR. Upon the favorable recommendation of STUK, the Finnish government delivered a Construction License for the Olkiluoto 3 NPP on February 17, 2005. Following the positive conclusion of the political debate in France with regard to nuclear energy, EDF will also submit a request to start the construction of an EPR on the Flamanville site. In the US, the first steps in view of a Design Certification by the NRC have been taken. These three independent decisions make the EPR the leading first generation 3+ design under construction. Important safety functions are assured by separate systems in a straightforward operating mode. Four separate, redundant trains for all safety systems are installed in four separate layout division for which a strict separation is ensured so that common mode failure, for example due to internal hazards, can be ruled out. A reduction in common mode failure potential is also obtained by design rules ensuring the systematic application of functional diversity. A four train-redundancy for the major safety systems provides flexibility in adapting the design to maintenance requirements, thus contributing to reduce the outage duration. Additional

  19. 47 CFR 80.301 - Watch requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFETY AND SPECIAL RADIO SERVICES STATIONS IN THE MARITIME SERVICES Safety Watch Requirements and Procedures Coast Station Safety Watches § 80.301 Watch...) Except for distress, urgency or safety messages, coast stations must not transmit on 2182 kHz during the...

  20. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

  1. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

  2. 47 CFR 80.304 - Watch requirement during silence periods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ....304 Section 80.304 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFETY AND SPECIAL RADIO SERVICES STATIONS IN THE MARITIME SERVICES Safety Watch Requirements and Procedures Ship Station Safety Watches § 80.304 Watch requirement during silence periods. Each ship station operating on...

  3. 49 CFR 214.337 - On-track safety procedures for lone workers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ...-track equipment is not impaired by background noise, lights, precipitation, fog, passing trains, or any... performing routine inspection or minor correction may use individual train detection to establish on-track... worker retains an absolute right to use on-track safety procedures other than individual train detection...

  4. Efficacy, safety, and patient acceptability of the Essure™ procedure

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Hopkins MR

    2011-04-01

    Full Text Available Collette R Lessard, Matthew R HopkinsDepartment of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota, USAAbstract: The Essure™ system for permanent contraception was developed as a less invasive method of female sterilization. Placement of the Essure™ coil involves a hysteroscopic transcervical technique. This procedure can be done in a variety of settings and with a range of anesthetic options. More than eight years have passed since the US Food and Drug Administration approval of Essure™. Much research has been done to evaluate placement success, adverse outcomes, satisfaction, pain, and the contraceptive efficacy of the Essure™. The purpose of this review is to summarize the available literature regarding the efficacy, safety, and patient satisfaction with this new sterilization technique.Keywords: hysteroscopic sterilization, Essure™, safety, efficacy, acceptability

  5. Safety for Users

    CERN Multimedia

    HR Department

    2008-01-01

    CERN welcomes more than 8000 Users every year. The PH Department as host to these scientific associates requires the highest safety standards. The PH Safety Office has published a Safety Flyer for Users. Important safety topics and procedures are presented. Although the Flyer is intended primarily to provide safety information for Users, the PH Safety Office invites all those on the CERN sites to keep a copy of the flyer as it gives guidance in matters of safety and explains what to do in the event of an emergency. Link: http://ph-dep.web.cern.ch/ph-dep/Safety/SafetyOffice.html PH-Safety Office PH Department

  6. Safety for Users

    CERN Multimedia

    HR Department

    2008-01-01

    CERN welcomes more than 8000 Users every year. The PH Department as host to these scientific associates requires the highest safety standards. The PH Safety Office has published a safety flyer for Users. Important safety topics and procedures are presented. Although the flyer is intended primarily to provide safety information for Users, the PH Safety Office invites all those on the CERN sites to keep a copy of the flyer as it gives guidance in matters of safety and explains what to do in the event of an emergency. The flyer is available at: http://ph-dep.web.cern.ch/ph-dep/Safety/SafetyOffice.html PH-Safety Office PH Department

  7. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements. Volume 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

  8. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements [VOL 1 and 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-12-28

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

  9. Safety Precautions and Operating Procedures in an (A)BSL-4 Laboratory: 2. General Practices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mazur, Steven; Holbrook, Michael R; Burdette, Tracey; Joselyn, Nicole; Barr, Jason; Pusl, Daniela; Bollinger, Laura; Coe, Linda; Jahrling, Peter B; Lackemeyer, Matthew G; Wada, Jiro; Kuhn, Jens H; Janosko, Krisztina

    2016-10-03

    Work in a biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) containment laboratory requires time and great attention to detail. The same work that is done in a BSL-2 laboratory with non-high-consequence pathogens will take significantly longer in a BSL-4 setting. This increased time requirement is due to a multitude of factors that are aimed at protecting the researcher from laboratory-acquired infections, the work environment from potential contamination and the local community from possible release of high-consequence pathogens. Inside the laboratory, movement is restricted due to air hoses attached to the mandatory full-body safety suits. In addition, disinfection of every item that is removed from Class II biosafety cabinets (BSCs) is required. Laboratory specialists must be trained in the practices of the BSL-4 laboratory and must show high proficiency in the skills they are performing. The focus of this article is to outline proper procedures and techniques to ensure laboratory biosafety and experimental accuracy using a standard viral plaque assay as an example procedure. In particular, proper techniques to work safely in a BSL-4 environment when performing an experiment will be visually emphasized. These techniques include: setting up a Class II BSC for experiments, proper cleaning of the Class II BSC when finished working, waste management and safe disposal of waste generated inside a BSL-4 laboratory, and the removal of inactivated samples from inside a BSL-4 laboratory to the BSL-2 laboratory.

  10. Human factoring administrative procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grider, D.A.; Sturdivant, M.H.

    1991-01-01

    In nonnuclear business, administrative procedures bring to mind such mundane topics as filing correspondence and scheduling vacation time. In the nuclear industry, on the other hand, administrative procedures play a vital role in assuring the safe operation of a facility. For some time now, industry focus has been on improving technical procedures. Significant efforts are under way to produce technical procedure requires that a validated technical, regulatory, and administrative basis be developed and that the technical process be established for each procedure. Producing usable technical procedures requires that procedure presentation be engineered to the same human factors principles used in control room design. The vital safety role of administrative procedures requires that they be just as sound, just a rigorously formulated, and documented as technical procedures. Procedure programs at the Tennessee Valley Authority and at Boston Edison's Pilgrim Station demonstrate that human factors engineering techniques can be applied effectively to technical procedures. With a few modifications, those same techniques can be used to produce more effective administrative procedures. Efforts are under way at the US Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex and at some utilities (Boston Edison, for instance) to apply human factors engineering to administrative procedures: The techniques being adapted include the following

  11. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition); Seguridad de las centrales nucleares: Diseno. Requisitos de seguridad especificos

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-04-15

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  12. Hazard Analysis and Safety Requirements for Small Drone Operations: To What Extent Do Popular Drones Embed Safety?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Plioutsias, Anastasios; Karanikas, Nektarios; Chatzimihailidou, Maria Mikela

    2018-03-01

    Currently, published risk analyses for drones refer mainly to commercial systems, use data from civil aviation, and are based on probabilistic approaches without suggesting an inclusive list of hazards and respective requirements. Within this context, this article presents: (1) a set of safety requirements generated from the application of the systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) technique on a generic small drone system; (2) a gap analysis between the set of safety requirements and the ones met by 19 popular drone models; (3) the extent of the differences between those models, their manufacturers, and the countries of origin; and (4) the association of drone prices with the extent they meet the requirements derived by STPA. The application of STPA resulted in 70 safety requirements distributed across the authority, manufacturer, end user, or drone automation levels. A gap analysis showed high dissimilarities regarding the extent to which the 19 drones meet the same safety requirements. Statistical results suggested a positive correlation between drone prices and the extent that the 19 drones studied herein met the safety requirements generated by STPA, and significant differences were identified among the manufacturers. This work complements the existing risk assessment frameworks for small drones, and contributes to the establishment of a commonly endorsed international risk analysis framework. Such a framework will support the development of a holistic and methodologically justified standardization scheme for small drone flights. © 2017 Society for Risk Analysis.

  13. Procedures for initiation, cost-sharing and management of OECD projects in nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    , finances and management should be considered in order to accommodate requirements and boundary conditions that might differ from case to case. Flexibility might include consideration of in-kind contributions when applicable for project furtherance. This proposal is primarily concerned with projects that are organised by the NEA secretariat upon CSNI recommendations and initiative. One should also notice that the NEA Nuclear Safety Division has for some time operated a database on common cause events denominated ICDE. Two additional databases, one on fire events (FIRE database) and one on piping failure (OPDE database) have started in 2002. They are smaller projects, which do not have a host country. These procedures apply also to these projects, with the exception that, for the latter ones, costs are equally shared among participants

  14. Safety assessment requirements for onsite transfers of radioactive material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Opperman, E.K.; Jackson, E.J.; Eggers, A.G.

    1992-05-01

    This document contains the requirements for developing a safety assessment document for an onsite package containing radioactive material. It also provides format and content guidance to establish uniformity in the safety assessment documentation and to ensure completeness of the information provided

  15. National Ignition Facility Project Site Safety Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dun, C

    2003-01-01

    This Safety Program for the National Ignition Facility (NIF) presents safety protocols and requirements that management and workers shall follow to assure a safe and healthful work environment during activities performed on the NIF Project site. The NIF Project Site Safety Program (NPSSP) requires that activities at the NIF Project site be performed in accordance with the ''LLNL ES and H Manual'' and the augmented set of controls and processes described in this NIF Project Site Safety Program. Specifically, this document: (1) Defines the fundamental NIF site safety philosophy. (2) Defines the areas covered by this safety program (see Appendix B). (3) Identifies management roles and responsibilities. (4) Defines core safety management processes. (5) Identifies NIF site-specific safety requirements. This NPSSP sets forth the responsibilities, requirements, rules, policies, and regulations for workers involved in work activities performed on the NIF Project site. Workers are required to implement measures to create a universal awareness that promotes safe practice at the work site and will achieve NIF management objectives in preventing accidents and illnesses. ES and H requirements are consistent with the ''LLNL ES and H Manual''. This NPSSP and implementing procedures (e.g., Management Walkabout, special work procedures, etc.,) are a comprehensive safety program that applies to NIF workers on the NIF Project site. The NIF Project site includes the B581/B681 site and support areas shown in Appendix B

  16. National Waste Repository Novi Han operational safety analysis report. Safety assessment methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The scope of the safety assessment (SA), presented includes: waste management functions (acceptance, conditioning, storage, disposal), inventory (current and expected in the future), hazards (radiological and non-radiological) and normal and accidental modes. The stages in the development of the SA are: criteria selection, information collection, safety analysis and safety assessment documentation. After the review the facilities functions and the national and international requirements, the criteria for safety level assessment are set. As a result from the 2nd stage actual parameters of the facility, necessary for safety analysis are obtained.The methodology is selected on the base of the comparability of the results with the results of previous safety assessments and existing standards and requirements. The procedure and requirements for scenarios selection are described. A radiological hazard categorisation of the facilities is presented. Qualitative hazards and operability analysis is applied. The resulting list of events are subjected to procedure for prioritization by method of 'criticality analysis', so the estimation of the risk is given for each event. The events that fall into category of risk on the boundary of acceptability or are unacceptable are subjected to the next steps of the analysis. As a result the lists with scenarios for PSA and possible design scenarios are established. PSA logical modeling and quantitative calculations of accident sequences are presented

  17. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues, other multiplant action issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-12-01

    This report is to provide a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs), Generic Safety Issues(GSIs), and other Multiplant Actions (MPAs) that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. An additional purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  18. Software quality assurance procedures for radioactive waste risk assessment codes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, I.; Mayer, J.

    1990-01-01

    This support study for the evaluation of the safety of geological disposal systems is aimed at identifying the requirements for software quality assurance procedures for radioactive waste risk assessment codes, and to recommend appropriate procedures. The research covers: (i) the analysis of existing procedures and definition of requirements; (ii) a case study of the use of some existing procedures; (iii) the definition and the implementation of procedures. The report is supported by appendices that give more detail on the procedures recommended. It is intended to provide ideas on the steps that should be taken to ensure the quality of the programs used for assessment of the safety case for radioactive waste repositories, and does not represent the introduction of wholly new ideas or techniques. The emphasis throughout is on procedures that will be easily implemented, rather than on the fully rigorous procedures that are required for some application areas. The study has concentrated on measures that will increase the confidence in repository performance assessments among the wider scientific/engineering community, and the lay public

  19. Safety and environmental requirements and design targets for TIBER-II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Piet, S.J.

    1987-09-01

    A consistent set of safety and environmental requirements and design targets was proposed and adopted for the TIBER-II (Tokamak Ignition/Burn Experimental Reactor) design effort. TIBER-II is the most recent US version of a fusion experimental test reactor (ETR). These safety and environmental design targets were one contribution of the Fusion Safety Program in the TIBER-II design effort. The other contribution, safety analyses, is documented in the TIBER-II design report. The TIBER-II approach, described here, concentrated on logical development of, first, a complete and consistent set of safety and environmental requirements that are likely appropriate for an ETR, and, second, an initial set of design targets to guide TIBER-II. Because of limited time in the TIBER-II design effort, the iterative process only included one iteration - one set of targets and one design. Future ETR design efforts should therefore build on these design targets and the associated safety analyses. 29 refs., 5 figs., 3 tabs

  20. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Technical Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRAHN, D.E.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this section is to explain the meaning of logical connectors with specific examples. Logical connectors are used in Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) to discriminate between, and yet connect, discrete Conditions, Required Actions, Completion Times, Surveillances, and Frequencies. The only logical connectors that appear in TSRs are AND and OR. The physical arrangement of these connectors constitutes logical conventions with specific meanings

  1. A new approach to determine the environmental qualification requirements for the safety related equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hasnaoui, C.; Parent, G.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of the environmental qualification of safety related equipment is to ensure that the plant defense-in-depth is not compromised by common mode failures following design basis accidents with a harsh environment. A new approach based on safety functions has been developed to determine what safety-related equipment is required to function during and after a design basis accident, as well as their environmental qualification requirements. The main feature of this approach is to use auxiliary safety functions established from safety requirements as credited in the safety analyses. This approach is undertaken in three steps: identification of the auxiliary safety functions of each main safety function; determination of the main equipment groups required for each auxiliary safety function; and review of the safety analyses for design basis accidents in order to determine the credited auxiliary safety functions and their mission times for each accident scenario. Some of the benefits of the proposed approach for the determination of the safety environmental qualification requirements are: a systematic approach for the review of safety analyses based on a safety function check list, and the insurance, with the availability of the safety functions, that Gentilly-2 defense-in-depth would not be compromised by design basis accidents with a harsh environment. (author)

  2. Technical safety requirements control level verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

  3. 40 CFR 240.209 - Safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 24 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Safety. 240.209 Section 240.209 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES GUIDELINES FOR THE THERMAL PROCESSING OF SOLID WASTES Requirements and Recommended Procedures § 240.209 Safety. ...

  4. Radiation safety procedures in radioiodine therapy for thyroid cancer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajashekharrao, B.; Samuel, A.M.

    1999-01-01

    During any administration of radioactive materials, it is imperative to always be conversant with any forbidden radiation health safety practices. This need is amplified when dealing with therapeutic amount of radionuclides. Among all the procedures dealing with the use of radiopharmaceuticals, it is easiest to think of 131 I, since this is the most widely used unsealed source of a radiopharmaceutical for treatment of thyroid cancer and hyperthyroidism and carries with it most of the problems associated with therapy applications

  5. 41 CFR 128-1.8006 - Seismic Safety Program requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Seismic Safety Program requirements. 128-1.8006 Section 128-1.8006 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1-INTRODUCTION 1.80-Seismic Safety Program...

  6. MITS Feed and Withdrawal Subsystem: operating procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, W.S.

    1980-01-01

    This procedure details the steps required to provide continuous feed flow and withdrawal of process product and waste flows in support of thruput operation in the cascade or its elements. It particularly requires operator attention to safety considerations

  7. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements; unresolved safety issues; generic safety issues; other multiplant action issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, the NRC established a program for publishing an annual report on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was initially compiled and reported in three NUREG-series volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). The first annual supplement, which combined these volumes into a single report and presented updated information as of September 30, 1991, was published in December 1991. The second annual supplement, which provided updated information as of September 30, 1992, was published in December 1992. Supplement 2 also provided the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of other multiplant action (MPA) issues not related to TMI Action Plan requirements, USIs, or GSIs. This third annual NUREG report, Supplement 3, presents updated information as of September 30, 1993. This report gives a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, GSIs, and other MPAs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. Additionally, this report serves as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  8. Exploration and safety evaluations of salt formations and site selection procedures; Erkundung und Sicherheitsbewertung von Salzformationen und Standortauswahlverfahren

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Krapf, Eva Barbara

    2016-12-12

    In 2011 the final decision for the withdrawal from the nuclear energy program was decided in the Federal Republic of Germany. The majority of the produced radioactive waste originate in the operation as well as in the decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities. The long-term containment of especially heat-developing and high-level waste in an underground disposal facility is pursued. The Site Selection Act (StandAG), passed in 2013, defined further procedural steps as well as responsibilities and the way of public participation during the site selection. In this context the newly founded Commission Storage of Highly Radioactive Waste was assigned with the task of giving relevant recommendations based on their investigation of specific aspects and fundamental questions. The objective of this procedure is the selection of the site that can provide the best possible safety for humans and the environment during the defined period of one million years. The Commissions' final report was published in July 2016. In this thesis a possible approach for exploring sites in connection with safety investigations is recommended. The site selection procedure described in the StandAG represents the basis for the considerations. Geoscientific exclusion criteria, minimum requirements as well as weighing criteria can be developed regarding the relevant geoscientific and climatic changes during the defined period of one million years. In contrast to the recommendations made by the Commission Storage of Highly Radioactive Waste no previously existing report has been revised and adapted. Rather, all issues relevant for the long-term containment of radioactive waste in a disposal facility had been newly developed. The considerations are related to salt domes as host rock. Furthermore, according to the StandAG preliminary safety investigations are required in every step of the site selection. The recommendations made in this thesis concerning content and feasibility of

  9. Quality procedure management for improved nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forzano, P.; Castagna, P.

    1995-01-01

    Emergency Operating Procedures and Accident Management Procedures are the next step in the computerization of NPP control rooms. Different improvements are presently conceivable for this operator aid tool, and research activities are in development. Undergoing activities regard especially formal aspects of knowledge representation, Human-Machine interface and procedure life cycle management. These aspects have been investigated deeply by Ansaldo, and partially incorporated in the DIAM prototype. Nuclear Power Plant Procedures can be seen from essentially two viewpoints: the process and the information management. From the first point of view, it is important to supply the knowledge apt to solve problems connected with the control of the process, from the second one the focus of attention is on the knowledge representation, its structure, elicitation and maintenance, and formal quality assurance. These two aspects of procedure representation can be considered and solved separately. In particular, methodological, formal and management issues require long and tedious activities, that in most cases constitute a great barrier for procedures development and upgrade. To solve these problems, Ansaldo is developing DIAM, a wide integrated tool for procedure management to support in procedure writing, updating, usage, and documentation. One of the most challenging features of DIAM is AUTO-LAY, a CASE sub-tool that, in a complete automatical way, structures parts or complete flow diagram. This is the feature that is partial present in some other CASE products, that, anyway, do not allow complex graph handling and isomorphism between video and paper representation. AUTO-LAY has the unique prerogative to draw graphs of any complexity to section them in pages, and to automatically compose a document. This has been recognized in the literature as the most important a second-generation CASE improvement. (Author) 9 Figs., 5 Refs

  10. Safety class methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donner, E.B.; Low, J.M.; Lux, C.R.

    1992-01-01

    DOE Order 6430.1A, General Design Criteria (GDC), requires that DOE facilities be evaluated with respect to ''safety class items.'' Although the GDC defines safety class items, it does not provide a methodology for selecting safety class items. The methodology described in this paper was developed to assure that Safety Class Items at the Savannah River Site (SRS) are selected in a consistent and technically defensible manner. Safety class items are those in the highest of four categories determined to be of special importance to nuclear safety and, merit appropriately higher-quality design, fabrication, and industrial test standards and codes. The identification of safety class items is approached using a cascading strategy that begins at the 'safety function' level (i.e., a cooling function, ventilation function, etc.) and proceeds down to the system, component, or structure level. Thus, the items that are required to support a safety function are SCls. The basic steps in this procedure apply to the determination of SCls for both new project activities, and for operating facilities. The GDC lists six characteristics of SCls to be considered as a starting point for safety item classification. They are as follows: 1. Those items whose failure would produce exposure consequences that would exceed the guidelines in Section 1300-1.4, ''Guidance on Limiting Exposure of the Public,'' at the site boundary or nearest point of public access 2. Those items required to maintain operating parameters within the safety limits specified in the Operational Safety Requirements during normal operations and anticipated operational occurrences. 3. Those items required for nuclear criticality safety. 4. Those items required to monitor the release of radioactive material to the environment during and after a Design Basis Accident. Those items required to achieve, and maintain the facility in a safe shutdown condition 6. Those items that control Safety Class Item listed above

  11. Standardized Procedure Content And Data Structure Based On Human Factors Requirements For Computer-Based Procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bly, Aaron; Oxstrand, Johanna; Le Blanc, Katya L

    2015-01-01

    Most activities that involve human interaction with systems in a nuclear power plant are guided by procedures. Traditionally, the use of procedures has been a paper-based process that supports safe operation of the nuclear power industry. However, the nuclear industry is constantly trying to find ways to decrease the human error rate, especially the human errors associated with procedure use. Advances in digital technology make computer-based procedures (CBPs) a valid option that provides further enhancement of safety by improving human performance related to procedure use. The transition from paper-based procedures (PBPs) to CBPs creates a need for a computer-based procedure system (CBPS). A CBPS needs to have the ability to perform logical operations in order to adjust to the inputs received from either users or real time data from plant status databases. Without the ability for logical operations the procedure is just an electronic copy of the paper-based procedure. In order to provide the CBPS with the information it needs to display the procedure steps to the user, special care is needed in the format used to deliver all data and instructions to create the steps. The procedure should be broken down into basic elements and formatted in a standard method for the CBPS. One way to build the underlying data architecture is to use an Extensible Markup Language (XML) schema, which utilizes basic elements to build each step in the smart procedure. The attributes of each step will determine the type of functionality that the system will generate for that step. The CBPS will provide the context for the step to deliver referential information, request a decision, or accept input from the user. The XML schema needs to provide all data necessary for the system to accurately perform each step without the need for the procedure writer to reprogram the CBPS. The research team at the Idaho National Laboratory has developed a prototype CBPS for field workers as well as the

  12. Standardized Procedure Content And Data Structure Based On Human Factors Requirements For Computer-Based Procedures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bly, Aaron; Oxstrand, Johanna; Le Blanc, Katya L

    2015-02-01

    Most activities that involve human interaction with systems in a nuclear power plant are guided by procedures. Traditionally, the use of procedures has been a paper-based process that supports safe operation of the nuclear power industry. However, the nuclear industry is constantly trying to find ways to decrease the human error rate, especially the human errors associated with procedure use. Advances in digital technology make computer-based procedures (CBPs) a valid option that provides further enhancement of safety by improving human performance related to procedure use. The transition from paper-based procedures (PBPs) to CBPs creates a need for a computer-based procedure system (CBPS). A CBPS needs to have the ability to perform logical operations in order to adjust to the inputs received from either users or real time data from plant status databases. Without the ability for logical operations the procedure is just an electronic copy of the paper-based procedure. In order to provide the CBPS with the information it needs to display the procedure steps to the user, special care is needed in the format used to deliver all data and instructions to create the steps. The procedure should be broken down into basic elements and formatted in a standard method for the CBPS. One way to build the underlying data architecture is to use an Extensible Markup Language (XML) schema, which utilizes basic elements to build each step in the smart procedure. The attributes of each step will determine the type of functionality that the system will generate for that step. The CBPS will provide the context for the step to deliver referential information, request a decision, or accept input from the user. The XML schema needs to provide all data necessary for the system to accurately perform each step without the need for the procedure writer to reprogram the CBPS. The research team at the Idaho National Laboratory has developed a prototype CBPS for field workers as well as the

  13. Licensing procedure and requirements in the FRG

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brosche, D.

    1981-01-01

    The investigations of the different dynamic stresses of pressure suppression systems after the Wuergassen incident in 1972 and their theoretical and experimental solutions required an extraordinary effort from all participants of the licensing procedures. As a consequence of these new problems a lot of mathematical models and computer codes had been developed and a lot of experimental work had been performed. Numerous highly qualified scientists and engineers had been involved for a long time in the licensing procedures and innumerable discussions had been necessary. These investigations and discussions had a great influence on the licensing procedures and on the project running. Too pessimistic assumptions and wrong interpretations of experiments led to fictitious problems and a lot of time and money was necessary to overcome these difficulties. Finally at 1977 it could be proved that the construction was able to control stresses so that additional investigations were not necessary. (orig./HP)

  14. Safety requirements for the Pu carriers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishima, H.

    1993-01-01

    Ministry of Transport of Japan has now set about studying requirements for Pu carriers to ensure safety. It was first studied what the basic concept of safe carriage of Pu should be, and the basic ideas have been worked out. Next the requirements for the Pu carriers were studied based on the above. There are at present no international requirements of construction and equipment for the nuclear-material carriers, but MOT of Japan has so far required special construction and equipment for the nuclear-material carriers which carry a large amount of radioactive material, such as spent fuel or low level radioactive waste, corresponding to the level of the respective potential hazard. The requirements of construction and equipment of the Pu carriers have been established considering the difference in heat generation between Pu and spent fuel, physical protection, and so forth, in addition to the above basic concept. (J.P.N.)

  15. 15 CFR 291.6 - Additional requirements; Federal policies and procedures.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... and Foreign Trade NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NIST... requirements; Federal policies and procedures. Recipients and subrecipients are subject to all Federal laws and Federal and Department of Commerce policies, regulations, and procedures applicable to Federal financial...

  16. Development of procedural requirements for life extension of nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Sang Hun; Son, Moon Kyu [Korea Association for Nuclear Technology, Taejon (Korea, Republic of); Ham, Cheol Hun [The Catholic University of Korea, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Chang, Keun Sun [Sunmoon Univ., Asan (Korea, Republic of); Paek, Won Phil [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Taejon (Korea, Republic of); Cheong, Ji Hwan [Baekseok College Cultural Studies, Cheonan (Korea, Republic of)

    2001-03-15

    Current status of regulatory aspects of life extension and upgrading of NPPs is reviewed for major foreign countries. Most countries require similar technical requirements; however, procedural aspects differ country by country. Regulatory systems suitable for NPP life extension is investigated. The procedure and requirements for reassessment of design life should be established first; then it can be incorporated into the PSR system. The concept of 'Current Licensing Basis (CLB)' can be adopted in Korea, but further elaboration for terms and definitions is needed for common understanding between interested groups. The procedure for maintenance and backfitting should also be improved. The Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) that require development of regulatory requirements for life extension are identified based on extensive analysis of foreign experiences. By analyzing the rules and regulations related to life extension. Basic directions are suggested to harmonize or establish regulatory systems for life extension, two-step licensing, PSR, and backfitting.

  17. Undergraduate Organic Chemistry Laboratory Safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    Luckenbaugh, Raymond W.

    1996-11-01

    Each organic chemistry student should become familiar with the educational and governmental laboratory safety requirements. One method for teaching laboratory safety is to assign each student to locate safety resources for a specific class laboratory experiment. The student should obtain toxicity and hazardous information for all chemicals used or produced during the assigned experiment. For example, what is the LD50 or LC50 for each chemical? Are there any specific hazards for these chemicals, carcinogen, mutagen, teratogen, neurotixin, chronic toxin, corrosive, flammable, or explosive agent? The school's "Chemical Hygiene Plan", "Prudent Practices for Handling Hazardous Chemicals in the Laboratory" (National Academy Press), and "Laboratory Standards, Part 1910 - Occupational Safety and Health Standards" (Fed. Register 1/31/90, 55, 3227-3335) should be reviewed for laboratory safety requirements for the assigned experiment. For example, what are the procedures for safe handling of vacuum systems, if a vacuum distillation is used in the assigned experiment? The literature survey must be submitted to the laboratory instructor one week prior to the laboratory session for review and approval. The student should then give a short presentation to the class on the chemicals' toxicity and hazards and describe the safety precautions that must be followed. This procedure gives the student first-hand knowledge on how to find and evaluate information to meet laboartory safety requirements.

  18. Quality assurance requirements for the computer software and safety analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Husarecek, J.

    1992-01-01

    The requirements are given as placed on the development, procurement, maintenance, and application of software for the creation or processing of data during the design, construction, operation, repair, maintenance and safety-related upgrading of nuclear power plants. The verification and validation processes are highlighted, and the requirements put on the software documentation are outlined. The general quality assurance principles applied to safety analyses are characterized. (J.B.). 1 ref

  19. Safety procedures for the MFTF sustaining-neutral-beam power supply

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilson, J.H.

    1981-01-01

    The MFTF SNBPSS comprises a number of sources of potentially hazardous electrical energy in a small physical area. Power is handled at 80 kV dc, 80 A; 70 V dc, 4000 A; 25 V dc, 5500 A; 3 kV dc, 10 A; and 2 kV dc, 10 A. Power for these systems is furnished from two separate 480 V distribution systems and a 13.8 kV distribution system. A defense in depth approach is used; interlocks are provided in the hardware to make it difficult to gain access to an energized circuit, and the operating procedure includes precautions which would protect personnel even if no interlocks were working. The complexity of the system implies a complex operating procedure, and this potential complexity is controlled by presenting the procedure in a modular form using 37 separate checklists for specific operations. The checklists are presented in flowchart form, so contingencies can be handled at the lowest possible level without compromising safety

  20. Safety requirements expected to the prototype fast breeder reactor 'Monju'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-11-01

    In July 2013, Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) has enforced new regulatory requirements in consideration of severe accidents for the commercial light water reactors (LWR) and also prototype power generation reactors such as the sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFR) of 'Monju' based on TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident (hereinafter referred to as '1F accident') occurred in March 2011. Although the regulatory requirements for SFR will be revised by NRA with consideration for public comments, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) set up 'Advisory Committee on Monju Safety Requirements' consisting of fast breeder reactor (FBR) and safety assessment experts in order to establish original safety requirements expected to the prototype FBR 'Monju' considering severe accidents with knowledge from JAEA as well as scientific and technical insights from the experts. This report summarizes the safety requirements expected to Monju discussed by the committee. (author)

  1. The application of workflow technology in the development of management procedures in NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fang Zhaoxia; Huang Fang

    2012-01-01

    According to the national nuclear safety standards and guides, operating organizations of NPPs should document management programs against all safety related activities. One of the preconditions for the implementation of these programs is to setup a comprehensive instructions and procedures. The workflow technology which is a concept originally from computer technology can help in analysing work processes of different working areas in NPP, designing and developing management procedures hierarchy and requirements. The application of the workflow can not only comprehensively analyse the work process but also analyse the requirements for personnel which are related to the work process, therefore the procedures and programs developed could meet the requirements of national nuclear safety standards and guides. This paper also covers the application of workflow in other areas in NPPs. (authors)

  2. Meeting up-to-date safety requirements in the Russian NPP projects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tepkyan, G. O.; Yashkin, A. V.

    2014-01-01

    Safety features in Russian NPP designs are implemented by the combination of active and passive safety systems • Russian NPP designs are in compliance with up-to-date international and European safety requirements and refer to Generation III+ • Russian state-of-the-art designs have already implemented some design solutions, which take into account “post-Fukushima” requirements. Russian NPP design principles have been approved during the European discussions in spring 2012, including the IAEA extraordinary session addressed to Fukushima NPP accident

  3. A procedure for safety assessment of components with cracks - Handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersson, P.; Bergman, M.; Brickstad, B.; Dahlberg, L.; Nilsson, F.; Sattari-Far, I.

    1996-01-01

    In this handbook a procedure is described which can be used both for assessment of detected cracks or crack like defects or for defect tolerance analysis. The procedure can be used to calculate possible crack growth due to fatigue or stress corrosion and to calculate the reserve margin for failure due to fracture and plastic collapse. For ductile materials, the procedure gives the reserve margin for initiation of stable crack growth. Thus, an extra reserve margin, unknown to size, exists for failure in components made of ductile materials. The procedure was developed for operative use with the following objectives in mind: The procedure should be able to handle both linear and non-linear problems without any a priori division; The procedure shall ensure uniqueness of the safety assessment; The procedure should be well defined and easy to use; The conservatism of the procedure should be well validated; The handbook that documents the procedure should be so complete that for most assessments access to any other fracture mechanics literature should not be necessary. The method utilized is based on the R6-method developed at Nuclear Electric plc. This method can in principle be used for all metallic materials. It is, however, more extensively verified for steel alloys only. The method is not intended for use in temperatures where creep deformation is of importance. The first edition of the handbook was released in 1990 and the second in 1991. This third edition has been extensively revised. A Windows-based program (SACC) has been developed which can perform the assessments described in the book including calculation of crack growth due to stress corrosion and fatigue. 52 refs., 27 figs., 35 tabs

  4. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  5. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  6. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  7. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Arabic Edition)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered.

  8. Specification of advanced safety modeling requirements (Rev. 0).

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fanning, T. H.; Tautges, T. J.

    2008-06-30

    The U.S. Department of Energy's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has lead to renewed interest in liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors for the purpose of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and making more efficient use of future repository capacity. However, the U.S. has not designed or constructed a fast reactor in nearly 30 years. Accurate, high-fidelity, whole-plant dynamics safety simulations will play a crucial role by providing confidence that component and system designs will satisfy established design limits and safety margins under a wide variety of operational, design basis, and beyond design basis transient conditions. Current modeling capabilities for fast reactor safety analyses have resulted from several hundred person-years of code development effort supported by experimental validation. The broad spectrum of mechanistic and phenomenological models that have been developed represent an enormous amount of institutional knowledge that needs to be maintained. Complicating this, the existing code architectures for safety modeling evolved from programming practices of the 1970s. This has lead to monolithic applications with interdependent data models which require significant knowledge of the complexities of the entire code in order for each component to be maintained. In order to develop an advanced fast reactor safety modeling capability, the limitations of the existing code architecture must be overcome while preserving the capabilities that already exist. To accomplish this, a set of advanced safety modeling requirements is defined, based on modern programming practices, that focuses on modular development within a flexible coupling framework. An approach for integrating the existing capabilities of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code into the SHARP framework is provided in order to preserve existing capabilities while providing a smooth transition to advanced modeling capabilities. In doing this, the advanced fast reactor safety models

  9. Specification of advanced safety modeling requirements (Rev. 0)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fanning, T. H.; Tautges, T. J.

    2008-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has lead to renewed interest in liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors for the purpose of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and making more efficient use of future repository capacity. However, the U.S. has not designed or constructed a fast reactor in nearly 30 years. Accurate, high-fidelity, whole-plant dynamics safety simulations will play a crucial role by providing confidence that component and system designs will satisfy established design limits and safety margins under a wide variety of operational, design basis, and beyond design basis transient conditions. Current modeling capabilities for fast reactor safety analyses have resulted from several hundred person-years of code development effort supported by experimental validation. The broad spectrum of mechanistic and phenomenological models that have been developed represent an enormous amount of institutional knowledge that needs to be maintained. Complicating this, the existing code architectures for safety modeling evolved from programming practices of the 1970s. This has lead to monolithic applications with interdependent data models which require significant knowledge of the complexities of the entire code in order for each component to be maintained. In order to develop an advanced fast reactor safety modeling capability, the limitations of the existing code architecture must be overcome while preserving the capabilities that already exist. To accomplish this, a set of advanced safety modeling requirements is defined, based on modern programming practices, that focuses on modular development within a flexible coupling framework. An approach for integrating the existing capabilities of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code into the SHARP framework is provided in order to preserve existing capabilities while providing a smooth transition to advanced modeling capabilities. In doing this, the advanced fast reactor safety models will

  10. Safety related requirements on future nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niehaus, F.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear power has the potential to significantly contribute to the future energy supply. However, this requires continuous improvements in nuclear safety. Technological advancements and implementation of safety culture will achieve a safety level for future reactors of the present generation of a probability of core-melt of less than 10 -5 per year, and less than 10 -6 per year for large releases of radioactive materials. There are older reactors which do not comply with present safety thinking. The paper reviews findings of a recent design review of WWER 440/230 plants. Advanced evolutionary designs might be capable of reducing the probability of significant off-site releases to less than 10 -7 per year. For such reactors there are inherent limitations to increase safety further due to the human element, complexity of design and capability of the containment function. Therefore, revolutionary designs are being explored with the aim of eliminating the potential for off-site releases. In this context it seems to be advisable to explore concepts where the ultimate safety barrier is the fuel itself. (orig.) [de

  11. NIF special equipment construction health and safety plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sawicki, R.H.

    1997-07-28

    The purpose of this plan is to identify how the construction and deployment activities of the National Ignition Facility (NIF) Special Equipment (SE) will be safely executed. This plan includes an identification of (1) the safety-related responsibilities of the SE people and their interaction with other organizations involved; (2) safety related requirements, policies, and documentation; (3) a list of the potential hazards unique to SE systems and the mechanisms that will be implemented to control them to acceptable levels; (4) a summary of Environmental Safety and Health (ES&H) training requirements; and (5) requirements of contractor safety plans that will be developed and used by all SE contractors participating in site activities. This plan is a subsidiary document to the NIF Construction Safety Program (CSP) and is intended to compliment the requirements stated therein with additional details specific to the safety needs of the SE construction-related activities. If a conflict arises between these two documents, the CSP will supersede. It is important to note that this plan does not list all of the potential hazards and their controls because the design and safety analysis process is still ongoing. Additional safety issues win be addressed in the Final Safety Analysis Report, Operational Safety Procedures (OSPs), and other plans and procedures as described in Section 3.0 of this plan.

  12. NIF special equipment construction health and safety plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sawicki, R.H.

    1997-01-01

    The purpose of this plan is to identify how the construction and deployment activities of the National Ignition Facility (NIF) Special Equipment (SE) will be safely executed. This plan includes an identification of (1) the safety-related responsibilities of the SE people and their interaction with other organizations involved; (2) safety related requirements, policies, and documentation; (3) a list of the potential hazards unique to SE systems and the mechanisms that will be implemented to control them to acceptable levels; (4) a summary of Environmental Safety and Health (ES ampersand H) training requirements; and (5) requirements of contractor safety plans that will be developed and used by all SE contractors participating in site activities. This plan is a subsidiary document to the NIF Construction Safety Program (CSP) and is intended to compliment the requirements stated therein with additional details specific to the safety needs of the SE construction-related activities. If a conflict arises between these two documents, the CSP will supersede. It is important to note that this plan does not list all of the potential hazards and their controls because the design and safety analysis process is still ongoing. Additional safety issues win be addressed in the Final Safety Analysis Report, Operational Safety Procedures (OSPs), and other plans and procedures as described in Section 3.0 of this plan

  13. Development of NPP Safety Requirements into Kenya's Grid Codes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ndirangu, Nguni James; Koo, Chang Choong [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    As presently drafted, Kenya's grid codes do not contain any NPP requirements. Through case studies of selected grid codes, this paper will study frequency, voltage and fault ride through requirements for NPP connection and operation, and offer recommendation of how these requirements can be incorporated in the Kenya's grid codes. Voltage and frequency excursions in Kenya's grid are notably frequently outside the generic requirement and the values observed by the German and UK grid codes. Kenya's grid codes require continuous operation for ±10% of nominal voltage and 45.0 to 52Hz on the grid which poses safety issues for an NPP. Considering stringent NPP connection to grid and operational safety requirements, and the importance of the TSO to NPP safety, more elaborate requirements need to be documented in the Kenya's grid codes. UK and Germany have a history of meeting high standards of nuclear safety and it is therefore recommended that format like the one in Table 1 to 3 should be adopted. Kenya's Grid code considering NPP should have: • Strict rules for voltage variation, that is, -5% to +10% of the nominal voltage • Strict rules for frequency variation, that is, 48Hz to 52Hz of the nominal frequencyand.

  14. Development of NPP Safety Requirements into Kenya's Grid Codes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ndirangu, Nguni James; Koo, Chang Choong

    2015-01-01

    As presently drafted, Kenya's grid codes do not contain any NPP requirements. Through case studies of selected grid codes, this paper will study frequency, voltage and fault ride through requirements for NPP connection and operation, and offer recommendation of how these requirements can be incorporated in the Kenya's grid codes. Voltage and frequency excursions in Kenya's grid are notably frequently outside the generic requirement and the values observed by the German and UK grid codes. Kenya's grid codes require continuous operation for ±10% of nominal voltage and 45.0 to 52Hz on the grid which poses safety issues for an NPP. Considering stringent NPP connection to grid and operational safety requirements, and the importance of the TSO to NPP safety, more elaborate requirements need to be documented in the Kenya's grid codes. UK and Germany have a history of meeting high standards of nuclear safety and it is therefore recommended that format like the one in Table 1 to 3 should be adopted. Kenya's Grid code considering NPP should have: • Strict rules for voltage variation, that is, -5% to +10% of the nominal voltage • Strict rules for frequency variation, that is, 48Hz to 52Hz of the nominal frequencyand

  15. DARHT: INTEGRATION OF AUTHORIZATION BASIS REQUIREMENTS AND WORKER SAFETY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MC CLURE, D. A.; NELSON, C. A.; BOUDRIE, R. L.

    2001-01-01

    This document describes the results of consensus agreements reached by the DARHT Safety Planning Team during the development of the update of the DARHT Safety Analysis Document (SAD). The SAD is one of the Authorization Basis (AB) Documents required by the Department prior to granting approval to operate the DARHT Facility. The DARHT Safety Planning Team is lead by Mr. Joel A. Baca of the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office (DOE/AL). Team membership is drawn from the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office, the Department of Energy Los Alamos Area Office (DOE/LAAO), and several divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Revision 1 of the DARHT SAD had been written as part of the process for gaining approval to operate the Phase 1 (First Axis) Accelerator. Early in the planning stage for the required update of the SAD for the approval to operate both Phase 1 and Phase 2 (First Axis and Second Axis) DARHT Accelerator, it was discovered that a conflict existed between the Laboratory approach to describing the management of facility and worker safety

  16. 1E Qualification of Electrical Equipment - Requirement for Safety Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Geambasu, C.; Segarceanu, D.; Albu, J.

    2002-01-01

    The paper presents the qualification methods of the safety related equipment according to the safety class 1E. There are presented the qualification principles, procedure and documents, emphasis being laid on the qualification approach by type tests. This approach assumes the equipment test under both normal and accident conditions (design basis events) simulating the operational conditions and covers the largest part of electrical equipment from a nuclear power plant.The safety related equipment is to be qualified is subjected to a sequential test that will be detailed in the paper. (author)

  17. Safety system status monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lewis, J.R.; Morgenstern, M.H.; Rideout, T.H.; Cowley, P.J.

    1984-03-01

    The Pacific Northwest Laboratory has studied the safety aspects of monitoring the preoperational status of safety systems in nuclear power plants. The goals of the study were to assess for the NRC the effectiveness of current monitoring systems and procedures, to develop near-term guidelines for reducing human errors associated with monitoring safety system status, and to recommend a regulatory position on this issue. A review of safety system status monitoring practices indicated that current systems and procedures do not adequately aid control room operators in monitoring safety system status. This is true even of some systems and procedures installed to meet existing regulatory guidelines (Regulatory Guide 1.47). In consequence, this report suggests acceptance criteria for meeting the functional requirements of an adequate system for monitoring safety system status. Also suggested are near-term guidelines that could reduce the likelihood of human errors in specific, high-priority status monitoring tasks. It is recommended that (1) Regulatory Guide 1.47 be revised to address these acceptance criteria, and (2) the revised Regulatory Guide 1.47 be applied to all plants, including those built since the issuance of the original Regulatory Guide

  18. Safety system status monitoring

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lewis, J.R.; Morgenstern, M.H.; Rideout, T.H.; Cowley, P.J.

    1984-03-01

    The Pacific Northwest Laboratory has studied the safety aspects of monitoring the preoperational status of safety systems in nuclear power plants. The goals of the study were to assess for the NRC the effectiveness of current monitoring systems and procedures, to develop near-term guidelines for reducing human errors associated with monitoring safety system status, and to recommend a regulatory position on this issue. A review of safety system status monitoring practices indicated that current systems and procedures do not adequately aid control room operators in monitoring safety system status. This is true even of some systems and procedures installed to meet existing regulatory guidelines (Regulatory Guide 1.47). In consequence, this report suggests acceptance criteria for meeting the functional requirements of an adequate system for monitoring safety system status. Also suggested are near-term guidelines that could reduce the likelihood of human errors in specific, high-priority status monitoring tasks. It is recommended that (1) Regulatory Guide 1.47 be revised to address these acceptance criteria, and (2) the revised Regulatory Guide 1.47 be applied to all plants, including those built since the issuance of the original Regulatory Guide.

  19. Nuclear fuels with high burnup: safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phuc Tran Dai

    2016-01-01

    Vietnam authorities foresees to build 3 reactors from Russian design (VVER AES 2006) by 2030. In order to prepare the preliminary report on safety analysis the Vietnamese Agency for Radioprotection and Safety has launched an investigation on the behaviour of nuclear fuels at high burnups (up to 60 GWj/tU) that will be those of the new plants. This study deals mainly with the behaviour of the fuel assemblies in case of loss of coolant (LOCA). It appears that for an average burnup of 50 GWj/tU and for the advanced design of the fuel assembly (cladding and materials) safety requirements are fulfilled. For an average burnup of 60 GWj/tU, a list of issues remains to be assessed, among which the impact of clad bursting or the hydrogen embrittlement of the advanced zirconium alloys. (A.C.)

  20. Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management of administrative controls to ensure safe operation of the facility

  1. Procedures for conducting common cause failure analysis in probabilistic safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-05-01

    The principal objective of this report is to supplement the procedure developed in Mosleh et al. (1988, 1989) by providing more explicit guidance for a practical approach to common cause failures (CCF) analysis. The detailed CCF analysis following that procedure would be very labour intensive and time consuming. This document identifies a number of options for performing the more labour intensive parts of the analysis in an attempt to achieve a balance between the need for detail, the purpose of the analysis and the resources available. The document is intended to be compatible with the Agency's Procedures for Conducting Probabilistic Safety Assessments for Nuclear Power Plants (IAEA, 1992), but can be regarded as a stand-alone report to be used in conjunction with NUREG/CR-4780 (Mosleh et al., 1988, 1989) to provide additional detail, and discussion of key technical issues

  2. Preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State. Their implementation is intended to minimize the consequences for people, property and the environment of any nuclear or radiological emergency. The fulfilment of these requirements will also contribute to the harmonization of arrangements in the event of a transnational emergency. These requirements are intended to be applied by authorities at the national level by means of adopting legislation, establishing regulations and assigning responsibilities. The requirements apply to all those practices and sources that have the potential for causing radiation exposure or environmental radioactive contamination warranting an emergency intervention and that are: (a) Used in a State that chooses to adopt the requirements or that requests any of the sponsoring organizations to provide for the application of the requirements. (B) Used by States with the assistance of the FAO, IAEA, ILO, PAHO, OCHA or WHO in compliance with applicable national rules and regulations. (C) Used by the IAEA or which involve the use of materials, services, equipment, facilities and non-published information made available by the IAEA or at its request or under its control or supervision. Or (d) Used under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement whereby the parties request the IAEA to provide for the application of the requirements. The requirements also apply to the off-site jurisdictions that may need to make an emergency intervention in a State that adopts the requirements. The types of practices and sources covered by these requirements include: fixed and mobile nuclear reactors. Facilities for the mining and processing of radioactive ores. Facilities for fuel reprocessing and other fuel cycle facilities. Facilities for the management of radioactive waste. The transport of radioactive material. Sources of radiation used in

  3. 42 CFR 3.210 - Required disclosure of patient safety work product to the Secretary.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Required disclosure of patient safety work product... HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL PROVISIONS PATIENT SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS AND PATIENT SAFETY WORK PRODUCT Confidentiality and Privilege Protections of Patient Safety Work Product § 3.210 Required disclosure of patient...

  4. USNRC licensing process as related to nuclear criticality safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ketzlach, N.

    1987-01-01

    The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations establishes procedures and criteria for the issuance of licenses to receive title to, own, acquire, deliver, receive, possess, use, and initially transfer special nuclear material; and establishes and provides for the terms and conditions upon which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will issue such licenses. Section 70.22 of the regulations, ''Contents of Applications'', requires that applications for licenses contain proposed procedures to avoid accidental conditions of criticality. These procedures are elements of a nuclear criticality safety program for operations with fissionable materials at fuels and materials facilities (i.e., fuel cycle facilities other than nuclear reactors) in which there exists a potential for criticality accidents. To assist the applicant in providing specific information needed for a nuclear criticality safety program in a license application, the NRC has issued regulatory guides. The NRC requirements for nuclear criticality safety include organizational, administrative, and technical requirements. For purely technical matters on nuclear criticality safety these guides endorse national standards. Others provide guidance on the standard format and content of license applications, guidance on evaluating radiological consequences of criticality accidents, or guidance for dealing with other radiation safety issues. (author)

  5. Discussion of important safety requirements for new nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Lin; Jia Xiang; Yan Tianwen; Li Wenhong; Li Chun

    2014-01-01

    This paper presents the analysis of several important safety requirements and improvement direction. Technical view of security goals on site safety evaluation, internal and external events fortification, serious accident prevention and mitigation, as well as the core, containment system and instrument control system design and engineering optimization, and etc are indicated. It will be useful for new plant design, construction and safety improvement. (authors)

  6. NASA's Software Safety Standard

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ramsay, Christopher M.

    2007-01-01

    NASA relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft launched that does not have a computer on board that will provide command and control services. There have been recent incidents where software has played a role in high-profile mission failures and hazardous incidents. For example, the Mars Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, the DART (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology), and MER (Mars Exploration Rover) Spirit anomalies were all caused or contributed to by software. The Mission Control Centers for the Shuttle, ISS, and unmanned programs are highly dependant on software for data displays, analysis, and mission planning. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been little to no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Meanwhile, academia and private industry have been stepping forward with procedures and standards for safety critical systems and software, for example Dr. Nancy Leveson's book Safeware: System Safety and Computers. The NASA Software Safety Standard, originally published in 1997, was widely ignored due to its complexity and poor organization. It also focused on concepts rather than definite procedural requirements organized around a software project lifecycle. Led by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard has recently undergone a significant update. This new standard provides the procedures and guidelines for evaluating a project for safety criticality and then lays out the minimum project lifecycle requirements to assure the software is created, operated, and maintained in the safest possible manner. This update of the standard clearly delineates the minimum set of software safety requirements for a project without detailing the implementation for those

  7. Evaluation of periodic safety status analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Faber, C.; Staub, G.

    1997-01-01

    In order to carry out the evaluation of safety status analyses by the safety assessor within the periodical safety reviews of nuclear power plants safety goal oriented requirements have been formulated together with complementary evaluation criteria. Their application in an inter-disciplinary coopertion covering the subject areas involved facilitates a complete safety goal oriented assessment of the plant status. The procedure is outlined briefly by an example for the safety goal 'reactivity control' for BWRs. (orig.) [de

  8. Licensing procedures and safety criteria for core conversion in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kanda, K.; Nakagome, Y.; Hayashi, M.

    1983-01-01

    Procedures relating to the construction and operation of reactor facilities are discussed. Specifically, the Safety Analysis Report on the Kyoto University Critical Assembly (KUCA) core conversion (93% to 45% enrichment) is noted. The results of critical experiments in the KUCA and of burnup tests in the Oak Ridge Research (ORR) Reactor will be used in the final determination of the feasibility of the conversion of the Kyoto University High Flux Reactor (KUHFR) to the use of 45% enrichment

  9. Health and Safety First

    CERN Document Server

    2013-01-01

    At CERN, health and safety underpin everything we do. We have strict operational procedures in place, as well as health, safety and environment (HSE) requirements to make our working environment as safe as possible. It’s everyone’s responsibility to follow these procedures and requirements to keep ourselves, and our colleagues, safe. We have a very good safety and operational record at CERN stretching back almost 60 years, but there is never room for complacency.   With this very much in mind, we have developed a robust plan for implementation if something unforeseen goes wrong.  Because however careful we all are, accidents do happen, and the mark of any organisation that aspires to be among the best in the world is how quickly and efficiently it acts when they do. A small team made up of people from several departments at CERN has produced a strategic crisis management plan that we can put into action should a major incident occur.  This plan focuses on...

  10. Development of photovoltaic array and module safety requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    1982-01-01

    Safety requirements for photovoltaic module and panel designs and configurations likely to be used in residential, intermediate, and large-scale applications were identified and developed. The National Electrical Code and Building Codes were reviewed with respect to present provisions which may be considered to affect the design of photovoltaic modules. Limited testing, primarily in the roof fire resistance field was conducted. Additional studies and further investigations led to the development of a proposed standard for safety for flat-plate photovoltaic modules and panels. Additional work covered the initial investigation of conceptual approaches and temporary deployment, for concept verification purposes, of a differential dc ground-fault detection circuit suitable as a part of a photovoltaic array safety system.

  11. KIT safety management. Annual report 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frank, Gerhard

    2013-01-01

    The KIT Safety Management Service Unit (KSM) guarantees radiological and conventional technical safety and security of Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and controls the implementation and observation of legal environmental protection requirements. KSM is responsible for - licensing procedures, - industrial safety organization, - control of environmental protection measures, - planning and implementation of emergency preparedness and response, - operation of radiological laboratories and measurement stations, - extensive radiation protection support and the - the execution of security tasks in and for all organizational units of KIT. Moreover, KSM is in charge of wastewater and environmental monitoring for all facilities and nuclear installations all over the KIT campus. KSM is headed by the Safety Commissioner of KIT, who is appointed by the Presidential Committee. Within his scope of procedure for KIT, the Safety Commissioner controls the implementation of and compliance with safety-relevant requirements. The KIT Safety Management is certified according to DIN EN ISO 9001, its industrial safety management is certified by the VBG as ''AMS-Arbeitsschutz mit System'' and, hence, fulfills the requirements of NLF / ISO-OSH 2001. KSM laboratories are accredited according to DIN EN ISO/IEC 17025. To the extent possible, KSM is committed to maintaining competence in radiation protection and to supporting research and teaching activities. The present reports lists the individual tasks of the KIT Safety Management and informs about the results achieved in 2012. Status figures in principle reflect the status at the end of the year 2012. The processes described cover the areas of competence of KSM.

  12. Aspects of the licensing procedures for enrichment reduction in research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krull, W.

    1983-01-01

    The enrichment reduction for research reactors requires a licensing procedure. For this purpose the qualification of the new fuel has to be demonstrated and changes in reactor safety have to be investigated like reactivity values, form-factors, Pu- and fission product inventory, safety margins and accidents. Calculations should be partly experimentally verified. The possible extent of the licensing procedure is discussed. (orig.) [de

  13. Survey on requirements for independent reviews and inspections of electrical and I and C equipment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Byman, Karin; Groenkvist, Stefan; Egerbo, Anders; Nilsson, Thomas (AaF Consult AB, Stockholm (Sweden))

    2009-03-15

    In this survey, licensing procedures for the implementation of different kinds of components and systems in nuclear power plants have been studied in four European countries: Belgium (Finland), Germany, and Switzerland. The main focus has been to describe the general features of the licensing procedures for electrical and for instrumentation and control (IandC) equipment and systems. The regulatory framework for the operation of nuclear power plants in Belgium is based on the American regulations. The licensing procedure for each modification of significance for the safety of a plant is carried out by the authorised inspection organisation (AVN), which follows its own procedures for the review of the modification file, the commissioning, and conformity check of the installation. These procedures are general and independent of the technical domain of the equipment or system and AVN uses the US regulations standard review plan (SRP) as a reference for technical reviews. The Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) is responsible for the surveillance of all nuclear activities in Belgium, but the private non-profit authorised inspection organisation (AVN) does perform inspections and other regulatory tasks delegated by FANC. Controls of electrical components and systems with regard to the general Belgian electrical regulations are performed by accredited inspection organisations. The regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear activities in Finland is domestic and detailed safety requirements are provided by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). They cover specific requirements for the licensing procedure for electrical and IandC equipment. In Finland, there are no general differences in the licensing procedure for electrical, instrumentation, and mechanical equipment and the licensing procedure is basically the same for all types of systems, structures and equipment. STUK has the responsibility for the regulatory control in Finland and may seek

  14. The Management System for Facilities and Activities. Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for management systems that integrate safety, health, security, quality assurance and environmental objectives. A successful management system ensures that nuclear safety matters are not dealt with in isolation but are considered within the context of all these objectives. The aim of this publication is to assist Member States in establishing and implementing effective management systems that integrate all aspects of managing nuclear facilities and activities in a coherent manner. It details the planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that all these requirements are satisfied. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system; 3. Management responsibility; 4. Resource management; 5. Process implementation; 6. Measurement, assessment and improvement.

  15. Safety Design Requirements for The Interior Architecture of Scientific Research Laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElDib, A.A.

    2014-01-01

    The paper discusses one of the primary objectives of interior architecture design of research laboratories (specially those using radioactive materials) where it should provide a safe, accessible environment for laboratory personnel to conduct their work. A secondary objective is to allow for maximum flexibility for safe research. Therefore, health and safety hazards must be anticipated and carefully evaluated so that protective measures can be incorporated into the interior architectural design of these facilities wherever possible. The interior architecture requirements discussed in this paper illustrate some of the basic health and safety design features required for new and remodeled laboratories.The paper discusses one of the primary objectives of interior architecture design of research laboratories (specially those using radioactive materials) where it should provide a safe, accessible environment for laboratory personnel to conduct their work. A secondary objective is to allow for maximum flexibility for safe research. Therefore, health and safety hazards must be anticipated and carefully evaluated so that protective measures can be incorporated into the interior architectural design of these facilities wherever possible. The interior architecture requirements discussed in this paper illustrate some of the basic health and safety design features required for new and remodeled laboratories.

  16. Licensing procedures and safety criteria for core conversion in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kanda, K.; Nakagome, Y.; Hayashi, M.

    1983-01-01

    In Japan, the establishment and operation of nuclear installations are governed mainly by the Law for Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors. This law lays down the regulations and conditions for licensing of the various installations involved in the nuclear fuel cycle, namely licensing of installations for refining, fabricating and reprocessing; and reactors, as well as licensing of the use of nuclear fuels in research facilities. Although procedures for the installations listed above vary depending on the installation concerned, only those relating to construction and operation of reactor facilities will be analysed in this study, as the conditions and principles applying to licensing and control of other installations are, to a large extent, similar to those concerning reactor facilities. The second part of this presentation describes the safety review of the KUCA reactor core conversion form HEU to MEU. For the safety review of the core conversion, the Committee on Examination of Reactor Safety of Japanese Government examined mainly the the nuclear characteristics and the integrity of aluminide fuel plates, which was very severe because we had no experience to use aluminide fuel plates in Japan. The integrity of fuel plates and the results of the worst accident analysis for the MEU core are shown with the comparison between the HEU and MEU cores. The significant difference was not observed between them. All the regulatory procedures were completed in September 1980. Fabrication of MEU fuel elements for the KUCA experiments by CERCA in France was started in September 1980, and will be completed in March 1981. The critical experiments in the KUCA with MEU fuel will be started on a single-core in May 1981 as a first step. Those on a coupled-core will follow

  17. Promoting participatory behavior on safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martinez Corcoles, M.

    2012-01-01

    Are two types of safety behaviors: On the one hand, the fulfillment of the essential procedures for safe operation, and secondly, those voluntary behaviors that contribute equally to enhance plant safety. During the last three decades, the focus on strict compliance has limited any behavior beyond what is required by the regulations.

  18. Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    This Code is a compilation of nuclear safety principles aimed at defining the essential requirements necessary to ensure nuclear safety. These requirements are applicable to structures, systems and components, and procedures important to safety in nuclear power plants embodying thermal neutron reactors, with emphasis on what safety requirements shall be met rather than on specifying how these requirements can be met. It forms part of the Agency's programme for establishing Codes and Safety Guides relating to land based stationary thermal neutron power plants. The document should be used by organizations designing, manufacturing, constructing and operating nuclear power plants as well as by regulatory bodies

  19. 46 CFR 272.42 - Audit requirements and procedures.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... procedures. (a) Required audit. In connection with the audit of the Operator's subsidizable expenses, the... of audit results. Upon completion of the audit by the Office of Inspector General, the MARAD Office of Financial Approvals shall notify the Operator of the audit results, including any items disallowed...

  20. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues, other multiplant action issues. Supplement 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, the NRC established a program for publishing an annual report on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was initially compiled and reported in three NUREG-series volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). The first annual supplement, which combined these volumes into a single report and presented updated information as of September 30, 1991, was published in December 1991. The second annual supplement, which provided updated information as of September 30, 1992, was published in December 1992. Supplement 2 also provided the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of other multiplant action (MPA) issues not related to TMI Action Plan requirements, USIs, or GSIs. Supplement 3 gives status as of September 30, 1993. This annual report, Supplement 4, presents updated information as of September 30, 1994. This report gives a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, GSIs, and other MPAs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. Additionally, this report serves as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  1. Improving the safety and quality of nursing care through standardized operating procedures in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ausserhofer, Dietmar; Rakic, Severin; Novo, Ahmed; Dropic, Emira; Fisekovic, Eldin; Sredic, Ana; Van Malderen, Greet

    2016-06-01

    We explored how selected 'positive deviant' healthcare facilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina approach the continuous development, adaptation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of nursing-related standard operating procedures. Standardized nursing care is internationally recognized as a critical element of safe, high-quality health care; yet very little research has examined one of its key instruments: nursing-related standard operating procedures. Despite variability in Bosnia and Herzegovina's healthcare and nursing care quality, we assumed that some healthcare facilities would have developed effective strategies to elevate nursing quality and safety through the use of standard operating procedures. Guided by the 'positive deviance' approach, we used a multiple-case study design to examine a criterion sample of four facilities (two primary healthcare centres and two hospitals), collecting data via focus groups and individual interviews. In each studied facility, certification/accreditation processes were crucial to the initiation of continuous development, adaptation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of nursing-related SOPs. In one hospital and one primary healthcare centre, nurses working in advanced roles (i.e. quality coordinators) were responsible for developing and implementing nursing-related standard operating procedures. Across the four studied institutions, we identified a consistent approach to standard operating procedures-related processes. The certification/accreditation process is enabling necessary changes in institutions' organizational cultures, empowering nurses to take on advanced roles in improving the safety and quality of nursing care. Standardizing nursing procedures is key to improve the safety and quality of nursing care. Nursing and Health Policy are needed in Bosnia and Herzegovina to establish a functioning institutional framework, including regulatory bodies, educational systems for developing nurses' capacities or the

  2. Software Safety Analysis of Digital Protection System Requirements Using a Qualitative Formal Method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jang-Soo; Kwon, Kee-Choon; Cha, Sung-Deok

    2004-01-01

    The safety analysis of requirements is a key problem area in the development of software for the digital protection systems of a nuclear power plant. When specifying requirements for software of the digital protection systems and conducting safety analysis, engineers find that requirements are often known only in qualitative terms and that existing fault-tree analysis techniques provide little guidance on formulating and evaluating potential failure modes. A framework for the requirements engineering process is proposed that consists of a qualitative method for requirements specification, called the qualitative formal method (QFM), and a safety analysis method for the requirements based on causality information, called the causal requirements safety analysis (CRSA). CRSA is a technique that qualitatively evaluates causal relationships between software faults and physical hazards. This technique, extending the qualitative formal method process and utilizing information captured in the state trajectory, provides specific guidelines on how to identify failure modes and the relationship among them. The QFM and CRSA processes are described using shutdown system 2 of the Wolsong nuclear power plants as the digital protection system example

  3. Technical safety requirements control level verification; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

  4. The significance of the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) in administrative procedures under nuclear law

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berg, H.P.

    1994-01-01

    The probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) is a useful tool for safety relevant evaluation of nuclear power plant designed on the basis of deterministic specifications. The PSA yields data identifying reliable or less reliable systems, or frequent or less frequent failure modes to be taken into account for safety engineering. Performance of a PSA in administrative procedures under nuclear law, e.g. licensing, is an obligation laid down in a footnote to criterion 1.1 of the BMI safety criteria catalogue, which has been in force unaltered since 1977. The paper explains the application and achievements of PSA in the phase of reactor development concerned with the conceptual design basis and design features, using as an example the novel PWR. (orig./HP) [de

  5. Survey on requirements for independent reviews and inspections of electrical and I and C equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Byman, Karin; Groenkvist, Stefan; Egerbo, Anders; Nilsson, Thomas

    2009-03-01

    In this survey, licensing procedures for the implementation of different kinds of components and systems in nuclear power plants have been studied in four European countries: Belgium (Finland), Germany, and Switzerland. The main focus has been to describe the general features of the licensing procedures for electrical and for instrumentation and control (IandC) equipment and systems. The regulatory framework for the operation of nuclear power plants in Belgium is based on the American regulations. The licensing procedure for each modification of significance for the safety of a plant is carried out by the authorised inspection organisation (AVN), which follows its own procedures for the review of the modification file, the commissioning, and conformity check of the installation. These procedures are very general and independent of the technical domain of the equipment or system and AVN uses the US regulations standard review plan (SRP) as a reference for technical reviews. The Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) is responsible for the surveillance of all nuclear activities in Belgium, but the private non-profit authorised inspection organisation (AVN) does perform inspections and other regulatory tasks delegated by FANC. Controls of electrical components and systems with regard to the general Belgian electrical regulations are performed by accredited inspection organisations. The regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear activities in Finland is domestic and detailed safety requirements are provided by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). They cover specific requirements for the licensing procedure for electrical and IandC equipment. In Finland, there are no general differences in the licensing procedure for electrical, instrumentation, and mechanical equipment and the licensing procedure is basically the same for all types of systems, structures and equipment. STUK has the responsibility for the regulatory control in Finland and may seek

  6. Safety training and safe operating procedures written for PBFA (Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator) II and applicable to other pulsed power facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Donovan, G.L.; Goldstein, S.A.

    1986-12-01

    To ensure that work in advancing pulsed power technology is performed with an acceptably low risk, pulsed power research facilities at Sandia National Laboratories must satisfy general safety guidelines established by the Department of Energy, policies and formats of the Environment, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Department, and detailed procedures formulated by the Pulsed Power Sciences Directorate. The approach to safety training and to writing safe operating procedures, and the procedures presented here are specific to the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator II (PBFA II) Facility but are applicable as guidelines to other research and development facilities which have similar hazards.

  7. Safety training and safe operating procedures written for PBFA [Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator] II and applicable to other pulsed power facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donovan, G.L.; Goldstein, S.A.

    1986-12-01

    To ensure that work in advancing pulsed power technology is performed with an acceptably low risk, pulsed power research facilities at Sandia National Laboratories must satisfy general safety guidelines established by the Department of Energy, policies and formats of the Environment, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Department, and detailed procedures formulated by the Pulsed Power Sciences Directorate. The approach to safety training and to writing safe operating procedures, and the procedures presented here are specific to the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator II (PBFA II) Facility but are applicable as guidelines to other research and development facilities which have similar hazards

  8. Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D

    2008-09-11

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment (LLNL 2007). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment are shown in the B695 Segment DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained waste. Furthermore, a Waste Packaging Unit will be permitted to treat hazardous and mixed waste. RHWM generally processes LLW with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (i.e., much less than 100 n

  9. Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laycak, D.

    2008-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment (LLNL 2007). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment are shown in the B695 Segment DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained waste. Furthermore, a Waste Packaging Unit will be permitted to treat hazardous and mixed waste. RHWM generally processes LLW with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (i.e., much less than 100 n

  10. The actual development of European aviation safety requirements in aviation medicine: prospects of future EASA requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Siedenburg, J

    2009-04-01

    Common Rules for Aviation Safety had been developed under the aegis of the Joint Aviation Authorities in the 1990s. In 2002 the Basic Regulation 1592/2002 was the founding document of a new entity, the European Aviation Safety Agency. Areas of activity were Certification and Maintenance of aircraft. On 18 March the new Basic Regulation 216/2008, repealing the original Basic Regulation was published and applicable from 08 April on. The included Essential Requirements extended the competencies of EASA inter alia to Pilot Licensing and Flight Operations. The future aeromedical requirements will be included as Annex II in another Implementing Regulation on Personnel Licensing. The detailed provisions will be published as guidance material. The proposals for these provisions have been published on 05 June 2008 as NPA 2008- 17c. After public consultation, processing of comments and final adoption the new proposals may be applicable form the second half of 2009 on. A transition period of four year will apply. Whereas the provisions are based on Joint Aviation Requirement-Flight Crew Licensing (JAR-FCL) 3, a new Light Aircraft Pilot Licence (LAPL) project and the details of the associated medical certification regarding general practitioners will be something new in aviation medicine. This paper consists of 6 sections. The introduction outlines the idea of international aviation safety. The second section describes the development of the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), the first step to common rules for aviation safety in Europe. The third section encompasses a major change as next step: the foundation of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the development of its rules. In the following section provides an outline of the new medical requirements. Section five emphasizes the new concept of a Leisure Pilot Licence. The last section gives an outlook on ongoing rulemaking activities and the opportunities of the public to participate in them.

  11. Long term safety requirements and safety indicators for the assessment of underground radioactive waste repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vovk, Ivan

    1998-01-01

    This presentation defines: waste disposal, safety issues, risk estimation; describes the integrated waste disposal process including quality assurance program. Related to actinides inventory it shows the main results of calculated activity obtained by deterministic estimation. It includes the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards and requirements; features related to site, design and waste package characteristics, as technical long term safety criteria for radioactive waste disposal facilities. Fundamental concern regarding the safety of radioactive waste disposal systems is their radiological impact on human beings and the environment. Safety requirements and criteria for judging the level of safety of such systems have been developed and there is a consensus among the international community on their basis within the well-established system of radiological protection. So far, however, little experience has been gained in applying long term safety criteria to actual disposal systems; consequently, there is an international debate on the most appropriate nature and form of the criteria to be used, taking into account the uncertainties involved. Emerging from the debate is the increasing conviction that the combined use of a variety of indicators would be advantageous in addressing the issue of reasonable assurance in the different time frames involved and in supporting the safety case for any particular repository concept. Indicators including risk, dose, radionuclide concentration, transit time, toxicity indices, fluxes at different points within the system, and barrier performance have all been identified as potentially relevant. Dose and risk are the indicators generally seen as most fundamental, as they seek directly to describe the radiological impact of a disposal system, and these are the ones that have been incorporated into most national standards to date. There are, however, certain problems in applying them. Application of a variety of different indicators

  12. The Safety Assessment of OPR-1000 for Station Blackout Applying Combined Deterministic and Probabilistic Procedure

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kang, Dong Gu; Ahn, Seung-Hoon; Cho, Dae-Hyung [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    This is termed station blackout (SBO). However, it does not generally include the loss of available AC power to safety buses fed by station batteries through inverters or by alternate AC sources. Historically, risk analysis results have indicated that SBO was a significant contributor to overall core damage frequency. In this study, the safety assessment of OPR-1000 nuclear power plant for SBO accident, which is a typical beyond design basis accident and important contributor to overall plant risk, is performed by applying the combined deterministic and probabilistic procedure (CDPP). In addition, discussions are made for reevaluation of SBO risk at OPR-1000 by eliminating excessive conservatism in existing PSA. The safety assessment of OPR-1000 for SBO accident, which is a typical BDBA and significant contributor to overall plant risk, was performed by applying the combined deterministic and probabilistic procedure. However, the reference analysis showed that the CDF and CCDP did not meet the acceptable risk, and it was confirmed that the SBO risk should be reevaluated. By estimating the offsite power restoration time appropriately, the SBO risk was reevaluated, and it was finally confirmed that current OPR-1000 system lies in the acceptable risk against the SBO. In addition, it was demonstrated that the proposed CDPP is applicable to safety assessment of BDBAs in nuclear power plants without significant erosion of the safety margin.

  13. 7 CFR 70.110 - Requirements for sanitation, facilities, and operating procedures in official plants.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Requirements for sanitation, facilities, and operating... Requirements for sanitation, facilities, and operating procedures in official plants. (a) The requirements for sanitation, facilities, and operating procedures in official plants shall be the applicable provisions stated...

  14. Interim safety basis compliance matrix for Trenches 31 and 34

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ames, R.R.

    1994-01-01

    The tables provided in this document identify the specific requirements and basis for the administrative controls established in the Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) Solid Waste Burial Ground (SWBG) Interim Safety Basis (ISB) for operation of the Project W-025, Mixed Waste Lined Landfill (Trenches 31 and 34). The tables document the necessary controls and implementing procedures to ensure compliance with the requirements of the ISB. These requirements provide a basis for future Unreviewed Safety Questions (USQ) screening of applicable procedure changes, proposed physical modifications, tests, experiments, and occurrences. Table 1 provides the SWBG interim Operational Safety Requirements administrative controls matrix. The specific assumptions and commitments used in the safety analysis documents applicable to disposal of mixed wastes in Trenches 31 and 34 are provided in Table 2. Table 3 is provided to document the potential engineered and administrative mitigating features identified in the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) for disposal of mixed waste

  15. Safety requirements for long term operation of NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Houdre, T.; Osouf, N.; Juvin, J.-C.

    2012-01-01

    In the future, the reactors operating at present will run alongside reactors of the EPR type or their equivalent, designed for a significantly higher level of safety. This raises the question of the acceptability of continued operation of reactors beyond 40 years when there is an available technology that is safer. Two objectives are therefore imperative. First, a re-evaluation of the safety level in the light of that required of EPR type reactors or their equivalent is necessary, with proposals to bring about significant and relevant improvements to the reactors. R and D work in France and elsewhere is already indicating orientations that could lead to answers, and improvements that would provide significant reductions in release in case of severe accident are being studied. Second, strict compliance of the reactors with the applicable regulations must be demonstrated. At the same time, ageing and obsolescence of the equipment will have to be managed. Where these two points are concerned, ASN expects far-reaching proposals from the licensee. With a view to a request for continued operation beyond 40 years, ASN has referred the matter to the Advisory Committee for nuclear reactors which will meet at the end of 2011 to establish the safety requirements for reactors at their fourth ten-yearly outage. (author)

  16. Tank waste remediation system nuclear criticality safety inspection and assessment plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    VAIL, T.S.

    1999-01-01

    This plan provides a management approved procedure for inspections and assessments of sufficient depth to validate that the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) facility complies with the requirements of the Project Hanford criticality safety program, NHF-PRO-334, ''Criticality Safety General, Requirements''

  17. Fuel supply shutdown facility interim operational safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Besser, R.L.; Brehm, J.R.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

    1995-01-01

    These Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSR) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls to ensure safe operation. The IOSRs apply to the fuel material storage buildings in various modes (operation, storage, surveillance)

  18. Road safety audit tools, procedures, and experiences : a literature review and recommendations : research in the framework of the European research project Safety Standards for Road Design and Redesign SAFESTAR, Workpackage 8.

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Kooi, R.M. van der

    1999-01-01

    This report describes tools and procedures established in different countries which apply Road Safety Audits (RSA). These RSAs are utilized to identify potential safety problems and they concentrate on safety measures to overcome these problems. This technique is used to detect possible safety

  19. Safety and regulatory requirements of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumar, S.V.; Bhardwaj, S.A.

    2000-01-01

    A pre-requisite for a nuclear power program in any country is well established national safety and regulatory requirements. These have evolved for nuclear power plants in India with participation of the regulatory body, utility, research and development (R and D) organizations and educational institutions. Prevailing international practices provided a useful base to develop those applicable to specific system designs for nuclear power plants in India. Their effectiveness has been demonstrated in planned activities of building up the nuclear power program as well as with unplanned activities, like those due to safety related incidents etc. (author)

  20. A procedure for the analysis of errors of commission in a Probabilistic Safety Assessment of a nuclear power plant at full power

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Julius, J.; Jorgenson, E.; Parry, G.W.; Mosleh, A.M.

    1995-01-01

    This paper describes an analytical procedure that has been developed to facilitate the identification of errors of commission for inclusion in a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of a nuclear power plant operating at full power. The procedure first identifies the opportunities for error by determining when operators are required to intervene to bring the plant to a safe condition following a transient, and then identifying under what conditions this is likely to occur using a model of the causes of error. In order to make the analysis practicable, a successive screening approach is used to identify those errors with the highest potential of occurrence. The procedure has been applied as part of a PSA study, and the results of that application are summarized. For the particular plant to which the procedure was applied, the conclusion was that, because of the nature of the procedures, the high degree of redundancy in the instrumentation, the operating practices, and the control board layouts, the potential for significant errors of commission is low

  1. Safety Precautions and Operating Procedures in an (A)BSL-4 Laboratory: 1. Biosafety Level 4 Suit Laboratory Suite Entry and Exit Procedures.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Janosko, Krisztina; Holbrook, Michael R; Adams, Ricky; Barr, Jason; Bollinger, Laura; Newton, Je T'aime; Ntiforo, Corrie; Coe, Linda; Wada, Jiro; Pusl, Daniela; Jahrling, Peter B; Kuhn, Jens H; Lackemeyer, Matthew G

    2016-10-03

    Biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) suit laboratories are specifically designed to study high-consequence pathogens for which neither infection prophylaxes nor treatment options exist. The hallmarks of these laboratories are: custom-designed airtight doors, dedicated supply and exhaust airflow systems, a negative-pressure environment, and mandatory use of positive-pressure ("space") suits. The risk for laboratory specialists working with highly pathogenic agents is minimized through rigorous training and adherence to stringent safety protocols and standard operating procedures. Researchers perform the majority of their work in BSL-2 laboratories and switch to BSL-4 suit laboratories when work with a high-consequence pathogen is required. Collaborators and scientists considering BSL-4 projects should be aware of the challenges associated with BSL-4 research both in terms of experimental technical limitations in BSL-4 laboratory space and the increased duration of such experiments. Tasks such as entering and exiting the BSL-4 suit laboratories are considerably more complex and time-consuming compared to BSL-2 and BSL-3 laboratories. The focus of this particular article is to address basic biosafety concerns and describe the entrance and exit procedures for the BSL-4 laboratory at the NIH/NIAID Integrated Research Facility at Fort Detrick. Such procedures include checking external systems that support the BSL-4 laboratory, and inspecting and donning positive-pressure suits, entering the laboratory, moving through air pressure-resistant doors, and connecting to air-supply hoses. We will also discuss moving within and exiting the BSL-4 suit laboratories, including using the chemical shower and removing and storing positive-pressure suits.

  2. Legal and governmental infrastructure for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for legal and governmental responsibilities in respect of the safety of nuclear facilities, the safe use of sources of ionizing radiation, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material. Thus, it covers development of the legal framework for establishing a regulatory body and other actions to achieve effective regulatory control of facilities and activities. Other responsibilities are also covered, such as those for developing the necessary support for safety, involvement in securing third party liability and emergency preparedness

  3. Legal and governmental infrastructure for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for legal and governmental responsibilities in respect of the safety of nuclear facilities, the safe use of sources of ionizing radiation, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material. Thus, it covers development of the legal framework for establishing a regulatory body and other actions to achieve effective regulatory control of facilities and activities. Other responsibilities are also covered, such as those for developing the necessary support for safety, involvement in securing third party liability and emergency preparedness

  4. Safety and regulatory aspects of front end facilities of nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khan, Kirity Bhushan; Jha, S.K.; Bhasin, Vivek; Behere, P.G.

    2017-01-01

    Nuclear Fuels Group of BARC consists of various divisions with diverse activities but impeccable safety records. This has been made possible with strict safety culture among trained personnel across all divisions. The major activities of this group encompass the front end fuel fabrication facilities for thermal and fast reactors and post irradiation examination of fuel and structural materials. The group has been responsible for delivering departmental targets, as and when required, fulfilling all safety and security requirements. The present article covers the safety and regulatory aspects of this group with special emphasis on group safety management by the administrative/organizational control, the procedure followed for regulatory review and control which are carried out and the laid down procedures for identifying, classifying and reporting of safety related incidents. (author)

  5. Workshop on Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety: Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dey, M.

    1993-09-01

    These are the proceedings of the Public Workshop on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety. The workshop was held at the Holiday Inn, Bethesda, on April 27 and 28, 1993. The purpose of the workshop was to provide an opportunity for public and industry input to the program. The workshop addressed the institutionalization of the program to review regulations with the purpose of eliminating those that are marginal. The objective is to avoid the dilution of safety efforts. One session was devoted to discussion of the framework for a performance-based regulatory approach. In addition, panelists and attendees discussed scope, schedules and status of specific regulatory items: containment leakage testing requirements, fire protection requirements, requirements for environmental qualification of electrical equipment, requests for information under 10CFR50.54(f), requirements for combustible gas control systems, and quality assurance requirements

  6. Workshop on Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety: Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dey, M. [Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC (United States). Div. of Safety Issue Resolution; Arsenault, F.; Patterson, M.; Gaal, M. [SCIENTECH, Inc., Rockville, MD (United States)

    1993-09-01

    These are the proceedings of the Public Workshop on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission`s Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety. The workshop was held at the Holiday Inn, Bethesda, on April 27 and 28, 1993. The purpose of the workshop was to provide an opportunity for public and industry input to the program. The workshop addressed the institutionalization of the program to review regulations with the purpose of eliminating those that are marginal. The objective is to avoid the dilution of safety efforts. One session was devoted to discussion of the framework for a performance-based regulatory approach. In addition, panelists and attendees discussed scope, schedules and status of specific regulatory items: containment leakage testing requirements, fire protection requirements, requirements for environmental qualification of electrical equipment, requests for information under 10CFR50.54(f), requirements for combustible gas control systems, and quality assurance requirements.

  7. Use of safety analysis to site comfirmation procedure in case of hard rock repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peltonen, E.K.

    1984-02-01

    The role of safety analysis in a confirmation procedure of a candidate disposal site of radioactive wastes is discussed. Items dealt with include principle reasons and practical goals of the use of safety analysis, methodology of safety analysis and assessment, as well as usefulness and adequacy of the present safety analysis. Safety analysis is a tool, which enables one to estimate quantitatively the possible radiological impacts from the disposal. The results can be compared with the criteria and the suitability conclusions drawn. Because of its systems analytical nature safety analysis is an effective method to reveal, what are the most important factors of the disposal system and the most critical site characteristics inside the lumped parameters often provided by the experimental site investigation methods. Furthermore it gives information on the accuracy needs of different site properties. This can be utilized to judge whether the quality and quantity of the measurements for the characterization are sufficient as well as to guide the further site investigations. A more practical discussion regarding the applicability of the use of safety analysis is presented by an example concerning the assessment of a Finnish candidate site for low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste repository. (author)

  8. Preparation, review, and approval of implementation plans for nuclear safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-10-01

    This standard describes an acceptable method to prepare, review, and approve implementation plans for DOE Nuclear Safety requirements. DOE requirements are identified in DOE Rules, Orders, Notices, Immediate Action Directives, and Manuals

  9. Radiation safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jain, Priyanka

    2014-01-01

    The use of radiation sources is a privilege; in order to retain the privilege, all persons who use sources of radiation must follow policies and procedures for their safe and legal use. The purpose of this poster is to describe the policies and procedures of the Radiation Protection Program. Specific conditions of radiation safety require the establishment of peer committees to evaluate proposals for the use of radionuclides, the appointment of a radiation safety officer, and the implementation of a radiation safety program. In addition, the University and Medical Centre administrations have determined that the use of radiation producing machines and non-ionizing radiation sources shall be included in the radiation safety program. These Radiation Safety policies are intended to ensure that such use is in accordance with applicable State and Federal regulations and accepted standards as directed towards the protection of health and the minimization of hazard to life or property. It is the policy that all activities involving ionizing radiation or radiation emitting devices be conducted so as to keep hazards from radiation to a minimum. Persons involved in these activities are expected to comply fully with the Canadian Nuclear Safety Act and all it. The risk of prosecution by the Department of Health and Community Services exists if compliance with all applicable legislation is not fulfilled. (author)

  10. A simple intervention to improve patient safety, save time and improve staff experience in the AMU procedure room.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Misselbrook, Gary Peter; Kause, Juliane; Yeoh, Su-Ann

    2016-01-01

    Over the last decade, operating theatres and Intensive Care Units (ICUs) have established systematic methods for performing procedures on patients that have been shown to reduce complications and improve patient safety. Whilst the use of procedure rooms on Acute Medicine Units (AMUs) is highly recommended by patient safety groups and Royal College publications, they are not universally available or appropriately utilised. In this article we discuss a quality improvement project that was undertaken on an AMU at a large university teaching hospital in the United Kingdom, highlighting its successes and challenges.

  11. [Safety monitoring of cell-based medicinal products (CBMPs)].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Funk, Markus B; Frech, Marion; Spranger, Robert; Keller-Stanislawski, Brigitte

    2015-11-01

    Cell-based medicinal products (CBMPs), a category of advanced-therapy medicinal products (ATMPs), are authorised for the European market by the European Commission by means of the centralized marketing authorisation. By conforming to the German Medicinal Products Act (Sec. 4b AMG), national authorisation can be granted by the Paul-Ehrlich-Institut in Germany exclusively for ATMPs not based on a routine manufacturing procedure. In both procedures, quality, efficacy, and safety are evaluated and the risk-benefit balance is assessed. For the centralised procedure, mainly controlled clinical trial data must be submitted, whereas the requirements for national procedures could be modified corresponding to the stage of development of the ATMP. After marketing authorization, the marketing authorization/license holder is obligated to report all serious adverse reactions to the competent authority and to provide periodic safety update reports. If necessary, post-authorization safety studies could be imposed. On the basis of these regulatory measures, the safety of advanced therapies can be monitored and improved.

  12. Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 3 (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  13. Radiation protection and safety of radiation sources: International basic safety standards. General safety requirements. Pt. 3 (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  14. Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 3 (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  15. Safety culture of nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zheng Beixin

    2008-01-01

    This paper is a summary on the basis of DNMC safety culture training material for managerial personnel. It intends to explain the basic contents of safety, design, management, enterprise culture, safety culture of nuclear power plant and the relationship among them. It explains especially the constituent elements of safety culture system, the basic requirements for the three levels of commitments: policy level, management level and employee level. It also makes some analyses and judgments for some typical safety culture cases, for example, transparent culture and habitual violation of procedure. (authors)

  16. Nuclear safety in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laverie, M.

    1981-02-01

    The principles and rules governing the safety of nuclear installations are defined as from three fundamental principles and three practical rules as follows: First principle: the operator is responsible and of the highest order. Second principle: the public authorities exercise their control responsibility with respect to the design, construction and running of the installations. Third principle: nuclear safety, this is to accept that man and his technique are not infallible and that one must be prepared to control the unpredictable. First rule: the installations must include several 'lines of defence' in succession and to the extent where this is possible these must be independent of each other. Second rule: procedures are required and supervised by the Government Departments. Third rule: nuclear safety requires that any incident or anomaly must undergo an analysis in depth and is also based on a standing 'clinical' examination of the installations. The definition is given as to how the public authorities exercise their intervention: terms and conditions of the intervention by the safety authorities, authorization procedures, surveillance of the installations, general technical regulations. Two specific subjects are presented in the addendum, (a) the choice of nuclear power station sites in France and (b) the storage of radioactive wastes [fr

  17. Preliminary waste acceptance requirements for the planned Konrad repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Warnecke, E.; Brennecke, P.

    1987-01-01

    The Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) has established Preliminary Waste Acceptance Requirements for the planned Konrad repository. These requirements were developed, in accordance with the Safety Criteria of the Reactor Safety Commission, with the help of a site specific safety assessment; they are under the reservation of the plan approval procedure, which is still in progress. In developing waste acceptance requirements, the PTB fulfills one of its duties as the institute responsible for waste disposal and gives guidelines for waste conditioning to waste producers and conditioners. (orig.) [de

  18. Enforcement handbook: Enforcement of DOE nuclear safety requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-06-01

    This Handbook provides detailed guidance and procedures to implement the General Statement of DOE Enforcement Policy (Enforcement Policy or Policy). A copy of this Enforcement Policy is included for ready reference in Appendix D. The guidance provided in this Handbook is qualified, however, by the admonishment to exercise discretion in determining the proper disposition of each potential enforcement action. As discussed in subsequent chapters, the Enforcement and Investigation Staff will apply a number of factors in assessing each potential enforcement situation. Enforcement sanctions are imposed in accordance with the Enforcement Policy for the purpose of promoting public and worker health and safety in the performance of activities at DOE facilities by DOE contractors (and their subcontractors and suppliers) who are indemnified under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act. These indemnified contractors, and their suppliers and subcontractors, will be referred to in this Handbook collectively as DOE contractors. It should be remembered that the purpose of the Department`s enforcement policy is to improve nuclear safety for the workers and the public, and this goal should be the prime consideration in exercising enforcement discretion.

  19. Enforcement handbook: Enforcement of DOE nuclear safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-06-01

    This Handbook provides detailed guidance and procedures to implement the General Statement of DOE Enforcement Policy (Enforcement Policy or Policy). A copy of this Enforcement Policy is included for ready reference in Appendix D. The guidance provided in this Handbook is qualified, however, by the admonishment to exercise discretion in determining the proper disposition of each potential enforcement action. As discussed in subsequent chapters, the Enforcement and Investigation Staff will apply a number of factors in assessing each potential enforcement situation. Enforcement sanctions are imposed in accordance with the Enforcement Policy for the purpose of promoting public and worker health and safety in the performance of activities at DOE facilities by DOE contractors (and their subcontractors and suppliers) who are indemnified under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act. These indemnified contractors, and their suppliers and subcontractors, will be referred to in this Handbook collectively as DOE contractors. It should be remembered that the purpose of the Department's enforcement policy is to improve nuclear safety for the workers and the public, and this goal should be the prime consideration in exercising enforcement discretion

  20. Safety of Cargo Aircraft Handling Procedure

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Daniel Hlavatý

    2017-07-01

    Full Text Available The aim of this paper is to get acquainted with the ways how to improve the safety management system during cargo aircraft handling. The first chapter is dedicated to general information about air cargo transportation. This includes the history or types of cargo aircraft handling, but also the means of handling. The second part is focused on detailed description of cargo aircraft handling, including a description of activities that are performed before and after handling. The following part of this paper covers a theoretical interpretation of safety, safety indicators and legislative provisions related to the safety of cargo aircraft handling. The fourth part of this paper analyzes the fault trees of events which might occur during handling. The factors found by this analysis are compared with safety reports of FedEx. Based on the comparison, there is a proposal on how to improve the safety management in this transportation company.

  1. Radiation safety requirements for training of users of diagnostic X ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Background. Globally, the aim of requirements regarding the use and ownership of diagnostic medical X-ray equipment is to limit radiation by abiding by the 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) principle. The ignorance of radiographers with regard to radiation safety requirements, however, is currently a cause of ...

  2. Development of safety factors to be used for evaluation of cracked nuclear components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brickstad, B.; Bergman, M.

    1996-10-01

    A modified concept for safety evaluation is introduced which separately accounts for the failure mechanisms fracture and plastic collapse. For application on nuclear components a set of safety factors are also proposed that retain the safety margins expressed in ASME, section III and XI. By performing comparative studies of the acceptance levels for surface cracks in pipes and a pressure vessel, it is shown that some of the anomalies connected with the old safety procedures are removed. It is the authors belief that the outlined safety evaluation procedure has the capability of treating cracks in a consistent way and that the procedure together with the proposed safety factors fulfill the basic safety requirements for nuclear components. Hopefully, it is possible in the near future to develop a probabilistic safety assessment procedure in Sweden, which enables a systematic treatment of uncertainties in the involved data. 14 refs

  3. APPLIED FARM FOOD SAFETY

    OpenAIRE

    Ender, Judit; Mikaczo, Andrea

    2008-01-01

    Recently there have been more and more foodborne illnesses being associated with fresh vegetable produce. In response to this, consumer confidence has been lowered with the safety of the vegetable industry. So, many retailers have recently announced programs requiring growers to have independent third-party inspections. The goal with this essay is to introduce a vegetable farm and reveal its food safety procedures from the seeding through shipping,. reviewing, evaluating, and strengthening cu...

  4. Safety of Running Two Rooms: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Overlapping Neurosurgical Procedures.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Self, D Mitchell; Ilyas, Adeel; Stetler, William R

    2018-04-27

    Overlapping surgery, a long-standing practice within academic neurosurgery centers nationwide, has recently come under scrutiny from the government and media as potentially harmful to patients. Therefore, the objective of this systematic review and meta-analysis is to determine the safety of overlapping neurosurgical procedures. The authors performed a systematic review and meta-analysis in accordance with PRISMA guidelines. A review of PubMed and Medline databases was undertaken with the search phrase "overlapping surgery AND neurosurgery AND outcomes." Data regarding patient demographics, type of neurosurgical procedure, and outcomes and complications were extracted from each study. The principle summary measure was odds ratio (OR) of the association of overlapping versus non-overlapping surgery with outcomes. The literature search yielded a total of 36 studies, of which 5 studies met inclusion criteria and were included in this study. These studies included a total of 25,764 patients undergoing neurosurgical procedures. Overlapping surgery was associated with an increased likelihood of being discharged home (OR = 1.32; 95% CI 1.20 to 1.44; P < 0.001) and a reduced 30-day unexpected return to the operating room (OR = 0.79; 95% CI 0.72 to 0.87; P < 0.001). Overlapping surgery did not significantly affect OR of length of surgery, 30-day mortality, or 30-day readmission. Overlapping neurosurgical procedures were not associated with worse patient outcomes. Additional, prospective studies are needed to further assess the safety overlapping procedures. Copyright © 2018. Published by Elsevier Inc.

  5. Correct safety requirements during the life cycle of heating plants; Korrekta saekerhetskrav under vaermeanlaeggningars livscykel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tegehall, Jan; Hedberg, Johan [Swedish National Testing and Research Inst., Boraas (Sweden)

    2006-10-15

    The safety of old steam boilers or hot water generators is in principle based on electromechanical components which are generally easy to understand. The use of safety-PLC is a new and flexible way to design a safe system. A programmable system offers more degrees of freedom and consequently new problems may arise. As a result, new standards which use the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) concept for the level of safety have been elaborated. The goal is to define a way of working to handle requirements on safety in control systems of heat and power plants. SIL-requirements are relatively new within the domain and there is a need for guidance to be able to follow the requirements. The target of this report is the people who work with safety questions during new construction, reconstruction, or modification of furnace plants. In the work, the Pressure Equipment Directive, 97/23/EC, as well as standards which use the SIL concept have been studied. Additionally, standards for water-tube boilers have been studied. The focus has been on the safety systems (safety functions) which are used in water-tube boilers for heat and power plants; other systems, which are parts of these boilers, have not been considered. Guidance has been given for the aforementioned standards as well as safety requirements specification and risk analysis. An old hot water generator and a relatively new steam boiler have been used as case studies. The design principles and safety functions of the furnaces have been described. During the risk analysis important hazards were identified. A method for performing a risk analysis has been described and the appropriate content of a safety requirements specification has been defined. If a heat or power plant is constructed, modified, or reconstructed, a safety life cycle shall be followed. The purpose of the safety life cycle is to plan, describe, document, perform, check, test, and validate that everything is correctly done. The components of the safety

  6. Computer-Based Procedures for Field Workers in Nuclear Power Plants: Development of a Model of Procedure Usage and Identification of Requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Katya Le Blanc; Johanna Oxstrand

    2012-04-01

    The nuclear industry is constantly trying to find ways to decrease the human error rate, especially the human errors associated with procedure use. As a step toward the goal of improving procedure use performance, researchers, together with the nuclear industry, have been looking at replacing the current paper-based procedures with computer-based procedure systems. The concept of computer-based procedures is not new by any means; however most research has focused on procedures used in the main control room. Procedures reviewed in these efforts are mainly emergency operating procedures and normal operating procedures. Based on lessons learned for these previous efforts we are now exploring a more unknown application for computer based procedures - field procedures, i.e. procedures used by nuclear equipment operators and maintenance technicians. The Idaho National Laboratory and participants from the U.S. commercial nuclear industry are collaborating in an applied research effort with the objective of developing requirements and specifications for a computer-based procedure system to be used by field workers. The goal is to identify the types of human errors that can be mitigated by using computer-based procedures and how to best design the computer-based procedures to do so. This paper describes the development of a Model of Procedure Use and the qualitative study on which the model is based. The study was conducted in collaboration with four nuclear utilities and five research institutes. During the qualitative study and the model development requirements and for computer-based procedures were identified.

  7. Technical Safety Requirements for the Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF)

    CERN Document Server

    Mahn, J A E M J G

    2003-01-01

    This document provides the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Sandia National Laboratories Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF). The TSR is a compilation of requirements that define the conditions, the safe boundaries, and the administrative controls necessary to ensure the safe operation of a nuclear facility and to reduce the potential risk to the public and facility workers from uncontrolled releases of radioactive or other hazardous materials. These requirements constitute an agreement between DOE and Sandia National Laboratories management regarding the safe operation of the Gamma Irradiation Facility.

  8. Basic national requirements for safe design, construction and operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1980-01-01

    Nuclear power plants have to be save. Vendors and utilities operating such plants, are convinced that their plants meet this requirement. Who, however, is establishing the safety requirements to be met by those manufacturing and operating nuclear power plants. What are the mechanisms to control whether the features provided assure the required safety level. Who controls whether the required and planned safety features are really provided. Who is eventually responsible for assuring safety after commissioning of a nuclear power plant. These fundamental questions being raised in many discussions on safety and environmental protection are dealt with in the following sections: (1) Fundamental safety requirements on nuclear power plants, in which such items as risk, legal bases and licensing procedure are discussed, (2) Surveillance during construction, in which safety analysis report, siting, safety evaluation, document examination, quality assurance, and commissioning testing are dealt with, (3) Operating tests and conditions in which recurrent inspections, environmental protection during operation, investigation of abnormal occurences and backfitting requirements as reviewed, and (4) Safety philosophy and safety policy to conclude this presentation. The German approach to nuclear safety serves as an example for an effective way of assuring safe nuclear power. (orig.)

  9. Implementation of an Enhanced Measurement Control Program for handling nuclear safety samples at WSRC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boler-Melton, C.; Holland, M.K.

    1991-01-01

    In the separation and purification of nuclear material, nuclear criticality safety (NCS) is of primary concern. The primary nuclear criticality safety controls utilized by the Savannah River Site (SRS) Separations Facilities involve administrative and process equipment controls. Additional assurance of NCS is obtained by identifying key process hold points where sampling is used to independently verify the effectiveness of production control. Nuclear safety measurements of samples from these key process locations provide a high degree of assurance that processing conditions are within administrative and procedural nuclear safety controls. An enhanced procedure management system aimed at making improvements in the quality, safety, and conduct of operation was implemented for Nuclear Safety Sample (NSS) receipt, analysis, and reporting. All procedures with nuclear safety implications were reviewed for accuracy and adequate detail to perform the analytical measurements safely, efficiently, and with the utmost quality. Laboratory personnel worked in a ''Deliberate Operating'' mode (a systematic process requiring continuous expert oversight during all phases of training, testing, and implementation) to initiate the upgrades. Thus, the effort to revise and review nuclear safety sample procedures involved a team comprised of a supervisor, chemist, and two technicians for each procedure. Each NSS procedure was upgraded to a ''Use Every Time'' (UET) procedure with sign-off steps to ensure compliance with each step for every nuclear safety sample analyzed. The upgrade program met and exceeded both the long and short term customer needs by improving measurement reliability, providing objective evidence of rigid adherence to program principles and requirements, and enhancing the system for independent verification of representative sampling from designated NCS points

  10. Can proceduralization support coping with the unexpected?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Norros, Leena; Savioja, Paula; Liinasuo, Marja; Wahlstrom, Mikael

    2014-01-01

    Operations of safety critical industries unquestionably require a diversity of technical and organizational control measures to increase stability and predictability of the complex sociotechnical systems. Nevertheless, experiences from recent severe accidents and results of safety research have questioned the effectiveness of the prevailing safety management strategy that mainly relies on standardization and designed-in defenses. This paper discusses the identified need to balance between stability and flexibility in a concrete safety issue, i.e., proceduralization. The main research problem of our study is whether procedure guided practice can offer sufficient support for flexibility of operating activity. We shall frame our study with the help of a model that explains different aspects of procedures. We then elaborate how these different aspects were considered empirically in our 3-phase study. In the first study we interviewed 62 main control room operators and asked how they consider procedures to support balancing. In the second study we observed in detail 12 NPP operator crews' activity in a simulated loss-of-coolant accident. In a third study we inquired 5 procedure designers about their conceptions concerning procedure guidance in operator work. Drawing on either interview or behavioral data we analyzed the personnel's stance to the flexibility and stability balancing, and how the conceptions portray in the practices of procedure usage. Our results demonstrate that the operators are aware of the need for balancing flexibility and stability and consider successful balancing to represent 'good' professional action. In actual action many operators, however, tend towards more straightforward following of procedures. Designers also see the capability for balancing stability and flexibility as a key operator competence but describe actual acting simply as procedure-following. According to the documents of the nuclear community, procedure

  11. Can proceduralization support coping with the unexpected?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Norros, Leena; Savioja, Paula; Liinasuo, Marja; Wahlstrom, Mikael [VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Vuorimiehentie (Finland)

    2014-08-15

    Operations of safety critical industries unquestionably require a diversity of technical and organizational control measures to increase stability and predictability of the complex sociotechnical systems. Nevertheless, experiences from recent severe accidents and results of safety research have questioned the effectiveness of the prevailing safety management strategy that mainly relies on standardization and designed-in defenses. This paper discusses the identified need to balance between stability and flexibility in a concrete safety issue, i.e., proceduralization. The main research problem of our study is whether procedure guided practice can offer sufficient support for flexibility of operating activity. We shall frame our study with the help of a model that explains different aspects of procedures. We then elaborate how these different aspects were considered empirically in our 3-phase study. In the first study we interviewed 62 main control room operators and asked how they consider procedures to support balancing. In the second study we observed in detail 12 NPP operator crews' activity in a simulated loss-of-coolant accident. In a third study we inquired 5 procedure designers about their conceptions concerning procedure guidance in operator work. Drawing on either interview or behavioral data we analyzed the personnel's stance to the flexibility and stability balancing, and how the conceptions portray in the practices of procedure usage. Our results demonstrate that the operators are aware of the need for balancing flexibility and stability and consider successful balancing to represent 'good' professional action. In actual action many operators, however, tend towards more straightforward following of procedures. Designers also see the capability for balancing stability and flexibility as a key operator competence but describe actual acting simply as procedure-following. According to the documents of the nuclear community, procedure

  12. Historical development of the seismic requirements for construction of nuclear power plants in the U.S. and worldwide and their current impact on cost and safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevenson, J.D.

    2003-01-01

    The following topics are described and discussed: Historical development of NPP seismic design requirements: Peak ground acceleration; Response spectra and damping; Floor or amplified response spectra; Effective high frequency response spectra; Seismic modeling procedures; Impact on cost (site preparation and foundations; site seismic response and generation of site dependent spectra). Potential use of indirect earthquake experience data in design and construction of NPP. Seismic contribution to safety. The following facts are summarized in two Appendices: Seismic intensity scales, and GRS safety codes and guides. (P.A.)

  13. 77 FR 75439 - Guidances for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for Investigational New...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-20

    ...] Guidances for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for Investigational New Drug Applications and Bioavailability/Bioequivalence Studies, and a Small Entity Compliance Guide; Availability... Reporting Requirements for INDs and BA/BE Studies'' and ``Safety Reporting Requirements for INDs and BA/BE...

  14. Modeling of requirement specification for safety critical real time computer system using formal mathematical specifications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sankar, Bindu; Sasidhar Rao, B.; Ilango Sambasivam, S.; Swaminathan, P.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Real time computer systems are increasingly used for safety critical supervision and control of nuclear reactors. Typical application areas are supervision of reactor core against coolant flow blockage, supervision of clad hot spot, supervision of undesirable power excursion, power control and control logic for fuel handling systems. The most frequent cause of fault in safety critical real time computer system is traced to fuzziness in requirement specification. To ensure the specified safety, it is necessary to model the requirement specification of safety critical real time computer systems using formal mathematical methods. Modeling eliminates the fuzziness in the requirement specification and also helps to prepare the verification and validation schemes. Test data can be easily designed from the model of the requirement specification. Z and B are the popular languages used for modeling the requirement specification. A typical safety critical real time computer system for supervising the reactor core of prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) against flow blockage is taken as case study. Modeling techniques and the actual model are explained in detail. The advantages of modeling for ensuring the safety are summarized

  15. Nuclear safety review requirements for launch approval

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sholtis, J.A. Jr.; Winchester, R.O.

    1992-01-01

    Use of nuclear power systems in space requires approval which is preceded by extensive safety analysis and review. This careful study allows an informed risk-benefit decision at the highest level of our government. This paper describes the process as it has historically been applied to U.S. isotopic power systems. The Ulysses mission, launched in October 1990, is used to illustrate the process. Expected variations to deal with reactor-power systems are explained

  16. 34 CFR 370.43 - What requirement applies to the use of mediation procedures?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What requirement applies to the use of mediation... applies to the use of mediation procedures? (a) Each designated agency shall implement procedures designed to ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, good faith negotiations and mediation procedures are...

  17. Romania - NPP PLiM Between Regulatory Requirement / Oversight and Operator Safety / Financial Interest

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goicea, Lucian

    2012-01-01

    Cernavoda Unit 1 PLiM started in the first third of its design life, to develop as regulatory requirements of the components of standards and programmes and to benefit by earlier implementation of the measures for achieving maximum operating life. CNCAN regulatory present approach on the utility PLiM combines the regulatory requirements on management system, ageing management provisions of periodic safety review, detailed technical requirements of ageing programmes and different techniques focusing only on safety issues. (author)

  18. 75 FR 34064 - Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards, Test Procedures for Roof Trusses

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-06-16

    ... failure. Failure is rupture, fracture, or excessive yielding. (v) Final recovery phase. Remove 2.0 times... members of the public. Commenters should follow the instructions provided on that site to submit comments... nondestructive testing procedure for roof trusses that permits a lower overall factor of safety to be used in...

  19. Specification of safety requirements for waste packages with respect to practicable quality control measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruendler, D.; Wurtinger, W.

    1987-01-01

    Waste packages for disposal in a repository in the Federal Republic of Germany have to meet safety requirements derived from site specific safety analyses. The examination of the waste packages with regard to compliance with these requirements is the main objective of quality control measures. With respect to quality control the requirements have to be specified in a way that practicable control measures can be applied. This is dealt with for the quality control of the activity inventory and the quality control of the waste form. The paper discusses the determination of the activity of hard-to-measure radionuclides and the specification of safety related requirements for the waste form and the packaging using typical examples

  20. Ferrocyanide Safety Program: Data requirements for the ferrocyanide safety issue developed through the data quality objectives (DQO) process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buck, J.W.; Anderson, C.M.; Pulsipher, B.A.; Toth, J.J.; Turner, P.J.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.; Meacham, J.E.

    1993-12-01

    This document records the data quality objectives (DQO) process applied to the Ferrocyanide Waste Tank Safety Issue at the Hanford Site by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory and Westinghouse Hanford Company. Specifically, the major recommendations and findings from this Ferrocyanide DQO process are presented so that decision makers can determine the type, quantity, and quality of data required for addressing tank safety issues. The decision logic diagrams and error tolerance equations also are provided. Finally, the document includes the DQO sample-size formulas for determining specific tank sampling requirements

  1. A procedure for safety assessment of components with cracks - Handbook. 3rd revised edition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andersson, P.; Bergman, M.; Brickstad, B.; Dahlberg, L.; Nilsson, F.; Sattari-Far, I. [SAQ Kontroll AB, Stockholm (Sweden)

    1999-12-01

    In this handbook a procedure is described which can be used both for assessment of detected cracks or crack-like defects and for defect tolerance analysis. The procedure can be used to calculate possible crack growth due to fatigue or stress corrosion and to calculate the reserve margin for failure due to fracture and plastic collapse. For ductile materials, the procedure gives the reserve margin for initiation of stable crack growth. Thus, an extra reserve margin, unknown to size, exists for failure in components made of ductile materials. The procedure was developed for operative use with the following objectives in mind: a) The procedure should be able to handle both linear and non-linear problems without any a priori division. b) The procedure shall ensure uniqueness of the safety assessment. c) The procedure should be well defined and easy to use. d) The conservatism of the procedure should be well validated. e) The handbook, that documents the procedure, should be so complete that for most assessments, access to any other fracture mechanics literature should not be necessary. The method utilized in the procedure is based on the R6-method developed at Nuclear Electric plc. The basic assumption is that fracture initiated by a crack can be described by the variables K{sub r} and L{sub r}. K{sub r} is the ratio between the stress intensity factor and the fracture toughness of the material. L{sub r} is the ratio between applied load and the plastic limit load of the structure. The pair of calculated values of these variables is plotted in a diagram. If the point is situated within the noncritical region, fracture is assumed not to occur. If the point is situated outside the region, crack growth and fracture may occur. The method can in principal be used for all metallic materials. It is, however, more extensively verified for steel alloys only. The method is not intended for use in temperature regions where creep deformation is of importance. To fulfil the above

  2. A procedure for safety assessment of components with cracks - Handbook. 3rd revised edition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersson, P.; Bergman, M.; Brickstad, B.; Dahlberg, L.; Nilsson, F.; Sattari-Far, I.

    1999-12-01

    In this handbook a procedure is described which can be used both for assessment of detected cracks or crack-like defects and for defect tolerance analysis. The procedure can be used to calculate possible crack growth due to fatigue or stress corrosion and to calculate the reserve margin for failure due to fracture and plastic collapse. For ductile materials, the procedure gives the reserve margin for initiation of stable crack growth. Thus, an extra reserve margin, unknown to size, exists for failure in components made of ductile materials. The procedure was developed for operative use with the following objectives in mind: a) The procedure should be able to handle both linear and non-linear problems without any a priori division. b) The procedure shall ensure uniqueness of the safety assessment. c) The procedure should be well defined and easy to use. d) The conservatism of the procedure should be well validated. e) The handbook, that documents the procedure, should be so complete that for most assessments, access to any other fracture mechanics literature should not be necessary. The method utilized in the procedure is based on the R6-method developed at Nuclear Electric plc. The basic assumption is that fracture initiated by a crack can be described by the variables K r and L r . K r is the ratio between the stress intensity factor and the fracture toughness of the material. L r is the ratio between applied load and the plastic limit load of the structure. The pair of calculated values of these variables is plotted in a diagram. If the point is situated within the noncritical region, fracture is assumed not to occur. If the point is situated outside the region, crack growth and fracture may occur. The method can in principal be used for all metallic materials. It is, however, more extensively verified for steel alloys only. The method is not intended for use in temperature regions where creep deformation is of importance. To fulfil the above given objectives

  3. Qualification of safety-related valve actuators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    This Standard describes the qualification of all types of power-driven valve actuators, including damper actuators, for safety-related functions in nuclear power generating stations. It may also be used to separately qualify actuator components. This Standard establishes the minimum requirements for, and guidance regarding, the methods and procedures for qualification of all safety-related functions of power-driven valve actuators

  4. Procedures for conducting probabilistic safety assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    A well performed and adequately documented safety assessment of a nuclear facility will serve as a basis to determine whether the facility complies with the safety objectives, principles and criteria as stipulated by the national regulatory body of the country where the facility is in operation. International experience shows that the practices and methodologies used to perform safety assessments and periodic safety re-assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities differ significantly from county to country. Most developing countries do not have methods and guidance for safety assessment that are prescribed by the regulatory body. Typically the safety evaluation for the facility is based on a case by case assessment. Whilst conservative deterministic analyses are predominantly used as a licensing basis in many countries, recently probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) techniques have been applied as a useful complementary tool to support safety decision making. The main benefit of PSA is to provide insights into the safety aspects of facility design and operation. PSA points up the potential environmental impacts of postulated accidents, including the dominant risk contributors, and enables safety analysts to compare options for reducing risk. In order to advise on how to apply PSA methodology for the safety assessment of non-reactor nuclear facilities, the IAEA organized several consultants meetings, which led to the preparation of this TECDOC. This document is intended as guidance for the conduct of PSA in non-nuclear facilities. The main emphasis here is on the general procedural steps of a PSA that is specific for a non-reactor nuclear facility, rather than the details of the specific methods. The report is directed at technical staff managing or performing such probabilistic assessments and to promote a standardized framework, terminology and form of documentation for these PSAs. It is understood that the level of detail implied in the tasks presented in this

  5. Innovative nuclear reactor - Indian approach to meet user requirements for safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saha, D.; Sinha, R.K.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: For sustainable development of nuclear energy, a number of key issues are to be addressed. It should be economically competitive; it must address the issues related to nuclear safety, proliferation resistance, environmental impact, waste disposal and cross cutting issues like social and infra-structural aspects. To compete successfully in the long term, in the highly competitive energy market and to overcome other challenges, it is necessary to introduce innovative reactor and fuel cycle concepts. Indian Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) is one such innovative reactor. To guide the research and development activities related to innovative concepts, user requirements are to be formulated. User requirements covering various aspects of sustainable development are being formulated at both national and international levels. One such international project involved in the formulation of user requirements is the IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). This paper deals with INPRO user requirements for safety and Indian approach to meet these requirements through AHWR

  6. DASS: A decision aid integrating the safety parameter display system and emergency functional recovery procedures. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.E.

    1984-08-01

    Using a stand-alone developmental test-bed consisting of a minicomputer and a high-resolution color graphics computer, displays and supporting software incorporating advanced on-line decision-aid concepts were developed and evaluated. The advanced concepts embodied in displays designed for the operating crew of a PWR plant include: (1) an integrated display format which supports a top-down approach to problem detection, recovery planning, and control; (2) introduction of nonobservable plant parameters derived from first principles mass and energy balances as part of the displayed information; and (3) systematic processing and display of key success path (plant safety system) attributes. The prototype system, referred to as the PWR-DASS (Disturbance Analysis and Surveillance System), consists of 18 displays targeted for principal use by the control room systems manager. PWR-DASS was conceived to fulfill an operational void not fully supported by safety parameter display systems or reformulated emergency procedure guidelines. The results from the evaluation by licensed operators suggest that organization and display of desired critical safety function and success path information as incorporated in the PWR-DASS prototype can support the systems manager's overview. The results also point to the need for several refinements required for a field grade system, and to the need for a simulator-based evaluation of the prototype or its successor. (author)

  7. A review of the literature pertaining to the efficacy, safety, educational requirements, uses and usage of mechanical adjusting devices

    Science.gov (United States)

    Taylor, Shane H; Arnold, Nicole D; Biggs, Lesley; Colloca, Christopher J; Mierau, Dale R; Symons, Bruce P; Triano, John J

    2004-01-01

    Over the past decade, mechanical adjusting devices (MADs) were a major source of debate within the Chiropractors’ Association of Saskatchewan (CAS). Since Saskatchewan was the only jurisdiction in North America to prohibit the use of MADs, the CAS established a committee in 2001 to review the literature on MADs. The committee evaluated the literature on the efficacy, safety, and uses of moving stylus instruments within chiropractic practice, and the educational requirements for chiropractic practice. Following the rating criteria for the evaluation of evidence, as outlined in the Clinical Guidelines for Chiropractic Practice in Canada (1994), the committee reviewed 55 articles – all of which pertained to the Activator. Of the 55 articles, 13 were eliminated from the final study. Of the 42 remaining articles, 6 were rated as class 1 evidence; 11 were rated as class 2 evidence and 25 were rated as class 3 evidence. In this article – the second in a series of two – we review the results of uses and usage, safety and educational requirements. Of the 30 articles designated under the category of usage, 3 were rated as Class 1 evidence; 9 studies were classified as Class 2 evidence and 18 were rated as Class 3 evidence. Overall the committee reached consensus that in clinical practice, there is broad application of these procedures. A minority report was written arguing that the reviewer was unable to reach a conclusion about the use of the Activator Instrument other than it is used as a clinical and research tool. Of the 16 studies that dealt either explicitly or implicitly with safety, 4 were Class 1 evidence; 3 were Class 2 evidence and 9 were Class 3 evidence. Overall the committee reached consensus that the evidence supports that the Activator instrument is safe and has no more relative risk than do manual HVLA procedures. A minority report was written arguing that there is no evidence either to support or refute the view that MAD is safe. Of the 5 studies

  8. 42 CFR 9.10 - Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and biosafety requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and... SANCTUARY SYSTEM § 9.10 Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and biosafety requirements. (a) How are employee Occupational Health and Safety Program risks and concerns addressed? The sanctuary shall...

  9. A Review of Safety and Design Requirements of the Artificial Pancreas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Blauw, Helga; Keith-Hynes, Patrick; Koops, Robin; DeVries, J Hans

    2016-11-01

    As clinical studies with artificial pancreas systems for automated blood glucose control in patients with type 1 diabetes move to unsupervised real-life settings, product development will be a focus of companies over the coming years. Directions or requirements regarding safety in the design of an artificial pancreas are, however, lacking. This review aims to provide an overview and discussion of safety and design requirements of the artificial pancreas. We performed a structured literature search based on three search components-type 1 diabetes, artificial pancreas, and safety or design-and extended the discussion with our own experiences in developing artificial pancreas systems. The main hazards of the artificial pancreas are over- and under-dosing of insulin and, in case of a bi-hormonal system, of glucagon or other hormones. For each component of an artificial pancreas and for the complete system we identified safety issues related to these hazards and proposed control measures. Prerequisites that enable the control algorithms to provide safe closed-loop control are accurate and reliable input of glucose values, assured hormone delivery and an efficient user interface. In addition, the system configuration has important implications for safety, as close cooperation and data exchange between the different components is essential.

  10. Information Management system of the safety regulatory requirements and guidance for the Korea next generation reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yun, Y. C.; Lee, J. H.; Lee, H. C.; Lee, J. S.

    2000-01-01

    In order to achieve the safety of the Korea Next Generation Reactors (KNGR), the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety has carried out the Safety and Regulatory Requirements and Guidance (SRRG) development program from 1992 such as establishment of the SRRG hierarchy, development of technical requirements and guidance, and consideration of new licensing system. The SRRG hierarchy for the KNGR was consisted of five tiers; Safety Objectives, Safety Principles, General Safety Criteria, Specific Safety Requirements and Safety Regulatory Guides. The developed SRRG have been compared the criteria in 10CFR and Reg. Guide in the U.S.A and the IAEA documents for assuring internationally acceptable level of the SRRG. To improve the efficiency and accuracy of SRRG development, the construction of database system was required in the course of development. Therefore, the Information Management System of SRRG for the KNGR has been developed which enables developers to quickly and accurately seek and systematically manage whole contexts of the SRRG, reference requirements, and current atomic energy regulation rules. Moreover, through homepage whose URL is 'http://kngr.kins.re.kr', the concerned persons and public can acquire the information related with SRRG and KNGR project, and post his/her thought to the opinion forum in the homepage

  11. Information Management system of the safety regulatory requirements and guidance for the Korea next generation reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yun, Y. C. [LG-EDS Systems, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Lee, J. H.; Lee, H. C.; Lee, J. S. [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2000-05-01

    In order to achieve the safety of the Korea Next Generation Reactors (KNGR), the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety has carried out the Safety and Regulatory Requirements and Guidance (SRRG) development program from 1992 such as establishment of the SRRG hierarchy, development of technical requirements and guidance, and consideration of new licensing system. The SRRG hierarchy for the KNGR was consisted of five tiers; Safety Objectives, Safety Principles, General Safety Criteria, Specific Safety Requirements and Safety Regulatory Guides. The developed SRRG have been compared the criteria in 10CFR and Reg. Guide in the U.S.A and the IAEA documents for assuring internationally acceptable level of the SRRG. To improve the efficiency and accuracy of SRRG development, the construction of database system was required in the course of development. Therefore, the Information Management System of SRRG for the KNGR has been developed which enables developers to quickly and accurately seek and systematically manage whole contexts of the SRRG, reference requirements, and current atomic energy regulation rules. Moreover, through homepage whose URL is 'http://kngr.kins.re.kr', the concerned persons and public can acquire the information related with SRRG and KNGR project, and post his/her thought to the opinion forum in the homepage.

  12. Dukovany nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    Presentation covers recommended safety issues for the Dukovany NPP which have been solved with satisfactory conclusions. Safety issues concerned include: radiation safety; nuclear safety; security; emergency preparedness; health protection at work; fire protection; environmental protection; chemical safety; technical safety. Quality assurance programs at all stages on NPP life time is described. Report includes description of NPP staff training provision, training simulator, emergency operating procedures, emergency preparedness, Year 2000 problem, inspections and life time management. Description of Dukovany Plant Safety Analysis Projects including integrity of the equipment, modernisation, equipment innovation and safety upgrading program show that this approach corresponds to the actual practice applied in EU countries, and fulfilment of current IAEA requirements for safety enhancement of the WWER 440/213 units in the course of MORAWA Equipment Upgrading program

  13. Guidelines on the facilities required for minor surgical procedures and minimal access interventions.

    LENUS (Irish Health Repository)

    Humphreys, H

    2012-02-01

    There have been many changes in healthcare provision in recent years, including the delivery of some surgical services in primary care or in day surgery centres, which were previously provided by acute hospitals. Developments in the fields of interventional radiology and cardiology have further expanded the range and complexity of procedures undertaken in these settings. In the face of these changes there is a need to define from an infection prevention and control perspective the basic physical requirements for facilities in which such surgical procedures may be carried out. Under the auspices of the Healthcare Infection Society, we have developed the following recommendations for those designing new facilities or upgrading existing facilities. These draw upon best practice, available evidence, other guidelines where appropriate, and expert consensus to provide sensible and feasible advice. An attempt is also made to define minimal access interventions and minor surgical procedures. For minimal access interventions, including interventional radiology, new facilities should be mechanically ventilated to achieve 15 air changes per hour but natural ventilation is satisfactory for minor procedures. All procedures should involve a checklist and operators should be appropriately trained. There is also a need for prospective surveillance to accurately determine the post-procedure infection rate. Finally, there is a requirement for appropriate applied research to develop the evidence base required to support subsequent iterations of this guidance.

  14. 49 CFR 1106.3 - Actions for which Safety Integration Plan is required.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 8 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Actions for which Safety Integration Plan is required. 1106.3 Section 1106.3 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued... TRANSPORTATION BOARD CONSIDERATION OF SAFETY INTEGRATION PLANS IN CASES INVOLVING RAILROAD CONSOLIDATIONS...

  15. Safety of type and screen method compared to conventional antiglobulin crossmatch procedures for compatibility testing in Indian setting

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chaudhary Rajendra

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available Background: Over the past 30 years, pretransfusion tests have undergone considerable modification. In 1984, AABB recommended that the full cross match could be replaced by an abbreviated cross match in patients with negative antibody screen. However, before implementation of such a policy, issue regarding safety of T & S needs to be evaluated. Objectives: The aim of pretransfusion testing (PTT is to ensure that enough red blood cells (RBCs in the selected red cell components will survive when transfused. Results and Conclusion: We have, therefore in this study; evaluated safety of T & S procedure for PTT in comparison with conventional test tube cross match. The T & S procedure gave a safety of 91.6%. Also, the usefulness of the T & S was shown through the detection of unexpected antibodies in 0.75% (15 out of 2026 of cases.

  16. Guide for reviewing safety analysis reports for packaging: Review of quality assurance requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moon, D.W.

    1988-10-01

    This review section describes quality assurance requirements applying to design, purchase, fabrication, handling, shipping, storing, cleaning, assembly, inspection, testing, operation, maintenance, repair, and modification of components of packaging which are important to safety. The design effort, operation's plans, and quality assurance requirements should be integrated to achieve a system in which the independent QA program is not overly stringent and the application of QA requirements is commensurate with safety significance. The reviewer must verify that the applicant's QA section in the SARP contains package-specific QA information required by DOE Orders and federal regulations that demonstrate compliance. 8 refs

  17. Euratom's accounting procedures to comply with IAEA requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kschwendt, H.

    1980-01-01

    The accounting concept used by the operators for nuclear materials accountancy is different from the evaluation concept used by IAEA. Euratom integrated these two concepts thus allowing for an automatic transformation from the one to the other concept (establishment of reports to IAEA by computer). Particular procedures have been developed to ensure the corrections of the accountancy in both concepts and to perform the retrospective corrections as required by IAEA. 4 refs

  18. Risk based limits for Operational Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    OSR limits are designed to protect the assumptions made in the facility safety analysis in order to preserve the safety envelope during facility operation. Normally, limits are set based on ''worst case conditions'' without regard to the likelihood (frequency) of a credible event occurring. In special cases where the accident analyses are based on ''time at risk'' arguments, it may be desirable to control the time at which the facility is at risk. A methodology has been developed to use OSR limits to control the source terms and the times these source terms would be available, thus controlling the acceptable risk to a nuclear process facility. The methodology defines a new term ''gram-days''. This term represents the area under a source term (inventory) vs time curve which represents the risk to the facility. Using the concept of gram-days (normalized to one year) allows the use of an accounting scheme to control the risk under the inventory vs time curve. The methodology results in at least three OSR limits: (1) control of the maximum inventory or source term, (2) control of the maximum gram-days for the period based on a source term weighted average, and (3) control of the maximum gram-days at the individual source term levels. Basing OSR limits on risk based safety analysis is feasible, and a basis for development of risk based limits is defensible. However, monitoring inventories and the frequencies required to maintain facility operation within the safety envelope may be complex and time consuming

  19. On some aspects of nuclear safety surveillance and review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Ganjie; Zhu Hong; Zhou Shanyuan

    2004-01-01

    Five aspects of the nuclear safety surveillance and review are discussed: Strict implementation of nuclear safety regulation, making the nuclear safety surveillance and review more normalization, procedurization, scientific decision-making; Strictly requiring the applicant to comply with the requirements of codes, do not allowing the utilization of mixing of codes; Properly controlling the strictness for the review on significant non-conformance; Strengthening the co-operation between regional offices and technical support units, Properly treat the relations between administrational management unit and technical support units. (authors)

  20. Requirements to amend the main influence factors on the safety culture after fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farcasiu, M.; Nitoi, M.

    2015-01-01

    The paper presents a general model that provides a framework for the safety culture assessment, creating the possibility to identify factors that can significantly influence the safety culture. The main safety culture influence factors (SCIF) used by model are the following: regulatory environment, organizational environment, worker characteristics, socio-political environment, national culture, organization history, business and technological characteristics. After the analysis of the deficiencies and weaknesses of SCIFc in evolution of the Fukushima accident, some issues that may become necessities and requirements to change and improve both the safety culture and safety of the nuclear installations were highlighted. For each influence factor were identified some requirements to amend. The results will emphasize the necesity of the human - technology - organization system assessment. Hence it was demonstrated that the safety culture results from the interaction of individuals with technology and with the organization. (authors)

  1. Defining System Requirements: a critical assessment of the Niam conceptual design procedure

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Peta Darke

    1995-05-01

    Full Text Available Requirements definition is a fundamental activity within information systems development. Social and organisational issues are at the centre of many of the problems experienced during the development and implementation of information systems, and these need to be explored during requirements definition. The NIAM Conceptual Schema Design Procedure (CSDP is a method for identifying and describing information requirements using fact types. This paper discusses some limitations of the information requirements definition step of the CSDP which result from its lack of focus on the socio-organisational dimension of information systems development. Four different approaches to exploring the socio-organisational contexts of systems are discussed. It is proposed that one of these, viewpoint development, be incorporated into the NIAM CSDP to provide a means of exploring and understanding a system's socio organisational context and to ensure that contextual information is a major input to the requirements definition process. This results in an enhanced design procedure. Future and current research areas are identified.

  2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON REGULATIONS AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR QUADRICYCLES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ana Pavlovic

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available In recent years, a new class of compact vehicles has been emerging and wide-spreading all around Europe: the quadricycle. These four-wheeled motor vehicles, originally derived from motorcycles, are a small and fuel-efficient mean of transportation used in rural or urban areas as an alternative to motorbikes or city cars. In some countries, they are also endorsed by local authorities and institutions which support small and environmentally-friendly vehicles. In this paper, several general considerations on quadricycles will be provided including the vehicle classification, evolution of regulations (as homologation, driver licence, emissions, etc, technical characteristics, safety requirements, most relevant investigations, and other additional useful information (e.g. references, links. It represents an important and actual topic of investigation for designers and manufacturers considering that the new EU regulation on the approval and market surveillance of quadricycles will soon enter in force providing conclusive requirements for functional safety environmental protection of these promising vehicles.

  3. General Approaches and Requirements on Safety and Security of Radioactive Materials Transport in Russian Federation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ershov, V.N.; Buchel'nikov, A.E.; Komarov, S.V.

    2016-01-01

    Development and implementation of safety and security requirements for transport of radioactive materials in the Russian Federation are addressed. At the outset it is worth noting that the transport safety requirements implemented are in full accordance with the IAEA's ''Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2009 Edition)''. However, with respect to security requirements for radioactive material transport in some cases the Russian Federation requirements for nuclear material are more stringent compared to IAEA recommendations. The fundamental principles of safety and security of RM managements, recommended by IAEA documents (publications No. SF-1 and GOV/41/2001) are compared. Its correlation and differences concerning transport matters, the current level and the possibility of harmonization are analysed. In addition a reflection of the general approaches and concrete transport requirements is being evaluated. Problems of compliance assessment, including administrative and state control problems for safety and security provided at internal and international shipments are considered and compared. (author)

  4. Updated procedure for the safety evaluation of natural flavor complexes used as ingredients in food

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Cohen, Samuel M.; Eisenbrand, Gerhard; Fukushima, Shoji; Gooderham, Nigel J.; Guengerich, F.P.; Hecht, Stephen S.; Rietjens, Ivonne M.C.M.; Davidsen, Jeanne M.; Harman, Christie L.; Taylor, Sean V.

    2018-01-01

    An effective and thorough approach for the safety evaluation of natural flavor complexes (NFCs) was published in 2005 by the Expert Panel of the Flavor and Extract Manufacturers Association (FEMA). An updated procedure is provided here, which maintains the essential concepts of the use of the

  5. Research on advanced system safety assessment procedures (II)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Kazuhiko; Shimada, Yukiyasu

    1999-03-01

    HAZOP (Hazard and operability study) is a systematic technique, which requires the involvement of an experienced, interdisciplinary team of engineers, to identify hazards or operability problems throughout an entire facility by brainstorming. Though HAZOP is recognized as the useful safety assessment method, it requires a labor-intensive and time-consuming process. So recently computer-aided HAZOP has been proposed. The research report in 1998 (PNC PJ1612 98-001) presented prototype system, which carries out HAZOP and FT synthesis, by making use of proposed method. Relationships between states of input and output variables, internal and external events of each component are represented using decision tables, and the system is implemented by C++. In this study, the causalities of plant component malfunctions are described as component malfunction basic model and are stored in the computer. Thus, we have developed safety evaluation support system by considering the fault propagation path. Component malfunction basic model is made based on the information on the causalities between the abnormal state and each malfunction in components. This component malfunction basic model provides the common frame to describe abnormal situation in components. By using this basic model, not only state malfunction of component but also the consequence to external circumstance is assessed. G2, which is an excellent object-oriented developer tool in GUI (Graphical User Interface), is used as a tool for developing the system. By using the graphical editor in the system, the user can carry out HAZOP easily. We have applied this system to the Nuclear Reprocessing Facilities to demonstrate the utilities of developing system. (author)

  6. Requirements of radiation protection and safety for nuclear medicine services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The requirements of radiation protection and safety for nuclear medicine services are established. The norms is applied to activities related to the radiopharmaceuticals for therapeutics and 'in vivo' diagnostics purposes. (M.C.K.) [pt

  7. An innovative 3-D numerical modelling procedure for simulating repository-scale excavations in rock - SAFETI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Young, R. P.; Collins, D.; Hazzard, J.; Heath, A. [Department of Earth Sciences, Liverpool University, 4 Brownlow street, UK-0 L69 3GP Liverpool (United Kingdom); Pettitt, W.; Baker, C. [Applied Seismology Consultants LTD, 10 Belmont, Shropshire, UK-S41 ITE Shrewsbury (United Kingdom); Billaux, D.; Cundall, P.; Potyondy, D.; Dedecker, F. [Itasca Consultants S.A., Centre Scientifique A. Moiroux, 64, chemin des Mouilles, F69130 Ecully (France); Svemar, C. [Svensk Karnbranslemantering AB, SKB, Aspo Hard Rock Laboratory, PL 300, S-57295 Figeholm (Sweden); Lebon, P. [ANDRA, Parc de la Croix Blanche, 7, rue Jean Monnet, F-92298 Chatenay-Malabry (France)

    2004-07-01

    This paper presents current results from work performed within the European Commission project SAFETI. The main objective of SAFETI is to develop and test an innovative 3D numerical modelling procedure that will enable the 3-D simulation of nuclear waste repositories in rock. The modelling code is called AC/DC (Adaptive Continuum/ Dis-Continuum) and is partially based on Itasca Consulting Group's Particle Flow Code (PFC). Results are presented from the laboratory validation study where algorithms and procedures have been developed and tested to allow accurate 'Models for Rock' to be produced. Preliminary results are also presented on the use of AC/DC with parallel processors and adaptive logic. During the final year of the project a detailed model of the Prototype Repository Experiment at SKB's Hard Rock Laboratory will be produced using up to 128 processors on the parallel super computing facility at Liverpool University. (authors)

  8. Edible safety requirements and assessment standards for agricultural genetically modified organisms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deng, Pingjian; Zhou, Xiangyang; Zhou, Peng; Du, Zhong; Hou, Hongli; Yang, Dongyan; Tan, Jianjun; Wu, Xiaojin; Zhang, Jinzhou; Yang, Yongcun; Liu, Jin; Liu, Guihua; Li, Yonghong; Liu, Jianjun; Yu, Lei; Fang, Shisong; Yang, Xiaoke

    2008-05-01

    This paper describes the background, principles, concepts and methods of framing the technical regulation for edible safety requirement and assessment of agricultural genetically modified organisms (agri-GMOs) for Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in the People's Republic of China. It provides a set of systematic criteria for edible safety requirements and the assessment process for agri-GMOs. First, focusing on the degree of risk and impact of different agri-GMOs, we developed hazard grades for toxicity, allergenicity, anti-nutrition effects, and unintended effects and standards for the impact type of genetic manipulation. Second, for assessing edible safety, we developed indexes and standards for different hazard grades of recipient organisms, for the influence of types of genetic manipulation and hazard grades of agri-GMOs. To evaluate the applicability of these criteria and their congruency with other safety assessment systems for GMOs applied by related organizations all over the world, we selected some agri-GMOs (soybean, maize, potato, capsicum and yeast) as cases to put through our new assessment system, and compared our results with the previous assessments. It turned out that the result of each of the cases was congruent with the original assessment.

  9. PGDP [Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant]-UF6 handling, sampling, analysis and associated QC/QA and safety related procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, R.L.

    1987-01-01

    This document is a compilation of Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant procedures on UF 6 handling, sampling, and analysis, along with associated QC/QA and safety related procedures. It was assembled for transmission by the US Department of Energy to the Korean Advanced Energy Institute as a part of the US-Korea technical exchange program

  10. Inclusion of service robots in the daily lives of frail older users: A step-by-step definition procedure on users' requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    García-Soler, Álvaro; Facal, David; Díaz-Orueta, Unai; Pigini, Lucia; Blasi, Lorenzo; Qiu, Renxi

    2018-01-01

    The implications for the inclusion of robots in the daily lives of frail older adults, especially in relation to these population needs, have not been extensively studied. The "Multi-Role Shadow Robotic System for Independent Living" (SRS) project has developed a remotely-controlled, semi-autonomous robotic system to be used in domestic environments. The objective of this paper is to document the iterative procedure used to identify, select and prioritize user requirements. Seventy-four requirements were identified by means of focus groups, individual interviews and scenario-based interviews. The list of user requirements, ordered according to impact, number and transnational criteria, revealed a high number of requirements related to basic and instrumental activities of daily living, cognitive and social support and monitorization, and also involving privacy, safety and adaptation issues. Analysing and understanding older users' perceptions and needs when interacting with technological devices adds value to assistive technology and ensures that the systems address currently unmet needs. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  11. Modifications of Probabilistic Safety Assessment-1 Nuclear Power Plant Dukovany based upon new version of Emergency Operating Procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aldorf, R.

    1997-01-01

    In the frame of 'living Probabilistic Safety Assessment-1 Nuclear Power Plant Dukovany Project' being performed by Nuclear Research Institute Rez during 1997 is planned to reflect on Probabilistic Safety Assessment-1 basis on impact of Emergency Response Guidelines (as one particular event from the list of other modifications) on Plant Safety. Following highlights help to orient the reader in main general aspects, findings and issues of the work that currently continues on. Older results of Probabilistic Safety Assessment-1 Nuclear Power Plant Dukovany have revealed that human behaviour during accident progression scenarios represent one of the most important aspects in plant safety. Current effort of Nuclear Power Plants Dukovany (Czech Republic) and Bohunice (Slovak Republic) is focussed on development of qualitatively new symptom-based Emergency Operating Procedures called Emergency Response Guidelines Supplier - Westinghouse Energy Systems Europe, Brussels works in cooperation with teams of specialist from both Nuclear Power Plants. In the frame of 'living Probabilistic Safety Assessment-1 Nuclear Power Plant Dukovany Project' being performed by Nuclear Research Institute Rez during 1997 is planned to prove on Probabilistic Safety Assessment -1 basis an expected - positive impact of Emergency Response Guidelines on Plant Safety, Since this contract is currently still in progress, it is possible to release only preliminary conclusions and observations. Emergency Response Guidelines compare to original Emergency Operating Procedures substantially reduce uncertainty of general human behaviour during plant response to an accident process. It is possible to conclude that from the current scope Probabilistic Safety Assessment Dukovany point of view (until core damage), Emergency Response Guidelines represent adequately wide basis for mitigating any initiating event

  12. Introduction of the Amendment of IAEA Safety Requirements Reflected Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahn, Sang-Kyu; Ahn, Hyung-Joon; Kim, Sun-Hae; Cheong, Jae-Hak [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The following five Safety Requirements publications were amended: Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety (GSR Part 1, 2010), Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (NS-R-3, 2003), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1, 2012), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (SSR-2/2, 2011), and Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4, 2009). Figure 1 shows IAEA Safety Standards Categories Major amendments of five Safety Requirements publications were introduced and analyzed in this study. The five IAEA safety requirements publications which are GSR Part 1 and 4, NS-R-3 and SSR-2/1 and 2, were amended to reflect the lesson learned from the Fukushima accident and other operating experiences. Specially, 36 provisions were modified and the new 29 provision with 1 requirement (No. 67: Emergency response facilities on the site) of the SSR-2/1 were established. Since the Fukushima accident happened, a new word, design extension conditions (DECs) which cover substantially the beyond design basis accidents (BDBA), including severe accident conditions, was created and more elaborated by the world nuclear experts. Design extension conditions could include conditions in events without significant fuel degradation and conditions with core melting. Figure 2 shows the range of the DECs. The amendment of the five IAEA safety requirements publications are focused at the prevention of initiating events, which would lead to the DECs, and mitigation of the consequences of DECs by the enhanced defense in depth principle. The following examples of the IAEA requirements to prevent the initiating events are: margins for withstanding external events; margins for avoiding cliff edge effects; safety assessment for multiple facilities or activities at a single site; safety assessment in cases where resources at a facility are shared; consideration of the potential occurrence of events in combination; establishing levels of hazard

  13. Nuclear Safety Regulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Novosel, N.; Prah, M.

    2008-01-01

    Beside new Ordinance on the control of nuclear material and special equipment ('Official Gazette' No. 15/08), from 2006 State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS) adopted Ordinance on performing nuclear activities ('Official Gazette' No. 74/06) and Ordinance on special requirements which expert organizations must fulfil in order to perform certain activities in the field of nuclear safety ('Official Gazette' No. 74/06), based on Nuclear Safety Act ('Official Gazette' No. 173/03). The Ordinance on performing nuclear activities regulates the procedure of notification of the intent to perform nuclear activities, submitting the application for the issue of a licence to perform nuclear activities, and the procedure for issuing decisions on granting a licence to perform a nuclear activity. The Ordinance also regulates the content of the forms for notification of the intent to perform nuclear activities, as well as of the application for the issue of a licence to perform the nuclear activity and the method of keeping the register of nuclear activities. According to the Nuclear Safety Act, nuclear activities are the production, processing, use, storage, disposal, transport, import, export, possession or other handling of nuclear material or specified equipment. The Ordinance on special requirements which expert organizations must fulfil in order to perform certain activities in the field of nuclear safety regulates these mentioned conditions, whereas compliance is established by a decision passed by the SONS. Special requirements which expert organizations must fulfil in order to perform certain activities in the field of nuclear safety are organizational, technical, technological conditions and established system of quality assurance. In 2007, State Office for Nuclear Safety finalized the text of new Ordinance on conditions for nuclear safety and protection with regard to the siting, design, construction, use and decommissioning of a facility in which a nuclear activity is

  14. American National Standard administrative practices for nuclear criticality safety, ANSI/ANS-8.19

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.R.; Carson, R.W.

    1991-01-01

    American National Standard Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety, ANSI/ANS-8.19, provides guidance for the administration of an effective program to control the risk of nuclear criticality in operations with fissile material outside reactors. The several sections of the standard address the responsibilities of management, supervisory personnel, and the criticality safety staff, as well as requirements and suggestions for the content of operating procedures, process evaluations, material control procedures, and emergency procedures

  15. Approaches to document the efficacy and safety of microdermabrasion procedure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Spencer, James M; Kurtz, Ellen S

    2006-11-01

    Microdermabrasion is a popular cosmetic procedure for skin rejuvenation, which is achieved by mechanical abrasion of the skin at a superficial level. The objective was to study the efficacy of microdermabrasion in photoaging and to investigate the compatibility of a cleanser and a lotion with microdermabrasion. Sixteen women underwent microdermabrasion to the face once a week for a total of six treatments. Subjects were also given a personal skin care regimen (cleanser and lotion). Colorimetry values as well as investigator and patients ratings for safety and efficacy were analyzed at various time points and compared to baseline. There were no significant changes in safety and tolerance variables throughout the study. Clinical efficacy variables (fine wrinkles, dullness, pigmentation, and large pores) significantly improved by the third treatment, with further improvement by the end of the study (six treatments). Subjects perceived improvement in facial photoaging variables. Colorimetry showed increased brightness and decreased yellowness of target skin sites on the face throughout the study. Multiple microdermabrasions were effective in significantly improving various facial photoaging variables. The personal skin care regimen used was well tolerated by the subjects.

  16. Safety requirements and options for a large size fast neutron reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cogne, F.; Megy, J.; Robert, E.; Benmergui, A.; Villeneuve, J.

    1977-01-01

    Starting from the experience gained in the safety evaluation of the PHENIX reactor, and from results already obtained in the safety studies on fast neutron reactors, the French regulatory bodies have defined since 1973 what could be the requirements and the recommendations in the matter of safety for the first large size ''prototype'' fast neutron power plant of 1200 MWe. Those requirements and recommendations, while not being compulsory due to the evolution of this type of reactors, will be used as a basis for the technical regulation that will be established in France in this field. They define particularly the care to be taken in the following areas which are essential for safety: the protection systems, the primary coolant system, the prevention of accidents at the core level, the measures to be taken with regard to the whole core accident and to the containment, the protection against sodium fires, and the design as a function of external aggressions. In applying these recommendations, the CREYS-MALVILLE plant designers have tried to achieve redundancy in the safety related systems and have justified the safety of the design with regard to the various involved phenomena. In particular, the extensive research made at the levels of the fuel and of the core instrumentation makes it possible to achieve the best defence to avoid the development of core accidents. The overall examination of the measures taken, from the standpoint of prevention and surveyance as well as from the standpoint of means of action led the French regulatory bodies to propose the construction permit of the CREYS MALVILLE plant, provided that additional examinations by the regulatory bodies be made during the construction of the plant on some technological aspects not fully clarified at the authorization time. The conservatism of the corresponding requirements should be demonstrated prior to the commissioning of the power plant. To pursue a programme on reactors of this type, or even more

  17. Probabilistic safety analysis of DC power supply requirements for nuclear power plants. Technical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baranowsky, P.W.; Kolaczkowski, A.M.; Fedele, M.A.

    1981-04-01

    A probabilistic safety assessment was performed as part of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission generic safety task A-30, Adequacy of Safety Related DC Power Supplies. Event and fault tree analysis techniques were used to determine the relative contribution of DC power related accident sequences to the total core damage probability due to shutdown cooling failures. It was found that a potentially large DC power contribution could be substantially reduced by augmenting the minimum design and operational requirements. Recommendations included (1) requiring DC power divisional independence, (2) improved test, maintenance, and surveillance, and (3) requiring core cooling capability be maintained following the loss of one DC power bus and a single failure in another system

  18. 19 CFR 101.9 - Test programs or procedures; alternate requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... basis for selecting participants. (b) NCAP testing. For purposes of conducting an approved test program or procedure designed to evaluate planned components of the National Customs Automation Program (NCAP... publication requirement. For tests affecting the NCAP, notice shall be published in the Federal Register not...

  19. Safety-related requirements for photovoltaic modules and arrays

    Science.gov (United States)

    Levins, A.; Smoot, A.; Wagner, R.

    1984-01-01

    Safety requirements for photovoltaic module and panel designs and configurations for residential, intermediate, and large scale applications are investigated. Concepts for safety systems, where each system is a collection of subsystems which together address the total anticipated hazard situation, are described. Descriptions of hardware, and system usefulness and viability are included. A comparison of these systems, as against the provisions of the 1984 National Electrical Code covering photovoltaic systems is made. A discussion of the Underwriters Laboratory UL investigation of the photovoltaic module evaluated to the provisions of the proposed UL standard for plat plate photovoltaic modules and panels is included. Grounding systems, their basis and nature, and the advantages and disadvantages of each are described. The meaning of frame grounding, circuit groundings, and the type of circuit ground are covered.

  20. Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998. Guide to the Australian radiation protection and nuclear safety licensing framework. 1. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-03-01

    The purpose of this guide is to provide information to Commonwealth entities who may require a license under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (ARPANS) Act 1998 to enable them to posses, have control of, use, operate or dispose of radiation sources. The guide describes to which agencies and what activities require licensing. It also addresses general administrative and legal matters such as appeal procedures, ongoing licensing requirements, monitoring and compliance. Applicants are advised to consult the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 and accompanying Regulations when submitting applications

  1. Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998. Guide to the Australian radiation protection and nuclear safety licensing framework; 1. ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-03-01

    The purpose of this guide is to provide information to Commonwealth entities who may require a license under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (ARPANS) Act 1998 to enable them to posses, have control of, use, operate or dispose of radiation sources. The guide describes to which agencies and what activities require licensing. It also addresses general administrative and legal matters such as appeal procedures, ongoing licensing requirements, monitoring and compliance. Applicants are advised to consult the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 and accompanying Regulations when submitting applications

  2. 75 FR 60129 - Draft Guidance for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-29

    ...., Bldg. 51, rm. 2201, Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002; or the Office of Communication, Outreach, and...'s ability to review critical safety information, improve safety monitoring of human drug and..., will represent the Agency's current thinking on safety reporting requirements for INDs and BA/BE...

  3. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D. T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2014-04-16

    This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

  4. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laycak, D. T.

    2014-01-01

    This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

  5. Goldmann applanation tonometry over daily disposable contact lens: accuracy and safety of procedure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zeri, Fabrizio; Lupelli, Luigi; Formichella, Paolo; Masci, Carlo; Fletcher, Robert

    2007-09-01

    To study accuracy and safety, related to sensation (discomfort) and trauma, when using Goldmann applanation tonometry (GAT) on eyes wearing daily disposable soft contact lenses. The intra-ocular pressure (IOP) of 136 normal eyes of 68 subjects was measured by Goldmann tonometer. Measurements were made in one eye with a contact lens (hilafilcon A) without anaesthetic drops and then without the contact lens using one drop of 0.4% oxybuprocaine hydrochloride. Each contact lens used was identical as to back optic zone, back vertex power. Standard Goldmann procedure only was used for the fellow eye of each subject. Subjective sensation (discomfort) responses to both procedures were studied in a subgroup (66 eyes) using a scale of discomfort, from 1 (no sensation) to 5 (highest sensation). Epithelial staining after tonometry was evaluated for this subgroup. No significant differences were found for the IOP with and without contact lens (tcontact lens insertion, tonometry on contact lens and application of topical anaesthetic). Corneal epithelial staining following the standard tonometry procedure was significantly higher than following the procedure with a contact lens (pcontact lens is accurate, compared to the standard procedure and within the IOP's normal range studied here. Also using a contact lens results in less trauma whilst discomfort is similar.

  6. Modernisation for maintaining and improving safety at Nordic nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hammer, L.; Wahlstroem, B.; Simola, K.

    1998-02-01

    The safety practices in Finland and Sweden are described and compared in regard of effecting modernisation for safety of the nuclear plants in the two countries, considering new technology and advancing safety requirements as proposed for new reactors. Particular attention is given to strategies for applying new safety requirements to reactors built to earlier standards, and to the interplay between the nuclear utilities and the safety authorities. Overviews are given of past and current modernisation of the nuclear power plants in Finland and Sweden. The management procedures in controlling the implementation of modifications to the nuclear power plants are described and discussed in regard of prevailing differences between Finnish and Swedish practices. A formal modelling technique (SADT) was applied for capture of the essential contents of the relevant documented procedures. Two examples of recent plant modifications in the Finnish nuclear plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa are described and discussed in greater detail. Recommendations are given. (au)

  7. Safety of liver biopsy as a day procedure in Abuth Zaria, Nigeria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Samuel, D.O.; Okuleke, I.P.

    2012-01-01

    Chronic liver disease (CLD) is an important condition, diagnosed mainly by liver biopsy and is a leading cause of death among the working class group. It is a major burden in sub-Saharan Africa where it leads to hepatocellular carcinoma with a high mortality. This study was a retrospective one undertaken to determine the safety of performing liver biopsy procedure between January 2000 to January 2009 in terms of the frequency of indications and side effects. A total of 279 entries were found out of which 270 (96.77%) had a definitive liver biopsy histology result. The main indication for liver biopsy was chronic viral hepatitis in 150 patients (53.76%) while the commonest complication was the post-procedure pain that was seen in 16 patients (5.7%). The average duration of hospital stay after biopsy was 6.08 +- 0.52 hours. (author)

  8. Best Estimate plus Uncertainty (BEPU) Analyses in the IAEA Safety Standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dusic, Milorad; )

    2013-01-01

    The Safety Standards Series establishes an essential basis for safety and represents the broadest international consensus. Safety Standards Series publications are categorized into: Safety Fundamental (Present the overall objectives, concepts and principles of protection and safety, they are the policy documents of the safety standards), Safety Requirements (Establish requirements that must be met to ensure the protection and safety of people and the environment, both now and in the future), and Safety Guides (Provide guidance, in the form of more detailed actions, conditions or procedures that can be used to comply with the Requirements). The incorporation of more detailed requirements, in accordance with national practice, may still be necessary. There should be only one set of international safety standards. Each safety standard will be reviewed by the relevant committee or by the commission every five years. Best Estimate plus Uncertainty (BEPU) Analyses are approached in the following IAEA Safety Standards: - Safety Requirements SSR 2/1 - Safety of NPPs, Design (Revision of NS-R-1); - General Safety Requirement GSR Part 4: Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities; - Safety Guide SSG-2 Deterministic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. NUSSC suggested that new safety guides should be accompanied by documents like TECDOCs or Safety Reports describing in detail their recommendations where appropriate. Special review is currently underway to identify needs for revision in the light of the Fukushima accident. Revision will concern, first, the Safety Requirements, and then, the Selected Safety Guides

  9. Request for Naval Reactors Comment on Proposed PROMETHEUS Space Flight Nuclear Reactor High Tier Reactor Safety Requirements and for Naval Reactors Approval to Transmit These Requirements to Jet Propulsion Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D. Kokkinos

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this letter is to request Naval Reactors comments on the nuclear reactor high tier requirements for the PROMETHEUS space flight reactor design, pre-launch operations, launch, ascent, operation, and disposal, and to request Naval Reactors approval to transmit these requirements to Jet Propulsion Laboratory to ensure consistency between the reactor safety requirements and the spacecraft safety requirements. The proposed PROMETHEUS nuclear reactor high tier safety requirements are consistent with the long standing safety culture of the Naval Reactors Program and its commitment to protecting the health and safety of the public and the environment. In addition, the philosophy on which these requirements are based is consistent with the Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group recommendations on space nuclear propulsion safety (Reference 1), DOE Nuclear Safety Criteria and Specifications for Space Nuclear Reactors (Reference 2), the Nuclear Space Power Safety and Facility Guidelines Study of the Applied Physics Laboratory

  10. UK experience of safety requirements for thermal reactor stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matthews, R.R.; Dale, G.C.; Tweedy, J.N.

    1977-01-01

    The paper summarises the development of safety requirements since the first of the Generating Boards' Magnox reactors commenced operation in 1962 and includes A.G.R. safety together with the preparation of S.G.H.W.R. design safety criteria. It outlines the basic principles originally adopted and shows how safety assessment is a continuing process throughout the life of a reactor. Some description is given of the continuous effort over the years to obtain increased safety margins for existing and new reactors, taking into account the construction and operating experience, experimental information, and more sophisticated computer-aided design techniques which have become available. The main safeguards against risks arising from the Generating Boards' reactors are the achievement of high standards of design, construction and operation, in conjunction with comprehensive fault analyses to ensure that adequate protective equipment is provided. The most important analyses refer to faults which can lead to excessive fuel element temperatures arising from an increase in power or a reduction in cooling capacity. They include the possibility of unintended control rod withdrawal at power or at start-up, coolant flow failure, pressure circuit failure, loss of boiler feed water, and failure of electric power. The paper reviews the protective equipment, and the policy for reactor safety assessments which include application of maximum credible accident philosophy and later the limited use of reliability and probability methods. Some of the Generating Boards' reactors are now more than half way through their planned working lives and during this time safety protective equipment has occasionally been brought into operation, often for spurious reasons. The general performance, of safety equipment is reviewed particularly for incidents such as main turbo-alternator trip, circulator failure, fuel element failures and other similar events, and some problems which have given rise to

  11. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  12. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  13. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  14. Hydrogen safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazier, W.R.

    1991-01-01

    The NASA experience with hydrogen began in the 1950s when the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) research on rocket fuels was inherited by the newly formed National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Initial emphasis on the use of hydrogen as a fuel for high-altitude probes, satellites, and aircraft limited the available data on hydrogen hazards to small quantities of hydrogen. NASA began to use hydrogen as the principal liquid propellant for launch vehicles and quickly determined the need for hydrogen safety documentation to support design and operational requirements. The resulting NASA approach to hydrogen safety requires a joint effort by design and safety engineering to address hydrogen hazards and develop procedures for safe operation of equipment and facilities. NASA also determined the need for rigorous training and certification programs for personnel involved with hydrogen use. NASA's current use of hydrogen is mainly for large heavy-lift vehicle propulsion, which necessitates storage of large quantities for fueling space shots and for testing. Future use will involve new applications such as thermal imaging

  15. 21 CFR 25.16 - Public health and safety emergencies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Public health and safety emergencies. 25.16... ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONSIDERATIONS Agency Actions Requiring Environmental Consideration § 25.16 Public health... importance to the public health or safety, may make full adherence to the procedural provisions of NEPA and...

  16. Nuclear health and safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-08-01

    This paper is a review of environmental and safety programs at facilities in the Naval Reactors Program which shows no basis for allegations that unsafe conditions exist there or that the environment is being harmed by activities conducted there. The prototype reactor design provides safety measures that are consistent with commercial nuclear power plants. Minor incidents affecting safety and the environment have occurred, however, and dents affecting safety and the environment have occurred, however, and as with other nuclear facilities, past activities have caused environmental problems that require ongoing monitoring and vigilance. While the program has historically been exempt from most oversight, some federal and state environmental oversight agencies have recently been permitted access to Naval Reactors facilities for oversight purposes. The program voluntarily cooperates with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding reactor modifications, safety improvements, and component reliability. In addition, the program and its contractors have established an extensive internal oversight program that is geared toward reporting the slightest deviations from requirements or procedures. Given the program's classification policies and requirements, it does not appear that the program routinely overclassifies information to prevent its release to the public or to avoid embarrassment. However, GAO did not some instances in which documents were improperly classified

  17. Safety requirements to the operation of hydropower plants; Sicherheit beim Betrieb von Wasserkraftwerken

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lux, Reinhard [Berufsgenossenschaft Energie Textil Elektro Medienerzeugnisse (BG ETEM), Koeln (Germany)

    2011-07-01

    Employers have to take into account various safety and health requirements relating to the design, construction, operation and maintenance of hydropower plants. Especially the diversity of the hydropower plant components requires the consideration of different safety and health aspects. In 2011 the ''Fachausschuss Elektrotechnik'' (expert committee electro-technics) of the institution for statutory accident insurance and prevention presented a new ''BG-Information'' dealing with ''Safe methods operating hydropower plants''. The following article gives an introduction into the conception and the essential requirements of this new BG-Information. (orig.)

  18. Study on the KALIMER safety approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Eui Kwang; Han, Do Hee; Kim, Young Cheol.

    1997-01-01

    This study describes KALIMER's safety approach, how to establish the safety criteria and temperature limit, how to define safety evaluation events, and some safety research and development needs items. It is recommended that the KALIMER's approach to safety use seven levels of safety design and a defense-in-depth design approach with particular emphasis on inherent passive features. In order to establish as set DBEs for KALIMER safety evaluation, the procedure is explained how to define safety evaluation events. Final selection is to be determined later with the final establishment of design concepts. On the basis of preliminary studies and evaluation of the plant safety related areas, the KALIMER and PRISM have following three main difference that may require special research and development for KALIMER. (author). 7 refs., 6 tabs., 6 figs

  19. Requirements and international co-operation in nuclear safety for evolutionary light water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnino, A.

    1999-01-01

    The principles of safety are now well known and implemented world-wide, leading to a situation of harmonisation in accordance with the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Future reactors are expected not only to meet current requirements but to go beyond the safety level presently accepted. To this end, technical safety requirements, as defined by the IAEA document Safety Fundamentals, need be duly considered in the design, the risks to workers and population must be decreased, a stable, transparent and objective regulatory process, including an international harmonisation with respect to licensing of new reactors, must be developed, and the issue of public acceptance must be addressed. Well-performing existing installations are seen as a prerequisite for an improved public acceptability; there should be no major accidents, the results from safety performance indicators must be unquestionable, and compliance with internationally harmonised criteria is essential. Economical competitiveness is another factor that influences the acceptability; the costs for constructing the plant, for its operation and maintenance, for the fuel cycle, and for the final decommissioning are of paramount importance. Plant simplification, longer fuel cycles, life extension are appealing options, but safety will have first priority. The IAEA can play an important role in this field, by providing peer reviews by teams of international experts and assistance to Member States on the use of its safety standards. (author)

  20. Health and safety plan for characterization sampling of ETR and MTR facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baxter, D.E.

    1994-10-01

    This health and safety plan establishes the procedures and requirements that will be used to minimize health and safety risks to persons performing Engineering Test Reactor and Materials Test Reactor characterization sampling activities, as required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration standard, 29 CFR 1910.120. It contains information about the hazards involved in performing the tasks, and the specific actions and equipment that will be used to protect persons working at the site

  1. Safety research for evolutionary light water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cacuci, D.G.

    1996-01-01

    The development of nuclear energy has been characterized by a continuous evolution of the technological and philosophical underpinnings of reactor safety to enable operation of the plant without causing harm to either the plant operators or the public. Currently, the safety of a nuclear plant is assured through the combined use of procedures and engineered safety features together with a system of multiple protective barriers against the release of radioactivity. This approach is embodied in the concept of Design-Basis Accidents (DBA), which requires the designers to demonstrate that all credible accidents have been identified and that all safety equipment and procedures perform their functions extremely reliably. Particularly important functions are the automatic protection to shut the reactor down and to remove the decay heat while ensuring the integrity of the containment structure. Within the DBA concept, the so-called severe accidents were conveniently defined to be those accidents that lie beyond the DBA envelope; hence, they did not form part of the safety case. (author)

  2. Safety research for evolutionary light water reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cacuci, D G [Karlsruhe Univ. (T.H.) (Germany). Universitaetsbibliothek

    1996-12-01

    The development of nuclear energy has been characterized by a continuous evolution of the technological and philosophical underpinnings of reactor safety to enable operation of the plant without causing harm to either the plant operators or the public. Currently, the safety of a nuclear plant is assured through the combined use of procedures and engineered safety features together with a system of multiple protective barriers against the release of radioactivity. This approach is embodied in the concept of Design-Basis Accidents (DBA), which requires the designers to demonstrate that all credible accidents have been identified and that all safety equipment and procedures perform their functions extremely reliably. Particularly important functions are the automatic protection to shut the reactor down and to remove the decay heat while ensuring the integrity of the containment structure. Within the DBA concept, the so-called severe accidents were conveniently defined to be those accidents that lie beyond the DBA envelope; hence, they did not form part of the safety case. (author).

  3. Assessment of the safety of injection practices and injection-related procedures in family health units and centers in Alexandria.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Elhoseeny, Taghareed A; Mourad, Juidan K

    2014-08-01

    The Safe Injection Global Network (SIGN) developed an intervention strategy for reducing overuse of injections and promoting the administration of safe injections. Tool C--Revised is designed to assess the safety of the most common procedures that puncture the skin within health services. The aim of the study was to assess injection safety within the primary healthcare facilities in Alexandria using Tool C--Revised. A total of 45 family health units and centers in Alexandria were selected by proportional allocation from the eight regions of Alexandria. The Tool C--Revised of the WHO was used for observation of the entire facility, injection practices and injection-related procedures, and sterilization practices. Interview of different health providers and immediate supervisor of injections was carried out. Indicators that reflect risk included: deficiency of alcohol-based hand rub for cleansing hands (13.3%), compliance with hand wash before preparing a procedure (56.9% before injection practices, 61.3% before phlebotomy, and 67.6% before lancet puncture), and wearing a new pair of gloves before new procedures (48.6% before injection practices, 9.7% for phlebotomy, 11.8% for lancet puncture, and 80% for both intravenous injections and infusions). Enough disposable equipment in all facilities for at least 2 weeks dependent on the statement of the average numbers of procedures per week was shown. Only 38% of the providers had received training regarding injection safety in the last 2 years and 62.5% had completed their three doses of hepatitis B vaccine. Only 42.2% of staffs who handled healthcare waste had access to heavy gloves. Indicators related to injection and injection-related practices that reflect risk to patients include deficiency of alcohol-based hand rub tools, nonadherence to hand hygiene before preparing an injection, and inadequate adherence to using a clean barrier when opening a glass ampule and use of gloves. Indicators that may reflect risk to

  4. Certification plan for safety and PRA codes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toffer, H.; Crowe, R.D.; Ades, M.J.

    1990-05-01

    A certification plan for computer codes used in Safety Analyses and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for the operation of the Savannah River Site (SRS) reactors has been prepared. An action matrix, checklists, and a time schedule have been included in the plan. These items identify what is required to achieve certification of the codes. A list of Safety Analysis and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SA ampersand PRA) computer codes covered by the certification plan has been assembled. A description of each of the codes was provided in Reference 4. The action matrix for the configuration control plan identifies code specific requirements that need to be met to achieve the certification plan's objectives. The checklist covers the specific procedures that are required to support the configuration control effort and supplement the software life cycle procedures based on QAP 20-1 (Reference 7). A qualification checklist for users establishes the minimum prerequisites and training for achieving levels of proficiency in using configuration controlled codes for critical parameter calculations

  5. Nuclear Criticality Safety Department Qualification Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carroll, K.J.; Taylor, R.G.; Worley, C.A.

    1996-01-01

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Department (NCSD) is committed to developing and maintaining a staff of highly qualified personnel to meet the current and anticipated needs in Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. This document defines the Qualification Program to address the NCSD technical and managerial qualification as required by the Y-1 2 Training Implementation Matrix (TIM). This Qualification Program is in compliance with DOE Order 5480.20A and applicable Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. (LMES) and Y-1 2 Plant procedures. It is implemented through a combination of WES plant-wide training courses and professional nuclear criticality safety training provided within the department. This document supersedes Y/DD-694, Revision 2, 2/27/96, Qualification Program, Nuclear Criticality Safety Department There are no backfit requirements associated with revisions to this document

  6. Hazard analysis & safety requirements for small drone operations : to what extent do popular drones embed safety?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Plioutsias, Anastasios; Karanikas, Nektarios; Chatzimichailidou, Maria Mikela

    2018-01-01

    Currently, published risk analyses for drones refer mainly to commercial systems, use data from civil aviation, and are based on probabilistic approaches without suggesting an inclusive list of hazards and respective requirements. Within this context, this paper presents: (1) a set of safety

  7. Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) Site-Specific Health and Safety Plan, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Flynn, N.C. Bechtel Jacobs

    2008-04-21

    The Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC) policy is to provide a safe and healthy workplace for all employees and subcontractors. The implementation of this policy requires that operations of the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF), located one-half mile west of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex, be guided by an overall plan and consistent proactive approach to environment, safety and health (ES&H) issues. The BJC governing document for worker safety and health, BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', describes the key elements of the BJC Safety and Industrial Hygiene (IH) programs, which includes the requirement for development and implementation of a site-specific Health and Safety Plan (HASP) where required by regulation (refer also to BJC-EH-1012, 'Development and Approval of Safety and Health Plans'). BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', implements the requirements for worker protection contained in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 851. The EMWMF site-specific HASP requirements identifies safe operating procedures, work controls, personal protective equipment, roles and responsibilities, potential site hazards and control measures, site access requirements, frequency and types of monitoring, site work areas, decontamination procedures, and outlines emergency response actions. This HASP will be available on site for use by all workers, management and supervisors, oversight personnel and visitors. All EMWMF assigned personnel will be briefed on the contents of this HASP and will be required to follow the procedures and protocols as specified. The policies and procedures referenced in this HASP apply to all EMWMF operations activities. In addition the HASP establishes ES&H criteria for the day-to-day activities to prevent or minimize any adverse effect on the environment and personnel safety and health and to meet standards that define acceptable

  8. 78 FR 65427 - Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Liquefied Petroleum Gas and Utility Liquefied...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-10-31

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No. PHMSA-2013-0097] Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Liquefied Petroleum Gas and Utility Liquefied Petroleum Gas Pipeline Systems AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration...

  9. Safety and licensing requirements in the Republic of South Africa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, D.M.; Langford, E.L.

    1986-01-01

    The principles for licensing of nuclear installations in South Africa are based on the control of mortality risk to the operators of an installation and the population resident in the vicinity of the site. This paper describes the development of this safety philosophy, and the nuclear licensing process used in this country. The structure of the nuclear regulatory function is briefly described, including the respective roles of the Atomic Energy Corporation, Licencing Branch and the Council for Nuclear Safety. The development of risk criteria and quantitative release magnitude-probability criteria for radioactive material is outlined. Tasks that have to be undertaken by a potential waste disposal site licensee before a site licence is issued are described. Once the facility is commissioned periodic monitoring procedures will have to be adopted throughout the lifetime of the facility. The scope of typical monitoring activities is outlined and the ongoing analyses to be performed and the records to be kept are discussed

  10. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larson, H L

    2007-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

  11. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Larson, H L

    2007-09-07

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

  12. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-07-15

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

  13. The usage of crash-safety simulation software in the automotive industry

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Verschut, R.; Hyun, Y.W.

    1998-01-01

    The last 10 years the safety issue for road vehicles has become increasingly important. Not only regulations but also NCAP testing force manufacturers to develop restraint systems which can meet the stringent criteria set by these procedures. Because of the various safety requirements the

  14. Safety assurance for nuclear chemical plants - regulatory practice in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Driscoll, J.; Charlesworth, F.

    1983-01-01

    This paper describes the legislation and licensing requirements for nuclear installations as well as the related safety assurance procedures in the UK. Developments in safety assurance practice are identified and discussed in relation to the role of the regulator and of the operator. (NEA) [fr

  15. Patient safety improvement programmes for primary care. Review of a Delphi procedure and pilot studies by the LINNEAUS collaboration on patient safety in primary care

    Science.gov (United States)

    Verstappen, Wim; Gaal, Sander; Esmail, Aneez; Wensing, Michel

    2015-01-01

    ABSTRACT Background: To improve patient safety it is necessary to identify the causes of patient safety incidents, devise solutions and measure the (cost-) effectiveness of improvement efforts. Objective: This paper provides a broad overview with practical guidance on how to improve patient safety. Methods: We used modified online Delphi procedures to reach consensus on methods to improve patient safety and to identify important features of patient safety management in primary care. Two pilot studies were carried out to assess the value of prospective risk analysis (PRA), as a means of identifying the causes of a patient safety incident. Results: A range of different methods can be used to improve patient safety but they have to be contextually specific. Practice organization, culture, diagnostic errors and medication safety were found to be important domains for further improvement. Improvement strategies for patient safety could benefit from insights gained from research on implementation of evidence-based practice. Patient involvement and prospective risk analysis are two promising and innovative strategies for improving patient safety in primary care. Conclusion: A range of methods is available to improve patient safety, but there is no ‘magic bullet.’ Besides better use of the available methods, it is important to use new and potentially more effective strategies, such as prospective risk analysis. PMID:26339837

  16. Education and training requirements in the revised European Basic Safety Standards Directive

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mundigl, S.

    2009-01-01

    The European Commission is currently developing a modified European Basic Safety Standards Directive covering two major objectives: the consolidation of existing European Radiation Protection legislation, and the revision of the European Basic Safety Standards. The consolidation will merge the following five Directives into one single Directive: the Basic Safety Standards Directive, the Medical Exposures Directive, the Public Information Directive, the Outside Workers Directive, and the Directive on the Control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources. The revision of the European Basic Safety Standards will take account of the latest recommendations by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and shall improve clarity of the requirements where appropriate. It is planned to introduce more binding requirements on natural radiation sources, on criteria for clearance, and on the cooperation between Member States for emergency planning and response, as well as a graded approach for regulatory control. One additional goal is to achieve greater harmonisation between the European BSS and the international BSS. Following a recommendation from the Article 31 Group of Experts, the current draft of the modified BSS will highlight the importance of education and training by dedicating a specific title to radiation protection education, training and information. This title will include a general requirement on the Member States to ensure the establishment of an adequate legislative and administrative framework for providing appropriate radiation protection education, training and information. In addition, there will be specific requirements on training in the medical field, on information and training of workers in general, of workers potentially exposed to orphan sources, and to emergency workers. The revised BSS directive will include requirements on the competence of a radiation protection expert (RPE) and of a radiation protection

  17. Qualification of safety-critical software for digital reactor safety system in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwon, Kee-Choon; Park, Gee-Yong; Kim, Jang-Yeol; Lee, Jang-Soo

    2013-01-01

    This paper describes the software qualification activities for the safety-critical software of the digital reactor safety system in nuclear power plants. The main activities of the software qualification processes are the preparation of software planning documentations, verification and validation (V and V) of the software requirements specifications (SRS), software design specifications (SDS) and codes, and the testing of the integrated software and integrated system. Moreover, the software safety analysis and software configuration management are involved in the software qualification processes. The V and V procedure for SRS and SDS contains a technical evaluation, licensing suitability evaluation, inspection and traceability analysis, formal verification, software safety analysis, and an evaluation of the software configuration management. The V and V processes for the code are a traceability analysis, source code inspection, test case and test procedure generation. Testing is the major V and V activity of the software integration and system integration phases. The software safety analysis employs a hazard operability method and software fault tree analysis. The software configuration management in each software life cycle is performed by the use of a nuclear software configuration management tool. Through these activities, we can achieve the functionality, performance, reliability, and safety that are the major V and V objectives of the safety-critical software in nuclear power plants. (author)

  18. Implementing process safety management in gas processing operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodman, D.L.

    1992-01-01

    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard entitled Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals; Explosives and Blasting Agents was finalized February 24, 1992. The purpose of the standard is to prevent or minimize consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, flammable, or explosive chemicals. OSHA believes that its rule will accomplish this goal by requiring a comprehensive management program that integrates technologies, procedures, and management practices. Gas Processors Association (GPA) member companies are significantly impacted by this major standard, the requirements of which are extensive and complex. The purpose of this paper is to review the requirements of the standard and to discuss the elements to consider in developing and implementing a viable long term Process Safety Management Program

  19. Radiation safety and regulatory aspects in Medical Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Banerjee, Sharmila

    2017-01-01

    Radiation safety and regulatory aspect of medical facilities are relevant in the context where radiation is used in providing healthcare to human patients. These include facilities, which carry out radiological procedures in diagnostic radiology, including dentistry, image-guided interventional procedures, nuclear medicine, and radiation therapy. The safety regulations provide recommendations and guidance on meeting the requirements for the safe use of radiation in medicine. The different safety aspects which come under its purview are the personnel involved in medical facilities where radiological procedures are performed which include the medical practitioners, radiation technologists, medical physicists, radiopharmacists, radiation protection and over and above all the patients. Regulatory aspects cover the guidelines provided by ethics committees, which regulate the administration of radioactive formulation in human patients. Nuclear medicine is a modality that utilizes radiopharmaceuticals either for diagnosis of physiological disorders related to anatomy, physiology and patho-physiology and for diagnosis and treatment of cancer

  20. Safety aspects of a fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donoghue, J.K.; Charlesworth, F.R.; Fairbairn, A.

    1977-01-01

    The establishment of the basic process must include the determination of the sensitivity of the process to operational errors or plant failures. The probability, and consequences of escapes of activity must be evaluated and emergency procedures set up to deal with accidents which might lead to such escapes. The administrative arrangements for safety should include a safety evaluation and advisory service independent of line management. A quality assurance strategy for the construction and commissioning stages is important. The design and construction of the plant must include: (i) Attention to plant reliability. Maintenance and inspection procedures to maintain reliability must be adopted and the design should include measures to facilitate in-service inspection of highly-active plant. (ii) Suitable and sufficient means of detection and prevention of malfunction, including criticality, bearing in mind both the timescale of development of the fault and its consequences. (iii) Measures for containment of activity. Penetrations from active into operating areas should be eliminated or minimised and maintenance should be separated from operational areas. Secondary containment beyond that provided for operations of a significant magnitude. A ventilation system with appropriate gas clean-up, monitoring and discharge facilities is required. (iv) Adequate shielding, with particular attention paid to multiple activities in a single operational area which might lead to an operator being exposed to radiation from operations which are beyond his control. (v) Means of accounting for active materials and for their recovery, transfer and disposal in the event of a forced shut down. (vi) Suitable methods for segregation and control of wastes within the plant and for their discharge. Solid or liquid wastes should be subject to delay and monitoring procedures before release. Facilities for storage of waste must be subject to the same safety principles as the plant itself. (vii) Final

  1. Safety procedures in operation of inspection and maintenance of pressure reduction and metering stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Villas Boas, Ademar Jose; Biesemeyer, Marco Aurelio R.

    2000-01-01

    Each local Natural Gas Distribution Company in Brazil has its own working procedures for operations of inspection and maintenance on equipment and accessories connected to the gas network. Some of these Companies developed a better elaborated and documented way of working routines, while others only work based on their operators experience. The objective of this work is to create a standard procedure for operations of inspection and maintenance of Pressure Reducing Stations and Metering Stations, mainly the ones concerned to safety aspects. This work has no intention of exhausting all aspects related to this subject but to become the first step to standardize these types of operations among Natural Gas Distribution Companies. (author)

  2. A Safety and Health Guide for Vocational Educators. Incorporating Requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Relevant Pennsylvania Requirements with Particular Emphasis for Those Concerned with Cooperative Education and Work Study Programs. Volume 15. Number 1.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wahl, Ray

    Intended as a guide for vocational educators to incorporate the requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970) and the requirements of various Pennsylvania safety and health regulations with their cooperative vocational programs, the first chapter of this document presents the legal implications of these safety and health…

  3. A PLC generic requirements and specification for safety-related applications in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Jea Bok; Lee, C. K.; Lee, D. Y.

    2001-12-01

    This report presents the requirements and specification to be applied to the generic qualification of programmable Logic Controller(PLC), which is being developed as part of the KNICS project, 'Development of the Digital Reactor Safety Systems' of which purpose is the application to safety-related instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants. This report defines the essential and critical characteristics that shall be included as part of a PLC design for safety-related application. The characteristics include performance, reliability, accuracy, the overall response time from an input to the PLC exceeding it trip condition to the resulting outputs, and the specification of processors and memories in digital controller. It also specifies the quality assurance process for software development, dealing with executive software, firmware, application software tools for developing the application software, and human machine interface(HMI). In addition, this report reviews the published standards and guidelines that are required for the PLC development and the quality assurance processes such as environment requirements, seismic withstand requirements, EMI/RFI withstand requirements, and isolation test

  4. Nuclear criticality safety training: guidelines for DOE contractors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crowell, M.R.

    1983-09-01

    The DOE Order 5480.1A, Chapter V, Safety of Nuclear Facilities, establishes safety procedures and requirements for DOE nuclear facilities. This guide has been developed as an aid to implementing the Chapter V requirements pertaining to nuclear criticality safety training. The guide outlines relevant conceptual knowledge and demonstrated good practices in job performance. It addresses training program operations requirements in the areas of employee evaluations, employee training records, training program evaluations, and training program records. It also suggests appropriate feedback mechanisms for criticality safety training program improvement. The emphasis is on academic rather than hands-on training. This allows a decoupling of these guidelines from specific facilities. It would be unrealistic to dictate a universal program of training because of the wide variation of operations, levels of experience, and work environments among DOE contractors and facilities. Hence, these guidelines do not address the actual implementation of a nuclear criticality safety training program, but rather they outline the general characteristics that should be included

  5. 45 CFR 1356.30 - Safety requirements for foster care and adoptive home providers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... licensing file for that foster or adoptive family must contain documentation which verifies that safety... 45 Public Welfare 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Safety requirements for foster care and adoptive... ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, FOSTER CARE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS, ADOPTION ASSISTANCE, AND CHILD AND...

  6. KIT safety management. Annual report 2012; KIT-Sicherheitsmanagement. Jahresbericht 2012

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frank, Gerhard (ed.)

    2013-07-01

    The KIT Safety Management Service Unit (KSM) guarantees radiological and conventional technical safety and security of Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and controls the implementation and observation of legal environmental protection requirements. KSM is responsible for - licensing procedures, - industrial safety organization, - control of environmental protection measures, - planning and implementation of emergency preparedness and response, - operation of radiological laboratories and measurement stations, - extensive radiation protection support and the - the execution of security tasks in and for all organizational units of KIT. Moreover, KSM is in charge of wastewater and environmental monitoring for all facilities and nuclear installations all over the KIT campus. KSM is headed by the Safety Commissioner of KIT, who is appointed by the Presidential Committee. Within his scope of procedure for KIT, the Safety Commissioner controls the implementation of and compliance with safety-relevant requirements. The KIT Safety Management is certified according to DIN EN ISO 9001, its industrial safety management is certified by the VBG as ''AMS-Arbeitsschutz mit System'' and, hence, fulfills the requirements of NLF / ISO-OSH 2001. KSM laboratories are accredited according to DIN EN ISO/IEC 17025. To the extent possible, KSM is committed to maintaining competence in radiation protection and to supporting research and teaching activities. The present reports lists the individual tasks of the KIT Safety Management and informs about the results achieved in 2012. Status figures in principle reflect the status at the end of the year 2012. The processes described cover the areas of competence of KSM.

  7. TRUPACT-II procedures and maintenance instructions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide the technical requirements for operation, inspection and maintenance of a TRUPACT-II Shipping Package and directly related components. This document shall supply the minimum requirements as specified in the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) and Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9218. In the event there is a conflict between this document and the TRUPACT-II SARP (NRC Certificate of Compliance No. 9218), the TRUPACT-II SARP shall govern. This document details the operations, maintenance, repair, replacement of components, as well as the documentation required and the procedures to be followed to maintain the integrity of the TRUPACT-II container. These procedures may be modified for site use, but as a minimum all parameters and format listed herein must be included in any site modified version. For convenience and where applicable steps may be performed out of sequence. Packaging and payload handling equipment and transport trailers have been specifically designed for use with the TRUPACT-II Packaging. This document discusses the minimum required procedures for use of the adjustable center of gravity lift fixture and the TRUPACT-II transport trailer in conjunction with the TRUPACT-II Packaging

  8. EPRI program in water reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loewenstein, W.B.; Gelhaus, F.; Gopalakrishnan, A.

    1975-01-01

    The basis for EPRI's water reactor safety program is twofold. First is compilation and development of fundamental background data necessary for quantified light-water reactor (LWR) safety assurance appraisals. Second is development of realistic and experimentally bench-marked analytical procedures. The results are expected either to confirm the safety margins in current operating parameters, and to identify overly conservative controls, or, in some cases, to provide a basis for improvements to further minimize uncertainties in expected performance. Achievement of these objectives requires the synthesis of related current and projected experimental-analytical projects toward establishment of an experimentally-based analysis for the assurance of safety for LWRs

  9. Rock mass and shaft concrete lining temperature measurement procedure: Final draft

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-10-01

    This procedure document describes the equipment and procedures which will be used to obtain temperature data from within rock-mass and shaft linings at the Deaf Smith Exploratory Shaft Facility. Temperature measurement methods for instrument temperature correction, fluid temperature correction, heated surface monitoring and air temperature monitoring are outside the scope of this procedure, and are covered in the appropriate individual test procedures. Calibration, acceptance testing and the assignment of transducer reference numbers are outside the scope of this procedure. Section 2.0 provides a summary of the temperature measurement methods which will be employed, together with the measurement locations, environmental considerations and measurement requirements. Test layouts, including detailed descriptions of instruments, support requirements and detailed installation procedures are also presented. Section 3.0 describes the requirements for data recording, ADAS monitoring, and data reporting. Section 4.0 defines personnel responsibilities and qualifications. In addition a measurement and installation schedule is provided, and safety and contingency plans are described. Section 5.0 discusses management and quality assurance requirements. Cited references are listed in Section 6.0. 7 refs., 9 figs

  10. European Utility Requirements: European nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Komsi, M.; Patrakka, E.

    1997-01-01

    The work procedure and the content of the European Utility Requirements (EUR) concerning the future LWRs is described in the article. European Utility Requirements, produced by utilities in a number of European countries, is a document specifying the details relating to engineered safety, operating performance, reliability and economics of the reactors to be built by manufacturers for the European market

  11. Robot-assisted procedures in pediatric neurosurgery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    De Benedictis, Alessandro; Trezza, Andrea; Carai, Andrea; Genovese, Elisabetta; Procaccini, Emidio; Messina, Raffaella; Randi, Franco; Cossu, Silvia; Esposito, Giacomo; Palma, Paolo; Amante, Paolina; Rizzi, Michele; Marras, Carlo Efisio

    2017-05-01

    OBJECTIVE During the last 3 decades, robotic technology has rapidly spread across several surgical fields due to the continuous evolution of its versatility, stability, dexterity, and haptic properties. Neurosurgery pioneered the development of robotics, with the aim of improving the quality of several procedures requiring a high degree of accuracy and safety. Moreover, robot-guided approaches are of special interest in pediatric patients, who often have altered anatomy and challenging relationships between the diseased and eloquent structures. Nevertheless, the use of robots has been rarely reported in children. In this work, the authors describe their experience using the ROSA device (Robotized Stereotactic Assistant) in the neurosurgical management of a pediatric population. METHODS Between 2011 and 2016, 116 children underwent ROSA-assisted procedures for a variety of diseases (epilepsy, brain tumors, intra- or extraventricular and tumor cysts, obstructive hydrocephalus, and movement and behavioral disorders). Each patient received accurate preoperative planning of optimal trajectories, intraoperative frameless registration, surgical treatment using specific instruments held by the robotic arm, and postoperative CT or MR imaging. RESULTS The authors performed 128 consecutive surgeries, including implantation of 386 electrodes for stereo-electroencephalography (36 procedures), neuroendoscopy (42 procedures), stereotactic biopsy (26 procedures), pallidotomy (12 procedures), shunt placement (6 procedures), deep brain stimulation procedures (3 procedures), and stereotactic cyst aspiration (3 procedures). For each procedure, the authors analyzed and discussed accuracy, timing, and complications. CONCLUSIONS To the best their knowledge, the authors present the largest reported series of pediatric neurosurgical cases assisted by robotic support. The ROSA system provided improved safety and feasibility of minimally invasive approaches, thus optimizing the surgical

  12. 10 CFR 73.58 - Safety/security interface requirements for nuclear power reactors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... requirements for nuclear power reactors. (a) Each operating nuclear power reactor licensee with a license... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety/security interface requirements for nuclear power reactors. 73.58 Section 73.58 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF...

  13. Safety procedures for the electron spectroscopy of actinides at the ALS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shuh, D.K.; Edelstein, N.M.; Bucher, J.J.

    1996-01-01

    This is an addendum to the ALS Experimental Safety Form Renewal for the continuation of actinide microspot experiments on beamlines 7.0. There are several modifications to the previously approved. procedures. There is an increase in the amount of allowable material of the low activity isotopes 238 U, 237 Np, 242 Pu, and 248 Cm. There is also the addition of 99 Tc and the activity isotopes 232 Th and 243 Am to the list of permissible sample materials. All of the materials are alpha-emitters with negligible gamma fields with the exception of 99 Tc which is a beta-emitter. There is a series of new experiments that requires the use of a crystal cleaver in the preparation chamber of the ultraESCA end station. The beamline 7.0 ultraESCA endstation has been suitably modified to permit the safe cleave of YUPd alloy rectangular ingots. AR of the sample materials are solids. The exact nature and composition of the samples are delineated in the sample preparation section that follows. A corresponding Radiological Work Authorization (RWA) must be issued for this work at ALS since the material amounts exceed those in the Low Activity Source (LAS) guidelines in Table I and those in the Values for Exemption of Sealed Source Inventory in Table II. The preliminary date for the next run of these sample materials has been tentatively scheduled in early February 1996 and this will be with the uranium cleave alloys, not the transuranic materials

  14. Regulatory requirements for demonstration of the achieved safety level at the Mochovce NPP before commissioning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lipar, M.

    1997-01-01

    A review of regulatory requirements for demonstration of the achieved safety level at the Mochovce NPP before commissioning is given. It contains licensing steps in Slovakia during commissioning; Status and methodology of Mochovce safety analysis report; Mochovce NPP safety enhancement program; Regulatory body policy towards Mochovce NPP safety enhancement; Recent development in Mochovce pre-operational safety enhancement program review and assessment process; Licensing steps in Slovakia during commissioning

  15. Operational and safety requirement of radiation facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zulkafli Ghazali

    2007-01-01

    Gamma and electron irradiation facilities are the most common industrial sources of ionizing radiation. They have been used for medical, industrial and research purposes since the 1950s. Currently there are more than 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation worldwide. These facilities are either used for the sterilization of medical and pharmaceutical products, the preservation of foodstuffs, polymer synthesis and modification, or the eradication of insect infestation. Irradiation with electron beam, gamma ray or ultra violet light can also destroy complex organic contaminants in both liquid and gaseous waste. EB systems are replacing traditional chemical sterilization methods in the medical supply industry. The ultra-violet curing facility, however, has found more industrial application in printing and furniture industries. Gamma and electron beam facilities produce very high dose rates during irradiation, and thus there is a potential of accidental exposure in the irradiation chamber which can be lethal within minutes. Although, the safety record of this industry has been relatively very good, there have been fatalities recorded in Italy (1975), Norway (1982), El Salvador (1989) and Israel (1990). Precautions against uncontrolled entry into irradiation chamber must therefore be taken. This is especially so in the case of gamma irradiation facilities those contain large amounts of radioactivity. If the mechanism for retracting the source is damaged, the source may remain exposed. This paper will, to certain extent, describe safety procedure and system being installed at ALURTRON, Nuclear Malaysia to eliminate accidental exposure of electron beam irradiation. (author)

  16. IR-360 nuclear power plant safety functions and component classification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yousefpour, F.; Shokri, F.; Soltani, H.

    2010-01-01

    The IR-360 nuclear power plant as a 2-loop PWR of 360 MWe power generation capacity is under design in MASNA Company. For design of the IR-360 structures, systems and components (SSCs), the codes and standards and their design requirements must be determined. It is a prerequisite to classify the IR-360 safety functions and safety grade of structures, systems and components correctly for selecting and adopting the suitable design codes and standards. This paper refers to the IAEA nuclear safety codes and standards as well as USNRC standard system to determine the IR-360 safety functions and to formulate the principles of the IR-360 component classification in accordance with the safety philosophy and feature of the IR-360. By implementation of defined classification procedures for the IR-360 SSCs, the appropriate design codes and standards are specified. The requirements of specific codes and standards are used in design process of IR-360 SSCs by design engineers of MASNA Company. In this paper, individual determination of the IR-360 safety functions and definition of the classification procedures and roles are presented. Implementation of this work which is described with example ensures the safety and reliability of the IR-360 nuclear power plant.

  17. IR-360 nuclear power plant safety functions and component classification

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yousefpour, F., E-mail: fyousefpour@snira.co [Management of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Company (MASNA) (Iran, Islamic Republic of); Shokri, F.; Soltani, H. [Management of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Company (MASNA) (Iran, Islamic Republic of)

    2010-10-15

    The IR-360 nuclear power plant as a 2-loop PWR of 360 MWe power generation capacity is under design in MASNA Company. For design of the IR-360 structures, systems and components (SSCs), the codes and standards and their design requirements must be determined. It is a prerequisite to classify the IR-360 safety functions and safety grade of structures, systems and components correctly for selecting and adopting the suitable design codes and standards. This paper refers to the IAEA nuclear safety codes and standards as well as USNRC standard system to determine the IR-360 safety functions and to formulate the principles of the IR-360 component classification in accordance with the safety philosophy and feature of the IR-360. By implementation of defined classification procedures for the IR-360 SSCs, the appropriate design codes and standards are specified. The requirements of specific codes and standards are used in design process of IR-360 SSCs by design engineers of MASNA Company. In this paper, individual determination of the IR-360 safety functions and definition of the classification procedures and roles are presented. Implementation of this work which is described with example ensures the safety and reliability of the IR-360 nuclear power plant.

  18. Safety requirements in the design of research reactors: A Canadian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, A.G.; Langman, V.J.

    2000-01-01

    In Canada, the formal development of safety requirements for the design of research reactors in general began under an inter-organizational Small Reactor Criteria Committee. This committee developed safety and licensing criteria for use by several small reactor projects in their licensing discussions with the Atomic Energy Control Board. The small reactor projects or facilities represented included the MAPLE-X10 reactor, the proposed SES-10 heating reactor and its prototype, the SDR reactor at the Whiteshell Laboratories, the Korea Multipurpose Research Reactor (a.k.a., HANARO) in Korea, the SCORE project, and the McMaster University Nuclear Reactor. The top level set of criteria which form a safety philosophy and serve as a framework for more detailed developments was presented at an IAEA Conference in 1989. AECL continued this work to develop safety principles and design criteria for new small reactors. The first major application of this work has been to the design, safety analysis and licensing of the MAPLE 1 and 2 reactors for the MDS Nordion Medical Isotope Reactor Project. This paper provides an overview of the safety principles and design criteria. Examples of an implementation of these safety principles and design criteria are drawn from the work to design the MAPLE 1 and 2 reactors. (author)

  19. Implementing and measuring safety goals and safety culture. 4. Utility's Activities for Better Safety Culture After the JCO Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omoto, Akira

    2001-01-01

    three activities described below. As a part of self-diagnosis of organizational behavior and an individual's factors influencing safety, measurement was carried out by asking questions to every employee at the station, i.e., 21 questions asking if we are appropriately implementing safety culture 'standards' as set forth in INSAG-4 (Ref. 2). The purpose was twofold: to educate about INSAG-4 and to find areas for improvement. The results indicated that employees want to learn more about (a) the background for the specific actions required/prescribed in the procedures/guidelines and (b) how things go wrong if they do not strictly follow the procedures/guidelines. These were important findings, which led to the reconstruction of the on-site education and training. Considering that employees should be well informed on safety culture; management's policy; and lessons learned from incidents, domestic or international, we started the bimonthly magazine Safety Culture. The first publication included articles on 'Lessons Learned from JCO', 'The Results from the Self- Diagnosis', 'Lessons from an Incident at Hunterston NPS (LOOP Followed by Operator Actions for Safe Shutdown)', and others. The on-site training system has two elements: on-the-job training and off-the-job study with classroom and hands-on training. Most of the employees are trained at the On-Site Training Center with equipment and are qualified for specific job categories. Training of operators has its own lengthy program. Given the foregoing findings, we (a) started lectures on JCO lessons learned, (b) modified the educational system at the On-Site Training Center to nurture the employees with well-balanced knowledge and thinking (Fig. 1), and (c) prepared documents that describe the background and reasons for the actions required/prescribed in the procedures/guidelines for use in on-the-job training. The important point to be remembered about the JCO accident is that the criticality safety at this facility

  20. Economics of the specification 6M safety re-evaluation and regulatory requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hopper, C.M.

    1985-01-01

    The objective of this work was to examine the potential economic impact of the DOT Specification 6M criticality safety re-evaluation and regulatory requirements. The examination was based upon comparative analyses of current authorized fissile material load limits for the 6M, current Federal regulations (and interpretations) limiting the contents of Type B fissile material packages, limiting aggregates of fissile material packages, and recent proposed fissile material mass limits derived from specialized criticality safety analyses of the 6M package. The work examines influences on cost in transportation, handling, and storage of fissile materials. Depending upon facility throughput requirements (and assumed incremental costs of fissile material packaging, storage, and transport), operating, facility storage capacity, and transportation costs can be reduced significantly. As an example of the pricing algorithm application based upon reasonable cost influences, the magnitude of the first year cost reductions could extend beyond four times the cost of the packaging nuclear criticality safety re-evaluation. 1 tab

  1. A working procedure for identifying emerging food safety issues at an early stage: Implications for European and international risk management practices

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Marvin, H.J.P.; Kleter, G.A.; Frewer, L.J.; Cope, S.F.; Wentholt, M.T.A.; Rowe, G.

    2009-01-01

    There is a need for early identification of emerging food safety issues in order to prevent them from developing into health risks. In this paper, various existing methods and procedures which can be used for early identification of safety issues are reviewed, including the monitoring of the

  2. Needs, requirements and challenges for technical support to nuclear safety authority

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Madonna, A.; Orsini, G.

    2010-01-01

    To face the very broad range of technical matters on which the regulatory and licensing activity are based, and related research and development activity, the Nuclear Safety Authorities (NSA) may need to rely upon external technical and scientific support. In providing technical support to NSA, the experience shows, from one side, the importance to have technical support organizations (TSO) with recognized competence, independence and appropriate regulatory view, and from the other side, the importance to have within the NSAs well developed management and technical capability to address, coordinate and use the results of the external technical support. Retaining the NSA the full responsibility for the final decision. Under which conditions and modus operandi the external support shall be provided in order to comply with requirements of being independent, competent and timely provided, fulfilling the administrative procedures, is the subject of attention and consideration of TSO function today. The Italian regulatory body is currently going to be institutionally re-established according to new law approved in 2009 /1/ and it needs to be resourced and fully organized with necessary capacities in the nearest future. The perspective of a new nuclear program, recently launched by the government, with significant incoming tasks for regulation and licensing, against the existing limited resources, let foresee a substantial potential need for technical support and advice. ITER-Consult (Ltd), created in 2003 in Italy, has well developed capabilities to provide independent technical evaluation and support to NSAs, to maintain safety culture and updated knowledge, to transfer know how and to establish international cooperation and networking. This mission is guided assuming as values the independence, the professional competence, the transparency, the credibility and the establishment of respectful relationship with the partners. Challenges exist for funding and operational

  3. Probabilistic safety analysis procedures guide, Sections 8-12. Volume 2, Rev. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCann, M.; Reed, J.; Ruger, C.; Shiu, K.; Teichmann, T.; Unione, A.; Youngblood, R.

    1985-08-01

    A procedures guide for the performance of probabilistic safety assessment has been prepared for interim use in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission programs. It will be revised as comments are received, and as experience is gained from its use. The probabilistic safety assessment studies performed are intended to produce probabilistic predictive models that can be used and extended by the utilities and by NRC to sharpen the focus of inquiries into a range of issues affecting reactor safety. The first volume of the guide describes the determination of the probability (per year) of core damage resulting from accident initiators internal to the plant (i.e., intrinsic to plant operation) and from loss of off-site electric power. The scope includes human reliability analysis, a determination of the importance of various core damage accident sequences, and an explicit treatment and display of uncertainties for key accident sequences. This second volume deals with the treatment of the so-called external events including seismic disturbances, fires, floods, etc. Ultimately, the guide will be augmented to include the plant-specific analysis of in-plant processes (i.e., containment performance). This guide provides the structure of a probabilistic safety study to be performed, and indicates what products of the study are valuable for regulatory decision making. For internal events, methodology is treated in the guide only to the extent necessary to indicate the range of methods which is acceptable; ample reference is given to alternative methodologies which may be utilized in the performance of the study. For external events, more explicit guidance is given

  4. Responsibility for the Violation of Ecological Safety Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Selivanovskaya, J. I.; Gilmutdinova, I.

    2018-01-01

    The article deals with the problems of responsibility for the violation of ecological safety requirements from the point of view of sustainable development of the state. Such types of responsibility as property, disciplinary, financial, administrative and criminal responsibility in the area are analysed. Suggestions on the improvement of legislation are put forward. Among other things it is suggested to introduce criminal sanctions against legal bodies (enterprises) for ecological crimes with punishments in the form of fines, suspension or discontinuation of activities.

  5. Development of ISA procedure for uranium fuel fabrication and enrichment facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamate, Kazuki; Arakawa, Tomoyuki; Yamashita, Masahiro; Sasaki, Noriaki; Hirano, Mitsumasa

    2011-01-01

    The integrated safety analysis (ISA) procedure has been developed to apply risk-informed regulation to uranium fuel fabrication and enrichment facilities. The major development efforts are as follows: (a) preparing the risk level matrix as an index for items-relied-on-for-safety (IROFS) identification, (b) defining requirements of IROFS, and (c) determining methods of IROFS importance based on the results of risk- and scenario-based analyses. For the risk level matrix, the consequence and likelihood categories have been defined by taking into account the Japanese regulatory laws, rules, and safety standards. The trial analyses using the developed procedure have been performed for several representative processes of the reference uranium fuel fabrication and enrichment facilities. This paper presents the results of the ISA for the sintering process of the reference fabrication facility. The results of the trial analyses have demonstrated the applicability of the procedure to the risk-informed regulation of these facilities. (author)

  6. The safety assessment of OPR-1000 nuclear power plant for station blackout accident applying the combined deterministic and probabilistic procedure

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kang, Dong Gu, E-mail: littlewing@kins.re.kr [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, 62 Gwahak-ro, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon 305-338 (Korea, Republic of); Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 291 Daehak-ro, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon 305-701 (Korea, Republic of); Chang, Soon Heung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 291 Daehak-ro, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon 305-701 (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-08-15

    Highlights: • The combined deterministic and probabilistic procedure (CDPP) was proposed for safety assessment of the BDBAs. • The safety assessment of OPR-1000 nuclear power plant for SBO accident is performed by applying the CDPP. • By estimating the offsite power restoration time appropriately, the SBO risk is reevaluated. • It is concluded that the CDPP is applicable to safety assessment of BDBAs without significant erosion of the safety margin. - Abstract: Station blackout (SBO) is a typical beyond design basis accident (BDBA) and significant contributor to overall plant risk. The risk analysis of SBO could be important basis of rulemaking, accident mitigation strategy, etc. Recently, studies on the integrated approach of deterministic and probabilistic method for nuclear safety in nuclear power plants have been done, and among them, the combined deterministic and probabilistic procedure (CDPP) was proposed for safety assessment of the BDBAs. In the CDPP, the conditional exceedance probability obtained by the best estimate plus uncertainty method acts as go-between deterministic and probabilistic safety assessments, resulting in more reliable values of core damage frequency and conditional core damage probability. In this study, the safety assessment of OPR-1000 nuclear power plant for SBO accident was performed by applying the CDPP. It was confirmed that the SBO risk should be reevaluated by eliminating excessive conservatism in existing probabilistic safety assessment to meet the targeted core damage frequency and conditional core damage probability. By estimating the offsite power restoration time appropriately, the SBO risk was reevaluated, and it was finally confirmed that current OPR-1000 system lies in the acceptable risk against the SBO. In addition, it is concluded that the CDPP is applicable to safety assessment of BDBAs in nuclear power plants without significant erosion of the safety margin.

  7. Safety requirements of the BMU to be met in final storage of heat-producing waste: An evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomauske, Bruno

    2009-01-01

    On August 12, 2008, The German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU) published a draft of July 29, 2008 of the ''Safety Requirements to Be Met in Final Storage of Heat-producing Radioactive Waste.'' As announced by the BMU, these safety requirements are to bring up to the state of the art the safety criteria of 1983. Over a couple of years, efforts had been made to adapt the criteria to the internationally accepted standard as demanded by the Advisory Committees on Reactor Safeguards (RSK) and Radiation Protection (SSK). There is no waste management concept underlying the safety requirements. As a consequence, the draft should be withdrawn by the Federal Ministry for the Environment and replaced by a version revised from scratch and offering assured quality. (orig./GL)

  8. Research on the development of advanced system safety assessment procedures (1)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Kazuhiko

    2002-02-01

    The past research reports in the area of safety engineering proposed the Computer-aided HAZOP system to be applied to Nuclear Reprocessing Facilities. Automated HAZOP system has great advantage compared with human analysts in terms of accuracy of the results, and time required to conduct HAZOP studies. This report surveys the literature on risk assessment and safety design based on the concept of independent protection layers (IPLs). Furthermore, to improve HAZOP System, counter measures information related to abnormal situation in plants are added to knowledge base in the system. As the result the HAZOP system can give appropriate measures information to protect accidents to uses. Such HAZOP system is applied to analyze the processes, where the ability of the proposed system is verified. (author)

  9. Safety requirements for a nuclear power plant electric power system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fouad, L F; Shinaishin, M A

    1988-06-15

    This work aims at identifying the safety requirements for the electric power system in a typical nuclear power plant, in view of the UNSRC and the IAEA. Description of a typical system is provided, followed by a presentation of the scope of the information required for safety evaluation of the system design and performance. The acceptance and design criteria that must be met as being specified by both regulatory systems, are compared. Means of implementation of such criteria as being described in the USNRC regulatory guides and branch technical positions on one hand and in the IAEA safety guides on the other hand are investigated. It is concluded that the IAEA regulations address the problems that may be faced with in countries having varying grid sizes ranging from large stable to small potentially unstable ones; and that they put emphasis on the onsite standby power supply. Also, in this respect the Americans identify the grid as the preferred power supply to the plant auxiliaries, while the IAEA leaves the possibility that the preferred power supply could be either the grid or the unit main generator depending on the reliability of each. Therefore, it is found that it is particularly necessary in this area of electric power supplies to deal with the IAEA and the American sets of regulations as if each complements and not supplements the other. (author)

  10. Extending and automating a Systems-Theoretic hazard analysis for requirements generation and analysis.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomas, John (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

    2012-05-01

    Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a powerful new hazard analysis method designed to go beyond traditional safety techniques - such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) - that overlook important causes of accidents like flawed requirements, dysfunctional component interactions, and software errors. While proving to be very effective on real systems, no formal structure has been defined for STPA and its application has been ad-hoc with no rigorous procedures or model-based design tools. This report defines a formal mathematical structure underlying STPA and describes a procedure for systematically performing an STPA analysis based on that structure. A method for using the results of the hazard analysis to generate formal safety-critical, model-based system and software requirements is also presented. Techniques to automate both the analysis and the requirements generation are introduced, as well as a method to detect conflicts between the safety and other functional model-based requirements during early development of the system.

  11. Risk and safety of pediatric sedation/anesthesia for procedures outside the operating room.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cravero, Joseph P

    2009-08-01

    Sedation and anesthesia outside the operating room represents a rapidly growing field of practice that involves a number of different specialty providers including anesthesiology. The literature surrounding this work is found in a variety of journals - many outside anesthesiology. This review is intended to inform readers about the current status of risk and safety involving sedation/anesthesia for tests and minor procedures utilizing a wide range of sources. Two large database studies have helped to define the frequency and nature of adverse events in pediatric sedation/anesthesia practice from a multispecialty perspective. A number of papers describing respiratory and hemodynamic aspects of dexmedetomidine sedation have also been published. Finally, a number of studies relating to training sedation providers, reporting of sedation adverse events, sedation for vulnerable populations, and (in particular) ketamine sedation adverse respiratory events have also come to light. The latest publications continue to document a relatively low risk to pediatric sedation yet also warn us about the potential adverse events in this field. The results help to define competencies required to deliver pediatric sedation and make this practice even safer. Particularly interesting are new jargon and methodologies for defining adverse events and the use of new methods for training sedation providers.

  12. Flaws found in Los Alamos safety procedures

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gwynne, Peter

    2017-12-01

    A US government panel on nuclear safety has discovered a series of safety issues at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, concluding that government oversight of the lab's emergency preparation has been ineffective.

  13. Safety analysis for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The aim of safety analysis for research reactors is to establish and confirm the design basis for items important to safety using appropriate analytical tools. The design, manufacture, construction and commissioning should be integrated with the safety analysis to ensure that the design intent has been incorporated into the as-built reactor. Safety analysis assesses the performance of the reactor against a broad range of operating conditions, postulated initiating events and other circumstances, in order to obtain a complete understanding of how the reactor is expected to perform in these situations. Safety analysis demonstrates that the reactor can be kept within the safety operating regimes established by the designer and approved by the regulatory body. This analysis can also be used as appropriate in the development of operating procedures, periodic testing and inspection programmes, proposals for modifications and experiments and emergency planning. The IAEA Safety Requirements publication on the Safety of Research Reactors states that the scope of safety analysis is required to include analysis of event sequences and evaluation of the consequences of the postulated initiating events and comparison of the results of the analysis with radiological acceptance criteria and design limits. This Safety Report elaborates on the requirements established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-4 on the Safety of Research Reactors, and the guidance given in IAEA Safety Series No. 35-G1, Safety Assessment of Research Reactors and Preparation of the Safety Analysis Report, providing detailed discussion and examples of related topics. Guidance is given in this report for carrying out safety analyses of research reactors, based on current international good practices. The report covers all the various steps required for a safety analysis; that is, selection of initiating events and acceptance criteria, rules and conventions, types of safety analysis, selection of

  14. Efficiency and Safety of One-Step Procedure Combined Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy and Eretrograde Cholangiopancreatography for Treatment of Cholecysto-Choledocholithiasis: A Randomized Controlled Trial.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Zhiyi; Zhang, Luyao; Liu, Yanling; Gu, Yang; Sun, Tieliang

    2017-11-01

    We aimed to evaluate the efficiency and safety of one-step procedure combined endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography (ERCP) and laparoscopic cholecystectomy (LC) for treatment of patients with cholecysto-choledocholithiasis. A prospective randomized study was performed on 63 consecutive cholecysto-choledocholithiasis patients during 2008 and 2011. The efficiency and safety of one-step procedure was assessed by comparing the two-step LC with ERCP + endoscopic sphincterotomy (EST). Outcomes including intraoperative features, postoperative features (length of stay and postoperative complications) were evaluated. One- or two-step procedure of LC with ERCP + EST was successfully performed in all patients, and common bile duct stones were completely removed. Statistical analyses showed that length of stay and pulmonary infection rate were significantly lower in the test group compared with that in the control group (P 0.05). The one-step procedure of LC with ERCP + EST is superior to the two-step procedure for treatment of patients with cholecysto-choledocholithiasis regarding to the reduced hospital stay and inhibited occurrence of pulmonary infections. Compared with two-step procedure, one-step procedure of LC with ERCP + EST may be a superior option for cholecysto-choledocholithiasis patients treatment regarding to hospital stay and pulmonary infections.

  15. User requirements in the area of safety of innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycle installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuczera, B.; Juhn, P.E.; Fukuda, K.; )

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Against the background of already existing IAEA and INSAC publications in the area of safety, in the framework of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) a set of user requirements for the safety of future nuclear installations has been established. Five top-level requirements are expected to apply to any type of innovative design. They should foster an increased level of safety that is transparent to and fully accepted by the general public. The approach to future reactor safety includes two complementary strategies: increased emphasis on inherent safety characteristics and enhancement of defense in depth. As compared to existing plants, the effectiveness of preventing measures should be highly enhanced, resulting in fewer mitigation measures. The targets and possible approaches of each of the five levels of defense developed for innovative reactor designs are outlined in the paper

  16. Spent nuclear fuel project cold vacuum drying facility safety equipment list

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    IRWIN, J.J.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the safety equipment list (SEL) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF). The SEL was prepared in accordance with the procedure for safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in HNF-PRO-516, ''Safety Structures, Systems, and Components,'' Revision 0 and HNF-PRO-097, Engineering Design and Evaluation, Revision 0. The SEL was developed in conjunction with HNF-SO-SNF-SAR-O02, Safety Analysis Report for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility, Phase 2, Supporting Installation of Processing Systems (Garvin 1998). The SEL identifies the SSCs and their safety functions, the design basis accidents for which they are required to perform, the design criteria, codes and standards, and quality assurance requirements that are required for establishing the safety design basis of the SSCs. This SEL has been developed for the CVDF Phase 2 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and shall be updated, expanded, and revised in accordance with future phases of the CVDF SAR until the CVDF final SAR is approved

  17. The nuclear licensing and supervisory procedures for nuclear facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1982-02-01

    A combined system has been developed in the Federal Republic of Germany: the States execute the Atomic Energy Act on behalf of the Federal Government. Despite these differences, the safety requirements and the safety standard achieved vary only insignificantly, as a result of a world-wide communication and of international cooperation. The legal prerequesites for the German nuclear licensing procedures have been established about 20 years ago, and, by a number of amendments have been adapted to new perceptions and developments. Several supplementary ordinances, due to further developments in nuclear technology, are being prepared. The work on associated technical provision, which had been neglected for a long time, has in recent years been tackled systematically and should, before long, lead to a comprehensive programme of safety standards, which simplifies and expedites the nuclear licensing procedures. Essential features of the licensing procedure are the phased structure and the division into intermediate steps which render it possible to adapt the safety requirements to the advancing state of science and technology. The responsible authorities call in experts for the safety verification of the application documents. It is the task of these experts to make assessments and to conduct quality examinations in the manufacturing plants and at the site, and to carry out recurrent tests. The public is involved by the announcement of the projects, the display of the documents and by the opportunity to raise objections during the licensing procedure. Licenses granted can be contested before the administrative courts. This procedure paves the way for the achievement of a satisfactory balance between private and public interests. (orig./HP)

  18. Software Dependability and Safety Evaluations ESA's Initiative

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hernek, M.

    ESA has allocated funds for an initiative to evaluate Dependability and Safety methods of Software. The objectives of this initiative are; · More extensive validation of Safety and Dependability techniques for Software · Provide valuable results to improve the quality of the Software thus promoting the application of Dependability and Safety methods and techniques. ESA space systems are being developed according to defined PA requirement specifications. These requirements may be implemented through various design concepts, e.g. redundancy, diversity etc. varying from project to project. Analysis methods (FMECA. FTA, HA, etc) are frequently used during requirements analysis and design activities to assure the correct implementation of system PA requirements. The criticality level of failures, functions and systems is determined and by doing that the critical sub-systems are identified, on which dependability and safety techniques are to be applied during development. Proper performance of the software development requires the development of a technical specification for the products at the beginning of the life cycle. Such technical specification comprises both functional and non-functional requirements. These non-functional requirements address characteristics of the product such as quality, dependability, safety and maintainability. Software in space systems is more and more used in critical functions. Also the trend towards more frequent use of COTS and reusable components pose new difficulties in terms of assuring reliable and safe systems. Because of this, its dependability and safety must be carefully analysed. ESA identified and documented techniques, methods and procedures to ensure that software dependability and safety requirements are specified and taken into account during the design and development of a software system and to verify/validate that the implemented software systems comply with these requirements [R1].

  19. CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMIT EVALUATION PROGRAM (CSLEP's) AND QUICK SCREENS: ANSWERS TO EXPEDITED PROCESSING LEGACY CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMITS AND EVALUATIONS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    TOFFER, H.

    2006-01-01

    Since the end of the cold war, the need for operating weapons production facilities has faded. Criticality Safety Limits and controls supporting production modes in these facilities became outdated and furthermore lacked the procedure based rigor dictated by present day requirements. In the past, in many instances, the formalism of present day criticality safety evaluations was not applied. Some of the safety evaluations amounted to a paragraph in a notebook with no safety basis and questionable arguments with respect to double contingency criteria. When material stabilization, clean out, and deactivation activities commenced, large numbers of these older criticality safety evaluations were uncovered with limits and controls backed up by tenuous arguments. A dilemma developed: on the one hand, cleanup activities were placed on very aggressive schedules; on the other hand, a highly structured approach to limits development was required and applied to the cleanup operations. Some creative approaches were needed to cope with the limits development process

  20. 78 FR 42889 - Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Utility LP-Gas and LPG Pipeline Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-18

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part 192 [Docket No. PHMSA-2013-0097] Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Utility LP-Gas and LPG Pipeline Systems AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION...

  1. 15 CFR 30.35 - Procedure for shipments exempt from filing requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Procedure for shipments exempt from filing requirements. 30.35 Section 30.35 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS Exemptions From the...

  2. Procedures for self-assessment of operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-08-01

    Self-assessment processes have been continuously developed by nuclear organizations, including nuclear power plants. Currently, the nuclear industry and governmental organizations are showing an increasing interest in the implementation of this process as an effective way for improving safety performance. Self-assessment involves the use of different types of tools and mechanisms to assist the organizations in assessing their own safety performance against given standards. This helps to enhance the understanding of the need for improvements, the feeling of ownership in achieving them and and the safety culture as a whole. The concepts developed in this report present the basic approach to self-assessment taking into consideration experience gained during Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions, from organizations and utilities which have successfully implemented parts of a self-assessment programme and from meetings organized to discuss the subject

  3. Determining quantitative road safety targets by applying statistical prediction techniques and a multi-stage adjustment procedure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wittenberg, P; Sever, K; Knoth, S; Sahin, N; Bondarenko, J

    2013-01-01

    Due to substantial progress made in road safety in the last ten years, the European Union (EU) renewed the ambitious agreement of halving the number of persons killed on the roads within the next decade. In this paper we develop a method that aims at finding an optimal target for each nation, in terms of being as achievable as possible, and with the cumulative EU target being reached. Targets as an important component in road safety policy are given as reduction rate or as absolute number of road traffic deaths. Determination of these quantitative road safety targets (QRST) is done by a top-down approach, formalized in a multi-stage adjustment procedure. Different QRST are derived under consideration of recent research. The paper presents a method to break the national target further down to regional targets in case of the German Federal States. Generalized linear models are fitted to data in the period 1991-2010. Our model selection procedure chooses various models for the EU and solely log-linear models for the German Federal States. If the proposed targets for the EU Member States are attained, the sum of fatalities should not exceed the total value of 15,465 per year by 2020. Both, the mean level and the range of mortality rates within the EU could be lowered from 28-113 in 2010 to 17-41 per million inhabitants in 2020. This study provides an alternative to the determination of safety targets by political commitments only, taking the history of road fatalities trends and population into consideration. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  4. Safety handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The purpose of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization's Safety Handbook is to outline simply the fundamental procedures and safety precautions which provide an appropriate framework for safe working with any potential hazards, such as fire and explosion, welding, cutting, brazing and soldering, compressed gases, cryogenic liquids, chemicals, ionizing radiations, non-ionising radiations, sound and vibration, as well as safety in the office. It also specifies the organisation for safety at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories and the responsibilities of individuals and committees. It also defines the procedures for the scrutiny and review of all operations and the resultant setting of safety rules for them. ills

  5. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) steel drum

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCormick, W.A.

    1998-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) provides the analyses and evaluations necessary to demonstrate that the steel drum packaging system meets the transportation safety requirements of HNF-PRO-154, Responsibilities and Procedures for all Hazardous Material Shipments, for an onsite packaging containing Type B quantities of solid and liquid radioactive materials. The basic component of the steel drum packaging system is the 208 L (55-gal) steel drum

  6. Promoting participatory behavior on safety; Fomentando el comportamiento participativo de seguridad

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Martinez Corcoles, M.

    2012-07-01

    Are two types of safety behaviors: On the one hand, the fulfillment of the essential procedures for safe operation, and secondly, those voluntary behaviors that contribute equally to enhance plant safety. During the last three decades, the focus on strict compliance has limited any behavior beyond what is required by the regulations.

  7. Procedures for controlling the risks of reliability, safety, and availability of technical systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    The reference book covers four sections. Apart from the fundamental aspects of the reliability problem, of risk and safety and the relevant criteria with regard to reliability, the material presented explains reliability in terms of maintenance, logistics and availability, and presents procedures for reliability assessment and determination of factors influencing the reliability, together with suggestions for systems technical integration. The reliability assessment consists of diagnostic and prognostic analyses. The section on factors influencing reliability discusses aspects of organisational structures, programme planning and control, and critical activities. (DG) [de

  8. [Optimal intravascular brachytherapy: safety and radiation protection, reliability and precision guaranteed by guidelines, recommendations and regulatory requirements].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Quast, Ulrich; Kaulich, Theodor W; Lorenz, Joachim

    2002-02-01

    The success of intravascular brachytherapy relies entirely on the interdisciplinary approach. Interventional cardiologists, radiation oncologists and medical physicists must form a team from day 1. All members of the team need special knowledge and regular training in the field of vascular radiation therapy. Optimization of intravascular brachytherapy requires the use of standardized methods of dose specification, recording and reporting. This also implies using standardized methods of source calibration in terms of absorbed dose to water and having methods for simple internal control of the dosimetric quantities of new or replaced sources. Guidance is offered by international recommendations (AAPM TG 60, DGMP Report 16, NCS and EVA GEC-ESTRO). LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION--WHAT'S NEW?: In Europe, new legal requirements on radiation protection issues have to be fulfilled. For Germany, the revised "Strahlenschutzverordnung" has been released recently. Nearly all organizational and medical processes are affected. For intravascular brachytherapy, several changes of requirements have to be considered. However, to follow these requirements does not cause serious problems. DGMP REPORT 16: GUIDELINES FOR MEDICAL PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF INTRAVASCULAR BRACHYTHERAPY: Evaluation of clinical results by comparison of intravascular brachytherapy treatment parameters is possible only if the prescribed dose and the applied dose distribution are reported clearly, completely and uniformly. The DGMP guidelines thus recommend to prescribe the dose to water at the system related reference point PRef at 2 mm radial distance for intracoronary application (and at 5 mm for peripheral vessels). The mean dose at 1 mm tissue depth (respectively at 2 mm) should be reported in addition. To safely define the planning target volume from the injured length, safety margins of at least 5 mm (10 mm) have to be taken into account on both ends. Safety margins have also to be considered for

  9. Proposal for basic safety requirements regarding the disposal of high-level radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-04-01

    A working group commissioned to prepare proposals for basic safety requirements for the storage and transport of radioactive waste prepared its report to the Danish Agency of Environmental Protection. The proposals include: radiation protection requirements, requirements concerning the properties of high-level waste units, the geological conditions of the waste disposal location, the supervision of waste disposal areas. The proposed primary requirements for safety evaluation of the disposal of high-level waste in deep geological formations are of a general nature, not being tied to specific assumptions regarding the waste itself, the geological and other conditions at the place of disposal, and the technical methods of disposal. It was impossible to test the proposals for requirements on a working repository. As no country has, to the knowledge of the working group, actually disposed of hifg-level radioactive waste or approved of plans for such disposal. Methods for evaluating the suitability of geological formations for waste disposal, and background material concerning the preparation of these proposals for basic safety requirements relating to radiation, waste handling and geological conditions are reviewed. Appended to the report is a description of the phases of the fuel cycle that are related to the storage of spent fuel and the disposal of high-level reprocessing waste in a salt formation. It should be noted that the proposals of the working group are not limited to the disposal of reprocessed fuel, but also include the direct disposal of spent fuel as well as disposal in geological formations other than salt. (EG)

  10. Laser Safety Inspection Criteria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barat, K

    2005-01-01

    opportunity to explain audit items to the laser user and thus the reasons for some of these items. Some examples are given from the audit criteria handout. As an explanatory key to the reader, an Operational Safety Procedure (OSP) as a formally reviewed safety procedure required for all Class 3B and Class 4 laser installations. An ''OSP Binder'' contains all safety documentation related to a given laser operation and serves as a central repository for documents, such as the OSP, interlock logs, lessons learned, contact information etc. ''Unattended Operation'' refers to approved procedures for unattended operation of the laser installation and may include operation beyond normal working hours. ''L-train'' is the LLNL training tracking system

  11. Development of ISA procedure for uranium fuel fabrication and enrichment facilities: overview of ISA procedure and its application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamate, Kazuki; Yamada, Takashi; Takanashi, Mitsuhiro; Sasaki, Noriaki

    2013-01-01

    Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) procedure for uranium fuel fabrication and enrichment facilities has been developed for aiming at applying risk-informed regulation to these uranium facilities. The development has carried out referring to the ISA (NUREG-1520) by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The paper presents purpose, principles and activities for the development of the ISA procedure, including Risk Level (RL) matrix and grading evaluation method of IROFS (Items Relied on for Safety), as well as general description and features of the procedure. Also described in the paper is current status in application of risk information from the ISA. Japanese four licensees of the uranium facilities have been conducting ISA for their representative processes using the developed procedure as their voluntary safety activities. They have been accumulating experiences and knowledge on the ISA procedure and risk information through the field activities. NISA (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency) and JNES (Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization) are studying how to use such risk information for the safety regulation of the uranium facilities, taking into account the licensees' experiences and knowledge. (authors)

  12. The role the safety analysis report and other documents in the licensing procedure in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albrecht, E.; Ballhaus, S.

    1975-01-01

    Legal requirements for the licensing procedure, requirements for and preparation of licensing documents, authorities and experts participating in the licensing procedure, course of the atomic licensing procedure e.g. application for construction and operation, public hearing, site and concept license, partial licenses. (HP) [de

  13. Pleural procedures and patient safety: a national BTS audit of practice.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hooper, Clare E; Welham, Sally A; Maskell, Nick A

    2015-02-01

    The BTS pleural procedures audit collected data over a 2-month period in June and July 2011. In contrast with the 2010 audit, which focussed simply on chest drain insertions, data on all pleural aspirations and local anaesthetic thoracoscopy (LAT) was also collected. Ninety hospitals submitted data, covering a patient population of 33 million. Twenty-one per cent of centres ran a specialist pleural disease clinic, 71% had a nominated chest drain safety lead, and 20% had thoracic surgery on site. Additionally, one-third of centres had a physician-led LAT service. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.

  14. Efficacy, Reliability, and Safety of Completely Autologous Fibrin Glue in Neurosurgical Procedures: Single-Center Retrospective Large-Number Case Study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nakayama, Noriyuki; Yano, Hirohito; Egashira, Yusuke; Enomoto, Yukiko; Ohe, Naoyuki; Kanemura, Nobuhiro; Kitagawa, Junichi; Iwama, Toru

    2018-01-01

    Commercially available fibrin glue (Com-FG), which is used commonly worldwide, is produced with pooled human plasma from multiple donors. However, it has added bovine aprotinin, which involves the risk of infection, allogenic immunity, and allergic reactions. We evaluate the efficacy, reliability, and safety of completely autologous fibrin glue (CAFG). From August 2014 to February 2016, prospective data were collected and analyzed from 153 patients. CAFG was prepared with the CryoSeal System using autologous blood and was applied during neurosurgical procedures. Using CAFG-soaked oxidized regenerated cellulose and/or polyglycolic acid sheets, we performed a pinpoint hemostasis, transposed the offending vessels in a microvascular decompression, and covered the dural incision to prevent cerebrospinal fluid leakage. The CryoSeal System had generated up to a mean of 4.51 mL (range, 3.0-8.4 mL) of CAFG from 400 mL autologous blood. Com-FG products were not used in our procedures. Only 6 patients required an additional allogeneic blood transfusion. The hemostatic effective rate was 96.1% (147 of 153 patients). Only 1 patient who received transsphenoidal surgery for a pituitary adenoma presented with the complication of delayed postoperative cerebrospinal fluid leakage (0.65%). No patient developed allergic reactions or systemic complications associated with the use of CAFG. CAFG effectively provides hemostatic, adhesive, and safety performance. The timing and three-dimensional shape of CAFG-soaked oxidized regenerated cellulose and/or polyglycolic acid sheets solidification can be controlled with slow fibrin formation. The cost to prepare CAFG is similar compared with Com-FG products, and it can therefore be easily used at most institutions. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  15. Evaluation of safety requirements of erbium laser equipment used in dentistry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Braga, Flavio Hamilton

    2002-01-01

    The erbium laser (Er:YAG) has been used in several therapeutic processes. Erbium lasers, however, operate with energies capable to produce lesions in biological tissues. Aiming the safe use, the commercialization of therapeutic laser equipment is controlled in Brazil, where the equipment should comply with quality and safety requirement prescribed in technical regulations. The objective of this work is to evaluate the quality and safety requirements of a commercial therapeutic erbium laser according to Brazilian regulations, and to discuss a risk control program intended to minimize the accidental exposition at dangerous laser radiation levels. It was verified that the analyzed laser can produce lesions in the skin and eyes, when exposed to laser radiation at distances smaller than 80 cm by 10 s or more. In these conditions, the use of protection glasses is recommended to the personnel that have access to the laser operation ambient. It was verified that the user's training and the presence of a target indicator are fundamental to avoid damages in the skin and buccal cavity. It was also verified that the knowledge and the correct use of the equipment safety devices, and the application of technical and administrative measures is efficient to minimize the risk of dangerous expositions to the laser radiation. (author)

  16. Statement on safety requirements concerning the long-term operation of the Muehleberg nuclear power station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-12-01

    This report published by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI investigates the safety requirements with respect to the long-term operation of the Muehleberg nuclear power station in Switzerland. Relevant international requirements and Swiss legal stipulations concerning the long-term operation of the power station are stated. The management of aging processes is looked at. The regular verification of the integrity of various plant components such as containments, piping, steam generation system, etc. is looked at in detail. The state-of-the-art concerning deterministic accident analyses and refitting technology are discussed, as are automated safety systems. The applicable laws, decrees and guidelines are listed in appendices

  17. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorizes the Agency to 'establish or adopt... standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property' - standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and sustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA's assistance in their application. The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles, which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its standards. Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety, operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material and safe management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization, regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience and insights to be shared. Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States have decided to adopt the IAEA's standards for use in their national regulations. For parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the

  18. Writer`s guide for technical procedures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-12-01

    A primary objective of operations conducted in the US Department of Energy (DOE) complex is safety. Procedures are a critical element of maintaining a safety envelope to ensure safe facility operation. This DOE Writer`s Guide for Technical Procedures addresses the content, format, and style of technical procedures that prescribe production, operation of equipment and facilities, and maintenance activities. The DOE Writer`s Guide for Management Control Procedures and DOE Writer`s Guide for Emergency and Alarm Response Procedures are being developed to assist writers in developing nontechnical procedures. DOE is providing this guide to assist writers across the DOE complex in producing accurate, complete, and usable procedures that promote safe and efficient operations that comply with DOE orders, including DOE Order 5480.19, Conduct of Operations for DOE Facilities, and 5480.6, Safety of Department of Energy-Owned Nuclear Reactors.

  19. Implications of safety requirements for the treatment of THMC processes in geological disposal systems for radioactive waste

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Frédéric Bernier

    2017-06-01

    Full Text Available The mission of nuclear safety authorities in national radioactive waste disposal programmes is to ensure that people and the environment are protected against the hazards of ionising radiations emitted by the waste. It implies the establishment of safety requirements and the oversight of the activities of the waste management organisation in charge of implementing the programme. In Belgium, the safety requirements for geological disposal rest on the following principles: defence-in-depth, demonstrability and the radiation protection principles elaborated by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP. Applying these principles requires notably an appropriate identification and characterisation of the processes upon which the safety functions fulfilled by the disposal system rely and of the processes that may affect the system performance. Therefore, research and development (R&D on safety-relevant thermo-hydro-mechanical-chemical (THMC issues is important to build confidence in the safety assessment. This paper points out the key THMC processes that might influence radionuclide transport in a disposal system and its surrounding environment, considering the dynamic nature of these processes. Their nature and significance are expected to change according to prevailing internal and external conditions, which evolve from the repository construction phase to the whole heating–cooling cycle of decaying waste after closure. As these processes have a potential impact on safety, it is essential to identify and to understand them properly when developing a disposal concept to ensure compliance with relevant safety requirements. In particular, the investigation of THMC processes is needed to manage uncertainties. This includes the identification and characterisation of uncertainties as well as for the understanding of their safety-relevance. R&D may also be necessary to reduce uncertainties of which the magnitude does not allow

  20. 24 CFR 200.936 - Supplementary specific procedural requirements under HUD building products certification program...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... requirements under HUD building products certification program for solid fuel type room heaters and fireplace... Supplementary specific procedural requirements under HUD building products certification program for solid fuel... fireplace stoves certified under the HUD Building Products Certification Program shall be designed...

  1. Procedures for conducting probabilistic safety assessments of nuclear power plants (level 2). Accident progression, containment analysis and estimation of accident source terms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The present publication on Level 2 PSA is based on a compilation and review of practices in various Member States. It complements Safety Series No. 50-P-4, issued in 1992, on Procedures for Conducting Probabilistic Safety Assessments of Nuclear Power Plants (Level 1). Refs, figs and tabs

  2. Development of safety-related regulatory requirements for nuclear power in developing countries. Key issue paper no. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, K.I.

    2000-01-01

    In implementing a national nuclear power program, balanced regulatory requirements are necessary to ensure nuclear safety and cost competitive nuclear power, and to help gain public acceptance. However, this is difficult due to the technology-intensive nature of the nuclear regulatory requirements, the need to reflect evolving technology and the need for cooperation among multidisciplinary technical groups. This paper suggests approaches to development of balanced nuclear regulatory requirements in developing countries related to nuclear power plant safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management along with key technical regulatory issues. It does not deal with economic or market regulation of electric utilities using nuclear power. It suggests that national regulatory requirements be developed using IAEA safety recommendations as guidelines and safety requirements of the supplier country as a main reference after careful planning, manpower buildup and thorough study of international and supplier country's regulations. Regulation making is not recommended before experienced manpower has been accumulated. With an option that the supplier country's regulations may be used in the interim, the lack of complete national regulatory requirements should not deter introduction of nuclear power in developing countries. (author)

  3. Assessment of LANL transportation policies and procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Danna, J.G.; Jennrich, E.A.; Lund, D.M.; Davis, K.D.; Hoevemeyer, S.S.

    1991-04-01

    In order to determine whether activities related to the transportation of waste at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) were being conducted in accordance with DOE policy, requirements stated in applicable DOE Orders were reviewed and compared with LANL policies and procedures described in the Administrative Requirements and the On-Site Transportation Manual. The following DOE Orders were determined to pertain to waste transportation and thus reviewed to identify requirements for which LANL is responsible for satisfying: Order 5820.2A Radioactive Waste Management; Order 1540.1 Materials Transportation and Traffic Management; and Order 5480.3 Safety Requirements for the Packaging and Transportation of Hazardous Materials, Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous Wastes. The LANL On-Site Transportation Manual and the Administrative Requirements contained in the LANL Environment, Safety, and Health Manual were reviewed to verify that each of the requirements identified through the review of the Orders and 10 CFR Part 71 were being satisfied. The following Administrative Requirements were considered in this task: Shipment of Radioactive Materials; Radioactive Liquid Waste; Low-Level Radioactive Solid Waste; Chemical, Hazardous, and Mixed Waste; Polychlorinated Biphenyls; and Transuranic (TRU) Solid Waste

  4. The comparison of license management procedure for nuclear power plant in China and United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yu Zusheng

    2006-01-01

    'Tow steps' license management procedure for nuclear power plant has been performed bas- ted on the requirement of 10CFR Part50-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES in United States since last century fifties. In order to ulterior reduce the risk of investment and technical for new construction nuclear power plants, new regulations 'One step' license management procedure-10CFR Part52-EARLY SITE PERMITS; STANDARD DESIGN CERTIFICATIONS; AND COMBINED LICENSES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS issued in 1989. The new regulations has been adopted by new design of nuclear power plant, for example AP1000. ‘The similar tow steps’ license management procedure for nuclear power plant has been performed basted on the requirement of HAFO01/01 Rules for the Implementation of Regulations on the Safety Regulation for Civilian Nuclear Installations of the People's Re- public of China Part One: Application and Issuance of Safety License for Nuclear Power Plant (December 1993) in China since last century nineties. This article introduces and compares the requirements and characteristics of above license management procedure for nuclear power plant in China and United States. (author)

  5. Physical safety: using of multimedia technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Munoz Garcia, M.

    1995-01-01

    For managing physical safety systems in nuclear power plants sophisticated computer equipment is essential. Standard safety procedure requires systems distributed throughout the plant, especially at security posts: Entrance Door, Access Control Center, Restricted Areas, etc. Besides being highly distributed, computerized physical safety management systems have always been characterized by the need to integrate very different elements. Graphic images have always played a very important role: photographs, fingerprints, signatures, etc. This makes integrated multimedia modules the ideal solution. This presentation describes how safety systems can combine not only still images, but also other multimedia data such as sound and video. It examines methodologies for using this new technology to upgrade high cost computer systems already in operation that can not be replaced. (Author)

  6. Shutdown Safety in NEK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gluhak, Mario; Senegovic, Marko

    2014-01-01

    Industry performance analysis since 2004 has revealed that 23% of the events reported to WANO occurred during outage periods. Given the fact that a plant is in the outage only 5 percent of the time, this emphasizes the importance of shutdown safety and measures station staffs undertake to maintain effective barriers to safety margins during the outage. Back in 1990s, the industry adopted guidance to meet safety requirements by focusing on safety functions. Both WANO and INPO released various documents, reports and guidelines to help accomplish those requirements. However, in the last decade inadequate 'defence in depth' has led to several events affecting shutdown safety and challenging one of the most important nuclear safety principles: 'The special characteristics of nuclear technology are taken into account in all decisions and actions. Reactivity control, continuity of core cooling, and integrity of fission product barriers are valued as essential, distinguishing attributes of nuclear station work environment'. NEK has recognized the importance of 'defence in depth'Industry performance analysis since 2004 has revealed that 23% of the events reported to WANO occurred during outage periods. Given the fact that a plant is in the outage only 5 percent of the time, this emphasizes the importance of shutdown safety and measures station staffs undertake to maintain effective barriers to safety margins during the outage. Back in 1990s, the industry adopted guidance to meet safety requirements by focusing on safety functions. Both WANO and INPO released various documents, reports and guidelines to help accomplish those requirements. However, in the last decade inadequate 'defence in depth' has led to several events affecting shutdown safety and challenging one of the most important nuclear safety principles: 'The special characteristics of nuclear technology are taken into account in all decisions and actions. Reactivity

  7. Software quality assurance for safety analysis and risk management at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ades, M.J.; Toffer, H.; Crowe, R.D.

    1991-01-01

    As part of its Reactor Operations Improvement Program at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), in cooperation with the Westinghouse Hanford Company, has developed and implemented quality assurance for safety-related software for technical programs essential to the safety and reliability of reactor operations. More specifically, the quality assurance process involved the development and implementation of quality standards and attendant procedures based on industry software quality standards. These procedures were then applied to computer codes in reactor safety and probabilistic risk assessment analyses. This paper provides a review of the major aspects of the WSRC safety-related software quality assurance. In particular, quality assurance procedures are described for the different life cycle phases of the software that include the Requirements, Software Design and Implementation, Testing and Installation, Operation and Maintenance, and Retirement Phases. For each phase, specific provisions are made to categorize the range of activities, the level of responsibilities, and the documentation needed to assure the control of the software. The software quality assurance procedures developed and implemented are evolutionary in nature, and thus, prone to further refinements. These procedures, nevertheless, represent an effective controlling tool for the development, production, and operation of safety-related software applicable to reactor safety and probabilistic risk assessment analyses

  8. TYPICAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF AN OPERATOR IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alexander Michaylovich Lushkin

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available In order to implement the concept of acceptable risk all airlines should have the Safety Management System (SMS from 01.01.2009 - at the request of ICAO and from 01.01.2010 - at the request of the Federal Air Transport Agen- cy. State requirements for SMS have not been formulated clearly. Leading airlines, in an effort to meet international stand- ards, develop and implement SMS on their own. So the implemented SMS differ in control settings (level of safety, proce- dures and methodological support of the processes of safety management. The summary of the best experience in develop- ment, implementation and improvement of SMS in leading airlines, allows to create a standard SMS to the airline, where the basic procedures required by the standards are systematized. The standard SMS is formed on experience in design, implementation and development of corporate SMS in three leading Russian airlines, in which the author worked in 2006-2015, and can be the basis of an SMS of the airlines operat- ing the planes and helicopters. Taken into account in a typical SMS requirements of international and national standards, research results, developed and implemented methodical maintenance of management procedures level of safety, contribut- ed to the successful passage of IATA periodic audits on developing standards of operational safety IOSA by the airline members and achieve the best level of safety not only in Russia but also in the world.

  9. Safety criteria for siting a nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The guide sets forth requirements for safety of the population and the environment in nuclear power plant siting. It also sets out the general basis for procedures employed by other competent authorities when they issue regulations or grant licences. On request STUK (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland) issues case-specific statements about matters relating to planning and about other matters relating to land use in the environment of nuclear power plants

  10. 76 FR 64 - Safety and Health Requirements Related to Camp Cars

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-01-03

    .... Water uses such as personal oral hygiene, drinking, food washing, preparation, cooking, cleaning of the... of Sec. 228.325 to ensure that the food service is safe and sanitary. FRA will hold the railroad... proposed section sets forth requirements regarding the safety of heating, cooking, ventilation, air...

  11. A Review of Safety and Design Requirements of the Artificial Pancreas

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Blauw, Helga; Keith-Hynes, Patrick; Koops, Robin; DeVries, J. Hans

    2016-01-01

    As clinical studies with artificial pancreas systems for automated blood glucose control in patients with type 1 diabetes move to unsupervised real-life settings, product development will be a focus of companies over the coming years. Directions or requirements regarding safety in the design of an

  12. ALS beamline design requirements: A guide for beamline designers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-06-01

    This manual is written as a guide for researchers in designing beamlines and endstations acceptable for use at the ALS. It contains guidelines and policies related to personnel safety and equipment and vacuum protection. All equipment and procedures must ultimately satisfy the safety requirements set aside in the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) Health and Safety Manual (PUB-3000) which is available from the ALS User Office or on the World WideWeb from the LBNL Homepage (http:// www.lbl.gov).

  13. Safety philosophy and research program of the LWR development in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nickel, H.

    1978-11-01

    In this paper the framework of the reactor safety concept in the Federal Republic of Germany will be described. It is grounded on several cornerstones the most important of which are a closed fuel cycle concept, a statutory licensing and supervision procedure, a set of compulsory safety-engineering requirements and comprehensive research in the field of reactor-safety. The main part of this last area is the Reactor Safety Research Program sponsored by the Federal Minister for Research and Technology. Furthermore, in this paper emphasis is laid on safety requirements particularly with regard to the quality of the reactor pressure vessel. (orig.) [de

  14. Technical evaluation of seismic qualification of safety-related equipment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cho, Yang Hui; Park, Heong Gee; Park, Yeong Seok [Univ. of Incheon, Incheon (Korea, Republic of)

    1994-04-15

    This study is purposed to evaluate the technical acceptability of the procedures and techniques of seismic qualifications which were performed for the YGN 3 and 4 safety-related equipment.This study is also targeted to suggest a systematized technical procedure guide for the effective performance and review of the seismic qualification, which reflects the most up-to-date licensing requirements and state-of the-art.

  15. Safety of Induced Sputum Collection in Children Hospitalized With Severe or Very Severe Pneumonia.

    Science.gov (United States)

    DeLuca, Andrea N; Hammitt, Laura L; Kim, Julia; Higdon, Melissa M; Baggett, Henry C; Brooks, W Abdullah; Howie, Stephen R C; Deloria Knoll, Maria; Kotloff, Karen L; Levine, Orin S; Madhi, Shabir A; Murdoch, David R; Scott, J Anthony G; Thea, Donald M; Amornintapichet, Tussanee; Awori, Juliet O; Chuananon, Somchai; Driscoll, Amanda J; Ebruke, Bernard E; Hossain, Lokman; Jahan, Yasmin; Kagucia, E Wangeci; Kazungu, Sidi; Moore, David P; Mudau, Azwifarwi; Mwananyanda, Lawrence; Park, Daniel E; Prosperi, Christine; Seidenberg, Phil; Sylla, Mamadou; Tapia, Milagritos D; Zaman, Syed M A; O'Brien, Katherine L

    2017-06-15

    Induced sputum (IS) may provide diagnostic information about the etiology of pneumonia. The safety of this procedure across a heterogeneous population with severe pneumonia in low- and middle-income countries has not been described. IS specimens were obtained as part a 7-country study of the etiology of severe and very severe pneumonia in hospitalized children <5 years of age. Rigorous clinical monitoring was done before, during, and after the procedure to record oxygen requirement, oxygen saturation, respiratory rate, consciousness level, and other evidence of clinical deterioration. Criteria for IS contraindications were predefined and serious adverse events (SAEs) were reported to ethics committees and a central safety monitor. A total of 4653 IS procedures were done among 3802 children. Thirteen SAEs were reported in relation to collection of IS, or 0.34% of children with at least 1 IS specimen collected (95% confidence interval, 0.15%-0.53%). A drop in oxygen saturation that required supplemental oxygen was the most common SAE. One child died after feeding was reinitiated 2 hours after undergoing sputum induction; this death was categorized as "possibly related" to the procedure. The overall frequency of SAEs was very low, and the nature of most SAEs was manageable, demonstrating a low-risk safety profile for IS collection even among severely ill children in low-income-country settings. Healthcare providers should monitor oxygen saturation and requirements during and after IS collection, and assess patients prior to reinitiating feeding after the IS procedure, to ensure patient safety. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press for the Infectious Diseases Society of America.

  16. Relationship between general safety requirements and safety culture in the improvement of safe operation of I.N.R. TRIGA reactor facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ciocanescu, M.; Preda, M.; Chiritescu, M.; Dumitru, M.

    1996-01-01

    Acquiring of the basic principles of ''safety culture'' by a large number of profesionals in the nuclear field drew the attention of the decision factors in the INR managerial structure, who decided to promote certain practical actions at each level in order to improve nuclear safety. Starting from the ''Republican Standards for Nuclear Safety'' issued by CSEN in 1975, where general safety criteria are defined for nuclear reactors and NPPs, the specialists at the TRIGA reactor originated and implemented a coherent and secure system to ensure nuclear safety over all steps of nuclear activities: research, conception, execution, commissioning and operation. This system has been continuosly corrected so that now it is completely integrated in a modern safety system. The paper presents the way in which a modern system for nuclear safety at the TRIGA reactor has been implemented and developed, in accordance to specific criteria and requirements imposed by related National Regulations and with the principles of safety culture. Starting from the definition of specific responsabilities, there are presented the internal stipulations and practical actions at all levels in order to enhance nuclear safety. (orig.)

  17. Application of fuzzy set theory for safety culture and safety management assessment of Kartini research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syarip; Hauptmanns, U.

    2000-01-01

    The safety culture status of nuclear power plant is usually assessed through interview and/or discussions with personnel and management in plant, and an assessment of the pertinent documentation. The approach for safety culture assessment described in IAEA Safety Series, make uses of a questionnaire composed of questions which require 'Yes' or 'No' as an answer. Hence, it is basically a check-list approach which is quite common for safety assessments in industry. Such a procedure ignores the fact that the expert answering the question usually has knowledge which goes far beyond a mere binary answer. Additionally, many situations cannot readily be described in such restricted terms. Therefore, it was developed a checklist consisting of questions which are formulated such that they require more than a simple 'yes' or 'no' as an answer. This allows one to exploit the expert knowledge of the analyst appropriately by asking him to qualify the degree of compliance of each of the topics examined. The method presented has proved useful in assessing the safety culture and quality of safety management of the research reactor. The safety culture status and the quality of safety management of Kartini research reactor is rated as 'average'. The method is also flexible and allows one to add questions to existing areas or to introduce new areas covering related topics

  18. Nuclear data for fission reactor core design and safety analysis: Requirements and status of accuracy of nuclear data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rowlands, J.L.

    1984-01-01

    The types of nuclear data required for fission reactor design and safety analysis, and the ways in which the data are represented and approximated for use in reactor calculations, are summarised first. The relative importance of different items of nuclear data in the prediction of reactor parameters is described and ways of investigating the accuracy of these data by evaluating related integral measurements are discussed. The use of sensitivity analysis, together with estimates of the uncertainties in nuclear data and relevant integral measurements, in assessing the accuracy of prediction of reactor parameters is described. The inverse procedure for deciding nuclear data requirements from the target accuracies for prediction of reactor parameters follows on from this. The need for assessments of the uncertainties in nuclear data evaluations and the form of the uncertainty information is discussed. The status of the accuracies of predictions and nuclear data requirements are then summarised. The reactor parameters considered include: (a) Criticality conditions, conversion and burn-up effects. (b) Energy production and deposition, decay heating, irradiation damage, dosimetry and induced radioactivity. (c) Kinetics characteristics and control, including temperature, power and coolant density coefficients, delayed neutrons and control absorbers. (author)

  19. Safety requirements and feedback of commonly used material handling equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pathak, M.K.

    2009-01-01

    Different types of cranes, hoists, chain pulley blocks are the most commonly used material handling equipment in industry along with attachments like chains, wire rope slings, d-shackles, etc. These equipment are used at work for transferring loads from one place to another and attachments are used for anchoring, fixing or supporting the load. Selection of the correct equipment, identification of the equipment planning of material handling operation, examination/testing of the equipment, education and training of the persons engaged in operation of the material handling equipment can reduce the risks to safety of people in workplace. Different safety systems like boom angle indicator, overload tripping device, limit switches, etc. should be available in the cranes for their safe use. Safety requirement for safe operation of material handling equipment with emphasis on different cranes and attachments particularly wire rope slings and chain slings have been brought out in this paper. An attempt has also been made to bring out common nature of deficiencies observed during regulatory inspection carried out by AERB. (author)

  20. PSA Update Procedures, an Ultimate Need for Living PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hegedus, D.

    1998-01-01

    Nuclear facilities by their complex nature, change with time. These changes can be both physical (plant modification, etc.), operational (enhanced procedures, etc.) and organizational. In addition, there are also changes in our understanding of the plant, due to operational experience, data collection, technology enhancements, etc. Therefore, it is imperative that PSA model must be frequently up-dated or modified to reflect these changes. Over the last ten years. these has been a remarkable growth of the use of Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs). The most rapidly growing area of the PSA Applications is their use to support operational decision-making. Many of these applications are characterized by the potential for not only improving the safety level but also for providing guidance on the optimal use of resources and reducing regulatory burden. To enable a wider use of the PSA model as a tool for safety activities it is essential to maintain the model in a controlled state. Moreover, to fulfill requirements for L iving PSA , the PSA model has to be constantly updated and/or monitored to reflect the current plant configuration. It should be noted that the PSA model should not only represent the plant design but should also represent the operational and emergency procedures. To keep the PSA model up-to-date several issues should be clearly defined including: - Responsibility should be divided among the PSA group, - Procedures for implementing changes should be established, and - QA requirements/program should be established to assure documentation and reporting. (author)

  1. PGSFR Core Thermal Design Procedure to Evaluate the Safety Margin

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Sun Rock; Kim, Sang-Ji [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has performed a SFR design with the final goal of constructing a prototype plant by 2028. The main objective of the SFR prototype plant is to verify the TRU metal fuel performance, reactor operation, and transmutation ability of high-level wastes. The core thermal design is to ensure the safe fuel performance during the whole plant operation. Compared to the critical heat flux in typical light water reactors, nuclear fuel damage in SFR subassemblies arises from a creep induced failure. The creep limit is evaluated based on the maximum cladding temperature, power, neutron flux, and uncertainties in the design parameters, as shown in Fig. 1. In this work, the core thermal design procedures are compared to verify the present PGSFR methodology based on the nuclear plant design criteria/guidelines and previous SFR thermal design methods. The PGSFR core thermal design procedure is verified based on the nuclear plant design criteria/guidelines and previous methods in LWRs and SFRs. The present method aims to directly evaluate the fuel cladding failure and to assure more safety margin. The 2 uncertainty is similar to 95% one-side tolerance limit of 1.96 in LWRs. The HCFs, ITDP, and MCM reveal similar uncertainty propagation for cladding midwall temperature for typical SFR conditions. The present HCFs are mainly employed from the CRBR except the fuel-related uncertainty such as an incorrect fuel distribution. Preliminary PGSFR specific HCFs will be developed by the end of 2015.

  2. Procedure for following external nuclear power plant operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kostadinov, V.

    2003-01-01

    Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) has developed computer database and the procedure for following-up and investigating external nuclear operating experience and administrative requirements. The SNSA's primary goal is to investigate safety significant events in due time, to analyze them from the regulatory point of view and to ensure that meaningful lessons be learned and used for improvement of the safe operation of Slovenian Nuclear Power Plant Krsko. Moreover, we intend to make uniform format and method for reporting broader spectrum of events analyzed including low level event reporting. (author)

  3. OCRWM [Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management] Safety Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-12-01

    The OCRWM Safety Plan sets forth management policies and general requirements for the safety of the public and of personnel associated with the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program (hereinafter called the ''Program''). It is applicable to all individuals and organizational elements of the Program, including all facilities and activities controlled by the Program pursuant to the Act, and to all phases of the Program. The plan defines the responsibilities assigned by the Director of the OCRWM to the various OCRWM line organizations, and to the contractors and the projects. It discusses the means by which safety policies and requirements will be communicated, and summarizes the applicable DOE Orders, and the procedures for reviewing, reporting, and evaluating safety problems. In addition, the OCRWM Safety Plan addresses DOE Orders applicable to occupational health and safety, worker protection, and public health and safety. OCRWM believes that it has an equally high level of commitment to both public safety and worker safety. The Plan also summarizes applicable NRC criteria and regulations that will be imposed through the formal licensing proceedings. While the Safety Plan sets forth OCRWM policy, it is not intended to be prescriptive in the details of implementation. Each OCRWM program element must develop and control its own set of detailed requirements for the protection of its workers and the public based on the principles set forth herein

  4. JET-ISX-B beryllium limiter experiment safety analysis report and operational safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edmonds, P.H.

    1985-09-01

    An experiment to evaluate the suitability of beryllium as a limiter material has been completed on the ISX-B tokamak. The experiment consisted of two phases: (1) the initial operation and characterization in the ISX experiment, and a period of continued operation to the specified surface fluence (10 22 atoms/cm 2 ) of hydrogen ions; and (2) the disassembly, decontamination, or disposal of the ISX facility. During these two phases of the project, the possibility existed for beryllium and/or beryllium oxide powder to be produced inside the vacuum vessel. Beryllium dust is a highly toxic material, and extensive precautions are required to prevent the release of the beryllium into the experimental work area and to prevent the contamination of personnel working on the device. Details of the health hazards associated with beryllium and the appropriate precautions are presented. Also described in appendixes to this report are the various operational safety requirements for the project

  5. Eurosafe 2006 radioactive waste management: long term safety requirements and societal expectations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety, to share experiences, exchange technical and scientific opinions, and conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum 2006 focuses on 'Radioactive Waste Management: Long Term Safety Requirements and Societal Expectations' from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry and presents the latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining increasing recognition. This

  6. Eurosafe 2006 radioactive waste management: long term safety requirements and societal expectations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety, to share experiences, exchange technical and scientific opinions, and conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum 2006 focuses on 'Radioactive Waste Management: Long Term Safety Requirements and Societal Expectations' from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry and presents the latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining increasing recognition. This

  7. Eurosafe 2006 radioactive waste management: long term safety requirements and societal expectations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety, to share experiences, exchange technical and scientific opinions, and conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum 2006 focuses on 'Radioactive Waste Management: Long Term Safety Requirements and Societal Expectations' from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry and presents the latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining increasing recognition

  8. Construction products performances and basic requirements for fire safety of facades in energy rehabilitation of buildings

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Laban Mirjana Đ.

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Construction product means any product or kit which is produced and placed on the market for incorporation in a permanent manner in construction works, or parts thereof, and the performance of which has an effect on the performance of the construction works with respect to the basic requirements for construction works. Safety in case of fire and Energy economy and heat retention represent two among seven basic requirements which building has to meet according to contemporary technical rules on planning and construction. Performances of external walls building materials (particularly reaction to fire could significantly affect to fire spread on the façade and other building parts. Therefore, façade shaping and materialization in building renewal process, has to meet the fire safety requirement, as well as the energy requirement. Brief survey of fire protection regulations development in Serbia is presented in the paper. Preventive measures for fire risk reduction in building façade energy renewal are proposed according to contemporary fire safety requirements.

  9. Safety Culture: A Requirement for New Business Models — Lessons Learned from Other High Risk Industries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kecklund, L.

    2016-01-01

    Technical development and changes on global markets affects all high risk industries creating opportunities as well as risks related to the achievement of safety and business goals. Changes in legal and regulatory frameworks as well as in market demands create a need for major changes. Several high risk industries are facing a situation where they have to develop new business models. Within the transportation domain, e.g., aviation and railways, there is a growing concern related to how the new business models may affects safety issues. New business models in aviation and railways include extensive use of outsourcing and subcontractors to reduce costs resulting in, e.g., negative changes in working conditions, work hours, employment conditions and high turnover rates. The energy sector also faces pressures to create new business models for transition to renewable energy production to comply with new legal and regulatory requirements and to make best use of new reactor designs. In addition, large scale phase out and decommissioning of nuclear facilities have to be managed by the nuclear industry. Some negative effects of new business models have already arisen within the transportation domain, e.g., the negative effects of extensive outsourcing and subcontractor use. In the railway domain the infrastructure manager is required by European and national regulations to assure that all subcontractors are working according to the requirements in the infrastructure managers SMS (Safety Management System). More than ten levels of subcontracts can be working in a major infrastructure project making the system highly complex and thus difficult to control. In the aviation domain, tightly coupled interacting computer networks supplying airport services, as well as air traffic control, are managed and maintained by several different companies creating numerous interfaces which must be managed by the SMS. There are examples where a business model with several low

  10. IAEA safety standards for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abou Yehia, H.

    2007-01-01

    The general structure of the IAEA Safety Standards and the process for their development and revision are briefly presented and discussed together with the progress achieved in the development of Safety Standards for research reactor. These documents provide the safety requirements and the key technical recommendations to achieve enhanced safety. They are intended for use by all organizations involved in safety of research reactors and developed in a way that allows them to be incorporated into national laws and regulations. The author reviews the safety standards for research reactors and details their specificities. There are 4 published safety standards: 1) Safety assessment of research reactors and preparation of the safety analysis report (35-G1), 2) Safety in the utilization and modification of research reactors (35-G2), 3) Commissioning of research reactors (NS-G-4.1), and 4) Maintenance, periodic testing and inspection of research reactors (NS-G-4.2). There 5 draft safety standards: 1) Operational limits and conditions and operating procedures for research reactors (DS261), 2) The operating organization and the recruitment, training and qualification of personnel for research reactors (DS325), 3) Radiation protection and radioactive waste management in the design and operation of research reactors (DS340), 4) Core management and fuel handling at research reactors (DS350), and 5) Grading the application of safety requirements for research reactors (DS351). There are 2 planned safety standards, one concerning the ageing management for research reactor and the second deals with the control and instrumentation of research reactors

  11. Definition and means of maintaining the supply ventilation system seismic shutdown portion of the PFP safety envelope. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keck, R.D.

    1995-01-01

    This report describes the modifications to the ventilation system for the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Topics discussed in this report include; system functional requirements, evaluations of equipment, a list of drawings showing the safety envelope boundaries; list of safety envelope equipment, functional requirements for individual safety envelope equipment, and a list of the operational, maintenance and surveillance procedures necessary to operate and maintain the system equipment

  12. Software Safety Risk in Legacy Safety-Critical Computer Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hill, Janice L.; Baggs, Rhoda

    2007-01-01

    Safety Standards contain technical and process-oriented safety requirements. Technical requirements are those such as "must work" and "must not work" functions in the system. Process-Oriented requirements are software engineering and safety management process requirements. Address the system perspective and some cover just software in the system > NASA-STD-8719.13B Software Safety Standard is the current standard of interest. NASA programs/projects will have their own set of safety requirements derived from the standard. Safety Cases: a) Documented demonstration that a system complies with the specified safety requirements. b) Evidence is gathered on the integrity of the system and put forward as an argued case. [Gardener (ed.)] c) Problems occur when trying to meet safety standards, and thus make retrospective safety cases, in legacy safety-critical computer systems.

  13. Considerations on the Application of the IAEA Safety Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-05-01

    Revised to take into consideration findings from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, has introduced some new concepts with respect to the earlier safety standard published in the year 2000. The preparation of SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1) was carried out with constant and intense involvement of IAEA Member States, but some new requirements, because of the novelty of the concepts introduced and the complexity of the issues, are not always interpreted in a unique way. The IAEA is confident that a complete clarification and a full understanding of the new requirements will be available when the supporting safety guides for design and safety assessment of nuclear power plants are prepared. The IAEA expects that the effort devoted to the preparation of this publication, which received input and comments from several Member States and experts, will also facilitate and harmonize the preparation or revision of these supporting standards

  14. Procedures to relate the NII safety assessment principles for nuclear reactors to risk

    CERN Document Server

    Kelly, G N; Hemming, C R

    1985-01-01

    Within the framework of the Public Inquiry into the proposed pressurised water reactor (PWR) at Sizewell, estimates were made of the levels of individual and societal risk from a PWR designed in a manner which would conform to the safety assessment principles formulated by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII). The procedures used to derive these levels of risk are described in this report. The opportunity has also been taken to revise the risk estimates made at the time of the Inquiry by taking account of additional data which were not then available, and to provide further quantification of the likely range of uncertainty in the predictions. This re-analysis has led to small changes in the levels of risk previously evaluated, but these are not sufficient to affect the broad conclusions reached before. For a reactor just conforming to the NII safety assessment principles a maximum individual risk of fatal cancer of about 10 sup - sup 6 per year of reactor operation has been estimated; the societal ris...

  15. Modeling the Non-functional Requirements in the Context of Usability, Performance, Safety and Security

    OpenAIRE

    Sadiq, Mazhar

    2007-01-01

    Requirement engineering is the most significant part of the software development life cycle. Until now great emphasis has been put on the maturity of the functional requirements. But with the passage of time it reveals that the success of software development does not only pertain to the functional requirements rather non-functional requirements should also be taken into consideration. Among the non-functional requirements usability, performance, safety and security are considered important. ...

  16. 78 FR 55230 - Safety and Environmental Management System Requirements for Vessels on the U.S. Outer Continental...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-09-10

    ...\\ including the regulation of workplace safety and health.\\2\\ The Coast Guard's regulatory authority extends... 147 [Docket No. USCG-2012-0779] RIN 1625-AC05 Safety and Environmental Management System Requirements... a vessel-specific Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS) that incorporates the management...

  17. International comparison of safety criteria applied to radwaste repositories. Safety aspects of the post-operational phase

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baltes, B.

    1994-01-01

    There is a generally accepted system of framework safety conditions governing the construction, operation, and post-operational monitoring of radwaste repositories. Although the development of these framework conditions may vary from country to country, the resulting criteria are based on the commonly accepted system of priciples and purposes established for ultimate radioactive waste disposal. The experience accumulated by GRS in the course of the plan approval procedure for the Konrad mine site and the safety-relevant studies performed for the planned Morsleben repository clearly show demand for further development of the safety criteria. In Germany, it is especially the safety criteria and detailed requirements filling the framework safety conditions that need revision and in-depth definition, as well as comparison and harmonisation with internationally applied criteria. These activities will particularly consider the international convention on radioactive waste management currently in preparation under the auspieces of the IAEA. (orig.) [de

  18. Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for Building 332, Increment III

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Odell, B. N.; Toy, Jr., A. J.

    1977-08-31

    This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) supplements the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR), dated January 18, 1974, for Building 332, Increment III of the Plutonium Materials Engineering Facility located at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL). The FSAR, in conjunction with the PSAR, shows that the completed increment provides facilities for safely conducting the operations as described. These documents satisfy the requirements of ERDA Manual Appendix 6101, Annex C, dated April 8, 1971. The format and content of this FSAR complies with the basic requirements of the letter of request from ERDA San to LLL, dated March 10, 1972. Included as appendices in support of th FSAR are the Building 332 Operational Safety Procedure and the LLL Disaster Control Plan.

  19. Systems reliability analyses and risk analyses for the licencing procedure under atomic law

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berning, A.; Spindler, H.

    1983-01-01

    For the licencing procedure under atomic law in accordance with Article 7 AtG, the nuclear power plant as a whole needs to be assessed, plus the reliability of systems and plant components that are essential to safety are to be determined with probabilistic methods. This requirement is the consequence of safety criteria for nuclear power plants issued by the Home Department (BMI). Systems reliability studies and risk analyses used in licencing procedures under atomic law are identified. The stress is on licencing decisions, mainly for PWR-type reactors. Reactor Safety Commission (RSK) guidelines, examples of reasoning in legal proceedings and arguments put forth by objectors are also dealt with. Correlations are shown between reliability analyses made by experts and licencing decisions by means of examples. (orig./HP) [de

  20. Safety analysis of the post-operational phase

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berg, H.P.; Ehrlich, D.

    1991-01-01

    The safety analysis of normal operation covers an analytical study of the system parts ultimate repository - waste forms of the ultimate repository system under normal and accidental operation. On that basis a requirement concept has been developed which entails reactions on planning and design of the repository, and requirements of waste products, packagings and permissible activities. The procedure for the operational phase is explained giving the Konrad repository project as an example. (DG) [de