WorldWideScience

Sample records for safety hazard analysis

  1. Software safety hazard analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lawrence, J.D.

    1996-02-01

    Techniques for analyzing the safety and reliability of analog-based electronic protection systems that serve to mitigate hazards in process control systems have been developed over many years, and are reasonably well understood. An example is the protection system in a nuclear power plant. The extension of these techniques to systems which include digital computers is not well developed, and there is little consensus among software engineering experts and safety experts on how to analyze such systems. One possible technique is to extend hazard analysis to include digital computer-based systems. Software is frequently overlooked during system hazard analyses, but this is unacceptable when the software is in control of a potentially hazardous operation. In such cases, hazard analysis should be extended to fully cover the software. A method for performing software hazard analysis is proposed in this paper

  2. The practical implementation of integrated safety management for nuclear safety analysis and fire hazards analysis documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    COLLOPY, M.T.

    1999-01-01

    In 1995 Mr. Joseph DiNunno of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued an approach to describe the concept of an integrated safety management program which incorporates hazard and safety analysis to address a multitude of hazards affecting the public, worker, property, and the environment. Since then the U S . Department of Energy (DOE) has adopted a policy to systematically integrate safety into management and work practices at all levels so that missions can be completed while protecting the public, worker, and the environment. While the DOE and its contractors possessed a variety of processes for analyzing fire hazards at a facility, activity, and job; the outcome and assumptions of these processes have not always been consistent for similar types of hazards within the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis. Although the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis are driven by different DOE Orders and requirements, these analyses should not be entirely independent and their preparation should be integrated to ensure consistency of assumptions, consequences, design considerations, and other controls. Under the DOE policy to implement an integrated safety management system, identification of hazards must be evaluated and agreed upon to ensure that the public. the workers. and the environment are protected from adverse consequences. The DOE program and contractor management need a uniform, up-to-date reference with which to plan. budget, and manage nuclear programs. It is crucial that DOE understand the hazards and risks necessarily to authorize the work needed to be performed. If integrated safety management is not incorporated into the preparation of the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis, inconsistencies between assumptions, consequences, design considerations, and controls may occur that affect safety. Furthermore, confusion created by inconsistencies may occur in the DOE process to grant authorization of the work. In accordance with

  3. A proposal for performing software safety hazard analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lawrence, J.D.; Gallagher, J.M.

    1997-01-01

    Techniques for analyzing the safety and reliability of analog-based electronic protection systems that serve to mitigate hazards in process control systems have been developed over many years, and are reasonably understood. An example is the protection system in a nuclear power plant. The extension of these techniques to systems which include digital computers is not well developed, and there is little consensus among software engineering experts and safety experts on how to analyze such systems. One possible technique is to extend hazard analysis to include digital computer-based systems. Software is frequently overlooked during system hazard analyses, but this is unacceptable when the software is in control of a potentially hazardous operation. In such cases, hazard analysis should be extended to fully cover the software. A method for performing software hazard analysis is proposed in this paper. The method concentrates on finding hazards during the early stages of the software life cycle, using an extension of HAZOP

  4. 340 Waste handling Facility Hazard Categorization and Safety Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodovsky, T.J.

    2010-01-01

    The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category 3. The final hazard categorization for the deactivated 340 Waste Handling Facility (340 Facility) is presented in this document. This hazard categorization was prepared in accordance with DOE-STD-1 027-92, Change Notice 1, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with Doe Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category (HC) 3. Routine nuclear waste receiving, storage, handling, and shipping operations at the 340 Facility have been deactivated, however, the facility contains a small amount of radioactive liquid and/or dry saltcake in two underground vault tanks. A seismic event and hydrogen deflagration were selected as bounding accidents. The generation of hydrogen in the vault tanks without active ventilation was determined to achieve a steady state volume of 0.33%, which is significantly less than the lower flammability limit of 4%. Therefore, a hydrogen deflagration is not possible in these tanks. The unmitigated release from a seismic event was used to categorize the facility consistent with the process defined in Nuclear Safety Technical Position (NSTP) 2002-2. The final sum-of-fractions calculation concluded that the facility is less than HC 3. The analysis did not identify any required engineered controls or design features. The Administrative Controls that were derived from the analysis are: (1) radiological inventory control, (2) facility change control, and (3) Safety Management Programs (SMPs). The facility configuration and radiological inventory shall be controlled to ensure that the assumptions in the analysis remain valid. The facility commitment to SMPs protects the integrity of the facility and environment by ensuring training, emergency response, and radiation protection. The full scale

  5. Process hazards analysis (PrHA) program, bridging accident analyses and operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richardson, J.A.; McKernan, S.A.; Vigil, M.J.

    2003-01-01

    Recently the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Technical Area 55 (TA-55) was revised and submitted to the US. Department of Energy (DOE). As a part of this effort, over seventy Process Hazards Analyses (PrHAs) were written and/or revised over the six years prior to the FSAR revision. TA-55 is a research, development, and production nuclear facility that primarily supports US. defense and space programs. Nuclear fuels and material research; material recovery, refining and analyses; and the casting, machining and fabrication of plutonium components are some of the activities conducted at TA-35. These operations involve a wide variety of industrial, chemical and nuclear hazards. Operational personnel along with safety analysts work as a team to prepare the PrHA. PrHAs describe the process; identi fy the hazards; and analyze hazards including determining hazard scenarios, their likelihood, and consequences. In addition, the interaction of the process to facility systems, structures and operational specific protective features are part of the PrHA. This information is rolled-up to determine bounding accidents and mitigating systems and structures. Further detailed accident analysis is performed for the bounding accidents and included in the FSAR. The FSAR is part of the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) that defines the safety envelope for all facility operations in order to protect the worker, the public, and the environment. The DSA is in compliance with the US. Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management and is approved by DOE. The DSA sets forth the bounding conditions necessary for the safe operation for the facility and is essentially a 'license to operate.' Safely of day-to-day operations is based on Hazard Control Plans (HCPs). Hazards are initially identified in the PrI-IA for the specific operation and act as input to the HCP. Specific protective features important to worker

  6. Lithium-thionyl chloride cell system safety hazard analysis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dampier, F. W.

    1985-03-01

    This system safety analysis for the lithium thionyl chloride cell is a critical review of the technical literature pertaining to cell safety and draws conclusions and makes recommendations based on this data. The thermodynamics and kinetics of the electrochemical reactions occurring during discharge are discussed with particular attention given to unstable SOCl2 reduction intermediates. Potentially hazardous reactions between the various cell components and discharge products or impurities that could occur during electrical or thermal abuse are described and the most hazardous conditions and reactions identified. Design factors influencing the safety of Li/SOCl2 cells, shipping and disposal methods and the toxicity of Li/SOCl2 battery components are additional safety issues that are also addressed.

  7. Hazard screening application guide. Safety Analysis Report Update Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    1992-06-01

    The basic purpose of hazard screening is to group precesses, facilities, and proposed modifications according to the magnitude of their hazards so as to determine the need for and extent of follow on safety analysis. A hazard is defined as a material, energy source, or operation that has the potential to cause injury or illness in human beings. The purpose of this document is to give guidance and provide standard methods for performing hazard screening. Hazard screening is applied to new and existing facilities and processes as well as to proposed modifications to existing facilities and processes. The hazard screening process evaluates an identified hazards in terms of the effects on people, both on-site and off-site. The process uses bounding analyses with no credit given for mitigation of an accident with the exception of certain containers meeting DOT specifications. The process is restricted to human safety issues only. Environmental effects are addressed by the environmental program. Interfaces with environmental organizations will be established in order to share information.

  8. Hazard Analysis Database Report

    CERN Document Server

    Grams, W H

    2000-01-01

    The Hazard Analysis Database was developed in conjunction with the hazard analysis activities conducted in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U S . Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, for HNF-SD-WM-SAR-067, Tank Farms Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The FSAR is part of the approved Authorization Basis (AB) for the River Protection Project (RPP). This document describes, identifies, and defines the contents and structure of the Tank Farms FSAR Hazard Analysis Database and documents the configuration control changes made to the database. The Hazard Analysis Database contains the collection of information generated during the initial hazard evaluations and the subsequent hazard and accident analysis activities. The Hazard Analysis Database supports the preparation of Chapters 3 ,4 , and 5 of the Tank Farms FSAR and the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process and consists of two major, interrelated data sets: (1) Hazard Analysis Database: Data from t...

  9. Information System Hazard Analysis: A Method for Identifying Technology-induced Latent Errors for Safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Weber, Jens H; Mason-Blakley, Fieran; Price, Morgan

    2015-01-01

    Many health information and communication technologies (ICT) are safety-critical; moreover, reports of technology-induced adverse events related to them are plentiful in the literature. Despite repeated criticism and calls to action, recent data collected by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and other organization do not indicate significant improvements with respect to the safety of health ICT systems. A large part of the industry still operates on a reactive "break & patch" model; the application of pro-active, systematic hazard analysis methods for engineering ICT that produce "safe by design" products is sparse. This paper applies one such method: Information System Hazard Analysis (ISHA). ISHA adapts and combines hazard analysis techniques from other safety-critical domains and customizes them for ICT. We provide an overview of the steps involved in ISHA and describe.

  10. Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment of Health and Safety Approach JSA (Job Safety Analysis) in Plantation Company

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sugarindra, Muchamad; Ragil Suryoputro, Muhammad; Tiya Novitasari, Adi

    2017-06-01

    Plantation company needed to identify hazard and perform risk assessment as an Identification of Hazard and Risk Assessment Crime and Safety which was approached by using JSA (Job Safety Analysis). The identification was aimed to identify the potential hazards that might be the risk of workplace accidents so that preventive action could be taken to minimize the accidents. The data was collected by direct observation to the workers concerned and the results were recorded on a Job Safety Analysis form. The data were as forklift operator, macerator worker, worker’s creeper, shredder worker, workers’ workshop, mechanical line worker, trolley cleaning workers and workers’ crepe decline. The result showed that shredder worker value was 30 and had the working level with extreme risk with the risk value range was above 20. So to minimize the accidents could provide Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) which were appropriate, information about health and safety, the company should have watched the activities of workers, and rewards for the workers who obey the rules that applied in the plantation.

  11. Practicality for Software Hazard Analysis for Nuclear Safety I and C System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Yong-Ho; Moon, Kwon-Ki; Chang, Young-Woo; Jeong, Soo-Hyun

    2016-01-01

    We are using the concept of system safety in engineering. It is difficult to make any system perfectly safe and probably a complete system may not easily be achieved. The standard definition of a system from MIL-STD- 882E is: “The organization of hardware, software, material, facilities, personnel, data, and services needed to perform a designated function within a stated environment with specified results.” From the perspective of the system safety engineer and the hazard analysis process, software is considered as a subsystem. Regarding hazard analysis, to date, methods for identifying software failures and determining their effects is still a research problem. Since the success of software development is based on rigorous test of hardware and software, it is necessary to check the balance between software test and hardware test, and in terms of efficiency. Lessons learned and experience from similar systems are important for the work of hazard analysis. No major hazard has been issued for the software developed and verified in Korean NPPs. In addition to hazard analysis, software development, and verification and validation were thoroughly performed. It is reasonable that the test implementation including the development of the test case, stress and abnormal conditions, error recovery situations, and high risk hazardous situations play a key role in detecting and preventing software faults

  12. Practicality for Software Hazard Analysis for Nuclear Safety I and C System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Yong-Ho; Moon, Kwon-Ki; Chang, Young-Woo; Jeong, Soo-Hyun [KEPCO Engineering and Construction Co., Deajeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    We are using the concept of system safety in engineering. It is difficult to make any system perfectly safe and probably a complete system may not easily be achieved. The standard definition of a system from MIL-STD- 882E is: “The organization of hardware, software, material, facilities, personnel, data, and services needed to perform a designated function within a stated environment with specified results.” From the perspective of the system safety engineer and the hazard analysis process, software is considered as a subsystem. Regarding hazard analysis, to date, methods for identifying software failures and determining their effects is still a research problem. Since the success of software development is based on rigorous test of hardware and software, it is necessary to check the balance between software test and hardware test, and in terms of efficiency. Lessons learned and experience from similar systems are important for the work of hazard analysis. No major hazard has been issued for the software developed and verified in Korean NPPs. In addition to hazard analysis, software development, and verification and validation were thoroughly performed. It is reasonable that the test implementation including the development of the test case, stress and abnormal conditions, error recovery situations, and high risk hazardous situations play a key role in detecting and preventing software faults.

  13. K Basin Hazard Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    PECH, S.H.

    2000-08-23

    This report describes the methodology used in conducting the K Basins Hazard Analysis, which provides the foundation for the K Basins Final Safety Analysis Report. This hazard analysis was performed in accordance with guidance provided by DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports and implements the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Report.

  14. K Basin Hazard Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PECH, S.H.

    2000-01-01

    This report describes the methodology used in conducting the K Basins Hazard Analysis, which provides the foundation for the K Basins Final Safety Analysis Report. This hazard analysis was performed in accordance with guidance provided by DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports and implements the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Report

  15. Hazard Analysis Database Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    GAULT, G.W.

    1999-10-13

    The Hazard Analysis Database was developed in conjunction with the hazard analysis activities conducted in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The FSAR is part of the approved TWRS Authorization Basis (AB). This document describes, identifies, and defines the contents and structure of the TWRS FSAR Hazard Analysis Database and documents the configuration control changes made to the database. The TWRS Hazard Analysis Database contains the collection of information generated during the initial hazard evaluations and the subsequent hazard and accident analysis activities. The database supports the preparation of Chapters 3,4, and 5 of the TWRS FSAR and the USQ process and consists of two major, interrelated data sets: (1) Hazard Evaluation Database--Data from the results of the hazard evaluations; and (2) Hazard Topography Database--Data from the system familiarization and hazard identification.

  16. K Basins Hazard Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WEBB, R.H.

    1999-01-01

    This report describes the methodology used in conducting the K Basins Hazard Analysis, which provides the foundation for the K Basins Safety Analysis Report (HNF-SD-WM-SAR-062/Rev.4). This hazard analysis was performed in accordance with guidance provided by DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports and implements the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Report

  17. Canister storage building hazard analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    POWERS, T.B.

    1999-01-01

    This report describes the methodology used in conducting the Canister Storage Building (CSB) hazard analysis to support the CSB final safety analysis report (FSAR) and documents the results. The hazard analysis was performed in accordance with the DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports'', and meets the intent of HNF-PRO-704, ''Hazard and Accident Analysis Process''. This hazard analysis implements the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports''

  18. Seafood safety: economics of hazard analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) programmes

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Cato, James C

    1998-01-01

    .... This document on economic issues associated with seafood safety was prepared to complement the work of the Service in seafood technology, plant sanitation and Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) implementation...

  19. 14 CFR 437.55 - Hazard analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Hazard analysis. 437.55 Section 437.55... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING EXPERIMENTAL PERMITS Safety Requirements § 437.55 Hazard analysis. (a) A permittee must... safety of property resulting from each permitted flight. This hazard analysis must— (1) Identify and...

  20. Final safety and hazards analysis for the Battelle LOCA simulation tests in the NRU reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Axford, D.J.; Martin, I.C.; McAuley, S.J.

    1981-04-01

    This is the final safety and hazards report for the proposed Battelle LOCA simulation tests in NRU. A brief description of equipment test design and operating procedure precedes a safety analysis and hazards review of the project. The hazards review addresses potential equipment failures as well as potential for a metal/water reaction and evaluates the consequences. The operation of the tests as proposed does not present an unacceptable risk to the NRU Reactor, CRNL personnel or members of the public. (author)

  1. Preliminary hazards analysis -- vitrification process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coordes, D.; Ruggieri, M.; Russell, J.; TenBrook, W.; Yimbo, P.

    1994-06-01

    This paper presents a Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA) for mixed waste vitrification by joule heating. The purpose of performing a PHA is to establish an initial hazard categorization for a DOE nuclear facility and to identify those processes and structures which may have an impact on or be important to safety. The PHA is typically performed during and provides input to project conceptual design. The PHA is then followed by a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) performed during Title 1 and 2 design. The PSAR then leads to performance of the Final Safety Analysis Report performed during the facility's construction and testing. It should be completed before routine operation of the facility commences. This PHA addresses the first four chapters of the safety analysis process, in accordance with the requirements of DOE Safety Guidelines in SG 830.110. The hazards associated with vitrification processes are evaluated using standard safety analysis methods which include: identification of credible potential hazardous energy sources; identification of preventative features of the facility or system; identification of mitigative features; and analyses of credible hazards. Maximal facility inventories of radioactive and hazardous materials are postulated to evaluate worst case accident consequences. These inventories were based on DOE-STD-1027-92 guidance and the surrogate waste streams defined by Mayberry, et al. Radiological assessments indicate that a facility, depending on the radioactive material inventory, may be an exempt, Category 3, or Category 2 facility. The calculated impacts would result in no significant impact to offsite personnel or the environment. Hazardous materials assessment indicates that a Mixed Waste Vitrification facility will be a Low Hazard facility having minimal impacts to offsite personnel and the environment

  2. Preliminary hazards analysis -- vitrification process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Coordes, D.; Ruggieri, M.; Russell, J.; TenBrook, W.; Yimbo, P. [Science Applications International Corp., Pleasanton, CA (United States)

    1994-06-01

    This paper presents a Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA) for mixed waste vitrification by joule heating. The purpose of performing a PHA is to establish an initial hazard categorization for a DOE nuclear facility and to identify those processes and structures which may have an impact on or be important to safety. The PHA is typically performed during and provides input to project conceptual design. The PHA is then followed by a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) performed during Title 1 and 2 design. The PSAR then leads to performance of the Final Safety Analysis Report performed during the facility`s construction and testing. It should be completed before routine operation of the facility commences. This PHA addresses the first four chapters of the safety analysis process, in accordance with the requirements of DOE Safety Guidelines in SG 830.110. The hazards associated with vitrification processes are evaluated using standard safety analysis methods which include: identification of credible potential hazardous energy sources; identification of preventative features of the facility or system; identification of mitigative features; and analyses of credible hazards. Maximal facility inventories of radioactive and hazardous materials are postulated to evaluate worst case accident consequences. These inventories were based on DOE-STD-1027-92 guidance and the surrogate waste streams defined by Mayberry, et al. Radiological assessments indicate that a facility, depending on the radioactive material inventory, may be an exempt, Category 3, or Category 2 facility. The calculated impacts would result in no significant impact to offsite personnel or the environment. Hazardous materials assessment indicates that a Mixed Waste Vitrification facility will be a Low Hazard facility having minimal impacts to offsite personnel and the environment.

  3. Final Hazard Classification and Auditable Safety Analysis for the N Basin Segment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kloster, G.L.

    1998-08-01

    The purposes of this report are to serve as the auditable safety analysis (ASA) for the N Basin Segment, during surveillance and maintenance preceding decontamination and decommissioning; to determine and document the final hazard classification (FHC) for the N Basin Segment. The result of the ASA evaluation are: based on hazard analyses and the evaluation of accidents, no activity could credibly result in an unacceptable exposure to an individual; controls are identified that serve to protect worker health and safety. The results of the FHC evaluation are: potential exposure is much below 10 rem (0.46 rem), and the FHC for the N Basin Segment is Radiological

  4. Hazard Classification and Auditable Safety Analysis for the 1300-N Emergency Dump Basin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kloster, G.L.

    1998-01-01

    This document combines three analytical functions consisting of (1) the hazards baseline of the Emergency Dump Basin (EDB) for surveillance and maintenance, (2) the final hazard classification for the facility, and (3) and auditable safety analysis. This document also describes the potential hazards contained within the EDB at the N Reactor complex and the vulnerabilities of those hazards. The EDB segment is defined and confirmed its independence from other segments at the site by demonstrating that no potential adverse interactions exist between the segments. No EDB hazards vulnerabilities were identified that require reliance on either active, mitigative, or protective measures; adequate facility structural integrity exists to safely control the hazards

  5. Hazard classification and auditable safety analysis for the 1300-N Emergency Dump Basin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kretzschmar, S.P.; Larson, A.R.

    1996-06-01

    This document combines the following four analytical functions: (1) hazards baseline of the Emergency Dump Basin (EDB) in the quiescent state; (2) preliminary hazard classification for intrusive activities (i.e., basin stabilization); (3) final hazard classification for intrusive activities; and (4) an auditable safety analysis. This document describes the potential hazards contained within the EDB at the N Reactor complex and the vulnerabilities of those hazards during the quiescent state (when only surveillance and maintenance activities take place) and during basin stabilization activities. This document also identifies the inventory of both radioactive and hazardous material in the EDB. Result is that the final hazard classification for the EDB segment intrusive activities is radiological

  6. Canister storage building hazard analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krahn, D.E.; Garvin, L.J.

    1997-01-01

    This report describes the methodology used in conducting the Canister Storage Building (CSB) hazard analysis to support the final CSB safety analysis report (SAR) and documents the results. The hazard analysis was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Report, and implements the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Report

  7. HAZARD ANALYSIS SOFTWARE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sommer, S; Tinh Tran, T.

    2008-01-01

    Washington Safety Management Solutions, LLC developed web-based software to improve the efficiency and consistency of hazard identification and analysis, control selection and classification, and to standardize analysis reporting at Savannah River Site. In the new nuclear age, information technology provides methods to improve the efficiency of the documented safety analysis development process which includes hazard analysis activities. This software provides a web interface that interacts with a relational database to support analysis, record data, and to ensure reporting consistency. A team of subject matter experts participated in a series of meetings to review the associated processes and procedures for requirements and standard practices. Through these meetings, a set of software requirements were developed and compiled into a requirements traceability matrix from which software could be developed. The software was tested to ensure compliance with the requirements. Training was provided to the hazard analysis leads. Hazard analysis teams using the software have verified its operability. The software has been classified as NQA-1, Level D, as it supports the analysis team but does not perform the analysis. The software can be transported to other sites with alternate risk schemes. The software is being used to support the development of 14 hazard analyses. User responses have been positive with a number of suggestions for improvement which are being incorporated as time permits. The software has enforced a uniform implementation of the site procedures. The software has significantly improved the efficiency and standardization of the hazard analysis process

  8. Chemical Hazards and Safety Issues in Fusion Safety Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadwallader, L.C.

    2003-01-01

    Radiological inventory releases have dominated accident consequences for fusion; these consequences are important to analyze and are generally the most severe result of a fusion facility accident event. However, the advent of, or plan for, large-scale usage of some toxic materials poses the additional hazard of chemical exposure from an accident event. Examples of toxic chemicals are beryllium for magnetic fusion and fluorine for laser fusion. Therefore, chemical exposure consequences must also be addressed in fusion safety assessment. This paper provides guidance for fusion safety analysis. US Department of Energy (DOE) chemical safety assessment practices for workers and the public are reviewed. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has published some guidance on public exposure to releases of mixtures of chemicals, this guidance has been used to create an initial guideline for treating mixed radiological and toxicological releases in fusion; for example, tritiated hazardous dust from a tokamak vacuum vessel. There is no convenient means to judge the hazard severity of exposure to mixed materials. The chemical fate of mixed material constituents must be reviewed to determine if there is a separate or combined radiological and toxicological carcinogenesis, or if other health threats exist with radiological carcinogenesis. Recommendations are made for fusion facility chemical safety evaluation and safety guidance for protecting the public from chemical releases, since such levels are not specifically identified in the DOE fusion safety standard

  9. Timing of Formal Phase Safety Reviews for Large-Scale Integrated Hazard Analysis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Massie, Michael J.; Morris, A. Terry

    2010-01-01

    Integrated hazard analysis (IHA) is a process used to identify and control unacceptable risk. As such, it does not occur in a vacuum. IHA approaches must be tailored to fit the system being analyzed. Physical, resource, organizational and temporal constraints on large-scale integrated systems impose additional direct or derived requirements on the IHA. The timing and interaction between engineering and safety organizations can provide either benefits or hindrances to the overall end product. The traditional approach for formal phase safety review timing and content, which generally works well for small- to moderate-scale systems, does not work well for very large-scale integrated systems. This paper proposes a modified approach to timing and content of formal phase safety reviews for IHA. Details of the tailoring process for IHA will describe how to avoid temporary disconnects in major milestone reviews and how to maintain a cohesive end-to-end integration story particularly for systems where the integrator inherently has little to no insight into lower level systems. The proposal has the advantage of allowing the hazard analysis development process to occur as technical data normally matures.

  10. Chemical process hazards analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-02-01

    The Office of Worker Health and Safety (EH-5) under the Assistant Secretary for the Environment, Safety and Health of the US Department (DOE) has published two handbooks for use by DOE contractors managing facilities and processes covered by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Rule for Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (29 CFR 1910.119), herein referred to as the PSM Rule. The PSM Rule contains an integrated set of chemical process safety management elements designed to prevent chemical releases that can lead to catastrophic fires, explosions, or toxic exposures. The purpose of the two handbooks, ``Process Safety Management for Highly Hazardous Chemicals`` and ``Chemical Process Hazards Analysis,`` is to facilitate implementation of the provisions of the PSM Rule within the DOE. The purpose of this handbook ``Chemical Process Hazards Analysis,`` is to facilitate, within the DOE, the performance of chemical process hazards analyses (PrHAs) as required under the PSM Rule. It provides basic information for the performance of PrHAs, and should not be considered a complete resource on PrHA methods. Likewise, to determine if a facility is covered by the PSM rule, the reader should refer to the handbook, ``Process Safety Management for Highly Hazardous Chemicals`` (DOE- HDBK-1101-96). Promulgation of the PSM Rule has heightened the awareness of chemical safety management issues within the DOE. This handbook is intended for use by DOE facilities and processes covered by the PSM rule to facilitate contractor implementation of the PrHA element of the PSM Rule. However, contractors whose facilities and processes not covered by the PSM Rule may also use this handbook as a basis for conducting process hazards analyses as part of their good management practices. This handbook explains the minimum requirements for PrHAs outlined in the PSM Rule. Nowhere have requirements been added beyond what is specifically required by the rule.

  11. Auditable safety analysis and final hazard classification for Buildings 1310-N and 1314-N

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kloster, G.L.

    1997-05-01

    This document is a graded auditable safety analysis (ASA) of the deactivation activities planned for the 100-N facility segment comprised of the Building 1310-N pump silo (part of the Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility) and 1314-N Building (Liquid Waste Disposal Building).The ASA describes the hazards within the facility and evaluates the adequacy of the measures taken to reduce, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. This document also serves as the Final Hazard Classification (FHC) for the 1310-N pump silo and 1314-N Building segment. The FHC is radiological based on the Preliminary Hazard Classification and the total inventory of radioactive and hazardous materials in the segment

  12. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility hazard analysis report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Krahn, D.E.

    1998-02-23

    This report describes the methodology used in conducting the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) hazard analysis to support the CVDF phase 2 safety analysis report (SAR), and documents the results. The hazard analysis was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, and implements the requirements of US Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.

  13. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility hazard analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krahn, D.E.

    1998-01-01

    This report describes the methodology used in conducting the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) hazard analysis to support the CVDF phase 2 safety analysis report (SAR), and documents the results. The hazard analysis was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, and implements the requirements of US Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports

  14. Final Hazard Classification and Auditable Safety Analysis for the 105-F Building Interim Safe Storage Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodovsky, T.J.; Bond, S.L.

    1998-07-01

    The auditable safety analysis (ASA) documents the authorization basis for the partial decommissioning and facility modifications to place the 105-F Building into interim safe storage (ISS). Placement into the ISS is consistent with the preferred alternative identified in the Record of Decision (58 FR). Modifications will reduce the potential for release and worker exposure to hazardous and radioactive materials, as well as lower surveillance and maintenance (S ampersand M) costs. This analysis includes the following: A description of the activities to be performed in the course of the 105-F Building ISS Project. An assessment of the inventory of radioactive and other hazardous materials within the 105-F Building. Identification of the hazards associated with the activities of the 105-F Building ISS Project. Identification of internally and externally initiated accident scenarios with the potential to produce significant local or offsite consequences during the 105-F Building ISS Project. Bounding evaluation of the consequences of the potentially significant accident scenarios. Hazard classification based on the bounding consequence evaluation. Associated safety function and controls, including commitments. Radiological and other employee safety and health considerations

  15. Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Treatment Building Safety Information Document (SID)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fatell, L.B.; Woolsey, G.B.

    1993-01-01

    This Safety Information Document (SID) provides a description and analysis of operations for the Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Disposal Facility Treatment Building (the Treatment Building). The Treatment Building has been classified as a moderate hazard facility, and the level of analysis performed and the methodology used are based on that classification. Preliminary design of the Treatment Building has identified the need for two separate buildings for waste treatment processes. The term Treatment Building applies to all these facilities. The evaluation of safety for the Treatment Building is accomplished in part by the identification of hazards associated with the facility and the analysis of the facility's response to postulated events involving those hazards. The events are analyzed in terms of the facility features that minimize the causes of such events, the quantitative determination of the consequences, and the ability of the facility to cope with each event should it occur. The SID presents the methodology, assumptions, and results of the systematic evaluation of hazards associated with operation of the Treatment Building. The SID also addresses the spectrum of postulated credible events, involving those hazards, that could occur. Facility features important to safety are identified and discussed in the SID. The SID identifies hazards and reports the analysis of the spectrum of credible postulated events that can result in the following consequences: Personnel exposure to radiation; Radioactive material release to the environment; Personnel exposure to hazardous chemicals; Hazardous chemical release to the environment; Events leading to an onsite/offsite fatality; and Significant damage to government property. The SID addresses the consequences to the onsite and offsite populations resulting from postulated credible events and the safety features in place to control and mitigate the consequences

  16. Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Treatment Building Safety Information Document (SID)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fatell, L.B.; Woolsey, G.B.

    1993-04-15

    This Safety Information Document (SID) provides a description and analysis of operations for the Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Disposal Facility Treatment Building (the Treatment Building). The Treatment Building has been classified as a moderate hazard facility, and the level of analysis performed and the methodology used are based on that classification. Preliminary design of the Treatment Building has identified the need for two separate buildings for waste treatment processes. The term Treatment Building applies to all these facilities. The evaluation of safety for the Treatment Building is accomplished in part by the identification of hazards associated with the facility and the analysis of the facility`s response to postulated events involving those hazards. The events are analyzed in terms of the facility features that minimize the causes of such events, the quantitative determination of the consequences, and the ability of the facility to cope with each event should it occur. The SID presents the methodology, assumptions, and results of the systematic evaluation of hazards associated with operation of the Treatment Building. The SID also addresses the spectrum of postulated credible events, involving those hazards, that could occur. Facility features important to safety are identified and discussed in the SID. The SID identifies hazards and reports the analysis of the spectrum of credible postulated events that can result in the following consequences: Personnel exposure to radiation; Radioactive material release to the environment; Personnel exposure to hazardous chemicals; Hazardous chemical release to the environment; Events leading to an onsite/offsite fatality; and Significant damage to government property. The SID addresses the consequences to the onsite and offsite populations resulting from postulated credible events and the safety features in place to control and mitigate the consequences.

  17. Industrial hazard and safety handbook

    CERN Document Server

    King, Ralph W

    1979-01-01

    Industrial Hazard and Safety Handbook (Revised Impression) describes and exposes the main hazards found in industry, with emphasis on how these hazards arise, are ignored, are identified, are eliminated, or are controlled. These hazard conditions can be due to human stresses (for example, insomnia), unsatisfactory working environments, as well as secret industrial processes. The book reviews the cost of accidents, human factors, inspections, insurance, legal aspects, planning for major emergencies, organization, and safety measures. The text discusses regulations, codes of practice, site layou

  18. Evaluation of seismic hazards for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The main objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on how to determine the ground motion hazards for a plant at a particular site and the potential for surface faulting, which could affect the feasibility of construction and safe operation of a plant at that site. The guidelines and procedures presented in this Safety Guide can appropriately be used in evaluations of site suitability and seismic hazards for nuclear power plants in any seismotectonic environment. The probabilistic seismic hazard analysis recommended in this Safety Guide also addresses the needs for seismic hazard analysis of external event PSAs conducted for nuclear power plants. Many of the methods and processes described may also be applicable to nuclear facilities other than power plants. Other phenomena of permanent ground displacement (liquefaction, slope instability, subsidence and collapse) as well as the topic of seismically induced flooding are treated in Safety Guides relating to foundation safety and coastal flooding. Recommendations of a general nature are given in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the acquisition of a database containing the information needed to evaluate and address all hazards associated with earthquakes. Section 4 covers the use of this database for construction of a seismotectonic model. Sections 5 and 6 review ground motion hazards and evaluations of the potential for surface faulting, respectively. Section 7 addresses quality assurance in the evaluation of seismic hazards for nuclear power plants

  19. A hazard and probabilistic safety analysis of a high-level waste transfer process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bott, T.F.; Sasser, M.K.

    1996-01-01

    This paper describes a safety analysis of a transfer process for high-level radioactive and toxic waste. The analysis began with a hazard assessment that used elements of What If, Checklist, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, and Hazards and Operability Study (HAZOP) techniques to identify and rough-in accident sequences. Based on this preliminary analysis, the most significant accident sequences were developed further using event trees. Quantitative frequency estimates for the accident sequences were based on operational data taken from the historical record of the site where the process is performed. Several modeling challenges were encountered in the course of the study. These included linked initiating and accident progression events, fire propagation modeling, accounting for administrative control violations, and handling mission-phase effects

  20. Safety analysis of autonomous excavator functionality

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seward, D.; Pace, C.; Morrey, R.; Sommerville, I.

    2000-01-01

    This paper presents an account of carrying out a hazard analysis to define the safety requirements for an autonomous robotic excavator. The work is also relevant to the growing generic class of heavy automated mobile machinery. An overview of the excavator design is provided and the concept of a safety manager is introduced. The safety manager is an autonomous module responsible for all aspects of system operational safety, and is central to the control system's architecture. Each stage of the hazard analysis is described, i.e. system model creation, hazard definition and hazard analysis. Analysis at an early stage of the design process, and on a system that interfaces directly to an unstructured environment, exposes certain issues relevant to the application of current hazard analysis methods. The approach taken in the analysis is described. Finally, it is explained how the results of the hazard analysis have influenced system design, in particular, safety manager specifications. Conclusions are then drawn about the applicability of hazard analysis of requirements in general, and suggestions are made as to how the approach can be taken further

  1. An OSHA based approach to safety analysis for nonradiological hazardous materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yurconic, M.

    1992-08-01

    The PNL method for chemical hazard classification defines major hazards by means of a list of hazardous substances (or chemical groups) with associated trigger quantities. In addition, the functional characteristics of the facility being classified is also be factored into the classification. In this way, installations defined as major hazard will only be those which have the potential for causing very serious incidents both on and off site. Because of the diversity of operations involving chemicals, it may not be possible to restrict major hazard facilities to certain types of operations. However, this hazard classification method recognizes that in the industrial sector major hazards are most commonly associated with activities involving very large quantities of chemicals and inherently energetic processes. These include operations like petrochemical plants, chemical production, LPG storage, explosives manufacturing, and facilities which use chlorine, ammonia, or other highly toxic gases in bulk quantities. The basis for this methodology is derived from concepts used by OSHA in its proposed chemical process safety standard, the Dow Fire and Explosion Index Hazard Classification Guide, and the International Labor Office's program on chemical safety. For the purpose of identifying major hazard facilities, this method uses two sorting criteria, (1) facility function and processes and (2) quantity of substances to identify facilities requiringclassification. Then, a measure of chemical energy potential (material factor) is used to identify high hazard class facilities

  2. Modeling and Hazard Analysis Using STPA

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ishimatsu, Takuto; Leveson, Nancy; Thomas, John; Katahira, Masa; Miyamoto, Yuko; Nakao, Haruka

    2010-09-01

    A joint research project between MIT and JAXA/JAMSS is investigating the application of a new hazard analysis to the system and software in the HTV. Traditional hazard analysis focuses on component failures but software does not fail in this way. Software most often contributes to accidents by commanding the spacecraft into an unsafe state(e.g., turning off the descent engines prematurely) or by not issuing required commands. That makes the standard hazard analysis techniques of limited usefulness on software-intensive systems, which describes most spacecraft built today. STPA is a new hazard analysis technique based on systems theory rather than reliability theory. It treats safety as a control problem rather than a failure problem. The goal of STPA, which is to create a set of scenarios that can lead to a hazard, is the same as FTA but STPA includes a broader set of potential scenarios including those in which no failures occur but the problems arise due to unsafe and unintended interactions among the system components. STPA also provides more guidance to the analysts that traditional fault tree analysis. Functional control diagrams are used to guide the analysis. In addition, JAXA uses a model-based system engineering development environment(created originally by Leveson and called SpecTRM) which also assists in the hazard analysis. One of the advantages of STPA is that it can be applied early in the system engineering and development process in a safety-driven design process where hazard analysis drives the design decisions rather than waiting until reviews identify problems that are then costly or difficult to fix. It can also be applied in an after-the-fact analysis and hazard assessment, which is what we did in this case study. This paper describes the experimental application of STPA to the JAXA HTV in order to determine the feasibility and usefulness of the new hazard analysis technique. Because the HTV was originally developed using fault tree analysis

  3. Hazards and hazard combinations relevant for the safety of nuclear power plants

    Science.gov (United States)

    Decker, Kurt; Brinkman, Hans; Raimond, Emmanuel

    2017-04-01

    exclusive (e.g., extremely high air temperature and surface ice). Our dataset further provides information on hazard combinations which are more likely to occur than just by random coincidence. 577 correlations between individual hazards are identified by expert opinion and shown in a cross-correlation chart. Combinations discriminate between: (1) causally connected hazards (cause-effect relation) where one hazard (e.g., costal erosion) may be caused by another hazard (e.g., storm surge); or where one hazard (e.g., high wind) is a prerequisite for a correlated hazard (e.g., storm surge). The identified causal links are not commutative. (2) Associated hazards ("contemporary" events) which are probable to occur at the same time due to a common root cause (e.g., a cold front of a meteorological low pressure area which leads to a drop of air pressure, high wind, thunderstorm, lightning, heavy rain and hail). The root cause may not necessarily be regarded as a hazard by itself. The hazard list and the hazard correlation chart may serve as a starting point for the hazard analysis process for nuclear installations in Level 1 PSA as outlined by IAEA (2010), the definition of design basis for nuclear reactors, and the assessment of design extension conditions as required by WENRA-RHWG (2014). It may further be helpful for the identification of hazard combinations and hazard cascades which threaten other critical infrastructure. References: Decker, K. & Brinkman, H., 2017. List of external hazards to be considered in extended PSA. Report No. ASAMPSA_E/WP21/D21.2/2017-41 - IRSN/ PSN-RES/SAG/2017-00011 IAEA, 2010. Development and Application of Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants. Safety Guide No. SSG-3, Vienna. http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/ WENRA-RHWG, 2014. WENRA Safety Reference Levels for Existing Reactors. Update in Relation to Lessons Learned from TEPCO Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident. http://www.wenra.org/publications/

  4. 75 FR 8239 - School Food Safety Program Based on Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles (HACCP...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-24

    ... (HACCP); Approval of Information Collection Request AGENCY: Food and Nutrition Service, USDA. ACTION... Safety Program Based on Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles (HACCP) was published on... must be based on the (HACCP) system established by the Secretary of Agriculture. The food safety...

  5. Job Hazards Analysis Among A Group Of Surgeons At Zagazig ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    ... 75% respectively. Conclusion: Job hazards analysis model was effective in assessment, evaluation and management of occupational hazards concerning surgeons and should considered as part of hospital wide quality and safety program. Key Words: Job Hazard Analysis, Risk Management, occupational Health Safety.

  6. Linking Safety Analysis to Safety Requirements

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hansen, Kirsten Mark

    Software for safety critical systems must deal with the hazards identified by safety analysistechniques: Fault trees, event trees,and cause consequence diagrams can be interpreted as safety requirements and used in the design activity. We propose that the safety analysis and the system design use...

  7. Hazard Analysis and Safety Requirements for Small Drone Operations: To What Extent Do Popular Drones Embed Safety?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Plioutsias, Anastasios; Karanikas, Nektarios; Chatzimihailidou, Maria Mikela

    2018-03-01

    Currently, published risk analyses for drones refer mainly to commercial systems, use data from civil aviation, and are based on probabilistic approaches without suggesting an inclusive list of hazards and respective requirements. Within this context, this article presents: (1) a set of safety requirements generated from the application of the systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) technique on a generic small drone system; (2) a gap analysis between the set of safety requirements and the ones met by 19 popular drone models; (3) the extent of the differences between those models, their manufacturers, and the countries of origin; and (4) the association of drone prices with the extent they meet the requirements derived by STPA. The application of STPA resulted in 70 safety requirements distributed across the authority, manufacturer, end user, or drone automation levels. A gap analysis showed high dissimilarities regarding the extent to which the 19 drones meet the same safety requirements. Statistical results suggested a positive correlation between drone prices and the extent that the 19 drones studied herein met the safety requirements generated by STPA, and significant differences were identified among the manufacturers. This work complements the existing risk assessment frameworks for small drones, and contributes to the establishment of a commonly endorsed international risk analysis framework. Such a framework will support the development of a holistic and methodologically justified standardization scheme for small drone flights. © 2017 Society for Risk Analysis.

  8. Seismic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations. Specific Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-08-15

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear installations. It supplements the Safety Requirements publication on Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations. The present publication provides guidance and recommends procedures for the evaluation of seismic hazards for nuclear power plants and other nuclear installations. It supersedes Evaluation of Seismic Hazards for Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-3.3 (2002). In this publication, the following was taken into account: the need for seismic hazard curves and ground motion spectra for the probabilistic safety assessment of external events for new and existing nuclear installations; feedback of information from IAEA reviews of seismic safety studies for nuclear installations performed over the previous decade; collective knowledge gained from recent significant earthquakes; and new approaches in methods of analysis, particularly in the areas of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and strong motion simulation. In the evaluation of a site for a nuclear installation, engineering solutions will generally be available to mitigate, by means of certain design features, the potential vibratory effects of earthquakes. However, such solutions cannot always be demonstrated to be adequate for mitigating the effects of phenomena of significant permanent ground displacement such as surface faulting, subsidence, ground collapse or fault creep. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations and guidance on evaluating seismic hazards at a nuclear installation site and, in particular, on how to determine: (a) the vibratory ground motion hazards, in order to establish the design basis ground motions and other relevant parameters for both new and existing nuclear installations; and (b) the potential for fault displacement and the rate of fault displacement that could affect the feasibility of the site or the safe operation of the installation at

  9. FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS - BUSTED BUTTE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Longwell, R.; Keifer, J.; Goodin, S.

    2001-01-01

    The purpose of this fire hazards analysis (FHA) is to assess the risk from fire within individual fire areas at the Busted Butte Test Facility and to ascertain whether the DOE fire safety objectives are met. The objective, identified in DOE Order 420.1, Section 4.2, is to establish requirements for a comprehensive fire and related hazards protection program for facilities sufficient to minimize the potential for: (1) The occurrence of a fire related event. (2) A fire that causes an unacceptable on-site or off-site release of hazardous or radiological material that will threaten the health and safety of employees. (3) Vital DOE programs suffering unacceptable interruptions as a result of fire and related hazards. (4) Property losses from a fire and related events exceeding limits established by DOE. Critical process controls and safety class systems being damaged as a result of a fire and related events

  10. Hydrothermal Liquefaction Treatment Preliminary Hazard Analysis Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lowry, Peter P.; Wagner, Katie A.

    2015-08-31

    A preliminary hazard assessment was completed during February 2015 to evaluate the conceptual design of the modular hydrothermal liquefaction treatment system. The hazard assessment was performed in 2 stages. An initial assessment utilizing Hazard Identification and Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA) techniques identified areas with significant or unique hazards (process safety-related hazards) that fall outside of the normal operating envelope of PNNL and warranted additional analysis. The subsequent assessment was based on a qualitative What-If analysis. This analysis was augmented, as necessary, by additional quantitative analysis for scenarios involving a release of hazardous material or energy with the potential for affecting the public.

  11. Final hazard classification and auditable safety analysis for the N basin segment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kloster, G.; Smith, R.I.; Larson, A.R.; Duncan, G.M.

    1996-12-01

    The purpose of this report is to provide the following: To serve as the auditable safety analysis (ASA) for the N Basin Segment, including both the quiescent state and planned intrusive activities. The ASA is developed through the realistic evaluation of potential hazards that envelope the threat to personnel. The ASA also includes the specification of the programmatic, baseline, and activity- specific controls that are necessary for the protection of workers. To determine and document the final hazard classification (FHC) for the N Basin Segment. The FHC is developed through the use of bounding accident analyses that envelope the potential exposures to personnel. The FHC also includes the specification of the special controls that are necessary to remain within the envelope of those accident analyses

  12. Laser Safety and Hazard Analysis for the Trailer (B70) Based AURA Laser System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    AUGUSTONI, ARNOLD L.

    2003-01-01

    A laser safety and hazard analysis was performed for the AURA laser system based on the 2000 version of the American National Standards Institute's (ANSI) Standard Z136.1, for ''Safe Use of Lasers'' and the 2000 version of the ANSI Standard Z136.6, for ''Safe Use of Lasers Outdoors''. The trailer based AURA laser system is a mobile platform, which is used to perform laser interaction experiments and tests at various national test sites. The trailer (B70) based AURA laser system is generally operated on the United State Air Force Starfire Optical Range (SOR) at Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB), New Mexico. The laser is used to perform laser interaction testing inside the laser trailer as well as outside the trailer at target sites located at various distances from the exit telescope. In order to protect personnel, who work inside the Nominal Hazard Zone (NHZ), from hazardous laser emission exposures it was necessary to determine the Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE) for each laser wavelength (wavelength bands) and calculate the appropriate minimum Optical Density (OD min ) of the laser safety eyewear used by authorized personnel and the Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance (NOHD) to protect unauthorized personnel who may have violated the boundaries of the control area and enter into the laser's NHZ

  13. 75 FR 63774 - Pipeline Safety: Safety of On-Shore Hazardous Liquid Pipelines

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-18

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part... Pipelines AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Department of... Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, Public Law 90-481, delegated to DOT the authority to develop...

  14. 78 FR 24309 - Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-04-24

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration List of Special Permit Applications Delayed AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA..., Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, East Building...

  15. 76 FR 45332 - Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-07-28

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Office of... Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION: List of Applications for Modification of..., 2011. ADDRESSES: Record Center, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department...

  16. 76 FR 303 - Pipeline Safety: Safety of On-Shore Hazardous Liquid Pipelines

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-01-04

    ... leak detection requirements for all pipelines; whether to require the installation of emergency flow... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part 195 [Docket ID PHMSA-2010-0229] RIN 2137-AE66 Pipeline Safety: Safety of On-Shore Hazardous Liquid...

  17. Repository Subsurface Preliminary Fire Hazard Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Logan, Richard C.

    2001-01-01

    This fire hazard analysis identifies preliminary design and operations features, fire, and explosion hazards, and provides a reasonable basis to establish the design requirements of fire protection systems during development and emplacement phases of the subsurface repository. This document follows the Technical Work Plan (TWP) (CRWMS M and O 2001c) which was prepared in accordance with AP-2.21Q, ''Quality Determinations and Planning for Scientific, Engineering, and Regulatory Compliance Activities''; Attachment 4 of AP-ESH-008, ''Hazards Analysis System''; and AP-3.11Q, ''Technical Reports''. The objective of this report is to establish the requirements that provide for facility nuclear safety and a proper level of personnel safety and property protection from the effects of fire and the adverse effects of fire-extinguishing agents

  18. INTERNAL HAZARDS ANALYSIS FOR LICENSE APPLICATION

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    R.J. Garrett

    2005-02-17

    The purpose of this internal hazards analysis is to identify and document the internal hazards and potential initiating events associated with preclosure operations of the repository at Yucca Mountain. Internal hazards are those hazards presented by the operation of the facility and by its associated processes that can potentially lead to a radioactive release or cause a radiological hazard. In contrast to external hazards, internal hazards do not involve natural phenomena and external man-made hazards. This internal hazards analysis was performed in support of the preclosure safety analysis and the License Application for the Yucca Mountain Project. The methodology for this analysis provides a systematic means to identify internal hazards and potential initiating events that may result in a radiological hazard or radiological release during the repository preclosure period. These hazards are documented in tables of potential internal hazards and potential initiating events (Section 6.6) for input to the repository event sequence categorization process. The results of this analysis will undergo further screening and analysis based on the criteria that apply to the performance of event sequence analyses for the repository preclosure period. The evolving design of the repository will be re-evaluated periodically to ensure that internal hazards that have not been previously evaluated are identified.

  19. INTERNAL HAZARDS ANALYSIS FOR LICENSE APPLICATION

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garrett, R.J.

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this internal hazards analysis is to identify and document the internal hazards and potential initiating events associated with preclosure operations of the repository at Yucca Mountain. Internal hazards are those hazards presented by the operation of the facility and by its associated processes that can potentially lead to a radioactive release or cause a radiological hazard. In contrast to external hazards, internal hazards do not involve natural phenomena and external man-made hazards. This internal hazards analysis was performed in support of the preclosure safety analysis and the License Application for the Yucca Mountain Project. The methodology for this analysis provides a systematic means to identify internal hazards and potential initiating events that may result in a radiological hazard or radiological release during the repository preclosure period. These hazards are documented in tables of potential internal hazards and potential initiating events (Section 6.6) for input to the repository event sequence categorization process. The results of this analysis will undergo further screening and analysis based on the criteria that apply to the performance of event sequence analyses for the repository preclosure period. The evolving design of the repository will be re-evaluated periodically to ensure that internal hazards that have not been previously evaluated are identified

  20. Preliminary Hazards Analysis Plasma Hearth Process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aycock, M.; Coordes, D.; Russell, J.; TenBrook, W.; Yimbo, P.

    1993-11-01

    This Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA) for the Plasma Hearth Process (PHP) follows the requirements of United States Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23 (DOE, 1992a), DOE Order 5480.21 (DOE, 1991d), DOE Order 5480.22 (DOE, 1992c), DOE Order 5481.1B (DOE, 1986), and the guidance provided in DOE Standards DOE-STD-1027-92 (DOE, 1992b). Consideration is given to ft proposed regulations published as 10 CFR 830 (DOE, 1993) and DOE Safety Guide SG 830.110 (DOE, 1992b). The purpose of performing a PRA is to establish an initial hazard categorization for a DOE nuclear facility and to identify those processes and structures which may have an impact on or be important to safety. The PHA is typically performed during and provides input to project conceptual design. The PRA then is followed by a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) performed during Title I and II design. This PSAR then leads to performance of the Final Safety Analysis Report performed during construction, testing, and acceptance and completed before routine operation. Radiological assessments indicate that a PHP facility, depending on the radioactive material inventory, may be an exempt, Category 3, or Category 2 facility. The calculated impacts would result in no significant impact to offsite personnel or the environment. Hazardous material assessments indicate that a PHP facility will be a Low Hazard facility having no significant impacts either onsite or offsite to personnel and the environment

  1. Safety analysis reports - new strategies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Booth, J.A.

    1994-01-01

    Within the past year there have been many external changes in the requirements of safety analysis reports. Now there is emphasis on open-quotes graded approachesclose quotes depending on the Hazard Classification of the project. The Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) has a Safety Analysis Working Group. The results of this group for the past year are discussed as well as the implications for EG ampersand G. New strategies include ideas for incorporating the graded approach, auditable safety documents, additional guidance for Hazard Classification per DOE-STD-1027-92. The emphasis in the paper is on those projects whose hazard classification is category three or less

  2. K Basin safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Porten, D.R.; Crowe, R.D.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this accident safety analysis is to document in detail, analyses whose results were reported in summary form in the K Basins Safety Analysis Report WHC-SD-SNF-SAR-001. The safety analysis addressed the potential for release of radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous material located in the K Basins and their supporting facilities. The safety analysis covers the hazards associated with normal K Basin fuel storage and handling operations, fuel encapsulation, sludge encapsulation, and canister clean-up and disposal. After a review of the Criticality Safety Evaluation of the K Basin activities, the following postulated events were evaluated: Crane failure and casks dropped into loadout pit; Design basis earthquake; Hypothetical loss of basin water accident analysis; Combustion of uranium fuel following dryout; Crane failure and cask dropped onto floor of transfer area; Spent ion exchange shipment for burial; Hydrogen deflagration in ion exchange modules and filters; Release of Chlorine; Power availability and reliability; and Ashfall

  3. A study of software safety analysis system for safety-critical software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, H. S.; Shin, H. K.; Chang, Y. W.; Jung, J. C.; Kim, J. H.; Han, H. H.; Son, H. S.

    2004-01-01

    The core factors and requirements for the safety-critical software traced and the methodology adopted in each stage of software life cycle are presented. In concept phase, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the system has been performed. The feasibility evaluation of selected safety parameter was performed and Preliminary Hazards Analysis list was prepared using HAZOP(Hazard and Operability) technique. And the check list for management control has been produced via walk-through technique. Based on the evaluation of the check list, activities to be performed in requirement phase have been determined. In the design phase, hazard analysis has been performed to check the safety capability of the system with regard to safety software algorithm using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). In the test phase, the test items based on FMEA have been checked for fitness guided by an accident scenario. The pressurizer low pressure trip algorithm has been selected to apply FTA method to software safety analysis as a sample. By applying CASE tool, the requirements traceability of safety critical system has been enhanced during all of software life cycle phases

  4. Microbiological performance of Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP)-based food safety management systems: A case of Nile perch processing company

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Kussaga, J.B.; Luning, P.A.; Tiisekwa, B.P.M.; Jacxsens, L.

    2017-01-01

    This study aimed at giving insight into microbiological safety output of a Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP)-based Food Safety Management System (FSMS) of a Nile perch exporting company by using a combined assessment, This study aimed at giving insight into microbiological safety output

  5. Hydrothermal Liquefaction Treatment Hazard Analysis Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lowry, Peter P. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Wagner, Katie A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2016-09-12

    Hazard analyses were performed to evaluate the modular hydrothermal liquefaction treatment system. The hazard assessment process was performed in 2 stages. An initial assessment utilizing Hazard Identification and Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA) techniques identified areas with significant or unique hazards (process safety-related hazards) that fall outside of the normal operating envelope of PNNL and warranted additional analysis. The subsequent assessment was based on a qualitative What-If analysis. The analysis was augmented, as necessary, by additional quantitative analysis for scenarios involving a release of hazardous material or energy with the potential for affecting the public. The following selected hazardous scenarios received increased attention: •Scenarios involving a release of hazardous material or energy, controls were identified in the What-If analysis table that prevent the occurrence or mitigate the effects of the release. •Scenarios with significant consequences that could impact personnel outside the immediate operations area, quantitative analyses were performed to determine the potential magnitude of the scenario. The set of “critical controls” were identified for these scenarios (see Section 4) which prevent the occurrence or mitigate the effects of the release of events with significant consequences.

  6. Hazard Management Dealt by Safety Professionals in Colleges: The Impact of Individual Factors

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tsung-Chih Wu

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available Identifying, evaluating, and controlling workplace hazards are important functions of safety professionals (SPs. The purpose of this study was to investigate the content and frequency of hazard management dealt by safety professionals in colleges. The authors also explored the effects of organizational factors/individual factors on SPs’ perception of frequency of hazard management. The researchers conducted survey research to achieve the objective of this study. The researchers mailed questionnaires to 200 SPs in colleges after simple random sampling, then received a total of 144 valid responses (response rate = 72%. Exploratory factor analysis indicated that the hazard management scale (HMS extracted five factors, including physical hazards, biological hazards, social and psychological hazards, ergonomic hazards, and chemical hazards. Moreover, the top 10 hazards that the survey results identified that safety professionals were most likely to deal with (in order of most to least frequent were: organic solvents, illumination, other chemicals, machinery and equipment, fire and explosion, electricity, noise, specific chemicals, human error, and lifting/carrying. Finally, the results of one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA indicated there were four individual factors that impacted the perceived frequency of hazard management which were of statistical and practical significance: job tenure in the college of employment, type of certification, gender, and overall job tenure. SPs within colleges and industries can now discuss plans revolving around these five areas instead of having to deal with all of the separate hazards.

  7. DESIGN PACKAGE 1E SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    M. Salem

    1995-06-23

    The purpose of this analysis is to systematically identify and evaluate hazards related to the Yucca Mountain Project Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) Design Package 1E, Surface Facilities, (for a list of design items included in the package 1E system safety analysis see section 3). This process is an integral part of the systems engineering process; whereby safety is considered during planning, design, testing, and construction. A largely qualitative approach was used since a radiological System Safety Analysis is not required. The risk assessment in this analysis characterizes the accident scenarios associated with the Design Package 1E structures/systems/components(S/S/Cs) in terms of relative risk and includes recommendations for mitigating all identified risks. The priority for recommending and implementing mitigation control features is: (1) Incorporate measures to reduce risks and hazards into the structure/system/component design, (2) add safety devices and capabilities to the designs that reduce risk, (3) provide devices that detect and warn personnel of hazardous conditions, and (4) develop procedures and conduct training to increase worker awareness of potential hazards, on methods to reduce exposure to hazards, and on the actions required to avoid accidents or correct hazardous conditions.

  8. Software hazard analysis for nuclear digital protection system by Colored Petri Net

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bai, Tao; Chen, Wei-Hua; Liu, Zhen; Gao, Feng

    2017-01-01

    Highlights: •A dynamic hazard analysis method is proposed for the safety-critical software. •The mechanism relies on Colored Petri Net. •Complex interactions between software and hardware are captured properly. •Common failure mode in software are identified effectively. -- Abstract: The software safety of a nuclear digital protection system is critical for the safety of nuclear power plants as any software defect may result in severe damage. In order to ensure the safety and reliability of safety-critical digital system products and their applications, software hazard analysis is required to be performed during the lifecycle of software development. The dynamic software hazard modeling and analysis method based on Colored Petri Net is proposed and applied to the safety-critical control software of the nuclear digital protection system in this paper. The analysis results show that the proposed method can explain the complex interactions between software and hardware and identify the potential common cause failure in software properly and effectively. Moreover, the method can find the dominant software induced hazard to safety control actions, which aids in increasing software quality.

  9. WIPP fire hazards and risk analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-05-01

    The purpose of this analysis was to conduct a fire hazards risk analysis of the Transuranic (TRU) contact-handled waste receipt, emplacement, and disposal activities at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The technical bases and safety envelope for these operations are defined in the approved WIPP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Although the safety documentation for the initial phase of the Test Program, the dry bin scale tests, has not yet been approved by the Department of Energy (DOE), reviews of the draft to date, including those by the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety (ACNFS), have concluded that the dry bin scale tests present no significant risks in excess of those estimated in the approved WIPP FSAR. It is the opinion of the authors and reviewers of this analysis, based on sound engineering judgment and knowledge of the WIPP operations, that a Fire Hazards and Risk Analysis specific to the dry bin scale test program is not warranted prior to first waste receipt. This conclusion is further supported by the risk analysis presented in this document which demonstrates the level of risk to WIPP operations posed by fire to be extremely low. 15 refs., 41 figs., 48 tabs

  10. Assessing food safety concepts on the dairy farm: the case of chemical hazards

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Valeeva, N.I.; Meuwissen, M.P.M.; Oude Lansink, A.G.J.M.; Bergevoet, R.H.M.; Huirne, R.B.M.

    2004-01-01

    Adaptive conjoint analysis was used to elicit farmers' and experts' preferences for attributes of improving food safety with respect to chemical hazards on the dairy farm. Groups of respondents were determined by cluster analysis based on similar farmers' and experts' perceptions of food safety

  11. Solid waste burial grounds interim safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saito, G.H.

    1994-01-01

    This Interim Safety Analysis document supports the authorization basis for the interim operation and restrictions on interim operations for the near-surface land disposal of solid waste in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. The Solid Waste Burial Grounds Interim Safety Basis supports the upgrade progress for the safety analysis report and the technical safety requirements for the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. Accident safety analysis scenarios have been analyzed based on the significant events identified in the preliminary hazards analysis. The interim safety analysis provides an evaluation of the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds to determine if the radiological and hazardous material exposures will be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint to the worker, the onsite personnel, the public, and the environment

  12. Solid waste burial grounds interim safety analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Saito, G.H.

    1994-10-01

    This Interim Safety Analysis document supports the authorization basis for the interim operation and restrictions on interim operations for the near-surface land disposal of solid waste in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. The Solid Waste Burial Grounds Interim Safety Basis supports the upgrade progress for the safety analysis report and the technical safety requirements for the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. Accident safety analysis scenarios have been analyzed based on the significant events identified in the preliminary hazards analysis. The interim safety analysis provides an evaluation of the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds to determine if the radiological and hazardous material exposures will be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint to the worker, the onsite personnel, the public, and the environment.

  13. Contribution of psychology to the safety of installations with a high hazard potential

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilpert, B.

    1996-01-01

    Installations with a high hazard potential are usually characterised by the dual attribute 'low risk - high hazard'. Diverse strategies of safety management are employed in such installations in order to limit the great hazard potential of safety-relevant occurrences (faults, abnormal operating states, accidents) that can take place in them. These strategies include specific control principles. In nuclear engineering, for example, the feedforward principle has already been used for some time as a tool of analytic risk determination (e.g., in probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) or Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)). A further example of these strategies of safety management is the empirical determination of risks through evaluation of operating experience (feedback control, e.g., epemiological studies, accident analysis) and, derived from this, identification of the system's weak points in terms of safety. Insights derived from the application of these control principles can serve to develop specific means of intervention. These will tend to be closely oriented to the results obtained with the control method and may consist in, e.g., trainings or measures of organisation development. Independent of this, it will also be possible to identify long-term measures for preventing safety-relevant occurrences (e.g., organisational learning, safety-mindedness). The above-named strategies of safety management (control, intervention, prevention) provide a fertile basis for psychological studies in fields such as the physiology and psychology of perception (information processing), cognitive, psychology (thought and action), social psychology (division of labour, norms), paedagogic psychology (training), or organisational and environmental psychology (safety-mindedness, leadership, environmental influences). (orig./DG) [de

  14. Introduction of the system of hazard analysis critical control point to ensure the safety of irradiated food

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sajet, A.S.

    2014-01-01

    Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) is a preventive system for food safety. It identifies safety risks faced by food. Identified points are controlled ensuring product safety. Because of presence of many of the pathogenic microorganisms and parasites in food which caused cases of food poisoning and many diseases transmitted through food, the current methods of food production could not prevent food contamination or prevent the growth of these pathogens completely because of being a part of the normal flora in the environment. Irradiation technology helped to control diseases transmitted through food, caused by pathological microorganisms and parasites present in food. The application of a system based on risk analysis as a means of risk management in food chain, demonstrated the importance of food irradiation. (author)

  15. Exploratory Studies Facility Subsurface Fire Hazards Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Logan, Richard C.

    2002-01-01

    The primary objective of this Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) is to confirm the requirements for a comprehensive fire and related hazards protection program for the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) are sufficient to minimize the potential for: The occurrence of a fire or related event; A fire that causes an unacceptable on-site or off-site release of hazardous or radiological material that will threaten the health and safety of employees, the public or the environment; Vital U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) programs suffering unacceptable interruptions as a result of fire and related hazards; Property losses from a fire and related events exceeding limits established by DOE; and Critical process controls and safety class systems being damaged as a result of a fire and related events

  16. Surface Fire Hazards Analysis Technical Report-Constructor Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flye, R.E.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this Fire Hazards Analysis Technical Report (hereinafter referred to as Technical Report) is to assess the risk from fire within individual fire areas to ascertain whether the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) fire safety objectives are met. The objectives identified in DOE Order 420.1, Change 2, Facility Safety, Section 4.2, establish requirements for a comprehensive fire and related hazards protection program for facilities sufficient to minimize the potential for: The occurrence of a fire or related event; A fire that causes an unacceptable on-site or off-site release of hazardous or radiological material that will threaten the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment; Vital DOE programs suffering unacceptable interruptions as a result of fire and related hazards; Property losses from a fire and related events exceeding defined limits established by DOE; and Critical process controls and safety class systems being damaged as a result of a fire and related events

  17. Hazards analysis of TNX Large Melter-Off-Gas System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Randall, C.T.

    1982-03-01

    Analysis of the potential safety hazards and an evaluation of the engineered safety features and administrative controls indicate that the LMOG System can be operated without undue hazard to employees or the public, or damage to equipment. The safety features provided in the facility design coupled with the planned procedural and administrative controls make the occurrence of serious accidents very improbable. A set of recommendations evolved during this analysis that was judged potentially capable of further reducing the probability of personnel injury or further mitigating the consequences of potential accidents. These recommendations concerned areas such as formic acid vapor hazards, hazard of feeding water to the melter at an uncontrolled rate, prevention of uncontrolled glass pours due to melter pressure excursions and additional interlocks. These specific suggestions were reviewed with operational and technical personnel and are being incorporated into the process. The safeguards provided by these recommendations are discussed in this report

  18. Hazard analysis & safety requirements for small drone operations : to what extent do popular drones embed safety?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Plioutsias, Anastasios; Karanikas, Nektarios; Chatzimichailidou, Maria Mikela

    2018-01-01

    Currently, published risk analyses for drones refer mainly to commercial systems, use data from civil aviation, and are based on probabilistic approaches without suggesting an inclusive list of hazards and respective requirements. Within this context, this paper presents: (1) a set of safety

  19. Nuclear safety: operational aspects. 3. Hazard Analysis of Passive Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burgazzi, Luciano

    2001-01-01

    Interest has been aroused in recent years regarding the reliability assessment of passive systems being developed by suppliers, industries, utilities, and research organizations that aim at plant safety improvement and substantial simplification in its implementation. The approach to passive systems reliability assessment entails first a detailed system and safety analysis, and failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) methodology has been chosen to perform the safety analysis at the system level. The FMEA technique allows identification of all potential failure modes in a system to evaluate their effects on the system and to classify them according to their severity; this technique identifies the reliability-critical areas in the system where modifications to the design are required to reduce the probability of failure. The present study concerns passive systems designed for decay heat removal relying on natural circulation that foresee, for the most part, a condenser immersed in a cooling pool. This is to identify and rank by importance the potential hazards related to passive-system equipment and operation that may critically affect the safety or availability of the plant. More specifically, the content of the paper analyzes the isolation condenser (IC) system foreseen for advanced boiling water reactors for removal of excess sensible and core decay heat by natural circulation during isolation transients. This FMEA analysis is the initial step to be accomplished as support for the development of a methodology aimed at the reliability assessment of thermal-hydraulic passive safety systems, providing important input to more detailed quantitative studies employing, for instance, event trees and fault trees or other reliability/availability models. Main purposes of the work are to identify important accident initiators, find out the possible consequences on the plant deriving from component failures, individuate possible causes, identify mitigating features and

  20. Exploratory Studies Facility Subsurface Fire Hazards Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kubicek, J. L.

    2001-01-01

    The primary objective of this Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) is to confirm the requirements for a comprehensive fire and related hazards protection program for the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) are sufficient to minimize the potential for: (1) The occurrence of a fire or related event. (2) A fire that causes an unacceptable on-site or off-site release of hazardous or radiological material that will threaten the health and safety of employees, the public or the environment. (3) Vital US. Department of Energy (DOE) programs suffering unacceptable interruptions as a result of fire and related hazards. (4) Property losses from a fire and related events exceeding limits established by DOE. (5) Critical process controls and safety class systems being damaged as a result of a fire and related events

  1. AN ENHANCED HAZARD ANALYSIS PROCESS FOR THE HANFORD TANK FARMS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SHULTZ MV

    2008-01-01

    CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., has expanded the scope and increased the formality of process hazards analyses performed on new or modified Tank Farm facilities, designs, and processes. The CH2M HILL process hazard analysis emphasis has been altered to reflect its use as a fundamental part of the engineering and change control process instead of simply being a nuclear safety analysis tool. The scope has been expanded to include identification of accidents/events that impact the environment, or require emergency response, in addition to those with significant impact to the facility worker, the offsite, and the 100-meter receptor. Also, there is now an expectation that controls will be identified to address all types of consequences. To ensure that the process has an appropriate level of rigor and formality, a new engineering standard for process hazards analysis was created. This paper discusses the role of process hazards analysis as an information source for not only nuclear safety, but also for the worker-safety management programs, emergency management, environmental programs. This paper also discusses the role of process hazards analysis in the change control process, including identifying when and how it should be applied to changes in design or process

  2. Development of a systematic methodology to select hazard analysis techniques for nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vasconcelos, Vanderley de; Reis, Sergio Carneiro dos; Costa, Antonio Carlos Lopes da [Centro de Desenvolvimento da Tecnologia Nuclear (CDTN/CNEN-MG), Belo Horizonte, MG (Brazil)]. E-mails: vasconv@cdtn.br; reissc@cdtn.br; aclc@cdtn.br; Jordao, Elizabete [Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), SP (Brazil). Faculdade de Engenharia Quimica]. E-mail: bete@feq.unicamp.br

    2008-07-01

    In order to comply with licensing requirements of regulatory bodies risk assessments of nuclear facilities should be carried out. In Brazil, such assessments are part of the Safety Analysis Reports, required by CNEN (Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission), and of the Risk Analysis Studies, required by the competent environmental bodies. A risk assessment generally includes the identification of the hazards and accident sequences that can occur, as well as the estimation of the frequencies and effects of these unwanted events on the plant, people, and environment. The hazard identification and analysis are also particularly important when implementing an Integrated Safety, Health, and Environment Management System following ISO 14001, BS 8800 and OHSAS 18001 standards. Among the myriad of tools that help the process of hazard analysis can be highlighted: CCA (Cause- Consequence Analysis); CL (Checklist Analysis); ETA (Event Tree Analysis); FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis); FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis); FTA (Fault Tree Analysis); HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study); HRA (Human Reliability Analysis); Pareto Analysis; PHA (Preliminary Hazard Analysis); RR (Relative Ranking); SR (Safety Review); WI (What-If); and WI/CL (What-If/Checklist Analysis). The choice of a particular technique or a combination of techniques depends on many factors like motivation of the analysis, available data, complexity of the process being analyzed, expertise available on hazard analysis, and initial perception of the involved risks. This paper presents a systematic methodology to select the most suitable set of tools to conduct the hazard analysis, taking into account the mentioned involved factors. Considering that non-reactor nuclear facilities are, to a large extent, chemical processing plants, the developed approach can also be applied to analysis of chemical and petrochemical plants. The selected hazard analysis techniques can support cost

  3. Development of a systematic methodology to select hazard analysis techniques for nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vasconcelos, Vanderley de; Reis, Sergio Carneiro dos; Costa, Antonio Carlos Lopes da; Jordao, Elizabete

    2008-01-01

    In order to comply with licensing requirements of regulatory bodies risk assessments of nuclear facilities should be carried out. In Brazil, such assessments are part of the Safety Analysis Reports, required by CNEN (Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission), and of the Risk Analysis Studies, required by the competent environmental bodies. A risk assessment generally includes the identification of the hazards and accident sequences that can occur, as well as the estimation of the frequencies and effects of these unwanted events on the plant, people, and environment. The hazard identification and analysis are also particularly important when implementing an Integrated Safety, Health, and Environment Management System following ISO 14001, BS 8800 and OHSAS 18001 standards. Among the myriad of tools that help the process of hazard analysis can be highlighted: CCA (Cause- Consequence Analysis); CL (Checklist Analysis); ETA (Event Tree Analysis); FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis); FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis); FTA (Fault Tree Analysis); HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study); HRA (Human Reliability Analysis); Pareto Analysis; PHA (Preliminary Hazard Analysis); RR (Relative Ranking); SR (Safety Review); WI (What-If); and WI/CL (What-If/Checklist Analysis). The choice of a particular technique or a combination of techniques depends on many factors like motivation of the analysis, available data, complexity of the process being analyzed, expertise available on hazard analysis, and initial perception of the involved risks. This paper presents a systematic methodology to select the most suitable set of tools to conduct the hazard analysis, taking into account the mentioned involved factors. Considering that non-reactor nuclear facilities are, to a large extent, chemical processing plants, the developed approach can also be applied to analysis of chemical and petrochemical plants. The selected hazard analysis techniques can support cost

  4. Factor analysis on hazards for safety assessment in decommissioning workplace of nuclear facilities using a semantic differential method

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Kwan-Seong [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, 1045 Daedeok-daero, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon 305-353 (Korea, Republic of)], E-mail: ksjeongl@kaeri.re.kr; Lim, Hyeon-Kyo [Chungbuk National University, 410 Sungbong-ro, Heungduk-gu, Cheongju, Chungbuk 361-763 (Korea, Republic of)

    2009-10-15

    The decommissioning of nuclear facilities must be accomplished according to its structural conditions and radiological characteristics. An effective risk analysis requires basic knowledge about possible risks, characteristics of potential hazards, and comprehensive understanding of the associated cause-effect relationships within a decommissioning for nuclear facilities. The hazards associated with a decommissioning plan are important not only because they may be a direct cause of harm to workers but also because their occurrence may, indirectly, result in increased radiological and non-radiological hazards. Workers need to be protected by eliminating or reducing the radiological and non-radiological hazards that may arise during routine decommissioning activities as well as during accidents. Therefore, to prepare the safety assessment for decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the radiological and non-radiological hazards should be systematically identified and classified. With a semantic differential method of screening factor and risk perception factor, the radiological and non-radiological hazards are screened and identified.

  5. Fire hazards analysis for solid waste burial grounds

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McDonald, K.M.

    1995-01-01

    This document comprises the fire hazards analysis for the solid waste burial grounds, including TRU trenches, low-level burial grounds, radioactive mixed waste trenches, etc. It analyzes fire potential, and fire damage potential for these facilities. Fire scenarios may be utilized in future safety analysis work, or for increasing the understanding of where hazards may exist in the present operation

  6. 75 FR 35366 - Pipeline Safety: Applying Safety Regulation to All Rural Onshore Hazardous Liquid Low-Stress Lines

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-06-22

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part... Onshore Hazardous Liquid Low-Stress Lines AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration... to the risks that hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines pose to the environment. In the Pipeline...

  7. Environmental Health and Safety Hazards Experienced by Home Health Care Providers: A Room-by-Room Analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Polivka, Barbara J; Wills, Celia E; Darragh, Amy; Lavender, Steven; Sommerich, Carolyn; Stredney, Donald

    2015-11-01

    The number of personnel providing in-home health care services is increasing substantially. The unique configuration of environmental hazards in individual client homes has a significant impact on the safety and health of home health care providers (HHPs). This mixed-methods study used data from a standardized questionnaire, focus groups, and individual interviews to explore environmental health and safety hazards encountered by HHPs in client homes. The participant sample (N = 68) included nurses, aides, therapists, and owners/managers from a variety of geographic locations. The most often-reported hazards were trip/slip/lift hazards, biohazards, and hazards from poor air quality, allergens, pests and rodents, and fire and burns. Frequency of identified key hazards varied by room, that is, kitchen (e.g., throw rugs, water on floor), bathroom (e.g., tight spaces for client handling), bedroom (e.g., bed too low), living room (e.g., animal waste), and hallway (e.g., clutter). Findings indicate the need for broader training to enable HHPs to identify and address hazards they encounter in client homes. © 2015 The Author(s).

  8. Standarized radiological hazard analysis for a broad based operational safety program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wadman, W.W. III; Andrews, L.L.

    1992-01-01

    The Radiological hazard Analysis (RHA) Manual provides a methodology and detailed guidance for systematic analysis of radiological hazards over a broad spectrum of program functions, housed in a wide variety of facilities. Radiological programs at LANL include: research and experimentation; routine materials operations; production; non-destructive examination or testing; isotope and machine produced radiations; chemistry; and metallurgy. The RHA permits uniform evaluation of hazard types over a range of several orders of magnitude of hazard severity. The results are used to estimate risk, evaluate types and level or resource allocations, identify deficiencies, and plan corrective actions for safe working environments. 2 refs

  9. Standardized radiological hazard analysis for a broad based operational safety program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wadman, W. III; Andrews, L.

    1992-01-01

    The Radiological Hazard Analysis (RHA) Manual provides a methodology and detailed guidance for systematic analysis of radiological hazards over a broad spectrum of program functions, housed in a wide variety of facilities. Radiological programs at LANL include: research and experimentation routine materials operations; production; non-destructive examination or testing; isotope and machine produced radiations; chemistry; and metallurgy. The RHA permits uniform evaluation of hazard types over a range of several orders of magnitude of hazard severity. The results are used to estimate risk, evaluate types and level of resource allocations, identify deficiencies, and plan corrective actions for safe working environments. (author)

  10. National Waste Repository Novi Han operational safety analysis report. Safety assessment methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The scope of the safety assessment (SA), presented includes: waste management functions (acceptance, conditioning, storage, disposal), inventory (current and expected in the future), hazards (radiological and non-radiological) and normal and accidental modes. The stages in the development of the SA are: criteria selection, information collection, safety analysis and safety assessment documentation. After the review the facilities functions and the national and international requirements, the criteria for safety level assessment are set. As a result from the 2nd stage actual parameters of the facility, necessary for safety analysis are obtained.The methodology is selected on the base of the comparability of the results with the results of previous safety assessments and existing standards and requirements. The procedure and requirements for scenarios selection are described. A radiological hazard categorisation of the facilities is presented. Qualitative hazards and operability analysis is applied. The resulting list of events are subjected to procedure for prioritization by method of 'criticality analysis', so the estimation of the risk is given for each event. The events that fall into category of risk on the boundary of acceptability or are unacceptable are subjected to the next steps of the analysis. As a result the lists with scenarios for PSA and possible design scenarios are established. PSA logical modeling and quantitative calculations of accident sequences are presented

  11. Geotechnical approach for occupational safety risk analysis of critical slope in open pit mining as implication for earthquake hazard

    Science.gov (United States)

    Munirwansyah; Irsyam, Masyhur; Munirwan, Reza P.; Yunita, Halida; Zulfan Usrina, M.

    2018-05-01

    Occupational safety and health (OSH) is a planned effort to prevent accidents and diseases caused by work. In conducting mining activities often occur work accidents caused by unsafe field conditions. In open mine area, there is often a slump due to unstable slopes, which can disrupt the activities and productivity of mining companies. Based on research on stability of open pit slopes conducted by Febrianti [8], the Meureubo coal mine located in Aceh Barat district, on the slope of mine was indicated unsafe slope conditions, it will be continued research on OSH for landslide which is to understand the stability of the excavation slope and the shape of the slope collapse. Plaxis software was used for this research. After analyzing the slope stability and the effect of landslide on OSH with Job Safety Analysis (JSA) method, to identify the hazard to work safety, risk management analysis will be conducted to classified hazard level and its handling technique. This research aim is to know the level of risk of work accident at the company and its prevention effort. The result of risk analysis research is very high-risk value that is > 350 then the activity must be stopped until the risk can be reduced to reach the risk value limit < 20 which is allowed or accepted.

  12. COLD-SAT feasibility study safety analysis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mchenry, Steven T.; Yost, James M.

    1991-01-01

    The Cryogenic On-orbit Liquid Depot-Storage, Acquisition, and Transfer (COLD-SAT) satellite presents some unique safety issues. The feasibility study conducted at NASA-Lewis desired a systems safety program that would be involved from the initial design in order to eliminate and/or control the inherent hazards. Because of this, a hazards analysis method was needed that: (1) identified issues that needed to be addressed for a feasibility assessment; and (2) identified all potential hazards that would need to be controlled and/or eliminated during the detailed design phases. The developed analysis method is presented as well as the results generated for the COLD-SAT system.

  13. Using a multi-method, user centred, prospective hazard analysis to assess care quality and patient safety in a care pathway

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Escoto Kamisha

    2007-06-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Care pathways can be complex, often involving multiple care providers and as such are recognised as containing multiple opportunities for error. Prospective hazard analysis methods may be useful for evaluating care provided across primary and secondary care pathway boundaries. These methods take into account the views of users (staff and patients when determining where potential hazards may lie. The aim of this study is to evaluate the feasibility of prospective hazard analysis methods when assessing quality and safety in care pathways that lie across primary and secondary care boundaries. Methods Development of a process map of the care pathway for patients entering into a Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD supported discharge programme. Triangulation of information from: care process mapping, semi-structured interviews with COPD patients, semi-structured interviews with COPD staff, two round modified Delphi study and review of prioritised quality and safety challenges by health care staff. Results Interview themes emerged under the headings of quality of care and patient safety. Quality and safety concerns were mostly raised in relation to communication, for example, communication with other hospital teams. The three highest ranked safety concerns from the modified Delphi review were: difficulties in accessing hospital records, information transfer to primary care and failure to communicate medication changes to primary care. Conclusion This study has demonstrated the feasibility of using mixed methods to review the quality and safety of care in a care pathway. By using multiple research methods it was possible to get a clear picture of service quality variations and also to demonstrate which points in the care pathway had real potential for patient safety incidents or system failures to occur. By using these methods to analyse one condition specific care pathway it was possible to uncover a number of hospital

  14. Preliminary hazards analysis of thermal scrap stabilization system. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lewis, W.S.

    1994-01-01

    This preliminary analysis examined the HA-21I glovebox and its supporting systems for potential process hazards. Upon further analysis, the thermal stabilization system has been installed in gloveboxes HC-21A and HC-21C. The use of HC-21C and HC-21A simplified the initial safety analysis. In addition, these gloveboxes were cleaner and required less modification for operation than glovebox HA-21I. While this document refers to glovebox HA-21I for the hazards analysis performed, glovebox HC-21C is sufficiently similar that the following analysis is also valid for HC-21C. This hazards analysis document is being re-released as revision 1 to include the updated flowsheet document (Appendix C) and the updated design basis (Appendix D). The revised Process Flow Schematic has also been included (Appendix E). This Current revision incorporates the recommendations provided from the original hazards analysis as well. The System Design Description (SDD) has also been appended (Appendix H) to document the bases for Safety Classification of thermal stabilization equipment

  15. An Independent Evaluation of the FMEA/CIL Hazard Analysis Alternative Study

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ray, Paul S.

    1996-01-01

    The present instruments of safety and reliability risk control for a majority of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs/projects consist of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis (HA), Critical Items List (CIL), and Hazard Report (HR). This extensive analytical approach was introduced in the early 1970's and was implemented for the Space Shuttle Program by NHB 5300.4 (1D-2. Since the Challenger accident in 1986, the process has been expanded considerably and resulted in introduction of similar and/or duplicated activities in the safety/reliability risk analysis. A study initiated in 1995, to search for an alternative to the current FMEA/CIL Hazard Analysis methodology generated a proposed method on April 30, 1996. The objective of this Summer Faculty Study was to participate in and conduct an independent evaluation of the proposed alternative to simplify the present safety and reliability risk control procedure.

  16. Seismic hazard analysis of Sinop province, Turkey using ...

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    1997-01-11

    Jan 11, 1997 ... 2008 in the Sinop province of Turkey this study presents a seismic hazard analysis based on ... Considering the development and improvement ... It is one of the most populated cities in the coun- ... done as reliably as the seismic hazard of region per- .... Seismic safety work of underground networks was.

  17. Connoted hazard and perceived importance of fluorescent, neon, and standard safety colors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zielinska, O A; Mayhorn, C B; Wogalter, M S

    2017-11-01

    The perceived hazard and rated importance of standard safety, fluorescent, and neon colors are investigated. Colors are used in warnings to enhance hazard communication. Red has consistently been rated as the highest in perceived hazard. Orange, yellow, and black are the next highest in connoted hazard; however, there is discrepancy in their ordering. Safety standards, such as ANSI Z535.1, also list colors to convey important information, but little research has examined the perceived importance of colors. In addition to standard safety colors, fluorescent colors are more commonly used in warnings. Understanding hazard and importance perceptions of standard safety and fluorescent colors is necessary to create effective warnings. Ninety participants rated and ranked a total of 33 colors on both perceived hazard and perceived importance. Rated highest were the safety red colors from the American National Standard Institute (ANSI), International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) together with three fluorescent colors (orange, yellow, and yellow-green) from 3 M on both dimensions. Rankings were similar to ratings except that fluorescent orange was the highest on perceived hazard, while fluorescent orange and safety red from the ANSI were ranked as the highest in perceived importance. Fluorescent colors convey hazard and importance levels as high as the standard safety red colors. Implications for conveying hazard and importance in warnings through color are discussed. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  18. Job safety analysis and hazard identification for work accident prevention in para rubber wood sawmills in southern Thailand.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thepaksorn, Phayong; Thongjerm, Supawan; Incharoen, Salee; Siriwong, Wattasit; Harada, Kouji; Koizumi, Akio

    2017-11-25

    We utilized job safety analysis (JSA) and hazard identification for work accident prevention in Para rubber wood sawmills, which aimed to investigate occupational health risk exposures and assess the health hazards at sawmills in the Trang Province, located in southern Thailand. We conducted a cross-sectional study which included a walk-through survey, JSA, occupational risk assessment, and environmental samplings from March through September 2015 at four Para rubber wood sawmills. We identified potential occupational safety and health hazards associated with six main processes, including: 1) logging and cutting, 2) sawing the lumber into sheets, 3) planing and re-arranging, 4) vacuuming and wood preservation, 5) drying and planks re-arranging, and 6) grading, packing, and storing. Working in sawmills was associated with high risk of wood dust and noise exposure, occupational accidents injuring hands and feet, chemicals and fungicide exposure, and injury due to poor ergonomics or repetitive work. Several high-risk areas were identified from JSA and hazard identification of the working processes, especially high wood dust and noise exposure when sawing lumber into sheets and risk of occupational accidents of the hands and feet when struck by lumber. All workers were strongly recommended to use personal protective equipment in any working processes. Exposures should be controlled using local ventilation systems and reducing noise transmission. We recommend that the results from the risk assessment performed in this study be used to create an action plan for reducing occupational health hazards in Para rubber sawmills.

  19. Auditable Safety Analysis and Final Hazard Classification for the 105-N Reactor Zone and 109-N Steam Generator Zone Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kloster, G.L.

    1998-07-01

    This document is a graded auditable safety analysis (ASA) and final hazard classification (FHC) for the Reactor/Steam Generator Zone Segment. The Reactor/Steam Generator Zone Segment, part of the N Reactor Complex, that is also known as the Reactor Building and Steam Generator Cells. The installation of the modifications described within to support surveillance and maintenance activities are to be completed by July 1, 1999. The surveillance and maintenance activities addressed within are assumed to continue for the next 15- 20 years, until the initiation of facility D ampersand D (i.e., Interim Safe Storage). The graded ASA in this document is in accordance with EDPI-4.30-01, Rev. 1, Safety Analysis Documentation, (BHI-DE-1) and is consistent with guidance provided by the U.S. Department of Energy. This ASA describes the hazards within the facility and evaluates the adequacy of the measures taken to reduce, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. This document also serves as the FHC for the Reactor/Steam Generator Zone Segment. This FHC is developed through the use of bounding accident analyses that envelope the potential exposures to personnel

  20. Joint probability safety assessment for NPP defense infrastructure against extreme external natural hazards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guilin, L.; Defu, L.; Huajun, L.; Fengqing, W.; Tao, Z.

    2012-01-01

    With the increasing tendency of natural hazards, the typhoon, hurricane and tropical Cyclone induced surge, wave, precipitation, flood and wind as extreme external loads menacing Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) in coastal and inland provinces of China. For all of planned, designed And constructed NPP the National Nuclear Safety Administration of China and IAEA recommended Probable Maximum Hurricane /Typhoon/(PMH/T), Probable Maximum Storm Surge (PMSS), Probable Maximum Flood (PMF), Design Basis Flood (DBF) as safety regulations for NPP defense infrastructures. This paper discusses the joint probability analysis of simultaneous occurrence typhoon induced extreme external hazards and compare with IAEA 2006-2009 recommended safety regulation design criteria for some NPP defense infrastructures along China coast. (authors)

  1. Extending and automating a Systems-Theoretic hazard analysis for requirements generation and analysis.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomas, John (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

    2012-05-01

    Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a powerful new hazard analysis method designed to go beyond traditional safety techniques - such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) - that overlook important causes of accidents like flawed requirements, dysfunctional component interactions, and software errors. While proving to be very effective on real systems, no formal structure has been defined for STPA and its application has been ad-hoc with no rigorous procedures or model-based design tools. This report defines a formal mathematical structure underlying STPA and describes a procedure for systematically performing an STPA analysis based on that structure. A method for using the results of the hazard analysis to generate formal safety-critical, model-based system and software requirements is also presented. Techniques to automate both the analysis and the requirements generation are introduced, as well as a method to detect conflicts between the safety and other functional model-based requirements during early development of the system.

  2. Toward a federal/state/local partnership in hazardous materials transportation safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-09-01

    In recognition of the federal government's responsibility for initiating a national strategy for hazardous materials transportation safety, the Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) prepared an internal strategy paper for creating a federal/state/local partnership in hazardous materials transportation safety in August 1981. The paper outlined the scope of the hazardous materials transportation problem and established MTB's approach for creating an intergovernmental partnership for its resolution. This paper represents an update and refinement of the original plan, and is designed to chart the direction of the emerging federal/state/local relationship. The cornerstone of the plan remains the establishment of a single national set of safety regulations. It is on achievement of this objective that MTB's plan for development of enforcement, training, and emergency response capabilities at all levels of government is based. Chapter I introduces the problem with a desription of the economic importance of hazardous materials and discusses its implications for public safety. Chapter II defines the appropriate role for each level of government in the areas of rulemaking, enforcement, emergency response, and education. Chapter III demonstrates the need for uniform national safety standards and describes the economic and safety benefits of this approach. Chapter IV contains a detailed description of MTB's program for developing a successful intergovernmental partnership in hazardous materials transportation safety

  3. Hot Cell Facility (HCF) Safety Analysis Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MITCHELL,GERRY W.; LONGLEY,SUSAN W.; PHILBIN,JEFFREY S.; MAHN,JEFFREY A.; BERRY,DONALD T.; SCHWERS,NORMAN F.; VANDERBEEK,THOMAS E.; NAEGELI,ROBERT E.

    2000-11-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is prepared in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, and has been written to the format and content guide of DOE-STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The Hot Cell Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility, and is operated by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Energy. This SAR provides a description of the HCF and its operations, an assessment of the hazards and potential accidents which may occur in the facility. The potential consequences and likelihood of these accidents are analyzed and described. Using the process and criteria described in DOE-STD-3009-94, safety-related structures, systems and components are identified, and the important safety functions of each SSC are described. Additionally, information which describes the safety management programs at SNL are described in ancillary chapters of the SAR.

  4. Hot Cell Facility (HCF) Safety Analysis Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MITCHELL, GERRY W.; LONGLEY, SUSAN W.; PHILBIN, JEFFREY S.; MAHN, JEFFREY A.; BERRY, DONALD T.; SCHWERS, NORMAN F.; VANDERBEEK, THOMAS E.; NAEGELI, ROBERT E.

    2000-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is prepared in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, and has been written to the format and content guide of DOE-STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The Hot Cell Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility, and is operated by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Energy. This SAR provides a description of the HCF and its operations, an assessment of the hazards and potential accidents which may occur in the facility. The potential consequences and likelihood of these accidents are analyzed and described. Using the process and criteria described in DOE-STD-3009-94, safety-related structures, systems and components are identified, and the important safety functions of each SSC are described. Additionally, information which describes the safety management programs at SNL are described in ancillary chapters of the SAR

  5. Evaluation of Hazardous Material Management Safety in the Chemical Laboratory in BATAN

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nur-Rahmah-Hidayati

    2005-01-01

    The management safety of the hazardous material (B3) in the chemical laboratory of BATAN was evaluated. The evaluation is necessary to be done because B3 is often used together with radioactive materials in the laboratory, but the attention to the safety aspect of B3 is not paid sufficiently in spite of its big potential hazard. The potential hazard generated from the nature of B3 could be flammable, explosive, oxidative, corrosive and poisonous. The handling of B3 could be conducted by enforcing the labelling and classification in the usage and disposal processes. Some observations of the chemical laboratory of BATAN show that the management safety of hazardous material in compliance with the government regulation no. 74 year 2001 has not been dully conducted. The management safety of B3 could be improved by, designating one who has adequate skill in hazardous material safety specially as the B3 safety officer, providing the Material Safety Data Sheet that is updated periodically to use in the laboratory and storage room, updating periodically the inventory of B3, performing training in work safety periodically, and monitoring the ventilation system intensively in laboratory and storage room. (author)

  6. OSHA safety requirements for hazardous chemicals in the workplace.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dohms, J

    1992-01-01

    This article outlines the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements set forth by the Hazard Communication Standard, which has been in effect for the healthcare industry since 1987. Administrators who have not taken concrete steps to address employee health and safety issues relating to hazardous chemicals are encouraged to do so to avoid the potential of large fines for cited violations. While some states administer their own occupational safety and health programs, they must adopt standards and enforce requirements that are at least as effective as federal requirements.

  7. Health and safety information program for hazardous materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Brien, M.P.; Fallon, N.J.; Kuehner, A.V.

    1979-01-01

    The system is used as a management tool in several safety and health programs. It is used to: trace the use of hazardous materials and to determine monitoring needs; inform the occupational physician of the potential health problems associated with materials ordered by a given individual; inform the fire and rescue group of hazardous materials in a given building; provide waste disposal recommendations to the hazardous waste management group; assist the hazardous materials shipping coordinator in identifying materials which are regulated by the Department of Transportation; and guide management decisions in the area of recognizing and rectifying unsafe conditions. The information system has been expanded from a manual effort to provide a brief description of health hazards of chemicals used at the lab to a computerized health and safety information system which serves the needs of all personnel who may encounter the material in the course of their work. The system has been designed to provide information needed to control the potential problems associated with a hazardous material up to the time that it is consumed in a given operation or is sent to the waste disposal facility

  8. Development of an auditable safety analysis in support of a radiological facility classification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kinney, M.D.; Young, B.

    1995-01-01

    In recent years, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities commonly have been classified as reactor, non-reactor nuclear, or nuclear facilities. Safety analysis documentation was prepared for these facilities, with few exceptions, using the requirements in either DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System; or DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. Traditionally, this has been accomplished by development of an extensive Safety Analysis Report (SAR), which identifies hazards, assesses risks of facility operation, describes and analyzes adequacy of measures taken to control hazards, and evaluates potential accidents and their associated risks. This process is complicated by analysis of secondary hazards and adequacy of backup (redundant) systems. The traditional SAR process is advantageous for DOE facilities with appreciable hazards or operational risks. SAR preparation for a low-risk facility or process can be cost-prohibitive and quite challenging because conventional safety analysis protocols may not readily be applied to a low-risk facility. The DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management recognized this potential disadvantage and issued an EM limited technical standard, No. 5502-94, Hazard Baseline Documentation. This standard can be used for developing documentation for a facility classified as radiological, including preparation of an auditable (defensible) safety analysis. In support of the radiological facility classification process, the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project has developed an auditable safety analysis document based upon the postulation criteria and hazards analysis techniques defined in DOE Order 5480.23

  9. Safety analysis of the existing 850 Firing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Odell, B.N.

    1986-01-01

    A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 850 Firing Facility at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, personnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operations and credible accidents that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequences were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but one of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exception was explosives, which was classified as a moderate hazard per the requirements given in DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at this facility will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public

  10. Safety analysis of the existing 851 Firing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Odell, B.N.

    1986-01-01

    A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 851 Firing Facility at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, personnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operations and credible accidents that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequences were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but two of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exceptions were the linear accelerator and explosives, which were classified as moderate hazards per the requirements given in DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at this facility will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public

  11. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-11-01

    The following provides a summary of the specific issues addressed in this FY-95 Annual Update as they relate to the CH TRU safety bases: Executive Summary; Site Characteristics; Principal Design and Safety Criteria; Facility Design and Operation; Hazards and Accident Analysis; Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements; Radiological and Hazardous Material Protection; Institutional Programs; Quality Assurance; and Decontamination and Decommissioning. The System Design Descriptions'' (SDDS) for the WIPP were reviewed and incorporated into Chapter 3, Principal Design and Safety Criteria and Chapter 4, Facility Design and Operation. This provides the most currently available final engineering design information on waste emplacement operations throughout the disposal phase up to the point of permanent closure. Also, the criteria which define the TRU waste to be accepted for disposal at the WIPP facility were summarized in Chapter 3 based on the WAC for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.'' This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents the safety analyses that develop and evaluate the adequacy of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact-Handled Transuranic Wastes (WIPP CH TRU) safety bases necessary to ensure the safety of workers, the public and the environment from the hazards posed by WIPP waste handling and emplacement operations during the disposal phase and hazards associated with the decommissioning and decontamination phase. The analyses of the hazards associated with the long-term (10,000 year) disposal of TRU and TRU mixed waste, and demonstration of compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 191, Subpart B and 40 CFR 268.6 will be addressed in detail in the WIPP Final Certification Application scheduled for submittal in October 1996 (40 CFR 191) and the No-Migration Variance Petition (40 CFR 268.6) scheduled for submittal in June 1996. Section 5.4, Long-Term Waste Isolation Assessment summarizes the current status of the assessment

  12. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-11-01

    The following provides a summary of the specific issues addressed in this FY-95 Annual Update as they relate to the CH TRU safety bases: Executive Summary; Site Characteristics; Principal Design and Safety Criteria; Facility Design and Operation; Hazards and Accident Analysis; Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements; Radiological and Hazardous Material Protection; Institutional Programs; Quality Assurance; and Decontamination and Decommissioning. The System Design Descriptions`` (SDDS) for the WIPP were reviewed and incorporated into Chapter 3, Principal Design and Safety Criteria and Chapter 4, Facility Design and Operation. This provides the most currently available final engineering design information on waste emplacement operations throughout the disposal phase up to the point of permanent closure. Also, the criteria which define the TRU waste to be accepted for disposal at the WIPP facility were summarized in Chapter 3 based on the WAC for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.`` This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents the safety analyses that develop and evaluate the adequacy of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact-Handled Transuranic Wastes (WIPP CH TRU) safety bases necessary to ensure the safety of workers, the public and the environment from the hazards posed by WIPP waste handling and emplacement operations during the disposal phase and hazards associated with the decommissioning and decontamination phase. The analyses of the hazards associated with the long-term (10,000 year) disposal of TRU and TRU mixed waste, and demonstration of compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 191, Subpart B and 40 CFR 268.6 will be addressed in detail in the WIPP Final Certification Application scheduled for submittal in October 1996 (40 CFR 191) and the No-Migration Variance Petition (40 CFR 268.6) scheduled for submittal in June 1996. Section 5.4, Long-Term Waste Isolation Assessment summarizes the current status of the assessment.

  13. Qualitative safety analysis in accelerator based systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sarkar, P.K.; Chowdhury, Lekha M.

    2006-01-01

    In recent developments connected to high energy and high current accelerators, the accelerator driven systems (ADS) and the Radioactive Ion Beam (RIB) facilities come in the forefront of application. For medical and industrial applications high current accelerators often need to be located in populated areas. These facilities pose significant radiological hazard during their operation and accidental situations. We have done a qualitative evaluation of radiological safety analysis using the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) methods for accelerator-based systems. The major contribution to hazard comes from a target rupture scenario in both ADS and RIB facilities. Other significant contributors to hazard in the facilities are also discussed using fault tree and event tree methodologies. (author)

  14. Using hazard maps to identify and eliminate workplace hazards: a union-led health and safety training program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Joe; Collins, Michele; Devlin, John; Renner, Paul

    2012-01-01

    The Institute for Sustainable Work and Environment and the Utility Workers Union of America worked with a professional evaluator to design, implement, and evaluate the results of a union-led system of safety-based hazard identification program that trained workers to use hazard maps to identify workplace hazards and target them for elimination. The evaluation documented program implementation and impact using data collected from both qualitative interviews and an on-line survey from worker trainers, plant managers, and health and safety staff. Managers and workers reported that not only were many dangerous hazards eliminated as a result of hazard mapping, some of which were long-standing, difficult-to-resolve issues, but the evaluation also documented improved communication between union members and management that both workers and managers agreed resulted in better, more sustainable hazard elimination.

  15. Expert systems for assisting the analysis of hazards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evrard, J.M.; Martinez, J.M.; Souchet, Y.

    1990-01-01

    The advantage of applying expert systems in the analysis of safety in the operation of nuclear power plants is discussed. Expert systems apply a method based on a common representation of nuclear power plants. The main steps of the method are summarized. The applications given concern in the following fields: the analysis of hazards in the electric power supplies of a gas-graphite power plant; the evaluation of the availability of safety procedures in a PWR power plant; the search for the sources of leakage in a PWR power plant. The analysis shows that expert systems are a powerful tool in the study of safety of nuclear power plants [fr

  16. YUCCA MOUNTAIN SITE CHARACTERIZATION PROJECT EAST-WEST DRIFT SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NA

    1999-06-08

    The purpose of this analysis is to systematically identify and evaluate hazards related to the design of the Yucca Mountain Project Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) East-West Cross Drift. This analysis builds upon prior ESF System Safety Analyses and incorporates TS Main Drift scenarios, where applicable, into the East-West Drift scenarios. This System Safety Analysis (SSA) focuses on the personnel safety and health hazards associated with the engineered design of the East-West Drift. The analysis also evaluates other aspects of the East-West Drift, including purchased equipment (e.g., scientific mapping platform) or Systems/Structures/Components (SSCs) and out-of-tolerance conditions. In addition to recommending design mitigation features, the analysis identifies the potential need for procedures, training, or Job Safety Analyses (JSAs). The inclusion of this information in the SSA is intended to assist the organization(s) (e.g., constructor, Safety and Health, design) responsible for these aspects of the East-West Drift in evaluating personnel hazards and augment the information developed by these organizations. The SSA is an integral part of the systems engineering process, whereby safety is considered during planning, design, testing, and construction. A largely qualitative approach is used which incorporates operating experiences and recommendations from vendors, the constructor and the operating contractor. The risk assessment in this analysis characterizes the scenarios associated with East-West Drift SSCs in terms of relative risk and includes recommendations for mitigating all identified hazards. The priority for recommending and implementing mitigation control features is: (1) Incorporate measures to reduce risks and hazards into SSC designs. (2) Add safety features and capabilities to existing designs. (3) Develop procedures and conduct training to increase worker awareness of potential hazards, reduce exposure to hazards, and inform personnel of the

  17. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Environmental Restoration (ER) Program Baseline Safety Analysis File (BSAF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-09-01

    The Baseline Safety Analysis File (BSAF) is a facility safety reference document for the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) environmental restoration activities. The BSAF contains information and guidance for safety analysis documentation required by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for environmental restoration (ER) activities, including: Characterization of potentially contaminated sites. Remedial investigations to identify and remedial actions to clean up existing and potential releases from inactive waste sites Decontamination and dismantlement of surplus facilities. The information is INEL-specific and is in the format required by DOE-EM-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports. An author of safety analysis documentation need only write information concerning that activity and refer to BSAF for further information or copy applicable chapters and sections. The information and guidance provided are suitable for: sm-bullet Nuclear facilities (DOE Order 5480-23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports) with hazards that meet the Category 3 threshold (DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports) sm-bullet Radiological facilities (DOE-EM-STD-5502-94, Hazard Baseline Documentation) Nonnuclear facilities (DOE-EM-STD-5502-94) that are classified as open-quotes lowclose quotes hazard facilities (DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System). Additionally, the BSAF could be used as an information source for Health and Safety Plans and for Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) for nuclear facilities with hazards equal to or greater than the Category 2 thresholds, or for nonnuclear facilities with open-quotes moderateclose quotes or open-quotes highclose quotes hazard classifications

  18. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Environmental Restoration (ER) Program Baseline Safety Analysis File (BSAF)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-09-01

    The Baseline Safety Analysis File (BSAF) is a facility safety reference document for the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) environmental restoration activities. The BSAF contains information and guidance for safety analysis documentation required by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for environmental restoration (ER) activities, including: Characterization of potentially contaminated sites. Remedial investigations to identify and remedial actions to clean up existing and potential releases from inactive waste sites Decontamination and dismantlement of surplus facilities. The information is INEL-specific and is in the format required by DOE-EM-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports. An author of safety analysis documentation need only write information concerning that activity and refer to BSAF for further information or copy applicable chapters and sections. The information and guidance provided are suitable for: {sm_bullet} Nuclear facilities (DOE Order 5480-23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports) with hazards that meet the Category 3 threshold (DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports) {sm_bullet} Radiological facilities (DOE-EM-STD-5502-94, Hazard Baseline Documentation) Nonnuclear facilities (DOE-EM-STD-5502-94) that are classified as {open_quotes}low{close_quotes} hazard facilities (DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System). Additionally, the BSAF could be used as an information source for Health and Safety Plans and for Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) for nuclear facilities with hazards equal to or greater than the Category 2 thresholds, or for nonnuclear facilities with {open_quotes}moderate{close_quotes} or {open_quotes}high{close_quotes} hazard classifications.

  19. Process safety management for highly hazardous chemicals

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-02-01

    Purpose of this document is to assist US DOE contractors who work with threshold quantities of highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs), flammable liquids or gases, or explosives in successfully implementing the requirements of OSHA Rule for Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (29 CFR 1910.119). Purpose of this rule is to prevent releases of HHCs that have the potential to cause catastrophic fires, explosions, or toxic exposures.

  20. Preliminary fire hazards analysis for W-211, Initial Tank Retrieval Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckfeldt, R.A.

    1995-01-01

    A fire hazards analysis (FHA) was performed for Project W-211, Initial Tank Retrieval System (ITRS), at the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford site. The objectives of this FHA was to determine (1) the fire hazards that expose the Initial Tank Retrieval System or are inherent in the process, (2) the adequacy of the fire-safety features planned, and (3) the degree of compliance of the project with specific fire safety provisions in DOE orders and related engineering codes and standards. The scope included the construction, the process hazards, building fire protection, and site wide fire protection. The results are presented in terms of the fire hazards present, the potential extent of fire damage, and the impact on employees and public safety. This study evaluated the ITRS with respect to its use at Tank 241-SY-101 only

  1. Risk assessment on hazards for decommissioning safety of a nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Kwan-Seong; Lee, Kune-Woo; Lim, Hyeon-Kyo

    2010-01-01

    A decommissioning plan should be followed by a qualitative and quantitative safety assessment of it. The safety assessment of a decommissioning plan is applied to identify the potential (radiological and non-radiological) hazards and risks. Radiological and non-radiological hazards arise during decommissioning activities. The non-radiological or industrial hazards to which workers are subjected during a decommissioning and dismantling process may be greater than those experienced during an operational lifetime of a facility. Workers need to be protected by eliminating or reducing the radiological and non-radiological hazards that may arise during routine decommissioning activities and as well as during accidents. The risk assessment method was developed by using risk matrix and fuzzy inference logic, on the basis of the radiological and non-radiological hazards for a decommissioning safety of a nuclear facility. Fuzzy inference of radiological and non-radiological hazards performs a mapping from radiological and non-radiological hazards to risk matrix. Defuzzification of radiological and non-radiological hazards is the conversion of risk matrix and priorities to the maximum criterion method and the mean criterion method. In the end, a composite risk assessment methodology, to rank the risk level on radiological and non-radiological hazards of the decommissioning tasks and to prioritize on the risk level of the decommissioning tasks, by simultaneously combining radiological and non-radiological hazards, was developed.

  2. Development of seismic hazard analysis in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Itoh, T.; Ishii, K.; Ishikawa, Y.; Okumura, T.

    1987-01-01

    In recent years, seismic risk assessment of the nuclear power plant have been conducted increasingly in various countries, particularly in the United States to evaluate probabilistically the safety of existing plants under earthquake loading. The first step of the seismic risk assessment is the seismic hazard analysis, in which the relationship between the maximum earthquake ground motions at the plant site and their annual probability of exceedance, i.e. the seismic hazard curve, is estimated. In this paper, seismic hazard curves are evaluated and examined based on historical earthquake records model, in which seismic sources are modeled with area-sources, for several different sites in Japan. A new evaluation method is also proposed to compute the response spectra of the earthquake ground motions in connection with estimating the probabilistic structural response. Finally the numerical result of probabilistic risk assessment for a base-isolated three story RC structure, in which the frequency of seismic induced structural failure is evaluated combining the seismic hazard analysis, is described briefly

  3. Safety analysis of the nuclear chemistry Building 151

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kvam, D.

    1984-01-01

    This report summarizes the results of a safety analysis that was done on Building 151. The report outlines the methodology, the analysis, and the findings that led to the low hazard classification. No further safety evaluation is indicated at this time. 5 tables

  4. Subseabed disposal safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koplick, C.M.; Kabele, T.J.

    1982-01-01

    This report summarizes the status of work performed by Analytic Sciences Corporation (TASC) in FY'81 on subseabed disposal safety analysis. Safety analysis for subseabed disposal is divided into two phases: pre-emplacement which includes all transportation, handling, and emplacement activities; and long-term (post-emplacement), which is concerned with the potential hazard after waste is safely emplaced. Details of TASC work in these two areas are provided in two technical reports. The work to date, while preliminary, supports the technical and environmental feasibility of subseabed disposal of HLW

  5. Systems engineered health and safety criteria for safety analysis reports

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beitel, G.A.; Morcos, N.

    1993-01-01

    The world of safety analysis is filled with ambiguous words: codes and standards, consequences and risks, hazard and accident, and health and safety. These words have been subject to disparate interpretations by safety analysis report (SAR) writers, readers, and users. open-quotes Principal health and safety criteriaclose quotes has been one of the most frequently misused phrases; rarely is it used consistently or effectively. This paper offers an easily understood definition for open-quotes principal health and safety criteriaclose quotes and uses systems engineering to convert an otherwise mysterious topic into the primary means of producing an integrated SAR. This paper is based on SARs being written for environmental restoration and waste management activities for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Requirements for these SARs are prescribed in DOE Order 5480-23, open-quotes Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.close quotes

  6. Evaluation of an active learning module to teach hazard and risk in Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) classes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Oyarzabal, Omar A; Rowe, Ellen

    2017-04-01

    The terms hazard and risk are significant building blocks for the organization of risk-based food safety plans. Unfortunately, these terms are not clear for some personnel working in food manufacturing facilities. In addition, there are few examples of active learning modules for teaching adult participants the principles of hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP). In this study, we evaluated the effectiveness of an active learning module to teach hazard and risk to participants of HACCP classes provided by the University of Vermont Extension in 2015 and 2016. This interactive module is comprised of a questionnaire; group playing of a dice game that we have previously introduced in the teaching of HACCP; the discussion of the terms hazard and risk; and a self-assessment questionnaire to evaluate the teaching of hazard and risk. From 71 adult participants that completed this module, 40 participants (56%) provided the most appropriate definition of hazard, 19 participants (27%) provided the most appropriate definition of risk, 14 participants (20%) provided the most appropriate definitions of both hazard and risk, and 23 participants (32%) did not provide an appropriate definition for hazard or risk. Self-assessment data showed an improvement in the understanding of these terms (P active learning modules to teach food safety classes. This study suggests that active learning helps food personnel better understand important food safety terms that serve as building blocks for the understanding of more complex food safety topics.

  7. Safety analysis of exothermic reaction hazards associated with the organic liquid layer in tank 241-C-103

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Postma, A.K.; Bechtold, D.B.; Borsheim, G.L.; Grisby, J.M.; Guthrie, R.L.; Kummerer, M.; Turner, D.A.; Plys, M.G.

    1994-03-01

    Safety hazards associated with the interim storage of a potentially flammable organic liquid in waste Tank C-103 are identified and evaluated. The technical basis for closing the unreviewed safety question (USQ) associated with the floating liquid organic layer in this tank is presented

  8. Safety analysis of exothermic reaction hazards associated with the organic liquid layer in tank 241-C-103

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Postma, A.K.; Bechtold, D.B.; Borsheim, G.L.; Grisby, J.M.; Guthrie, R.L.; Kummerer, M.; Turner, D.A. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States); Plys, M.G. [Fauske and Associates, Inc., Burr Ridge, IL (United States)

    1994-03-01

    Safety hazards associated with the interim storage of a potentially flammable organic liquid in waste Tank C-103 are identified and evaluated. The technical basis for closing the unreviewed safety question (USQ) associated with the floating liquid organic layer in this tank is presented.

  9. Application of systems and control theory-based hazard analysis to radiation oncology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pawlicki, Todd; Samost, Aubrey; Brown, Derek W; Manger, Ryan P; Kim, Gwe-Ya; Leveson, Nancy G

    2016-03-01

    Both humans and software are notoriously challenging to account for in traditional hazard analysis models. The purpose of this work is to investigate and demonstrate the application of a new, extended accident causality model, called systems theoretic accident model and processes (STAMP), to radiation oncology. Specifically, a hazard analysis technique based on STAMP, system-theoretic process analysis (STPA), is used to perform a hazard analysis. The STPA procedure starts with the definition of high-level accidents for radiation oncology at the medical center and the hazards leading to those accidents. From there, the hierarchical safety control structure of the radiation oncology clinic is modeled, i.e., the controls that are used to prevent accidents and provide effective treatment. Using STPA, unsafe control actions (behaviors) are identified that can lead to the hazards as well as causal scenarios that can lead to the identified unsafe control. This information can be used to eliminate or mitigate potential hazards. The STPA procedure is demonstrated on a new online adaptive cranial radiosurgery procedure that omits the CT simulation step and uses CBCT for localization, planning, and surface imaging system during treatment. The STPA procedure generated a comprehensive set of causal scenarios that are traced back to system hazards and accidents. Ten control loops were created for the new SRS procedure, which covered the areas of hospital and department management, treatment design and delivery, and vendor service. Eighty three unsafe control actions were identified as well as 472 causal scenarios that could lead to those unsafe control actions. STPA provides a method for understanding the role of management decisions and hospital operations on system safety and generating process design requirements to prevent hazards and accidents. The interaction of people, hardware, and software is highlighted. The method of STPA produces results that can be used to improve

  10. Sensor technology for hazardous cargo transportation safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-01

    The overall goal of this research project was to develop oxidant vapor detection devices that can be : used to ensure the safety of hazardous freight transportation systems. Two nanotechnology-based : systems originally developed for improvised explo...

  11. STARS software tool for analysis of reliability and safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poucet, A.; Guagnini, E.

    1989-01-01

    This paper reports on the STARS (Software Tool for the Analysis of Reliability and Safety) project aims at developing an integrated set of Computer Aided Reliability Analysis tools for the various tasks involved in systems safety and reliability analysis including hazard identification, qualitative analysis, logic model construction and evaluation. The expert system technology offers the most promising perspective for developing a Computer Aided Reliability Analysis tool. Combined with graphics and analysis capabilities, it can provide a natural engineering oriented environment for computer assisted reliability and safety modelling and analysis. For hazard identification and fault tree construction, a frame/rule based expert system is used, in which the deductive (goal driven) reasoning and the heuristic, applied during manual fault tree construction, is modelled. Expert system can explain their reasoning so that the analyst can become aware of the why and the how results are being obtained. Hence, the learning aspect involved in manual reliability and safety analysis can be maintained and improved

  12. Safety analysis of the existing 804 and 845 firing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Odell, B.N.

    1986-01-01

    A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 804 and 845 Firing Facilities at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, peronnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operation and credible accident that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequence were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but one of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exception was explosives. Since this hazard has the potential for causing significant on-site and minimum off-site consequences, Bunkers 804 and 845 have been classified as moderate hazard facilties per DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at these facilities will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public

  13. Administrative goals and safety standards for hazard control on forested recreation sites

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lee A. Paine

    1973-01-01

    For efficient control of tree hazard on recreation sites, a specific administrative goal must be selected. A safety standard designed to achieve the selected goal and a uniform hazard-rating procedure will then promote a consistent level of safety at an acceptable cost. Safety standards can be established with the aid of data for past years, and dollar evaluations are...

  14. Application of system safety engineering techniques for hazard prevention at the Superconducting Super Collider

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hendrix, B.L.

    1991-01-01

    A primary goal of the Superconducting Super Collider Laboratory (SSCL) is to establish an exemplary safety program. Achieving this goal requires leadership, planning, coordination, and technical know-how. To ensure that safety is an inherent part of the design, the Environment, Safety and Health Office employs a systems engineering discipline and process known as System Safety. The goal of System Safety - hazard prevention - is accomplished by analyzing systems to identify hazards and to evaluate design and procedural options and countermeasures to prevent, eliminate, mitigate, or control hazards and risks. Establishment of safety and human factors design criteria at the outset of the project prevents unsafe designs and safety violations, reduces risks, and helps in avoiding costly design changes later. This process requires a considerable amount of coordination with a variety of technical disciplines and safety professionals to integrate methods of hazard prevention, mitigation, and risk reduction throughout the system life-cycle

  15. 76 FR 73011 - Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-28

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Office of... Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of actions on Special Permit Applications. SUMMARY: In... reissue the Nuclear 173.56(b)(3)(i special permit Security ). originally issued Administration on an...

  16. HYGIENE PRACTICES IN URBAN RESTAURANTS AND CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING FOOD SAFETY AND HAZARD ANALYSIS CRITICAL CONTROL POINTS (HACCP) PROGRAMMES IN THIKA TOWN, KENYA.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Muinde, R K; Kiinyukia, C; Rombo, G O; Muoki, M A

    2012-12-01

    To determine the microbial load in food, examination of safety measures and possibility of implementing an Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) system. The target population for this study consisted of restaurants owners in Thika. Municipality (n = 30). Simple randomsamples of restaurantswere selected on a systematic sampling method of microbial analysis in cooked, non-cooked, raw food and water sanitation in the selected restaurants. Two hundred and ninety eight restaurants within Thika Municipality were selected. Of these, 30 were sampled for microbiological testing. From the study, 221 (74%) of the restaurants were ready to eat establishments where food was prepared early enough to hold and only 77(26%) of the total restaurants, customers made an order of food they wanted. 118(63%) of the restaurant operators/staff had knowledge on quality control on food safety measures, 24 (8%) of the restaurants applied these knowledge while 256 (86%) of the restaurants staff showed that food contains ingredients that were hazard if poorly handled. 238 (80%) of the resultants used weighing and sorting of food materials, 45 (15%) used preservation methods and the rest used dry foods as critical control points on food safety measures. The study showed that there was need for implementation of Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) system to enhance food safety. Knowledge of HACCP was very low with 89 (30%) of the restaurants applying some of quality measures to the food production process systems. There was contamination with Coliforms, Escherichia coli and Staphylococcus aureus microbial though at very low level. The means of Coliforms, Escherichia coli and Staphylococcus aureas microbial in sampled food were 9.7 x 103CFU/gm, 8.2 x 103 CFU/gm and 5.4 x 103 CFU/gm respectively with Coliforms taking the highest mean.

  17. Attitude and awareness of general dental practitioners toward radiation hazards and safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Aravind, B S; Joy, E Tatu; Kiran, M Shashi; Sherubin, J Eugenia; Sajesh, S; Manchil, P Redwin Dhas

    2016-10-01

    The aim and objective is to evaluate the level of awareness and attitude about radiation hazards and safety practices among general dental practitioners in Trivandrum District, Kerala, India. A questionnaire-based cross-sectional study was conducted among 300 general dental practitioners in Trivandrum District, Kerala, India. Postanswering the questions, a handout regarding radiation safety and related preventive measures was distributed to encourage radiation understanding and protection. Statistical analysis were done by assessing the results using Chi-square statistical test, t -test, and other software (Microsoft excel + SPSS 20.0 trail version). Among 300 general practitioners (247 females and 53 males), 80.3% of the practitioners were found to have a separate section for radiographic examination in their clinics. Intraoral radiographic machines were found to be the most commonly (63.3%) used radiographic equipment while osteoprotegerin was the least (2%). Regarding the practitioner's safety measures, only 11.7% of them were following all the necessary steps while 6.7% clinicians were not using any safety measure in their clinic, and with respect to patient safety, only 9.7% of practitioners were following the protocol. The level of awareness of practitioners regarding radiation hazards and safety was found to be acceptable. However, implementation of their knowledge with respect to patient and personnel safety was found wanting. Insisting that they follow the protocols and take necessary safety measures by means of continuing medical education programs, pamphlets, articles, and workshops is strongly recommended.

  18. Fire hazard analysis of the radioactive mixed waste trenchs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McDonald, K.M.

    1995-01-01

    This Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) is intended to assess comprehensively the risk from fire associated with the disposal of low level radioactive mixed waste in trenches within the lined landfills, provided by Project W-025, designated Trench 31 and 34 of the Burial Ground 218-W-5. Elements within the FHA make recommendations for minimizing risk to workers, the public, and the environment from fire during the course of the operation's activity. Transient flammables and combustibles present that support the operation's activity are considered and included in the analysis. The graded FHA contains the following elements: description of construction, protection of essential safety class equipment, fire protection features, description of fire hazards, life safety considerations, critical process equipment, high value property, damage potential--maximum credible fire loss (MCFL) and maximum possible fire loss (MPFL), fire department/brigade response, recovery potential, potential for a toxic, biological and/or radiation incident due to a fire, emergency planning, security considerations related to fire protection, natural hazards (earthquake, flood, wind) impact on fire safety, and exposure fire potential, including the potential for fire spread between fire areas. Recommendations for limiting risk are made in the text of this report and printed in bold type. All recommendations are repeated in a list in Section 18.0

  19. Final hazard classification and auditable safety analysis for the 105-C Reactor Interim Safe Storage Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodovsky, T.J.; Larson, A.R.; Dexheimer, D.

    1996-12-01

    This document summarizes the inventories of radioactive and hazardous materials present in the 105-C Reactor Facility and the operations associated with the Interim Safe Storage Project which includes decontamination and demolition and interim safe storage of the remaining facility. This document also establishes a final hazard classification and verifies that appropriate and adequate safety functions and controls are in place to reduce or mitigate the risk associated with those operations

  20. Auditors of safety in hazardous materials transportation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manas Lahoz, J.L.

    1993-01-01

    The author describes the methodology for safety auditory and control, prevention, risks of hazardous materials transport through ship, airplane, rail, etc. In this way, The author presents the classification of damage materials transport, characteristic damage and different transport methods

  1. Implementation of health and safety management system to reduce hazardous potential in PT.XYZ Indonesia

    Science.gov (United States)

    Widodo, L.; Adianto; Sartika, D. I.

    2017-12-01

    PT. XYZ is a large automotive manufacturing company that manufacture, assemble as well as a car exporter. The other products are spare parts, jig and dies. PT. XYZ has long been implementing the Occupational Safety and Health Management System (OSHMS) to reduce the potential hazards that cause work accidents. However, this does not mean that OSHMS that has been implemented does not need to be upgraded and improved. This is due to the potential danger caused by work is quite high. This research was conducted in Sunter 2 Plant where its production activities have a high level of potential hazard. Based on Hazard Identification risk assessment, Risk Assessment, and Risk Control (HIRARC) found 10 potential hazards in Plant Stamping Production, consisting of 4 very high risk potential hazards (E), 5 high risk potential hazards (H), and 1 moderate risk potential hazard (M). While in Plant Casting Production found 22 potential hazards findings consist of 7 very high risk potential hazards (E), 12 high risk potential hazards (H), and 3 medium risk potential hazards (M). Based on the result of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), the main priority is the high risk potential hazards (H) and very high risk potential hazards (E). The proposed improvement are to make the visual display of the importance of always using the correct Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), establishing good working procedures, conducting OSH training for workers on a regular basis, and continuing to conduct safety campaigns.

  2. Preliminary hazard analysis using sequence tree method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huang Huiwen; Shih Chunkuan; Hung Hungchih; Chen Minghuei; Yih Swu; Lin Jiinming

    2007-01-01

    A system level PHA using sequence tree method was developed to perform Safety Related digital I and C system SSA. The conventional PHA is a brainstorming session among experts on various portions of the system to identify hazards through discussions. However, this conventional PHA is not a systematic technique, the analysis results strongly depend on the experts' subjective opinions. The analysis quality cannot be appropriately controlled. Thereby, this research developed a system level sequence tree based PHA, which can clarify the relationship among the major digital I and C systems. Two major phases are included in this sequence tree based technique. The first phase uses a table to analyze each event in SAR Chapter 15 for a specific safety related I and C system, such as RPS. The second phase uses sequence tree to recognize what I and C systems are involved in the event, how the safety related systems work, and how the backup systems can be activated to mitigate the consequence if the primary safety systems fail. In the sequence tree, the defense-in-depth echelons, including Control echelon, Reactor trip echelon, ESFAS echelon, and Indication and display echelon, are arranged to construct the sequence tree structure. All the related I and C systems, include digital system and the analog back-up systems are allocated in their specific echelon. By this system centric sequence tree based analysis, not only preliminary hazard can be identified systematically, the vulnerability of the nuclear power plant can also be recognized. Therefore, an effective simplified D3 evaluation can be performed as well. (author)

  3. YUCCA MOUNTAIN SITE CHARACTERIZATIONS PROJECT TUNNEL BORING MACHINE (TBM) SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The purpose of this analysis is to systematically identify and evaluate hazards related to the tunnel boring machine (TBM) used in the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) at the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project. This process is an integral part of the systems engineering process; whereby safety is considered during planning, design, testing, and construction. Since the TBM is an ''as built'' system, the MandO is conducting the System Safety Analysis during the construction or assembly phase of the TBM. A largely qualitative approach was used since a radiological System Safety Analysis is not required. The risk assessment in this analysis characterizes the accident scenarios associated with the TBM in terms of relative risk and includes recommendations for mitigating all identified risks. The priority for recommending and implementing mitigation control features is: (1) Incorporate measures to reduce risks and hazards into the system/subsystem/component design, (2) add safety features and capabilities to existing designs, and (3) develop procedures and conduct training to increase worker awareness of potential hazards, on methods to reduce exposure to hazards, and on the actions required to avoid accidents or correct hazardous conditions. The scope of this analysis is limited to the TBM during normal operations, excluding hazards occurring during assembly and test of the TBM or maintenance of the TBM equipment

  4. YUCCA MOUNTAIN SITE CHARACTERIZATIONS PROJECT TUNNEL BORING MACHINE (TBM) SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    N/A

    1997-02-19

    The purpose of this analysis is to systematically identify and evaluate hazards related to the tunnel boring machine (TBM) used in the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) at the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project. This process is an integral part of the systems engineering process; whereby safety is considered during planning, design, testing, and construction. Since the TBM is an ''as built'' system, the M&O is conducting the System Safety Analysis during the construction or assembly phase of the TBM. A largely qualitative approach was used since a radiological System Safety Analysis is not required. The risk assessment in this analysis characterizes the accident scenarios associated with the TBM in terms of relative risk and includes recommendations for mitigating all identified risks. The priority for recommending and implementing mitigation control features is: (1) Incorporate measures to reduce risks and hazards into the system/subsystem/component design, (2) add safety features and capabilities to existing designs, and (3) develop procedures and conduct training to increase worker awareness of potential hazards, on methods to reduce exposure to hazards, and on the actions required to avoid accidents or correct hazardous conditions. The scope of this analysis is limited to the TBM during normal operations, excluding hazards occurring during assembly and test of the TBM or maintenance of the TBM equipment.

  5. Young worker safety in construction: do family ties and workgroup size affect hazard exposures and safety practices?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rauscher, Kimberly J; Myers, Douglas J; Runyan, Carol W; Schulman, Michael

    2012-01-01

    Little is known about how social aspects of the work environment influence exposures or safety practices affecting young construction workers. Our objective was to investigate whether working on a construction site with a small number of workers (≤10 vs. 11-50) or having a family-firm connection (working in a family-owned firm or one in which a family member also works) impacts hazard exposures and safety practices. Participants included 187 North Carolina construction workers 14 to 17 years old who were surveyed about their jobs. We conducted stratified analyses using cross-tabulations and chi-square statistics to measure associations between workgroup size (i.e., the total number of workers on a jobsite) and family-firm connections (yes/no) and hazard exposures (e.g., saws) and safety practices (e.g., supervision). Having a family-firm connection was associated with fewer hazard exposures and greater safety practices. Youth who worked on jobsites with a larger workgroup (11-50 workers) reported more hazards but also more safety practices. Family-firm connections, in particular, may have a protective effect for youth in construction. Even though the statistical significance of our findings on workgroup size was limited in places, the pattern of differences found suggest that further research in this area is warranted.

  6. Evaluation of an active learning module to teach hazard and risk in Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP classes

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Omar A. Oyarzabal

    2017-04-01

    Full Text Available The terms hazard and risk are significant building blocks for the organization of risk-based food safety plans. Unfortunately, these terms are not clear for some personnel working in food manufacturing facilities. In addition, there are few examples of active learning modules for teaching adult participants the principles of hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP. In this study, we evaluated the effectiveness of an active learning module to teach hazard and risk to participants of HACCP classes provided by the University of Vermont Extension in 2015 and 2016. This interactive module is comprised of a questionnaire; group playing of a dice game that we have previously introduced in the teaching of HACCP; the discussion of the terms hazard and risk; and a self-assessment questionnaire to evaluate the teaching of hazard and risk. From 71 adult participants that completed this module, 40 participants (56% provided the most appropriate definition of hazard, 19 participants (27% provided the most appropriate definition of risk, 14 participants (20% provided the most appropriate definitions of both hazard and risk, and 23 participants (32% did not provide an appropriate definition for hazard or risk. Self-assessment data showed an improvement in the understanding of these terms (P < 0.05. Thirty participants (42% stated that the most valuable thing they learned with this interactive module was the difference between hazard and risk, and 40 participants (65% responded that they did not attend similar presentations in the past. The fact that less than one third of the participants answered properly to the definitions of hazard and risk at baseline is not surprising. However, these results highlight the need for the incorporation of modules to discuss these important food safety terms and include more active learning modules to teach food safety classes. This study suggests that active learning helps food personnel better understand important

  7. SYSTEMS SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR FIRE EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ECRB CROSS DRIFT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    R. J. Garrett

    2001-01-01

    The purpose of this analysis is to systematically identify and evaluate fire hazards related to the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project (YMP) Enhanced Characterization of the Repository Block (ECRB) East-West Cross Drift (commonly referred to as the ECRB Cross-Drift). This analysis builds upon prior Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) System Safety Analyses and incorporates Topopah Springs (TS) Main Drift fire scenarios and ECRB Cross-Drift fire scenarios. Accident scenarios involving the fires in the Main Drift and the ECRB Cross-Drift were previously evaluated in ''Topopah Springs Main Drift System Safety Analysis'' (CRWMS M and O 1995) and the ''Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project East-West Drift System Safety Analysis'' (CRWMS M and O 1998). In addition to listing required mitigation/control features, this analysis identifies the potential need for procedures and training as part of defense-in-depth mitigation/control features. The inclusion of this information in the System Safety Analysis (SSA) is intended to assist the organization(s) (e.g., Construction, Environmental Safety and Health, Design) responsible for these aspects of the ECRB Cross-Drift in developing mitigation/control features for fire events, including Emergency Refuge Station(s). This SSA was prepared, in part, in response to Condition/Issue Identification and Reporting/Resolution System (CIRS) item 1966. The SSA is an integral part of the systems engineering process, whereby safety is considered during planning, design, testing, and construction. A largely qualitative approach is used which incorporates operating experiences and recommendations from vendors, the constructor and the operating contractor. The risk assessment in this analysis characterizes the scenarios associated with fires in terms of relative risk and includes recommendations for mitigating all identified hazards. The priority for recommending and implementing mitigation control features is: (1) Incorporate

  8. Infusing Reliability Techniques into Software Safety Analysis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shi, Ying

    2015-01-01

    Software safety analysis for a large software intensive system is always a challenge. Software safety practitioners need to ensure that software related hazards are completely identified, controlled, and tracked. This paper discusses in detail how to incorporate the traditional reliability techniques into the entire software safety analysis process. In addition, this paper addresses how information can be effectively shared between the various practitioners involved in the software safety analyses. The author has successfully applied the approach to several aerospace applications. Examples are provided to illustrate the key steps of the proposed approach.

  9. 76 FR 25576 - Pipeline Safety: Applying Safety Regulations to All Rural Onshore Hazardous Liquid Low-Stress Lines

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-05-05

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part... to All Rural Onshore Hazardous Liquid Low-Stress Lines AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials..., suggested that the scope should include low-stress gas pipelines such as those associated with coal bed...

  10. Impacts on health and safety from transfer/consolidation of nuclear materials and hazardous chemicals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gallucci, R.H.V.

    1994-11-01

    Environmental restoration plans at the US Department of Energy (USDOE) Hanford Site calls for transfer/consolidation of ''targets/threats,'' namely nuclear materials and hazardous chemicals. Reductions in the health and safety hazards will depend on the plans implemented. Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) estimated these potential impacts, assuming implementation of the current reference plan and employing ongoing risk and safety analyses. The results indicated the potential for ''significant'' reductions in health and safety hazards in the long term (> 25 years) and a potentially ''noteworthy'' reduction in health hazard in the short term (≤ 25 years)

  11. Hazard and consequence analysis for waste emplacement at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gerstner, D.M.; Clayton, S.G.; Farrell, R.F.; McCormick, J.A.; Ortiz, C.; Standiford, D.L.

    1996-01-01

    The Carlsbad Area Office established and analyzed the safety bases for the design and operations as documented in the WIPP Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Additional independent efforts are currently underway to assess the hazards associated with the long-term (10,000 year) isolation period as required by 40 CFR 191. The structure of the WIPP SAR is unique due to the hazards involved, and the agreement between the State of New Mexico and the DOE regarding SAR content and format. However, the hazards and accident analysis philosophy as contained in DOE-STD-3009-94 was followed as closely as possible, while adhering to state agreements. Hazards associated with WIPP waste receipt, emplacement, and disposal operations were systematically identified using a modified Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) technique. The WIPP HAZOP assessed the potential internal, external, and natural phenomena events that can cause the identified hazards to develop into accidents. The hazard assessment identified deviations from the intended design and operation of the waste handling system, analyzed potential accident consequences to the public and workers, estimated likelihood of occurrence, and evaluated associated preventative and mitigative features. It was concluded from the assessment that the proposed WIPP waste emplacement operations and design are sufficient to ensure safety of the public, workers, and environment, over the 35 year disposal phase

  12. Volcanic hazards and aviation safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    Casadevall, Thomas J.; Thompson, Theodore B.; Ewert, John W.; ,

    1996-01-01

    An aeronautical chart was developed to determine the relative proximity of volcanoes or ash clouds to the airports and flight corridors that may be affected by volcanic debris. The map aims to inform and increase awareness about the close spatial relationship between volcanoes and aviation operations. It shows the locations of the active volcanoes together with selected aeronautical navigation aids and great-circle routes. The map mitigates the threat that volcanic hazards pose to aircraft and improves aviation safety.

  13. External hazards analysis approach to level 1 PSA of Mochovce NPP - Slovakia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stojka, Tibor

    2000-01-01

    Analyses of external events had been first time performed at the design stage of the Mochovce NPP showing sufficiently low contribution of external hazards to core damage frequency. But, based on IAEA document 'Safety problems of WWER-440/213 NPPs and the categorization' (IAEA-EBP-WWER-03, 1996), the need of new reassessment arose due to discrepancy of some origin recommendations in compare with present IAEA ones. Mochovce NPP Nuclear Safety Improvements Program elaborated at the same time included the IAEA recommendations and following improvements were proposed to perform in context of external events. 1. Seismic project and new locality seismic evaluation This safety improvement includes also some 'on site' technical improvements in seismic stability of structures and equipment. 2. Unit specific analyses of extreme meteorologic conditions. This safety improvement focuses on impact of feasible extreme conditions on NPP systems caused by rain, snow and hail storms, frost, winds, low and high temperatures. 3. Analyses of external hazards caused by humans. In this safety improvement were specified: feasible sources of explosions; analyses of hydrogen, gas and propane-calor gas depots; air crash risk. The results of these implemented safety improvements were considered in the PSA study. The External hazards analysis is also part of Level 1 PSA Mochovce NPP performed by PSA Department of VUJE Trnava Inc., Engineering, Design and Research Organization, Slovakia. Some partial analyses are performed in cooperation with following companies DS and S - SAIC, USA and Geophysical Institute Academy of Science, Slovakia Relko, Slovakia. Basic documents are: NUREG/CR-2300 'PRA Procedures Guide - A Guide to the Performance of Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear Power Plants' and IAEA SS No. 50-P-7 'Treatment of External Hazards in PSA for NPPs. The external hazards analysis consists of following parts: 1. Geography and plant locality; 2. Nearby industry; 3. Extreme

  14. HANFORD SAFETY ANALYSIS & RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (SARAH)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    EVANS, C B

    2004-12-21

    The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 2 and 3 (HC-2 and 3) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management''. Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' Consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'' (STD-3009), and DOE-STD-3011-2002, ''Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents'' (STD-3011), the Hanford SARAH describes methodology for performing a safety analysis leading to development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and provides the information necessary to ensure a consistently rigorous approach that meets DOE expectations. The DSA and TSR documents, together with the DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER), are the basic components of facility safety basis documentation. For HC-2 or 3 nuclear facilities in long-term surveillance and maintenance (S&M), for decommissioning activities, where source term has been eliminated to the point that only low-level, residual fixed contamination is present, or for environmental remediation activities outside of a facility structure, DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities'' (STD-1120), may serve as the basis for the DSA. HC-2 and 3 environmental remediation sites also are subject to the hazard analysis methodologies of this standard.

  15. Hazard Analysis for Pneumatic Flipper Suitport/Z-1 Manned Evaluation, Chamber B, Building 32. Revision: Basic

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-01-01

    One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to protect our personnel from injury and our equipment from damage. The purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Z1 Suit Port Test in Chamber B located in building 32, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments, and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment, and hardware. The goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel and/or damage facility equipment, flight hardware, property, or harm the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, JSC Safety and Health Handbook.

  16. Approaches that use seismic hazard results to address topics of nuclear power plant seismic safety, with application to the Charleston earthquake issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sewell, R.T.; McGuire, R.K.; Toro, G.R.; Stepp, J.C.; Cornell, C.A.

    1990-01-01

    Plant seismic safety indicators include seismic hazard at the SSE (safe shut-down earthquake) acceleration, seismic margin, reliability against core damage, and reliability against offsite consequences. This work examines the key role of hazard analysis in evaluating these indicators and in making rational decisions regarding plant safety. The paper outlines approaches that use seismic hazard results as a basis for plant seismic safety evaluation and applies one of these approaches to the Charleston earthquake issue. This approach compares seismic hazard results that account for the Charleston tectonic interpretation, using the EPRI-Seismicity Owners Group (SOG) methodology, with hazard results that are consistent with historical tectonic interpretations accepted in regulation. Based on hazard results for a set of 21 eastern U.S. nuclear power plant sites, the comparison shows that no systematic 'plant-to-plant' increase in hazard accompanies the Charleston hypothesis; differences in mean hazards for the two interpretations are generally insignificant relative to current uncertainties in seismic hazard. (orig.)

  17. Current issues and related activities in seismic hazard analysis in Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seo, Jeong-Moon [Korea Atomic Energy Research Inst., Taejon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Jong-Rim; Chang, Chun-Joong

    1997-03-01

    This paper discusses some technical issues identified from the seismic hazard analyses for probabilistic safety assessment on the operating Korean nuclear power plants and the related activities to resolve the issues. Since there are no strong instrumental earthquake records in Korea, the seismic hazard analysis is mainly dependent on the historical earthquake records. Results of the past seismic hazard analyses show that there are many uncertainties in attenuation function and intensity level and that there is a need to improve statistical method. The identification of the activity of the Yangsan Fault, which is close to nuclear power plant sites, has been an important issue. But the issue has not been resolved yet in spite of much research works done. Recently, some capable faults were found in the offshore area of Gulupdo Island in the Yellow Sea. It is anticipated that the results of research on both the Yangsan Fault and reduction of uncertainty in seismic hazard analysis will have an significant influence on seismic design and safety assessment of nuclear power plants in the future. (author)

  18. Current issues and related activities in seismic hazard analysis in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seo, Jeong-Moon; Lee, Jong-Rim; Chang, Chun-Joong.

    1997-01-01

    This paper discusses some technical issues identified from the seismic hazard analyses for probabilistic safety assessment on the operating Korean nuclear power plants and the related activities to resolve the issues. Since there are no strong instrumental earthquake records in Korea, the seismic hazard analysis is mainly dependent on the historical earthquake records. Results of the past seismic hazard analyses show that there are many uncertainties in attenuation function and intensity level and that there is a need to improve statistical method. The identification of the activity of the Yangsan Fault, which is close to nuclear power plant sites, has been an important issue. But the issue has not been resolved yet in spite of much research works done. Recently, some capable faults were found in the offshore area of Gulupdo Island in the Yellow Sea. It is anticipated that the results of research on both the Yangsan Fault and reduction of uncertainty in seismic hazard analysis will have an significant influence on seismic design and safety assessment of nuclear power plants in the future. (author)

  19. Safety Analysis (SA) of the Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities (Buildings 514, 612, and 614) at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Odell, B.N.; Toy, A.J.

    1979-12-13

    This safety analysis was performed for the Manager of Plant Operations at LLL and fulfills the requirements of DOE Order 5481.1. The analysis was based on field inspections, document review, computer calculations, and extensive input from Waste Management personnel. It was concluded that the quantities of materials handled do not pose undue risks on- or off-site, even in postulated severe accidents. Risks from the various hazards at these facilities vary from low to moderate as specified in DOE Order 5481.1. Recommendations are made for additional management and technical support of waste disposal operations.

  20. Safety Analysis (SA) of the Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities (Buildings 514, 612, and 614) at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Odell, B.N.; Toy, A.J.

    1979-01-01

    This safety analysis was performed for the Manager of Plant Operations at LLL and fulfills the requirements of DOE Order 5481.1. The analysis was based on field inspections, document review, computer calculations, and extensive input from Waste Management personnel. It was concluded that the quantities of materials handled do not pose undue risks on- or off-site, even in postulated severe accidents. Risks from the various hazards at these facilities vary from low to moderate as specified in DOE Order 5481.1. Recommendations are made for additional management and technical support of waste disposal operations

  1. The price of safety: costs for mitigating and coping with Alpine hazards

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pfurtscheller, C.; Thieken, A. H.

    2013-10-01

    Due to limited public budgets and the need to economize, the analysis of costs of hazard mitigation and emergency management of natural hazards becomes increasingly important for public natural hazard and risk management. In recent years there has been a growing body of literature on the estimation of losses which supported to help to determine benefits of measures in terms of prevented losses. On the contrary, the costs of mitigation are hardly addressed. This paper thus aims to shed some light on expenses for mitigation and emergency services. For this, we analysed the annual costs of mitigation efforts in four regions/countries of the Alpine Arc: Bavaria (Germany), Tyrol (Austria), South Tyrol (Italy) and Switzerland. On the basis of PPP values (purchasing power parities), annual expenses on public safety ranged from EUR 44 per capita in the Free State of Bavaria to EUR 216 in the Autonomous Province of South Tyrol. To analyse the (variable) costs for emergency services in case of an event, we used detailed data from the 2005 floods in the Federal State of Tyrol (Austria) as well as aggregated data from the 2002 floods in Germany. The analysis revealed that multi-hazards, the occurrence and intermixture of different natural hazard processes, contribute to increasing emergency costs. Based on these findings, research gaps and recommendations for costing Alpine natural hazards are discussed.

  2. Automated hazard analysis of digital control systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garrett, Chris J.; Apostolakis, George E.

    2002-01-01

    Digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems can provide important benefits in many safety-critical applications, but they can also introduce potential new failure modes that can affect safety. Unlike electro-mechanical systems, whose failure modes are fairly well understood and which can often be built to fail in a particular way, software errors are very unpredictable. There is virtually no nontrivial software that will function as expected under all conditions. Consequently, there is a great deal of concern about whether there is a sufficient basis on which to resolve questions about safety. In this paper, an approach for validating the safety requirements of digital I and C systems is developed which uses the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology to conduct automated hazard analyses. The prime implicants of these analyses can be used to identify unknown system hazards, prioritize the disposition of known system hazards, and guide lower-level design decisions to either eliminate or mitigate known hazards. In a case study involving a space-based reactor control system, the method succeeded in identifying an unknown failure mechanism

  3. Use of fire hazard analysis to cost effectively manage facility modifications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Krueger, K., E-mail: kkruger@plcfire.com [PLC Fire Safety Solutions, Fredericton, NB (Canada); Cronk, R., E-mail: rcronk@plcfire.com [PLC Fire Safety Solutions, Mississauga, ON (Canada)

    2014-07-01

    In Canada, licenced Nuclear power facilities, or facilities that process, handle or store nuclear material are required by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission to have a change control process in place. These processes are in place to avoid facility modifications that could result in an increase in fire hazards, or degradation of fire protection systems. Change control processes can have a significant impact on budgets associated with plant modifications. A Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) is also a regulatory requirement for licenced facilities in Canada. An FHA is an extensive evaluation of a facility's construction, nuclear safety systems, fire hazards, and fire protection features. This paper is being presented to outline how computer based data management software can help organize facilities' fire safety information, manage this information, and reduce the costs associated with preparation of FHAs as well as facilities' change control processes. (author)

  4. An intelligent hybrid system for surface coal mine safety analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lilic, N.; Obradovic, I.; Cvjetic, A. [University of Belgrade, Belgrade (Serbia)

    2010-06-15

    Analysis of safety in surface coal mines represents a very complex process. Published studies on mine safety analysis are usually based on research related to accidents statistics and hazard identification with risk assessment within the mining industry. Discussion in this paper is focused on the application of AI methods in the analysis of safety in mining environment. Complexity of the subject matter requires a high level of expert knowledge and great experience. The solution was found in the creation of a hybrid system PROTECTOR, whose knowledge base represents a formalization of the expert knowledge in the mine safety field. The main goal of the system is the estimation of mining environment as one of the significant components of general safety state in a mine. This global goal is subdivided into a hierarchical structure of subgoals where each subgoal can be viewed as the estimation of a set of parameters (gas, dust, climate, noise, vibration, illumination, geotechnical hazard) which determine the general mine safety state and category of hazard in mining environment. Both the hybrid nature of the system and the possibilities it offers are illustrated through a case study using field data related to an existing Serbian surface coal mine.

  5. Integrated risk reduction framework to improve railway hazardous materials transportation safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Xiang; Saat, M Rapik; Barkan, Christopher P L

    2013-09-15

    Rail transportation plays a critical role to safely and efficiently transport hazardous materials. A number of strategies have been implemented or are being developed to reduce the risk of hazardous materials release from train accidents. Each of these risk reduction strategies has its safety benefit and corresponding implementation cost. However, the cost effectiveness of the integration of different risk reduction strategies is not well understood. Meanwhile, there has been growing interest in the U.S. rail industry and government to best allocate resources for improving hazardous materials transportation safety. This paper presents an optimization model that considers the combination of two types of risk reduction strategies, broken rail prevention and tank car safety design enhancement. A Pareto-optimality technique is used to maximize risk reduction at a given level of investment. The framework presented in this paper can be adapted to address a broader set of risk reduction strategies and is intended to assist decision makers for local, regional and system-wide risk management of rail hazardous materials transportation. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  6. PRO-ELICERE: A Hazard Analysis Automation Process Applied to Space Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tharcius Augusto Pivetta

    2016-07-01

    Full Text Available In the last decades, critical systems have increasingly been developed using computers and software even in space area, where the project approach is usually very conservative. In the projects of rockets, satellites and its facilities, like ground support systems, simulators, among other critical operations for the space mission, it must be applied a hazard analysis. The ELICERE process was created to perform a hazard analysis mainly over computer critical systems, in order to define or evaluate its safety and dependability requirements, strongly based on Hazards and Operability Study and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis techniques. It aims to improve the project design or understand the potential hazards of existing systems improving their functions related to functional or non-functional requirements. Then, the main goal of the ELICERE process is to ensure the safety and dependability goals of a space mission. The process, at the beginning, was created to operate manually in a gradual way. Nowadays, a software tool called PRO-ELICERE was developed, in such a way to facilitate the analysis process and store the results for reuse in another system analysis. To understand how ELICERE works and its tool, a small example of space study case was applied, based on a hypothetical rocket of the Cruzeiro do Sul family, developed by the Instituto de Aeronáutica e Espaço in Brazil.

  7. Survey of systems safety analysis methods and their application to nuclear waste management systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pelto, P.J.; Winegardner, W.K.; Gallucci, R.H.V.

    1981-11-01

    This report reviews system safety analysis methods and examines their application to nuclear waste management systems. The safety analysis methods examined include expert opinion, maximum credible accident approach, design basis accidents approach, hazard indices, preliminary hazards analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, fault trees, event trees, cause-consequence diagrams, G0 methodology, Markov modeling, and a general category of consequence analysis models. Previous and ongoing studies on the safety of waste management systems are discussed along with their limitations and potential improvements. The major safety methods and waste management safety related studies are surveyed. This survey provides information on what safety methods are available, what waste management safety areas have been analyzed, and what are potential areas for future study

  8. Survey of systems safety analysis methods and their application to nuclear waste management systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pelto, P.J.; Winegardner, W.K.; Gallucci, R.H.V.

    1981-11-01

    This report reviews system safety analysis methods and examines their application to nuclear waste management systems. The safety analysis methods examined include expert opinion, maximum credible accident approach, design basis accidents approach, hazard indices, preliminary hazards analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, fault trees, event trees, cause-consequence diagrams, G0 methodology, Markov modeling, and a general category of consequence analysis models. Previous and ongoing studies on the safety of waste management systems are discussed along with their limitations and potential improvements. The major safety methods and waste management safety related studies are surveyed. This survey provides information on what safety methods are available, what waste management safety areas have been analyzed, and what are potential areas for future study.

  9. From Safety Analysis to Formal Specification

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hansen, Kirsten Mark; Ravn, Anders P.; Stavridou, Victoria

    1998-01-01

    Software for safety critical systems must deal with the hazards identified bysafety analysis. This paper investigates, how the results of onesafety analysis technique, fault trees, are interpreted as software safetyrequirements to be used in the program design process. We propose thatfault tree...... analysis and program development use the samesystem model. This model is formalized in areal-time, interval logic, based on a conventional dynamic systems modelwith state evolving over time. Fault trees are interpreted astemporal formulas, and it is shown how such formulas can be usedfor deriving safety...

  10. Toward risk assessment 2.0: Safety supervisory control and model-based hazard monitoring for risk-informed safety interventions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Favarò, Francesca M.; Saleh, Joseph H.

    2016-01-01

    Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a staple in the engineering risk community, and it has become to some extent synonymous with the entire quantitative risk assessment undertaking. Limitations of PRA continue to occupy researchers, and workarounds are often proposed. After a brief review of this literature, we propose to address some of PRA's limitations by developing a novel framework and analytical tools for model-based system safety, or safety supervisory control, to guide safety interventions and support a dynamic approach to risk assessment and accident prevention. Our work shifts the emphasis from the pervading probabilistic mindset in risk assessment toward the notions of danger indices and hazard temporal contingency. The framework and tools here developed are grounded in Control Theory and make use of the state-space formalism in modeling dynamical systems. We show that the use of state variables enables the definition of metrics for accident escalation, termed hazard levels or danger indices, which measure the “proximity” of the system state to adverse events, and we illustrate the development of such indices. Monitoring of the hazard levels provides diagnostic information to support both on-line and off-line safety interventions. For example, we show how the application of the proposed tools to a rejected takeoff scenario provides new insight to support pilots’ go/no-go decisions. Furthermore, we augment the traditional state-space equations with a hazard equation and use the latter to estimate the times at which critical thresholds for the hazard level are (b)reached. This estimation process provides important prognostic information and produces a proxy for a time-to-accident metric or advance notice for an impending adverse event. The ability to estimate these two hazard coordinates, danger index and time-to-accident, offers many possibilities for informing system control strategies and improving accident prevention and risk mitigation

  11. Perceived safety of transporting hazardous materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reese, R.T.; Shepherd, E.W.

    1981-01-01

    A framework for relating the variables involved in the public perception of hazardous materials transportation was presented. The framework consisted of a conditional mathematical equation in which perceived safety was described by six basic terms (technical feasibility, political palatability, social responsibility, utility assessment, media interpretation, and familiarity as a function of time). The resulting framework provides the technologist with an initial formulation to better understand public perception

  12. HANFORD SAFETY ANALYSIS and RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (SARAH)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    EVANS, C.B.

    2004-01-01

    The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 2 and 3 (HC-2 and 3) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management''. Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' Consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'' (STD-3009), and DOE-STD-3011-2002, ''Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents'' (STD-3011), the Hanford SARAH describes methodology for performing a safety analysis leading to development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and provides the information necessary to ensure a consistently rigorous approach that meets DOE expectations. The DSA and TSR documents, together with the DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER), are the basic components of facility safety basis documentation. For HC-2 or 3 nuclear facilities in long-term surveillance and maintenance (S and M), for decommissioning activities, where source term has been eliminated to the point that only low-level, residual fixed contamination is present, or for environmental remediation activities outside of a facility structure, DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities'' (STD-1120), may serve as the basis for the DSA. HC-2 and 3 environmental remediation sites also are subject to the hazard analysis methodologies of this standard

  13. Fire Hazard Analysis for the Cold Neutron Source System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Jung Won; Kim, Young Ki; Wu, Sang Ik; Park, Young Cheol; Kim, Bong Soo; Kang, Mee Jin; Oh, Sung Wook

    2006-04-15

    As the Cold Neutron Source System for its installation in HANARO has been designing, the fire hazard analysis upon the CNS system becomes required under No. 2003-20 of the MOST notice, Technical Standard about the Fire Hazard Analysis. As a moderator, the strongly flammable hydrogen is filled in the hydrogen system of CNS. Against the fire or explosion in the reactor hall, accordingly, the physical damage on the reactor safety system should be evaluated in order to reflect the safety protection precaution in the design of CNS system. For the purpose of fire hazard analysis, the accident scenarios were divided into three: hydrogen leak during the hydrogen charging in the system, hydrogen leak during the normal operation of CNS, explosion of hydrogen buffer tank by the external fire. The analysis results can be summarized as follows. First, there is no physical damage threatening the reactor safety system although all hydrogen gas came out of the system then ignited as a jet fire. Second, since the CNS equipment island (CEI) is located enough away from the reactor, no physical damage caused by the buffer tank explosion is on the reactor in terms of the overpressure except the flying debris so that the light two-hour fireproof panel is installed in an one side of hydrogen buffer tank. Third, there are a few combustibles on the second floor of CEI so that the fire cannot be propagated to other areas in the reactor hall; however, the light two-hour fireproof panel will be built on the second floor against the external or internal fire so as to play the role of a fire protection area.

  14. Fire Hazard Analysis for the Cold Neutron Source System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Jung Won; Kim, Young Ki; Wu, Sang Ik; Park, Young Cheol; Kim, Bong Soo; Kang, Mee Jin; Oh, Sung Wook

    2006-04-01

    As the Cold Neutron Source System for its installation in HANARO has been designing, the fire hazard analysis upon the CNS system becomes required under No. 2003-20 of the MOST notice, Technical Standard about the Fire Hazard Analysis. As a moderator, the strongly flammable hydrogen is filled in the hydrogen system of CNS. Against the fire or explosion in the reactor hall, accordingly, the physical damage on the reactor safety system should be evaluated in order to reflect the safety protection precaution in the design of CNS system. For the purpose of fire hazard analysis, the accident scenarios were divided into three: hydrogen leak during the hydrogen charging in the system, hydrogen leak during the normal operation of CNS, explosion of hydrogen buffer tank by the external fire. The analysis results can be summarized as follows. First, there is no physical damage threatening the reactor safety system although all hydrogen gas came out of the system then ignited as a jet fire. Second, since the CNS equipment island (CEI) is located enough away from the reactor, no physical damage caused by the buffer tank explosion is on the reactor in terms of the overpressure except the flying debris so that the light two-hour fireproof panel is installed in an one side of hydrogen buffer tank. Third, there are a few combustibles on the second floor of CEI so that the fire cannot be propagated to other areas in the reactor hall; however, the light two-hour fireproof panel will be built on the second floor against the external or internal fire so as to play the role of a fire protection area

  15. Safety analysis report for the use of hazardous production materials in photovoltaic applications at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Crandall, R.S.; Nelson, B.P.; Moskowitz, P.D.; Fthenakis, V.M.

    1992-07-01

    To ensure the continued safety of SERI's employees, the community, and the environment, NREL commissioned an internal audit of its photovoltaic operations that used hazardous production materials (HPMS). As a result of this audit, NREL management voluntarily suspended all operations using toxic and/or pyrophoric gases. This suspension affected seven laboratories and ten individual deposition systems. These activities are located in Building 16, which has a permitted occupancy of Group B, Division 2 (B-2). NREL management decided to do the following. (1) Exclude from this SAR all operations which conformed, or could easily be made to conform, to B-2 Occupancy requirements. (2) Include in this SAR all operations that could be made to conform to B-2 Occupancy requirements with special administrative and engineering controls. (3) Move all operations that could not practically be made to conform to B-2 occupancy requirements to alternate locations. In addition to the layered set of administrative and engineering controls set forth in this SAR, a semiquantitative risk analysis was performed on 30 various accident scenarios. Twelve presented only routine risks, while 18 presented low risks. Considering the demonstrated safe operating history of NREL in general and these systems specifically, the nature of the risks identified, and the layered set of administrative and engineering controls, it is clear that this facility falls within the DOE Low Hazard Class. Each operation can restart only after it has passed an Operational Readiness Review, comparing it to the requirements of this SAR, while subsequent safety inspections will ensure future compliance. This document contains the appendices to the NREL safety analysis report.

  16. Hazard classification methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brereton, S.J.

    1996-01-01

    This document outlines the hazard classification methodology used to determine the hazard classification of the NIF LTAB, OAB, and the support facilities on the basis of radionuclides and chemicals. The hazard classification determines the safety analysis requirements for a facility

  17. Safety analysis and review system: a Department of Energy safety assurance tool

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosenthal, H.B.

    1981-01-01

    The concept of the Safety Analysis and Review System is not new. It has been used within the Department and its predecessor agencies, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), for over 20 years. To minimize the risks from nuclear reactor and power plants, the AEC developed a process to support management authorization of each operation through identification and analysis of potential hazards and the measures taken to control them. As the agency evolved from AEC through ERDA to the Department of Energy, its responsibilities were broadened to cover a diversity of technologies, including those associated with the development of fossil, solar, and geothermal energy. Because the safety analysis process had proved effective in a technology of high potential hazard, the Department investigated the applicability of the process to the other technologies. This paper describes the system and discusses how it is implemented within the Department

  18. Fire hazard analysis for fusion energy experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alvares, N.J.; Hasegawa, H.K.

    1979-01-01

    The 2XIIB mirror fusion facility at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) was used to evaluate the fire safety of state-of-the-art fusion energy experiments. The primary objective of this evaluation was to ensure the parallel development of fire safety and fusion energy technology. Through fault-tree analysis, we obtained a detailed engineering description of the 2XIIB fire protection system. This information helped us establish an optimum level of fire protection for experimental fusion energy facilities as well as evaluate the level of protection provided by various systems. Concurrently, we analyzed the fire hazard inherent to the facility using techniques that relate the probability of ignition to the flame spread and heat-release potential of construction materials, electrical and thermal insulations, and dielectric fluids. A comparison of the results of both analyses revealed that the existing fire protection system should be modified to accommodate the range of fire hazards inherent to the 2XIIB facility

  19. Magnetic resonance imaging: hazard, risk and safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Narayan, Pradeep; Suri, S.; Singh, P.

    2001-01-01

    The hazard and risk associated with magnetic resonance imaging is a matter of concern. In 1982, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), USA issued guidelines to Hospital's Investigational Review Board (IRBs) in 'Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic Exposure Risks for Trials of Clinical Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR)'. In 1997, the Berufsgenossenschaft (BG), professional association for precision engineering and electronics of Germany, in their preliminary proposal for safety limits extended their concerns on static magnetic field. Owing to both time varying and static magnetic fields applied in Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) this became of immediate concern to user community to assess the potential hazard and risk associated with the NMR system

  20. The probabilistic risk analysis of external hazards of an interim storage for spent nuclear fuel in Olkiluoto

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puukka, Tiia

    2014-01-01

    Due to natural disasters occurred in the world and the experiences perceived of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the particular knowledge of the role and influence of external hazards in the safety of interim storage of spent nuclear fuel has been emphasized. For that reason it is substantial that they are included in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of the interim storage facility. This is also required by the Regulatory Guides issued by The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority STUK. To enhance safety culture and nuclear safety in Olkiluoto, The Finnish utility Teollisuuden Voima Oyj has recently completed an analysis of external natural (seismic events are studied as a separate analysis) and unintentional human-induced risks associated with the spent fuel pool cooling and decay heat removal systems as part of the full-scope PRA study for the interim storage of spent fuel (KPA store). The analysis had four goals to achieve: (1) to determine the definition of an initiating event in the context of the KPA store, (2) to identify all potential external hazards and hazard combinations, (3) to perform a qualitative screening analysis based on frequency-strength analysis and detailed plant responses analysis and (4) to model the hazards passed the screening analysis so that model can be used as a risk analysis tool in the risk informed decision making and operating procedures. The assessment carried out included the analysis of operation procedures of decay heat removal, the study of external hazards related initiating events included in the PRA of the OL1 and OL2 nuclear power plants and their dependencies on the initiating events of the KPA store. All external hazards related initiating events were modeled using fault tree linking method. The main result and conclusion of this study was that using the screening analysis, initiating events caused by external hazards that could lead to leakage of the spent fuel pools or that could pose a threat to the

  1. WE-G-BRA-07: Analyzing the Safety Implications of a Brachytherapy Process Improvement Project Utilizing a Novel System-Theory-Based Hazard-Analysis Technique

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tang, A; Samost, A; Viswanathan, A; Cormack, R; Damato, A

    2015-01-01

    Purpose: To investigate the hazards in cervical-cancer HDR brachytherapy using a novel hazard-analysis technique, System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). The applicability and benefit of STPA to the field of radiation oncology is demonstrated. Methods: We analyzed the tandem and ring HDR procedure through observations, discussions with physicists and physicians, and the use of a previously developed process map. Controllers and their respective control actions were identified and arranged into a hierarchical control model of the system, modeling the workflow from applicator insertion through initiating treatment delivery. We then used the STPA process to identify potentially unsafe control actions. Scenarios were then generated from the identified unsafe control actions and used to develop recommendations for system safety constraints. Results: 10 controllers were identified and included in the final model. From these controllers 32 potentially unsafe control actions were identified, leading to more than 120 potential accident scenarios, including both clinical errors (e.g., using outdated imaging studies for planning), and managerial-based incidents (e.g., unsafe equipment, budget, or staffing decisions). Constraints identified from those scenarios include common themes, such as the need for appropriate feedback to give the controllers an adequate mental model to maintain safe boundaries of operations. As an example, one finding was that the likelihood of the potential accident scenario of the applicator breaking during insertion might be reduced by establishing a feedback loop of equipment-usage metrics and equipment-failure reports to the management controller. Conclusion: The utility of STPA in analyzing system hazards in a clinical brachytherapy system was demonstrated. This technique, rooted in system theory, identified scenarios both technical/clinical and managerial in nature. These results suggest that STPA can be successfully used to analyze safety in

  2. WE-G-BRA-07: Analyzing the Safety Implications of a Brachytherapy Process Improvement Project Utilizing a Novel System-Theory-Based Hazard-Analysis Technique

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tang, A; Samost, A [Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States); Viswanathan, A; Cormack, R; Damato, A [Dana-Farber Cancer Institute - Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Boston, MA (United States)

    2015-06-15

    Purpose: To investigate the hazards in cervical-cancer HDR brachytherapy using a novel hazard-analysis technique, System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). The applicability and benefit of STPA to the field of radiation oncology is demonstrated. Methods: We analyzed the tandem and ring HDR procedure through observations, discussions with physicists and physicians, and the use of a previously developed process map. Controllers and their respective control actions were identified and arranged into a hierarchical control model of the system, modeling the workflow from applicator insertion through initiating treatment delivery. We then used the STPA process to identify potentially unsafe control actions. Scenarios were then generated from the identified unsafe control actions and used to develop recommendations for system safety constraints. Results: 10 controllers were identified and included in the final model. From these controllers 32 potentially unsafe control actions were identified, leading to more than 120 potential accident scenarios, including both clinical errors (e.g., using outdated imaging studies for planning), and managerial-based incidents (e.g., unsafe equipment, budget, or staffing decisions). Constraints identified from those scenarios include common themes, such as the need for appropriate feedback to give the controllers an adequate mental model to maintain safe boundaries of operations. As an example, one finding was that the likelihood of the potential accident scenario of the applicator breaking during insertion might be reduced by establishing a feedback loop of equipment-usage metrics and equipment-failure reports to the management controller. Conclusion: The utility of STPA in analyzing system hazards in a clinical brachytherapy system was demonstrated. This technique, rooted in system theory, identified scenarios both technical/clinical and managerial in nature. These results suggest that STPA can be successfully used to analyze safety in

  3. Analysis of tank safety with propane-butane on LPG distribution station

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Krzysiak Zbigniew

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available An analysis of the risk of failure in the safety valve – tank with propane-butane (LPG system has been conducted. An uncontrolled outflow of liquid LPG, caused by a failure of the above mentioned system has been considered as a threat. The main research goal of the study is the hazardous analysis of propane-butane gas outflow for the safety valve – LPG tank system. The additional goal is the development of an useful method to fast identify the hazard of a mismatched safety valve. The results of the research analysis have confirmed that safety valves are basic protection of the installation (tank against failures that can lead to loss of life, material damage and further undesired costs of their unreliability. That is why a new, professional computer program has been created that allows for the selection of safety valves or for the verification of a safety valve selection in installations where any technical or technological changes have been made.

  4. Using Addenda in Documented Safety Analysis Reports

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swanson, D.S.; Thieme, M.A.

    2003-01-01

    This paper discusses the use of addenda to the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) located at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Addenda were prepared for several systems and processes at the facility that lacked adequate descriptive information and hazard analysis in the DSA. They were also prepared for several new activities involving unreviewed safety questions (USQs). Ten addenda to the RWMC DSA have been prepared since the last annual update

  5. Fire hazards analysis for the uranium oxide (UO3) facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wyatt, D.M.

    1994-01-01

    The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) documents the deactivation end-point status of the UO 3 complex fire hazards, fire protection and life safety systems. This FHA has been prepared for the Uranium Oxide Facility by Westinghouse Hanford Company in accordance with the criteria established in DOE 5480.7A, Fire Protection and RLID 5480.7, Fire Protection. The purpose of the Fire Hazards Analysis is to comprehensively and quantitatively assess the risk from a fire within individual fire areas in a Department of Energy facility so as to ascertain whether the objectives stated in DOE Order 5480.7, paragraph 4 are met. Particular attention has been paid to RLID 5480.7, Section 8.3, which specifies the criteria for deactivating fire protection in decommission and demolition facilities

  6. A formal safety analysis for PLC software-based safety critical system using Z

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koh, Jung Soo; Seong, Poong Hyun

    1997-01-01

    This paper describes a formal safety analysis technique which is demonstrated by performing empirical formal safety analysis with the case study of beamline hutch door Interlock system that is developed by using PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) systems at the Pohang Accelerator Laboratory. In order to perform formed safety analysis, we have built the Z formal specifications representation from user requirement written in ambiguous natural language and target PLC ladder logic, respectively. We have also studied the effective method to express typical PLC timer component by using specific Z formal notation which is supported by temporal history. We present a formal proof technique specifying and verifying that the hazardous states are not introduced into ladder logic in the PLC-based safety critical system

  7. Metal food packaging design based on hazard analysis critical control point (HACCP system in canned food safety

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Li Xingyi

    2016-06-01

    Full Text Available This study aims to design metal food packaging with hazard analysis critical control point (HACCP. First, theory of HACCP was introduced in detail. Taking empty cans provided by Wuxi Huapeng Food Packaging Company as an example, we studied migration of bisphenol compounds in coating of food can to food stimulant. Moreover, packaging design of luncheon meat can was taken as an example to confirm whether HACCP system could effectively control migration of phenolic substance. Results demonstrated that, coating of such empty were more likely to contain multiple bisphenol compounds such as bisphenol A (BPA, and bisphenol A diglycidyl ether (BADGE was considered as the leading bisphenol pollutant; food stimulant of different types, storage temperature and time could all impact migration of bisphenol compounds. HACCP system was proved to be effective in controlling hazards of phenolic substance in luncheon meat can and could reduce various phenolic substance indexes to an acceptable range. Therefore, HACCP can control migration of phenolic substance and recontamination of food and thus ensure food safety.

  8. The Dread Factor: How Hazards and Safety Training Influence Learning and Performance

    Science.gov (United States)

    Burke, Michael J.; Salvador, Rommel O.; Smith-Crowe, Kristin; Chan-Serafin, Suzanne; Smith, Alexis; Sonesh, Shirley

    2011-01-01

    On the basis of hypotheses derived from social and experiential learning theories, we meta-analytically investigated how safety training and workplace hazards impact the development of safety knowledge and safety performance. The results were consistent with an expected interaction between the level of engagement of safety training and hazardous…

  9. SNF fuel retrieval sub project safety analysis document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BERGMANN, D.W.

    1999-01-01

    This safety analysis is for the SNF Fuel Retrieval (FRS) Sub Project. The FRS equipment will be added to K West and K East Basins to facilitate retrieval, cleaning and repackaging the spent nuclear fuel into Multi-Canister Overpack baskets. The document includes a hazard evaluation, identifies bounding accidents, documents analyses of the accidents and establishes safety class or safety significant equipment to mitigate accidents as needed

  10. SNF fuel retrieval sub project safety analysis document

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BERGMANN, D.W.

    1999-02-24

    This safety analysis is for the SNF Fuel Retrieval (FRS) Sub Project. The FRS equipment will be added to K West and K East Basins to facilitate retrieval, cleaning and repackaging the spent nuclear fuel into Multi-Canister Overpack baskets. The document includes a hazard evaluation, identifies bounding accidents, documents analyses of the accidents and establishes safety class or safety significant equipment to mitigate accidents as needed.

  11. 78 FR 66326 - Hazardous Materials: Rail Petitions and Recommendations To Improve the Safety of Railroad Tank...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-05

    ...: Rail Petitions and Recommendations To Improve the Safety of Railroad Tank Car Transportation (RRR) AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION: Advance Notice of... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Parts...

  12. Hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP) for an ultrasound food processing operation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chemat, Farid; Hoarau, Nicolas

    2004-05-01

    Emerging technologies, such as ultrasound (US), used for food and drink production often cause hazards for product safety. Classical quality control methods are inadequate to control these hazards. Hazard analysis of critical control points (HACCP) is the most secure and cost-effective method for controlling possible product contamination or cross-contamination, due to physical or chemical hazard during production. The following case study on the application of HACCP to an US food-processing operation demonstrates how the hazards at the critical control points of the process are effectively controlled through the implementation of HACCP.

  13. Occupational hazards and safety measures amongst the paint factory workers in lagos, Nigeria.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Awodele, Olufunsho; Popoola, Temidayo D; Ogbudu, Bawo S; Akinyede, Akin; Coker, Herbert A B; Akintonwa, Alade

    2014-06-01

    The manufacture of paint involves a variety of processes that present with medical hazards. Safety initiatives are hence introduced to limit hazard exposures and promote workplace safety. This aim of this study is to assess the use of available control measures/initiatives in selected paint factories in Lagos West Senatorial District, Nigeria. A total of 400 randomly selected paint factory workers were involved in the study. A well-structured World Health Organization standard questionnaire was designed and distributed to the workers to elicit information on awareness to occupational hazards, use of personal protective devices, and commonly experienced adverse symptoms. Urine samples were obtained from 50 workers randomly selected from these 400 participants, and the concentrations of the heavy metals (lead, cadmium, arsenic, and chromium) were determined using atomic absorption spectroscopy. The results show that 72.5% of the respondents are aware of the hazards associated with their jobs; 30% have had formal training on hazards and safety measures; 40% do not use personal protective devices, and 90% of the respondents reported symptoms relating to hazard exposure. There was a statistically significant (p metal concentrations in the urine samples obtained from paint factory workers as compared with nonfactory workers. The need to develop effective frameworks that will initiate the integration and ensure implementation of safety regulations in paint factories is evident. Where these exist, there is a need to promote adherence to these practice guidelines.

  14. Overview of Food Safety Hazards in the European Dairy Supply Chain

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Asselt, Van E.D.; Fels, van der Ine; Marvin, H.J.P.; Bokhorst-van De Veen, Van H.; Nierop Groot, M.

    2017-01-01

    Monitoring of dairy products should preferably focus on the most relevant food safety hazards in the dairy supply chain. For this purpose, the possible presence of microbiological, chemical, and physical hazards as well as trends in the dairy supply chain that may affect their presence were

  15. Frequency Analysis of Aircraft hazards for License Application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    K. Ashley

    2006-01-01

    The preclosure safety analysis for the monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain must consider the hazard that aircraft may pose to surface structures. Relevant surface structures are located beneath the restricted airspace of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) on the eastern slope of Yucca Mountain, near the North Portal of the Exploratory Studies Facility Tunnel (Figure 1). The North Portal is located several miles from the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), which is used extensively by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) for training and test flights (Figure 1). The NTS airspace, which is controlled by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for NTS activities, is not part of the NTTR. Agreements with the DOE allow USAF aircraft specific use of the airspace above the NTS (Reference 2.1.1 [DIRS 103472], Section 3.1.1 and Appendix A, Section 2.1; and Reference 2.1.2 [DIRS 157987], Sections 1.26 through 1.29). Commercial, military, and general aviation aircraft fly within several miles to the southwest of the repository site in the Beatty Corridor, which is a broad air corridor that runs approximately parallel to U.S. Highway 95 and the Nevada-California border (Figure 2). These aircraft and other aircraft operations are identified and described in ''Identification of Aircraft Hazards'' (Reference 2.1.3, Sections 6 and 8). The purpose of this analysis is to estimate crash frequencies for aircraft hazards identified for detailed analysis in ''Identification of Aircraft Hazards'' (Reference 2.1.3, Section 8). Reference 2.1.3, Section 8, also identifies a potential hazard associated with electronic jamming, which will be addressed in this analysis. This analysis will address only the repository and not the transportation routes to the site. The analysis is intended to provide the basis for: (1) Categorizing event sequences related to aircraft hazards; (2) Identifying design or operational requirements related to aircraft hazards

  16. Frequency Analysis of Aircraft hazards for License Application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    K. Ashley

    2006-10-24

    The preclosure safety analysis for the monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain must consider the hazard that aircraft may pose to surface structures. Relevant surface structures are located beneath the restricted airspace of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) on the eastern slope of Yucca Mountain, near the North Portal of the Exploratory Studies Facility Tunnel (Figure 1). The North Portal is located several miles from the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), which is used extensively by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) for training and test flights (Figure 1). The NTS airspace, which is controlled by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for NTS activities, is not part of the NTTR. Agreements with the DOE allow USAF aircraft specific use of the airspace above the NTS (Reference 2.1.1 [DIRS 103472], Section 3.1.1 and Appendix A, Section 2.1; and Reference 2.1.2 [DIRS 157987], Sections 1.26 through 1.29). Commercial, military, and general aviation aircraft fly within several miles to the southwest of the repository site in the Beatty Corridor, which is a broad air corridor that runs approximately parallel to U.S. Highway 95 and the Nevada-California border (Figure 2). These aircraft and other aircraft operations are identified and described in ''Identification of Aircraft Hazards'' (Reference 2.1.3, Sections 6 and 8). The purpose of this analysis is to estimate crash frequencies for aircraft hazards identified for detailed analysis in ''Identification of Aircraft Hazards'' (Reference 2.1.3, Section 8). Reference 2.1.3, Section 8, also identifies a potential hazard associated with electronic jamming, which will be addressed in this analysis. This analysis will address only the repository and not the transportation routes to the site. The analysis is intended to provide the basis for: (1) Categorizing event sequences related to aircraft hazards; (2) Identifying design or operational requirements related to aircraft hazards.

  17. Health and Safety Procedures Manual for hazardous waste sites

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thate, J.E.

    1992-09-01

    The Oak Ridge National Laboratory Chemical Assessments Team (ORNL/CAT) has developed this Health and Safety Procedures Manual for the guidance, instruction, and protection of ORNL/CAT personnel expected to be involved in hazardous waste site assessments and remedial actions. This manual addresses general and site-specific concerns for protecting personnel, the general public, and the environment from any possible hazardous exposures. The components of this manual include: medical surveillance, guidance for determination and monitoring of hazards, personnel and training requirements, protective clothing and equipment requirements, procedures for controlling work functions, procedures for handling emergency response situations, decontamination procedures for personnel and equipment, associated legal requirements, and safe drilling practices.

  18. System-level hazard analysis using the sequence-tree method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huang, H.-W.; Shih Chunkuan; Yih Swu; Chen, M.-H.

    2008-01-01

    A system-level PHA using the sequence-tree method is presented to perform safety-related digital I and C system SSA. The conventional PHA involves brainstorming among experts on various portions of the system to identify hazards through discussions. However, since the conventional PHA is not a systematic technique, the analysis results depend strongly on the experts' subjective opinions. The quality of analysis cannot be appropriately controlled. Therefore, this study presents a system-level sequence tree based PHA, which can clarify the relationship among the major digital I and C systems. This sequence-tree-based technique has two major phases. The first phase adopts a table to analyze each event in SAR Chapter 15 for a specific safety-related I and C system, such as RPS. The second phase adopts a sequence tree to recognize the I and C systems involved in the event, the working of the safety-related systems and how the backup systems can be activated to mitigate the consequence if the primary safety systems fail. The defense-in-depth echelons, namely the Control echelon, Reactor trip echelon, ESFAS echelon and Monitoring and indicator echelon, are arranged to build the sequence-tree structure. All the related I and C systems, including the digital systems and the analog back-up systems, are allocated in their specific echelons. This system-centric sequence-tree analysis not only systematically identifies preliminary hazards, but also vulnerabilities in a nuclear power plant. Hence, an effective simplified D3 evaluation can also be conducted

  19. Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for the Tokamak Physics Experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Motloch, C.G.; Bonney, R.F.; Levine, J.D.; Masson, L.S.; Commander, J.C.

    1995-04-01

    This Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR), includes an indication of the magnitude of facility hazards, complexity of facility operations, and the stage of the facility life-cycle. It presents the results of safety analyses, safety assurance programs, identified vulnerabilities, compensatory measures, and, in general, the rationale describing why the Tokamak Physics Experiment (TPX) can be safely operated. It discusses application of the graded approach to the TPX safety analysis, including the basis for using Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23 and DOE-STD-3009-94 in the development of the PSAR

  20. Fire hazard analysis for Plutonium Finishing Plant complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MCKINNIS, D.L.

    1999-01-01

    A fire hazards analysis (FHA) was performed for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Complex at the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford site. The scope of the FHA focuses on the nuclear facilities/structures in the Complex. The analysis was conducted in accordance with RLID 5480.7, [DOE Directive RLID 5480.7, 1/17/94] and DOE Order 5480.7A, ''Fire Protection'' [DOE Order 5480.7A, 2/17/93] and addresses each of the sixteen principle elements outlined in paragraph 9.a(3) of the Order. The elements are addressed in terms of the fire protection objectives stated in paragraph 4 of DOE 5480.7A. In addition, the FHA also complies with WHC-CM-4-41, Fire Protection Program Manual, Section 3.4 [1994] and WHC-SD-GN-FHA-30001, Rev. 0 [WHC, 1994]. Objectives of the FHA are to determine: (1) the fire hazards that expose the PFP facilities, or that are inherent in the building operations, (2) the adequacy of the fire safety features currently located in the PFP Complex, and (3) the degree of compliance of the facility with specific fire safety provisions in DOE orders, related engineering codes, and standards

  1. Automation for System Safety Analysis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Malin, Jane T.; Fleming, Land; Throop, David; Thronesbery, Carroll; Flores, Joshua; Bennett, Ted; Wennberg, Paul

    2009-01-01

    This presentation describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early model-based analysis of failures and hazards due to system-software interactions. The tools perform and assist analysts in the following tasks: 1) extract model parts from text for architecture and safety/hazard models; 2) combine the parts with library information to develop the models for visualization and analysis; 3) perform graph analysis and simulation to identify and evaluate possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and functions, in nominal and anomalous system-software configurations and scenarios; and 4) identify resulting candidate scenarios for software integration testing. There has been significant technical progress in model extraction from Orion program text sources, architecture model derivation (components and connections) and documentation of extraction sources. Models have been derived from Internal Interface Requirements Documents (IIRDs) and FMEA documents. Linguistic text processing is used to extract model parts and relationships, and the Aerospace Ontology also aids automated model development from the extracted information. Visualizations of these models assist analysts in requirements overview and in checking consistency and completeness.

  2. Safety Aspects of Sustainable Storage Dams and Earthquake Safety of Existing Dams

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Martin Wieland

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available The basic element in any sustainable dam project is safety, which includes the following safety elements: ① structural safety, ② dam safety monitoring, ③ operational safety and maintenance, and ④ emergency planning. Long-term safety primarily includes the analysis of all hazards affecting the project; that is, hazards from the natural environment, hazards from the man-made environment, and project-specific and site-specific hazards. The special features of the seismic safety of dams are discussed. Large dams were the first structures to be systematically designed against earthquakes, starting in the 1930s. However, the seismic safety of older dams is unknown, as most were designed using seismic design criteria and methods of dynamic analysis that are considered obsolete today. Therefore, we need to reevaluate the seismic safety of existing dams based on current state-of-the-art practices and rehabilitate deficient dams. For large dams, a site-specific seismic hazard analysis is usually recommended. Today, large dams and the safety-relevant elements used for controlling the reservoir after a strong earthquake must be able to withstand the ground motions of a safety evaluation earthquake. The ground motion parameters can be determined either by a probabilistic or a deterministic seismic hazard analysis. During strong earthquakes, inelastic deformations may occur in a dam; therefore, the seismic analysis has to be carried out in the time domain. Furthermore, earthquakes create multiple seismic hazards for dams such as ground shaking, fault movements, mass movements, and others. The ground motions needed by the dam engineer are not real earthquake ground motions but models of the ground motion, which allow the safe design of dams. It must also be kept in mind that dam safety evaluations must be carried out several times during the long life of large storage dams. These features are discussed in this paper.

  3. Bayesian-network-based safety risk analysis in construction projects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang, Limao; Wu, Xianguo; Skibniewski, Miroslaw J.; Zhong, Jingbing; Lu, Yujie

    2014-01-01

    This paper presents a systemic decision support approach for safety risk analysis under uncertainty in tunnel construction. Fuzzy Bayesian Networks (FBN) is used to investigate causal relationships between tunnel-induced damage and its influential variables based upon the risk/hazard mechanism analysis. Aiming to overcome limitations on the current probability estimation, an expert confidence indicator is proposed to ensure the reliability of the surveyed data for fuzzy probability assessment of basic risk factors. A detailed fuzzy-based inference procedure is developed, which has a capacity of implementing deductive reasoning, sensitivity analysis and abductive reasoning. The “3σ criterion” is adopted to calculate the characteristic values of a triangular fuzzy number in the probability fuzzification process, and the α-weighted valuation method is adopted for defuzzification. The construction safety analysis progress is extended to the entire life cycle of risk-prone events, including the pre-accident, during-construction continuous and post-accident control. A typical hazard concerning the tunnel leakage in the construction of Wuhan Yangtze Metro Tunnel in China is presented as a case study, in order to verify the applicability of the proposed approach. The results demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach and its application potential. A comparison of advantages and disadvantages between FBN and fuzzy fault tree analysis (FFTA) as risk analysis tools is also conducted. The proposed approach can be used to provide guidelines for safety analysis and management in construction projects, and thus increase the likelihood of a successful project in a complex environment. - Highlights: • A systemic Bayesian network based approach for safety risk analysis is developed. • An expert confidence indicator for probability fuzzification is proposed. • Safety risk analysis progress is extended to entire life cycle of risk-prone events. • A typical

  4. Example process hazard analysis of a Department of Energy water chlorination process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-09-01

    On February 24, 1992, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) released a revised version of Section 29 Code of Federal Regulations CFR Part 1910 that added Section 1910.119, entitled ``Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals`` (the PSM Rule). Because US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders 5480.4 and 5483.1A prescribe OSHA 29 CFR 1910 as a standard in DOE, the PSM Rule is mandatory in the DOE complex. A major element in the PSM Rule is the process hazard analysis (PrHA), which is required for all chemical processes covered by the PSM Rule. The PrHA element of the PSM Rule requires the selection and application of appropriate hazard analysis methods to systematically identify hazards and potential accident scenarios associated with processes involving highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs). The analysis in this report is an example PrHA performed to meet the requirements of the PSM Rule. The PrHA method used in this example is the hazard and operability (HAZOP) study, and the process studied is the new Hanford 300-Area Water Treatment Facility chlorination process, which is currently in the design stage. The HAZOP study was conducted on May 18--21, 1993, by a team from the Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC), Battelle-Columbus, the DOE, and Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). The chlorination process was chosen as the example process because it is common to many DOE sites, and because quantities of chlorine at those sites generally exceed the OSHA threshold quantities (TQs).

  5. Fire hazard analysis at the first unit of the Ignalina nuclear power plant: 1. Analysis of fire prevention and ventilation systems and secondary effects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poskas, P.; Simonis, V.; Zujus, R. and others

    2004-01-01

    Evaluation of the fire prevention and ventilation systems and the secondary effects on safety at the Ignalina NPP from the point of view of fire hazard using computerized system is presented. Simplified screening algorithms for fire prevention, ventilation and the evaluation of secondary effects are developed, which allow accelerating fire hazard analysis at the Ignalina NPP. The analysis indicated that the fire prevention systems practically meet the national requirements and international recommendations for fire prevention. But it is necessary to introduce in separate rooms the measures improving fire prevention to guarantee the effective functioning of the ventilation systems and the reduction of the influence of secondary effects on safety. Computerized system of fire prevention and ventilation systems and evaluation of secondary effects on safety can be easily applied for fire hazard analysis at different big plants. (author)

  6. Evaluation of natural phenomena hazards as part of safety assessments for nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kot, C.A.; Hsieh, B.J.; Srinivasan, M.G.; Shin, Y.W.

    1995-02-01

    The continued operation of existing US Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities and laboratories requires a safety reassessment based on current criteria and guidelines. This also includes evaluations for the effects of Natural Phenomena Hazards (NPH), for which these facilities may not have been designed. The NPH evaluations follow the requirements of DOE Order 5480.28, Natural Phenomena Hazards Mitigation (1993) which establishes NPH Performance Categories (PCs) for DOE facilities and associated target probabilistic performance goals. These goals are expressed as the mean annual probability of exceedance of acceptable behavior for structures, systems and components (SSCs) subjected to NPH effects. The assignment of an NPH Performance Category is based on the overall hazard categorization (low, moderate, high) of a facility and on the function of an SSC under evaluation (DOE-STD-1021, 1992). Detailed guidance for the NPH analysis and evaluation criteria are also provided (DOE-STD-1020, 1994). These analyses can be very resource intensive, and may not be necessary for the evaluation of all SSCs in existing facilities, in particular for low hazard category facilities. An approach relying heavily on screening inspections, engineering judgment and use of NPH experience data (S. J. Eder et al., 1993), can minimize the analytical effort, give reasonable estimates of the NPH susceptibilities, and yield adequate information for an overall safety evaluation of the facility. In the following sections this approach is described in more detail and is illustrated by an application to a nuclear laboratory complex

  7. Flood Hazard and Risk Analysis in Urban Area

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huang, Chen-Jia; Hsu, Ming-hsi; Teng, Wei-Hsien; Lin, Tsung-Hsien

    2017-04-01

    Typhoons always induce heavy rainfall during summer and autumn seasons in Taiwan. Extreme weather in recent years often causes severe flooding which result in serious losses of life and property. With the rapid industrial and commercial development, people care about not only the quality of life, but also the safety of life and property. So the impact of life and property due to disaster is the most serious problem concerned by the residents. For the mitigation of the disaster impact, the flood hazard and risk analysis play an important role for the disaster prevention and mitigation. In this study, the vulnerability of Kaohsiung city was evaluated by statistics of social development factor. The hazard factors of Kaohsiung city was calculated by simulated flood depth of six different return periods and four typhoon events which result in serious flooding in Kaohsiung city. The flood risk can be obtained by means of the flood hazard and social vulnerability. The analysis results provide authority to strengthen disaster preparedness and to set up more resources in high risk areas.

  8. Generalized railway tank car safety design optimization for hazardous materials transport: Addressing the trade-off between transportation efficiency and safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saat, Mohd Rapik; Barkan, Christopher P.L.

    2011-01-01

    North America railways offer safe and generally the most economical means of long distance transport of hazardous materials. Nevertheless, in the event of a train accident releases of these materials can pose substantial risk to human health, property or the environment. The majority of railway shipments of hazardous materials are in tank cars. Improving the safety design of these cars to make them more robust in accidents generally increases their weight thereby reducing their capacity and consequent transportation efficiency. This paper presents a generalized tank car safety design optimization model that addresses this tradeoff. The optimization model enables evaluation of each element of tank car safety design, independently and in combination with one another. We present the optimization model by identifying a set of Pareto-optimal solutions for a baseline tank car design in a bicriteria decision problem. This model provides a quantitative framework for a rational decision-making process involving tank car safety design enhancements to reduce the risk of transporting hazardous materials.

  9. 78 FR 53190 - Pipeline Safety: Notice to Operators of Hazardous Liquid and Natural Gas Pipelines of a Recall on...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-28

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No. PHMSA-2013-0185] Pipeline Safety: Notice to Operators of Hazardous Liquid and Natural Gas Pipelines of a Recall on Leak Repair Clamps Due to Defective Seal AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety...

  10. Lessons learned - development of the tritium facilities 5480.23 safety analysis report and technical safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.; Bowman, M.E.; Goff, L.

    1997-01-01

    A review was performed which identified open-quotes Lessons Learnedclose quotes from the development of the 5480.23 Tritium Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Tritium Facilities (TF). The open-quotes Lessons Learnedclose quotes were based on an evaluation of the use of the SRS procedures, processes, and work practices which contributed to the success or lack thereof. This review also identified recommendations and suggestions for improving the development of SARs and TSRs at SRS. The 5480.23 SAR describes the site for the TF, the various process systems in the process buildings, a complete hazards and accident analysis of the most significant hazards affecting the nearby offsite population, and the selection of safety systems, structures, and components to protect both the public and site workers. It also provides descriptions of important programs and processes which add defense in depth to public and worker protection

  11. System safety analysis of an autonomous mobile robot

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bartos, R.J.

    1994-01-01

    Analysis of the safety of operating and maintaining the Stored Waste Autonomous Mobile Inspector (SWAMI) II in a hazardous environment at the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP) was completed. The SWAMI II is a version of a commercial robot, the HelpMate trademark robot produced by the Transitions Research Corporation, which is being updated to incorporate the systems required for inspecting mixed toxic chemical and radioactive waste drums at the FEMP. It also has modified obstacle detection and collision avoidance subsystems. The robot will autonomously travel down the aisles in storage warehouses to record images of containers and collect other data which are transmitted to an inspector at a remote computer terminal. A previous study showed the SWAMI II has economic feasibility. The SWAMI II will more accurately locate radioactive contamination than human inspectors. This thesis includes a System Safety Hazard Analysis and a quantitative Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). The objectives of the analyses are to prevent potentially serious events and to derive a comprehensive set of safety requirements from which the safety of the SWAMI II and other autonomous mobile robots can be evaluated. The Computer-Aided Fault Tree Analysis (CAFTA copyright) software is utilized for the FTA. The FTA shows that more than 99% of the safety risk occurs during maintenance, and that when the derived safety requirements are implemented the rate of serious events is reduced to below one event per million operating hours. Training and procedures in SWAMI II operation and maintenance provide an added safety margin. This study will promote the safe use of the SWAMI II and other autonomous mobile robots in the emerging technology of mobile robotic inspection

  12. Food safety hazards in Georgian Tushuri Guda cheese

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Avtandil Korakhashvili

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available Scientific-research work provides a timely and valuable review of the progress being made in the greater understanding of the factors contributing to Tushuri Guda cheese making and how this experience may be applied to producing better and more consistent products with food safety HACCP system requirements. The HACCP study in this variety of cheese covers all types of food safety hazards, like biological, chemical and physical, but unfortunately it needs a more precise definition. It did not include clarification of cleaning and sanitation operations in accordance with modern standards, sanitation of grasslands and meadows. All of that are covered by the plant Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs procedures and Good Hygiene Practices (GHPs for the obtaining of maximal food safety results.

  13. Job Hazard Analysis

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1998-01-01

    .... Establishing proper job procedures is one of the benefits of conducting a job hazard analysis carefully studying and recording each step of a job, identifying existing or potential job hazards...

  14. Model extension and improvement for simulator-based software safety analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Huang, H.-W. [Department of Engineering and System Science, National Tsing Hua University (NTHU), 101 Section 2 Kuang Fu Road, Hsinchu, Taiwan (China) and Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER), No. 1000 Wenhua Road, Chiaan Village, Longtan Township, Taoyuan County 32546, Taiwan (China)]. E-mail: hwhwang@iner.gov.tw; Shih Chunkuan [Department of Engineering and System Science, National Tsing Hua University (NTHU), 101 Section 2 Kuang Fu Road, Hsinchu, Taiwan (China); Yih Swu [Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Ching Yun University, 229 Chien-Hsin Road, Jung-Li, Taoyuan County 320, Taiwan (China); Chen, M.-H. [Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER), No. 1000Wenhua Road, Chiaan Village, Longtan Township, Taoyuan County 32546, Taiwan (China); Lin, J.-M. [Taiwan Power Company (TPC), 242 Roosevelt Road, Section 3, Taipei 100, Taiwan (China)

    2007-05-15

    One of the major concerns when employing digital I and C system in nuclear power plant is digital system may introduce new failure mode, which differs with previous analog I and C system. Various techniques are under developing to analyze the hazard originated from software faults in digital systems. Preliminary hazard analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, and fault tree analysis are the most extensive used techniques. However, these techniques are static analysis methods, cannot perform dynamic analysis and the interactions among systems. This research utilizes 'simulator/plant model testing' technique classified in (IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003, 2003. IEEE Standard for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations) to identify hazards which might be induced by nuclear I and C software defects. The recirculation flow system, control rod system, feedwater system, steam line model, dynamic power-core flow map, and related control systems of PCTran-ABWR model were successfully extended and improved. The benchmark against ABWR SAR proves this modified model is capable to accomplish dynamic system level software safety analysis and better than the static methods. This improved plant simulation can then further be applied to hazard analysis for operator/digital I and C interface interaction failure study, and the hardware-in-the-loop fault injection study.

  15. Safety analysis and risk assessment of the National Ignition Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brereton, S.; McLouth, L.; Odell, B.

    1996-01-01

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a proposed U.S. Department of Energy inertial confinement laser fusion facility. The candidate sites for locating the NIF are: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the preferred site. The NIF will operate by focusing 192 laser beams onto a tiny deuterium-tritium target located at the center of a spherical target chamber. The NIF mission is to achieve inertial confinement fusion (ICF) ignition, access physical conditions in matter of interest to nuclear weapons physics, provide an above ground simulation capability for nuclear weapons effects testing, and contribute to the development of inertial fusion for electrical power production. The NIF has been classified as a radiological, low hazard facility on the basis of a preliminary hazards analysis and according to the DOE methodology for facility classification. This requires that a safety analysis be prepared under DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System. A draft Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) has been written, and this will be finalized later in 1996. This paper summarizes the safety issues associated with the operation of the NIF and the methodology used to study them. It provides a summary of the methodology, an overview of the hazards, estimates maximum routine and accidental exposures for the preferred site of LLNL, and concludes that the risks from NIF operations are low

  16. Recent developments in the external hazard risk assessment in Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    Ukrainian legislation prescribes safety analysis reports for all operating and future NPPs. Apart from main report they must include: safety analysis supplement; design basis accident analysis; beyond design basis accident analysis; probabilistic safety assessment (PSA); technical; substantiation of safety. Regulatory requirements to PSA contents cover the criteria for core damage frequency and large radioactive release frequency. Initiating events taken into account are internal events; internal hazards and external hazards. External hazards to be considered are seismic events, external fires, external floods, extreme ambient temperatures, aircraft crashes, etc. Current status of PSA development is related to operating WWER-440 and WWER-1000 NPPs and NPPs under construction. This presentation describes in detail the external hazard risk assessment for South Ukraine including methodology applied and expected future activities

  17. 77 FR 66638 - The Standard on Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals; Extension of the Office...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-11-06

    ... Standard on Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals; Extension of the Office of Management...) approval of the information collection requirements specified in the Standard on Process Safety Management...: The Standard on Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (29 CFR 1910.119). OMB Number...

  18. Risk-Informed External Hazards Analysis for Seismic and Flooding Phenomena for a Generic PWR

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parisi, Carlo [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Prescott, Steve [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Ma, Zhegang [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Spears, Bob [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Szilard, Ronaldo [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Coleman, Justin [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Kosbab, Ben [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2017-07-26

    This report describes the activities performed during the FY2017 for the US-DOE Light Water Reactor Sustainability Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization (LWRS-RISMC), Industry Application #2. The scope of Industry Application #2 is to deliver a risk-informed external hazards safety analysis for a representative nuclear power plant. Following the advancements occurred during the previous FYs (toolkits identification, models development), FY2017 focused on: increasing the level of realism of the analysis; improving the tools and the coupling methodologies. In particular the following objectives were achieved: calculation of buildings pounding and their effects on components seismic fragility; development of a SAPHIRE code PRA models for 3-loops Westinghouse PWR; set-up of a methodology for performing static-dynamic PRA coupling between SAPHIRE and EMRALD codes; coupling RELAP5-3D/RAVEN for performing Best-Estimate Plus Uncertainty analysis and automatic limit surface search; and execute sample calculations for demonstrating the capabilities of the toolkit in performing a risk-informed external hazards safety analyses.

  19. Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment in Water Treatment Plant considering Environmental Health and Safety Practice

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Falakh Fajrul

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Water Treatment Plant (WTP is an important infrastructure to ensure human health and the environment. In its development, aspects of environmental safety and health are of concern. This paper case study was conducted at the Water Treatment Plant Company in Semarang, Central Java, Indonesia. Hazard identification and risk assessment is one part of the occupational safety and health program at the risk management stage. The purpose of this study was to identify potential hazards using hazard identification methods and risk assessment methods. Risk assessment is done using criteria of severity and probability of accident. The results obtained from this risk assessment are 22 potential hazards present in the water purification process. Extreme categories that exist in the risk assessment are leakage of chlorine and industrial fires. Chlorine and fire leakage gets the highest value because its impact threatens many things, such as industrial disasters that could endanger human life and the environment. Control measures undertaken to avoid potential hazards are to apply the use of personal protective equipment, but management will also be better managed in accordance with hazard control hazards, occupational safety and health programs such as issuing work permits, emergency response training is required, Very useful in overcoming potential hazards that have been determined.

  20. Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment in Water Treatment Plant considering Environmental Health and Safety Practice

    Science.gov (United States)

    Falakh, Fajrul; Setiani, Onny

    2018-02-01

    Water Treatment Plant (WTP) is an important infrastructure to ensure human health and the environment. In its development, aspects of environmental safety and health are of concern. This paper case study was conducted at the Water Treatment Plant Company in Semarang, Central Java, Indonesia. Hazard identification and risk assessment is one part of the occupational safety and health program at the risk management stage. The purpose of this study was to identify potential hazards using hazard identification methods and risk assessment methods. Risk assessment is done using criteria of severity and probability of accident. The results obtained from this risk assessment are 22 potential hazards present in the water purification process. Extreme categories that exist in the risk assessment are leakage of chlorine and industrial fires. Chlorine and fire leakage gets the highest value because its impact threatens many things, such as industrial disasters that could endanger human life and the environment. Control measures undertaken to avoid potential hazards are to apply the use of personal protective equipment, but management will also be better managed in accordance with hazard control hazards, occupational safety and health programs such as issuing work permits, emergency response training is required, Very useful in overcoming potential hazards that have been determined.

  1. Software FMEA analysis for safety-related application software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Gee-Yong; Kim, Dong Hoon; Lee, Dong Young

    2014-01-01

    Highlights: • We develop a modified FMEA analysis suited for applying to software architecture. • A template for failure modes on a specific software language is established. • A detailed-level software FMEA analysis on nuclear safety software is presented. - Abstract: A method of a software safety analysis is described in this paper for safety-related application software. The target software system is a software code installed at an Automatic Test and Interface Processor (ATIP) in a digital reactor protection system (DRPS). For the ATIP software safety analysis, at first, an overall safety or hazard analysis is performed over the software architecture and modules, and then a detailed safety analysis based on the software FMEA (Failure Modes and Effect Analysis) method is applied to the ATIP program. For an efficient analysis, the software FMEA analysis is carried out based on the so-called failure-mode template extracted from the function blocks used in the function block diagram (FBD) for the ATIP software. The software safety analysis by the software FMEA analysis, being applied to the ATIP software code, which has been integrated and passed through a very rigorous system test procedure, is proven to be able to provide very valuable results (i.e., software defects) that could not be identified during various system tests

  2. Application of Software Safety Analysis Methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, G. Y.; Hur, S.; Cheon, S. W.; Kim, D. H.; Lee, D. Y.; Kwon, K. C.; Lee, S. J.; Koo, Y. H.

    2009-01-01

    A fully digitalized reactor protection system, which is called the IDiPS-RPS, was developed through the KNICS project. The IDiPS-RPS has four redundant and separated channels. Each channel is mainly composed of a group of bistable processors which redundantly compare process variables with their corresponding setpoints and a group of coincidence processors that generate a final trip signal when a trip condition is satisfied. Each channel also contains a test processor called the ATIP and a display and command processor called the COM. All the functions were implemented in software. During the development of the safety software, various software safety analysis methods were applied, in parallel to the verification and validation (V and V) activities, along the software development life cycle. The software safety analysis methods employed were the software hazard and operability (Software HAZOP) study, the software fault tree analysis (Software FTA), and the software failure modes and effects analysis (Software FMEA)

  3. Hazard analysis of typhoon-related external events using extreme value theory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Yo Chan; Jang, Seung Cheol [Integrated Safety Assessment Division, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Lim, Tae Jin [Dept. of Industrial Information Systems Engineering, Soongsil University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-02-15

    After the Fukushima accident, the importance of hazard analysis for extreme external events was raised. To analyze typhoon-induced hazards, which are one of the significant disasters of East Asian countries, a statistical analysis using the extreme value theory, which is a method for estimating the annual exceedance frequency of a rare event, was conducted for an estimation of the occurrence intervals or hazard levels. For the four meteorological variables, maximum wind speed, instantaneous wind speed, hourly precipitation, and daily precipitation, the parameters of the predictive extreme value theory models were estimated. The 100-year return levels for each variable were predicted using the developed models and compared with previously reported values. It was also found that there exist significant long-term climate changes of wind speed and precipitation. A fragility analysis should be conducted to ensure the safety levels of a nuclear power plant for high levels of wind speed and precipitation, which exceed the results of a previous analysis.

  4. Current regulatory developments concerning the implementation of probabilistic safety analyses for external hazards in Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krauss, Matias; Berg, Heinz-Peter

    2014-01-01

    The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) initiated in September 2003 a comprehensive program for the revision of the national nuclear safety regulations which has been successfully completed in November 2012. These nuclear regulations take into account the current recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA). In this context, the recommendations and guidelines of the Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (KTA) and the technical documents elaborated by the respective expert group on Probabilistic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants (FAK PSA) are being updated or in the final process of completion. A main topic of the revision was the issue external hazards. As part of this process and in the light of the accident at Fukushima and the findings of the related actions resulting in safety reviews of nuclear power plants at national level in Germany and on European level, a revision of all relevant standards and documents has been made, especially the recommendations of KTA and FAK PSA. In that context, not only design issues with respect to events such as earthquakes and floods have been discussed, but also methodological issues regarding the implementation of improved probabilistic safety analyses on this topic. As a result of the revision of the KTA 2201 series 'Design of Nuclear Power Plants against Seismic Events' with their parts 1 to 6, part 1 'Principles' was published as the first standard in November 2011, followed by the revised versions of KTA 2201.2 (soil) and 2201.4 (systems and components) in 2012. The modified the standard KTA 2201.3 (structures) is expected to be issued before the end of 2013. In case of part 5 (seismic instrumentation) and part 6 (post>seismic actions) draft amendments are expected in 2013. The expert group 'Probabilistic Safety Assessments for Nuclear Power Plants' (FAK PSA) is an advisory body of the Federal

  5. Fire hazard analysis for Plutonium Finishing Plant complex

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MCKINNIS, D.L.

    1999-02-23

    A fire hazards analysis (FHA) was performed for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Complex at the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford site. The scope of the FHA focuses on the nuclear facilities/structures in the Complex. The analysis was conducted in accordance with RLID 5480.7, [DOE Directive RLID 5480.7, 1/17/94] and DOE Order 5480.7A, ''Fire Protection'' [DOE Order 5480.7A, 2/17/93] and addresses each of the sixteen principle elements outlined in paragraph 9.a(3) of the Order. The elements are addressed in terms of the fire protection objectives stated in paragraph 4 of DOE 5480.7A. In addition, the FHA also complies with WHC-CM-4-41, Fire Protection Program Manual, Section 3.4 [1994] and WHC-SD-GN-FHA-30001, Rev. 0 [WHC, 1994]. Objectives of the FHA are to determine: (1) the fire hazards that expose the PFP facilities, or that are inherent in the building operations, (2) the adequacy of the fire safety features currently located in the PFP Complex, and (3) the degree of compliance of the facility with specific fire safety provisions in DOE orders, related engineering codes, and standards.

  6. The role of hazard- and risk-based approaches in ensuring food safety

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Barlow, S.M.; Boobis, A.R.; Bridges, J.; Cockburn, A.; Dekant, W.; Hepburn, P.; Houben, G.F.; König, J.; Nauta, M.J.; Schuermans, J.; Bánáti, D.

    2015-01-01

    Background: Food legislation in the European Union and elsewhere includes both hazard- and risk-based approaches for ensuring safety. In hazard-based approaches, simply the presence of a potentially harmful agent at a detectable level in food is used as a basis for legislation and/or risk management

  7. Hazard classification of environmental restoration activities at the INEL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peatross, R.G.

    1996-04-01

    The following documents require that a hazard classification be prepared for all activities for which US Department of Energy (DOE) has assumed environmental, safety, and health responsibility: the DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System and DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. A hazard classification defines the level of hazard posed by an operation or activity, assuming an unmitigated release of radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous material. For environmental restoration activities, the release threshold criteria presented in Hazard Baseline Documentation (DOE-EM-STD-5502-94) are used to determine classifications, such as Radiological, Nonnuclear, and Other Industrial facilities. Based upon DOE-EM-STD-5502-94, environmental restoration activities in all but one of the sites addressed by the scope of this classification (see Section 2) can be classified as ''Other Industrial Facility''. DOE-EM-STD-5502-94 states that a Health and Safety Plan and compliance with the applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards are sufficient safety controls for this classification

  8. Safety evaluation report of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant safety analysis report: Contact-handled transuranic waste disposal operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-02-01

    DOE 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, requires that the US Department of Energy conduct an independent, defensible, review in order to approve a Safety Analysis Report (SAR). That review and the SAR approval basis is documented in this formal Safety Evaluation Report (SER). This SER documents the DOE's review of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant SAR and provides the Carlsbad Area Office Manager, the WIPP SAR approval authority, with the basis for approving the safety document. It concludes that the safety basis documented in the WIPP SAR is comprehensive, correct, and commensurate with hazards associated with planned waste disposal operations

  9. Environmental risk analysis of hazardous material rail transportation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Saat, Mohd Rapik, E-mail: mohdsaat@illinois.edu [Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1243 Newmark Civil Engineering Laboratory, 205 North Mathews Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801 (United States); Werth, Charles J.; Schaeffer, David [Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1243 Newmark Civil Engineering Laboratory, 205 North Mathews Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801 (United States); Yoon, Hongkyu [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM 87123 (United States); Barkan, Christopher P.L. [Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1243 Newmark Civil Engineering Laboratory, 205 North Mathews Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801 (United States)

    2014-01-15

    Highlights: • Comprehensive, nationwide risk assessment of hazardous material rail transportation. • Application of a novel environmental (i.e. soil and groundwater) consequence model. • Cleanup cost and total shipment distance are the most significant risk factors. • Annual risk varies from $20,000 to $560,000 for different products. • Provides information on the risk cost associated with specific product shipments. -- Abstract: An important aspect of railroad environmental risk management involves tank car transportation of hazardous materials. This paper describes a quantitative, environmental risk analysis of rail transportation of a group of light, non-aqueous-phase liquid (LNAPL) chemicals commonly transported by rail in North America. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Environmental Consequence Model (HMTECM) was used in conjunction with a geographic information system (GIS) analysis of environmental characteristics to develop probabilistic estimates of exposure to different spill scenarios along the North American rail network. The risk analysis incorporated the estimated clean-up cost developed using the HMTECM, route-specific probability distributions of soil type and depth to groundwater, annual traffic volume, railcar accident rate, and tank car safety features, to estimate the nationwide annual risk of transporting each product. The annual risk per car-mile (car-km) and per ton-mile (ton-km) was also calculated to enable comparison between chemicals and to provide information on the risk cost associated with shipments of these products. The analysis and the methodology provide a quantitative approach that will enable more effective management of the environmental risk of transporting hazardous materials.

  10. Environmental risk analysis of hazardous material rail transportation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saat, Mohd Rapik; Werth, Charles J.; Schaeffer, David; Yoon, Hongkyu; Barkan, Christopher P.L.

    2014-01-01

    Highlights: • Comprehensive, nationwide risk assessment of hazardous material rail transportation. • Application of a novel environmental (i.e. soil and groundwater) consequence model. • Cleanup cost and total shipment distance are the most significant risk factors. • Annual risk varies from $20,000 to $560,000 for different products. • Provides information on the risk cost associated with specific product shipments. -- Abstract: An important aspect of railroad environmental risk management involves tank car transportation of hazardous materials. This paper describes a quantitative, environmental risk analysis of rail transportation of a group of light, non-aqueous-phase liquid (LNAPL) chemicals commonly transported by rail in North America. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Environmental Consequence Model (HMTECM) was used in conjunction with a geographic information system (GIS) analysis of environmental characteristics to develop probabilistic estimates of exposure to different spill scenarios along the North American rail network. The risk analysis incorporated the estimated clean-up cost developed using the HMTECM, route-specific probability distributions of soil type and depth to groundwater, annual traffic volume, railcar accident rate, and tank car safety features, to estimate the nationwide annual risk of transporting each product. The annual risk per car-mile (car-km) and per ton-mile (ton-km) was also calculated to enable comparison between chemicals and to provide information on the risk cost associated with shipments of these products. The analysis and the methodology provide a quantitative approach that will enable more effective management of the environmental risk of transporting hazardous materials

  11. Safety analysis report for the use of hazardous production materials in photovoltaic applications at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Volume 2, Appendices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Crandall, R.S.; Nelson, B.P.; Moskowitz, P.D.; Fthenakis, V.M.

    1992-07-01

    To ensure the continued safety of SERI`s employees, the community, and the environment, NREL commissioned an internal audit of its photovoltaic operations that used hazardous production materials (HPMS). As a result of this audit, NREL management voluntarily suspended all operations using toxic and/or pyrophoric gases. This suspension affected seven laboratories and ten individual deposition systems. These activities are located in Building 16, which has a permitted occupancy of Group B, Division 2 (B-2). NREL management decided to do the following. (1) Exclude from this SAR all operations which conformed, or could easily be made to conform, to B-2 Occupancy requirements. (2) Include in this SAR all operations that could be made to conform to B-2 Occupancy requirements with special administrative and engineering controls. (3) Move all operations that could not practically be made to conform to B-2 occupancy requirements to alternate locations. In addition to the layered set of administrative and engineering controls set forth in this SAR, a semiquantitative risk analysis was performed on 30 various accident scenarios. Twelve presented only routine risks, while 18 presented low risks. Considering the demonstrated safe operating history of NREL in general and these systems specifically, the nature of the risks identified, and the layered set of administrative and engineering controls, it is clear that this facility falls within the DOE Low Hazard Class. Each operation can restart only after it has passed an Operational Readiness Review, comparing it to the requirements of this SAR, while subsequent safety inspections will ensure future compliance. This document contains the appendices to the NREL safety analysis report.

  12. The role of health and safety experts in the management of hazardous and toxic wastes in Indonesia

    Science.gov (United States)

    Supriyadi; Hadiyanto

    2018-02-01

    Occupational Safety and Health Experts in Indonesia have an important role in integrating environmental health and safety factors, including in this regard as human resources assigned to undertake hazardous waste management. Comprehensive knowledge and competence skills need to be carried out responsibly, as an inherent professional occupational safety and health profession. Management leaders should continue to provide training in external agencies responsible for science in the management of toxic waste to enable occupational safety and health experts to improve their performance in the hierarchy of control over the presence of hazardous materials. This paper provides an overview of what strategies and competencies the Occupational Safety and Health expert needs to have in embracing hazardous waste management practices.

  13. A Technique of Software Safety Analysis in the Design Phase for PLC Based Safety-Critical Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koo, Seo-Ryong; Kim, Chang-Hwoi

    2017-01-01

    The purpose of safety analysis, which is a method of identifying portions of a system that have the potential for unacceptable hazards, is firstly to encourage design changes that will reduce or eliminate hazards and, secondly, to conduct special analyses and tests that can provide increased confidence in especially vulnerable portions of the system. For the design and implementation phase of the PLC based systems, we proposed a technique for software design specification and analysis, and this technique enables us to generate software design specifications (SDSs) in nuclear fields. For the safety analysis in the design phase, we used architecture design blocks of NuFDS to represent the architecture of the software. On the basis of the architecture design specification, we can directly generate the fault tree and then use the fault tree for qualitative analysis. Therefore, we proposed a technique of fault tree synthesis, along with a universal fault tree template for the architecture modules of nuclear software. Through our proposed fault tree synthesis in this work, users can use the architecture specification of the NuFDS approach to intuitively compose fault trees that help analyze the safety design features of software.

  14. Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D

    2008-06-16

    This documented safety analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements', and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

  15. Assessment of occupational health and safety hazard exposures among working college students.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Balanay, Jo Anne G; Adesina, Adepeju; Kearney, Gregory D; Richards, Stephanie L

    2014-01-01

    Adolescents and young adults have higher injury rates than their adult counterparts in similar jobs. This study used the working college student population to assess health and safety hazards in the workplace, characterize related occupational diseases and injuries, and describe worker health/safety activities provided by employers. College students (≥17 years old) were assessed via online surveys about work history, workplace exposure to hazards, occupational diseases/injuries, and workplace health/safety activities. Approximately half (51%) of participants (n = 1,147) were currently employed at the time of the survey or had been employed while enrolled in college. Restaurants (other than fast food) were the most frequently reported work setting. The most reported workplace hazards included noise exposure and contact with hot liquids/surfaces. Twenty percent of working students experienced injury at work; some injuries were severe enough to limit students' normal activities for >3 days (30%) or require medical attention (44%). Men had significantly higher prevalence of injuries (P = 0.05) and near-misses (P safety training and half were given personal protective equipment (PPE) by their employers. Risk reduction from workplace injuries and illnesses among working college students may be achieved by implementing occupational health and safety (OHS) strategies including incorporation of OHS in the college curriculum, promotion of OHS by university/college student health services, and improving awareness of OHS online resources among college students, employers, and educators. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  16. Hazard Analysis of Software Requirements Specification for Process Module of FPGA-based Controllers in NPP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung; Sejin; Kim, Eui-Sub; Yoo, Junbeom [Konkuk University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Keum, Jong Yong; Lee, Jang-Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Software in PLC, FPGA which are used to develop I and C system also should be analyzed to hazards and risks before used. NUREG/CR-6430 proposes the method for performing software hazard analysis. It suggests analysis technique for software affected hazards and it reveals that software hazard analysis should be performed with the aspects of software life cycle such as requirements analysis, design, detailed design, implements. It also provides the guide phrases for applying software hazard analysis. HAZOP (Hazard and operability analysis) is one of the analysis technique which is introduced in NUREG/CR-6430 and it is useful technique to use guide phrases. HAZOP is sometimes used to analyze the safety of software. Analysis method of NUREG/CR-6430 had been used in Korea nuclear power plant software for PLC development. Appropriate guide phrases and analysis process are selected to apply efficiently and NUREG/CR-6430 provides applicable methods for software hazard analysis is identified in these researches. We perform software hazard analysis of FPGA software requirements specification with two approaches which are NUREG/CR-6430 and HAZOP with using general GW. We also perform the comparative analysis with them. NUREG/CR-6430 approach has several pros and cons comparing with the HAZOP with general guide words and approach. It is enough applicable to analyze the software requirements specification of FPGA.

  17. 21 CFR 123.6 - Hazard analysis and Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... Control Point (HACCP) plan. 123.6 Section 123.6 Food and Drugs FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF... Provisions § 123.6 Hazard analysis and Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) plan. (a) Hazard... fish or fishery product being processed in the absence of those controls. (b) The HACCP plan. Every...

  18. The role of hazard- and risk-based approaches in ensuring food safety

    OpenAIRE

    Barlow, Susan M.; Boobis, Alan R.; Bridges, Jim; Cockburn, Andrew; Dekant, Wolfgang; Hepburn, Paul; Houben, Geert F.; König, Jürgen; Nauta, Maarten; Schuermans, Jeroen; Bánáti, Diána

    2015-01-01

    BackgroundFood legislation in the European Union and elsewhere includes both hazard- and risk-based approaches for ensuring safety. In hazard-based approaches, simply the presence of a potentially harmful agent at a detectable level in food is used as a basis for legislation and/or risk management action. Risk-based approaches allow consideration of exposure in assessing whether there may be unacceptable risks to health.Scope and approachThe advantages and disadvantages of hazard- and risk-ba...

  19. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) steel drum

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCormick, W.A.

    1998-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) provides the analyses and evaluations necessary to demonstrate that the steel drum packaging system meets the transportation safety requirements of HNF-PRO-154, Responsibilities and Procedures for all Hazardous Material Shipments, for an onsite packaging containing Type B quantities of solid and liquid radioactive materials. The basic component of the steel drum packaging system is the 208 L (55-gal) steel drum

  20. 14 CFR 437.29 - Hazard analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Hazard analysis. 437.29 Section 437.29... Documentation § 437.29 Hazard analysis. (a) An applicant must perform a hazard analysis that complies with § 437.55(a). (b) An applicant must provide to the FAA all the results of each step of the hazard analysis...

  1. Integrated risk reduction framework to improve railway hazardous materials transportation safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Liu, Xiang, E-mail: liu94@illinois.edu; Saat, M. Rapik, E-mail: mohdsaat@illinois.edu; Barkan, Christopher P.L., E-mail: cbarkan@illinois.edu

    2013-09-15

    Highlights: • An integrated framework is developed to optimize risk reduction. • A negative binomial regression model is developed to analyze accident-cause-specific railcar derailment probability. • A Pareto-optimality technique is applied to determine the lowest risk given any level of resource. • A multi-attribute decision model is developed to determine the optimal amount of investment for risk reduction. • The models could aid the government and rail industry in developing cost-efficient risk reduction policy and practice. -- Abstract: Rail transportation plays a critical role to safely and efficiently transport hazardous materials. A number of strategies have been implemented or are being developed to reduce the risk of hazardous materials release from train accidents. Each of these risk reduction strategies has its safety benefit and corresponding implementation cost. However, the cost effectiveness of the integration of different risk reduction strategies is not well understood. Meanwhile, there has been growing interest in the U.S. rail industry and government to best allocate resources for improving hazardous materials transportation safety. This paper presents an optimization model that considers the combination of two types of risk reduction strategies, broken rail prevention and tank car safety design enhancement. A Pareto-optimality technique is used to maximize risk reduction at a given level of investment. The framework presented in this paper can be adapted to address a broader set of risk reduction strategies and is intended to assist decision makers for local, regional and system-wide risk management of rail hazardous materials transportation.

  2. Physical hazard safety awareness among healthcare workers in Tanta university hospitals, Egypt.

    Science.gov (United States)

    El-Sallamy, Rania M; Kabbash, Ibrahim Ali; El-Fatah, Sanaa Abd; El-Feky, Asmaa

    2017-05-17

    Hospital workers are exposed to many occupational hazards that may threaten their health and safety. Physical hazards encountered in hospital working environment include temperature, illumination, noise, electrical injuries, and radiation. To assess the awareness of healthcare workers (HCWs) about physical hazards in Tanta university hospitals, this cross-sectional study included 401 HCWs (physicians, nurses, technicians, and workers) from seven departments (general surgery, orthopedics, radiology, ophthalmology, kitchen, incinerator, and laundry). Data were collected through interview questionnaire to assess six types of physical hazards (noise, electric hazards, temperature, radiation, fire, and lighting,). Most of the physicians (63.7%) were aware of the level of noise. All physicians, nurses, technicians, and majority of workers reported that hearing protective devices were not available, and all HCWs reported that periodic hearing examination was not performed. Most of the nurses (75.2%) and workers (68.5%) did not attended emergency training, and more than two thirds of all HCWs were not briefed about emergency evacuation. Most HCWs were not given appropriate radiation safety training before starting work (88% of workers, 73.7% of nurses, 65.7% of physicians, and 68.3% of technicians). The majority of physicians, nurses, and technicians (70.5, 65.4, and 53.7%) denied regular environmental monitoring for radiation level inside work place. Health education programs on health and safety issues regarding physical hazards should be mandatory to all healthcare workers to improve their awareness and protect them from undue exposures they may face due to lack of adequate awareness and knowledge. There is urgent need of expanding the occupational healthcare services in Egypt to cover all the employees as indicated by the international recommendations and the Egyptian Constitution, legislation, and community necessity.

  3. Comprehension of hazard communication: effects of pictograms on safety data sheets and labels.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Boelhouwer, Eric; Davis, Jerry; Franco-Watkins, Ana; Dorris, Nathan; Lungu, Claudiu

    2013-09-01

    The United Nations has proposed the Globally Harmonized System (GHS) of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals to make hazard communication more uniform and to improve comprehension. Two experiments were conducted to test whether the addition of hazard and precautionary pictograms to safety data sheets and product labels would improve the transfer of information to users compared to safety data sheets and product labels containing text only. Additionally, naïve users, workers, and experts were tested to determine any potential differences among users. The effect of adding pictograms to safety data sheets and labels was statistically significant for some conditions, but was not significant across all conditions. One benefit of the addition of pictograms was that the time to respond to the survey questions decreased when the pictograms were present for both the SDS and the labels. GHS format SDS and labels do provide benefits to users, but the system will need further enhancements and modifications to continue to improve the effectiveness of hazard communication. The final rule to modify the HCS to include the Globally Harmonized System (GHS) for the Classification and Labelling of Chemicals announced by OSHA (2012b) will change the information content of every chemical SDS and label used in commerce. This study suggests that the inclusion of GHS hazard pictograms and precautionary pictograms to SDS and labels may benefit the user. Copyright © 2013 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  4. Irradiation hazards and safety standards for patients in dental radiography

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williamson, B D.P.

    1975-07-01

    The historical developments which have led to a reduction in the hazards or potential hazards to patients in dental radiography are reviewed. Based on a simple risk estimate, the safety of present-day techniques employed in routine dental radiography is assessed. Also included in the review is a description of techniques used and results obtained from the National Radiation Laboratory's (NRL) surveillance programme of patients' exposure to irradiation in dental radiography. The possibilities of and need for achieving further reductions of irradiation are discussed.

  5. A CONCEPTUAL DISASTER RISK REDUCTION FRAMEWORK FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY HAZARDS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Amir S. GOHARDANI

    2013-06-01

    Full Text Available The health and safety hazard status of construction workers is constantly challenged by the projects in the built environment. In this article, various aspects of health and safety hazards for construction workers have been reviewed and investigated through a disaster risk reduction prism. This approach has further led to the perception of glancing at the construction sector as an ongoing disaster zone and equally provides a new management perspective. From this perspective, the occurrence of a disaster within the construction sector corresponds to the temporary or permanent ill-health or death of a construction worker. Geographical location is one of the factors that play an important role in addressing the health and safety hazards for construction workers. In addition to the location, geographical considerations equally encapsulate regional, cultural, governmental and work ethical effects. These effects may potentially contribute to disparities in the construction sector. With an increasing level of understanding for health and safety hazards in the construction domain, more efficient prevention measures can be taken in order to enable a disaster management cycle, capable of responding to the rigorous demands of the construction sector.

  6. Obtention to the methodology for evaluation to the confirmation of the hazardous wastes safety isolation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peralta, J.L.; Gil, R.; Castillo, R.; Leyva, D.

    2003-01-01

    Taking into account, the practical experience of the safety assessment in the radioactive wastes management, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations in this topics, the norms and national and international legislation about noxious substances to the environment and their restriction limits, the best international practices and approaches of isolation hazardous wastes sites, a Methodology is developed (Cuba particular conditions) to obtaining and/or confirmation of the hazardous wastes safety isolation, as a tool able to carry out the assessment of facilities to build and all installation and/or place where hazardous wastes isolated from the environment. The Methodology, embraces the evaluation of technical, economic and social topics, allowing to develop an integral safety assessment which allows to estimate the environment possible impact for hazardous waste isolation (radioactive and non radioactive); Just are shown in this paper the selection approaches for the obtaining and/or evaluation of the best site, the steps description to continue for the definition of the main scenarios and the models to take into account in the valuation of the possible liberation and pathway to the environment of the non radioactive pollutants. The main contribution of this Methodology resides in the creation of a scientific-technique necessary guide for the evident demand of carrying out the most organized, effective and hazardous wastes safety management

  7. A formal safety analysis for PLC software-based safety critical system using Z

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koh, Jung Soo

    1997-02-01

    This paper describes a formal safety analysis technique which is demonstrated by performing empirical formal safety analysis with the case study of beamline hutch door Interlock system that is developed by using PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) systems at the Pohang Accelerator Laboratory. In order to perform formal safety analysis, we have built the Z formal specifications representation from user requirement written in ambiguous natural language and target PLC ladder logic, respectively. We have also studied the effective method to express typical PLC timer component by using specific Z formal notation which is supported by temporal history. We present a formal proof technique specifying and verifying that the hazardous states are not introduced into ladder logic in the PLC-based safety critical system. And also, we have found that some errors or mismatches in user requirement and final implemented PLC ladder logic while analyzing the process of the consistency and completeness of Z translated formal specifications. In the case of relatively small systems like Beamline hutch door interlock system, a formal safety analysis including explicit proof is highly recommended so that the safety of PLC-based critical system may be enhanced and guaranteed. It also provides a helpful benefits enough to comprehend user requirement expressed by ambiguous natural language

  8. Safety analysis of tritium processing system based on PHA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fu Wanfa; Luo Deli; Tang Tao

    2012-01-01

    Safety analysis on primary confinement of tritium processing system for TBM was carried out with Preliminary Hazard Analysis. Firstly, the basic PHA process was given. Then the function and safe measures with multiple confinements about tritium system were described and analyzed briefly, dividing the two kinds of boundaries of tritium transferring through, that are multiple confinement systems division and fluid loops division. Analysis on tritium releasing is the key of PHA. Besides, PHA table about tritium releasing was put forward, the causes and harmful results being analyzed, and the safety measures were put forward also. On the basis of PHA, several kinds of typical accidents were supposed to be further analyzed. And 8 factors influencing the tritium safety were analyzed, laying the foundation of evaluating quantitatively the safety grade of various nuclear facilities. (authors)

  9. Technical basis document for natural event hazards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CARSON, D.M.

    2003-01-01

    This technical basis document was developed to support the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), and describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins for natural event hazards (NEH)-initiated representative accident and associated represented hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous conditions based on an evaluation of the frequency and consequence. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers, because all facility worker hazardous conditions are considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR-level controls. Determination of the need for safety-class SSCs was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'', as described in this report

  10. Safety analysis, risk assessment, and risk acceptance criteria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jamali, K.

    1997-01-01

    This paper discusses a number of topics that relate safety analysis as documented in the Department of Energy (DOE) safety analysis reports (SARs), probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) as characterized primarily in the context of the techniques that have assumed some level of formality in commercial nuclear power plant applications, and risk acceptance criteria as an outgrowth of PRA applications. DOE SARs of interest are those that are prepared for DOE facilities under DOE Order 5480.23 and the implementing guidance in DOE STD-3009-94. It must be noted that the primary area of application for DOE STD-3009 is existing DOE facilities and that certain modifications of the STD-3009 approach are necessary in SARs for new facilities. Moreover, it is the hazard analysis (HA) and accident analysis (AA) portions of these SARs that are relevant to the present discussions. Although PRAs can be qualitative in nature, PRA as used in this paper refers more generally to all quantitative risk assessments and their underlying methods. HA as used in this paper refers more generally to all qualitative risk assessments and their underlying methods that have been in use in hazardous facilities other than nuclear power plants. This discussion includes both quantitative and qualitative risk assessment methods. PRA has been used, improved, developed, and refined since the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) was published in 1975 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Much debate has ensued since WASH-1400 on exactly what the role of PRA should be in plant design, reactor licensing, 'ensuring' plant and process safety, and a large number of other decisions that must be made for potentially hazardous activities. Of particular interest in this area is whether the risks quantified using PRA should be compared with numerical risk acceptance criteria (RACs) to determine whether a facility is 'safe.' Use of RACs requires quantitative estimates of consequence frequency and magnitude

  11. Safety Analysis Report for the use of hazardous production materials in photovoltaic applications at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crandall, R.S.; Nelson, B.P.; Moskowitz, P.D.; Fthenakis, V.M.

    1992-07-01

    To ensure the continued safety of SERI's employees, the community, and the environment, NREL commissioned an internal audit of its photovoltaic operations that used hazardous production materials (HPMs). As a result of this audit, NREL management voluntarily suspended all operations using toxic and/or pyrophoric gases. This suspension affected seven laboratories and ten individual deposition systems. These activities are located in Building 16, which has a permitted occupancy of Group B, Division 2 (B-2). NREL management decided to do the following. (1) Exclude from this SAR all operations which conformed, or could easily be made to conform, to B-2 Occupancy requirements. (2) Include in this SAR all operations that could be made to conform to B-2 Occupancy requirements with special administrative and engineering controls. (3) Move all operations that could not practically be made to conform to B-2 Occupancy requirements to alternate locations. In addition to the layered set of administrative and engineering controls set forth in this SAR, a semiquantitative risk analysis was performed on 30 various accident scenarios. Twelve presented only routine risks, while 18 presented low risks. Considering the demonstrated safe operating history of NREL in general and these systems specifically, the nature of the risks identified, and the layered set of administrative and engineering controls, it is clear that this facility falls within the DOE Low Hazard Class. Each operation can restart only after it has passed an Operational Readiness Review, comparing it to the requirements of this SAR, while subsequent safety inspections will ensure future compliance

  12. Documented Safety Analysis for the B695 Segment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D

    2008-09-11

    This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) was prepared for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Building 695 (B695) Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF). The report provides comprehensive information on design and operations, including safety programs and safety structures, systems and components to address the potential process-related hazards, natural phenomena, and external hazards that can affect the public, facility workers, and the environment. Consideration is given to all modes of operation, including the potential for both equipment failure and human error. The facilities known collectively as the DWTF are used by LLNL's Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division to store and treat regulated wastes generated at LLNL. RHWM generally processes low-level radioactive waste with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (e.g., much less than 100 nCi/g). Wastes processed often contain only depleted uranium and beta- and gamma-emitting nuclides, e.g., {sup 90}Sr, {sup 137}Cs, or {sup 3}H. The mission of the B695 Segment centers on container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. The B695 Segment is used for storage of radioactive waste (including transuranic and low-level), hazardous, nonhazardous, mixed, and other waste. Storage of hazardous and mixed waste in B695 Segment facilities is in compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). LLNL is operated by the Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, for the Department of Energy (DOE). The B695 Segment is operated by the RHWM Division of LLNL. Many operations in the B695 Segment are performed under a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) operation plan, similar to commercial treatment operations with best demonstrated available technologies. The buildings of the B695 Segment were designed and built considering such operations, using proven building

  13. Documented Safety Analysis for the B695 Segment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laycak, D.

    2008-01-01

    This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) was prepared for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Building 695 (B695) Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF). The report provides comprehensive information on design and operations, including safety programs and safety structures, systems and components to address the potential process-related hazards, natural phenomena, and external hazards that can affect the public, facility workers, and the environment. Consideration is given to all modes of operation, including the potential for both equipment failure and human error. The facilities known collectively as the DWTF are used by LLNL's Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division to store and treat regulated wastes generated at LLNL. RHWM generally processes low-level radioactive waste with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (e.g., much less than 100 nCi/g). Wastes processed often contain only depleted uranium and beta- and gamma-emitting nuclides, e.g., 90 Sr, 137 Cs, or 3 H. The mission of the B695 Segment centers on container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. The B695 Segment is used for storage of radioactive waste (including transuranic and low-level), hazardous, nonhazardous, mixed, and other waste. Storage of hazardous and mixed waste in B695 Segment facilities is in compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). LLNL is operated by the Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, for the Department of Energy (DOE). The B695 Segment is operated by the RHWM Division of LLNL. Many operations in the B695 Segment are performed under a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) operation plan, similar to commercial treatment operations with best demonstrated available technologies. The buildings of the B695 Segment were designed and built considering such operations, using proven building systems, and keeping

  14. New U.K. safety legislation and its effects on the control of radiological hazards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bell, B.H.J.; Luxon, S.G.

    1977-01-01

    This paper explains the objectives of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and refers in particular to its effects on the control of hazards at nuclear installations and, more widely, on the control of radiological hazards generally. It deals also with the changes resulting from the setting up of the Health and Safety Commission and its Executive under the new Act, and the effects of these changes on the work of the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. (auth.) [fr

  15. Prevention is better: the case of the underutilized failure mode effect analysis in patient safety

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lewis Goodrum

    2017-02-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Prospective hazard analysis methodologies, like failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA, have been tried and tested in the engineering industry and are more recently gaining momentum in healthcare. Considering FMEA’s evidence based successes, this commentary makes the case that healthcare is underutilizing the methodology by relying on retrospective hazard analysis. Healthcare leaders should determine where prospective hazard analysis principles could be better built into care delivery planning and processes that will enhance patient safety.

  16. Software safety analysis techniques for developing safety critical software in the digital protection system of the LMR

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jang Soo; Cheon, Se Woo; Kim, Chang Hoi; Sim, Yun Sub

    2001-02-01

    This report has described the software safety analysis techniques and the engineering guidelines for developing safety critical software to identify the state of the art in this field and to give the software safety engineer a trail map between the code and standards layer and the design methodology and documents layer. We have surveyed the management aspects of software safety activities during the software lifecycle in order to improve the safety. After identifying the conventional safety analysis techniques for systems, we have surveyed in details the software safety analysis techniques, software FMEA(Failure Mode and Effects Analysis), software HAZOP(Hazard and Operability Analysis), and software FTA(Fault Tree Analysis). We have also surveyed the state of the art in the software reliability assessment techniques. The most important results from the reliability techniques are not the specific probability numbers generated, but the insights into the risk importance of software features. To defend against potential common-mode failures, high quality, defense-in-depth, and diversity are considered to be key elements in digital I and C system design. To minimize the possibility of CMFs and thus increase the plant reliability, we have provided D-in-D and D analysis guidelines.

  17. Software safety analysis techniques for developing safety critical software in the digital protection system of the LMR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jang Soo; Cheon, Se Woo; Kim, Chang Hoi; Sim, Yun Sub

    2001-02-01

    This report has described the software safety analysis techniques and the engineering guidelines for developing safety critical software to identify the state of the art in this field and to give the software safety engineer a trail map between the code and standards layer and the design methodology and documents layer. We have surveyed the management aspects of software safety activities during the software lifecycle in order to improve the safety. After identifying the conventional safety analysis techniques for systems, we have surveyed in details the software safety analysis techniques, software FMEA(Failure Mode and Effects Analysis), software HAZOP(Hazard and Operability Analysis), and software FTA(Fault Tree Analysis). We have also surveyed the state of the art in the software reliability assessment techniques. The most important results from the reliability techniques are not the specific probability numbers generated, but the insights into the risk importance of software features. To defend against potential common-mode failures, high quality, defense-in-depth, and diversity are considered to be key elements in digital I and C system design. To minimize the possibility of CMFs and thus increase the plant reliability, we have provided D-in-D and D analysis guidelines

  18. TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT FOR NATURAL EVENT HAZARDS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRIPPS, L.J.

    2006-01-01

    This technical basis document was developed to support the documented safety analysis (DSA) and describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins for natural event hazard (NEH)-initiated accidents. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous conditions based on an evaluation of the frequency and consequence. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers, because all facility worker hazardous conditions are considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR-level controls

  19. Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company californium multiplier/delayed neutron counter safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zimmer, W.H.

    1976-08-01

    The Californium Multiplier (CFX) is a subcritical assembly of uranium surrounding 252 Cf spontaneously fissioning neutron sources; its function is to multiply the neutron flux to a level useful for activation analysis. This document summarizes the safety analysis aspects of the CFX, DNC, pneumatic transfer system, and instrumentation and to detail all the aspects of the total facility as a starting point for the ARHCO Safety Analysis Review. Recognized hazards and steps already taken to neutralize them are itemized

  20. SEISMIC ANALYSIS FOR PRECLOSURE SAFETY

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    E.N. Lindner

    2004-12-03

    The purpose of this seismic preclosure safety analysis is to identify the potential seismically-initiated event sequences associated with preclosure operations of the repository at Yucca Mountain and assign appropriate design bases to provide assurance of achieving the performance objectives specified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR Part 63 for radiological consequences. This seismic preclosure safety analysis is performed in support of the License Application for the Yucca Mountain Project. In more detail, this analysis identifies the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that are subject to seismic design bases. This analysis assigns one of two design basis ground motion (DBGM) levels, DBGM-1 or DBGM-2, to SSCs important to safety (ITS) that are credited in the prevention or mitigation of seismically-initiated event sequences. An application of seismic margins approach is also demonstrated for SSCs assigned to DBGM-2 by showing a high confidence of a low probability of failure at a higher ground acceleration value, termed a beyond-design basis ground motion (BDBGM) level. The objective of this analysis is to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 63.111(a) and 10 CFR 63.111(b) for offsite and worker doses. The results of this calculation are used as inputs to the following: (1) A classification analysis of SSCs ITS by identifying potential seismically-initiated failures (loss of safety function) that could lead to undesired consequences; (2) An assignment of either DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 to each SSC ITS credited in the prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence; and (3) A nuclear safety design basis report that will state the seismic design requirements that are credited in this analysis. The present analysis reflects the design information available as of October 2004 and is considered preliminary. The evolving design of the repository will be re-evaluated periodically to ensure that seismic hazards are properly

  1. SEISMIC ANALYSIS FOR PRECLOSURE SAFETY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    E.N. Lindner

    2004-01-01

    The purpose of this seismic preclosure safety analysis is to identify the potential seismically-initiated event sequences associated with preclosure operations of the repository at Yucca Mountain and assign appropriate design bases to provide assurance of achieving the performance objectives specified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR Part 63 for radiological consequences. This seismic preclosure safety analysis is performed in support of the License Application for the Yucca Mountain Project. In more detail, this analysis identifies the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that are subject to seismic design bases. This analysis assigns one of two design basis ground motion (DBGM) levels, DBGM-1 or DBGM-2, to SSCs important to safety (ITS) that are credited in the prevention or mitigation of seismically-initiated event sequences. An application of seismic margins approach is also demonstrated for SSCs assigned to DBGM-2 by showing a high confidence of a low probability of failure at a higher ground acceleration value, termed a beyond-design basis ground motion (BDBGM) level. The objective of this analysis is to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 63.111(a) and 10 CFR 63.111(b) for offsite and worker doses. The results of this calculation are used as inputs to the following: (1) A classification analysis of SSCs ITS by identifying potential seismically-initiated failures (loss of safety function) that could lead to undesired consequences; (2) An assignment of either DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 to each SSC ITS credited in the prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence; and (3) A nuclear safety design basis report that will state the seismic design requirements that are credited in this analysis. The present analysis reflects the design information available as of October 2004 and is considered preliminary. The evolving design of the repository will be re-evaluated periodically to ensure that seismic hazards are properly

  2. Final safety analysis report for the Ground Test Accelerator (GTA), Phase 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1994-10-01

    This document is the second volume of a 3 volume safety analysis report on the Ground Test Accelerator (GTA). The GTA program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is the major element of the national Neutral Particle Beam (NPB) program, which is supported by the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO). A principal goal of the national NPB program is to assess the feasibility of using hydrogen and deuterium neutral particle beams outside the Earth`s atmosphere. The main effort of the NPB program at Los Alamos concentrates on developing the GTA. The GTA is classified as a low-hazard facility, except for the cryogenic-cooling system, which is classified as a moderate-hazard facility. This volume consists of failure modes and effects analysis; accident analysis; operational safety requirements; quality assurance program; ES&H management program; environmental, safety, and health systems critical to safety; summary of waste-management program; environmental monitoring program; facility expansion, decontamination, and decommissioning; summary of emergency response plan; summary plan for employee training; summary plan for operating procedures; glossary; and appendices A and B.

  3. Effectiveness evaluation methodology for safety processes to enhance organisational culture in hazardous installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mengolini, A.; Debarberis, L.

    2008-01-01

    Safety performance indicators are widely collected and used in hazardous installations. The IAEA, OECD and other international organisations have developed approaches that strongly promote deployment of safety performance indicators. These indicators focus mainly on operational performance, but some of them also address organisational and safety culture aspects. However, operators of hazardous installations, in particular those with limited resources and time constraints, often find it difficult to collect the large number of different safety performance indicators. Moreover, they also have difficulties with giving a meaning to the numbers and trends recorded, especially to those that should reflect a positive safety culture. In this light, the aim of this article is to address the need to monitor and assess progress on implementation of a programme to enhance safety and organisational culture. It proposes a specific process-view approach to effectiveness evaluation of organisational and safety culture indicators by means of a multi-level system in which safety processes and staff involvement in defining improvement activities are central. In this way safety becomes fully embedded in staff activities. Key members of personnel become directly involved in identifying and supplying leading indicators relating to their own daily activity and become responsible and accountable for keeping the measurement system alive. Besides use of lagging indicators, particular emphasis is placed on the importance of identifying and selecting leading indicators which can be used to drive safety performance for organisational and safety culture aspects as well

  4. Effectiveness evaluation methodology for safety processes to enhance organisational culture in hazardous installations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mengolini, A; Debarberis, L

    2008-06-30

    Safety performance indicators are widely collected and used in hazardous installations. The IAEA, OECD and other international organisations have developed approaches that strongly promote deployment of safety performance indicators. These indicators focus mainly on operational performance, but some of them also address organisational and safety culture aspects. However, operators of hazardous installations, in particular those with limited resources and time constraints, often find it difficult to collect the large number of different safety performance indicators. Moreover, they also have difficulties with giving a meaning to the numbers and trends recorded, especially to those that should reflect a positive safety culture. In this light, the aim of this article is to address the need to monitor and assess progress on implementation of a programme to enhance safety and organisational culture. It proposes a specific process-view approach to effectiveness evaluation of organisational and safety culture indicators by means of a multi-level system in which safety processes and staff involvement in defining improvement activities are central. In this way safety becomes fully embedded in staff activities. Key members of personnel become directly involved in identifying and supplying leading indicators relating to their own daily activity and become responsible and accountable for keeping the measurement system alive. Besides use of lagging indicators, particular emphasis is placed on the importance of identifying and selecting leading indicators which can be used to drive safety performance for organisational and safety culture aspects as well.

  5. An overview of safety assessment, regulation, and control of hazardous material use at NREL

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nelson, B. P.; Crandall, R. S.; Moskowitz, P. D.; Fthenakis, V. M.

    1992-12-01

    This paper summarizes the methodology we use to ensure the safe use of hazardous materials at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). First, we analyze the processes and the materials used in those processes to identify the hazards presented. Then we study federal, state, and local regulations and apply the relevant requirements to our operations. When necessary, we generate internal safety documents to consolidate this information. We design research operations and support systems to conform to these requirements. Before we construct the systems, we perform a semiquantitative risk analysis on likely accident scenarios. All scenarios presenting an unacceptable risk require system or procedural modifications to reduce the risk. Following these modifications, we repeat the risk analysis to ensure that the respective accident scenarios present an acceptable risk. Once all risks are acceptable, we conduct an operational readiness review (ORR). A management-appointed panel performs the ORR ensuring compliance with all relevant requirements. After successful completion of the ORR, operations can begin.

  6. An overview of safety assessment, regulation, and control of hazardous material use at NREL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nelson, B.P.; Crandall, R.S.; Moskowitz, P.D.; Fthenakis, V.M.

    1992-01-01

    This paper summarizes the methodology we use to ensure the safe use of hazardous materials at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). First, we analyze the processes and the materials used in those processes to identify the hazards presented. Then we study federal, state, and local regulations and apply the relevant requirements to our operations. When necessary, we generate internal safety documents to consolidate this information. We design research operations and support systems to conform to these requirements. Before we construct the systems, we perform a semiquantitative risk analysis on likely accident scenarios. All scenarios presenting in unacceptable risk require system or procedural modifications to reduce the risk. Following these modifications, we repeat the risk analysis to ensure that the respective accident scenarios present acceptable risk. Once all risks are acceptable, we conduct an operational readiness review (ORR). A management appointed panel performs the ORR ensuring compliance with all relevant requirements. After successful completion of the ORR, operations can begin

  7. An overview of safety assessment, regulation, and control of hazardous material use at NREL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nelson, B.P.; Crandall, R.S.; Moskowitz, P.D.; Fthenakis, V.M.

    1992-01-01

    This paper summarizes the methodology we use to ensure the safe use of hazardous materials at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). First, we analyze the processes and the materials used in those processes to identify the hazards presented. Then we study federal, state, and local regulations and apply the relevant requirements to our operations. When necessary, we generate internal safety documents to consolidate this information. We design research operations and support systems to conform to these requirements. Before we construct the systems, we perform a semiquantitative risk analysis on likely accident scenarios. All scenarios presenting an unacceptable risk require system or procedural modifications to reduce the risk. Following these modifications, we repeat the risk analysis to ensure that the respective accident scenarios present an acceptable risk. Once all risks are acceptable, we conduct an operational readiness review (ORR). A management-appointed panel performs the ORR ensuring compliance with all relevant requirements. After successful completion of the ORR, operations can begin

  8. Historical analysis of US pipeline accidents triggered by natural hazards

    Science.gov (United States)

    Girgin, Serkan; Krausmann, Elisabeth

    2015-04-01

    Natural hazards, such as earthquakes, floods, landslides, or lightning, can initiate accidents in oil and gas pipelines with potentially major consequences on the population or the environment due to toxic releases, fires and explosions. Accidents of this type are also referred to as Natech events. Many major accidents highlight the risk associated with natural-hazard impact on pipelines transporting dangerous substances. For instance, in the USA in 1994, flooding of the San Jacinto River caused the rupture of 8 and the undermining of 29 pipelines by the floodwaters. About 5.5 million litres of petroleum and related products were spilled into the river and ignited. As a results, 547 people were injured and significant environmental damage occurred. Post-incident analysis is a valuable tool for better understanding the causes, dynamics and impacts of pipeline Natech accidents in support of future accident prevention and mitigation. Therefore, data on onshore hazardous-liquid pipeline accidents collected by the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) was analysed. For this purpose, a database-driven incident data analysis system was developed to aid the rapid review and categorization of PHMSA incident reports. Using an automated data-mining process followed by a peer review of the incident records and supported by natural hazard databases and external information sources, the pipeline Natechs were identified. As a by-product of the data-collection process, the database now includes over 800,000 incidents from all causes in industrial and transportation activities, which are automatically classified in the same way as the PHMSA record. This presentation describes the data collection and reviewing steps conducted during the study, provides information on the developed database and data analysis tools, and reports the findings of a statistical analysis of the identified hazardous liquid pipeline incidents in terms of accident dynamics and

  9. Analysis on Dangerous Source of Large Safety Accident in Storage Tank Area

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Tong; Li, Ying; Xie, Tiansheng; Liu, Yu; Zhu, Xueyuan

    2018-01-01

    The difference between a large safety accident and a general accident is that the consequences of a large safety accident are particularly serious. To study the tank area which factors directly or indirectly lead to the occurrence of large-sized safety accidents. According to the three kinds of hazard source theory and the consequence cause analysis of the super safety accident, this paper analyzes the dangerous source of the super safety accident in the tank area from four aspects, such as energy source, large-sized safety accident reason, management missing, environmental impact Based on the analysis of three kinds of hazard sources and environmental analysis to derive the main risk factors and the AHP evaluation model is established, and after rigorous and scientific calculation, the weights of the related factors in four kinds of risk factors and each type of risk factors are obtained. The result of analytic hierarchy process shows that management reasons is the most important one, and then the environmental factors and the direct cause and Energy source. It should be noted that although the direct cause is relatively low overall importance, the direct cause of Failure of emergency measures and Failure of prevention and control facilities in greater weight.

  10. A test of safety, violence prevention, and civility climate domain-specific relationships with relevant workplace hazards.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gazica, Michele W; Spector, Paul E

    2016-01-01

    Safety climate, violence prevention climate, and civility climate were independently developed and linked to domain-specific workplace hazards, although all three were designed to promote the physical and psychological safety of workers. To test domain specificity between conceptually related workplace climates and relevant workplace hazards. Data were collected from 368 persons employed in various industries and descriptive statistics were calculated for all study variables. Correlational and relative weights analyses were used to test for domain specificity. The three climate domains were similarly predictive of most workplace hazards, regardless of domain specificity. This study suggests that the three climate domains share a common higher order construct that may predict relevant workplace hazards better than any of the scales alone.

  11. MGR External Events Hazards Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Booth, L.

    1999-01-01

    The purpose and objective of this analysis is to apply an external events Hazards Analysis (HA) to the License Application Design Selection Enhanced Design Alternative 11 [(LADS EDA II design (Reference 8.32))]. The output of the HA is called a Hazards List (HL). This analysis supersedes the external hazards portion of Rev. 00 of the PHA (Reference 8.1). The PHA for internal events will also be updated to the LADS EDA II design but under a separate analysis. Like the PHA methodology, the HA methodology provides a systematic method to identify potential hazards during the 100-year Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) operating period updated to reflect the EDA II design. The resulting events on the HL are candidates that may have potential radiological consequences as determined during Design Basis Events (DBEs) analyses. Therefore, the HL that results from this analysis will undergo further screening and analysis based on the criteria that apply during the performance of DBE analyses

  12. Final hazard classification and auditable safety analysis for the 308 Building Complex during post-deactivation surveillance and maintenance mode

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dexheimer, D.

    1996-11-01

    This document summarizes the inventories of radioactive and hazardous materials present within the 308 Building Complex, and presents the hazard evaluation methodology used to prepare the hazard classification for the Complex. The complex includes the 308 Building (process area and office facilities) and the 308 Building Annex, which includes the former Neutron Radiography Facility containing a shutdown (and partially decommissioned) reactor. This document applies to the post-deactivation surveillance and maintenance mode only, and provides an authorization basis limited to surveillance and maintenance activities. This document does not authorize decommissioning and decontamination activities, movement of fissile materials, modification to facility confinement structures, nor the introduction or storage of additional radionuclides in the 308 Building Complex. This document established a final hazard classification and identifies appropriate and adequate safety functions and controls to reduce or mitigate the risk associated with the surveillance and maintenance mode. The most consequential hazard event scenario is a postulated unmitigated release from an earthquake event involving the entire complex. That release is equivalent to 30% of the Nuclear Category 3 threshold adjusted as allowed by DOE-STD-1027-92 (DOE 1992). The dominant isotopes are 239 Pu, 240 Pu, and 241 Am in the gloveboxes

  13. Investigation of lithium-thionyl chloride battery safety hazards

    Science.gov (United States)

    Attia, A. I.; Gabriel, K. A.; Burns, R. P.

    1983-01-01

    In the ten years since the feasibility of a lithium-thionyl chloride cell was first recognized (1) remarkable progress has been made in hardware development. Cells as large as 16,000 Ah (2) and batteries of 10.8 MWh (3) have been demonstrated. In a low rate configuration, energy densities of 500 to 600 Wh/kg are easily achieved. Even in the absence of reported explosions, safety would be a concern for such a dense energetic package; the energy density of a lithium-thionyl chloride cell is approaching that of dynamite (924 Wh/kg). In fact explosions have occurred. In general the hazards associated with lithium-thionyl chloride batteries may be divided into four categories: Explosions as a result of an error in battery design. Very large cells were in prototype development prior to a full appreciation of the hazards of the system. It is possible that some of the remaining safety issues are related to cell design; Explosions as a result of external physical abuse such as cell incineration and puncture; Explosions due to short circuiting which could lead to thermal runaway reactions. These problems appear to have been solved by changes in the battery design (4); and Explosions due to abnormal electrical operation (i.e., charging (5) and overdischarging (6) and in partially or fully discharged cells on storage (7 and 8).

  14. Hazard screening application guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-06-01

    The basic purpose of hazard screening is to group precesses, facilities, and proposed modifications according to the magnitude of their hazards so as to determine the need for and extent of follow on safety analysis. A hazard is defined as a material, energy source, or operation that has the potential to cause injury or illness in human beings. The purpose of this document is to give guidance and provide standard methods for performing hazard screening. Hazard screening is applied to new and existing facilities and processes as well as to proposed modifications to existing facilities and processes. The hazard screening process evaluates an identified hazards in terms of the effects on people, both on-site and off-site. The process uses bounding analyses with no credit given for mitigation of an accident with the exception of certain containers meeting DOT specifications. The process is restricted to human safety issues only. Environmental effects are addressed by the environmental program. Interfaces with environmental organizations will be established in order to share information

  15. Recognizing Job Health Hazards. Module SH-08. Safety and Health.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Center for Occupational Research and Development, Inc., Waco, TX.

    This student module on recognizing job health hazards is one of 50 modules concerned with job safety and health. This module presents the four general categories of environmental conditions or stresses: chemical, physical, biological, and ergonomic. Following the introduction, 14 objectives (each keyed to a page in the text) the student is…

  16. Environmental Risk Assessment: Spatial Analysis of Chemical Hazards and Risks in South Korea

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yu, H.; Heo, S.; Kim, M.; Lee, W. K.; Jong-Ryeul, S.

    2017-12-01

    This study identified chemical hazard and risk levels in Korea by analyzing the spatial distribution of chemical factories and accidents. The number of chemical factories and accidents in 5-km2 grids were used as the attribute value for spatial analysis. First, semi-variograms were conducted to examine spatial distribution patterns and to identify spatial autocorrelation of chemical factories and accidents. Semi-variograms explained that the spatial distribution of chemical factories and accidents were spatially autocorrelated. Second, the results of the semi-variograms were used in Ordinary Kriging to estimate chemical hazard and risk level. The level values were extracted from the Ordinary Kriging result and their spatial similarity was examined by juxtaposing the two values with respect to their location. Six peaks were identified in both the hazard and risk estimation result, and the peaks correlated with major cities in Korea. Third, the estimated hazard and risk levels were classified with geometrical interval and could be classified into four quadrants: Low Hazard and Low Risk (LHLR), Low Hazard and High Risk (LHHR), High Hazard and Low Risk (HHLR), and High Hazard and High Risk (HHHR). The 4 groups identified different chemical safety management issues in Korea; relatively safe LHLR group, many chemical reseller factories were found in HHLR group, chemical transportation accidents were in the LHHR group, and an abundance of factories and accidents were in the HHHR group. Each quadrant represented different safety management obstacles in Korea, and studying spatial differences can support the establishment of an efficient risk management plan.

  17. A fire hazard analysis at the Ignalina nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joerud, F.; Magnusson, T.

    1998-01-01

    The fire hazard analysis (FHA) of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) Unit no.1 was initiated during 1997 and is estimated to finalise in summer 1998. The reason for starting a FHA was a recommendation in the Safety Analysis Report and its review to prioritise a systematic FHA. Fire protection improvements had earlier been based on engineering assessments, but further improvements required a systematic FHA. It is also required by the regulator for licensing of unit no.1. In preparation of the analysis it was decided to perform a deterministic FHA to fulfil the requirements in the IAEA draft of a Safety Practice ''Preparation of Fire Hazard Analyses for Nuclear Power Plants''. As a supporting document the United States Department of Energy Reactor Core Protection Evaluation Methodology for Fires at RBMK and WWER Nuclear Power Plants (RCPEM) was agreed to be used. The assistance of the project is performed as a bilateral activity between Sweden and UK. The project management is the responsibility of the INPP. In order to transfer knowledge to the INPP project group, training activities are arranged by the western team. The project will be documented as a safety case. The project consists of parties from INPP, Sweden, UK and Russia which makes the project very dependent of good communication procedures. The most difficult problems is except from the problems with translation, the problems with different standards and lack of testing protocols of the fire protection installations and problems to set the right level of screening criteria. There is also the new dimension of making it possible to take credit for the fire brigade in the safety case, which can bring the project into difficulties. The most interesting challenges for the project are to set the most sensible safety levels in the screening phase, to handle the huge volume of rooms for survey and screening, to maintain the good exchange of fire- and nuclear safety information between all the parties involved

  18. Safety study application guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., (Energy Systems) is committed to performing and documenting safety analyses for facilities it manages for the Department of Energy (DOE). Included are analyses of existing facilities done under the aegis of the Safety Analysis Report Upgrade Program, and analyses of new and modified facilities. A graded approach is used wherein the level of analysis and documentation for each facility is commensurate with the magnitude of the hazard(s), the complexity of the facility and the stage of the facility life cycle. Safety analysis reports (SARs) for hazard Category 1 and 2 facilities are usually detailed and extensive because these categories are associated with public health and safety risk. SARs for Category 3 are normally much less extensive because the risk to public health and safety is slight. At Energy Systems, safety studies are the name given to SARs for Category 3 (formerly open-quotes lowclose quotes) facilities. Safety studies are the appropriate instrument when on-site risks are limited to irreversible consequences to a few people, and off-site consequences are limited to reversible consequences to a few people. This application guide provides detailed instructions for performing safety studies that meet the requirements of DOE Orders 5480.22, open-quotes Technical Safety Requirements,close quotes and 5480.23, open-quotes Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.close quotes A seven-chapter format has been adopted for safety studies. This format allows for discussion of all the items required by DOE Order 5480.23 and for the discussions to be readily traceable to the listing in the order. The chapter titles are: (1) Introduction and Summary, (2) Site, (3) Facility Description, (4) Safety Basis, (5) Hazardous Material Management, (6) Management, Organization, and Institutional Safety Provisions, and (7) Accident Analysis

  19. Analysis on the Industrial Design of Food Package and the Component of Hazardous Substance in the Packaging Material

    OpenAIRE

    Wei-Wen Huang

    2015-01-01

    Transferring the hazardous chemicals contained in food packaging materials into food would threaten the health of consumers, therefore, the related laws and regulations and the detection method of hazardous substance have been established at home and abroad to ensure the safety to use the food packaging material. According to the analysis on the hazardous component in the food packaging, a set of detection methods for hazardous substance in the food packaging was established in the paper and ...

  20. Experiences of frontline nursing staff on workplace safety and occupational health hazards in two psychiatric hospitals in Ghana.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alhassan, Robert Kaba; Poku, Kwabena Adu

    2018-06-06

    Psychiatric hospitals need safe working environments to promote productivity at the workplace. Even though occupational health and safety is not completely new to the corporate society, its scope is largely limited to the manufacturing/processing industries which are perceived to pose greater dangers to workers than the health sector. This paper sought to explore the experiences of frontline nursing personnel on the occupational health and safety conditions in two psychiatric hospitals in Ghana. This is an exploratory cross-sectional study among 296 nurses and nurse-assistants in Accra (n = 164) and Pantang (n = 132) psychiatric hospitals using the proportional stratified random sampling technique. Multivariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression test was conducted to ascertain the determinants of staff exposure to occupational health hazards and the frequency of exposure to these occupational health hazards on daily basis. Knowledge levels on occupational health hazards was high in Accra and Pantang psychiatric hospitals (i.e. 92 and 81% respectively), but barely 44% of the 296 interviewed staff in the two hospitals said they reported their most recent exposure to an occupational health hazard to hospital management. It was found that staff who worked for more years on the ward had higher likelihood of exposure to occupational health hazards than those who worked for lesser years (p = 0.002). The category of occupational health hazards reported most were the physical health hazards. Psychosocial hazards were the least reported health hazards. Frequency of exposure to occupational health hazards on daily basis was positively associated with work schedules of staff particularly, staff on routine day schedule (Coef = 4.49, p = 0.011) and those who alternated between day and night schedules (Coef = 4.48, p = 0.010). Occupational health and safety conditions in the two hospitals were found to be generally poor. Even though majority of

  1. Part I: Hazard, sensorial and economic implications of applying the hazard analysis and critical control points to irradiated ready-to-eat meals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haruvy, Y.F.

    2009-01-01

    The classical methodology of hazard analysis and critical control points focuses on hazards and related implications. A new methodology is suggested here, one that attempts at a systematic simultaneous assessment of safety hazards, sensorial failures and economic risks, and the critical control points necessary for their early detection and/or prevention of their potential outcomes. The new methodology also attempts to combine the three parameters to form a qualitative prioritization of the numerous control points and to screen those that can be cost effective for implementation. This is demonstrated in this paper for a complex product, i.e. radiation sterilized ready-to-eat meals. Hence, a fourth parameter specific to this product - the radiation specific pitfall - is also assessed. The advantages and drawbacks of the combined assessment methodology are described and their overall possible impact is discussed. Finally, the suggested combined assessment and control system for ensuring the safety and quality of food can provide a more structured and critical approach to control identified hazards, compared with that achievable by traditional inspection and quality control procedures. It has the potential to identify areas of concern where failure has not yet been experienced, making it particularly useful for new operations and products thereafter. (author)

  2. Alcator C-MOD final safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fiore, C.L.

    1989-06-01

    This document is designed to address the safety issues involved with the Alcator C-Mod project. This report will begin with a brief description of the experimental objectives which will be followed by information concerning the site. The Alcator C-Mod experiment is a pulsed fusion experiment in which a plasma formed from small amounts of hydrogen or deuterium gas is confined in a magnetic field for short periods (∼1 s). No radioactive fuels or fissile materials are used in the device, so that no criticality hazard exists and no credible nuclear accident can occur. During deuterium operation, the production of a small number of neutrons from a short pulse could result in a small amount of short- and intermediate-lived radioactive isotopes being produced inside the experimental cell. This report will demonstrate that this does not pose an additional hazard to the general population. The health and safety hazards resulting from Alcator C-Mod occur to the workers on the experiment, each of which is described in its own chapter with the steps taken to minimize the risk to employees. These hazards include fire, chemicals and cryogenics, air quality, electrical, electromagnetic radiation, ionizing radiation, and mechanical and natural phenomena. None of these hazards is unique to the facility, and methods of protection from them are well defined and are discussed in the chapter which describes each hazard. The quality assurance program, critical to ensuring the safety aspects of the program, will also be described

  3. Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities March 2010

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D T

    2010-03-05

    This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements,' and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

  4. Safety in Serbian animal source food industry and the impact of hazard analysis and critical control points: A review

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tomašević, I.; Đekić, I.

    2017-09-01

    There is a significant lack of HACCP-educated and/or HACCP-highly trained personnel within the Serbian animal source food workforces and veterinary inspectors, and this can present problems, particularly in hazard identification and assessment activities. However, despite obvious difficulties, HACCP benefits to the Serbian dairy industry are widespread and significant. Improving prerequisite programmes on the farms, mainly through infrastructural investments in milk collectors and transportation vehicles on one hand, and increasing hygiene awareness of farmers through training on the other hand has improved the safety of milk. The decline in bacterial numbers on meat contact surfaces, meat handlers’ hands and cooling facilities presents strong evidence of improved process hygiene and justifies the adoption of HACCP in Serbian meat establishments. Apart from the absence of national food poisoning statistics or national foodborne disease databases, the main obstacle to fully recognising the impact of HACCP on the safety of animal source food in Serbia is the lack of research regarding the occurrence of chemical and/or physical hazards interrelated with its production.

  5. Safety analysis report upgrade program at the Plutonium Facility, Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pan, P.Y.

    1993-01-01

    Plutonium research and development activities have resided at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) since 1943. The function of the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) has been to perform basic special nuclear materials research and development and to support national defense and energy programs. The original Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for PF-4 was approved by DOE in 1978. This FSAR analyzed design-basis and bounding accidents. In 1986, DOE/AL published DOE/AL Order 5481.1B, ''Safety Analysis and Review System'', as a requirement for preparation and review of safety analyses. To meet the new DOE requirements, the Facilities Management Group of the Nuclear Material Technology Division submitted a draft FSAR to DOE for approval in April 1991. This draft FSAR analyzed the new configurations and used a limited-scope probabilistic risk analysis for accident analysis. During the DOE review of the draft FSAR, DOE Order 5480.23 ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports'', was promulgated and was later officially released in April 1992. The new order significantly expands the scope, preparation, and maintenance efforts beyond those required in DOE/AL Order 5481.1B by requiring: description of institutional and human-factor safety programs; clear definitions of all facility-specific safety commitments; more comprehensive and detailed hazard assessment; use of new safety analysis methods; and annual updates of FSARs. This paper describes the safety analysis report (SAR) upgrade program at the Plutonium Facility in LANL. The SAR upgrade program is established to meet the requirements in DOE Order 5480.23. Described in this paper are the SAR background, authorization basis for operations, hazard classification, and technical program elements

  6. Final Hazard Categorization and Auditable Safety Analysis for the Remediation of the 118-D-1, 118-D-2, 118-D-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2 and 118-H-3 Solid Waste Burial Grounds

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    T. J. Rodovsky

    2006-03-01

    This report presents the initial hazard categorization, final hazard categorization and auditable safety analysis for the remediation of the 118-D-1, 118-D-2, and 118-D-3 Burial Grounds located within the 100-D/DR Area of the Hanford Site and the 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds located within the 100-H Area of the Hanford Site.

  7. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) Castor GSF cask

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clements, E.P.

    1997-01-01

    The CASTOR GSF packaging was designed and fabricated to be a certified Type B(U) packaging and comply with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for transport of up to five sealed canisters of vitrified radioactive materials. This onsite Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) provides the analysis and evaluations necessary to demonstrate that the casks, with the canister payload, meet the intent of the Type B packaging regulations set forth in 10 CFR 71 and therefore meet the onsite transportation safety requirements of WHC-CM-2-14, Hazardous Material Packaging and Shipping

  8. Estimation of average hazardous-event-frequency for allocation of safety-integrity levels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Misumi, Y.; Sato, Y.

    1999-01-01

    One of the fundamental concepts of the draft international standard, IEC 61508, is target failure measures to be allocated to Electric/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems, i.e. Safety Integrity Levels. The Safety Integrity Levels consist of four discrete probabilistic levels for specifying the safety integrity requirements or the safety functions to be allocated to Electric/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems. In order to select the Safety Integrity Levels the draft standard classifies Electric/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems into two modes of operation using demand frequencies only. It is not clear which modes of operation should be applied to Electric/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems taking into account the demand-state probability and the spurious demand frequency. It is essential for the allocation of Safety Integrity Levels that generic algorithms be derived by involving possible parameters, which make it possible to model the actuality of real systems. The present paper addresses this issue. First of all, the overall system including Electric/Electronic/programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems is described using a simplified fault-tree. Then, the relationships among demands, demand-states and proof-tests are studied. Overall systems are classified into two groups: a non-demand-state-at-proof-test system which includes both repairable and non-repairable demand states and a constant-demand-frequency system. The new ideas such as a demand-state, spurious demand-state, mean time between detections, rates of d-failure and h-failure, and an h/d ratio are introduced in order to make the Safety Integrity Levels and modes of operation generic and comprehensive. Finally, the overall system is simplified and modeled by fault-trees using Priority-AND gates. At the same time the assumptions for modeling are described. Generic algorithms to estimate hazardous

  9. Fault tree synthesis for software design analysis of PLC based safety-critical systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koo, S. R.; Cho, C. H.; Seong, P. H.

    2006-01-01

    As a software verification and validation should be performed for the development of PLC based safety-critical systems, a software safety analysis is also considered in line with entire software life cycle. In this paper, we propose a technique of software safety analysis in the design phase. Among various software hazard analysis techniques, fault tree analysis is most widely used for the safety analysis of nuclear power plant systems. Fault tree analysis also has the most intuitive notation and makes both qualitative and quantitative analyses possible. To analyze the design phase more effectively, we propose a technique of fault tree synthesis, along with a universal fault tree template for the architecture modules of nuclear software. Consequently, we can analyze the safety of software on the basis of fault tree synthesis. (authors)

  10. 21 CFR 120.7 - Hazard analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 2 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Hazard analysis. 120.7 Section 120.7 Food and Drugs FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) FOOD FOR HUMAN... hazards. The written hazard analysis shall consist of at least the following: (1) Identification of food...

  11. ORNL necessary and sufficient standards for environment, safety, and health. Final report of the Identification Team for other industrial, radiological, and non-radiological hazard facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-07-01

    This Necessary and Sufficient (N and S) set of standards is for Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). These facility classifications are based on a laboratory-wide approach to classify facilities by hazard category. An analysis of the hazards associated with the facilities at ORNL was conducted in 1993. To identify standards appropriate for these Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities, the activities conducted in these facilities were assessed, and the hazards associated with the activities were identified. A preliminary hazards list was distributed to all ORNL organizations. The hazards identified in prior hazard analyses are contained in the list, and a category of other was provided in each general hazard area. A workshop to assist organizations in properly completing the list was held. Completed hazard screening lists were compiled for each ORNL division, and a master list was compiled for all Other Industrial, Radiological Hazard, and Non-Radiological facilities and activities. The master list was compared against the results of prior hazard analyses by research and development and environment, safety, and health personnel to ensure completeness. This list, which served as a basis for identifying applicable environment, safety, and health standards, appears in Appendix A.

  12. ORNL necessary and sufficient standards for environment, safety, and health. Final report of the Identification Team for other industrial, radiological, and non-radiological hazard facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    This Necessary and Sufficient (N and S) set of standards is for Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). These facility classifications are based on a laboratory-wide approach to classify facilities by hazard category. An analysis of the hazards associated with the facilities at ORNL was conducted in 1993. To identify standards appropriate for these Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities, the activities conducted in these facilities were assessed, and the hazards associated with the activities were identified. A preliminary hazards list was distributed to all ORNL organizations. The hazards identified in prior hazard analyses are contained in the list, and a category of other was provided in each general hazard area. A workshop to assist organizations in properly completing the list was held. Completed hazard screening lists were compiled for each ORNL division, and a master list was compiled for all Other Industrial, Radiological Hazard, and Non-Radiological facilities and activities. The master list was compared against the results of prior hazard analyses by research and development and environment, safety, and health personnel to ensure completeness. This list, which served as a basis for identifying applicable environment, safety, and health standards, appears in Appendix A

  13. Safety, health and environmental committee (JKSHE): Establishing chemical hazard management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shyen, A.K.S.; Noriah Mod Ali; Sangau, J.K.

    2012-01-01

    Most of the laboratories in Malaysian Nuclear Agency are using chemicals in their research activities. However, it is known that using of chemicals without proper knowledge especially on the material characteristics as well as safe handling procedure may cause great harm to the workers. Therefore, Safety, Health and Environmental Committee (JKSHE) sees the need to establish a good chemical hazard management to ensure that a safe and healthy workplace and environment is provided. One of the elements in chemical hazard management is to carry out Chemical Hazard Risk Assessment (CHRA). The assessment was done so that decision can be made on suitable control measures upon use of such chemicals, such as induction and training courses to be given to the workers and health surveillance activities that may be needed to protect the workers. For this, JKSHE has recommended to conduct CHRA for one of the laboratories at Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratory (SSDL) namely Film Dosimeter Processing Room (dark room) as the initial effort towards a better chemical hazard management. This paper presents the case study where CHRA was conducted to identify the chemical hazards at the selected laboratory, the adequacy of existing control measures and finally the recommendation for more effective control measures. (author)

  14. Criticality safety analysis of Hanford Waste Tank 241-101-SY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perry, R.T.; Sapir, J.L.; Krohn, B.J.

    1993-01-01

    As part of a safety assessment for proposed pump mixing operations to mitigate episodic gas releases in Tank 241-101-SY at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington, a criticality safety analysis was made using the Sn transport code ONEDANT. The tank contains approximately one million gallons of waste and an estimated 910 G of plutonium. the criticality analysis considers reconfiguration and underestimation of plutonium content. The results indicate that Tank SY-101 does not present a criticality hazard. These methods are also used in criticality analyses of other Hanford tanks

  15. Preharvest food safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Childers, A B; Walsh, B

    1996-07-23

    Preharvest food safety is essential for the protection of our food supply. The production and transport of livestock and poultry play an integral part in the safety of these food products. The goals of this safety assurance include freedom from pathogenic microorganisms, disease, and parasites, and from potentially harmful residues and physical hazards. Its functions should be based on hazard analysis and critical control points from producer to slaughter plant with emphasis on prevention of identifiable hazards rather than on removal of contaminated products. The production goal is to minimize infection and insure freedom from potentially harmful residues and physical hazards. The marketing goal is control of exposure to pathogens and stress. Both groups should have functional hazard analysis and critical control points management programs which include personnel training and certification of producers. These programs must cover production procedures, chemical usage, feeding, treatment practices, drug usage, assembly and transportation, and animal identification. Plans must use risk assessment principles, and the procedures must be defined. Other elements would include preslaughter certification, environmental protection, control of chemical hazards, live-animal drug-testing procedures, and identification of physical hazards.

  16. Safety Analysis Report: X17B2 beamline Synchrotron Medical Research Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gmuer, N.F.; Thomlinson, W.

    1990-02-01

    This report contains a safety analysis for the X17B2 beamline synchrotron medical research facility. Health hazards, risk assessment and building systems are discussed. Reference is made to transvenous coronary angiography

  17. Safety analysis of the 700-horsepower combustion test facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Berkey, B.D.

    1981-05-01

    The objective of the program reported herein was to provide a Safety Analysis of the 700 h.p. Combustion Test Facility located in Building 93 at the Pittsburgh Energy Technology Center. Extensive safety related measures have been incorporated into the design, construction, and operation of the Combustion Test Facility. These include: nitrogen addition to the coal storage bin, slurry hopper, roller mill and pulverizer baghouse, use of low oxygen content combustion gas for coal conveying, an oxygen analyzer for the combustion gas, insulation on hot surfaces, proper classification of electrical equipment, process monitoring instrumentation and a planned remote television monitoring system. Analysis of the system considering these factors has resulted in the determination of overall probabilities of occurrence of hazards as shown in Table I. Implementation of the recommendations in this report will reduce these probabilities as indicated. The identified hazards include coal dust ignition by hot ductwork and equipment, loss of inerting within the coal conveying system leading to a coal dust fire, and ignition of hydrocarbon vapors or spilled oil, or slurry. The possibility of self-heating of coal was investigated. Implementation of the recommendations in this report will reduce the ignition probability to no more than 1 x 10/sup -6/ per event. In addition to fire and explosion hazards, there are potential exposures to materials which have been identified as hazardous to personal health, such as carbon monoxide, coal dust, hydrocarbon vapors, and oxygen deficient atmosphere, but past monitoring experience has not revealed any problem areas. The major environmental hazard is an oil spill. The facility has a comprehensive spill control plan.

  18. 75 FR 4134 - Pipeline Safety: Leak Detection on Hazardous Liquid Pipelines

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-26

    ... safety study on pipeline Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems (NTSB/SS-05/02). The... indications of a leak on the SCADA interface was the impetus for this study. The NTSB examined 13 hazardous... pipelines, the line balance technique for leak detection can often be performed with manual calculations...

  19. Improving the design of higher-capacity railway tank cars for hazardous materials transport: Optimizing the trade-off between weight and safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barkan, Christopher P.L.

    2008-01-01

    As with many aspects of modern industrial society, decision-makers face trade-offs in considering hazardous materials transportation equipment and practices. Tank cars used for transport of hazardous materials can be made more resistant to damage in accidents through use of a thicker steel tank and other protective features. However, the additional weight of these features reduces the car's capacity and thus its efficiency as a transportation vehicle. In this paper the problem of tank car safety versus weight is developed as a multi-attribute decision problem. North American railroads recently developed specifications for higher capacity tank cars for transportation of hazardous materials including enhanced safety design features. A group of tank car safety design features or 'risk reduction options' (RROs) were analyzed with regard to their effect on the conditional probability of release in an accident, and their incremental effect on tank car weight. All possible combinations of these RROs were then analyzed in terms of the reduced release probability per unit of weight increase and the Pareto optimal set of options identified. This set included the combinations of RROs that provided the greatest improvement in safety with the least amount of additional weight for any desired level of tank car weight increase. The analysis was conducted for both non-insulated and insulated tank cars and used two objective functions, minimization of conditional probability of release, and minimization of expected quantity lost, given that a car was derailed in an accident. Sensitivity analyses of the effect of tank car size and use of different objective functions were conducted and the optimality results were found to be robust. The results of this analysis were used by the Association of American Railroads Tank Car Committee to develop new specifications for higher capacity non-insulated and insulated, non-pressure tank cars resulting in an estimated 32% and 24% respective

  20. Treatment of external hazards in probabilistic safety assessment for nuclear power plants. A Safety Practice

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    This Safety Practice provides guidance on conducting a PSA for external hazards in nuclear power plants. Emphasis is placed on the procedural steps of the PSA rather then on the details of corresponding methods. The publication is intended to assist technical persons managing or performing PSAs. A particular aim is to promote a standardized framework, terminology and form of documentation for external hazards PSA so as to facilitate external review of the results of such studies. For those specialists who are already involved in related studies, such as a Level 1 PSA dealing only with internal events, this publication provides an indication of how additional external events could be integrated into an existing PSA. 16 refs, 5 figs, 2 tabs

  1. Analysis of Aviation Safety Reporting System Incident Data Associated with the Technical Challenges of the Atmospheric Environment Safety Technology Project

    Science.gov (United States)

    Withrow, Colleen A.; Reveley, Mary S.

    2014-01-01

    This study analyzed aircraft incidents in the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) that apply to two of the three technical challenges (TCs) in NASA's Aviation Safety Program's Atmospheric Environment Safety Technology Project. The aircraft incidents are related to airframe icing and atmospheric hazards TCs. The study reviewed incidents that listed their primary problem as weather or environment-nonweather between 1994 and 2011 for aircraft defined by Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Parts 121, 135, and 91. The study investigated the phases of flight, a variety of anomalies, flight conditions, and incidents by FAR part, along with other categories. The first part of the analysis focused on airframe-icing-related incidents and found 275 incidents out of 3526 weather-related incidents over the 18-yr period. The second portion of the study focused on atmospheric hazards and found 4647 incidents over the same time period. Atmospheric hazards-related incidents included a range of conditions from clear air turbulence and wake vortex, to controlled flight toward terrain, ground encounters, and incursions.

  2. Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of Natural External Hazards Including Earthquakes. Workshop Proceedings, Prague, Czech Republic, 17-20 June 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The Fukushima Dai-ichi accident triggered discussions about the significance of external hazards and their treatment in safety analyses. In addition, stress tests results have shown vulnerabilities and potential of cliff-edge effects in plant responses to external hazards and have identified possibilities and priorities for improvements and safety measures' implementation at specific sites and designs. In order to address these issues and provide relevant conclusions and recommendations to CSNI and CNRA, the CSNI Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK) directed, in cooperation with the CSNI Working Group on Integrity and Ageing of Components and Structures (WGIAGE), a workshop hosted by UJV Rez. The key objectives of the workshop were to collect information from the OECD member states on methods and approaches being used, and experience gained in probabilistic safety assessment of natural external hazards, as well as to support the fulfillment of the CSNI task on 'PSA of natural external hazards including earthquakes'. These objectives are described more in detail in the introduction in Chapter 1 of this report. The WGRISK activities preceding the workshop and leading to the decision to organize it are described in Chapter 2 of this report. The focus of the workshop was on external events PSA for nuclear power plants, including all modes of operation. The workshop scope was generally limited to external, natural hazards, including those hazards where the distinction between natural and man-made hazards is not sharp. The detailed information about the presentations, discussions, and results of the workshop is presented in Chapter 3 of this report. Some general conclusions were agreed on during the workshop, which are presented in the following paragraphs. - The lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor accidents and related actions at the national, regional, and global level have emphasized the importance to assess risks associated (authors) with

  3. Use of the t-distribution to construct seismic hazard curves for seismic probabilistic safety assessments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yee, Eric [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Dept. of Nuclear Power Plant Engineering, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2017-03-15

    Seismic probabilistic safety assessments are used to help understand the impact potential seismic events can have on the operation of a nuclear power plant. An important component to seismic probabilistic safety assessment is the seismic hazard curve which shows the frequency of seismic events. However, these hazard curves are estimated assuming a normal distribution of the seismic events. This may not be a strong assumption given the number of recorded events at each source-to-site distance. The use of a normal distribution makes the calculations significantly easier but may underestimate or overestimate the more rare events, which is of concern to nuclear power plants. This paper shows a preliminary exploration into the effect of using a distribution that perhaps more represents the distribution of events, such as the t-distribution to describe data. The integration of a probability distribution with potentially larger tails basically pushes the hazard curves outward, suggesting a different range of frequencies for use in seismic probabilistic safety assessments. Therefore the use of a more realistic distribution results in an increase in the frequency calculations suggesting rare events are less rare than thought in terms of seismic probabilistic safety assessment. However, the opposite was observed with the ground motion prediction equation considered.

  4. Use of the t-distribution to construct seismic hazard curves for seismic probabilistic safety assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yee, Eric

    2017-01-01

    Seismic probabilistic safety assessments are used to help understand the impact potential seismic events can have on the operation of a nuclear power plant. An important component to seismic probabilistic safety assessment is the seismic hazard curve which shows the frequency of seismic events. However, these hazard curves are estimated assuming a normal distribution of the seismic events. This may not be a strong assumption given the number of recorded events at each source-to-site distance. The use of a normal distribution makes the calculations significantly easier but may underestimate or overestimate the more rare events, which is of concern to nuclear power plants. This paper shows a preliminary exploration into the effect of using a distribution that perhaps more represents the distribution of events, such as the t-distribution to describe data. The integration of a probability distribution with potentially larger tails basically pushes the hazard curves outward, suggesting a different range of frequencies for use in seismic probabilistic safety assessments. Therefore the use of a more realistic distribution results in an increase in the frequency calculations suggesting rare events are less rare than thought in terms of seismic probabilistic safety assessment. However, the opposite was observed with the ground motion prediction equation considered

  5. Survey of potential health and safety hazards of commercial-scale ethanol production facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Watson, A.P.; Smith, J.G.; Elmore, J.L.

    1982-04-01

    Generic safety and health aspects of commercial-scale (60 to 600 million L/y) anhydrous ethanol production were identified. Several common feedstocks (grains, roots and fibers, and sugarcane) and fuels (coal, natural gas, wood, and bagasse) were evaluated throughout each step of generic plant operation, from initial milling and sizing through saccharification, fermentation, distillation, and stillage disposal. The fermentation, digestion, or combustion phases are not particularly hazardous, although the strong acids and bases used for hydrolysis and pH adjustment should be handled with the same precautions that every industrial solvent deserves. The most serious safety hazard is that of explosion from grain dust or ethanol fume ignition and boiler/steam line overpressurization. Inhalation of ethanol and carbon dioxide vapors may cause intoxication or asphyxiation in unventilated areas, which could be particularly hazardous near equipment controls and agitating vats. Contact with low-pressure process steam would produce scalding burns. Benzene, used in stripping water from ethanol in the final distillation column, is a suspected leukemogen. Substitution of this fluid by alternative liquids is addressed.

  6. The role of hazard- and risk-based approaches in ensuring food safety

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Barlow, Susan M.; Boobis, Alan R.; Bridges, Jim

    2015-01-01

    action. Risk-based approaches allow consideration of exposure in assessing whether there may be unacceptable risks to health. Scope and approach The advantages and disadvantages of hazard- and risk-based approaches for ensuring the safety of food chemicals, allergens, ingredients and microorganisms were...

  7. FOOD QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY

    OpenAIRE

    Rizwana Khatoon; Debkumar Chakraborty; R.C. Chandni; Amar Sankar; A.V. Raghu

    2017-01-01

    Food safety system mainly focuses on identifying and preventing hazards that may lead product to deteriorate. The main important of manufacturing practice is a system that ensures that products meet food safety, quality and legal requirements. The hazard analysis and critical control point system, applies to food safety management, uses the approach of controlling critical points in food handling to prevent food safety problems. Besides enhancing food safety, other benefits of applying HACCP ...

  8. Examination of alternatives to upgrade fire safety in operating NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, J. H.; Jung, I. S.

    2003-01-01

    For the Kori unit 2,3,4, Younggwang 1,2 and Ulchin 1,2 fire protection vulnerabilities and further improvement items are investigated. The most major problem is that those plants do not have plant-specific Fire Hazard Analysis Report. To improve fire safety of those plants, their own Fire Hazard Analysis should be proceed at first. Then, according to results of Fire Hazard Analysis, fire protection improvement program should be implemented. For the assurance of long term fire safety, result of Fire Hazard Analysis should be incorporated in the FSAR and periodically reviewed the impact of design change to fire safety

  9. Comparative Distributions of Hazard Modeling Analysis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rana Abdul Wajid

    2006-07-01

    Full Text Available In this paper we present the comparison among the distributions used in hazard analysis. Simulation technique has been used to study the behavior of hazard distribution modules. The fundamentals of Hazard issues are discussed using failure criteria. We present the flexibility of the hazard modeling distribution that approaches to different distributions.

  10. [Introduction of hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP) principles at the flight catering food production plant].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Popova, A Yu; Trukhina, G M; Mikailova, O M

    In the article there is considered the quality control and safety system implemented in the one of the largest flight catering food production plant for airline passengers and flying squad. The system for the control was based on the Hazard Analysis And Critical Control Points (HACCP) principles and developed hygienic and antiepidemic measures. There is considered the identification of hazard factors at stages of the technical process. There are presented results of the analysis data of monitoring for 6 critical control points over the five-year period. The quality control and safety system permit to decline food contamination risk during acceptance, preparation and supplying of in-flight meal. There was proved the efficiency of the implemented system. There are determined further ways of harmonization and implementation for HACCP principles in the plant.

  11. Hydrotreater/Distillation Column Hazard Analysis Report Rev. 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lowry, Peter P. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Wagner, Katie A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2016-04-15

    This project Hazard and Risk Analysis Report contains the results of several hazard analyses and risk assessments. An initial assessment was conducted in 2012, which included a multi-step approach ranging from design reviews to a formal What-If hazard analysis. A second What-If hazard analysis was completed during February 2013 to evaluate the operation of the hydrotreater/distillation column processes to be installed in a process enclosure within the Process Development Laboratory West (PDL-West) facility located on the PNNL campus. The qualitative analysis included participation of project and operations personnel and applicable subject matter experts. The analysis identified potential hazardous scenarios, each based on an initiating event coupled with a postulated upset condition. The unmitigated consequences of each hazardous scenario were generally characterized as a process upset; the exposure of personnel to steam, vapors or hazardous material; a spray or spill of hazardous material; the creation of a flammable atmosphere; or an energetic release from a pressure boundary.

  12. Hazard identification checklist: Occupational safety and health issues associated with green building

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Terwoert, J.; Ustailieva, E.

    2013-01-01

    This checklist accompanies the e-fact on the same topic and aims to help identify the potential hazards to workers’ safety and health associated with the planning and construction of green buildings, their maintenance, renovation (retrofitting), demolition, and on-site waste collection. It also

  13. Preliminary hazard analysis for the Brayton Isotope Ground Demonstration System (including vacuum test chamber)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, L.G.

    1975-01-01

    The Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) of the BIPS-GDS is a tabular summary of hazards and undesired events which may lead to system damage or failure and/or hazard to personnel. The PHA reviews the GDS as it is envisioned to operate in the Vacuum Test Chamber (VTC) of the GDS Test Facility. The VTC and other equipment which will comprise the test facility are presently in an early stage of preliminary design and will undoubtedly undergo numerous changes before the design is frozen. The PHA and the FMECA to follow are intended to aid the design effort by identifying areas of concern which are critical to the safety and reliability of the BIPS-GDS and test facility

  14. PENERAPAN SISTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP PADA PROSES PEMBUATAN KERIPIK TEMPE

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rahmi Yuniarti

    2015-06-01

    Full Text Available Malang is one of the industrial centers of tempe chips. To maintain the quality and food safety, analysis is required to identify the hazards during the production process. This study was conducted to identify the hazards during the production process of tempe chips and provide recommendations for developing a HACCP system. The phases of production process of tempe chips are started from slice the tempe, move it to the kitchen, coat it with flour dough, fry it in the pan, drain it, package it, and then storage it. There are 3 types of potential hazards in terms of biological, physical, and chemical during the production process. With the CCP identification, there are three processes that have Critical Control Point. There are the process of slicing tempe, immersion of tempe into the flour mixture and draining. Recommendations for the development of HACCP systems include recommendations related to employee hygiene, supporting equipment, 5-S analysis, and the production layout.

  15. Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thio, H. K.; Ichinose, G. A.; Somerville, P. G.; Polet, J.

    2006-12-01

    The recent tsunami disaster caused by the 2004 Sumatra-Andaman earthquake has focused our attention to the hazard posed by large earthquakes that occur under water, in particular subduction zone earthquakes, and the tsunamis that they generate. Even though these kinds of events are rare, the very large loss of life and material destruction caused by this earthquake warrant a significant effort towards the mitigation of the tsunami hazard. For ground motion hazard, Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) has become a standard practice in the evaluation and mitigation of seismic hazard to populations in particular with respect to structures, infrastructure and lifelines. Its ability to condense the complexities and variability of seismic activity into a manageable set of parameters greatly facilitates the design of effective seismic resistant buildings but also the planning of infrastructure projects. Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis (PTHA) achieves the same goal for hazards posed by tsunami. There are great advantages of implementing such a method to evaluate the total risk (seismic and tsunami) to coastal communities. The method that we have developed is based on the traditional PSHA and therefore completely consistent with standard seismic practice. Because of the strong dependence of tsunami wave heights on bathymetry, we use a full waveform tsunami waveform computation in lieu of attenuation relations that are common in PSHA. By pre-computing and storing the tsunami waveforms at points along the coast generated for sets of subfaults that comprise larger earthquake faults, we can efficiently synthesize tsunami waveforms for any slip distribution on those faults by summing the individual subfault tsunami waveforms (weighted by their slip). This efficiency make it feasible to use Green's function summation in lieu of attenuation relations to provide very accurate estimates of tsunami height for probabilistic calculations, where one typically computes

  16. Job safety and awareness analysis of safety implementation among electrical workers in airport service company

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Putra Perdana Suteja

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Electrical is a fundamental process in the company that has high risk and responsibility especially in public service company such as an airport. Hence, the company that operates activities in the airport has to identify and control the safety activities of workers. On the safety implementation, the lack of workers’ awareness is fundamental aspects to the safety failure. Therefore, this study aimed to analyse the safety awareness and identify risk in the electrical workplace. Safety awareness questionnaires are distributed to ten workers in order to analyse their awareness. Job safety analysis method used to identify the risk in the electrical workplace. The preliminary study stated that workers were not aware of personal protective equipment usage so that the awareness and behavioural need to be analysed. The result is the hazard was found such as electrical shock and noise for various intensity in the workplace. While electrical workers were aware of safety implementation but less of safety behaviour. Furthermore, the recommendation can be implemented are the implementation of behaviour-based safety (BBS, 5S implementation and accident report list.

  17. Standard Compliant Hazard and Threat Analysis for the Automotive Domain

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kristian Beckers

    2016-06-01

    Full Text Available The automotive industry has successfully collaborated to release the ISO 26262 standard for developing safe software for cars. The standard describes in detail how to conduct hazard analysis and risk assessments to determine the necessary safety measures for each feature. However, the standard does not concern threat analysis for malicious attackers or how to select appropriate security countermeasures. We propose the application of ISO 27001 for this purpose and show how it can be applied together with ISO 26262. We show how ISO 26262 documentation can be re-used and enhanced to satisfy the analysis and documentation demands of the ISO 27001 standard. We illustrate our approach based on an electronic steering column lock system.

  18. 324 Building fire hazards analysis implementation plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BARILO, N.F.

    1999-01-01

    In March 1998, the 324 Building Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) (Reference 1) was approved by the U S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) for implementation by B and W Hanford Company (BWHC). The purpose of the FHA was to identify gaps in compliance with DOE Order 5480.7A (Reference 2) and Richland Operations Office Implementation Directive (RLID) 5480.7 (Reference 3), especially in regard to loss limitation. The FHA identified compliance gaps in six areas and provided 20 recommendations to bring the 324 Building into compliance with DOE Order 5480 7A. Additionally, one observation was provided. A status is provided for each recommendation in this document. The actions for recommendations associated with the safety related part of the 324 Building and operation of the cells and support areas were evaluated using the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process BWHC will use this Implementation Plan to bring the 324 Building and its operation into compliance with DOE Order 5480 7A and RLID 5480.7

  19. IMPLEMENTING CHANGES TO AN APPROVED AND IN-USE DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KING JP

    2008-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) has refined a process to ensure a comprehensive and complete DSA/TSR change implementation. Successful Nuclear Facility Safety Basis implementation is essential to avoid creating a Potential Inadequacy in Safety Analysis (PISA) situation, or implementing a facility into a non-compliance that can result in a TSR violation. Once past initial implementation, additional changes to Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) are often needed due to needed requirement clarifications, operating experience indicating that Conditions/Required Actions/Surveillance Requirements could be improved, changes in facility conditions, or changes in facility mission etc. An effective change implementation process is essential to ensuring compliance with 10 CFR 830.202(a), 'The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1,2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility must establish and maintain the safety basis for the facility'

  20. Nuclear power plant's safety and risk (requirements of safety and reliability)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1977-01-01

    Starting out from the given safety objectives as they have evolved during the past few years and from the present legal and regulatory provisions for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, the hazards involved in regular operation, accidents and emergency situations are discussed. In compliance with the positive safety balance of nuclear power plants in the FRG, special attention is focused on the preventive safety analysis within the frame of the nuclear licensing procedure. Reference is made to the beginnings of a comprehensive hazard concept for an unbiased plant assessment. Emergency situations are discussed from the point of view of general hazard comparisons. (orig.) [de

  1. Safety balance: Analysis of safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delage, M.; Giroux, C.

    1990-12-01

    Safety analysis, and particularly analysis of exploitation of NPPs is constantly affected by EDF and by the safety authorities and their methodologies. Periodic safety reports ensure that important issues are not missed on daily basis, that incidents are identified and that relevant actions are undertaken. French safety analysis method consists of three principal steps. First type of safety balance is analyzed at the normal start-up phase for each unit including the final safety report. This enables analysis of behaviour of units ten years after their licensing. Second type is periodic operational safety analysis performed during a few years. Finally, the third step consists of safety analysis of the oldest units with the aim to improve the safety standards. The three steps of safety analysis are described in this presentation in detail with the aim to present the objectives and principles. Examples of most recent exercises are included in order to illustrate the importance of such analyses

  2. The role of quantitative uncertainty in the safety analysis of flammable gas accidents in Hanford waste tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bratzel, D.R.

    1998-01-01

    Following a 1990 investigation into flammable gas generation, retention, and release mechanisms within the Hanford Site high-level waste tanks, personnel concluded that the existing Authorization Basis documentation did not adequately evaluate flammable gas hazards. The US Department of Energy Headquarters subsequently declared the flammable gas hazard as an unresolved safety issue. Although work scope has been focused on resolution of the issue, it has yet to be resolved due to considerable uncertainty regarding essential technical parameters and associated risk. Resolution of the Flammable Gas Safety Issue will include the identification of a set of controls for the Authorization Basis for the tanks which will require a safety analysis of flammable gas accidents. A traditional nuclear facility safety analysis is based primarily on the analysis of a set of bounding accidents to represent the risks of the possible accidents and hazardous conditions at a facility. While this approach may provide some indication of the bounding consequences of accidents for facilities, it does not provide a satisfactory basis for identification of facility risk or safety controls when there is considerable uncertainty associated with accident phenomena and/or data as is the case with potential flammable gas accidents at the Hanford Site. This is due to the difficulties in identifying the bounding case and reaching consensus among safety analysts, facility operations and engineering, and the regulator on the implications of the safety analysis results. In addition, the bounding cases are frequently based on simplifying assumptions that make the analysis results insensitive to variations among facilities or the impact of alternative safety control strategies. The existing safety analysis of flammable gas accidents for the Tank Waste Remediation system (TWRS) at the Hanford Site has these difficulties. However, Hanford Site personnel are developing a refined safety analysis approach

  3. Risk prediction, safety analysis and quantitative probability methods - a caveat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Critchley, O.H.

    1976-01-01

    Views are expressed on the use of quantitative techniques for the determination of value judgements in nuclear safety assessments, hazard evaluation, and risk prediction. Caution is urged when attempts are made to quantify value judgements in the field of nuclear safety. Criteria are given the meaningful application of reliability methods but doubts are expressed about their application to safety analysis, risk prediction and design guidances for experimental or prototype plant. Doubts are also expressed about some concomitant methods of population dose evaluation. The complexities of new designs of nuclear power plants make the problem of safety assessment more difficult but some possible approaches are suggested as alternatives to the quantitative techniques criticized. (U.K.)

  4. Safety assessment in plant layout design using indexing approach: implementing inherent safety perspective. Part 2-Domino Hazard Index and case study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tugnoli, Alessandro; Khan, Faisal; Amyotte, Paul; Cozzani, Valerio

    2008-12-15

    The design of layout plans requires adequate assessment tools for the quantification of safety performance. The general focus of the present work is to introduce an inherent safety perspective at different points of the layout design process. In particular, index approaches for safety assessment and decision-making in the early stages of layout design are developed and discussed in this two-part contribution. Part 1 (accompanying paper) of the current work presents an integrated index approach for safety assessment of early plant layout. In the present paper (Part 2), an index for evaluation of the hazard related to the potential of domino effects is developed. The index considers the actual consequences of possible escalation scenarios and scores or ranks the subsequent accident propagation potential. The effects of inherent and passive protection measures are also assessed. The result is a rapid quantification of domino hazard potential that can provide substantial support for choices in the early stages of layout design. Additionally, a case study concerning selection among various layout options is presented and analyzed. The case study demonstrates the use and applicability of the indices developed in both parts of the current work and highlights the value of introducing inherent safety features early in layout design.

  5. Assessing Landslide Hazard Using Artificial Neural Network

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Farrokhzad, Farzad; Choobbasti, Asskar Janalizadeh; Barari, Amin

    2011-01-01

    failure" which is main concentration of the current research and "liquefaction failure". Shear failures along shear planes occur when the shear stress along the sliding surfaces exceed the effective shear strength. These slides have been referred to as landslide. An expert system based on artificial...... and factor of safety. It can be stated that the trained neural networks are capable of predicting the stability of slopes and safety factor of landslide hazard in study area with an acceptable level of confidence. Landslide hazard analysis and mapping can provide useful information for catastrophic loss...... reduction, and assist in the development of guidelines for sustainable land use planning. The analysis is used to identify the factors that are related to landslides and to predict the landslide hazard in the future based on such a relationship....

  6. Study on the experimental VHTR safety with analysis for a hypothetical rapid depressurization accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mitake, S.; Suzuki, K.; Ohno, T.; Okada, T.

    1982-01-01

    A hypothetical rapid depressurization accident of the experimental VHTR has been analyzed, including all phenomena in the accident, from its initiating depressurization of the coolant to consequential radiological hazard. Based on reliability analysis of the engineered safety features, all possible sequences, in which the safety systems are in success or in failure, have been investigated with event tree analysis. The result shows the inherent safety characteristics of the reactor and the effectiveness of the engineered safety features. And through the analysis, it has been indicated that further investigations on some phenomena in the accident, e.g., air ingress by natural circulation flow and fission product transport in the plant, will bring forth more reasonable and sufficient safety of the reactor

  7. SHEAT: a computer code for probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, user's manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ebisawa, Katsumi; Kondo, Masaaki; Abe, Kiyoharu; Tanaka, Toshiaki; Takani, Michio.

    1994-08-01

    The SHEAT code developed at Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute is for probabilistic seismic hazard analysis which is one of the tasks needed for seismic Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of a nuclear power plant. Seismic hazard is defined as an annual exceedance frequency of occurrence of earthquake ground motions at various levels of intensity at a given site. With the SHEAT code, seismic hazard is calculated by the following two steps: (1) Modeling of earthquake generation around a site. Future earthquake generation (locations, magnitudes and frequencies of postulated earthquakes) is modelled based on the historical earthquake records, active fault data and expert judgement. (2) Calculation of probabilistic seismic hazard at the site. An earthquake ground motion is calculated for each postulated earthquake using an attenuation model taking into account its standard deviation. Then the seismic hazard at the site is calculated by summing the frequencies of ground motions by all the earthquakes. This document is the user's manual of the SHEAT code. It includes: (1) Outlines of the code, which include overall concept, logical process, code structure, data file used and special characteristics of the code, (2) Functions of subprograms and analytical models in them, (3) Guidance of input and output data, and (4) Sample run results. The code has widely been used at JAERI to analyze seismic hazard at various nuclear power plant sites in japan. (author)

  8. Determinants of Knowledge and Safety Practices of Occupational Hazards of Textile Dye Workers in Sokoto, Nigeria: A Descriptive Analytic Study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Okafoagu, Nneka Christina; Oche, Mansur; Awosan, Kehinde Joseph; Abdulmulmuni, Hashim Bala; Gana, Godwin Jiya; Ango, Jessica Timane; Raji, Ismail

    2017-06-23

    Textile dye workers are subject to occupational hazards on a daily basis due to exposure to precarious conditions in the workplace. This study aimed to assess the knowledge, attitude and safety practices and its determinants among textile dye workers in Sokoto metropolis, Nigeria. This is a descriptive cross-sectional study conducted among 200 textile dye workers and the respondents were selected by multi stage sampling technique. Data was collected using an interviewer administered questionnaire. Data was processed using SPSS IBM version 20 and analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Majority of the respondents (74.0%) had good knowledge of workplace hazards; (81.0%) had positive attitude and only 20% observed all the safety practices. Formal education (P=0.047); working less than 5 days a week (P=0.001) and permanent employment (P=0.013) were found to be determinants of respondents' knowledge and attitude towards workplace hazards. Although the respondents had good knowledge and positive attitude, their lack of observance of safety practices brings to fore the need for direct safety instruction and training and retraining of textile dye workers on workplace hazards and safety practices.

  9. Fire safety engineering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.N.

    1989-01-01

    The periodic occurrence of large-scale, potentially disastrous industrial accidents involving fire in hazardous environments such as oilwell blowouts, petrochemical explosions and nuclear installations highlights the need for an integrated approach to fire safety engineering. Risk reduction 'by design' and rapid response are of equal importance in the saving of life and property in such situations. This volume of papers covers the subject thoroughly, touching on such topics as hazard analysis, safety design and testing, fire detection and control, and includes studies of fire hazard in the context of environment protection. (author)

  10. [Design of a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) plan to assure the safety of a bologna product produced by a meat processing plant].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bou Rached, Lizet; Ascanio, Norelis; Hernández, Pilar

    2004-03-01

    The Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) is a systematic integral program used to identify and estimate the hazards (microbiological, chemical and physical) and the risks generated during the primary production, processing, storage, distribution, expense and consumption of foods. To establish a program of HACCP has advantages, being some of them: to emphasize more in the prevention than in the detection, to diminish the costs, to minimize the risk of manufacturing faulty products, to allow bigger trust to the management, to strengthen the national and international competitiveness, among others. The present work is a proposal based on the design of an HACCP program to guarantee the safety of the Bologna Special Type elaborated by a meat products industry, through the determination of hazards (microbiological, chemical or physical), the identification of critical control points (CCP), the establishment of critical limits, plan corrective actions and the establishment of documentation and verification procedures. The used methodology was based in the application of the seven basic principles settled down by the Codex Alimentarius, obtaining the design of this program. In view of the fact that recently the meat products are linked with pathogens like E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes, these were contemplated as microbiological hazard for the establishment of the HACCP plan whose application will guarantee the obtaining of a safe product.

  11. Natural phenomena risk analysis - an approach for the tritium facilities 5480.23 SAR natural phenomena hazards accident analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.; Joshi, J.R.; Long, T.A.; Taylor, R.P.

    1997-01-01

    A Tritium Facilities (TF) Safety Analysis Report (SAR) has been developed which is compliant with DOE Order 5480.23. The 5480.23 SAR upgrades and integrates the safety documentation for the TF into a single SAR for all of the tritium processing buildings. As part of the TF SAR effort, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) were analyzed. A cost effective strategy was developed using a team approach to take advantage of limited resources and budgets. During development of the Hazard and Accident Analysis for the 5480.23 SAR, a strategy was required to allow maximum use of existing analysis and to develop a cost effective graded approach for any new analysis in identifying and analyzing the bounding accidents for the TF. This approach was used to effectively identify and analyze NPH for the TF. The first part of the strategy consisted of evaluating the current SAR for the RTF to determine what NPH analysis could be used in the new combined 5480.23 SAR. The second part was to develop a method for identifying and analyzing NPH events for the older facilities which took advantage of engineering judgment, was cost effective, and followed a graded approach. The second part was especially challenging because of the lack of documented existing analysis considered adequate for the 5480.23 SAR and a limited budget for SAR development and preparation. This paper addresses the strategy for the older facilities

  12. Towards a decision support system for control of multiple food safety hazards in raw milk production

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Spiegel, van der M.; Sterrenburg, P.; Haasnoot, W.; Fels-Klerx, van der H.J.

    2013-01-01

    Decision support systems (DSS) for controlling multiple food safety hazards in raw milk production have not yet been developed, but the underlying components are fragmentarily available. This article presents the state-of-the-art of essential DSS elements for judging food safety compliance of raw

  13. The software safety analysis based on SFTA for reactor power regulating system in nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Zhaohui; Yang Xiaohua; Liao Longtao; Wu Zhiqiang

    2015-01-01

    The digitalized Instrumentation and Control (I and C) system of Nuclear power plants can provide many advantages. However, digital control systems induce new failure modes that differ from those of analog control systems. While the cost effectiveness and flexibility of software is widely recognized, it is very difficult to achieve and prove high levels of dependability and safety assurance for the functions performed by process control software, due to the very flexibility and potential complexity of the software itself. Software safety analysis (SSA) was one way to improve the software safety by identify the system hazards caused by software failure. This paper describes the application of a software fault tree analysis (SFTA) at the software design phase. At first, we evaluate all the software modules of the reactor power regulating system in nuclear power plant and identify various hazards. The SFTA was applied to some critical modules selected from the previous step. At last, we get some new hazards that had not been identified in the prior processes of the document evaluation which were helpful for our design. (author)

  14. Fire Hazard Analysis for the Cold Vacuum Drying facility (CVD) Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    SINGH, G.

    2000-09-06

    The CVDF is a nonreactor nuclear facility that will process the Spent Nuclear Fuels (SNF) presently stored in the 105-KE and 105-KW SNF storage basins. Multi-canister overpacks (MCOs) will be loaded (filled) with K Basin fuel transported to the CVDF. The MCOs will be processed at the CVDF to remove free water from the fuel cells (packages). Following processing at the CVDF, the MCOs will be transported to the CSB for interim storage until a long-term storage solution can be implemented. This operation is expected to start in November 2000. A Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) is required for all new facilities and all nonreactor nuclear facilities, in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.7A, Fire Protection. This FHA has been prepared in accordance with DOE 5480.7A and HNF-PRO-350, Fire Hazard Analysis Requirements. Additionally, requirements or criteria contained in DOE, Richland Operations Office (RL) RL Implementing Directive (RLID) 5480.7, Fire Protection, or other DOE documentation are cited, as applicable. This FHA comprehensively assesses the risk of fire at the CVDF to ascertain whether the specific objectives of DOE 5480.7A are met. These specific fire protection objectives are: (1) Minimize the potential for the occurrence of a fire. (2) Ensure that fire does not cause an onsite or offsite release of radiological and other hazardous material that will threaten the public health and safety or the environment. (3) Establish requirements that will provide an acceptable degree of life safety to DOE and contractor personnel and ensure that there are no undue hazards to the public from fire and its effects in DOE facilities. (4) Ensure that vital DOE programs will not suffer unacceptable delays as a result of fire and related perils. (5) Ensure that property damage from fire and related perils does not exceed an acceptable level. (6) Ensure that process control and safety systems are not damaged by fire or related perils. This FHA is based on the

  15. Fire Hazard Analysis for the Cold Vacuum Drying facility (CVD) Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SINGH, G.

    2000-01-01

    The CVDF is a nonreactor nuclear facility that will process the Spent Nuclear Fuels (SNF) presently stored in the 105-KE and 105-KW SNF storage basins. Multi-canister overpacks (MCOs) will be loaded (filled) with K Basin fuel transported to the CVDF. The MCOs will be processed at the CVDF to remove free water from the fuel cells (packages). Following processing at the CVDF, the MCOs will be transported to the CSB for interim storage until a long-term storage solution can be implemented. This operation is expected to start in November 2000. A Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) is required for all new facilities and all nonreactor nuclear facilities, in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.7A, Fire Protection. This FHA has been prepared in accordance with DOE 5480.7A and HNF-PRO-350, Fire Hazard Analysis Requirements. Additionally, requirements or criteria contained in DOE, Richland Operations Office (RL) RL Implementing Directive (RLID) 5480.7, Fire Protection, or other DOE documentation are cited, as applicable. This FHA comprehensively assesses the risk of fire at the CVDF to ascertain whether the specific objectives of DOE 5480.7A are met. These specific fire protection objectives are: (1) Minimize the potential for the occurrence of a fire. (2) Ensure that fire does not cause an onsite or offsite release of radiological and other hazardous material that will threaten the public health and safety or the environment. (3) Establish requirements that will provide an acceptable degree of life safety to DOE and contractor personnel and ensure that there are no undue hazards to the public from fire and its effects in DOE facilities. (4) Ensure that vital DOE programs will not suffer unacceptable delays as a result of fire and related perils. (5) Ensure that property damage from fire and related perils does not exceed an acceptable level. (6) Ensure that process control and safety systems are not damaged by fire or related perils. This FHA is based on the

  16. Safety margins in deterministic safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Viktorov, A.

    2011-01-01

    The concept of safety margins has acquired certain prominence in the attempts to demonstrate quantitatively the level of the nuclear power plant safety by means of deterministic analysis, especially when considering impacts from plant ageing and discovery issues. A number of international or industry publications exist that discuss various applications and interpretations of safety margins. The objective of this presentation is to bring together and examine in some detail, from the regulatory point of view, the safety margins that relate to deterministic safety analysis. In this paper, definitions of various safety margins are presented and discussed along with the regulatory expectations for them. Interrelationships of analysis input and output parameters with corresponding limits are explored. It is shown that the overall safety margin is composed of several components each having different origins and potential uses; in particular, margins associated with analysis output parameters are contrasted with margins linked to the analysis input. While these are separate, it is possible to influence output margins through the analysis input, and analysis method. Preserving safety margins is tantamount to maintaining safety. At the same time, efficiency of operation requires optimization of safety margins taking into account various technical and regulatory considerations. For this, basic definitions and rules for safety margins must be first established. (author)

  17. Informing Workers of Chemical Hazards: The OSHA Hazard Communication Standard.

    Science.gov (United States)

    American Chemical Society, Washington, DC.

    Practical information on how to implement a chemical-related safety program is outlined in this publication. Highlights of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administrations (OSHA) Hazard Communication Standard are presented and explained. These include: (1) hazard communication requirements (consisting of warning labels, material safety…

  18. Seismic fragility analysis of a nuclear building based on probabilistic seismic hazard assessment and soil-structure interaction analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gonzalez, R.; Ni, S.; Chen, R.; Han, X.M. [CANDU Energy Inc, Mississauga, Ontario (Canada); Mullin, D. [New Brunswick Power, Point Lepreau, New Brunswick (Canada)

    2016-09-15

    Seismic fragility analyses are conducted as part of seismic probabilistic safety assessment (SPSA) for nuclear facilities. Probabilistic seismic hazard assessment (PSHA) has been undertaken for a nuclear power plant in eastern Canada. Uniform Hazard Spectra (UHS), obtained from the PSHA, is characterized by high frequency content which differs from the original plant design basis earthquake spectral shape. Seismic fragility calculations for the service building of a CANDU 6 nuclear power plant suggests that the high frequency effects of the UHS can be mitigated through site response analysis with site specific geological conditions and state-of-the-art soil-structure interaction analysis. In this paper, it is shown that by performing a detailed seismic analysis using the latest technology, the conservatism embedded in the original seismic design can be quantified and the seismic capacity of the building in terms of High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) can be improved. (author)

  19. European protection principles against external hazards by means of Emergency Power Supply and Control Safety System Building in Nuclear Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallinat, Dipl Ing [Max Aicher Engineering GmbH, Freilassing (Germany)

    2016-10-15

    One of the most important nuclear power plant safety requirements is a redundant and independent power system. This requires such a design of emergency power systems that failure of one will not adversely impact the other. External hazards of natural origin or linked to human activity could potentially affect plant safety. The general objective of the design provisions is to ensure that the safety functions of the systems and components required to return the plant to a safe shutdown state and to prevent and limit radioactive release are not adversely affected. As external hazards are site dependent, Technical Guidelines specify that 'it is not necessary to take all of the hazards in a standardized design; such external hazards as external flooding, drought, ice formation and toxic, corrosive or combustible gases may be dealt with only for a specific plant, on a plant specific basis'. In accordance with the Technical Guidelines, external hazards are taken into consideration at the design stage consistently with internal events or hazards. The basic design principle is to protect against external hazards in accordance with the Technical Guidelines using a 'load case' procedure.

  20. Identification of training and emergency-planning needs through job-safety analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Veltrie, J.

    1987-01-01

    Training and emergency-planning needs within the photovoltaic industry may be more accurately determined through the performance of detailed job-safety analysis. This paper outlines the four major components of such an analysis, namely operational review, hazards evaluation, personnel review and resources evaluation. It then shows how these may be developed into coherent training and planning recommendations, for both emergency and non-emergency situations.

  1. A situational analysis of priority disaster hazards in Uganda: findings from a hazard and vulnerability analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mayega, R W; Wafula, M R; Musenero, M; Omale, A; Kiguli, J; Orach, G C; Kabagambe, G; Bazeyo, W

    2013-06-01

    Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa have not conducted a disaster risk analysis. Hazards and vulnerability analyses provide vital information that can be used for development of risk reduction and disaster response plans. The purpose of this study was to rank disaster hazards for Uganda, as a basis for identifying the priority hazards to guide disaster management planning. The study as conducted in Uganda, as part of a multi-country assessment. A hazard, vulnerability and capacity analysis was conducted in a focus group discussion of 7 experts representing key stakeholder agencies in disaster management in Uganda. A simple ranking method was used to rank the probability of occurance of 11 top hazards, their potential impact and the level vulnerability of people and infrastructure. In-terms of likelihood of occurance and potential impact, the top ranked disaster hazards in Uganda are: 1) Epidemics of infectious diseases, 2) Drought/famine, 3) Conflict and environmental degradation in that order. In terms of vulnerability, the top priority hazards to which people and infrastructure were vulnerable were: 1) Conflicts, 2) Epidemics, 3) Drought/famine and, 4) Environmental degradation in that order. Poverty, gender, lack of information, and lack of resilience measures were some of the factors promoting vulnerability to disasters. As Uganda develops a disaster risk reduction and response plan, it ought to prioritize epidemics of infectious diseases, drought/famine, conflics and environmental degradation as the priority disaster hazards.

  2. Proposal for the improvement of IRD safety culture based on risk analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aguiar, L.A.; Ferreira, P.R.R.; Silveira, C.S.

    2017-01-01

    The Safety Culture (SC) is a concept about the relationship of individuals and organizations towards the safety in a specific activity. Any organization that carries out activities with risks has a SC, even at minimum levels. People perceive different types of radiation risks in very different ways, therefore, to identify and to analysis of the possible radiation risks resulting from normal operation or accident conditions is an important issue in order to improve the SC in organization. The main is to present guidelines for the improvement of the safety culture in the Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry - IRD through on risk-based approach. The methodology proposed here is: A) select a division of the IRD for case study; B) assess the level of the 10 culture safety basic elements of the IRD division selected; C) conduct a survey of the hazards and risks associated with the various activities developed by the division; D) reassess the level of the 10 basic elements of CS; And E) analyze the results and correlate the impact of risk knowledge on safety culture improvement. The expected result is improvement the safety and of safety culture by understanding of radiation risks and hazards relating to work and to the working environment; and thus enforce a collective commitment to safety by teams and individuals and raise the safety culture to higher levels. (author)

  3. Proposal for the improvement of IRD safety culture based on risk analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Aguiar, L.A.; Ferreira, P.R.R. [Instituto de Radioproteção e Dosimetria (DIRAD/IRD/CNEN-RJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil); Silveira, C.S., E-mail: laguiar@ird.gov.br [Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear (DRS/CGMI/CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2017-07-01

    The Safety Culture (SC) is a concept about the relationship of individuals and organizations towards the safety in a specific activity. Any organization that carries out activities with risks has a SC, even at minimum levels. People perceive different types of radiation risks in very different ways, therefore, to identify and to analysis of the possible radiation risks resulting from normal operation or accident conditions is an important issue in order to improve the SC in organization. The main is to present guidelines for the improvement of the safety culture in the Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry - IRD through on risk-based approach. The methodology proposed here is: A) select a division of the IRD for case study; B) assess the level of the 10 culture safety basic elements of the IRD division selected; C) conduct a survey of the hazards and risks associated with the various activities developed by the division; D) reassess the level of the 10 basic elements of CS; And E) analyze the results and correlate the impact of risk knowledge on safety culture improvement. The expected result is improvement the safety and of safety culture by understanding of radiation risks and hazards relating to work and to the working environment; and thus enforce a collective commitment to safety by teams and individuals and raise the safety culture to higher levels. (author)

  4. Reliability analysis of common hazardous waste treatment processes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waters, R.D.

    1993-05-01

    Five hazardous waste treatment processes are analyzed probabilistically using Monte Carlo simulation to elucidate the relationships between process safety factors and reliability levels. The treatment processes evaluated are packed tower aeration, reverse osmosis, activated sludge, upflow anaerobic sludge blanket, and activated carbon adsorption

  5. Reliability analysis of common hazardous waste treatment processes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Waters, Robert D. [Vanderbilt Univ., Nashville, TN (United States)

    1993-05-01

    Five hazardous waste treatment processes are analyzed probabilistically using Monte Carlo simulation to elucidate the relationships between process safety factors and reliability levels. The treatment processes evaluated are packed tower aeration, reverse osmosis, activated sludge, upflow anaerobic sludge blanket, and activated carbon adsorption.

  6. A RULE-BASED SYSTEM APPROACH FOR SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN HAZARDOUS WORK SYSTEMS

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ercüment N. DİZDAR

    1998-03-01

    Full Text Available Developments in technology increased the importance of safety management in work life. These improvements also resulted in a requirement of more investment and assignment on human in work systems. Here we face this problem: Can we make it possible to forecast the possible accidents that workers can face, and prevent these accidents by taking necessary precautions? In this study made, we aimed at developing an rule-based system to forecast the occupational accidents in coming periods at the departments of the facilities in hazardous work systems. The validity of the developed system was proved by implementing it into practice in hazardous work systems in manufacturing industry.

  7. Safety analysis fundamentals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wright, A.C.D.

    2002-01-01

    This paper discusses the safety analysis fundamentals in reactor design. This study includes safety analysis done to show consequences of postulated accidents are acceptable. Safety analysis is also used to set design of special safety systems and includes design assist analysis to support conceptual design. safety analysis is necessary for licensing a reactor, to maintain an operating license, support changes in plant operations

  8. Software safety analysis on the model specified by NuSCR and SMV input language at requirements phase of software development life cycle using SMV

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koh, Kwang Yong; Seong, Poong Hyun

    2005-01-01

    Safety-critical software process is composed of development process, verification and validation (V and V) process and safety analysis process. Safety analysis process has been often treated as an additional process and not found in a conventional software process. But software safety analysis (SSA) is required if software is applied to a safety system, and the SSA shall be performed independently for the safety software through software development life cycle (SDLC). Of all the phases in software development, requirements engineering is generally considered to play the most critical role in determining the overall software quality. NASA data demonstrate that nearly 75% of failures found in operational software were caused by errors in the requirements. The verification process in requirements phase checks the correctness of software requirements specification, and the safety analysis process analyzes the safety-related properties in detail. In this paper, the method for safety analysis at requirements phase of software development life cycle using symbolic model verifier (SMV) is proposed. Hazard is discovered by hazard analysis and in other to use SMV for the safety analysis, the safety-related properties are expressed by computation tree logic (CTL)

  9. Charged-particle beam: a safety mandate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Young, K.C.

    1983-01-01

    The Advanced Test Accelerator (ATA) is a recent development in the field of charged particle beam research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. With this experimental apparatus, researchers will characterize intense pulses of electron beams propagated through air. Inherent with the ATA concept was the potential for exposure to hazards, such as high radiation levels and hostile breathing atmospheres. The need for a comprehensive safety program was mandated; a formal system safety program was implemented during the project's conceptual phase. A project staff position was created for a safety analyst who would act as a liaison between the project staff and the safety department. Additionally, the safety analyst would be responsible for compiling various hazards analyses reports, which formed the basis of th project's Safety Analysis Report. Recommendations for safety features from the hazards analysis reports were incorporated as necessary at appropriate phases in project development rather than adding features afterwards. The safety program established for the ATA project faciliated in controlling losses and in achieving a low-level of acceptable risk

  10. Safety Culture: Lessons Learned from the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigations Board

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Griffon, M.

    2016-01-01

    The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) investigation of the 2005 BP Texas City Refinery disaster as well as the Baker Panel Report have set the stage for the consideration of human and organizational factors and safety culture as contributing causes of major accidents in the oil and gas industry. The investigation of the BP Texas City tragedy in many ways started a shift in the way the oil and chemical industry sectors looked at process safety and the importance of human and organizational factors in improving safety. Since the BP Texas City incident the CSB has investigated several incidents, including the 2010 Macondo disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, where organizational factors and safety culture, once again, were contributing causes of the incidents. In the Texas City incident the CSB found that “while most attention was focused on the injury rate, the overall safety culture and process safety management (PSM) program had serious deficiencies.” The CSB concluded that “safety campaigns, goals, and rewards focused on improving personal safety metrics and worker behaviors rather than on process safety and management safety systems.” The Baker panel, established as a result of a CSB recommendation, did a more extensive review of BPs safety culture. The Baker panel found that ‘while BP has aspirational goals of “no accidents, no harm to people” BP has not provided effective leadership in making certain it’s management and US refining workforce understand what is expected of them regarding process safety performance.’ This may have been in part due to a misinterpretation of positive trends in personal injury rates as an indicator of effective process safety. The panel also found that “at some of its US refineries BP has not established a positive, trusting and open environment with effective lines of communication between management and the workforce, including employee representatives.” In 2010 when the CSB began to

  11. Software system safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    Uber, James G.

    1988-01-01

    Software itself is not hazardous, but since software and hardware share common interfaces there is an opportunity for software to create hazards. Further, these software systems are complex, and proven methods for the design, analysis, and measurement of software safety are not yet available. Some past software failures, future NASA software trends, software engineering methods, and tools and techniques for various software safety analyses are reviewed. Recommendations to NASA are made based on this review.

  12. Transportation Safety Excellence in Operations Through Improved Transportation Safety Document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dr. Michael A. Lehto; MAL

    2007-01-01

    A recent accomplishment of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Nuclear Safety analysis group was to obtain DOE-ID approval for the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantity radioactive/fissionable waste in Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A drums at MFC. This accomplishment supported excellence in operations through safety analysis by better integrating nuclear safety requirements with waste requirements in the Transportation Safety Document (TSD); reducing container and transport costs; and making facility operations more efficient. The MFC TSD governs and controls the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials in non-DOT approved containers. Previously, the TSD did not include the capability to transfer payloads of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials using DOT Type A drums. Previous practice was to package the waste materials to less-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantities when loading DOT Type A drums for transfer out of facilities to reduce facility waste accumulations. This practice allowed operations to proceed, but resulted in drums being loaded to less than the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste acceptance criteria (WAC) waste limits, which was not cost effective or operations friendly. An improved and revised safety analysis was used to gain DOE-ID approval for adding this container configuration to the MFC TSD safety basis. In the process of obtaining approval of the revised safety basis, safety analysis practices were used effectively to directly support excellence in operations. Several factors contributed to the success of MFC's effort to obtain approval for the use of DOT Type A drums, including two practices that could help in future safety basis changes at other facilities. (1) The process of incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the TSD at MFC helped to better integrate nuclear safety

  13. 242-A evaporator safety analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CAMPBELL, T.A.

    1999-01-01

    This report provides a revised safety analysis for the upgraded 242-A Evaporator (the Evaporator). This safety analysis report (SAR) supports the operation of the Evaporator following life extension upgrades and other facility and operations upgrades (e.g., Project B-534) that were undertaken to enhance the capabilities of the Evaporator. The Evaporator has been classified as a moderate-hazard facility (Johnson 1990). The information contained in this SAR is based on information provided by 242-A Evaporator Operations, Westinghouse Hanford Company, site maintenance and operations contractor from June 1987 to October 1996, and the existing operating contractor, Waste Management Hanford (WMH) policies. Where appropriate, a discussion address the US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders applicable to a topic is provided. Operation of the facility will be compared to the operating contractor procedures using appropriate audits and appraisals. The following subsections provide introductory and background information, including a general description of the Evaporator facility and process, a description of the scope of this SAR revision,a nd a description of the basic changes made to the original SAR

  14. 242-A evaporator safety analysis report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CAMPBELL, T.A.

    1999-05-17

    This report provides a revised safety analysis for the upgraded 242-A Evaporator (the Evaporator). This safety analysis report (SAR) supports the operation of the Evaporator following life extension upgrades and other facility and operations upgrades (e.g., Project B-534) that were undertaken to enhance the capabilities of the Evaporator. The Evaporator has been classified as a moderate-hazard facility (Johnson 1990). The information contained in this SAR is based on information provided by 242-A Evaporator Operations, Westinghouse Hanford Company, site maintenance and operations contractor from June 1987 to October 1996, and the existing operating contractor, Waste Management Hanford (WMH) policies. Where appropriate, a discussion address the US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders applicable to a topic is provided. Operation of the facility will be compared to the operating contractor procedures using appropriate audits and appraisals. The following subsections provide introductory and background information, including a general description of the Evaporator facility and process, a description of the scope of this SAR revision,a nd a description of the basic changes made to the original SAR.

  15. Supplemental Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment - Hydrotreater

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lowry, Peter P. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Wagner, Katie A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2015-04-01

    A supplemental hazard analysis was conducted and quantitative risk assessment performed in response to an independent review comment received by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) from the U.S. Department of Energy Pacific Northwest Field Office (PNSO) against the Hydrotreater/Distillation Column Hazard Analysis Report issued in April 2013. The supplemental analysis used the hazardous conditions documented by the previous April 2013 report as a basis. The conditions were screened and grouped for the purpose of identifying whether additional prudent, practical hazard controls could be identified, using a quantitative risk evaluation to assess the adequacy of the controls and establish a lower level of concern for the likelihood of potential serious accidents. Calculations were performed to support conclusions where necessary.

  16. Truck shipment risks for assessing hazardous materials - a new paradigm incorporating safety and security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Greenberg, A.; McSweeney, T.; Allen, J.; Lepofsky, M. [Battelle Memorial Inst., Columbus, OH (United States); Abkowitz, M. [Dept. of Civil Engineering, Vanderbilt Univ., Nashville, TN (United States)

    2004-07-01

    Recent terrorist events, most notably September 11, 2001, have taught us that transportation risk management must be performed with a different lens to accommodate terrorism scenarios that would have previously been considered unlikely to warrant serious attention. Given these circumstances, a new paradigm is needed for managing the risks associated with highway transport of hazardous materials. In particular, this paradigm must: 1) more explicitly consider security threat and vulnerability, and 2) integrate security considerations into an overall framework for addressing natural and man-made disasters, be they accidental or planned. This paper summarizes the results of a study sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration for the purpose of exploring how a paradigm might evolve in which both safety and security risks can be evaluated as a systematic, integrated process. The work was directed at developing a methodology for assessing the impacts of hazardous materials safety and security incident consequences when transported by highway. This included consideration of the manner in which these materials could be involved in initiating events as well as potential outcomes under a variety of release conditions. The methodology is subsequently applied to various classes of hazardous materials to establish an economic profile of the impacts that might be expected if a major release were to occur. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings and implications associated with this effort.

  17. Truck shipment risks for assessing hazardous materials - a new paradigm incorporating safety and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greenberg, A.; McSweeney, T.; Allen, J.; Lepofsky, M.; Abkowitz, M.

    2004-01-01

    Recent terrorist events, most notably September 11, 2001, have taught us that transportation risk management must be performed with a different lens to accommodate terrorism scenarios that would have previously been considered unlikely to warrant serious attention. Given these circumstances, a new paradigm is needed for managing the risks associated with highway transport of hazardous materials. In particular, this paradigm must: 1) more explicitly consider security threat and vulnerability, and 2) integrate security considerations into an overall framework for addressing natural and man-made disasters, be they accidental or planned. This paper summarizes the results of a study sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration for the purpose of exploring how a paradigm might evolve in which both safety and security risks can be evaluated as a systematic, integrated process. The work was directed at developing a methodology for assessing the impacts of hazardous materials safety and security incident consequences when transported by highway. This included consideration of the manner in which these materials could be involved in initiating events as well as potential outcomes under a variety of release conditions. The methodology is subsequently applied to various classes of hazardous materials to establish an economic profile of the impacts that might be expected if a major release were to occur. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings and implications associated with this effort

  18. Application of hazard analysis critical control points (HACCP) to organic chemical contaminants in food.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ropkins, K; Beck, A J

    2002-03-01

    Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) is a systematic approach to the identification, assessment, and control of hazards that was developed as an effective alternative to conventional end-point analysis to control food safety. It has been described as the most effective means of controlling foodborne diseases, and its application to the control of microbiological hazards has been accepted internationally. By contrast, relatively little has been reported relating to the potential use of HACCP, or HACCP-like procedures, to control chemical contaminants of food. This article presents an overview of the implementation of HACCP and discusses its application to the control of organic chemical contaminants in the food chain. Although this is likely to result in many of the advantages previously identified for microbiological HACCP, that is, more effective, efficient, and economical hazard management, a number of areas are identified that require further research and development. These include: (1) a need to refine the methods of chemical contaminant identification and risk assessment employed, (2) develop more cost-effective monitoring and control methods for routine chemical contaminant surveillance of food, and (3) improve the effectiveness of process optimization for the control of chemical contaminants in food.

  19. A consideration of hazards, earthquakes, aircraft crashes, explosions and fires in the safety of laboratories and plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doumenc, A.; Faure, J.; Mohammadioun, B.; Jacquet, P.

    1987-03-01

    Although laboratories and plants differ from nuclear reactors both in their characteristics and sitings, safety measures developed for the hazards of earthquakes, aircraft crashes, explosions and fires are very similar. These measures provide a satisfactory level of safety for these installations [fr

  20. Pasteurised milk and implementation of HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    T.B Murdiati

    2004-10-01

    Full Text Available The purpose of pasteurisation is to destroy pathogen bacteria without affecting the taste, flavor, and nutritional value. A study on the implementation of HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point in producing pasteurized milk was carried out in four processing unit of pasteurised milk, one in Jakarta, two in Bandung and one in Bogor. The critical control points in the production line were identified. Milk samples were collected from the critical points and were analysed for the total number of microbes. Antibiotic residues were detected on raw milks. The study indicated that one unit in Bandung dan one unit in Jakarta produced pasteurized milk with lower number of microbes than the other units, due to better management and control applied along the chain of production. Penisilin residues was detected in raw milk used by unit in Bogor. Six critical points and the hazard might arise in those points were identified, as well as how to prevent the hazards. Quality assurance system such as HACCP would be able to produce high quality and safety of pasteurised milk, and should be implemented gradually.

  1. The implementation of a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point management system in a peanut butter ice cream plant

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yu-Ting Hung

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available To ensure the safety of the peanut butter ice cream manufacture, a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP plan has been designed and applied to the production process. Potential biological, chemical, and physical hazards in each manufacturing procedure were identified. Critical control points for the peanut butter ice cream were then determined as the pasteurization and freezing process. The establishment of a monitoring system, corrective actions, verification procedures, and documentation and record keeping were followed to complete the HACCP program. The results of this study indicate that implementing the HACCP system in food industries can effectively enhance food safety and quality while improving the production management.

  2. Management system of health and safety work (SMK3) with job safety analysis (JSA) in PT. Nira Murni construction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Melliana, Armen, Yusrizal, Akmal, Syarifah

    2017-11-01

    PT Nira Murni construction is a contractor of PT Chevron Pacific Indonesia which engaged in contractor, fabrication, maintenance construction suppliers, and labor services. The high of accident rate in this company is caused the lack of awareness of workplace safety. Therefore, it requires an effort to reduce the accident rate on the company so that the financial losses can be minimized. In this study, Safe T-Score method is used to analyze the accident rate by measuring the level of frequency. Analysis is continued using risk management methods which identify hazards, risk measurement and risk management. The last analysis uses Job safety analysis (JSA) which will identify the effect of accidents. From the result of this study can be concluded that Job Safety Analysis (JSA) methods has not been implemented properly. Therefore, JSA method needs to follow-up in the next study, so that can be well applied as prevention of occupational accidents.

  3. Preliminary Assessment for the Effects of the External Hazard Factors on the Safety of NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jin, So Beom; Hyun, Seung Gyu; Kim, Sang Yun; Lee, Sung Kyu; Hur, Youl

    2010-01-01

    The Ch.etsu Offshore Earthquake(2007.7.16) in Japan caused damage to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa(K-K) Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) with seismic ground motion that exceeded the design level. This incident drew the interest of the safety evaluation studies for NPPs subjected to earthquakes exceeding the design basis around the world. Also, the Indian Ocean Tsunami(2004.12.26) tripped the Madras NPP by reason of flooding of the intake pump house and inundated the construction site of a fast breeder reactor site in India. In addition, from the various man-made and natural hazards such as the oil spill accident near Mallipo, Taean, Chungnam (2007.12), the forest fire near the Ulchin NPP site, the several inflows of marine organism into the intake of the Ulchin NPP, it was confirmed that the safety of NPPs may be affected by natural and human induced disasters. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has been warned about global warming; the average temperature rose about 1.5 .deg. C during the 20th century and the damages caused by typhoons and heavy rains have also increased in Korea. Accordingly, a natural disaster prevention research team(hereafter team) ,which have been organized and operated since 2009, has assessed the impact of various hazards such as earthquakes and environmental changes due to global warming on the safety of NPP and has discussed to establish countermeasures. This paper introduces that the preliminary assessment for the effects of the external hazard factors on the safety of NPPs was conducted by the team

  4. Risk analysis for roadways subjected to multiple landslide-related hazards

    Science.gov (United States)

    Corominas, Jordi; Mavrouli, Olga

    2014-05-01

    Roadways through mountainous terrain often involve cuts and landslide areas whose stability is precarious and require protection and stabilization works. To optimize the allocation of resources, government and technical offices are increasingly interested in both the risk analysis and assessment. Risk analysis has to consider the hazard occurrence and the consequences. The consequences can be both direct and indirect. The former include the costs regarding the repair of the roadway, the damage of vehicles and the potential fatalities, while the latter refer to the costs related to the diversion of vehicles, the excess of distance travelled, the time differences, and tolls. The type of slope instabilities that may affect a roadway may vary and its effects as well. Most current approaches either consider a single hazardous phenomenon each time, or if applied at small (for example national) scale, they do not take into account local conditions at each section of the roadway. The objective of this work is the development of a simple and comprehensive methodology for the assessment of the risk due to multiple hazards along roadways, integrating different landslide types that include rockfalls, debris flows and considering as well the potential failure of retaining walls. To quantify risk, all hazards are expressed with a common term: their probability of occurrence. The methodology takes into consideration the specific local conditions along the roadway. For rockfalls and debris flow a variety of methods for assessing the probability of occurrence exists. To assess the annual probability of failure of retaining walls we use an indicator-based model that provides a hazard index. The model parameters consist in the design safety factor, and further anchorage design and construction parameters. The probability of failure is evaluated in function of the hazard index and next corrected (in terms of order of magnitude) according to in situ observations for increase of two

  5. Safety analysis and risk assessment handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peterson, V.L.; Colwell, R.G.; Dickey, R.L.

    1997-01-01

    This Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) provides guidance to the safety analyst at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) in the preparation of safety analyses and risk assessments. Although the older guidance (the Rocky Flats Risk Assessment Guide) continues to be used for updating the Final Safety Analysis Reports developed in the mid-1980s, this new guidance is used with all new authorization basis documents. With the mission change at RFETS came the need to establish new authorization basis documents for its facilities, whose functions had changed. The methodology and databases for performing the evaluations that support the new authorization basis documents had to be standardized, to avoid the use of different approaches and/or databases for similar accidents in different facilities. This handbook presents this new standardized approach. The handbook begins with a discussion of the requirements of the different types of authorization basis documents and how to choose the one appropriate for the facility to be evaluated. It then walks the analyst through the process of identifying all the potential hazards in the facility, classifying them, and choosing the ones that need to be analyzed further. It then discusses the methods for evaluating accident initiation and progression and covers the basic steps in a safety analysis, including consequence and frequency binning and risk ranking. The handbook lays out standardized approaches for determining the source terms of the various accidents (including airborne release fractions, leakpath factors, etc.), the atmospheric dispersion factors appropriate for Rocky Flats, and the methods for radiological and chemical consequence assessments. The radiological assessments use a radiological open-quotes templateclose quotes, a spreadsheet that incorporates the standard values of parameters, whereas the chemical assessments use the standard codes ARCHIE and ALOHA

  6. Fire hazards analysis for W-413, West Area Tank Farm Storage and Staging Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huckfeldt, R.A.; Lott, D.T.

    1994-01-01

    In accordance with DOE Order 5480.7A, a Fire Hazards Analysis must be performed for all new facilities. The purpose of the analysis is to comprehensively assess the risk from fire within individual fire areas in relation to proposed fire protection so as to ascertain whether the fire protection objectives of the Order are met. The Order acknowledges a graded approach commensurate with the hazards involved. Tank Farms Operations must sore/stage material and equipment such as pipes, fittings, conduit, instrumentation and others related items until work packages are ready to work. Consumable materials, such as nut, bolts and welding rod, are also requires to be stored for routine and emergency work. Connex boxes and open storage is currently used for much of the storage because of the limited space at and 272WA. Safety issues based on poor housekeeping and material deteriorating due to weather damage has resulted from this inadequate storage space. It has been determined that a storage building in close proximity to the Tank Farm work force would be cost effective. This facility is classified as a safety class 4 building

  7. STAMP model and its application prospect in DCS safety analysis of nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Xiaohua; Liu Jie; Liu Zhaohui; Liu Hua; Yu Tonglan

    2013-01-01

    The application of DCS (Digit Control System) is a certain trend for the development of nuclear power. DCS not only improves the control capability of nuclear power system, but also increases the complexity of the system. Traditional safety analysis techniques based on event-chain model are facing challenges. In order to improve the safety performance of nuclear power DCS, the latest research achievement in the field of safety engineering should be focused, studied and applied into nuclear power safety. This paper introduces a new safety analysis model named STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes) based on the system theory, analyzes its advantages and disadvantages compared with the traditional ones, and explains the basic steps of STPA (STAMP-Based Hazard Analysis) technology. Finally, according to the application status of STAMP at home and abroad, it prospects the development of STAMP in China's nuclear power safety. (authors)

  8. The role of risk assessment and safety analysis in integrated safety assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niall, R.; Hunt, M.; Wierman, T.E.

    1990-01-01

    To ensure that the design and operation of both nuclear and non- nuclear hazardous facilities is acceptable, and meets all societal safety expectations, a rigorous deterministic and probabilistic assessment is necessary. An approach is introduced, founded on the concept of an ''Integrated Safety Assessment.'' It merges the commonly performed safety and risk analyses and uses them in concert to provide decision makers with the necessary depth of understanding to achieve ''adequacy.'' 3 refs., 1 fig

  9. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Environmental Restoration Program (ERP), Baseline Safety Analysis File (BSAF). Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-06-20

    This document was prepared to take the place of a Safety Evaluation Report since the Baseline Safety Analysis File (BSAF)and associated Baseline Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) File do not meet the requirements of a complete safety analysis documentation. Its purpose is to present in summary form the background of how the BSAF and Baseline TSR originated and a description of the process by which it was produced and approved for use in the Environmental Restoration Program.The BSAF is a facility safety reference document for INEL environmental restoration activities including environmental remediation of inactive waste sites and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of surplus facilities. The BSAF contains safety bases common to environmental restoration activities and guidelines for performing and documenting safety analysis. The common safety bases can be incorporated by reference into the safety analysis documentation prepared for individual environmental restoration activities with justification and any necessary revisions. The safety analysis guidelines in BSAF provide an accepted method for hazard analysis; analysis of normal, abnormal, and accident conditions; human factors analysis; and derivation of TSRS. The BSAF safety bases and guidelines are graded for environmental restoration activities.

  10. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Environmental Restoration Program (ERP), Baseline Safety Analysis File (BSAF). Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This document was prepared to take the place of a Safety Evaluation Report since the Baseline Safety Analysis File (BSAF)and associated Baseline Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) File do not meet the requirements of a complete safety analysis documentation. Its purpose is to present in summary form the background of how the BSAF and Baseline TSR originated and a description of the process by which it was produced and approved for use in the Environmental Restoration Program.The BSAF is a facility safety reference document for INEL environmental restoration activities including environmental remediation of inactive waste sites and decontamination and decommissioning (D ampersand D) of surplus facilities. The BSAF contains safety bases common to environmental restoration activities and guidelines for performing and documenting safety analysis. The common safety bases can be incorporated by reference into the safety analysis documentation prepared for individual environmental restoration activities with justification and any necessary revisions. The safety analysis guidelines in BSAF provide an accepted method for hazard analysis; analysis of normal, abnormal, and accident conditions; human factors analysis; and derivation of TSRS. The BSAF safety bases and guidelines are graded for environmental restoration activities

  11. Hazard characterization and special considerations for environmental and decontamination and decommissioning activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerr, N.R.

    1993-08-01

    The mission of the US Department of Energy (DOE) has changed from defense production of special nuclear materials to cleanup of production facilities at the Hanford Site. The DOE contractors have formed the Energy Facility Contractors Group to support this change in mission. In addition, the Safety Analysis Working Subgroup for Environmental Restoration and Decontamination and Decommissioning (ER/D ampersand D) was formed to identify, develop, and share information that supports safety analyses and engineering of ER/D ampersand D activities. Safety analysis is in part the process of identifying and understanding the hazards that could result in exposures to radiological or chemical hazardous substances. The following paragraphs address the special considerations given to hazard characterization for ER/D ampersand D activities

  12. A Sensitivity Study for an Evaluation of Input Parameters Effect on a Preliminary Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rhee, Hyun-Me; Kim, Min Kyu; Choi, In-Kil [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Sheen, Dong-Hoon [Chonnam National University, Gwangju (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    The tsunami hazard analysis has been based on the seismic hazard analysis. The seismic hazard analysis has been performed by using the deterministic method and the probabilistic method. To consider the uncertainties in hazard analysis, the probabilistic method has been regarded as attractive approach. The various parameters and their weight are considered by using the logic tree approach in the probabilistic method. The uncertainties of parameters should be suggested by analyzing the sensitivity because the various parameters are used in the hazard analysis. To apply the probabilistic tsunami hazard analysis, the preliminary study for the Ulchin NPP site had been performed. The information on the fault sources which was published by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) had been used in the preliminary study. The tsunami propagation was simulated by using the TSUNAMI{sub 1}.0 which was developed by Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES). The wave parameters have been estimated from the result of tsunami simulation. In this study, the sensitivity analysis for the fault sources which were selected in the previous studies has been performed. To analyze the effect of the parameters, the sensitivity analysis for the E3 fault source which was published by AESJ was performed. The effect of the recurrence interval, the potential maximum magnitude, and the beta were suggested by the sensitivity analysis results. Level of annual exceedance probability has been affected by the recurrence interval.. Wave heights have been influenced by the potential maximum magnitude and the beta. In the future, the sensitivity analysis for the all fault sources in the western part of Japan which were published AESJ would be performed.

  13. Rankine bottoming cycle safety analysis. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lewandowski, G.A.

    1980-02-01

    Vector Engineering Inc. conducted a safety and hazards analysis of three Rankine Bottoming Cycle Systems in public utility applications: a Thermo Electron system using Fluorinal-85 (a mixture of 85 mole % trifluoroethanol and 15 mole % water) as the working fluid; a Sundstrand system using toluene as the working fluid; and a Mechanical Technology system using steam and Freon-II as the working fluids. The properties of the working fluids considered are flammability, toxicity, and degradation, and the risks to both plant workers and the community at large are analyzed.

  14. Taxonomic analysis of perceived risk: modeling individual and group perceptions within homogeneous hazard domains

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kraus, N.N.; Slovic, P.

    1988-01-01

    Previous studies of risk perception have typically focused on the mean judgments of a group of people regarding the riskiness (or safety) of a diverse set of hazardous activities, substances, and technologies. This paper reports the results of two studies that take a different path. Study 1 investigated whether models within a single technological domain were similar to previous models based on group means and diverse hazards. Study 2 created a group taxonomy of perceived risk for only one technological domain, railroads, and examined whether the structure of that taxonomy corresponded with taxonomies derived from prior studies of diverse hazards. Results from Study 1 indicated that the importance of various risk characteristics in determining perceived risk differed across individuals and across hazards, but not so much as to invalidate the results of earlier studies based on group means and diverse hazards. In Study 2, the detailed analysis of railroad hazards produced a structure that had both important similarities to, and dissimilarities from, the structure obtained in prior research with diverse hazard domains. The data also indicated that railroad hazards are really quite diverse, with some approaching nuclear reactors in their perceived seriousness. These results suggest that information about the diversity of perceptions within a single domain of hazards could provide valuable input to risk-management decisions

  15. Hazards in the chemical laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bretherick, L.

    1987-01-01

    The contents of this book are: Preface; Introduction; Health and Safety at Work Act 1974; Safety Planning and Management; Fire Protection; Reactive Chemical Hazards; Chemical Hazards and Toxicology; Health Care and First Aid; Hazardous Chemicals; Precautions against Radiations; and An American View

  16. Effects of climate change on food safety hazards in the dairy production chain

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Spiegel, van der M.; Fels-Klerx, van der H.J.; Marvin, H.J.P.

    2012-01-01

    The aim of this study is to analyse the effect of climate change on emerging food safety hazards in the dairy production chain. For this purpose, a holistic approach was used to select critical factors from inside and outside the production chain that are affected by climatic factors. An expert

  17. Electrical Switchgear Building No. 5010-ESF Fire Hazards Technical Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    N.M. Ruonavaara

    2001-01-01

    The purpose of this Fire Hazards Analysis Technical Report (hereinafter referred to as Technical Report) is to assess the risk from fire within individual fire areas to ascertain whether the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) fire safety objectives are met. The objectives, identified in DOE Order 420.1, Change 2, Fire Safety, Section 4.2, establish requirements for a comprehensive fire and related hazards protection program for facilities sufficient to minimize the potential for: (1) The occurrence of a fire or related event; (2) A fire that causes an unacceptable on-site or off-site release of hazardous or radiological material that will threaten the health and safety of the employees, the public, and the environment; (3) Vital DOE programs suffering unacceptable interruptions as a result of fire and related hazards; (4) Property losses from a fire and related events exceeding defined limits established by DOE; and (5) Critical process controls and safety class systems being damaged as a result of a fire and related event

  18. Auditable safety analysis for the surveillance and maintenance of the REDOX complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cuneo, V.J.

    1997-02-01

    The Reduction-Oxidation (REDOX) Complex is an inactive surplus facility that contains two former fuel processing facilities (the 202-S Canyon Building and the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility) and a number of ancillary support structures. Deactivation started in 1967 and was completed in 1969 when the plant was transferred to surveillance and maintenance (S ampersand M). This document provides the auditable safety analysis (ASA) for the post-deactivation, long-term S ampersand M phase of the above grade structures of the REDOX Complex. The S ampersand M phase is conducted for the following reasons: (1) Maintain confinement of residual inventories of radioactive materials and other contaminants until the facility is ultimately dispositioned, (2) Prevent deterioration of confinement structures, (3) Respond to potential accident conditions requiring response and mitigation, (4) Provide for the safety of workers involved in the S ampersand M phase, and (5) Provide the basis for evaluation and selection of ultimate disposal alternatives. The ability of the existing facilities to withstand the effects of natural phenomena hazard events is evaluated and the active support systems used to maintain ventilation and/or prevent the spread of contamination are described. This auditable safety analysis document evaluates the routinely required S ampersand M activities (i.e., the S ampersand M of facility barriers, equipment, structures, and postings [including repair and upgrade]; measures to identify, remove, or repair damaged asbestos; measures to identify, remove, or appropriately manage existing containers of hazardous substances; and the performance of spill response measures as needed). For the REDOX Complex, the movement of cell cover blocks is also evaluated, as D-cell cover block was removed a number of years ago and should be replaced. The type and nature of the hazards presented by the REDOX Complex and the REDOX-specific controls required to maintain these

  19. The use of hazards analysis in the development of training

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Houghton, F.K.

    1998-12-01

    A hazards analysis identifies the operation hazards and the positive measures that aid in the mitigation or prevention of the hazard. If the tasks are human intensive, the hazard analysis often credits the personnel training as contributing to the mitigation of the accident`s consequence or prevention of an accident sequence. To be able to credit worker training, it is important to understand the role of the training in the hazard analysis. Systematic training, known as systematic training design (STD), performance-based training (PBT), or instructional system design (ISD), uses a five-phase (analysis, design, development, implementation, and evaluation) model for the development and implementation of the training. Both a hazards analysis and a training program begin with a task analysis that documents the roles and actions of the workers. Though the tasks analyses are different in nature, there is common ground and both the hazard analysis and the training program can benefit from a cooperative effort. However, the cooperation should not end with the task analysis phase of either program. The information gained from the hazards analysis should be used in all five phases of the training development. The training evaluation, both of the individual worker and institutional training program, can provide valuable information to the hazards analysis effort. This paper will discuss the integration of the information from the hazards analysis into a training program. The paper will use the installation and removal of a piece of tooling that is used in a high-explosive operation. This example will be used to follow the systematic development of a training program and demonstrate the interaction and cooperation between the hazards analysis and training program.

  20. 324 Building fire hazards analysis implementation plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eggen, C.D.

    1998-01-01

    In March 1998, the 324 Building Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) (Reference 1) was approved by the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) for implementation by B and W Hanford Company (BWHC). The purpose of the FHA was to identify gaps in compliance with DOE Order 5480.7A (Reference 2) and Richland Operations Office Implementation Directive (RLID) 5480.7 (Reference 3), especially in regard to loss limitation. The FHA identified compliance gaps in six areas and provided 20 recommendations to bring the 324 Building into compliance with DOE Order 5480.7A. Additionally, one observation was provided. To date, four of the recommendations and the one observation have been completed. Actions identified for seven of the recommendations are currently in progress. Exemption requests will be transmitted to DOE-RL for three of the recommendations. Six of the recommendations are related to future shut down activities of the facility and the corrective actions are not being addressed as part of this plan. The actions for recommendations associated with the safety related part of the 324 Building and operation of the cells and support areas were evaluated using the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process. Major Life Safety Code concerns have been corrected. The status of the recommendations and actions was confirmed during the July 1998 Fire Protection Assessment. BVMC will use this Implementation Plan to bring the 324 Building and its operation into compliance with DOE Order 5480.7A and RLID 5480.7

  1. C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zelkin, Natalie; Henriksen, Stephen

    2011-01-01

    This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

  2. Danger, hazard, risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kafka, P.

    1992-01-01

    The real conditions covered by technical safety studies are described better by the term 'risk' instead of such qualitative terms as 'danger' or 'hazard'. 'Risk' incorporates not only the type of damage, the onset of damage, the probability of damage occurring, but also the extent of damage. In reliability and safety engineering, a probabilistic safety analysis is able to describe a plant most comprehensively by these three elements: What can happen? How frequently will it occur? What are the impacts to be taken into account? PSA is meaningful not only when applied to such technical areas in which there is a risk potential; the holistic analytical process optimizes any kind of system and plant in terms of availability and technical safety. (orig.) [de

  3. The implementation of a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point management system in a peanut butter ice cream plant.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hung, Yu-Ting; Liu, Chi-Te; Peng, I-Chen; Hsu, Chin; Yu, Roch-Chui; Cheng, Kuan-Chen

    2015-09-01

    To ensure the safety of the peanut butter ice cream manufacture, a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) plan has been designed and applied to the production process. Potential biological, chemical, and physical hazards in each manufacturing procedure were identified. Critical control points for the peanut butter ice cream were then determined as the pasteurization and freezing process. The establishment of a monitoring system, corrective actions, verification procedures, and documentation and record keeping were followed to complete the HACCP program. The results of this study indicate that implementing the HACCP system in food industries can effectively enhance food safety and quality while improving the production management. Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier B.V.

  4. ESSAA: Embedded system safety analysis assistant

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wallace, Peter; Holzer, Joseph; Guarro, Sergio; Hyatt, Larry

    1987-01-01

    The Embedded System Safety Analysis Assistant (ESSAA) is a knowledge-based tool that can assist in identifying disaster scenarios. Imbedded software issues hazardous control commands to the surrounding hardware. ESSAA is intended to work from outputs to inputs, as a complement to simulation and verification methods. Rather than treating the software in isolation, it examines the context in which the software is to be deployed. Given a specified disasterous outcome, ESSAA works from a qualitative, abstract model of the complete system to infer sets of environmental conditions and/or failures that could cause a disasterous outcome. The scenarios can then be examined in depth for plausibility using existing techniques.

  5. 化工企业危化品安全管理解析%Analysis on Safety Management of Hazardous Chemicals in Chemical Enterprises

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    韩宇

    2016-01-01

    With the development of economy in our country,chemical enterprises in our country are developing rapidly.The dangerous chemicals produced by chemical enterprises have certain function under specific environment.The chemical enterprise must make good safety management measures,To develop clear safety rules and sound rules and regulations to enhance the safety awareness of chemical workers,the use of hazardous chemicals and the use of good norms,enhance the safety of chemical enterprises,hazardous chemicals,and effectively prevent the occurrence of accidents,On the current chemical enterprises in China's chemical safety supervision and management of the existing problems,and in accordance with existing problems to develop a clear safety management measures to enhance the safety of chemical companies.%随着我国经济的不断发展,我国化工企业也在飞速的发展,在化工企业生产的危险化学品在特定的环境下有着特定的作用,化工企业一定要制定良好的安全管理措施,制定明确的安全准则和健全的规章制度,提升工作人员的安全意识,对危险化学品的使用范围和使用过程进行良好的规范,提升化工企业危险化学品的安全性,有效防止安全事故的发生。对现今我国化工企业危险化学品安全管理监督存在的问题进分析,并根据存在的问题制定明确的安全管理措施,以提升化工企业的安全性。

  6. Laboratory safety handbook

    Science.gov (United States)

    Skinner, E.L.; Watterson, C.A.; Chemerys, J.C.

    1983-01-01

    Safety, defined as 'freedom from danger, risk, or injury,' is difficult to achieve in a laboratory environment. Inherent dangers, associated with water analysis and research laboratories where hazardous samples, materials, and equipment are used, must be minimized to protect workers, buildings, and equipment. Managers, supervisors, analysts, and laboratory support personnel each have specific responsibilities to reduce hazards by maintaining a safe work environment. General rules of conduct and safety practices that involve personal protection, laboratory practices, chemical handling, compressed gases handling, use of equipment, and overall security must be practiced by everyone at all levels. Routine and extensive inspections of all laboratories must be made regularly by qualified people. Personnel should be trained thoroughly and repetitively. Special hazards that may involve exposure to carcinogens, cryogenics, or radiation must be given special attention, and specific rules and operational procedures must be established to deal with them. Safety data, reference materials, and texts must be kept available if prudent safety is to be practiced and accidents prevented or minimized.

  7. Hazards from aircraft

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grund, J.E.; Hornyik, K.

    1975-01-01

    The siting of nuclear power plants has created innumerable environmental concerns. Among the effects of the ''man-made environment'' one of increasing importance in recent nuclear plant siting hazards analysis has been the concern about aircraft hazards to the nuclear plant. These hazards are of concern because of the possibility that an aircraft may have a malfunction and crash either near the plant or directly into it. Such a crash could be postulated to result, because of missile and/or fire effects, in radioactive releases which would endanger the public health and safety. The majority of studies related to hazards from air traffic have been concerned with the determination of the probability associated with an aircraft striking vulnerable portions of a given plant. Other studies have focused on the structural response to such a strike. This work focuses on the problem of strike probability. 13 references

  8. 340 waste handling facility interim safety basis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    VAIL, T.S.

    1999-04-01

    This document presents an interim safety basis for the 340 Waste Handling Facility classifying the 340 Facility as a Hazard Category 3 facility. The hazard analysis quantifies the operating safety envelop for this facility and demonstrates that the facility can be operated without a significant threat to onsite or offsite people.

  9. 340 waste handling facility interim safety basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    VAIL, T.S.

    1999-01-01

    This document presents an interim safety basis for the 340 Waste Handling Facility classifying the 340 Facility as a Hazard Category 3 facility. The hazard analysis quantifies the operating safety envelop for this facility and demonstrates that the facility can be operated without a significant threat to onsite or offsite people

  10. Identification of Aircraft Hazards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    K. Ashley

    2006-01-01

    Aircraft hazards were determined to be potentially applicable to a repository at Yucca Mountain in ''Monitored Geological Repository External Events Hazards Screening Analysis'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 174235], Section 6.4.1). That determination was conservatively based upon limited knowledge of flight data in the area of concern and upon crash data for aircraft of the type flying near Yucca Mountain. The purpose of this report is to identify specific aircraft hazards that may be applicable to a monitored geologic repository (MGR) at Yucca Mountain, using NUREG-0800, ''Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants'' (NRC 1987 [DIRS 103124], Section 3.5.1.6), as guidance for the inclusion or exclusion of identified aircraft hazards. The intended use of this report is to provide inputs for further screening and analysis of identified aircraft hazards based upon the criteria that apply to Category 1 and Category 2 event sequence analyses as defined in 10 CFR 63.2 [DIRS 176544] (Section 4). The scope of this report includes the evaluation of military, private, and commercial use of airspace in the 100-mile regional setting of the repository at Yucca Mountain with the potential for reducing the regional setting to a more manageable size after consideration of applicable screening criteria (Section 7)

  11. Transport of hazardous goods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The course 'Transport of hazardous goods' was held in Berlin in November 1988 in cooperation with the Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung. From all lecturs, two are recorded separately: 'Safety of tank trucks - requirements on the tank, development possibiities of active and passive safety' and 'Requirements on the transport of radioactive materials - possible derivations for other hazardous goods'. The other lectures deal with hazardous goods law, requirements on packinging, risk assessment, railroad transport, hazardous goods road network, insurance matters, EC regulations, and waste tourism. (HSCH) [de

  12. HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points): is it coming to the dairy?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cullor, J S

    1997-12-01

    The risks and consequences of foodborne and waterborne pathogens are coming to the forefront of public health concerns, and strong pressure is being applied on agriculture for immediate implementation of on-farm controls. The FDA is considering HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points) as the new foundation for revision of the US Food Safety Assurance Program because HACCP is considered to be a science-based, systematic approach to the prevention of food safety problems. In addition, the implementation of HACCP principles permits more government oversight through requirements for standard operating procedures and additional systems for keeping records, places primary responsibility for ensuring food safety on the food manufacturer or distributor, and may assist US food companies in competing more effectively in the world market. With the HACCP-based program in place, a government investigator should be able to determine and evaluate both current and past conditions that are critical to ensuring the safety of the food produced by the facility. When this policy is brought to the production unit, the impact for producers and veterinarians will be substantial.

  13. Locating Errors Through Networked Surveillance: A Multimethod Approach to Peer Assessment, Hazard Identification, and Prioritization of Patient Safety Efforts in Cardiac Surgery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thompson, David A; Marsteller, Jill A; Pronovost, Peter J; Gurses, Ayse; Lubomski, Lisa H; Goeschel, Christine A; Gosbee, John W; Wahr, Joyce; Martinez, Elizabeth A

    2015-09-01

    The objectives were to develop a scientifically sound and feasible peer-to-peer assessment model that allows health-care organizations to evaluate patient safety in cardiovascular operating rooms and to establish safety priorities for improvement. The locating errors through networked surveillance study was conducted to identify hazards in cardiac surgical care. A multidisciplinary team, composed of organizational sociology, organizational psychology, applied social psychology, clinical medicine, human factors engineering, and health services researchers, conducted the study. We used a transdisciplinary approach, which integrated the theories, concepts, and methods from each discipline, to develop comprehensive research methods. Multiple data collection was involved: focused literature review of cardiac surgery-related adverse events, retrospective analysis of cardiovascular events from a national database in the United Kingdom, and prospective peer assessment at 5 sites, involving survey assessments, structured interviews, direct observations, and contextual inquiries. A nominal group methodology, where one single group acts to problem solve and make decisions was used to review the data and develop a list of the top priority hazards. The top 6 priority hazard themes were as follows: safety culture, teamwork and communication, infection prevention, transitions of care, failure to adhere to practices or policies, and operating room layout and equipment. We integrated the theories and methods of a diverse group of researchers to identify a broad range of hazards and good clinical practices within the cardiovascular surgical operating room. Our findings were the basis for a plan to prioritize improvements in cardiac surgical care. These study methods allowed for the comprehensive assessment of a high-risk clinical setting that may translate to other clinical settings.

  14. 40 CFR 68.67 - Process hazard analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ...) Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP); (5) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA); (6) Fault Tree...) The hazards of the process; (2) The identification of any previous incident which had a likely...

  15. Accident analysis for aircraft crash into hazardous facilities: DOE standard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-10-01

    This standard provides the user with sufficient information to evaluate and assess the significance of aircraft crash risk on facility safety without expending excessive effort where it is not required. It establishes an approach for performing a conservative analysis of the risk posed by a release of hazardous radioactive or chemical material resulting from an aircraft crash into a facility containing significant quantities of such material. This can establish whether a facility has a significant potential for an aircraft impact and whether this has the potential for producing significant offsite or onsite consequences. General implementation guidance, screening and evaluation guidelines, and methodologies for the evaluations are included

  16. Safety assessment for the 118-B-1 Burial Ground excavation treatability tests. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zimmer, J.J.; Frain, J.M.

    1994-12-01

    This revision of the Safety Assessment provides an auditable safety analysis of the hazards for the proposed treatability test activities per DOE-EM-STD-5502-94, DOE Limited Standard, Hazard Baseline Documentation (DOE 1994). The proposed activities are classified as radiological activities and as such, no longer require Operational Safety Limits (OSLs). The OSLS, Prudent Actions, and Institutional and Organization Controls have been removed from this revision and replaced with ''Administrative Actions Important to Safety,'' as determined by the hazards analysis. Those Administrative Actions Important to Safety are summarized in Section 1.1, ''Assessment Summary.''

  17. Development of a Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis Method and Application to an NPP in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, M. K.; Choi, Ik

    2012-01-01

    A methodology of tsunami PSA was developed in this study. A tsunami PSA consists of tsunami hazard analysis, tsunami fragility analysis and system analysis. In the case of tsunami hazard analysis, evaluation of tsunami return period is a major task. For the evaluation of tsunami return period was evaluated with empirical method using historical tsunami record and tidal gauge record. For the performing a tsunami fragility analysis, procedure of tsunami fragility analysis was established and target equipment and structures for investigation of tsunami fragility assessment were selected. A sample fragility calculation was performed for the equipment in a Nuclear Power Plant. For the system analysis, accident sequence of tsunami event was developed according to the tsunami run-up and draw down, and tsunami induced core damage frequency (CDF) is determined. For the application to the real nuclear power plant, the Ulchin 56 NPP which is located on the east coast of Korean peninsula was selected. Through this study, whole tsunami PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) working procedure was established and an example calculation was performed for one nuclear power plant in Korea

  18. Storage of hazardous substances in bonded warehouses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Villalobos Artavia, Beatriz

    2008-01-01

    A variety of special regulations exist in Costa Rica for registration and transport of hazardous substances; these set the requirements for entry into the country and the security of transport units. However, the regulations mentioned no specific rules for storing hazardous substances. Tax deposits have been the initial place where are stored the substances that enter the country.The creation of basic rules that would be regulating the storage of hazardous substances has taken place through the analysis of regulations and national and international laws governing hazardous substances. The regulatory domain that currently exists will be established with a field research in fiscal deposits in the metropolitan area. The storage and security measures that have been used by the personnel handling the substances will be identified to be putting the reality with that the hazardous substances have been handled in tax deposits. A rule base for the storage of hazardous substances in tax deposits can be made, protecting the safety of the environment in which are manipulated and avoiding a possible accident causing a mess around. The rule will have the characteristics of the storage warehouses hazardous substances, such as safety standards, labeling standards, infrastructure features, common storage and transitional measures that must possess and meet all bonded warehouses to store hazardous substances. (author) [es

  19. Application of a structural model for advanced analysis in the evaluation of nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Landesmann, Alexandre; Barros, Francisco Claudio Pereira de; Batista, Eduardo de Miranda

    2003-01-01

    The Advanced Analysis concept, which means the direct consideration of both physical and geometric nonlinear effects in the analysis and design of steel buildings structures, represents the state-of-art in the field of structural analysis by this beginning of the 21 st century. In this context, the present paper presents an Advanced Analysis methodology applied to the Safety Evaluation of high hazardous civil structures. This Safety Evaluation plays an important part in the regulators position as a step in the licensing process performed by CNEN - Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission. The proposed Advance Analysis procedure is implemented by a refined second-order plastic hinge model. The application of this model allows to carry out: the description of the inelastic structural behavior; the identification of the collapse mechanism; the ultimate load level; structural safety's level and the service ability limit. (author)

  20. Standard practice for design and use of safety alert system for hazardous work locations in the coatings and lining industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1984-01-01

    This practice covers a safety alert system for hazardous work locations and materials for the coatings and lining application industry. This practice is designed for multi-employer work sites. Limitations--This practice does not identify specific hazardous materials or work locations but provides a means for rating each. This standard may involve hazardous materials, operations, and equipment

  1. Software Safety Analysis of Digital Protection System Requirements Using a Qualitative Formal Method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jang-Soo; Kwon, Kee-Choon; Cha, Sung-Deok

    2004-01-01

    The safety analysis of requirements is a key problem area in the development of software for the digital protection systems of a nuclear power plant. When specifying requirements for software of the digital protection systems and conducting safety analysis, engineers find that requirements are often known only in qualitative terms and that existing fault-tree analysis techniques provide little guidance on formulating and evaluating potential failure modes. A framework for the requirements engineering process is proposed that consists of a qualitative method for requirements specification, called the qualitative formal method (QFM), and a safety analysis method for the requirements based on causality information, called the causal requirements safety analysis (CRSA). CRSA is a technique that qualitatively evaluates causal relationships between software faults and physical hazards. This technique, extending the qualitative formal method process and utilizing information captured in the state trajectory, provides specific guidelines on how to identify failure modes and the relationship among them. The QFM and CRSA processes are described using shutdown system 2 of the Wolsong nuclear power plants as the digital protection system example

  2. FMECA application to Rainfall Hazard prevention in olive trees growings

    Science.gov (United States)

    Buendia-Buendía, F. S.; Bermudez, R.; Tarquis, A. M.; Andina, D.

    2010-05-01

    The FMECA (Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis) is a broadly extended System Safety tool applied in industries as Aerospace in order to prevent hazards. This methodology studies the different failure modes of a system and try to mitigate them in a systematic procedure. In this paper this tool is applied in order to mitigate economical impact hazards derived from Rainfalls to olive trees growing in Granada (Spain), understanding hazard from the System Safety perspective (Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to personnel; damage to or loss of a system, equipment or property; or damage to the environment). The work includes a brief introduction to the System Safety and FMECA methodologies, applying then these concepts to analyze the Olive trees as a system and identify the hazards during the different stages of the whole life cycle plant production.

  3. Risk assessment. Basic documents for the preparation of the report 'Energy, Health, environment, and safety hazards' by the Swedish Energy Commission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    This report contains several essays on the rational ways of assessing the hazards, and choosing, the future energy production systems. Theories of decision analysis are touched upon by a number of authors and the fault tree statistical method is described. The Rasmussen report (WASH-1400) and a few related papers are discussed. As an example of the risks of advanced technological systems, the air traffic safety is accounted for. (L.E.)

  4. WE-G-BRA-06: Application of Systems and Control Theory-Based Hazard Analysis to Radiotherapy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pawlicki, T [UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA (United States); Samost, A; Leveson, N [Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA (United States)

    2015-06-15

    Purpose: The process of delivering radiation occurs in a complex socio-technical system heavily reliant on human operators. Furthermore, both humans and software are notoriously challenging to account for in traditional hazard analysis models. High reliability industries such as aviation have approached this problem through using hazard analysis techniques grounded in systems and control theory. The purpose of this work is to apply the Systems Theoretic Accident Model Processes (STAMP) hazard model to radiotherapy. In particular, the System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) approach is used to perform a hazard analysis of a proposed on-line adaptive cranial radiosurgery procedure that omits the CT Simulation step and uses only CBCT for planning, localization, and treatment. Methods: The STPA procedure first requires the definition of high-level accidents and hazards leading to those accidents. From there, hierarchical control structures were created followed by the identification and description of control actions for each control structure. Utilizing these control structures, unsafe states of each control action were created. Scenarios contributing to unsafe control action states were then identified and translated into system requirements to constrain process behavior within safe boundaries. Results: Ten control structures were created for this new CBCT-only process which covered the areas of hospital and department management, treatment design and delivery, and vendor service. Twenty three control actions were identified that contributed to over 80 unsafe states of those control actions resulting in over 220 failure scenarios. Conclusion: The interaction of people, hardware, and software are highlighted through the STPA approach. STPA provides a hierarchical model for understanding the role of management decisions in impacting system safety so that a process design requirement can be traced back to the hazard and accident that it is intended to mitigate. Varian

  5. Safety- and risk analysis activities in other areas than the nuclear industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kozine, I.; Duijm, N.J.; Lauridsen, K.

    2000-12-01

    The report gives an overview of the legislation within the European Union in the field of major industrial hazards and gives examples of decision criteria applied in a number of European countries when judging the acceptability of an activity. Furthermore, the report mentions a few methods used in the analysis of the safety of chemical installations. (au)

  6. Use of safety analysis results to support process operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karvonen, I.; Heino, P.

    1990-01-01

    Safety and risk analysis carried out during the design phase of a process plant produces useful knowledge about the behavior and the disturbances of the system. This knowledge, however, often remains to the designer though it would be of benefit to the operators and supervisors of the process plant, too. In Technical Research Centre of Finland a project has been started to plan and construct a prototype of an information system to make use of the analysis knowledge during the operation phase. The project belongs to a Nordic KRM project (Knowledge Based Risk Management System). The information system is planned to base on safety and risk analysis carried out during the design phase and completed with operational experience. The safety analysis includes knowledge about potential disturbances, their causes and consequences in the form of Hazard and Operability Study, faut trees and/or event trees. During the operation disturbances can however, occur, which are not included in the safety analysis, or the causes or consequences of which have been incompletely identified. Thus the information system must also have an interface for the documentation of the operational knowledge missing from the analysis results. The main tasks off the system when supporting the management of a disturbance are to identify it (or the most important of the coexistent ones) from the stored knowledge and to present it in a proper form (for example as a deviation graph). The information system may also be used to transfer knowledge from one shift to another and to train process personnel

  7. Development of a Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toshiaki Sakai; Tomoyoshi Takeda; Hiroshi Soraoka; Ken Yanagisawa; Tadashi Annaka

    2006-01-01

    It is meaningful for tsunami assessment to evaluate phenomena beyond the design basis as well as seismic design. Because once we set the design basis tsunami height, we still have possibilities tsunami height may exceeds the determined design tsunami height due to uncertainties regarding the tsunami phenomena. Probabilistic tsunami risk assessment consists of estimating for tsunami hazard and fragility of structures and executing system analysis. In this report, we apply a method for probabilistic tsunami hazard analysis (PTHA). We introduce a logic tree approach to estimate tsunami hazard curves (relationships between tsunami height and probability of excess) and present an example for Japan. Examples of tsunami hazard curves are illustrated, and uncertainty in the tsunami hazard is displayed by 5-, 16-, 50-, 84- and 95-percentile and mean hazard curves. The result of PTHA will be used for quantitative assessment of the tsunami risk for important facilities located on coastal area. Tsunami hazard curves are the reasonable input data for structures and system analysis. However the evaluation method for estimating fragility of structures and the procedure of system analysis is now being developed. (authors)

  8. Probability analysis of multiple-tank-car release incidents in railway hazardous materials transportation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu, Xiang; Saat, Mohd Rapik; Barkan, Christopher P.L.

    2014-01-01

    Railroads play a key role in the transportation of hazardous materials in North America. Rail transport differs from highway transport in several aspects, an important one being that rail transport involves trains in which many railcars carrying hazardous materials travel together. By contrast to truck accidents, it is possible that a train accident may involve multiple hazardous materials cars derailing and releasing contents with consequently greater potential impact on human health, property and the environment. In this paper, a probabilistic model is developed to estimate the probability distribution of the number of tank cars releasing contents in a train derailment. Principal operational characteristics considered include train length, derailment speed, accident cause, position of the first car derailed, number and placement of tank cars in a train and tank car safety design. The effect of train speed, tank car safety design and tank car positions in a train were evaluated regarding the number of cars that release their contents in a derailment. This research provides insights regarding the circumstances affecting multiple-tank-car release incidents and potential strategies to reduce their occurrences. The model can be incorporated into a larger risk management framework to enable better local, regional and national safety management of hazardous materials transportation by rail

  9. Probability analysis of multiple-tank-car release incidents in railway hazardous materials transportation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Liu, Xiang, E-mail: liu94@illinois.edu; Saat, Mohd Rapik, E-mail: mohdsaat@illinois.edu; Barkan, Christopher P.L., E-mail: cbarkan@illinois.edu

    2014-07-15

    Railroads play a key role in the transportation of hazardous materials in North America. Rail transport differs from highway transport in several aspects, an important one being that rail transport involves trains in which many railcars carrying hazardous materials travel together. By contrast to truck accidents, it is possible that a train accident may involve multiple hazardous materials cars derailing and releasing contents with consequently greater potential impact on human health, property and the environment. In this paper, a probabilistic model is developed to estimate the probability distribution of the number of tank cars releasing contents in a train derailment. Principal operational characteristics considered include train length, derailment speed, accident cause, position of the first car derailed, number and placement of tank cars in a train and tank car safety design. The effect of train speed, tank car safety design and tank car positions in a train were evaluated regarding the number of cars that release their contents in a derailment. This research provides insights regarding the circumstances affecting multiple-tank-car release incidents and potential strategies to reduce their occurrences. The model can be incorporated into a larger risk management framework to enable better local, regional and national safety management of hazardous materials transportation by rail.

  10. Hazard management at the workplace

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hasfazilah Hassan; Azimawati Ahmad; Syed Asraf Fahlawi Wafa S M Ghazi; Hairul Nizam Idris

    2005-01-01

    Failure to ensure health and safety environment at workplace will cause an accident involving loss to the time, human resource, finance and for the worse case effect the moral value of an organization. If we go through to the cause of the accident, it is impossible to have a totally safety workplace. It is because every process in work activities has it own hazard elements. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the best action to prevent from the hazard with a comprehensive and effectiveness hazard management. Hazard management is the one of the pro-active hazard control. With this we manage to identify and evaluate the hazard and control the hazard risk. Therefore, hazard management should be screened constantly and continuously to make sure work hazard always in control. (Author)

  11. Safety Justification and Safety Case for Safety-critical Software in Digital Reactor Protection System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwon, Kee-Choon; Lee, Jang-Soo; Jee, Eunkyoung

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear safety-critical software is under strict regulatory requirements and these regulatory requirements are essential for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. The verification & validation (V and V) and hazard analysis of the safety-critical software are required to follow regulatory requirements through the entire software life cycle. In order to obtain a license from the regulatory body through the development and validation of safety-critical software, it is essential to meet the standards which are required by the regulatory body throughout the software development process. Generally, large amounts of documents, which demonstrate safety justification including standard compliance, V and V, hazard analysis, and vulnerability assessment activities, are submitted to the regulatory body during the licensing process. It is not easy to accurately read and evaluate the whole documentation for the development activities, implementation technology, and validation activities. The safety case methodology has been kwon a promising approach to evaluate the level and depth of the development and validation results. A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible, and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment. It is suggested to evaluate the level and depth of the results of development and validation by applying safety case methodology to achieve software safety demonstration. A lot of documents provided as evidence are connected to claim that corresponds to the topic for safety demonstration. We demonstrated a case study in which more systematic safety demonstration for the target system software is performed via safety case construction than simply listing the documents

  12. Safety Justification and Safety Case for Safety-critical Software in Digital Reactor Protection System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kwon, Kee-Choon; Lee, Jang-Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Jee, Eunkyoung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Nuclear safety-critical software is under strict regulatory requirements and these regulatory requirements are essential for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. The verification & validation (V and V) and hazard analysis of the safety-critical software are required to follow regulatory requirements through the entire software life cycle. In order to obtain a license from the regulatory body through the development and validation of safety-critical software, it is essential to meet the standards which are required by the regulatory body throughout the software development process. Generally, large amounts of documents, which demonstrate safety justification including standard compliance, V and V, hazard analysis, and vulnerability assessment activities, are submitted to the regulatory body during the licensing process. It is not easy to accurately read and evaluate the whole documentation for the development activities, implementation technology, and validation activities. The safety case methodology has been kwon a promising approach to evaluate the level and depth of the development and validation results. A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible, and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment. It is suggested to evaluate the level and depth of the results of development and validation by applying safety case methodology to achieve software safety demonstration. A lot of documents provided as evidence are connected to claim that corresponds to the topic for safety demonstration. We demonstrated a case study in which more systematic safety demonstration for the target system software is performed via safety case construction than simply listing the documents.

  13. IDENTIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT HAZARDS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    K.L. Ashley

    2005-01-01

    Aircraft hazards were determined to be potentially applicable to a repository at Yucca Mountain in the ''Monitored Geological Repository External Events Hazards Screening Analysis'' (BSC 2004, Section 6.4.1). That determination was conservatively based on limited knowledge of flight data in the area of concern and on crash data for aircraft of the type flying near Yucca Mountain. The purpose of this report is to identify specific aircraft hazards that may be applicable to a Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) at Yucca Mountain using NUREG-0800, ''Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants'' (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.1.6), as guidance for the inclusion or exclusion of identified aircraft hazards. NUREG-0800 is being used here as a reference because some of the same considerations apply. The intended use of this report is to provide inputs for further screening and analysis of the identified aircraft hazards based on the criteria that apply to Category 1 and 2 event sequence analyses as defined in 10 CFR 63.2 (see Section 4). The scope of this technical report includes the evaluation of military, private, and commercial use of airspace in the 100-mile regional setting of the MGR at Yucca Mountain with the potential for reducing the regional setting to a more manageable size after consideration of applicable screening criteria (see Section 7)

  14. Identification of Aircraft Hazards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    K. Ashley

    2006-12-08

    Aircraft hazards were determined to be potentially applicable to a repository at Yucca Mountain in ''Monitored Geological Repository External Events Hazards Screening Analysis'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 174235], Section 6.4.1). That determination was conservatively based upon limited knowledge of flight data in the area of concern and upon crash data for aircraft of the type flying near Yucca Mountain. The purpose of this report is to identify specific aircraft hazards that may be applicable to a monitored geologic repository (MGR) at Yucca Mountain, using NUREG-0800, ''Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants'' (NRC 1987 [DIRS 103124], Section 3.5.1.6), as guidance for the inclusion or exclusion of identified aircraft hazards. The intended use of this report is to provide inputs for further screening and analysis of identified aircraft hazards based upon the criteria that apply to Category 1 and Category 2 event sequence analyses as defined in 10 CFR 63.2 [DIRS 176544] (Section 4). The scope of this report includes the evaluation of military, private, and commercial use of airspace in the 100-mile regional setting of the repository at Yucca Mountain with the potential for reducing the regional setting to a more manageable size after consideration of applicable screening criteria (Section 7).

  15. Uncertainty Analysis and Expert Judgment in Seismic Hazard Analysis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Klügel, Jens-Uwe

    2011-01-01

    The large uncertainty associated with the prediction of future earthquakes is usually regarded as the main reason for increased hazard estimates which have resulted from some recent large scale probabilistic seismic hazard analysis studies (e.g. the PEGASOS study in Switzerland and the Yucca Mountain study in the USA). It is frequently overlooked that such increased hazard estimates are characteristic for a single specific method of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA): the traditional (Cornell-McGuire) PSHA method which has found its highest level of sophistication in the SSHAC probability method. Based on a review of the SSHAC probability model and its application in the PEGASOS project, it is shown that the surprising results of recent PSHA studies can be explained to a large extent by the uncertainty model used in traditional PSHA, which deviates from the state of the art in mathematics and risk analysis. This uncertainty model, the Ang-Tang uncertainty model, mixes concepts of decision theory with probabilistic hazard assessment methods leading to an overestimation of uncertainty in comparison to empirical evidence. Although expert knowledge can be a valuable source of scientific information, its incorporation into the SSHAC probability method does not resolve the issue of inflating uncertainties in PSHA results. Other, more data driven, PSHA approaches in use in some European countries are less vulnerable to this effect. The most valuable alternative to traditional PSHA is the direct probabilistic scenario-based approach, which is closely linked with emerging neo-deterministic methods based on waveform modelling.

  16. L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System Engineering - Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zelkin, Natalie; Henriksen, Stephen

    2011-01-01

    This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.

  17. Earthquake Hazard Analysis Methods: A Review

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sari, A. M.; Fakhrurrozi, A.

    2018-02-01

    One of natural disasters that have significantly impacted on risks and damage is an earthquake. World countries such as China, Japan, and Indonesia are countries located on the active movement of continental plates with more frequent earthquake occurrence compared to other countries. Several methods of earthquake hazard analysis have been done, for example by analyzing seismic zone and earthquake hazard micro-zonation, by using Neo-Deterministic Seismic Hazard Analysis (N-DSHA) method, and by using Remote Sensing. In its application, it is necessary to review the effectiveness of each technique in advance. Considering the efficiency of time and the accuracy of data, remote sensing is used as a reference to the assess earthquake hazard accurately and quickly as it only takes a limited time required in the right decision-making shortly after the disaster. Exposed areas and possibly vulnerable areas due to earthquake hazards can be easily analyzed using remote sensing. Technological developments in remote sensing such as GeoEye-1 provide added value and excellence in the use of remote sensing as one of the methods in the assessment of earthquake risk and damage. Furthermore, the use of this technique is expected to be considered in designing policies for disaster management in particular and can reduce the risk of natural disasters such as earthquakes in Indonesia.

  18. An examination of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act (HMTUSA): A southern perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-03-01

    On November 16,1990, President Bush signed into law the most comprehensive amendments to the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) in 15 years. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990 (HMTUSA) was created by Congress in an effort to strengthen and clarify the HMTA. This paper will discuss the act's provisions as they affect shipments of spent fuel and high-level radioactive materials as well as the impact of those provisions on routing and emergency response issues in the southern region. HMTUSA consists of seven key provisions that affect radioactive materials: clarification of regulatory jurisdiction; highway routing standards; broadened industry registration; safety permits for motor carriers of high risk materials; expanded nuclear transportation requirements; new provisions for emergency response training and planning; and a public process for assessing the feasibility of a federally operated central reporting system and data center. In addition to amending various HMTA provisions, the new HMTUSA act provides appropriations to carry out the specific goals of the legislation. The act authorizes appropriations for the 1991, 1992 and 1993 fiscal years

  19. Integrated Safety, Environmental and Emergency Management System (ISEEMS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, R.; Langwell, G.; Thomas, C.; Coffing, S.

    1996-01-01

    The Risk Management and NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act) Department of Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) recognized the need for hazard and environmental data analysis and management to support the line managers' need to know, understand, manage and document the hazards in their facilities and activities. The Integrated Safety, Environmental, and Emergency Management System (ISEEMS) was developed in response to this need. SNL needed a process that would quickly and easily determine if a facility or project activity contained only standard industrial hazards and therefore require minimal safety documentation, or if non-standard industrial hazards existed which would require more extensive analysis and documentation. Many facilities and project activities at SNL would benefit from the quick screening process used in ISEEMS. In addition, a process was needed that would expedite the NEPA process. ISEEMS takes advantage of the fact that there is some information needed for the NEPA process that is also needed for the safety documentation process. The ISEEMS process enables SNL line organizations to identify and manage hazards and environmental concerns at a level of effort commensurate with the hazards themselves by adopting a necessary and sufficient (graded) approach to compliance. All hazard-related information contained within ISEEMS is location based and can be displayed using on-line maps and building floor plans. This visual representation provides for quick assimilation and analysis

  20. 75 FR 45591 - Pipeline Safety: Notice of Technical Pipeline Safety Advisory Committee Meetings

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-08-03

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part... Committee Meetings AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA); DOT. ACTION... safety standards, risk assessments, and safety policies for natural gas pipelines and for hazardous...

  1. Implementing DOE guidance for hazards assessments at Rocky Flats Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zimmerman, G.A.

    1993-01-01

    Hazards Assessments are performed for a variety of activities and facilities at Rocky Flats Plant. Prior to 1991, there was no guidance for performing Hazards Assessments. Each organization that performed Hazards Assessments used its own methodology with no attempt at standardization. In 1991, DOE published guidelines for the performance of Hazards Assessments for Emergency Planning (DOE-EPG-5500.1, ''Guidance for a Hazards Assessment Methodology''). Subsequently, in 1992, DOE published a standard for the performance of Hazards Assessments (DOE-STD-1027-92, ''Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis, Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports''). Although these documents are a step in the direction of standardization, there remains a great deal of interpretation and subjective implementation in the performance of Hazards Assessments. Rocky Flats Plant has initiated efforts to develop a uniform and standard process to be used for Hazards Assessments

  2. How to control chemical hazards

    CERN Multimedia

    2012-01-01

    Improving protection against chemical hazards is one of the 2012 CERN safety objectives identified by the Director General. Identifying and drawing up a complete inventory of chemicals, and assessing the associated risks are important steps in this direction.   The HSE Unit has drawn up safety rules, guidelines and forms to help you to meet this objective. We would like to draw your attention to: • safety guidelines C-0-0-1 and C-1-0-2 (now also available in French), which deal with the identification of hazardous chemicals and the assessment of chemical risk; • safety guideline C-1-0-1, which deals with the storage of hazardous chemicals. All safety documents can be consulted at: cern.ch/regles-securite The HSE Unit will be happy to answer any questions you may have. Write to us at: safety-general@cern.ch The HSE Unit

  3. Tsunami hazard

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami on 11 March, 2011 has led the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant to a serious accident, which highlighted a variety of technical issues such as a very low design tsunami height and insufficient preparations in case a tsunami exceeding the design tsunami height. Lessons such as to take measures to be able to maintain the important safety features of the facility for tsunamis exceeding design height and to implement risk management utilizing Probabilistic Safety Assessment are shown. In order to implement the safety assessment on nuclear power plants across Japan accordingly to the back-fit rule, Nuclear Regulatory Commission will promulgate/execute the New Safety Design Criteria in July 2013. JNES has positioned the 'enhancement of probabilistic tsunami hazard assessment' as highest priority issue and implemented in order to support technically the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in formulating the new Safety Design Criteria. Findings of the research had reflected in the 'Technical Review Guidelines for Assessing Design Tsunami Height based on tsunami hazards'. (author)

  4. Life on the line: Job demands, perceived co-worker support for safety, and hazardous work events.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Turner, Nick; Chmiel, Nik; Hershcovis, M Sandy; Walls, Melanie

    2010-10-01

    The present study of 334 United Kingdom trackside workers tested an interaction hypothesis. We hypothesized, drawing on the job demands-resources framework, that perceived support for safety (from senior managers, supervisors, and coworkers) as job resources would weaken the relationship between higher job demands and more frequent hazardous work events. Consistent with social impact theory, we predicted that perceived coworker support for safety would be particularly influential when trackside workers faced higher job demands. Moderated multiple regression showed that, of all three sources of perceived support for safety, perceived coworker support for safety was most important for keeping employees safe in the face of high job demands. © 2010 APA, all rights reserved.

  5. Current status and issues of external event PSA for extreme natural hazards after Fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, In-Kil; Hahm, Daegi; Kim, Min Kyu

    2014-01-01

    Extreme external events is emerged as significant risk contributor to the nuclear power plants after Fukushima Daiichi accident due to the catastrophic earthquake followed by great tsunami greater than a design basis. This accident shows that the extreme external events have the potential to simultaneously affect redundant and diverse safety systems and thereby induce common cause failure or common cause initiators. The probabilistic risk assessment methodology has been used for the risk assessment and safety improvement against the extreme natural hazards. The earthquake and tsunami hazard is an important issue for the nuclear industry in Korea. In this paper, the role and application of probabilistic safety assessment for the post Fukushima action will be introduced. For the evaluation of the extreme natural hazard, probabilistic seismic and tsunami hazard analysis is being performed for the safety enhancement. The research activity on the external event PSA and its interim results will be introduced with the issues to be solved in the future for the reliability enhancement of the risk analysis results. (authors)

  6. Hazardous solvent substitution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Twitchell, K.E.

    1995-01-01

    Eliminating hazardous solvents is good for the environment, worker safety, and the bottom line. However, even though we are motivated to find replacements, the big question is 'What can we use as replacements for hazardous solvents?'You, too, can find replacements for your hazardous solvents. All you have to do is search for them. Search through the vendor literature of hundreds of companies with thousands of products. Ponder the associated material safety data sheets, assuming of course that you can obtain them and, having obtained them, that you can read them. You will want to search the trade magazines and other sources for product reviews. You will want to talk to users about how well the product actually works. You may also want to check US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other government reports for toxicity and other safety information. And, of course, you will want to compare the product's constituent chemicals with the many hazardous constituency lists to ensure the safe and legal use of the product in your workplace

  7. The use of hazards analysis in the development of training

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Houghton, F.K.

    1998-03-01

    When training for a job in which human error has the potential of producing catastrophic results, an understanding of the hazards that may be encountered is of paramount importance. In high consequence activities, it is important that the training program be conducted in a safe environment and yet emphasize the potential hazards. Because of the high consequence of a human error the use of a high-fidelity simulation is of great importance to provide the safe environment the worker needs to learn and hone required skills. A hazards analysis identifies the operation hazards, potential human error, and associated positive measures that aid in the mitigation or prevention of the hazard. The information gained from the hazards analysis should be used in the development of training. This paper will discuss the integration of information from the hazards analysis into the development of simulation components of a training program.

  8. Hazard sign comprehension among illiterate adults

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    KATEVG

    Hazard signs have been considered an effective mode of transferring safety .... United Kingdom and the United States of America, indicating that hazard ..... primary providers of these programmes (Occupational Health and Safety Act 1993).

  9. Readiness to implement Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems in Iowa schools.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Henroid, Daniel; Sneed, Jeannie

    2004-02-01

    To evaluate current food-handling practices, food safety prerequisite programs, and employee knowledge and food safety attitudes and provide baseline data for implementing Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems in school foodservice. One member of the research team visited each school to observe food-handling practices and assess prerequisite programs using a structured observation form. A questionnaire was used to determine employees' attitudes, knowledge, and demographic information. A convenience sample of 40 Iowa schools was recruited with input from the Iowa Department of Education. Descriptive statistics were used to summarize data. One-way analysis of variance was used to assess differences in attitudes and food safety knowledge among managers, cooks, and other foodservice employees. Multiple linear regression assessed the relationship between manager and school district demographics and the food safety practice score. Proper food-handling practices were not being followed in many schools and prerequisite food safety programs for HACCP were found to be inadequate for many school foodservice operations. School foodservice employees were found to have a significant amount of food safety knowledge (15.9+/-2.4 out of 20 possible points). School districts with managers (P=.019) and employees (P=.030) who had a food handler certificate were found to have higher food safety practice scores. Emphasis on implementing prerequisite programs in preparation for HACCP is needed in school foodservice. Training programs, both basic food safety such as ServSafe and HACCP, will support improvement of food-handling practices and implementation of prerequisite programs and HACCP.

  10. Notification: FY 2012 Management Challenges and Internal Control Weaknesses for the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    February 1, 2012. The EPA Office of Inspector General is beginning work to update our list of areas we consider to be the key management challenges confronting the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board.

  11. Development of evaluation method for software safety analysis techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huang, H.; Tu, W.; Shih, C.; Chen, C.; Yang, W.; Yih, S.; Kuo, C.; Chen, M.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Full text: Following the massive adoption of digital Instrumentation and Control (I and C) system for nuclear power plant (NPP), various Software Safety Analysis (SSA) techniques are used to evaluate the NPP safety for adopting appropriate digital I and C system, and then to reduce risk to acceptable level. However, each technique has its specific advantage and disadvantage. If the two or more techniques can be complementarily incorporated, the SSA combination would be more acceptable. As a result, if proper evaluation criteria are available, the analyst can then choose appropriate technique combination to perform analysis on the basis of resources. This research evaluated the applicable software safety analysis techniques nowadays, such as, Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Markov chain modeling, Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM), and simulation-based model analysis; and then determined indexes in view of their characteristics, which include dynamic capability, completeness, achievability, detail, signal/ noise ratio, complexity, and implementation cost. These indexes may help the decision makers and the software safety analysts to choose the best SSA combination arrange their own software safety plan. By this proposed method, the analysts can evaluate various SSA combinations for specific purpose. According to the case study results, the traditional PHA + FMEA + FTA (with failure rate) + Markov chain modeling (without transfer rate) combination is not competitive due to the dilemma for obtaining acceptable software failure rates. However, the systematic architecture of FTA and Markov chain modeling is still valuable for realizing the software fault structure. The system centric techniques, such as DFM and Simulation-based model analysis, show the advantage on dynamic capability, achievability, detail, signal/noise ratio. However, their disadvantage are the completeness complexity

  12. Hazard analysis in uranium hexafluoride production facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marin, Maristhela Passoni de Araujo

    1999-01-01

    The present work provides a method for preliminary hazard analysis of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The proposed method identify both chemical and radiological hazards, as well as the consequences associated with accident scenarios. To illustrate the application of the method, a uranium hexafluoride production facility was selected. The main hazards are identified and the potential consequences are quantified. It was found that, although the facility handles radioactive material, the main hazards as associated with releases of toxic chemical substances such as hydrogen fluoride, anhydrous ammonia and nitric acid. It was shown that a contention bung can effectively reduce the consequences of atmospheric release of toxic materials. (author)

  13. Safety analysis for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The aim of safety analysis for research reactors is to establish and confirm the design basis for items important to safety using appropriate analytical tools. The design, manufacture, construction and commissioning should be integrated with the safety analysis to ensure that the design intent has been incorporated into the as-built reactor. Safety analysis assesses the performance of the reactor against a broad range of operating conditions, postulated initiating events and other circumstances, in order to obtain a complete understanding of how the reactor is expected to perform in these situations. Safety analysis demonstrates that the reactor can be kept within the safety operating regimes established by the designer and approved by the regulatory body. This analysis can also be used as appropriate in the development of operating procedures, periodic testing and inspection programmes, proposals for modifications and experiments and emergency planning. The IAEA Safety Requirements publication on the Safety of Research Reactors states that the scope of safety analysis is required to include analysis of event sequences and evaluation of the consequences of the postulated initiating events and comparison of the results of the analysis with radiological acceptance criteria and design limits. This Safety Report elaborates on the requirements established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-4 on the Safety of Research Reactors, and the guidance given in IAEA Safety Series No. 35-G1, Safety Assessment of Research Reactors and Preparation of the Safety Analysis Report, providing detailed discussion and examples of related topics. Guidance is given in this report for carrying out safety analyses of research reactors, based on current international good practices. The report covers all the various steps required for a safety analysis; that is, selection of initiating events and acceptance criteria, rules and conventions, types of safety analysis, selection of

  14. On-site transportation and handling of uranium-233 special nuclear material: Preliminary hazards and accident analysis. Final

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solack, T.; West, D.; Ullman, D.; Coppock, G.; Cox, C.

    1995-01-01

    U-233 Special Nuclear Material (SNM) currently stored at the T-Building Storage Areas A and B must be transported to the SW/R Tritium Complex for repackaging. This SNM is in the form of oxide powder contained in glass jars which in turn are contained in heat sealed double polyethylene bags. These doubled-bagged glass jars have been primarily stored in structural steel casks and birdcages for approximately 20 years. The three casks, eight birdcages, and one pail/pressure vessel will be loaded onto a transport truck and moved over an eight day period. The Preliminary Hazards and Accident Analysis for the on-site transportation and handling of Uranium-233 Special Nuclear Material, documented herein, was performed in accordance with the format and content guidance of DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, dated July 1994, specifically Chapter Three, Hazard and Accident Analysis. The Preliminary Hazards Analysis involved detailed walkdowns of all areas of the U-233 SNM movement route, including the T-Building Storage Area A and B, T-Building truck tunnel, and the roadway route. Extensive discussions were held with operations personnel from the Nuclear Material Control Group, Nuclear Materials Accountability Group, EG and G Mound Security and the Material Handling Systems Transportation Group. Existing documentation related to the on-site transportation of hazardous materials, T-Building and SW/R Tritium Complex SARs, and emergency preparedness/response documentation were also reviewed and analyzed to identify and develop the complete spectrum of energy source hazards

  15. 76 FR 53086 - Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-08-25

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part 192 [Docket No. PHMSA-2011-0023] RIN 2137-AE72 Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Department of Transportation (DOT...

  16. SU-D-201-05: On the Automatic Recognition of Patient Safety Hazards in a Radiotherapy Setup Using a Novel 3D Camera System and a Deep Learning Framework

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Santhanam, A; Min, Y; Beron, P; Agazaryan, N; Kupelian, P; Low, D [UCLA, Los Angeles, CA (United States)

    2016-06-15

    Purpose: Patient safety hazards such as a wrong patient/site getting treated can lead to catastrophic results. The purpose of this project is to automatically detect potential patient safety hazards during the radiotherapy setup and alert the therapist before the treatment is initiated. Methods: We employed a set of co-located and co-registered 3D cameras placed inside the treatment room. Each camera provided a point-cloud of fraxels (fragment pixels with 3D depth information). Each of the cameras were calibrated using a custom-built calibration target to provide 3D information with less than 2 mm error in the 500 mm neighborhood around the isocenter. To identify potential patient safety hazards, the treatment room components and the patient’s body needed to be identified and tracked in real-time. For feature recognition purposes, we used a graph-cut based feature recognition with principal component analysis (PCA) based feature-to-object correlation to segment the objects in real-time. Changes in the object’s position were tracked using the CamShift algorithm. The 3D object information was then stored for each classified object (e.g. gantry, couch). A deep learning framework was then used to analyze all the classified objects in both 2D and 3D and was then used to fine-tune a convolutional network for object recognition. The number of network layers were optimized to identify the tracked objects with >95% accuracy. Results: Our systematic analyses showed that, the system was effectively able to recognize wrong patient setups and wrong patient accessories. The combined usage of 2D camera information (color + depth) enabled a topology-preserving approach to verify patient safety hazards in an automatic manner and even in scenarios where the depth information is partially available. Conclusion: By utilizing the 3D cameras inside the treatment room and a deep learning based image classification, potential patient safety hazards can be effectively avoided.

  17. SU-D-201-05: On the Automatic Recognition of Patient Safety Hazards in a Radiotherapy Setup Using a Novel 3D Camera System and a Deep Learning Framework

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Santhanam, A; Min, Y; Beron, P; Agazaryan, N; Kupelian, P; Low, D

    2016-01-01

    Purpose: Patient safety hazards such as a wrong patient/site getting treated can lead to catastrophic results. The purpose of this project is to automatically detect potential patient safety hazards during the radiotherapy setup and alert the therapist before the treatment is initiated. Methods: We employed a set of co-located and co-registered 3D cameras placed inside the treatment room. Each camera provided a point-cloud of fraxels (fragment pixels with 3D depth information). Each of the cameras were calibrated using a custom-built calibration target to provide 3D information with less than 2 mm error in the 500 mm neighborhood around the isocenter. To identify potential patient safety hazards, the treatment room components and the patient’s body needed to be identified and tracked in real-time. For feature recognition purposes, we used a graph-cut based feature recognition with principal component analysis (PCA) based feature-to-object correlation to segment the objects in real-time. Changes in the object’s position were tracked using the CamShift algorithm. The 3D object information was then stored for each classified object (e.g. gantry, couch). A deep learning framework was then used to analyze all the classified objects in both 2D and 3D and was then used to fine-tune a convolutional network for object recognition. The number of network layers were optimized to identify the tracked objects with >95% accuracy. Results: Our systematic analyses showed that, the system was effectively able to recognize wrong patient setups and wrong patient accessories. The combined usage of 2D camera information (color + depth) enabled a topology-preserving approach to verify patient safety hazards in an automatic manner and even in scenarios where the depth information is partially available. Conclusion: By utilizing the 3D cameras inside the treatment room and a deep learning based image classification, potential patient safety hazards can be effectively avoided.

  18. A complete electrical hazard classification system and its application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gordon, Lloyd B [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Cartelli, Laura [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    The Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, NFPA 70E, and relevant OSHA electrical safety standards evolved to address the hazards of 60-Hz power that are faced primarily by electricians, linemen, and others performing facility and utility work. This leaves a substantial gap in the management of electrical hazards in Research and Development (R&D) and specialized high voltage and high power equipment. Examples include lasers, accelerators, capacitor banks, electroplating systems, induction and dielectric heating systems, etc. Although all such systems are fed by 50/60 Hz alternating current (ac) power, we find substantial use of direct current (dc) electrical energy, and the use of capacitors, inductors, batteries, and radiofrequency (RF) power. The electrical hazards of these forms of electricity and their systems are different than for 50160 Hz power. Over the past 10 years there has been an effort to develop a method of classifying all of the electrical hazards found in all types of R&D and utilization equipment. Examples of the variation of these hazards from NFPA 70E include (a) high voltage can be harmless, if the available current is sufficiently low, (b) low voltage can be harmful if the available current/power is high, (c) high voltage capacitor hazards are unique and include severe reflex action, affects on the heart, and tissue damage, and (d) arc flash hazard analysis for dc and capacitor systems are not provided in existing standards. This work has led to a comprehensive electrical hazard classification system that is based on various research conducted over the past 100 years, on analysis of such systems in R&D, and on decades of experience. Initially, national electrical safety codes required the qualified worker only to know the source voltage to determine the shock hazard. Later, as arc flash hazards were understood, the fault current and clearing time were needed. These items are still insufficient to fully characterize all types of

  19. Multi-hazard risk analysis for management strategies

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kappes, M.; Keiler, M.; Bell, R.; Glade, T.

    2009-04-01

    Risk management is very often operating in a reactive way, responding to an event, instead of proactive starting with risk analysis and building up the whole process of risk evaluation, prevention, event management and regeneration. Since damage and losses from natural hazards raise continuously more and more studies, concepts (e.g. Switzerland or South Tyrol-Bolozano) and software packages (e.g. ARMAGEDOM, HAZUS or RiskScape) are developed to guide, standardize and facilitate the risk analysis. But these approaches focus on different aspects and are mostly closely adapted to the situation (legislation, organization of the administration, specific processes etc.) of the specific country or region. We propose in this study the development of a flexible methodology for multi-hazard risk analysis, identifying the stakeholders and their needs, processes and their characteristics, modeling approaches as well as incoherencies occurring by combining all these different aspects. Based on this concept a flexible software package will be established consisting of ArcGIS as central base and being complemented by various modules for hazard modeling, vulnerability assessment and risk calculation. Not all modules will be developed newly but taken from the current state-of-the-art and connected or integrated into ArcGIS. For this purpose two study sites, Valtellina in Italy and Bacelonnette in France, were chosen and the hazards types debris flows, rockfalls, landslides, avalanches and floods are planned to be included in the tool for a regional multi-hazard risk analysis. Since the central idea of this tool is its flexibility this will only be a first step, in the future further processes and scales can be included and the instrument thus adapted to any study site.

  20. Risk analysis procedure for post-wildfire natural hazards in British Columbia

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jordan, Peter

    2010-05-01

    Following a severe wildfire season in 2003, and several subsequent damaging debris flow and flood events, the British Columbia Forest Service developed a procedure for analysing risks to public safety and infrastructure from such events. At the same time, the Forest Service undertook a research program to determine the extent of post-wildfire hazards, and examine the hydrologic and geomorphic processes contributing to the hazards. The risk analysis procedure follows the Canadian Standards Association decision-making framework for risk management (which in turn is based on international standards). This has several steps: identification of risk, risk analysis and estimation, evaluation of risk tolerability, developing control or mitigation strategies, and acting on these strategies. The Forest Service procedure deals only with the first two steps. The results are passed on to authorities such as the Provincial Emergency Program and local government, who are responsible for evaluating risks, warning residents, and applying mitigation strategies if appropriate. The objective of the procedure is to identify and analyse risks to public safety and infrastructure. The procedure is loosely based on the BAER (burned area emergency response) program in the USA, with some important differences. Our procedure focuses on identifying risks and warning affected parties, not on mitigation activities such as broadcast erosion control measures. Partly this is due to limited staff and financial resources. Also, our procedure is not multi-agency, but is limited to wildfires on provincial forest land; in British Columbia about 95% of forest land is in the publicly-owned provincial forest. Each fire season, wildfires are screened by size and proximity to values at risk such as populated areas. For selected fires, when the fire is largely contained, the procedure begins with an aerial reconnaissance of the fire, and photography with a hand-held camera, which can be used to make a

  1. [The safety data sheets of the paint and coatings sector: analysis of the items of most interest to health and safety in the workplace].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Boniardi, Luca; Canti, Zulejka; Cantoni, Susanna; Fustinoni, Silvia

    2014-07-15

    The interlinked REACH-CLP regulations promote the sharing of knowledge regarding the risks and hazards of chemicals throughout the supply chain. The safety data sheet (SDS) is the main instrument to achieve this goal. to study 100 SDS of paints and coatings sector in order to highlight major criticisms related to health and safety of workers. Using the criteria prescribed by Regulation 453/2010/EC and preparing a suitable check list, some items of the sections 1 "Identification of the substance/mixture and of the company", 2 "Hazards identification", 3 "Composition/information on ingredients", the first part of section 7 "Precautions for safe handling", sections 8 "Exposure controls/personal protection" and 16 "Other information", were therefore evaluated for their appropriateness. Seven SDS were written in a foreign language and were excluded from further analysis. Of the remaining 93 SDS, only 23% had a proportion of adequate items greater than 80%, 49 % had adequate items between 60 and 80%, and 28% had less than 60% adequate items. The most critical sections were those relating to workers' safe handling and exposure controls and protection. In conclusion, from the analysis of SDS we found high percentages of inadequacy, especially in sections 7 and 8, the most relevant for the protection of the health and safety of workers.

  2. 76 FR 70953 - Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-16

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part 192 [Docket ID PHMSA-2011-0023] RIN 2137-AE72 Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA); DOT. ACTION: Advance notice of...

  3. Frame-based safety analysis approach for decision-based errors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fan, Chin-Feng; Yihb, Swu

    1997-01-01

    A frame-based approach is proposed to analyze decision-based errors made by automatic controllers or human operators due to erroneous reference frames. An integrated framework, Two Frame Model (TFM), is first proposed to model the dynamic interaction between the physical process and the decision-making process. Two important issues, consistency and competing processes, are raised. Consistency between the physical and logic frames makes a TFM-based system work properly. Loss of consistency refers to the failure mode that the logic frame does not accurately reflect the state of the controlled processes. Once such failure occurs, hazards may arise. Among potential hazards, the competing effect between the controller and the controlled process is the most severe one, which may jeopardize a defense-in-depth design. When the logic and physical frames are inconsistent, conventional safety analysis techniques are inadequate. We propose Frame-based Fault Tree; Analysis (FFTA) and Frame-based Event Tree Analysis (FETA) under TFM to deduce the context for decision errors and to separately generate the evolution of the logical frame as opposed to that of the physical frame. This multi-dimensional analysis approach, different from the conventional correctness-centred approach, provides a panoramic view in scenario generation. Case studies using the proposed techniques are also given to demonstrate their usage and feasibility

  4. Regulatory Activities to the Natural Hazard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Kangryong; Jung, Raeyoung

    2008-01-01

    The safety of the Nuclear Power Plants(NPPs) against the natural hazards has been investigated focused on earthquake and tsunami. Since the mass media and general people have high interests on nuclear safety whenever the natural hazards occur, earthquake and tsunami are not only technical safety concern, but also psychological issues in terms of public acceptance of nuclear energy. The Korean peninsula has been considered as a safe zone compared to neighboring countries against natural hazard, but the historical documents which state severely damaged events due to the strong earthquake make US paying careful attention to assure the safety against natural phenomenon. The potential and characteristics of earthquake and tsunami have been examined, and the status of seismic and tsunami safety of the NPPs in Korea is described. the follow-up action after disastrous huge earthquake and tsunami occurred in neighboring countries is summarized as well. The assessment results show that the NPPs in Korea are well designed, constructed and maintained with certain amount of safety margin against natural hazards, and the utility and the regulatory body are continuously doing an effort to enhance the safety with consideration of lessons learned from big events in other countries

  5. 40 CFR 68.65 - Process safety information.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... (CONTINUED) CHEMICAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROVISIONS Program 3 Prevention Program § 68.65 Process safety... 40 Protection of Environment 15 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Process safety information. 68.65... compilation of written process safety information before conducting any process hazard analysis required by...

  6. Industry-specific risk models for numerical scoring of hazards and prioritization of safety measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khali, Y.F.; Johnson, K.

    2004-01-01

    Risk analysis consists of five cornerstones that have to be viewed in an holistic manner by risk practitioners of any organization regardless of the industry type or nature of its critical infrastructures. The cornerstones are hazard identification, risk assessment and consequence analysis, determination of risk management actions required to reduce risks to acceptable levels, communication of risk insights among the stake-holders, and continuous monitoring and verification to ensure sustained attainment of tolerable risk levels. Our primary objectives in this research are two fold: first, we compare and contrast a wide spectrum of current industry-specific and application-dependent semi-quantitative risk models. Secondly, based on the insights to be gained from the first task, we propose a framework for a robust risk-based approach for conducting security vulnerability assessment (SVA). Risk practitioners of critical infrastructures, such as commercial nuclear power plants, water utilities, chemical plants, transmission and distribution substations... etc., could readily use this proposed approach to classify, evaluate, and prioritize risks to support allocation of resources required to ensure protection of public health and safety. (author)

  7. Nuclear Safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Silver, E G [ed.

    1989-01-01

    This document is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated.

  8. Preparation of safety analysis reports (SARs) for near surface radioactive waste disposal facilities. Format and content of SARs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-02-01

    All facilities at which radioactive wastes are processed, stored and disposed of have the potential for causing hazards to humans and to the environment. Precautions must be taken in the siting, design and operation of the facilities to ensure that an adequate level of safety is achieved. The processes by which this is evaluated is called safety assessment. An important part of safety assessment is the documentation of the process. A well prepared safety analysis report (SAR) is essential if approval of the facility is to be obtained from the regulatory authorities. This TECDOC describes the format and content of a safety analysis report for a near surface radioactive waste disposal facility and will serve essentially as a checklist in this respect

  9. Safety training priorities

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thompson, N. A.; Ruck, H. W.

    1984-04-01

    The Air Force is interested in identifying potentially hazardous tasks and prevention of accidents. This effort proposes four methods for determining safety training priorities for job tasks in three enlisted specialties. These methods can be used to design training aimed at avoiding loss of people, time, materials, and money associated with on-the-job accidents. Job tasks performed by airmen were measured using task and job factor ratings. Combining accident reports and job inventories, subject-matter experts identified tasks associated with accidents over a 3-year period. Applying correlational, multiple regression, and cost-benefit analysis, four methods were developed for ordering hazardous tasks to determine safety training priorities.

  10. The application of integrated safety management principles to the Tritium Extraction Facility project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hickman, M.O.; Viviano, R.R.

    2000-01-01

    analysis, preliminary safety analysis report, fire hazard analysis, and design process hazards review. As a result of these reviews, hazard mitigation and minimization attributes were incorporated into the design requirements of the TEF

  11. A critical analysis of hazard resilience measures within sustainability assessment frameworks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matthews, Elizabeth C.; Sattler, Meredith; Friedland, Carol J.

    2014-01-01

    Today, numerous sustainability assessment frameworks (SAFs) exist to guide designers in achieving sustainable performance in the design of structures and communities. SAFs are beneficial in educating users and are useful tools for incorporating sustainability strategies into planning, design, and construction; however, there is currently a substantial gap in the ability of existing SAFs to incorporate hazard resistance and hazard mitigation in the broader context of sustainable design. This paper analyzes the incorporation of hazard resistant design and hazard mitigation strategies within SAFs via a multi-level analysis of eleven SAFs. The SAFs analyzed range in scale of application (i.e. building, site, community). Three levels of analysis are presented: (1) macro-level analysis comparing the number of measures strictly addressing resilience versus sustainability, (2) meso-level analysis of the coverage of types of hazards within SAFs (e.g. flood, fire), and (3) micro-level analysis of SAF measures connected to flood-related hazard resilience. The results demonstrate that hazard resistance and hazard mitigation do not figure prominently in the intent of SAFs and that weaknesses in resilience coverage exist that have the potential to lead to the design of structures and communities that are still highly vulnerable to the impacts of extreme events. - Highlights: • Sustainability assessment frameworks (SAFs) were analyzed for resilience coverage • Hazard resistance and mitigation do not figure prominently in the intent of SAFs • Approximately 75% of SAFs analyzed address three or fewer hazards • Lack of economic measures within SAFs could impact resilience and sustainability • Resilience measures for flood hazards are not consistently included in SAFs

  12. A critical analysis of hazard resilience measures within sustainability assessment frameworks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matthews, Elizabeth C., E-mail: echiso1@lsu.edu [Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA (United States); Sattler, Meredith, E-mail: msattler@lsu.edu [School of Architecture, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA (United States); Friedland, Carol J., E-mail: friedland@lsu.edu [Bert S. Turner Department of Construction Management, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA (United States)

    2014-11-15

    Today, numerous sustainability assessment frameworks (SAFs) exist to guide designers in achieving sustainable performance in the design of structures and communities. SAFs are beneficial in educating users and are useful tools for incorporating sustainability strategies into planning, design, and construction; however, there is currently a substantial gap in the ability of existing SAFs to incorporate hazard resistance and hazard mitigation in the broader context of sustainable design. This paper analyzes the incorporation of hazard resistant design and hazard mitigation strategies within SAFs via a multi-level analysis of eleven SAFs. The SAFs analyzed range in scale of application (i.e. building, site, community). Three levels of analysis are presented: (1) macro-level analysis comparing the number of measures strictly addressing resilience versus sustainability, (2) meso-level analysis of the coverage of types of hazards within SAFs (e.g. flood, fire), and (3) micro-level analysis of SAF measures connected to flood-related hazard resilience. The results demonstrate that hazard resistance and hazard mitigation do not figure prominently in the intent of SAFs and that weaknesses in resilience coverage exist that have the potential to lead to the design of structures and communities that are still highly vulnerable to the impacts of extreme events. - Highlights: • Sustainability assessment frameworks (SAFs) were analyzed for resilience coverage • Hazard resistance and mitigation do not figure prominently in the intent of SAFs • Approximately 75% of SAFs analyzed address three or fewer hazards • Lack of economic measures within SAFs could impact resilience and sustainability • Resilience measures for flood hazards are not consistently included in SAFs.

  13. Tsunami hazard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami on 11 March, 2011 has led the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant to a serious accident, which highlighted a variety of technical issues such as a very low design tsunami height and insufficient preparations in case a tsunami exceeding the design tsunami height. Lessons such as to take measures to be able to maintain the important safety features of the facility for tsunamis exceeding design height and to implement risk management utilizing Probabilistic Safety Assessment are shown. In order to implement the safety assessment on nuclear power plants across Japan accordingly to the back-fit rule, Nuclear Regulatory Commission will promulgate/execute the New Safety Design Criteria in July 2013. JNES has positioned the 'enhancement of probabilistic tsunami hazard assessment' as highest priority issue and implemented in order to support technically the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in formulating the new Safety Design Criteria. Findings of the research had reflected in the 'Technical Review Guidelines for Assessing Design Tsunami Height based on tsunami hazards'. (author)

  14. Health and safety training for hazardous waste site activities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Implementation of OSHA 29 CFR 1910.120(e)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, D.A.

    1988-01-01

    Among the requirements set forth by the interim final rule, 29 CFR Part 1910.120, promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in response to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), are specific provisions for health and safety training of employees involved in hazardous waste operations. These training provisions require a minimum of 40 hours of initial instruction off the site for employees involved in corrective operations and cleanup activities at hazardous waste sites. A less detailed training requirement of 24 hours is specified for employees working in more routine treatment, storage, and disposal activities. Managers and supervisors who are directly responsible for or who supervise employees engaged in hazardous waste operations must complete 8 additional hours of training related to management of hazardous waste site activities. Consistent with the intent of 29 CFR 1910.120, a training program has been developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to comply with the need to protect the safety and health of hazardous waste workers. All hourly requirements specified in the interim final rule are met by a comprehensive program structure involving three stages of training. This paper will outline and discuss the content of each of these stages of the program. The involvement of various ORNL organizations in facilitating the training will be highlighted. Implementation strategies will be discussed as well as progress made to date

  15. ARIES-AT safety design and analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Petti, D.A. [Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Fusion Safety Program, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415 (United States)]. E-mail: David.Petti@inl.gov; Merrill, B.J. [Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Fusion Safety Program, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415 (United States); Moore, R.L. [Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Fusion Safety Program, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415 (United States); Longhurst, G.R. [Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Fusion Safety Program, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415 (United States); El-Guebaly, L. [Fusion Technology Institute, 1500 Engineering Drive, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706 (United States); Mogahed, E. [Fusion Technology Institute, 1500 Engineering Drive, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706 (United States); Henderson, D. [Fusion Technology Institute, 1500 Engineering Drive, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706 (United States); Wilson, P. [Fusion Technology Institute, 1500 Engineering Drive, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706 (United States); Abdou, A. [Fusion Technology Institute, 1500 Engineering Drive, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706 (United States)

    2006-01-15

    ARIES-AT is a 1000 MWe conceptual fusion power plant design with a very low projected cost of electricity. The design contains many innovative features to improve both the physics and engineering performance of the system. From the safety and environmental perspective, there is greater depth to the overall analysis than in past ARIES studies. For ARIES-AT, the overall spectrum of off-normal events to be examined has been broadened. They include conventional loss of coolant and loss of flow events, an ex-vessel loss of coolant, and in-vessel off-normal events that mobilize in-vessel inventories (e.g., tritium and tokamak dust) and bypass primary confinement such as a loss of vacuum and an in-vessel loss of coolant with bypass. This broader examination of accidents improves the robustness of the design from the safety perspective and gives additional confidence that the facility can meet the no-evacuation requirement under average weather conditions. We also provide a systematic assessment of the design to address key safety functions such as confinement, decay heat removal, and chemical energy control. In the area of waste management, both the volume of the component and its hazard are used to classify the waste. In comparison to previous ARIES designs, the overall waste volume is less because of the compact design.

  16. A Real-Time Construction Safety Monitoring System for Hazardous Gas Integrating Wireless Sensor Network and Building Information Modeling Technologies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cheung, Weng-Fong; Lin, Tzu-Hsuan; Lin, Yu-Cheng

    2018-02-02

    In recent years, many studies have focused on the application of advanced technology as a way to improve management of construction safety management. A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), one of the key technologies in Internet of Things (IoT) development, enables objects and devices to sense and communicate environmental conditions; Building Information Modeling (BIM), a revolutionary technology in construction, integrates database and geometry into a digital model which provides a visualized way in all construction lifecycle management. This paper integrates BIM and WSN into a unique system which enables the construction site to visually monitor the safety status via a spatial, colored interface and remove any hazardous gas automatically. Many wireless sensor nodes were placed on an underground construction site and to collect hazardous gas level and environmental condition (temperature and humidity) data, and in any region where an abnormal status is detected, the BIM model will alert the region and an alarm and ventilator on site will start automatically for warning and removing the hazard. The proposed system can greatly enhance the efficiency in construction safety management and provide an important reference information in rescue tasks. Finally, a case study demonstrates the applicability of the proposed system and the practical benefits, limitations, conclusions, and suggestions are summarized for further applications.

  17. Safety in handling helium and nitrogen

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmauch, G.; Lansing, L.; Santay, T.; Nahmias, D.

    1991-01-01

    Based upon the authors' industrial experience and practices, they have provided an overview of safety in storage, handling, and transfer of both laboratory and bulk quantities of gaseous and liquid forms of nitrogen and helium. They have addressed the properties and characteristics of both the gaseous and liquid fluids, typical storage and transport containers, transfer techniques, and the associated hazards which include low temperatures, high pressures, and asphyxiation. Methods and procedures to control and eliminate these hazards are described, as well as risk remediation through safety awareness training, personal protective equipment, area ventilation, and atmosphere monitoring. They have included as an example a recent process hazards analysis performed by Air Products on the asphyxiation hazard associated with the use of liquid helium in MRI magnet systems

  18. Safety management in research and development organisation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nivedha, T.

    2016-01-01

    Health and safety is one of the most important aspects of an organizations smooth and effective functioning. It depends on the safety management, health management, motivation, leadership and training, welfare facilities, accident statistics, policy, organization and administration, hazard control and risk analysis, monitoring, statistics and reporting. Workplace accidents are increasingly common, main causes are untidiness, noise, too hot or cold environments, old or poorly maintained machines, and lack of training or carelessness of employees. One of the biggest issues facing employers today is the safety of their employees. This study aims at analyzing the occupational health and safety of Research organization in Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research by gathering information on health management, safety management, motivation, leadership and training, welfare facilities, accident statistics, organization and administration, hazard control and risk analysis, monitoring, statistics and reporting. Data were collected by using questionnaires which were developed on health and safety management system. (author)

  19. Advanced Photon Source experimental beamline Safety Assessment Document: Addendum to the Advanced Photon Source Accelerator Systems Safety Assessment Document (APS-3.2.2.1.0)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    This Safety Assessment Document (SAD) addresses commissioning and operation of the experimental beamlines at the Advanced Photon Source (APS). Purpose of this document is to identify and describe the hazards associated with commissioning and operation of these beamlines and to document the measures taken to minimize these hazards and mitigate the hazard consequences. The potential hazards associated with the commissioning and operation of the APS facility have been identified and analyzed. Physical and administrative controls mitigate identified hazards. No hazard exists in this facility that has not been previously encountered and successfully mitigated in other accelerator and synchrotron radiation research facilities. This document is an updated version of the APS Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). During the review of the PSAR in February 1990, the APS was determined to be a Low Hazard Facility. On June 14, 1993, the Acting Director of the Office of Energy Research endorsed the designation of the APS as a Low Hazard Facility, and this Safety Assessment Document supports that designation

  20. Layout of the safety analysis report for nuclear power plants with pressurized water reactor or boiling water reactor in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albrecht, E.

    1980-01-01

    For a licence according to paragraph 7 of the Atomic Energy Act to construct and operate a nuclear power plant, the applicant has to submit a safety analysis report, which must describe the site, the plant, all hazards in connection with the plant and the proposed safety precautions. For the structure and the content of a safety analysis report, a first guideline was published in 1959. Only a few safety analysis reports were prepared nearly strictly according to this guideline. In 1976 a second guideline was published for a standard safety analysis report. The lecture deals with the guidelines. A survey over the structure and content of the German safety analysis reports will be given. The experience gained by the new safety analysis reports will be discussed. (orig.)

  1. Preliminary Assessment of Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements for Airborne Trajectory Management (ABTM) Roadmap Applications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cotton, William B.; Hilb, Robert; Koczo, Stefan, Jr.; Wing, David J.

    2016-01-01

    A set of five developmental steps building from the NASA TASAR (Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests) concept are described, each providing incrementally more efficiency and capacity benefits to airspace system users and service providers, culminating in a Full Airborne Trajectory Management capability. For each of these steps, the incremental Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements are identified for later use in future formal safety assessments intended to lead to certification and operational approval of the equipment and the associated procedures. Two established safety assessment methodologies that are compliant with the FAA's Safety Management System were used leading to Failure Effects Classifications (FEC) for each of the steps. The most likely FEC for the first three steps, Basic TASAR, Digital TASAR, and 4D TASAR, is "No effect". For step four, Strategic Airborne Trajectory Management, the likely FEC is "Minor". For Full Airborne Trajectory Management (Step 5), the most likely FEC is "Major".

  2. Fire hazard analysis for the fuel supply shutdown storage buildings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    REMAIZE, J.A.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of a fire hazards analysis (FHA) is to comprehensively assess the risk from fire and other perils within individual fire areas in a DOE facility in relation to proposed fire protection so as to ascertain whether the objectives of DOE 5480.7A, Fire Protection, are met. This Fire Hazards Analysis was prepared as required by HNF-PRO-350, Fire Hazards Analysis Requirements, (Reference 7) for a portion of the 300 Area N Reactor Fuel Fabrication and Storage Facility

  3. SRL process hazards review manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-08-01

    The principal objective of the Process Hazards Management Program is to provide a regular, systematic review of each process at the Savannah River Laboratory (SRL) to eliminate injuries and to minimize property damage resulting from process hazards of catastrophic potential. Management effort is directed, through the Du Pont Safety Program, toward those controls and practices that ensure this objective. The Process Hazards Management Program provides an additional dimension to further ensure the health and safety of employees and the public. Du Pont has concluded that an organized approach is essential to obtain an effective and efficient process hazards review. The intent of this manual is to provide guidance in creating such an organized approach to performing process hazards reviews on a continuing basis

  4. Time Based Workload Analysis Method for Safety-Related Operator Actions in Safety Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Yun Goo; Oh, Eung Se [Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co., Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    During the design basis event, the safety system performs safety functions to mitigate the event. The most of safety system is actuated by automatic system however, there are operator manual actions that are needed for the plant safety. These operator actions are classified as important human actions in human factors engineering design. The human factors engineering analysis and evaluation is needed for these important human actions to assure that operator successfully perform their tasks for plant safety and operational goals. The work load analysis is one of the required analysis for the important human actions.

  5. Time Based Workload Analysis Method for Safety-Related Operator Actions in Safety Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Yun Goo; Oh, Eung Se

    2016-01-01

    During the design basis event, the safety system performs safety functions to mitigate the event. The most of safety system is actuated by automatic system however, there are operator manual actions that are needed for the plant safety. These operator actions are classified as important human actions in human factors engineering design. The human factors engineering analysis and evaluation is needed for these important human actions to assure that operator successfully perform their tasks for plant safety and operational goals. The work load analysis is one of the required analysis for the important human actions.

  6. Barrow hazards survey

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    Following a series of public meetings at which PERG presented the results of a literature review and site specific accident study of the hazards of the maritime transport of spent nuclear reactor fuel to Barrow (en route to the Windscale reprocessing works), PERG was requested by the Planning Committee of Barrow Town Council to prepare an assessment of the interaction of the hazards arising from the concentration of nuclear activities in the area with those of a proposed gas-terminal. This report presents a preliminary review of the Environmental Impact Assessments prepared by the Borough Surveyor and a critical appraisal of the hazard analyses undertaken by the Health and Safety Executive, and the consultants to Cumbria County Council on this matter, the Safety and Reliability Directorate of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. After a general and historical introduction, the document continues under the following headings: a description of the hazards (BNFL spent fuel shipments; the gas terminal; gas condensate storage; the Vickers shipyard (involving nuclear powered submarines)); the interaction of hazards; planning implications and democratic decisions; recommendations. (U.K.)

  7. Safety Analysis (SA) of the decontamination facility, Building 419, at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Odell, B.N.

    1980-01-01

    This safety analysis was performed for the Manager, Plant Services at LLNL and fulfills the requirements of DOE Order 5481.1. The analysis was based on field inspections, document review, computer calculations, and extensive input from Waste Management personnel. It was concluded that the maximum quantities of radioactive materials that safety procedures allow to be handled in this building do not pose undue risks on- or off-site even in postulated severe accidents. Risk from the various hazards at this facility vary from low to moderate as specified in DOE Order 5481.1. Recommendations are made for improvements that will reduce risks even further

  8. GUI program to compute probabilistic seismic hazard analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Jin Soo; Chi, H. C.; Cho, J. C.; Park, J. H.; Kim, K. G.; Im, I. S.

    2006-12-01

    The development of program to compute probabilistic seismic hazard is completed based on Graphic User Interface(GUI). The main program consists of three part - the data input processes, probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and result output processes. The probabilistic seismic hazard analysis needs various input data which represent attenuation formulae, seismic zoning map, and earthquake event catalog. The input procedure of previous programs based on text interface take a much time to prepare the data. The data cannot be checked directly on screen to prevent input erroneously in existing methods. The new program simplifies the input process and enable to check the data graphically in order to minimize the artificial error within limits of the possibility

  9. Management of construction safety at KKNPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khare, P.K.

    2016-01-01

    Construction is considered as one of the most hazardous activities owing to the number of accidents and injuries. At KKNPP, management of industrial safety has been envisaged since the preliminary stage of construction planning, including design aspects. The governing principles of safety management are evolved from the Factories Act, 1948, the Atomic Energy(Factories) Rules, 1996, AERB safety guidelines on Control of works (2011) and Corporate HSE policy of NPCIL (2014). Numerous risk assessment and hazard control measures are adopted consistently to ensure a safe work environment during the construction, which includes Job Hazard Analysis, work permit through Computerized Maintenance Management System, safety procedures, exclusive safety training facility for the contractor's workmen, safety motivational measures, safety surveillance and reporting through Safety Related Deficiencies Management System. Assessment of efficacy of safety management system is continuously done through safety audits and observations are being circulated and discussed in committee meetings. Fire safety is also being taken care of since inception of project work. Well-equipped fire station with trained fire fighters was made available since the beginning as per AERB safety standard on fire protection system for Nuclear facilities. Fire prevention measures specific to the work are implemented during all activities. (author)

  10. Tank farms hazards assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broz, R.E.

    1994-01-01

    Hanford contractors are writing new facility specific emergency procedures in response to new and revised US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders on emergency preparedness. Emergency procedures are required for each Hanford facility that has the potential to exceed the criteria for the lowest level emergency, an Alert. The set includes: (1) a facility specific procedure on Recognition and Classification of Emergencies, (2) area procedures on Initial Emergency Response and, (3) an area procedure on Protective Action Guidance. The first steps in developing these procedures are to identify the hazards at each facility, identify the conditions that could release the hazardous material, and calculate the consequences of the releases. These steps are called a Hazards Assessment. The final product is a document that is similar in some respects to a Safety Analysis Report (SAR). The document could br produced in a month for a simple facility but could take much longer for a complex facility. Hanford has both types of facilities. A strategy has been adopted to permit completion of the first version of the new emergency procedures before all the facility hazards Assessments are complete. The procedures will initially be based on input from a task group for each facility. This strategy will but improved emergency procedures in place sooner and therefore enhance Hanford emergency preparedness. The purpose of this document is to summarize the applicable information contained within the Waste Tank Facility ''Interim Safety Basis Document, WHC-SD-WM-ISB-001'' as a resource, since the SARs covering Waste Tank Operations are not current in all cases. This hazards assessment serves to collect, organize, document and present the information utilized during the determination process

  11. Using Monte Carlo techniques and parallel processing for debris hazard analysis of rocket systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    LaFarge, R.A.

    1994-02-01

    Sandia National Laboratories has been involved with rocket systems for many years. Some of these systems have carried high explosive onboard, while others have had FTS for destruction purposes whenever a potential hazard is detected. Recently, Sandia has also been involved with flight tests in which a target vehicle is intentionally destroyed by a projectile. Such endeavors always raise questions about the safety of personnel and the environment in the event of a premature detonation of the explosive or an activation of the FTS, as well as intentional vehicle destruction. Previous attempts to investigate fragmentation hazards for similar configurations have analyzed fragment size and shape in detail but have computed only a limited number of trajectories to determine the probabilities of impact and casualty expectations. A computer program SAFETIE has been written in support of various SNL flight experiments to compute better approximations of the hazards. SAFETIE uses the AMEER trajectory computer code and the Engineering Sciences Center LAN of Sun workstations to determine more realistically the probability of impact for an arbitrary number of exclusion areas. The various debris generation models are described.

  12. Hazard Evaluation for Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Sludge at the Solid Waste Treatment Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SCHULTZ, M.V.

    2000-01-01

    As part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) storage basin clean-up project, sludge that has accumulated in the K Basins due to corrosion of damaged irradiated N Reactor will be loaded into containers and placed in interim storage. The Hanford Site Treatment Complex (T Plant) has been identified as the location where the sludge will be stored until final disposition of the material occurs. Long term storage of sludge from the K Basin fuel storage facilities requires identification and analysis of potential accidents involving sludge storage in T Plant. This report is prepared as the initial step in the safety assurance process described in DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports and HNF-PRO-704, Hazards and Accident Analysis Process. This report documents the evaluation of potential hazards and off-normal events associated with sludge storage activities. This information will be used in subsequent safety analyses, design, and operations procedure development to ensure safe storage. The hazards evaluation for the storage of SNF sludge in T-Plant used the Hazards and Operability Analysis (HazOp) method. The hazard evaluation identified 42 potential hazardous conditions. No hazardous conditions involving hazardous/toxic chemical concerns were identified. Of the 42 items identified in the HazOp study, eight were determined to have potential for onsite worker consequences. No items with potential offsite consequences were identified in the HazOp study. Hazardous conditions with potential onsite worker or offsite consequences are candidates for quantitative consequence analysis. The hazardous conditions with potential onsite worker consequences were grouped into two event categories, Container failure due to overpressure - internal to T Plant, and Spill of multiple containers. The two event categories will be developed into accident scenarios that will be quantitatively analyzed to determine release consequences. A third category, Container failure due to

  13. Hazard avoidance via descent images for safe landing

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yan, Ruicheng; Cao, Zhiguo; Zhu, Lei; Fang, Zhiwen

    2013-10-01

    In planetary or lunar landing missions, hazard avoidance is critical for landing safety. Therefore, it is very important to correctly detect hazards and effectively find a safe landing area during the last stage of descent. In this paper, we propose a passive sensing based HDA (hazard detection and avoidance) approach via descent images to lower the landing risk. In hazard detection stage, a statistical probability model on the basis of the hazard similarity is adopted to evaluate the image and detect hazardous areas, so that a binary hazard image can be generated. Afterwards, a safety coefficient, which jointly utilized the proportion of hazards in the local region and the inside hazard distribution, is proposed to find potential regions with less hazards in the binary hazard image. By using the safety coefficient in a coarse-to-fine procedure and combining it with the local ISD (intensity standard deviation) measure, the safe landing area is determined. The algorithm is evaluated and verified with many simulated descent downward looking images rendered from lunar orbital satellite images.

  14. Calculation of Hazard Category 2/3 Threshold Quantities Using Contemporary Dosimetric Data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Walker, William C. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2017-11-01

    The purpose of this report is to describe the methodology and selection of input data utilized to calculate updated Hazard Category 2 and Hazard Category 3 Threshold Quantities (TQs) using contemporary dosimetric information. The calculation of the updated TQs will be considered for use in the revision to the Department of Energy (DOE) Technical Standard (STD-) 1027-92 Change Notice (CN)-1, “Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.” The updated TQs documented in this report complement an effort previously undertaken by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which in 2014 issued revised Supplemental Guidance documenting the calculation of updated TQs for approximately 100 radionuclides listed in DOE-STD-1027-92, CN-1. The calculations documented in this report complement the NNSA effort by expanding the set of radionuclides to more than 1,250 radionuclides with a published TQ. The development of this report was sponsored by the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Safety (AU-30) within the Associate Under Secretary for Environment, Health, Safety, and Security organization.

  15. [Hazard function and life table: an introduction to the failure time analysis].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Matsushita, K; Inaba, H

    1987-04-01

    Failure time analysis has become popular in demographic studies. It can be viewed as a part of regression analysis with limited dependent variables as well as a special case of event history analysis and multistate demography. The idea of hazard function and failure time analysis, however, has not been properly introduced to nor commonly discussed by demographers in Japan. The concept of hazard function in comparison with life tables is briefly described, where the force of mortality is interchangeable with the hazard rate. The basic idea of failure time analysis is summarized for the cases of exponential distribution, normal distribution, and proportional hazard models. The multiple decrement life table is also introduced as an example of lifetime data analysis with cause-specific hazard rates.

  16. Hazardous-waste analysis plan for LLNL operations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Roberts, R.S.

    1982-02-12

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is involved in many facets of research ranging from nuclear weapons research to advanced Biomedical studies. Approximately 80% of all programs at LLNL generate hazardous waste in one form or another. Aside from producing waste from industrial type operations (oils, solvents, bottom sludges, etc.) many unique and toxic wastes are generated such as phosgene, dioxin (TCDD), radioactive wastes and high explosives. One key to any successful waste management program must address the following: proper identification of the waste, safe handling procedures and proper storage containers and areas. This section of the Waste Management Plan will address methodologies used for the Analysis of Hazardous Waste. In addition to the wastes defined in 40 CFR 261, LLNL and Site 300 also generate radioactive waste not specifically covered by RCRA. However, for completeness, the Waste Analysis Plan will address all hazardous waste.

  17. Hazardous-waste analysis plan for LLNL operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roberts, R.S.

    1982-01-01

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is involved in many facets of research ranging from nuclear weapons research to advanced Biomedical studies. Approximately 80% of all programs at LLNL generate hazardous waste in one form or another. Aside from producing waste from industrial type operations (oils, solvents, bottom sludges, etc.) many unique and toxic wastes are generated such as phosgene, dioxin (TCDD), radioactive wastes and high explosives. One key to any successful waste management program must address the following: proper identification of the waste, safe handling procedures and proper storage containers and areas. This section of the Waste Management Plan will address methodologies used for the Analysis of Hazardous Waste. In addition to the wastes defined in 40 CFR 261, LLNL and Site 300 also generate radioactive waste not specifically covered by RCRA. However, for completeness, the Waste Analysis Plan will address all hazardous waste

  18. Occupational safety in the nuclear power plant. The contribution of sociology to the development of a communication tool for the elimination of hazardous situations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zedler, Christien; Huber, Veit

    2012-01-01

    Nuclear power plant companies make efforts to enhance the operational safety in the plant. Despite a variety of measures the number of accidents at work is still too high, esp. for external personnel. Social psychological considerations were used to develop communication tools for the elimination of hazardous situations, for instance by safety dialogues between employees. The observation of hazardous situations should trigger communication and discussion on the risk of the specific situation. In the contribution practical experiences and recommendations for the realization of a safety dialogue culture in the NPP Grafenrheinfeld are summarized and illustrated by examples.

  19. Analysis of aerosol emission and hazard evaluation of electrical discharge machining (EDM) process.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jose, Mathew; Sivapirakasam, S P; Surianarayanan, M

    2010-01-01

    The safety and environmental aspects of a manufacturing process are important due to increased environmental regulations and life quality. In this paper, the concentration of aerosols in the breathing zone of the operator of Electrical Discharge Machining (EDM), a commonly used non traditional manufacturing process is presented. The pattern of aerosol emissions from this process with varying process parameters such as peak current, pulse duration, dielectric flushing pressure and the level of dielectric was evaluated. Further, the HAZOP technique was employed to identify the inherent safety aspects and fire risk of the EDM process under different working conditions. The analysis of aerosol exposure showed that the concentration of aerosol was increased with increase in the peak current, pulse duration and dielectric level and was decreased with increase in the flushing pressure. It was also found that at higher values of peak current (7A) and pulse duration (520 micros), the concentration of aerosols at breathing zone of the operator was above the permissible exposure limit value for respirable particulates (5 mg/m(3)). HAZOP study of the EDM process showed that this process is vulnerable to fire and explosion hazards. A detailed discussion on preventing the fire and explosion hazard is presented in this paper. The emission and risk of fire of the EDM process can be minimized by selecting proper process parameters and employing appropriate control strategy.

  20. Reduce the methane hazards in collieries, vol. 1.

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Van Zyl, FJ

    1996-10-01

    Full Text Available In an effort to improve safety in the underground environment of a mechanical miner section, with relation to the methane hazard a data obtained with the multi-channel methane monitoring unit, combined with situ and laboratory coal analysis data...

  1. Safety (management and technology). Safety of chemical materials; Anzen (manejimento to tekunoroji). Kagaku busshitsu no anzensei

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yoshida, T. [Hosei Univ., Tokyo (Japan). Faculty of Engineering

    1994-08-05

    In chemical materials there exist hazardous materials causing health damages, environmental pollution, fires and explosions. The hazard analysis has been noted as a means for preventing accidents due to chemical materials. This means leads to an effective method of recognizing hazard, evaluating the risk, and lowering the degree of hazard to an allowable level. This paper describes a hazard analysis of autoreactive materials, out of chemical materials causing fires and explosions, which may react by theirselves and cause accidents. In particular, an example is introduced in which this hazard analysis method is adapted to an experimental production of the next generation gas generating agent for automobile collision safety air-bags. In this manufacturing process, in kneading and granulating processes where lots of materials are handled, materials are used in a moistened state, thus countermeasures for preventing occurrence of combustion and explosion being taken. 5 refs., 2 figs., 4 tabs.

  2. Requirement analysis of the safety-critical software implementation for the nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, Hoon Seon; Jung, Jae Cheon; Kim, Jae Hack; Nam, Sang Ku; Kim, Hang Bae

    2005-01-01

    The safety critical software shall be implemented under the strict regulation and standards along with hardware qualification. In general, the safety critical software has been implemented using functional block language (FBL) and structured language like C in the real project. Software design shall comply with such characteristics as; modularity, simplicity, minimizing the use of sub-routine, and excluding the interrupt logic. To meet these prerequisites, we used the computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tool to substantiate the requirements traceability matrix that were manually developed using Word processors or Spreadsheets. And the coding standard and manual have been developed to confirm the quality of software development process, such as; readability, consistency, and maintainability in compliance with NUREG/CR-6463. System level preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) is performed by analyzing preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) and FMEA document. The modularity concept is effectively implemented for the overall module configurations and functions using RTP software development tool. The response time imposed on the basis of the deterministic structure of the safety-critical software was measured

  3. Freight-train derailment rates for railroad safety and risk analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Xiang; Rapik Saat, M; Barkan, Christopher P L

    2017-01-01

    Derailments are the most common type of train accident in the United States. They cause damage to infrastructure, rolling stock and lading, disrupt service, and have the potential to cause casualties, and harm the environment. Train safety and risk analysis relies on accurate assessment of derailment likelihood. Derailment rate - the number of derailments normalized by traffic exposure - is a useful statistic to estimate the likelihood of a derailment. Despite its importance, derailment rate analysis using multiple factors has not been previously developed. In this paper, we present an analysis of derailment rates on Class I railroad mainlines based on data from the U.S. Federal Railroad Administration and the major freight railroads. The point estimator and confidence interval of train and car derailment rates are developed by FRA track class, method of operation and annual traffic density. The analysis shows that signaled track with higher FRA track class and higher traffic density is associated with a lower derailment rate. The new accident rates have important implications for safety and risk management decisions, such as the routing of hazardous materials. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  4. Safety and Equality at Odds: OSHA and Title VII Clash over Health Hazards in the Workplace.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Crowell, Donald R.; Copus, David A.

    1978-01-01

    Discusses the legal problems presented by job health hazards which have a different effect on men and women. Where methods of eliminating or minimizing exposure, as required by the Occupational Safety and Health Act, affect only one sex, the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act may be violated. (MF)

  5. Safety overview of the National Ignition Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brereton, S.J.; McLouth, L.; Odell, B.; Singh, M.; Tobin, M.; Trent, M.

    1996-01-01

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a proposed US Department of Energy inertial confinement laser fusion facility. The candidate sites for locating the NIF are: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the preferred site. The NIF will operate by focusing 192 laser beams onto a tiny deuterium- tritium target located at the center of a spherical target chamber. The NIF mission is to achieve inertial confinement fusion (ICF) ignition, access physical conditions in matter of interest to nuclear weapons physics, provide an above ground simulation capability for nuclear weapons effects testing, and contribute to the development of inertial fusion for electrical power production. The NIF has been classified as a radiological, low hazard facility on the basis of a preliminary hazards analysis and according to the DOE methodology for facility classification. This requires that a safety analysis be prepared under DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System. A draft Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) has been written, and this will be finalized later in 1996. This paper summarizes the safety issues associated with the operation of the NIF. It provides an overview of the hazards, estimates maximum routine and accidental exposures for the preferred site of LLNL, and concludes that the risks from NIF operations are low

  6. Report 6: Guidance document. Man-made hazards and Accidental Aircraft Crash hazards modelling and implementation in extended PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kahia, S.; Brinkman, H.; Bareith, A.; Siklossy, T.; Vinot, T.; Mateescu, T.; Espargilliere, J.; Burgazzi, L.; Ivanov, I.; Bogdanov, D.; Groudev, P.; Ostapchuk, S.; Zhabin, O.; Stojka, T.; Alzbutas, R.; Kumar, M.; Nitoi, M.; Farcasiu, M.; Borysiewicz, M.; Kowal, K.; Potempski, S.

    2016-01-01

    The goal of this report is to provide guidance on practices to model man-made hazards (mainly external fires and explosions) and accidental aircraft crash hazards and implement them in extended Level 1 PSA. This report is a joint deliverable of work package 21 (WP21) and work package 22 (WP22). The general objective of WP21 is to provide guidance on all of the individual hazards selected at the first ASAMPSA-E End Users Workshop (May 2014, Uppsala, Sweden). The objective of WP22 is to provide the solutions for purposes of different parts of man-made hazards Level 1 PSA fulfilment. This guidance is focusing on man-made hazards, namely: external fires and explosions, and accidental aircraft crash hazards. Guidance developed refers to existing guidance whenever possible. The initial part of guidance (WP21 part) reflects current practices to assess the frequencies for each type of hazards or combination of hazards (including correlated hazards) as initiating event for PSAs. The sources and quality of hazard data, the elements of hazard assessment methodologies and relevant examples are discussed. Classification and criteria to properly assess hazard combinations as well as examples and methods for assessment of these combinations are included in this guidance. In appendixes additional material is presented with the examples of practical approaches to aircraft crash and man-made hazard. The following issues are addressed: 1) Hazard assessment methodologies, including issues related to hazard combinations. 2) Modelling equipment of safety related SSC, 3) HRA, 4) Emergency response, 5) Multi-unit issues. Recommendations and also limitations, gaps identified in the existing methodologies and a list of open issues are included. At all stages of this guidance and especially from an industrial end-user perspective, one must keep in mind that the development of man-made hazards probabilistic analysis must be conditioned to the ability to ultimately obtain a representative risk

  7. 78 FR 9311 - Hazard Communication; Corrections and Technical Amendment

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-02-08

    ....1044, Appendix Reference to ``Class IIIA combustible B. liquid'' is corrected to ``Category 4 flammable..., Fire prevention, Hazard communication, Hazardous substances, Occupational safety and health. 29 CFR... Asbestos, Construction industry, Fire prevention, Hazardous substances, Occupational safety and health...

  8. Seveso II directive in prevention and mitigation of consequences of chemical terrorism, safety management systems in hazardous installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klicek, M.

    2009-01-01

    Mayor accidents caused by hazardous substances are great threat to public. The consequences are often very severe with great number of injured people or even deaths and a great material damage. Statistic data shows that the main cause of accidents in hazardous installations is 'human factor', including the possibility of terrorist attack, or classic military operations. In order to ensure effective chemical safety, the actions should be taken by industry, public authorities, communities and other stake holders to prevent industrial accidents. Safety should be an integral part of the business activities of an enterprise, and all hazardous installations should strive to reach the ultimate goal of zero incidents. Safety management systems (SMS) should include appropriate technology and processes, as well as establishing an effective organisational structure. To mitigate consequences of accidents, emergency planning, land-use planning and risk communication is necessary. Adequate response in the event of accident should limit adverse consequences to health, environment and property. Follow-up actions are needed to learn from the accidents and other unexpected events, in order to reduce future incidents. In this paper the author will discus the implementing of SEVESO II directive in obtaining two main goals: major accident prevention and mitigation of consequences for men and environment in case of possible terrorist actions or military activities. Some Croatian experiences in implementing of UNEP APELL Programme, and its connection with SEVESO II directive will be shown.(author)

  9. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) contaminated well cars

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mercado, J.E.

    1998-01-01

    In support of past operations, railcars were used to ship irradiated fuel from the 100 Area fuel storage basins to the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility. There are two configurations for the packaging systems that transported the fuel: the Three-Well Cask Car, which is outfitted with three casks, and the taller, single well, New Production Reactor (NPR) Cask Car. In this document, these cask cars are referred to collectively as well cars. The purpose of this document is to evaluate and authorize the onsite transportation of well cars that contain significant levels of contamination. No irradiated fuel will be transported in the well cars. Neutron detection data confirmed that the well cars do not contain fuel. The intention is to move 14 retired well cars from their current locations in the 100 Area to a suitable storage location in the 200 Area. Each well car contains Type B quantities of radioactivity; so that the hazard of the transport operation is relatively low. This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) provides the analyses and evaluations necessary to demonstrate that the contaminated well cars meet the transportation safety requirements of HNF-PRO-154, Responsibilities and Procedures for Hazardous Material Shipments for an onsite packaging. The scope of this document addresses the preparation and transportation of the contaminated well cars

  10. Final Safety Analysis Document for Building 693 Chemical Waste Storage Building at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salazar, R.J.; Lane, S.

    1992-02-01

    This Safety Analysis Document (SAD) for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Building 693, Chemical Waste Storage Building (desipated as Building 693 Container Storage Unit in the Laboratory's RCRA Part B permit application), provides the necessary information and analyses to conclude that Building 693 can be operated at low risk without unduly endangering the safety of the building operating personnel or adversely affecting the public or the environment. This Building 693 SAD consists of eight sections and supporting appendices. Section 1 presents a summary of the facility designs and operations and Section 2 summarizes the safety analysis method and results. Section 3 describes the site, the facility desip, operations and management structure. Sections 4 and 5 present the safety analysis and operational safety requirements (OSRs). Section 6 reviews Hazardous Waste Management's (HWM) Quality Assurance (QA) program. Section 7 lists the references and background material used in the preparation of this report Section 8 lists acronyms, abbreviations and symbols. Appendices contain supporting analyses, definitions, and descriptions that are referenced in the body of this report

  11. Screening of external hazards for NPP with bank type reactor. Modeling of safety related systems and equipment for RBMK. Probabilistic assessment of NPP safety on aircraft impact. Progress report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kostarev, V.

    1999-01-01

    This progress report was produced within the frame of IAEA research project on screening the hazards for NPP with bank type reactor. It covers the following tasks; development of the model for the primary loop system of RBMK; developing the models for safety related equipment of RBMK; developing of models for safety related models of EGP-6 type reactor (Bilibinskaya Nuclear Co-generated heat and Power Plant); and probabilistic assessment of NPP safety on aircraft impact

  12. An Assessment of the Fire Safety Hazard Associated with External Fire Spread in Tall Buildings with Combustible Façade Material

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Lavard Brogaard, Nicholas; Torero, Jose L.; Jomaas, Grunde

    2014-01-01

    in order to obtain a conclusive assessment of the fire safety hazards associated with combustible facades. Prescriptive fire safety codes are typically not allowing any type of combustible façade in buildings that are taller than 2-3 stories. However, a performance based approach does not contain height...

  13. Major hazards onshore and offshore

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    This symposium continues the tradition of bringing together papers on a topic of current interest and importance in terms of process safety - in this case, Major Hazards Onshore and Offshore. Lord Cullen in his report on the Piper Alpha disaster has, in effect, suggested that the experience gained in the control of major hazards onshore during the 1980s should be applied to improve safety offshore during the 1990s. This major three-day symposium reviews what has been learned so far with regard to major hazards and considers its present and future applications both onshore and offshore. The topics covered in the programme are wide ranging and deal with all aspects of legislation, the application of regulations, techniques for evaluating hazards and prescribing safety measures in design, construction and operation, the importance of the human factors, and recent technical developments in protective measures, relief venting and predicting the consequences of fires and explosions. (author)

  14. The Role and Quality of Software Safety in the NASA Constellation Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    Layman, Lucas; Basili, Victor R.; Zelkowitz, Marvin V.

    2010-01-01

    In this study, we examine software safety risk in the early design phase of the NASA Constellation spaceflight program. Obtaining an accurate, program-wide picture of software safety risk is difficult across multiple, independently-developing systems. We leverage one source of safety information, hazard analysis, to provide NASA quality assurance managers with information regarding the ongoing state of software safety across the program. The goal of this research is two-fold: 1) to quantify the relative importance of software with respect to system safety; and 2) to quantify the level of risk presented by software in the hazard analysis. We examined 154 hazard reports created during the preliminary design phase of three major flight hardware systems within the Constellation program. To quantify the importance of software, we collected metrics based on the number of software-related causes and controls of hazardous conditions. To quantify the level of risk presented by software, we created a metric scheme to measure the specificity of these software causes. We found that from 49-70% of hazardous conditions in the three systems could be caused by software or software was involved in the prevention of the hazardous condition. We also found that 12-17% of the 2013 hazard causes involved software, and that 23-29% of all causes had a software control. Furthermore, 10-12% of all controls were software-based. There is potential for inaccuracy in these counts, however, as software causes are not consistently scoped, and the presence of software in a cause or control is not always clear. The application of our software specificity metrics also identified risks in the hazard reporting process. In particular, we found a number of traceability risks in the hazard reports may impede verification of software and system safety.

  15. 78 FR 41853 - Safety Advisory Guidance: Heating Rail Tank Cars To Prepare Hazardous Material for Unloading or...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-12

    ... rail tank car due to chemical self-reaction and expansion of the toluene diisocyanate matter wastes. On...: Cheryl West Freeman, Division of Engineering and Research, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety... catastrophically ruptured at a transfer station at the BASF Corporation chemical facility in Freeport, Texas. The...

  16. Performance Analysis: Control of Hazardous Energy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    De Grange, Connie E. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Freeman, Jeff W. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Kerr, Christine E. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2010-10-06

    LLNL experienced 26 occurrences related to the control of hazardous energy from January 1, 2008 through August 2010. These occurrences were 17% of the total number of reported occurrences during this 32-month period. The Performance Analysis and Reporting Section of the Contractor Assurance Office (CAO) routinely analyzes reported occurrences and issues looking for patterns that may indicate changes in LLNL’s performance and early indications of performance trends. It became apparent through these analyses that LLNL might have experienced a change in the control of hazardous energy and that these occurrences should be analyzed in more detail to determine if the perceived change in performance was real, whether that change is significant and if the causes of the occurrences are similar. This report documents the results of this more detailed analysis.

  17. Pantex Plant final safety analysis report, Zone 4 magazines. Staging or interim storage for nuclear weapons and components: Issue D

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-04-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) contains a detailed description and evaluation of the significant environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) issues associated with the operations of the Pantex Plant modified-Richmond and steel arch construction (SAC) magazines in Zone 4. It provides (1) an overall description of the magazines, the Pantex Plant, and its surroundings; (2) a systematic evaluations of the hazards that could occur as a result of the operations performed in these magazines; (3) descriptions and analyses of the adequacy of the measures taken to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards; and (4) analyses of potential accidents and their associated risks.

  18. 21 CFR 120.8 - Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 2 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP... SERVICES (CONTINUED) FOOD FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION HAZARD ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) SYSTEMS General Provisions § 120.8 Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) plan. (a) HACCP plan. Each...

  19. Deterministic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. Specific Safety Guide (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide harmonized guidance to designers, operators, regulators and providers of technical support on deterministic safety analysis for nuclear power plants. It provides information on the utilization of the results of such analysis for safety and reliability improvements. The Safety Guide addresses conservative, best estimate and uncertainty evaluation approaches to deterministic safety analysis and is applicable to current and future designs. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Grouping of initiating events and associated transients relating to plant states; 3. Deterministic safety analysis and acceptance criteria; 4. Conservative deterministic safety analysis; 5. Best estimate plus uncertainty analysis; 6. Verification and validation of computer codes; 7. Relation of deterministic safety analysis to engineering aspects of safety and probabilistic safety analysis; 8. Application of deterministic safety analysis; 9. Source term evaluation for operational states and accident conditions; References

  20. Agent-based simulation for human-induced hazard analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bulleit, William M; Drewek, Matthew W

    2011-02-01

    Terrorism could be treated as a hazard for design purposes. For instance, the terrorist hazard could be analyzed in a manner similar to the way that seismic hazard is handled. No matter how terrorism is dealt with in the design of systems, the need for predictions of the frequency and magnitude of the hazard will be required. And, if the human-induced hazard is to be designed for in a manner analogous to natural hazards, then the predictions should be probabilistic in nature. The model described in this article is a prototype model that used agent-based modeling (ABM) to analyze terrorist attacks. The basic approach in this article of using ABM to model human-induced hazards has been preliminarily validated in the sense that the attack magnitudes seem to be power-law distributed and attacks occur mostly in regions where high levels of wealth pass through, such as transit routes and markets. The model developed in this study indicates that ABM is a viable approach to modeling socioeconomic-based infrastructure systems for engineering design to deal with human-induced hazards. © 2010 Society for Risk Analysis.