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Sample records for safety injection tank

  1. Performance Analysis of Multi Stage Safety Injection Tank

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Soo Jai; Kim, Young In; Bae, Youngmin; Kang, Han-Ok; Kim, Keung Koo

    2015-01-01

    In general the integral reactor has such characteristics, the integral reactor requires a high flow rate of coolant safety injection at the initial stage of the accident in which the core level is relatively fast decreased, A medium flow rate of coolant safety injection at the early and middle stages of the accident in which the coolant discharge flow rate is relatively large due to a high internal pressure of the reactor vessel, and a low flow rate of coolant safety injection is required at the middle and late stages of the accident in which the coolant discharge flow rate is greatly reduced due to a decreased pressure of the reactor vessel. It is noted that a high flow rate of the integral reactor is quite smaller compared to a flow rate required in the commercial loop type reactor. However, a nitrogen pressurized safety injection tank has been typically designed to quickly inject a high flow rate of coolant when the internal pressure of the reactor vessel is rapidly decreased, and a core makeup tank has been designed to safely inject at a single mode flow rate due to a gravitational head of water subsequent to making a pressure balance between the reactor vessel and core makeup tank. As a result, in order to compensate such a disadvantage, various type systems are used in a complicated manner in a reactor according to the required characteristic of safety injection during an accident. In the present study, we have investigated numerically the performance of the multi stage safety injection tank. A parameter study has performed to understand the characteristics of the multi stage safety injection tank. The performance of the multi stage safety injection tank has been investigated numerically. When an accident occurs, the coolant in the multi stage safety injection tank is injected into a reactor vessel by a gravitational head of water subsequent to making a pressure balance between the reactor and tank. At the early stages of the accident, the high flow rate of

  2. Performance Analysis of Multi Stage Safety Injection Tank

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shin, Soo Jai; Kim, Young In; Bae, Youngmin; Kang, Han-Ok; Kim, Keung Koo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    In general the integral reactor has such characteristics, the integral reactor requires a high flow rate of coolant safety injection at the initial stage of the accident in which the core level is relatively fast decreased, A medium flow rate of coolant safety injection at the early and middle stages of the accident in which the coolant discharge flow rate is relatively large due to a high internal pressure of the reactor vessel, and a low flow rate of coolant safety injection is required at the middle and late stages of the accident in which the coolant discharge flow rate is greatly reduced due to a decreased pressure of the reactor vessel. It is noted that a high flow rate of the integral reactor is quite smaller compared to a flow rate required in the commercial loop type reactor. However, a nitrogen pressurized safety injection tank has been typically designed to quickly inject a high flow rate of coolant when the internal pressure of the reactor vessel is rapidly decreased, and a core makeup tank has been designed to safely inject at a single mode flow rate due to a gravitational head of water subsequent to making a pressure balance between the reactor vessel and core makeup tank. As a result, in order to compensate such a disadvantage, various type systems are used in a complicated manner in a reactor according to the required characteristic of safety injection during an accident. In the present study, we have investigated numerically the performance of the multi stage safety injection tank. A parameter study has performed to understand the characteristics of the multi stage safety injection tank. The performance of the multi stage safety injection tank has been investigated numerically. When an accident occurs, the coolant in the multi stage safety injection tank is injected into a reactor vessel by a gravitational head of water subsequent to making a pressure balance between the reactor and tank. At the early stages of the accident, the high flow rate of

  3. Preliminary study on functional performance of compound type multistage safety injection tank

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bae, Youngmin; Kim, Young In; Kim, Keung Koo

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • Functional performance of compound type multistage safety injection tanks is studied. • Effects of key design parameters are scrutinized. • Distinctive flow features in compound type safety injection tanks are explored. - Abstract: A parametric study is carried out to evaluate the functional performance of a compound type multistage safety injection tank that would be considered one of the components for the passive safety injection systems in nuclear power plants. The effects of key design parameters such as the initial volume fraction and charging pressure of gas, tank elevation, vertical location of a sparger, resistance coefficient, and operating condition on the injection flow rate are scrutinized along with a discussion of the relevant flow features. The obtained results indicate that the compound type multistage safety injection tank can effectively control the injection flow rate in a passive manner, by switching the driving force for the safety injection from gas pressure to gravity during the refill and reflood phases, respectively

  4. Transient performance analysis of pressurized safety injection tank with a partition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bae, Youngmin; Kim, Young In; Kim, Keung Koo

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • Functional performance of safety injection tanks with a partition is evaluated. • Effects of key design parameters are scrutinized. • Distinctive features of the flow in multi-unit safety injection tanks are explored. - Abstract: A parametric study has been performed to evaluate the functional performance of a pressurized multi-unit safety injection tank, which would be considered as one of the candidates for a passive safety injection system in a nuclear power plant. The influences of key design parameters including the orifice size, initial gas fraction, and resistance coefficients and operating condition on the injection flow rate are scrutinized with a discussion of the relevant flow features such as the choked flow of gas through an orifice and two interconnected regions of differing gaseous pressure. The obtained results indicate that a multi-unit safety injection tank can passively control the injection flow rate and provide a stable safety injection over a relatively long period even in the case of drastic depressurization of a reactor coolant system

  5. CFD Analysis of the Safety Injection Tank and Fluidic Device

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cho, Jai Oan; Nietiadi, Yohanes Setiawan; Lee, Jeong Ik [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Addad, Yacine [KUSTAR, Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates)

    2016-05-15

    One of the most important components in the ECCS is the safety injection tank (SIT). Inside the SIT, a fluidic device is installed, which passively controls the mass flow of the safety injection and eliminates the need for low pressure safety injection pumps. As more passive safety mechanisms are being pursued, it has become more important to understand flow structure and the loss mechanism within the fluidic device. Current computational fluid dynamics (CFD) calculations have had limited success in predicting the fluid flow accurately. This study proposes to find a more exact result using CFD and more realistic modeling to predict the performance during accident scenarios more accurately. The safety injection tank with fluidic device was analyzed thoroughly using CFD. The preliminary calculation used 60,000 meshes for the initial test calculation. The results fit the experimental results surprisingly despite its coarse grid. Nonetheless, the mesh resolution was increased to capture the vortex in the fluidic device precisely. Once a detailed CFD computation is finished, a small-scale experiment will be conducted for the given conditions. Using the experimental results and the CFD model, physical models can be improved to fit the results more accurately.

  6. Hydrodynamics of Safety Injection Tank with Fluidic Device in Recent Regulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bang, Young Seok; Yoo, Seung Hun

    2016-01-01

    Safety Injection Tank (SIT) with Fluidic Device (FD) has been used in several APR1400 nuclear power plants. It was designed to provide a longer passive safety injection than the existing accumulator to improve the safety for Large Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LBLOCA) by changing the injected flow through the FD and the standpipe of the SIT. As a result, high flow injection phase and the subsequent low flow one can be achieved as longer than the existing accumulator. The present paper discusses the major concerns related to SIT hydrodynamics and the directions to resolution recently concerned. Modeling of SIT/FD by total hydraulic resistances, potential of nitrogen intrusion, and effect of initial pressure of SIT testing are included. Based on the discussion, a table of the important phenomena of the SIT/FD was proposed with the relevancy of the calculation models applied. The present paper discussed the SIT hydrodynamics including the modeling of SIT/FD by total hydraulic resistances, potential of nitrogen intrusion, and effect of initial pressure of SIT testing. Also a table of the important phenomena of the SIT/FD was proposed with the relevancy of the calculation models applied. The following conclusions are obtained uncertainty due to the assumption of the total Kfactor as constant for high flow, transition phase, and low flow phase should be considered and nitrogen intrusion phenomena during the transition phase should be considered with a conservatism, especially considering the current situation of nonmeasuring the standpipe level

  7. Hydrodynamics of Safety Injection Tank with Fluidic Device in Recent Regulation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bang, Young Seok; Yoo, Seung Hun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Safety Injection Tank (SIT) with Fluidic Device (FD) has been used in several APR1400 nuclear power plants. It was designed to provide a longer passive safety injection than the existing accumulator to improve the safety for Large Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LBLOCA) by changing the injected flow through the FD and the standpipe of the SIT. As a result, high flow injection phase and the subsequent low flow one can be achieved as longer than the existing accumulator. The present paper discusses the major concerns related to SIT hydrodynamics and the directions to resolution recently concerned. Modeling of SIT/FD by total hydraulic resistances, potential of nitrogen intrusion, and effect of initial pressure of SIT testing are included. Based on the discussion, a table of the important phenomena of the SIT/FD was proposed with the relevancy of the calculation models applied. The present paper discussed the SIT hydrodynamics including the modeling of SIT/FD by total hydraulic resistances, potential of nitrogen intrusion, and effect of initial pressure of SIT testing. Also a table of the important phenomena of the SIT/FD was proposed with the relevancy of the calculation models applied. The following conclusions are obtained uncertainty due to the assumption of the total Kfactor as constant for high flow, transition phase, and low flow phase should be considered and nitrogen intrusion phenomena during the transition phase should be considered with a conservatism, especially considering the current situation of nonmeasuring the standpipe level.

  8. An experimental study of the flow characteristics of fluidic device in a passive safety injection tank

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cho, Seok; Song, Chul Hwa; Won, Suon Yeon; Min, Kyong Ho; Chung, Moon Ki

    1998-01-01

    It is considered to adopt passive safety injection tank (SIT) as a enhanced safety feature in KNGR. Passive SIT employs a vortex chamber as a fluidic device, which control injection flow rate passively by the variation of flow resistance produced by vortex intensity within the vortex chamber. To investigate the flow characteristics of the vortex chamber many tests have been carried out by using small-scale test facility. In this report the effects of geometric parameters of vortex chamber on discharge flow characteristics and the velocity measurement result of flow field, measured by PIV, are presented and discussed. (author). 25 refs., 11 tabs., 31 figs

  9. Design of Safety Injection Tanks Using Axiomatic Design and TRIZ

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heo, Gyunyoung; Jeong, Yong Hoon

    2008-01-01

    Design can be categorized into two steps: 'synthesis' and 'analysis'. While synthesis is the process of decision-making on design parameters, analysis is the process of optimizing the parameters selected. It is known from experience that the mistakes made in the synthesis process are hardly corrected in the analysis process. 'Systematic synthesis' is, therefore, easy to overlook but an important topic. 'Systematic' is interpreted as 'minimizing' uncertainty and subjectivity. This paper will introduce the design product achieved by using Axiomatic Design (AD) and TRIZ (Theory of Inventive Problem Solving romanized acronym for Russian), which is a new design of Safety Injection Tank (SIT). In designing a large-capacity SIT which should play an important role in mitigating the large break loss of coolant accidents, there are three issues: 1) the excessively large plenum for pressurized nitrogen gas; 2) the difficulties maintaining the high initial injection flow rate; and 3) the non-condensable nitrogen gas in the coolant. This study proposes a conceptual idea for SITs that are pressurized by the chemical reaction of solid propellants. The AD theory and the principles of TRIZ enable new approach in problem-solving for those three issues in an innovative way. The paper made an effort to clarify the systematic synthesis process to reach the final design solution. (authors)

  10. Theoretical Study on the Flow of Refilling Stage in a Safety Injection Tank

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Jun Sang [Halla Univ. Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2017-10-15

    In this study, a theoretical analysis was performed to the flow of refilling stage in a safety injection tank, which is the core cooling system of nuclear power plant in an emergency. A theoretical model was proposed with a nonlinear governing equation defining on the flow of the refilling process of the coolant. Utilizing the Taylor-series expansion, the 1st - order approximation flow equation was obtained, along with its analytic solution of closed type, which could predict accurately the variations of free surface height and flow rate of the coolant. The availability of theoretical result was confirmed by comparing with previous experimental results.

  11. Safety Injection Tank Performance Analysis Using CFD

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cho, Jai Oan; Lee, Jeong Ik; Nietiadi Yohanes Setiawan [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Addad Yacine [KUSTAR, Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates); Bang, Young Seok; Yoo, Seung Hun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    This may affect the core cooling capability and threaten the fuel integrity during LOCA situations. However, information on the nitrogen flow rate during discharge is very limited due to the associated experimental measurement difficulties, and these phenomena are hardly reflected in current 1D system codes. In the current study, a CFD analysis is presented which hopefully should allow obtaining a more realistic prediction of the SIT performance which can then be reflected on 1D system codes to simulate various accident scenarios. Current Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) calculations have had limited success in predicting the fluid flow accurately. This study aims to find a better CFD prediction and more accurate modeling to predict the system performance during accident scenarios. The safety injection tank with fluidic device was analyzed using commercial CFD. A fine resolution grid was used to capture the vortex of the fluidic device. The calculation so far has shown good consistency with the experiment. Calculation should complete by the conference date and will be thoroughly analyzed to be discussed. Once a detailed CFD computation is finished, a small-scale experiment will be conducted for the given conditions. Using the experimental results and the CFD model, physical models can be validated to give more reliable results. The data from CFD and experiments will provide a more accurate K-factor of the fluidic device which can later be applied in system code inputs.

  12. Design of Safety Injection Tanks Using Axiomatic Design and TRIZ

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heo, Gyunyoung [Kyung Hee University, 1 Seocheon-dong, Giheung-gu, Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do, 446-701 (Korea, Republic of); Jeong, Yong Hoon [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 373-1 Guseong-dong, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, 305-701 (Korea, Republic of)

    2008-07-01

    Design can be categorized into two steps: 'synthesis' and 'analysis'. While synthesis is the process of decision-making on design parameters, analysis is the process of optimizing the parameters selected. It is known from experience that the mistakes made in the synthesis process are hardly corrected in the analysis process. 'Systematic synthesis' is, therefore, easy to overlook but an important topic. 'Systematic' is interpreted as 'minimizing' uncertainty and subjectivity. This paper will introduce the design product achieved by using Axiomatic Design (AD) and TRIZ (Theory of Inventive Problem Solving romanized acronym for Russian), which is a new design of Safety Injection Tank (SIT). In designing a large-capacity SIT which should play an important role in mitigating the large break loss of coolant accidents, there are three issues: 1) the excessively large plenum for pressurized nitrogen gas; 2) the difficulties maintaining the high initial injection flow rate; and 3) the non-condensable nitrogen gas in the coolant. This study proposes a conceptual idea for SITs that are pressurized by the chemical reaction of solid propellants. The AD theory and the principles of TRIZ enable new approach in problem-solving for those three issues in an innovative way. The paper made an effort to clarify the systematic synthesis process to reach the final design solution. (authors)

  13. The Development of Computer Code for Safety Injection Tank (SIT) with Fluidic Device(FD) Blowdown Test

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Joo Hee; Kim, Tae Han; Choi, Hae Yun; Lee, Kwang Won; Chung, Chang Kyu

    2007-01-01

    Safety Injection Tanks (SITs) with the Fluidic Device (FD) of APR1400 provides a means of rapid reflooding of the core following a large break Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA), and keeping it covered until flow from the Safety Injection Pump (SIP) becomes available. A passive FD can provide two operation stages of a safety water injection into the RCS and allow more effective use of borated water in case of LOCA. Once a large break LOCA occurs, the system will deliver a high flow rate of cooling water for a certain period of time, and thereafter, the flow rate is reduced to a lower flow rate. The conventional computer code 'TURTLE' used to simulate the blowdown of OPR1000 SIT can not be directly applied to simulate a blowdown process of the SIT with FD. A new computer code is needed to be developed for the blowdown test evaluation of the APR1400 SIT with FD. Korea Power Engineering Company (KOPEC) has developed a new computer code to analyze the characteristics of the SIT with FD and validated the code through the comparison of the calculation results with the test results obtained by Ulchin 5 and 6 units pre-operational test and VAlve Performance Evaluation Rig (VAPER) tests performed by The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI)

  14. An experimental study on the thermal-hydraulic phenomena in the Hybrid Safety Injection Tank using a separate effect test facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryu, Sung Uk; Ryu, Hyobong; Park, Hyun-Sik; Yi, Sung-Jae

    2016-01-01

    Highlights: • The experimental study on the pressure balancing between the Hybrid SIT and PZR. • The effects of different variables affecting the pressure balancing are investigated. • A sensitivity analysis on the pressure variations of the Hybrid SIT. - Abstract: This paper reports an experimental research for investigating thermal hydraulic phenomena of Hybrid Safety Injection Tank (Hybrid SIT) using a separate effect test facility in Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). The Hybrid SIT is a passive safety injection system that enables the safety injection water to be injected into the reactor pressure vessel throughout all operating pressures by connecting the top of the SIT and the pressurizer (PZR). The separate effect test (SET) facility of Hybrid SIT, which is designed based on the APR+ power plant, comprises a PZR, Hybrid SIT, pressure balancing line (PBL), injection line (IL), nitrogen gas line, and refueling water tank (RWT). Furthermore, the pressure loss range of the SET facility was analyzed and compared with that of the reference nuclear power plant. In this research, a condition for balancing the pressure between the Hybrid SIT and PZR is examined and the effects of different variables affecting the pressure balancing, which are flow rate, injection velocity of steam and initial water level, are also investigated. The condition for balancing the pressure between the Hybrid SIT and PZR was derived theoretically from a pressure network for the Hybrid SIT, pressurizer, and reactor pressure vessel. Additionally, a sensitivity analysis as a theoretical approach was conducted on the pressure variations in relation to the rate of steam condensation inside the Hybrid SIT. The results showed that pressure of the Hybrid SIT was predominantly determined by the rate of steam condensation. The results showed that if the rate of condensation increased or decreased by 10%, the Hybrid SIT pressure at the pressure balancing point decreased or

  15. Compartmentalized safety coolant injection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, F.T.

    1983-01-01

    A safety coolant injection system for nuclear reactors wherein a core reflood tank is provided to afford more reliable reflooding of the reactor core in the event of a break in one of the reactor coolant supply loops. Each reactor coolant supply loop is arranged in a separate compartment in the containment structure to contain and control the flow of spilled coolant so as to permit its use during emergency core cooling procedures. A spillway allows spilled coolant in the compartment to pass into the emergency water storage tank from where it can be pumped back to the reactor vessel. (author)

  16. Data report for ROSA-IV LSTF gravity-driven safety injection experiment run SB-CL-27

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yonomoto, Taisuke; Saitou, Seishi; Kuroda, Takeshi

    1994-03-01

    Experimental data are presented for the passive injection test, Run SB-CL-27, conducted at the ROSA-IV Large Scale Test Facility (LSTF) on September 17, 1992. This experiment simulated thermal-hydraulic behavior of a gravity-driven, passive safety injection system during a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in a pressurized water reactor (PWR). The injection system consisted of a gravity-driven injection tank, located above the reactor vessel, with connecting lines. The tank was initially filled with water of room temperature at the same pressure as the pressurizer. The connecting lines to the cold leg and to the vessel downcomer were opened at the test initiation. Then, a natural circulation flow developed in the loop which was formed by these lines and the injection tank. The hot water in the cold leg circulated into the upper part of tank and accumulated there causing a significant thermal stratification. This thermal stratification prevented direct-contact condensation of steam from occurring during the subsequent tank drain-down phase. Therefore, no condensation-induced depressurization of the tank, affecting adversely the injection performance, occurred. (author)

  17. Waste Tank Safety Screening Module: An aspect of Hanford Site tank waste characterization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, J.G.; Wood, T.W.; Babad, H.; Redus, K.S.

    1994-01-01

    Forty-five (45) of the 149 Hanford single-shell tanks have been designated as Watch-List tanks for one or more high-priority safety issues, which include significant concentrations of organic materials, ferrocyanide salts, potential generation of flammable gases, high heat generation, criticality, and noxious vapor generation. While limited waste characterization data have been acquired on these wastes under the original Tri-Party Agreement, to date all of the tank-by-tank assessments involved in these safety issue designations have been based on historical data rather than waste on data. In response to guidance from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB finding 93-05) and related direction from the US Department of Energy (DOE), Westinghouse Hanford Company, assisted by Pacific Northwest Laboratory, designed a measurements-based screening program to screen all single-shell tanks for all of these issues. This program, designated the Tank Safety Screening Module (TSSM), consists of a regime of core, supernatant, and auger samples and associated analytical measurements intended to make first-order discriminations of the safety status on a tank-by-tank basis. The TSSM combines limited tank sampling and analysis with monitoring and tank history to provide an enhanced measurement-based categorization of the tanks relative to the safety issues. This program will be implemented beginning in fiscal year (FY) 1994 and supplemented by more detailed characterization studies designed to support safety issue resolution

  18. Ferrocyanide Safety Program: Safety criteria for ferrocyanide watch list tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Postma, A.K.; Meacham, J.E.; Barney, G.S.

    1994-01-01

    This report provides a technical basis for closing the ferrocyanide Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) at the Hanford Site. Three work efforts were performed in developing this technical basis. The efforts described herein are: 1. The formulation of criteria for ranking the relative safety of waste in each ferrocyanide tank. 2. The current classification of tanks into safety categories by comparing available information on tank contents with the safety criteria; 3. The identification of additional information required to resolve the ferrocyanide safety issue

  19. Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    WEISS, E.V.

    2000-12-15

    Data and calculations from previous criticality safety evaluations and analyses were used to evaluate criticality safety for the entire Tank Farms facility to support the continued waste storage mission. This criticality safety evaluation concludes that a criticality accident at the Tank Farms facility is an incredible event due to the existing form (chemistry) and distribution (neutron absorbers) of tank waste. Limits and controls for receipt of waste from other facilities and maintenance of tank waste condition are set forth to maintain the margin subcriticality in tank waste.

  20. Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WEISS, E.V.

    2000-01-01

    Data and calculations from previous criticality safety evaluations and analyses were used to evaluate criticality safety for the entire Tank Farms facility to support the continued waste storage mission. This criticality safety evaluation concludes that a criticality accident at the Tank Farms facility is an incredible event due to the existing form (chemistry) and distribution (neutron absorbers) of tank waste. Limits and controls for receipt of waste from other facilities and maintenance of tank waste condition are set forth to maintain the margin subcriticality in tank waste

  1. Analysis of pulsed injection for microgravity receiver tank chilldown

    Science.gov (United States)

    Honkonen, Scott C.; Pietrzyk, Joe R.; Schuster, John R.

    The dominant heat transfer mechanism during the hold phase of a tank chilldown cycle in a low-gravity environment is due to fluid motion persistence following the charge. As compared to the single-charge per vent cycle case, pulsed injection maintains fluid motion and the associated high wall heat transfer coefficients during the hold phase. As a result, the pulsed injection procedure appears to be an attractive method for reducing the time and liquid mass required to chill a tank. However, for the representative conditions considered, no significant benefit can be realized by using pulsed injection as compared to the single-charge case. A numerical model of the charge/hold/vent process was used to evaluate the pulsed injection procedure for tank chilldown in microgravity. Pulsed injection results in higher average wall heat transfer coefficients during the hold, as compared to the single-charge case. However, these high levels were not coincident with the maximum wall-to-fluid temperature differences, as in the single-charge case. For representative conditions investigated, the charge/hold/vent process is very efficient. A slightly shorter chilldown time was realized by increasing the number of pulses.

  2. Tank safety screening data quality objective. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hunt, J.W.

    1995-04-27

    The Tank Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO) will be used to classify 149 single shell tanks and 28 double shell tanks containing high-level radioactive waste into safety categories for safety issues dealing with the presence of ferrocyanide, organics, flammable gases, and criticality. Decision rules used to classify a tank as ``safe`` or ``not safe`` are presented. Primary and secondary decision variables used for safety status classification are discussed. The number and type of samples required are presented. A tabular identification of each analyte to be measured to support the safety classification, the analytical method to be used, the type of sample, the decision threshold for each analyte that would, if violated, place the tank on the safety issue watch list, and the assumed (desired) analytical uncertainty are provided. This is a living document that should be evaluated for updates on a semiannual basis. Evaluation areas consist of: identification of tanks that have been added or deleted from the specific safety issue watch lists, changes in primary and secondary decision variables, changes in decision rules used for the safety status classification, and changes in analytical requirements. This document directly supports all safety issue specific DQOs and additional characterization DQO efforts associated with pretreatment and retrieval. Additionally, information obtained during implementation can assist in resolving assumptions for revised safety strategies, and in addition, obtaining information which will support the determination of error tolerances, confidence levels, and optimization schemes for later revised safety strategy documentation.

  3. Scoping analyses for the safety injection system configuration for Korean next generation reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bae, Kyoo Hwan; Song, Jin Ho; Park, Jong Kyoon

    1996-01-01

    Scoping analyses for the Safety Injection System (SIS) configuration for Korean Next Generation Reactor (KNGR) are performed in this study. The KNGR SIS consists of four mechanically separated hydraulic trains. Each hydraulic train consisting of a High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump and a Safety Injection Tank (SIT) is connected to the Direct Vessel Injection (DVI) nozzle located above the elevation of cold leg and thus injects water into the upper portion of reactor vessel annulus. Also, the KNGR is going to adopt the advanced design feature of passive fluidic device which will be installed in the discharge line of SIT to allow more effective use of borated water during the transient of large break LOCA. To determine the feasible configuration and capacity of SIT and HPSl pump with the elimination of the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pump for KNGR, licensing design basis evaluations are performed for the limiting large break LOCA. The study shows that the DVI injection with the fluidic device SlT enhances the SIS performance by allowing more effective use of borated water for an extended period of time during the large break LOCA

  4. High-heat tank safety issue resolution program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang, O.S.

    1993-12-01

    The purpose of this program plan is to provide a guide for selecting corrective actions that will mitigate and/or remediate the high-heat waste tank safety issue for single-shell tank (SST) 241-C-106. This program plan also outlines the logic for selecting approaches and tasks to mitigate and resolve the high-heat safety issue. The identified safety issue for high-heat tank 241-C-106 involves the potential release of nuclear waste to the environment as the result of heat-induced structural damage to the tank's concrete, if forced cooling is interrupted for extended periods. Currently, forced ventilation with added water to promote thermal conductivity and evaporation cooling is used to cool the waste. At this time, the only viable solution identified to resolve this safety issue is the removal of heat generating waste in the tank. This solution is being aggressively pursued as the permanent solution to this safety issue and also to support the present waste retrieval plan. Tank 241-C-106 has been selected as the first SST for retrieval. The program plan has three parts. The first part establishes program objectives and defines safety issues, drivers, and resolution criteria and strategy. The second part evaluates the high-heat safety issue and its mitigation and remediation methods and alternatives according to resolution logic. The third part identifies major tasks and alternatives for mitigation and resolution of the safety issue. Selected tasks and best-estimate schedules are also summarized in the program plan

  5. A study on the effect of fluidic device installed in a safety injection tank on thermal-hydraulic phenomena of large break loss of coolant accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chung, Young Jong; Bae, Kyoo Hwan; Song, Jin Ho; Sim, Suk Ku; Park, Jong Kyun

    1999-03-01

    The performance of the Safety Injection Tank (SIT) with fluidic device (advanced SIT) is analyzed for the large break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA) using RELAP5/MOD3.1-KREM. First the case is analyzed using the conventional SIT. Among various cases the case with 4-split downcomer, discharge coefficient Cd=0.6, MCP trip with reactor trip and break location of cold leg discharge side with the pressurizer is found to be the most limiting case. For the same condition, the advanced SIT results the similar PCT, however it can maintain adequately the liquid level in the downcomer. By changing the ECCS location from the current injection to the cold leg elevations, PCT is improved by 75 K. (Author). 6 refs., 4 tabs., 54 figs

  6. Analysis for Passive Safety Injection of IPSS in Various LOCAs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Sangho; Chang, Soonheung

    2013-01-01

    The Fukushima accident shows US the possibility of accidents that are beyond a designed imagination. Lots of lessons can be shortly summarized into three issues. First of all, the original cause was the occurrence of a Station Black-Out (SBO). Even if engineers considered the possibility of a loss of offsite power enough to be managed, the failure of EDGs seemed to be unnoticed. The second is poor operation and accident management. They could not understand the overall system and did not check the availability of alternating systems. The third is the large release of radioactive materials outside the containment. Even if SBO occurred and the accident was not managed well, all the means must have prevented the large release out of containment. After that, lots of problems were pointed and numerous actions were carried out in each country. The representative proposals are AAC, additional physical barrier, bunker concept and large big tank. Integrated passive safety system (IPSS) was proposed as one of the solutions for enhancing the safety. IPSS can cope with a SBO and accidents with a SBO. IPSS has five functions which are passive decay heat removal, passive safety injection, passive containment cooling, passive in-vessel retention and filtered venting system. The results showed a high performance of removing decay heat through steam generator cooling by forming natural circulation in the primary circuit. The design concept of passive safety injection system (PSIS) consists of the injection line from integrated passive safety tank (IPST) to reactor vessel. The previous works were only focused on a double ended guillotine break LOCA in SBO. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the performance of PSIS in IPSS for various LOCAs by using MARS (Multi-dimensional Analysis of Reactor Safety) code. The simulated accidents were LOCAs which were accompanied with a SBO. The conditions of the LOCAs were varied only for the size of break. It shall show the capability of PSIS

  7. Tank farm health and safety plan. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mickle, G.D.

    1995-01-01

    This Tank Farm Health and Safety Plan (HASP) for the conduct of all operations and work activities at the Hanford Site 200 Area Tank Farms is provided in order to minimize health and safety risks to workers and other onsite personnel. The HASP accomplishes this objective by establishing requirements, providing general guidelines, and conveying farm and facility-specific hazard communication information. The HASP, in conjunction with the job-specific information required by the HASP, is provided also as a reference for use during the planning of work activities at the tank farms. This HASP applies to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC), other prime contractors to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and subcontractors to WHC who may be involved in tank farm work activities. This plan is intended to be both a requirements document and a useful reference to aid tank farm workers in understanding the safety and health issues that are encountered in routine and nonroutine work activities. The HASP defines the health and safety responsibilities of personnel working at the tank farms. It has been prepared in recognition of and is consistent with National Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH), and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)/Unlimited State Coast Guard (USCG)/U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Occupational Safety and Health Guidance Manual for Hazardous Waste Site Activities (NIOSH 1985); WHC-CM-4-3, Industrial Safety Manual, Volume 4, open-quotes Health and Safety Programs for Hazardous Waste Operations;close quotes 29 CFR 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response; WHC-CM-1-1, Management Policies; and WHC-CM-1-3, Management Requirements and Procedures. When differences in governing regulations or policies exist, the more stringent requirements shall apply until the discrepancy can be resolved

  8. Tank farm health and safety plan. Revision 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mickle, G.D.

    1995-03-29

    This Tank Farm Health and Safety Plan (HASP) for the conduct of all operations and work activities at the Hanford Site 200 Area Tank Farms is provided in order to minimize health and safety risks to workers and other onsite personnel. The HASP accomplishes this objective by establishing requirements, providing general guidelines, and conveying farm and facility-specific hazard communication information. The HASP, in conjunction with the job-specific information required by the HASP, is provided also as a reference for use during the planning of work activities at the tank farms. This HASP applies to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC), other prime contractors to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and subcontractors to WHC who may be involved in tank farm work activities. This plan is intended to be both a requirements document and a useful reference to aid tank farm workers in understanding the safety and health issues that are encountered in routine and nonroutine work activities. The HASP defines the health and safety responsibilities of personnel working at the tank farms. It has been prepared in recognition of and is consistent with National Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH), and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)/Unlimited State Coast Guard (USCG)/U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Occupational Safety and Health Guidance Manual for Hazardous Waste Site Activities (NIOSH 1985); WHC-CM-4-3, Industrial Safety Manual, Volume 4, {open_quotes}Health and Safety Programs for Hazardous Waste Operations;{close_quotes} 29 CFR 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response; WHC-CM-1-1, Management Policies; and WHC-CM-1-3, Management Requirements and Procedures. When differences in governing regulations or policies exist, the more stringent requirements shall apply until the discrepancy can be resolved.

  9. A summary description of the flammable gas tank safety program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, G.D.; Sherwood, D.J.

    1994-10-01

    Radioactive liquid waste may produce hydrogen as result of the interaction of gamma radiation and water. If the waste contains organic chelating agents, additional hydrogen as well as nitrous oxide and ammonia may be produced by thermal and radiolytic decomposition of these organics. Several high-level radioactive liquid waste storage tanks, located underground at the Hanford Site in Washington State, are on a Flammable Gas Watch List. Some contain waste that produces and retains gases until large quantities of gas are released rapidly to the tank vapor space. Tanks nearly-filled to capacity have relatively little vapor space; therefore if the waste suddenly releases a large amount of hydrogen and nitrous oxide, a flammable gas mixture could result. The most notable example of a Hanford waste tank with a flammable gas problem is tank 241-SY-101. Upon occasion waste stored in this tank has released enough flammable gas to burn if an ignition source had been present inside of the tank. Several, other Hanford waste tanks exhibit similar behavior although to a lesser magnitude. Because this behavior was hot adequately-addressed in safety analysis reports for the Hanford Tank Farms, an unreviewed safety question was declared, and in 1990 the Flammable Gas Tank Safety Program was established to address this problem. The purposes of the program are a follows: (1) Provide safety documents to fill gaps in the safety analysis reports, and (2) Resolve the safety issue by acquiring knowledge about gas retention and release from radioactive liquid waste and developing mitigation technology. This document provides the general logic and work activities required to resolve the unreviewed safety question and the safety issue of flammable gas mixtures in radioactive liquid waste storage tanks

  10. Coupled analysis of passive safety injection and containment filtered venting for passive decay heat removal - 15140

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, S.H.; Ham, J.H.; Jeong, Y.H.; Chang, S.H.

    2015-01-01

    Lots of interests for the safety of nuclear power plants have risen these days. The safety has to be continuously reviewed and enhanced in nuclear power plants currently operating as well as those designed and constructed in future. After the Fukushima accidents, many additional safety systems which can be applied to nuclear power plants in operation have been proposed. Those include alternating power source such as movable diesel generators and DC batteries in non-safety grade. Also, emergency preparedness for the prevention of a core damage accident was proposed to cope with the extended-SBO (station blackout) by using fire protection systems. In order to prevent the release of radioactive materials, safety systems for preserving the integrity of containment were proposed in two views of cooling and venting containment. Two approaches are effective for mitigating a severe accident. The design concept installing big water tanks besides containment at high level was proposed for various safety functions. One of the functions in the system is to inject the coolant from the elevated tank into a reactor vessel in the case of loss of coolant accident. When the pressure in reactor coolant system is sufficiently low, the coolant can be injected by gravity. If not, the depressurization in reactor vessel would be needed considering the containment pressure. Containment cooling in conventional pressurized water reactors is dependent on containment cooling pumps and sprays. Additional containment cooling systems cannot be simply and easily applied in the current nuclear power plants without major modifications. Therefore, for the operation of passive safety injection system, containment filtered venting system can be adopted for the depressurization of containment. In the design and operation of the passive safety injection system and the containment filtered venting system, main operating points related with open and close pressures in the filtered venting system were

  11. Degradation of safety injection system and containment spray piping and tank fracture toughness analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Douglas, A.; Doubel, P.; Wicker, C.

    2011-01-01

    Extensive stress corrosion cracking (SCC), induced by the marine environment and the presence of high residual stresses arising from the respective manufacturing processes has been encountered in the safety injection system piping (RIS), containment spray system piping (EAS) and reactor and spent fuel storage tank (PTR), or refuelling water storage tank (RWST) of the Koeberg plant. Type 304L steels from the RIS system and replacement components for the RIS and RWST systems have been subject to mechanical and fracture toughness testing. The following conclusions have been drawn. -) The piping sections of both the original and replacement components exhibit residual cold work. The level of cold work imparted to the piping and elbow have been estimated to be 2, 2 to 3, 9% and 5, 7 to 7, 3% respectively. -) Re-annealing produces different responses in type 304L as a function of prior cold work level. Re-annealing of material cold worked to low levels i.e. 3.5% maintain the cold worked level of UTS but can exhibit 0, 2% PS. levels below that of the mill annealed condition. There is the potential for the ASTM A312 minimum 0, 2% level to be breached. At higher levels of cold work i.e. 7% re-annealing results in extensive grain growth, a significant reduction in 0, 2% PS from the mill annealed condition and the recovery of the UTS to the mill annealed level. -) Cold work at the levels obtained significantly reduces the SOL initiation toughness Ji. The reduction in toughness can be greater than 50%. The resistance to ductile crack propagation, dJ/da, remains unchanged at least up to 5 % cold work. -) The defect assessment for the RIS/EAS systems have used highly conservative values of initiation toughness such that no crack initiation would occur under the loading conditions considered and in a non-hostile environment. -) Under the marine environment to which the RIS/EAS components are still subjected, the limiting criterion for operation of the RIS/EAS system remains a

  12. High-heat tank safety issue resolution program plan. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang, O.S.

    1994-12-01

    The purpose of this program plan is to provide a guide for selecting corrective actions that will mitigate and/or remediate the high-heat waste tank safety issue for single-shell tank 241-C-106. The heat source of approximately 110,000 Btu/hr is the radioactive decay of the stored waste material (primarily 90 Sr) inadvertently transferred into the tank in the later 1960s. Currently, forced ventilation, with added water to promote thermal conductivity and evaporation cooling, is used for heat removal. The method is very effective and economical. At this time, the only viable solution identified to permanently resolve this safety issue is the removal of heat-generating waste in the tank. This solution is being aggressively pursued as the only remediation method to this safety issue, and tank 241-C-106 has been selected as the first single-shell tank for retrieval. The current cooling method and other alternatives are addressed in this program as means to mitigate this safety issue before retrieval. This program plan has three parts. The first part establishes program objectives and defines safety issue, drivers, and resolution criteria and strategy. The second part evaluates the high-heat safety issue and its mitigation and remediation methods and other alternatives according to resolution logic. The third part identifies major tasks and alternatives for mitigation and resolution of the safety issue. A table of best-estimate schedules for the key tasks is also included in this program plan

  13. Extension of Surveillance Test Interval of Safety Injection Pump for APR-1400 Reactors to Improve Reliability and Availability of the Pump

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Osama, A. Rezk; Jung, J. C.; Lee, Yong-Kwan [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The safety features function to localize, control, mitigate, and terminate such incidents and to hold exposure levels below applicable limits. The safety injection system is comprised of four independent mechanical trains without any tie line among the injection paths and two electrical divisions. Each train has one active Safety Injection Pump (SIP) and one passive Safety Injection Tank (SIT) equipped with a Fluidic Device (FD), each train provides 50% of the minimum injection flow rate for breaks larger than the size of a direct vessel injection line. For breaks equal to or smaller than the size of a direct vessel injection line, each train has 100% of the required capacity. The low pressure injection pumps with common header installed in the conventional design are eliminated, and the functions for safety injection and shutdown cooling are separated. The arrangement of safety injection system for APR-1400 as shown in figure (1). The results obtained in this work show that STI extensions for the SIS feasible without any unacceptable increase in the plant total risk, STI extensions are acceptable for safety injection system to provide plant operational flexibility in the performance of both corrective and preventive maintenance for the safety injection system.

  14. Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Site High Level Waste Storage Tanks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ROGERS, C.A.

    2000-02-17

    This criticality safety evaluation covers operations for waste in underground storage tanks at the high-level waste tank farms on the Hanford site. This evaluation provides the bases for criticality safety limits and controls to govern receipt, transfer, and long-term storage of tank waste. Justification is provided that a nuclear criticality accident cannot occur for tank farms operations, based on current fissile material and operating conditions.

  15. Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Site High-Level Waste Storage Tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ROGERS, C.A.

    2000-01-01

    This criticality safety evaluation covers operations for waste in underground storage tanks at the high-level waste tank farms on the Hanford site. This evaluation provides the bases for criticality safety limits and controls to govern receipt, transfer, and long-term storage of tank waste. Justification is provided that a nuclear criticality accident cannot occur for tank farms operations, based on current fissile material and operating conditions

  16. Ferrocyanide Safety Program rationale for removing six tanks from the safety watch list

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borsheim, G.L.

    1993-09-01

    This report documents an in-depth study of single-shell tanks containing ferrocyanide wastes. Topics include: safety assessments, tank histories, supportive documentation about interim stabilization and planned remedial activities

  17. Criticality safety analysis of Hanford Waste Tank 241-101-SY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perry, R.T.; Sapir, J.L.; Krohn, B.J.

    1993-01-01

    As part of a safety assessment for proposed pump mixing operations to mitigate episodic gas releases in Tank 241-101-SY at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington, a criticality safety analysis was made using the Sn transport code ONEDANT. The tank contains approximately one million gallons of waste and an estimated 910 G of plutonium. the criticality analysis considers reconfiguration and underestimation of plutonium content. The results indicate that Tank SY-101 does not present a criticality hazard. These methods are also used in criticality analyses of other Hanford tanks

  18. CHANGING THE SAFETY CULTURE IN HANFORD TANK FARMS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BERRIOCHOA MV; ALCALA LJ

    2009-01-06

    In 2000 the Hanford Tank Farms had one of the worst safety records in the Department of Energy Complex. By the end of FY08 the safety performance of the workforce had turned completely around, resulting in one of the best safety records in the DOE complex for operations of its kind. This paper describes the variety of programs and changes that were put in place to accomplish such a dramatic turn-around. The U.S. Department of Energy's 586-square-mile Hanford Site in Washington State was established during World War II as part of the Manhattan Project to develop nuclear materials to end the war. For the next several decades it continued to produce plutonium for the nation's defense, leaving behind vast quantities of radioactive and chemical waste. Much of this waste, 53,000,000 gallons, remains stored in 149 aging single-shell tanks and 28 newer double-shell tanks. One of the primary objectives at Hanford is to safely manage this waste until it can be prepared for disposal, but this has not always been easy. These giant underground tanks, many of which date back to the beginning of the Manhattan Project, range in size from 55,000 gallons up to 1.1 million gallons, and are buried beneath 10 feet of soil near the center of the site. Up to 67 of the older single-shell tanks have leaked as much as one million gallons into the surrounding soil. Liquids from the single-shell tanks were removed by 2003 but solids remain in the form of saltcake, sludges and a hardened heel at the bottom of some tanks. The Department of Energy's Office of River Protection was established to safely manage this waste until it could be prepared for disposal. For most of the last seven years the focus has been on safely retrieving waste from the 149 aging single-shell and moving it to the newer double-shell tanks. Removing waste from the tanks is a difficult and complex task. The tanks were made to put waste in, not take it out. Because of the toxic nature of the waste, both

  19. Environmental Assessment: Waste Tank Safety Program, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-02-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) needs to take action in the near-term, to accelerate resolution of waste tank safety issues at the Hanford Site near the City of Richland, Washington, and reduce the risks associated with operations and management of the waste tanks. The DOE has conducted nuclear waste management operations at the Hanford Site for nearly 50 years. Operations have included storage of high-level nuclear waste in 177 underground storage tanks (UST), both in single-shell tank (SST) and double-shell tank configurations. Many of the tanks, and the equipment needed to operate them, are deteriorated. Sixty-seven SSTs are presumed to have leaked a total approximately 3,800,000 liters (1 million gallons) of radioactive waste to the soil. Safety issues associated with the waste have been identified, and include (1) flammable gas generation and episodic release; (2) ferrocyanide-containing wastes; (3) a floating organic solvent layer in Tank 241-C-103; (4) nuclear criticality; (5) toxic vapors; (6) infrastructure upgrades; and (7) interim stabilization of SSTs. Initial actions have been taken in all of these areas; however, much work remains before a full understanding of the tank waste behavior is achieved. The DOE needs to accelerate the resolution of tank safety concerns to reduce the risk of an unanticipated radioactive or chemical release to the environment, while continuing to manage the wastes safely

  20. Passive safety injection experiments and analyses (PAHKO)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tuunanen, J.

    1998-01-01

    PAHKO project involved experiments on the PACTEL facility and computer simulations of selected experiments. The experiments focused on the performance of Passive Safety Injection Systems (PSIS) of Advanced Light Water Reactors (ALWRs) in Small Break Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) conditions. The PSIS consisted of a Core Make-up Tank (CMT) and two pipelines (Pressure Balancing Line, PBL, and Injection Line, IL). The examined PSIS worked efficiently in SBLOCAs although the flow through the PSIS stopped temporarily if the break was very small and the hot water filled the CMT. The experiments demonstrated the importance of the flow distributor in the CMT to limit rapid condensation. The project included validation of three thermal-hydraulic computer codes (APROS, CATHARE and RELAP5). The analyses showed the codes are capable to simulate the overall behaviour of the transients. The detailed analyses of the results showed some models in the codes still need improvements. Especially, further development of models for thermal stratification, condensation and natural circulation flow with small driving forces would be necessary for accurate simulation of the PSIS phenomena. (orig.)

  1. Resolution of Hanford tanks organic complexant safety issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kirch, N.W.

    1998-01-01

    The Hanford Site tanks have been assessed for organic complexant reaction hazards. The results have shown that most tanks contain insufficient concentrations of TOC to support a propagating reaction. It has also been shown that those tanks where the TOC concentration approaches levels of concern, degradation of the organic complexants to less energetic compounds has occurred. The results of the investigations have been documented. The residual organic complexants in the Hanford Site waste tanks do not present a safety concern for long-term storage

  2. Ferrocyanide tank safety program: Cesium uptake capacity of simulated ferrocyanide tank waste. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burgeson, I.E.; Bryan, S.A.

    1995-07-01

    The objective of this project is to determine the capacity for 137 Cs uptake by mixed metal ferrocyanides present in Hanford Site waste tanks, and to assess the potential for aggregation of these 137 Cs-exchanged materials to form ''hot-spots'' in the tanks. This research, performed at Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) for Westinghouse Hanford Company, stems from concerns regarding possible localized radiolytic heating within the tanks. After ferrocyanide was added to 18 high-level waste tanks in the 1950s, some of the ferrocyanide tanks received considerable quantities of saltcake waste that was rich in 137 Cs. If radioactive cesium was exchanged and concentrated by the nickel ferrocyanide present in the tanks, the associated heating could cause tank temperatures to rise above the safety limits specified for the ferrocyanide-containing tanks, especially if the supernate in the tanks is pumped out and the waste becomes drier

  3. Safety considerations on LPG storage tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paff, R.

    1993-01-01

    The safety of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) storage tanks, in refineries, petrochemicals plants, or distribution storage, is an important concern. Some serious accidents in recent years, have highlighted the need for a good safety policy for such equipment. Accidents in LPG storage are mainly due to losses of containment of the LPG. Formation of a cloud can lead to a ''Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion'' (UVCE). Liquid leakage can lead to pool fires in the retention area. In some circumstances the heat input of the tank, combined with the loss of mechanical resistance of the steel under high temperature, can lead to a BLEVE ''Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion''. It is obvious that such equipment needs a proper design, maintenance and operating policy. The details to be considered are set out. (4 figures). (Author)

  4. Ferrocyanide Safety Program: Data interpretation report for tank 241-T-107 core samples

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sasaki, L.M.; Valenzuela, B.D.

    1994-08-01

    Between November 1992 and March 1993, three core samples were obtained from tank 241-T-107. Analyses were performed on these core samples to support the Ferrocyanide Safety Program and the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1994) Milestone M-10-00. This document summarizes and evaluates those analytical results that are pertinent to the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue. This document compares the analytical results with the data requirements for ferrocyanide tanks as documented in Data Requirements of the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue Developed Through the Data Quality Objectives Process (Meacham et al. 1994) and provides an assessment of the safety condition of the tank. Analytes not listed in the Data Quality Objectives (DQO) document (Meacham et al. 1994) or not pertinent to the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue are not discussed in this report. Complete documentation of the analytical results can be found in the data package for the tank 241-T-107 cores (Svancara and Pool 1993). A more complete evaluation of the analytical results and an estimate of the tank inventory will be provided in a forthcoming tank characterization report for tank 241-T-107

  5. Uniform and non-uniform inlet temperature of a vertical hot water jet injected into a rectangular tank

    KAUST Repository

    El-Amin, Mohamed; Sun, Shuyu

    2010-01-01

    In most of real-world applications, such as the case of heat stores, inlet is not kept at a constant temperature but it may vary with time during charging process. In this paper, a vertical water jet injected into a rectangular storage tank is measured experimentally and simulated numerically. Two cases of study are considered; one is a hot water jet with uniform inlet temperature (UIT) injected into a cold water tank, and the other is a cold water jet with non-uniform inlet temperature (NUIT) injected into a hot water tank. Three different temperature differences and three different flow rates are studied for the hot water jet with UIT which is injected into a cold water tank. Also, three different initial temperatures with constant flow rate as well as three different flow rates with constant initial temperature are considered for the cold jet with NUIT which is injected into a hot water tank. Turbulence intensity at the inlet as well as Reynolds number for the NUIT cases are therefore functions of inlet temperature and time. Both experimental measurements and numerical calculations are carried out for the same measured flow and thermal conditions. The realizable k-ε model is used for modeling the turbulent flow. Numerical solutions are obtained for unsteady flow while pressure, velocity, temperature and turbulence distributions inside the water tank are analyzed. The simulated results are compared to the measured results, and they show a good agreement at low temperatures. © 2010 IEEE.

  6. Uniform and non-uniform inlet temperature of a vertical hot water jet injected into a rectangular tank

    KAUST Repository

    El-Amin, Mohamed

    2010-12-01

    In most of real-world applications, such as the case of heat stores, inlet is not kept at a constant temperature but it may vary with time during charging process. In this paper, a vertical water jet injected into a rectangular storage tank is measured experimentally and simulated numerically. Two cases of study are considered; one is a hot water jet with uniform inlet temperature (UIT) injected into a cold water tank, and the other is a cold water jet with non-uniform inlet temperature (NUIT) injected into a hot water tank. Three different temperature differences and three different flow rates are studied for the hot water jet with UIT which is injected into a cold water tank. Also, three different initial temperatures with constant flow rate as well as three different flow rates with constant initial temperature are considered for the cold jet with NUIT which is injected into a hot water tank. Turbulence intensity at the inlet as well as Reynolds number for the NUIT cases are therefore functions of inlet temperature and time. Both experimental measurements and numerical calculations are carried out for the same measured flow and thermal conditions. The realizable k-ε model is used for modeling the turbulent flow. Numerical solutions are obtained for unsteady flow while pressure, velocity, temperature and turbulence distributions inside the water tank are analyzed. The simulated results are compared to the measured results, and they show a good agreement at low temperatures. © 2010 IEEE.

  7. Organic Tanks Safety Program: Advanced organic analysis FY 1996 progress report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-09-01

    Major focus during the first part of FY96 was to evaluate using organic functional group concentrations to screen for energetics. Fourier transform infrared and Raman spectroscopy would be useful screening tools for determining C-H and COO- organic content in tank wastes analyzed in a hot cell. These techniques would be used for identifying tanks of potential safety concern that may require further analysis. Samples from Tanks 241-C-106 and -C-204 were analyzed; the major organic in C-106 was B2EHPA and in C-204 was TBP. Analyses of simulated wastes were also performed for the Waste Aging Studies Task; organics formed as a result of degradation were identified, and the original starting components were monitored quantitatively. Sample analysis is not routine and required considerable methods adaptation and optimization. Several techniques have been evaluated for directly analyzing chelator and chelator fragments in tank wastes: matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization time-of-flight mass spectrometry and liquid chromatography with ultraviolet detection using Cu complexation. Although not directly funded by the Tanks Safety Program, the success of these techniques have implications for both the Flammable Gas and Organic Tanks Safety Programs

  8. Analysis of tank safety with propane-butane on LPG distribution station

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Krzysiak Zbigniew

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available An analysis of the risk of failure in the safety valve – tank with propane-butane (LPG system has been conducted. An uncontrolled outflow of liquid LPG, caused by a failure of the above mentioned system has been considered as a threat. The main research goal of the study is the hazardous analysis of propane-butane gas outflow for the safety valve – LPG tank system. The additional goal is the development of an useful method to fast identify the hazard of a mismatched safety valve. The results of the research analysis have confirmed that safety valves are basic protection of the installation (tank against failures that can lead to loss of life, material damage and further undesired costs of their unreliability. That is why a new, professional computer program has been created that allows for the selection of safety valves or for the verification of a safety valve selection in installations where any technical or technological changes have been made.

  9. Safety evaluation of interim stabilization of non-stabilized single-shell watch list tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stahl, S.M.

    1994-01-01

    This report provides results of a review of recently completed safety analyses related to hazards associated with Interim Stabilization of Single analyses related to hazards included oh the Hanford Site Waste Tank-Watch Shell Tanks (SSTs) that are included on the Hanford List. The purpose of the review was to identify and summarize conclusions regarding the safety of interim stabilization of Watch List SSTs, and to highlight applicable limitations, restrictions, and controls. The scope of this review was restricted to SSTs identified List in the categories of flammable gas ferrocyanide, and organic salts. High heat tanks were not included in the scope. A Watch List tank is defined as an underground storage tank containing waste that requires special safety precautions because it may have a serious potential for release of high level radioactive waste because of uncontrolled increases in temperature or pressure. Special restrictions have been placed on these tanks

  10. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements. Volume 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

  11. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements [VOL 1 and 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-12-28

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

  12. DOE high-level waste tank safety program Final report, Task 002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The overall objective of the work on Task 002 was to provide LANL with support to the DOE High-Level Waste Tank Safety program. The objective of the work was to develop safety documentation in support of the unsafe tank mitigation activities at Hanford. The work includes the development of safety assessment and an environmental assessment. All tasks which were assigned under this Task Order were completed. Descriptions of the objectives of each task and effort performed to complete each objective are provided. The two tasks were: Task 2.1--safety assessment for instrumentation insertion; and Task 2.2--environmental assessment

  13. Technical safety appraisal of the Hanford Tank Farm Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brinkerhoff, L.C.

    1989-05-01

    This report presents the results of one in a series of TSAs being conducted at DOE nuclear operations by the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health, Office of Safety Appraisals. TSAs are one of the initiatives announced by the Secretary of Energy on September 18, 1985, to enhance the DOE environment, safety and health program. This report provides the results of a TSA of the Tank Farm in the 200 East and 200 West Areas located on the Hanford site. The appraisal was conducted by a team of experts assembled by the DOE Office of Safety Appraisals and was conducted during onsite visits of March 20--24 and April 3--14, 1989. At the Tank Farm, the processing of spent reactor fuels to recover the useful radioactive products is accompanied by the production of radioactive waste. Because many of these wastes will retain radioactivity for many years, they must be safely handled, contained, and disposed with regard to protection of the environment, employees, and the public. Dilute low-level waste and five year ''cooled'' aging wastes are pumped to an evaporator for concentration. The radioactive liquid and solid wastes are stored in underground carbon steel tanks ranging in capacity from 55,000 to over one million gallons

  14. Probabilistic safety assessment for high-level waste tanks at Hanford

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, L.H.; MacFarlane, D.R.; Stack, D.W.

    1996-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory has performed a comprehensive probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), including consideration of external events, for the 18 tank farms at the Hanford Tank Farm (HTF). This work was sponsored by the Department of Energy/Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Division (DOE/EM)

  15. Generalized railway tank car safety design optimization for hazardous materials transport: Addressing the trade-off between transportation efficiency and safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saat, Mohd Rapik; Barkan, Christopher P.L.

    2011-01-01

    North America railways offer safe and generally the most economical means of long distance transport of hazardous materials. Nevertheless, in the event of a train accident releases of these materials can pose substantial risk to human health, property or the environment. The majority of railway shipments of hazardous materials are in tank cars. Improving the safety design of these cars to make them more robust in accidents generally increases their weight thereby reducing their capacity and consequent transportation efficiency. This paper presents a generalized tank car safety design optimization model that addresses this tradeoff. The optimization model enables evaluation of each element of tank car safety design, independently and in combination with one another. We present the optimization model by identifying a set of Pareto-optimal solutions for a baseline tank car design in a bicriteria decision problem. This model provides a quantitative framework for a rational decision-making process involving tank car safety design enhancements to reduce the risk of transporting hazardous materials.

  16. Engineered safety in development of liquid poison injection system (shut down system-2) for 500 MWe PHWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sapra, M.K.; Kundu, S.N.; Mohan, L.R.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The provision of shut down systems (SDS) is a mandatory requirement for safety of any nuclear reactor. The SDS shall be capable of making and holding the core adequately subcritical in the event of any anticipated operational occurrence and postulated accident conditions. The shut down function will perform as intended when its design and components are thoroughly evaluated for their reliability and effectiveness. A full scale mock up for one injection unit was designed and developed at Hall No.7, BARC. Experimental studies were carried out to qualify the design and evolve process parameters such as gas tank pressure, poison discharge rate and poison injection time. In liquid poison injection system i.e. shutdown system -2, there is no physical barrier, between the two liquids i.e. the poison and the moderator. A liquid in liquid interface, called poison moderator interface (PMI) separates these fluids. Extensive lab scale studies have been carried out on PMI movement study i.e. the interface movement due to molecular diffusion and due to process disturbances under simulated reactor condition. On the basis of lab scale results, a full-scale PMI setup has been designed and developed to generate plant data. From reactor safety consideration, the floating ball in poison tank is designed in such a way that it prevents the over pressurisation of calandria. For this purpose a non-intrusive ultrasonic ball detection system (U-BDS) has been developed. This paper covers the PMI system for 500 MWe PHWR with relevant safety aspects and describes in detail, the experimental results of PMI study. The engineered safety in design, methodology and qualification of U-BDS and its role intended in performance of SDS-2 have been also discussed in the paper

  17. Tank farms criticality safety manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FORT, L.A.

    2003-01-01

    This document defines the Tank Farms Contractor (TFC) criticality safety program, as required by Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR-), Subpart 830.204(b)(6), ''Documented Safety Analysis'' (10 CFR- 830.204 (b)(6)), and US Department of Energy (DOE) 0 420.1A, Facility Safety, Section 4.3, ''Criticality Safety.'' In addition, this document contains certain best management practices, adopted by TFC management based on successful Hanford Site facility practices. Requirements in this manual are based on the contractor requirements document (CRD) found in Attachment 2 of DOE 0 420.1A, Section 4.3, ''Nuclear Criticality Safety,'' and the cited revisions of applicable standards published jointly by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Nuclear Society (ANS) as listed in Appendix A. As an informational device, requirements directly imposed by the CRD or ANSI/ANS Standards are shown in boldface. Requirements developed as best management practices through experience and maintained consistent with Hanford Site practice are shown in italics. Recommendations and explanatory material are provided in plain type

  18. SAFETY ANALYSIS APPROACH TO TANK 241-SY-101 REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    RYAN, G.W.

    2000-01-01

    An Unreviewed Safety Question was declared related to the unexplained waste surface level growth in high-level radioactive waste storage Tank 241-SY-101 at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. Because the waste surface level in Tank 241-SY-101 was growing in a manner inconsistent with previous behavior, the following issues of concern were recognized: (1) The continually rising surface level had the potential to reach physical encumbrances or limits within the tank (e.g., instrumentation, cameras, established Authorization Basis limits, and the double containment boundary) and the potential to significantly change the consequences of previously analyzed accidents (e.g., flammable gas deflagrations). (2) The presence of new hazards because of significant quantities of flammable gas retained in the crust (e.g., crust collapse gas-release events). (3) The potential to inhibit information gathering related to the existing hazards in the tank (e.g., unable to determine surface level to assess the potential for large gas releases). In response to this situation, a Contractor Project Team, which included Department of Energy representation, was formed to constructively address the issue. The team was responsible for developing and evaluating remediation options and executing the chosen option for remediating the surface level rise issue for Tank 241-SY-101. From an Authorization Basis perspective, the following important aspects will be discussed in this paper: (1) The integrated nature of the Project Team. The team consisted of all the organizations necessary to ensure that the time available to remediate Tank 241-SY-101 was effectively used. Most notable is the connectivity of the Nuclear Safety and Licensing organization with the Engineering, Design, and Operations organizations. (2) The ability of the safety analysis support to adjust to and address evolving Project Team goals and dynamic tank conditions. (3) Due to the urgency to mitigate this developing issue

  19. Probabilistic safety assessment for Hanford high-level waste tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MacFarlane, D.R.; Stack, D.S.; Kindinger, J.P.; Deremer, R.K.

    1995-01-01

    This paper gives results from the first comprehensive level-3 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), including consideration of external events, for the Hanford tank farm (HTF). This work was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy/Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Division (DOE/EM). At the HTF, there are 177 underground tanks in 18 separate tank farms containing accumulated liquid/sludge/saltcake radioactive wastes from 50 yr of weapons materials production activities. The total waste volume is ∼60 million gal, containing ∼200 million Ci of radioactivity

  20. Vibration of safety injection pump motors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wattrelos, D.

    1996-12-01

    This paper covers a fault encountered in the safety injection pump motors of the French 900 MWe unit nuclear power stations. This fault was not revealed either during the low pressure safety injection and containment spray system pump qualification tests under accident conditions or during the special tests on a test bench carried out to attempt to replicate the fault and to identify ways of remedying it. This constitutes a potential common mode of failure of the safety injection system and the containment spray system pumps. The vibration phenomena illustrate the importance of carrying out tests in the plants under conditions as close as possible to those of actual accident situations.

  1. Vibration of safety injection pump motors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wattrelos, D.

    1996-01-01

    This paper covers a fault encountered in the safety injection pump motors of the French 900 MWe unit nuclear power stations. This fault was not revealed either during the low pressure safety injection and containment spray system pump qualification tests under accident conditions or during the special tests on a test bench carried out to attempt to replicate the fault and to identify ways of remedying it. This constitutes a potential common mode of failure of the safety injection system and the containment spray system pumps. The vibration phenomena illustrate the importance of carrying out tests in the plants under conditions as close as possible to those of actual accident situations

  2. Vibration of safety injection pump motors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wattrelos, D.

    1997-01-01

    This paper covers a fault encountered in the safety injection pump motors of the French 900 MWe unit nuclear power stations. This fault was not revealed either during the low pressure safety injection and containment spray system pump qualification test under accident conditions or during the special tests on a test bench carried out to attempt to replicate the fault and to identify ways of remedying it. This constitutes a potential common mode of failure of the safety injection system and the containment spray system pumps. The vibration phenomena illustrate the importance of carrying out test in the plants under conditions as close as possible to those of actual accident. (author)

  3. Planning exercise for the resolution of high level waste tank safety issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunting, J.; Saveland, J.

    1992-01-01

    Several conditions have been found to exist within high level radioactive waste storage tanks at the Hanford site which could lead to uncontrolled exothermic reactions and/or to the release of tank contents into the environment. These conditions have led to the establishment of four priority 1 safety issues for the Hanford tanks. Resolution of these safety issues will require the coordinated efforts of professionals in chemical, nuclear, operations, safety, and other technical areas. A coordinated and integrated approach is necessary in order to achieve resolution in the shortest possible time, while ensuring that the steps taken do not complicate the later jobs of vitrification and ultimate disposal. This paper describes the purpose, process, and results of an effort to develop a suggested approach. (author)

  4. Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment for Tank 38H Salt Dissolution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davis, P.L.

    1996-01-01

    This assessment report of sample results of the accumulating insoluble solids from Tank 38H demonstrates that an inherent subcritical condition for nuclear criticality safety exists during saltcake dissolution. This report also defines criteria for future sampling of Tank 38H for continued verification of the inherent subcritical condition as saltcake dissolution proceeds

  5. Tank 241-C-103 tank characterization plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schreiber, R.D.

    1994-01-01

    The data quality objective (DQO) process was chosen as a tool to be used to identify the sampling analytical needs for the resolution of safety issues. A Tank Characterization Plant (TCP) will be developed for each double shell tank (DST) and single-shell tank (SST) using the DQO process. There are four Watch list tank classifications (ferrocyanide, organic salts, hydrogen/flammable gas, and high heat load). These classifications cover the six safety issues related to public and worker health that have been associated with the Hanford Site underground storage tanks. These safety issues are as follows: ferrocyanide, flammable gas, organic, criticality, high heat, and vapor safety issues. Tank C-103 is one of the twenty tanks currently on the Organic Salts Watch List. This TCP will identify characterization objectives pertaining to sample collection, hot cell sample isolation, and laboratory analytical evaluation and reporting requirements in accordance with the appropriate DQO documents. In addition, the current contents and status of the tank are projected from historical information. The relevant safety issues that are of concern for tanks on the Organic Salts Watch List are: the potential for an exothermic reaction occurring from the flammable mixture of organic materials and nitrate/nitrite salts that could result in a release of radioactive material and the possibility that other safety issues may exist for the tank

  6. System Safety Program Plan for Project W-314, tank farm restoration and safe operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boos, K.A.

    1996-01-01

    This System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) outlines the safety analysis strategy for project W-314, ''Tank Farm Restoration and Safe Operations.'' Project W-314 will provide capital improvements to Hanford's existing Tank Farm facilities, with particular emphasis on infrastructure systems supporting safe operation of the double-shell activities related to the project's conceptual Design Phase, but is planned to be updated and maintained as a ''living document'' throughout the life of the project to reflect the current safety analysis planning for the Tank Farm Restoration and Safe Operations upgrades. This approved W-314 SSPP provides the basis for preparation/approval of all safety analysis documentation needed to support the project

  7. Probabilistic safety assessment for Hanford high-level waste tank 241-SY-101

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MacFarlane, D.R.; Bott, T.F.; Brown, L.F.; Stack, D.W. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Kindinger, J.; Deremer, R.K.; Medhekar, S.R.; Mikschl, T.J. [PLG, Inc., Newport Beach, CA (United States)

    1994-05-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) is performing a comprehensive probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), which will include consideration of external events for the 18 tank farms at the Hanford Site. This effort is sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE/EM, EM-36). Even though the methodology described herein will be applied to the entire tank farm, this report focuses only on the risk from the weapons-production wastes stored in tank number 241-SY-101, commonly known as Tank 101-SY, as configured in December 1992. This tank, which periodically releases ({open_quotes}burps{close_quotes}) a gaseous mixture of hydrogen, nitrous oxide, ammonia, and nitrogen, was analyzed first because of public safety concerns associated with the potential for release of radioactive tank contents should this gas mixture be ignited during one of the burps. In an effort to mitigate the burping phenomenon, an experiment is being conducted in which a large pump has been inserted into the tank to determine if pump-induced circulation of the tank contents will promote a slow, controlled release of the gases. At the Hanford Site there are 177 underground tanks in 18 separate tank farms containing accumulated liquid/sludge/salt cake radioactive wastes from 50 yr of weapons materials production activities. The total waste volume is about 60 million gal., which contains approximately 120 million Ci of radioactivity.

  8. Probabilistic safety assessment for Hanford high-level waste tank 241-SY-101

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MacFarlane, D.R.; Bott, T.F.; Brown, L.F.; Stack, D.W.; Kindinger, J.; Deremer, R.K.; Medhekar, S.R.; Mikschl, T.J.

    1994-05-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) is performing a comprehensive probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), which will include consideration of external events for the 18 tank farms at the Hanford Site. This effort is sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE/EM, EM-36). Even though the methodology described herein will be applied to the entire tank farm, this report focuses only on the risk from the weapons-production wastes stored in tank number 241-SY-101, commonly known as Tank 101-SY, as configured in December 1992. This tank, which periodically releases (open-quotes burpsclose quotes) a gaseous mixture of hydrogen, nitrous oxide, ammonia, and nitrogen, was analyzed first because of public safety concerns associated with the potential for release of radioactive tank contents should this gas mixture be ignited during one of the burps. In an effort to mitigate the burping phenomenon, an experiment is being conducted in which a large pump has been inserted into the tank to determine if pump-induced circulation of the tank contents will promote a slow, controlled release of the gases. At the Hanford Site there are 177 underground tanks in 18 separate tank farms containing accumulated liquid/sludge/salt cake radioactive wastes from 50 yr of weapons materials production activities. The total waste volume is about 60 million gal., which contains approximately 120 million Ci of radioactivity

  9. Measurements of waste tank passive ventilation rates using tracer gases

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.; Olsen, K.B.; Sklarew, D.S.; Evans, J.C.; Remund, K.M.

    1997-09-01

    This report presents the results of ventilation rate studies of eight passively ventilated high-level radioactive waste tanks using tracer gases. Head space ventilation rates were determined for Tanks A-101, AX-102, AX-103, BY-105, C-107, S-102, U-103, and U-105 using sulfur hexafluoride (SF 6 ) and/or helium (He) as tracer gases. Passive ventilation rates are needed for the resolution of several key safety issues. These safety issues are associated with the rates of flammable gas production and ventilation, the rates at which organic salt-nitrate salt mixtures dry out, and the estimation of organic solvent waste surface areas. This tracer gas study involves injecting a tracer gas into the tank headspace and measuring its concentration at different times to establish the rate at which the tracer is removed by ventilation. Tracer gas injection and sample collection were performed by SGN Eurisys Service Corporation and/or Lockheed Martin Hanford Corporation, Characterization Project Operations. Headspace samples were analyzed for He and SF 6 by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The tracer gas method was first demonstrated on Tank S-102. Tests were conducted on Tank S-102 to verify that the tracer gas was uniformly distributed throughout the tank headspace before baseline samples were collected, and that mixing was sufficiently vigorous to maintain an approximately uniform distribution of tracer gas in the headspace during the course of the study. Headspace samples, collected from a location about 4 in away from the injection point and 15, 30, and 60 minutes after the injection of He and SF 6 , indicated that both tracer gases were rapidly mixed. The samples were found to have the same concentration of tracer gases after 1 hour as after 24 hours, suggesting that mixing of the tracer gas was essentially complete within 1 hour

  10. Program plan for evaluation of the Ferrocyanide Waste Tank safety issue at the Hanford Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borsheim, G.L.; Meacham, J.E.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

    1994-03-01

    This document describes the background, priorities, strategy and logic, and task descriptions for the Ferrocyanide Waste Tank Safety Program. The Ferrocyanide Safety Program was established in 1990 to provide resolution of a major safety issue identified for 24 high-level radioactive waste tanks at the Hanford Site

  11. Application of the risk-based strategy to the Hanford tank waste organic-nitrate safety issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunter, V.L.; Colson, S.D.; Ferryman, T.; Gephart, R.E.; Heasler, P.; Scheele, R.D.

    1997-12-01

    This report describes the results from application of the Risk-Based Decision Management Approach for Justifying Characterization of Hanford Tank Waste to the organic-nitrate safety issue in Hanford single-shell tanks (SSTs). Existing chemical and physical models were used, taking advantage of the most current (mid-1997) sampling and analysis data. The purpose of this study is to make specific recommendations for planning characterization to help ensure the safety of each SST as it relates to the organic-nitrate safety issue. An additional objective is to demonstrate the viability of the Risk-Based Strategy for addressing Hanford tank waste safety issues

  12. Application of the risk-based strategy to the Hanford tank waste organic-nitrate safety issue

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hunter, V.L.; Colson, S.D.; Ferryman, T.; Gephart, R.E.; Heasler, P.; Scheele, R.D.

    1997-12-01

    This report describes the results from application of the Risk-Based Decision Management Approach for Justifying Characterization of Hanford Tank Waste to the organic-nitrate safety issue in Hanford single-shell tanks (SSTs). Existing chemical and physical models were used, taking advantage of the most current (mid-1997) sampling and analysis data. The purpose of this study is to make specific recommendations for planning characterization to help ensure the safety of each SST as it relates to the organic-nitrate safety issue. An additional objective is to demonstrate the viability of the Risk-Based Strategy for addressing Hanford tank waste safety issues.

  13. Safety issue resolution strategy plan for inactive miscellaneous underground storage tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang, O.S.; Powers, T.B.

    1994-09-01

    The purpose of this strategy plan is to identify, confirm, and resolve safely issues associated with inactive miscellaneous underground storage tanks (MUSTs) using a risk-based priority approach. Assumptions and processes to assess potential risks and operational concerns are documented in this report. Safety issue priorities are ranked based on a number of considerations including risk ranking and cost effectiveness. This plan specifies work scope and recommends schedules for activities related to resolving safety issues, such as collecting historical data, searching for authorization documents, performing Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) screening and evaluation, identifying safety issues, imposing operational controls and monitoring, characterizing waste contents, mitigating and resolving safety issues, and fulfilling other remediation requirements consistent with the overall Tank Waste Remediation System strategy. Recommendations for characterization and remediation are also recommended according to the order of importance and practical programmatic consideration

  14. Safety evaluation for packaging for 1720-DR sodium-filled tank

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mercado, M.S.

    1996-01-01

    Preparations are under way to sell the sodium stored in the 1720-DR tank in the 1720-DR building. This will require that the tank, as well as the 1720-DR facility, be moved to the 300 Area, so that the sodium may be melted and transferred into a railroad tanker car. Because the sodium is a hazardous material and is being shipped in a nonspecification packaging, a safety evaluation for packaging (SEP) is required. This SEP approves the sodium-filled tank for a single shipment from the 105-DR area to the 300 Area

  15. Safety evaluation for packaging transport of LSA-II liquids in MC-312 cargo tanks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carlstrom, R.F.

    1996-09-11

    This safety evaluation for packaging authorizes the onsite transfer of bulk LSA-II radioactive liquids in the 222-S Laboratory Cargo Tank and Liquid Effluent Treatment Facility Cargo Tanks (which are U.S. Department of Transportation MC-312 specification cargo tanks) from their operating facilities to tank farm facilities.

  16. Reactor design and safety approach for a tank-type fast reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davies, S.M.; Yamaki, Hideo; Goodman, L.

    1984-06-01

    A tank type plant has been designed that offers compactness, high reliability under seismic and thermal transients, and a safety design approach that provides a balance between public safety and plant availability. This report provides a description of the design philosophy and safety features of the reactor

  17. Waste Tank Organic Safety Project organic concentration mechanisms task. FY 1994 progress report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gerber, M.A.

    1994-09-01

    The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), Waste Tank Organic Safety Project is conducting research to support Westinghouse Hanford Company's (WHC) Waste Tank Safety Program, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy's Tank Farm Project Office. The goal of PNL's program is to provide a scientific basis for analyzing organics in Hanford's underground storage tanks (USTs) and for determining whether they are at concentrations that pose a potentially unsafe condition. Part of this research is directed toward determining what organic concentrations are safe by conducting research on organic aging mechanisms and waste energetics to assess the conditions necessary to produce an uncontrolled energy release in tanks due to reactions between the organics and the nitrate and nitrate salts in the tank wastes. The objective of the Organic Concentration Mechanisms Task is to assess the degree of localized enrichment of organics to be expected in the USTs due to concentration mechanisms. This report describes the progress of research conducted in FY 1994 on two concentration mechanisms of interest to the tank safety project: (1) permeation of a separate organic liquid phase into the interstitial spaces of the tank solids during the draining of free liquid from the tanks; and (2) concentration of organics on the surfaces of the solids due to adsorption. Three experiments were conducted to investigate permeation of air and solvent into a sludge simulant that is representative of single-shell tank sludge. The permeation behavior of air and solvent into the sludge simulant can be explained by the properties of the fluid pairs (air/supernate and solvent supernate) and the sludge. One important fluid property is the interfacial tension between the supernate and either the solvent or air. In general, the greater the interfacial tension between two fluids, the more difficult it will be for the air or solvent to displace the supernate during dewatering of the sludge

  18. SAFETY EVALUATION OF OXALIC ACID WASTE RETRIEVAL IN SINGLE SHELL TANK (SST) 241-C-106

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SHULTZ, M.V.

    2003-01-01

    This report documents the safety evaluation of the process of retrieving sludge waste from single-shell tank 241-C-106 using oxalic acid. The results of the HAZOP, safety evaluation, and control allocation/decision are part of the report. This safety evaluation considers the use of oxalic acid to recover residual waste in single-shell tank (SST) 241-C-106. This is an activity not addressed in the current tank farm safety basis. This evaluation has five specific purposes: (1) Identifying the key configuration and operating assumptions needed to evaluate oxalic acid dissolution in SST 241-C-106. (2) Documenting the hazardous conditions identified during the oxalic acid dissolution hazard and operability study (HAZOP). (3) Documenting the comparison of the HAZOP results to the hazardous conditions and associated analyzed accident currently included in the safety basis, as documented in HNF-SD-WM-TI-764, Hazard Analysis Database Report. (4) Documenting the evaluation of the oxalic acid dissolution activity with respect to: (A) Accident analyses described in HNF-SD-WM-SAR-067, Tank Farms Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), and (B) Controls specified in HNF-SD-WM-TSR-006, Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements (TSR). (5) Documenting the process and results of control decisions as well as the applicability of preventive and/or mitigative controls to each oxalic acid addition hazardous condition. This safety evaluation is not intended to be a request to authorize the activity. Authorization issues are addressed by the unreviewed safety question (USQ) evaluation process. This report constitutes an accident analysis

  19. Study on core make-up water experiment of AC600 make-up water tank

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ji Fuyun; Li Changlin; Zheng Hua; Liu Shaohua; Xu Xiaolan

    1999-01-01

    The core makeup tank (CMT) is a principal component of the passive high pressure safety injection systems for AC600 and has a function to inject cold borated water into reactor vessel during abnormal events. The purpose of this experiment is to verify the gravity drain behavior of the CMT and to provide experimental data to verify the computer codes used in the safety analyses. Five experiments with simulative small and medium break conditions are conducted at AC600 core makeup tank performance test facility of Nuclear Power Institute of China (NPIC). The author provides the results of one test. The simulated accident is a small break loss-of-coolant accident

  20. Tank waste remediation system nuclear criticality safety program management review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BRADY RAAP, M.C.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the results of an internal management review of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) criticality safety program, performed in advance of the DOE/RL assessment for closure of the TWRS Nuclear Criticality Safety Issue, March 1994. Resolution of the safety issue was identified as Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Milestone M-40-12, due September 1999

  1. Safety evaluation for packaging 222-S laboratory cargo tank for onetime type B material shipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nguyen, P.M.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Evaluation for Packaging (SEP) is to evaluate and document the safety of the onetime shipment of bulk radioactive liquids in the 222-S Laboratory cargo tank (222-S cargo tank). The 222-S cargo tank is a US Department of Transportation (DOT) MC-312 specification (DOT 1989) cargo tank, vehicle registration number HO-64-04275, approved for low specific activity (LSA) shipments in accordance with the DOT Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). In accordance with the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) Order 5480.1A, Chapter III (RL 1988), an equivalent degree of safety shall be provided for onsite shipments as would be afforded by the DOT shipping regulations for a radioactive material package. This document demonstrates that this packaging system meets the onsite transportation safety criteria for a onetime shipment of Type B contents

  2. Performance Verification for Safety Injection Tank with Fluidic Device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yune, Seok Jeong; Kim, Da Yong

    2014-01-01

    In LBLOCA, the SITs of a conventional nuclear power plant deliver excessive cooling water to the reactor vessel causing the water to flow into the containment atmosphere. In an effort to make it more efficient, Fluidic Device (FD) is installed inside a SIT of Advanced Power Reactor 1400 (APR 1400). FD, a complete passive controller which doesn't require actuating power, controls injection flow rates which are susceptible to a change in the flow resistance inside a vortex chamber of FD. When SIT Emergency Core Cooling (ECC) water level is above the top of the stand pipe, the water enters the vortex chamber through both the top of the stand pipe and the control ports resulting in injection of the water at a large flow rate. When the water level drops below the top of the stand pipe, the water only enters the vortex chamber through the control ports resulting in vortex formation in the vortex chamber and a relatively small flow injection. Performance verification of SIT shall be carried out because SITs play an integral role to mitigate accidents. In this paper, the performance verification method of SIT with FD is presented. In this paper, the equations for calculation of flow resistance coefficient (K) are induced to evaluate on-site performance of APR 1400 SIT with FD. Then, the equations are applied to the performance verification of SIT with FD and good results are obtained

  3. FFTF railroad tank car Safety Evaluation for Packaging

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlstrom, R.F.

    1995-01-01

    This Safety Evaluation for Packaging (SEP) provides evaluations considered necessary to approve transfer of the 8,000 gallon Liquid Waste Tank Car (LWTC) from Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) to the 200 Areas. This SEP will demonstrate that the transfer of the LWTC will provide an equivalent degree of safety as would be provided by packages meeting U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements. This fulfills onsite transportation requirements implemented in the Hazardous Material Packaging and Shipping, WHC-CM-2-14

  4. Tank waste remediation system nuclear criticality safety inspection and assessment plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    VAIL, T.S.

    1999-01-01

    This plan provides a management approved procedure for inspections and assessments of sufficient depth to validate that the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) facility complies with the requirements of the Project Hanford criticality safety program, NHF-PRO-334, ''Criticality Safety General, Requirements''

  5. Safety evaluation for packaging (Onsite) transport of LSA-II liquids in MC-312 cargo tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlstrom, R.F.

    1996-01-01

    This safety evaluation for packaging authorizes the onsite transfer of bulk LSA-II radioactive liquids in the 222-S Laboratory Cargo Tank and Liquid Effluent Treatment Facility Cargo Tanks (which are U.S. Department of Transportation MC-312 specification cargo tanks) from their operating facilities to tank farm facilities

  6. Resolution of the ferrocyanide safety issue for the Hanford site high-level waste tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cash, R.J.

    1996-01-01

    This paper describes the approach used to resolve the ferrocyanide safety issue, a process that began in 1990 after heightened concern was expressed by various government agencies about the safety of Hanford site high-level waste tanks. At the time, little was known about ferrocyanide-nitrate/nitrite reactions and the potential for offsite releases of radioactivity from the Hanford Site. Recent studies have shown that the combined effects of temperature, radiation, and pH during more than 38 years of storage have destroyed most of the ferrocyanide originally added to tanks. This has been proven in the laboratory using flowsheet-derived waste simulants and confirmed by waste samples obtained from the ferrocyanide tanks. The resulting tank waste sludges are too dilute to support a sustained exothermic reaction, even if dried out and heated to temperatures of at least 250 C. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has been requested to close the ferrocyanide safety issue

  7. Status report on resolution of Waste Tank Safety Issues at the Hanford Site. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dukelow, G.T.; Hanson, G.A.

    1995-05-01

    The purpose of this report is to provide and update the status of activities supporting the resolution of waste tank safety issues and system deficiencies at the Hanford Site. This report provides: (1) background information on safety issues and system deficiencies; (2) a description of the Tank Waste Remediation System and the process for managing safety issues and system deficiencies; (3) changes in safety issue description, prioritization, and schedules; and (4) a summary of the status, plans, order of magnitude, cost, and schedule for resolving safety issues and system deficiencies

  8. 77 FR 62224 - Hanford Tank Farms Flammable Gas Safety Strategy

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-10-12

    ... (Board) believes that current operations at the Hanford Tank Farms require safety- significant active... administrative control in lieu of an engineered feature is also contrary to DOE's established hierarchy of...

  9. Tank 241-AZ-101 tank characterization plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schreiber, R.D.

    1995-01-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has advised the DOE to concentrate the near-term sampling and analysis activities on identification and resolution of safety issues. The Data Quality Objective (DQO) process was chosen as a tool to be used in the resolution of safety issues. As a result, A revision in the Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) milestone M-44 has been made, which states that ''A Tank Characterization Plan (TCP) will also be developed for each double-shell tank (DST) and single-shell tank (SST) using the DQO process. Development of TCPs by the DQO process is intended to allow users to ensure their needs will be met and that resources are devoted to gaining only necessary information''. This document satisfies that requirement for Tank 241-AZ-101 (AZ-101) sampling activities. Tank AZ-101 is currently a non-Watch List tank, so the only DQOs applicable to this tank are the safety screening DQO and the compatibility DQO, as described below. The contents of Tank AZ-101, as of October 31, 1994, consisted of 3,630 kL (960 kgal) of dilute non-complexed waste and aging waste from PUREX (NCAW, neutralized current acid waste). Tank AZ-101 is expected to have two primary layers. The bottom layer is composed of 132 kL of sludge, and the top layer is composed of 3,500 kL of supernatant, with a total tank waste depth of approximately 8.87 meters

  10. Tank 244A tank characterization plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schreiber, R.D.

    1994-01-01

    The Double-Shell Tank (DST) System currently receives waste from the Single-Shell Tank (SST) System in support of SST stabilization efforts or from other on-site facilities which generate or store waste. Waste is also transferred between individual DSTs. The mixing or commingling of potentially incompatible waste types at the Hanford Site must be addressed prior to any waste transfers into the DSTs. The primary goal of the Waste Compatibility Program is to prevent the formation of an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) as a result of improper waste management. Tank 244A is a Double Contained Receiver Tank (DCRT) which serves as any overflow tank for the East Area Farms. Waste material is able to flow freely between the underground storage tanks and tank 244A. Therefore, it is necessary to test the waste in tank 244A for compatibility purposes. Two issues related to the overall problem of waste compatibility must be evaluated: Assurance of continued operability during waste transfer and waste concentration and Assurance that safety problems are not created as a result of commingling wastes under interim storage. The results of the grab sampling activity prescribed by this Tank Characterization Plan shall help determine the potential for four kinds of safety problems: criticality, flammable gas accumulation, energetics, and corrosion and leakage

  11. Preliminary safety criteria for organic watch list tanks at the Hanford site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Webb, A.B.; Stewart, J.L.; Turner, O.A.; Plys, M.G.; Malinovic, B.; Grigsby, J.M.; Camaioni, D.M.; Heasler, P.G.; Samuels, W.O.; Toth, J.J.

    1995-11-01

    Condensed-phase, rapid reactions of organic salts with nitrates/nitrites in Hanford High Level Radioactive Waste single-shell tanks could lead to structural failure of the tanks resulting in significant releases of radionuclides and toxic materials. This report establishes appropriate preliminary safety criteria to ensure that tank wastes will be maintained safe. These criteria show that if actual dry wastes contain less than 1.2 MJ/kg of reactants reaction energy or less 4.5 wt % of total organic carbon, then the waste will be safe and will not propagate if ignited. Waste moisture helps to retard reactions; when waste moisture exceeds 20 wt %, rapid reactions are prevented, regardless of organic carbon concentrations. Aging and degradation of waste materials has been considered to predict the types and amounts to organic compounds present in the waste. Using measurements of 3 waste phases (liquid, salt cake, and sludge) obtained from tank waste samples analyzed in the laboratory, analysis of variance (ANOVA) models were used to estimate waste states for unmeasured tanks. The preliminary safety criteria are based upon calorimetry and propagation testing of likely organic compounds which represent actual tank wastes. These included sodium salts of citrate, formate, acetate and hydroxyethylethylenediaminetricetate (HEDTA). Hot cell tests of actual tank wastes are planned for the future to confirm propagation tests performed in the laboratory. The effects of draining liquids from the tanks which would remove liquids and moisture were considered because reactive waste which is too dry may propagate. Evaporation effects which could remove moisture from the tanks were also calculated. The various ways that the waste could be heated or ignited by equipment failures or tank operations activities were considered and appropriate monitoring and controls were recommended

  12. Preliminary safety criteria for organic watch list tanks at the Hanford site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Webb, A.B.; Stewart, J.L.; Turner, O.A. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States); Plys, M.G.; Malinovic, B. [Fauske and Associates, Inc., Burr Ridge, IL (United States); Grigsby, J.M. [G & P Consulting, Inc. (United States); Camaioni, D.M.; Heasler, P.G.; Samuels, W.O.; Toth, J.J. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Portland, OR (United States)

    1995-11-01

    Condensed-phase, rapid reactions of organic salts with nitrates/nitrites in Hanford High Level Radioactive Waste single-shell tanks could lead to structural failure of the tanks resulting in significant releases of radionuclides and toxic materials. This report establishes appropriate preliminary safety criteria to ensure that tank wastes will be maintained safe. These criteria show that if actual dry wastes contain less than 1.2 MJ/kg of reactants reaction energy or less 4.5 wt % of total organic carbon, then the waste will be safe and will not propagate if ignited. Waste moisture helps to retard reactions; when waste moisture exceeds 20 wt %, rapid reactions are prevented, regardless of organic carbon concentrations. Aging and degradation of waste materials has been considered to predict the types and amounts to organic compounds present in the waste. Using measurements of 3 waste phases (liquid, salt cake, and sludge) obtained from tank waste samples analyzed in the laboratory, analysis of variance (ANOVA) models were used to estimate waste states for unmeasured tanks. The preliminary safety criteria are based upon calorimetry and propagation testing of likely organic compounds which represent actual tank wastes. These included sodium salts of citrate, formate, acetate and hydroxyethylethylenediaminetricetate (HEDTA). Hot cell tests of actual tank wastes are planned for the future to confirm propagation tests performed in the laboratory. The effects of draining liquids from the tanks which would remove liquids and moisture were considered because reactive waste which is too dry may propagate. Evaporation effects which could remove moisture from the tanks were also calculated. The various ways that the waste could be heated or ignited by equipment failures or tank operations activities were considered and appropriate monitoring and controls were recommended.

  13. Tank 241-BY-111 tank characterization plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Homi, C.S.

    1994-01-01

    The sampling and analytical needs associated with the 51 Hanford Site underground storage tanks classified on one or more of the four Watch Lists (ferrocyanide, organic, flammable gas, and high heat), and the safety screening of all 177 tanks have been identified through the Data Quality Objective (DQO) process. DQO's identify information needed by a program group in the Tank Waste Remediation System concerned with safety issues, regulatory requirements, or the transporting and processing of tank waste. This Tank Characterization Plan will identify characterization objectives for Tank BY-111 pertaining to sample collection, sample preparation and analysis, and laboratory analytical evaluation and reporting requirements. In addition, an estimate of the current contents and status of the tank is given

  14. Flammable gas tank safety program: Technical basis for gas analysis and monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estey, S.D.

    1998-01-01

    Several Hanford waste tanks have been observed to exhibit periodic releases of significant quantities of flammable gases. Because potential safety issues have been identified with this type of waste behavior, applicable tanks were equipped with instrumentation offering the capability to continuously monitor gases released from them. This document was written to cover three primary areas: (1) describe the current technical basis for requiring flammable gas monitoring, (2) update the technical basis to include knowledge gained from monitoring the tanks over the last three years, (3) provide the criteria for removal of Standard Hydrogen Monitoring System(s) (SHMS) from a waste tank or termination of other flammable gas monitoring activities in the Hanford Tank farms

  15. Waste Tank Organic Safety Program: Analytical methods development. Progress report, FY 1994

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, J.A.; Clauss, S.A.; Grant, K.E.

    1994-09-01

    The objectives of this task are to develop and document extraction and analysis methods for organics in waste tanks, and to extend these methods to the analysis of actual core samples to support the Waste Tank organic Safety Program. This report documents progress at Pacific Northwest Laboratory (a) during FY 1994 on methods development, the analysis of waste from Tank 241-C-103 (Tank C-103) and T-111, and the transfer of documented, developed analytical methods to personnel in the Analytical Chemistry Laboratory (ACL) and 222-S laboratory. This report is intended as an annual report, not a completed work

  16. Safety evaluation of interim stabilization of non-stabilized single-shell watch list tanks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stahl, S.M.

    1994-12-30

    The report provides a summation of the status of safety issues associated with interim stabilization of Watch List SSTs (organic, ferrocyanide, and flammable gas), as extracted from recent safety analyses, including the Tank Farms Accelerated Safety Analysis efforts.

  17. Safety evaluation of interim stabilization of non-stabilized single-shell watch list tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stahl, S.M.

    1994-01-01

    The report provides a summation of the status of safety issues associated with interim stabilization of Watch List SSTs (organic, ferrocyanide, and flammable gas), as extracted from recent safety analyses, including the Tank Farms Accelerated Safety Analysis efforts

  18. Tank 241-AZ-102 tank characterization plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schreiber, R.D.

    1995-01-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has advised the DOE to concentrate the near-term sampling and analysis activities on identification and resolution of safety issues. The Data Quality Objective (DQO) process was chosen as a tool to be used in the resolution of safety issues. As a result, a revision in the Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) milestone M-44 has been made, which states that ''A Tank Characterization Plan (TCP) will also be developed for each double-shell tank (DST) and single-shell tank (SST) using the DQO process ... Development of TCPs by the DQO process is intended to allow users to ensure their needs will be met and that resources are devoted to gaining only necessary information''. This document satisfies that requirement for tank 241-AZ-102 (AZ-102) sampling activities. Tank AZ-102 is currently a non-Watch List tank, so the only DQOs applicable to this tank are the safety screening DQO and the compatibility DQO, as described below. The current contents of Tank AZ-102, as of October 31, 1994, consisted of 3,600 kL (950 kgal) of dilute non-complexed waste and aging waste from PUREX (NCAW, neutralized current acid waste). Tank AZ-102 is expected to have two primary layers. The bottom layer is composed of 360 kL of sludge, and the top layer is composed of 3,240 kL of supernatant, with a total tank waste depth of approximately 8.9 meters

  19. Accelerated safety analyses - structural analyses Phase I - structural sensitivity evaluation of single- and double-shell waste storage tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Becker, D.L.

    1994-11-01

    Accelerated Safety Analyses - Phase I (ASA-Phase I) have been conducted to assess the appropriateness of existing tank farm operational controls and/or limits as now stipulated in the Operational Safety Requirements (OSRs) and Operating Specification Documents, and to establish a technical basis for the waste tank operating safety envelope. Structural sensitivity analyses were performed to assess the response of the different waste tank configurations to variations in loading conditions, uncertainties in loading parameters, and uncertainties in material characteristics. Extensive documentation of the sensitivity analyses conducted and results obtained are provided in the detailed ASA-Phase I report, Structural Sensitivity Evaluation of Single- and Double-Shell Waste Tanks for Accelerated Safety Analysis - Phase I. This document provides a summary of the accelerated safety analyses sensitivity evaluations and the resulting findings

  20. Summary of tank information relating salt well pumping to flammable gas safety issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Caley, S.M.; Mahoney, L.A.; Gauglitz, P.A.

    1996-09-01

    The Hanford Site has 149 single-shell tanks (SSTs) containing radioactive wastes that are complex mixes of radioactive and chemical products. Active use of these SSTs was phased out completely by November 1980, and the first step toward final disposal of the waste in the SSTs is interim stabilization, which involves removing essentially all of the drainable liquid from the tank. Stabilization can be achieved administratively, by jet pumping to remove drainable interstitial liquid, or by supernatant pumping. To date, 116 tanks have been declared interim stabilized; 44 SSTs have had drainable liquid removed by salt well jet pumping. Of the 149 SSTs, 19 are on the Flammable Gas Watch List (FGWL) because the waste in these tanks is known or suspected, in all but one case, to generate and retain mixtures of flammable gases, including; hydrogen, nitrous oxide, and ammonia. Salt well pumping to remove the drainable interstitial liquid from these SSTs is expected to cause the release of much of the retained gas, posing a number of safety concerns. The scope of this work is to collect and summarize information, primarily tank data and observations, that relate salt well pumping to flammable gas safety issues. While the waste within FGWL SSTs is suspected offering flammable gases, the effect of salt well pumping on the waste behavior is not well understood. This study is being conducted for the Westinghouse Hanford Company as part of the Flammable Gas Project at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Understanding the historical tank behavior during and following salt well pumping will help to resolve the associated safety issues

  1. Super Phenix 1: in Service inspection of main and safety tanks weldments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asty, Michel; Vertut, Jean; Argous, J.P.

    1980-05-01

    In service inspection of the main tank of the Super Phenix 1 reactor is a new demand as compared to Phenix: the authorities have asked that surface and internal defects could be detected and their evolution monitored in the future. The presence of thermal baffles inside the main tank precludes the access on that side: the distance between the main and safety tanks takes into account the room needed for an In Service Inspection module. An inspection vehicle is presently under development, which includes ultrasonic examination (focussed probes) and visual examination (TV cameras) capabilities. We briefly describe the techniques that have been selected for ultrasonic testing and also for the vehicle and its guidance between the tanks

  2. Super Phenix 1: In-service inspection of main and safety tanks weldments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Asty, M [DTech/STA, Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires de Saclay (France); Vertut, J [DPR/STEP, Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires de Saclay (France); Argous, J P [DRNR/STRS, Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires de Cadarache (France)

    1980-11-01

    In Service Inspection of the main tank of the Super Phenix 1 reactor is a new demand compared to Phenix: the authorities have asked that surface and internal defects be detected and their evolution monitored in the future. The presence of thermal baffles inside the main tank precludes the access on that side: the distance between the main and safety tanks takes into account the room needed for an In Service Inspection module. An inspection vehicle is presently under development, which includes ultrasonic examination (focussed probes) and visual examination (TV cameras) capabilities. We briefly describe the techniques that have been selected for ultrasonic testing and also for the vehicle and its guidance between the tanks. (author)

  3. Super Phenix 1: In-service inspection of main and safety tanks weldments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asty, M.; Vertut, J.; Argous, J.P.

    1980-01-01

    In Service Inspection of the main tank of the Super Phenix 1 reactor is a new demand compared to Phenix: the authorities have asked that surface and internal defects be detected and their evolution monitored in the future. The presence of thermal baffles inside the main tank precludes the access on that side: the distance between the main and safety tanks takes into account the room needed for an In Service Inspection module. An inspection vehicle is presently under development, which includes ultrasonic examination (focussed probes) and visual examination (TV cameras) capabilities. We briefly describe the techniques that have been selected for ultrasonic testing and also for the vehicle and its guidance between the tanks. (author)

  4. Safety analysis of exothermic reaction hazards associated with the organic liquid layer in tank 241-C-103

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Postma, A.K.; Bechtold, D.B.; Borsheim, G.L.; Grisby, J.M.; Guthrie, R.L.; Kummerer, M.; Turner, D.A.; Plys, M.G.

    1994-03-01

    Safety hazards associated with the interim storage of a potentially flammable organic liquid in waste Tank C-103 are identified and evaluated. The technical basis for closing the unreviewed safety question (USQ) associated with the floating liquid organic layer in this tank is presented

  5. Safety analysis of exothermic reaction hazards associated with the organic liquid layer in tank 241-C-103

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Postma, A.K.; Bechtold, D.B.; Borsheim, G.L.; Grisby, J.M.; Guthrie, R.L.; Kummerer, M.; Turner, D.A. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States); Plys, M.G. [Fauske and Associates, Inc., Burr Ridge, IL (United States)

    1994-03-01

    Safety hazards associated with the interim storage of a potentially flammable organic liquid in waste Tank C-103 are identified and evaluated. The technical basis for closing the unreviewed safety question (USQ) associated with the floating liquid organic layer in this tank is presented.

  6. Tank 241-BY-108 tank characterization plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carpenter, B.C.

    1994-01-01

    The sampling and analytical needs associated with the 51 Hanford Site underground storage tanks classified on one or more of the four Watch Lists (ferrocyanide, organic, flammable gas, and high heat), and the safety screening of all 177 tanks have been identified through the Data Quality Objective (DQO) process. DQOs identity information needed by a program group in the Tank Waste Remediation System concerned with safety issues, regulatory requirements, or the transporting and processing of tank waste. This Tank Characterization Plan will identify characterization objectives for tank BY-108 pertaining to sample collection, sample preparation and analysis, and laboratory analytical evaluation and reporting requirements. In addition, an estimate of the current contents and status of the tank is given. Single-shell tank BY-108 is classified as a Ferrocyanide Watch List tank. The tank was declared an assumed leaker and removed from service in 1972; interim stabilized was completed in February 1985. Although not officially an Organic Watch List tank, restrictions have been placed on intrusive operations by Standing Order number-sign 94-16 (dated 09/08/94) since the tank is suspected to contain or to have contained a floating organic layer

  7. Tank characterization report for double-shell Tank 241-AP-107

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeLorenzo, D.S.; Simpson, B.C.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this tank characterization report is to describe and characterize the waste in Double-Shell Tank 241-AP-107 based on information gathered from various sources. This report summarizes the available information regarding the waste in Tank 241-AP-107, and arranges it in a useful format for making management and technical decisions concerning this particular waste tank. In addition, conclusion and recommendations based on safety and further characterization needs are given. Specific objectives reached by the sampling and characterization of the waste in Tank 241-AP-107 are: Contribute toward the fulfillment of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Milestone M-44-05 concerning the characterization of Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks; Complete safety screening of the contents of Tank 241-AP-107 to meet the characterization requirements of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety board (DNFSB) Recommendation 93-5; and Provide tank waste characterization to the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Program Elements in accordance with the TWRS Tank Waste Analysis Plan

  8. Organic Tanks Safety Program: Waste aging studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Camaioni, D.M.; Samuels, W.D.; Lenihan, B.D.; Clauss, S.A.; Wahl, K.L.; Campbell, J.A.

    1994-11-01

    The underground storage tanks at the Hanford Complex contain wastes generated from many years of plutonium production and recovery processes, and mixed wastes from radiological degradation processes. The chemical changes of the organic materials used in the extraction processes have a direct on several specific safety issues, including potential energy releases from these tanks. This report details the first year's findings of a study charged with determining how thermal and radiological processes may change the composition of organic compounds disposed to the tank. Their approach relies on literature precedent, experiments with simulated waste, and studies of model reactions. During the past year, efforts have focused on the global reaction kinetics of a simulated waste exposed to γ radiation, the reactions of organic radicals with nitrite ion, and the decomposition reactions of nitro compounds. In experiments with an organic tank non-radioactive simulant, the authors found that gas production is predominantly radiolytically induced. Concurrent with gas generation they observe the disappearance of EDTA, TBP, DBP and hexone. In the absence of radiolysis, the TBP readily saponifies in the basic medium, but decomposition of the other compounds required radiolysis. Key organic intermediates in the model are C-N bonded compounds such as oximes. As discussed in the report, oximes and nitro compounds decompose in strong base to yield aldehydes, ketones and carboxylic acids (from nitriles). Certain aldehydes can react in the absence of radiolysis to form H 2 . Thus, if the pathways are correct, then organic compounds reacting via these pathways are oxidizing to lower energy content. 75 refs

  9. Vibration analysis of the Golfech 2 safety injection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morilhat, P.

    1993-01-01

    The main function of the safety injection system in a PWR plant is to ensure cooling of fuel elements in the event of a loss of coolant accident. The multistage centrifugal pump mounted-on this system induces pressure fluctuations, resulting in dynamic loads on piping. In certain plant units, these loads have caused cracking in the nozzles connected to the safety injection system, whereas in others, no damage has been observed. In order to understand the differences in dynamic behavior observed from one site to another, tests were performed on a real safety injection system, that of Golfech-2. They enabled determination of the modal characteristics of the system and identification of the hydro-acoustic source of the low head safety injection pump. They also enabled assessment of the pressure fluctuation levels in the pump suction and discharge areas as well as the vibratory response of the system when operating under partial and nominal flow conditions. Finally, these test results were used to estimate fatigue damage in the safety injection system. The experimental results will later be used to validate the model of the system undertaken with the piping design code CIRCUS and define the boundary conditions to be taken into account. (author). 6 figs., 2 refs

  10. THESEUS - a research project to improve the safety standard of tank vehicles for dangerous goods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guenther, B.

    1992-01-01

    A research project reffered to as THESEUS was initiated by the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology of Germany. The intent of the investigation is to generate measures designed to enhance the safety standard of commercial transports of dangerous goods in tank vehicles. Hereby, the analysis of real accidents by teams within the project will provide the relevant parameters for the experimental and theoretical investigation of vehicles, tank components and safety devices. The project started in summer 1990. This paper will focus main features and the work done so far. Special consideration will be made to the failure behaviour of tank components as the authors field of activity. (orig.)

  11. 45-Day safety screen results for tank 241-U-202, push mode, cores 75 and 78

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jo, J.

    1995-01-01

    This document is a report of the analytical results for samples collected from the radioactive wastes in Tank 241-U-202 at the Hanford Reservation. Core samples were collected from the solid wastes in the tank and underwent safety screening analyses including differential scanning calorimetry, thermogravimetric analysis, and total alpha analysis. Results indicate that no safety screening notification limits were exceeded

  12. Hanford Tank Safety Project: Minutes of the Tank Waste Science Panel meeting, February 7--8, 1991

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Strachan, D.M. [comp.

    1991-06-01

    The Tank Waste Science Panel met February 7--8, 1991, to review the latest data from the analyses of the October 24, 1990, gas release from Tank 241-SY-101 (101-SY) at Hanford; discuss the results of work being performed in support of the Hanford Tank Safety Project; and be briefed on the ferrocyanide issues included in the expanded scope of the Science Panel. The shapes of the gas release curves from the past three events are similar and correlate well with changes in waste level, but the correlation between the released volume of gas and the waste height is not as good. An analysis of the kinetics of gas generation from waste height measurements in Tank 101-SY suggests that the reaction giving rise to the gases in the tank is independent of the gas pressure and independent of the physical processes that give rise to the episodic release of the gases. Tank waste height data were also used to suggest that a floating crust formed early in the history of the tank and that the current crust is being made thicker in the eastern sector of the tank by repeated upheaval of waste slurry onto the surface. The correlation between the N{sub 2}O and N{sub 2} generated in the October release appears to be 1:1, suggesting a single mechanistic pathway. Analysis of other gas generation ratios, however, suggests that H{sub 2} and N{sub 2}O are evolved together, whereas N{sub 2} is from the air. If similar ratios are observed in planned radiolysis experiments are Argonne National Laboratory, radiolysis would appear to be generating most of the gases in Tank 101-SY. Data from analysis of synthetic waste crust using a dynamic x-ray diffractometer suggest that, in air, organics are being oxidized and liberating CO{sub 2} and NO{sub x}. Experiments at Savannah River Laboratory indicate that irradiation of solutions containing NO{sub 3} and organics can produce N{sub 2}O.

  13. Remediation of arsenic-contaminated groundwater using media-injected permeable reactive barriers with a modified montmorillonite: sand tank studies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Luo, Ximing; Liu, Haifei; Huang, Guoxin; Li, Ye; Zhao, Yan; Li, Xu

    2016-01-01

    A modified montmorillonite (MMT) was prepared using an acid activation-sodium activation-iron oxide coating method to improve the adsorption capacities of natural MMTs. For MMT, its interlamellar distance increased from 12.29 to 13.36 Å, and goethite (α-FeOOH) was intercalated into its clay layers. Two novel media-injected permeable reactive barrier (MI-PRB) configurations were proposed for removing arsenic from groundwater. Sand tank experiments were conducted to investigate the performance of the two MI-PRBs: Tank A was filled with quartz sand. Tank B was packed with quartz sand and zero-valent iron (ZVI) in series, and the MMT slurry was respectively injected into them to form reactive zones. The results showed that for tank A, total arsenic (TA) removal of 98.57% was attained within the first 60 mm and subsequently descended slowly to 88.84% at the outlet. For tank B, a similar spatial variation trend was observed in the quartz sand layer, and subsequently, TA removal increased to ≥99.80% in the ZVI layer. TA removal by MMT mainly depended on both surface adsorption and electrostatic adhesion. TA removal by ZVI mainly relied on coagulation/precipitation and adsorption during the iron corrosion. The two MI-PRBs are feasible alternatives for in situ remediation of groundwater with elevated As levels.

  14. Ferrocyanide safety program: FY 1995 report on Mossbauer spectroscopy tank activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Riedel, F.R.

    1995-01-01

    This report summarizes FY 1995 activities on the Mossbauer Spectroscopy task. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has developed a miniaturized Mossbauer spectrometer that is small enough to perform elevation scans in the Hanford Site waste tank liquid observation wells. Mossbauer spectroscopy is a sensitive and selective method that can detect and distinguish between different iron-based compounds in many types of chemical environments. Iron is major constituent of ferrocyanide waste and information about its location and composition in the tanks supports interim safe storage of the waste and final resolution of the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue. Results obtained from studies of ferrocyanide waste simulants and those from the first test in a hot cell environment using radioactive tank waste are presented

  15. Analysis on Dangerous Source of Large Safety Accident in Storage Tank Area

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Tong; Li, Ying; Xie, Tiansheng; Liu, Yu; Zhu, Xueyuan

    2018-01-01

    The difference between a large safety accident and a general accident is that the consequences of a large safety accident are particularly serious. To study the tank area which factors directly or indirectly lead to the occurrence of large-sized safety accidents. According to the three kinds of hazard source theory and the consequence cause analysis of the super safety accident, this paper analyzes the dangerous source of the super safety accident in the tank area from four aspects, such as energy source, large-sized safety accident reason, management missing, environmental impact Based on the analysis of three kinds of hazard sources and environmental analysis to derive the main risk factors and the AHP evaluation model is established, and after rigorous and scientific calculation, the weights of the related factors in four kinds of risk factors and each type of risk factors are obtained. The result of analytic hierarchy process shows that management reasons is the most important one, and then the environmental factors and the direct cause and Energy source. It should be noted that although the direct cause is relatively low overall importance, the direct cause of Failure of emergency measures and Failure of prevention and control facilities in greater weight.

  16. Running scenarios using the Waste Tank Safety and Operations Hanford Site model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stahlman, E.J.

    1995-11-01

    Management of the Waste Tank Safety and Operations (WTS ampersand O) at Hanford is a large and complex task encompassing 177 tanks and having a budget of over $500 million per year. To assist managers in this task, a model based on system dynamics was developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The model simulates the WTS ampersand O at the Hanford Tank Farms by modeling the planning, control, and flow of work conducted by Managers, Engineers, and Crafts. The model is described in Policy Analysis of Hanford Tank Farm Operations with System Dynamics Approach (Kwak 1995b) and Management Simulator for Hanford Tank Farm Operations (Kwak 1995a). This document provides guidance for users of the model in developing, running, and analyzing results of management scenarios. The reader is assumed to have an understanding of the model and its operation. Important parameters and variables in the model are described, and two scenarios are formulated as examples

  17. Tank 241-B-103 tank characterization plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carpenter, B.C.

    1995-01-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) has advised the US Department of Energy (DOE) to concentrate the near-term sampling and analysis activities on identification and resolution of safety issues. The data quality objective (DQO) process was chosen as a tool to be used to identify sampling and analytical needs for the resolution of safety issues. As a result, a revision in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement or TPA) milestone M-44-00 has been made, which states that ''A Tank Characterization Plan (TCP) will also be developed for each double-shell tank (DST) and single-shell tank (SST) using the DQO process... Development of TCPs by the DQO process is intended to allow users (e.g., Hanford Facility user groups, regulators) to ensure their needs will be met and that resources are devoted to gaining only necessary information.'' This document satisfies that requirement for Tank 241-B-103 (B-103) sampling activities. Tank B-103 was placed on the Organic Watch List in January 1991 due to review of TRAC data that predicts a TOC content of 3.3 dry weight percent. The tank was classified as an assumed leaker of approximately 30,280 liters (8,000 gallons) in 1978 and declared inactive. Tank B-103 is passively ventilated with interim stabilization and intrusion prevention measures completed in 1985

  18. Tank 241-AW-101 tank characterization plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sathyanarayana, P.

    1994-01-01

    The first section gives a summary of the available information for Tank AW-101. Included in the discussion are the process history and recent sampling events for the tank, as well as general information about the tank such as its age and the risers to be used for sampling. Tank 241-AW-101 is one of the 25 tanks on the Flammable Gas Watch List. To resolve the Flammable Gas safety issue, characterization of the tanks, including intrusive tank sampling, must be performed. Prior to sampling, however, the potential for the following scenarios must be evaluated: the potential for ignition of flammable gases such as hydrogen-air and/or hydrogen-nitrous oxide; and the potential for secondary ignition of organic-nitrate/nitrate mixtures in crust layer initiated by the burning of flammable gases or by a mechanical in-tank energy source. The characterization effort applicable to this Tank Characterization Plan is focused on the resolution of the crust burn flammable gas safety issue of Tank AW-101. To evaluate the potential for a crust burn of the waste material, calorimetry tests will be performed on the waste. Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) will be used to determine whether an exothermic reaction exists

  19. The effect of injection safety training on knowledge and attitude of ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Background: Studies have shown poor injection safety practices among health workers in Nigeria and this was adduced to lack of adequate training on injection safety practices. Objective: The study assessed the effect of the training intervention on the knowledge and attitude of primary healthcare workers on injection ...

  20. Tank 241-C-107 tank characterization plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schreiber, R.D.

    1995-01-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) has advised the US Department of Energy (DOE) to concentrate the near-term sampling and analysis activities on identification and resolution of safety issues. The data quality objective (DQO) process was chosen as a tool to be used to identify sampling and analytical needs for the resolution of safety issues. As a result, a revision in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement or TPA) milestone M-44-00 has been made, which states that ''A Tank Characterization Plan (TCP) will also be developed for each double-shell tank (DST) and single-shell tank (SST) using the DQO process... Development of TCPs by the DQO process is intended to allow users (e.g., Hanford Facility user groups, regulators) to ensure their needs will be met and that resources are devoted to gaining only necessary information.'' This document satisfies that requirement for the Tank 241-C-107 (C-107) sampling activities. Currently tank C-107 is categorized as a sound, low-heat load tank with partial isolation completed in December 1982. The tank is awaiting stabilization. Tank C-107 is expected to contain three primary layers of waste. The bottom layer should contain a mixture of the following wastes: ion exchange, concentrated phosphate waste from N-Reactor, Hanford Lab Operations, strontium semi-works, Battelle Northwest, 1C, TBP waste, cladding waste, and the hot semi-works. The middle layer should contain strontium recovery supernate. The upper layer should consist of non-complexed waste

  1. Dryout modeling in support of the organic tank safety project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simmons, C.S.

    1998-08-01

    This work was performed for the Organic Tank Safety Project to evaluate the moisture condition of the waste surface organic-nitrate bearing tanks that are classified as being conditionally safe because sufficient water is present. This report describes the predictive modeling procedure used to predict the moisture content of waste in the future, after it has been subjected to dryout caused by water vapor loss through passive ventilation. This report describes a simplified procedure for modeling the drying out of tank waste. Dryout occurs as moisture evaporates from the waste into the headspace and then exits the tank through ventilation. The water vapor concentration within the waste of the headspace is determined by the vapor-liquid equilibrium, which depends on the waste's moisture content and temperature. This equilibrium has been measured experimentally for a variety of waste samples and is described by a curve called the water vapor partial pressure isotherm. This curve describes the lowering of the partial pressure of water vapor in equilibrium with the waste relative to pure water due to the waste's chemical composition and hygroscopic nature. Saltcake and sludge are described by two distinct calculations that emphasize the particular physical behavior or each. A simple, steady-state model is devised for each type to obtain the approximate drying behavior. The report shows the application of the model to Tanks AX-102, C-104, and U-105

  2. Improving the design of higher-capacity railway tank cars for hazardous materials transport: Optimizing the trade-off between weight and safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barkan, Christopher P.L.

    2008-01-01

    As with many aspects of modern industrial society, decision-makers face trade-offs in considering hazardous materials transportation equipment and practices. Tank cars used for transport of hazardous materials can be made more resistant to damage in accidents through use of a thicker steel tank and other protective features. However, the additional weight of these features reduces the car's capacity and thus its efficiency as a transportation vehicle. In this paper the problem of tank car safety versus weight is developed as a multi-attribute decision problem. North American railroads recently developed specifications for higher capacity tank cars for transportation of hazardous materials including enhanced safety design features. A group of tank car safety design features or 'risk reduction options' (RROs) were analyzed with regard to their effect on the conditional probability of release in an accident, and their incremental effect on tank car weight. All possible combinations of these RROs were then analyzed in terms of the reduced release probability per unit of weight increase and the Pareto optimal set of options identified. This set included the combinations of RROs that provided the greatest improvement in safety with the least amount of additional weight for any desired level of tank car weight increase. The analysis was conducted for both non-insulated and insulated tank cars and used two objective functions, minimization of conditional probability of release, and minimization of expected quantity lost, given that a car was derailed in an accident. Sensitivity analyses of the effect of tank car size and use of different objective functions were conducted and the optimality results were found to be robust. The results of this analysis were used by the Association of American Railroads Tank Car Committee to develop new specifications for higher capacity non-insulated and insulated, non-pressure tank cars resulting in an estimated 32% and 24% respective

  3. Criticality safety of high-level tank waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rogers, C.A.

    1995-01-01

    Radioactive waste containing low concentrations of fissile isotopes is stored in underground storage tanks on the Hanford Site in Washington State. The goal of criticality safety is to ensure that this waste remains subcritical into the indefinite future without supervision. A large ratio of solids to plutonium provides an effective way of ensuring a low plutonium concentration. Since the first waste discharge, a program of audits and appraisals has ensured that operations are conducted according to limits and controls applied to them. In addition, a program of surveillance and characterization maintains watch over waste after discharge

  4. Waste tank safety program annual status report for FY 1993, Task 5: Toxicology and epidemiology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mahlum, D.D.; Young, J.Y.

    1993-09-01

    A toxicology team independently reviewed analytical data and provided advice concerning potential health effects associated with exposure to tank-vapor constituents at the Hanford site. Most of the emphasis was directed toward Tank 241-C-103, but a preliminary assessment was also made of the toxicologic implication of the cyanide levels in the headspace of Tank 241-C-108. The objectives of this program are to (1) review procedures used for sampling vapors from various tanks, (2) identify constituents in tank-vapor samples that could be related to symptoms reported by waste-tank workers, (3) evaluate the toxicologic implications of those constituents by comparison to established toxicologic data bases, (4) provide advice for additional analytical efforts, and (5) support other activities as requested by the project manager and the cognizant Westinghouse Hanford Company Tank Vapor Issues Safety Resolution Manager

  5. 78 FR 66326 - Hazardous Materials: Rail Petitions and Recommendations To Improve the Safety of Railroad Tank...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-05

    ...: Rail Petitions and Recommendations To Improve the Safety of Railroad Tank Car Transportation (RRR) AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION: Advance Notice of... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Parts...

  6. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-S-104

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiCenso, A.T.; Simpson, B.C.

    1994-01-01

    In July and August 1992, Single-Shell Tank 241-S-104 was sampled as part of the overall characterization effort directed by the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Sampling was also performed to determine proper handling of the waste, to address corrosivity and compatibility issues, and to comply with requirements of the Washington Administrative Code. This Tank Characterization Report presents an overview of that tank sampling and analysis effort, and contains observations regarding waste characteristics. It also presents expected concentration and bulk inventory data for the waste contents based on this latest sampling data and background historical and surveillance tank information. Finally, this report makes recommendations and conclusions regarding operational safety. The purpose of this report is to describe the characteristics the waste in Single-Shell Tank 241-S-104 (hereafter, Tank 241-S-104) based on information obtained from a variety of sources. This report summarizes the available information regarding the chemical and physical properties of the waste in Tank 241-S-104, and using the historical information to place the analytical data in context, arranges this information in a format useful for making management and technical decisions concerning waste tank safety and disposal issues. In addition, conclusions and recommendations are presented based on safety issues and further characterization needs

  7. Injection safety practices in a main referral hospital in northeastern ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    2013-03-25

    Mar 25, 2013 ... containers specific for non-sharps infectious waste and 17 (77.3%) of the observed therapeutic injections ..... injection safety, a high percentage was not complying .... the availability of loose disposable injection equipment.

  8. Assessment of the safety of injection practices and injection-related procedures in family health units and centers in Alexandria.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Elhoseeny, Taghareed A; Mourad, Juidan K

    2014-08-01

    The Safe Injection Global Network (SIGN) developed an intervention strategy for reducing overuse of injections and promoting the administration of safe injections. Tool C--Revised is designed to assess the safety of the most common procedures that puncture the skin within health services. The aim of the study was to assess injection safety within the primary healthcare facilities in Alexandria using Tool C--Revised. A total of 45 family health units and centers in Alexandria were selected by proportional allocation from the eight regions of Alexandria. The Tool C--Revised of the WHO was used for observation of the entire facility, injection practices and injection-related procedures, and sterilization practices. Interview of different health providers and immediate supervisor of injections was carried out. Indicators that reflect risk included: deficiency of alcohol-based hand rub for cleansing hands (13.3%), compliance with hand wash before preparing a procedure (56.9% before injection practices, 61.3% before phlebotomy, and 67.6% before lancet puncture), and wearing a new pair of gloves before new procedures (48.6% before injection practices, 9.7% for phlebotomy, 11.8% for lancet puncture, and 80% for both intravenous injections and infusions). Enough disposable equipment in all facilities for at least 2 weeks dependent on the statement of the average numbers of procedures per week was shown. Only 38% of the providers had received training regarding injection safety in the last 2 years and 62.5% had completed their three doses of hepatitis B vaccine. Only 42.2% of staffs who handled healthcare waste had access to heavy gloves. Indicators related to injection and injection-related practices that reflect risk to patients include deficiency of alcohol-based hand rub tools, nonadherence to hand hygiene before preparing an injection, and inadequate adherence to using a clean barrier when opening a glass ampule and use of gloves. Indicators that may reflect risk to

  9. 45-Day safety screen results for Tank 241-C-101, auger sample 95-AUG-019

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sasaki, L.M.

    1995-01-01

    One auger sample from Tank 241-C-101 was received by the 222-S Laboratory and underwent safety screening analyses--differential scanning calorimetry (DSC), thermogravimetric analysis (TGA), and total alpha analysis--in accordance with the tank characterization plan. Analytical results for the TGA on the crust sample (the uppermost portion of the auger sample) (sample number S95T000823) were less than the safety screening notification limit of 17 weight percent water. Verbal and written notifications were made on May 3, 1995. No exotherms were observed in the DSC analyses and the total alpha results were well below the safety screening notification limit. This report includes the primary safety screening results obtained from the analyses and copies of all DSC and TGA raw data scans as requested per the TCP. Although not included in this report, a photograph of the extruded sample was taken and is available. This report also includes bulk density measurements required by Characterization Plant Engineering. Additional analyses (pH, total organic carbon, and total inorganic carbon) are being performed on the drainable liquid at the request of Characterization Process Control; these analyses will be reported at a later date in a final report for this auger sample. Tank C-101 is not part of any of the four Watch Lists

  10. 49 CFR 238.423 - Fuel tanks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Fuel tanks. 238.423 Section 238.423 Transportation....423 Fuel tanks. (a) External fuel tanks. Each type of external fuel tank must be approved by FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety upon a showing that the fuel tank provides a level of safety at least...

  11. Injection safety knowledge and practices among clinical health care ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Injection safety is therefore critical in preventing occupational exposure and infection from blood borne pathogens, hence prevention is a vital part of any ... safety among clinical healthcare workers at the Garissa Provincial General Hospital.

  12. Analysis on engineering application of CNP1000 in-containment refueling water storage tank

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang Bin; Wang Yong; Qiu Jian; Weng Minghui

    2005-01-01

    Based on the basic design of CNP1000 (three loops), which is self-reliance designed by China National Nuclear Cooperation, and investigation results from abroad advanced nuclear power plant design of In-containment Refueling Water Storage tank, this paper describe the system flowsheet, functional requirements, structural design and piping arrangement about In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank. The design takes the lower structural space as the IRWST. Four areas are configured to meet the diverse functional requirements, including depressurization area, water collection area, safety injection and/or containment spray suction area, TSP storage area / reactor cavity flooding holdup tank. Also the paper depict the corresponding analysis and demonstration, such as In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank pressure transient on depressurization area of IRWST, suction and internal flow stream of IRWST, configuration of strains, the addition method and amount of chemical addition, design and engineering applicant of Reactor Cavity Flooding System. All the analysis results show the basic design of IRWST meeting with the Utility Requirement Document's requirements on performance of safety function, setting of overfill passage, overpressure protection, related interference, etc., and show the reliability of Engineering Safety Features being improved for CNP1000 (three loops). Meanwhile, it is demonstrated that the design of In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank can apply on the future nuclear power plant project in China. (authors)

  13. Experimental research progress on passive safety systems of Chinese advanced PWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xiao Zejun; Zhuo Wenbin; Zheng Hua; Chen Bingde; Zong Guifang; Jia Dounan

    2003-01-01

    TMI and Chernobyl accidents, having pronounced impact on nuclear industries, triggered the governments as well as interested institutions to devote much attention to the safety of nuclear power plant and public's requirements on nuclear power plant safety were also going to be stricter and stricter. It is obvious that safety level of an ordinary light water reactor is no longer satisfactory to these requirements. Recently, the safety authorities have recommended the implementation of passive system to improve the safety of nuclear reactors. Passive safety system is one of the main differences between Chinese advanced PWR and other conventional PWR. The working principle of passive safety system is to utilize the gravity, natural convection (natural circulation) and stored energy to implement the system's safety function. Reactors with passive safety systems are not only safer, but also more economical. The passive safety system of Chinese advanced PWR is composed of three independent systems, i.e. passive containment cooling system, passive residual heat removal system and passive core makeup tank injection system. This paper is a summary of experimental research progress on passive containment cooling system, passive residual heat removal system and passive core makeup tank injection system

  14. Main Steam Line Break Analysis for the Fully Passive Safety System of SMART

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Seong Wook; Chun, Ji Han; Bae, Kyoo Hwan; Kim, Keung Koo

    2013-01-01

    The standard design approval of SMART (System-integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor) developed by KAERI and KEPCO consortium was issued on July 4, 2012. Although SMART has enhanced safety compared to the conventional reactor, there is a demand to meet the 'passive safety performance requirements' after the Fukushima accident. The passive safety performance requirements are the capabilities to maintain the plant at a safe shutdown condition for a minimum of 72 hours without AC power supply or operator action in case of design basis accident (DBA). To satisfy the requirements, KAERI is developing a safety enhanced SMART by adopting a passive safety injection system. The passive safety injection system developed for SMART is a gravity-driven injection system, which consists of four trains, each of which includes a pressure balance line, core makeup tank (CMT), safety injection tank (SIT) and injection line. The CMT plays an important role to inject borated water into the RCS to prevent or dissolve the return to power (re-criticality) condition during the event of increase in heat removal by the secondary system. The main steam line break accident (MSLB) is the most limiting accident for an increase in heat removal by the secondary system. In this study, the safety analysis results of MSLBs at hot full power condition and at hot zero power condition in view of re-criticality are given. The MSLB accident has been analyzed for the SMART adopting fully passive safety system in the aspect of re-criticality. The results show that the core remains subcritical condition throughout the transient due to the borated water injected by the CMT. As further works, many kinds of analyses and sensitivity studies should be performed for the design establishment and improvement of the fully passive system of SMART

  15. 45-Day safety screening report for grab samples from Tank 241-AP-107

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, G.L.

    1995-01-01

    Three samples; 107-AP-1C, 107-AP-2c and 107-AP-3C; were received at 222-S Laboratory for analysis of DSC, TGA and visual appearance. Four additional samples; 107-AP-1D, 107-AP-2D, 107-AP-3D and 107-AP-6; were received for visual appearance only. No results exceeded the safety screen notification criteria. This report compiles the analytical results. Tank 241-AP-107 is a double-shell tank which is not on any of the four Watch Lists

  16. Waste Tank Organic Safety Project: Analysis of liquid samples from Hanford waste tank 241-C-103

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pool, K.H.; Bean, R.M.

    1994-03-01

    A suite of physical and chemical analyses has been performed in support of activities directed toward the resolution of an Unreviewed Safety Question concerning the potential for a floating organic layer in Hanford waste tank 241-C-103 to sustain a pool fire. The analysis program was the result of a Data Quality Objectives exercise conducted jointly with staff from Westinghouse Hanford Company and Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). The organic layer has been analyzed for flash point, organic composition including volatile organics, inorganic anions and cations, radionuclides, and other physical and chemical parameters needed for a safety assessment leading to the resolution of the Unreviewed Safety Question. The aqueous layer underlying the floating organic material was also analyzed for inorganic, organic, and radionuclide composition, as well as other physical and chemical properties. This work was conducted to PNL Quality Assurance impact level III standards (Good Laboratory Practices)

  17. Organic Tank Safety Project: development of a method to measure the equilibrium water content of Hanford organic tank wastes and demonstration of method on actual waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheele, R.D.; Bredt, P.R.; Sell, R.L.

    1996-09-01

    Some of Hanford's underground waste storage tanks contain Organic- bearing high level wastes that are high priority safety issues because of potentially hazardous chemical reactions of organics with inorganic oxidants in these wastes such as nitrates and nitrites. To ensure continued safe storage of these wastes, Westinghouse Hanford Company has placed affected tanks on the Organic Watch List and manages them under special rules. Because water content has been identified as the most efficient agent for preventing a propagating reaction and is an integral part of the criteria developed to ensure continued safe storage of Hanford's organic-bearing radioactive tank wastes, as part of the Organic Tank Safety Program the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed and demonstrated a simple and easily implemented procedure to determine the equilibrium water content of these potentially reactive wastes exposed to the range of water vapor pressures that might be experienced during the wastes' future storage. This work focused on the equilibrium water content and did not investigate the various factors such as at sign ventilation, tank surface area, and waste porosity that control the rate that the waste would come into equilibrium, with either the average Hanford water partial pressure 5.5 torr or other possible water partial pressures

  18. Organic Tank Safety Project: development of a method to measure the equilibrium water content of Hanford organic tank wastes and demonstration of method on actual waste

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Scheele, R.D.; Bredt, P.R.; Sell, R.L.

    1996-09-01

    Some of Hanford`s underground waste storage tanks contain Organic- bearing high level wastes that are high priority safety issues because of potentially hazardous chemical reactions of organics with inorganic oxidants in these wastes such as nitrates and nitrites. To ensure continued safe storage of these wastes, Westinghouse Hanford Company has placed affected tanks on the Organic Watch List and manages them under special rules. Because water content has been identified as the most efficient agent for preventing a propagating reaction and is an integral part of the criteria developed to ensure continued safe storage of Hanford`s organic-bearing radioactive tank wastes, as part of the Organic Tank Safety Program the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed and demonstrated a simple and easily implemented procedure to determine the equilibrium water content of these potentially reactive wastes exposed to the range of water vapor pressures that might be experienced during the wastes` future storage. This work focused on the equilibrium water content and did not investigate the various factors such as @ ventilation, tank surface area, and waste porosity that control the rate that the waste would come into equilibrium, with either the average Hanford water partial pressure 5.5 torr or other possible water partial pressures.

  19. Stabilization of in-tank residual wastes and external-tank soil contamination for the tank focus area, Hanford Tank Initiative: Applications to the AX tank farm

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Becker, D.L.

    1997-01-01

    This report investigates five technical areas for stabilization of decommissioned waste tanks and contaminated soils at the Hanford Site AX Farm. The investigations are part of a preliminary evacuation of end-state options for closure of the AX Tanks. The five technical areas investigated are: (1) emplacement of cementations grouts and/or other materials; (2) injection of chemicals into contaminated soils surrounding tanks (soil mixing); (3) emplacement of grout barriers under and around the tanks; (4) the explicit recognition that natural attenuation processes do occur; and (5) combined geochemical and hydrological modeling. Research topics are identified in support of key areas of technical uncertainty, in each of the five areas. Detailed cost-benefit analyses of the technologies are not provided. This investigation was conducted by Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, during FY 1997 by tank Focus Area (EM-50) funding

  20. Tank 241-TX-105 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    Tank 241-TX-105 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-TX-105 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

  1. Tank 241-BY-107 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    Tank 241-BY-107 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issuesclose quotes. Tank 241-BY-107 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolutionclose quotes

  2. Tank 241-BY-111 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    Tank 241-BY-111 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-BY-111 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

  3. Tank 241-C-108 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    Tank 241-C-108 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues (Osborne and Huckaby 1994). Tank 241-C-108 was vapor sampled in accordance with Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution (Osborne et al., 1994)

  4. Tank 241-TX-118 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    Tank 241-TX-118 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-TX-118 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

  5. Tank 241-BY-112 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    Tank 241-BY-112 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-BY-112 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

  6. Tank 241-C-104 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    Tank 241-C-104 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-C-104 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

  7. Tank 241-BY-103 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    Tank 241-BY-103 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-BY-103 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

  8. Tank 241-U-107 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Huckaby, J.L.

    1995-05-31

    Tank 241-U-107 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in {open_quotes}Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.{close_quotes} Tank 241-U-107 was vapor sampled in accordance with {open_quotes}Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.{close_quotes}

  9. Status of tank 241-SY-101 data analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anantatmula, R.P.

    1992-09-01

    The Waste Tank Flammable Gas Stabilization Program was established in 1990 to provide for resolution of a major safety issue identified for 23 of the high-level waste tanks at the Hanford Site. The safety issue involves the production, accumulation, and periodic release from these tanks of flammable gases in concentrations exceeding the lower flammability limits. This document deals primarily with tank 241-SY-101 from the SY Tank Farm. The flammable gas condition has existed for this tank since the tank was first filled in the time period from 1977 to 1980. During a general review of waste tank chemical stability in 1988--1989, this situation was re-examined and, in March 1990, the condition was declared to be an unreviewed safety question. Tank 241-SY-101 was placed under special operating restrictions, and a program of investigation was begun to evaluate the condition and determine appropriate courses of action. This report summarizes the data that have become available on tank 241-SY-101 since it was declared as an unreviewed safety question and updates the information reported in an earlier document (WHC-EP-0517). The report provides a technical basis for use in the evaluation of safety risks of the tank and subsequent resolution of the unreviewed safety question

  10. Tank characterization report for double-shell tank 241-AP-102

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LAMBERT, S.L.

    1999-01-01

    In April 1993, Double-Shell Tank 241-AP-102 was sampled to determine waste feed characteristics for the Hanford Grout Disposal Program. This Tank Characterization Report presents an overview of that tank sampling and analysis effort, and contains observations regarding waste characteristics, expected bulk inventory, and concentration data for the waste contents based on this latest sampling data and information on the history of the tank. Finally, this report makes recommendations and conclusions regarding tank operational safety issues

  11. Tank waste compositions and atmospheric dispersion coefficients for use in accelerated safety analysis consequence assessments. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Savino, A.V.

    1995-11-01

    This topical report contains technical support information used to determine accident consequences for the Tank Farms Accelerated Safety Analysis (ASA) Interim Chapter 3, Hazard and Accident Analysis: Potential for Releases and Required Mitigation and Prevention and the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) environmental impact statement (EIS) accident consequence report. It does not determine accident consequences or describe specific accident scenarios, but instead provides generic information used to calculate radiological and toxic chemical consequences for postulated tank farms accident releases

  12. A safety equipment list for rotary mode core sampling systems operation in single shell flammable gas tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SMALLEY, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    This document identifies all interim safety equipment to be used for rotary mode core sampling of single-shell flammable gas tanks utilizing Rotary Mode Core Sampling systems (RMCS). This document provides the safety equipment for RMCS trucks HO-68K-4600, HO-68K-4647, trucks three and four respectively, and associated equipment. It is not intended to replace or supersede WHC-SD-WM-SEL-023, (Kelly 1991), or WHC-SD-WM-SEL-032, (Corbett 1994), which classifies 80-68K-4344 and HO-68K-4345 respectively. The term ''safety equipment'' refers to safety class (SC) and safety significant (SS) equipment, where equipment refers to structures, systems and components (SSC's). The identification of safety equipment in this document is based on the credited design safety features and analysis contained in the Authorization Basis (AB) for rotary mode core sampling operations in single-shell flammable gas tanks. This is an interim safety classification since the AB is interim. This document will be updated to reflect the final RMCS equipment safety classification designations upon completion of a final AB which will be implemented with the release of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

  13. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-U-110

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, T.M.; Jensen, L.

    1993-04-01

    This report investigates the nature of the waste in tank U-110 using historical and current information. When characterizing tank waste, several important properties are considered. First, the physical characteristics of the waste are presented, including waste appearance, density, and size of waste particles. The existence of any exotherms in the tank that may present a safety concern is investigated. Finally, the radiological and chemical composition of the tank are presented

  14. The role of quantitative uncertainty in the safety analysis of flammable gas accidents in Hanford waste tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bratzel, D.R.

    1998-01-01

    Following a 1990 investigation into flammable gas generation, retention, and release mechanisms within the Hanford Site high-level waste tanks, personnel concluded that the existing Authorization Basis documentation did not adequately evaluate flammable gas hazards. The US Department of Energy Headquarters subsequently declared the flammable gas hazard as an unresolved safety issue. Although work scope has been focused on resolution of the issue, it has yet to be resolved due to considerable uncertainty regarding essential technical parameters and associated risk. Resolution of the Flammable Gas Safety Issue will include the identification of a set of controls for the Authorization Basis for the tanks which will require a safety analysis of flammable gas accidents. A traditional nuclear facility safety analysis is based primarily on the analysis of a set of bounding accidents to represent the risks of the possible accidents and hazardous conditions at a facility. While this approach may provide some indication of the bounding consequences of accidents for facilities, it does not provide a satisfactory basis for identification of facility risk or safety controls when there is considerable uncertainty associated with accident phenomena and/or data as is the case with potential flammable gas accidents at the Hanford Site. This is due to the difficulties in identifying the bounding case and reaching consensus among safety analysts, facility operations and engineering, and the regulator on the implications of the safety analysis results. In addition, the bounding cases are frequently based on simplifying assumptions that make the analysis results insensitive to variations among facilities or the impact of alternative safety control strategies. The existing safety analysis of flammable gas accidents for the Tank Waste Remediation system (TWRS) at the Hanford Site has these difficulties. However, Hanford Site personnel are developing a refined safety analysis approach

  15. CSER 94-09: Implications of the heat anomaly in Tank 106-C to criticality safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rogers, C.A.

    1994-10-01

    Water is periodically added to Tank C-106 to cool its waste. In March 1994 addition of water was temporarily discontinued to determine if the tank could be adequately cooled at a lower water level. Following an addition of water, a temperature fluctuation was observed on one of the thermocouple trees. This Criticality Safety Evaluation Report (CSER) explains why the anomalous temperature measurements could not have been caused by nuclear criticality. Waste in Tank C-106 was discharged from processing facilities under controls designed to ensure that the contents of the tank would remain well subcritical under all credible conditions. The observed temperature profile does not fit the profile expected from a criticality event. In addition, there has been no indication of any significant increase in the rate of water evaporation.

  16. Chemical and chemically-related considerations associated with sluicing tank C-106 waste to tank AY-102

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reynolds, D.A.

    1997-01-01

    New data on tank 241-C-106 were obtained from grab sampling and from compatibility testing of tank C-106 and tank AY-102 wastes. All chemistry-associated and other compatibility Information compiled in this report strongly suggests that the sluicing of the contents of tank C-106, in accord with appropriate controls, will pose no unacceptable risk to workers, public safety, or the environment. In addition, it is expected that the sluicing operation will successfully resolve the High-Heat Safety Issue for tank C-106

  17. Tank farm nuclear criticality review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bratzel, D.R.

    1996-01-01

    The technical basis for the nuclear criticality safety of stored wastes at the Hanford Site Tank Farm Complex was reviewed by a team of senior technical personnel whose expertise covered all appropriate aspects of fissile materials chemistry and physics. The team concluded that the detailed and documented nucleonics-related studies underlying the waste tanks criticality safety basis were sound. The team concluded that, under current plutonium inventories and operating conditions, a nuclear criticality accident is incredible in any of the Hanford single-shell tanks (SST), double-shell tanks (DST), or double-contained receiver tanks (DCRTS) on the Hanford Site

  18. FY 1993 Ferrocyanide Tank Safety Project: Effects of Aging on Ferrocyanide Wastes test plan for the remainder of FY 1993

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lilga, M.A.; Schiefelbein, G.F.

    1993-06-01

    Researchers in the Hanford Ferrocyanide Task Team are studying safety issues associated with ferrocyanide precipitates in single shell waste storage tanks (SST). Ferrocyanide is a stable complex of ferrous, ion and cyanide ion that is considered nontoxic because it does not dissociate readily in aqueous solutions. However, in the laboratory at temperatures in excess of 180 degrees C and in the presence of oxidizers such as nitrates and nitrites, dry ferrocyanide and ferrocyanide waste stimulants can be made to react exothermically. The Ferrocyanide Safety Project at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) is part of the Waste Tank Safety Program at Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC). The purpose of the WHC program is to (1) maintain the ferrocyanide tanks with minimal risk of an accident, (2) select one or more strategies to assure safe storage, and (3) close out the unreviewed safety question (USQ). Tank ferrocyanide wastes were exposed to highly alkaline wastes from subsequent processing operations. Chemical reactions with caustic may have changed the ferrocyanide materials during 40 years of storage in the SSTs. Research in the open-quotes Effects of Aging on Ferrocyanide Wastesclose quotes task is targeted at studying aging of ferrocyanide tank simulants and other ferrocyanide materials to obtain a better understanding of how tank materials may have changed over the years. The research objective in this project is to determine the solubility and hydrolysis characteristics of simulated ferrocyanide tank wastes in alkaline media. The behavior of ferrocyanide simulant wastes is being determined by performing chemical reactions under conditions that might mimic the potential ranges in SST environments. Experiments are conducted at high pH, at high ionic strength, and in the presence of gamma radiation. Verification of simulant study findings by comparison with results with actual waste will also be required

  19. A discussion on the safety classification of the tank 241-SY-101 mixer pump

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van Vleet, R.J.

    1997-01-01

    An analysis, consistent with the methodology used in the draft TWRS FSAR (HNF-SD-WM-SAR-067), is presented to show that the classification of the mixer pump in tank 241-SY-101 should be safety significant

  20. Technical safety requirements for the South Tank Farm remediation project, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Platfoot, J.H.

    1999-01-01

    The South Tank Farm (STF) is a series of six, 170,000-gal underground, domed storage tanks that were placed into service in 1943. The tanks were constructed of a concrete mixture known as gunite. They were used as a portion of the Liquid LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW) System for the collection, neutralization, storage, and transfer of the aqueous portion of the radioactive and/or hazardous chemical wastes produced as part of normal facility operations at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Although the last of the tanks was taken out of service in 1986, they have been shown by structural analysis to continue to be structurally sound. An attempt was made in 1983 to empty the tanks; however, removal of all the sludge from the tanks was not possible with the equipment and schedule available. Since removal of the liquid waste in 1983, liquid continues to accumulate within the tanks. The in-leakage is believed to be the result of groundwater dripping into the tanks around penetrations in the domes. The tanks are currently being maintained under a Surveillance and Maintenance Program, which includes activities such as level monitoring, vegetation control, High Efficiency Particulate Air filter leakage requirement testing/replacement, sign erection/repair, pump-out of excess liquids, and instrument calibration/maintenance. A technique known as confined sluicing, which uses a high-pressure, low-volume water jet integrated with a jet pump, will be used to remove the sludge. The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) are those operational requirements that specify the operating limits and surveillance requirements, the basis thereof, safety boundaries, and the management of administrative controls necessary to ensure the safe operation of the STF remediation project. Effective implementation of TSRs will limit to acceptable levels the risks to the public and workers from uncontrolled releases of radioactive or other hazardous material

  1. Investigation of flammable gas and thermal safety issues for retrieval of waste from Tank 241-AN-105

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Caley, S.M.; Stewart, C.W.; Antoniak, Z.I.; Cuta, J.M.; Mahoney, L.A.; Panisko, F.E.

    1998-09-01

    The primary purpose of this report is to identify and resolve some of the flammable gas and thermal safety issues potentially associated with the retrieval of waste from Tank 241-AN-105 (AN-105), which is the first double-shell tank scheduled for waste retrieval at Hanford. The planned retrieval scenario includes the following steps in AN-105: (1) degas the tank using two submerged mixing pumps, (2) turn off the mixer pump(s) and allow any suspended solids to settle, (3) decant the supernatant to the intermediate feed staging tank(s) (IFSTs) (AP-102 and/or AP-104) using water/caustic dilution at the transfer pump inlet, (4) add the remaining dilution water/caustic to the slurry remaining in AN-105, (5) mix the tank with the mixer pump(s) until the soluble solids dissolve, (6) turn off the mixer pump(s) and let the insoluble solids settle, and (7) decant the new supernatant to the IFST(s), leaving the insoluble solids behind. Three waste retrieval safety issues are addressed in this report. They are (1) the controlled degassing of AN-105 to ensure that the headspace remains <25% of the lower flammability limit (LFL), (2) an assessment of how dissolved gas (mainly ammonia) released during the transfer of the supernatant in AN-105 to the IFSTs and the water/caustic dilution of the remaining slurry in AN-105 will affect the flammability in these tanks; and (3) an assessment of the maximum waste temperatures that might occur in AN-105 during retrieval operations.

  2. Investigation of flammable gas and thermal safety issues for retrieval of waste from Tank 241-AN-105

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Caley, S.M.; Stewart, C.W.; Antoniak, Z.I.; Cuta, J.M.; Mahoney, L.A.; Panisko, F.E.

    1998-09-01

    The primary purpose of this report is to identify and resolve some of the flammable gas and thermal safety issues potentially associated with the retrieval of waste from Tank 241-AN-105 (AN-105), which is the first double-shell tank scheduled for waste retrieval at Hanford. The planned retrieval scenario includes the following steps in AN-105: (1) degas the tank using two submerged mixing pumps, (2) turn off the mixer pump(s) and allow any suspended solids to settle, (3) decant the supernatant to the intermediate feed staging tank(s) (IFSTs) (AP-102 and/or AP-104) using water/caustic dilution at the transfer pump inlet, (4) add the remaining dilution water/caustic to the slurry remaining in AN-105, (5) mix the tank with the mixer pump(s) until the soluble solids dissolve, (6) turn off the mixer pump(s) and let the insoluble solids settle, and (7) decant the new supernatant to the IFST(s), leaving the insoluble solids behind. Three waste retrieval safety issues are addressed in this report. They are (1) the controlled degassing of AN-105 to ensure that the headspace remains <25% of the lower flammability limit (LFL), (2) an assessment of how dissolved gas (mainly ammonia) released during the transfer of the supernatant in AN-105 to the IFSTs and the water/caustic dilution of the remaining slurry in AN-105 will affect the flammability in these tanks; and (3) an assessment of the maximum waste temperatures that might occur in AN-105 during retrieval operations

  3. Feed tank transfer requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Freeman-Pollard, J.R.

    1998-09-16

    This document presents a definition of tank turnover. Also, DOE and PC responsibilities; TWRS DST permitting requirements; TWRS Authorization Basis (AB) requirements; TWRS AP Tank Farm operational requirements; unreviewed safety question (USQ) requirements are presented for two cases (i.e., tank modifications occurring before tank turnover and tank modification occurring after tank turnover). Finally, records and reporting requirements, and documentation which will require revision in support of transferring a DST in AP Tank Farm to a privatization contractor are presented.

  4. Feed tank transfer requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Freeman-Pollard, J.R.

    1998-01-01

    This document presents a definition of tank turnover. Also, DOE and PC responsibilities; TWRS DST permitting requirements; TWRS Authorization Basis (AB) requirements; TWRS AP Tank Farm operational requirements; unreviewed safety question (USQ) requirements are presented for two cases (i.e., tank modifications occurring before tank turnover and tank modification occurring after tank turnover). Finally, records and reporting requirements, and documentation which will require revision in support of transferring a DST in AP Tank Farm to a privatization contractor are presented

  5. Injection safety practices among nursing staff of mission hospitals in ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Vincent E. Omorogbe, Vivian O. Omuemu, Alphonsus R. Isara ... practice of injection safety by nurses in mission hospitals in Benin City, Nigeria. Materials and Methods: A descriptive cross-sectional study was carried out. .... alternatives, reuse of injection equipment, self ... health facilities in rendering healthcare services.

  6. [Necessity of applying pharmacovigilance in post-marketing safety monitoring of traditional Chinese medicine injections].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Hai-Nan; Chen, Wen; Fu, Zheng; Du, Wen-min; He, Jia

    2008-03-01

    Traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) injection has become one of the hotspots in the new TCM research and development. The serious adverse drug reactions happened in clinical have arosed attention widely in the whole society. It's very urgent to monitor the post-marketing safety of TCM injections. This paper elucidated the pharmacovigilance's necessity in the post-marketing safety monitoring of TCM injections, basing on the reason of safety problem of TCM injections and the future developing trend of adverse drug reaction monitoring. Also, this paper introduced the rapid signal detection method of spontaneous reporting system database by data mining technology.

  7. Tank 241-C-108 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    Tank 241-C-108 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-C-108 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

  8. Tank 241-BY-107 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    Tank 241-BY-107 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-BY-107 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

  9. Tank 241-BY-108 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    Tank 241-BY-108 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in ''Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues'' (Osborne and Huckaby 1994). Tank 241-BY-108 was vapor sampled in accordance with ''Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution (Osborne et al., 1994)

  10. Tank 241-BY-106 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    Tank 241-BY-106 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-BY-106 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

  11. A safety equipment list for rotary mode core sampling systems operation in single shell flammable gas tanks; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SMALLEY, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    This document identifies all interim safety equipment to be used for rotary mode core sampling of single-shell flammable gas tanks utilizing Rotary Mode Core Sampling systems (RMCS). This document provides the safety equipment for RMCS trucks HO-68K-4600, HO-68K-4647, trucks three and four respectively, and associated equipment. It is not intended to replace or supersede WHC-SD-WM-SEL-023, (Kelly 1991), or WHC-SD-WM-SEL-032, (Corbett 1994), which classifies 80-68K-4344 and HO-68K-4345 respectively. The term ''safety equipment'' refers to safety class (SC) and safety significant (SS) equipment, where equipment refers to structures, systems and components (SSC's). The identification of safety equipment in this document is based on the credited design safety features and analysis contained in the Authorization Basis (AB) for rotary mode core sampling operations in single-shell flammable gas tanks. This is an interim safety classification since the AB is interim. This document will be updated to reflect the final RMCS equipment safety classification designations upon completion of a final AB which will be implemented with the release of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

  12. Safety evaluation for packaging transportation of equipment for tank 241-C-106 waste sluicing system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Calmus, D.B.

    1994-01-01

    A Waste Sluicing System (WSS) is scheduled for installation in nd waste storage tank 241-C-106 (106-C). The WSS will transfer high rating sludge from single shell tank 106-C to double shell waste tank 241-AY-102 (102-AY). Prior to installation of the WSS, a heel pump and a transfer pump will be removed from tank 106-C and an agitator pump will be removed from tank 102-AY. Special flexible receivers will be used to contain the pumps during removal from the tanks. After equipment removal, the flexible receivers will be placed in separate containers (packagings). The packaging and contents (packages) will be transferred from the Tank Farms to the Central Waste Complex (CWC) for interim storage and then to T Plant for evaluation and processing for final disposition. Two sizes of packagings will be provided for transferring the equipment from the Tank Farms to the interim storage facility. The packagings will be designated as the WSSP-1 and WSSP-2 packagings throughout the remainder of this Safety Evaluation for Packaging (SEP). The WSSP-1 packagings will transport the heel and transfer pumps from 106-C and the WSSP-2 packaging will transport the agitator pump from 102-AY. The WSSP-1 and WSSP-2 packagings are similar except for the length

  13. Report on the handling of safety information concerning flammable gases and ferrocyanide at the Hanford waste tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-07-01

    This report discusses concerns safety issues, and management at Hanford Tank Farm. Concerns center on the issue of flammable gas generation which could ignite, and on possible exothermic reactions of ferrocyanide compounds which were added to single shell tanks in the 1950's. It is believed that information concerning these issues has been mis-handled and the problems poorly managed

  14. Report on the handling of safety information concerning flammable gases and ferrocyanide at the Hanford waste tanks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-07-01

    This report discusses concerns safety issues, and management at Hanford Tank Farm. Concerns center on the issue of flammable gas generation which could ignite, and on possible exothermic reactions of ferrocyanide compounds which were added to single shell tanks in the 1950's. It is believed that information concerning these issues has been mis-handled and the problems poorly managed. (CBS)

  15. Scanning electron microscopic analyses of Ferrocyanide tank wastes for the Ferrocyanide safety program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Callaway, W.S.

    1995-09-01

    This is Fiscal Year 1995 Annual Report on the progress of activities relating to the application of scanning electron microscopy in addressing the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks. The status of the FY 1995 activities directed towards establishing facilities capable of providing SEM based micro-characterization of ferrocyanide tank wastes is described. A summary of key events in the SEM task over FY 1995 and target activities in FY 1996 are presented. A brief overview of the potential applications of computer controlled SEM analytical data in light of analyses of ferrocyanide simulants performed by an independent contractor is also presented

  16. Study of status of safe injection practice and knowledge regarding injection safety among primary health care workers in Baglung district, western Nepal.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gyawali, Sudesh; Rathore, Devendra S; Kc, Bhuvan; Shankar, P Ravi

    2013-01-03

    Unsafe injection practices and injection overuse are widespread in developing countries harming the patient and inviting risks to the health care workers. In Nepal, there is a dearth of documented information about injection practices so the present study was carried out: a) to determine whether the selected government health facilities satisfy the conditions for safe injections in terms of staff training, availability of sterile injectable equipment and their proper disposal after use and b) to assess knowledge and attitudes of healthcare workers in these health care facilities with regard to injection safety. A descriptive cross-sectional mixed type (qualitative and quantitative) survey was carried out from 18th May to 16th June 2012. In-depth interviews with the in-charges were conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire. Observation of the health facilities using a structured observation tool was done. The data were analysed manually by summarizing, tabulating and presenting in various formats. The in-charges (eight males, two females) who participated in the study ranged in age from 30 to 50 years with a mean age of 37.8 years. Severe infection followed by pain was the most important cause for injection use with injection Gentamicin being most commonly prescribed. New single use (disposable) injections and auto-disable syringes were used to inject curative drugs and vaccines respectively. Sufficient safety boxes were also supplied to dispose the used syringe. All health care workers had received full course of Hepatitis B vaccine and were knowledgeable about at least one pathogen transmitted through unsafe injection practices. Injection safety management policy and waste disposal guideline was not available for viewing in any of the facilities. The office staff who disposed the bio-medical wastes did so without taking any safety measures. Moreover, none of these staff had received any formal training in waste management. Certain safe injection

  17. Study of status of safe injection practice and knowledge regarding injection safety among primary health care workers in Baglung district, western Nepal

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gyawali Sudesh

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Unsafe injection practices and injection overuse are widespread in developing countries harming the patient and inviting risks to the health care workers. In Nepal, there is a dearth of documented information about injection practices so the present study was carried out: a to determine whether the selected government health facilities satisfy the conditions for safe injections in terms of staff training, availability of sterile injectable equipment and their proper disposal after use and b to assess knowledge and attitudes of healthcare workers in these health care facilities with regard to injection safety. Methodology A descriptive cross-sectional mixed type (qualitative and quantitative survey was carried out from 18th May to 16th June 2012. In-depth interviews with the in-charges were conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire. Observation of the health facilities using a structured observation tool was done. The data were analysed manually by summarizing, tabulating and presenting in various formats. Results The in-charges (eight males, two females who participated in the study ranged in age from 30 to 50 years with a mean age of 37.8 years. Severe infection followed by pain was the most important cause for injection use with injection Gentamicin being most commonly prescribed. New single use (disposable injections and auto-disable syringes were used to inject curative drugs and vaccines respectively. Sufficient safety boxes were also supplied to dispose the used syringe. All health care workers had received full course of Hepatitis B vaccine and were knowledgeable about at least one pathogen transmitted through unsafe injection practices. Injection safety management policy and waste disposal guideline was not available for viewing in any of the facilities. The office staff who disposed the bio-medical wastes did so without taking any safety measures. Moreover, none of these staff had received any formal

  18. Mixing processes in high-level waste tanks. 1998 annual progress report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peterson, P.F.

    1998-01-01

    Flammable gases can be generated in DOE high-level waste tanks, including radiolytic hydrogen, and during cesium precipitation from salt solutions, benzene. Under normal operating conditions the potential for deflagration or detonation from these gases is precluded by purging and ventilation systems, which remove the flammable gases and maintain a well-mixed condition in the tanks. Upon failure of the ventilation system, due to seismic or other events, however, it has proven more difficult to make strong arguments for well-mixed conditions, due to the potential for density-induced stratification which can potentially sequester fuel or oxidizer at concentrations significantly higher than average. This has complicated the task of defining the safety basis for tank operation. Waste-tank mixing processes have considerable overlap with similar large-enclosure mixing processes that occur in enclosure fires and nuclear reactor containments. Significant differences also exist, so that modeling techniques that have been developed previously can not be directly applied to waste tanks. In particular, mixing of air introduced through tank roof penetrations by buoyancy and pressure driven exchange flows, mixed convection induced by an injected high-velocity purge jet interacting with buoyancy driven flow, and onset and breakdown of stable stratification under the influence of an injected jet have not been adequately studied but are important in assessing the potential for accumulation of high-concentration pockets of fuel and oxygen. Treating these phenomena requires a combination of experiments and the development of new, more general computational models than those that have been developed for enclosure fires. U.C. Berkeley is now completing the second year of its three-year project that started in September, 1996. Excellent progress has been made in several important areas related to waste-tank ventilation and mixing processes.'

  19. Injection Safety among Primary Health Care Workers in Jazan Region, Saudi Arabia

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    AA Ismail

    2014-07-01

    Full Text Available Background: Occupational exposure to percutaneous injuries is a substantial source of infections with blood-borne pathogens among health-care workers. Few studies evaluated injection safety practices in Saudi Arabia. Objective: To examine the structure and process of injection safety at primary health care level in Jazan health district, to evaluate knowledge, attitudes, and practices of primary health care physicians and nurses towards injection safety, and to determine the incidence of needle stick injuries among health care workers in Jazan region, Saudi Arabia. Methods: A cross-sectional study was conducted in Jazan primary health care centers (PHCCs, Saudi Arabia from September 2011 to March 2012. Data were collected using an observational checklist and data collection sheet. Jazan city health district was chosen at random from the 14 health sectors in Jazan region. All the 33 (10 urban, and 23 rural PHCCs of Jazan city were included in this study to get the predetermined sample size of health care workers. 200 health care workers (HCWs were recruited (29% physicians, and 71% nurses. Results: Syringes in the PHCCs were disposable (100%, individually packed (92%, and available at all volumes (98%. Methods of safe disposal of needles and sharps were also operated through contracting with professional companies in 84.8% of instances. Urban PHCCs had more posts for injection safety promotion than rural centers (p=0.02. Continuous Medical Education (CME programs on infection control were present in only 60% of PHCCs. At least 95% of HCWs in Jazan believed that sharp objects should be kept in a puncture-proof container, kept in a closed container, or disposed by a professional company. More than 80% of HCWs washed their hands by soap and water and cleaned them by alcohol before giving injection, and also got the three doses of hepatitis B vaccine.The rate of needle stick injury in the past year was 14%, without a significant difference between

  20. An investigation of fluid mixing with safety injection in advanced reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cha, Jong Hee; Won, Soon Yean; Chung, Moon Ki; Jun, Hyung Gil

    1994-01-01

    The objective of this work is to investigate the fluid mixing phenomena in aspect of pressurized thermal shock(PTS) in an advanced PWR vessel downcomer during transient cooldown with safety injection. It provides comparison of fluid mixing characteristics between AP 600 DVI, designed by Westinghouse, and ABB CE System 80+ DVI, and the effects of deflector at the reactor downcomer. In order to investigate the fluid mixing phenomena in the downcomer of an advanced PWR, the flow visualization tests and the salt concentration tests were conducted in a 1/7-scale acrylic transparent model, which was designed and built based on AP 600 reactor geometry. The behaviour of the safety injection flow in downcomer associated with mixing phenomenon can be observed during visualization test, and time-dependent mixing rate between safety injection fluid and existing coolant can be determined with concentration test. Visualization tests were performed by the dye injection method. The results of concentration measurements were compared with the calculation using the REMIX code. During the tests, difference between AP 600 DVI flow and ABB CE System 80+ DVI flow and the effect of the deflector were observed

  1. The effect of nozzle location on the concentration profiles in chemical addition tank

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, B. H.; Kim, E. K.; Ro, T. S.; Lee, C. H.

    2001-01-01

    A numerical analysis of the flow and injection characteristics is performed for the flow field created by water injected into a cylindrical tank with an initially stationary fluid. The flow is relevant to the operation of the chemical addition system in the chemical and volume control system( CVCS) of nuclear power plants. This study is performed to improve the current design which has a disk block inside tank. The numerical analysis for the flow and injection characteristics in chemical addition tank are carried out using CFD code FLUENT 5. Results show that the inlet nozzle installed in tangential direction at the uppermost region of the tank cylinder and the outlet nozzle located at the center of the tank bottom is very effective in enhancing the injection in the tank

  2. Performance Evaluation of SMART Passive Safety System for Small Break LOCA Using MARS Code

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chun, Ji Han; Lee, Guy Hyung; Bae, Kyoo Hwan; Chung, Young Jong; Kim, Keung Koo

    2013-01-01

    SMART has significantly enhanced safety by reducing its core damage frequency to 1/10 that of a conventional nuclear power plant. KAERI is developing a passive safety injection system to replace the active safety injection pump in SMART. It consists of four trains, each of which includes gravity-driven core makeup tank (CMT) and safety injection tank (SIT). This system is required to meet the passive safety performance requirements, i.e., the capability to maintain a safe shutdown condition for a minimum of 72 hours without an AC power supply or operator action in the case of design basis accidents (DBAs). The CMT isolation valve is opened by the low pressurizer pressure signal, and the SIT isolation valve is opened at 2 MPa. Additionally, two stages of automatic depressurization systems are used for rapid depressurization. Preliminary safety analysis of SMART passive safety system in the event of a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) was performed using MARS code. In this study, the safety analysis results of a guillotine break of safety injection line which was identified as the limiting SBLOCA in SMART are given. The preliminary safety analysis of a SBLOCA for the SMART passive safety system was performed using the MARS code. The analysis results of the most limiting SI line guillotine break showed that the collapsed liquid level inside the core support barrel was maintained sufficiently high above the top of core throughout the transient. This means that the passive safety injection flow from the CMT and SIT causes no core uncovery during the 72 hours following the break with no AC power supply or operator action, which in turn results in a consistent decrease in the fuel cladding temperature. Therefore, the SMART passive safety system can meet the passive safety performance requirement of maintaining the plant at a safe shutdown condition for a minimum of 72 hours without AC power or operator action for a representing accident of SBLOCA

  3. Waste compatibility safety issues and final results for tank 241-T-110 push mode samples

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuzum, J.L.

    1997-01-01

    This document is the final laboratory report for Tank 241-T-110. Push mode core segments were removed from risers 2 and 6 between January 29, 1997, and February 7, 1997. Segments were received and extruded at 222-S Laboratory. Analyses were performed in accordance with Tank 241-T-110 Push Mode Core Sampling and analysis Plan (TSAP) and Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO). None of the subsamples submitted for total alpha activity (AT) or differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) analyses exceeded the notification limits stated in DQO

  4. 45-Day safety screening results for tank 241-U-102, push mode cores 143 and 144

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steen, F.H.

    1996-01-01

    This document is the 45-day report deliverable for tank 241-U-102 push mode core segments collected between April 16, 1996 and May 6, 1996 and received by the 222-S Laboratory between April 17, 1996 and May 8, 1996. The segments were subsampled and analyzed in accordance, with the Tank 241-U-102 Push Mode Core Sampling and analysis Plan (TSAP) (Hu, 1996) and the Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO) (Dukelow, et al., 1995). The analytical results are included in Table 1. Attachment I is a cross reference to relate the tank farm identification numbers to the 222-S Laboratory LabCore sample numbers. The subsamples generated in the laboratory for analysis are identified in these diagrams with their sources shown. The diagram identifying the hydrostatic head fluid (HHF) blank is also included, Primary safety screening results and the raw data from Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) and thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) analyses are included in this report. Two of the samples submitted for DSC analysis exceeded notification limits as stated in the Safety Screening DQO (Dukelow, et al., 1995). Cyanide analysis was requested on these samples and a Reactive System Screening Tool analysis was requested for the sample exhibiting the highest exothenn in accordance with the TSAP (Hu, 1996). The results for these analyses will be reported in a revision to this document

  5. 9 CFR 316.14 - Marking tank cars and tank trucks used in transportation of edible products.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 9 Animals and Animal Products 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Marking tank cars and tank trucks used in transportation of edible products. 316.14 Section 316.14 Animals and Animal Products FOOD SAFETY... CONTAINERS § 316.14 Marking tank cars and tank trucks used in transportation of edible products. Each tank...

  6. Early Safety Assessment of Automotive Systems Using Sabotage Simulation-Based Fault Injection Framework

    OpenAIRE

    Juez, Garazi; Amparan, Estíbaliz; Lattarulo, Ray; Ruíz, Alejandra; Perez, Joshue; Espinoza, Huascar

    2017-01-01

    As road vehicles increase their autonomy and the driver reduces his role in the control loop, novel challenges on dependability assessment arise. Model-based design combined with a simulation-based fault injection technique and a virtual vehicle poses as a promising solution for an early safety assessment of automotive systems. To start with, the design, where no safety was considered, is stimulated with a set of fault injection simulations (fault forecasting). By doing so, safety strategies ...

  7. An experimental study on passive safety systems for the SMART design with the SMART-ITL facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Hyun-Sik; Bae, Hwang; Ryu, Sung-Uk; Jeon, Byong-Guk; Yang, Jin-Hwa; Yi, Sung-Jae

    2016-01-01

    Passive Safety Systems (PSSs) are added to the SMART design to increase the safety margin during accidents especially under a prolonged station blackout. A set of validation tests were performed for the PSSs of the SMART design with an integral effect test loop of SMART-ITL. Both single and dual trains of the Passive Safety Injection System (PSIS) were simulated to validate the SMART design together with two stages of Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) and four trains of Passive Residual Heat Removal System (PRHRS), and their results were compared. In this paper, the effect of the train number of PSIS on a Small-Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) scenario is investigated for a break size of 0.4 inch. The single and dual train tests show a similar trend in general but the injected water migrates slightly differently in the RV and is discharged through the break nozzle. The parameters of the Reactor Vessel (RV) pressure, RV water level, accumulated break mass, and injection flowrates from the Core Makeup Tank (CMT) and Safety Injection Tank (SIT) were compared. The acquired data will be used to validate the safety analysis code and its related models to evaluate the performance of SMART PSS, and to provide the base data during the application phase of construction licensing of the SMART design. (author)

  8. Enabling social listening for cardiac safety monitoring: Proceedings from a drug information association-cardiac safety research consortium cosponsored think tank.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Seifert, Harry A; Malik, Raleigh E; Bhattacharya, Mondira; Campbell, Kevin R; Okun, Sally; Pierce, Carrie; Terkowitz, Jeffrey; Turner, J Rick; Krucoff, Mitchell W; Powell, Gregory E

    2017-12-01

    This white paper provides a summary of the presentations and discussions from a think tank on "Enabling Social Listening for Cardiac Safety Monitoring" trials that was cosponsored by the Drug Information Association and the Cardiac Safety Research Consortium, and held at the White Oak headquarters of the US Food and Drug Administration on June 3, 2016. The meeting's goals were to explore current methods of collecting and evaluating social listening data and to consider their applicability to cardiac safety surveillance. Social listening is defined as the act of monitoring public postings on the Internet. It has several theoretical advantages for drug and device safety. First, these include the ability to detect adverse events that are "missed" by traditional sources and the ability to detect adverse events sooner than would be allowed by traditional sources, both by affording near-real-time access to data from culturally and geographically diverse sources. Social listening can also potentially introduce a novel patient voice into the conversation about drug safety, which could uniquely augment understanding of real-world medication use obtained from more traditional methodologies. Finally, it can allow for access to information about drug misuse and diversion. To date, the latter 2 of these have been realized. Although regulators from the Food and Drug Administration and the United Kingdom's Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency participated in the think tank along with representatives from industry, academia, and patient groups, this article should not be construed to constitute regulatory guidance. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  9. Tank characterization data report: Tank 241-C-112

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Simpson, B.C.; Borsheim, G.L.; Jensen, L.

    1993-09-01

    Tank 241-C-112 is a Hanford Site Ferrocyanide Watch List tank that was most recently sampled in March 1992. Analyses of materials obtained from tank 241-C-112 were conducted to support the resolution of the Ferrocyanide Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) and to support Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Milestone M-10-00. Analysis of core samples obtained from tank 241-C-112 strongly indicates that the fuel concentration in the tank waste will not support a propagating exothermic reaction. Analysis of the process history of the tank as well as studies of simulants provided valuable information about the physical and chemical condition of the waste. This information, in combination with the analysis of the tank waste, sup ports the conclusion that an exothermic reaction in tank 241-C-112 is not plausible. Therefore, the contents of tank 241-C-112 present no imminent threat to the workers at the Hanford Site, the public, or the environment from its forrocyanide inventory. Because an exothermic reaction is not credible, the consequences of this accident scenario, as promulgated by the General Accounting Office, are not applicable.

  10. Tank characterization data report: Tank 241-C-112

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, B.C.; Borsheim, G.L.; Jensen, L.

    1993-09-01

    Tank 241-C-112 is a Hanford Site Ferrocyanide Watch List tank that was most recently sampled in March 1992. Analyses of materials obtained from tank 241-C-112 were conducted to support the resolution of the Ferrocyanide Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) and to support Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Milestone M-10-00. Analysis of core samples obtained from tank 241-C-112 strongly indicates that the fuel concentration in the tank waste will not support a propagating exothermic reaction. Analysis of the process history of the tank as well as studies of simulants provided valuable information about the physical and chemical condition of the waste. This information, in combination with the analysis of the tank waste, sup ports the conclusion that an exothermic reaction in tank 241-C-112 is not plausible. Therefore, the contents of tank 241-C-112 present no imminent threat to the workers at the Hanford Site, the public, or the environment from its forrocyanide inventory. Because an exothermic reaction is not credible, the consequences of this accident scenario, as promulgated by the General Accounting Office, are not applicable

  11. SCOPE safety-controls optimization by performance evaluation: A systematic approach for safety-related decisions at the Hanford Tank Remediation System. Phase 1, final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bergeron, K.D.; Williams, D.C.; Slezak, S.E.; Young, M.L.

    1996-12-01

    The Department of Energy's Hanford Tank Waste Remediation system poses a significant challenge for hazard management because of the uncertainty that surrounds many of the variables that must be considered in decisions on safety and control strategies. As a result, site managers must often operate under excessively conservative and expensive assumptions. This report describes a systematic approach to quantifying the uncertainties surrounding the critical parameters in control decisions (e.g., condition of the tanks, kinds of wastes, types of possible accidents) through the use of expert elicitation methods. The results of the elicitations would then be used to build a decision support system and accident analysis model that would allow managers to see how different control strategies would affect the cost and safety of a facility configuration

  12. Review of Nuclear Criticality Safety Requirements Implementation for Hanford Tank Farms Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DEFIGH PRICE, C.

    2000-01-01

    In November 1999, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Energy directed a series of actions to strengthen the Department's ongoing nuclear criticality safety programs. A Review Plan describing lines of inquiry for assessing contractor programs was included. The Office of River Protection completed their assessment of the Tank Farm Contractor program in May 2000. This document supports that assessment by providing a compliance statement for each line of inquiry

  13. TARA beamline and injection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Post, R.S.; Brindza, P.; Coleman, J.W.; Torti, R.P.; Blackfield, D.T.; Goodrich, P.

    1983-01-01

    The TARA beamline for neutral beam injection will permit one to three sources to fire into each plug (60 degree or optional 90 degree injection with respect to the TARA axis) or into each anchor (90 degree injection only). The sources, pre-aimed on their mounting plate at the NB test stand, may be fired into neutralizer ducts or optionally through a magnesium curtain, and the unneutralized fraction is dumped by the TARA fringing field onto a receiver plate. The beamline is housed in a cylindrical tank with the beam axis along the tank diameter at the midplane. The tank will be sorption pumped using LN + T/sub I/ or N/sub B/ and/or e-beam gettering. The beam burial tank contains sed arrays and a thin foil dump which reaches sufficiently high temperatures during the shot to boil out gas between shots

  14. Knowledge, perception and practice of injection safety and ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Knowledge, perception and practice of injection safety and healthcare waste management among teaching hospital staff in south east Nigeria: an intervention study. ... Following the intervention, a significantly high number became aware of post-exposure prophylaxis and color coded bins and liners. Conclusion: There is a ...

  15. 49 CFR 229.217 - Fuel tank.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Fuel tank. 229.217 Section 229.217 Transportation... tank. (a) External fuel tanks. Locomotives equipped with external fuel tanks shall, at a minimum... to the fuel tank safety requirements of § 238.223 or § 238.423 of this chapter. The Director of the...

  16. Hanford Site Tank Waste Remediation System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-05-01

    The US Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State has the most diverse and largest amount of highly radioactive waste of any site in the US. High-level radioactive waste has been stored in large underground tanks since 1944. A Tank Waste Remediation System Program has been established within the DOE to safely manage and immobilize these wastes in anticipation of permanent disposal in a geologic repository. The Hanford Site Tank Waste Remediation System Waste Management 1993 Symposium Papers and Viewgraphs covered the following topics: Hanford Site Tank Waste Remediation System Overview; Tank Waste Retrieval Issues and Options for their Resolution; Tank Waste Pretreatment - Issues, Alternatives and Strategies for Resolution; Low-Level Waste Disposal - Grout Issue and Alternative Waste Form Technology; A Strategy for Resolving High-Priority Hanford Site Radioactive Waste Storage Tank Safety Issues; Tank Waste Chemistry - A New Understanding of Waste Aging; Recent Results from Characterization of Ferrocyanide Wastes at the Hanford Site; Resolving the Safety Issue for Radioactive Waste Tanks with High Organic Content; Technology to Support Hanford Site Tank Waste Remediation System Objectives

  17. Advanced organic analysis and analytical methods development: FY 1995 progress report. Waste Tank Organic Safety Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wahl, K.L.; Campbell, J.A.; Clauss, S.A.

    1995-09-01

    This report describes the work performed during FY 1995 by Pacific Northwest Laboratory in developing and optimizing analysis techniques for identifying organics present in Hanford waste tanks. The main focus was to provide a means for rapidly obtaining the most useful information concerning the organics present in tank waste, with minimal sample handling and with minimal waste generation. One major focus has been to optimize analytical methods for organic speciation. Select methods, such as atmospheric pressure chemical ionization mass spectrometry and matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization mass spectrometry, were developed to increase the speciation capabilities, while minimizing sample handling. A capillary electrophoresis method was developed to improve separation capabilities while minimizing additional waste generation. In addition, considerable emphasis has been placed on developing a rapid screening tool, based on Raman and infrared spectroscopy, for determining organic functional group content when complete organic speciation is not required. This capability would allow for a cost-effective means to screen the waste tanks to identify tanks that require more specialized and complete organic speciation to determine tank safety

  18. HANFORD DOUBLE SHELL TANK (DST) THERMAL & SEISMIC PROJECT BUCKLING EVALUATION METHODS & RESULTS FOR THE PRIMARY TANKS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MACKEY TC; JOHNSON KI; DEIBLER JE; PILLI SP; RINKER MW; KARRI NK

    2007-02-14

    This report documents a detailed buckling evaluation of the primary tanks in the Hanford double-shell waste tanks (DSTs), which is part of a comprehensive structural review for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Project. This work also provides information on tank integrity that specifically responds to concerns raised by the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) Oversight (EH-22) during a review of work performed on the double-shell tank farms and the operation of the aging waste facility (AWF) primary tank ventilation system. The current buckling review focuses on the following tasks: (1) Evaluate the potential for progressive I-bolt failure and the appropriateness of the safety factors that were used for evaluating local and global buckling. The analysis will specifically answer the following questions: (a) Can the EH-22 scenario develop if the vacuum is limited to -6.6-inch water gage (w.g.) by a relief valve? (b) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario can develop? (c) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario cannot develop? (2) Develop influence functions to estimate the axial stresses in the primary tanks for all reasonable combinations of tank loads, based on detailed finite element analysis. The analysis must account for the variation in design details and operating conditions between the different DSTs. The analysis must also address the imperfection sensitivity of the primary tank to buckling. (3) Perform a detailed buckling analysis to determine the maximum allowable differential pressure for each of the DST primary tanks at the current specified limits on waste temperature, height, and specific gravity. Based on the I-bolt loads analysis and the small deformations that are predicted at the unfactored limits on vacuum and axial loads, it is very unlikely that the EH-22 scenario (i.e., progressive I-bolt failure leading to global

  19. Tank characterization report for double-shell tank 241-AW-105

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sasaki, L.M.

    1997-01-01

    One of the major functions of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for double-shell tank 241-AW-105. The objectives of this report are to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-AW-105 waste; and to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone Characterization. information presented in this report originated from sample analyses and known historical sources. While only the results of a recent sampling event will be used to fulfill the requirements of the data quality objectives (DQOs), other information can be used to support or question conclusions derived from these results. Historical information for tank 241-AW-105 is provided in Appendix A, including surveillance information, records pertaining to waste transfers and tank operations, and expected tank contents derived from a process knowledge model. The recent sampling event listed, as well as pertinent sample data obtained before 1996, are summarized in Appendix B along with the sampling results. The results of the 1996 grab sampling event satisfied the data requirements specified in the sampling and analysis plan (SAP) for this tank. In addition, the tank headspace flammability was measured, which addresses

  20. Ferrocyanide tank waste stability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fowler, K.D.

    1993-01-01

    Ferrocyanide wastes were generated at the Hanford Site during the mid to late 1950s as a result of efforts to create more tank space for the storage of high-level nuclear waste. The ferrocyanide process was developed to remove 137 CS from existing waste and newly generated waste that resulted from the recovery of valuable uranium in Hanford Site waste tanks. During the course of research associated with the ferrocyanide process, it was recognized that ferrocyanide materials, when mixed with sodium nitrate and/or sodium nitrite, were capable of violent exothermic reaction. This chemical reactivity became an issue in the 1980s, when safety issues associated with the storage of ferrocyanide wastes in Hanford Site tanks became prominent. These safety issues heightened in the late 1980s and led to the current scrutiny of the safety issues associated with these wastes, as well as current research and waste management programs. Testing to provide information on the nature of possible tank reactions is ongoing. This document supplements the information presented in Summary of Single-Shell Tank Waste Stability, WHC-EP-0347, March 1991 (Borsheim and Kirch 1991), which evaluated several issues. This supplement only considers information particular to ferrocyanide wastes

  1. Tank characterization report for double-shell Tank 241-AW-105

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiCenso, A.T.; Amato, L.C.; Franklin, J.D.; Lambie, R.W.; Stephens, R.H.; Simpson, B.C.

    1994-01-01

    In May 1990, double-shell Tank 241-AW-105 was sampled to determine proper handling of the waste, to address corrosivity and compatibility issues, and to comply with requirements of the Washington Administrative Code. This Tank Characterization Report presents an overview of that tank sampling and analysis effort, and contains observations regarding waste characteristics. It also addresses expected concentration and bulk inventory data for the waste contents based on this latest sampling data and background tank information. This report summarizes the available information regarding the waste in Tank 241-AW-105, and using the historical information to place the analytical data in context, arranges this information in a useful format for making management and technical decisions concerning this waste tank. In addition, conclusions and recommendations are given based on safety issues and further characterization needs

  2. SCOPE safety-controls optimization by performance evaluation: A systematic approach for safety-related decisions at the Hanford Tank Remediation System. Phase 1, final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bergeron, K.D.; Williams, D.C.; Slezak, S.E.; Young, M.L. [and others

    1996-12-01

    The Department of Energy`s Hanford Tank Waste Remediation system poses a significant challenge for hazard management because of the uncertainty that surrounds many of the variables that must be considered in decisions on safety and control strategies. As a result, site managers must often operate under excessively conservative and expensive assumptions. This report describes a systematic approach to quantifying the uncertainties surrounding the critical parameters in control decisions (e.g., condition of the tanks, kinds of wastes, types of possible accidents) through the use of expert elicitation methods. The results of the elicitations would then be used to build a decision support system and accident analysis model that would allow managers to see how different control strategies would affect the cost and safety of a facility configuration.

  3. High priority tank sampling and analysis report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brown, T.M.

    1998-03-05

    In July 1993, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) transmitted Recommendation 93-5 (Conway 1993) to the US Department of Energy (DOE). Recommendation 93-5 noted that there was insufficient tank waste technical information and the pace to obtain it was too slow to ensure that Hanford Site wastes could be safely stored, that associated operations could be conducted safely, and that future disposal data requirements could be met. In May 1996, the DOE issued Revision 1 of the Recommendation 93-5 Implementation Plan (DOE-RL 1996). The Implementation Plan revision presented a modified approach to achieve the original plan`s objectives. The approach concentrated on actions necessary to ensure that wastes can be safely stored, that operations can be safely conducted, and that timely characterization information for the tank waste Disposal Program could be obtained. The Implementation Plan proposed 28 High Priority tanks, which, if sampled and analyzed, were expected to provide information to answer questions regarding safety and disposal issues. The High Priority tank list was originally developed in Section 9.0 of the Tank Waste Characterization Basis (Brown et al. 1995) by integrating the needs of the various safety and disposal programs. The High Priority tank list represents a set of tanks that were expected to provide the highest information return for characterization resources expended. The High Priority tanks were selected for near-term core sampling and were not expected to be the only tanks that would provide meaningful information. Sampling and analysis of non-High Priority tanks also could be used to provide scientific and technical data to confirm assumptions, calibrate models, and measure safety related phenomenological characteristics of the waste. When the sampling and analysis results of the High Priority and other tanks were reviewed, it was expected that a series of questions should be answered allowing key decisions to be made. The first

  4. High priority tank sampling and analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, T.M.

    1998-01-01

    In July 1993, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) transmitted Recommendation 93-5 (Conway 1993) to the US Department of Energy (DOE). Recommendation 93-5 noted that there was insufficient tank waste technical information and the pace to obtain it was too slow to ensure that Hanford Site wastes could be safely stored, that associated operations could be conducted safely, and that future disposal data requirements could be met. In May 1996, the DOE issued Revision 1 of the Recommendation 93-5 Implementation Plan (DOE-RL 1996). The Implementation Plan revision presented a modified approach to achieve the original plan's objectives. The approach concentrated on actions necessary to ensure that wastes can be safely stored, that operations can be safely conducted, and that timely characterization information for the tank waste Disposal Program could be obtained. The Implementation Plan proposed 28 High Priority tanks, which, if sampled and analyzed, were expected to provide information to answer questions regarding safety and disposal issues. The High Priority tank list was originally developed in Section 9.0 of the Tank Waste Characterization Basis (Brown et al. 1995) by integrating the needs of the various safety and disposal programs. The High Priority tank list represents a set of tanks that were expected to provide the highest information return for characterization resources expended. The High Priority tanks were selected for near-term core sampling and were not expected to be the only tanks that would provide meaningful information. Sampling and analysis of non-High Priority tanks also could be used to provide scientific and technical data to confirm assumptions, calibrate models, and measure safety related phenomenological characteristics of the waste. When the sampling and analysis results of the High Priority and other tanks were reviewed, it was expected that a series of questions should be answered allowing key decisions to be made. The first

  5. AA injection kicker in its tank

    CERN Multimedia

    CERN PhotoLab

    1980-01-01

    For single-turn injection of the antiprotons, a septum at the end of the injection line made the beam parallel to the injection orbit, and a quarter of a betatron-wavelength downstream a fast kicker corrected the angle. Kicker type: lumped delay line. PFN voltage 56 kV. Bending angle 7.5 mrad; kick-strength 0.9 Tm; fall-time 95%-5% in 150 ns. The injection orbit is to the left, the stack orbit to the far right. A fast shutter near the central orbit had to be closed before the kicker fired, so as to protect the stack core from being shaken by the kicker's fringe field. The shutter is shown in closed position.

  6. Feed tank transfer requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Freeman-Pollard, J.R.

    1998-01-01

    This document presents a definition of tank turnover; DOE responsibilities; TWRS DST permitting requirements; TWRS Authorization Basis (AB) requirements; TWRS AP Tank Farm operational requirements; unreviewed safety question (USQ) requirements; records and reporting requirements, and documentation which will require revision in support of transferring a DST in AP Tank Farm to a privatization contractor for use during Phase 1B

  7. 49 CFR 193.2623 - Inspecting LNG storage tanks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED) PIPELINE SAFETY LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FACILITIES: FEDERAL SAFETY STANDARDS Maintenance § 193.2623 Inspecting LNG storage tanks. Each LNG... 49 Transportation 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Inspecting LNG storage tanks. 193.2623 Section 193...

  8. Stabilization of in-tank residuals and external-tank soil contamination: FY 1997 interim report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Becker, D.L.

    1997-01-01

    This interim report evaluates various ways to stabilize decommissioned waste tanks and contaminated soils at the AX Tank Farm as part of a preliminary evaluation of end-state options for the Hanford tanks. Five technical areas were considered: (1) emplacement of smart grouts and/or other materials, (2) injection of chemical-getters into contaminated soils surrounding tanks (soil mixing), (3) emplacement of grout barriers under and around the tanks, (4) the use of engineered barriers over the tanks, and (5) the explicit recognition that natural attenuation processes do occur. Research topics are identified in support of key areas of technical uncertainty, in each of the five technical areas. Detailed cost/benefit analyses of the recommended technologies are not provided in this evaluation, performed by Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

  9. Progress in evaluating the hazard of ferrocyanide waste storage tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Babad, Harry; Cash, Robert J.; Postma, Arlin

    1992-01-01

    There are 177 high-level waste tanks on the Hanford site. Twenty-four single-shell tanks are identified as potential safety issues. These tanks contain quantities of ferrocyanide, nitrate, and nitrite salts that potentially could explode under certain conditions. Efforts were initiated in September 1990 to determine the reactive properties of the ferrocyanide waste and to define the criteria necessary to ensure tank safety until mitigation or remediation actions, if required, could be implemented. This paper describes the results of recent chemical and physical studies on synthetic ferrocyanide waste mixtures. Data obtained from monitoring, tank behavior modeling, and research studies on waste have provided sufficient understanding of the tank behavior. The Waste Tank Safety Program is exploring whether the waste in many of the ferrocyanide tanks actually represents an unreviewed safety question. The General Accounting Office (GAO) in October 1990 suggested that ferrocyanide tank accident scenarios exceed the bounds of the Hanford Environmental Impact Statement. Using the same assumptions Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) staff confirmed the consistency of the GAO report calculations. The hypothetical accident scenario in the GAO report, and in the EIS, are based on several assumptions that may, or may not reflect actual tank conditions. The Ferrocyanide Stabilization Program at Westinghouse Hanford (summarized in this paper) will provide updated and new data using scientific research with synthetic wastes and characterization of actual tank samples. This new information will replace the assumptions on tank waste chemical and physical properties allowing an improved recalculation of current safety and future risk associated with these tanks. (author)

  10. Progress in evaluating the hazards of ferrocyanide waste storage tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Babad, H.; Cash, R.; Postma, A.

    1992-03-01

    There are 177 high-level waste tanks on the Hanford site. Twenty-four single-shell tanks are identified as potential safety issues. These tanks contain quantities of ferrocyanide, nitrate, and nitrite salts that potentially could explode under certain conditions. Efforts were initiated in September 1990 to determine the reactive properties of the ferrocyanide waste and to define the criteria necessary to ensure tank safety until mitigation or remediation actions, if required, could be implemented. This paper describes the results of recent chemical and physical studies on synthetic ferrocyanide waste mixtures. Data obtained from monitoring, tank behavior modeling, and research studies on waste have provided sufficient understanding of the tank behavior. The Waste Tank Safety Program is exploring to determine whether the waste in many of the ferrocyanide tanks actually represents an unreviewed safety question. The General Accounting Office (GAO) in October 1990 (1) suggested that ferrocyanide-tanks accident scenarios exceed the bounds of the Hanford Environmental Impact Statement (2). Using the same assumptions Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) staff confirmed the consistency of the GAO report calculations. The hypothetical accident scenario in the GAO report, and in the EIS, are based on several assumptions that may, or may not reflect actual tank conditions. The Ferrocyanide Stabilization Program at Westinghouse Hanford (summarized in this paper) will provide updated and new data using scientific research with synthetic and actual waste tank characterization. This new information will replace the assumptions on tank waste chemical and physical properties allowing an improved recalculation of current safety and future risk associated with these tanks

  11. Criticality safety calculations of 'poison tube tank' compared with annular tanks for storing fissile solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gopalakrishnan, C.R.; Joseph, G.

    1995-01-01

    A comparative study of the shielded area space required for storing fissile solution by the conventional annular tank and by poison tube tank is made. Poison tube tank is similar to commercial heat exchanger. The neutron poisons studied are gadolinium oxide and borax. Variation of multiplication factor for an array of annular tanks containing uranium nitrate or plutonium nitrate solutions are presented for annular widths of 10, 7.5 and 5 cm. It is concluded that for the given concentration, 5 cm annular width tanks are safe at a pitch distance of 120 and 90 cm for uranium and plutonium solutions respectively. Using these, as reference values, it is found that the shielded area saving for the poison tube tank is a factor of 12 and 8 for the given concentration of uranium and plutonium solutions respectively. (author)

  12. Control and metallurgical examination on safety injection piping

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thebault, Y.; Grandjean, Y.; Gauthier, V.; Lambert, B.; Debustcher, B.

    1998-01-01

    From 1992 until 1997, cracking phenomena by thermal fatigue regarding safety injection piping were evidenced on several PWR 900 MW reactors. These events led EDF to the implementation of a first maintenance programme. In December 1996, a new leak occurred on an EDF 900 MW PWR in operation and was located on a safety injection pipe. In site inspections and metallurgical examinations carried out in the EDF hot Laboratory evidenced defects inside the pipe, out of the welding areas. These degradations are the consequence of a fatigue cracking phenomenon with thermal cycling linked to permanent tensile stresses. Following this incident, a programme of non destructive testing was implemented on all the EDF 900 MW plants. These inspections exhibited the same defects on other PWR 900 MW units. The results of the metallurgical examinations and also in site inspection results allowed EDF to understand the phenomenon and to validate an inspection programme on the one hand and a modification of the design of the circuits on the other hand. (authors)

  13. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-T-104

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiCenso, A.T.; Simpson, B.C.

    1994-01-01

    In August 1992, Single-Shell Tank 241-T-104 was sampled to determine proper handling of the waste, to address corrosivity and compatibility issues, and to comply with requirements of the Washington Administrative Code (Ecology, 1991). This Tank Characterization Report presents an overview of that tank sampling and analysis effort, and contains observations regarding waste characteristics. It also addresses expected concentration and bulk inventory data for the waste contents based on this latest sampling data and background tank information. The purpose of this report is to describe and characterize the waste in Single-Shall Tank 241-T-104 (hereafter, Tank 241-T-104) based on information given from various sources. This report summarizes the available information regarding the waste in Tank 241-T-104, and using the historical information to place the analytical data in context, arranges this information in a useful format for making management and technical decisions concerning this waste tank. In addition, conclusions and recommendations are given based on safety issues and further characterization needs

  14. Ozone destruction of Hanford Site tank waste organics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Colby, S.A.

    1993-04-01

    Ozone processing is one of several technologies being developed to meet the intent of the Secretary of the US Department of Energy, Decision on the Programmatic Approach and Near-Term Actions for Management and Disposal of Hanford Tank Waste Decision Statement, dated December 20, 1991, which emphasizes the need to resolve tank safety issues by destroying or modifying the constituents (e.g., organics) that cause safety concerns. As a result, the major tank treatment objectives on the Hanford Site are to resolve the tank safety issues regarding organic compounds (and accompanying flammable gas generation), which all potentially can react to evolve heat and gases. This report contains scoping test results of an alkaline ozone oxidation process to destroy organic compounds found in the Hanford Site's radioactive waste storage tanks

  15. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-BX-107

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raphael, G.F.

    1996-01-01

    This study examined and assessed the status, safety issues, composition, and distribution of the wastes contained in the tank 241-BX-107. Historical and most recent information, ranging from engineering structural assessment experiments, process history, monitoring and remediation activities, to analytical core sample data, were compiled and interpreted in an effort to develop a realistic, contemporary profile for the tank BX-107 contents

  16. Safety evaluation report on Westinghouse Electric Company ECCS evaluation model for plants equipped with upper head injection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lauben, G.N.; Wagner, N.H.; Israel, S.L.; McPherson, G.D.; Hodges, M.W.

    1978-04-01

    For plants which include an ice condenser containment concept, Westinghouse has planned an additional safety system known as the upper head injection (UHI) system to augment the emergency core cooling system. This system is comprised of additional accumulator tanks and piping arranged to supply cooling water to the top of the core during the blowdown period following a postulated large-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The objective of UHI is to add to the core cooling provided by the conventional emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and so permit operation at linear heat rates comparable to those permitted in plants utilizing the dry containment concept. In this way, plants which include the UHI system would have greater operating flexibility while still meeting the acceptance criteria as defined in paragraph 50.46 of 10 CFR Part 50. This review is concerned with those changes to the Westinghouse ECCS evaluation model that have been proposed for the UHI-LOCA model

  17. A Simple Fully Passive Safety Option for SMART SBLOCA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Won Jae

    2012-01-01

    SMART reactor, an integral pressurized water reactor (iPWR), is developed by KAERI and now under standard design licensing review. Integral reactor design of the SMART has small diameter penetrations below 2 inches at upper parts of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the core is located at very lower part. Amount of reactor coolant inventory is around 0.55tons/MWth during normal operations, which is seven times more than that of conventional PWRs. Such intrinsic safety features of the SMART can provide prolonged core cooling during a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA). As an engineered safety feature for SBLOCA, electrically two-train and mechanically four-train active safety injection (SI) systems are provided to refill the RPV, whose safety been proven through safety analysis and experiments. In addition, four-train passive residual heat removal systems (PRHRSs) are provided to remove core decay heat by natural circulation in the secondary side of steam generators during transient and accident conditions. After Fukushima disaster, a passive safety of nuclear power plants has become more emphasized than conventional active safety, even though there are still debates whether it can really insure the realistic safety. Passive safety is defined such that the core safety is ensured for 72 hours after accidents without any active safety systems and operator actions. In light of this, a simple fully passive safety option for SBLOCA is proposed: low-pressure safety injection tanks (SITs) and heat pipes submerged in the PRHRS emergency coolant tanks (ECTs). Post-LOCA long-term cooling after 72 hours is provided by sump recirculation using shutdown cooling system. Realistic analysis method using MARS3.1 is used to derive fully passive safety option, and then to screen design and operating parameters and to demonstrate the safety performance of SITs. SI line break is selected as a reference SBLOCA scenario

  18. Tank vent processing system having a corrosion preventive device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ouchi, Shoichi; Sato, Hirofumi

    1987-01-01

    Purpose: To prevent corrosion of a tank vent processing device by injecting an oxygen gas. Constitution: Oxygen gas and phosphorous at high temperature are poured into a tank vent processing device and amorphous oxide layers optimum to the prevention of external corrosion are formed to the inner surface of the device. Since the corrosion preventive device using the oxygen gas injection can be constituted as a relatively simple device, it is more economical than constituting a relatively large tank vent processing device with corrosion resistant stainless steels. (Kamimura, M.)

  19. Knowledge, Attitude and Practice of Injection Safety among Benue ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    adedamla

    syringes without sterilization. ... Injection safety as a concept includes all actions that ... access safe, affordable equipment to promote the ... Hospital. MATERIALS AND METHODS ... latitude 7043'N and longitude 8034'E. The hospital ... respondents personal experience of the consequences of .... facilities in Nigeria in 2004.

  20. HANFORD DOUBLE-SHELL TANK (DST) THERMAL and SEISMIC PROJECT-BUCKLING EVALUATION METHODS and RESULTS FOR THE PRIMARY TANKS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mackey, T.C.; Johnson, K.I.; Deibler, J.E.; Pilli, S.P.; Rinker, M.W.; Karri, N.K.

    2007-01-01

    This report documents a detailed buckling evaluation of the primary tanks in the Hanford double-shell waste tanks (DSTs), which is part of a comprehensive structural review for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Project. This work also provides information on tank integrity that specifically responds to concerns raised by the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Oversight (EH-22) during a review of work performed on the double-shell tank farms and the operation of the aging waste facility (AWF) primary tank ventilation system. The current buckling review focuses on the following tasks: (1) Evaluate the potential for progressive I-bolt failure and the appropriateness of the safety factors that were used for evaluating local and global buckling. The analysis will specifically answer the following questions: (a) Can the EH-22 scenario develop if the vacuum is limited to -6.6-inch water gage (w.g.) by a relief valve? (b) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario can develop? (c) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario cannot develop? (2) Develop influence functions to estimate the axial stresses in the primary tanks for all reasonable combinations of tank loads, based on detailed finite element analysis. The analysis must account for the variation in design details and operating conditions between the different DSTs. The analysis must also address the imperfection sensitivity of the primary tank to buckling. (3) Perform a detailed buckling analysis to determine the maximum allowable differential pressure for each of the DST primary tanks at the current specified limits on waste temperature, height, and specific gravity. Based on the I-bolt loads analysis and the small deformations that are predicted at the unfactored limits on vacuum and axial loads, it is very unlikely that the EH-22 scenario (i.e., progressive I-bolt failure leading to

  1. ATR/OTR-SY Tank Camera Purge System and in Tank Color Video Imaging System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werry, S.M.

    1995-01-01

    This procedure will document the satisfactory operation of the 101-SY tank Camera Purge System (CPS) and 101-SY in tank Color Camera Video Imaging System (CCVIS). Included in the CPRS is the nitrogen purging system safety interlock which shuts down all the color video imaging system electronics within the 101-SY tank vapor space during loss of nitrogen purge pressure

  2. Minutes of the Tank Waste Science Panel meeting, July 20, 1990: Hanford Tank Safety Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strachan, D.M.; Morgan, L.G.

    1991-02-01

    The second meeting of the Tank Waste Science Panel was held July 20, 1990. Science Panel members discussed the prioritization of various analyses to be performed on core samples from tank 101-SY, and were asked to review and comment on the draft Westinghouse Hanford Company document ''Analytical Chemistry Plan.'' They also reviewed and discussed the initial contributions to the report titled Chemical and Physical Processes in Tank 101-SY: A Preliminary Report. Science Panel members agreed that a fundamental understanding of the physical and chemical processes in the tank is essential, and strongly recommended that no remediation measures be taken until there is a better understanding of the chemical and physical phenomena that result in the episodic gas release from tank 101-SY. 1 ref

  3. Maximum surface level and temperature histories for Hanford waste tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flanagan, B.D.; Ha, N.D.; Huisingh, J.S.

    1994-01-01

    Radioactive defense waste resulting from the chemical processing of spent nuclear fuel has been accumulating at the Hanford Site since 1944. This waste is stored in underground waste-storage tanks. The Hanford Site Tank Farm Facilities Interim Safety Basis (ISB) provides a ready reference to the safety envelope for applicable tank farm facilities and installations. During preparation of the ISB, tank structural integrity concerns were identified as a key element in defining the safety envelope. These concerns, along with several deficiencies in the technical bases associated with the structural integrity issues and the corresponding operational limits/controls specified for conduct of normal tank farm operations are documented in the ISB. Consequently, a plan was initiated to upgrade the safety envelope technical bases by conducting Accelerated Safety Analyses-Phase 1 (ASA-Phase 1) sensitivity studies and additional structural evaluations. The purpose of this report is to facilitate the ASA-Phase 1 studies and future analyses of the single-shell tanks (SSTs) and double-shell tanks (DSTs) by compiling a quantitative summary of some of the past operating conditions the tanks have experienced during their existence. This report documents the available summaries of recorded maximum surface levels and maximum waste temperatures and references other sources for more specific data

  4. Design process of the nanofluid injection mechanism in nuclear power plants

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bang In Choel

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Nanofluids, which are engineered suspensions of nanoparticles in a solvent such as water, have been found to show enhanced coolant properties such as higher critical heat flux and surface wettability at modest concentrations, which is a useful characteristic in nuclear power plants (NPPs. This study attempted to provide an example of engineering applications in NPPs using nanofluid technology. From these motivations, the conceptual designs of the emergency core cooling systems (ECCSs assisted by nanofluid injection mechanism were proposed after following a design framework to develop complex engineering systems. We focused on the analysis of functional requirements for integrating the conventional ECCSs and nanofluid injection mechanism without loss of performance and reliability. Three candidates of nanofluid-engineered ECCS proposed in previous researches were investigated by applying axiomatic design (AD in the manner of reverse engineering and it enabled to identify the compatibility of functional requirements and potential design vulnerabilities. The methods to enhance such vulnerabilities were referred from TRIZ and concretized for the ECCS of the Korean nuclear power plant. The results show a method to decouple the ECCS designs with the installation of a separate nanofluids injection tank adjacent to the safety injection tanks such that a low pH environment for nanofluids can be maintained at atmospheric pressure which is favorable for their injection in passive manner.

  5. Assessment of injection safety in Ha Dong General Hospital, Hanoi, in 2012 [version 3; referees: 2 approved

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Phan Van Tuong

    2017-09-01

    Full Text Available Background: Injection is one of the most frequently used medical methods to introduce drugs or other substances into the body for purposes of treatment or prevention. Unsafe injection can cause adverse outcomes, such as abscess and anaphylactic shock, and increases the risk of blood-borne transmission of viruses to patients and health care workers, as well as the community. Recognizing the importance of injection safety, in 2000 the Vietnamese Ministry of Health (MOH collaborated with the Vietnam Nurses Association to launch the “Safe injection” program throughout the country, including Hanoi. Methods: This cross-sectional study, combining quantitative and qualitative analysis, was conducted from February to August 2012 in Ha Dong General Hospital using a structured questionnaire and observation checklist. The target population of the study was 109 nurses working in clinical departments and 436 injections were observed. Results: The percentage of nurses who are familiar with injection safety standards was found to be 82.6%. The proportion of practical injections that met the 23 standards of injection safety set by the MOH amounted to 22.2%. The factors related to safe injection practice of nurses who are younger age group (OR=3.1; p<0.05 and lower amount of working years (OR=2.8; p<0.05. Conclusions: Despite the high level of knowledge about safety injection, a low proportion of nurses performed correct safety injection practice. Moreover, the results demonstrated that experience might not always guarantee better practice. The findings raise the need for further training about this issue, especially among older nurses.

  6. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-T-102

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baldwin, J.H.

    1997-01-01

    A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-T-102. The objectives of this report are to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-T-102 waste; and to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendixes. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone M-44-05. Characterization information presented in this report originated from sample analyses and known historical sources. The most recent core sampling of tank 241-T-102 (March 1993) predated the existence of data quality objectives (DQOs). An assessment of the technical issues from the currently applicable DQOs was made using data from the 1993 push mode core sampling event, a July 1994 grab sampling event, and a May 1996 vapor flammability measurement. Historical information for tank 241-T-102, provided in Appendix A, includes surveillance information, records pertaining to waste transfers and tank operations, and expected tank contents derived from a process knowledge model. Appendix B contains further sampling and analysis data from the March 1993 push mode core sampling event and data from the grab sampling event in August 1994 and May 1996 vapor flammability measurement. Of the two push mode cores taken in March of 1993, cores 55

  7. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-T-102

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baldwin, J.H.

    1997-06-24

    A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-T-102. The objectives of this report are to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-T-102 waste; and to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendixes. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone M-44-05. Characterization information presented in this report originated from sample analyses and known historical sources. The most recent core sampling of tank 241-T-102 (March 1993) predated the existence of data quality objectives (DQOs). An assessment of the technical issues from the currently applicable DQOs was made using data from the 1993 push mode core sampling event, a July 1994 grab sampling event, and a May 1996 vapor flammability measurement. Historical information for tank 241-T-102, provided in Appendix A, includes surveillance information, records pertaining to waste transfers and tank operations, and expected tank contents derived from a process knowledge model. Appendix B contains further sampling and analysis data from the March 1993 push mode core sampling event and data from the grab sampling event in August 1994 and May 1996 vapor flammability measurement. Of the two push mode cores taken in March of 1993, cores 55

  8. 49 CFR 179.10 - Tank mounting.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Tank mounting. 179.10 Section 179.10 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY... Design Requirements § 179.10 Tank mounting. (a) The manner in which tanks are attached to the car...

  9. Supporting document for the historical tank content estimate for S tank farm

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brevick, C.H.; Gaddis, L.A.; Walsh, A.C.

    1994-06-01

    This document provides historical evaluations of the radioactive mixed wastes stored in the Hanford Site 200 West Area underground single-shell tanks (SSTs). A Historical Tank Content Estimate has been developed by reviewing the process histories, waste transfer data, and available physical and chemical characterization data from various Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) contractors. The historical data will supplement information gathered from in-tank core sampling activities that are currently underway. A tank history review that is accompanied by current characterization data creates a complete and reliable inventory estimate. Additionally, historical review of the tanks may reveal anomalies or unusual contents that are critical to characterization and post characterization activities. Complete and accurate tank waste characterizations are critical first steps for DOE and Westinghouse Hanford Company safety programs, waste pretreatment, and waste retrieval activities. The scope of this document is limited to all the SSTs in the S Tank Farm of the southwest quadrant of the 200 West Area. Nine appendices compile data on: tank level histories; temperature graphs; surface level graphs; drywell graphs; riser configuration and tank cross section; sampling data; tank photographs; unknown tank transfers; and tank layering comparison. 113 refs

  10. Supporting document for the historical tank content estimate for A Tank Farm

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brevick, C.H.; Gaddis, L.A.; Walsh, A.C.

    1994-06-01

    This document provides historical evaluations of the radioactive mixed wastes stored in the Hanford Site 200-East Area underground single-shell tanks (SSTs). A Historical Tank Content Estimate has been developed by reviewing the process histories, waste transfer data, and available physical and chemical characterization data from various Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) contractors. The historical data will supplement information gathered from in-tank core sampling activities that are currently underway. A tank history review that is accompanied by current characterization data creates a complete and reliable inventory estimate. Additionally, historical review of the tanks may reveal anomalies or unusual contents that are critical to characterization and post characterization activities. Complete and accurate tank waste characterizations are critical first steps for DOE and Westinghouse Hanford Company safety programs, waste pretreatment, and waste retrieval activities. The scope of this document is limited to the SSTs in the A Tank Farm of the northeast quadrant of the 200 East Area. Nine appendices compile data on: tank level histories; temperature graphs; surface level graphs; drywell graphs; riser configuration and tank cross section; sampling data; tank photographs; unknown tank transfers; and tank layering comparison. 113 refs

  11. Supporting document for the historical tank content estimate for A Tank Farm

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brevick, C.H.; Gaddis, L.A.; Walsh, A.C.

    1994-06-01

    This document provides historical evaluations of the radioactive mixed wastes stored in the Hanford Site 200-East Area underground single-shell tanks (SSTs). A Historical Tank Content Estimate has been developed by reviewing the process histories, waste transfer data, and available physical and chemical characterization data from various Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) contractors. The historical data will supplement information gathered from in-tank core sampling activities that are currently underway. A tank history review that is accompanied by current characterization data creates a complete and reliable inventory estimate. Additionally, historical review of the tanks may reveal anomalies or unusual contents that are critical to characterization and post characterization activities. Complete and accurate tank waste characterizations are critical first steps for DOE and Westinghouse Hanford Company safety programs, waste pretreatment, and waste retrieval activities. The scope of this document is limited to the SSTs in the A Tank Farm of the northeast quadrant of the 200 East Area. Nine appendices compile data on: tank level histories; temperature graphs; surface level graphs; drywell graphs; riser configuration and tank cross section; sampling data; tank photographs; unknown tank transfers; and tank layering comparison. 113 refs.

  12. Supporting document for the historical tank content estimate for S tank farm

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brevick, C.H.; Gaddis, L.A.; Walsh, A.C.

    1994-06-01

    This document provides historical evaluations of the radioactive mixed wastes stored in the Hanford Site 200 West Area underground single-shell tanks (SSTs). A Historical Tank Content Estimate has been developed by reviewing the process histories, waste transfer data, and available physical and chemical characterization data from various Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) contractors. The historical data will supplement information gathered from in-tank core sampling activities that are currently underway. A tank history review that is accompanied by current characterization data creates a complete and reliable inventory estimate. Additionally, historical review of the tanks may reveal anomalies or unusual contents that are critical to characterization and post characterization activities. Complete and accurate tank waste characterizations are critical first steps for DOE and Westinghouse Hanford Company safety programs, waste pretreatment, and waste retrieval activities. The scope of this document is limited to all the SSTs in the S Tank Farm of the southwest quadrant of the 200 West Area. Nine appendices compile data on: tank level histories; temperature graphs; surface level graphs; drywell graphs; riser configuration and tank cross section; sampling data; tank photographs; unknown tank transfers; and tank layering comparison. 113 refs.

  13. Supporting document for the historical tank content estimate for B Tank Farm

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brevick, C.H.; Gaddis, L.A.; Johnson, E.D.

    1994-06-01

    This document provides historical evaluations of the radioactive mixed wastes stored in the Hanford Site 200-East Area underground single-shell tanks (SSTs). A Historical Tank Content Estimate has been developed by reviewing the process histories, waste transfer data, and available physical and chemical characterization data from various Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) contractors. The historical data will supplement information gathered from in-tank core sampling activities that are currently underway. A tank history review that is accompanied by current characterization data creates a complete and reliable inventory estimate. Additionally, historical review of the tanks may reveal anomalies or unusual contents that are critical to characterization and post characterization activities. Complete and accurate tank waste characterizations are critical first steps for DOE and Westinghouse Hanford Company safety programs, waste pretreatment, and waste retrieval activities. The scope of this document is limited to the SSTs in the B Tank Farm of the northeast quadrant of the 200 East Area. Nine appendices compile data on: tank level histories; temperature graphs; surface level graphs; drywell graphs; riser configuration and tank cross section; sampling data; tank photographs; unknown tank transfers; and tank layering comparison. 113 refs

  14. Kartini reactor tank inspection using NDT method for safety improvement of the reactor operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syarip; Sutondo, Tegas; Saleh, Chaerul; Nitiswati; Puradwi; Andryansah; Mudiharjo

    2002-01-01

    The inspection of Kartini reactor tank liner (TRK) by using Non Destructive Testing (NDT) methods to improve the reactor operation safety, have been done. The type of NDT used were: visual examination using an underwater camera and magnifier, replication survey using dental putty, hardness test using an Equotip D indentor, thickness test using ultrasonic probe, and dye penetrant test. The visual examination showed that the surface of TRK was in good condition. The hardness readings were considered to be consistent with the original condition of the tank and the slight hardness increase at the reactor core area consistent with the neutron fluence experienced -10 1 4 n/cm 2 . Results of ultrasonic thickness survey showed that in average the TRK thickness is between 5,0 mm - 6,5 mm, a low 2,1 mm thickness exists at the top of the TRK in the belt area (double layer aluminum plat, therefore do not influencing the safety ). The replica and dye penetrant test at the low thickness area and several suspected areas showed that it could be some defect from original manufacture. Therefore, it can be concluded that the TRK is still feasible for continued operation safely

  15. 33 CFR 183.518 - Fuel tank openings.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Fuel tank openings. 183.518...) BOATING SAFETY BOATS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT Fuel Systems Equipment Standards § 183.518 Fuel tank openings. Each opening into the fuel tank must be at or above the topmost surface of the tank. ...

  16. Implementation of Recommendations from the One System Comparative Evaluation of the Hanford Tank Farms and Waste Treatment Plant Safety Bases

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garrett, Richard L.; Niemi, Belinda J.; Paik, Ingle K.; Buczek, Jeffrey A.; Lietzow, J.; McCoy, F.; Beranek, F.; Gupta, M.

    2013-01-01

    A Comparative Evaluation was conducted for One System Integrated Project Team to compare the safety bases for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project (WTP) and Tank Operations Contract (TOC) (i.e., Tank Farms) by an Expert Review Team. The evaluation had an overarching purpose to facilitate effective integration between WTP and TOC safety bases. It was to provide One System management with an objective evaluation of identified differences in safety basis process requirements, guidance, direction, procedures, and products (including safety controls, key safety basis inputs and assumptions, and consequence calculation methodologies) between WTP and TOC. The evaluation identified 25 recommendations (Opportunities for Integration). The resolution of these recommendations resulted in 16 implementation plans. The completion of these implementation plans will help ensure consistent safety bases for WTP and TOC along with consistent safety basis processes. procedures, and analyses. and should increase the likelihood of a successful startup of the WTP. This early integration will result in long-term cost savings and significant operational improvements. In addition, the implementation plans lead to the development of eight new safety analysis methodologies that can be used at other U.S. Department of Energy (US DOE) complex sites where URS Corporation is involved

  17. Computational Studies on the Performance of Flow Distributor in Tank

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Soo Jai; Kim, Young In; Ryu, Seungyeob; Bae, Youngmin

    2014-01-01

    Core make-up tank (CMT) is full of borated water and provides makeup and boration to the reactor coolant system (RCS) for early stage of loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and non-LOCA. The top and bottom of CMT are connected to the RCS through the pressure balance line (PBL) and the safety injection line (SIL), respectively. Each PBL is normally open to maintain pressure of the CMT at RCS, and this arrangement enables the CMT to inject water to the RCS by gravity when the isolation valves of SIL are open. During CMT injection into the Reactor, the condensation and thermal stratification are observed in CMT and the rapid condensation disturbed the injection operation. The optimal design of the flow distributor is very important to ensure structural integrity of the reactor system and their safe operation during some transient or accident conditions. In the present study, we numerically investigated the performance of flow distributor in tank with different shape factor such as the total number of the holes, the pitch-to-hole diameter ratios (p/d), the diameter of the hole and the area ratios. These data will contribute to the design the flow distributor. In the present study, the model of the flow distributor in tank is simulated using the commercial CFD software, Fluent 13.0 with varying the different shape factor of the flow distributor such as the total number of the holes, the diameter of the holes and the area ratio. As the diameter of the hole is smaller, the velocity difference between holes, which is located at upper position and lower position of the flow distributor, also decreases. For larger area ratio, the velocity of the holes is slower. When the diameter of the hole is large enough for the velocity difference between holes to be large, however, the velocity of the holes is not in inverse proportional to the area ratio

  18. Computational Studies on the Performance of Flow Distributor in Tank

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shin, Soo Jai; Kim, Young In; Ryu, Seungyeob; Bae, Youngmin [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    Core make-up tank (CMT) is full of borated water and provides makeup and boration to the reactor coolant system (RCS) for early stage of loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and non-LOCA. The top and bottom of CMT are connected to the RCS through the pressure balance line (PBL) and the safety injection line (SIL), respectively. Each PBL is normally open to maintain pressure of the CMT at RCS, and this arrangement enables the CMT to inject water to the RCS by gravity when the isolation valves of SIL are open. During CMT injection into the Reactor, the condensation and thermal stratification are observed in CMT and the rapid condensation disturbed the injection operation. The optimal design of the flow distributor is very important to ensure structural integrity of the reactor system and their safe operation during some transient or accident conditions. In the present study, we numerically investigated the performance of flow distributor in tank with different shape factor such as the total number of the holes, the pitch-to-hole diameter ratios (p/d), the diameter of the hole and the area ratios. These data will contribute to the design the flow distributor. In the present study, the model of the flow distributor in tank is simulated using the commercial CFD software, Fluent 13.0 with varying the different shape factor of the flow distributor such as the total number of the holes, the diameter of the holes and the area ratio. As the diameter of the hole is smaller, the velocity difference between holes, which is located at upper position and lower position of the flow distributor, also decreases. For larger area ratio, the velocity of the holes is slower. When the diameter of the hole is large enough for the velocity difference between holes to be large, however, the velocity of the holes is not in inverse proportional to the area ratio.

  19. Corrective action strategy for single-shell tanks containing organic chemicals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turner, D.A.

    1993-08-01

    A Waste Tank Organic Safety Program (Program) Plan is to be transmitted to the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) for approval by December 31, 1993. In April 1993 an agreement was reached among cognizant U.S. Department of Energy - Headquarters (HQ), RL and Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) staff that the Program Plan would be preceded by a ''Corrective Action Strategy,'' which addressed selected planning elements supporting the Program Plan. The ''Corrective Action Strategy'' would be reviewed and consensus reached regarding the planning elements. A Program Plan reflecting this consensus would then be prepared. A preliminary ''corrective action strategy'' is presented for resolving the organic tanks safety issue based on the work efforts recommended in the ISB (Interim Safety Basis for Hanford Site tank farm facilities). A ''corrective action strategy'' logic was prepared for individual SSTs (single-shell tanks), or a group of SSTs having similar characteristics, as appropriate. Four aspects of the organic tanks safety issue are addressed in the ISB: SSTs with the potential for combustion in the tank's headspace; combustion of a floating organic layer as a pool fire; surface fires in tanks that formerly held floating organic layers; SSTs with the potential for organic-nitrate reactions. A preliminary ''corrective action strategy'' for each aspect of the organic tanks safety issue is presented

  20. Experimental study on thermal-hydraulic behaviors of a pressure balanced coolant injection system for a passive safety light water reactor JPSR

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Satoh, Takashi; Watanabe, Hironori; Araya, Fumimasa; Nakajima, Katsutoshi [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment; Iwamura, Takamichi; Murao, Yoshio

    1998-02-01

    A conceptual design study of a passive safety light water reactor JPSR has been performed at Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute JAERI. A pressure balanced coolant injection experiment has been carried out, with an objective to understand thermal-hydraulic characteristics of a passive coolant injection system which has been considered to be adopted to JPSR. This report summarizes experimental results and data recorded in experiment run performed in FY. 1993 and 1994. Preliminary experiments previously performed are also briefly described. As the results of the experiment, it was found that an initiation of coolant injection was delayed with increase in a subcooling in the pressure balance line. By inserting a separation device which divides the inside of core make-up tank (CMT) into several small compartments, a diffusion of a high temperature region formed just under the water surface was restrained and then a steam condensation was suppressed. A time interval from an uncovery of the pressure balance line to the initiation of the coolant injection was not related by a linear function with a discharge flow rate simulating a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) condition. The coolant was injected intermittently by actuation of a trial fabricated passive valve actuated by pressure difference for the present experiment. It was also found that the trial passive valve had difficulties in setting an actuation set point and vibrations noises and some fraction of the coolant was remained in CMT without effective use. A modification was proposed for resolving these problems by introducing an anti-closing mechanism. (author)

  1. Tanks focus area. Annual report 1997

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frey, J.

    1997-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management is tasked with a major remediation project to treat and dispose of radioactive waste in hundreds of underground storage tanks. These tanks contain about 90,000,000 gallons of high-level and transuranic wastes. We have 68 known or assumed leaking tanks, that have allowed waste to migrate into the soil surrounding the tank. In some cases, the tank contents have reacted to form flammable gases, introducing additional safety risks. These tanks must be maintained in the safest possible condition until their eventual remediation to reduce the risk of waste migration and exposure to workers, the public, and the environment. Science and technology development for safer, more efficient, and cost-effective waste treatment methods will speed up progress toward the final remediation of these tanks. The DOE Office of Environmental Management established the Tanks Focus Area to serve as the DOE-EM's technology development program for radioactive waste tank remediation in partnership with the Offices of Waste Management and Environmental Restoration. The Tanks Focus Area is responsible for leading, coordinating, and facilitating science and technology development to support remediation at DOE's four major tank sites: the Hanford Site in Washington State, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory in Idaho, Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The technical scope covers the major functions that comprise a complete tank remediation system: waste retrieval, waste pretreatment, waste immobilization, tank closure, and characterization of both the waste and tank. Safety is integrated across all the functions and is a key component of the Tanks Focus Area program

  2. Injection safety practices among resident doctors in a tertiary health ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    2013-11-20

    Nov 20, 2013 ... E‑mail: drbecky4flex@yahoo.com. Introduction. Injection is one of ... materials, inadequate facilities for sterilization as well as an average of 4.9 .... protective equipment (PPE), safety boxes at strategic locations in the hospital ...

  3. WISE recommendations to ensure the safety of injections in diabetes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Strauss, K

    2012-01-01

    Injections and fingersticks administered to patients with diabetes in health care settings present a risk of blood exposure to the injector as well as other workers in potential contact with sharps. Such exposures could lead to transmission of bloodborne pathogens such as hepatitis and HIV. A recent EU Directive requires that where such risks have been identified, processes and devices must be put in place to reduce or eliminate the risk. The aim of this paper is to provide formal guidelines on the application of this Directive to diabetes care settings. These evidence-based recommendations were written and vetted by a large group of international safety experts. A systematic literature search was conducted for all peer-reviewed studies and publications which bear on sharps safety in diabetes. Initially a group of experts reviewed this literature and drafted the recommendations. These were then presented for review, debate and revision to 57 experts from 14 countries at the WISE workshop in October, 2011. After the WISE meeting, the revised Recommendations were circulated electronically to attendees on three occasions, each time in a new iteration with revisions. Each recommendation was graded by the weight it should have in daily practice and by its degree of support in the medical literature. The topics covered include Risks of Sharps Injury and Muco-cutaneous Exposure, The EU Directive, Device Implications, Injection Technique Implications, Education and Training (Creating a "Safety Culture"), Value, Awareness and Responsibility. These safety recommendations provide practical guidance and fill an important gap in diabetes management. If followed, they should help ensure safe, effective and largely injury-free injections and fingersticks. They will serve as the roadmap for applying the new EU Directive to diabetes care. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.

  4. Evaluation of Coolant Injection Procedure in the Severe Accident Management Strategy of APR1400

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cho, Yongjin; Lim, Kukhee; Song, Sungchu; Lee, Sukho; Hwang, Taesuk

    2013-01-01

    A coolant injection strategy in the severe accident management guideline (SAMG) of APR1400 relates to immediate coolant injection into RCS (Reactor Coolant System) or injection following the recovery of secondary coolant inventory. This strategy could play important role in accident mitigation and radiological consequences. In this study, appropriateness of the strategy was evaluated using MELCOR1.8.6 and several sensitivity studies of the key parameters were performed. Analysis for APR1400 using MELCOR 1.8.6 was performed to evaluate the effectiveness of accident management strategies and the following conclusions were identified. Sequential operation of secondary and RCS injection may not be the best strategy and the simultaneous injection of secondary and RCS injection could be more preferable. At least, the RCS injection should start before complete drainage of water in the safety injection tank using mobile pumps. In this study, the effectiveness of timing of operator action has been examined and the amount of injection flowrate needs to be studied in the future

  5. A survey of available information on gas generation in tank 241-SY-101: Hanford Tank Safety Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strachan, D.M.; Reynolds, D.A.; Siemer, D.D.; Wallace, R.W.

    1991-03-01

    As a result of a concerted effort to determine the chemical and physical mechanisms underlying the generation and episodic release of gases from tank 241-SY-101, more commonly known as tank 101-SY, the Tank Waste Science Panel has been established at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Four of the members of this panel met to screen the available information on tank 101-SY and provide to the remaining members a shortened list of references that could be used to assess the mechanisms underlying the generation and episodic release of gases from tank 101-SY. This document is the result of this preliminary screening of information for the Tank Waste Science Panel and was provided to the Panel members at their first meeting. 14 refs., 3 tabs

  6. Tank Characterization report for single-shell tank 241-SX-103

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WILMARTH, S.R.

    1999-01-01

    A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report. This report and its appendices serve as the tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-SX-103. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-SX-103 waste, and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, and Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendices contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15c, change request M-44-97-03 to ''issue characterization deliverables consistent with the Waste Information Requirements Document developed for fiscal year 1999'' (Adams et al. 1998)

  7. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-U-103

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    SASAKI, L.M.

    1999-02-24

    A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report. This report and its appendices serve as the tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-U-103. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-U-103 waste and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendices contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15b, change request M-44-97-03 to ''issue characterization deliverables consistent with Waste Information Requirements Documents developed for 1998.''

  8. Nuclear criticality safety evaluation of the passage of decontaminated salt solution from the ITP filters into tank 50H for interim storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hobbs, D.T.; Davis, J.R.

    1994-01-01

    This report assesses the nuclear criticality safety associated with the decontaminated salt solution after passing through the In-Tank Precipitation (ITP) filters, through the stripper columns and into Tank 50H for interim storage until transfer to the Saltstone facility. The criticality safety basis for the ITP process is documented. Criticality safety in the ITP filtrate has been analyzed under normal and process upset conditions. This report evaluates the potential for criticality due to the precipitation or crystallization of fissionable material from solution and an ITP process filter failure in which insoluble material carryover from salt dissolution is present. It is concluded that no single inadvertent error will cause criticality and that the process will remain subcritical under normal and credible abnormal conditions

  9. Assessment of injection safety in Ha Dong General Hospital, Hanoi, in 2012 [version 4; referees: 2 approved

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Phan Van Tuong

    2017-11-01

    Full Text Available Background: Injection is one of the most frequently used medical methods to introduce drugs or other substances into the body for purposes of treatment or prevention. Unsafe injection can cause adverse outcomes, such as abscess and anaphylactic shock, and increases the risk of blood-borne transmission of viruses to patients and health care workers, as well as the community. Recognizing the importance of injection safety, in 2000 the Vietnamese Ministry of Health (MOH collaborated with the Vietnam Nurses Association to launch the “Safe injection” program throughout the country, including Hanoi. Methods: This cross-sectional study, combining quantitative and qualitative analysis, was conducted from February to August 2012 in Ha Dong General Hospital using a structured questionnaire and observation checklist. The target population of the study was 109 nurses working in clinical departments and 436 injections were observed. Results: The percentage of nurses who are familiar with injection safety standards was found to be 82.6%. The proportion of practical injections that met the 23 standards of injection safety set by the MOH amounted to 22.2%. The factors related to safe injection practice of nurses who were younger age group (OR=3.1; p<0.05 and fewer number of years working as a nurse (OR=2.8; p<0.05. Conclusions: While nurses have high level of knowledge about safe injections but a small proportion actually practiced. Experience may not always guarantee safe practices.  Injection safety training should be regularly imparted upon all categories of nurses.

  10. An evaluation of designed passive Core Makeup Tank (CMT) for China pressurized reactor (CPR1000)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang, Mingjun; Tian, Wenxi; Qiu, Suizheng; Su, Guanghui; Zhang, Yapei

    2013-01-01

    Highlights: ► Only PRHRS is not sufficient to maintain reactor safety in case of SGTR accident. ► The Core Makeup Tank (CMT) is designed for CPR1000. ► Joint operation of PRHRS and CMT can keep reactor safety during the SGTR transient. ► CMT is a vital supplement for CPR1000 passive safety system design. - Abstract: Emergency Passive Safety System (EPSS) is an innovative design to improve reliability of nuclear power plants. In this work, the EPSS consists of secondary passive residual heat removal system (PRHRS) and the reactor Core Makeup Tank (CMT) system. The PRHRS, which has been studied in our previous paper, can effectively remove the core residual heat and passively improve the inherent safety by passive methods. The designed CMT, representing the safety improvement for CPR1000, is used to inject cool boron-containing water into the primary system during the loss of coolant accident. In this study, the behaviors of EPSS and transient characteristics of the primary loop system during the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) accident are investigated using the nuclear reactor thermal hydraulic code RELAP5/MOD3.4. The results show that the designed CMT can protect the reactor primary loop from boiling and maintain primary loop coolant in single phase state. Both PRHRS and CMT operation ensures reactor safety during the SGTR accident. Results reported in this paper show that the designed CMT is a further safety improvement for CPR1000

  11. Tank characterization report for Single-Shell Tank B-111

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Remund, K.M.; Tingey, J.M.; Heasler, P.G.; Toth, J.J.; Ryan, F.M.; Hartley, S.A.; Simpson, D.B.; Simpson, B.C.

    1994-09-01

    Tank 241-B-111 (hereafter referred to as B-111) is a 2,006,300 liter (530,000 gallon) single-shell waste tank located in the 200 East B tank farm at Hanford. Two cores were taken from this tank in 1991 and analysis of the cores was conducted by Battelle's 325-A Laboratory in 1993. Characterization of the waste in this tank is being done to support Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Milestone M-44-05. Tank B-111 was constructed in 1943 and put into service in 1945; it is the second tank in a cascade system with Tanks B-110 and B-112. During its process history, B-111 received mostly second-decontamination-cycle waste and fission products waste via the cascade from Tank B-110. This tank was retired from service in 1976, and in 1978 the tank was assumed to have leaked 30,300 liters (8,000 gallons). The tank was interim stabilized and interim isolated in 1985. The tank presently contains approximately 893,400 liters (236,000 gallons) of sludge-like waste and approximately 3,800 liters (1,000 gallons) of supernate. Historically, there are no unreviewed safety issues associated with this tank and none were revealed after reviewing the data from the latest core sampling event in 1991. An extensive set of analytical measurements was performed on the core composites. The major constituents (> 0.5 wt%) measured in the waste are water, sodium, nitrate, phosphate, nitrite, bismuth, iron, sulfate and silicon, ordered from largest concentration to the smallest. The concentrations and inventories of these and other constituents are given. Since Tanks B-110 and B-111 have similar process histories, their sampling results were compared. The results of the chemical analyses have been compared to the dangerous waste codes in the Washington Dangerous Waste Regulations (WAC 173-303). This assessment was conducted by comparing tank analyses against dangerous waste characteristics 'D' waste codes; and against state waste codes

  12. The integrated criticality safety evaluation for the Hanford tank waste treatment and immobilization plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Losey, D. C.; Miles, R. E.; Perks, M. F.

    2009-01-01

    The Criticality Safety Evaluation Report (CSER) for the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) has been developed as a single, integrated evaluation with a scope that covers all of the planned WTP operations. This integrated approach is atypical, as the scopes of criticality evaluations are usually more narrowly defined. Several adjustments were made in developing the WTP CSER, but the primary changes were to provide introductory overview for the criticality safety control strategy and to provide in-depth analysis of the underlying physical and chemical mechanisms that contribute to ensuring safety. The integrated approach for the CSER allowed a more consistent evaluation of safety and avoided redundancies that occur when evaluation is distributed over multiple documents. While the approach used with the WTP CSER necessitated more coordination and teamwork, it has yielded a report is that more integrated and concise than is typical. The integrated approach with the CSER produced a simple criticality control scheme that uses relatively few controls. (authors)

  13. Waste tank characterization sampling limits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tusler, L.A.

    1994-01-01

    This document is a result of the Plant Implementation Team Investigation into delayed reporting of the exotherm in Tank 241-T-111 waste samples. The corrective actions identified are to have immediate notification of appropriate Tank Farm Operations Shift Management if analyses with potential safety impact exceed established levels. A procedure, WHC-IP-0842 Section 12.18, ''TWRS Approved Sampling and Data Analysis by Designated Laboratories'' (WHC 1994), has been established to require all tank waste sampling (including core, auger and supernate) and tank vapor samples be performed using this document. This document establishes levels for specified analysis that require notification of the appropriate shift manager. The following categories provide numerical values for analysis that may indicate that a tank is either outside the operating specification or should be evaluated for inclusion on a Watch List. The information given is intended to translate an operating limit such as heat load, expressed in Btu/hour, to an analysis related limit, in this case cesium-137 and strontium-90 concentrations. By using the values provided as safety flags, the analytical laboratory personnel can notify a shift manager that a tank is in potential violation of an operating limit or that a tank should be considered for inclusion on a Watch List. The shift manager can then take appropriate interim measures until a final determination is made by engineering personnel

  14. 78 FR 41853 - Safety Advisory Guidance: Heating Rail Tank Cars To Prepare Hazardous Material for Unloading or...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-12

    ... rail tank car due to chemical self-reaction and expansion of the toluene diisocyanate matter wastes. On...: Cheryl West Freeman, Division of Engineering and Research, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety... catastrophically ruptured at a transfer station at the BASF Corporation chemical facility in Freeport, Texas. The...

  15. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-C-109

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Simpson, B.C.

    1997-05-23

    One of the major functions of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-C-109. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241 C-109 waste; and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices.

  16. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-C-109

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, B.C.

    1997-01-01

    One of the major functions of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-C-109. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241 C-109 waste; and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices

  17. Tank characterization report for double-shell tank 241-AP-101. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Conner, J.M.

    1997-01-01

    One major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes m support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for double-shell tank 241-AP-101. The objectives of this report are to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-AP-101 waste; and to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 provides the best-basis inventory estimate, and Section 4.0 makes recommendations about safety status and additional sampling needs. The appendixes contain supporting data and information. This report supported the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, Milestone M-44-05. The characterization information in this report originated from sample analyses and known historical sources. Appendix A provides historical information for tank 241-AP-101 including surveillance, information, records pertaining to waste transfers and tank operations, and expected tank contents derived from a model based upon process knowledge. Appendix B summarizes recent sampling events and historical sampling information. Tank 241-AP-101 was grab sampled in November 1995, when the tank contained 2,790 kL (737 kgal) of waste. An addition1034al 1,438 kL (380 kgal) of waste was received from tank 241-AW-106 in transfers on March 1996 and January 1997. This waste was the product of the 242-A Evaporator Campaign 95-1. Characterization information for the additional 1,438 kL (380 kgal) was obtained using grab sampling data from tank 241-AW-106 and a slurry sample from the evaporator. Appendix C reports on the statistical analysis and numerical manipulation of data used in

  18. Determination of mixing characterisitics in leaching tanks using ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    The mixing characteristics in two gold leaching tanks each of volume 1.4 x 103 m3 were investigated with a pulse injection of 7.4 x 1010 Bq aqueous solution of 131I into the feed of the tanks to determine the flow model and mixing efficiency of the system. The flow patterns in the tanks connected in series were identical with ...

  19. 33 CFR 183.510 - Fuel tanks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... SAFETY BOATS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT Fuel Systems Equipment Standards § 183.510 Fuel tanks. (a) Each fuel tank in a boat must have been tested by its manufacturer under § 183.580 and not leak when...

  20. Organic reactivity analysis in Hanford single-shell tanks: Experimental and modeling basis for an expanded safety criterion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fauske, H.; Grigsby, J.M.; Turner, D.A.; Babad, H.; Meacham, J.E.

    1996-01-01

    De-spite demonstrated safe storage in terms of chemical stability of the Hanford high level waste for many decades, including decreasing waste temperatures and continuing aging of chemicals to less energetic states, concerns continue relative to assurance of long-term safe storage. Review of potential chemical safety hazards has been of particular recent interest in response to serious incidents within the Nuclear Weapons Complexes in the former Soviet Union (the 1957 Kyshtym and the 1993 Tomsk-7 incidents). Based upon an evaluation of the extensive new information and understanding that have developed over the last few years, it is concluded that the Hanford waste is stored safely and that concerns related to potential chemical safety hazards are not warranted. Spontaneous bulk runaway reactions of the Kyshtym incident type and other potential condensed-phase propagating reactions can be ruled out by assuring appropriate tank operating controls are in place and by limiting tank intrusive activities. This paper summarizes the technical basis for this position

  1. Chemical compatibility of tank wastes in tanks 241-C-106, 241-AY-101, and 241-AY-102

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sederburg, J.P.

    1994-01-01

    This report documents the chemical compatibility of waste types within tanks 241-C-106, 241-AY-101, and 241-AY-102. This information was compiled to facilitate the transfer of tank 241-C-106 waste to tank 241-AY-102 utilizing supernatant from tank 241-AY-101 as the sluicing medium. This document justifies that no chemical compatibility safety issues currently understood, or theorized from thermodynamic modeling, will result from the intended sluice transfer operation

  2. Minutes of the Tank Waste Science Panel meeting, November 11--13, 1991. Hanford Tank Safety Project

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Strachan, D.M. [comp.

    1992-04-01

    The sixth meeting of the Tank Waste Science Panel was held November 11--13, 1991, in Pasco and Richland, Washington. Participating scientists presented the results of recent work on various aspects of issues relating to the generation and release of gases from Tank 241-SY-101 and the presence of ferrocyanide in other tanks at Hanford. Results are discussed.

  3. NRC Information No. 90-18: Potential problems with Crosby safety relief valves used on diesel generator air start receiver tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rossi, C.E.

    1992-01-01

    On March 31, 1989, Cooper Industries was made aware of circumstances at Perry Unit 1 that led to the Division I EDG being declared inoperable. A Crosby safety relief valve on one of the two EDG starting air receiving tanks was inadvertently hit during maintenance activities. The force of the impact caused the valve to open and blow down both air receiving tanks. The safety relief valve did not reseat until approximately 30 psig below the EDG automatic start lockout signal. On January 12, 1990, Cooper Industries learned that a similar event had occurred at Comanche Peak. On January 17, 1990, Cooper Industries submitted a 10 CFR Part 21 report on the affected safety relief valves (Crosby style JMBU and JRU safety relief valves). Although Crosby-style JMBU and JRU safety relief valves were designed to meet the requirements of Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, they were not seismically qualified. In addition, the blowdown characteristics of the valves were not consistent with the functional requirements of the system in which they were installed. Cooper Industries has recommended replacing these valves with seismically qualified valves that have the proper blowdown reseat characteristics

  4. Aboveground storage tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rizzo, J.A.

    1992-01-01

    With the 1988 promulgation of the comprehensive Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations for underground storage of petroleum and hazardous substances, many existing underground storage tank (UST) owners have been considering making the move to aboveground storage. While on the surface, this may appear to be the cure-all to avoiding the underground leakage dilemma, there are many other new and different issues to consider with aboveground storage. The greatest misconception is that by storing materials above ground, there is no risk of subsurface environmental problems. it should be noted that with the aboveground storage tank (AGST) systems, there is still considerable risk of environmental contamination, either by the failure of onground tank bottoms or the spillage of product onto the ground surface where it subsequently finds its way to the ground water. In addition, there are added safety concerns that must be addressed. So what are the other specific areas of concern besides environmental to be addressed when making the decision between underground and aboveground tanks? The primary issues that will be addressed in this paper are: Safety, Product Losses, Cost Comparison of USTs vs AGSTs, Space Availability/Accessibility, Precipitation Handling, Aesthetics and Security, Pending and Existing Regulations

  5. Catch tanks inhibitor addition 200-East and 200-West Areas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palit, A.N.

    1996-01-01

    Reported is the study of 11 catch tanks in the 200-East Area and the 7 catch tanks in the 200-West Area listed as active. The location, capacity, material of construction, annual total accumulation, annual rain intrusion, waste transfer rate, and access for chemical injection in these tanks are documented. The present and future utilization and isolation plans for the catch tanks are established

  6. Qualification of Raman analysis on Hanford tank waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, B.A.

    1997-01-01

    Chemical characterization is often required for the Hanford tanks in order to support safety assessments, compatibility between tank contents and operations activities such as sluicing and material transfer. Safety drivers include monitoring of organic chemical and oxidizer levels to better assess indicators that may point to problems from such factors as reactivity of tank contents and flammability from gas generation. Monitoring is also being recognized as a useful in support of operations in tank contents retrieval and storage of material before treatment. Important operations aspects which benefit from additional monitoring and characterization include formation of gels, foaming and fouling of transfer lines during material transfer

  7. Nuclear criticality safety bounding analysis for the in-tank-precipitation (ITP) process, impacted by fissile isotopic weight fractions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bess, C.E.

    1994-04-22

    The In-Tank Precipitation process (ITP) receives High Level Waste (HLW) supernatant liquid containing radionuclides in waste processing tank 48H. Sodium tetraphenylborate, NaTPB, and monosodium titanate (MST), NaTi{sub 2}O{sub 5}H, are added for removal of radioactive Cs and Sr, respectively. In addition to removal of radio-strontium, MST will also remove plutonium and uranium. The majority of the feed solutions to ITP will come from the dissolution of supernate that had been concentrated by evaporation to a crystallized salt form, commonly referred to as saltcake. The concern for criticality safety arises from the adsorption of U and Pt onto MST. If sufficient mass and optimum conditions are achieved then criticality is credible. The concentration of u and Pt from solution into the smaller volume of precipitate represents a concern for criticality. This report supplements WSRC-TR-93-171, Nuclear Criticality Safety Bounding Analysis For The In-Tank-Precipitation (ITP) Process. Criticality safety in ITP can be analyzed by two bounding conditions: (1) the minimum safe ratio of MST to fissionable material and (2) the maximum fissionable material adsorption capacity of the MST. Calculations have provided the first bounding condition and experimental analysis has established the second. This report combines these conditions with canyon facility data to evaluate the potential for criticality in the ITP process due to the adsorption of the fissionable material from solution. In addition, this report analyzes the potential impact of increased U loading onto MST. Results of this analysis demonstrate a greater safety margin for ITP operations than the previous analysis. This report further demonstrates that the potential for criticality in the ITP process due to adsorption of fissionable material by MST is not credible.

  8. 46 CFR 154.235 - Cargo tank location.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cargo tank location. 154.235 Section 154.235 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (CONTINUED) CERTAIN BULK DANGEROUS CARGOES SAFETY STANDARDS... Survival Capability and Cargo Tank Location § 154.235 Cargo tank location. (a) For type IG hulls, cargo...

  9. 33 CFR 183.520 - Fuel tank vent systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ...) BOATING SAFETY BOATS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT Fuel Systems Equipment Standards § 183.520 Fuel tank vent systems. (a) Each fuel tank must have a vent system that prevents pressure in the tank from exceeding 80... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Fuel tank vent systems. 183.520...

  10. Tank characterization reference guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Lorenzo, D.S.; DiCenso, A.T.; Hiller, D.B.; Johnson, K.W.; Rutherford, J.H.; Smith, D.J.; Simpson, B.C.

    1994-09-01

    Characterization of the Hanford Site high-level waste storage tanks supports safety issue resolution; operations and maintenance requirements; and retrieval, pretreatment, vitrification, and disposal technology development. Technical, historical, and programmatic information about the waste tanks is often scattered among many sources, if it is documented at all. This Tank Characterization Reference Guide, therefore, serves as a common location for much of the generic tank information that is otherwise contained in many documents. The report is intended to be an introduction to the issues and history surrounding the generation, storage, and management of the liquid process wastes, and a presentation of the sampling, analysis, and modeling activities that support the current waste characterization. This report should provide a basis upon which those unfamiliar with the Hanford Site tank farms can start their research

  11. Status of SPACE Safety Analysis Code Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Dong Hyuk; Yang, Chang Keun; Kim, Se Yun; Ha, Sang Jun

    2009-01-01

    In 2006, the Korean the Korean nuclear industry started developing a thermal-hydraulic analysis code for safety analysis of PWR(Pressurized Water Reactor). The new code is named as SPACE(Safety and Performance Analysis Code for Nuclear Power Plant). The SPACE code can solve two-fluid, three-field governing equations in one dimensional or three dimensional geometry. The SPACE code has many component models required for modeling a PWR, such as reactor coolant pump, safety injection tank, etc. The programming language used in the new code is C++, for new generation of engineers who are more comfortable with C/C++ than old FORTRAN language. This paper describes general characteristics of SPACE code and current status of SPACE code development

  12. Preliminary safety equipment list for Tank 241-C-106 Manipulator Retrieval System, Project W-340

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guthrie, R.L.

    1994-01-01

    This document identifies the anticipated safety classification of the estimated major subsystems, based on the projected major functions, that will be used as guidance for the development of the conceptual design of the Manipulator Retrieval System for Tank 241-C-106. This document is intended to be updated as the design of the Manipulator Retrieval System evolves through the conceptual and definitive design phases. The Manipulator Retrieval System is to be capable of removing the hardened sludge heel at the bottom of single shell Tank 241-C-106 and to perform an overall clean out of the tank that leaves a maximum of 360 ft 3 (TPA milestone M-45-00). The thickness of the heel prior to initiation of waste retrieval with the Manipulator Retrieval System is estimated to be 1- to 2-ft. The Manipulator Retrieval System is currently in the pre-conceptual phase with no definitive systems or subsystems. The anticipated retrieval functions for the Manipulator Retrieval System is based on Table 6-2 of WHC-SD-W340-ES-001, Rev. 1. Projected equipment to accomplish these functions were based on the following systems and equipment: Rotary Mode Core Sampling Equipment (WHC-SD-WM-SEL-032); Light Duty Utility Arm System Equipment (WHC-SD-WM-SEL-034); Single Shell Tanks Equipment (WHC-SD-WM-SEL-020)

  13. Locomotive fuel tank structural safety testing program : passenger locomotive fuel tank jackknife derailment load test.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-08-01

    This report presents the results of a passenger locomotive fuel tank load test simulating jackknife derailment (JD) load. The test is based on FRA requirements for locomotive fuel tanks in the Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 238, Ap...

  14. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-T-105

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Field, J.G.

    1998-01-01

    A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-T-105. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-T-105 waste and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendices contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15b, change request M-44-97-03, to ''issue characterization deliverables consistent with the waste information requirements documents developed for 1998''

  15. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-U-112

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Field, J.G.

    1998-01-01

    A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-U-112. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-U-112 waste, and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendixes contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15b, change request M-44-97-03 to issue characterization deliverables consistent with the Waste Information Requirements Document developed for 1998

  16. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-T-112

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCain, D.J.

    1998-01-01

    A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-T-112. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-T-112 waste and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendices contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15b, change request M-44-97-03, to ''issue characterization deliverables consistent with the Waste Information Requirements Documents developed for 1998.''

  17. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-T-105

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Field, J.G.

    1998-06-18

    A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-T-105. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-T-105 waste and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendices contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15b, change request M-44-97-03, to ``issue characterization deliverables consistent with the waste information requirements documents developed for 1998``.

  18. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-TX-104

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FIELD, J.G.

    1999-01-01

    A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-TX-104. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-TX-104 waste, and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendices contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15c, change request M-44-97-03 to ''issue characterization deliverables consistent with the Waste Information Requirements Document developed for FY 1999'' (Adams et al. 1998)

  19. [Establishment of model of traditional Chinese medicine injections post-marketing safety monitoring].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Guo, Xin-E; Zhao, Yu-Bin; Xie, Yan-Ming; Zhao, Li-Cai; Li, Yan-Feng; Hao, Zhe

    2013-09-01

    To establish a nurse based post-marketing safety surveillance model for traditional Chinese medicine injections (TCMIs). A TCMIs safety monitoring team and a research hospital team engaged in the research, monitoring processes, and quality control processes were established, in order to achieve comprehensive, timely, accurate and real-time access to research data, to eliminate errors in data collection. A triage system involving a study nurse, as the first point of contact, clinicians and clinical pharmacists was set up in a TCM hospital. Following the specified workflow involving labeling of TCM injections and using improved monitoring forms it was found that there were no missing reports at the ratio of error was zero. A research nurse as the first and main point of contact in post-marketing safety monitoring of TCM as part of a triage model, ensures that research data collected has the characteristics of authenticity, accuracy, timeliness, integrity, and eliminate errors during the process of data collection. Hospital based monitoring is a robust and operable process.

  20. SRTC criticality safety technical review: Nuclear criticality safety evaluation 94-02, uranium solidification facility pencil tank module spacing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rathbun, R.

    1994-01-01

    Review of NMP-NCS-94-0087, ''Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation 94-02: Uranium Solidification Facility Pencil Tank Module Spacing (U), April 18, 1994,'' was requested of the SRTC Applied Physics Group. The NCSE is a criticality assessment to show that the USF process module spacing, as given in Non-Conformance Report SHM-0045, remains safe for operation. The NCSE under review concludes that the module spacing as given in Non-Conformance Report SHM-0045 remains in a critically safe configuration for all normal and single credible abnormal conditions. After a thorough review of the NCSE, this reviewer agrees with that conclusion

  1. 33 CFR 183.550 - Fuel tanks: Installation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ...) BOATING SAFETY BOATS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT Fuel Systems Manufacturer Requirements § 183.550 Fuel tanks: Installation. (a) Each fuel tank must not be integral with any boat structure or mounted on an engine. (b) Each... the top surface of each metallic fuel tank when the boat is in its static floating position. (e) Each...

  2. Mitigation of the most hazardous tank at the Hanford Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reynolds, D.A.

    1994-09-01

    Various tanks at the Hanford Site have been declared to be unresolved safety problems. This means that the tank has the potential to be beyond the limits covered by the current safety documentation. Tank 241-SY-101 poses the greatest hazard. The waste stored in this tank has periodically released hydrogen gas which exceeds the lower flammable limits. A mixer pump was installed in this tank to stir the waste. Stirring the waste would allow the hydrogen to be released slowly in a controlled manner and mitigate the hazard associated with this tank. The testing of this mixer pump is reported in this document. The mixer pump has been successful in controlling the hydrogen concentration in the tank dome to below the flammable limit which has mitigated the hazardous gas releases

  3. Tank characterization report for double-shell tank 241-AN-105

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jo, J.

    1997-01-01

    A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for double-shell tank 241-AN-105. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-AN-105 waste; and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices. This report also supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1996) milestone M-44-10

  4. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-S-111

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Conner, J.M.

    1997-01-01

    One of the major functions of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-S-111. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data to address technical issues associated with tank 241-S-111 waste; and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices. This report also supports the requirements of Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1996) milestone M-44-10

  5. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-C-104

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baldwin, J.H.

    1997-05-21

    A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-C-104. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-C-104 waste; and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1996) milestone M-44-10.

  6. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-S-111

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Conner, J.M.

    1997-04-28

    One of the major functions of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-S-111. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data to address technical issues associated with tank 241-S-111 waste; and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices. This report also supports the requirements of Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1996) milestone M-44-10.

  7. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-B-104

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Field, J.G.

    1996-01-01

    This document summarizes information on the historical uses, present status, and the sampling and analysis results of waste stored in Tank 241-B-104. Sampling and analyses meet safety screening and historical data quality objectives. This report supports the requirements of Tri-party Agreement Milestone M-44-09. his characterization report summoned the available information on the historical uses and the current status of single-shell tank 241-B-104, and presents the analytical results of the June 1995 sampling and analysis effort. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order Milestone M-44-09 (Ecology et al. 1994). Tank 241-B-104 is a single-shell underground waste storage tank located in the 200 East Area B Tank Farm on the Hanford Site. It is the first tank in a three-tank cascade series. The tank went into service in August 1946 with a transfer of second-cycle decontamination waste generated from the bismuth phosphate process. The tank continued to receive this waste type until the third quarter of 1950, when it began receiving first-cycle decontamination waste also produced during the bismuth phosphate process. Following this, the tank received evaporator bottoms sludge from the 242-B Evaporator and waste generated from the flushing of transfer lines. A description and the status of tank 241-B-104 are sum in Table ES-1 and Figure ES-1. The tank has an operating capacity of 2,010 kL (530 kgal), and presently contains 1,400 kL (371 kgal) of waste. The total amount is composed of 4 kL (1 kgal) of supernatant, 260 kL (69 kgal) of saltcake, and 1,140 kL (301 kgal) of sludge (Hanlon 1995). Current surveillance data and observations appear to support these results

  8. 49 CFR 179.4 - Changes in specifications for tank cars.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Changes in specifications for tank cars. 179.4... TANK CARS Introduction, Approvals and Reports § 179.4 Changes in specifications for tank cars. (a...—Tank Car Safety, AAR, for consideration by its Tank Car Committee. An application for construction of...

  9. HANFORD DOUBLE SHELL TANK THERMAL AND SEISMIC PROJECT BUCKLING EVALUATION METHODS AND RESULTS FOR THE PRIMARY TANKS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MACKEY TC; JOHNSON KI; DEIBLER JE; PILLI SP; RINKER MW; KARRI NK

    2009-01-14

    This report documents a detailed buckling evaluation of the primary tanks in the Hanford double-shell waste tanks (DSTs), which is part of a comprehensive structural review for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Project. This work also provides information on tank integrity that specifically responds to concerns raised by the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) Oversight (EH-22) during a review of work performed on the double-shell tank farms and the operation of the aging waste facility (AWF) primary tank ventilation system. The current buckling review focuses on the following tasks: (1) Evaluate the potential for progressive anchor bolt failure and the appropriateness of the safety factors that were used for evaluating local and global buckling. The analysis will specifically answer the following questions: (a) Can the EH-22 scenario develop if the vacuum is limited to -6.6-inch water gage (w.g.) by a relief valve? (b) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario can develop? (c) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario cannot develop? (2) Develop influence functions to estimate the axial stresses in the primary tanks for all reasonable combinations of tank loads based on detailed finite element analysis. The analysis must account for the variation in design details and operating conditions between the different DSTs. The analysis must also address the imperfection sensitivity of the primary tank to buckling. (3) Perform a detailed buckling analysis to determine the maximum allowable differential pressure for each of the DST primary tanks at the current specified limits on waste temperature, height, and specific gravity. Based on the concrete anchor bolt loads analysis and the small deformations that are predicted at the unfactored limits on vacuum and axial loads, it is very unlikely that the EH-22 scenario (i.e., progressive anchor bolt

  10. HANFORD DOUBLE-SHELL TANK THERMAL AND SEISMIC PROJECT-BUCKLING EVALUATION METHODS AND RESULTS FOR THE PRIMARY TANKS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mackey, T.C.; Johnson, K.I.; Deibler, J.E.; Pilli, S.P.; Rinker, M.W.; Karri, N.K.

    2009-01-01

    This report documents a detailed buckling evaluation of the primary tanks in the Hanford double-shell waste tanks (DSTs), which is part of a comprehensive structural review for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Project. This work also provides information on tank integrity that specifically responds to concerns raised by the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Oversight (EH-22) during a review of work performed on the double-shell tank farms and the operation of the aging waste facility (AWF) primary tank ventilation system. The current buckling review focuses on the following tasks: (1) Evaluate the potential for progressive anchor bolt failure and the appropriateness of the safety factors that were used for evaluating local and global buckling. The analysis will specifically answer the following questions: (a) Can the EH-22 scenario develop if the vacuum is limited to -6.6-inch water gage (w.g.) by a relief valve? (b) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario can develop? (c) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario cannot develop? (2) Develop influence functions to estimate the axial stresses in the primary tanks for all reasonable combinations of tank loads based on detailed finite element analysis. The analysis must account for the variation in design details and operating conditions between the different DSTs. The analysis must also address the imperfection sensitivity of the primary tank to buckling. (3) Perform a detailed buckling analysis to determine the maximum allowable differential pressure for each of the DST primary tanks at the current specified limits on waste temperature, height, and specific gravity. Based on the concrete anchor bolt loads analysis and the small deformations that are predicted at the unfactored limits on vacuum and axial loads, it is very unlikely that the EH-22 scenario (i.e., progressive anchor

  11. Safety assessment of automated vehicle functions by simulation-based fault injection

    OpenAIRE

    Juez, Garazi; Amparan, Estibaliz; Lattarulo, Ray; Rastelli, Joshue Perez; Ruiz, Alejandra; Espinoza, Huascar

    2017-01-01

    As automated driving vehicles become more sophisticated and pervasive, it is increasingly important to assure its safety even in the presence of faults. This paper presents a simulation-based fault injection approach (Sabotage) aimed at assessing the safety of automated vehicle functions. In particular, we focus on a case study to forecast fault effects during the model-based design of a lateral control function. The goal is to determine the acceptable fault detection interval for pe...

  12. Cesium uptake capacity of simulated ferrocyanide tank waste. Interim report FY 1994, Ferrocyanide Safety Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burgeson, I.E.; Bryan, S.A.; Burger, L.E.

    1994-09-01

    The objective of this project is to determine the capacity for 137 CS uptake by mixed metal ferrocyanides present in Hanford waste tanks, and to assess the potential for aggregation of these 137 CS exchanged materials to form tank ''hot-spots.'' This research, performed at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) for the Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC), stems from concerns of possible localized radiolytic heating within the tanks. If radioactive cesium is exchanged and concentrated by the remaining nickel ferrocyanide present in the tanks, this heating could cause temperatures to rise above the safety limits specified for the ferrocyanide tanks. For the purposes of this study, two simulants, In-Farm-2 and U-Plant-2, were chosen to represent the wastes generated by the scavenging processes. These simulants were formulated using protocols from the original cesium scavenging campaign. Later additions of cesium-rich wastes from various processes also were considered. The simulants were prepared and centrifuged to obtain a moist ferrocyanide sludge. The centrifuged sludges were treated with the original supernate spiked with a known amount of cesium nitrate. After analysis by flame atomic absorption spectrometry, distribution coefficients (K d ) were calculated. The capacity of solid waste simulants to exchange radioactive cesium from solution was examined. Initial results showed that the greater the molar ratio of cesium to cesium nickel ferrocyanide, the less effective the exchange of cesium from solution. The theoretical capacity of 2 mol cesium per mol of nickel ferrocyanide was not observed. The maximum capacity under experimental conditions was 0.35 mol cesium per mol nickel ferrocyanide. Future work on this project will examine the layering tendency of the cesium nickel ferrocyanide species

  13. Tank wall thinning -- Process and programs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greer, S.D.; McBrine, W.J.

    1994-01-01

    In-service thinning of tank walls has occurred in the power industry and can pose a significant risk to plant safety and dependability. Appropriate respect for the energy stored in a high-pressure drain tank warrants a careful consideration of this possibility and appropriate action in order to assure the adequate safety margins against leakage or rupture. Although it has not proven to be a widespread problem, several cases of wall thinning and at least one recent tank rupture has highlighted this issue in recent years, particularly in nuclear power plants. However, the problem is not new or unique to the nuclear power industry. Severe wall thinning in deaerator tanks has been frequently identified at fossil-fueled power plants. There are many mechanisms which can contribute to tank wall thinning. Considerations for a specific tank are dictated by the system operating conditions, tank geometry, and construction material. Thinning mechanisms which have been identified include: Erosion/Corrosion Impingement Erosion Cavitation Erosion General Corrosion Galvanic Corrosion Microbial-induced Corrosion of course there are many other possible types of material degradation, many of which are characterized by pitting and cracking. This paper specifically addresses wall thinning induced by Erosion/Corrosion (also called Flow-Accelerated Corrosion) and Impingement Erosion of tanks in a power plant steam cycle. Many of the considerations presented are applicable to other types of vessels, such as moisture separators and heat exchangers

  14. Safety assessment for proposed pump mixing operations to mitigate episodic gas releases in tank 241-101-SY: Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lentsch, J.W., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-05-16

    This safety assessment addresses each of the elements required for the proposed action to remove a slurry distributor and to install, operate, and remove a mixing pump in Tank 241-SY-101, which is located within the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington. The proposed action is required as part of an ongoing evaluation of various mitigation concepts developed to eliminate episodic gas releases that result in hydrogen concentrations in the tank dome space that exceed the lower flammability limit.

  15. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-U-106

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, T.M.

    1997-01-01

    One major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-U-106. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-U-106 waste, and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 of this report summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, and Section 4.0 makes recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling. The appendixes contain supporting data and information. This report also supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ikology et al. 1996), Milestone M-44-10

  16. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-U-106

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brown, T.M.

    1997-04-15

    One major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-U-106. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-U-106 waste, and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 of this report summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, and Section 4.0 makes recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling. The appendixes contain supporting data and information. This report also supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ikology et al. 1996), Milestone M-44-10.

  17. Hanford Site Waste Storage Tank Information Notebook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Husa, E.I.; Raymond, R.E.; Welty, R.K.; Griffith, S.M.; Hanlon, B.M.; Rios, R.R.; Vermeulen, N.J.

    1993-07-01

    This report provides summary data on the radioactive waste stored in underground tanks in the 200 East and West Areas at the Hanford Site. The summary data covers each of the existing 161 Series 100 underground waste storage tanks (500,000 gallons and larger). It also contains information on the design and construction of these tanks. The information in this report is derived from existing reports that document the status of the tanks and their materials. This report also contains interior, surface photographs of each of the 54 Watch List tanks, which are those tanks identified as Priority I Hanford Site Tank Farm Safety Issues in accordance with Public Law 101-510, Section 3137*

  18. Primary break with total loss of high pressure safety injection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cordelle, F.; Champ, M.; Pochard, R.

    1988-10-01

    The probabilitic safety assessment of a 900 MW plant has displayed the potential importance, with regard to the risk, of intermediate primary breaks with failure of the high pressure safety injection system. The probability of such sequence is about 10 -6 /plant X year. Therefore, it is necessary to establish: - if this sequence can lead to core melt down, - if clad ruptures can occur. This event must be taken into account to determine the repair time of contaminated systems. For these studies, a three inch equivalent diameter break is considerd, as this is the most sensitive in its category with regard to these phenomena. In addition to the above objectives, the purpose of these studies is to evaluate the sensitivity of the results to the following parameters: - the time limit at which the operator starts cooling down the plant via the steam generators. Two calculations have been made with the RELAP code (1 and 2) and two with the CATHARE code (3 and 4) - the pump trip time. Four calculations have been made with the CATHARE code (5, 6, 7 and 8). In the case of failure of only one high pressure safety injection file, 6 calculations have been made with the CATHARE code, concerning the influence of pump trip time (9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14)

  19. Tank characterization report for double-shell tank 241-AP-105

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeLorenzo, D.S.; Simpson, B.C.

    1994-01-01

    Double-Shell Tank 241-AP-105 is a radioactive waste tank most recently sampled in March of 1993. Sampling and characterization of the waste in Tank 241-AP-105 contributes toward the fulfillment of Milestone M-44-05 of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology, EPA, and DOE, 1993). Characterization is also needed tot evaluate the waste's fitness for safe processing through an evaporator as part of an overall waste volume reduction program. Tank 241-AP-105, located in the 200 East Area AP Tank Farm, was constructed and went into service in 1986 as a dilute waste receiver tank; Tank 241AP-1 05 was considered as a candidate tank for the Grout Treatment Facility. With the cancellation of the Grout Program, the final disposal of the waste in will be as high- and low-level glass fractions. The tank has an operational capacity of 1,140,000 gallons, and currently contains 821,000 gallons of double-shell slurry feed. The waste is heterogeneous, although distinct layers do not exist. Waste has been removed periodically for processing and concentration through the 242-A Evaporator. The tank is not classified as a Watch List tank and is considered to be sound. There are no Unreviewed Safety Questions associated with Tank 241-AP-105 at this time. The waste in Tank 241-AP-105 exists as an aqueous solution of metallic salts and radionuclides, with limited amounts of organic complexants. The most prevalent soluble analytes include aluminum, potassium, sodium, hydroxide, carbonate, nitrate, and nitrite. The calculated pH is greater than the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act established limit of 12.5 for corrosivity. In addition, cadmium, chromium, and lead concentrations were found at levels greater than their regulatory thresholds. The major radionuclide constituent is 137 Cs, while the few organic complexants present include glycolate and oxalate. Approximately 60% of the waste by weight is water

  20. Flammable gas tank safety program: Technical basis for gas analysis and monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sherwood, D.J.

    1995-01-01

    Flammable gases generated in radioactive liquids. Twenty-five high level radioactive liquid waste storage tanks located underground at the Hanford Site are on a Flammable Gas Watch List because they contain waste which tends to retain the gases generated in it until rather large quantities are available for sudden release to the tank head space; if a tank is full it has little dome space, and a flammable concentration of gases could be produced--even if the tank is ventilated. If the waste has no tendency to retain gas generated in it then a continual flammable gas concentration in the tank dome space is established by the gas production rate and the tank ventilation rate (or breathing rate for unventilated tanks); this is also a potential problem for Flammable Gas Watch List tanks, and perhaps other Hanford tanks too. All Flammable Gas Watch List tanks will be fitted with Standard Hydorgen Monitoring Systems so that their behavior can be observed. In some cases, such as tank 241-SY-101, the data gathered from such observations will indicate that tank conditions need to be mitigated so that gas release events are either eliminated or rendered harmless. For example, a mixer pump was installed in tank 241-SY-101; operating the pump stirs the waste, replacing the large gas release events with small releases of gas that are kept below twenty-five percent of the lower flammability limit by the ventilation system. The concentration of hydrogen measured in Hanford waste tanks is greater than that of any other flammable gas. Hydrogen levels measured with a Standard Hydrogen Monitoring System in excess of 0.6 volume percent will cause Westinghouse Hanford Company to consider actions which will decrease the amount of flammable gas in the tank

  1. Safety analysis report for the North Tank Farm, Tank W-11, and the Gunite and Associated Tanks -- Treatability Study, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Platfoot, J.H.

    1997-02-01

    The North Tank Farm (NTF) tanks consist of eight underground storage tanks which have been removed from service because of age and changes in liquid waste system needs and requirements. Tank W-11, which was constructed in 1943, has been removed from service, and contains several hundred gallons of liquid low-level waste (LLLW). The Gunite and Associated Tanks (GAAT) Treatability Study involves the demonstration of sludge removal techniques and equipment for use in other waste storage tanks throughout the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The hazards associated with the NTF, Tank W-11, and the Treatability Study are identified in hazard identification table in Appendixes A, B, and C. The hazards identified for the NTF, Tank W-11, and the Treatability Study were analyzed in the preliminary hazards analyses (PHA) included as Appendices D and E. The PHA identifies potential accident scenarios and qualitatively estimates the consequences. Because of the limited quantities of materials present in the tanks and the types of energy sources that may result in release of the materials, none of the accidents identified are anticipated to result in significant adverse health effects to on-site or off-site personnel

  2. Safety and feasibility of platelet rich fibrin matrix injections for treatment of common urologic conditions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ethan L Matz

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Purpose: Autologous platelet rich plasma (PRP is used increasingly in a variety of settings. PRP injections have been used for decades to improve angiogenesis and wound healing. They have also been offered commercially in urology with little to no data on safety or efficacy. PRP could theoretically improve multiple urologic conditions, such as erectile dysfunction (ED, Peyronie's disease (PD, and stress urinary incontinence (SUI. A concern with PRP, however, is early washout, a situation potentially avoided by conversion to platelet rich fibrin matrix (PRFM. Before clinical trials can be performed, safety analysis is desirable. We reviewed an initial series of patients receiving PRFM for urologic pathology to assess safety and feasibility. Materials and Methods: Data were reviewed for patients treated with PRFM at our center from November 2012 to July 2017. Patients were observed immediately post-injection and at follow-up for complications and tolerability. Where applicable, International Index of Erectile Function (IIEF-5 scores were reviewed before and after injections for ED and/or PD. Pad use data was collected pre/post injection for SUI. Results: Seventeen patients were identified, with a mean receipt of 2.1 injections per patient. Post-procedural minor adverse events were seen in 3 men, consisting of mild pain at injection site and mild penile bruising. No patients experienced complications at follow-up. No decline was observed in men completing pre/post IIEF-5 evaluations. Conclusions: PRFM appears to be a safe and feasible treatment modality in patients with urologic disease. Further placebo-controlled trials are warranted.

  3. Development of liquid poison injection system (SDS-2) for 500 MWe PHWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nawathe, Shirish; Umashankari, P.; Balakrishnan, Kamala; Mahajan, S.C.; Kakodkar, A.

    1991-01-01

    A secondary shut-down system (SDS-2) in the form of a mecahnism for introducing poison into the moderator of the PHWR is under development in Reactor Engineering Division of BARC. The system, as conceived, consists of a tank containing pressurised helium connected to poison tanks through quick opening solenoid valves. The tanks are connected to horizontal injection tubes in the calandria. On system actuation, gadolinium nitrate solution from the tanks passes to the injection tubes which have a number of holes through which the poison enters the moderator. This report details the development work being done on this poison injection system. An experimental facility was set up to measure the poison jet growth rate and the jet spread after injection, and mathematical models were developed to convert the observed jets into reactivity worth values. A description of the work and the computed results are presented. (author). 21 graphs. , 15 tabs

  4. Radiotracer investigation in gold leaching tanks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dagadu, C P K; Akaho, E H K; Danso, K A; Stegowski, Z; Furman, L

    2012-01-01

    Measurement and analysis of residence time distribution (RTD) is a classical method to investigate performance of chemical reactors. In the present investigation, the radioactive tracer technique was used to measure the RTD of aqueous phase in a series of gold leaching tanks at the Damang gold processing plant in Ghana. The objective of the investigation was to measure the effective volume of each tank and validate the design data after recent process intensification or revamping of the plant. I-131 was used as a radioactive tracer and was instantaneously injected into the feed stream of the first tank and monitored at the outlet of different tanks. Both sampling and online measurement methods were used to monitor the tracer concentration. The results of measurements indicated that both the methods provided identical RTD curves. The mean residence time (MRT) and effective volume of each tank was estimated. The tanks-in-series model with exchange between active and stagnant volume was used and found suitable to describe the flow structure of aqueous phase in the tanks. The estimated effective volume of the tanks and high degree of mixing in tanks could validate the design data and confirmed the expectation of the plant engineer after intensification of the process. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  5. [Systemic safety following intravitreal injections of anti-VEGF].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baillif, S; Levy, B; Girmens, J-F; Dumas, S; Tadayoni, R

    2018-03-01

    The goal of this manuscript is to assess data suggesting that intravitreal injection of anti-vascular endothelial growth factors (anti-VEGFs) could result in systemic adverse events (AEs). The class-specific systemic AEs should be similar to those encountered in cancer trials. The most frequent AE observed in oncology, hypertension and proteinuria, should thus be the most common expected in ophthalmology, but their severity should be lower because of the much lower doses of anti-VEGFs administered intravitreally. Such AEs have not been frequently reported in ophthalmology trials. In addition, pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic data describing systemic diffusion of anti-VEGFs should be interpreted with caution because of significant inconsistencies reported. Thus, safety data reported in ophthalmology trials and pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic data provide robust evidence that systemic events after intravitreal injection are very unlikely. Additional studies are needed to explore this issue further, as much remains to be understood about local and systemic side effects of anti-VEGFs. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.

  6. Criticality safety evaluation of disposing of K Basin sludge in double-shell tank AW-105

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ROGERS, C.A.

    1999-01-01

    A criticality safety evaluation is made of the disposal of K Basin sludge in double-shell tank (DST) AW-105 located in the 200 east area of Hanford Site. The technical basis is provided for limits and controls to be used in the development of a criticality prevention specification (CPS). A model of K Basin sludge is developed to account for fuel burnup. The iron/uranium mass ration required to ensure an acceptable magrin of subcriticality is determined

  7. Hazard assessments of double-shell flammable gas tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fox, G.L.; Stepnewski, D.D.

    1994-01-01

    This report is the fourth in a series of hazard assessments performed on the double-shell flammable gas watch list tanks. This report focuses on hazards associated with the double-shell watch list tanks (101-AW, 103-AN, 104-AN, and 105-AN). While a similar assessment has already been performed for tank 103-SY, it is also included here to incorporate a more representative slurry gas mixture and provide a consistent basis for comparing results for all the flammable gas tanks. This report is intended to provide an in-depth assessment by considering the details of the gas release event and slurry gas mixing as the gas is released from the waste. The consequences of postulated gas ignition are evaluated using a plume burn model and updated ignition frequency predictions. Tank pressurization which results from a gas burn, along with the structural response, is also considered. The report is intended to support the safety basis for work activities in flammable gas tanks by showing margins to safety limits that are available in the design and procedures

  8. System Study: High-Pressure Safety Injection 1998-2014

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schroeder, John Alton [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States). Risk Assessment and Management Services Dept.

    2015-12-01

    This report presents an unreliability evaluation of the high-pressure safety injection system (HPSI) at 69 U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. Demand, run hours, and failure data from fiscal year 1998 through 2014 for selected components were obtained from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Consolidated Events Database (ICES). The unreliability results are trended for the most recent 10 year period, while yearly estimates for system unreliability are provided for the entire active period. No statistically significant increasing or decreasing trends were identified in the HPSI results.

  9. Final characterization and safety screen report of double shell tank 241-AP-104 for 242-A evaporator, campaign 96-1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, G.L.

    1996-01-01

    This data package satisfies the requirement for a format IV, final report. It is a follow-up to the 45-day safety screen report for tank AP-104. Evaporator candidate feed from tank 241-AP-104 (hereafter referred to as AP-104) was characterized for physical, inorganic, organic and radiochemical parameters by the Westinghouse Hanford Company, 222-S Laboratory, and by the Battelle Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Analytical Chemistry Laboratory (ACL) as directed by the Tank Sample and Analysis Plan (TSAP), References 1 through 4. Preliminary data in the form of summary analytical tables were provided to the project in advance of this final report to enable early estimation of evaporator operational parameters, using the Predict modeling program. Laboratory analyses at ACL Laboratory was performed according to the TSAP. Analyses were performed at the 222-S Laboratory as defined and specified in the TSAP and the Laboratory's Quality Assurance Plan, References 5 and 6. Any deviations from the instructions documented in the TSAP are discussed in this narrative and are supported with additional documentation. SAMPLING The TSAP, section 2, provided sampling information for waste samples collected from tank AP-104. The bottle-on-a-string method was used to collect liquid grab samples from the tank. Each glass sample bottle was amber, precleaned, and contained approximately 100 milliliters. Each bottle was closed with a teflon seal cap (or teflon septum for volatile organic analysis samples). Field blank samples were prepared by placing deionized water into sampling bottles, lowering the unclosed bottles into the riser for a period of time, retrieving them from the riser, and then closing the bottles with the same types of caps used for the tank samples. None of the samples were preserved by acidification. Upon receipt, the sample bottles destined for organic analyses were placed in a refrigerator. No attempt was made during sampling to assure the complete

  10. first tank of Linac 1

    CERN Multimedia

    This was the first tank of the linear accelerator Linac1, the injection system for the Proton Synchrotron, It ran for 34 years (1958 - 1992). Protons entered at the far end and were accelerated between the copper drift tubes by an oscillating electromagnetic field. The field flipped 200 million times a second (200 MHz) so the protons spent 5 nanoseconds crossing a drift tube and a gap. Moving down the tank, the tubes and gaps had to get longer as the protons gained speed. The tank accelerated protons from 500 KeV to 10 MeV. Linac1 was also used to accelerate deutrons and alpha particles for the Intersecting Storage Rings and oxygen and sulpher ions for the Super Proton Synchrotron heavy ion programme.

  11. Development and demonstration of a stabilization system for buried mixed waste tanks: Initital results of the tank V-9 hot demonstration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matthern, G.E.; Kuhns, D.J.; Meservey, R.H.; Farnsworth, R.K.

    1996-01-01

    This paper describes a systematic approach for the stabilization of buried mixed waste tanks and presents the status of an application of this approach to a specific hot waste tank demonstration to be performed in FY-96. The approach uses the cradle-to-grave concept and includes technical, health and safety, and regulatory considerations and requirements. It starts with the identification of the tank and continues to the final disposition and monitoring of the tank

  12. 49 CFR 193.2181 - Impoundment capacity: LNG storage tanks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FACILITIES: FEDERAL SAFETY STANDARDS Design Impoundment Design and Capacity § 193.2181 Impoundment capacity: LNG storage tanks. Each impounding system serving an LNG storage tank must have a... 49 Transportation 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Impoundment capacity: LNG storage tanks. 193.2181...

  13. A safety assessment for proposed pump mixing operations to mitigate episodic gas releases in tank 241-SY-101: Hanford Site,Richland, Washington

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lentsch, J.W.

    1996-07-01

    This safety assessment addresses each of the elements required for the proposed action to remove a slurry distributor and to install, operate, and remove a mixing pump in Tank 241-SY-101,which is located within the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington.The proposed action is required as part of an ongoing evaluation of various mitigation concepts developed to eliminate episodic gas releases that result in hydrogen concentrations in the tank dome space that exceed the lower flammability limit.

  14. High priority tank sampling and analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, T.M.

    1998-01-01

    In July 1993, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Board issued Recommendation 93-5 (Conway 1993) which noted that there was insufficient tank waste technical information and the pace to obtain it was too slow to ensure that Hanford Site wastes could be safely stored, that associated operations could be conducted safely, and that future disposal data requirements could be met. In response, the US Department of Energy, in May 1996, issued Revision 1 of the Recommendation 93-5 Implementation Plan (DOE-RL 1996). The Implementation Plan presented a modified approach to achieve the original plan's objectives, concentrating on actions necessary to ensure that wastes can be safely stored, that operations can be safely conducted, and that timely characterization information for the tank waste Disposal Program could be obtained. The Implementation Plan proposed 28 High Priority tanks for near term core sampling and analysis, which along with sampling and analysis of other non-High Priority tanks, could provide the scientific and technical data to confirm assumptions, calibrate models, and.measure safety related phenomenology of the waste. When the analysis results of the High Priority and other-tank sampling were reviewed, it was expected that a series of 12 questions, 9 related to safety issues and 3 related to planning for the disposal process, should be answered allowing key decisions to be made. This report discusses the execution of the Implementation Plan and the results achieved in addressing the questions. Through sampling and analysis, all nine safety related questions have been answered and extensive data for the three disposal planning related questions have been collected, allowing for key decision making. Many more tanks than the original 28 High Priority tanks identified in the Implementation Plan were sampled and analyzed. Twenty-one High Priority tanks and 85 other tanks were core sampled and used to address the questions. Thirty-eight additional tanks were auger

  15. Safe interim storage of Hanford tank wastes, draft environmental impact statement, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-07-01

    This Draft EIS is prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Washington State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA). DOE and Ecology have identified the need to resolve near-term tank safety issues associated with Watchlist tanks as identified pursuant to Public Law (P.L.) 101-510, Section 3137, ``Safety Measures for Waste Tanks at Hanford Nuclear Reservation,`` of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, while continuing to provide safe storage for other Hanford wastes. This would be an interim action pending other actions that could be taken to convert waste to a more stable form based on decisions resulting from the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) EIS. The purpose for this action is to resolve safety issues concerning the generation of unacceptable levels of hydrogen in two Watchlist tanks, 101-SY and 103-SY. Retrieving waste in dilute form from Tanks 101-SY and 103-SY, hydrogen-generating Watchlist double shell tanks (DSTs) in the 200 West Area, and storage in new tanks is the preferred alternative for resolution of the hydrogen safety issues.

  16. Safe interim storage of Hanford tank wastes, draft environmental impact statement, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-07-01

    This Draft EIS is prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Washington State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA). DOE and Ecology have identified the need to resolve near-term tank safety issues associated with Watchlist tanks as identified pursuant to Public Law (P.L.) 101-510, Section 3137, ''Safety Measures for Waste Tanks at Hanford Nuclear Reservation,'' of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, while continuing to provide safe storage for other Hanford wastes. This would be an interim action pending other actions that could be taken to convert waste to a more stable form based on decisions resulting from the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) EIS. The purpose for this action is to resolve safety issues concerning the generation of unacceptable levels of hydrogen in two Watchlist tanks, 101-SY and 103-SY. Retrieving waste in dilute form from Tanks 101-SY and 103-SY, hydrogen-generating Watchlist double shell tanks (DSTs) in the 200 West Area, and storage in new tanks is the preferred alternative for resolution of the hydrogen safety issues

  17. Sloshing impact in roofed tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Uras, R.A.

    1995-01-01

    A large number of high-level waste (HLW) storage tanks exists in various tank farms. Seismic activities at those locations may cause significant sloshing in HLW tanks. These tanks are covered to avoid any spilling during large amplitude earthquakes. However, large amplitude sloshing may result in impact on the cover or the roof of the tank. Hence, a better understanding of the impact phenomenon is necessary to assess the safety of the tanks currently in existence, and to establish design guidelines for future designs. A pressure based formulation is derived to model sloshing impact in roared tanks. It is incorporated into Argonne's in-house finite element code FLUSTR-ANL. A numerical test case with a harmonic input excitation is studied. The simulation results indicate that linear behavior is preserved beyond the first impact, and some mesh distortion is observed following a stronger second impact. During the impact, the displacement of the contacting surface nodes remains constant, and the velocities are reduced to zero. An identification of impacting nodes is possible from the dynamic pressures induced in surface elements

  18. Sloshing impact in roofed tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Uras, R.A.

    1995-01-01

    A large number of high-level waste (HLW) storage tanks exists in various tank farms. Seismic activities at those locations may cause significant sloshing in HLW tanks. These tanks are covered to avoid any spilling during large amplitude earthquakes. However, large amplitude sloshing may result in impact on the cover or the roof of the tank. Hence, a better understanding of the impact phenomenon is necessary to assess the safety of the tanks currently in existence, and to establish design guidelines for future designs. A pressure based formulation is derived to model sloshing impact in roofed tanks. It is incorporated into Argonne's in-house finite element code FLUSTR-ANL. A numerical test case with a harmonic input excitation is studied. The simulation results indicate that linear behavior is preserved beyond the first impact, and some mesh distortion is observed following a stronger second impact. During the impact, the displacement of the contacting surface nodes remains constant, and the velocities are reduced to zero. An identification of impacting nodes is possible from the dynamic pressures induced in surface elements

  19. Effects on LOCA mass and energy release of the SIT Fluidic device for SKN 3 and 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, Jeung Hyo; Kim, Tae Yoon; Choi, Han Rim; Choi, Chul Jin; Seo, Jong Tae

    2003-01-01

    A fluidic device is employed for the control of safety injection tank flow during a large break loss of coolant accident in Shin Kori Nuclear power plant Unit 3 and 4. It is installed in the safety injection tank and provides two stages of safety injection tank flow injection, initially high flow injection and then low flow injection after the reactor vessel downcomer annulus full. This allows a more effective use of safety injection tank water inventory during a loss of coolant accident. However, the fluidic device may have an adverse impact on the mass and energy release during the accident. That is, the steam mass and energy release will be increased by a considerable amount because the safety injection tank low flow injection via fluidic device is not credited to condense the steam flows through intact cold legs. The increased mass and energy releases have an impact on the peak pressure and temperature of the containment. This effect of the fluidic device is analyzed on the mass and energy release and the peak pressure and temperature of the containment. The calculation has been done using the CEFLASH-4A, the FLOOD3 with some modifications for the fluidic device and the CONTEMPT-LT code. The results show that the mass and energy release and the peak pressure and temperature were considerably increased when compared with the case without the fluidic device. However, the results satisfy the required design margin

  20. Effects on LOCA mass and energy release of the SIT Fluidic device for SKN 3 and 4

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Song, Jeung Hyo; Kim, Tae Yoon; Choi, Han Rim; Choi, Chul Jin; Seo, Jong Tae [Korea Power Engineering Company, Daejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2003-07-01

    A fluidic device is employed for the control of safety injection tank flow during a large break loss of coolant accident in Shin Kori Nuclear power plant Unit 3 and 4. It is installed in the safety injection tank and provides two stages of safety injection tank flow injection, initially high flow injection and then low flow injection after the reactor vessel downcomer annulus full. This allows a more effective use of safety injection tank water inventory during a loss of coolant accident. However, the fluidic device may have an adverse impact on the mass and energy release during the accident. That is, the steam mass and energy release will be increased by a considerable amount because the safety injection tank low flow injection via fluidic device is not credited to condense the steam flows through intact cold legs. The increased mass and energy releases have an impact on the peak pressure and temperature of the containment. This effect of the fluidic device is analyzed on the mass and energy release and the peak pressure and temperature of the containment. The calculation has been done using the CEFLASH-4A, the FLOOD3 with some modifications for the fluidic device and the CONTEMPT-LT code. The results show that the mass and energy release and the peak pressure and temperature were considerably increased when compared with the case without the fluidic device. However, the results satisfy the required design margin.

  1. 14 CFR 129.113 - Fuel tank system maintenance program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Fuel tank system maintenance program. 129... Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements § 129.113 Fuel tank system maintenance program. (a) Except... on which an auxiliary fuel tank is installed under a field approval, before June 16, 2008, the...

  2. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-S-104

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jo, J.

    1997-01-01

    One of the major functions of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-S-104. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with 241-S- 104 waste; and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendixes. This report also supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1996) milestone M-44-05

  3. Accident scenarios triggered by lightning strike on atmospheric storage tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Necci, Amos; Argenti, Francesca; Landucci, Gabriele; Cozzani, Valerio

    2014-01-01

    Severe Natech accidents may be triggered by lightning strike affecting storage tanks containing relevant inventories of hazardous materials. The present study focused on the identification of event sequences and accident scenarios following lightning impact on atmospheric tanks. Reference event trees, validated using past accident analysis, are provided to describe the specific accident chains identified, accounting for reference protection and mitigation safety barriers usually adopted in current industrial practice. An overall methodology was outlined to allow the calculation of the expected frequencies of final scenarios following lightning impact on atmospheric storage tanks, taking into account the expected performance of available safety barriers. The methodology was applied to a case study in order to better understand the data that may be obtained and their importance in the framework of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) and of the risk management of industrial facilities with respect to external hazards due to natural events. - Highlights: • Event sequences following lightning impact on atmospheric tanks were identified. • Reference event trees including standard safety barriers were obtained. • Safety barriers applied in industrial practice were assessed to quantify event trees. • Frequencies of final scenarios following lightning impact on tanks were calculated. • Natech scenarios caused by lightning have an important influence on risk profiles

  4. Residence time distribution measurements in a pilot-scale poison tank using radiotracer technique.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pant, H J; Goswami, Sunil; Samantray, J S; Sharma, V K; Maheshwari, N K

    2015-09-01

    Various types of systems are used to control the reactivity and shutting down of a nuclear reactor during emergency and routine shutdown operations. Injection of boron solution (borated water) into the core of a reactor is one of the commonly used methods during emergency operation. A pilot-scale poison tank was designed and fabricated to simulate injection of boron poison into the core of a reactor along with coolant water. In order to design a full-scale poison tank, it was desired to characterize flow of liquid from the tank. Residence time distribution (RTD) measurement and analysis was adopted to characterize the flow dynamics. Radiotracer technique was applied to measure RTD of aqueous phase in the tank using Bromine-82 as a radiotracer. RTD measurements were carried out with two different modes of operation of the tank and at different flow rates. In Mode-1, the radiotracer was instantaneously injected at the inlet and monitored at the outlet, whereas in Mode-2, the tank was filled with radiotracer and its concentration was measured at the outlet. From the measured RTD curves, mean residence times (MRTs), dead volume and fraction of liquid pumped in with time were determined. The treated RTD curves were modeled using suitable mathematical models. An axial dispersion model with high degree of backmixing was found suitable to describe flow when operated in Mode-1, whereas a tanks-in-series model with backmixing was found suitable to describe flow of the poison in the tank when operated in Mode-2. The results were utilized to scale-up and design a full-scale poison tank for a nuclear reactor. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  5. Characterization of the corrosion behavior of the carbon steel liner in Hanford Site single-shell tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anantatmula, R.P.; Schwenk, E.B.; Danielson, M.J.

    1994-06-01

    Six safety initiatives have been identified for accelerating the resolution of waste tank safety issues and closure of unreviewed safety questions. Safety Initiative 5 is to reduce safety and environmental risk from tank leaks. Item d of Safety Initiative 5 is to complete corrosion studies of single-shell tanks to determine failure mechanisms and corrosion control options to minimize further degradation by June 1994. This report has been prepared to fulfill Safety Initiative 5, Item d. The corrosion mechanisms that apply to Hanford Site single-shell tanks are stress corrosion cracking, pitting/crevice corrosion, uniform corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement, and microbiologically influenced corrosion. The corrosion data relevant to the single-shell tanks dates back three decades, when results were obtained from in-situ corrosion coupons in a few single-shell tanks. Since that time there have been intertank transfers, evaporation, and chemical alterations of the waste. These activities have changed the character and the present composition of the waste is not well characterized. All conclusions and recommendations are made in the absence of relevant laboratory experimental data and tank inspection data. The report attempts to identify the failure mechanisms by a literature survey of carbon steel data in environments similar to the single-shell tank wastes, and by a review of the work performed at the Savannah River Site where similar wastes are stored in similar carbon steel tanks. Based on these surveys, and in the absence of data specific to Hanford single-shell tanks, it may be concluded that the single-shell tanks identified as leakers failed primarily by stress corrosion cracking due to the presence of high nitrate/low hydroxide wastes and residual stresses. In addition, some failures may be attributed to pitting under crevices in low hydroxide locations

  6. [Comparative study on four kinds of assessment methods of post-marketing safety of Danhong injection].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Xuelin; Tang, Jinfa; Meng, Fei; Li, Chunxiao; Xie, Yanming

    2011-10-01

    To study the adverse reaction of Danhong injection with four kinds of methods, central monitoring method, chart review method, literature study method and spontaneous reporting method, and to compare the differences between them, explore an appropriate method to carry out post-marketing safety evaluation of traditional Chinese medicine injection. Set down the adverse reactions' questionnaire of four kinds of methods, central monitoring method, chart review method, literature study method and collect the information on adverse reactions in a certain period. Danhong injection adverse reaction information from Henan Province spontaneous reporting system was collected with spontaneous reporting method. Carry on data summary and descriptive analysis. Study the adverse reaction of Danhong injection with four methods of central monitoring method, chart review method, literature study method and spontaneous reporting method, the rates of adverse events were 0.993%, 0.336%, 0.515%, 0.067%, respectively. Cyanosis, arrhythmia, hypotension, sweating, erythema, hemorrhage dermatitis, rash, irritability, bleeding gums, toothache, tinnitus, asthma, elevated aminotransferases, constipation, pain are new discovered adverse reactions. The central monitoring method is the appropriate method to carry out post-marketing safety evaluation of traditional Chinese medicine injection, which could objectively reflect the real world of clinical usage.

  7. 14 CFR 125.507 - Fuel tank system inspection program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Fuel tank system inspection program. 125... Airworthiness and Safety Improvements § 125.507 Fuel tank system inspection program. (a) Except as provided in... fuel tank is installed under a field approval, before June 16, 2008, the certificate holder must submit...

  8. 14 CFR 91.1507 - Fuel tank system inspection program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Fuel tank system inspection program. 91... Airworthiness and Safety Improvements § 91.1507 Fuel tank system inspection program. (a) Except as provided in... fuel tank is installed under a field approval, before June 16, 2008, the operator must submit to the...

  9. Waste tank vapor project: Vapor space characterization of waste tank 241-BY-104: Results from samples collected on June 24, 1994

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clauss, T.W.; Ligotke, M.W.; McVeety, B.D.; Pool, K.H.; Lucke, R.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Goheen, S.C.

    1994-11-01

    This report describes results of the analyses of tank-headspace samples taken from Hanford waste Tank 241-BY-104 (referred to as Tank BY-104) on June 24, 1994. The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) contracted with Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) to provide sampling devices and analyze inorganic and organic samples collected from the tank headspace. The sample job was designated S4019 and was performed by WHC on June 24, 1994 using the vapor sampling system (VSS). The results of the analyses are expected to be used in the determination of safety and toxicological issues related to the tank-headspace gas as described in the WHC report entitled Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Vapor Issue Resolution, WHC-SD-WM-DQO-002, Rev. 0. Sampling devices, including 16 sorbent trains (for inorganic analyses), and 5 SUMMA trademark canisters (for organic analyses), were supplied to the WHC sampling staff on June 20, 1994. Samples were taken (by WHC) on June 24. The samples were returned from the field on June 27. The inorganic samples delivered to PNL on chain-of-custody (COC) 006893 included 16 sorbent trains as described in Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. Additional inorganic blank spikes were obtained from related sample jobs. SUMMA trademark samples delivered to PNL on COC 006896 included one ambient air sample, one ambient-air sample through the sampling system, and three tank-headspace SUMMA trademark canister samples. The samples were inspected upon delivery to the 326/23B laboratory and logged into PNL laboratory record book 55408. Custody of the sorbent trains was transferred to PNL personnel performing the inorganic analysis and stored at refrigerated (≤10 degrees C) temperature until the time of analysis. Access to the 326/23B laboratory is limited to PNL personnel working on the waste-tank safety program

  10. FY 1999 cold demonstration of the Multi-Point Injection (MPI) process for stabilizing contaminated sludge in buried horizontal tanks with limited access at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kauschinger, J.L.; Lewis, B.E.; Spence, R.D.

    2000-01-01

    A major problem faced by the U.S. Department of Energy is the remediation of buried tank waste. Exhumation of the sludge is currently the preferred remediation method. However, exhumation does not typically remove all the contaminated material from the tank. The best management practices for in-tank treatment of wastes require an integrated approach to develop appropriate treatment agents that can be safely delivered and uniformly mixed with the sludge. Ground Environmental Services, Inc., has developed and demonstrated a remotely controlled, high-velocity, jet-delivery system, which is termed Multi-Point-Injection (MPItrademark). This robust jet-delivery system has been used to create homogeneous monoliths containing shallow-buried miscellaneous waste in trenches [fiscal year (FY) 1995] and surrogate sludge in a cylindrical test tank (FY 1998). During the FY 1998 demonstration, the MPI process was able to successfully form a 32-ton uniform monolith in about 8 min. Analytical data indicated that 10 tons of a zeolite-type physical surrogate were uniformly mixed within the 40-inch-thick monolith without lifting the MPI jetting tools off the tank floor. Over 1,000 lb of cohesive surrogates, with consistencies of Gunite and Associated Tanks (GAATs) TH-4 and Hanford tank sludges, were easily mixed into the monolith without exceeding a core temperature of 100 F during curing

  11. Tank inspection, repair, alternation, and reconstruction, January 1992

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1992-01-01

    This paper incorporates APIs Aboveground Storage Tank Inspector Certication Program (ASTICP) as an integral part of API Standard 653. This program certies qualified aboveground storage tank inspectors for oil tanks. The ASTICP was developed in accordance with APIs Environmental Excellence Program and promotes the operation of facilities and materials handling in a manner that protects the environment, and the safety and health of employees and the public

  12. Safety basis for selected activities in single-shell tanks with flammable gas concerns. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schlosser, R.L.

    1996-01-01

    This is full revision to Revision 0 of this report. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of analyses done to support activities performed for single-shell tanks. These activities are encompassed by the flammable gas Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ). The basic controls required to perform these activities involve the identification, elimination and/or control of ignition sources and monitoring for flammable gases. Controls are implemented through the Interim Safety Basis (ISB), IOSRs, and OSDs. Since this report only provides a historical compendium of issues and activities, it is not to be used as a basis to perform USQ screenings and evaluations. Furthermore, these analyses and others in process will be used as the basis for developing the Flammable Gas Topical Report for the ISB Upgrade

  13. Hanford Tanks Initiative quality assurance implementation plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huston, J.J.

    1998-01-01

    Hanford Tanks Initiative (HTI) Quality Assurance Implementation Plan for Nuclear Facilities defines the controls for the products and activities developed by HTI. Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD)(HNF-PRO599) is the document that defines the quality requirements for Nuclear Facilities. The QAPD provides direction for compliance to 10 CFR 830.120 Nuclear Safety Management, Quality Assurance Requirements. Hanford Tanks Initiative (HTI) is a five-year activity resulting from the technical and financial partnership of the US Department of Energy's Office of Waste Management (EM-30), and Office of Science and Technology Development (EM-50). HTI will develop and demonstrate technologies and processes for characterization and retrieval of single shell tank waste. Activities and products associated with HTI consist of engineering, construction, procurement, closure, retrieval, characterization, and safety and licensing

  14. Engineering test plan for Tank 241-SY-101 in situ viscometer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sobocinski, R.G.; Stokes, T.I.; Pearce, K.L.

    1994-11-01

    To obtain in situ measurements of the rheological properties within tank 241-SY-101, this document will implement the test strategy defined in PNLMIT-041994, acquisition and Reduction of Data Obtained in Tank SY-101 with the Ball Rheometer. Instructions for all sequences are defined within the procedure. All safety requirements as defined in LA-UR-92-3196, A Safety Assessment for Proposed Mixing Operations to Mitigate Episodic Gas Releases in Tank 241-101-SY have been implemented into this procedure

  15. Residual heat removal pump and low pressure safety injection pump retrofit program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dudiak, J.G.; McKenna, J.M.

    1992-01-01

    Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pumps installed in pressurized water-to-reactor power plants are used to provide low-head safety injection in the event of loss of coolant in the reactor coolant system. Because these pumps are subjected to rather severe temperature and pressure transients, the majority of pumps installed in the RHR service are vertical pumps with a single stage impeller. Typically the pump impeller is mounted on an extended motor shaft (close-coupled configuration) and a mechanical seal is employed at the pump end of the shaft. Traditionally RHR and LPSI pumps have been a significant maintenance item for many utilities. Periodic mechanical seal of motor bearing replacement often is considered routine maintenance. The closed-coupled pump design requires disassembly of the casing cover from the lower pump casing while performing these routine maintenance tasks. This paper introduces a design modification developed to convert the close-coupled RHR and LPSI pumps to a coupled configuration

  16. Ferrocyanide safety program: Heat load and thermal characteristics determination for selected tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaren, J.M.; Cash, R.J.

    1993-11-01

    An analysis was conducted to determine the heat loads, conductivities, and heat distributions of waste tanks 241-BY-105, -106, -108, -110, -111, and 241-C-109 at the Hanford Site. The heat distribution of tank 241-BY-111 was determined to be homogeneously distributed throughout the sludge contained in the tank. All of the other tanks, with the exception of 241-C-109, showed evidence of a heat-producing layer at the bottom of the tanks. No evidence of a heat-producing layer in a position above the bottom was found. The thermal conductivities were determined to be within the ranges found by previous laboratory and computer analysis. The heat loads of the tanks were found to be below 2.81 kW (9,600 Btu/hr)

  17. Comparison of in-plant performance test data with analytic prediction of reactor safety system injection transient (U)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roy, B.N.; Neill, C.H. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    This paper compares the performance test data from injection transients for both of the subsystems of the Supplementary Safety System of the Savannah River Site production reactor with analytical predictions from an in-house thermal hydraulic computer code. The code was initially developed for design validation of the new Supplementary Safety System subsystem, but is shown to be equally capable of predicting the performance of the Supplementary Safety System existing subsystem even though the two subsystem transient injections have marked differences. The code itself was discussed and its validation using prototypic tests with simulated fluids was reported in an earlier paper (Roy and Nomm 1991)

  18. Structural analysis of multiport riser 5A installation on tank 241SY101

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Strehlow, J.P.

    1994-09-16

    The Tank 101-SY multiport riser assembly in the 241-SY-101 waste tank will replace the existing 42 inch riser with four smaller ports. Each smaller port can be used independently to access the tank interior with equipment and instruments needed to mitigate the concentration of hydrogen in the tank. This document provides a design report on the structural evaluation of the multiport riser assembly as well as its anchorage. The multiport riser assembly is a steel structure installed directly above the 42-inch riser and sealed at the existing riser flange. The assembly is structurally supported by the concrete pad placed around the 42 inch riser. The multiport riser assembly will provide two 8-inch penetrations, one 12-inch penetration and one 24-inch penetration. Each penetration will have a shielding plate. These penetrations will be used to insert equipment such as a sonic probe into the tank. In addition to normal loads, non-reactor Safety Class 1 structures, systems and components are to withstand the effects of extreme environmental loads including Design Basis Earthquake (DBE), Design Basis Wind (DBW), Design Basis Flood, Volcanic Eruptions and other abnormal loads considered on a case by case basis. Non-reactor Safety Class 2, 3 and 4 structures, systems and components are those that are not Safety Class 1 and are respectively specified as onsite safety related, occupational safety related and non-safety related items. The 241-SY-101 tank is considered as a non-reactor Safety Class 1 structure. The multiport riser assembly is considered as a non-reactor Safety Class 2 structure since it serves to contain the radioactive and toxic materials under normal operating conditions. However, the pressure relief doors provided on the assembly are considered as Safety Class 1 structures.

  19. Modeling water retention of sludge simulants and actual saltcake tank wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simmons, C.S.

    1996-07-01

    The Ferrocyanide Tanks Safety Program managed by Westinghouse hanford Company has been concerned with the potential combustion hazard of dry tank wastes containing ferrocyanide chemical in combination with nitrate salts. Pervious studies have shown that tank waste containing greater than 20 percent of weight as water could not be accidentally ignited. Moreover, a sustained combustion could not be propagated in such a wet waste even if it contained enough ferrocyanide to burn. Because moisture content is a key critical factor determining the safety of ferrocyanide-containing tank wastes, physical modeling was performed by Pacific Northwest National laboratory to evaluate the moisture-retaining behavior of typical tank wastes. The physical modeling reported here has quantified the mechanisms by which two main types of tank waste, sludge and saltcake, retain moisture in a tank profile under static conditions. Static conditions usually prevail after a tank profile has been stabilized by pumping out any excess interstitial liquid, which is not naturally retained by the waste as a result of physical forces such as capillarity

  20. Speciation of organic carbon in Hanford waste storage tanks: Part 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, C.D.

    1997-02-01

    This report is the first in a series to report on speciation of organic carbon in Hanford waste storage tanks. The comparison of the existing total organic carbon with oxalate and limited analyses of other organic species (acetate, formate, and normal paraffin hydrocarbons [NPH]) are reported. All of the data have been previously reported by the Grout and Characterization programs; the information includes all of the publicly available data through October 1996. Oxalate data were reported for 33 tanks, TOC data were reported for 82 tanks, and both oxalate and TOC data were available for 27 tanks. Of these 27 tanks, seven were found to have greater than 80% of the TOC identified as oxalate: 241-BY-104, 241-BY-105, 241-BY-106, 241-BY-110, 241-S-109, and 241-SX-108. Eighty percent accountability has been tentatively established as a minimum goal of the Organic Safety Program for speciation of TOC. Accountability of TOC through speciation will allow more accurate estimate of the potential energy content of the wastes as currently stored. Of the remaining 19 tanks, seven had between 40 and 80% of the TOC identified as oxalate, and eleven had less than 35% of the TOC identified. Of these, only five tanks had segment results that were greater than 1% TOC, and none was above 2%. Since the cur-rent safety criterion outlined in the Safety Analysis is 4.5% TOC, it may be determined that the further analyses of these tank wastes are not necessary. If additional analyses are deemed necessary, minimal work may be required, possibly limited to ion chromatography (IC), ion pair chromatography and capillary zone electrophoresis (CZE). Additional speciation work is planned for this fiscal year in both the Organic Tanks Safety and Characterization programs. The Characterization program reports acetate and formate data in addition to the oxalate data for all the tank cores it processes

  1. Rethinking the Hanford Tank Waste Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parker, F. L.; Clark, D. E.; Morcos, N.

    2002-01-01

    The program to treat and dispose of the highly radioactive wastes stored in underground tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford site has been studied. A strategy/management approach to achieve an acceptable (technically sound) end state for these wastes has been developed in this study. This approach is based on assessment of the actual risks and costs to the public, workers, and the environment associated with the wastes and storage tanks. Close attention should be given to the technical merits of available waste treatment and stabilization methodologies, and application of realistic risk reduction goals and methodologies to establish appropriate tank farm cleanup milestones. Increased research and development to reduce the mass of non-radioactive materials in the tanks requiring sophisticated treatment is highly desirable. The actual cleanup activities and milestones, while maintaining acceptable safety standards, could be more focused on a risk-to-benefit cost effectiveness, as agreed to by the involved stakeholders and in accordance with existing regulatory requirements. If existing safety standards can be maintained at significant cost savings under alternative plans but with a change in the Tri-Party Agreement (a regulatory requirement), those plans should be carried out. The proposed strategy would also take advantage of the lessons learned from the activities and efforts in the first phase of the two-phased cleanup of the Hanford waste tank farms

  2. Double shell tanks emergency pumping plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tangen, M.J.

    1994-01-01

    At the request of the Department of Energy (DOE), a formal plan for the emergency transfer of waste from a leaking double shell tank to a designated receiver tank has been developed. This plan is in response to the priority 2 safety issue ''Response to a leaking double-shell tank'' in the DOE Report to Congress, 1991. The plan includes the tanks in four of the east tank farms and one of the west farms. The background information and supporting calculations used for the creation of the emergency plan are discussed in this document. The scope of this document is all of the double shell tanks in the AN, AP, AW, AY, and SY farms. The transfer lines, flush pits, and valve pits involved in the transfer of waste between these farms are also included in the scope. Due to the storage of high heat waste, AZ farm is excluded at this time

  3. Tank waste remediation system: An update

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alumkal, W.T.; Babad, H.; Dunford, G.L.; Honeyman, J.O.; Wodrich, D.D.

    1995-02-01

    The US Department of Energy's Hanford Site, located in southeastern Washington State, contains the largest amount and the most diverse collection of highly radioactive waste in the US. High-level radioactive waste has been stored at the Hanford Site in large, underground tanks since 1944. Approximately 217,000 M 3 (57 Mgal) of caustic liquids, slurries, saltcakes, and sludges have accumulated in 177 tanks. In addition, significant amounts of 90 Sr and 137 Cs were removed from the tank waste, converted to salts, doubly encapsulated in metal containers, and stored in water basins. The Tank Waste Remediation System Program was established by the US Department of Energy in 1991 to safely manage and immobilize these wastes in anticipation of permanent disposal of the high-level waste fraction in a geologic repository. Since 1991, significant progress has been made in resolving waste tank safety issues, upgrading Tank Farm facilities and operations, and developing a new strategy for retrieving, treating, and immobilizing the waste for disposal

  4. Characterization of Hanford tank wastes containing ferrocyanides

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tingey, J.M.; Matheson, J.D.; McKinley, S.G.; Jones, T.E.; Pool, K.H.

    1993-02-01

    Currently, 17 storage tanks on the Hanford site that are believed to contain > 1,000 gram moles (465 lbs) of ferrocyanide compounds have been identified. Seven other tanks are classified as ferrocyanide containing waste tanks, but contain less than 1,000 gram moles of ferrocyanide compounds. These seven tanks are still included as Hanford Watch List Tanks. These tanks have been declared an unreviewed safety question (USQ) because of potential thermal reactivity hazards associated with the ferrocyanide compounds and nitrate and nitrite. Hanford tanks with waste containing > 1,000 gram moles of ferrocyanide have been sampled. Extensive chemical, radiothermical, and physical characterization have been performed on these waste samples. The reactivity of these wastes were also studied using Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) and Thermogravimetric analysis. Actual tank waste samples were retrieved from tank 241-C-112 using a specially designed and equipped core-sampling truck. Only a small portion of the data obtained from this characterization effort will be reported in this paper. This report will deal primarily with the cyanide and carbon analyses, thermal analyses, and limited physical property measurements

  5. Safety and efficacy of multiuse botulinum toxin vials for intralaryngeal injection.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barrow, Emily M; Rosen, Clark A; Hapner, Edie R; Smith, Sarah; Hatcher, Jeanne L; Simpson, Blake; Johns, Michael M

    2015-05-01

    Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines maintain that single-use vials cannot be used for multiple patients. Botox product labeling states that the reconstituted toxin should be used within 4 hours on a single patient based on concerns of reduced potency, contamination, and consequent infections. The purpose of this study was to determine the safety and efficacy of using single-use vials in a multidose fashion. Prospective study and cohort chart review. A multi-institutional three-part study was performed between May 2013 and October 2013: 1) a summation of subjects' recall of their past experiences (symptoms/response) with previous multidose Botox injections, 2) a prospective study of intralaryngeal injections, and 3) a chart review of injection responses in a subset of the cohort. Seven hundred forty-three subjects receiving 6,216 injections demonstrated zero infection-related complications on retrospective chart review. One hundred seventy-nine subjects recalled 24.0% overall adverse events, 10.6% redness, 7.3% pain and swelling at the injection site, and 0% fever. One hundred seventy-four subjects prospectively reported 12.6% overall adverse events. The self-reported efficacy rate of Botox injection was 96.6%. The low rates of adverse events following the use of Botox in a multipatient fashion are consistent with other percutaneous injections. No evidence of infection was found with multidose Botox use. Given the low incidence of side effects and high success rate, Botox can be used both safely and effectively in a multipatient fashion. 4 © 2014 The American Laryngological, Rhinological and Otological Society, Inc.

  6. Tank characterization report for single-shell tanks 241-T-201, 241-T-202, 241-T-203, and 241-T-204

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, B.C.

    1998-01-01

    A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, in addition to other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for the single-shell tank series consisting of 241-T-201, -T-202, -T-203, and -T-204. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with T-200 series tank waste and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendices contain supporting data and information. Appendix A contains historical information for 241-T-201 to T-204, including surveillance information, records pertaining to waste transfers and tank operations, and expected tank contents derived from a process knowledge-based computer program. Appendix B summarizes sampling events, sample data obtained before 1989, and the most current sampling results. Appendix C reports the statistical analysis and numerical manipulation of data used in issue resolution. Appendix D contains the evaluation to establish the best-basis for the inventory estimate and the statistical analysis performed for this evaluation. Appendix E is a bibliography that resulted from an in-depth literature search of all known information sources applicable to tanks 241-T-201, -T-202, -T-203, and -T-204. The reports listed in Appendix E are available in the Tank Characterization and Safety Resource Center

  7. Numerical studies on the performance of a flow distributor in tank

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shin, Soo Jai, E-mail: shinsoojai@kaeri.re.kr; Kim, Young In; Ryu, Seungyeob; Bae, Youngmin; Kim, Keung Koo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daedeok-daero 989-111, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon 305-353 (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-03-10

    Flow distributors are generally observed in several nuclear power plants. During core make-up tank (CMT) injection into the reactor, the condensation and thermal stratification are observed in the CMT, and rapid condensation disturbs the injection operation. To reduce the condensation phenomena in the tank, CMT was equipped with a flow distributor. The optimal design of the flow distributor is very important to ensure the structural integrity the CMT and its safe operation during certain transient or accident conditions. In the present study, we numerically investigated the performance of a flow distributor in tank with different shape factors such as the total number of holes, pitch-to-hole diameter ratios, diameter of the hole, and the area ratios. These data will contribute to a design of the flow distributor.

  8. Numerical studies on the performance of a flow distributor in tank

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Soo Jai; Kim, Young In; Ryu, Seungyeob; Bae, Youngmin; Kim, Keung Koo

    2015-01-01

    Flow distributors are generally observed in several nuclear power plants. During core make-up tank (CMT) injection into the reactor, the condensation and thermal stratification are observed in the CMT, and rapid condensation disturbs the injection operation. To reduce the condensation phenomena in the tank, CMT was equipped with a flow distributor. The optimal design of the flow distributor is very important to ensure the structural integrity the CMT and its safe operation during certain transient or accident conditions. In the present study, we numerically investigated the performance of a flow distributor in tank with different shape factors such as the total number of holes, pitch-to-hole diameter ratios, diameter of the hole, and the area ratios. These data will contribute to a design of the flow distributor

  9. Underground storage tank 431-D1U1, Closure Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mancieri, S.

    1993-09-01

    This document contains information about the decommissioning of Tank 431-D1U1. This tank was installed in 1965 for diesel fuel storage. This tank will remain in active usage until closure procedures begin. Soils and ground water around the tank will be sampled to check for leakage. Appendices include; proof of proper training for workers, health and safety briefing record, task hazard analysis summary, and emergency plans.

  10. Hanford waste tank cone penetrometer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seda, R.Y.

    1995-12-01

    A new tool is being developed to characterize tank waste at the Hanford Reservation. This tool, known as the cone penetrometer, is capable of obtaining chemical and physical properties in situ. For the past 50 years, this tool has been used extensively in soil applications and now has been modified for usage in Hanford Underground Storage tanks. These modifications include development of new ''waste'' data models as well as hardware design changes to accommodate the hazardous and radioactive environment of the tanks. The modified cone penetrometer is scheduled to be deployed at Hanford by Fall 1996. At Hanford, the cone penetrometer will be used as an instrumented pipe which measures chemical and physical properties as it pushes through tank waste. Physical data, such as tank waste stratification and mechanical properties, is obtained through three sensors measuring tip pressure, sleeve friction and pore pressure. Chemical data, such as chemical speciation, is measured using a Raman spectroscopy sensor. The sensor package contains other instrumentation as well, including a tip and side temperature sensor, tank bottom detection and an inclinometer. Once the cone penetrometer has reached the bottom of the tank, a moisture probe will be inserted into the pipe. This probe is used to measure waste moisture content, water level, waste surface moisture and tank temperature. This paper discusses the development of this new measurement system. Data from the cone penetrometer will aid in the selection of sampling tools, waste tank retrieval process, and addressing various tank safety issues. This paper will explore various waste models as well as the challenges associated with tank environment

  11. Assessment of thermal fatigue crack propagation in safety injection PWR lines

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simos, N.; Reich, M.; Costantino, C.J.; Hartzman, M.

    1990-01-01

    Cyclic thermal stratification resulting in alternating thermal stresses in pipe cross sections has been identified as the primary cause of high cycle thermal fatigue failure. A number of piping lines in operating plants around the world, susceptible to thermal stratification, have experienced circumferential cracking as a result of high levels of alternating bending stresses. This paper addresses the mechanisms of crack initiation and crack growth and provides estimates of fatigue cycles to failure for a typical safety injection line with such cyclic load history. Utilizing a 3-D finite element analysis, the temperature profile and the corresponding thermal stress field of a complete thermal cycle in a safety injection line consisting of a horizontal pipe section and an elbow, is obtained. Since the observed cracking occurred in the region of the elbow-to-horizontal pipe weld, the analysis performed assessed (1) the impact of the level of local geometric discontinuities on the initiation of an inside surface flaw is greatest and (2) the number of thermal cycles required to drive a small surface crack through the pipe wall. 12 refs., 14 figs., 2 tabs

  12. Nuclear criticality project plan for the Hanford Site tank farms

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bratzel, D.R., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-08-06

    The mission of this project is to provide a defensible technical basis report in support of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). This technical basis report will also be used to resolve technical issues associated with the nuclear criticality safety issue. The strategy presented in this project plan includes an integrated programmatic and organizational approach. The scope of this project plan includes the provision of a criticality technical basis supporting document (CTBSD) to support the FSAR as well as for resolution of the nuclear criticality safety issue. Specifically, the CTBSD provides the requisite technical analysis to support the FSAR hazard and accident analysis as well as for the determination of the required FSAR limits and controls. The scope of The CTBSD will provide a baseline for understanding waste partitioning and distribution phenomena and mechanistics for current operational activities inclusive of single-shell tanks, double-shell tanks, double-contained receiver tanks, and miscellaneous underground storage tanks.. Although the FSAR does not include future operational activities, the waste partitioning and distribution phenomena and mechanistics work scope identified in this project plan provide a sound technical basis as a point of departure to support independent safety analyses for future activities. The CTBSD also provides the technical basis for resolution of the technical issues associated with the nuclear criticality safety issue. In addition to the CTBSD, additional documentation will be required to fully resolve U.S. Department of Energy-Headquarters administrative and programmatic issues. The strategy and activities defined in this project plan provide a CTBSD for the FSAR and for accelerated resolution of the safety issue in FY 1996. On April 30, 1992, a plant review committee reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Reports for the single-shell, double-shell, and aging waste tanks in light of the conclusions of the inadequate waste

  13. Tank characterization report for Single-Shell Tank 241-BX-107

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raphael, G.F.

    1994-09-01

    This study examined and assessed the status, safety issues, composition, and distribution of the wastes contained in the tank 241-BX-107. Historical and most recent information, ranging from engineering structural assessment experiments, process history, monitoring and remediation activities, to analytical core sample data, were compiled and interpreted in an effort to develop a realistic, contemporary profile for the tank BX-107 contents. The results of this is study revealed that tank BX-107, a 2,006,050 L (530,000 gal) cylindrical single-shell, dished-bottom carbon-steel tank in the 200 East Area of the Hanford Site, was classified as sound. It has been interim stabilized and thus contains less than 189,250 L (50,000 gal) of interstitial liquid, and less than 18,925 L (5,000 gal) of supernatant. It has also been partially interim isolated, whereby all inlets to the tank are sealed to prevent inadvertent addition of liquid. At a residual waste level of ∼3.07 m (120.7 ± 2 in. from sidewall bottom or ∼132.9 in. from center bottom), it is estimated that the tank BX-107 contents are equivalent to 1,305,825 L (345,000 gal). The vapor space pressure is at atmospheric. The latest temperature readings, which were taken in July 1994, show a moderate temperature value of 19 degrees C (66 degrees F). Two supernatant samples were collected in 1974 and 1990, prior to interim stabilization. Sludge core samples were obtained in 1979 and 1992

  14. Project health and safety plan for the Gunite and Associated Tanks at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abston, J.P.

    1997-04-01

    The Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems) policy is to provide a safe and healthful workplace for all employees and subcontractors. The accomplishment of this policy requires that operations at the Gunite and Associated Tanks (GAAT) in the North and South Tank Farms (NTF and STF) at the Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge National Laboratory are guided by an overall plan and consistent proactive approach to health and safety (H and S) issues. The policy and procedures in this plan apply to all GAAT operations in the NTF and STF. The provisions of this plan are to be carried out whenever activities identifies s part of the GAAT are initiated that could be a threat to human health or the environment. This plan implements a policy and establishes criteria for the development of procedures for day-to-day operations to prevent or minimize any adverse impact to the environment and personnel safety and health and to meet standards that define acceptable management of hazardous and radioactive materials and wastes. The plan is written to utilize past experience and best management practices in order to minimize hazards to human health or the environment from events such as fires, explosions, falls, mechanical hazards, or any unplanned release of hazardous or radioactive materials to the air. This plan explains additional task-specific health and safety requirements such as the Site Safety and health Addendum and Activity Hazard Analysis, which should be used in concert with this plan and existing established procedures

  15. Project health and safety plan for the Gunite and Associated Tanks at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Abston, J.P.

    1997-04-01

    The Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems) policy is to provide a safe and healthful workplace for all employees and subcontractors. The accomplishment of this policy requires that operations at the Gunite and Associated Tanks (GAAT) in the North and South Tank Farms (NTF and STF) at the Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge National Laboratory are guided by an overall plan and consistent proactive approach to health and safety (H and S) issues. The policy and procedures in this plan apply to all GAAT operations in the NTF and STF. The provisions of this plan are to be carried out whenever activities identifies s part of the GAAT are initiated that could be a threat to human health or the environment. This plan implements a policy and establishes criteria for the development of procedures for day-to-day operations to prevent or minimize any adverse impact to the environment and personnel safety and health and to meet standards that define acceptable management of hazardous and radioactive materials and wastes. The plan is written to utilize past experience and best management practices in order to minimize hazards to human health or the environment from events such as fires, explosions, falls, mechanical hazards, or any unplanned release of hazardous or radioactive materials to the air. This plan explains additional task-specific health and safety requirements such as the Site Safety and health Addendum and Activity Hazard Analysis, which should be used in concert with this plan and existing established procedures.

  16. Radiotracer investigation in gold leaching tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dagadu, C.P.K.; Akaho, E.H.K.; Danso, K.A.; Stegowski, Z.; Furman, L.

    2012-01-01

    Measurement and analysis of residence time distribution (RTD) is a classical method to investigate performance of chemical reactors. In the present investigation, the radioactive tracer technique was used to measure the RTD of aqueous phase in a series of gold leaching tanks at the Damang gold processing plant in Ghana. The objective of the investigation was to measure the effective volume of each tank and validate the design data after recent process intensification or revamping of the plant. I-131 was used as a radioactive tracer and was instantaneously injected into the feed stream of the first tank and monitored at the outlet of different tanks. Both sampling and online measurement methods were used to monitor the tracer concentration. The results of measurements indicated that both the methods provided identical RTD curves. The mean residence time (MRT) and effective volume of each tank was estimated. The tanks-in-series model with exchange between active and stagnant volume was used and found suitable to describe the flow structure of aqueous phase in the tanks. The estimated effective volume of the tanks and high degree of mixing in tanks could validate the design data and confirmed the expectation of the plant engineer after intensification of the process. - Highlights: ► I-131 radioactive tracer is suitable for tracing the aqueous phase in gold ore slurry. ► Online data collection is more convenient method for tracer monitoring in industrial process systems. ► The tanks-in-series model with exchange between active and stagnant zones is suitable to describe the flow behavior of leaching tanks. ► The radiotracer RTD technique could be used to validate design data after process intensification in gold leaching tanks.

  17. Radiotracer investigation in gold leaching tanks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dagadu, C.P.K., E-mail: dagadukofi@yahoo.co.uk [Ghana Atomic Energy Commission, P.O. Box LG 80, Legon, Accra (Ghana); Akaho, E.H.K.; Danso, K.A. [Ghana Atomic Energy Commission, P.O. Box LG 80, Legon, Accra (Ghana); Stegowski, Z.; Furman, L. [Faculty of Physics and Applied Computer Science, AGH-UST, 30-059 Krakow (Poland)

    2012-01-15

    Measurement and analysis of residence time distribution (RTD) is a classical method to investigate performance of chemical reactors. In the present investigation, the radioactive tracer technique was used to measure the RTD of aqueous phase in a series of gold leaching tanks at the Damang gold processing plant in Ghana. The objective of the investigation was to measure the effective volume of each tank and validate the design data after recent process intensification or revamping of the plant. I-131 was used as a radioactive tracer and was instantaneously injected into the feed stream of the first tank and monitored at the outlet of different tanks. Both sampling and online measurement methods were used to monitor the tracer concentration. The results of measurements indicated that both the methods provided identical RTD curves. The mean residence time (MRT) and effective volume of each tank was estimated. The tanks-in-series model with exchange between active and stagnant volume was used and found suitable to describe the flow structure of aqueous phase in the tanks. The estimated effective volume of the tanks and high degree of mixing in tanks could validate the design data and confirmed the expectation of the plant engineer after intensification of the process. - Highlights: Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer I-131 radioactive tracer is suitable for tracing the aqueous phase in gold ore slurry. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Online data collection is more convenient method for tracer monitoring in industrial process systems. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer The tanks-in-series model with exchange between active and stagnant zones is suitable to describe the flow behavior of leaching tanks. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer The radiotracer RTD technique could be used to validate design data after process intensification in gold leaching tanks.

  18. Tank 241-SY-101 push mode core sampling and analysis plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CONNER, J.M.

    1998-01-01

    This sampling and analysis plan (SAP) identifies characterization objectives pertaining to sample collection, laboratory analytical evaluation, and reporting requirements for push mode core samples from tank 241-SY-101 (SY-101). It is written in accordance with Data Quality Objective to Support Resolution of the Flammable Gas Safety Issue (Bauer 1998), Low Activity Waste Feed Data Quality Objectives (Wiemers and Miller 1997 and DOE 1998), Data Quality Objectives for TWRS Privatization Phase I: Confirm Tank T is an Appropriate Feed Source for Low-Activity Waste Feed Batch X (Certa 1998), and the Tank Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (Dukelow et al. 1995). The Tank Characterization Technical Sampling Basis document (Brown et al. 1998) indicates that these issues apply to tank SY-101 for this sampling event. Brown et al. also identifies high-level waste, regulatory, pretreatment and disposal issues as applicable issues for this tank. However, these issues will not be addressed via this sampling event

  19. Assessment of passive safety injection systems of ALWRs. Final report of the European Commission 4th framework programme. Project FI4I-CT95-004 (APSI)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tuunanen, J. [VTT Energy, Espoo (Finland). Nuclear Energy; Vihavainen, J. [Lappeenranta Univ. of Technology (Finland); D' Auria, F. [Univ. of Pisa (Italy); Kimber, G. [AEA Technology (United Kingdom)

    1999-07-01

    The European Commission 4th Framework Programme project 'Assessment of Passive Safety Injection Systems of Advanced Light Water Reactors (FI4I-CT95-0004)' involved experiments on the PACTEL test facility and computer simulations of selected experiments. The experiments focused on the performance of Passive Safety Injection Systems (PSIS) of Advanced Light Water Reactors (ALWRs) in Small Break Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) conditions. The PSIS consisted of a Core Make-up Tank (CMT) and two pipelines. A pressure balancing line (PBL) connected the CMT to one cold leg. The injection line (IL) connected it to the downcomer. The project involved 15 experiments in three series. The experiments provided valuable information about condensation and heat transfer processes in the CMT, thermal stratification of water in the CMT, and natural circulation flow through the PSIS lines. The experiments showed the examined PSIS works efficiently in SBLOCAs although the flow through the PSIS may stop in very small SBLOCAs, when the hot water fills the CMT. The experiments also demonstrated the importance of flow distributor (sparger) in the CMT to limit rapid condensation. The project included validation of three thermal-hydraulic computer codes (APROS, CATHARE and RELAP5). The analyses showed the codes are capable of simulating the overall behaviour of the transients. The codes predicted accurately the core heatup, which occurred when the primary coolant inventory was reduced so much that the core top became free of water. The detailed analyses of the calculation results showed that some models in the codes still need improvements. Especially, further development of models for thermal stratification, condensation and natural circulation flow with small driving forces would be necessary for accurate simulation of phenomena in the PSIS. (orig.)

  20. Assessment of passive safety injection systems of ALWRs. Final report of the European Commission 4th framework programme. Project FI4I-CT95-004 (APSI)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tuunanen, J.; D'Auria, F.; Kimber, G.

    1999-01-01

    The European Commission 4th Framework Programme project 'Assessment of Passive Safety Injection Systems of Advanced Light Water Reactors (FI4I-CT95-0004)' involved experiments on the PACTEL test facility and computer simulations of selected experiments. The experiments focused on the performance of Passive Safety Injection Systems (PSIS) of Advanced Light Water Reactors (ALWRs) in Small Break Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) conditions. The PSIS consisted of a Core Make-up Tank (CMT) and two pipelines. A pressure balancing line (PBL) connected the CMT to one cold leg. The injection line (IL) connected it to the downcomer. The project involved 15 experiments in three series. The experiments provided valuable information about condensation and heat transfer processes in the CMT, thermal stratification of water in the CMT, and natural circulation flow through the PSIS lines. The experiments showed the examined PSIS works efficiently in SBLOCAs although the flow through the PSIS may stop in very small SBLOCAs, when the hot water fills the CMT. The experiments also demonstrated the importance of flow distributor (sparger) in the CMT to limit rapid condensation. The project included validation of three thermal-hydraulic computer codes (APROS, CATHARE and RELAP5). The analyses showed the codes are capable of simulating the overall behaviour of the transients. The codes predicted accurately the core heatup, which occurred when the primary coolant inventory was reduced so much that the core top became free of water. The detailed analyses of the calculation results showed that some models in the codes still need improvements. Especially, further development of models for thermal stratification, condensation and natural circulation flow with small driving forces would be necessary for accurate simulation of phenomena in the PSIS. (orig.)

  1. Headspace gas and vapor characterization summary for the 43 vapor program suspect tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckaby, J.L.; Bratzel, D.R.

    1995-01-01

    During the time period between February 1994 and September 1995, Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) sampled the waste tank headspace of 43 single-shell tanks for a variety of gaseous and/or volatile and semi-volatile compounds. This report summarizes the results of analyses of those sampling activities with respect to both the Priority 1 Safety Issues and relative to the detection in the headspace of significant concentrations of target analytes relating to worker breathing space consideration as recommended by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) Toxicology Review Panel. The information contained in the data tables was abstracted from the vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization reports. Selected results are tabulated and summarized. Sampling equipment and methods, as well as sample analyses, are briefly described. Vapor sampling of passively ventilated single-shell tanks (tanks C-105, C-106, and SX-106 were sampled and are actively ventilated) has served to highlight or confirm tank headspace conditions associated with both priority 1 safety issues and supports source term analysis associated with protecting worker health and safety from noxious vapors

  2. TANK FARM ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    TIFFT, S.R.

    2003-01-01

    Through regulations, permitting or binding negotiations, Regulators establish requirements, limits, permit conditions and Notice of Construction (NOC) conditions with which the Office of River Protection (ORP) and the Tank Farm Contractor (TFC) must comply. Operating Specifications are technical limits which are set on a process to prevent injury to personnel, or damage to the facility or environment, The main purpose of this document is to provide specification limits and recovery actions for the TFC Environmental Surveillance Program at the Hanford Site. Specification limits are given for monitoring frequencies and permissible variation of readings from an established baseline or previous reading. The requirements in this document are driven by environmental considerations and data analysis issues, rather than facility design or personnel safety issues. This document is applicable to all single-shell tank (SST) and double-shell tank (DST) waste tanks, and the associated catch tanks and receiver tanks, and transfer systems. This Tank Farm Environmental Specifications Document (ESD) implements environmental-regulatory limits on the configuration and operation of the Hanford Tank Farms facility that have been established by Regulators. This ESD contains specific field operational limits and recovery actions for compliance with airborne effluent regulations and agreements, liquid effluents regulations and agreements, and environmental tank system requirements. The scope of this ESD is limited to conditions that have direct impact on Operations/Projects or that Operations Projects have direct impact upon. This document does not supercede or replace any Department of Energy (DOE) Orders, regulatory permits, notices of construction, or Regulatory agency agreements binding on the ORP or the TFC. Refer to the appropriate regulation, permit, or Notice of Construction for an inclusive listing of requirements

  3. 49 CFR 172.331 - Bulk packagings other than portable tanks, cargo tanks, tank cars and multi-unit tank car tanks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Bulk packagings other than portable tanks, cargo tanks, tank cars and multi-unit tank car tanks. 172.331 Section 172.331 Transportation Other Regulations... packagings other than portable tanks, cargo tanks, tank cars and multi-unit tank car tanks. (a) Each person...

  4. Organic tanks safety program FY96 waste aging studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Camaioni, D.M.; Samuels, W.D.; Linehan, J.C.; Clauss, S.A.; Sharma, A.K.; Wahl, K.L.; Campbell, J.A.

    1996-10-01

    Uranium and plutonium production at the Hanford Site produced large quantities of radioactive by-products and contaminated process chemicals, which are stored in underground tanks awaiting treatment and disposal. Having been made strongly alkaline and then subjected to successive water evaporation campaigns to increase storage capacity, the wastes now exist in the physical forms of salt cakes, metal oxide sludges, and partially saturated aqueous brine solutions. The tanks that contain organic process chemicals mixed with nitrate/nitrite salt wastes may be at risk for fuel- nitrate combustion accidents. The purpose of the Waste Aging Task is to elucidate how chemical and radiological processes will have aged or degraded the organic compounds stored in the tanks. Ultimately, the task seeks to develop quantitative measures of how aging changes the energetic properties of the wastes. This information will directly support efforts to evaluate the hazard as well as to develop potential control and mitigation strategies

  5. Lessons learned from a community based intervention to improve injection safety in Pakistan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Altaf, Arshad; Shah, Sharaf Ali; Shaikh, Kulsoom; Constable, Fiona M; Khamassi, Selma

    2013-04-22

    A national study in 2007 revealed that in Pakistan the prevalence of hepatitis B is 2.5% and for hepatitis C it is 5%. Unsafe injections have been identified as one of the reasons for the spread of these infections. Trained and untrained providers routinely perform unsafe practices primarily for economic reasons i.e. they reuse injection equipment on several patients. The patients, do not question the provider about the need for an injection because of social barriers or whether the syringe is coming from a new sterile packet due to lack of knowledge. The present paper represents an intervention that was developed to empower the community to improve unsafe injection practices in rural Pakistan. In a rural district of Pakistan (Tando Allahyar, Sindh) with a population of approximately 630,000 a multipronged approach was used in 2010 (June to December) to improve injection safety. The focus of the intervention was the community, however providers were not precluded. The organization of interventions was also carefully planned. A baseline assessment (n=300) was conducted prior to the intervention. The interventions comprised large scale gatherings of the community (males and females) across the district. Smaller gatherings included teachers, imams of mosques and the training of trained and untrained healthcare providers. The Pakistan Television Network was used to broadcast messages recorded by prominent figures in the local language. The local FM channel and Sunday newspaper were also used to disseminate messages on injection safety. An end of project assessment was carried out in January 2012. The study was ethically reviewed and approved. The interventions resulted in improving misconceptions about transmission of hepatitis B and C. In the baseline assessment (only 9%) of the respondents associated hepatitis B and C with unsafe injections which increased to 78% at the end of project study. In the baseline study 15% of the study participants reported that a new

  6. PSA results for Hanford high level waste Tank 101-SY

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MacFarlane, D.R.; Bott, T.F.; Brown, L.F.; Stack, D.W. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Kindinger, J.; Deremer, R.K.; Medhekar, S.R.; Mikschl, T.J. [PLG, Inc., Newport Beach, CA (United States)

    1993-10-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory has performed a comprehensive probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) that includes consideration of external events for the weapons-production wastes stored in tank number 241-SY-101, commonly known as Tank 101-SY, as configured in December 1992. This tank, which periodically releases (``burps``) a gaseous mixture of hydrogen, nitrous oxide, ammonia, and nitrogen, was analyzed because of public safety concerns associated with the potential for release of radioactive tank contents should this gas mixture be ignited during one of the burps. In an effort to mitigate the burping phenomenon, an experiment is underway in which a large pump has been inserted into the tank to determine if pump-induced circulation of the tank contents will promote a slow, controlled release of the gases. This PSA for Tank 101-SY, which did not consider the pump experiment or future tank-remediation activities, involved three distinct tasks. First, the accident sequence analysis identified and quantified those potential accidents whose consequences result in tank material release. Second, characteristics and release paths for the airborne and liquid radioactive source terms were determined. Finally, the consequences, primarily onsite and offsite potential health effects resulting from radionuclide release, were estimated, and overall risk curves were constructed. An overview of each of these tasks and a summary of the overall results of the analysis are presented in the following sections.

  7. PSA results for Hanford high level waste Tank 101-SY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MacFarlane, D.R.; Bott, T.F.; Brown, L.F.; Stack, D.W.; Kindinger, J.; Deremer, R.K.; Medhekar, S.R.; Mikschl, T.J.

    1993-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory has performed a comprehensive probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) that includes consideration of external events for the weapons-production wastes stored in tank number 241-SY-101, commonly known as Tank 101-SY, as configured in December 1992. This tank, which periodically releases (''burps'') a gaseous mixture of hydrogen, nitrous oxide, ammonia, and nitrogen, was analyzed because of public safety concerns associated with the potential for release of radioactive tank contents should this gas mixture be ignited during one of the burps. In an effort to mitigate the burping phenomenon, an experiment is underway in which a large pump has been inserted into the tank to determine if pump-induced circulation of the tank contents will promote a slow, controlled release of the gases. This PSA for Tank 101-SY, which did not consider the pump experiment or future tank-remediation activities, involved three distinct tasks. First, the accident sequence analysis identified and quantified those potential accidents whose consequences result in tank material release. Second, characteristics and release paths for the airborne and liquid radioactive source terms were determined. Finally, the consequences, primarily onsite and offsite potential health effects resulting from radionuclide release, were estimated, and overall risk curves were constructed. An overview of each of these tasks and a summary of the overall results of the analysis are presented in the following sections

  8. Aqueous Boric acid injection facility of PWR type reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsuoka, Tsuyoshi; Iwami, Masao.

    1996-01-01

    If a rupture should be caused in a secondary system of a PWR type reactor, pressure of a primary coolant recycling system is lowered, and a back flow check valve is opened in response to the lowering of the pressure. Then, low temperature aqueous boric acid in the lower portion of a pressurized tank is flown into the primary coolant recycling system based on the pressure difference, and the aqueous boric acid reaches the reactor core together with coolants to suppress reactivity. If the injection is continued, high temperature aqueous boric acid in the upper portion boils under a reduced pressure, further urges the low temperature aqueous boric acid in the lower portion by the steam pressure and injects the same to the primary system. The aqueous boric acid stream from the pressurized tank flowing by self evaporation of the high temperature aqueous boric acid itself is rectified by a rectifying device to prevent occurrence of vortex flow, and the steam is injected in a state of uniform stream. When the pressure in the pressurized tank is lowered, a bypass valve is opened to introduce the high pressure fluid of primary system into the pressurized tank to keep the pressure to a predetermined value. When the pressure in the pressurized tank is elevated to higher than the pressure of the primary system, a back flow check valve is opened, and high pressure aqueous boric acid is flown out of the pressurized tank to keep the pressure to a predetermined value. (N.H.)

  9. Program plan for the resolution of tank vapor issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osborne, J.W.

    1992-09-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide a detailed description of the priorities, logic, work breakdown structure (WBS), task descriptions, and program milestones required for the resolution of tank vapor issues associated with the single-shell tanks (SST) and double-shell tanks (DST). The primary objective of this plan is to determine whether a health (personnel exposure) and/or safety (flammability) hazard exists. This plan is focused upon one waste tank, 241-C-103, but contains all elements required to bring the vapor issues to resolution

  10. The subcritical mass limit, 2.4 kgU, for the JCO's precipitation tank

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Komuro, Yuichi

    1999-01-01

    The critical safety on the precipitation tank in JCO Corporation forming a critical accident in September 30, 1999 had to be guaranteed by limiting amount of uranium contained into charging solution. The limited value of uranic mass in the precipitation tank was determined to be 2.4 kg, and from the dissolution tank positioned at upstream of this tank a solution not excess amount of solution to this value was designed to be transferred. In the 2nd Accident Survey Committee, there were found some discussions on a leading method of this value. In order to answer some requirements for this, here was described on outlines on U.S. Nuclear Safety Guide, TID-7016 Rev. 1, leading method of the limited value in 2.4 kg, and safety tolerance. As a result of reinvestigation, as it was confirmed that 2.4 kg in the limited amount contained an sufficient safety tolerance qualitatively and in comparison with already critical data. (G.K.)

  11. Improved tank car design development : ongoing studies on sandwich structures

    Science.gov (United States)

    2009-03-02

    The Government and industry have a common interest in : improving the safety performance of railroad tank cars carrying : hazardous materials. Research is ongoing to develop strategies : to maintain the structural integrity of railroad tank cars carr...

  12. Utilization of the MPI Process for in-tank solidification of heel material in large-diameter cylindrical tanks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kauschinger, J.L.; Lewis, B.E.

    2000-01-01

    A major problem faced by the US Department of Energy is remediation of sludge and supernatant waste in underground storage tanks. Exhumation of the waste is currently the preferred remediation method. However, exhumation cannot completely remove all of the contaminated materials from the tanks. For large-diameter tanks, amounts of highly contaminated ``heel'' material approaching 20,000 gal can remain. Often sludge containing zeolite particles leaves ``sand bars'' of locally contaminated material across the floor of the tank. The best management practices for in-tank treatment (stabilization and immobilization) of wastes require an integrated approach to develop appropriate treatment agents that can be safely delivered and mixed uniformly with sludge. Ground Environmental Services has developed and demonstrated a remotely controlled, high-velocity jet delivery system termed, Multi-Point-Injection (MPI). This robust jet delivery system has been field-deployed to create homogeneous monoliths containing shallow buried miscellaneous waste in trenches [fiscal year (FY) 1995] and surrogate sludge in cylindrical (FY 1998) and long, horizontal tanks (FY 1999). During the FY 1998 demonstration, the MPI process successfully formed a 32-ton uniform monolith of grout and waste surrogates in about 8 min. Analytical data indicated that 10 tons of zeolite-type physical surrogate were uniformly mixed within a 40-in.-thick monolith without lifting the MPI jetting tools off the tank floor. Over 1,000 lb of cohesive surrogates, with consistencies similar to Gunite and Associated Tank (GAAT) TH-4 and Hanford tank sludges, were easily intermixed into the monolith without exceeding a core temperature of 100 F during curing.

  13. Final characterization and safety screen report of double shell tank 241-AP-105 for evaporator campaign 97-1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, G.L.

    1997-01-01

    Evaporator candidate feed from tank 241-AP-105 (hereafter referred to as AP-105) was characterized for physical, inorganic, organic and radiochemical parameters by the 222-S Laboratory as directed by the Tank Sample and Analysis Plan (TSAP), References 1 through 4, and Engineering Change Notice, number 635332, Reference 5. This data package satisfies the requirement for a format IV, final report as described in Reference 1. This data package is also a follow-up to the 45-Day safety screen results for tank AP-105, Reference 8, which was issued on November 5, 1996, and is attached as Section II to this report. Preliminary data in the form of summary analytical tables were provided to the project in advance of this final report to enable early estimation of evaporator operational parameters, using the Predict modeling program. Analyses were performed at the 222-S Laboratory as defined and specified in the TSAP and the Laboratory's Quality Assurance P1an, References 6 and 7. Any deviations from the instructions documented in the TSAP are discussed in this narrative and are supported with additional documentation

  14. 33 CFR 183.564 - Fuel tank fill system.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Fuel tank fill system. 183.564...) BOATING SAFETY BOATS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT Fuel Systems Manufacturer Requirements § 183.564 Fuel tank fill system. (a) Each fuel fill opening must be located so that a gasoline overflow of up to five...

  15. 45-day safety screen results and final report for tank 241-C-202, auger samples 95-Aug-026 and 95-Aug-027

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baldwin, J.H.

    1995-01-01

    Two auger samples from tank 241-C-202 (C-202) were received at the 222-S Laboratories and underwent safety screening analysis, consisting of differential scanning calorimetry (DSC), thermogravimetric analysis (TGA), and total alpha activity. Two samples were submitted for energetics determination by DSC. Within the triplicate analyses of each sample, one of the results for energetics exceeded the notification limit. The sample and duplicate analyses for both augers exceeded the notification limit for TGA. As required by the Tank Characterization Plan, the appropriate notifications were made within 24 hours of official confirmation that the limits were violated

  16. Interim criteria for Organic Watch List tanks at the Hanford Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Babad, S.; Turner, D.A.

    1993-09-01

    This document establishes interim criteria for identifying single-shell radioactive waste storage tanks at the Hanford Site that contain organic chemicals mixed with nitrate/nitrite salts in potentially hazardous concentrations. These tanks are designated as ''organic Watch List tanks.'' Watch List tanks are radioactive waste storage tanks that have the potential for release of high-level waste as a result of uncontrolled increases in temperature or pressure. Organic Watch List tanks are those Watch List tanks that contain relatively high concentrations of organic chemicals. Because of the potential for release of high-level waste resulting from uncontrolled increases in temperature or pressure, the organic Watch List tanks (collectively) constitute a Hanford Site radioactive waste storage tank ''safety issue.''

  17. A summary of available information on ferrocyanide tank wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burger, L.L.; Strachan, D.M.; Reynolds, D.A.; Schulz, W.W.

    1991-10-01

    Ferrocyanide wastes were generated at the Hanford site during the mid to late 1950s to make more tank space available for the storage of high level nuclear waste. The ferrocyanide process was developed as a method of removing 137 Cs from existing waste solutions and from process solutions that resulted from the recovery of valuable uranium in waste tanks. During the coarse of the research associated with the ferrocyanide process, it was discovered that ferrocyanide materials when mixed with NaNO 3 and/or NaNO 2 exploded. This chemical reactivity became an issue in the 1980s when the safety associated with the storage of ferrocyanide wastes in Hanford tanks became prominent. These safety issues heightened in the late 1980s and led to the current scrutiny of the safety associated with these wastes and the current research and waste management programs. Over the past three years, numerous explosive test have been carried out using milligram quantities of cyanide compounds. These tests provide information on the nature of possible tank reactions. On heating a mixture of ferrocyanide and nitrate or nitrite, an explosive reaction normally begins at about 240 degrees C, but may occur well below 200 degrees C in the presence of catalysts or organic compounds that may act as initiators. The energy released is highly dependent on the course of the reaction. Three attempts to model hot spots in local areas of the tanks indicate a very low probability of having a hot spot large enough and hot enough to be of concern. The main purpose of this document is to inform the members of the Tank Waste Science Panel of the background and issues associated with the ferrocyanide wastes. Hopefully, this document fulfills similar needs outside of the framework of the Tank Waste Science Panel. 50 refs., 9 figs., 7 tabs

  18. Decision Document for Heat Removal from High-Level Waste Tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WILLIS, W.L.

    2000-01-01

    This document establishes the combination of design and operational configurations that will be used to provide heat removal from high-level waste tanks during Phase 1 waste feed delivery to prevent the waste temperature from exceeding tank safety requirement limits. The chosen method--to use the primary and annulus ventilation systems to remove heat from the high-level waste tanks--is documented herein

  19. Hanford high level waste (HLW) tank mixer pump safe operating envelope reliability assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, S.R.; Clark, J.

    1993-01-01

    The US Department of Energy and its contractor, Westinghouse Corp., are responsible for the management and safe storage of waste accumulated from processing defense reactor irradiated fuels for plutonium recovery at the Hanford Site. These wastes, which consist of liquids and precipitated solids, are stored in underground storage tanks pending final disposition. Currently, 23 waste tanks have been placed on a safety watch list because of their potential for generating, storing, and periodically releasing various quantities of hydrogen and other gases. Tank 101-SY in the Hanford SY Tank Farm has been found to release hydrogen concentrations greater than the lower flammable limit (LFL) during periodic gas release events. In the unlikely event that an ignition source is present during a hydrogen release, a hydrogen burn could occur with a potential to release nuclear waste materials. To mitigate the periodic gas releases occurring from Tank 101-SY, a large mixer pump currently is being installed in the tank to promote a sustained release of hydrogen gas to the tank dome space. An extensive safety analysis (SA) effort was undertaken and documented to ensure the safe operation of the mixer pump after it is installed in Tank 101-SY.1 The SA identified a need for detailed operating, alarm, and abort limits to ensure that analyzed safety limits were not exceeded during pump operations

  20. Robotic cleaning of radwaste tank nozzles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boughman, G.; Jones, S.L.

    1992-01-01

    The Susquehanna radwaste processing system includes two reactor water cleanup phase separator tanks and one waste sludge phase separator tank. A system of educator nozzles and associated piping is used to provide mixing in the tanks. The mixture pumped through the nozzles is a dense resin-and-water slurry, and the nozzles tend to plug up during processing. The previous method for clearing the nozzles had been for a worker to enter the tanks and manually insert a hydrolaser into each nozzle, one at a time. The significant radiation exposure and concern for worker safety in the tank led the utility to investigate alternate means for completing this task. The typical tank configuration is shown in a figure. The initial approach investigated was to insert a manipulator arm in the tank. This arm would be installed by workers and then teleoperated from a remote control station. This approach was abandoned because of several considerations including educator location and orientation, excessive installation time, and cost. The next approach was to use a mobile platform that would operate on the tank floor. This approach was selected as being the most feasible solution. After a competitive selection process, REMOTEC was selected to provide the mobile platform. Their proposal was based on the commercial ANDROS Mark 5 platform

  1. 45-Day safety screening for Tank 241-B-102 auger samples, riser 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bell, K.E.

    1994-01-01

    This is the 45-Day report for the fiscal year 1994 Tank 241-B-102 auger sampling characterization effort. Only one of the two planned auger samples was received by the 222-S Laboratory, however it was decided to begin the 45-day clock and issue a report based on receipt of the first auger sample. Included are copies of the differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) and thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) scans as requested. Also included is a copy of any immediate notification documentation, chain of custody forms, the hot cell work plan, extruded segment [auger] description sheets, and total alpha data. The TGA percent moisture results are below the safety criteria limit of 17% in a subsample taken approximately five minutes after extrusion and a second subsample taken from the lower half of the auger. Verbal and written notifications were made as prescribed. The DSC analysis of all subsamples indicates the presence of fraction exotherms, however the results are a factor of two or more below the notification limit of 523 Joules/gram (J/g). Total alpha results are all below the detection limit. In some cases, the tank characterization plan (TCP) accuracy and precision criteria are not met. If a re-run was not performed when a TCP quality control limit was not met, then reasons for not performing the re-run are provided

  2. Test plan for determining breathing rates in single shell tanks using tracer gases. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersen, J.A.

    1997-01-01

    This test plan specifies the requirements and conditions for the injection of tracer gas (Helium (He)) into single shell tanks to determine breathing rates using periodic sampling. The eight tanks which have been selected at the time this Test Plan was developed are A-101, AX-102, AX-103, BY-105, C-107, U-103 (U-103 is counted twice, once during the winter months and once during the summer), and U-105. Other tanks to be sampled will be assigned by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) at a later date in the study process as resources allow, the document shall be revised as required. The sampling of headspace for each of these tanks shall be performed using available risers or the Standard Hydrogen Monitoring System (SHMS) cabinet as available. The tank farm vapor cognizant engineer shall assign the injection and sample testing point for each tank and document the point in the field work package. SUMMA TMI canisters, equipped in-line with dual particulate air filters and two silica gel sorbent traps will be used to collect the gas samples. The purpose of dual particulate air filters is to ensure no radioactive particulates are transferred to the SUMMA TMI canisters. The silica gel sorbent traps will effectively eliminate any tritiated water vapor that may be present in the sample gas stream. PNNL shall supply the tracer gases injection system and shall perform the analysis on the headspace samples. TWRS Characterization project shall inject the tracer gas and perform the sampling. Refer to Engineering Task Plan HNF-SD-TWR-ETP-002 for a detailed description of the responsibilities for this task

  3. Organic analysis of the headspace in Hanford waste tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lucke, R.B.; McVeety, B.D.; Clauss, T.W.; Fruchter, J.S.; Goheen, S.C.

    1994-01-01

    Before radioactive mixed waste in Hanford waste tanks can be isolated and permanently stored, several safety issues need to be addressed. The headspace vapors in Hanford Tank 103-C raise two issues: (1) the potential flammability of the vapor and aerosol, and (2) the potential worker health and safety hazards associated with the toxicity of the constituents. As a result, the authors have implemented organic analysis methods to characterize the headspace vapors in Hanford waste tanks. To address the flammability issue, they have used OSHA versatile sampling (OVS) tubes as the sampling method followed by solvent extraction and GC/MS analysis. For analyzing volatile organics and organic air toxins, they have implemented SUMMA trademark canisters as the collection device followed by cryogenic trapping and GC/MS analysis. Strategies for modifying existing NIOSH and EPA methods to make them applicable to vapors in Hanford waste tanks are discussed. Identification and quantification results of volatile and semivolatile organics are presented

  4. Determination of Optimal Flow Paths for Safety Injection According to Accident Conditions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yoo, Kwae Hwan; Kim, Ju Hyun; Kim, Dong Yeong; Na, Man Gyun [Chosun Univ., Gwangju (Korea, Republic of); Hur, Seop; Kim, Changhwoi [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    In case severe accidents happen, major safety parameters of nuclear reactors are rapidly changed. Therefore, operators are unable to respond appropriately. This situation causes the human error of operators that led to serious accidents at Chernobyl. In this study, we aimed to develop an algorithm that can be used to select the optimal flow path for cold shutdown in serious accidents, and to recover an NPP quickly and efficiently from the severe accidents. In order to select the optimal flow path, we applied a Dijkstra algorithm. The Dijkstra algorithm is used to find the path of minimum total length between two given nodes and needs a weight (or length) matrix. In this study, the weight between nodes was calculated from frictional and minor losses inside pipes. That is, the optimal flow path is found so that the pressure drop between a starting node (water source) and a destination node (position that cooling water is injected) is minimized. In case a severe accident has happened, if we inject cooling water through the optimized flow path, then the nuclear reactor will be safely and effectively returned into the cold shutdown state. In this study, we have analyzed the optimal flow paths for safety injection as a preliminary study for developing an accident recovery system. After analyzing the optimal flow path using the Dijkstra algorithm, and the optimal flow paths were selected by calculating the head loss according to path conditions.

  5. Radiological Source Terms for Tank Farms Safety Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    COWLEY, W.L.

    2000-06-27

    This document provides Unit Liter Dose factors, atmospheric dispersion coefficients, breathing rates and instructions for using and customizing these factors for use in calculating radiological doses for accident analyses in the Hanford Tank Farms.

  6. Hanford Site organic waste tanks: History, waste properties, and scientific issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strachan, D.M.; Schulz, W.W.; Reynolds, D.A.

    1993-01-01

    Eight Hanford single-shell waste tanks are included on a safety watch list because they are thought to contain significant concentrations of various organic chemical. Potential dangers associated with the waste in these tanks include exothermic reaction, combustion, and release of hazardous vapors. In all eight tanks the measured waste temperatures are in the range 16 to 46 degree C, far below the 250 to 380 degree C temperatures necessary for onset of rapid exothermic reactions and initiation of deflagration. Investigation of the possibility of vapor release from Tank C-103 has been elevated to a top safety priority. There is a need to obtain an adequate number of truly representative vapor samples and for highly sensitive and capable methods and instruments to analyze these samples. Remaining scientific issues include: an understanding of the behavior and reaction of organic compounds in existing underground tank environments knowledge of the types and amounts of organic compounds in the tanks knowledge of selected physical and chemical properties of organic compounds source, composition, quality, and properties of the presently unidentified volatile organic compound(s) apparently evolving from Tank C-103

  7. Prediction of parameters affecting the safety of tank farms in case of emergency

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gorev Vyacheslav

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The current article demonstrates that the physical nature of blow-out of oil products burning in the tank is connected with overheating and fast vaporization of bottom water accumulated in the tank or on a surface of internal floating roof. It is shown that the period of time, during which the homothermal layer of oil, heated up to the boiling point while burning in the tank, reaches the level of bottom water or the water added in the tank in the process of extinguishing depends on the heat losses into environment through the side surface of the tank. It is determined that blow-out time depends on the water cooled surface area of the tank. It is shown that intensive water cooling extremely decreases the rate of formation of homothermal layer with increasing of its thickness.

  8. Safety evaluation for adding water to tank 101-SY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clinton, R.

    1994-01-01

    This document provides a new water limit for Tank 241-SY-101. The original limit was set at 9600 gallons. The new limit is now 20,000 gallons. There are various activities that require the use of additional water to the tank. The main activity is the removal of the temporary mixer pump. This requires a large amount of water which will exceed the original limit. Also, other activities such as flushing, adding a viscometer, and adding a void fraction meter requires additional water. The new limit safely incorporates these activities and allows room for more future activities

  9. Summary of Activities for Nondestructive Evaluation of Insulation in Cryogenic Tanks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arens, Ellen

    2012-01-01

    This project was undertaken to investigate methods to non-intrusively determine the existence and density of perlite insulation in the annular region of the cryogenic storage vessels, specifically considering the Launch Complex 39 hydrogen tanks at Kennedy Space Center. Lack of insulation in the tanks (as existed in the pad B hydrogen tank at Kennedy Space Center) results in an excessive loss of commodity and can pose operational and safety risks if precautions are not taken to relieve the excessive gas build-up. Insulation with a density that is higher than normal (due to settling or compaction) may also pose an operational and safety risk if the insulation prevents the system from moving and responding to expansions and contractions as fluid is removed and added to the tank.

  10. Underground or aboveground storage tanks - A critical decision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rizzo, J.A.

    1992-01-01

    With the 1988 promulgation of the comprehensive Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations for underground storage of petroleum and hazardous substances, many existing underground storage tank (UST) owners have been considering making the move to aboveground storage. While on the surface, this may appear to be the cure-all to avoiding the underground leakage dilemma, there are many other new and different issues to consider with aboveground storage. The greatest misconception is that by storing materials above ground, there is no risk of subsurface environmental problems. It should be noted that with the aboveground storage tank (AGST) systems, there is still considerable risk of environmental contamination, either by the failure of onground tank bottoms or the spillage of product onto the ground surface where it subsequently finds its way to the ground water. In addition, there are added safety concerns that must be addressed. The greatest interest in AGSTs comes from managers with small volumes of used oil, fresh oil, solvents, chemicals, or heating oil. Dealing with small capacity tanks is not so different than large bulk storage - and, in fact, it lends itself to more options, such as portable storage, tank within tank configurations and inside installations. So what are the other specific areas of concern besides environmental to be addressed when making the decision between underground and aboveground tanks? The primary issues that will be addressed in this presentation are: (1) safety; (2) product losses; (3) cost comparison of USTs vs AGSTs; (4) space availability/accessibility; (5) precipitation handling; (6) aesthetics and security; (7) pending and existing regulations

  11. SPS injection kicker magnet

    CERN Document Server

    1975-01-01

    One of the first-generation SPS injection kicker magnets. Lifting the tank-lid reveals the inner structure. For a more detailed description see 7502072X. See also 7502074X and Annual Report 1975, p.162. To the left: Roland Tröhler; to the right: Giacomo Busetta.

  12. Safety evaluation for the interim stabilization of Tank 241-C-103

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Geschke, G.R.

    1995-03-01

    This document provides the basis for interim stabilization of tank 241-C-103. The document covers the removal of the organic liquid layer and the aqueous supernatant from tank 241-C-103. Hazards are identified, consequences are calculated and controls to mitigate or prevent potential accidents are developed.

  13. Safety evaluation for the interim stabilization of Tank 241-C-103

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Geschke, G.R.

    1995-03-01

    This document provides the basis for interim stabilization of tank 241-C-103. The document covers the removal of the organic liquid layer and the aqueous supernatant from tank 241-C-103. Hazards are identified, consequences are calculated and controls to mitigate or prevent potential accidents are developed

  14. Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-C-110. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benar, C.J.

    1997-01-01

    . The reports listed in Appendix E may be found in the Lockheed Martin Hanford Corporation Tank Characterization and Safety Resource Center

  15. Preliminary fire hazards analysis for W-211, Initial Tank Retrieval Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckfeldt, R.A.

    1995-01-01

    A fire hazards analysis (FHA) was performed for Project W-211, Initial Tank Retrieval System (ITRS), at the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford site. The objectives of this FHA was to determine (1) the fire hazards that expose the Initial Tank Retrieval System or are inherent in the process, (2) the adequacy of the fire-safety features planned, and (3) the degree of compliance of the project with specific fire safety provisions in DOE orders and related engineering codes and standards. The scope included the construction, the process hazards, building fire protection, and site wide fire protection. The results are presented in terms of the fire hazards present, the potential extent of fire damage, and the impact on employees and public safety. This study evaluated the ITRS with respect to its use at Tank 241-SY-101 only

  16. A sub-tank water-saving drinking water station

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Ting

    2017-05-01

    "Thousands of boiling water" problem has been affecting people's quality of life and good health, and now most of the drinking fountains cannot effectively solve this problem, at the same time, ordinary drinking water also has high energy consumption, there are problems such as yin and yang water. Our newly designed dispenser uses a two-tank heating system. Hot water after heating, into the insulation tank for insulation, when the water tank in the water tank below a certain water level, the cold water and then enter the heating tank heating. Through the water flow, tank volume and other data to calculate the time required for each out of water, so as to determine the best position of the water level control, summed up the optimal program, so that water can be continuously uninterrupted supply. Two cans are placed up and down the way, in the same capacity on the basis of the capacity of the container, the appropriate to reduce its size, and increase the bottom radius, reduce the height of its single tank to ensure that the overall height of two cans compared with the traditional single change. Double anti-dry design, to ensure the safety of the use of drinking water. Heating tank heating circuit on and off by the tank of the float switch control, so that the water heating time from the tank water level control, to avoid the "thousands of boiling water" generation. The entry of cold water is controlled by two solenoid valves in the inlet pipe, and the opening and closing of the solenoid valve is controlled by the float switch in the two tanks. That is, the entry of cold water is determined by the water level of the two tanks. By designing the control scheme cleverly, Yin and yang water generation. Our design completely put an end to the "thousands of boiling water", yin and yang water, greatly improving the drinking water quality, for people's drinking water safety provides a guarantee, in line with the concept of green and healthy development. And in the small

  17. Role of passive valves & devices in poison injection system of advanced heavy water reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sapra, M.K.; Kundu, S.; Vijayan, P.K.; Vaze, K.K.; Sinha, R.K.

    2014-01-01

    The Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) is a 300 MWe pressure tube type boiling light water (H 2 O) cooled, heavy water (D 2 O) moderated reactor. The reactor design is based on well-proven water reactor technologies and incorporates a number of passive safety features such as natural circulation core cooling; direct in-bundle injection of light water coolant during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) from Advanced Accumulators and Gravity Driven Water Pool by passive means; Passive Decay Heat Removal using Isolation Condensers, Passive Containment Cooling System and Passive Containment Isolation System. In addition to above, there is another passive safety system named as Passive Poison Injection System (PPIS) which is capable of shutting down the reactor for a prolonged time. It is an additional safety system in AHWR to fulfill the shutdown function in the event of failure of wired shutdown systems i.e. primary and secondary shut down systems of the reactor. When demanded, PPIS injects the liquid poison into the moderator by passive means using passive valves and devices. On increase of main heat transport (MHT) system pressure beyond a predetermined value, a set of rupture disks burst, which in-turn actuate the passive valve. The opening of passive valve initiates inrush of high pressure helium gas into poison tanks to push the poison into the moderator system, thereby shutting down the reactor. This paper primarily deals with design and development of Passive Poison Injection System (PPIS) and its passive valves & devices. Recently, a prototype DN 65 size Poison Injection Passive Valve (PIPV) has been developed for AHWR usage and tested rigorously under simulated conditions. The paper will highlight the role of passive valves & devices in PPIS of AHWR. The design concept and test results of passive valves along with rupture disk performance will also be covered. (author)

  18. 49 CFR 231.9 - Tank cars without end sills.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... clearance, within 30 inches of side of car, until car is shopped for work amounting to practically... 49 Transportation 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Tank cars without end sills. 231.9 Section 231.9..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RAILROAD SAFETY APPLIANCE STANDARDS § 231.9 Tank cars without end sills. (a...

  19. Inerting ballast tanks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baes, Gabriel L.; Bronneberg, Jos [SBM Offshore, AA Schiedam (Netherlands); Barros, Maria A.S.D. de [Universidade Estadual de Maringa (UEM), PR (Brazil)

    2012-07-01

    This report expands upon the work conducted by SBM Offshore to develop a tank preservation treatment, which is intended to achieve a service life of 30 years. This work focuses on the corrosion problems, in the ballast tanks, based on new built hulls, both for the Gas Exploration Market, the FLNG - Floating Liquefied Natural Gas, and for the Oil Exploration market - FPSO's - Floating Production Storage and offloading Units. Herein, the corrosion rate input comes from the various references related to the process of nitrogen injection, which is expected to extend the vessel's time life. The essential elements of this solution comprise the deoxygenation process, corrosion models, coating effects, tests from laboratory, shipboard tests, corrosion institutes and regulations applicable to the operation. The best corrosion protection system for ballast tanks area combines a coating system and an inert gas system. The condition of the tanks will be dependent upon the level of protection applied to the steel structure, including, but not limited to coating, cathodic protection, etc. There is a need for products which extend the life time. It is not sufficient, only have good theoretical base for the corrosion and an excellent treatment system. In addition, the design of the ships structure must also eliminate the presence of local stress concentrations which can result in fatigue cracking and rupture of the protective coating barrier starting the corrosion. As a direct result of this, more problems in corrosion can be mitigated, vessels can have a better corrosion performance with less maintenance and repairs to coating systems in ballast tanks. Furthermore ships will be positively impacted operationally due to less frequent dry docking. There is a huge potential in the application of inert gas to combat the corrosion rate inside the ballast tanks, one of the most corrosive environments on earth. This application can have a direct impact on vessel structure

  20. Criticality safety considerations for MSRE fuel drain tank uranium aggregation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hollenbach, D.F.; Hopper, C.M.

    1997-01-01

    This paper presents the results of a preliminary criticality safety study of some potential effects of uranium reduction and aggregation in the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) fuel drain tanks (FDTs) during salt removal operations. Since the salt was transferred to the FDTs in 1969, radiological and chemical reactions have been converting the uranium and fluorine in the salt to UF 6 and free fluorine. Significant amounts of uranium (at least 3 kg) and fluorine have migrated out of the FDTs and into the off-gas system (OGS) and the auxiliary charcoal bed (ACB). The loss of uranium and fluorine from the salt changes the chemical properties of the salt sufficiently to possibly allow the reduction of the UF 4 in the salt to uranium metal as the salt is remelted prior to removal. It has been postulated that up to 9 kg of the maximum 19.4 kg of uranium in one FDT could be reduced to metal and concentrated. This study shows that criticality becomes a concern when more than 5 kg of uranium concentrates to over 8 wt% of the salt in a favorable geometry

  1. Efficiency and safety of subconjunctival injection of anti-VEGF agent - bevacizumab - in treating dry eye.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jiang, Xiaodan; Lv, Huibin; Qiu, Weiqiang; Liu, Ziyuan; Li, Xuemin; Wang, Wei

    2015-01-01

    Dry eye is a chronic inflammatory ocular surface disease with high prevalence. The current therapies for dry eye remain to be unspecific and notcomprehensive. This study aims to explore safety and efficacy of a novel treatment - subconjunctival injection of bevacizumab - in dry eye patients. Sixty-four eyes of 32 dry eye patients received subconjunctival injection of 100 μL 25 mg/mL bevacizumab. Dry eye symptoms, signs (corrected visual acuity, intraocular pressure, conjunctival vascularity, corneal staining, tear break-up time, Marx line score, and blood pressure), and conjunctival impression cytology were evaluated 3 days before and 1 week, 1 month, and 3 months after injection. Significant improvements were observed in dry eye symptoms, tear break-up time, and conjunctival vascularization area at all the visits after injection compared to the baseline (Pdry eye disease.

  2. Probability analysis of multiple-tank-car release incidents in railway hazardous materials transportation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu, Xiang; Saat, Mohd Rapik; Barkan, Christopher P.L.

    2014-01-01

    Railroads play a key role in the transportation of hazardous materials in North America. Rail transport differs from highway transport in several aspects, an important one being that rail transport involves trains in which many railcars carrying hazardous materials travel together. By contrast to truck accidents, it is possible that a train accident may involve multiple hazardous materials cars derailing and releasing contents with consequently greater potential impact on human health, property and the environment. In this paper, a probabilistic model is developed to estimate the probability distribution of the number of tank cars releasing contents in a train derailment. Principal operational characteristics considered include train length, derailment speed, accident cause, position of the first car derailed, number and placement of tank cars in a train and tank car safety design. The effect of train speed, tank car safety design and tank car positions in a train were evaluated regarding the number of cars that release their contents in a derailment. This research provides insights regarding the circumstances affecting multiple-tank-car release incidents and potential strategies to reduce their occurrences. The model can be incorporated into a larger risk management framework to enable better local, regional and national safety management of hazardous materials transportation by rail

  3. Probability analysis of multiple-tank-car release incidents in railway hazardous materials transportation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Liu, Xiang, E-mail: liu94@illinois.edu; Saat, Mohd Rapik, E-mail: mohdsaat@illinois.edu; Barkan, Christopher P.L., E-mail: cbarkan@illinois.edu

    2014-07-15

    Railroads play a key role in the transportation of hazardous materials in North America. Rail transport differs from highway transport in several aspects, an important one being that rail transport involves trains in which many railcars carrying hazardous materials travel together. By contrast to truck accidents, it is possible that a train accident may involve multiple hazardous materials cars derailing and releasing contents with consequently greater potential impact on human health, property and the environment. In this paper, a probabilistic model is developed to estimate the probability distribution of the number of tank cars releasing contents in a train derailment. Principal operational characteristics considered include train length, derailment speed, accident cause, position of the first car derailed, number and placement of tank cars in a train and tank car safety design. The effect of train speed, tank car safety design and tank car positions in a train were evaluated regarding the number of cars that release their contents in a derailment. This research provides insights regarding the circumstances affecting multiple-tank-car release incidents and potential strategies to reduce their occurrences. The model can be incorporated into a larger risk management framework to enable better local, regional and national safety management of hazardous materials transportation by rail.

  4. Tank 241-C-106 past-practice sluicing waste retrieval, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington. Environmental Assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-02-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) needs to take action to eliminate safety concerns with storage of the high-heat waste in Tank 241-C-106 (Tank C-106), and demonstrate a tank waste retrieval technology. This Environmental Assessment (EA) was prepared to analyze the potential impacts associated with the proposed action, past-practice sluicing of Tank C-106, an underground single-shell tank (SST). Past-practice sluicing is defined as the mode of waste retrieval used extensively in the past at the Hanford Site on the large underground waste tanks, and involves introducing a high-volume, low-pressure stream of liquid to mobilize sludge waste prior to pumping. It is proposed to retrieve the waste from Tank C-106 because this waste is classified not only as transuranic and high-level, but also as high-heat, which is caused by the radioactive decay of strontium. This waste characteristic has led DOE to place Tank C-106 on the safety ''Watchlist.''

  5. Toxic chemical considerations for tank farm releases

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Van Keuren, J.C.; Davis, J.S., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-08-01

    This topical report contains technical information used to determine the accident consequences of releases of toxic chemical and gases for the Tank Farm Final Safety Analysis report (FSAR).It does not provide results for specific accident scenarios but does provide information for use in those calculations including chemicals to be considered, chemical concentrations, chemical limits and a method of summing the fractional contributions of each chemical. Tank farm composites evaluated were liquids and solids for double shell tanks, single shell tanks, all solids,all liquids, headspace gases, and 241-C-106 solids. Emergency response planning guidelines (ERPGs) were used as the limits.Where ERPGs were not available for the chemicals of interest, surrogate ERPGs were developed. Revision 2 includes updated sample data, an executive summary, and some editorial revisions.

  6. TFA Tank Focus Area - multiyear program plan FY98-FY00

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) continues to face a major radioactive waste tank remediation problem with hundreds of waste tanks containing hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of high-level waste (HLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste across the DOE complex. Approximately 80 tanks are known or assumed to have leaked. Some of the tank contents have reacted to form flammable gases, introducing additional safety risks. These tanks must be maintained in a safe condition and eventually remediated to minimize the risk of waste migration and/or exposure to workers, the public, and the environment. However, programmatic drivers are more ambitious than baseline technologies and budgets will support. Science and technology development investments are required to reduce the technical and programmatic risks associated with the tank remediation baselines. The Tanks Focus Area (TFA) was initiated in 1994 to serve as the DOE's Office of Environmental Management's (EM's) national technology development program for radioactive waste tank remediation. The national program was formed to increase integration and realize greater benefits from DOE's technology development budget. The TFA is responsible for managing, coordinating, and leveraging technology development to support DOE's four major tank sites: Hanford Site (Washington), Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) (Idaho), Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) (Tennessee), and Savannah River Site (SRS) (South Carolina). Its technical scope covers the major functions that comprise a complete tank remediation system: waste retrieval, waste pretreatment, waste immobilization, tank closure, and characterization of both the waste and tank with safety integrated into all the functions. The TFA integrates program activities across organizations that fund tank technology development EM, including the Offices of Waste Management (EM-30), Environmental Restoration (EM-40), and Science and Technology (EM-50)

  7. TFA Tanks Focus Area Multiyear Program Plan FY00-FY04

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BA Carteret; JH Westsik; LR Roeder-Smith; RL Gilchrist; RW Allen; SN Schlahta; TM Brouns

    1999-10-12

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) continues to face a major radioactive waste tank remediation problem with hundreds of waste tanks containing hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of high-level waste (HLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste across the DOE complex. Approximately 68 tanks are known or assumed to have leaked contamination to the soil. Some of the tank contents have reacted to form flammable gases, introducing additional safety risks. These tanks must be maintained in a safe condition and eventually remediated to minimize the risk of waste migration and/or exposure to workers, the public, and the environment. However, programmatic drivers are more ambitious than baseline technologies and budgets will support. Science and technology development investments are required to reduce the technical and programmatic risks associated with the tank remediation baselines. The Tanks Focus Area (TFA) was initiated in 1994 to serve as the DOE Office of Environmental Management's (EM's) national technology development program. for radioactive waste tank remediation. The national program was formed to increase integration and realize greater benefits from DOE's technology development budget. The TFA is responsible for managing, coordinating, and leveraging technology development to support DOE's five major tank sites: Hanford Site (Washington), Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) (Idaho), Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) (Tennessee), Savannah River Site (SRS) (South Carolina), and West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) (New York). Its technical scope covers the major functions that comprise a complete tank remediation system: waste retrieval, waste pretreatment, waste immobilization, tank closure, and characterization of both the waste and tank with safety integrated into all the functions. The TFA integrates program activities across EM organizations that fund tank technology development, including the Offices of Waste

  8. TFA Tanks Focus Area Multiyear Program Plan FY00-FY04

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BA Carteret; JH Westsik; LR Roeder-Smith; RL Gilchrist; RW Allen; SN Schlahta; TM Brouns

    1999-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) continues to face a major radioactive waste tank remediation problem with hundreds of waste tanks containing hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of high-level waste (HLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste across the DOE complex. Approximately 68 tanks are known or assumed to have leaked contamination to the soil. Some of the tank contents have reacted to form flammable gases, introducing additional safety risks. These tanks must be maintained in a safe condition and eventually remediated to minimize the risk of waste migration and/or exposure to workers, the public, and the environment. However, programmatic drivers are more ambitious than baseline technologies and budgets will support. Science and technology development investments are required to reduce the technical and programmatic risks associated with the tank remediation baselines. The Tanks Focus Area (TFA) was initiated in 1994 to serve as the DOE Office of Environmental Management's (EM's) national technology development program. for radioactive waste tank remediation. The national program was formed to increase integration and realize greater benefits from DOE's technology development budget. The TFA is responsible for managing, coordinating, and leveraging technology development to support DOE's five major tank sites: Hanford Site (Washington), Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) (Idaho), Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) (Tennessee), Savannah River Site (SRS) (South Carolina), and West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) (New York). Its technical scope covers the major functions that comprise a complete tank remediation system: waste retrieval, waste pretreatment, waste immobilization, tank closure, and characterization of both the waste and tank with safety integrated into all the functions. The TFA integrates program activities across EM organizations that fund tank technology development, including the Offices of Waste Management (EM-30

  9. TFA Tank Focus Area - multiyear program plan FY98-FY00

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-09-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) continues to face a major radioactive waste tank remediation problem with hundreds of waste tanks containing hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of high-level waste (HLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste across the DOE complex. Approximately 80 tanks are known or assumed to have leaked. Some of the tank contents have reacted to form flammable gases, introducing additional safety risks. These tanks must be maintained in a safe condition and eventually remediated to minimize the risk of waste migration and/or exposure to workers, the public, and the environment. However, programmatic drivers are more ambitious than baseline technologies and budgets will support. Science and technology development investments are required to reduce the technical and programmatic risks associated with the tank remediation baselines. The Tanks Focus Area (TFA) was initiated in 1994 to serve as the DOE`s Office of Environmental Management`s (EM`s) national technology development program for radioactive waste tank remediation. The national program was formed to increase integration and realize greater benefits from DOE`s technology development budget. The TFA is responsible for managing, coordinating, and leveraging technology development to support DOE`s four major tank sites: Hanford Site (Washington), Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) (Idaho), Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) (Tennessee), and Savannah River Site (SRS) (South Carolina). Its technical scope covers the major functions that comprise a complete tank remediation system: waste retrieval, waste pretreatment, waste immobilization, tank closure, and characterization of both the waste and tank with safety integrated into all the functions. The TFA integrates program activities across organizations that fund tank technology development EM, including the Offices of Waste Management (EM-30), Environmental Restoration (EM-40), and Science and Technology (EM-50).

  10. Test of safety injection supply by diesel generator under reactor vessel closed condition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Hao; Bi Fengchuan; Che Junxia; Zhang Jianwen; Yang Bo

    2014-01-01

    The paper studied that the test of diesel generator full load take-up under the condition of actual safety injection and reactor vessel closed in Ningde nuclear project unit l. It is proved that test result accorded with design criteria, meanwhile, the test was removed from the key path of project schedule, which cut a huge cost. (authors)

  11. Operating watch list tanks: A study in control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohl, P.; Hamrick, D.; Marchetti, S.

    1991-01-01

    The paper will present the controls and processes by which Westinghouse Hanford Company manages the characterization and maintenance of tanks that are considered unresolved safety questions. Cultural as well as management changes will be discussed. First, processes by which safe and disciplined actions around potentially hazardous high-activity Hanford waste tanks can be instilled in our work force will be examined. Our success in changing our work practices will be discussed in tangible terms. Second, the dual challenge of upgrading personnel skills while addressing the upgrades for antiquated equipment and control systems with limited financial growth will be examined. This represents one of the primary management challenges of the Waste Tank Operations organization. Reorganization of groups to improve plant maintenance efficiencies, their tracking and prioritization will be addressed. This includes the establishment of unique internal review committee of line managers and operators to prioritize maintenance activities. Finally a means of enhancing the ability of plant forces to respond to anomalies in monitoring data or other tank related event will be discussed. The innovative use of a open-quotes Joint Test Groupclose quotes structure (e.g., on call teams of representatives from all affected and authorizing organizations) to assure that all activities on open-quotes watch list tanksclose quotes in the Tank Farm remain within the defined safety envelope will be discussed

  12. Complex Protection of Vertical Stainless Steel Tanks

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Fakhrislamov Radik Zakievich

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available The authors consider the problem of fail-safe oil and oil products storage in stainless steel tanks and present the patented tank inner side protection technology. The latter provides process, ecological and fire safety and reducing soil evaporation of oil products, which is a specific problem. The above-mentioned technology includes corrosion protection and heat insulation protection providing increase of cover durability and RVS service life in general. The offered technological protection scheme is a collaboration of the author, Steel Paint GmbH firm and JSC “Koksokhimmontazhproyekt”. PU foam unicomponent materials of Steel Paint GmbH firm provide the protection of tank inner side and cover.

  13. Resolution of issues related to alternative RCS injection in the absence of containment sump recirculation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Charles L Kling; Stephen S Barshay; Mathew C Jacob; Michael J Friedman

    2005-01-01

    Full text of publication follows: On June 9, 2003 the US NRC issued Bulletin No. 2003-01 that deals with the potential impact of debris blockage on containment sump recirculation at PWRs during a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA). In response to the bulletin, the Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) is in the process of developing procedural and operational strategies for their Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) to address the issues raised. Westinghouse provided engineering support to OPPD in identifying and resolving issues related to alternative means of supplying safety injection water to the reactor coolant system (RCS) in the absence of containment sump recirculation. Nuclear power plants are designed to protect the core following a LOCA by providing a continuous supply of cooling water to the core. In the long term, the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) inventory will be depleted and core heat removal accomplished via recirculation of water previously injected into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and collected in the containment sump. Debris generated within the containment as a result of the impingement of fluid jets in the Zone of Influence (ZOI) of the RCS break and containment wash down may find its way into the containment sump. As the safety injection pumps take suction from the sump, in the recirculation mode of operation, the debris suspended in the sump water could begin to accumulate in the sump screen that is located in the recirculation path. Should sufficient debris accumulate on the sump screen, a flow blockage could potentially develop. This would result in insufficient safety injection pump NPSH, thereby impairing the recirculation mode of injection into RCS. Potential debris blockage and prevention of sump recirculation may be addressed by refilling the RWST with water and injecting this water directly into the core. This paper identifies and attempts to resolve several issues related to this alternative mode of RCS injection. In particular, the

  14. 40 CFR 146.5 - Classification of injection wells.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... establishment septic tank. The UIC requirements do not apply to single family residential septic system wells, nor to non-residential septic system wells which are used solely for the disposal of sanitary waste... whether what is injected is a radioactive waste or not. (9) Septic system wells used to inject the waste...

  15. Prevalence of injections and knowledge of safe injections among rural residents in Central China.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yan, Y W; Yan, J; Zhang, G P; Gao, Z L; Jian, H X

    2007-08-01

    Abuse of the injection services, namely unnecessary injections and unsafe injections, exists extensively in developing countries. Unsafe injection practices contribute to the transmission of blood-borne pathogens. The aims of this study were to survey the prevalence of injections and knowledge of injection safety among the rural residents in Jingzhou district, Hubei, China and to provide scientific data for developing a health educational programme. A retrospective cross-sectional study was conducted in 12 villages, which were selected from the Jingzhou district by the random sampling method. 50 rural residents were interviewed per village using a questionnaire. Among the 595 residents studied, 192 had received at least one injection in the past three months, with an injection prevalence of 32.3 percent and an average of 0.93 injections. 90.3 percent of the rural residents knew that unsafe injections could transmit the following blood-borne pathogens: human immunodeficiency virus (74.4 percent), hepatitis B virus (55.8 percent) and hepatitis C virus (22.9 percent). Logistic regression analysis showed that the residents' age, educational level and residential area were important factors in influencing their knowledge about injection safety. The results indicated that the injection prevalence was high among rural residents in the study area, and their knowledge regarding injection safety should be further improved.

  16. Initial tank calibration at NUCEF critical facility. 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yanagisawa, Hiroshi

    1994-07-01

    Analyses on initial tank calibration data were carried out for the purpose of the nuclear material accountancy and control for critical facilities in NUCEF: Nuclear Fuel Cycle Safety Engineering Research Facility. Calibration functions to evaluate volume of nuclear material solution in accountancy tanks were determined by regression analysis on the data considering dimension and shape of the tank. The analyses on dip-tube separation (probe separation), which are necessary to evaluate solution density in the tanks, were also carried out. As a result, regression errors of volume calculated with the calibration functions were within 0.05 lit. (0.01%) at a nominal level of Pu accountancy tanks. Errors of the evaluated dip-tube separations were also small, e.g. within 0.2mm (0.11%). Therefore, it was estimated that systematic errors of bulk measurements would satisfy the target value of NUCEF critical facilities (0.3% for Pu accountancy tanks). This paper summarizes the data analysis methods, results of analysis and evaluated errors. (author)

  17. SY Tank Farm ventilation isolation option risk assessment report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Powers, T.B.; Morales, S.D.

    1994-03-01

    The safety of the 241-SY Tank Farm ventilation system has been under extensive scrutiny due to safety concerns associated with tank 101-SY. Hydrogen and other gases are generated and trapped in the waste below the liquid surface. Periodically, these gases are released into the dome space and vented through the exhaust system. This attention to the ventilation system has resulted in the development of several alternative ventilation system designs. The ventilation system provides the primary means of mitigation of accidents associated with flammable gases. This report provides an assessment of various alternatives ventilation system designs.

  18. Ferrocyanide safety program: Credibility of drying out ferrocyanide tank waste by hot spots

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickinson, D.R.; McLaren, J.M.; Borsheim, G.L.; Crippen, M.D.

    1993-04-01

    The single-shell waste tanks at the Hanford Site that contain significant quantities of ferrocyanide have been considered a possible hazard, since under certain conditions the ferrocyanide in the waste tanks could undergo an exothermic chemical reaction with the nitrates and nitrites that are also present in the tanks. The purpose of this report is to assess the credibility of local dryout of ferrocyanide due to a hotspot. This report considers the following: What amount of decay heat generation within what volume would be necessary to raise the temperature of the liquid in the sludge to its boiling point? What mechanisms could produce a significant local concentration of heat sources? Is it credible that a waste tank heat concentration could be as large as that required to reach the dryout temperatures? This report also provides a recommendation as to whether infrared scanning of the ferrocyanide tanks is needed. From the analyses presented in this report it is evident that formation of dry, and thus chemically reactive, regions in the ferrocyanide sludge by local hotspots is not credible. This conclusion is subject to reevaluation if future analyses of tank core samples show much higher 137 Cs or 90 Sr concentrations than expected. Since hotspots of concern are not credible, infrared scanning to detect such hotspots is not required for safe storage of tank waste

  19. 49 CFR 172.330 - Tank cars and multi-unit tank car tanks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Tank cars and multi-unit tank car tanks. 172.330..., TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, AND SECURITY PLANS Marking § 172.330 Tank cars and multi-unit tank car tanks. (a... material— (1) In a tank car unless the following conditions are met: (i) The tank car must be marked on...

  20. 49 CFR 231.7 - Tank cars with side platforms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Tank cars with side platforms. 231.7 Section 231.7..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RAILROAD SAFETY APPLIANCE STANDARDS § 231.7 Tank cars with side platforms. (a) Hand brakes—(1) Number. Same as specified for “Box and other house cars” (see § 231.1(a)(1)). (2...

  1. Tanks Focus Area FY98 midyear technical review

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schlahta, S.N.; Brouns, T.M.

    1998-06-01

    The Tanks Focus Area (TFA) serves as the DOE`s Office of Environmental Management`s national technology and solution development program for radioactive waste tank remediation. Its technical scope covers the major functions that comprise a complete tank remediation system: waste retrieval, waste pretreatment, waste immobilization, tank closure, and characterization of both the waste and tank with safety integrated into all the functions. In total, 17 technologies and technical solutions were selected for review. The purpose of each review was to understand the state of development of each technology selected for review and to identify issues to be resolved before the technology or technical solution progressed to the next level of maturity. The reviewers provided detailed technical and programmatic recommendations and comments. The disposition of these recommendations and comments and their impact on the program is documented in this report.

  2. Tanks Focus Area FY98 midyear technical review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schlahta, S.N.; Brouns, T.M.

    1998-06-01

    The Tanks Focus Area (TFA) serves as the DOE's Office of Environmental Management's national technology and solution development program for radioactive waste tank remediation. Its technical scope covers the major functions that comprise a complete tank remediation system: waste retrieval, waste pretreatment, waste immobilization, tank closure, and characterization of both the waste and tank with safety integrated into all the functions. In total, 17 technologies and technical solutions were selected for review. The purpose of each review was to understand the state of development of each technology selected for review and to identify issues to be resolved before the technology or technical solution progressed to the next level of maturity. The reviewers provided detailed technical and programmatic recommendations and comments. The disposition of these recommendations and comments and their impact on the program is documented in this report

  3. Engineering task plan for determining breathing rates in single shell tanks using tracer gas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersen, J.A.

    1997-01-01

    The testing of single shell tanks to determine breathing rates. Inert tracer gases helium, and sulfur hexafluoride will be injected into the tanks AX-103, BY-105, C-107 and U-103. Periodic samples will be taken over a three month interval to determine actual headspace breathing rates

  4. 45-Day safety screen results for Tank 241-U-201, push mode, cores 70, 73 and 74

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sathyanarayana, P.

    1995-01-01

    Three core samples, each having two segments, from Tank 241-U-201 (U-201) were received by the 222-S Laboratories. Safety screening analysis, such as differential scanning calorimetry (DSC), thermogravimetric analysis (TGA), and total alpha activity were conducted on Core 70, Segment 1 and 2 and on Core 73, Segment 1 and 2. Core 74, Segment 1 and 2 were taken to test rotary bit in push mode sampling. No analysis was requested on Core 74, Segment 1 and 2. Analytical results for the TGA analyses for Core 70, Segment 1, Upper half solid sample was less than the safety screening notification limit of 17 percent water. Notification was made on April 27, 1995. No exotherm was associated with this sample. Analytical results are presented in Tables 1 to 4, with the applicable notification limits shaded

  5. Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford waste tank 241-S-101: Results from samples collected on 06/06/96

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, B.L.; Evans, J.C.; Pool, K.H.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Silvers, K.L.

    1997-01-01

    This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-S-101. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the inorganic analytes, permanent gases, and total non-methane organic compounds is listed

  6. Tank 241-C-103 organic vapor and liquid characterization and supporting activities, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The action proposed is to sample the vapor space and liquid waste and perform other supporting activities in Tank 241-C-103 located in the 241-C Tank Farm on the Hanford Site. Operations at Tank 241-C-103 are curtailed because of an unreviewed safety question (USQ) concerning flammability issues of the organic waste in the tank. This USQ must be resolved before normal operation and surveillance of the tank can resume. In addition to the USQ, Tank 241-C-103 is thought to be involved in several cases of exposure of individuals to noxious vapors. This safety issue requires the use of supplied air for workers in the vicinity of the tank. Because of the USQ, the US Department of Energy proposes to characterize the waste in the vapor space and the organic and aqueous layers, to determine the volume of the organic layer. This action is needed to: (1) assess potential risks to workers, the public, and the environment from continued routine tank operations and (2) provide information on the waste material in the tank to facilitate a comprehensive safety analysis of this USQ. The information would be used to determine if a flammable condition within the tank is credible. This information would be used to prevent or mitigate an accident during continued waste storage and future waste characterization. Alternatives to the proposed activities have been considered in this analysis

  7. Feasibility report on criticality issues associated with storage of K Basin sludge in tanks farms

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vail, T.S.

    1997-05-29

    This feasibility study provides the technical justification for conclusions about K Basin sludge storage options. The conclusions, solely based on criticality safety considerations, depend on the treatment of the sludge. The two primary conclusions are, (1) untreated sludge must be stored in a critically safe storage tank, and (2) treated sludge (dissolution, precipitation and added neutron absorbers) can be stored in a standard Double Contained Receiver Tank (DCRT) or 241-AW-105 without future restrictions on tank operations from a criticality safety perspective.

  8. Feasibility report on criticality issues associated with storage of K Basin sludge in tanks farms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vail, T.S.

    1997-01-01

    This feasibility study provides the technical justification for conclusions about K Basin sludge storage options. The conclusions, solely based on criticality safety considerations, depend on the treatment of the sludge. The two primary conclusions are, (1) untreated sludge must be stored in a critically safe storage tank, and (2) treated sludge (dissolution, precipitation and added neutron absorbers) can be stored in a standard Double Contained Receiver Tank (DCRT) or 241-AW-105 without future restrictions on tank operations from a criticality safety perspective

  9. Mixing processes in high-level waste tanks. Progress report, September 15, 1996 - September 14, 1997

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peterson, P.F.

    1997-01-01

    'U.C. Berkeley has made excellent progress in the last year in building and running experiments and performing analysis to study mixing processes that can affect the distribution of fuel and oxygen in the air space of DOE high-level waste tanks, and the potential to create flammable concentrations at isolated locations, achieving all of the milestones outlined in the proposal. The DOE support has allowed the acquisition of key experimental equipment, and has funded the full-time efforts of one doctoral student and one postdoctoral researcher working on the project. In addition, one masters student and one other doctoral student, funded by external sources, have also contributed to the research effort. Flammable gases can be generated in DOE high-level waste tanks, including radiolytic hydrogen, and during cesium precipitation from salt solutions, benzene. Under normal operating conditions the potential for deflagration or detonation from these gases is precluded by purging and ventilation systems, which remove the flammable gases and maintain a well-mixed condition in the tanks. Upon failure of the ventilation system, due to seismic or other events, however, it has proven more difficult to make strong arguments for well-mixed conditions, due to the potential for density-induced stratification which can potentially sequester fuel or oxidizer at concentrations significantly higher than average. This has complicated the task of defining the safety basis for tank operation. The author is currently developing numerical tools for modeling the transient evolution of fuel and oxygen concentrations in waste tanks following loss of ventilation. When used with reasonable grid resolutions, standard multi-dimensional fluid dynamics codes suffer from excessive numerical diffusion effects, which strongly over predict mixing and provide nonconservative estimates, particularly after stratification occurs. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed

  10. Organic tanks safety program, FY97 waste aging studies. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Camaioni, D.M.; Samuels, W.D.; Linehan, J.C.; Sharma, A.K.; Hogan, M.O.; Lilga, M.A.; Clauss, S.A.; Wahl, K.L.; Campbell, J.A.

    1998-02-01

    To model tank waste aging and interpret tank waste speciation results, the authors began measuring the reactivity of organic complexants and related compounds towards radiation-induced oxidation reactions. Because of the high efficiency of scavenging of the primary radicals of water radiolysis by nitrate and nitrite ion, the major radiolytically-generated radicals in these solutions, and in Hanford tank wastes, are NO 2 , NO and O - . Prior to this effort, little quantitative information existed for the reactions of these radicals with organic compounds such as those that were used in Hanford processes. Therefore, modeling of actual waste aging, or even simulated waste aging, was not feasible without measuring reactivities and determining reaction paths. The authors have made the first rate measurements of complexant aging and determined some of their degradation products

  11. Alternatives Generation and Analysis for Heat Removal from High Level Waste Tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WILLIS, W.L.

    2000-01-01

    This document addresses the preferred combination of design and operational configurations to provide heat removal from high-level waste tanks during Phase 1 waste feed delivery to prevent the waste temperature from exceeding tank safety requirement limits. An interim decision for the preferred method to remove the heat from the high-level waste tanks during waste feed delivery operations is presented herein

  12. Alternatives Generation and Analysis for Heat Removal from High Level Waste Tanks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    WILLIS, W.L.

    2000-06-15

    This document addresses the preferred combination of design and operational configurations to provide heat removal from high-level waste tanks during Phase 1 waste feed delivery to prevent the waste temperature from exceeding tank safety requirement limits. An interim decision for the preferred method to remove the heat from the high-level waste tanks during waste feed delivery operations is presented herein.

  13. Tank Vapor Characterization Project. Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford Waste Tank AX-102: Results from samples collected on June 27, 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clauss, T.W.; Pool, K.H.; Evans, J.C.; McVeety, B.D.; Thomas, B.L.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Ligotke, M.W.

    1995-11-01

    This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-AX-102 (Tank AX-102) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank-farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, sample volumes provided by WHC. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the text

  14. Tank Bump Accident Potential and Consequences During Waste Retrieval

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BRATZEL, D.R.

    2000-01-01

    This report provides an evaluation of Hanford tank bump accident potential and consequences during waste retrieval operations. The purpose of this report is to consider the best available new information to support recommendations for safety controls. A new tank bump accident analysis for safe storage (Epstein et al. 2000) is extended for this purpose. A tank bump is a postulated event in which gases, consisting mostly of water vapor, are suddenly emitted from the waste and cause tank headspace pressurization. Tank bump scenarios, physical models, and frequency and consequence methods are fully described in Epstein et al. (2000). The analysis scope is waste retrieval from double-shell tanks (DSTs) including operation of equipment such as mixer pumps and air lift circulators. The analysis considers physical mechanisms for tank bump to formulate criteria for bump potential during retrieval, application of the criteria to the DSTs, evaluation of bump frequency, and consequence analysis of a bump. The result of the consequence analysis is the mass of waste released from tanks; radiological dose is calculated using standard methods (Cowley et al. 2000)

  15. Safety device and machine system of nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-10-01

    It introduces principle and kinds of heat power including heat balance and nuclear power. It explains a lot of technical terms about the nuclear power system, which are primary loop, reactor, steam generator, primary coolant pump and pressurizer in PWR, chemical and volume control system, component cooling system, safety injection system, and spent fuel cooling and storage system in auxiliary system, liquid solid and gaseous waste disposal system in radwaste disposal, gland sealing system, turbine instrumentation, turning gear, hydrogen cooling system, condenser, feedwater heater, degenerate heater, auxiliary heat exchanger, centrifugal pump, rotary reciprocating and tank and pressure vessel.

  16. Tank 241-C-106 sampling data requirements developed through the data quality objectives (DQO) process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang, O.S.; Bell, K.E.; Anderson, C.M.; Peffers, M.S.; Pulsipher, B.A.; Scott, J.L.

    1994-01-01

    The rate of heat generation for tank 241-C-106 at the Hanford Site is estimated at more then 100,000 Btu/h. The heat is generated primarily from the radioactive decay of 90 Sr waste that was inadvertently transferred into the tank in the late 1960s. If proper tank cooling is not maintained for this tank, heat-induced structural damage to the tank's concrete shell could result in the release of nuclear waste to the environment. Because of high-heat concerns in January 1991, tank 241-C-106 was designated as a Watch List tank and deemed as a Priority 1 safety issue. Waste Tank Safety Program (WTSP) is responsible for the resolution of this safety issue. Although forced cooling is effective for short term, the long-term resolution for tank cooling is waste retrieval. Single-shell Tank Retrieval Project (Retrieval) is responsible for the safe retrieval and transfer of radioactive waste from tank 241-C-106 to a selected double-shell tank. This data quality objective (DQO) study is an effort to determine engineering and design data needs for WTSP and assist Retrieval in designing contingency action retrieval systems. The 7-step DQO process is a tool developed by the Environmental Protection Agency with a goal of identifying needs and reducing costs. This report discusses the results of two DQO efforts for WTSP and Retrieval. The key data needs to support WTSP are thermal conductivity, permeability, and heat load profile. For the Retrieval support, there are nine and three data needs identified, respectively, for retrieval engineering system design and HVAC system design. The updated schedule to drill two core samples using rotary mode is set for March 1994. The analysis of the sample is expected to be completed by September 1994

  17. Hazard evaluation for transfer of waste from tank 241-SY-101 to tank 241-SY-102

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SHULTZ, M.V.

    1999-01-01

    Tank 241-SY-101 (SY-101) waste level growth is an emergent, high priority issue. The purpose of this document is to record the hazards evaluation process and document potential hazardous conditions that could lead to the release of radiological and toxicological material from the proposed transfer of a limited quantity (approximately 100,000 gallons) of waste from SY-101 to 241-SY-102 (SY-102). The results of the hazards evaluation will be compared to the current Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Basis for Interim Operation (HNF-SD-WM-BIO-001, 1998, Revision 1) to identify any hazardous conditions where Authorization Basis (AB) controls may not be sufficient or may not exist. Comparison to LA-UR-92-3196, A Safety Assessment for Proposed Pump Mixing Operations to Mitigate Episodic Gas Releases in Tank 241-SY-101, was also made in the case of transfer pump removal activities. This document is not intended to authorize the activity or determine the adequacy of controls; it is only intended to provide information about the hazardous conditions associated with this activity. The Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process will be used to determine the adequacy of controls and whether the proposed activity is within the AB. This hazard evaluation does not constitute an accident analysis

  18. Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Vapor space characterization of waste Tank A-101, Results from samples collected on June 8, 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pool, K.H.; Clauss, T.W.; McVeety, B.D.; Evans, J.C.; Thomas, B.L.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Ligotke, M.W.

    1995-11-01

    This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-A-101 (Tank A-101) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank-farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the results is listed in Table 1. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the text

  19. Tank farm instrumentation and data acquisition/management upgrade plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scaief, C.C. III.

    1994-01-01

    This plan provides the strategy, implementation, and schedule for upgrading tank farm instrumentation, data acquisition and data management. The focus is on surveillance parameters to verify and maintain tank safety. The criteria do not necessarily constitute mandatory requirements but are based upon engineering judgement and best available information. Schedules reflect preliminary funding for FY95. For out years they are best engineering judgment

  20. Tank 50H Tetraphenylborate Destruction Results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peters, T.B.

    2003-01-01

    obstacles upon returning Tank 50H to HLW service. The concerns include the potential for retention of flammable gases, nuclear criticality safety implications, and possible combustible solids formation. A recent document describes the initial results of that work

  1. Evaluation of tank thermal expansion data in CALDEX

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suda, S.; Weh, R.

    1991-01-01

    A thermal expansion test involving a large annular input reprocessing tank was carried out as a part of the CALDEX Project at the TEKO test facility in Karlsruhe, FRG. The objective of this test was to investigate thermal expansion properties of the tank and effects on various pressure and level measurement instruments used in the determination of liquid volume. In the thermal expansion test, a weak nitric acid solution was heated internally to a temperature of 60 degrees C by means of steam injection through the sparge ring. After heating, the annular tank took about one hour to thermally equilibrate, and it took another hour for the sparge ring and pulsator pipes to fill before thermal effects could be followed. The temperature at the end of the test, after tank and its contents had cooled undisturbed for fifty hours, was 29.9 degrees C. Thirteen instrument readings were obtained during each measurement cycle of roughly 70 seconds for a total of over 2800 readings per instrument. Thermal expansion effects for the CALDEX annular tank were consistent with that reported for cylindrical tanks. Temperature variations effect each type of probe in a way that depends on the properties of the probe and the characteristics of the measurement system. 3 refs., 4 figs., 3 tabs

  2. Acoustic imaging of underground storage tank wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mech, S.J.

    1995-09-01

    Acoustics is a potential tool to determine the properties of high level wastes stored in Underground Storage Tanks. Some acoustic properties were successfully measured by a limited demonstration conducted in 114-TX. This accomplishment provides the basis for expanded efforts to qualify techniques which depend on the acoustic properties of tank wastes. This work is being sponsored by the Department of Energy under the Office of Science and Technology. In FY-1994, limited Tank Waste Remediation Systems EM-30 support was available at Hanford and Los Alamos National Laboratory. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Earth Resources Laboratory (ERL) were engaged for analysis support, and Elohi Geophysics, Inc. for seismic testing services. Westinghouse-Hanford Company provided the testing and training, supplied the special engineering and safety analysis equipment and procedures, and provided the trained operators for the actual tank operations. On 11/9/94, limited in-tank tests were successfully conducted in tank 114-TX. This stabilized Single Shell Tank was reported as containing 16.8 feet of waste, the lower 6.28 feet of which contained interstitial liquid. Testing was conducted over the lower 12 feet, between two Liquid Observation Wells thirty feet apart. The ''quick-look'' data was reviewed on-site by MIT and Elohi

  3. Calculation notes that support accident scenario and consequence of the in-tank fuel fire/deflageration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crowe, R.D. Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-01-01

    The purpose of this calculation note is to provide the basis for In-Tank Fuel fire/Deflageration consequence for the Tank Farm Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Tank Fuel Fire/Deflageration scenario is developed and details and description of the analysis methods are provided

  4. Calculation notes that support accident scenario and consequence of the in-tank fuel fire/deflagration

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Crowe, R.D.

    1996-09-27

    The purpose of this calculation note is to provide the basis for In-Tank Fuel Fire/Deflageration consequence for the Tank Farm Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Tank Fuel Fire/Deflageration scenario is developed and details and description of the analysis methods are provided.

  5. Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the tank waste remediation system. Volume 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-04-01

    This appendix describes the current safety concerns associated with the tank waste and analyzes the potential accidents and associated potential health effects that could occur under the alternatives included in this Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

  6. Epidural Steroid Injections are Safe and Effective: Multisociety Letter in Support of the Safety and Effectiveness of Epidural Steroid Injections.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kennedy, David J; Levin, Joshua; Rosenquist, Richard; Singh, Virtaj; Smith, Clark; Stojanovic, Milan P; Vorobeychik, Yakov

    2015-05-01

    In April 2014, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a Drug Safety Communication requesting that corticosteroid labeling include warnings that injection of corticosteroids into the epidural space of the spine may result in rare but serious adverse events, including loss of vision, stroke, paralysis, and death. The International Spine Intervention Society spearheaded a collaboration of more than a dozen other medical societies in submitting the letter below to the FDA on November 7, 2014. We are publishing the letter to ensure that the readership of Pain Medicine is aware of the multisociety support for the safety and effectiveness of these procedures. A special note of thanks to all of the societies who signed on in support of the message. Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  7. Safety analysis report for the gunite and associated tanks project remediation of the South Tank Farm, facility 3507, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Platfoot, J.H.

    1998-02-01

    The South Tank Farm (STF) is a series of six, 170,000-gal underground, domed storage tanks, which were placed into service in 1943. The tanks were constructed of a concrete mixture known as gunite. They were used as a portion of the Liquid Low-Level Waste System for the collection, neutralization, storage, and transfer of the aqueous portion of the radioactive and/or hazardous chemical wastes produced as part of normal facility operations at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The last of the tanks was taken out of service in 1986, but the tanks have been shown by structural analysis to continue to be structurally sound. An attempt was made in 1983 to empty the tanks; however, removal of all the sludge from the tanks was not possible with the equipment and schedule available. Since removal of the liquid waste in 1983, liquid continues to accumulate within the tanks. The in-leakage is believed to be the result of groundwater dripping into the tanks around penetrations in the domes. The tanks are currently being maintained under a Surveillance and Maintenance Program that includes activities such as level monitoring, vegetation control, High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter leakage requirement testing/replacement, sign erection/repair, pump-out of excessive liquids, and instrument calibration/maintenance. These activities are addressed in ORNL/ER-275

  8. Thermographic inspection of pipes, tanks, and containment liners

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Renshaw, Jeremy B., E-mail: jrenshaw@epri.com; Muthu, Nathan [Electric Power Research Institute, 1300 West WT Harris Blvd., Charlotte, NC 28262 (United States); Lhota, James R.; Shepard, Steven M., E-mail: sshepard@thermalwave.com [Thermal Wave Imaging, 845 Livernois St., Ferndale, MI 48220 (United States)

    2015-03-31

    Nuclear power plants are required to operate at a high level of safety. Recent industry and license renewal commitments aim to further increase safety by requiring the inspection of components that have not traditionally undergone detailed inspected in the past, such as tanks and liners. NEI 09-14 requires the inspection of buried pipes and tanks while containment liner inspections are required as a part of license renewal commitments. Containment liner inspections must inspect the carbon steel liner for defects - such as corrosion - that could threaten the pressure boundary and ideally, should be able to inspect the surrounding concrete for foreign material that could be in contact with the steel liner and potentially initiate corrosion. Such an inspection requires a simultaneous evaluation of two materials with very different material properties. Rapid, yet detailed, inspection results are required due to the massive size of the tanks and containment liners to be inspected. For this reason, thermal NDE methods were evaluated to inspect tank and containment liner mockups with simulated defects. Thermographic Signal Reconstruction (TSR) was utilized to enhance the images and provide detailed information on the sizes and shapes of the observed defects. The results show that thermographic inspection is highly sensitive to the defects of interest and is capable of rapidly inspecting large areas.

  9. Analyses of liquid-gas two-phase flow in fermentation tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toi, Takashi; Serizawa, Akimi; Takahashi, Osamu; Kawara, Zensaku; Gofuku, Akio; Kataoka, Isao.

    1993-01-01

    The understanding of two-phase flow is one of the important problems for both design and safety analyses of various engineering systems. For example, the flow conditions in beer fermentation tanks have an influence on the quality of production and productivity of tank. In this study, a two-dimensional numerical calculation code based on the one-pressure two-fluid model is developed to understand the circulation structure of low quality liquid-gas two-phase flows induced by bubble plume in a tank. (author)

  10. Safety of bilateral same-day intravitreal injections of anti-vascular endothelial growth factor agents

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ruão M

    2017-02-01

    Full Text Available Miguel Ruão,1 María Andreu-Fenoll,2 Rosa Dolz-Marco,2 Roberto Gallego-Pinazo2 1Department of Ophthalmology, Centro Hospitalar Entre Douro e Vouga, Santa Maria da Feira, Portugal; 2Unit of Macula, Department of Ophthalmology, University and Polytechnic Hospital La Fe, Valencia, Spain Purpose: The aim was to evaluate the safety of bilateral same-day injections with intravitreal antiangiogenic drugs for macular diseases.Methods: Cross-sectional retrospective review of unilateral and bilateral same-day antiangiogenic injections was conducted between January 2011 and March 2016 in the Unit of Macula, University and Polytechnic Hospital La Fe (Valencia, Spain. A total of 8,172 injections were administered, among which 6,560 were unilateral and 1,612 were bilateral injections. Patients were included in the study regardless of the diagnosis. Ranibizumab and aflibercept were the antiangiogenic drugs used. The presence of endophthalmitis or retinal detachment was evaluated.Results: A total of 1 (0.012% culture-proven endophthalmitis and 19 (0.233% acute intraocular inflammations were registered. In the unilateral injections group, there were 18 (0.274% acute intraocular inflammations and 1 (0.015% culture-proven endophthalmitis. One (0.062% of the 1,612 bilateral same-day injections had a unilateral acute intraocular inflammation, and there were no culture-proven endophthalmitis in this group.Conclusion: Bilateral same-day injections are more convenient for patients and their caregivers than the unilateral injections administered on different days. In our study, the prevalence of culture-proven endophthalmitis and acute intraocular inflammation was lower in the bilateral injections than in the unilateral group. These data support the idea that bilateral same-day injections are a safe and valid treatment to use in our clinical practice. Keywords: bilateral, intravitreal, injections, anti-VEGF, endophthalmitis

  11. Recommended Practices to Improve Nurse Tank Safety: Phase II

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-12-01

    This project addressed four topics: Pinhole leaks in nurse tanks were studied by radiography, serial milling, and side-angle ultrasound. These measurements indicated that welding surfaces contaminated by water, mill scale, rust, or other contamin...

  12. Single-Shell Tank (SST) Retrieval Project Plan for Tank 241-C-104 Retrieval

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DEFIGH PRICE, C.

    2000-01-01

    In support of the SST Interim Closure Project, Project W-523 ''Tank 241-C-104 Waste Retrieval System'' will provide systems for retrieval and transfer of radioactive waste from tank 241-C-104 (C-104) to the DST staging tank 241-AY-101 (AY-101). At the conclusion of Project W-523, a retrieval system will have been designed and tested to meet the requirements for Acceptance of Beneficial Use and been turned over to operations. Completion of construction and operations of the C-104 retrieval system will meet the recently proposed near-term Tri-Party Agreement milestone, M-45-03F (Proposed Tri-Party Agreement change request M-45-00-01A, August, 30 2000) for demonstrating limits of retrieval technologies on sludge and hard heels in SSTs, reduce near-term storage risks associated with aging SSTs, and provide feed for the tank waste treatment plant. This Project Plan documents the methodology for managing Project W-523; formalizes responsibilities; identifies key interfaces required to complete the retrieval action; establishes the technical, cost, and schedule baselines; and identifies project organizational requirements pertaining to the engineering process such as environmental, safety, quality assurance, change control, design verification, testing, and operational turnover

  13. Improving safety margin of LWRs by rethinking the emergency core cooling system criteria and safety system capacity

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Youho, E-mail: euo@kaist.ac.kr; Kim, Bokyung, E-mail: bkkim2@kaist.ac.kr; NO, Hee Cheon, E-mail: hcno@kaist.ac.kr

    2016-10-15

    Highlights: • Zircaloy embrittlement criteria can increase to 1370 °C for CP-ECR lower than 13%. • The draft ECCS criteria of U.S. NRC allow less than 5% in power margin. • The Japanese fracture-based criteria allow around 5% in power margin. • Increasing SIT inventory is effective in assuring safety margin for power uprates. - Abstract: This study investigates the engineering compatibility between emergency core cooling system criteria and safety water injection systems, in the pursuit of safety margin increase of light water reactors. This study proposes an acceptable temperature increase to 1370 °C as long as equivalent cladding reacted calculated by the Cathcart–Pawel equation is below 13%, after an extensive literature review. The influence of different ECCS criteria on the safety margin during large break loss of coolant accident is investigated for OPR-1000 by the system code MARS-KS, implemented with the KINS-REM method. The fracture-based emergency core cooling system (ECCS) criteria proposed in this study are shown to enable power margins up to 10%. In the meantime, the draft U.S. NRC’s embrittlement criteria (burnup-sensitive) and Japanese fracture-based criteria are shown to allow less than 5%, and around 5% of power margins, respectively. Increasing safety injection tank (SIT) water inventory is the key, yet convenient, way of assuring safety margin for power increase. More than 20% increase in the SIT water inventory is required to allow 15% power margins, for the U.S. NRC’s burnup-dependent embrittlement criteria. Controlling SIT water inventory would be a useful option that could allow the industrial desire to pursue power margins even under the recent atmosphere of imposing stricter ECCS criteria for the considerable burnup effects.

  14. Safety assessment of the SMART design during SBLOCA tests using the high pressure safety injection pump of the SMART-ITL facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bae, Hwang; Ryu, Sung Uk; Jeon, Byong-Guk; Yang, Jin-Hwa; Yoon, Eun-Koo; Shin, Yong-Cheol; Min, Kyoung-Ho; Park, Jong-Kuk; Choi, Nam-Hyun; Bang, Yun-Gon; Seo, Chan-Jong; Yi, Sung-Jae; Park, Hyun-Sik [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    SMART is a small-sized integral pressurized light water reactor designed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) from 1997 and received standard design approval (SDA) by the Korean regulatory body in July 2012. Single reactor pressure vessel contains all of the main components including a pressurizer (PZR), steam generators (SG) and reactor coolant pumps (RCP) without any large-size pipes. Several tests to verify a safety and performance of SMART design were carried out. This paper introduces a comparison with three SBLOCA tests. Overall thermal-hydraulic phenomena were observed and showed a traditional trend to decrease a system pressure and temperature. A collapsed water level of the hot side indicated that the safety injection system was successfully operated to recover the reactor coolant system (RCS) and protect the core uncover. An SBLOCA test simulating a guillotine break on the SIS, SCS, and PSV was performed. It was enough to keep a steady-state condition before the SBLOCA test begins. An actuation signal as the boundary condition was properly simulated during the transient test. The scenarios of the SBLOCA in the SMART design were reproduced well using the SMART-ITL facility. The safety injection is effective to protect the core uncover as well as to cool down the RCS. All of the measured parameters show reasonable behaviors.

  15. Safety assessment of the SMART design during SBLOCA tests using the high pressure safety injection pump of the SMART-ITL facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bae, Hwang; Ryu, Sung Uk; Jeon, Byong-Guk; Yang, Jin-Hwa; Yoon, Eun-Koo; Shin, Yong-Cheol; Min, Kyoung-Ho; Park, Jong-Kuk; Choi, Nam-Hyun; Bang, Yun-Gon; Seo, Chan-Jong; Yi, Sung-Jae; Park, Hyun-Sik

    2016-01-01

    SMART is a small-sized integral pressurized light water reactor designed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) from 1997 and received standard design approval (SDA) by the Korean regulatory body in July 2012. Single reactor pressure vessel contains all of the main components including a pressurizer (PZR), steam generators (SG) and reactor coolant pumps (RCP) without any large-size pipes. Several tests to verify a safety and performance of SMART design were carried out. This paper introduces a comparison with three SBLOCA tests. Overall thermal-hydraulic phenomena were observed and showed a traditional trend to decrease a system pressure and temperature. A collapsed water level of the hot side indicated that the safety injection system was successfully operated to recover the reactor coolant system (RCS) and protect the core uncover. An SBLOCA test simulating a guillotine break on the SIS, SCS, and PSV was performed. It was enough to keep a steady-state condition before the SBLOCA test begins. An actuation signal as the boundary condition was properly simulated during the transient test. The scenarios of the SBLOCA in the SMART design were reproduced well using the SMART-ITL facility. The safety injection is effective to protect the core uncover as well as to cool down the RCS. All of the measured parameters show reasonable behaviors

  16. FY 1997 Progress report on tube propagation testing of tank waste using the PRSST

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bechtold, D.B.

    1997-01-01

    The subject of this FY 1997 progress report is tube propagation tests of actual, dried tank waste to verify the contact temperature ignition (CTI) criterion for point-source ignition in the Hanford Site waste tanks. Testing is in support of the Organic Tanks Safety Project and will help resolve safety issues with waste containing organic constituents. In FY 1997, improvements were made to the laboratory apparatus and procedures for conducting the testing, and the final testing strategy was formulated. The strategy lays out details of the tests to be performed, samples to be tested, and modes of reporting results

  17. The Hanford Site Tank Waste Remediation System: An update

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alumkal, W.T.; Babad, H.; Harmon, H.D.; Wodrich, D.D.

    1994-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Site, located in southeastern Washington State, has the most diverse and largest amount of highly radioactive waste in the United States. High-level radioactive waste has been stored in large underground tanks since 1944. Approximately 230,000 m 3 (61 Mgal) of caustic liquids, slurries, saltcakes, and sludges have 137 Cs accumulated in 177 tanks. In addition, significant amounts of 90 Sr and were removed from the tank waste, converted to salts, doubly encapsulated in metal containers., and stored in water basins. A Tank Waste Remediation System Program was established by the U.S. Department of Energy in 1991 to safely manage and immobilize these wastes in anticipation of permanent disposal of the high-level waste fraction in a geologic repository. Since 1991, progress has been made resolving waste tank safety issues, upgrading Tank Farm facilities and operations, and developing a new strategy for retrieving, treating, and immobilizing the waste for disposal

  18. Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford Waste Tank U-203, Results from samples collected on August 8, 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pool, K.H.; Clauss, T.W.; Evans, J.C.; McVeety, B.D.; Thomas, B.L.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Ligotke, M.W.

    1995-11-01

    This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-U-203 (Tank U-203) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank-farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the results is listed. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the text

  19. Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford Waste Tank U-204, Results from samples collected on August 8, 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clauss, T.W.; Evans, J.C.; McVeety, B.D.; Pool, K.H.; Thomas, B.L.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Ligotke, M.W.

    1995-11-01

    This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-U-204 (Tank U-204) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank-farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the results is listed. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the text

  20. High organic containing tanks: Assessing the hazard potential

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, R.C.P.; Babad, H.

    1991-09-01

    Eight Hanford Site tanks contain organic chemicals at concentrations believed to be greater than 10 mole percent sodium acetate equivalent mixed with the oxidizing salts sodium nitrate/sodium nitrite. Also, three of the hydrogen and ferrocyanide tanks appear on the organic tank list. Concentrations of organics that may be present in some tanks could cause an exothermic reaction given a sufficient driving force, such as high temperatures. However, the difference between ignition temperatures and actual tank temperatures measured is so large that the probability of such a reaction is considered very low. The consequences of the postulated reaction are about the same as the scenarios for an explosion in a ''burping'' hydrogen tank. Although work on this issue is just beginning, consideration of hazards associated with heating nitrate-nitrite mixtures containing organic materials is an integral part of both the hydrogen and ferrocyanide tank efforts. High concentrations of organic compounds have been inferred (from tank transfer, flow sheet records, and limited analytical data) in eight single-shell tanks. Many organic chemicals, if present in concentrations above 10 dry weight percent (sodium acetate equivalent), have the potential to react with nitrate-nitrites constituents at temperatures above 200 degree C (392 degree F) in an exothermic manner. The concentrations of organic materials in the listed single-shell tanks, and their chemical identity, is not accurately known at present. A tank sampling program has been planned to provide more information on the contents of these tanks and to serve as a basis for laboratory testing and safety evaluations. 2 refs., 1 fig., 2 tabs

  1. Tank 241-T-105, cores 205 and 207 analytical results for the final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Esch, R.A.

    1997-01-01

    This document is the final laboratory report for tank 241-T-105 push mode core segments collected between June 24, 1997 and June 30, 1997. The segments were subsampled and analyzed in accordance with the Tank Push Mode Core Sampling and Analysis Plan (TSAP) (Field,1997), the Tank Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (Safety DQO) (Dukelow, et al., 1995) and Tank 241-T-105 Sample Analysis (memo) (Field, 1997a). The analytical results are included in Table 1. None of the subsamples submitted for the differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) analysis or total alpha activity (AT) exceeded the notification limits as stated in the TSAP (Field, 1997). The statistical results of the 95% confidence interval on the mean calculations are provided by the Tank Waste Remediation Systems (TWRS) Technical Basis Group in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding (Schreiber, 1997) and not considered in this report

  2. Risk assessment methodology for Hanford high-level waste tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bott, T.F.; Mac Farlane, D.R.; Stack, D.W.; Kindinger, J.

    1992-01-01

    A methodology is presented for applying Probabilistic Safety Assessment techniques to quantification of the health risks posed by the high-level waste (HLW) underground tanks at the Department of Energy's Hanford reservation. This methodology includes hazard screening development of a list of potential accident initiators, systems fault trees development and quantification, definition of source terms for various release categories, and estimation of health consequences from the releases. Both airborne and liquid pathway releases to the environment, arising from aerosol and spill/leak releases from the tanks, are included in the release categories. The proposed methodology is intended to be applied to a representative subset of the total of 177 tanks, thereby providing a baseline risk profile for the HLW tank farm that can be used for setting clean-up/remediation priorities. Some preliminary results are presented for Tank 101-SY

  3. Science and technology needs: Integrated research and development, the path to gaining a defensible understanding on ''watch list'' tank risk and interim stabilization needs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, B.M.; Mellinger, G.; Strachan, D.; Hallen, R.

    1991-09-01

    The ''watch list'' waste tanks at the Hanford Site in Washington state are those that the Secretary of the Department of Energy reports upon to the Congress because of the unresolved safety question. As such, they are subject to intense surveillance and an enhanced list of controls and safety procedures. The objective of the Waste Tank Safety Program is to mitigate the safety concerns with respect to these tanks, thereby removing them from the ''watch list.'' The essential step in this process is the development of a defensible position that reduce the risk of these tanks to an acceptable level. An integrated research and development (R ampersand D) program is believed to be the most cost-effective means of achieving the information required to mitigate the safety concern and to resolve the safety issues. This program uses chemical and physical modeling studies of synthetic waste, is substantiated with limited field data and radioactive samples from a tank, and uses numerical modeling to extrapolate results to actual tank-scale operations. 3 refs., 4 figs

  4. Safety and efficacy of bi-annual intra-articular LBSA0103 injections in patients with knee osteoarthritis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lee, Jin Kyu; Choi, Chong-Hyuk; Oh, Kwang-Jun; Kyung, Hee-Soo; Yoo, Ju-Hyung; Ha, Chul-Won; Bin, Seong-Il; Kang, Seung-Baik; Kim, Myung Ku; Lee, Ju-Hong; Lee, Myung Chul

    2017-11-01

    The objective of this study is to assess the safety and efficacy of repeated intra-articular injection of high molecular weight hyaluronic acid (LBSA0103) at a 26-week interval, in patients with osteoarthritis of the knee. The study was an open-label, single arm, multicentre prospective trial conducted in patients with symptomatic knee osteoarthritis. The intervention consisted of two intra-articular injections of LBSA0103, with the second injection performed 26 weeks after the first injection. The primary outcome was the incidence of adverse drug reactions related to each injection. Assessment of efficacy of repeated injections in terms of maintenance of pain relief was a secondary objective of this study. Of the 185 patients screened, 174 patients received the first injection and 153 patients received both injections of LBSA0103. Nine adverse drug reactions occurred in seven patients (4.02%) after the first injection, while only one adverse drug reaction occurred (0.65%) after the second injection. As a secondary outcome measure, the improvements in the efficacy parameters including total WOMAC score and weight-bearing pain were all significant at both week 13 and 39 compared to the baseline value (P injection were consistent with those after the initial injection of LBSA0103 (between week 26 and week 39, P injection of LBSA0103 at a 26-week interval is safe without increased risk of adverse drug reactions. Additionally, LBSA0103 is effective in reduction of osteoarthritis knee pain and in maintenance of pain reduction for a 39-week period when a second injection is administered.

  5. Tanks focus area multiyear program plan FY97-FY99

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-08-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) continues to face a major tank remediation problem with approximately 332 tanks storing over 378,000 ml of high-level waste (HLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste across the DOE complex. Most of the tanks have significantly exceeded their life spans. Approximately 90 tanks across the DOE complex are known or assumed to have leaked. Some of the tank contents are potentially explosive. These tanks must be remediated and made safe. How- ever, regulatory drivers are more ambitious than baseline technologies and budgets will support. Therefore, the Tanks Focus Area (TFA) began operation in October 1994. The focus area manages, coordinates, and leverages technology development to provide integrated solutions to remediate problems that will accelerate safe and cost-effective cleanup and closure of DOE's national tank system. The TFA is responsible for technology development to support DOE's four major tank sites: Hanford Site (Washington), INEL (Idaho), Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) (Tennessee), and Savannah River Site (SRS) (South Carolina). Its technical scope covers the major functions that comprise a complete tank remediation system: safety, characterization, retrieval, pretreatment, immobilization, and closure

  6. Assessment of chemical vulnerabilities in the Hanford high-level waste tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meacham, J.E.

    1996-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to summarize results of relevant data (tank farm and laboratory) and analysis related to potential chemical vulnerabilities of the Hanford Site waste tanks. Potential chemical safety vulnerabilities examined include spontaneous runaway reactions, condensed phase waste combustibility, and tank headspace flammability. The major conclusions of the report are the following: Spontaneous runaway reactions are not credible; condensed phase combustion is not likely; and periodic releases of flammable gas can be mitigated by interim stabilization

  7. Safety and Efficacy of Intratumoral Injections of Chimeric Antigen Receptor (CAR) T Cells in Metastatic Breast Cancer.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tchou, Julia; Zhao, Yangbing; Levine, Bruce L; Zhang, Paul J; Davis, Megan M; Melenhorst, Jan Joseph; Kulikovskaya, Irina; Brennan, Andrea L; Liu, Xiaojun; Lacey, Simon F; Posey, Avery D; Williams, Austin D; So, Alycia; Conejo-Garcia, Jose R; Plesa, Gabriela; Young, Regina M; McGettigan, Shannon; Campbell, Jean; Pierce, Robert H; Matro, Jennifer M; DeMichele, Angela M; Clark, Amy S; Cooper, Laurence J; Schuchter, Lynn M; Vonderheide, Robert H; June, Carl H

    2017-12-01

    Chimeric antigen receptors (CAR) are synthetic molecules that provide new specificities to T cells. Although successful in treatment of hematologic malignancies, CAR T cells are ineffective for solid tumors to date. We found that the cell-surface molecule c-Met was expressed in ∼50% of breast tumors, prompting the construction of a CAR T cell specific for c-Met, which halted tumor growth in immune-incompetent mice with tumor xenografts. We then evaluated the safety and feasibility of treating metastatic breast cancer with intratumoral administration of mRNA-transfected c-Met-CAR T cells in a phase 0 clinical trial (NCT01837602). Introducing the CAR construct via mRNA ensured safety by limiting the nontumor cell effects (on-target/off-tumor) of targeting c-Met. Patients with metastatic breast cancer with accessible cutaneous or lymph node metastases received a single intratumoral injection of 3 × 10 7 or 3 × 10 8 cells. CAR T mRNA was detectable in peripheral blood and in the injected tumor tissues after intratumoral injection in 2 and 4 patients, respectively. mRNA c-Met-CAR T cell injections were well tolerated, as none of the patients had study drug-related adverse effects greater than grade 1. Tumors treated with intratumoral injected mRNA c-Met-CAR T cells were excised and analyzed by immunohistochemistry, revealing extensive tumor necrosis at the injection site, cellular debris, loss of c-Met immunoreactivity, all surrounded by macrophages at the leading edges and within necrotic zones. We conclude that intratumoral injections of mRNA c-Met-CAR T cells are well tolerated and evoke an inflammatory response within tumors. Cancer Immunol Res; 5(12); 1152-61. ©2017 AACR . ©2017 American Association for Cancer Research.

  8. Technology development activities supporting tank waste remediation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bonner, W.F.; Beeman, G.H.

    1994-06-01

    This document summarizes work being conducted under the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Technology Development (EM-50) in support of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Program. The specific work activities are organized by the following categories: safety, characterization, retrieval, barriers, pretreatment, low-level waste, and high-level waste. In most cases, the activities presented here were identified as supporting tank remediation by EM-50 integrated program or integrated demonstration lead staff and the selections were further refined by contractor staff. Data sheets were prepared from DOE-HQ guidance to the field issued in September 1993. Activities were included if a significant portion of the work described provides technology potentially needed by TWRS; consequently, not all parts of each description necessarily support tank remediation

  9. Tank 241-C-106 waste retrieval sluicing system process control plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carothers, K.G.

    1998-07-25

    Project W-320 has installed the Waste Retrieval Sluicing System at the 200 East Area on the Hanford Site to retrieve the sludge from single-shell tank 241-C-106 and transfer it into double-shell tank 241-AY-102. Operation of the WRSS process will resolve the high-heat safety issue for tank 241-C-106 and demonstrate a technology for the retrieval of single-shell tank wastes. This process control plan coordinates the technical operating requirements (primarily mass transfer, temperature, and flammable gas) for the sluicing operation and provides overall technical guidance for the retrieval activity.

  10. Tank 241-C-106 waste retrieval sluicing system process control plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carothers, K.G.

    1998-01-01

    Project W-320 has installed the Waste Retrieval Sluicing System at the 200 East Area on the Hanford Site to retrieve the sludge from single-shell tank 241-C-106 and transfer it into double-shell tank 241-AY-102. Operation of the WRSS process will resolve the high-heat safety issue for tank 241-C-106 and demonstrate a technology for the retrieval of single-shell tank wastes. This process control plan coordinates the technical operating requirements (primarily mass transfer, temperature, and flammable gas) for the sluicing operation and provides overall technical guidance for the retrieval activity

  11. AX Tank Farm tank removal study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    SKELLY, W.A.

    1999-02-24

    This report examines the feasibility of remediating ancillary equipment associated with the 241-AX Tank Farm at the Hanford Site. Ancillary equipment includes surface structures and equipment, process waste piping, ventilation components, wells, and pits, boxes, sumps, and tanks used to make waste transfers to/from the AX tanks and adjoining tank farms. Two remedial alternatives are considered: (1) excavation and removal of all ancillary equipment items, and (2) in-situ stabilization by grout filling, the 241-AX Tank Farm is being employed as a strawman in engineering studies evaluating clean and landfill closure options for Hanford single-shell tanks. This is one of several reports being prepared for use by the Hanford Tanks Initiative Project to explore potential closure options and to develop retrieval performance evaluation criteria for tank farms.

  12. Knowledge and Practice on Injection Safety among Primary Health Care Workers in Kaski District, Western Nepal

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gyawali, Sudesh; Rathore, Devendra Singh; Shankar, P Ravi; Kc, Vikash Kumar; Jha, Nisha; Sharma, Damodar

    2016-01-01

    Background Unsafe injection practice can transmit various blood borne infections. The aim of this study was to assess the knowledge and practice of injection safety among injection providers, to obtain information about disposal of injectable devices, and to compare the knowledge and practices of urban and rural injection providers. Methods The study was conducted with injection providers working at primary health care facilities within Kaski district, Nepal. Ninety-six health care workers from 69 primary health care facilities were studied and 132 injection events observed. A semi-structured checklist was used for observing injection practice and a questionnaire for the survey. Respondents were interviewed to complete the questionnaire and obtain possible explanations for certain observed behaviors. Results All injection providers knew of at least one pathogen transmitted through use/re-use of unsterile syringes. Proportion of injection providers naming hepatitis/jaundice as one of the diseases transmitted by unsafe injection practice was significantly higher in urban (75.6%) than in rural (39.2%) area. However, compared to urban respondents (13.3%), a significantly higher proportion of rural respondents (37.3%) named Hepatitis B specifically as one of the diseases transmitted. Median (inter-quartile range) number of therapeutic injection and injectable vaccine administered per day by the injection providers were 2 (1) and 1 (1), respectively. Two handed recapping by injection providers was significantly higher in urban area (33.3%) than in rural areas (21.6%). Most providers were not aware of the post exposure prophylaxis guideline. Conclusion The knowledge of the injection providers about safe injection practice was acceptable. The use of safe injection practice by providers in urban and rural health care facilities was almost similar. The deficiencies noted in the practice must be addressed. PMID:27540325

  13. Regulatory analysis for the use of underground barriers at the Hanford Site tank farms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hampsten, K.L.

    1994-01-01

    Sixty-seven of the single-shell tanks at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington, are assumed to have leaked in the past. Some of the waste retrieval options being considered, such as past-practice sluicing (a process that uses hot water to dislodge waste for subsequent removal by pumping), have the potential for increasing releases of dangerous waste from these tanks. Underground barrier systems are being evaluated as a method to mitigate releases of tank waste to the soil and groundwater that may occur during retrieval activities. The following underground barrier system options are among those being evaluated to determine whether their construction at the Single-Shell Tank Farms is viable. (1) A desiccant barrier would be created by circulating air through the subsurface soil to lower and then maintain the water saturation below the levels required for liquids to flow. (2) An injected materials barrier would be created by injecting materials such as grout or silica into the subsurface soils to form a barrier around and under a given tank or tank farm. (3) A cryogenic barrier would be created by freezing subsurface soils in the vicinity of a tank or tank farm. An analysis is provided of the major regulatory requirements that may impact full scale construction and operation of an underground barrier system and a discussion of factors that should be considered throughout the barrier selection process, irrespective of the type of underground barrier system being considered. However, specific barrier systems will be identified when a given regulation will have significant impact on a particular type of barrier technology. Appendix A provides a matrix of requirements applicable to construction and operation of an underground barrier system

  14. AX Tank Farm tank removal study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SKELLY, W.A.

    1998-01-01

    This report considers the feasibility of exposing, demolishing, and removing underground storage tanks from the 241-AX Tank Farm at the Hanford Site. For the study, it was assumed that the tanks would each contain 360 ft 3 of residual waste (corresponding to the one percent residual Inventory target cited in the Tri-Party Agreement) at the time of demolition. The 241-AX Tank Farm is being employed as a ''strawman'' in engineering studies evaluating clean and landfill closure options for Hanford single-shell tank farms. The report is one of several reports being prepared for use by the Hanford Tanks Initiative Project to explore potential closure options and to develop retrieval performance evaluation criteria for tank farms

  15. Tank 241-S-106, cores 183, 184 and 187 analytical results for the final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Esch, R.A.

    1997-01-01

    This document is the final laboratory report for tank 241-S-106 push mode core segments collected between February 12, 1997 and March 21, 1997. The segments were subsampled and analyzed in accordance with the Tank Push Mode Core Sampling and Analysis Plan (TSAP), the Tank Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (Safety DQO), the Historical Model Evaluation Data Requirements (Historical DQO) and the Data Quality Objective to Support Resolution of the Organic Complexant Safety Issue (Organic DQO). The analytical results are included in Table 1. Six of the twenty-four subsamples submitted for the differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) analysis exceeded the notification limit of 480 Joules/g stated in the DQO. Appropriate notifications were made. Total Organic Carbon (TOC) analyses were performed on all samples that produced exotherms during the DSC analysis. All results were less than the notification limit of three weight percent TOC. No cyanide analysis was performed, per agreement with the Tank Safety Program. None of the samples submitted for Total Alpha Activity exceeded notification limits as stated in the TSAP. Statistical evaluation of results by calculating the 95% upper confidence limit is not performed by the 222-S Laboratory and is not considered in this report. No core composites were created because there was insufficient solid material from any of the three core sampling events to generate a composite that would be representative of the tank contents

  16. First generation long-reach manipulator for retrieval of waste from Hanford single-shell tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gibbons, P.W.; McDaniel, L.B.

    1994-10-01

    The US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, has established the Tank Waste Remediation System to resolve environmental and safety issues related to underground waste-storage tanks at the Hanford Site. The Tank Waste Remediation System has identified the use of an advanced-technology, long-reach manipulator system as a low-water-addition retrieval alternative to past-practice sluicing

  17. Are needle-free injections a useful alternative for growth hormone therapy in children? Safety and pharmacokinetics of growth hormone delivered by a new needle-free injection device compared to a fine gauge needle.

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dorr, H.G.; Zabransky, S.; Keller, E.; Otten, B.J.; Partsch, C.J.; Nyman, L.; Gillespie, B.K.; Lester, N.R.; Wilson, A.M.; Hyren, C.; Kuijck, M.A. van; Schuld, P.; Schoenfeld, S.L.

    2003-01-01

    The clinical safety, use and pharmacokinetics of a new needle-free device for delivery of growth hormone (GH) were compared with those of conventional needle injection devices. In an open-label, randomized, 4-period crossover study, 18 healthy adults received single subcutaneous injections of

  18. Improvement of Modeling Scheme of the Safety Injection Tank with Fluidic Device for Realistic LBLOCA Calculation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bang, Young Seok; Cheong, Aeju; Woo, Sweng Woong

    2014-01-01

    Confirmation of the performance of the SIT with FD should be based on thermal-hydraulic analysis of LBLOCA and an adequate and physical model simulating the SIT/FD should be used in the LBLOCA calculation. To develop such a physical model on SIT/FD, simulation of the major phenomena including flow distribution of by standpipe and FD should be justified by full scale experiment and/or plant preoperational testing. Author's previous study indicated that an approximation of SIT/FD phenomena could be obtained by a typical system transient code, MARS-KS, and using 'accumulator' component model, however, that additional improvement on modeling scheme of the FD and standpipe flow paths was needed for a reasonable prediction. One problem was a depressurizing behavior after switchover to low flow injection phase. Also a potential to release of nitrogen gas from the SIT to the downstream pipe and then reactor core through flow paths of FD and standpipe has been concerned. The intrusion of noncondensible gas may have an effect on LBLOCA thermal response. Therefore, a more reliable model on SIT/FD has been requested to get a more accurate prediction and a confidence of the evaluation of LBLOCA. The present paper is to discuss an improvement of modeling scheme from the previous study. Compared to the existing modeling, effect of the present modeling scheme on LBLOCA cladding thermal response is discussed. The present study discussed the modeling scheme of SIT with FD for a realistic simulation of LBLOCA of APR1400. Currently, the SIT blowdown test can be best simulated by the modeling scheme using 'pipe' component with dynamic area reduction. The LBLOCA analysis adopting the modeling scheme showed the PCT increase of 23K when compared to the case of 'accumulator' component model, which was due to the flow rate decrease at transition phase low flow injection and intrusion of nitrogen gas to the core. Accordingly, the effect of SIT/FD modeling

  19. Developing a model for moisture in saltcake waste tanks: Progress report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simmons, C.S.; Aimo, N.; Fayer, M.J.; White, M.D.

    1997-07-01

    This report describes a modeling effort to provide a computer simulation capability for estimating the distribution and movement of moisture in the saltcake-type waste contained in Hanford's single-shell radioactive waste storage tanks. This moisture model goes beyond an earlier version because it describes water vapor movement as well as the interstitial liquid held in a saltcake waste. The work was performed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to assist Duke Engineering and Services Hanford with the Organic Tank Safety Program. The Organic Tank Safety Program is concerned whether saltcake waste, when stabilized by jet pumping, will retain sufficient moisture near the surface to preclude any possibility of an accidental ignition and propagation of burning. The nitrate/nitrite saltcake, which might also potentially include combustible organic chemicals might not always retain enough moisture near the surface to preclude any such accident. Draining liquid from a tank by pumping, coupled with moisture evaporating into a tank's head space, may cause a dry waste surface that is not inherently safe. The moisture model was devised to help examine this safety question. The model accounts for water being continually cycled by evaporation into the head space and returned to the waste by condensation or partly lost through venting to the external atmosphere. Water evaporation occurs even in a closed tank, because it is driven by the transfer to the outside of the heat load generated by radioactivity within the waste. How dry a waste may become over time depends on the particular hydraulic properties of a saltcake, and the model uses those properties to describe the capillary flow of interstitial liquid as well as the water vapor flow caused by thermal differences within the porous waste

  20. Protecting worker health and safety using remote handling systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dennison, D.K.; Merrill, R.D.; Reed, R.K.

    1995-03-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is currently developing and installing two large-scale, remotely controlled systems for use in improving worker health and safety by minimizing exposure to hazardous and radioactive materials. The first system is a full-scale liquid feed system for use in delivering chemical reagents to LLNL's existing aqueous low-level radioactive and mixed waste treatment facility (Tank Farm). The Tank Farm facility is used to remove radioactive and toxic materials in aqueous wastes prior to discharge to the City of Livermore Water Reclamation Plant (LWRP), in accordance with established discharge limits. Installation of this new reagent feed system improves operational safety and process efficiency by eliminating the need to manually handle reagents used in the treatment processes. This was done by installing a system that can inject precisely metered amounts of various reagents into the treatment tanks and can be controlled either remotely or locally via a programmable logic controller (PLC). The second system uses a robotic manipulator to remotely handle, characterize, process, sort, and repackage hazardous wastes containing tritium. This system uses an IBM-developed gantry robot mounted within a special glove box enclosure designed to isolate tritiated wastes from system operators and minimize the potential for release of tritium to the atmosphere. Tritiated waste handling is performed remotely, using the robot in a teleoperational mode for one-of-a-kind functions and in an autonomous mode for repetitive operations. The system is compatible with an existing portable gas cleanup unit designed to capture any gas-phase tritium inadvertently released into the glove box during waste handling

  1. Investigation of thermolytic hydrogen generation rate of tank farm simulated and actual waste

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Martino, C. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Newell, D. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Woodham, W. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Pareizs, J. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Edwards, T. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Howe, A. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL)

    2017-11-15

    To support resolution of Potential Inadequacies in the Safety Analysis for the Savannah River Site (SRS) Tank Farm, Savannah River National Laboratory conducted research to determine the thermolytic hydrogen generation rate (HGR) with simulated and actual waste. Gas chromatography methods were developed and used with air-purged flow systems to quantify hydrogen generation from heated simulated and actual waste at rates applicable to the Tank Farm Documented Safety Analysis (DSA). Initial simulant tests with a simple salt solution plus sodium glycolate demonstrated the behavior of the test apparatus by replicating known HGR kinetics. Additional simulant tests with the simple salt solution excluding organics apart from contaminants provided measurement of the detection and quantification limits for the apparatus with respect to hydrogen generation. Testing included a measurement of HGR on actual SRS tank waste from Tank 38. A final series of measurements examined HGR for a simulant with the most common SRS Tank Farm organics at temperatures up to 140 °C. The following conclusions result from this testing.

  2. 46 CFR 35.30-10 - Cargo tank hatches, ullage holes, and Butterworth plates-TB/ALL.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cargo tank hatches, ullage holes, and Butterworth plates... OPERATIONS General Safety Rules § 35.30-10 Cargo tank hatches, ullage holes, and Butterworth plates—TB/ALL. No cargo tank hatches, ullage holes, or Butterworth plates shall be opened or shall remain open...

  3. Test plan for Fauske and Associates to perform tube propagation experiments with simulated Hanford tank wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, C.D.; Babad, H.

    1996-05-01

    This test plan, prepared at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for Westinghouse Hanford Company, provides guidance for performing tube propagation experiments on simulated Hanford tank wastes and on actual tank waste samples. Simulant compositions are defined and an experimental logic tree is provided for Fauske and Associates (FAI) to perform the experiments. From this guidance, methods and equipment for small-scale tube propagation experiments to be performed at the Hanford Site on actual tank samples will be developed. Propagation behavior of wastes will directly support the safety analysis (SARR) for the organic tanks. Tube propagation may be the definitive tool for determining the relative reactivity of the wastes contained in the Hanford tanks. FAI have performed tube propagation studies previously on simple two- and three-component surrogate mixtures. The simulant defined in this test plan more closely represents actual tank composition. Data will be used to support preparation of criteria for determining the relative safety of the organic bearing wastes

  4. Developments in the safe design of LNG tanks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fulford, N. J.; Slatter, M. D.

    The objective of this paper is to discuss how the gradual development of design concepts for liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage systems has helped to enhance storage safety and economy. The experience in the UK is compared with practice in other countries with similar LNG storage requirements. Emphasis is placed on the excellent record of safety and reliability exhibited by tanks with a primary metal container designed and constructed to approved standards. The work carried out to promote the development of new materials, fire protection, and monitoring systems for use in LNG storage is also summarized, and specific examples described from British Gas experience. Finally, the trends in storage tank design world-wide and options for future design concepts are discussed, bearing in mind planned legislation and design codes governing hazardous installations.

  5. Tank 241-BY-109, cores 201 and 203, analytical results for the final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Esch, R.A.

    1997-01-01

    This document is the final laboratory report for tank 241-BY-109 push mode core segments collected between June 6, 1997 and June 17, 1997. The segments were subsampled and analyzed in accordance with the Tank Push Mode Core Sampling and Analysis Plan (Bell, 1997), the Tank Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (Dukelow, et al, 1995). The analytical results are included

  6. Structural failure modes in vertical tanks: reinforcement evaluation and solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alcantud Abellan, M.; Orden Martinez, A.

    1995-01-01

    Vertical storage tanks are essential components in the safety of nuclear plant systems. It has been shown that the traditional method of analysing seismic loads is not conservative, as it does not take account of the interaction between fluid and tank structure. This paper identifies different possible structural failure modes in tanks due to seismic load, and methods devised by various authors to evaluate tank structure capacity under different failure modes. These methods are based on experimental data relating to the structural behaviour of tanks during actual seismic events, tests, and theoretical analyses. The paper describes the problems of these structures under seismic loads in nuclear plants. It proposes solutions to the main structural problem, tank anchorage, for which the re-evaluation of the anchorage capacity is required, using methods (finite element) less conservative than those proposed by other authors. Also proposed is the local reinforcement of anchorages to increase their capacity. (Author) 4 refs

  7. Preliminary investigation of interconnected systems interactions for the safety injection system of Indian Point-3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alesso, H.P.; Lappa, D.A.; Smith, C.F.; Sacks, I.J.

    1983-01-01

    The rich diversity of ideas and techniques for analyzing interconnected systems interaction has presented the NRC with the problem of identifying methods appropriate for their own review and audit. This report presents the findings of a preliminary study using the Digraph Matrix Analysis method to evaluate interconnected systems interactions for the safety injection system of Indian Point-3. The analysis effort in this study was subjected to NRC constraints regarding the use of Boolean logic, the construction of simplified plant representations or maps, and the development of heuristic measures as specified by the NRC. The map and heuristic measures were found to be an unsuccessful approach. However, from the effort to model and analyze the Indian Point-3 safety injection system, including Boolean logic in the model, singleton and doubleton cut-sets were identified. It is recommended that efforts excluding Boolean logic and utilizing the NRC heuristic measures not be pursed further and that the Digraph Matrix approach (or other comparable risk assessment technique) with Boolean logic included to conduct the audit of the Indian Point-3 systems interaction study

  8. Ferrocyanide Safety Program: Data requirements for the ferrocyanide safety issue developed through the data quality objectives (DQO) process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buck, J.W.; Anderson, C.M.; Pulsipher, B.A.; Toth, J.J.; Turner, P.J.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.; Meacham, J.E.

    1993-12-01

    This document records the data quality objectives (DQO) process applied to the Ferrocyanide Waste Tank Safety Issue at the Hanford Site by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory and Westinghouse Hanford Company. Specifically, the major recommendations and findings from this Ferrocyanide DQO process are presented so that decision makers can determine the type, quantity, and quality of data required for addressing tank safety issues. The decision logic diagrams and error tolerance equations also are provided. Finally, the document includes the DQO sample-size formulas for determining specific tank sampling requirements

  9. Motorcycle fuel tanks and pelvic fractures: A motorcycle fuel tank syndrome.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Meredith, Lauren; Baldock, Matthew; Fitzharris, Michael; Duflou, Johan; Dal Nevo, Ross; Griffiths, Michael; Brown, Julie

    2016-08-17

    Pelvic injuries are a serious and commonly occurring injury to motorcycle riders involved in crashes, yet there has been limited research investigating the mechanisms involved in these injuries. This study aimed to investigate the mechanisms involved in pelvic injuries to crashed motorcyclists. This study involved in-depth crash investigation and 2 convenience-based data sets were used. These data sets investigated motorcycle crashes in the Sydney, Newcastle, and Adelaide regions. Participants included motorcycle riders who had crashed either on a public road or private property within the study areas. The mechanism of injury and the type of injuries were investigated. The most frequent cause of pelvic injuries in crashed motorcyclists was due to contact with the motorcycle fuel tank during the crash (85%). For riders who had come into contact with the fuel tank, the injury types were able to be grouped into 3 categories based on the complexity of the injury. The complexity of the injury appeared to increase with impact speed but this was a nonsignificant trend. The pelvic injuries that did not occur from contact with the fuel tank in this sample differed in asymmetry of loading and did not commonly involve injury to the bladder. They were commonly one-sided injuries but this differed based on the point of loading; however, a larger sample of these injuries needs to be investigated. Overall improvements in road safety have not been replicated in the amelioration of pelvic injuries in motorcyclists and improvements in the design of crashworthy motorcycle fuel tanks appear to be required.

  10. Resolving the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue at the Hanford Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meacham, J.E.; Cash, R.J.; Babad, H.

    1994-02-01

    Considerable data have been obtained on the chemical and physical properties of ferrocyanide waste stored in Hanford Site single-shell tanks (SSTs). Theoretical analyses and ferrocyanide waste simulant studies have led to the development of fuel, moisture, and temperature criteria that define continued safe storage. Developing the criteria provides the technical basis for closing the Ferrocyanide Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ). Using the safety criteria, the ferrocyanide tanks have been ranked into one of three safety categories: Safe, Conditionally Safe, and Unsafe. All the ferrocyanide tanks are currently ranked in either the Safe or Conditionally Safe categories. Analyses of core samples taken from three ferrocyanide tanks have shown cyanide concentrations about a factor of ten lower than predicted by the original flowsheets. Hydrolytic and radiolytic destruction (aging) of the ferrocyanide matrix has occurred during the 35 plus years the waste has been stored at the Hanford Site. Because of waste aging, it is possible that all of the ferrocyanide tanks may now contain less than the 8 wt % sodium nickel ferrocyanide specified in the fuel criterion for the Safe category. Ferrocyanide tanks that remain in the Conditionally Safe category may require monitoring and surveillance to verify that the waste remains in an unreactive state. Further characterization of the tanks by core sampling and analyses should lead to resolution of the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue by September 1997

  11. Mass spectrometry analysis of tank wastes at the Hanford Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, J.A.; Mong, G.M.; Clauss, S.A.

    1995-01-01

    Twenty-five of the 177 high-level waste storage tanks at the Hanford Site in southeastern Washington are being watched closely because of the possibility that flammable gas mixtures may be produced from the mixed wastes contained in the storage tanks. One tank in particular, Tank 241-SY-101 (Tank 101-SY), has exhibited episodic releases of flammable gas mixtures since its final filling in the early 1980s. It has been postulated that the organic compounds present in the waste may be precursors to the production of hydrogen. Mass spectrometry has proven to be an invaluable tool for the identification of organic components in wastes from Tank 101-SY and C-103. A suite of physical and chemical analyses has been performed in support of activities directed toward the resolution of an Unresolved Safety Question concerning the potential for a floating organic layer in Hanford Waste Tank 241-C-103 to sustain a pool fire. The aqueous layer underlying the floating organic material was also analyzed for organic components

  12. Reevaluation of the post-marketing safety of Shuxuening injection based on real-world and evidence-based evaluations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Can; Shi, Qing-Ping; Ding, Feng; Jiang, Xiao-Dong; Tang, Wei; Yu, Mei-Ling; Zhu, Jian-Hua

    2018-01-01

    To evaluate the factors influencing suspected hypersensitivity and adverse systemic reactions after Shuxuening injection and to provide innovative ideas and methods for the reevaluation of post-marketing safety of Shuxuening. This study used a prospective, nested case-control study design, combined with a prescription sequence analysis design method. It classified patients who exhibited trigger signals after administration of Shuxuening injection as suspected allergic patients and made comparisons with patients who did not report adverse effects to calculate the correlation between relevant risk factors and suspected allergic reactions. Randomized controlled studies and cohort studies of the adverse drug reaction (ADR) of Shuxuening were performed using a computer database. Data retrieval was carried out by the foundation governing the individual database. Meta-analysis was performed by using R3.2.3 software to evaluate the ADRs of Shuxuening. The results of real-world study showed that administration of Shuxuening in combination with potassium aspartate and magnesium, atorvastatin calcium, Shengmai injection, pantoprazole sodium, or high-dose medication was a risk factor for suspected allergic reactions. Meta-analysis showed that the incidence of adverse events was 5.84% (95% CI 0.0499; 0.0674), and serious adverse reaction rate was 4.36% (95% CI 0.0188; 0.0760) when Shuxuening was used in combination with these drugs. The incidence of allergic reaction was also influenced by the vehicle, duration of treatment, single dose, and indicated vs off-label use. Risk factors for adverse reaction following the use of Shuxuening injection in patients are associated with a single dose, vehicle, type of disease, and combination with potassium aspartate, atorvastatin calcium, Shengmai injection, injection with pantoprazole sodium, and other drugs. Physicians should be careful to follow guidelines when administering this drug. We further propose that the unique methodology

  13. Large-Scale Wireless Temperature Monitoring System for Liquefied Petroleum Gas Storage Tanks

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Guangwen Fan

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available Temperature distribution is a critical indicator of the health condition for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG storage tanks. In this paper, we present a large-scale wireless temperature monitoring system to evaluate the safety of LPG storage tanks. The system includes wireless sensors networks, high temperature fiber-optic sensors, and monitoring software. Finally, a case study on real-world LPG storage tanks proves the feasibility of the system. The unique features of wireless transmission, automatic data acquisition and management, local and remote access make the developed system a good alternative for temperature monitoring of LPG storage tanks in practical applications.

  14. Large-Scale Wireless Temperature Monitoring System for Liquefied Petroleum Gas Storage Tanks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fan, Guangwen; Shen, Yu; Hao, Xiaowei; Yuan, Zongming; Zhou, Zhi

    2015-09-18

    Temperature distribution is a critical indicator of the health condition for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) storage tanks. In this paper, we present a large-scale wireless temperature monitoring system to evaluate the safety of LPG storage tanks. The system includes wireless sensors networks, high temperature fiber-optic sensors, and monitoring software. Finally, a case study on real-world LPG storage tanks proves the feasibility of the system. The unique features of wireless transmission, automatic data acquisition and management, local and remote access make the developed system a good alternative for temperature monitoring of LPG storage tanks in practical applications.

  15. Evaluation of the generation and release of flammable gases in tank 241-SY-101

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Babad, H.; Johnson, G.D.; Lechelt, J.A.; Reynolds, D.A. (Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States)); Pederson, L.R.; Strachan, D.M. (Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States)); Meisel, D.; Jonah, C. (Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)); Ashby, E.C. (Georgia Inst. of Tech., Atlanta, GA (United States))

    1991-11-01

    Tank 241-SY-101 is a double shell, high-level waste tank located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site. This tank contains about 1 million gallons of waste that was concentrated at the 242-S Evaporator. Shortly after the waste was put in the tank, the waste began to expand because the generation of gases. In 1990 this tank was declared to have an unreviewed safety question because of the periodic release of hydrogen and nitrous oxide. A safety program was established to conduct a characterization of the waste and vented gases and to determine an effective means to prevent the accumulation of flammable gases in the tank dome space and ventilation system. Results of the expanded characterization conducted in fiscal year 1991 are presented. The use of gas chromatographs, mass spectrometers, and hydrogen-specific monitors provided a greater understanding of the vented gases. Additional instrumentation placed in the tank also helped to provide more detailed information on tank temperatures, gas pressure, and gas flow rates. An extensive laboratory study involving the Westinghouse Hanford Company, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and the Georgia Institute of Technology was initiated for the purpose of determining the mechanisms responsible for the generation of various gases. These studies evaluate both radiolytic and thermochemical processes. Results of the first series of experiments are described.

  16. Gas generation and retention in Tank 101-SY: A summary of laboratory studies, tank data, and information needs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pederson, L.R.; Ashby, E.C.; Jonah, C.; Meisel, D.; Strachan, D.M.

    1992-06-01

    Chemical and radioactive wastes from processes used to separate plutonium from uranium are stored in underground tanks at the Hanford Site in Washington state. In March 1981, it was observed that the volume of wastes in Tank 101-SY slowly increased, followed by a rapid decrease and the venting of large quantities of gases. These cycles occurred every 8 to 15 weeks and continue to the present time. Subsequent analyses showed that these gases were composed primarily of hydrogen and nitrous oxide (N 2 O). In response to the potential for explosion and release of hazardous materials to the environment, laboratory programs were initiated at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Georgia Institute of Technology (GIT), Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), and Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC), to develop a better understanding of the physical and chemical processes occurring in this waste tank. An aggressive sampling and analysis effort is also under way to characterize the wastes as fully as possible. These efforts will provide a technically defensible basis for safety analyses and future mitigation/remediation of the tank and its contents

  17. Gas generation and retention in Tank 101-SY: A summary of laboratory studies, tank data, and information needs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pederson, L.R. [comp.] [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Ashby, E.C. [Georgia Inst. of Tech., Atlanta, GA (United States); Jonah, C.; Meisel, D. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Strachan, D.M. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States)

    1992-06-01

    Chemical and radioactive wastes from processes used to separate plutonium from uranium are stored in underground tanks at the Hanford Site in Washington state. In March 1981, it was observed that the volume of wastes in Tank 101-SY slowly increased, followed by a rapid decrease and the venting of large quantities of gases. These cycles occurred every 8 to 15 weeks and continue to the present time. Subsequent analyses showed that these gases were composed primarily of hydrogen and nitrous oxide (N{sub 2}O). In response to the potential for explosion and release of hazardous materials to the environment, laboratory programs were initiated at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Georgia Institute of Technology (GIT), Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), and Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC), to develop a better understanding of the physical and chemical processes occurring in this waste tank. An aggressive sampling and analysis effort is also under way to characterize the wastes as fully as possible. These efforts will provide a technically defensible basis for safety analyses and future mitigation/remediation of the tank and its contents.

  18. Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford Tank 241-S-107: Results from samples collected on 06/18/96

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pool, K.H.; Evans, J.C.; Thomas, B.L.

    1997-01-01

    This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-S-107 (Tank S-107) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest National. Laboratory (PNNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, on sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the inorganic analytes, permanent gases, and total non-methane organic compounds is listed in Table S.1. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the appendices

  19. Safety of radiofrequency treatment over human skin previously injected with medium-term injectable soft-tissue augmentation materials: a controlled pilot trial.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alam, Murad; Levy, Ross; Pajvani, Urvi; Pavjani, Urvi; Ramierez, James A; Guitart, Joan; Veen, Heather; Gladstone, Hayes B

    2006-03-01

    Several soft-tissue augmentation materials are now available for reduction of nasolabial fold creases and perioral rhytides. Nasolabial folds and perioral rhytides can also be improved by skin tightening delivered by non-ablative radiofrequency (RF) treatment. The purpose of this study was to assess the safety of RF treatment over skin areas recently injected with medium-term injectable soft-tissue augmentation materials. Five subjects were assigned to the experimental arm (augmentation materials plus RF) and one to the control arm (augmentation materials alone). Each subject received injections of 0.3 mL of hyaluronic acid derivative (Restylane) and calcium hydroxylapatite (Radiesse) 3 cm apart on the upper inner arm. Two weeks later, two non-overlapping passes of RF (Thermage ThermaCool TC) were delivered at 63.5 setting with medium-fast 1.5 cm2 tip over injected sites in all of the experimental subjects. Punch skin biopsies were obtained 3 days later from each of the two injection sites on each subject. Light microscopy and digital photomicrographs obtained at low, medium, and high power showed no difference between filler materials in experimental and control subjects. In both cases filler was evident at the deep dermal-subcutaneous junction. Nodule formation, foreign body extravasation, or hemorrhage/clot was not observed grossly or histologically. Subjects and physicians did not report any difference in signs and symptoms between the experimental and control arms. Slightly increased transitory pain was noted when RF was delivered over filler versus over normal skin. Applying RF treatment over the same area 2 weeks after deep dermal injection with hyaluronic acid derivatives or calcium hydroxylapatite does not appear to cause gross morphological changes in the filler material or surrounding skin. Further studies with different parameters are necessary to confirm these findings. 2006 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

  20. Developing the Safety of Atrial Fibrillation Ablation Registry Initiative (SAFARI) as a collaborative pan-stakeholder critical path registry model: a Cardiac Safety Research Consortium "Incubator" Think Tank.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Al-Khatib, Sana M; Calkins, Hugh; Eloff, Benjamin C; Kowey, Peter; Hammill, Stephen C; Ellenbogen, Kenneth A; Marinac-Dabic, Danica; Waldo, Albert L; Brindis, Ralph G; Wilbur, David J; Jackman, Warren M; Yaross, Marcia S; Russo, Andrea M; Prystowsky, Eric; Varosy, Paul D; Gross, Thomas; Pinnow, Ellen; Turakhia, Mintu P; Krucoff, Mitchell W

    2010-10-01

    Although several randomized clinical trials have demonstrated the safety and efficacy of catheter ablation of atrial fibrillation (AF) in experienced centers, the outcomes of this procedure in routine clinical practice and in patients with persistent and long-standing persistent AF remain uncertain. Brisk adoption of this therapy by physicians with diverse training and experience highlights potential concerns regarding the safety and effectiveness of this procedure. Some of these concerns could be addressed by a national registry of AF ablation procedures such as the Safety of Atrial Fibrillation Ablation Registry Initiative that was initially proposed at a Cardiac Safety Research Consortium Think Tank meeting in April 2009. In January 2010, the Cardiac Safety Research Consortium, in collaboration with the Duke Clinical Research Institute, the US Food and Drug Administration, the American College of Cardiology, and the Heart Rhythm Society, held a follow-up meeting of experts in the field to review the construct and progress to date. Other participants included the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute; the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; the AdvaMed AF working group; and additional industry representatives. This article summarizes the discussions that occurred at the meeting of the state of the Safety of Atrial Fibrillation Ablation Registry Initiative, the identification of a clear pathway for its implementation, and the exploration of solutions to potential issues in the execution of this registry. Copyright © 2010 Mosby, Inc. All rights reserved.