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Sample records for safety devices required

  1. Framework conditions and requirements to ensure the technical functional safety of reprocessed medical devices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kraft, Marc

    2008-09-03

    Testing and restoring technical-functional safety is an essential part of medical device reprocessing. Technical functional tests have to be carried out on the medical device in the course of the validation of reprocessing procedures. These ensure (in addition to the hygiene tests) that the reprocessing procedure is suitable for the medical device. Functional tests are, however, also a part of reprocessing procedures. As a stage in the reprocessing, they ensure for the individual medical device that no damage or other changes limit the performance. When determining which technical-functional tests are to be carried out, the current technological standard has to be taken into account in the form of product-specific and process-oriented norms. Product-specific norms primarily define safety-relevant requirements. The risk management method described in DIN EN ISO 14971 is the basis for recognising hazards; the likelihood of such hazards arising can be minimised through additional technical-functional tests, which may not yet have been standardised. Risk management is part of a quality management system, which must be bindingly certified for manufacturers and processors of critical medical devices with particularly high processing demands by a body accredited by the competent authority.

  2. NASA safety standard for lifting devices and equipment

    Science.gov (United States)

    1990-09-01

    NASA's minimum safety requirements are established for the design, testing, inspection, maintenance, certification, and use of overhead and gantry cranes (including top running monorail, underhung, and jib cranes), mobile cranes, derrick hoists, and special hoist supported personnel lifting devices (these do not include elevators, ground supported personnel lifts, or powered platforms). Minimum requirements are also addressed for the testing, inspection, and use of Hydra-sets, hooks, and slings. Safety standards are thoroughly detailed.

  3. Developments of radiation safety requirements for the management of radiation devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Hee Seock; Choi, Jin Ho; Cheong, Yuon Young

    2002-03-01

    The approach of the risk-informed regulatory options was studied to develop the radiation safety requirements for the managements for radiation devices. The task analysis, exposure, accident scenario development, risk analysis, and systematic approach for regulatory options was considered in full, based on the NRC report, 'NUREG/CR-6642', and the translation of its core part was conducted for ongoing research. In this methodology, the diamond tree that includes human factors, etc, additionally with normal event tree, was used. According to the analysis results of this approach, the risk analysis and the development of regulatory options were applied for the electron linear accelerators and the qualitative results were obtained. Because the field user groups were participated in this study could contribute to the basis establishment of the risk-informed regulation policy through securing consensus and inducing particle interests. It will make an important role of establishing the detail plan of ongoing research

  4. Developments of radiation safety requirements for the management of radiation devices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Hee Seock [Pohang Accelerator Lab, Pohang (Korea, Republic of); Choi, Jin Ho [Gachun University of Medicine and science, Incheon (Korea, Republic of); Cheong, Yuon Young [Asan Medical Center, Seoul (Korea, Republic of)] (and others)

    2002-03-15

    The approach of the risk-informed regulatory options was studied to develop the radiation safety requirements for the managements for radiation devices. The task analysis, exposure, accident scenario development, risk analysis, and systematic approach for regulatory options was considered in full, based on the NRC report, 'NUREG/CR-6642', and the translation of its core part was conducted for ongoing research. In this methodology, the diamond tree that includes human factors, etc, additionally with normal event tree, was used. According to the analysis results of this approach, the risk analysis and the development of regulatory options were applied for the electron linear accelerators and the qualitative results were obtained. Because the field user groups were participated in this study could contribute to the basis establishment of the risk-informed regulation policy through securing consensus and inducing particle interests. It will make an important role of establishing the detail plan of ongoing research.

  5. Safety rod driving device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murakami, Kiyonobu; Kurosaki, Akira.

    1988-01-01

    Purpose: To rapidly insert safety rods for a criticality experiment device into a reactor core container to stop the criticality reaction thereby prevent reactivity accidents. Constitution: A cylinder device having a safety rod as a cylinder rod attached with a piston at one end is constituted. The piston is elevated by pressurized air and attracted and fixed by an electromagnet which is a stationary device disposed at the upper portion of the cylinder. If the current supply to the electromagnet is disconnected, the safety rod constituting the cylinder rod is fallen together with the piston to the lower portion of the cylinder. Since the cylinder rod driving device has neither electrical motor nor driving screw as in the conventional device, necessary space can be reduced and the weight is decreased. In addition, since the inside of the nuclear reactor can easily be shielded completely from the external atmosphere, leakage of radioactive materials can be prevented. (Horiuchi, T.)

  6. Safety of mechanical devices. Safety of automation systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pahl, G.; Schweizer, G.; Kapp, K.

    1985-01-01

    The paper deals with the classic procedures of safety engineering in the sectors mechanical engineering, electrical and energy engineering, construction and transport, medicine technology and process technology. Particular stress is laid on the safety of automation systems, control technology, protection of mechanical devices, reactor safety, mechanical constructions, transport systems, railway signalling devices, road traffic and protection at work in chemical plans. (DG) [de

  7. Safety lock for radiography exposure device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gaines, T.M.

    1982-01-01

    A safety lock for securing a radiation source in a radiography exposure device is disclosed. The safety lock prevents the inadvertent extension of the radiation source from the exposure device. The exposure devices are used extensively in industry for nondestructive testing of metal materials for defect. Unnecessary exposure of the radiographer or operator occurs not infrequently due to operator's error in believing that the radiation source is secured in the exposure device when, in fact, it is not. The present invention solves this problem of unnecessary exposure by releasingly trapping the radiation source in the shield of the radiography exposure device each time the source is retracted therein so that it is not inadvertently extended therefrom without the operator resetting the safety lock, thereby releasing the radiation source. Further, the safety lock includes an indicator which indicates when the source is trapped in the exposure device and also when it is untrapped. The safety lock is so designed that it does not prevent the return of the source to the trapped, shielded position in the exposure device. Further the safety lock includes a key means for locking the radiation source in the trapped position. The key means cannot be actuated until said radiation source is in said trapped position to further insure the safety lock cannot be inadvertently locked with the source untrapped and thus still extendable from the exposure device

  8. Comparing non-safety with safety device sharps injury incidence data from two different occupational surveillance systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mitchell, A H; Parker, G B; Kanamori, H; Rutala, W A; Weber, D J

    2017-06-01

    The United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Bloodborne Pathogens Standard as amended by the Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act requiring the use of safety-engineered medical devices to prevent needlesticks and sharps injuries has been in place since 2001. Injury changes over time include differences between those from non-safety compared with safety-engineered medical devices. This research compares two US occupational incident surveillance systems to determine whether these data can be generalized to other facilities and other countries either with legislation in place or considering developing national policies for the prevention of sharps injuries among healthcare personnel. Copyright © 2017 The Healthcare Infection Society. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  9. Design of Hack-Resistant Diabetes Devices and Disclosure of Their Cyber Safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sackner-Bernstein, Jonathan

    2017-03-01

    The focus of the medical device industry and regulatory bodies on cyber security parallels that in other industries, primarily on risk assessment and user education as well as the recognition and response to infiltration. However, transparency of the safety of marketed devices is lacking and developers are not embracing optimal design practices with new devices. Achieving cyber safe diabetes devices: To improve understanding of cyber safety by clinicians and patients, and inform decision making on use practices of medical devices requires disclosure by device manufacturers of the results of their cyber security testing. Furthermore, developers should immediately shift their design processes to deliver better cyber safety, exemplified by use of state of the art encryption, secure operating systems, and memory protections from malware.

  10. [Implementation of safety devices: biological accident prevention].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Catalán Gómez, M Teresa; Sol Vidiella, Josep; Castellà Castellà, Manel; Castells Bo, Carolina; Losada Pla, Nuria; Espuny, Javier Lluís

    2010-04-01

    Accidental exposures to blood and biological material were the most frequent and potentially serious accidents in healthcare workers, reported in the Prevention of Occupational Risks Unit within 2002. Evaluate the biological percutaneous accidents decrease after a progressive introduction of safety devices. Biological accidents produced between 2.002 and 2.006 were analyzed and reported by the injured healthcare workers to the Level 2b Hospital Prevention of Occupational Risk Unit with 238 beds and 750 employees. The key of the study was the safety devices (peripheral i.v. catheter, needleless i.v. access device and capillary blood collection lancet). Within 2002, 54 percutaneous biological accidents were registered and 19 in 2006, that represents a 64.8% decreased. There has been no safety devices accident reported involving these material. Accidents registered during the implantation period occurred because safety devices were not used at that time. Safety devices have proven to be effective in reducing needle stick percutaneous accidents, so that they are a good choice in the primary prevention of biological accidents contact.

  11. Report by the work-group on 'safety of medical devices emitting ionizing radiations'. Articulation of radiation protection requirements of the 97/43/Euratom directive and IAEA recommendations with the essential requirements of the 93/42/CEE directive related to medical devices used in external radiotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    As some dysfunctions and events had been reported in 2007 and 2008 in field of radiotherapy, this report aims at clarifying the articulation between the different European regulations concerning medical devices emitting ionizing radiations and radiation protection. The authors report a survey with device manufacturers, and analyze the content of the different regulations and recommendations. Then, the authors recommend and propose a set of actions related to the IAEA requirements and recommendations, to CE marking requirements, and to new radiation protection and safety requirements present in the Euratom directive

  12. Safety of Research Reactors. Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The main objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to provide a basis for safety and a basis for safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Another objective is to establish requirements on aspects relating to regulatory control, the management of safety, site evaluation, design, operation and decommissioning. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives. This Safety Requirements publication is intended for use by organizations engaged in the site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, operation and decommissioning of research reactors as well as by regulatory bodies

  13. 30 CFR 250.511 - Traveling-block safety device.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Traveling-block safety device. 250.511 Section... Traveling-block safety device. All units being used for well-completion operations that have both a traveling block and a crown block must be equipped with a safety device that is designed to prevent the...

  14. 30 CFR 250.611 - Traveling-block safety device.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Traveling-block safety device. 250.611 Section... Traveling-block safety device. After May 31, 1989, all units being used for well-workover operations which have both a traveling block and a crown block shall be equipped with a safety device which is designed...

  15. Universal Safety Distance Alert Device for Road Vehicles

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Matic Virant

    2016-04-01

    Full Text Available Driving with too short of a safety distance is a common problem in road traffic, often with traffic accidents as a consequence. Research has identified a lack of vehicle-mountable devices for alerting the drivers of trailing vehicles about keeping a sufficient safe distance. The principal requirements for such a device were defined. A conceptual study was performed in order to select the components for the integration of the device. Based on the results of this study, a working prototype of a flexible, self-contained device was designed, built and tested. The device is intended to be mounted on the rear of a vehicle. It uses radar as the primary distance sensor, assisted with a GPS receiver for velocity measurement. A Raspberry Pi single-board computer is used for data acquisition and processing. The alerts are shown on an LED-matrix display mounted on the rear of the host vehicle. The device software is written in Python and provides automatic operation without requiring any user intervention. The tests have shown that the device is usable on almost any motor vehicle and performs reliably in simulated and real traffic. The open issues and possibilities for future improvements are presented in the Discussion.

  16. Safety device for nuclear reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jacquelin, Roland.

    1977-01-01

    This invention relates to a safety device for a nuclear reactor, particularly a liquid metal (generally sodium) cooled fast reactor. This safety device includes an absorbing element with a support head connected by a disconnectable connector formed by the armature of an electromagnet at the end of an axially mobile vertical control rod. This connection is so designed that in the event of it becoming disconnected, the absorbing element gravity slides in a passage through the reactor core into an open container [fr

  17. An evaluation of sharp safety blood evacuation devices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ford, Joanna; Phillips, Peter

    This article describes an evaluation of three sharp safety blood evacuation devices in seven Welsh NHS boards and the Welsh Blood Service. Products consisted of two phlebotomy needles possessing safety shields and one phlebotomy device with wings, tubing and a retractable needle. The device companies provided the devices and appropriate training. Participating healthcare workers used the safety device instead of the conventional device to sample blood during the evaluation period and each type of device was evaluated in random order. Participants filled in a questionnaire for each type of device and then a further questionnaire comparing the two shielded evacuation needles with each other Results showed that responses to all three products were fairly positive, although each device was not liked by everyone who used it. When the two shielded evacuation devices were compared with each other, most users preferred the device with the shield positioned directly above the needle to the device with the shield at the side. However, in laboratory tests, the preferred device produced more fluid splatter than the other shielded device on activation.

  18. Safety syringes and anti-needlestick devices in orthopaedic surgery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sibbitt, Wilmer L; Band, Philip A; Kettwich, Lawrence G; Sibbitt, Cristina R; Sibbitt, Lori J; Bankhurst, Arthur D

    2011-09-07

    The American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgery (AAOS), The Joint Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act encourage the integration of safety-engineered devices to prevent needlestick injuries to health-care workers and patients. We hypothesized that safety syringes and needles could be used in outpatient orthopaedic injection and aspiration procedures. The study investigated the orthopaedic uses and procedural idiosyncrasies of safety-engineered devices, including (1) four safety needles (Eclipse, SafetyGlide, SurGuard, and Magellan), (2) a mechanical safety syringe (RPD), (3) two automatic retractable syringes (Integra, VanishPoint), (4) three manual retractable syringes (Procedur-SF, Baksnap, Invirosnap), and (5) three shielded syringes (Safety-Lok, Monoject, and Digitally Activated Shielded [DAS] Syringe). The devices were first tested ex vivo, and then 1300 devices were used for 425 subjects undergoing outpatient arthrocentesis, intra-articular injections, local anesthesia, aspiration biopsy, and ultrasound-guided procedures. During the clinical observation, there were no accidental needlesticks (0 needlesticks per 1300 devices). Safety needles could be successfully used on a Luer syringe but were limited to ≤1.5 in (≤3.81 cm) in length and the shield could interfere with sonography. The mechanical safety syringes functioned well in all orthopaedic procedures. Automatic retractable syringes were too small for arthrocentesis of the knee, and the plunger blew out and prematurely collapsed with high-pressure injections. The manual retractable syringes and shielded syringes could be used with conventional needles for most orthopaedic procedures. The most effective and reliable safety devices for orthopaedic syringe procedures are shielded safety needles, mechanical syringes, manual retractable syringes, and shielded syringes, but not automatic retractable syringes. Even when adopting

  19. Safety status system for operating room devices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Guédon, Annetje C P; Wauben, Linda S G L; Overvelde, Marlies; Blok, Joleen H; van der Elst, Maarten; Dankelman, Jenny; van den Dobbelsteen, John J

    2014-01-01

    Since the increase of the number of technological aids in the operating room (OR), equipment-related incidents have come to be a common kind of adverse events. This underlines the importance of adequate equipment management to improve the safety in the OR. A system was developed to monitor the safety status (periodic maintenance and registered malfunctions) of OR devices and to facilitate the notification of malfunctions. The objective was to assess whether the system is suitable for use in an busy OR setting and to analyse its effect on the notification of malfunctions. The system checks automatically the safety status of OR devices through constant communication with the technical facility management system, informs the OR staff real-time and facilitates notification of malfunctions. The system was tested for a pilot period of six months in four ORs of a Dutch teaching hospital and 17 users were interviewed on the usability of the system. The users provided positive feedback on the usability. For 86.6% of total time, the localisation of OR devices was accurate. 62 malfunctions of OR devices were reported, an increase of 12 notifications compared to the previous year. The safety status system was suitable for an OR complex, both from a usability and technical point of view, and an increase of reported malfunctions was observed. The system eases monitoring the safety status of equipment and is a promising tool to improve the safety related to OR devices.

  20. Generic Safety Requirements for Developing Safe Insulin Pump Software

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Yi; Jetley, Raoul; Jones, Paul L; Ray, Arnab

    2011-01-01

    Background The authors previously introduced a highly abstract generic insulin infusion pump (GIIP) model that identified common features and hazards shared by most insulin pumps on the market. The aim of this article is to extend our previous work on the GIIP model by articulating safety requirements that address the identified GIIP hazards. These safety requirements can be validated by manufacturers, and may ultimately serve as a safety reference for insulin pump software. Together, these two publications can serve as a basis for discussing insulin pump safety in the diabetes community. Methods In our previous work, we established a generic insulin pump architecture that abstracts functions common to many insulin pumps currently on the market and near-future pump designs. We then carried out a preliminary hazard analysis based on this architecture that included consultations with many domain experts. Further consultation with domain experts resulted in the safety requirements used in the modeling work presented in this article. Results Generic safety requirements for the GIIP model are presented, as appropriate, in parameterized format to accommodate clinical practices or specific insulin pump criteria important to safe device performance. Conclusions We believe that there is considerable value in having the diabetes, academic, and manufacturing communities consider and discuss these generic safety requirements. We hope that the communities will extend and revise them, make them more representative and comprehensive, experiment with them, and use them as a means for assessing the safety of insulin pump software designs. One potential use of these requirements is to integrate them into model-based engineering (MBE) software development methods. We believe, based on our experiences, that implementing safety requirements using MBE methods holds promise in reducing design/implementation flaws in insulin pump development and evolutionary processes, therefore improving

  1. Safety in Cryogenics – Safety device sizing

    CERN Multimedia

    CERN. Geneva

    2016-01-01

    The calculation is separated in three operations: o The estimation of the loads arriving on the component to protect, o The calculation of the mass flow to evacuate, o And the sizing of the safety device.

  2. Auxetic foam for snowsport safety devices

    OpenAIRE

    Allen, Tom; Duncan, Olly; Foster, Leon; Senior, Terry; Zampieri, Davide; Edeh, Victor; Alderson, Andrew

    2017-01-01

    Skiing and snowboarding are popular snow-sports with inherent risk of injury. There is potential to reduce the prevalence of injuries by improving and implementing snow-sport safety devices with the application of advanced materials. This paper investigates the application of auxetic foam to snow-sport safety devices. Composite pads - consisting of foam covered with a semi-rigid shell - were investigated as a simple model of body armour and a large 70 x 355 x 355 mm auxetic foam sample was fa...

  3. Pump safety device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Timmermans, Francis; Vandervorst, Jean.

    1981-01-01

    Safety device for longitudinally leak proofing the shaft of a pump in the event of the fracture of the dynamic seal separating the pump fluid high pressure chamber from the low pressure chamber. It is designed for fitting to the primary pumps of nuclear reactors. It includes a hollow cyclindrical piston located coaxially around the pump shaft and normally housed in a chamber provided for this purpose in the fixed housing of the dynamic seal, and means for moving this piston coaxially so as to compress a safety O ring between the shaft and the piston in the event of the dynamic seal failing [fr

  4. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  5. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  6. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations; to be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources; and to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  7. Linking Safety Analysis to Safety Requirements

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hansen, Kirsten Mark

    Software for safety critical systems must deal with the hazards identified by safety analysistechniques: Fault trees, event trees,and cause consequence diagrams can be interpreted as safety requirements and used in the design activity. We propose that the safety analysis and the system design use...

  8. Safety of nuclear power plants: Design. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The present publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (Safety Series No. 50-C-D (Rev. 1), issued in 1988). It takes account of developments relating to the safety of nuclear power plants since the Code on Design was last revised. These developments include the issuing of the Safety Fundamentals publication, The Safety of Nuclear Installations, and the present revision of various safety standards and other publications relating to safety. Requirements for nuclear safety are intended to ensure adequate protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear power plants. It is recognized that technology and scientific knowledge advance, and nuclear safety and what is considered adequate protection are not static entities. Safety requirements change with these developments and this publication reflects the present consensus. This Safety Requirements publication takes account of the developments in safety requirements by, for example, including the consideration of severe accidents in the design process. Other topics that have been given more detailed attention include management of safety, design management, plant ageing and wearing out effects, computer based safety systems, external and internal hazards, human factors, feedback of operational experience, and safety assessment and verification. This publication establishes safety requirements that define the elements necessary to ensure nuclear safety. These requirements are applicable to safety functions and the associated structures, systems and components, as well as to procedures important to safety in nuclear power plants. It is expected that this publication will be used primarily for land based stationary nuclear power plants with water cooled reactors designed for electricity generation or for other heat production applications (such as district heating or desalination). It is recognized that in the case of

  9. Safety of nuclear power plants: Design. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The present publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (Safety Series No. 50-C-D (Rev. 1), issued in 1988). It takes account of developments relating to the safety of nuclear power plants since the Code on Design was last revised. These developments include the issuing of the Safety Fundamentals publication, The Safety of Nuclear Installations, and the present revision of various safety standards and other publications relating to safety. Requirements for nuclear safety are intended to ensure adequate protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear power plants. It is recognized that technology and scientific knowledge advance, and nuclear safety and what is considered adequate protection are not static entities. Safety requirements change with these developments and this publication reflects the present consensus. This Safety Requirements publication takes account of the developments in safety requirements by, for example, including the consideration of severe accidents in the design process. Other topics that have been given more detailed attention include management of safety, design management, plant ageing and wearing out effects, computer based safety systems, external and internal hazards, human factors, feedback of operational experience, and safety assessment and verification. This publication establishes safety requirements that define the elements necessary to ensure nuclear safety. These requirements are applicable to safety functions and the associated structures, systems and components, as well as to procedures important to safety in nuclear power plants. It is expected that this publication will be used primarily for land based stationary nuclear power plants with water cooled reactors designed for electricity generation or for other heat production applications (such as district heating or desalination). It is recognized that in the case of

  10. 33 CFR 159.131 - Safety: Incinerating device.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... (CONTINUED) POLLUTION MARINE SANITATION DEVICES Design, Construction, and Testing § 159.131 Safety.... Unitized incineration devices must completely burn to a dry, inert ash, a simultaneous defecation and...

  11. Safety of Magnetic Resonance Imaging in Patients with Cardiac Devices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nazarian, Saman; Hansford, Rozann; Rahsepar, Amir A; Weltin, Valeria; McVeigh, Diana; Gucuk Ipek, Esra; Kwan, Alan; Berger, Ronald D; Calkins, Hugh; Lardo, Albert C; Kraut, Michael A; Kamel, Ihab R; Zimmerman, Stefan L; Halperin, Henry R

    2017-12-28

    were not clinically significant and did not require device revision or reprogramming. We evaluated the safety of MRI, performed with the use of a prespecified safety protocol, in 1509 patients who had a legacy pacemaker or a legacy implantable cardioverter-defibrillator system. No long-term clinically significant adverse events were reported. (Funded by Johns Hopkins University and the National Institutes of Health; ClinicalTrials.gov number, NCT01130896 .).

  12. Traceability of Software Safety Requirements in Legacy Safety Critical Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hill, Janice L.

    2007-01-01

    How can traceability of software safety requirements be created for legacy safety critical systems? Requirements in safety standards are imposed most times during contract negotiations. On the other hand, there are instances where safety standards are levied on legacy safety critical systems, some of which may be considered for reuse for new applications. Safety standards often specify that software development documentation include process-oriented and technical safety requirements, and also require that system and software safety analyses are performed supporting technical safety requirements implementation. So what can be done if the requisite documents for establishing and maintaining safety requirements traceability are not available?

  13. 76 FR 57045 - Announcement of Requirements and Registration for “Reporting Device Adverse Events Challenge”

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-09-15

    ... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Announcement of Requirements and Registration for ``Reporting Device Adverse Events Challenge'' Authority: 15 U.S.C. 3719. AGENCY: Office of the National..., specifically as it relates to monitoring product safety and effectiveness. The ``Reporting Device Adverse...

  14. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  15. Safety device of thermonuclear device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aoki, Isao; Ueda, Shuzo; Seki, Yasushi; Sakurai, Akiko; Kasahara, Fumio; Obara, Atsushi; Yamauchi, Michinori.

    1997-01-01

    The present invention provides a safety device against an event of intrusion of coolants in a vacuum vessel. Namely, a coolant supply system comprises cooling tubes for supplying coolants to main reactor structure components including a vacuum vessel. A detection means detects leakage of coolants in the vacuum vessel. A coolant supply control means controls the supply of coolants to the main reactor structural components based on the leakage detection signals of the detection means. A stagnated material discharging means discharges stagnated materials in the main reactor structural components caused by the leakage of coolants. The leakage of coolants (for example, water) in the vacuum vessel can thus be detected by the water detection device in the vacuum vessel. A control value of a coolant supply means is closed by the leakage detection signals. The supply of coolants to the main reactor structural components is restricted to suppress the leakage. The stagnated materials are discharged to a tank by way of a water draining valve. (I.S.)

  16. Safety of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements for all main areas of safety for research reactors, with particular emphasis on requirements for design and operation. It explains the safety objectives and concepts that form the basis for safety and safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of new research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives and concepts, and they are to be applied to the extent practicable for existing research reactors. The safety requirements established in this publication for the management of safety and regulatory supervision apply to site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, commissioning, operation (including utilization and modification), and planning for decommissioning of research reactors (including critical assemblies and subcritical assemblies). The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies and other organizations with responsibilities in these areas and in safety analysis, verification and review, and the provision of technical support.

  17. Monitoring Device Safety in Interventional Cardiology

    OpenAIRE

    Matheny, Michael E.; Ohno-Machado, Lucila; Resnic, Frederic S.

    2006-01-01

    Objective: A variety of postmarketing surveillance strategies to monitor the safety of medical devices have been supported by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, but there are few systems to automate surveillance. Our objective was to develop a system to perform real-time monitoring of safety data using a variety of process control techniques.

  18. Safety considerations in the design of the fusion engineering device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barrett, R.J.

    1983-01-01

    Safety considerations play a significant role in the design of a near-term Fusion Engineering Device (FED). For the safety of the general public and the plant workers, the radiation environment caused by the reacting plasma and the potential release of tritium fuel are the dominant considerations. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) regulations and guidelines for radiation protection have been reviewed and are being applied to the device design. Direct radiation protection is provided by the device shield and the reactor building walls. Radiation from the activated device components and the tritium fuel is to be controlled with shielding, contamination control, and ventilation. The potential release of tritium from the plant has influenced the selection of reactor building and plant designs and specifications. The safety of the plant workers is affected primarily by the radiation from the activated device components and from plasma chamber debris. The highly activated device components make it necessary to design many of the maintenance activities in the reactor building for totally remote operation. The hot cell facility has evolved as a totally remote maintenance facility due to the high radiation levels of the device components. Safety considerations have had substantial impacts on the design of FED. Several examples of safety-related design impacts are discussed in the paper. Feasible solutions have been identified for all outstanding safety-related items, and additional optimization of these solutions is anticipated in future design studies

  19. Push Off 2000 : new oilfield safety device catching on

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mowers, J.

    2006-12-15

    Fuel gas scrubbers use production gas to operate oil batteries, well separators, dehydrators, compressors, and pneumatic and pressure controls. Once an internal float gets stuck, production is stopped. The Push Off 2000 is a new safety device for fuel gas scrubbers which allows operators to easily dislodge a stuck internal float by activating the tool, which is mounted on top of the vessel. The device was developed after an operator suffered burns from a flash explosion that occurred after using a hammer to strike the fuel gas scrubber. The hammer method is the usual method of dealing with stuck internal floats, and can also jeopardize the integrity of the vessel, releasing gas or liquid hydrocarbons into the environment. The Push Off 2000 is expected to reduce costly facility downtime and increase revenue generating production time. Over 50 oil and gas companies have the Push Off 2000 device installed on fuel gas scrubber units at their facilities, and have recognized the safety and economic merits of the tool. The patented device has been approved by the Alberta Boilers Safety Association, the British Columbia Boiler and Elevator Safety Branch, and the Saskatchewan Boiler and Pressure Vessel Safety Unit. 1 fig.

  20. Functionality of road safety devices – identification and analysis of factors

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jeliński Łukasz

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Road safety devices are designed to protect road users from the risk of injury or death. The principal type of restraint is the safety barrier. Deployed on sites with the highest risk of run-off-road accidents, safety barriers are mostly found on bridges, flyovers, central reservations, and on road edges which have fixed obstacles next to them. If properly designed and installed, safety barriers just as other road safety devices, should meet a number of functional features. This report analyses factors which may deteriorate functionality, ways to prevent this from happening and the thresholds for loss of road safety device functionality.

  1. Safety evaluation in the development of medical devices and combination products

    CERN Document Server

    Gad, Shayne C

    2008-01-01

    Capturing the growth of the global medical device market in recent years, this practical new guide is essential for all who are responsible for ensuring safety in the use and manufacture of medical devices. It has been extensively updated to reflect significant advances, incorporating combination products and helpful case examples of current real-life problems in the field.The Third Edition explores these key current trends:global device marketscontinually advancing technologythe increasing harmonization of device safety regulation worldwideEach aspect of safety evaluation is considered in ter

  2. Safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific reference include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. The safety objective, concepts and safety principles; 3. Legal framework and regulatory supervision; 4. The management system and verification of safety; 5. Siting of the facility; 6. Design of the facility; 7. Construction of the facility; 8. Commissioning of the facility; 9. Operation of the facility; 10. Decommissioning of the facility; Appendix I: Requirements specific to uranium fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix II: Requirements specific to mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix III: Requirements specific to conversion facilities and enrichment facilities

  3. Stakeholder challenges in purchasing medical devices for patient safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hinrichs, Saba; Dickerson, Terry; Clarkson, John

    2013-03-01

    This study identifies the stakeholders who have a role in medical device purchasing within the wider system of health-care delivery and reports on their particular challenges to promote patient safety during purchasing decisions. Data was collected through observational work, participatory workshops, and semi-structured qualitative interviews, which were analyzed and coded. The study takes a systems-based and engineering design approach to the study. Five hospitals took part in this study, and the participants included maintenance, training, clinical end-users, finance, and risk departments. The main stakeholders for purchasing were identified to be staff from clinical engineering (Maintenance), device users (Clinical), device trainers (Training), and clinical governance for analyzing incidents involving devices (Risk). These stakeholders display varied characteristics in terms of interpretation of their own roles, competencies for selecting devices, awareness and use of resources for purchasing devices, and attitudes toward the purchasing process. The role of "clinical engineering" is seen by these stakeholders to be critical in mediating between training, technical, and financial stakeholders but not always recognized in practice. The findings show that many device purchasing decisions are tackled in isolation, which is not optimal for decisions requiring knowledge that is currently distributed among different people within different departments. The challenges expressed relate to the wider system of care and equipment management, calling for a more systemic view of purchasing for medical devices.

  4. 49 CFR 214.509 - Required visual illumination and reflective devices for new on-track roadway maintenance machines.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... devices for new on-track roadway maintenance machines. 214.509 Section 214.509 Transportation Other... TRANSPORTATION RAILROAD WORKPLACE SAFETY On-Track Roadway Maintenance Machines and Hi-Rail Vehicles § 214.509 Required visual illumination and reflective devices for new on-track roadway maintenance machines. Each new...

  5. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factor, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations (registrants and licensees) and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks

  6. Regulatory Experience of the Embedded Digital Devices for Safety I and C Systems on Nuclear Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Y. M.; Lee, H. K.; Park, H. S. [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Conventional I and C(Instrumentation and Control) systems are tend to becoming unavailable and being replaced by smart equipment. These smart equipment is usually called embedded digital devices (EDDs) or industrial digital devices of limited functionality. Usually, some of these devices are found embedded in plant equipment such as sensing instrumentation, motors, pumps, actuators and breakers. They typically have a micro-processor, RAM, communication interface, a power source, etc. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) is concerning that these EDDs might exist in procured equipment used in safety systems without the devices having been explicitly identified in procurement documentation. This paper addresses the regulatory experiences of KINS of the EDDs for safety I and C systems and the future works for them. In this paper, we showed regulatory experiences of EDDs which used for safety grade equipment. EDDs might exist in safety grade procured equipment without explicit identification. Undetected defects of EDDs might be the potential safety concerns. EDDs should meet certain specific requirements in order to be selected and used in safety I and C system. We have plan to develop technical positions for identification and qualifying them. The technical position will address, but may not be limited to, quality and reliability, CCFs via software errors, EMC, and CGID for EDDs.

  7. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Chinese Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  8. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  9. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  10. Evaluating and Predicting Patient Safety for Medical Devices With Integral Information Technology

    Science.gov (United States)

    2005-01-01

    323 Evaluating and Predicting Patient Safety for Medical Devices with Integral Information Technology Jiajie Zhang, Vimla L. Patel, Todd R...errors are due to inappropriate designs for user interactions, rather than mechanical failures. Evaluating and predicting patient safety in medical ...the users on the identified trouble spots in the devices. We developed two methods for evaluating and predicting patient safety in medical devices

  11. CFD Analysis of the Safety Injection Tank and Fluidic Device

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cho, Jai Oan; Nietiadi, Yohanes Setiawan; Lee, Jeong Ik [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Addad, Yacine [KUSTAR, Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates)

    2016-05-15

    One of the most important components in the ECCS is the safety injection tank (SIT). Inside the SIT, a fluidic device is installed, which passively controls the mass flow of the safety injection and eliminates the need for low pressure safety injection pumps. As more passive safety mechanisms are being pursued, it has become more important to understand flow structure and the loss mechanism within the fluidic device. Current computational fluid dynamics (CFD) calculations have had limited success in predicting the fluid flow accurately. This study proposes to find a more exact result using CFD and more realistic modeling to predict the performance during accident scenarios more accurately. The safety injection tank with fluidic device was analyzed thoroughly using CFD. The preliminary calculation used 60,000 meshes for the initial test calculation. The results fit the experimental results surprisingly despite its coarse grid. Nonetheless, the mesh resolution was increased to capture the vortex in the fluidic device precisely. Once a detailed CFD computation is finished, a small-scale experiment will be conducted for the given conditions. Using the experimental results and the CFD model, physical models can be improved to fit the results more accurately.

  12. Supplement to safety analysis report. 306-W building operations safety requirement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richey, C.R.

    1979-08-01

    The operations safety requirements (OSRs) presented in this report define the conditions, safe boundaries, and management control needed for safely conducting operations with radioactive materials in the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) 306-W building. The safety requirements are organized in five sections. Safety limits are safety-related process variables that are observable and measurable. Limiting conditions cover: equipment and technical conditions and characteristics of the facility and operations necessary for continued safe operation. Surveillance requirements prescribe the requirements for checking systems and components that are essential to safety. Equipment design controls require that changes to process equipment and systems be independently checked and approved to assure that the changes will have no adverse effect on safety. Administrative controls describe and discuss the organization and administrative systems and procedures to be used for safe operation of the facility. Details of the implementation of the operations safety requirements are prescribed by internal PNL documents such as criticality safety specifications and radiation work procedures

  13. Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-05-01

    This Standard identifies safety requirements for magnetic fusion facilities. Safety functions are used to define outcomes that must be achieved to ensure that exposures to radiation, hazardous materials, or other hazards are maintained within acceptable limits. Requirements applicable to magnetic fusion facilities have been derived from Federal law, policy, and other documents. In addition to specific safety requirements, broad direction is given in the form of safety principles that are to be implemented and within which safety can be achieved

  14. Safety and feasibility research of CIPT-Ⅱ irradiation device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Zhihua; Mi Xiangmiao; Li Rundong

    2014-01-01

    CITP-Ⅱ irradiation device, which is specially designed for fusion tritium breeder research, works in a thermal neutron reactor. With lithium orthosilicate as the breeder, the safety analysis was done to work out the device's influence on physical parameters of the reactor and get the breeder's temperature distribution and thermo-technical features in the n-γ field. The stiffness and strength were checked, and also the safety characters of the device were assessed. The feasibility of gap gas regulating the temperature and gas refueling the breeder was demonstrated. The calculation and analysis results provide data for comprehensive performance assessment. (authors)

  15. IAEA safety requirements for safety assessment of fuel cycle facilities and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, G.

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorises the Agency to establish standards of safety for protection of health and minimisation of danger to life and property. In that respect, the IAEA has established a Safety Fundamentals publication which contains ten safety principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment from the harmful effects of ionising radiation. A number of these principles require safety assessments to be carried out as a means of evaluating compliance with safety requirements for all nuclear facilities and activities and to determine the measures that need to be taken to ensure safety. The safety assessments are required to be carried out and documented by the organisation responsible for operating the facility or conducting the activity, are to be independently verified and are to be submitted to the regulatory body as part of the licensing or authorisation process. In addition to the principles of the Safety Fundamentals, the IAEA establishes requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the environment and which are governed by the principles in the Safety Fundamentals. The IAEA's Safety Requirements publication 'Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities', establishes the safety requirements that need to be fulfilled in conducting and maintaining safety assessments for the lifetime of facilities and activities, with specific attention to defence in depth and the requirement for a graded approach to the application of these safety requirements across the wide range of fuel cycle facilities and activities. Requirements for independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the operating organisation, including the requirement for the safety assessment to be periodically reviewed and updated are also covered. For many fuel cycle facilities and activities, environmental impact assessments and non-radiological risk assessments will be required. The

  16. A review of the literature pertaining to the efficacy, safety, educational requirements, uses and usage of mechanical adjusting devices

    Science.gov (United States)

    Taylor, Shane H; Arnold, Nicole D; Biggs, Lesley; Colloca, Christopher J; Mierau, Dale R; Symons, Bruce P; Triano, John J

    2004-01-01

    Over the past decade, mechanical adjusting devices (MADs) were a major source of debate within the Chiropractors’ Association of Saskatchewan (CAS). Since Saskatchewan was the only jurisdiction in North America to prohibit the use of MADs, the CAS established a committee in 2001 to review the literature on MADs. The committee evaluated the literature on the efficacy, safety, and uses of moving stylus instruments within chiropractic practice, and the educational requirements for chiropractic practice. Following the rating criteria for the evaluation of evidence, as outlined in the Clinical Guidelines for Chiropractic Practice in Canada (1994), the committee reviewed 55 articles – all of which pertained to the Activator. Of the 55 articles, 13 were eliminated from the final study. Of the 42 remaining articles, 6 were rated as class 1 evidence; 11 were rated as class 2 evidence and 25 were rated as class 3 evidence. In this article – the second in a series of two – we review the results of uses and usage, safety and educational requirements. Of the 30 articles designated under the category of usage, 3 were rated as Class 1 evidence; 9 studies were classified as Class 2 evidence and 18 were rated as Class 3 evidence. Overall the committee reached consensus that in clinical practice, there is broad application of these procedures. A minority report was written arguing that the reviewer was unable to reach a conclusion about the use of the Activator Instrument other than it is used as a clinical and research tool. Of the 16 studies that dealt either explicitly or implicitly with safety, 4 were Class 1 evidence; 3 were Class 2 evidence and 9 were Class 3 evidence. Overall the committee reached consensus that the evidence supports that the Activator instrument is safe and has no more relative risk than do manual HVLA procedures. A minority report was written arguing that there is no evidence either to support or refute the view that MAD is safe. Of the 5 studies

  17. ACCIDENT WITH NEEDLESTICK: KNOWLEDGE AND USE OF SAFETY DEVICE

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sandra Maria Souza da Silva

    2016-07-01

    Full Text Available Health workers engaged in labour activities in environments surrounded the occupational hazards. Identify knowledge and use of safety devide for preventing accidents with sharp objects between nurses and nurse technicians, workers of the Intensive Care Unit, Emergency and Surgical Block, during the month of may 2015. Exploratory study, quantitative, developed in a teaching hospital in in Recife-PE. The data collection was conducted using a questionnaire prepared by the research authors. The results were submitted to descriptive statistical analysis, being evidenced that, although data indicate high rate of respondents know and use products with referencing safety devices to prevent accidents, cite gloves and masks as representatives of those materials, which requires clarification in discussion of the study. It is necessary to guide and clarify as to such mechanisms, through the permanent education, and training among workers.

  18. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  19. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  20. Use of FPGA and CPLD in nuclear reactor safety systems and its regulatory review requirements for reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roy, Suvadip; Biswas, Animesh; Pradhan, S.K.

    2015-01-01

    Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) and Complex Programmable Logic Devices (CPLD) is being used widely in safety critical and safety related systems in nuclear power plans like in trip logic units, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation decision logic and neutronic signal processing for their reprogrammability feature and compact design. These HDL Programmable devices (HPD) are complex devices consisting of both hardware and software which is used to implement the logic on the FPGA. It is observed that these Programmable devices suffer from various modes of failure and the major failures in these devices are due to Single Event Upset (SEU), where a highly energetic ionizing radiation may lead to device failure which can even occur in radiologically benign environment. Other failures can occur during steps of developing the hardware using software tools like during Synthesis and placement and routing of the desired hardware. Here a study on use of such devices in Nuclear Reactors, study on mode of failures of these devices, way to tackle such failure and development of review guidelines for review of such devices used in safety critical and safety related systems with special emphasis on choice of software tools, way to mitigate effects of SEU and simulation and hardware testing results to be reviewed by regulatory body during design safety review is done. (author)

  1. Safety design requirements for safety systems and components of JSFR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kubo, Shigenobu; Shimakawa, Yoshio; Yamano, Hidemasa; Kotake, Shoji

    2011-01-01

    Safety design requirements for JSFR were summarized taking the development targets of the FaCT project and design feature of JSFR into account. The related safety principle and requirements for Monju, CRBRP, PRISM, SPX, LWRs, IAEA standards, goals of GIF, basic principle of INPRO etc. were also taken into account so that the safety design requirements can be a next-generation global standard. The development targets for safety and reliability are set based on those of FaCT, namely, ensuring safety and reliability equal to future LWR and related fuel cycle facilities. In order to achieve these targets, the defence-in-depth concept is used as the basic safety design principle. General features of the safety design requirements are 1) Achievement of higher reliability, 2) Achievement of higher inspectability and maintainability, 3) Introduction of passive safety features, 4) Reduction of operator action needs, 5) Design consideration against Beyond Design Basis Events, 6) In-Vessel Retention of degraded core materials, 7) Prevention and mitigation against sodium chemical reactions, and 8) Design against external events. The current specific requirements for each system and component are summarized taking the basic design concept of JSFR into account, which is an advanced loop-type large-output power plant with a mixed-oxide-fuelled core. (author)

  2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication

  3. A safety control device for detecting undesirable conditions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1974-09-26

    The invention relates to safety control devices. It deals with a device adapted to transmit a warning signal and to the detection of an undesirable condition in an associated apparatus, said device comprising switching means comprising transistors mounted in a reaction path, feeding means for opening the switching means whenever an undesirable condition has been detected by sensors, whereby an oscillator is caused to stop oscillating, and an outlet device controlled by the oscillator stoppage. This can be applied to the supervision of nuclear reactor.

  4. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  5. 49 CFR 214.511 - Required audible warning devices for new on-track roadway maintenance machines.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... roadway maintenance machines. 214.511 Section 214.511 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to... SAFETY On-Track Roadway Maintenance Machines and Hi-Rail Vehicles § 214.511 Required audible warning devices for new on-track roadway maintenance machines. Each new on-track roadway maintenance machine shall...

  6. Preventing medical device recalls

    CERN Document Server

    Raheja, Dev

    2014-01-01

    Introduction to Medical Device RequirementsIntroductionThe ChallengesSources of ErrorsUnderstanding the Science of Safety     Overview of FDA Quality System Regulation     Overview of Risk Management Standard ISO 14971     Overview of FDA Device Approval Process     Overview of Regulatory Requirements for Clinical TrialsSummaryReferencesPreventing Recalls during Specification WritingIntroductionConduct Requirements Analysis to Identify Missing RequirementsSpecifications for Safety, Durability, and

  7. Use of digital computing devices in systems important to safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    The incorporation of digital computing devices in systems important to safety now is progressing fast in several countries, including Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, USA. There are now reactors with microprocessors in some trip systems. The major functions of those systems are: reactor trip initiation, display, monitoring, testing, re-calibration of detectors. The benefits of moving to a fully computerized shut-down system should be improved reliability, greater flexibility, better man-machine interface, improved testing, higher reactor output and lower overall cost. With the introduction of computer devices in systems important to safety, plant availability and safety are improved because disturbances are treated before they lead to safety action, in this way helping the operator to avoid errors. The Meeting presentations were divided into sessions devoted to the following topics: Needs for the use of digital devices (DCD) in safety important systems (SIS) (5 papers); Problems raised by the integration SIS in the NPP control (7 papers); Description and presentation of DCD of SIS (6 papers); Results of experiences in engineering, manufacture, qualification operation of DCD hardware and software (5 papers). A separate abstract was prepared for each of these papers

  8. Site evaluation for nuclear installations. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Siting, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-S (Rev. 1). It takes account of developments relating to site evaluations for nuclear installations since the Code on Siting was last revised. These developments include the issuing of the Safety Fundamentals publication on The Safety of Nuclear Installations, and the revision of various safety standards and other publications relating to safety. Requirements for site evaluation are intended to ensure adequate protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear installations. It is recognized that there are steady advances in technology and scientific knowledge, in nuclear safety and in what is considered adequate protection. Safety requirements change with these advances and this publication reflects the present consensus among States. This Safety Requirements publication was prepared under the IAEA programme on safety standards for nuclear installations. It establishes requirements and provides criteria for ensuring safety in site evaluation for nuclear installations. The Safety Guides on site evaluation listed in the references provide recommendations on how to meet the requirements established in this Safety Requirements publication. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements for the elements of a site evaluation for a nuclear installation so as to characterize fully the site specific conditions pertinent to the safety of a nuclear installation. The purpose is to establish requirements for criteria, to be applied as appropriate to site and site-installation interaction in operational states and accident conditions, including those that could lead to emergency measures for: (a) Defining the extent of information on a proposed site to be presented by the applicant; (b) Evaluating a proposed site to ensure that the site

  9. Range Flight Safety Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Loftin, Charles E.; Hudson, Sandra M.

    2018-01-01

    The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to provide the technical requirements for the NPR 8715.5, Range Flight Safety Program, in regards to protection of the public, the NASA workforce, and property as it pertains to risk analysis, Flight Safety Systems (FSS), and range flight operations. This standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers, including Component Facilities and Technical and Service Support Centers, and may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical requirement. This standard may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory or to other contractors, grant recipients, or parties to agreements to the extent specified or referenced in their contracts, grants, or agreements, when these organizations conduct or participate in missions that involve range flight operations as defined by NPR 8715.5.1.2.2 In this standard, all mandatory actions (i.e., requirements) are denoted by statements containing the term “shall.”1.3 TailoringTailoring of this standard for application to a specific program or project shall be formally documented as part of program or project requirements and approved by the responsible Technical Authority in accordance with NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements.

  10. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to all types of radioactive waste disposal facility. It is linked to the fundamental safety principles for each disposal option and establishes a set of strategic requirements that must be in place before facilities are developed. Consideration is also given to the safety of existing facilities developed prior to the establishment of present day standards. The requirements will be complemented by Safety Guides that will provide guidance on good practice for meeting the requirements for different types of waste disposal facility. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of people and the environment; 3. Safety requirements for planning for the disposal of radioactive waste; 4. Requirements for the development, operation and closure of a disposal facility; 5. Assurance of safety; 6. Existing disposal facilities; Appendices.

  11. Improving Patient Safety with X-Ray and Anesthesia Machine Ventilator Synchronization: A Medical Device Interoperability Case Study

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arney, David; Goldman, Julian M.; Whitehead, Susan F.; Lee, Insup

    When a x-ray image is needed during surgery, clinicians may stop the anesthesia machine ventilator while the exposure is made. If the ventilator is not restarted promptly, the patient may experience severe complications. This paper explores the interconnection of a ventilator and simulated x-ray into a prototype plug-and-play medical device system. This work assists ongoing interoperability framework development standards efforts to develop functional and non-functional requirements and illustrates the potential patient safety benefits of interoperable medical device systems by implementing a solution to a clinical use case requiring interoperability.

  12. Safety Features of Material and Personnel Movement Devices. Module SH-25. Safety and Health.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Center for Occupational Research and Development, Inc., Waco, TX.

    This student module on safety features of material and personnel movement devices is one of 50 modules concerned with job safety and health. This module covers safe conditions and operating practices for conveyors, elevators, escalators, moving walks, manlifts, forklifts, and motorized hand trucks. Following the introduction, 10 objectives (each…

  13. FAST and SAFE Passive Safety Devices for Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hartanto, Donny; Kim, Chihyung; Kim, In-Hyung; Kim, Yonghee [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    The major factor is the impact of the neutron spectral hardening. The second factor that affects the CVR is reduced capture by the coolant when the coolant voiding occurs. To improve the CVR, many ideas and concepts have been proposed, which include introduction of an internal blanket, spectrum softening, or increasing the neutron leakage. These ideas may reduce the CVR, but they deteriorate the neutron economy. Another potential solution is to adopt a passive safety injection device such as the ARC (autonomous reactivity control) system, which is still under development. In this paper, two new concepts of passive safety devices are proposed. The devices are called FAST (Floating Absorber for Safety at Transient) and SAFE (Static Absorber Feedback Equipment). Their purpose is to enhance the negative reactivity feedback originating from the coolant in fast reactors. SAFE is derived to balance the positive reactivity feedback due to sodium coolant temperature increases. It has been demonstrated that SAFE allows a low-leakage SFR to achieve a self-shutdown and self-controllability even though the generic coolant temperature coefficient is quite positive and the coolant void reactivity can be largely managed by the new FAST device. It is concluded that both FAST and SAFE devices will improve substantially the fast reactor safety and they deserve more detailed investigations.

  14. Requirements of safety and reliability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1977-01-01

    The safety strategy for nuclear power plants is characterized by the fact that the high level of safety was attained not as a result of experience, but on the basis of preventive accident analyses and the findings derived from such analyses. Although, in these accident analyses, the deterministic approach is predominant it is supplemented by reliability analyses. The accidents analyzed in nuclear licensing procedures cover a wide spectrum from minor incidents to the design basis accidents which determine the design of the safety devices. The initial and boundary conditions, which are essential for accident analyses, and the determination of the loads occuring in various states during regular operation and in accidents flow into the design of the individual systems and components. The inevitable residual risk and its origins are discussed. (orig./HP) [de

  15. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  16. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  17. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  18. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    his Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  19. Effect of electronic device use on pedestrian safety : a literature review.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-04-01

    This literature review on the effect of electronic device use on pedestrian safety is part of a research project sponsored by the Office of Behavioral Safety Research in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). An extensive literat...

  20. 78 FR 29392 - Embedded Digital Devices in Safety-Related Systems, Systems Important to Safety, and Items Relied...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-05-20

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2013-0098] Embedded Digital Devices in Safety-Related Systems, Systems Important to Safety, and Items Relied on for Safety AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION... (NRC) is issuing for public comment Draft Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2013-XX, ``Embedded Digital...

  1. Regulation E 69-14. Monitoring requirements for medical devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    In the 'Regulations for the State Evaluation and Registration of Medical Equipment' force (Hereinafter Rules) set forth in Chapter VII, Articles 79 and 86, the monitoring activity as one of the programs necessary for evaluating the safety and effectiveness of medical monitoring equipment. In the years 2008 and 2011 were approved and implemented by the Center for State Control of Medical Equipment (CCEEM) Regulations and -1.1 ER and ER-1 that support and regulatory requirements 'Control and monitoring of pacemakers and implantable defibrillators' and 'Assessment, recording and control after market surgical silicone implants,' which are specific to these products and have provided a useful result for the performance of the activity. Given the number and diversity of high-risk medical devices as implantable or sustain human life that are brought into our National Health System (SNS), a regulation establishing control over the behavior becomes necessary safety and effectiveness of this equipment during use, which provide inputs to risk management. The objective of this regulation is to establish the regulatory requirements for tracking medical equipment introduced in the NHS. The provisions of this Regulation is aimed at health institutions, to CECMED as manufacturers, suppliers, distributors and importers of medical equipment.

  2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  3. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  4. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  5. Safety and effectiveness considerations for clinical studies of visual prosthetic devices

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cohen, Ethan D.

    2007-03-01

    With the advent of new designs of visual prostheses for the blind, FDA is faced with developing guidance for evaluating their engineering, safety and patient performance. Visual prostheses are considered significant risk medical devices, and their use in human clinical trials must be approved by FDA under an investigation device exemption (IDE). This paper contains a series of test topics and design issues that sponsors should consider in order to assess the safety and efficacy of their device. The IDE application includes a series of pre-clinical and clinical data sections. The pre-clinical section documents laboratory, animal and bench top performance tests of visual prostheses safety and reliability to support a human clinical trial. The materials used in constructing the implant should be biocompatible, sterile, corrosion resistant, and able to withstand any forces exerted on it during normal patient use. The clinical data section is composed of items related to patient-related evaluation of device performance. This section documents the implantation procedure, trial design, statistical analysis and how visual performance is assessed. Similar to cochlear implants, a visual prosthesis is expected to last in the body for many years, and good pre-clinical and clinical testing will help ensure its safety, durability and effectiveness.

  6. Autonomous booster device of a safety valve

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Namand, H.

    1983-01-01

    The invention concerns an autonomous booster device of a protection safety valve of a pressure vessel. The valve comprises a hollow structure, a seat connected with a mobile flap forming one piece with a stem and a calibration spring bearing on the stem and on the valve structure to maintain the flap bearing on the seat. The stem of the flap is prolongated in a box forming one piece with the valve structure and receives an added push of a spring. The box acts as a pressure device of which the piston can exercise on the stem a push opposite to and larger than the spring one. The feeding device of the pressure box is finally described in detail [fr

  7. The development of safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jorel, M.

    2009-01-01

    This document describes the safety approach followed in France for the design of nuclear reactors. This safety approach is based on safety principles from which stem safety requirements that set limiting values for specific parameters. The improvements in computerized simulation, the use of more adequate new materials, a better knowledge of the concerned physical processes, the changes in the reactor operations (higher discharge burnups for instance) have to be taken into account for the definition of safety criteria and the setting of limiting values. The developments of the safety criteria linked to the risks of cladding failure and loss of primary coolant are presented. (A.C.)

  8. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  9. Safety Design Approach for the Development of Safety Requirements for Design of Commercial HTGR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohashi, Hirofumi; Sato, Hiroyuki; Nakagawa, Shigeaki; Tachibana, Yukio; Nishihara, Tetsuo; Yan, Xing; Sakaba, Nariaki; Kunitomi, Kazuhiko

    2014-01-01

    The research committee on “Safety requirements for HTGR design” was established in 2013 under the Atomic Energy Society of Japan to develop the draft safety requirements for the design of commercial High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGRs), which incorporate the HTGR safety features demonstrated using the High Temperature Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR), lessons learned from the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and requirements for the integration of the hydrogen production plants. The safety design approach for the commercial HTGRs which is a basement of the safety requirements is determined prior to the development of the safety requirements. The safety design approaches for the commercial HTGRs are to confine the radioactive materials within the coated fuel particles not only during normal operation but also during accident conditions, and the integrity of the coated fuel particles and other requiring physical barriers are protected by the inherent and passive safety features. This paper describes the main topics of the research committee, the safety design approaches and the safety functions of the commercial HTGRs determined in the research committee. (author)

  10. Safety assessment for facilities and activities. General safety requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF 6 ; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

  11. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

  12. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

  13. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation.? read more The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are

  14. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  15. Radiation safety requirements for radionuclide laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    In accordance with the section 26 of the Finnish Radiation Act (592/91) the safety requirements to be taken into account in planning laboratories and other premises, which affect safety in the use of radioactive materials, are confirmed by the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. The guide specifies the requirements for laboratories and storage rooms in which radioactive materials are used or stored as unsealed sources. There are also some general instructions concerning work procedures in a radionuclide laboratory

  16. Safety-related control air systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1977-01-01

    This Standard applies to those portions of the control air system that furnish air required to support, control, or operate systems or portions of systems that are safety related in nuclear power plants. This Standard relates only to the air supply system(s) for safety-related air operated devices and does not apply to the safety-related air operated device or to air operated actuators for such devices. The objectives of this Standard are to provide (1) minimum system design requirements for equipment, piping, instruments, controls, and wiring that constitute the air supply system; and (2) the system and component testing and maintenance requirements

  17. "We can't get along without each other": Qualitative interviews with physicians about device industry representatives, conflict of interest and patient safety.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Anna R Gagliardi

    Full Text Available Physician relationships with device industry representatives have not been previously assessed. This study explored interactions with device industry representatives among physicians who use implantable cardiovascular and orthopedic devices to identify whether conflict of interest (COI is a concern and how it is managed.A descriptive qualitative approach was used. Physicians who implant orthopedic and cardiovascular devices were identified in publicly available directories and web sites, and interviewed about their relationships with device industry representatives. Sampling was concurrent with data collection and analysis. Data were analyzed and discussed using constant comparative technique by all members of the research team.Twenty-two physicians (10 cardiovascular, 12 orthopedic were interviewed. Ten distinct representative roles were identified: purchasing, training, trouble-shooting, supplying devices, assisting with device assembly and insertion, supporting operating room staff, mitigating liability, conveying information about recalls, and providing direct and indirect financial support. Participants recognized the potential for COI but representatives were present for the majority of implantations. Participants revealed a tension between physicians and representatives that was characterized as "symbiotic", but required physicians to be vigilant about COI and patient safety, particularly because representatives varied regarding disclosure of device defects. They described a concurrent tension between hospitals, whose policies and business practices were focused on cost-control, and physicians who were required to comply with those policies and use particular devices despite concerns about their safety and effectiveness.Given the potential for COI and threats to patient safety, further research is needed to establish the clinical implications of the role of, and relationship with device industry representatives; and whether and how

  18. Product-based Safety Certification for Medical Devices Embedded Software.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Neto, José Augusto; Figueiredo Damásio, Jemerson; Monthaler, Paul; Morais, Misael

    2015-01-01

    Worldwide medical device embedded software certification practices are currently focused on manufacturing best practices. In Brazil, the national regulatory agency does not hold a local certification process for software-intensive medical devices and admits international certification (e.g. FDA and CE) from local and international industry to operate in the Brazilian health care market. We present here a product-based certification process as a candidate process to support the Brazilian regulatory agency ANVISA in medical device software regulation. Center of Strategic Technology for Healthcare (NUTES) medical device embedded software certification is based on a solid safety quality model and has been tested with reasonable success against the Class I risk device Generic Infusion Pump (GIP).

  19. JET-ISX-B beryllium limiter experiment safety analysis report and operational safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edmonds, P.H.

    1985-09-01

    An experiment to evaluate the suitability of beryllium as a limiter material has been completed on the ISX-B tokamak. The experiment consisted of two phases: (1) the initial operation and characterization in the ISX experiment, and a period of continued operation to the specified surface fluence (10 22 atoms/cm 2 ) of hydrogen ions; and (2) the disassembly, decontamination, or disposal of the ISX facility. During these two phases of the project, the possibility existed for beryllium and/or beryllium oxide powder to be produced inside the vacuum vessel. Beryllium dust is a highly toxic material, and extensive precautions are required to prevent the release of the beryllium into the experimental work area and to prevent the contamination of personnel working on the device. Details of the health hazards associated with beryllium and the appropriate precautions are presented. Also described in appendixes to this report are the various operational safety requirements for the project

  20. Investigation on regulatory requirements for radiation safety management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Eun Ok; Choi, Yoon Seok; Cho, Dae Hyung

    2013-01-01

    NRC recognizes that efficient management of radiation safety plan is an important factor to achieve radiation safety service. In case of Korea, the contents to perform the actual radiation safety management are legally contained in radiation safety management reports based on the Nuclear Safety Act. It is to prioritize the importance of safety regulations in each sector in accordance with the current situation of radiation and radioactive isotopes-used industry and to provide a basis for deriving safety requirements and safety regulations system maintenance by the priority of radiation safety management regulations. It would be helpful to achieve regulations to conform to reality based on international standards if consistent safety requirements is developed for domestic users, national standards and international standards on the basis of the results of questions answered by radiation safety managers, who lead on-site radiation safety management, about the priority of important factors in radioactive sources use, sales, production, moving user companies, to check whether derived configuration requirements for radiation safety management are suitable for domestic status

  1. Safety requirements and feedback of commonly used material handling equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pathak, M.K.

    2009-01-01

    Different types of cranes, hoists, chain pulley blocks are the most commonly used material handling equipment in industry along with attachments like chains, wire rope slings, d-shackles, etc. These equipment are used at work for transferring loads from one place to another and attachments are used for anchoring, fixing or supporting the load. Selection of the correct equipment, identification of the equipment planning of material handling operation, examination/testing of the equipment, education and training of the persons engaged in operation of the material handling equipment can reduce the risks to safety of people in workplace. Different safety systems like boom angle indicator, overload tripping device, limit switches, etc. should be available in the cranes for their safe use. Safety requirement for safe operation of material handling equipment with emphasis on different cranes and attachments particularly wire rope slings and chain slings have been brought out in this paper. An attempt has also been made to bring out common nature of deficiencies observed during regulatory inspection carried out by AERB. (author)

  2. Safety requirements applicable to the SMART design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seul, Kwang Won; Kim, Wee Kyong; Kim, Hho Jung

    1999-01-01

    The 330 MW thermal power of integral reactor, named SMART (System integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor), is under development at KAERI for seawater desalination application and electricity generation. The final product of nuclear desalination plant (NDP) is electricity and fresh water. Thus, in addition to the protection of the public around the plant facility from the possible release of radioactive materials, the fresh water should be prevented from radioactivity contamination. In this study, to ensure the safety of SMART reactor in the early stage of design development, the safety requirements applicable to the SMART design were investigated, based on the current regulatory requirements for the existing NPPs and the advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs. The interface requirements related to the desalination facility were also investigated, based on the recent IAEA research activities pertaining to the NDP. As a result, it was found that the current regulatory requirements and guidance for the existing NPPs and advanced LWR designs are applicable to the SMART design and its safety evaluation. However, the safety requirements related to the SMART-specific design and the desalination plant are needed to develop in the future to assure the safety of the SMART reactor

  3. HTR-PM Safety requirement and Licensing experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Fu; Zhang Zuoyi; Dong Yujie; Wu Zongxin; Sun Yuliang

    2014-01-01

    HTR-PM is a 200MWe modular pebble bed high temperature reactor demonstration plant which is being built in Shidao Bay, Weihai, Shandong, China. The main design parameters of HTR-PM were fixed in 2006, the basic design was completed in 2008. The review of Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) of HTR-PM was started in April 2008, completed in September 2009. In general, HTR- PM design complies with the current safety requirement for nuclear power plant in China, no special standards are developed for modular HTR. Anyway, Chinese Nuclear Safety Authority, together with the designers, developed some dedicated design criteria for key systems and components and published the guideline for the review of safety analysis report of HTR-PM, based on the experiences from licensing of HTR-10 and new development of nuclear safety. The probabilistic safety goal for HTR-PM was also defined by the safety authority. The review of HTR-PM PSAR lasted for one and a half years, with 3 dialogues meetings and 8 topics meetings, with more than 2000 worksheets and answer sheets. The heavily discussed topics during the PSAR review process included: the requirement for the sub-atmospheric ventilation system, the utilization of PSA in design process, the scope of beyond design basis accidents, the requirement for the qualification of TRISO coating particle fuel, and etc. Because of the characteristics of first of a kind for the demonstration plant, the safety authority emphasized the requirement for the experiment and validation, the PSAR was licensed with certain licensing conditions. The whole licensing process was under control, and was re-evaluated again after Fukushima accident to be shown that the design of HTR-PM complies with current safety requirement. This is a good example for how to license a new reactor. (author)

  4. Geological disposal of radioactive waste. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication is concerned with providing protection to people and the environment from the hazards associated with waste management activities related to disposal, i.e. hazards that could arise during the operating period and following closure. It sets out the protection objectives and criteria for geological disposal and establishes the requirements that must be met to ensure the safety of this disposal option, consistent with the established principles of safety for radioactive waste management. It is intended for use by those involved in radioactive waste management and in making decisions in relation to the development, operation and closure of geological disposal facilities, especially those concerned with the related regulatory aspects. This publication contains 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. The safety requirements for geological disposal; 4. Requirements for the development, operation and closure of geological disposal facilities; Appendix: Assurance of compliance with the safety objective and criteria; Annex I: Geological disposal and the principles of radioactive waste management; Annex II: Principles of radioactive waste management

  5. Safety device for nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruhl, H.

    1974-01-01

    The safety device is used to capture fragments of the lid of a pressure vessel when this vessel ruptures. It consists of a catcher structure attached to the concrete vessel, which is open at the top, and surrounding the pressure vessel. The catcher structure in this case may be designed as a ring installed very close to the concrete vessel, as a closure plate or may be made of transverse beams arranged parallel to each other. It is anchored either rigidly or elastically to the concrete vessel by means of springs or to the foundation by means of steel stretching members. (DG) [de

  6. Evaluation of safety requirements of erbium laser equipment used in dentistry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Braga, Flavio Hamilton

    2002-01-01

    The erbium laser (Er:YAG) has been used in several therapeutic processes. Erbium lasers, however, operate with energies capable to produce lesions in biological tissues. Aiming the safe use, the commercialization of therapeutic laser equipment is controlled in Brazil, where the equipment should comply with quality and safety requirement prescribed in technical regulations. The objective of this work is to evaluate the quality and safety requirements of a commercial therapeutic erbium laser according to Brazilian regulations, and to discuss a risk control program intended to minimize the accidental exposition at dangerous laser radiation levels. It was verified that the analyzed laser can produce lesions in the skin and eyes, when exposed to laser radiation at distances smaller than 80 cm by 10 s or more. In these conditions, the use of protection glasses is recommended to the personnel that have access to the laser operation ambient. It was verified that the user's training and the presence of a target indicator are fundamental to avoid damages in the skin and buccal cavity. It was also verified that the knowledge and the correct use of the equipment safety devices, and the application of technical and administrative measures is efficient to minimize the risk of dangerous expositions to the laser radiation. (author)

  7. MRI with cardiac pacing devicesSafety in clinical practice

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kaasalainen, Touko, E-mail: touko.kaasalainen@hus.fi [HUS Medical Imaging Center, Helsinki University Central Hospital, POB 340 (Haartmaninkatu 4), 00290 Helsinki (Finland); Department of Physics, University of Helsinki (Finland); Pakarinen, Sami, E-mail: sami.pakarinen@hus.fi [HUS Department of Cardiology, Helsinki University Central Hospital, POB 340 (Haartmaninkatu 4), 00290 Helsinki (Finland); Kivistö, Sari, E-mail: sari.kivisto@hus.fi [HUS Medical Imaging Center, Helsinki University Central Hospital, POB 340 (Haartmaninkatu 4), 00290 Helsinki (Finland); Holmström, Miia, E-mail: miia.holmstrom@hus.fi [HUS Medical Imaging Center, Helsinki University Central Hospital, POB 340 (Haartmaninkatu 4), 00290 Helsinki (Finland); Hänninen, Helena, E-mail: helena.hanninen@hus.fi [HUS Department of Cardiology, Helsinki University Central Hospital, POB 340 (Haartmaninkatu 4), 00290 Helsinki (Finland); Peltonen, Juha, E-mail: juha.peltonen@hus.fi [HUS Medical Imaging Center, Helsinki University Central Hospital, POB 340 (Haartmaninkatu 4), 00290 Helsinki (Finland); Department of Biomedical Engineering and Computational Science, School of Science, Aalto University, Helsinki (Finland); Lauerma, Kirsi, E-mail: kirsi.lauerma@hus.fi [HUS Medical Imaging Center, Helsinki University Central Hospital, POB 340 (Haartmaninkatu 4), 00290 Helsinki (Finland); Sipilä, Outi, E-mail: outi.sipila@hus.fi [HUS Medical Imaging Center, Helsinki University Central Hospital, POB 340 (Haartmaninkatu 4), 00290 Helsinki (Finland)

    2014-08-15

    Objectives: The aim of this study was to introduce a single centre “real life” experience of performing MRI examinations in clinical practice on patients with cardiac pacemaker systems. Additionally, we aimed to evaluate the safety of using a dedicated safety protocol for these patients. Materials and methods: We used a 1.5 T MRI scanner to conduct 68 MRI scans of different body regions in patients with pacing systems. Of the cardiac devices, 32% were MR-conditional, whereas the remaining 68% were MR-unsafe. We recorded the functional parameters of the devices prior, immediately after, and approximately one month after the MRI scanning, and compared the device parameters to the baseline values. Results: All MRI examinations were completed safely, and each device could be interrogated normally following the MRI. We observed no changes in the programmed parameters of the devices. For most of the participants, the distributions of the immediate and one-month changes in the device parameters were within 20% of the baseline values, although some changes approached clinically important thresholds. Furthermore, we observed no differences in the variable changes between MR-conditional and MR-unsafe pacing systems, or between scans of the thorax area and other scanned areas. Conclusion: MRI in patients with MR-conditional pacing systems and selected MR-unsafe systems could be performed safely under strict conditions in this study.

  8. An examination of safety reports involving electronic flight bags and portable electronic devices

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-06-01

    The purpose of this research was to develop a better understanding of safety considerations with the use of Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) and Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs) by examining safety reports from Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS),...

  9. The Role of Patient Safety in the Device Purchasing Process

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Johnson, Todd R; Zhang, Jiajie; Patel, Vimla L; Keselman, Alla; Tang, Xiaozhou; Brixey, Juliana J; Paige, Danielle; Turley, James P

    2005-01-01

    To examine how patient safety considerations are incorporated into medical device purchase decisions, individuals involved in recent infusion pump purchasing decisions at three different health care...

  10. Safety considerations in the design of the Fusion Engineering Device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barrett, R.J.

    1983-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) regulations and guidelines for radiation protection have been reviewed and are being applied to the device design. Direct radiation protection is provided by the device shield and the reactor building walls. Radiation from the activated device components and the tritium fuel is to be controlled with shielding, contamination control, and ventilation. The potential release of tritium from the plant has influenced the selection of reactor building and plant designs and specifications. The safety of the plant workers is affected primarily by the radiation from the activated device components and from plasma chamber debris

  11. Site safety requirements for high level waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen Weiming; Wang Ju

    2006-01-01

    This paper outlines the content, status and trend of site safety requirements of International Atomic Energy Agency, America, France, Sweden, Finland and Japan. Site safety requirements are usually represented as advantageous vis-a-vis disadvantagous conditions, and potential advantage vis-a-vis disadvantage conditions, respectively in aspects of geohydrology, geochemistry, lithology, climate and human intrusion etc. Study framework and steps of site safety requirements for China are discussed under the view of systems science. (authors)

  12. New requirements on safety of nuclear power plants according to the IAEA safety standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Misak, J.

    2005-01-01

    In this presentation author presents new requirements on safety of nuclear power plants according to the IAEA safety standards. It is concluded that: - New set of IAEA Safety Standards is close to completion: around 40 standards for NPPs; - Different interpretation of IAEA Safety Standards at present: best world practices instead of previous 'minimum common denominator'; - A number of safety improvements required for NPPs; - Requirements related to BDBAs and severe accidents are the most demanding due to degradation of barriers: hardware modifications and accident management; - Large variety between countries in implementation of accident management programmes: from minimum to major hardware modifications; -Distinction between existing and new NPPs is essential from the point of view of the requirements; WWER 440 reactors have potential to reflect IAEA Safety Standards for existing NPPs; relatively low reactor power offers broader possibilities

  13. Motorcycle safety device investigation: A case study on airbags

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    analysis methods for research evaluation of rider crash protective devices fitted to ... The safety evaluation is then based on simulation of the 200 impact types. ... with recording of ISO 13232 car-front impact tests to evaluate the qualitative.

  14. Correct safety requirements during the life cycle of heating plants; Korrekta saekerhetskrav under vaermeanlaeggningars livscykel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tegehall, Jan; Hedberg, Johan [Swedish National Testing and Research Inst., Boraas (Sweden)

    2006-10-15

    function (limiter or limiting device, sensors, protective equipment, actuating element) shall be assembled correctly. It is important to select components that can withstand environmental stress. Safety shall be guaranteed and no unexpected hazardous event shall occur. For both old and new plants validation/check/test by a third part or notified body is necessary to perform (depends on local legal requirements and the type of equipment). The purpose with this project has been to give guidance on the requirements which affect the design of safety-related control systems in heat and power plants.

  15. NSPWG-recommended safety requirements and guidelines for SEI nuclear propulsion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, A.C.; Lee, J.H.; McCulloch, W.H.; Sawyer, J.C. Jr.; Bari, R.A.; Brown, N.W.; Cullingford, H.S.; Hardy, A.C.; Remp, K.; Sholtis, J.A.

    1992-01-01

    An Interagency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) nuclear propulsion program to facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG developed a top- level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the nuclear propulsion safety program and the development of Safety Functional Requirements. In addition the NSPWG reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top-level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. Safety requirements were developed for reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, and safeguards. Guidelines were recommended for risk/reliability, operational safety, flight trajectory and mission abort, space debris and meteoroids, and ground test safety. In this paper the specific requirements and guidelines will be discussed

  16. Safety-related control air systems - approved 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    This standard applies to those portions of the control air system that furnish air required to support, control, or operate systems or portions of systems that are safety related in nuclear power plants. This standard relates only to the air supply system(s) for safety-related air operated devices and does not apply to the safety-related air operated device or to air operated actuators for such devices. The objectives of this standard are to provide (1) minimum system design requirements for equipment, piping, instruments, controls, and wiring that constitute the air supply system; and (2) the system and component testing and maintenance requirements

  17. Condition Monitoring and Fault Diagnosis for an Antifalling Safety Device

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Guangxiang Yang

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available There is a constant need for the safe operation and reliability of antifalling safety device (AFSD of an elevator. This paper reports an experimental study on rotation speed and catching torque monitoring and fault diagnosis of an antifalling safety device in a construction elevator. Denoising the signal using wavelet transform is presented in this paper. Based on the denoising effects for several types of wavelets, the sym8 wavelet basis, which introduces the high order approximation and an adaptive threshold, is employed for denoising the signal. The experimental result shows a maximum data error reduction of 7.5% is obtained and SNRs (signal-to-noise ratio of rotation speed and catching torque are improved for 3.9% and 6.4%, respectively.

  18. Functional and operational requirements document : building 1012, Battery and Energy Storage Device Test Facility, Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johns, William H. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2013-11-01

    This report provides an overview of information, prior studies, and analyses relevant to the development of functional and operational requirements for electrochemical testing of batteries and energy storage devices carried out by Sandia Organization 2546, Advanced Power Sources R&D. Electrochemical operations for this group are scheduled to transition from Sandia Building 894 to a new Building located in Sandia TA-II referred to as Building 1012. This report also provides background on select design considerations and identifies the Safety Goals, Stakeholder Objectives, and Design Objectives required by the Sandia Design Team to develop the Performance Criteria necessary to the design of Building 1012. This document recognizes the Architecture-Engineering (A-E) Team as the primary design entity. Where safety considerations are identified, suggestions are provided to provide context for the corresponding operational requirement(s).

  19. Analyzing Software Requirements Errors in Safety-Critical, Embedded Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lutz, Robyn R.

    1993-01-01

    This paper analyzes the root causes of safety-related software errors in safety-critical, embedded systems. The results show that software errors identified as potentially hazardous to the system tend to be produced by different error mechanisms than non- safety-related software errors. Safety-related software errors are shown to arise most commonly from (1) discrepancies between the documented requirements specifications and the requirements needed for correct functioning of the system and (2) misunderstandings of the software's interface with the rest of the system. The paper uses these results to identify methods by which requirements errors can be prevented. The goal is to reduce safety-related software errors and to enhance the safety of complex, embedded systems.

  20. Meeting the maglev system's safety requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pierick, K

    1983-12-01

    The author shows how the safety requirements of the maglev track system derive from the general legal conditions for the safety of tracked transport. It is described how their compliance beyond the so-called ''development-accompanying'' and ''acceptance-preparatory'' safety work can be assured for the Transrapid test layout (TVE) now building in Emsland and also for later application as public transport system in Germany within the meaning of the General Railway Act.

  1. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Technical Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRAHN, D.E.

    2000-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt of multi-canister overpacks (MCOs) containing spent nuclear fuel. removal of free water from the MCOs using the cold vacuum drying process, and inerting and testing of the MCOs before transport to the Canister Storage Building. Controls required for public safety, significant defense in depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological and toxicological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines are included

  2. 78 FR 46560 - Pipeline Safety: Class Location Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-01

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part... class location requirements for gas transmission pipelines. Section 5 of the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory... and, with respect to gas transmission pipeline facilities, whether applying IMP requirements to...

  3. 21 CFR 821.25 - Device tracking system and content requirements: manufacturer requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICAL DEVICES MEDICAL DEVICE TRACKING REQUIREMENTS Tracking... procedure for the collection, maintenance, and auditing of the data specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of... recording system, and the file maintenance procedures system; and (3) A quality assurance program that...

  4. Thermal-Responsive Polymers for Enhancing Safety of Electrochemical Storage Devices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yang, Hui; Leow, Wan Ru; Chen, Xiaodong

    2018-03-01

    Thermal runway constitutes the most pressing safety issue in lithium-ion batteries and supercapacitors of large-scale and high-power density due to risks of fire or explosion. However, traditional strategies for averting thermal runaway do not enable the charging-discharging rate to change according to temperature or the original performance to resume when the device is cooled to room temperature. To efficiently control thermal runaway, thermal-responsive polymers provide a feasible and reversible strategy due to their ability to sense and subsequently act according to a predetermined sequence when triggered by heat. Herein, recent research progress on the use of thermal-responsive polymers to enhance the thermal safety of electrochemical storage devices is reviewed. First, a brief discussion is provided on the methods of preventing thermal runaway in electrochemical storage devices. Subsequently, a short review is provided on the different types of thermal-responsive polymers that can efficiently avoid thermal runaway, such as phase change polymers, polymers with sol-gel transitions, and polymers with positive temperature coefficients. The results represent the important development of thermal-responsive polymers toward the prevention of thermal runaway in next-generation smart electrochemical storage devices. © 2018 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.

  5. Safeguards of basic protection devices, high-protection devices, full-protection devices and school X-ray devices. Guideline for manufacturer and evaluating experts, rev. 1.0; Sicherheitsvorrichtungen von Basisschutzgeraeten, Hochschutzgeraeten, Vollschutzgeraeten und Schulroentgeneinrichtungen. Anforderungen fuer die Bauartpruefung nach der Roentgenverordnung. Leitfaden fuer Hersteller und Gutachter Rev. 1.0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dombrowski, Harald; Grottker, Ulrich; Pullner, Bjoern; Roettger, Annette; Zwiener, Roland

    2017-07-15

    This report describes the PTB requirements for engineered safeguards of basic-protection devices, high-protection devices, full-protection devices and school X-ray devices within the framework of type tests according to the German X-ray Ordinance. It contains detailed requirements for the hard- and software to ensure the required safety level. Especially manufacturers and evaluators of such X-ray tube assemblies are addressed.

  6. Software used to size the safety devices

    CERN Multimedia

    CERN. Geneva

    2016-01-01

    To avoid mistakes during the calculation, CEA/SBT has decided to write a software that take into account all the situations it is possible to encountered (subcritical state, supercritical state, …). The goal is to permit to the engineer in charge of a cryostat manufacturing to perform this calculation; he is the only person able to do the accidental analysis which is fundamental for the sizing of the safety device. The software performed will be presented.

  7. Factors affecting the utilization of safety devices by commercial ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Background: Motorcycle crashes are common causes of morbidity and mortality for both riders and passengers. To prevent and reduce the severity of injuries sustained through road traffic accidents (RTA) many countries enforce the use of safety devices while riding. Certain factors including non-enforcement of the existing ...

  8. International standardization of safety requirements for fast reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is conducting the FaCT (Fast Reactor Cycle Technology Development) project in cooperation with Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC) and Mitsubishi FBR systems inc. (MFBR), where an advanced loop-type fast reactor named JSFR (Japan Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor) is being developed. It is important to develop software technologies (a safety guideline, safety design criteria, safety design standards etc.) of FBRs as well as hardware ones (a reactor plant itself) in order to address prospective worldwide utilization of FBR technology. Therefore, it is expected to establish a rational safety guideline applicable to the JSFR and harmonized with national nuclear-safety regulations as well, including Japan, the United States and the European Union. This report presents domestic and international status of safety guideline development for sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs), results of comparative study for safety requirements provided in existing documents and a proposal for safety requirements of future SFRs with a roadmap for their refinement and worldwide utilization. (author)

  9. Safety design guides for seismic requirements for CANDU 9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young; A. C. D. Wright

    1996-03-01

    This safety design guide for seismic requirements for CANDU 9 describes the seismic design philosophy, defines the applicable earthquakes and identifies the structures and systems requiring seismic qualification to ensure that the essential safety function can be adequately satisfied following earthquake. The detailed requirements for structures, systems and components which must be seismically qualified are specified in the Appendix. The change status of the regulatory requirements, code and standards should be traced and this safety design guide shall be updated accordingly. 1 fig., (Author) .new

  10. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication applies to the disposal of radioactive waste of all types by means of emplacement in designed disposal facilities, subject to the necessary limitations and controls being placed on the disposal of the waste and on the development, operation and closure of facilities. The classification of radioactive waste is discussed. This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements to provide assurance of the radiation safety of the disposal of radioactive waste, in the operation of a disposal facility and especially after its closure. The fundamental safety objective is to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. This is achieved by setting requirements on the site selection and evaluation and design of a disposal facility, and on its construction, operation and closure, including organizational and regulatory requirements.

  11. Fire safety requirements for electrical cables towards nuclear reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raju, M.R.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Electrical power supply forms a very important part of any nuclear reactor. Power supplies have been categorized in to class I, II, III and IV from reliability point. The safety related equipment are provided with highly reliable power supply to achieve the safety of very high order. Vast network of cables in a nuclear reactor are grouped and segregated to ensure availability of power to at least one group under all anticipated occurrences. Since fire can result in failures leading to unavailability of power caused by common cause, both passive and active fire protection methods are adopted in addition to fire detection system. The paper describes the requirement for passive fire protection to electrical cables viz. fire barrier and fire breaks. The paper gives an account of the tests required to standardize the products. Fire safety implementation for cables in research reactors is described

  12. Design and construction of safety devices utilizing methods of measurement and control engineering

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Greiner, B; Weidlich, S

    1982-08-01

    This article considers a proposed concept for the design and construction of measurement and control devices for the safety of chemical plants with the aim of preventing danger to persons and the environment and damage. Such measurement and control devices are generally employed when primary measures adopted for plant safety, such as safety valves, collection vessels, etc. are not applicable or insufficient by themselves. The concept regards the new sheet no. 3 of the VDI/VDE code draft 2180 ''Safety of chemical engineering plant'' and proposes a further subdivision of class A into safety classes A0, A1, and A2. Overall, it is possible, on the basis of the measures for raising the availability of measurement and control equipment which are presented in this article, to make selection appropriate to the potential danger involved. The proposed procedure should not, however, be regarded as a rigid scheme but rather as leading to a systematic view and supporting decisions resting on sound operating experience.

  13. The main requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Webb, G.A.M.

    1998-01-01

    The main requirements of the new international basic safety standards are discussed, including such topics as health effects of ionizing radiations, the revision of basic safety standards, the requirements for radiation protection practices, the requirements for intervention,and the field of regulatory infrastructures. (A.K.)

  14. Model-based engineering for medical-device software.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ray, Arnab; Jetley, Raoul; Jones, Paul L; Zhang, Yi

    2010-01-01

    This paper demonstrates the benefits of adopting model-based design techniques for engineering medical device software. By using a patient-controlled analgesic (PCA) infusion pump as a candidate medical device, the authors show how using models to capture design information allows for i) fast and efficient construction of executable device prototypes ii) creation of a standard, reusable baseline software architecture for a particular device family, iii) formal verification of the design against safety requirements, and iv) creation of a safety framework that reduces verification costs for future versions of the device software. 1.

  15. Safety Requirements and Modern Technical Requirements in Human Information Systems in Amman Hotels

    OpenAIRE

    Farouq Ahmad Alazzam; Sattam Rakan Allahawiah; Mohammad Nayef Alsarayreh; Kafa Hmoud Abdallah al Nawaiseh

    2015-01-01

    This study aimed to demonstrate the availability of Safety requirements and modern technical requirements in human information systems in Amman hotels. an the most important results of this study is the availability of security and safety requirements in human information systems In Amman hotels and The adequacy of the information that it provided .and show that all departments are not connected by appropriate and effective communication networks in adequate form . Also sophisticated operatin...

  16. Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility interim operational safety requirements

    CERN Document Server

    Covey, L I

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSRs) for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt and inspection of cesium and strontium capsules from private irradiators; decontamination of the capsules and equipment; surveillance of the stored capsules; and maintenance activities. Controls required for public safety, significant defense-in-depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines (EGs) are included.

  17. Safety analysis of an irradiation device for 99Mo production in RA-3 reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lerner, Ana Maria; Madariaga, Marcelo; Waldman, Ricardo

    2000-01-01

    The Argentine RA-3 research reactor (5 MW) has been converted to LEU fuel more than nine years ago. Since then, it has been operating with LEU fuel, which has been designed and fabricated at the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA). The Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) is the institution in charge of the installation safety control. It is under this framework that the ARN has elaborated a neutronic calculation model for the RA-3 core, paying special attention to the device presently used for the irradiation of (HEU) 235 U targets required to obtain 9 '9Mo as a fission product. A regulatory analysis of results is carried out in the framework of ARN standards for fixed experiments. For such purpose, calculated reactivity values associated with such device are compared with recently measured values at the installation. Finally, and according to guidelines established in the first part of this work, a calculation model for a new device proposed by CNEA for the irradiation of metallic (LEU) uranium targets and still at its design stage, is here analysed. (author)

  18. 10 CFR 32.101 - Schedule B-prototype tests for luminous safety devices for use in aircraft.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ....101 Schedule B—prototype tests for luminous safety devices for use in aircraft. An applicant for a... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Schedule B-prototype tests for luminous safety devices for use in aircraft. 32.101 Section 32.101 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SPECIFIC DOMESTIC LICENSES...

  19. OSHA safety requirements for hazardous chemicals in the workplace.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dohms, J

    1992-01-01

    This article outlines the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements set forth by the Hazard Communication Standard, which has been in effect for the healthcare industry since 1987. Administrators who have not taken concrete steps to address employee health and safety issues relating to hazardous chemicals are encouraged to do so to avoid the potential of large fines for cited violations. While some states administer their own occupational safety and health programs, they must adopt standards and enforce requirements that are at least as effective as federal requirements.

  20. Medical Device Safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    A medical device is any product used to diagnose, cure, or treat a condition, or to prevent disease. They ... may need one in a hospital. To use medical devices safely Know how your device works. Keep ...

  1. Development of Network Protocol for the Integrated Safety System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, S. W.; Baek, J. I.; Lee, S. H.; Park, C. S.; Park, K. H.; Shin, J. M. [Hannam Univ., Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2007-06-15

    Communication devices in the safety system of nuclear power plants are distinguished from those developed for commercial purposes in terms of a strict requirement of safety. The concept of safety covers the determinability, the reliability, and the separation/isolation to prevent the undesirable interactions among devices. The safety also requires that these properties be never proof less. Most of the current commercialized communication products rarely have the safety properties. Moreover, they can be neither verified nor validated to satisfy the safety property of implementation process. This research proposes the novel architecture and protocol of a data communication network for the safety system in nuclear power plants.

  2. Development of Network Protocol for the Integrated Safety System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, S. W.; Baek, J. I.; Lee, S. H.; Park, C. S.; Park, K. H.; Shin, J. M.

    2007-06-01

    Communication devices in the safety system of nuclear power plants are distinguished from those developed for commercial purposes in terms of a strict requirement of safety. The concept of safety covers the determinability, the reliability, and the separation/isolation to prevent the undesirable interactions among devices. The safety also requires that these properties be never proof less. Most of the current commercialized communication products rarely have the safety properties. Moreover, they can be neither verified nor validated to satisfy the safety property of implementation process. This research proposes the novel architecture and protocol of a data communication network for the safety system in nuclear power plants

  3. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission's financial guarantee requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferch, R.

    2006-01-01

    The Nuclear Safety and Control Act gives the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) the legal authority to require licensees to provide financial guarantees in order to meet the purposes of the Act. CNSC policy and guidance with regard to financial guarantees is outlined, and the current status of financial guarantee requirements as applied to various CNSC licensees is described. (author)

  4. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition); Bezopasnost' atomnykh ehlektrostantsij: proektirovanie. Konkretnye trebovaniya bezopasnosti

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-04-15

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  5. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI action plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, a program was established whereby an annual NUREG report would be published on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was compiled and reported in three NUREG volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). This annual NUREG report combines these volumes into a single report and provides updated information as of September 30, 1991. The data contained in these NUREG reports are a product of the NRC's Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) database, which is maintained by the Project Management Staff in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and by NRC regional personnel. This report is to provide a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan Requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, and GSIs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. An additional purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  6. High-Speed Maglev Trains; German Safety Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    1991-12-31

    This document is a translation of technology-specific safety requirements developed : for the German Transrapid Maglev technology. These requirements were developed by a : working group composed of representatives of German Federal Railways (DB), Tes...

  7. Development of High-Level Safety Requirements for a Pyroprocessing Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seo, Seok Jun; Jo, Woo Jin; You, Gil Sung; Choung, Won Myung; Lee, Ho Hee; Kim, Hyun Min; Jeon, Hong Rae; Ku, Jeong Hoe; Lee, Hyo Jik [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing a pyroproceesing technology to reduce the waste volume and recycle some elements. The pyroprocessing includes several treatment processes which are related with not only radiological and physical but also chemical and electrochemical properties. Thus, it is of importance to establish safety design requirements considering all the aspects of those properties for a reliable pyroprocessing facility. In this study, high-level requirements are presented in terms of not only radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, and seismic safety but also confinement and chemical safety for the unique characteristics of a pyroprocessing facility. Several high-level safety design requirements such as radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, seismic, confinement, and chemical processing were presented for a pyroprocessing facility. The requirements must fulfill domestic and international safety technology standards for a nuclear facility. Furthermore, additional requirements should be considered for the unique electrochemical treatments in a pyroprocessing facility.

  8. Discussion on several important safety requirements for the new nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yan Tianwen; Li Jigen; Zhang Lin; Feng Youcai; Jia Xiang; Li Wenhong

    2013-01-01

    Post the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Chinese government raised higher safety goals and safety requirements for the new nuclear power plant to be constructed. The paper expounded the important indicators of safety requirements and the aspects of safety modification that had been developed for the new NPPs. It also discussed and analyzed the main fields required by the new NPPs safety requirements in the safety goals, safety evaluation of sites, defenses of internal and external events, severe accident prevention and mitigation, design of reactor core, containment system and I and C system, and optimization of engineering measure, which gave some references to the design, construction and safety modifications of new NPPs in China. (authors)

  9. Development of the switch requirements and architecture of a safety data communication system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, K.I.; Lee, J.K.; Park, H.Y.; Koo, I.S.

    2004-12-01

    In accordance with digitalising the Instrumentation and Control(I and C) systems in the integral reactor, a communication network is required for effective information exchanges between the different equipment, an enhancement of the design flexibility, a simple installation and cost reduction. Generally, a communication network consists of a topology, the protocol, a communication medium, an interconnection device, etc. In this report, the development methods of switch and the architecture of a Safety Data Communication System(SDCS) are investigated and analyzed. In this report, the design requirements for switch are presented, which are the essential requirements to develop the switch in a SDCS of the SMART-P. To establish these requirements, the evaluation and analysis of the design and implementation method of the COTS switches, the architecture of SDCS and the design requirements of a SDCS were performed. At the detail design stage, these requirements will be used for the top-tier requirements, especially the design target and design basis. To develop the detail design requirements in the future, more quantitative and qualitative analyses are required. In the case of selecting the COTS switch and developing the switch, these requirements will also be used for the evaluation guide

  10. Development of the switch requirements and architecture of a safety data communication system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, K.I.; Lee, J.K.; Park, H.Y.; Koo, I.S

    2004-12-01

    In accordance with digitalising the Instrumentation and Control(I and C) systems in the integral reactor, a communication network is required for effective information exchanges between the different equipment, an enhancement of the design flexibility, a simple installation and cost reduction. Generally, a communication network consists of a topology, the protocol, a communication medium, an interconnection device, etc. In this report, the development methods of switch and the architecture of a Safety Data Communication System(SDCS) are investigated and analyzed. In this report, the design requirements for switch are presented, which are the essential requirements to develop the switch in a SDCS of the SMART-P. To establish these requirements, the evaluation and analysis of the design and implementation method of the COTS switches, the architecture of SDCS and the design requirements of a SDCS were performed. At the detail design stage, these requirements will be used for the top-tier requirements, especially the design target and design basis. To develop the detail design requirements in the future, more quantitative and qualitative analyses are required. In the case of selecting the COTS switch and developing the switch, these requirements will also be used for the evaluation guide.

  11. Westinghouse Hanford Company safety analysis reports and technical safety requirements upgrade program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Busche, D.M.

    1995-09-01

    During Fiscal Year 1992, the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) separately transmitted the following US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) for compliance: DOE 5480.21, ''Unreviewed Safety Questions,'' DOE 5480.22, ''Technical Safety Requirements,'' and DOE 5480.23, ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.'' WHC has proceeded with its impact assessment and implementation process for the Orders. The Orders are closely-related and contain some requirements that are either identical, similar, or logically-related. Consequently, WHC has developed a strategy calling for an integrated implementation of the three Orders. The strategy is comprised of three primary objectives, namely: Obtain DOE approval of a single list of DOE-owned and WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities, Establish and/or upgrade the ''Safety Basis'' for each Nuclear Facility, and Establish a functional Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process to govern the management and preservation of the Safety Basis for each Nuclear Facility. WHC has developed policy-revision and facility-specific implementation plans to accomplish near-term tasks associated with the above strategic objectives. This plan, which as originally submitted in August 1993 and approved, provided an interpretation of the new DOE Nuclear Facility definition and an initial list of WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities. For each current existing Nuclear Facility, existing Safety Basis documents are identified and the plan/status is provided for the ISB. Plans for upgrading SARs and developing TSRs will be provided after issuance of the corresponding Rules

  12. Innovative safety ideas for fusion experimental machines

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brereton, S.J.; Gouge, M.; Piet, S.J.; Merrill, B.J.; Holland, D.F.; Sze, D.K.

    1990-01-01

    Throughout the early stages of design of fusion experimental devices, such as ITER, safety experts have worked with designers to incorporate safety features into the design. Recent efforts have focused on passive safety features. Although designs of near-term fusion machines may appear consistent with expected regulatory requirements, the safety characteristics can potentially be more attractive. Here, a variety of suggestions that appear promising in terms of improving safety are given. These include new concepts, innovative technologies, further support of past concepts, and possible modification to operating scenarios. Some technical discussion on the feasibility of the proposals is provided. The ideas are generally conceptual at this stage and require further assessment and development work. However, each has the potential for enhancing the safety of experimental devices. 33 refs., 6 figs., 9 tabs

  13. Permitting product liability litigation for FDA-approved drugs and devices promotes patient safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kesselheim, A S

    2010-06-01

    In 2008 and 2009, the Supreme Court reviewed the question of whether patients injured by dangerous prescription drugs or medical devices can bring tort lawsuits against pharmaceutical and device manufacturers. The Court ruled that claims against device manufacturers were preempted while claims against pharmaceutical manufacturers were not. The threat of product liability lawsuits promotes patient safety by encouraging manufacturers to take greater responsibility in providing clear warnings about known adverse effects of their products.

  14. Research Devices Maintenance Programs and Safety Network Infrastructures in Nuclear Malaysia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zainudin Jaafar; Muhammad Zahidee Taat; Ishak Mansor

    2015-01-01

    Instrumentation and Automation Center (PIA) is responsible in carrying out maintenance work for building safety infrastructure and area for nuclear scientific and research work. Care cycle and nuclear scientific tools starting from the preparation of specifications until devices disposal- to get the maximum output from devices therefore PIA has introduced Effective and Comprehensive Maintenance Plan under Management/ Trust/ Development/ Science Fund budgets and also user, Asset Management, caring and handling of the devices. This paper also discussed more on case study related to using and handling so that it can be guidance and standard when its involving mishandling, improper maintenance, inadequacy of supervision and others including improvement suggestion programs. (author)

  15. Design requirements of communication architecture of SMART safety system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, H. Y.; Kim, D. H.; Sin, Y. C.; Lee, J. Y.

    2001-01-01

    To develop the communication network architecture of safety system of SMART, the evaluation elements for reliability and performance factors are extracted from commercial networks and classified the required-level by importance. A predictable determinacy, status and fixed based architecture, separation and isolation from other systems, high reliability, verification and validation are introduced as the essential requirements of safety system communication network. Based on the suggested requirements, optical cable, star topology, synchronous transmission, point-to-point physical link, connection-oriented logical link, MAC (medium access control) with fixed allocation are selected as the design elements. The proposed architecture will be applied as basic communication network architecture of SMART safety system

  16. ACED devices and SECAF supports for the control of structure, pipe network and equipment behaviour at seismic movements in order to enhance the safety margin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Serban, Viorel; Prisecaru, I.; Cretu, D.; Moldoveanu, T.

    2002-01-01

    In order to enhance the safety margin of structure, pipe networks and equipment associated to the existing NPPs, the classic consolidation solutions are very expensive and many times, impossible to be implemented. Structures, pipe networks, systems and equipment have geometries imposed by the basic construction requirements, operating and safety requirements and their modifications is not always possible. In order to enhance the strength capacity of (new or old) structures, systems and equipment mechanical devices with controlled elasticity and damping (ACED) have been designed, constructed and experimented. These devices are capable to support very large static loads over which dynamic loads (shock, vibration and seismic movements) overlap (which are damped). To increase the strength capacity of (new or existing) pipe networks and equipment connecting with pipes, SECAF supports that allow displacements from thermal expansions with low reaction force have been designed, constructed and experimented. SECAF supports are capable elastically to take permanent loads over which shocks, vibrations and seismic movements (which are damp) overlap. ACED devices and SECAF supports can be used to rehabilitate the existing NPPs with law financial costs and an increase of their strength capacity up to 100% under seismic movements, shocks and vibrations. ACED devices and SECAF supports do not require maintenance, are not affected by presence of a radiation field and their estimated service-life is similar to the NPPs

  17. Utilization of ocular safety devices among Sawmill workers in Nigeria

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Objective: The study was carried out to assess the use of eye safety devices in sawmill workers in Nigeria. Methods: A cross-sectional study of sawmill workers was carried out using pretested questionnaires. Ocular examination was done on site with a pen torch, portable hand-held slit lamp bio-microscope and direct ...

  18. TWRS safety SSCs: Requirements and characteristics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith-Fewell, M.A.

    1997-01-01

    Safety Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) have been identified from hazard and accident analyses. These analyses were performed to support the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Basis for Interim Operation (BID). The text identifies and evaluates the SSCs and their supporting SSCs to show that they either prevent the occurrence of the accident or mitigate the consequences of the accident to below the acceptance guidelines. The requirements for the SSCs to fulfill these tasks are described

  19. 77 FR 60704 - Medical Devices; Availability of Safety and Effectiveness Summaries for Premarket Approval...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-10-04

    ... regulations provide that FDA publish a quarterly list of available safety and effectiveness summaries of PMA...-0638] Medical Devices; Availability of Safety and Effectiveness Summaries for Premarket Approval... Administration (FDA) is publishing a list of premarket approval applications (PMAs) that have been approved. This...

  20. 78 FR 35284 - Medical Devices; Availability of Safety and Effectiveness Summaries for Premarket Approval...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-12

    ... summaries of safety and effectiveness data to the Division of Dockets Management (HFA-305), Food and Drug... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Food and Drug Administration [Docket Nos. FDA-2013-M-0036... Devices; Availability of Safety and Effectiveness Summaries for Premarket Approval Applications AGENCY...

  1. 76 FR 31965 - Medical Devices; Availability of Safety and Effectiveness Summaries for Premarket Approval...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-06-02

    ... summaries of safety and effectiveness data to the Division of Dockets Management (HFA-305), Food and Drug... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Food and Drug Administration [Docket Nos. FDA-2011-M-0034... Devices; Availability of Safety and Effectiveness Summaries for Premarket Approval Applications AGENCY...

  2. Risk assessment of medical devices: evaluation of microbiological and toxicological safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dorpema, J.W.

    1995-01-01

    Safety assessment of medical devices includes sterilization and biological evaluation or biocompatability testing. Sterilization by ETO gas is criticised for their carcinogenic potency or even banned. Mutual acceptance of biological evaluation test results is promoted by a laboratory accreditation and qualification program. (Author)

  3. Passive safety device and internal short tested method for energy storage cells and systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Keyser, Matthew; Darcy, Eric; Long, Dirk; Pesaran, Ahmad

    2015-09-22

    A passive safety device for an energy storage cell for positioning between two electrically conductive layers of the energy storage cell. The safety device also comprising a separator and a non-conductive layer. A first electrically conductive material is provided on the non-conductive layer. A first opening is formed through the separator between the first electrically conductive material and one of the electrically conductive layers of the energy storage device. A second electrically conductive material is provided adjacent the first electrically conductive material on the non-conductive layer, wherein a space is formed on the non-conductive layer between the first and second electrically conductive materials. A second opening is formed through the non-conductive layer between the second electrically conductive material and another of the electrically conductive layers of the energy storage device. The first and second electrically conductive materials combine and exit at least partially through the first and second openings to connect the two electrically conductive layers of the energy storage device at a predetermined temperature.

  4. The tendency of medical electrical equipment - IEC 60601-2-54: Particular requirements for the basic safety and essential performance of x-ray equipment for radiography and radioscopy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roh, Young Hoon; Kim, Jung Min

    2015-01-01

    Medical electrical equipment - Part 1: General requirement for basic safety and essential performance of MFDS was revised as 3th edition and Medical electrical equipment Part 2-54: Particular requirements for the basic safety and essential performance of X-ray equipment will be expected to be announced as notification. Therefore this technical report was written to introduce provision of the particular requirements, replacement, addition, amendment. The purpose of this particular requirements is to secure requirements for basic safety and essential performance of X-ray equipment for radiography and radioscopy. X-ray high voltage generator, mechanical protective device, protection against radiation is included in this particular requirements. Medical electrical equipment - Part 1, Part 1-2, Part 1-3 is applied to this particular requirements. If the requirements is announced as notification, It is expected to widen understanding for basic safety and essential performance of X-ray equipment for radiography and radioscopy and play a part to internationalize of medical equipment

  5. 78 FR 17415 - Medical Devices; Availability of Safety and Effectiveness Summaries for Premarket Approval...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-03-21

    ... its decision. The regulations provide that FDA publish a quarterly list of available safety and..., FDA-2012-M-1183, and FDA-2012-M-1184] Medical Devices; Availability of Safety and Effectiveness.... SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is publishing a list of premarket approval applications...

  6. Technical safety requirements for the Annular Core Research Reactor Facility (ACRRF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boldt, K.R.; Morris, F.M.; Talley, D.G.; McCrory, F.M.

    1998-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) document is prepared and issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.22, Technical Safety Requirements. The bases for the TSR are established in the ACRRF Safety Analysis Report issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The TSR identifies the operational conditions, boundaries, and administrative controls for the safe operation of the facility

  7. 41 CFR 102-34.250 - Do Federal employees in Government motor vehicles have to use all safety devices and follow all...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... safety devices and follow all safety guidelines? Yes, Federal employees in Government motor vehicles have... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Do Federal employees in Government motor vehicles have to use all safety devices and follow all safety guidelines? 102-34.250 Section...

  8. 77 FR 35745 - Highway Safety Programs; Conforming Products List of Screening Devices To Measure Alcohol in...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-14

    ..., battery powered device with a semiconductor sensor. (2) Alcohol Countermeasure Systems Corp., submitted...-0062] Highway Safety Programs; Conforming Products List of Screening Devices To Measure Alcohol in... Screening Devices to Measure Alcohol in Bodily Fluids dated, March 31, 2008 (73 FR 16956). DATES: Effective...

  9. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered.

  10. Tritium radioluminescent devices, Health and Safety Manual

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Traub, R.J.; Jensen, G.A.

    1995-06-01

    This document consolidates available information on the properties of tritium, including its environmental chemistry, its health physics, and safe practices in using tritium-activated RL lighting. It also summarizes relevant government regulations on RL lighting. Chapters are divided into a single-column part, which provides an overview of the topic for readers simply requiring guidance on the safety of tritium RL lighting, and a dual-column part for readers requiring more technical and detailed information.

  11. Tritium radioluminescent devices, Health and Safety Manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Traub, R.J.; Jensen, G.A.

    1995-06-01

    This document consolidates available information on the properties of tritium, including its environmental chemistry, its health physics, and safe practices in using tritium-activated RL lighting. It also summarizes relevant government regulations on RL lighting. Chapters are divided into a single-column part, which provides an overview of the topic for readers simply requiring guidance on the safety of tritium RL lighting, and a dual-column part for readers requiring more technical and detailed information

  12. Radiation safety in X-ray facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-09-01

    The guide specifies the radiation safety requirements for structural shielding and other safety arrangements used in X-ray facilities in medical and veterinary X-ray activities and in industry, research and education. The guide is also applicable to premises in which X-ray equipment intended for radiation therapy and operating at a voltage of less than 25 kV is used. The guide applies to new X-ray facilities in which X-ray equipment that has been used elsewhere is transferred. The radiation safety requirements for radiation therapy X-ray devices operating at a voltage exceeding 25 kV, and for the premices in which such devices are used, are set out in Guide ST 2.2

  13. Radiation safety in X-ray facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-09-01

    The guide specifies the radiation safety requirements for structural shielding and other safety arrangements used in X-ray facilities in medical and veterinary X-ray activities and in industry, research and education. The guide is also applicable to premises in which X-ray equipment intended for radiation therapy and operating at a voltage of less than 25 kV is used. The guide applies to new X-ray facilities in which X-ray equipment that has been used elsewhere is transferred. The radiation safety requirements for radiation therapy X-ray devices operating at a voltage exceeding 25 kV, and for the premices in which such devices are used, are set out in Guide ST 2.2.

  14. Investigational new drug safety reporting requirements for human drug and biological products and safety reporting requirements for bioavailability and bioequivalence studies in humans. Final rule.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-29

    The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is amending its regulations governing safety reporting requirements for human drug and biological products subject to an investigational new drug application (IND). The final rule codifies the agency's expectations for timely review, evaluation, and submission of relevant and useful safety information and implements internationally harmonized definitions and reporting standards. The revisions will improve the utility of IND safety reports, reduce the number of reports that do not contribute in a meaningful way to the developing safety profile of the drug, expedite FDA's review of critical safety information, better protect human subjects enrolled in clinical trials, subject bioavailability and bioequivalence studies to safety reporting requirements, promote a consistent approach to safety reporting internationally, and enable the agency to better protect and promote public health.

  15. BIOANALYTICAL STANDARDIZING FOR SEROLOGICAL DIAGNOSTIC MEDICAL DEVICES

    OpenAIRE

    A. Yu. Galkin; A. G. Komar; A. A. Grigorenko

    2015-01-01

    In article we analyzed national and international regulations concerning the quality and safety of medical devices for in vitro diagnostics. We discussed the possibility of a partial application of the recommendations of the State Pharmacopoeia of Ukraine to this type of product. The main guiding regulatory documents establishing requirements for quality and safety tools for the serological diagnosis products are The technical regulation on medical devices for the diagnosis in vitro, DSTU ISO...

  16. The Training Requirements for the Workers a Legal Instrument to Ensure the Safety Use of the Ionizing Radiation Sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosca, G.; Coroianu, A.; Stanescu, G.

    2009-01-01

    Recognizing the need for a graded and commensurate with the practice associated risk approach, the Romanian Regulatory Authority developed the legal framework for defining the roles, duties and responsibilities for the radiation workers (RWs) and the radiological safety officer (RPO). The licensee is responsible to provide for the RWs basic knowledge and understanding of radiation proprieties, good knowledge of the local rules and the operational radiation protection methods and the safety features of the devices, on the job training under the supervision of a RPO or a qualified expert (RPE). Every 5 years the participation to a refresher course is required

  17. Operating safety requirements for the intermediate level liquid waste system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-07-01

    The operation of the Intermediate Level Liquid Waste (ILW) System, which is described in the Final Safety Analysis, consists of two types of operations, namely: (1) the operation of a tank farm which involves the storage and transportation through pipelines of various radioactive liquids; and (2) concentration of the radioactive liquids by evaporation including rejection of the decontaminated condensate to the Waste Treatment Plant and retention of the concentrate. The following safety requirements in regard to these operations are presented: safety limits and limiting control settings; limiting conditions for operation; and surveillance requirements. Staffing requirements, reporting requirements, and steps to be taken in the event of an abnormal occurrence are also described

  18. Preparation of safety regulatory requirements for new technology like digital system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    The current regulatory requirements on digital instrumentation and control system have been reviewed by JNES, considering international trend discussed in DICWG of MDEP. MDEP DICWG held in OECD/NEA gives the opportunity to identify the convergence of applicable standards. The working group's activities include: identifying and prioritising the member countries' challenges, practices, and needs regarding standards and regulatory guidance on digital instrumentation and control; identifying areas of importance and needs for convergence of existing standards and guidance or development of new standards; sharing of information; and identifying common positions among the member countries for areas of particular importance and need. The DICWG drafted common positions on specific issues which are based on the existing standards, national regulatory guidance, best practices, and group inputs using an agreed process and framework. The following four general common positions have been discussed in this fiscal year. The Treatment of Common Cause Failure Resulting from Software within Digital Safety Systems, The Treatment of Hardware Description Language(HDL) Programmed Devices for Use in Nuclear Safety System, Factory Acceptance Test and Site Acceptance Test, The Use of Automatic Tests to Perform Surveilance for Digital Systems. (author)

  19. Philosophy and safety requirements for land-based nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kellermann, Otto

    1978-01-01

    The main ideas of safety philosophy for land-based nuclear installations are presented together with their background of protection goals. Today's requirements for design and quality assurance are deductively shown. Finally a proposition is made for a new balancing of safety philosophy according to the high safety level that nuclear installations have reached

  20. Safety integrity requirements for computer based I ampersand C systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thuy, N.N.Q.; Ficheux-Vapne, F.

    1997-01-01

    In order to take into account increasingly demanding functional requirements, many instrumentation and control (I ampersand C) systems in nuclear power plants are implemented with computers. In order to ensure the required safety integrity of such equipment, i.e., to ensure that they satisfactorily perform the required safety functions under all stated conditions and within stated periods of time, requirements applicable to these equipment and to their life cycle need to be expressed and followed. On the other hand, the experience of the last years has led EDF (Electricite de France) and its partners to consider three classes of systems and equipment, according to their importance to safety. In the EPR project (European Pressurized water Reactor), these classes are labeled E1A, E1B and E2. The objective of this paper is to present the outline of the work currently done in the framework of the ETC-I (EPR Technical Code for I ampersand C) regarding safety integrity requirements applicable to each of the three classes. 4 refs., 2 figs

  1. A comparison of the difference of requirements between functional safety and nuclear safety controllers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chen, C.K.; Lee, C.L.; Shyu, S.S. [Inst. of Nuclear Energy Research, Taoyuan, Taiwan (China)

    2014-07-01

    In order to establish self-reliant capabilities of nuclear I&C systems in Taiwan, Taiwan's Nuclear I&C System (TNICS) project had been established by Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER). A Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) safety controller (SCS-2000) has been completed and gone through the IEC 61508 Safety Integrity Level 3 (SIL3) certification of Functional Safety for industries. Based on the certification processes, the difference of requirements between Functional Safety and Nuclear Safety controllers in term of hardware and software are addressed in this study. Besides, the measures used to determine and verify the reliability of the safety control system design are presented. (author)

  2. NF EN ISO 11137-1, July 2006. Sterilization of health care products - Irradiation - Part 1: Requirements for development, validation and routine control of a sterilization process for medical devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This part of the ISO 11137 standard specifies requirements for the development, validation and routine control of a radiation sterilization process for medical devices. Although the scope of this part of the ISO 11137 standard is limited to medical devices, it specifies requirements and provides guidance that may be applicable to other products and equipment. This part of the international standard covers radiation processes employing irradiators using the radionuclide 60 Co or 137 Cs, a beam from an electron generator or a beam from an X-ray generator. This part of the international standard does not: - specify requirements for development, validation and routine control of a process for inactivating the causative agents of spongiform encephalopathies such as scrapie, bovine spongiform encephalopathy and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease; - detail specified requirements for designating a medical device as sterile; - specify a quality management system for the control of all stages of production of medical devices; - specify requirements for occupational safety associated with the design and operation of irradiation facilities; - specify requirements for the sterilization of used or reprocessed devices

  3. Predisposal management of radioactive waste. General safety requirements. Pt. 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish, the requirements that must be satisfied in the predisposal management of radioactive waste. This publication sets out the objectives, criteria and requirements for the protection of human health and the environment that apply to the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and shutdown of facilities for the predisposal management of radioactive waste, and the requirements that must be met to ensure the safety of such facilities and activities. This Safety Requirements publication applies to the predisposal management of radioactive waste of all types and covers all the steps in its management from its generation up to its disposal, including its processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning), storage and transport. Such waste may arise from the commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities; the use of radionuclides in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and education; the processing of materials that contain naturally occurring radionuclides; and the remediation of contaminated areas. The introduction of the document (Section 1) informs about its objective, scope and structure. The protection of human health and the environment is considered in Section 2 of this publication. Section 3 establishes requirements for the responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste. Requirements for the principal approaches to and the elements of the predisposal management of radioactive waste are established in Section 4. Section 5 establishes requirements for the safe development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and safe conduct of activities. The Annex presents a discussion of the consistency of the safety requirements established in this publication with the fundamental safety principles

  4. Recommended general safety requirements for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-06-01

    This report presents recommendations for a set of general safety requirements that could form the basis for the licensing of nuclear power plants by the Atomic Energy Control Board. In addition to a number of recommended deterministic requirements the report includes criteria for the acceptability of the design of such plants based upon the calculated probability and consequence (in terms of predicted radiation dose to members of the public) of potential fault sequences. The report also contains a historical review of nuclear safety principles and practices in Canada

  5. Evaluation of safety, an unavoidable requirement in the applications of ionizing radiations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jova Sed, Luis Andres

    2013-01-01

    The safety assessments should be conducted as a means to evaluate compliance with safety requirements (and thus the application of fundamental safety principles) for all facilities and activities in order to determine the measures to be taken to ensure safety. It is an essential tool in decision making. For long time we have linked the safety assessment to nuclear facilities and not to all practices involving the use of ionizing radiation in daily life. However, the main purpose of the safety assessment is to determine if it has reached an appropriate level of safety for an installation or activity and if it has fulfilled the objectives of safety and basic safety criteria set by the designer, operating organization and the regulatory body under the protection and safety requirements set out in the International Basic safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. This paper presents some criteria and personal experiences with the new international recommendations on this subject and its practical application in the region and demonstrates the importance of this requirement. Reflects the need to train personnel of the operator and the regulatory body in the proportional application of this requirement in practice with ionizing radiation

  6. Medical devices; exemption from premarket notification; class II devices; wheelchair elevator. Final order.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-03-04

    The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is publishing an order granting a petition requesting exemption from premarket notification requirements for wheelchair elevator devices commonly known as inclined platform lifts and vertical platform lifts. These devices are used to provide a means for a person with a mobility impairment caused by injury or other disease to move from one level to another, usually in a wheelchair. This order exempts wheelchair elevators, class II devices, from premarket notification and establishes conditions for exemption for this device that will provide a reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device without submission of a premarket notification (510(k)). This exemption from 510(k), subject to these conditions, is immediately in effect for wheelchair elevators. All other devices classified under FDA's wheelchair elevator regulations, including attendant-operated stair climbing devices for wheelchairs and portable platform lifts, continue to require submission of 510(k)s. FDA is publishing this order in accordance with the section of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the FD&C Act) permitting the exemption of a device from the requirement to submit a 510(k).

  7. Nuclear criticality safety and time reactivity enhancement aspects of energy amplifier system devices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Siciliano, F [ENEA, Centro Ricerche Trisaia, Rotondelle, Matera (Italy). Direzione INFO

    1995-12-01

    As far as the Rubbia`s and colleagues proposal of innovating Energy Amplifier system (E.A.s.) device driven by a particle beam accelerator is concerned, four basic topics are comprised in the present paper: (1) A short outline of the nuclear aspects of Th-U and U-Pu fuel cycles regarding their general breeding and efficiency features. (2) The needed nuclear criticality control requirements have been studied in terms of safety regulating parameters on the basis of the ThO2 mixed oxides selected as fuel kind for the E.A.s. device technology development. Particular attention is devoted to time evolution of neutron multiplication factor since delayed development of the 233U buildup and so system reactivity are expected in the Th-U cycle. (3) Code E.A.s. device irradiation and post-irradiation modelling for determining higher actinides buildup, fission products formation and fuel consumption trends as function of time, system enrichment degree and flux level parameters. (4) The confirmation, on the basis of the same specific power irradiation, of expected actinides waste obtainment cleaner than the one deriving from the U-Pu cycle utilization. For this end, a model comparison of equivalent enriched fissile nuclides in both cycles has been devised as having, within the range of 0-700 days, ten irradiation periods of about 53 MW/ton specific power and equivalent cooling time post-irradiation periods.

  8. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities. Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific relevance include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal

  9. Risk and safety requirements for diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kowalski, Marek L; Ansotegui, Ignacio; Aberer, Werner

    2016-01-01

    One of the major concerns in the practice of allergy is related to the safety of procedures for the diagnosis and treatment of allergic disease. Management (diagnosis and treatment) of hypersensitivity disorders involves often intentional exposure to potentially allergenic substances (during skin...... attempted to present general requirements necessary to assure the safety of these procedures. Following review of available literature a group of allergy experts within the World Allergy Organization (WAO), representing various continents and areas of allergy expertise, presents this report on risk...... associated with diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology and proposes a consensus on safety requirements for performing procedures in allergy offices. Optimal safety measures including appropriate location, type and required time of supervision, availability of safety equipment, access...

  10. Requirements to be met by a safety philosophy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hahn, L.

    1990-01-01

    The author's assessment of the use of safety philosophies is that, since 'safety philosophers' still are not certain whether a safety philosophy ought to be applicable to just one, particular technology, or rather to a variety of different technologies, there is reason to state that the required ethical, philosophical and political foundations to build a safety philosophy on are still missing. And this, the author presumes, is one of the reasons why our society to a far extent is incapable of acting, faced not only with the nuclear issue, but also with the present and future ecological challenge. (orig./DG) [de

  11. Defence-in-depth and development of safety requirements for advanced nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnino, A.; Gasparini, M.

    2002-01-01

    The paper addresses a general approach for the preparation of the design safety requirements using the IAEA Safety Objectives and the strategy of defence-in-depth. It proposes a general method (top-down approach) to prepare safety requirements for a given kind of reactor using the IAEA requirements for nuclear power plants as a starting point through a critical interpretation and application of the strategy of defence-in-depth. The IAEA has recently developed a general methodology for screening the defence-in-depth of nuclear power plants starting from the fundamental safety objectives as proposed in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals. This methodology may provide a useful tool for the preparation of safety requirements for the design and operation of any kind of reactor. Currently the IAEA is preparing the technical basis for the development of safety requirements for Modular High Temperature Gas Reactors, with the aim of showing the viability of the method. A draft TECDOC has been prepared and circulated among several experts for comments. This paper is largely based on the content of the draft TECDOC. (authors)

  12. Industrial Personal Computer based Display for Nuclear Safety System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Ji Hyeon; Kim, Aram; Jo, Jung Hee; Kim, Ki Beom; Cheon, Sung Hyun; Cho, Joo Hyun; Sohn, Se Do; Baek, Seung Min

    2014-01-01

    The safety display of nuclear system has been classified as important to safety (SIL:Safety Integrity Level 3). These days the regulatory agencies are imposing more strict safety requirements for digital safety display system. To satisfy these requirements, it is necessary to develop a safety-critical (SIL 4) grade safety display system. This paper proposes industrial personal computer based safety display system with safety grade operating system and safety grade display methods. The description consists of three parts, the background, the safety requirements and the proposed safety display system design. The hardware platform is designed using commercially available off-the-shelf processor board with back plane bus. The operating system is customized for nuclear safety display application. The display unit is designed adopting two improvement features, i.e., one is to provide two separate processors for main computer and display device using serial communication, and the other is to use Digital Visual Interface between main computer and display device. In this case the main computer uses minimized graphic functions for safety display. The display design is at the conceptual phase, and there are several open areas to be concreted for a solid system. The main purpose of this paper is to describe and suggest a methodology to develop a safety-critical display system and the descriptions are focused on the safety requirement point of view

  13. Industrial Personal Computer based Display for Nuclear Safety System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ji Hyeon; Kim, Aram; Jo, Jung Hee; Kim, Ki Beom; Cheon, Sung Hyun; Cho, Joo Hyun; Sohn, Se Do; Baek, Seung Min [KEPCO, Youngin (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-08-15

    The safety display of nuclear system has been classified as important to safety (SIL:Safety Integrity Level 3). These days the regulatory agencies are imposing more strict safety requirements for digital safety display system. To satisfy these requirements, it is necessary to develop a safety-critical (SIL 4) grade safety display system. This paper proposes industrial personal computer based safety display system with safety grade operating system and safety grade display methods. The description consists of three parts, the background, the safety requirements and the proposed safety display system design. The hardware platform is designed using commercially available off-the-shelf processor board with back plane bus. The operating system is customized for nuclear safety display application. The display unit is designed adopting two improvement features, i.e., one is to provide two separate processors for main computer and display device using serial communication, and the other is to use Digital Visual Interface between main computer and display device. In this case the main computer uses minimized graphic functions for safety display. The display design is at the conceptual phase, and there are several open areas to be concreted for a solid system. The main purpose of this paper is to describe and suggest a methodology to develop a safety-critical display system and the descriptions are focused on the safety requirement point of view.

  14. 40 CFR 152.500 - Requirements for devices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 23 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Requirements for devices. 152.500 Section 152.500 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CONTINUED) PESTICIDE PROGRAMS... other than a bacterium, virus, or other microorganism on or in living man or living animals) but not...

  15. [Industry regulation and its relationship to the rapid marketing of medical devices].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Matsuoka, Atsuko

    2012-01-01

    In the market of medical devices, non-Japanese products hold a large part even in Japan. To overcome this situation, the Japanese government has been announcing policies to encourage the medical devices industry, such as the 5-year strategy for medical innovation (June 6, 2012). The Division of Medical Devices has been contributing to rapid marketing of medical devices by working out the standards for approval review and accreditation of medical devices, guidances on evaluation of medical devices with emerging technology, and test methods for biological safety evaluation of medical devices, as a part of practice in the field of regulatory science. The recent outcomes are 822 standards of accreditation for Class II medical devices, 14 guidances on safety evaluation of medical devices with emerging technology, and the revised test methods for biological safety evaluation (MHLW Notification by Director, OMDE, Yakushokuki-hatsu 0301 No. 20 "Basic Principles of Biological Safety Evaluation Required for Application for Approval to Market Medical Devices").

  16. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1, Revision 1 (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  17. EPR meets the next generation PWR safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bouteille, Francois; Czech, Juergen; Sloan, Sandra

    2006-01-01

    At the origin was the common decision in 1989 of Framatome and Siemens to cooperate to design a Nuclear Island which meets the future needs of utilities. EDF and a group of main German Utilities joined this effort in 1991 and from that point were completely involved in the progress of the work. Compliance of the EPR with the European Utility Requirements (EUR) was verified to ensure a large acceptability of the design by other participating utilities. In addition, the entire process was backed up to the end of 1998 by the French and the German Safety Authorities which engaged into a long-lasting cooperation to define common requirements applicable to future Nuclear Power Plants. Upon signature of the Olkiluoto 3 contract, STUK, the Finnish safety and radiation authority, began reviewing the design of the EPR. Upon the favorable recommendation of STUK, the Finnish government delivered a Construction License for the Olkiluoto 3 NPP on February 17, 2005. Following the positive conclusion of the political debate in France with regard to nuclear energy, EDF will also submit a request to start the construction of an EPR on the Flamanville site. In the US, the first steps in view of a Design Certification by the NRC have been taken. These three independent decisions make the EPR the leading first generation 3+ design under construction. Important safety functions are assured by separate systems in a straightforward operating mode. Four separate, redundant trains for all safety systems are installed in four separate layout division for which a strict separation is ensured so that common mode failure, for example due to internal hazards, can be ruled out. A reduction in common mode failure potential is also obtained by design rules ensuring the systematic application of functional diversity. A four train-redundancy for the major safety systems provides flexibility in adapting the design to maintenance requirements, thus contributing to reduce the outage duration. Additional

  18. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

  19. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

  20. Safety analysis and evaluation of the next fusion device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kobayashi, Shigetada; Honda, Tsutomu; Ohmura, Hiroshi; Kawai, Masayoshi; Shimizu, Takeshi; Yamaoka, Mitsuaki; Nakahara, Katsuhiko; Seki, Yasushi.

    1988-12-01

    As a part of safety evaluation, a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) has been attempted for the Next Fusion Device system. Among the various events related to safety, a number of representative events have been selected for assessment, from the events in normal operation state, repair and maintenance state and accidental state. In the first chapter, in order to conduct the probabilistic risk assessment of the whole Fusion Experimental Reactor (FER), the data base required for the analysis was investigated in 1.1, the results on the failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), accident sequence, radioactive inventory leakage flow path, event tree analysis (ETA) and fault tree analysis (FTA) were summarized in 1.2 to 1.5, respectively. Based on these results, accident initiating events were evaluated in 1.6, and overall risk was assessed in 1.7 and the tasks for the future were summarized in 1.8. It is important to analyze and evaluate various events during normal operations, repair and maintenance and accidents. However, due to the large uncertainties in the modeling of phenomena or the data base, there are many events for which realistic analyses are difficult. Three such events were selected and studied in chapter two. In 2.1, the temperature rise in the reactor structure after the Loss-of-Coolant-Accident caused by the decay heat under various heat removal conditions were investigated. In 2.2, the radiation dose of personnel during repair and maintenance period caused by the release of activated dust were estimated. Lastly, in 2.3 tritium behavior in the stainless steel first wall and graphite armour were studied. (author)

  1. Safety catching device for pipes in missile shielding cylinders of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hering, S.; Doll, B.

    1976-01-01

    The safety catching device consists of a steel wire passed in U-shape around the pipe to be caught and supported by two anchor ties embedded in the concrete of the missile shielding cylinder. This flexible catching device is to cause the energy released in case of a pipe rupture to be absorbed and no dangerous bending shesses to be transferred to the walls of the missile shielding cylinder. (UWI) [de

  2. Licensing of simple digital devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jackson, T. W.

    2008-01-01

    The inability to guarantee error-free software gave rise to the potential for common-cause failure of digital safety systems in nuclear power plants. To address this vulnerability, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) required a quality software development process and a defense-in-depth and diversity analysis for digital safety systems. As a result of recent interim [NRC] staff guidance in the digital instrumentation and control (I and C) area, licensing of simple digital devices decreases some regulatory burden with respect to demonstrating a quality software development process and defense-in-depth and diversity analysis. This paper defines simple digital devices and addresses the interim staff guidance that applies to such devices. The paper also highlights the technical aspects that affect the licensing of such devices and incorporates licensing experience in the U.S. to date. (authors)

  3. Safety evaluation of stamp type digital microneedle devices in hairless mice.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Park, Kui Young; Jang, Woo Sun; Lim, Yun Young; Ahn, Joo Hee; Lee, Sang Jin; Kim, Chan Woong; Kim, Sung Eun; Kim, Beom Joon; Kim, Myeung Nam

    2013-02-01

    Microneedles provide a minimally invasive means to transport molecules into the skin. A number of specific strategies have been employed to use microneedles for transdermal delivery. The purpose of this study was to investigate the safety of two new digital microneedle devices (Digital Hand® and Digital Pro®; Bomtech Electronics Co., Ltd., Seoul, Korea) for the perforation of skin in skin-hairless-1 mice. This device replaces conventional needles and is designed specifically for intradermal delivery. We used two newly developed digital microneedle devices to perforate the skin of skin-hairless-1 mice. We conducted a comparative study of the two digital microneedle devices and DTS® (Disk type-microneedle Therapy System; DTS lab., Seoul, Korea). To evaluate skin stability, we performed visual and dermatoscopic inspections, measurements of transepidermal water loss, and biopsies. The two novel digital microneedle devices did not induce significant abnormalities of the skin on visual or dermatoscopic inspection, regardless of needle size (0.25~2.0 mm). No significant histopathological changes, such as inflammatory cell infiltration, desquamation of the stratum corneum, or disruption of the basal layer, were observed. The digital microneedle devices and microneedle therapy system produced similar results on measures of skin stability. These two novel digital microneedle devices are safe transdermal drug delivery systems.

  4. A novel mechanical design of broken rope protection device for enhancing the safety performances of overhead manned equipment in coal mine

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Xiaoguang Zhang

    2015-08-01

    Full Text Available A novel mechanical design of the broken rope protection device is proposed to enhance the safety performances of the overhead manned equipment. According to the operating characteristics and functional requirements of the overhead manned equipment, a three-dimensional mechanical model of the broken rope protection device was redesigned. Based on the known parameters of the mechanical model, the stress and strength of the main components are readjusted using the statics characteristics of finite element analysis. To ensure the reliability of the control system of the broken rope protection device, the process of people’s falling, the response performance of the tension sensor, and the signal extraction of the broken rope are analyzed under different loading and unloading speeds. The working principle of the broken rope protection device is expounded in detail. The experimental results showed that better effect is obtained by the new broken rope protection device, which is characterized by good durability, low investment, and high reliability.

  5. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements. Volume 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

  6. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements [VOL 1 and 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-12-28

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

  7. The Challenges of Balancing Safety and Security in Implantable Medical Devices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Katzis, Konstantinos; Jones, Richard W; Despotou, George

    2016-01-01

    Modern Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs), implement capabilities that have contributed significantly to patient outcomes, as well as quality of life. The ever increasing connectivity of IMD's does raise security concerns though there are instances where implemented security measures might impact on patient safety. The paper discusses challenges of addressing both of these attributes in parallel.

  8. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition); Seguridad de las centrales nucleares: Diseno. Requisitos de seguridad especificos

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-04-15

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  9. Hazard Analysis and Safety Requirements for Small Drone Operations: To What Extent Do Popular Drones Embed Safety?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Plioutsias, Anastasios; Karanikas, Nektarios; Chatzimihailidou, Maria Mikela

    2018-03-01

    Currently, published risk analyses for drones refer mainly to commercial systems, use data from civil aviation, and are based on probabilistic approaches without suggesting an inclusive list of hazards and respective requirements. Within this context, this article presents: (1) a set of safety requirements generated from the application of the systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) technique on a generic small drone system; (2) a gap analysis between the set of safety requirements and the ones met by 19 popular drone models; (3) the extent of the differences between those models, their manufacturers, and the countries of origin; and (4) the association of drone prices with the extent they meet the requirements derived by STPA. The application of STPA resulted in 70 safety requirements distributed across the authority, manufacturer, end user, or drone automation levels. A gap analysis showed high dissimilarities regarding the extent to which the 19 drones meet the same safety requirements. Statistical results suggested a positive correlation between drone prices and the extent that the 19 drones studied herein met the safety requirements generated by STPA, and significant differences were identified among the manufacturers. This work complements the existing risk assessment frameworks for small drones, and contributes to the establishment of a commonly endorsed international risk analysis framework. Such a framework will support the development of a holistic and methodologically justified standardization scheme for small drone flights. © 2017 Society for Risk Analysis.

  10. Safety assessment requirements for onsite transfers of radioactive material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Opperman, E.K.; Jackson, E.J.; Eggers, A.G.

    1992-05-01

    This document contains the requirements for developing a safety assessment document for an onsite package containing radioactive material. It also provides format and content guidance to establish uniformity in the safety assessment documentation and to ensure completeness of the information provided

  11. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues, other multiplant action issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-12-01

    This report is to provide a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs), Generic Safety Issues(GSIs), and other Multiplant Actions (MPAs) that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. An additional purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  12. Safety and environmental requirements and design targets for TIBER-II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Piet, S.J.

    1987-09-01

    A consistent set of safety and environmental requirements and design targets was proposed and adopted for the TIBER-II (Tokamak Ignition/Burn Experimental Reactor) design effort. TIBER-II is the most recent US version of a fusion experimental test reactor (ETR). These safety and environmental design targets were one contribution of the Fusion Safety Program in the TIBER-II design effort. The other contribution, safety analyses, is documented in the TIBER-II design report. The TIBER-II approach, described here, concentrated on logical development of, first, a complete and consistent set of safety and environmental requirements that are likely appropriate for an ETR, and, second, an initial set of design targets to guide TIBER-II. Because of limited time in the TIBER-II design effort, the iterative process only included one iteration - one set of targets and one design. Future ETR design efforts should therefore build on these design targets and the associated safety analyses. 29 refs., 5 figs., 3 tabs

  13. Leaving patients to their own devices? Smart technology, safety and therapeutic relationships.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ho, Anita; Quick, Oliver

    2018-03-06

    This debate article explores how smart technologies may create a double-edged sword for patient safety and effective therapeutic relationships. Increasing utilization of health monitoring devices by patients will likely become an important aspect of self-care and preventive medicine. It may also help to enhance accurate symptom reports, diagnoses, and prompt referral to specialist care where appropriate. However, the development, marketing, and use of such technology raise significant ethical implications for therapeutic relationships and patient safety. Drawing on lessons learned from other direct-to-consumer health products such as genetic testing, this article explores how smart technology can also pose regulatory challenges and encourage overutilization of healthcare services. In order for smart technology to promote safer care and effective therapeutic encounters, the technology and its utilization must be safe. This article argues for unified regulatory guidelines and better education for both healthcare providers and patients regarding the benefits and risks of these devices.

  14. X-ray safety at the Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gutierrez, J.A.

    1986-11-01

    An organized and structured safety program for x-ray generating devices was initiated in October, 1979. An X-ray Device Control Office was established to manage the program that currently oversees the activities of 201 x-ray generating devices and to provide SOP reviews, perform shielding calculations, and provide training for both the operators and health physics x-ray device surveyors. The new program also establishes controls for procurement of new equipment, requires the writing of Standard Operating Procedures, requires training for operators and provides routine and non-routine safety inspections of x-ray generating devices. Prior to this program going into effect, the Laboratory had recorded nine documented x-ray related exposure accidents. Since then, there have been none. Program elements and experiences of interest to other x-ray device users are discussed. 3 refs

  15. Safety code 19: recommended safety procedures for the selection, installation and use of x-ray diffraction equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    This document is one of a series of Safety Codes prepared by the Radiation Protection Bureau to set out requirements for the safe use of radiation emitting devices. The equipment and installation guidelines and safety procedures detailed in this Code are primarily for the instruction and guidance of persons employed in Federal Public Service Departments and Agencies, as well as those coming under the jurisdiction of the Canada Labour Code. This Safety Code is also intended to assist other users of X-ray diffraction equipment to select safe equipment and to install and use it so that the radiation hazard to the operator and other persons in its vicinity is negligible. It should be noted that facilities under provincial jurisdiction may be subject to requirements specified under provincial statutes. This Code supersedes Safety Code RPD-SC-7, entitled 'Requirements For Non-Medical X-Ray Equipment, Use and Installation', insofar as X-ray diffraction equipment is concerned, and it is intended to complement X-ray equipment design, construction and performance standards promulgated under the Radiation Emitting Devices Act

  16. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Technical Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRAHN, D.E.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this section is to explain the meaning of logical connectors with specific examples. Logical connectors are used in Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) to discriminate between, and yet connect, discrete Conditions, Required Actions, Completion Times, Surveillances, and Frequencies. The only logical connectors that appear in TSRs are AND and OR. The physical arrangement of these connectors constitutes logical conventions with specific meanings

  17. A new approach to determine the environmental qualification requirements for the safety related equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hasnaoui, C.; Parent, G.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of the environmental qualification of safety related equipment is to ensure that the plant defense-in-depth is not compromised by common mode failures following design basis accidents with a harsh environment. A new approach based on safety functions has been developed to determine what safety-related equipment is required to function during and after a design basis accident, as well as their environmental qualification requirements. The main feature of this approach is to use auxiliary safety functions established from safety requirements as credited in the safety analyses. This approach is undertaken in three steps: identification of the auxiliary safety functions of each main safety function; determination of the main equipment groups required for each auxiliary safety function; and review of the safety analyses for design basis accidents in order to determine the credited auxiliary safety functions and their mission times for each accident scenario. Some of the benefits of the proposed approach for the determination of the safety environmental qualification requirements are: a systematic approach for the review of safety analyses based on a safety function check list, and the insurance, with the availability of the safety functions, that Gentilly-2 defense-in-depth would not be compromised by design basis accidents with a harsh environment. (author)

  18. Technical safety requirements control level verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

  19. 41 CFR 128-1.8006 - Seismic Safety Program requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Seismic Safety Program requirements. 128-1.8006 Section 128-1.8006 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1-INTRODUCTION 1.80-Seismic Safety Program...

  20. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements; unresolved safety issues; generic safety issues; other multiplant action issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, the NRC established a program for publishing an annual report on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was initially compiled and reported in three NUREG-series volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). The first annual supplement, which combined these volumes into a single report and presented updated information as of September 30, 1991, was published in December 1991. The second annual supplement, which provided updated information as of September 30, 1992, was published in December 1992. Supplement 2 also provided the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of other multiplant action (MPA) issues not related to TMI Action Plan requirements, USIs, or GSIs. This third annual NUREG report, Supplement 3, presents updated information as of September 30, 1993. This report gives a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, GSIs, and other MPAs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. Additionally, this report serves as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  1. 47 CFR 80.305 - Watch requirements of the Communications Act and the Safety Convention.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... and the Safety Convention. 80.305 Section 80.305 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFETY AND SPECIAL RADIO SERVICES STATIONS IN THE MARITIME SERVICES Safety Watch Requirements and Procedures Ship Station Safety Watches § 80.305 Watch requirements of the Communications Act and the Safety...

  2. Safety requirements for the Pu carriers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishima, H.

    1993-01-01

    Ministry of Transport of Japan has now set about studying requirements for Pu carriers to ensure safety. It was first studied what the basic concept of safe carriage of Pu should be, and the basic ideas have been worked out. Next the requirements for the Pu carriers were studied based on the above. There are at present no international requirements of construction and equipment for the nuclear-material carriers, but MOT of Japan has so far required special construction and equipment for the nuclear-material carriers which carry a large amount of radioactive material, such as spent fuel or low level radioactive waste, corresponding to the level of the respective potential hazard. The requirements of construction and equipment of the Pu carriers have been established considering the difference in heat generation between Pu and spent fuel, physical protection, and so forth, in addition to the above basic concept. (J.P.N.)

  3. Quality assurance requirements for the computer software and safety analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Husarecek, J.

    1992-01-01

    The requirements are given as placed on the development, procurement, maintenance, and application of software for the creation or processing of data during the design, construction, operation, repair, maintenance and safety-related upgrading of nuclear power plants. The verification and validation processes are highlighted, and the requirements put on the software documentation are outlined. The general quality assurance principles applied to safety analyses are characterized. (J.B.). 1 ref

  4. Safety requirements expected to the prototype fast breeder reactor 'Monju'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-11-01

    In July 2013, Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) has enforced new regulatory requirements in consideration of severe accidents for the commercial light water reactors (LWR) and also prototype power generation reactors such as the sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFR) of 'Monju' based on TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident (hereinafter referred to as '1F accident') occurred in March 2011. Although the regulatory requirements for SFR will be revised by NRA with consideration for public comments, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) set up 'Advisory Committee on Monju Safety Requirements' consisting of fast breeder reactor (FBR) and safety assessment experts in order to establish original safety requirements expected to the prototype FBR 'Monju' considering severe accidents with knowledge from JAEA as well as scientific and technical insights from the experts. This report summarizes the safety requirements expected to Monju discussed by the committee. (author)

  5. Materials for electrochemical device safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vissers, Daniel R.; Amine, Khalil; Thackeray, Michael M.; Kahaian, Arthur J.; Johnson, Christopher S.

    2015-04-07

    An electrochemical device includes a thermally-triggered intumescent material or a gas-triggered intumescent material. Such devices prevent or minimize short circuits in a device that could lead to thermal run-away. Such devices may include batteries or supercapacitors.

  6. 78 FR 12329 - Distinguishing Medical Device Recalls From Product Enhancements; Reporting Requirements; Draft...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-02-22

    ... medical devices to take timely action to correct violative devices or remove them from the marketplace...] Distinguishing Medical Device Recalls From Product Enhancements; Reporting Requirements; Draft Guidance for... draft guidance entitled ``Distinguishing Medical Device Recalls From Product Enhancements; Reporting...

  7. Meeting up-to-date safety requirements in the Russian NPP projects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tepkyan, G. O.; Yashkin, A. V.

    2014-01-01

    Safety features in Russian NPP designs are implemented by the combination of active and passive safety systems • Russian NPP designs are in compliance with up-to-date international and European safety requirements and refer to Generation III+ • Russian state-of-the-art designs have already implemented some design solutions, which take into account “post-Fukushima” requirements. Russian NPP design principles have been approved during the European discussions in spring 2012, including the IAEA extraordinary session addressed to Fukushima NPP accident

  8. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  9. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  10. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  11. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Arabic Edition)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered.

  12. Specification of advanced safety modeling requirements (Rev. 0).

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fanning, T. H.; Tautges, T. J.

    2008-06-30

    The U.S. Department of Energy's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has lead to renewed interest in liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors for the purpose of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and making more efficient use of future repository capacity. However, the U.S. has not designed or constructed a fast reactor in nearly 30 years. Accurate, high-fidelity, whole-plant dynamics safety simulations will play a crucial role by providing confidence that component and system designs will satisfy established design limits and safety margins under a wide variety of operational, design basis, and beyond design basis transient conditions. Current modeling capabilities for fast reactor safety analyses have resulted from several hundred person-years of code development effort supported by experimental validation. The broad spectrum of mechanistic and phenomenological models that have been developed represent an enormous amount of institutional knowledge that needs to be maintained. Complicating this, the existing code architectures for safety modeling evolved from programming practices of the 1970s. This has lead to monolithic applications with interdependent data models which require significant knowledge of the complexities of the entire code in order for each component to be maintained. In order to develop an advanced fast reactor safety modeling capability, the limitations of the existing code architecture must be overcome while preserving the capabilities that already exist. To accomplish this, a set of advanced safety modeling requirements is defined, based on modern programming practices, that focuses on modular development within a flexible coupling framework. An approach for integrating the existing capabilities of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code into the SHARP framework is provided in order to preserve existing capabilities while providing a smooth transition to advanced modeling capabilities. In doing this, the advanced fast reactor safety models

  13. Specification of advanced safety modeling requirements (Rev. 0)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fanning, T. H.; Tautges, T. J.

    2008-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has lead to renewed interest in liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors for the purpose of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and making more efficient use of future repository capacity. However, the U.S. has not designed or constructed a fast reactor in nearly 30 years. Accurate, high-fidelity, whole-plant dynamics safety simulations will play a crucial role by providing confidence that component and system designs will satisfy established design limits and safety margins under a wide variety of operational, design basis, and beyond design basis transient conditions. Current modeling capabilities for fast reactor safety analyses have resulted from several hundred person-years of code development effort supported by experimental validation. The broad spectrum of mechanistic and phenomenological models that have been developed represent an enormous amount of institutional knowledge that needs to be maintained. Complicating this, the existing code architectures for safety modeling evolved from programming practices of the 1970s. This has lead to monolithic applications with interdependent data models which require significant knowledge of the complexities of the entire code in order for each component to be maintained. In order to develop an advanced fast reactor safety modeling capability, the limitations of the existing code architecture must be overcome while preserving the capabilities that already exist. To accomplish this, a set of advanced safety modeling requirements is defined, based on modern programming practices, that focuses on modular development within a flexible coupling framework. An approach for integrating the existing capabilities of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code into the SHARP framework is provided in order to preserve existing capabilities while providing a smooth transition to advanced modeling capabilities. In doing this, the advanced fast reactor safety models will

  14. Current trends in codal requirements for safety in operation of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Srivasista, K.; Shah, Y.K.; Gupta, S.K.

    2006-01-01

    The Code of practice on safety in nuclear power plant operation states the requirements to be met during operation of a nuclear power plant for assuring safety. Among various stages of authorization, regulatory body issues authorization for operation of a nuclear power plant, monitors and enforces regulatory requirements. The responsible organization shall have overall responsibility and the plant management shall have the primary responsibility for ensuring safe and efficient operation of its nuclear power plants. A set of codal requirements covering technical and administrative aspects are mandatory for the plant management to implement to ensure that the nuclear power plant is operated in accordance with the design intent. Requirements on operating procedures and instructions establish operation and maintenance, inspection and testing of the plant in a planned and systematic way. The requirements on emergency preparedness programme establish with a reasonable assurance that, in the event of an emergency situation, appropriate measures can be taken to mitigate the consequences. Commissioning requirements verify performance criteria during commissioning to ensure that the design intent and QA requirements are met. Several modifications in systems important to safety required during operation of a nuclear power plant are regulated. However new operational codal requirements arising out of periodic safety review, operational experience feedback, life management, probabilistic safety assessment, physical security, safety convention and obligations and decommissioning are not covered in the present code of practice for safety in nuclear power plant operation. Codal provisions on 'Review by operating organization on aspects of design having implications on operability' are also required to be addressed. The merits in developing such a methodology include acceptance of the design by operating organization, ensuring maintainability, proper layout etc. in the new designs

  15. Safety requirements and safety experience of nuclear facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schnurer, H.L.

    1977-01-01

    Peaceful use of nuclear energy within the F.R.G. is rapidly growing. The Energy Programme of the Federal Government forecasts a capacity of up to 50.000 MW in 1985. Whereas most of this capacity will be of the LWR-Type, other activities are related to LMFBR - and HTGR - development, nuclear ships, and facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle. Safety of nuclear energy is the pacemaker for the realization of nuclear programmes and projects. Due to a very high population - and industrialisation density, safety has the priority before economical aspects. Safety requirements are therefore extremely stringent, which will be shown for the legal, the technical as well as for the organizational area. They apply for each nuclear facility, its site and the nuclear energy system as a whole. Regulatory procedures differ from many other countries, assigning executive power to state authorities, which are supervised by the Federal Government. Another particularity of the regulatory process is the large scope of involvement of independent experts within the licensing procedures. The developement of national safety requirements in different countries generates a necessity to collaborate and harmonize safety and radiation protection measures, at least for facilities in border areas, to adopt international standards and to assist nuclear developing countries. However, different nationally, regional or local situations might raise problems. Safety experience with nuclear facilities can be concluded from the positive construction and operation experience, including also a few accidents and incidents and the conclusions, which have been drawn for the respective factilities and others of similar design. Another tool for safety assessments will be risk analyses, which are under development by German experts. Final, a scope of future problems and developments shows, that safety of nuclear installations - which has reached a high performance - nevertheless imposes further tasks to be solved

  16. Safety related requirements on future nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niehaus, F.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear power has the potential to significantly contribute to the future energy supply. However, this requires continuous improvements in nuclear safety. Technological advancements and implementation of safety culture will achieve a safety level for future reactors of the present generation of a probability of core-melt of less than 10 -5 per year, and less than 10 -6 per year for large releases of radioactive materials. There are older reactors which do not comply with present safety thinking. The paper reviews findings of a recent design review of WWER 440/230 plants. Advanced evolutionary designs might be capable of reducing the probability of significant off-site releases to less than 10 -7 per year. For such reactors there are inherent limitations to increase safety further due to the human element, complexity of design and capability of the containment function. Therefore, revolutionary designs are being explored with the aim of eliminating the potential for off-site releases. In this context it seems to be advisable to explore concepts where the ultimate safety barrier is the fuel itself. (orig.) [de

  17. Development of NPP Safety Requirements into Kenya's Grid Codes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ndirangu, Nguni James; Koo, Chang Choong [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    As presently drafted, Kenya's grid codes do not contain any NPP requirements. Through case studies of selected grid codes, this paper will study frequency, voltage and fault ride through requirements for NPP connection and operation, and offer recommendation of how these requirements can be incorporated in the Kenya's grid codes. Voltage and frequency excursions in Kenya's grid are notably frequently outside the generic requirement and the values observed by the German and UK grid codes. Kenya's grid codes require continuous operation for ±10% of nominal voltage and 45.0 to 52Hz on the grid which poses safety issues for an NPP. Considering stringent NPP connection to grid and operational safety requirements, and the importance of the TSO to NPP safety, more elaborate requirements need to be documented in the Kenya's grid codes. UK and Germany have a history of meeting high standards of nuclear safety and it is therefore recommended that format like the one in Table 1 to 3 should be adopted. Kenya's Grid code considering NPP should have: • Strict rules for voltage variation, that is, -5% to +10% of the nominal voltage • Strict rules for frequency variation, that is, 48Hz to 52Hz of the nominal frequencyand.

  18. Development of NPP Safety Requirements into Kenya's Grid Codes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ndirangu, Nguni James; Koo, Chang Choong

    2015-01-01

    As presently drafted, Kenya's grid codes do not contain any NPP requirements. Through case studies of selected grid codes, this paper will study frequency, voltage and fault ride through requirements for NPP connection and operation, and offer recommendation of how these requirements can be incorporated in the Kenya's grid codes. Voltage and frequency excursions in Kenya's grid are notably frequently outside the generic requirement and the values observed by the German and UK grid codes. Kenya's grid codes require continuous operation for ±10% of nominal voltage and 45.0 to 52Hz on the grid which poses safety issues for an NPP. Considering stringent NPP connection to grid and operational safety requirements, and the importance of the TSO to NPP safety, more elaborate requirements need to be documented in the Kenya's grid codes. UK and Germany have a history of meeting high standards of nuclear safety and it is therefore recommended that format like the one in Table 1 to 3 should be adopted. Kenya's Grid code considering NPP should have: • Strict rules for voltage variation, that is, -5% to +10% of the nominal voltage • Strict rules for frequency variation, that is, 48Hz to 52Hz of the nominal frequencyand

  19. Cybersecurity and the Medical Device Product Development Lifecycle.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jones, Richard W; Katzis, Konstantinos

    2017-01-01

    Protecting connected medical devices from evolving cyber related threats, requires a continuous lifecycle approach whereby cybersecurity is integrated within the product development lifecycle and both complements and re-enforces the safety risk management processes therein. This contribution reviews the guidance relating to medical device cybersecurity within the product development lifecycle.

  20. DARHT: INTEGRATION OF AUTHORIZATION BASIS REQUIREMENTS AND WORKER SAFETY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MC CLURE, D. A.; NELSON, C. A.; BOUDRIE, R. L.

    2001-01-01

    This document describes the results of consensus agreements reached by the DARHT Safety Planning Team during the development of the update of the DARHT Safety Analysis Document (SAD). The SAD is one of the Authorization Basis (AB) Documents required by the Department prior to granting approval to operate the DARHT Facility. The DARHT Safety Planning Team is lead by Mr. Joel A. Baca of the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office (DOE/AL). Team membership is drawn from the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office, the Department of Energy Los Alamos Area Office (DOE/LAAO), and several divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Revision 1 of the DARHT SAD had been written as part of the process for gaining approval to operate the Phase 1 (First Axis) Accelerator. Early in the planning stage for the required update of the SAD for the approval to operate both Phase 1 and Phase 2 (First Axis and Second Axis) DARHT Accelerator, it was discovered that a conflict existed between the Laboratory approach to describing the management of facility and worker safety

  1. TH-C-18C-01: MRI Safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pooley, R [Mayo Clinic, Jacksonville, FL (United States); Bernstein, M; Shu, Y; Gorny, K; Felmlee, J [Mayo Clinic, Rochester, MN (United States); Panda, A [Mayo Clinic, Arizona, Scottsdale, AZ (United States)

    2014-06-15

    Clinical diagnostic medical physicists may be responsible for implementing and maintaining a comprehensive MR safety program. Accrediting bodies including the ACR, IAC, Radsite and The Joint Commission each include aspects of MR Safety into their imaging accreditation programs; MIPPA regulations further raise the significance of non-compliance. In addition, The Joint Commission recently announced New and Revised Diagnostic Imaging Standards for accredited health care organizations which include aspects of MR Safety. Hospitals and clinics look to the physicist to understand guidelines, regulations and accreditation requirements related to MR safety. The clinical medical physicist plays a significant role in a clinical practice by understanding the physical basis for the risks and acting as a facilitator to successfully implement a safety program that provides well-planned siting, allows for the safe scanning of certain implanted devices, and helps radiologists manage specific patient exams. The MRI scanning of specific devices will be discussed including cardiac pacemakers and neurostimulators such as deep brain stimulators. Furthermore for sites involved in MR guided interventional procedures, the MR physicist plays an essential role to establish safe practices. Creating a framework for a safe MRI practice includes the review of actual safety incidents or close calls to determine methods for prevention in the future. Learning Objectives: Understand the requirements and recommendations related to MR safety from accrediting bodies and federal regulations. Understand the Medical Physicist's roles to ensure MR Safety. Identify best practices for dealing with implanted devices, including pacemakers and deep brain stimulators. Review aspects of MR safety involved in an MR guided interventional environment. Understand the important MR safety aspects in actual safety incidents or near misses.

  2. Economic benefits of safety-engineered sharp devices in Belgium - a budget impact model.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hanmore, Emma; Maclaine, Grant; Garin, Fiona; Alonso, Alexander; Leroy, Nicolas; Ruff, Lewis

    2013-11-25

    Measures to protect healthcare workers where there is risk of injury or infection from medical sharps became mandatory in the European Union (EU) from May 2013. Our research objective was to estimate the net budget impact of introducing safety-engineered devices (SEDs) for prevention of needlestick injuries (NSIs) in a Belgian hospital. A 5-year incidence-based budget impact model was developed from the hospital inpatient perspective, comparing costs and outcomes with SEDs and prior-used conventional (non-safety) devices. The model accounts for device acquisition costs and costs of NSI management in 4 areas of application where SEDs are currently used: blood collection, infusion, injection and diabetes insulin administration. Model input data were sourced from the Institut National d'Assurance Maladie-Invalidité, published studies, clinical guidelines and market research. Costs are discounted at 3%. For a 420-bed hospital, 100% substitution of conventional devices by SEDs is estimated to decrease the cumulative 5-year incidence of NSIs from 310 to 75, and those associated with exposure to blood-borne viral diseases from 60 to 15. Cost savings from managing fewer NSIs more than offset increased device acquisition costs, yielding estimated 5-year overall savings of €51,710. The direction of these results is robust to a range of sensitivity and model scenario analyses. The model was most sensitive to variation in the acquisition costs of SEDs, rates of NSI associated with conventional devices, and the acquisition costs of conventional devices. NSIs are a significant potential risk with the use of sharp devices. The incidence of NSIs and the costs associated with their management can be reduced through the adoption of safer work practices, including investment in SEDs. For a Belgian hospital, the budget impact model reports that the incremental acquisition costs of SEDs are offset by the savings from fewer NSIs. The availability of more robust data for NSI reduction

  3. Nuclear fuels with high burnup: safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phuc Tran Dai

    2016-01-01

    Vietnam authorities foresees to build 3 reactors from Russian design (VVER AES 2006) by 2030. In order to prepare the preliminary report on safety analysis the Vietnamese Agency for Radioprotection and Safety has launched an investigation on the behaviour of nuclear fuels at high burnups (up to 60 GWj/tU) that will be those of the new plants. This study deals mainly with the behaviour of the fuel assemblies in case of loss of coolant (LOCA). It appears that for an average burnup of 50 GWj/tU and for the advanced design of the fuel assembly (cladding and materials) safety requirements are fulfilled. For an average burnup of 60 GWj/tU, a list of issues remains to be assessed, among which the impact of clad bursting or the hydrogen embrittlement of the advanced zirconium alloys. (A.C.)

  4. Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management of administrative controls to ensure safe operation of the facility

  5. Tank farms criticality safety manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FORT, L.A.

    2003-01-01

    This document defines the Tank Farms Contractor (TFC) criticality safety program, as required by Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR-), Subpart 830.204(b)(6), ''Documented Safety Analysis'' (10 CFR- 830.204 (b)(6)), and US Department of Energy (DOE) 0 420.1A, Facility Safety, Section 4.3, ''Criticality Safety.'' In addition, this document contains certain best management practices, adopted by TFC management based on successful Hanford Site facility practices. Requirements in this manual are based on the contractor requirements document (CRD) found in Attachment 2 of DOE 0 420.1A, Section 4.3, ''Nuclear Criticality Safety,'' and the cited revisions of applicable standards published jointly by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Nuclear Society (ANS) as listed in Appendix A. As an informational device, requirements directly imposed by the CRD or ANSI/ANS Standards are shown in boldface. Requirements developed as best management practices through experience and maintained consistent with Hanford Site practice are shown in italics. Recommendations and explanatory material are provided in plain type

  6. Preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State. Their implementation is intended to minimize the consequences for people, property and the environment of any nuclear or radiological emergency. The fulfilment of these requirements will also contribute to the harmonization of arrangements in the event of a transnational emergency. These requirements are intended to be applied by authorities at the national level by means of adopting legislation, establishing regulations and assigning responsibilities. The requirements apply to all those practices and sources that have the potential for causing radiation exposure or environmental radioactive contamination warranting an emergency intervention and that are: (a) Used in a State that chooses to adopt the requirements or that requests any of the sponsoring organizations to provide for the application of the requirements. (B) Used by States with the assistance of the FAO, IAEA, ILO, PAHO, OCHA or WHO in compliance with applicable national rules and regulations. (C) Used by the IAEA or which involve the use of materials, services, equipment, facilities and non-published information made available by the IAEA or at its request or under its control or supervision. Or (d) Used under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement whereby the parties request the IAEA to provide for the application of the requirements. The requirements also apply to the off-site jurisdictions that may need to make an emergency intervention in a State that adopts the requirements. The types of practices and sources covered by these requirements include: fixed and mobile nuclear reactors. Facilities for the mining and processing of radioactive ores. Facilities for fuel reprocessing and other fuel cycle facilities. Facilities for the management of radioactive waste. The transport of radioactive material. Sources of radiation used in

  7. The efficacy and safety of a novel posterior scleral reinforcement device in rabbits

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yuan, Yongguang; Zong, Yao; Zheng, Qishan [State Key Laboratory of Ophthalmology, Zhongshan Ophthalmic Center, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou (China); Qian, Garrett [University of New South Wales (Australia); Qian, Xiaobin; Li, Yujie; Shao, Wanwen [State Key Laboratory of Ophthalmology, Zhongshan Ophthalmic Center, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou (China); Gao, Qianying, E-mail: gaoqy@mail.sysu.edu.cn [State Key Laboratory of Ophthalmology, Zhongshan Ophthalmic Center, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou (China)

    2016-05-01

    Purpose: To evaluate the efficacy and safety of posterior scleral reinforcement (PSR) device for myopia suppression in rabbits' eyes. Methods: PSR surgery was performed on the normal 12 8-week-old New Zealand white rabbits' right eyes. To determine efficacy of the device, ophthalmic examination would be taken at pre-operation and post-operation (1 week, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and 1 year), such as A-ultrasound, diopter and B-ultrasound. Evaluation of safety were based on the following indicators: intraocular pressure (IOP), slit lamp, fundus photography, fundus fluorescein angiography and pathological examination after surgery. The efficacy and safety of PSR device were evaluated by comparison (treated eyes and contralateral eyes) of pre and post-operation. Results: The novel PSR device could significantly shorten axial length (preoperative axial length: 16.36 ± 0.14 mm, postoperative 1 week, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months and 1 year axial lengths: 15.03 ± 0.28 mm, 15.23 ± 0.32 mm, 15.39 ± 0.31 mm, 15.45 ± 0.22 mm and 15.45 ± 0.22 mm; P = 0.00037 < 0.001) in the treated eyes (right eyes) after surgery. At different postoperative time points, the B-ultrasound images showed that the PSR located in appropriate position and supported the posterior sclera very well. At the same time, IOP of treated eyes kept a relatively stable level (preoperative IOP: 12.56 ± 2.01 mmHg, postoperative IOP: ranging from 11.33 ± 1.23 mmHg to 13.44 ± 2.19 mmHg, P > 0.05) post-operation 1 year. During observation period, there was no significant inflammatory reaction and complications such as anterior chamber flare, empyema, endophthalmitis, vitreous hemorrhage, retina detachment and retinal choroid neovascularization by slit lamp, fundus photography and fundus fluorescein angiography. In addition, there were no pathologic changes be found by comparison treated eyes group and contralateral group eyes based on pathological examinations. Conclusions: In vivo study

  8. Inherent Risk or Risky Decision? Coach's Failure to Use Safety Device an Assumed Risk

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dodds, Mark A.; Bochicchio, Kristi Schoepfer

    2013-01-01

    The court examined whether a coach's failure to implement a safety device during pitching practice enhanced the risk to the athlete or resulted in a suboptimal playing condition, in the context of the assumption of risk doctrine.

  9. 42 CFR 3.210 - Required disclosure of patient safety work product to the Secretary.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Required disclosure of patient safety work product... HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL PROVISIONS PATIENT SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS AND PATIENT SAFETY WORK PRODUCT Confidentiality and Privilege Protections of Patient Safety Work Product § 3.210 Required disclosure of patient...

  10. Pre-market clinical evaluations of innovative high-risk medical devices in Europe.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hulstaert, Frank; Neyt, Mattias; Vinck, Imgard; Stordeur, Sabine; Huić, Mirjana; Sauerland, Stefan; Kuijpers, Marja R; Abrishami, Payam; Vondeling, Hindrik; Flamion, Bruno; Garattini, Silvio; Pavlovic, Mira; van Brabandt, Hans

    2012-07-01

    High-quality clinical evidence is most often lacking when novel high-risk devices enter the European market. At the same time, a randomized controlled trial (RCT) is often initiated as a requirement for obtaining market access in the US. Should coverage in Europe be postponed until RCT data are available? We studied the premarket clinical evaluation of innovative high-risk medical devices in Europe compared with the US, and with medicines, where appropriate. The literature and regulatory documents were checked. Representatives from industry, Competent Authorities, Notified Bodies, Ethics Committees, and HTA agencies were consulted. We also discuss patient safety and the transparency of information. In contrast to the US, there is no requirement in Europe to demonstrate the clinical efficacy of high-risk devices in the premarket phase. Patients in Europe can thus have earlier access to a potentially lifesaving device, but at the risk of insufficiently documented efficacy and safety. Variations in the stringency of clinical reviews, both at the level of Notified Bodies and Competent Authorities, do not guarantee patient safety. We tried to document the design of premarket trials in Europe and number of patients exposed, but failed as this information is not made public. Furthermore, the Helsinki Declaration is not followed with respect to the registration and publication of premarket trials. For innovative high-risk devices, new EU legislation should require the premarket demonstration of clinical efficacy and safety, using an RCT if possible, and a transparent clinical review, preferably centralized.

  11. Lithography requirements in complex VLSI device fabrication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilson, A.D.

    1985-01-01

    Fabrication of complex very large scale integration (VLSI) circuits requires continual advances in lithography to satisfy: decreasing minimum linewidths, larger chip sizes, tighter linewidth and overlay control, increasing topography to linewidth ratios, higher yield demands, increased throughput, harsher device processing, lower lithography cost, and a larger part number set with quick turn-around time. Where optical, electron beam, x-ray, and ion beam lithography can be applied to judiciously satisfy the complex VLSI circuit fabrication requirements is discussed and those areas that are in need of major further advances are addressed. Emphasis will be placed on advanced electron beam and storage ring x-ray lithography

  12. Discussion of important safety requirements for new nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Lin; Jia Xiang; Yan Tianwen; Li Wenhong; Li Chun

    2014-01-01

    This paper presents the analysis of several important safety requirements and improvement direction. Technical view of security goals on site safety evaluation, internal and external events fortification, serious accident prevention and mitigation, as well as the core, containment system and instrument control system design and engineering optimization, and etc are indicated. It will be useful for new plant design, construction and safety improvement. (authors)

  13. Ethical issues associated with the introduction of new surgical devices, or just because we can, doesn't mean we should.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ross, Sue; Robert, Magali; Harvey, Marie-Andrée; Farrell, Scott; Schulz, Jane; Wilkie, David; Lovatsis, Danny; Epp, Annette; Easton, Bill; McMillan, Barry; Schachter, Joyce; Gupta, Chander; Weijer, Charles

    2008-06-01

    Surgical devices are often marketed before there is good evidence of their safety and effectiveness. Our paper discusses the ethical issues associated with the early marketing and use of new surgical devices from the perspectives of the six groups most concerned. Health Canada, which is responsible for licensing new surgical devices, should amend their requirements to include rigorous clinical trials that provide data on effectiveness and safety for each new product before it is marketed. Industry should comply with all Health Canada requirements to obtain licenses for new products. Until Health Canada requires effectiveness and safety data, industry should cooperate with physicians in appropriate studies before releasing new products and should make balanced presentations of all the available evidence. Surgeons should, before using a new surgical device, assess the evidence on its effectiveness and safety and ensure they are properly trained and competent in using the device. Surgeons should provide their patients with an evaluation of the available evidence and inform them about possible complications and the surgeon's level of experience with the new device. Patients, who should be given an honest evaluation of the available evidence, possible complications, and the surgeon's experience, should be encouraged to evaluate the evidence and information to their own satisfaction to ensure that fully informed consent is given. Health institutions, responsible for regulating practice within their walls, should review new devices for safety, effectiveness, and economic impacts, before allowing their use. They should also limit the use of new surgical devices to surgeons trained and competent in the new technology. Professional societies should provide guidance on the early adoption of new surgical devices and technologies. We urge all those involved in the development, licensing, and use of new surgical devices to aim for higher ethical standards to protect the health

  14. Development of photovoltaic array and module safety requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    1982-01-01

    Safety requirements for photovoltaic module and panel designs and configurations likely to be used in residential, intermediate, and large-scale applications were identified and developed. The National Electrical Code and Building Codes were reviewed with respect to present provisions which may be considered to affect the design of photovoltaic modules. Limited testing, primarily in the roof fire resistance field was conducted. Additional studies and further investigations led to the development of a proposed standard for safety for flat-plate photovoltaic modules and panels. Additional work covered the initial investigation of conceptual approaches and temporary deployment, for concept verification purposes, of a differential dc ground-fault detection circuit suitable as a part of a photovoltaic array safety system.

  15. Wheeled mobility device transportation safety in fixed route and demand-responsive public transit vehicles within the United States.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Frost, Karen L; van Roosmalen, Linda; Bertocci, Gina; Cross, Douglas J

    2012-01-01

    An overview of the current status of wheelchair transportation safety in fixed route and demand-responsive, non-rail, public transportation vehicles within the US is presented. A description of each mode of transportation is provided, followed by a discussion of the primary issues affecting safety, accessibility, and usability. Technologies such as lifts, ramps, securement systems, and occupant restraint systems, along with regulations and voluntary industry standards have been implemented with the intent of improving safety and accessibility for individuals who travel while seated in their wheeled mobility device (e.g., wheelchair or scooter). However, across both fixed route and demand-responsive transit systems a myriad of factors such as nonuse and misuse of safety systems, oversized wheeled mobility devices, vehicle space constraints, and inadequate vehicle operator training may place wheeled mobility device (WhMD) users at risk of injury even under non-impact driving conditions. Since WhMD-related incidents also often occur during the boarding and alighting process, the frequency of these events, along with factors associated with these events are described for each transit mode. Recommendations for improving WhMD transportation are discussed given the current state of

  16. 75 FR 18219 - Drug and Medical Device Forum on Food and Drug Administration Drug and Device Requirements and...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-09

    ... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Food and Drug Administration [Docket No. FDA-2010-N-0142] Drug and Medical Device Forum on Food and Drug Administration Drug and Device Requirements and Supplier Controls; Public Educational Forum AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS. ACTION: Notice of public...

  17. The Management System for Facilities and Activities. Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for management systems that integrate safety, health, security, quality assurance and environmental objectives. A successful management system ensures that nuclear safety matters are not dealt with in isolation but are considered within the context of all these objectives. The aim of this publication is to assist Member States in establishing and implementing effective management systems that integrate all aspects of managing nuclear facilities and activities in a coherent manner. It details the planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that all these requirements are satisfied. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system; 3. Management responsibility; 4. Resource management; 5. Process implementation; 6. Measurement, assessment and improvement.

  18. Safety Design Requirements for The Interior Architecture of Scientific Research Laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElDib, A.A.

    2014-01-01

    The paper discusses one of the primary objectives of interior architecture design of research laboratories (specially those using radioactive materials) where it should provide a safe, accessible environment for laboratory personnel to conduct their work. A secondary objective is to allow for maximum flexibility for safe research. Therefore, health and safety hazards must be anticipated and carefully evaluated so that protective measures can be incorporated into the interior architectural design of these facilities wherever possible. The interior architecture requirements discussed in this paper illustrate some of the basic health and safety design features required for new and remodeled laboratories.The paper discusses one of the primary objectives of interior architecture design of research laboratories (specially those using radioactive materials) where it should provide a safe, accessible environment for laboratory personnel to conduct their work. A secondary objective is to allow for maximum flexibility for safe research. Therefore, health and safety hazards must be anticipated and carefully evaluated so that protective measures can be incorporated into the interior architectural design of these facilities wherever possible. The interior architecture requirements discussed in this paper illustrate some of the basic health and safety design features required for new and remodeled laboratories.

  19. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues, other multiplant action issues. Supplement 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, the NRC established a program for publishing an annual report on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was initially compiled and reported in three NUREG-series volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). The first annual supplement, which combined these volumes into a single report and presented updated information as of September 30, 1991, was published in December 1991. The second annual supplement, which provided updated information as of September 30, 1992, was published in December 1992. Supplement 2 also provided the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of other multiplant action (MPA) issues not related to TMI Action Plan requirements, USIs, or GSIs. Supplement 3 gives status as of September 30, 1993. This annual report, Supplement 4, presents updated information as of September 30, 1994. This report gives a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, GSIs, and other MPAs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. Additionally, this report serves as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  20. Safety, efficacy, and performance of implanted recycled cardiac rhythm management (CRM) devices in underprivileged patients.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hasan, Reema; Ghanbari, Hamid; Feldman, Dustin; Menesses, Daniel; Rivas, Daniel; Zakhem, Nicole C; Duarte, Carlos; Machado, Christian

    2011-06-01

    Patients in underdeveloped nations have limited access to life-saving medical technology including cardiac rhythm management (CRM) devices. We evaluated alternative means to provide such technology to this patient population while assessing the safety and efficacy of such a practice. Patients in the United States with clinical indications for extraction of CRM devices were consented. Antemortem CRM devices were cleaned and sterilized following a protocol established at our institution. Surveillance in vitro cultures were performed for quality assurance. The functional status of pulse generators was tested with a pacing system analyzer to confirm at least 70% battery life. Most generators were transported, in person, to an implanting institution in Nicaragua. Recipients with a Class I indication for CRM implantation, and meeting economical criteria set forth, were consented for implantation of a recycled device. Between 2003 and 2009, implantation was performed in 17 patients with an average age of 42.1 ± 20.3 years. Of the 17 patients, nine were male and eight were female. Mean follow-up was 68 ± 38 months. Device evaluation occurred prior to discharge, 4 weeks post implantation, and every 6 months thereafter. There were three deaths during the follow-up period secondary to myocardial infarction, stroke, and heart failure. Hematoma formation occurred in one patient. No infections, early battery depletion, or device malfunction were identified during follow-up. Our case series is the longest follow-up of recipients of recycled antemortem CRM devices. Our findings support the feasibility and safety of this alternative acquisition of life-saving technology. ©2011, The Authors. Journal compilation ©2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  1. Software Safety Analysis of Digital Protection System Requirements Using a Qualitative Formal Method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jang-Soo; Kwon, Kee-Choon; Cha, Sung-Deok

    2004-01-01

    The safety analysis of requirements is a key problem area in the development of software for the digital protection systems of a nuclear power plant. When specifying requirements for software of the digital protection systems and conducting safety analysis, engineers find that requirements are often known only in qualitative terms and that existing fault-tree analysis techniques provide little guidance on formulating and evaluating potential failure modes. A framework for the requirements engineering process is proposed that consists of a qualitative method for requirements specification, called the qualitative formal method (QFM), and a safety analysis method for the requirements based on causality information, called the causal requirements safety analysis (CRSA). CRSA is a technique that qualitatively evaluates causal relationships between software faults and physical hazards. This technique, extending the qualitative formal method process and utilizing information captured in the state trajectory, provides specific guidelines on how to identify failure modes and the relationship among them. The QFM and CRSA processes are described using shutdown system 2 of the Wolsong nuclear power plants as the digital protection system example

  2. Technical safety requirements control level verification; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

  3. The design study of the JT-60SU device. No.8. Nuclear shielding and safety design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miya, Naoyuki; Kikuchi, Mitsuru; Ushigusa, Kenkichi [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Naka, Ibaraki (Japan). Naka Fusion Research Establishment] [and others

    1998-03-01

    Results of nuclear shielding design study and safety analysis for the steady-state tokamak device JT-60SU are described. D-T operation (option) for two years is adopted in addition to ten years operation using deuterium. Design work has been done in accordance with general laws for radioisotopes handling in Japan as a guideline of safety evaluation, which is applied to the operation of present JT-60U device. Optimization of the shielding design for the device structure including vacuum vessel has been presented to meet with allowable limits of biological shielding determined in advance. It is shown that JT-60SU can be operated safely in the present JT-60 experimental building. It is planed to use 100g/year of tritium in D-T operation phase. A concept of multiple -barrier system is applied to the facility design to prevent propagation of tritium, in which the torus hall and the tritium removal room provide the tertiary confinement. From the design of atmosphere detritiation system for accidental tritium release, it is shown that tritium concentration level can be reduced to the allowable level after two weeks with reasonable compact size components. Safety assessment related to activation of coolant/air, and atmospheric tritium effluents are discussed. (author)

  4. Guidelines on the safety of light-based home-use hair removal devices from the European Society for Laser Dermatology

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Town, Graham; Ash, C; Dierickx, C

    2012-01-01

    . These guidelines provide a definition of light-based home-use technology, to inform healthcare professionals about home-use light-based technology and encourage manufacturers wishing to sell in Europe to adopt 'best practice'. The review presents the current status on standards and regulation issues and considers...... home-use safety issues, encompassing human, device and electrical safety, given risks to the eyes and skin from optical radiation both to the consumer and persons in the vicinity. Proposed technical measurement methodology is considered with focus on recognized critical parameters for the safe use...... of light-based hair removal technology including recording the technical performance and safety claims of a range of home-use hair removal devices. The literature review emphasizes potential adverse incidents and safety aspects of treating cosmetic conditions, such as unwanted hair growth. Although some...

  5. The safety of non-incineration waste disposal devices in four hospitals of Tehran.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Farshad, Aliasghar; Gholami, Hamid; Farzadkia, Mahdi; Mirkazemi, Roksana; Kermani, Majid

    2014-01-01

    The safe management of hospital waste is a challenge in many developing countries. The aim of this study was to compare volatile organic compounds (VOCs) emissions and the microbial disinfectant safety in non-incineration waste disposal devices. VOC emissions and microbial infections were measured in four non-incineration waste disposal devices including: autoclave with and without a shredder, dry heat system, and hydroclave. Using NIOSH and US EPA-TO14 guidelines, the concentration and potential risk of VOCs in emitted gases from four devices were assessed. ProSpore2 biological indicators were used to assess the microbial analysis of waste residue. There was a significant difference in the type and concentration of VOCs and microbial infection of residues in the four devices. Emissions from the autoclave with a shredder had the highest concentration of benzene, ethyl benzene, xylene, and BTEX, and emissions from the hydroclave had the highest concentration of toluene. The highest level of microbial infection was observed in the residues of the autoclave without a shredder. There is an increased need for proper regulation and control of non-incinerator devices and for monitoring and proper handling of these devices in developing countries.

  6. Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D

    2008-09-11

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment (LLNL 2007). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment are shown in the B695 Segment DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained waste. Furthermore, a Waste Packaging Unit will be permitted to treat hazardous and mixed waste. RHWM generally processes LLW with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (i.e., much less than 100 n

  7. Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laycak, D.

    2008-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment (LLNL 2007). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment are shown in the B695 Segment DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained waste. Furthermore, a Waste Packaging Unit will be permitted to treat hazardous and mixed waste. RHWM generally processes LLW with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (i.e., much less than 100 n

  8. The actual development of European aviation safety requirements in aviation medicine: prospects of future EASA requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Siedenburg, J

    2009-04-01

    Common Rules for Aviation Safety had been developed under the aegis of the Joint Aviation Authorities in the 1990s. In 2002 the Basic Regulation 1592/2002 was the founding document of a new entity, the European Aviation Safety Agency. Areas of activity were Certification and Maintenance of aircraft. On 18 March the new Basic Regulation 216/2008, repealing the original Basic Regulation was published and applicable from 08 April on. The included Essential Requirements extended the competencies of EASA inter alia to Pilot Licensing and Flight Operations. The future aeromedical requirements will be included as Annex II in another Implementing Regulation on Personnel Licensing. The detailed provisions will be published as guidance material. The proposals for these provisions have been published on 05 June 2008 as NPA 2008- 17c. After public consultation, processing of comments and final adoption the new proposals may be applicable form the second half of 2009 on. A transition period of four year will apply. Whereas the provisions are based on Joint Aviation Requirement-Flight Crew Licensing (JAR-FCL) 3, a new Light Aircraft Pilot Licence (LAPL) project and the details of the associated medical certification regarding general practitioners will be something new in aviation medicine. This paper consists of 6 sections. The introduction outlines the idea of international aviation safety. The second section describes the development of the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), the first step to common rules for aviation safety in Europe. The third section encompasses a major change as next step: the foundation of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the development of its rules. In the following section provides an outline of the new medical requirements. Section five emphasizes the new concept of a Leisure Pilot Licence. The last section gives an outlook on ongoing rulemaking activities and the opportunities of the public to participate in them.

  9. 76 FR 23255 - Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-04-26

    ... petitions for reconsideration from Harley-Davidson Motor Company (January 18, 2008) and Ford Motor Company... [Docket No. NHTSA-2007-28322] Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Lamps, Reflective Devices, and... part, the petitions for reconsideration of the December 4, 2007, final rule reorganizing Federal Motor...

  10. Long term safety requirements and safety indicators for the assessment of underground radioactive waste repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vovk, Ivan

    1998-01-01

    This presentation defines: waste disposal, safety issues, risk estimation; describes the integrated waste disposal process including quality assurance program. Related to actinides inventory it shows the main results of calculated activity obtained by deterministic estimation. It includes the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards and requirements; features related to site, design and waste package characteristics, as technical long term safety criteria for radioactive waste disposal facilities. Fundamental concern regarding the safety of radioactive waste disposal systems is their radiological impact on human beings and the environment. Safety requirements and criteria for judging the level of safety of such systems have been developed and there is a consensus among the international community on their basis within the well-established system of radiological protection. So far, however, little experience has been gained in applying long term safety criteria to actual disposal systems; consequently, there is an international debate on the most appropriate nature and form of the criteria to be used, taking into account the uncertainties involved. Emerging from the debate is the increasing conviction that the combined use of a variety of indicators would be advantageous in addressing the issue of reasonable assurance in the different time frames involved and in supporting the safety case for any particular repository concept. Indicators including risk, dose, radionuclide concentration, transit time, toxicity indices, fluxes at different points within the system, and barrier performance have all been identified as potentially relevant. Dose and risk are the indicators generally seen as most fundamental, as they seek directly to describe the radiological impact of a disposal system, and these are the ones that have been incorporated into most national standards to date. There are, however, certain problems in applying them. Application of a variety of different indicators

  11. Recommended safety objectives, principles and requirements for mini-reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-05-01

    Canadian and international publications containing objectives, principles and requirements for the safety of nuclear facilities in general and nuclear power plants in particular have been reviewed for their relevance to mini-reactors. Most of the individual recommendations, sometimes with minor wording changes, are applicable to mini-reactors. However, some prescriptive requirements for the shutdown, emergency core cooling and containment systems of power reactors are considered inappropriate for mini-reactors. The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety favours a generally non-prescriptive approach whereby the applicant for a mini-reactor license is free to propose any means of satisfying the fundamental objectives, but must convince the regulatory agency to that effect. To do so, a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) would be the favoured procedure. A generic PSA for all mini-reactors of the same design would be acceptable. Notwithstanding this non-prescriptive approach, the ACNS considers that it would be prudent to require the existence of at least one independent shutdown system and two physically independent locations from which the reactor can be shut down and the shutdown condition monitored, and to require provision for an assumed loss of integrity of the primary cooling system's boundary unless convincing arguments to the contrary are presented. The ACNS endorses in general the objectives and fundamental principles proposed by the interorganizational Small Reactor Criteria working group, and intends to review and comment on the documents on specific applications to be issued by that working group

  12. Can we use IEC 61850 for safety related functions?

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Luca Rocca

    2016-08-01

    Full Text Available Safety is an essential issue for processes that present high risk for human beings and environment. An acceptable level of risk is obtained both with actions on the process itself (risk reduction and with the use of special safety systems that switch the process into safe mode when a fault or an abnormal operation mode happens. These safety systems are today based on digital devices that communicate through digital networks. The IEC 61508 series specifies the safety requirements of all the devices that are involved in a safety function, including the communication network. Also electrical generation and distribution systems are processes that may have a significant level of risk, so the criteria stated by the IEC 61508 applies. Starting from this consideration, the paper analyzes the safety requirement for the communication network and compare them with the services of the communication protocol IEC 61850 that represents the most used protocol for automation of electrical plants. The goal of this job is to demonstrate that, from the technical point of view, IEC 61850 can be used for implementing safety-related functions, even if a formal safety certification is still missing.

  13. Organisational Capabilities Required for Enabling Employee Mobility through Bring- Your-Own-Device Concept

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Toperesu B-Abee

    2017-03-01

    Full Text Available Background: Mobile device adoption is on the rise and people are increasingly using mobile devices as a part of their lives. Studies have shown that people can use mobile devices to perform their work duties from anywhere. Organisations are now exploring ways of enabling and supporting mobility for employees’ mobile devices, including BYOD (Bring-Your-Own-Device policies. Objective: The objective of this study is to identify the main capabilities required for enterprise mobility. Methods/Approach: This qualitative research study presents empirical results based on interviews with selected senior IS managers of large organizations. Results: The main findings of this study suggest that information security and mobile device management are among the main capabilities required for enterprise mobility. Conclusions: Enterprise mobility is an emerging field which has received very little research attention. More research in the field will help organisations make informed decisions on how to increase productivity, sales and efficiency while achieving employee satisfaction through enterprise mobility.

  14. 21 CFR 801.16 - Medical devices; Spanish-language version of certain required statements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 8 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Medical devices; Spanish-language version of....16 Medical devices; Spanish-language version of certain required statements. If devices restricted to prescription use only are labeled solely in Spanish for distribution in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico where...

  15. 30 CFR 250.404 - What are the requirements for the crown block?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What are the requirements for the crown block... General Requirements § 250.404 What are the requirements for the crown block? You must have a crown block safety device that prevents the traveling block from striking the crown block. You must check the device...

  16. Safety requirements for long term operation of NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Houdre, T.; Osouf, N.; Juvin, J.-C.

    2012-01-01

    In the future, the reactors operating at present will run alongside reactors of the EPR type or their equivalent, designed for a significantly higher level of safety. This raises the question of the acceptability of continued operation of reactors beyond 40 years when there is an available technology that is safer. Two objectives are therefore imperative. First, a re-evaluation of the safety level in the light of that required of EPR type reactors or their equivalent is necessary, with proposals to bring about significant and relevant improvements to the reactors. R and D work in France and elsewhere is already indicating orientations that could lead to answers, and improvements that would provide significant reductions in release in case of severe accident are being studied. Second, strict compliance of the reactors with the applicable regulations must be demonstrated. At the same time, ageing and obsolescence of the equipment will have to be managed. Where these two points are concerned, ASN expects far-reaching proposals from the licensee. With a view to a request for continued operation beyond 40 years, ASN has referred the matter to the Advisory Committee for nuclear reactors which will meet at the end of 2011 to establish the safety requirements for reactors at their fourth ten-yearly outage. (author)

  17. Safety motion increase of trains by improvement diagnostics process devices of railway automation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    B.M.Bondarenko

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available The complex use of methods of nondestructive check for the automated diagnostics electromagnetic relays of railway automation the first class reliability is offered. The methods determination of their mechanical parameters are resulted, that allows to exclude a human factor from the control, promote reliability of devices railway automation and safety motion of railway transport.

  18. 77 FR 32642 - Medical Devices; Exemption From Premarket Notification: Powered Patient Transport

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-01

    ...] Medical Devices; Exemption From Premarket Notification: Powered Patient Transport AGENCY: Food and Drug... received a petition requesting exemption from the premarket notification requirements for powered patient... necessary to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness. Under the Medical Device Amendments...

  19. Organisational Capabilities Required for Enabling Employee Mobility through Bring- Your-Own-Device Concept

    OpenAIRE

    Toperesu, B-Abee; Van Belle, Jean-Paul

    2017-01-01

    Background: Mobile device adoption is on the rise and people are increasingly using mobile devices as a part of their lives. Studies have shown that people can use mobile devices to perform their work duties from anywhere. Organisations are now exploring ways of enabling and supporting mobility for employees’ mobile devices, including BYOD (Bring-Your-Own-Device) policies. Objective: The objective of this study is to identify the main capabilities required for enterprise mobility. Methods/App...

  20. 30 CFR 75.1107-7 - Water spray devices; capacity; water supply; minimum requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Water spray devices; capacity; water supply... Water spray devices; capacity; water supply; minimum requirements. (a) Where water spray devices are... square foot over the top surface area of the equipment and the supply of water shall be adequate to...

  1. Fuel supply shutdown facility interim operational safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Besser, R.L.; Brehm, J.R.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

    1995-01-01

    These Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSR) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls to ensure safe operation. The IOSRs apply to the fuel material storage buildings in various modes (operation, storage, surveillance)

  2. The increased use of radiation requires enhanced activities regarding radiation safety control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Yun Jong; Lee, Jin Woo; Jeong, Gyo Seong

    2015-01-01

    More recently, companies that have obtained permission to use radioactive materials or radiation device and registered radiation workers have increased by 10% and 4% respectively. The increased use of radiation could have an effect on radiation safety control. However, there is not nearly enough manpower and budget compared to the number of workers and facilities. This paper will suggest a counteroffer thought analyzing pending issues. The results of this paper indicate that there are 47 and 31.3 workers per radiation protection officer in educational and research institutes, respectively. There are 20.1 persons per RPO in hospitals, even though there are 2 RPOs appointed. Those with a special license as a radioisotope handler were ruled out as possible managers because medical doctors who have a special license for radioisotope handling normally have no experience with radiation safety. The number of staff members and budget have been insufficient for safety control at most educational and research institutes. It is necessary to build an optimized safety control system for effective Radiation Safety Control. This will reduce the risk factor of safety, and a few RPOs can be supplied for efficiency and convenience

  3. The increased use of radiation requires enhanced activities regarding radiation safety control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Yun Jong; Lee, Jin Woo; Jeong, Gyo Seong [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Jeongeup (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    More recently, companies that have obtained permission to use radioactive materials or radiation device and registered radiation workers have increased by 10% and 4% respectively. The increased use of radiation could have an effect on radiation safety control. However, there is not nearly enough manpower and budget compared to the number of workers and facilities. This paper will suggest a counteroffer thought analyzing pending issues. The results of this paper indicate that there are 47 and 31.3 workers per radiation protection officer in educational and research institutes, respectively. There are 20.1 persons per RPO in hospitals, even though there are 2 RPOs appointed. Those with a special license as a radioisotope handler were ruled out as possible managers because medical doctors who have a special license for radioisotope handling normally have no experience with radiation safety. The number of staff members and budget have been insufficient for safety control at most educational and research institutes. It is necessary to build an optimized safety control system for effective Radiation Safety Control. This will reduce the risk factor of safety, and a few RPOs can be supplied for efficiency and convenience.

  4. Safety and regulatory requirements of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumar, S.V.; Bhardwaj, S.A.

    2000-01-01

    A pre-requisite for a nuclear power program in any country is well established national safety and regulatory requirements. These have evolved for nuclear power plants in India with participation of the regulatory body, utility, research and development (R and D) organizations and educational institutions. Prevailing international practices provided a useful base to develop those applicable to specific system designs for nuclear power plants in India. Their effectiveness has been demonstrated in planned activities of building up the nuclear power program as well as with unplanned activities, like those due to safety related incidents etc. (author)

  5. Firearm Safety Locks: Federal Agency Implementation of the Presidential Directive

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1998-01-01

    ... deaths among children ages 5 to 14. In order to have the federal government serve as an example of gun safety, the President required that a safety lock device be provided with each handgun issued to federal law enforcement officers...

  6. An overview of review guidelines for HDL programmable devices in nuclear safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Komanduri, Raghavan; Srivani, L.; Thirugnana Murthy, D.

    2013-01-01

    HDL programmable devices viz. CPLDs and FPGAs are increasingly being used to implement digital designs in the I and C systems performing safety functions of nuclear power plants. Synthesizable RTL descriptions manually written in HDLs are the first step in developing industry standard large scale digital designs. The reliability of the implementation is determined by the methodologies followed by the designer during development. Very few guidelines on HPD design practices, specific to nuclear industry are available. This paper presents an overview of the existing guidelines such as IEC 62566 and U.S. NRC's 'Review guidelines for FPGAs in nuclear power plant safety systems'. (author)

  7. 30 CFR 23.7 - Specific requirements for approval.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... adequate instructions for the installation and connection of telephones and signal devices in order that the safety of these devices and other circuits shall not be diminished by improper installation. MSHA reserves the right to require the attachment of wiring diagrams to the cases of telephones and signal...

  8. The safety of non-incineration waste disposal devices in four hospitals of Tehran

    Science.gov (United States)

    Farshad, Aliasghar; Gholami, Hamid; Farzadkia, Mahdi; Mirkazemi, Roksana; Kermani, Majid

    2014-01-01

    Background: The safe management of hospital waste is a challenge in many developing countries. Objectives: The aim of this study was to compare volatile organic compounds (VOCs) emissions and the microbial disinfectant safety in non-incineration waste disposal devices. Methods: VOC emissions and microbial infections were measured in four non-incineration waste disposal devices including: autoclave with and without a shredder, dry heat system, and hydroclave. Using NIOSH and US EPA-TO14 guidelines, the concentration and potential risk of VOCs in emitted gases from four devices were assessed. ProSpore2 biological indicators were used to assess the microbial analysis of waste residue. Results: There was a significant difference in the type and concentration of VOCs and microbial infection of residues in the four devices. Emissions from the autoclave with a shredder had the highest concentration of benzene, ethyl benzene, xylene, and BTEX, and emissions from the hydroclave had the highest concentration of toluene. The highest level of microbial infection was observed in the residues of the autoclave without a shredder. Conclusions: There is an increased need for proper regulation and control of non-incinerator devices and for monitoring and proper handling of these devices in developing countries. PMID:25000113

  9. Requirements on the provisional safety analyses and technical comparison of safety measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-04-01

    decide on the provision of a design license for a repository site for SMA and another one for HAA, or for a common site for both SMA and HAA. The present report concerns the second step and recapitulates the assertions of SGT on the provisional safety analyses and on the safety technical comparison. It establishes the specific requirements of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) on provisional safety and the safety technical comparison. Further, it defines the extent and content of the safety technical documentation necessary for step 2

  10. Legal and governmental infrastructure for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for legal and governmental responsibilities in respect of the safety of nuclear facilities, the safe use of sources of ionizing radiation, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material. Thus, it covers development of the legal framework for establishing a regulatory body and other actions to achieve effective regulatory control of facilities and activities. Other responsibilities are also covered, such as those for developing the necessary support for safety, involvement in securing third party liability and emergency preparedness

  11. Legal and governmental infrastructure for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for legal and governmental responsibilities in respect of the safety of nuclear facilities, the safe use of sources of ionizing radiation, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material. Thus, it covers development of the legal framework for establishing a regulatory body and other actions to achieve effective regulatory control of facilities and activities. Other responsibilities are also covered, such as those for developing the necessary support for safety, involvement in securing third party liability and emergency preparedness

  12. Workshop on Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety: Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dey, M.

    1993-09-01

    These are the proceedings of the Public Workshop on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety. The workshop was held at the Holiday Inn, Bethesda, on April 27 and 28, 1993. The purpose of the workshop was to provide an opportunity for public and industry input to the program. The workshop addressed the institutionalization of the program to review regulations with the purpose of eliminating those that are marginal. The objective is to avoid the dilution of safety efforts. One session was devoted to discussion of the framework for a performance-based regulatory approach. In addition, panelists and attendees discussed scope, schedules and status of specific regulatory items: containment leakage testing requirements, fire protection requirements, requirements for environmental qualification of electrical equipment, requests for information under 10CFR50.54(f), requirements for combustible gas control systems, and quality assurance requirements

  13. Workshop on Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety: Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dey, M. [Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC (United States). Div. of Safety Issue Resolution; Arsenault, F.; Patterson, M.; Gaal, M. [SCIENTECH, Inc., Rockville, MD (United States)

    1993-09-01

    These are the proceedings of the Public Workshop on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission`s Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety. The workshop was held at the Holiday Inn, Bethesda, on April 27 and 28, 1993. The purpose of the workshop was to provide an opportunity for public and industry input to the program. The workshop addressed the institutionalization of the program to review regulations with the purpose of eliminating those that are marginal. The objective is to avoid the dilution of safety efforts. One session was devoted to discussion of the framework for a performance-based regulatory approach. In addition, panelists and attendees discussed scope, schedules and status of specific regulatory items: containment leakage testing requirements, fire protection requirements, requirements for environmental qualification of electrical equipment, requests for information under 10CFR50.54(f), requirements for combustible gas control systems, and quality assurance requirements.

  14. Preparation, review, and approval of implementation plans for nuclear safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-10-01

    This standard describes an acceptable method to prepare, review, and approve implementation plans for DOE Nuclear Safety requirements. DOE requirements are identified in DOE Rules, Orders, Notices, Immediate Action Directives, and Manuals

  15. Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 3 (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  16. Radiation protection and safety of radiation sources: International basic safety standards. General safety requirements. Pt. 3 (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  17. Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 3 (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  18. Safety in the Utilization and Modification of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-07-15

    This Safety Guide is a revision of Safety Series No. 35-G2 on safety in the utilization and modification of research reactors. It provides recommendations on meeting the requirements for the categorization, safety assessment and approval of research reactor experiments and modification projects. Specific safety considerations in different phases of utilization and modification projects are covered, including the pre-implementation, implementation and post-implementation phases. Guidance is also provided on the operational safety of experiments, including in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices. Examples of the application of the safety categorization process for experiments and modification projects and of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment are also provided. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system for the utilization and modification of a research reactor; 3. Categorization, safety assessment and approval of an experiment or modification; 4. Safety considerations for the design of an experiment or modification; 5. Pre-implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 6. Implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 7. Post-implementation phase of a utilization or modification project; 8. Operational safety of experiments at a research reactor; 9. Safety considerations in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices; 10. Safety aspects of out-of-reactor-core installations; Annex I: Example of a checklist for the categorization of an experiment or modification at a research reactor; Annex II: Example of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment at a research reactor; Annex III: Examples of reasons for a modification at a research reactor.

  19. Safety in the Utilization and Modification of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Guide is a revision of Safety Series No. 35-G2 on safety in the utilization and modification of research reactors. It provides recommendations on meeting the requirements for the categorization, safety assessment and approval of research reactor experiments and modification projects. Specific safety considerations in different phases of utilization and modification projects are covered, including the pre-implementation, implementation and post-implementation phases. Guidance is also provided on the operational safety of experiments, including in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices. Examples of the application of the safety categorization process for experiments and modification projects and of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment are also provided. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system for the utilization and modification of a research reactor; 3. Categorization, safety assessment and approval of an experiment or modification; 4. Safety considerations for the design of an experiment or modification; 5. Pre-implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 6. Implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 7. Post-implementation phase of a utilization or modification project; 8. Operational safety of experiments at a research reactor; 9. Safety considerations in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices; 10. Safety aspects of out-of-reactor-core installations; Annex I: Example of a checklist for the categorization of an experiment or modification at a research reactor; Annex II: Example of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment at a research reactor; Annex III: Examples of reasons for a modification at a research reactor.

  20. Field Safety Notes in Product Problems of Medical Devices for Use in Pulmonology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hannig, Jürgen; Siekmeier, Rüdiger

    2015-01-01

    The current European system for medical devices is governed by three EC directives: the Medical Device Directive 93/42/EEC, the In-Vitro Diagnostic Directive 98/79/EC and the Active Implantable Medical Device Directive 90/385/EEC and regulates marketing and post-market surveillance of medical devices in the European Economic Area. In cases of incidents and field safety corrective actions (FSCA) manufacturers have to inform the responsible Competent Authority, which is the Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices (BfArM) and the public by field safety notices (FSN). In this study we analyzed FSN of medical devices exclusively serving for diagnostics or treatment in pulmonology (e.g. nebulizers, oxygen concentrators, pulse oximeters, lung function analyzers, and non-active devices for treatment). FSCA and FSN publicized by BfArM in 2005-2013 were analyzed in respect to the MEDDEV 2.12-1 rev 8. In total 41 FSCA were publicized for the included products. German and English FSN were found in 36/35 cases, respectively. FSN were clearly characterized as FSN in 22/20 cases and declaration of the type of action was found in 27/26 cases, respectively. Product names were provided in all cases. Lot numbers or other information for product characterization were available in 7/8 and 26/24 cases, respectively. Detailed information regarding FSCA and product malfunction were found in 27/33 and 36/35 cases, respectively. Information on product related risks with previous use of the affected product was provided in 24/23 cases. In 34/34 cases manufacturers provided information to mitigate product related risks. Requests to pass FSN to persons needing awareness were found in 10/14 cases. Contact data were provided in 30/30 cases. Confirmation that the Competent Authority was informed was found in 12/14 cases and in 19/18 cases a customer confirmation was included. The obtained data suggest that there is an increasing annual number of FSCA and most FSN fulfill the criteria of

  1. Radiation safety requirements for training of users of diagnostic X ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Background. Globally, the aim of requirements regarding the use and ownership of diagnostic medical X-ray equipment is to limit radiation by abiding by the 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) principle. The ignorance of radiographers with regard to radiation safety requirements, however, is currently a cause of ...

  2. Control device for a nuclear reactor with a multitude of control rods, extending into the reactor core from above, with linear drive mechanisms and additional gripper devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bevilacqua, F.

    1979-01-01

    The components of the additional gripper devices with magnetically operated finger-shaped latches are separated from the also magnetically operated latches of the linear drive mechanisms in order to avoid common-mode failures when fast shutdown is required. Only part of the safety rods are held by the additional gripping devices in the withdrawn position. There is provided for recording elements indicating positively which one of the safety locks is gearing with the control rods. At the upper end of each control rod there is a coupling head held by electromagnetically operated locking devices in the withdrawn position, if control power is available. (DG) [de

  3. Technical Safety Requirements for the Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF)

    CERN Document Server

    Mahn, J A E M J G

    2003-01-01

    This document provides the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Sandia National Laboratories Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF). The TSR is a compilation of requirements that define the conditions, the safe boundaries, and the administrative controls necessary to ensure the safe operation of a nuclear facility and to reduce the potential risk to the public and facility workers from uncontrolled releases of radioactive or other hazardous materials. These requirements constitute an agreement between DOE and Sandia National Laboratories management regarding the safe operation of the Gamma Irradiation Facility.

  4. 77 FR 75439 - Guidances for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for Investigational New...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-20

    ...] Guidances for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for Investigational New Drug Applications and Bioavailability/Bioequivalence Studies, and a Small Entity Compliance Guide; Availability... Reporting Requirements for INDs and BA/BE Studies'' and ``Safety Reporting Requirements for INDs and BA/BE...

  5. 75 FR 45696 - Pipeline Safety: Personal Electronic Device Related Distractions

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-08-03

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No... and operators of natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline facilities are required to have and follow.... Advisory Bulletin (ADB-10-06) To: Owners and Operators of Hazardous Liquid and Natural Gas Pipeline Systems...

  6. Modeling of requirement specification for safety critical real time computer system using formal mathematical specifications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sankar, Bindu; Sasidhar Rao, B.; Ilango Sambasivam, S.; Swaminathan, P.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Real time computer systems are increasingly used for safety critical supervision and control of nuclear reactors. Typical application areas are supervision of reactor core against coolant flow blockage, supervision of clad hot spot, supervision of undesirable power excursion, power control and control logic for fuel handling systems. The most frequent cause of fault in safety critical real time computer system is traced to fuzziness in requirement specification. To ensure the specified safety, it is necessary to model the requirement specification of safety critical real time computer systems using formal mathematical methods. Modeling eliminates the fuzziness in the requirement specification and also helps to prepare the verification and validation schemes. Test data can be easily designed from the model of the requirement specification. Z and B are the popular languages used for modeling the requirement specification. A typical safety critical real time computer system for supervising the reactor core of prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) against flow blockage is taken as case study. Modeling techniques and the actual model are explained in detail. The advantages of modeling for ensuring the safety are summarized

  7. Nuclear safety review requirements for launch approval

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sholtis, J.A. Jr.; Winchester, R.O.

    1992-01-01

    Use of nuclear power systems in space requires approval which is preceded by extensive safety analysis and review. This careful study allows an informed risk-benefit decision at the highest level of our government. This paper describes the process as it has historically been applied to U.S. isotopic power systems. The Ulysses mission, launched in October 1990, is used to illustrate the process. Expected variations to deal with reactor-power systems are explained

  8. DESIGN PACKAGE 1E SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    M. Salem

    1995-06-23

    The purpose of this analysis is to systematically identify and evaluate hazards related to the Yucca Mountain Project Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) Design Package 1E, Surface Facilities, (for a list of design items included in the package 1E system safety analysis see section 3). This process is an integral part of the systems engineering process; whereby safety is considered during planning, design, testing, and construction. A largely qualitative approach was used since a radiological System Safety Analysis is not required. The risk assessment in this analysis characterizes the accident scenarios associated with the Design Package 1E structures/systems/components(S/S/Cs) in terms of relative risk and includes recommendations for mitigating all identified risks. The priority for recommending and implementing mitigation control features is: (1) Incorporate measures to reduce risks and hazards into the structure/system/component design, (2) add safety devices and capabilities to the designs that reduce risk, (3) provide devices that detect and warn personnel of hazardous conditions, and (4) develop procedures and conduct training to increase worker awareness of potential hazards, on methods to reduce exposure to hazards, and on the actions required to avoid accidents or correct hazardous conditions.

  9. Romania - NPP PLiM Between Regulatory Requirement / Oversight and Operator Safety / Financial Interest

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goicea, Lucian

    2012-01-01

    Cernavoda Unit 1 PLiM started in the first third of its design life, to develop as regulatory requirements of the components of standards and programmes and to benefit by earlier implementation of the measures for achieving maximum operating life. CNCAN regulatory present approach on the utility PLiM combines the regulatory requirements on management system, ageing management provisions of periodic safety review, detailed technical requirements of ageing programmes and different techniques focusing only on safety issues. (author)

  10. A novel safety device with metal counter meshing gears discriminator directly driven by axial flux permanent magnet micromotors based on MEMS technology

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Weiping; Chen, Wenyuan; Zhao, Xiaolin; Li, Shengyong; Jiang, Yong

    2005-08-01

    In a novel safety device based on MEMS technology for high consequence systems, the discriminator consists of two groups of metal counter meshing gears and two pawl/ratchet wheel mechanisms. Each group of counter meshing gears is onepiece and driven directly by an axial flux permanent magnet micromotor respectively. The energy-coupling element is an optical shutter with two collimators and a coupler wheel. The safety device's probability is less than 1/106. It is fabricated by combination of an LiGA-like process and precision mechanical engineering. The device has simple structure, few dynamic problems, high strength and strong reliability.

  11. Seismic qualification of multiple interconnected safety-related cabinets in a high seismic zone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khan, M.R.; Chen, W.H.W.; Wang, T.Y.

    1993-01-01

    Certain safety-related multiple, interconnected electrical cabinets and the devices contained therein are required to perform their intended safety functions during and after a design basis seismic event. In general, seismic testing is performed to ensure the structural integrity of the cabinets and the functionality of their associated devices. Constrained by the shake table capacity, seismic testing is usually performed only for a limited number of interconnected cabinets. Also, original shake table tests performed usually did not provide detailed response information at various locations inside the cabinets. For operational and maintenance purposes, doors and panels of some cabinets may need to be opened while the adjacent cabinets are required to remain functional. In addition, in-cabinet response spectra need to be generated for the seismic qualification of new devices and the replacement parts. Consequently, seismic analysis of safety-related multiple, interconnected cabinets is frequently required for configurations which are different from the original tested conditions. This paper presents results of seismic tests of three interconnected safety-related cabinets and finite element analyses performed to compare the analytical results with those obtained from the cabinet seismic tests. Parametric analyses are performed to determine how many panels and doors can be opened while the adjacent cabinets still remain functional. The study indicates that for cabinets located in a high seismic zone, the critical damping of the cabinet is significantly higher than 5% to 7% typically used in qualifying electrical equipment. For devices mounted on the cabinet doors to performed their intended safety function, it requires stiffening of doors and that these doors be properly bolted to the cabinet frame. It also shows that even though doors and panels bolted to the cabinet frame are the primary seismic resistant element of the cabinet, opening of a limited number of them

  12. Specification of safety requirements for waste packages with respect to practicable quality control measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruendler, D.; Wurtinger, W.

    1987-01-01

    Waste packages for disposal in a repository in the Federal Republic of Germany have to meet safety requirements derived from site specific safety analyses. The examination of the waste packages with regard to compliance with these requirements is the main objective of quality control measures. With respect to quality control the requirements have to be specified in a way that practicable control measures can be applied. This is dealt with for the quality control of the activity inventory and the quality control of the waste form. The paper discusses the determination of the activity of hard-to-measure radionuclides and the specification of safety related requirements for the waste form and the packaging using typical examples

  13. Ferrocyanide Safety Program: Data requirements for the ferrocyanide safety issue developed through the data quality objectives (DQO) process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buck, J.W.; Anderson, C.M.; Pulsipher, B.A.; Toth, J.J.; Turner, P.J.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.; Meacham, J.E.

    1993-12-01

    This document records the data quality objectives (DQO) process applied to the Ferrocyanide Waste Tank Safety Issue at the Hanford Site by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory and Westinghouse Hanford Company. Specifically, the major recommendations and findings from this Ferrocyanide DQO process are presented so that decision makers can determine the type, quantity, and quality of data required for addressing tank safety issues. The decision logic diagrams and error tolerance equations also are provided. Finally, the document includes the DQO sample-size formulas for determining specific tank sampling requirements

  14. 77 FR 45927 - Implementation of Device Registration and Listing Requirements Enacted in the Public Health...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-08-02

    ... would also assist us in our fundamental regulatory activities, such as planning and scheduling... of labeling (or the label and package insert) and, in some cases, advertising. Section 510(j)(2) of... postmarketing surveillance programs, help ensure the safety of imported devices, improve the scheduling and...

  15. Safety Audit of Band Saw in Manufacturing Organization

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Martin Kotus

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper deals with the verifying of safety status for a selected device in the manufacturing organization. The safety audit of band saw was realized in the manufacturing process. Safety requirements of the machinery for cutting material are given in the standard STN 20 0723. This standard from the point of view of the work safety defines selected requirements for sawing, cutting compounds and the using of prevention to work with cutting compounds. Among the basic requirements belong material clamping and security services for cut, band saws and jaws wear, as well as the required protective cover. The efficiency of audit in percentage was evaluated by the level of fulfilment as follows: fulfilled (A mostly fulfilled (AB, conditionally fulfilled (B or unfulfilled (C. Through safety audit, were defined the weaknesses that increase the degree of employee health hazard. There were proposed corrective actions to eliminate weaknesses and retraining employees. It is still needed to perform the safety audit due to reduction of the probability of occupational injury.

  16. 30 CFR 250.802 - Design, installation, and operation of surface production-safety systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... Analysis Checklists are included in API RP 14C you must utilize the analysis technique and documentation... device requirements for pipelines are under § 250.1004. (c) Specification for surface safety valves (SSV..., Recommended Practice for Installation, Maintenance, and Repair of Surface Safety Valves and Underwater Safety...

  17. Innovative nuclear reactor - Indian approach to meet user requirements for safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saha, D.; Sinha, R.K.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: For sustainable development of nuclear energy, a number of key issues are to be addressed. It should be economically competitive; it must address the issues related to nuclear safety, proliferation resistance, environmental impact, waste disposal and cross cutting issues like social and infra-structural aspects. To compete successfully in the long term, in the highly competitive energy market and to overcome other challenges, it is necessary to introduce innovative reactor and fuel cycle concepts. Indian Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) is one such innovative reactor. To guide the research and development activities related to innovative concepts, user requirements are to be formulated. User requirements covering various aspects of sustainable development are being formulated at both national and international levels. One such international project involved in the formulation of user requirements is the IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). This paper deals with INPRO user requirements for safety and Indian approach to meet these requirements through AHWR

  18. Devices and Endoscopic Bariatric Therapies for Obesity.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Saunders, Katherine H; Igel, Leon I; Saumoy, Monica; Sharaiha, Reem Z; Aronne, Louis J

    2018-04-17

    In this review, we describe the FDA-approved and investigational devices and endoscopic bariatric therapies for the treatment of obesity. We focus on literature published in the past few years and present mechanisms of action as well as efficacy and safety data. Devices and endoscopic procedures are emerging options to fill the significant treatment gap in the management of obesity. Not only are these devices and procedures minimally invasive and reversible, but they are potentially more effective than antiobesity medications, often safer for poor surgical candidates and possibly less expensive than bariatric surgery. As many patients require a variety of management strategies (medications, devices, procedures, and/or surgery) in addition to lifestyle modifications to achieve clinically significant weight loss, the future of obesity treatment involves a multidisciplinary approach. Combinations of advanced treatment strategies can lead to additive or synergistic weight loss. This is an area that requires further investigation.

  19. Device for removing hydrogen gas from the safety containment vessel of a nuclear reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stiefel, M.

    1983-01-01

    The safe processing of all concentrations of gas mixtures should be possible with such a device using a thermal recombiner of compact construction. A recombiner consisting of a metal case and diverter sheets situated in it is heated by induction. The incoming pipe for the gas mixture enriched with hydrogen and the outgoing pipe for the gas mixture with low hydrogen content are connected together by a three way valve. The third connection to the safety valve takes the larger port of the gas mixture with low hydrogen content back to the safety containment vessel. Sufficient amount of the gas mixture with low hydrogen content is taken via the three way valve to the safety containment vessel to ensure that the hydrogen content of the gas mixture taken to the recombiner remains below the 4% by volume limit. (orig./PW)

  20. BIOANALYTICAL STANDARDIZING FOR SEROLOGICAL DIAGNOSTIC MEDICAL DEVICES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    A. Yu. Galkin

    2015-04-01

    Full Text Available In article we analyzed national and international regulations concerning the quality and safety of medical devices for in vitro diagnostics. We discussed the possibility of a partial application of the recommendations of the State Pharmacopoeia of Ukraine to this type of product. The main guiding regulatory documents establishing requirements for quality and safety tools for the serological diagnosis products are The technical regulation on medical devices for the diagnosis in vitro, DSTU ISO 13485 “Medical devices. Quality management system. Regulatory requirements”, and DSTU ISO/IEC 17025 “General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories”. Similar requirements of the State Pharmacopoeia of Ukraine which are used for drug standardization can not be directly applied to the medical devises for in vitro diagnostics due to a number of features, namely, the serological diagnosis products pre-designed to determine the unknown concentration of a particular analyte in a biological material, the diagnostic kits has to include the control samples (internal standard systems that need to be calibrated. It was determined following parameters of bioanalytical standardization and validation characterization for of qualitative (semi quantitative test-kits for serological diagnosis: precision (convergence, intralaboratory precision and reproducibility, diagnostic and analytical specificity, diagnostic sensitivity. It’s necessary to inspect additional parameters for quantitative test-kits such as accuracy (precision, linearity, analytical sensitivity and range.

  1. Regulatory Science in Practice (Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hojo, Taisuke

    2017-01-01

    Review, safety, and relief services of the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency are primarily focused on scientifically evaluating pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and cellular and tissue-based products referring to their quality, efficacy, and safety, which requires a variety of scientific knowledge and methods. Pharmaceutical regulation should be established based on the most advanced scientific expertise at all times. In order to evaluate products that use cutting-edge technology such as induced pluripotent stem cells and information and communication technology adequately, since fiscal year 2012 the Science Committee has been established as a platform to exchange opinions among members from top-ranking domestic and international academia and to enhance personnel exchanges through the Initiative to Facilitate Development of Innovative Drugs. In addition, the Regulatory Science Center will be established in 2018 to increase the integrity of our services for product reviews and safety measures. In particular, requiring electronic data submissions for clinical trial applications followed by an advanced approach to analysis should not only enhance the quality of reviews of individual products but should also support the development of pharmaceuticals and medical devices by providing pharmaceutical affairs consultations on research and development strategies with various guidelines based on new insights resulting from product-bridging data analysis. Moreover, a database including electronic health records with comprehensive medical information collected mainly from 10 cooperating medical institutions will be developed with the aim of developing safety measures in a more timely manner using methods of pharmacoepidemiological analysis.

  2. 42 CFR 9.10 - Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and biosafety requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and... SANCTUARY SYSTEM § 9.10 Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and biosafety requirements. (a) How are employee Occupational Health and Safety Program risks and concerns addressed? The sanctuary shall...

  3. A Review of Safety and Design Requirements of the Artificial Pancreas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Blauw, Helga; Keith-Hynes, Patrick; Koops, Robin; DeVries, J Hans

    2016-11-01

    As clinical studies with artificial pancreas systems for automated blood glucose control in patients with type 1 diabetes move to unsupervised real-life settings, product development will be a focus of companies over the coming years. Directions or requirements regarding safety in the design of an artificial pancreas are, however, lacking. This review aims to provide an overview and discussion of safety and design requirements of the artificial pancreas. We performed a structured literature search based on three search components-type 1 diabetes, artificial pancreas, and safety or design-and extended the discussion with our own experiences in developing artificial pancreas systems. The main hazards of the artificial pancreas are over- and under-dosing of insulin and, in case of a bi-hormonal system, of glucagon or other hormones. For each component of an artificial pancreas and for the complete system we identified safety issues related to these hazards and proposed control measures. Prerequisites that enable the control algorithms to provide safe closed-loop control are accurate and reliable input of glucose values, assured hormone delivery and an efficient user interface. In addition, the system configuration has important implications for safety, as close cooperation and data exchange between the different components is essential.

  4. Information Management system of the safety regulatory requirements and guidance for the Korea next generation reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yun, Y. C.; Lee, J. H.; Lee, H. C.; Lee, J. S.

    2000-01-01

    In order to achieve the safety of the Korea Next Generation Reactors (KNGR), the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety has carried out the Safety and Regulatory Requirements and Guidance (SRRG) development program from 1992 such as establishment of the SRRG hierarchy, development of technical requirements and guidance, and consideration of new licensing system. The SRRG hierarchy for the KNGR was consisted of five tiers; Safety Objectives, Safety Principles, General Safety Criteria, Specific Safety Requirements and Safety Regulatory Guides. The developed SRRG have been compared the criteria in 10CFR and Reg. Guide in the U.S.A and the IAEA documents for assuring internationally acceptable level of the SRRG. To improve the efficiency and accuracy of SRRG development, the construction of database system was required in the course of development. Therefore, the Information Management System of SRRG for the KNGR has been developed which enables developers to quickly and accurately seek and systematically manage whole contexts of the SRRG, reference requirements, and current atomic energy regulation rules. Moreover, through homepage whose URL is 'http://kngr.kins.re.kr', the concerned persons and public can acquire the information related with SRRG and KNGR project, and post his/her thought to the opinion forum in the homepage

  5. Information Management system of the safety regulatory requirements and guidance for the Korea next generation reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yun, Y. C. [LG-EDS Systems, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Lee, J. H.; Lee, H. C.; Lee, J. S. [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2000-05-01

    In order to achieve the safety of the Korea Next Generation Reactors (KNGR), the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety has carried out the Safety and Regulatory Requirements and Guidance (SRRG) development program from 1992 such as establishment of the SRRG hierarchy, development of technical requirements and guidance, and consideration of new licensing system. The SRRG hierarchy for the KNGR was consisted of five tiers; Safety Objectives, Safety Principles, General Safety Criteria, Specific Safety Requirements and Safety Regulatory Guides. The developed SRRG have been compared the criteria in 10CFR and Reg. Guide in the U.S.A and the IAEA documents for assuring internationally acceptable level of the SRRG. To improve the efficiency and accuracy of SRRG development, the construction of database system was required in the course of development. Therefore, the Information Management System of SRRG for the KNGR has been developed which enables developers to quickly and accurately seek and systematically manage whole contexts of the SRRG, reference requirements, and current atomic energy regulation rules. Moreover, through homepage whose URL is 'http://kngr.kins.re.kr', the concerned persons and public can acquire the information related with SRRG and KNGR project, and post his/her thought to the opinion forum in the homepage.

  6. Concept of the LORELEI Test Device for LOCA Experiment in the JHR Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, N.; Ferry, L.; Azulay, A.; Mileguir, O.; Weiss, Y.; Szanto, M.

    2014-01-01

    Modeling of nuclear fuel cladding behavior during a Loss of Coolant accident (LOCA) is a principal requirement in reactor safety analysis. Former safety criteria were obtained from experiments during the 1970's, conducted mainly with fresh fuels. Changes in modern fuel design, introduction of new cladding materials and motivation towards higher burn-ups have generated a need to re-examine safety criteria and their continued validity. This led to the growing development of both experiments and simulations meant to address this need. The Halden IFA-650 series of experiments for example, beginning in the early 2000's have clearly shown that existing criteria and experimental data are insufficient for the growing demand for higher burn-ups. In JHR material testing reactor, which is currently under construction, one significant experimental device is the LORELEI testing device. The objective is to examine the LOCA sequence influence on: thermo-mechanical behavior of the fuel clad, possible fuel relocation, corrosion at high temperature, oxidation, hydriding and resulted clad embrittment. The device is a single rod closed loop system placed on a displacement device inside a defined channel in the reflector. Several operational constrains on the device, as required by the reactor operational philosophy resulted quite a few challenges in the design. Constrains as: pre experimental re-irradiation phase under thermo-syphonic flow, application of active insulation to simulate the surrounding fuel, application of tensile force during refolding simulation, controlling the experiment with non-direct temperature measurement, etc. requires sophisticated solutions. The main objective of the conceptual design was to remove the uncertainties of those challenging requirements. The current presentation describes the approach applied defining the concept of the device, using sophisticated design combined with computational and experimental tools

  7. 49 CFR 1106.3 - Actions for which Safety Integration Plan is required.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 8 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Actions for which Safety Integration Plan is required. 1106.3 Section 1106.3 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued... TRANSPORTATION BOARD CONSIDERATION OF SAFETY INTEGRATION PLANS IN CASES INVOLVING RAILROAD CONSOLIDATIONS...

  8. Regulatory requirements and administrative practice in safety of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Servant, J.

    1977-01-01

    This paper reviews the current situation of the France regulatory rules and procedures dealing with the safety of the main nuclear facilities and, more broadly, the nuclear security. First, the author outlines the policy of the French administration which requires that the licensee responsible for an installation has to demonstrate that all possible measures are taken to ensure a sufficient level of safety, from the early stage of the project to the end of the operation of the plant. Thus, the administration performs the assessment on a case-by-case basis, of the safety of each installation before granting a nuclear license. On the other hand, the administration settles overall safety requirements for specific categories of installations or components, which determine the ultimate safety performances, but avoid, as far as possible, to detail the technical specifications to be applied in order to comply with these goals. This approach, which allows the designers and the licensees to rely upon sound codes and standards, gains the advantage of a great flexibility without imparing the nuclear safety. The author outlines the licensing progress for the main categories of installations: nuclear power plants of the PWR type, fast breeders, uranium isotope separation plants, and irradiated fuel processing plants. Emphasis is placed on the most noteworthy points: standardization of projects, specific risks of each site, problems of advanced type reactors, etc... The development of the technical regulations is presented with emphasis on the importance of an internationally concerned action within the nuclear international community. The second part of this paper describes the France operating experience of nuclear installations from the safety point of view. Especially, the author examines the technical and administrative utilization of data from safety significant incidents in reactors and plants, and the results of the control performed by the nuclear installations

  9. Endovenous mechanochemical ablation of great saphenous vein incompetence using the ClariVein device: a safety study

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Eekeren, R. van; Boersma, D.; Elias, S.; Holewijn, S.; Werson, D.A.; Vries, J.P. de; Reijnen, M.M.P.J.

    2011-01-01

    PURPOSE: To evaluate the feasibility and safety of endovenous mechanochemical ablation (MOCA) for the treatment of great saphenous vein (GSV) incompetence. METHODS: The newly developed ClariVein device uses a technique that combines mechanical endothelial damage using a rotating wire with the

  10. Guide for reviewing safety analysis reports for packaging: Review of quality assurance requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moon, D.W.

    1988-10-01

    This review section describes quality assurance requirements applying to design, purchase, fabrication, handling, shipping, storing, cleaning, assembly, inspection, testing, operation, maintenance, repair, and modification of components of packaging which are important to safety. The design effort, operation's plans, and quality assurance requirements should be integrated to achieve a system in which the independent QA program is not overly stringent and the application of QA requirements is commensurate with safety significance. The reviewer must verify that the applicant's QA section in the SARP contains package-specific QA information required by DOE Orders and federal regulations that demonstrate compliance. 8 refs

  11. OpenICE medical device interoperability platform overview and requirement analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arney, David; Plourde, Jeffrey; Goldman, Julian M

    2018-02-23

    We give an overview of OpenICE, an open source implementation of the ASTM standard F2761 for the Integrated Clinical Environment (ICE) that leverages medical device interoperability, together with an analysis of the clinical and non-functional requirements and community process that inspired its design.

  12. Impact of New Radiation Safety Standards on Licensing Requirements of Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strohal, P.; Subasic, D.; Valcic, I.

    1996-01-01

    As the outcomes of the newly introduced safety philosophies, new and more strict safety design requirements for nuclear installation are expected to be introduced. New in-depth defence measures should be incorporated into the design and operation procedure for a nuclear installation, to compensate for potential failures in protection or safety measures. The new requirements will also apply to licensing of NPP's operation as well as to licensing of nuclear sites, especially for radioactive waste disposal sites. This paper intends to give an overview of possible impacts of new internationally agreed basic safety standards with respect to NPP and related technologies. Recently issued new basic safety standards for radiation protection are introducing some new safety principles which may have essential impact on future licensing requirements regarding nuclear power plants and radioactive waste installations. These new standards recognize exposures under normal conditions ('practices') and intervention conditions. The term interventions describes the human activities that seek to reduce the existing radiation exposure or existing likelihood of incurring exposure which is not part of a controlled practice. The other new development in safety standards is the introduction of so called potential exposure based on the experience gained from a number of radiation accidents. This exposure is not expected to be delivered with certainty but it may result from an accident at a source or owing to an event or sequence of events of a probabilistic nature, including equipment failures and operating errors. (author)

  13. Regulator Loss Functions and Hierarchical Modeling for Safety Decision Making.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hatfield, Laura A; Baugh, Christine M; Azzone, Vanessa; Normand, Sharon-Lise T

    2017-07-01

    Regulators must act to protect the public when evidence indicates safety problems with medical devices. This requires complex tradeoffs among risks and benefits, which conventional safety surveillance methods do not incorporate. To combine explicit regulator loss functions with statistical evidence on medical device safety signals to improve decision making. In the Hospital Cost and Utilization Project National Inpatient Sample, we select pediatric inpatient admissions and identify adverse medical device events (AMDEs). We fit hierarchical Bayesian models to the annual hospital-level AMDE rates, accounting for patient and hospital characteristics. These models produce expected AMDE rates (a safety target), against which we compare the observed rates in a test year to compute a safety signal. We specify a set of loss functions that quantify the costs and benefits of each action as a function of the safety signal. We integrate the loss functions over the posterior distribution of the safety signal to obtain the posterior (Bayes) risk; the preferred action has the smallest Bayes risk. Using simulation and an analysis of AMDE data, we compare our minimum-risk decisions to a conventional Z score approach for classifying safety signals. The 2 rules produced different actions for nearly half of hospitals (45%). In the simulation, decisions that minimize Bayes risk outperform Z score-based decisions, even when the loss functions or hierarchical models are misspecified. Our method is sensitive to the choice of loss functions; eliciting quantitative inputs to the loss functions from regulators is challenging. A decision-theoretic approach to acting on safety signals is potentially promising but requires careful specification of loss functions in consultation with subject matter experts.

  14. Making Your Secondary School E-Safe: Whole School Cyberbullying and E-Safety Strategies for Meeting Ofsted Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Katz, Adrienne

    2016-01-01

    The internet and mobile devices play a huge role in teenagers' home and school life, and it is becoming more and more important to effectively address e-safety in secondary schools. This practical book provides guidance on how to teach and promote e-safety and tackle cyberbullying with real-life examples from schools of what works and what schools…

  15. Making Your Primary School E-Safe: Whole School Cyberbullying and E-Safety Strategies for Meeting Ofsted Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Katz, Adrienne

    2015-01-01

    Children are using the internet and mobile devices at increasingly younger ages, and it's becoming more and more important to address e-safety in primary schools. This practical book provides guidance on how to teach and promote e-safety and tackle cyberbullying with real-life examples from schools of what works and what schools need to do. The…

  16. Risk based limits for Operational Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    OSR limits are designed to protect the assumptions made in the facility safety analysis in order to preserve the safety envelope during facility operation. Normally, limits are set based on ''worst case conditions'' without regard to the likelihood (frequency) of a credible event occurring. In special cases where the accident analyses are based on ''time at risk'' arguments, it may be desirable to control the time at which the facility is at risk. A methodology has been developed to use OSR limits to control the source terms and the times these source terms would be available, thus controlling the acceptable risk to a nuclear process facility. The methodology defines a new term ''gram-days''. This term represents the area under a source term (inventory) vs time curve which represents the risk to the facility. Using the concept of gram-days (normalized to one year) allows the use of an accounting scheme to control the risk under the inventory vs time curve. The methodology results in at least three OSR limits: (1) control of the maximum inventory or source term, (2) control of the maximum gram-days for the period based on a source term weighted average, and (3) control of the maximum gram-days at the individual source term levels. Basing OSR limits on risk based safety analysis is feasible, and a basis for development of risk based limits is defensible. However, monitoring inventories and the frequencies required to maintain facility operation within the safety envelope may be complex and time consuming

  17. Reactor safety device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okada, Yasumasa.

    1987-01-01

    Purpose: To scram control rods by processing signals from a plurality of temperature detectors and generating abnormal temperature warning upon occurrence of abnormal temperature in a nuclear reactor. Constitution: A temperature sensor comprising a plurality of reactors each having a magnetic body as the magnetic core having a curie point different from each other and corresponding to the abnormal temperature against which reactor core fuels have to be protected is disposed in an identical instrumentation well near the reactor core fuel outlet/inlet of a reactor. A temperature detection device actuated upon detection of an abnormal temperature by the abrupt reduction of the reactance of each of the reactors is disposed. An OR circuit and an AND circuit for conducting OR and AND operations for each of the abnormal temperature detection signals from the temperature detection device are disposed. The output from the OR circuit is used as the abnormal temperature warning signal, while the output from the AND circuit is utilized as a signal for actuating the scram operation of control rod drive mechanisms. Accordingly, it is possible to improve the reliability of the reactor scram system, particularly, improve the reliability under a high temperature atmosphere. (Kamimura, M.)

  18. The inverted cup device for blood transfer on malaria RDTs: ease of use, acceptability and safety in routine use by health workers in Nigeria.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Incardona, Sandra; Mwancha-Kwasa, Magoma; Rees-Channer, Roxanne R; Albertini, Audrey; Havumaki, Joshua; Chiodini, Peter; Oyibo, Wellington; Gonzalez, Iveth J

    2018-01-15

    Malaria rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) are becoming widely adopted for case management at community level. However, reports and anecdotal observations indicate that the blood transfer step poses a significant challenge to many users. This study sought to evaluate the inverted cup device in the hands of health workers in everyday clinical practice, in comparison with the plastic pipette, and to determine the volume accuracy of the device made of a lower-cost plastic. The volume accuracy of inverted cup devices made of two plastics, PMMA and SBC, was compared by transferring blood 150 times onto filter paper and comparing the blood spot areas with those produced by 20 reference transfers with a calibrated micropipette. The ease of use, safety and acceptability of the inverted cup device and the pipette were evaluated by 50 health workers in Nigeria. Observations were recorded on pre-designed questionnaires, by the health workers themselves and by trained observers. Focus group discussions were also conducted. The volume accuracy assessment showed that the device made from the low-cost material (SBC) delivered a more accurate volume (mean 5.4 μL, SD 0.48 μL, range 4.5-7.0 μL) than the PMMA device (mean 5.9 μL, SD 0.48 μL, range 4.9-7.2 μL). The observational evaluation demonstrated that the inverted cup device performed better than the pipette in all aspects, e.g. higher proportions of health workers achieved successful blood collection (96%, vs. 66%), transfer of the required blood volume (90%, vs. 58%), and blood deposit without any loss (95%, vs. 50%). Majority of health workers also considered it' very easy' to use (81%),'very appropriate' for everyday use (78%), and 50% of them reported that it was their preferred BTD. The good volume accuracy and high acceptability of the inverted cup device shown in this study, along with observed ease of use and safety in hands of health workers, further strengthens prior findings which demonstrated its higher

  19. Requirements to amend the main influence factors on the safety culture after fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farcasiu, M.; Nitoi, M.

    2015-01-01

    The paper presents a general model that provides a framework for the safety culture assessment, creating the possibility to identify factors that can significantly influence the safety culture. The main safety culture influence factors (SCIF) used by model are the following: regulatory environment, organizational environment, worker characteristics, socio-political environment, national culture, organization history, business and technological characteristics. After the analysis of the deficiencies and weaknesses of SCIFc in evolution of the Fukushima accident, some issues that may become necessities and requirements to change and improve both the safety culture and safety of the nuclear installations were highlighted. For each influence factor were identified some requirements to amend. The results will emphasize the necesity of the human - technology - organization system assessment. Hence it was demonstrated that the safety culture results from the interaction of individuals with technology and with the organization. (authors)

  20. SafeNet: a methodology for integrating general-purpose unsafe devices in safe-robot rehabilitation systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vicentini, Federico; Pedrocchi, Nicola; Malosio, Matteo; Molinari Tosatti, Lorenzo

    2014-09-01

    Robot-assisted neurorehabilitation often involves networked systems of sensors ("sensory rooms") and powerful devices in physical interaction with weak users. Safety is unquestionably a primary concern. Some lightweight robot platforms and devices designed on purpose include safety properties using redundant sensors or intrinsic safety design (e.g. compliance and backdrivability, limited exchange of energy). Nonetheless, the entire "sensory room" shall be required to be fail-safe and safely monitored as a system at large. Yet, sensor capabilities and control algorithms used in functional therapies require, in general, frequent updates or re-configurations, making a safety-grade release of such devices hardly sustainable in cost-effectiveness and development time. As such, promising integrated platforms for human-in-the-loop therapies could not find clinical application and manufacturing support because of lacking in the maintenance of global fail-safe properties. Under the general context of cross-machinery safety standards, the paper presents a methodology called SafeNet for helping in extending the safety rate of Human Robot Interaction (HRI) systems using unsafe components, including sensors and controllers. SafeNet considers, in fact, the robotic system as a device at large and applies the principles of functional safety (as in ISO 13489-1) through a set of architectural procedures and implementation rules. The enabled capability of monitoring a network of unsafe devices through redundant computational nodes, allows the usage of any custom sensors and algorithms, usually planned and assembled at therapy planning-time rather than at platform design-time. A case study is presented with an actual implementation of the proposed methodology. A specific architectural solution is applied to an example of robot-assisted upper-limb rehabilitation with online motion tracking. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

  1. Safety, effectiveness and acceptability of the PrePex device for adult male circumcision in Kenya.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Paul J Feldblum

    Full Text Available To assess the safety, effectiveness and acceptability of the PrePex device for adult medical male circumcision (MMC in routine service delivery in Kenya.We enrolled 427 men ages 18-49 at one fixed and two outreach clinics. Procedures were performed by trained clinical officers and nurses. The first 50 enrollees were scheduled for six follow-up visits, and remaining men were followed at Days 7 and 42. We recorded adverse events (AEs and time to complete healing, and interviewed men about acceptability and pain.Placement and removal procedures each averaged between 3 and 4 minutes. Self-reported pain was minimal during placement but was fleetingly intense during removal. The rate of moderate/severe AEs was 5.9% overall (95% confidence interval [CI] 3.8%-8.5%, all of which resolved without sequelae. AEs included 5 device displacements, 2 spontaneous foreskin detachments, and 9 cases of insufficient foreskin removal. Surgical completion of MMC was required for 9 men (2.1%. Among the closely monitored first 50 participants, the probability of complete healing by Day 42 was 0.44 (95% CI 0.30-0.58, and 0.90 by Day 56. A large majority of men was favorable about their MMC procedure and would recommend PrePex to friends and family.The PrePex device was effective for MMC in Kenya, and well-accepted. The AE rate was higher than reported for surgical procedures there, or in previous PrePex studies. Healing time is longer than following surgical circumcision. Provider experience and clearer counseling on post-placement and post-removal care should lead to lower AE rates.ClinicalTrials.gov NCT01711411.

  2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON REGULATIONS AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR QUADRICYCLES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ana Pavlovic

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available In recent years, a new class of compact vehicles has been emerging and wide-spreading all around Europe: the quadricycle. These four-wheeled motor vehicles, originally derived from motorcycles, are a small and fuel-efficient mean of transportation used in rural or urban areas as an alternative to motorbikes or city cars. In some countries, they are also endorsed by local authorities and institutions which support small and environmentally-friendly vehicles. In this paper, several general considerations on quadricycles will be provided including the vehicle classification, evolution of regulations (as homologation, driver licence, emissions, etc, technical characteristics, safety requirements, most relevant investigations, and other additional useful information (e.g. references, links. It represents an important and actual topic of investigation for designers and manufacturers considering that the new EU regulation on the approval and market surveillance of quadricycles will soon enter in force providing conclusive requirements for functional safety environmental protection of these promising vehicles.

  3. General Approaches and Requirements on Safety and Security of Radioactive Materials Transport in Russian Federation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ershov, V.N.; Buchel'nikov, A.E.; Komarov, S.V.

    2016-01-01

    Development and implementation of safety and security requirements for transport of radioactive materials in the Russian Federation are addressed. At the outset it is worth noting that the transport safety requirements implemented are in full accordance with the IAEA's ''Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2009 Edition)''. However, with respect to security requirements for radioactive material transport in some cases the Russian Federation requirements for nuclear material are more stringent compared to IAEA recommendations. The fundamental principles of safety and security of RM managements, recommended by IAEA documents (publications No. SF-1 and GOV/41/2001) are compared. Its correlation and differences concerning transport matters, the current level and the possibility of harmonization are analysed. In addition a reflection of the general approaches and concrete transport requirements is being evaluated. Problems of compliance assessment, including administrative and state control problems for safety and security provided at internal and international shipments are considered and compared. (author)

  4. Practice of Regulatory Science (Development of Medical Devices).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Niimi, Shingo

    2017-01-01

    Prototypes of medical devices are made in accordance with the needs of clinical practice, and for systems required during the initial process of medical device development for new surgical practices. Verification of whether these prototypes produce the intended performance specifications is conducted using basic tests such as mechanical and animal tests. The prototypes are then improved and modified until satisfactory results are obtained. After a prototype passes through a clinical trial process similar to that for new drugs, application for approval is made. In the approval application process, medical devices are divided into new, improved, and generic types. Reviewers judge the validity of intended use, indications, operation procedures, and precautions, and in addition evaluate the balance between risk and benefit in terms of efficacy and safety. Other characteristics of medical devices are the need for the user to attain proficiency in usage techniques to ensure efficacy and safety, and the existence of a variety of medical devices for which assessment strategies differ, including differences in impact on the body in cases in which a physical burden to the body or failure of a medical device develops. Regulatory science of medical devices involves prediction, judgment, and evaluation of efficacy, safety, and quality, from which data result which can become indices in the development stages from design to application for approval. A reduction in the number of animals used for testing, improvement in efficiency, reduction of the necessity for clinical trials, etc. are expected through rational setting of evaluation items.

  5. Safety flywheel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schneider, R.T.

    1977-01-17

    The patent application relates to an inertial energy storage device employing a safety flywheel which is made of flexible material such as a twisted rope ring. The rigidity required for such a device is achieved through centrifugal forces inherent in such a device when it is operating. A small number of the strands of the rope ring have a tensile strength that is lower than the vast majority of the strands of the rope ring whereby should any of these strands fail, they will begin to whiplash allowing such a failure to be detected and braked before a catastrophic failure occurs. This is accomplished by the inclusion of glass tubes located around the periphery of the flywheel. The tubes are in communication with a braking fluid reservoir. The flywheel and glass tubes are enclosed within a vacuum-tight housing.

  6. 16 CFR 1512.17 - Other requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 16 Commercial Practices 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Other requirements. 1512.17 Section 1512.17 Commercial Practices CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION FEDERAL HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES ACT REGULATIONS... the ground plane. (d) Toe clearance. Bicycles not equipped with positive foot-retaining devices (such...

  7. Requirements of radiation protection and safety for nuclear medicine services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The requirements of radiation protection and safety for nuclear medicine services are established. The norms is applied to activities related to the radiopharmaceuticals for therapeutics and 'in vivo' diagnostics purposes. (M.C.K.) [pt

  8. Edible safety requirements and assessment standards for agricultural genetically modified organisms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deng, Pingjian; Zhou, Xiangyang; Zhou, Peng; Du, Zhong; Hou, Hongli; Yang, Dongyan; Tan, Jianjun; Wu, Xiaojin; Zhang, Jinzhou; Yang, Yongcun; Liu, Jin; Liu, Guihua; Li, Yonghong; Liu, Jianjun; Yu, Lei; Fang, Shisong; Yang, Xiaoke

    2008-05-01

    This paper describes the background, principles, concepts and methods of framing the technical regulation for edible safety requirement and assessment of agricultural genetically modified organisms (agri-GMOs) for Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in the People's Republic of China. It provides a set of systematic criteria for edible safety requirements and the assessment process for agri-GMOs. First, focusing on the degree of risk and impact of different agri-GMOs, we developed hazard grades for toxicity, allergenicity, anti-nutrition effects, and unintended effects and standards for the impact type of genetic manipulation. Second, for assessing edible safety, we developed indexes and standards for different hazard grades of recipient organisms, for the influence of types of genetic manipulation and hazard grades of agri-GMOs. To evaluate the applicability of these criteria and their congruency with other safety assessment systems for GMOs applied by related organizations all over the world, we selected some agri-GMOs (soybean, maize, potato, capsicum and yeast) as cases to put through our new assessment system, and compared our results with the previous assessments. It turned out that the result of each of the cases was congruent with the original assessment.

  9. Safety and effectiveness of repeat arterial closure using the AngioSeal device in patients with hepatic malignancy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hieb, Robert A; Neisen, Melissa J; Hohenwalter, Eric J; Molnar, Jim A; Rilling, William S

    2008-12-01

    To retrospectively evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the use of the AngioSeal device for repeat arterial closure in patients with hepatic malignancy. A retrospective analysis of patients with hepatic malignancy who had undergone repeated arterial closure with the AngioSeal device was performed. All charts for patients undergoing transarterial chemoembolization or TheraSphere radioembolization were reviewed for the method of hemostasis and the number of arterial closures. A total of 53 patients (58.5% men, 41.5% women; mean age, 58.7 years) had repeat AngioSeal arterial puncture closure after chemoembolization or TheraSphere treatment. Percutaneous closure of the common femoral artery with the AngioSeal device was performed in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. The patients were examined for complications on follow-up. Effectiveness was defined by the ability to obtain satisfactory hemostasis. Safety was assessed by the absence of groin complications and by vessel patency on follow-up angiograms of the puncture site obtained at subsequent liver-directed therapy sessions. Fifty-three patients in this study group had a total of 203 common femoral artery punctures. There were a total of 161 closures with the AngioSeal device (79.3%): 58 (36%) single closures and 103 (64.0%) repeat closures. Of the 161 attempts at AngioSeal closure, there was one closure failure in the single-puncture group, yielding a success rate of 98.3%; and one closure failure in the repeat-puncture group, yielding a success rate of 99%. In these two patients, hemostasis was achieved with traditional manual compression without the need for any other device, and no complications were noted. The overall success rate of AngioSeal device closure was 98.7%. The repeat use of the AngioSeal closure device is safe and effective in patients with hepatic malignancy undergoing regional oncologic interventional procedures.

  10. Introduction of the Amendment of IAEA Safety Requirements Reflected Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahn, Sang-Kyu; Ahn, Hyung-Joon; Kim, Sun-Hae; Cheong, Jae-Hak [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The following five Safety Requirements publications were amended: Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety (GSR Part 1, 2010), Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (NS-R-3, 2003), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1, 2012), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (SSR-2/2, 2011), and Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4, 2009). Figure 1 shows IAEA Safety Standards Categories Major amendments of five Safety Requirements publications were introduced and analyzed in this study. The five IAEA safety requirements publications which are GSR Part 1 and 4, NS-R-3 and SSR-2/1 and 2, were amended to reflect the lesson learned from the Fukushima accident and other operating experiences. Specially, 36 provisions were modified and the new 29 provision with 1 requirement (No. 67: Emergency response facilities on the site) of the SSR-2/1 were established. Since the Fukushima accident happened, a new word, design extension conditions (DECs) which cover substantially the beyond design basis accidents (BDBA), including severe accident conditions, was created and more elaborated by the world nuclear experts. Design extension conditions could include conditions in events without significant fuel degradation and conditions with core melting. Figure 2 shows the range of the DECs. The amendment of the five IAEA safety requirements publications are focused at the prevention of initiating events, which would lead to the DECs, and mitigation of the consequences of DECs by the enhanced defense in depth principle. The following examples of the IAEA requirements to prevent the initiating events are: margins for withstanding external events; margins for avoiding cliff edge effects; safety assessment for multiple facilities or activities at a single site; safety assessment in cases where resources at a facility are shared; consideration of the potential occurrence of events in combination; establishing levels of hazard

  11. The development of neural stimulators: a review of preclinical safety and efficacy studies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shepherd, Robert K; Villalobos, Joel; Burns, Owen; Nayagam, David

    2018-05-14

    Given the rapid expansion of the field of neural stimulation and the rigorous regulatory approval requirements required before these devices can be applied clinically, it is important that there is clarity around conducting preclinical safety and efficacy studies required for the development of this technology. The present review examines basic design principles associated with the development of a safe neural stimulator and describes the suite of preclinical safety studies that need to be considered when taking a device to clinical trial. Neural stimulators are active implantable devices that provide therapeutic intervention, sensory feedback or improved motor control via electrical stimulation of neural or neuro-muscular tissue in response to trauma or disease. Because of their complexity, regulatory bodies classify these devices in the highest risk category (Class III), and they are therefore required to go through a rigorous regulatory approval process before progressing to market. The successful development of these devices is achieved through close collaboration across disciplines including engineers, scientists and a surgical/clinical team, and the adherence to clear design principles. Preclinical studies form one of several key components in the development pathway from concept to product release of neural stimulators. Importantly, these studies provide iterative feedback in order to optimise the final design of the device. Key components of any preclinical evaluation include: in vitro studies that are focussed on device reliability and include accelerated testing under highly controlled environments; in vivo studies using animal models of the disease or injury in order to assess safety and, given an appropriate animal model, the efficacy of the technology under both passive and electrically active conditions; and human cadaver and ex vivo studies designed to ensure the device's form factor conforms to human anatomy, to optimise the surgical approach and to

  12. Sharps injuries in UK health care: a review of injury rates, viral transmission and potential efficacy of safety devices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Elder, Alexander; Paterson, Caron

    2006-12-01

    To review the literature on sharps injuries and occupational bloodborne virus transmission in health care in the UK and the worldwide evidence for injury prevention of sharps safety devices. Literature review by online database and Internet resource search. Twenty-four relevant publications were identified regarding UK reported sharps injury rates. UK studies showed as much as a 10-fold difference between injuries reported through standard reporting systems (0.78-5.15 per 100 person-years) and rates estimated from retrospective questionnaires of clinical populations (30-284 per 100 person-years). National surveillance data from England, Wales and Northern Ireland gives a rate of 1.43 known hepatitis C virus or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) transmissions to health care workers per annum. When extrapolated, this suggests an approximate rate of 0.009 such viral transmissions per 1000 hospital beds per annum. Risk of infection from sources with no risk factors is extremely small (less than one in one million for HIV transmission based on Scottish data). Thirty-one studies on the efficacy of sharps safety devices showed evidence of a reduction in injuries, with the greatest reductions achieved by blunt suture needles and safety cannulae. Although injuries remain common, confirmed viral transmission in the UK has been relatively rare. The degree of under-reporting of sharps injuries may be as much as 10-fold. Safety-engineered devices are likely to be effective at injury reduction.

  13. Regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material, 2005 edition. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This publication includes amendments to the 1996 Edition (As Amended 2003) arising from the second cycle of the biennial review and revision process, as agreed by the Transport Safety Standards Committee (TRANSSC) at its ninth meeting in March 2004, as endorsed by the Commission on Safety Standards at its meeting in June 2004 and as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in November 2004. Although this publication is identified as a new edition, there are no changes that affect the administrative and approval requirements in Section VIII. The fields covered are General Provisions (radiation protection; emergency response; quality assurance; compliance assurance; non-compliance; special arrangement and training); Activity Limits and Materials Restrictions, Requirement and Controls for Transport , Requirements for Radioactive Materials and for Packagings and Packages, Test Procedures, Approval and Administrative Requirements

  14. Recommended safety procedures for the selection and use of demonstration-type gas discharge devices in schools

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    A 1972 survey of 30 Ottawa secondary schools revealed a total of 347 actual or potential X-ray sources available in these schools. More than half of these sources were gas discharge tubes. Some gas discharge tubes, in particular the cold cathode type, can emit X-rays at significantly high levels. Unless such tubes are used carefully, and with regard for good radiation safety practices, they can result in exposures to students that are in excess of the maximum levels recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. Several cases of the recommended dose being exceeded were found in the classes surveyed. This document has been prepared to assist science teachers and others using demonstration-type gas discharge devices to select and use such devices so as to present negligible risk to themselves and students. Useful information on safety procedures to be followed when performing demonstrations or experiments is included. (J.T.A.)

  15. Radiation safety of sealed sources and equipment containing them

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The guide gives information and requirements concerning the technical construction, installation, use and licensing of devices containing sealed radioactive sources in order to ensure the operational safety. The requirements are in accordance with the international standards ISO 1677, ISO 2919, ISO 7205 and Nordic Recommendations on radiation protection for radionuclide gauges in permanent installation. The guide explains also the practical measures that must be taken into account when a radiation device is repaired, maintained or removed from the use. (8 refs.)

  16. Safety requirements and options for a large size fast neutron reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cogne, F.; Megy, J.; Robert, E.; Benmergui, A.; Villeneuve, J.

    1977-01-01

    Starting from the experience gained in the safety evaluation of the PHENIX reactor, and from results already obtained in the safety studies on fast neutron reactors, the French regulatory bodies have defined since 1973 what could be the requirements and the recommendations in the matter of safety for the first large size ''prototype'' fast neutron power plant of 1200 MWe. Those requirements and recommendations, while not being compulsory due to the evolution of this type of reactors, will be used as a basis for the technical regulation that will be established in France in this field. They define particularly the care to be taken in the following areas which are essential for safety: the protection systems, the primary coolant system, the prevention of accidents at the core level, the measures to be taken with regard to the whole core accident and to the containment, the protection against sodium fires, and the design as a function of external aggressions. In applying these recommendations, the CREYS-MALVILLE plant designers have tried to achieve redundancy in the safety related systems and have justified the safety of the design with regard to the various involved phenomena. In particular, the extensive research made at the levels of the fuel and of the core instrumentation makes it possible to achieve the best defence to avoid the development of core accidents. The overall examination of the measures taken, from the standpoint of prevention and surveyance as well as from the standpoint of means of action led the French regulatory bodies to propose the construction permit of the CREYS MALVILLE plant, provided that additional examinations by the regulatory bodies be made during the construction of the plant on some technological aspects not fully clarified at the authorization time. The conservatism of the corresponding requirements should be demonstrated prior to the commissioning of the power plant. To pursue a programme on reactors of this type, or even more

  17. Probabilistic safety analysis of DC power supply requirements for nuclear power plants. Technical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baranowsky, P.W.; Kolaczkowski, A.M.; Fedele, M.A.

    1981-04-01

    A probabilistic safety assessment was performed as part of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission generic safety task A-30, Adequacy of Safety Related DC Power Supplies. Event and fault tree analysis techniques were used to determine the relative contribution of DC power related accident sequences to the total core damage probability due to shutdown cooling failures. It was found that a potentially large DC power contribution could be substantially reduced by augmenting the minimum design and operational requirements. Recommendations included (1) requiring DC power divisional independence, (2) improved test, maintenance, and surveillance, and (3) requiring core cooling capability be maintained following the loss of one DC power bus and a single failure in another system

  18. Safety-related requirements for photovoltaic modules and arrays

    Science.gov (United States)

    Levins, A.; Smoot, A.; Wagner, R.

    1984-01-01

    Safety requirements for photovoltaic module and panel designs and configurations for residential, intermediate, and large scale applications are investigated. Concepts for safety systems, where each system is a collection of subsystems which together address the total anticipated hazard situation, are described. Descriptions of hardware, and system usefulness and viability are included. A comparison of these systems, as against the provisions of the 1984 National Electrical Code covering photovoltaic systems is made. A discussion of the Underwriters Laboratory UL investigation of the photovoltaic module evaluated to the provisions of the proposed UL standard for plat plate photovoltaic modules and panels is included. Grounding systems, their basis and nature, and the advantages and disadvantages of each are described. The meaning of frame grounding, circuit groundings, and the type of circuit ground are covered.

  19. 75 FR 60129 - Draft Guidance for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-29

    ...., Bldg. 51, rm. 2201, Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002; or the Office of Communication, Outreach, and...'s ability to review critical safety information, improve safety monitoring of human drug and..., will represent the Agency's current thinking on safety reporting requirements for INDs and BA/BE...

  20. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D. T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2014-04-16

    This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

  1. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laycak, D. T.

    2014-01-01

    This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

  2. On the electrical safety of dielectric elastomer actuators in proximity to the human body

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pourazadi, S.; Shagerdmootaab, A.; Chan, H.; Moallem, M.; Menon, C.

    2017-11-01

    Novel devices based on the use of dielectric elastomer actuators (DEA) have been proposed for a large variety of different applications. In many of these applications, DEAs are envisioned to be in direct or close proximity to the human body. Since DEAs usually require high voltage for their actuation, the safety of individuals operating or using these devices should be ensured. In this paper, safety standards based on safe limits for electrical discharge are investigated. Flat and cylindrical DEA configurations, which are generally considered as the building blocks for the design of DEA-based systems, are investigated in detail. Relevant elements and factors that affect the electrical discharge of DEA devices are analyzed and guidelines to design DEA-based devices that are not of harm for humans are provided. The performed analyses are experimentally validated using flat DEA samples. The safety requirements that should be considered when wrapping DEAs around the body (specifically the legs) are also briefly investigated to provide a practical example of interest for the biomedical community.

  3. Request for Naval Reactors Comment on Proposed PROMETHEUS Space Flight Nuclear Reactor High Tier Reactor Safety Requirements and for Naval Reactors Approval to Transmit These Requirements to Jet Propulsion Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D. Kokkinos

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this letter is to request Naval Reactors comments on the nuclear reactor high tier requirements for the PROMETHEUS space flight reactor design, pre-launch operations, launch, ascent, operation, and disposal, and to request Naval Reactors approval to transmit these requirements to Jet Propulsion Laboratory to ensure consistency between the reactor safety requirements and the spacecraft safety requirements. The proposed PROMETHEUS nuclear reactor high tier safety requirements are consistent with the long standing safety culture of the Naval Reactors Program and its commitment to protecting the health and safety of the public and the environment. In addition, the philosophy on which these requirements are based is consistent with the Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group recommendations on space nuclear propulsion safety (Reference 1), DOE Nuclear Safety Criteria and Specifications for Space Nuclear Reactors (Reference 2), the Nuclear Space Power Safety and Facility Guidelines Study of the Applied Physics Laboratory

  4. UK experience of safety requirements for thermal reactor stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matthews, R.R.; Dale, G.C.; Tweedy, J.N.

    1977-01-01

    The paper summarises the development of safety requirements since the first of the Generating Boards' Magnox reactors commenced operation in 1962 and includes A.G.R. safety together with the preparation of S.G.H.W.R. design safety criteria. It outlines the basic principles originally adopted and shows how safety assessment is a continuing process throughout the life of a reactor. Some description is given of the continuous effort over the years to obtain increased safety margins for existing and new reactors, taking into account the construction and operating experience, experimental information, and more sophisticated computer-aided design techniques which have become available. The main safeguards against risks arising from the Generating Boards' reactors are the achievement of high standards of design, construction and operation, in conjunction with comprehensive fault analyses to ensure that adequate protective equipment is provided. The most important analyses refer to faults which can lead to excessive fuel element temperatures arising from an increase in power or a reduction in cooling capacity. They include the possibility of unintended control rod withdrawal at power or at start-up, coolant flow failure, pressure circuit failure, loss of boiler feed water, and failure of electric power. The paper reviews the protective equipment, and the policy for reactor safety assessments which include application of maximum credible accident philosophy and later the limited use of reliability and probability methods. Some of the Generating Boards' reactors are now more than half way through their planned working lives and during this time safety protective equipment has occasionally been brought into operation, often for spurious reasons. The general performance, of safety equipment is reviewed particularly for incidents such as main turbo-alternator trip, circulator failure, fuel element failures and other similar events, and some problems which have given rise to

  5. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  6. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  7. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  8. 42 CFR 84.117 - Gas mask containers; minimum requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Gas mask containers; minimum requirements. 84.117... SAFETY AND HEALTH RESEARCH AND RELATED ACTIVITIES APPROVAL OF RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE DEVICES Gas Masks § 84.117 Gas mask containers; minimum requirements. (a) Gas masks shall be equipped with a substantial...

  9. Safety requirements to the operation of hydropower plants; Sicherheit beim Betrieb von Wasserkraftwerken

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lux, Reinhard [Berufsgenossenschaft Energie Textil Elektro Medienerzeugnisse (BG ETEM), Koeln (Germany)

    2011-07-01

    Employers have to take into account various safety and health requirements relating to the design, construction, operation and maintenance of hydropower plants. Especially the diversity of the hydropower plant components requires the consideration of different safety and health aspects. In 2011 the ''Fachausschuss Elektrotechnik'' (expert committee electro-technics) of the institution for statutory accident insurance and prevention presented a new ''BG-Information'' dealing with ''Safe methods operating hydropower plants''. The following article gives an introduction into the conception and the essential requirements of this new BG-Information. (orig.)

  10. Requirements and international co-operation in nuclear safety for evolutionary light water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnino, A.

    1999-01-01

    The principles of safety are now well known and implemented world-wide, leading to a situation of harmonisation in accordance with the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Future reactors are expected not only to meet current requirements but to go beyond the safety level presently accepted. To this end, technical safety requirements, as defined by the IAEA document Safety Fundamentals, need be duly considered in the design, the risks to workers and population must be decreased, a stable, transparent and objective regulatory process, including an international harmonisation with respect to licensing of new reactors, must be developed, and the issue of public acceptance must be addressed. Well-performing existing installations are seen as a prerequisite for an improved public acceptability; there should be no major accidents, the results from safety performance indicators must be unquestionable, and compliance with internationally harmonised criteria is essential. Economical competitiveness is another factor that influences the acceptability; the costs for constructing the plant, for its operation and maintenance, for the fuel cycle, and for the final decommissioning are of paramount importance. Plant simplification, longer fuel cycles, life extension are appealing options, but safety will have first priority. The IAEA can play an important role in this field, by providing peer reviews by teams of international experts and assistance to Member States on the use of its safety standards. (author)

  11. 42 CFR 84.101 - Man test 5; requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Man test 5; requirements. 84.101 Section 84.101 Public Health PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH RESEARCH AND RELATED ACTIVITIES APPROVAL OF RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE DEVICES Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus § 84.101 Man test 5; requirements....

  12. 42 CFR 84.102 - Man test 6; requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Man test 6; requirements. 84.102 Section 84.102 Public Health PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH RESEARCH AND RELATED ACTIVITIES APPROVAL OF RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE DEVICES Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus § 84.102 Man test 6; requirements....

  13. 78 FR 68714 - Medical Devices; Ophthalmic Devices; Classification of the Scleral Plug

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-15

    ... amendments), as ``preamendments devices.'' FDA classifies these devices after the Agency takes the following.... FDA-2012-N-1238] Medical Devices; Ophthalmic Devices; Classification of the Scleral Plug AGENCY: Food... scleral plugs in order to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness of the device. The...

  14. 30 CFR 77.808 - Disconnecting devices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... Mineral Resources MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH MANDATORY SAFETY STANDARDS, SURFACE COAL MINES AND SURFACE WORK AREAS OF UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Surface High-Voltage Distribution § 77.808 Disconnecting devices. Disconnecting devices shall be installed at the...

  15. Hazard analysis & safety requirements for small drone operations : to what extent do popular drones embed safety?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Plioutsias, Anastasios; Karanikas, Nektarios; Chatzimichailidou, Maria Mikela

    2018-01-01

    Currently, published risk analyses for drones refer mainly to commercial systems, use data from civil aviation, and are based on probabilistic approaches without suggesting an inclusive list of hazards and respective requirements. Within this context, this paper presents: (1) a set of safety

  16. 78 FR 65427 - Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Liquefied Petroleum Gas and Utility Liquefied...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-10-31

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No. PHMSA-2013-0097] Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Liquefied Petroleum Gas and Utility Liquefied Petroleum Gas Pipeline Systems AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration...

  17. Nuclear reactor safety protection device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okido, Fumiyasu; Noguchi, Atomi; Matsumiya, Shoichi; Furusato, Ken-ichiro; Arita, Setsuo.

    1994-01-01

    The device of the present invention extremely reduces a probability of causing unnecessary scram of a nuclear reactor. That is, four control devices receive signals from each of four sensors and output four trip signals respectively in a quardruplicated control device. Each of the trip signals and each of trip signals via a delay circuit are inputted to a logical sum element. The output of the logical sum circuit is inputted to a decision of majority circuit. The decision of majority circuit controls a scram pilot valve which conducts scram of the reactor by way of a solenoid coils. With such procedures, even if surge noises of a short pulse width are mixed to the sensor signals and short trip signals are outputted, there is no worry that the scram pilot valve is actuated. Accordingly, factors of lowering nuclear plant operation efficiency due to erroneous reactor scram can be reduced. (I.S.)

  18. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larson, H L

    2007-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

  19. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Larson, H L

    2007-09-07

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

  20. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-07-15

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

  1. Estimating Safety Effects of Green-Man Countdown Devices at Signalized Pedestrian Crosswalk Based on Cellular Automata

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chen Chai

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Safety effects of Green-Man Countdown Device (GMCD at signalized pedestrian crosswalks are evaluated. Pedestrian behavior at GMCD and non-GMCD crosswalks is observed and analyzed. A microsimulation model is developed based on field observations to estimate safety performance. Simulation outputs allow analysts to assess the impacts of GMCD at various conditions with different geometric layout, traffic and pedestrian volumes, and the green time. According to simulation results, it is found that the safety impact of GMCD is affected by traffic condition as well as different time duration within green-man signal phase. In general, GMCD increases average walking velocity, especially during the last few seconds. The installation of GMCD improves safety performance generally, especially at more crowded crossings. Conflict severity is increased during last 10 s after GMCD installation. Findings from this study suggest that the current practice, which is to install GMCD at more crowded crosswalks or near the school zone, is effective. Moreover, at crosswalks with GMCD, longer all red signal phase is suggested to improve pedestrian safety during intergreen period.

  2. Education and training requirements in the revised European Basic Safety Standards Directive

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mundigl, S.

    2009-01-01

    The European Commission is currently developing a modified European Basic Safety Standards Directive covering two major objectives: the consolidation of existing European Radiation Protection legislation, and the revision of the European Basic Safety Standards. The consolidation will merge the following five Directives into one single Directive: the Basic Safety Standards Directive, the Medical Exposures Directive, the Public Information Directive, the Outside Workers Directive, and the Directive on the Control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources. The revision of the European Basic Safety Standards will take account of the latest recommendations by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and shall improve clarity of the requirements where appropriate. It is planned to introduce more binding requirements on natural radiation sources, on criteria for clearance, and on the cooperation between Member States for emergency planning and response, as well as a graded approach for regulatory control. One additional goal is to achieve greater harmonisation between the European BSS and the international BSS. Following a recommendation from the Article 31 Group of Experts, the current draft of the modified BSS will highlight the importance of education and training by dedicating a specific title to radiation protection education, training and information. This title will include a general requirement on the Member States to ensure the establishment of an adequate legislative and administrative framework for providing appropriate radiation protection education, training and information. In addition, there will be specific requirements on training in the medical field, on information and training of workers in general, of workers potentially exposed to orphan sources, and to emergency workers. The revised BSS directive will include requirements on the competence of a radiation protection expert (RPE) and of a radiation protection

  3. Hydrodynamics of Safety Injection Tank with Fluidic Device in Recent Regulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bang, Young Seok; Yoo, Seung Hun

    2016-01-01

    Safety Injection Tank (SIT) with Fluidic Device (FD) has been used in several APR1400 nuclear power plants. It was designed to provide a longer passive safety injection than the existing accumulator to improve the safety for Large Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LBLOCA) by changing the injected flow through the FD and the standpipe of the SIT. As a result, high flow injection phase and the subsequent low flow one can be achieved as longer than the existing accumulator. The present paper discusses the major concerns related to SIT hydrodynamics and the directions to resolution recently concerned. Modeling of SIT/FD by total hydraulic resistances, potential of nitrogen intrusion, and effect of initial pressure of SIT testing are included. Based on the discussion, a table of the important phenomena of the SIT/FD was proposed with the relevancy of the calculation models applied. The present paper discussed the SIT hydrodynamics including the modeling of SIT/FD by total hydraulic resistances, potential of nitrogen intrusion, and effect of initial pressure of SIT testing. Also a table of the important phenomena of the SIT/FD was proposed with the relevancy of the calculation models applied. The following conclusions are obtained uncertainty due to the assumption of the total Kfactor as constant for high flow, transition phase, and low flow phase should be considered and nitrogen intrusion phenomena during the transition phase should be considered with a conservatism, especially considering the current situation of nonmeasuring the standpipe level

  4. Hydrodynamics of Safety Injection Tank with Fluidic Device in Recent Regulation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bang, Young Seok; Yoo, Seung Hun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Safety Injection Tank (SIT) with Fluidic Device (FD) has been used in several APR1400 nuclear power plants. It was designed to provide a longer passive safety injection than the existing accumulator to improve the safety for Large Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LBLOCA) by changing the injected flow through the FD and the standpipe of the SIT. As a result, high flow injection phase and the subsequent low flow one can be achieved as longer than the existing accumulator. The present paper discusses the major concerns related to SIT hydrodynamics and the directions to resolution recently concerned. Modeling of SIT/FD by total hydraulic resistances, potential of nitrogen intrusion, and effect of initial pressure of SIT testing are included. Based on the discussion, a table of the important phenomena of the SIT/FD was proposed with the relevancy of the calculation models applied. The present paper discussed the SIT hydrodynamics including the modeling of SIT/FD by total hydraulic resistances, potential of nitrogen intrusion, and effect of initial pressure of SIT testing. Also a table of the important phenomena of the SIT/FD was proposed with the relevancy of the calculation models applied. The following conclusions are obtained uncertainty due to the assumption of the total Kfactor as constant for high flow, transition phase, and low flow phase should be considered and nitrogen intrusion phenomena during the transition phase should be considered with a conservatism, especially considering the current situation of nonmeasuring the standpipe level.

  5. A Safety and Health Guide for Vocational Educators. Incorporating Requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Relevant Pennsylvania Requirements with Particular Emphasis for Those Concerned with Cooperative Education and Work Study Programs. Volume 15. Number 1.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wahl, Ray

    Intended as a guide for vocational educators to incorporate the requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970) and the requirements of various Pennsylvania safety and health regulations with their cooperative vocational programs, the first chapter of this document presents the legal implications of these safety and health…

  6. A PLC generic requirements and specification for safety-related applications in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Jea Bok; Lee, C. K.; Lee, D. Y.

    2001-12-01

    This report presents the requirements and specification to be applied to the generic qualification of programmable Logic Controller(PLC), which is being developed as part of the KNICS project, 'Development of the Digital Reactor Safety Systems' of which purpose is the application to safety-related instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants. This report defines the essential and critical characteristics that shall be included as part of a PLC design for safety-related application. The characteristics include performance, reliability, accuracy, the overall response time from an input to the PLC exceeding it trip condition to the resulting outputs, and the specification of processors and memories in digital controller. It also specifies the quality assurance process for software development, dealing with executive software, firmware, application software tools for developing the application software, and human machine interface(HMI). In addition, this report reviews the published standards and guidelines that are required for the PLC development and the quality assurance processes such as environment requirements, seismic withstand requirements, EMI/RFI withstand requirements, and isolation test

  7. Interface requirements in nuclear medicine devices and systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maguire, G.Q. Jr.; Brill, A.B.; Noz, M.E.

    1982-01-01

    Interface designs for three nuclear medicine imaging systems, and computer networking strategies proposed for medical imaging departments are presented. Configurations for two positron-emission-tomography devices (PET III and ECAT) and a general-purpose tomography instrument (the UNICON) are analyzed in terms of specific performance parameters. Interface designs for these machines are contrasted in terms of utilization of standard versus custom modules, cost, and ease of modification, upgrade, and support. The requirements of general purpose systems for medical image analysis, display, and archiving, are considered, and a realizable state-of-the-art system is specfied, including a suggested timetable

  8. 45 CFR 1356.30 - Safety requirements for foster care and adoptive home providers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... licensing file for that foster or adoptive family must contain documentation which verifies that safety... 45 Public Welfare 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Safety requirements for foster care and adoptive... ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, FOSTER CARE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS, ADOPTION ASSISTANCE, AND CHILD AND...

  9. Structure requirements for magnetic energy storage devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eyssa, Y.M.; Huang, X.

    1993-01-01

    Large variety of large and small magnetic energy storage systems have been designed and analyzed in the last 20 years. Cryoresistive and superconductive energy storage (SMES) magnets have been considered for applications such as load leveling for electric utilities, pulsed storage for electromagnetic launchers and accelerator devices, and space borne superconductive energy storage systems. Large SMES are supported by a combination of cold and warm structure while small SMES are supported only by cold structure. In this article we provide analytical and numerical tools to estimate the structure requirements as function of the stored energy and configuration. Large and small solenoidal and toroidal geometries are used. Considerations for both warm and cold structure are discussed. Latest design concepts for both large and small units are included. (orig.)

  10. 21 CFR 801.128 - Exceptions or alternatives to labeling requirements for medical devices held by the Strategic...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... requirements for medical devices held by the Strategic National Stockpile. 801.128 Section 801.128 Food and... requirements for medical devices held by the Strategic National Stockpile. (a) The appropriate FDA Center... Strategic National Stockpile. (b)(1)(i) A Strategic National Stockpile official or any entity that...

  11. A systematic review of light-based home-use devices for hair removal and considerations on human safety

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Thaysen-Petersen, D; Bjerring, P; Dierickx, C

    2012-01-01

    To systematically review and evaluate the efficacy and human safety of currently available home-based optical hair removal devices. Methods A comprehensive Pub Med literature search was conducted which systematically identified publications of relevance. Prospective clinical trials were included whether controlled......, uncontrolled or randomized and with a sample size of at least 10 individuals. Results We identified a total of seven studies: one controlled (CT) and six uncontrolled trials (UCTs). No randomized controlled trials (RCT) were recognized. The best evidence was found for IPL (intense pulsed light) (three devices...

  12. Conceptual design of the Topaz II anticriticality device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Trujillo, D.; Bultman, D.; Potter, R.C.; Sanchez, L.; Skobelev, V.E.

    1993-01-01

    The Topaz II Flight Safety team requires that the hardware for the Rusian-built reactor be modified to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical in the event of an inadvertent accident in which the reactor is submersed in wet sand or water. In April 1993, the American Flight safety team chose the fuel-out anticriticality device as the baseline for the hardware design. We describe the initial stages of the hardware design; show how the mechanism works; and describe its function, the functional and operational requirements, and the difficult design problems encountered. Also described, are the initial interactions between the Russian and American design teams. Because the effort is to add an American modification to a Russian flight reactor, this project has required unusual technical cooperation and consultation with the Russian design team

  13. 10 CFR 73.58 - Safety/security interface requirements for nuclear power reactors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... requirements for nuclear power reactors. (a) Each operating nuclear power reactor licensee with a license... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety/security interface requirements for nuclear power reactors. 73.58 Section 73.58 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF...

  14. Regulatory requirements for demonstration of the achieved safety level at the Mochovce NPP before commissioning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lipar, M.

    1997-01-01

    A review of regulatory requirements for demonstration of the achieved safety level at the Mochovce NPP before commissioning is given. It contains licensing steps in Slovakia during commissioning; Status and methodology of Mochovce safety analysis report; Mochovce NPP safety enhancement program; Regulatory body policy towards Mochovce NPP safety enhancement; Recent development in Mochovce pre-operational safety enhancement program review and assessment process; Licensing steps in Slovakia during commissioning

  15. Extraglottic airway devices: technology update

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sharma B

    2017-08-01

    Full Text Available Bimla Sharma, Chand Sahai, Jayashree Sood Department of Anaesthesiology, Pain and Perioperative Medicine, Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, New Delhi, India Abstract: Extraglottic airway devices (EADs have revolutionized the field of airway management. The invention of the laryngeal mask airway was a game changer, and since then, there have been several innovations to improve the EADs in design, functionality, safety and construction material. These have ranged from changes in the shape of the mask, number of cuffs and material used, like rubber, polyvinylchloride and latex. Phthalates, which were added to the construction material in order to increase device flexibility, were later omitted when this chemical was found to have serious adverse reproductive outcomes. The various designs brought out by numerous companies manufacturing EADs resulted in the addition of several devices to the airway market. These airway devices were put to use, many of them with inadequate or no evidence base regarding their efficacy and safety. To reduce the possibility of compromising the safety of the patient, the Difficult Airway Society (DAS formed the Airway Device Evaluation Project Team (ADEPT to strengthen the evidence base for airway equipment and vet the new extraglottic devices. A preuse careful analysis of the design and structure may help in better understanding of the functionality of a particular device. In the meantime, the search for the ideal EAD continues. Keywords: extraglottic airway devices, laryngeal mask airway, other extraglottic airway devices, safety, technology update

  16. Safety requirements in the design of research reactors: A Canadian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, A.G.; Langman, V.J.

    2000-01-01

    In Canada, the formal development of safety requirements for the design of research reactors in general began under an inter-organizational Small Reactor Criteria Committee. This committee developed safety and licensing criteria for use by several small reactor projects in their licensing discussions with the Atomic Energy Control Board. The small reactor projects or facilities represented included the MAPLE-X10 reactor, the proposed SES-10 heating reactor and its prototype, the SDR reactor at the Whiteshell Laboratories, the Korea Multipurpose Research Reactor (a.k.a., HANARO) in Korea, the SCORE project, and the McMaster University Nuclear Reactor. The top level set of criteria which form a safety philosophy and serve as a framework for more detailed developments was presented at an IAEA Conference in 1989. AECL continued this work to develop safety principles and design criteria for new small reactors. The first major application of this work has been to the design, safety analysis and licensing of the MAPLE 1 and 2 reactors for the MDS Nordion Medical Isotope Reactor Project. This paper provides an overview of the safety principles and design criteria. Examples of an implementation of these safety principles and design criteria are drawn from the work to design the MAPLE 1 and 2 reactors. (author)

  17. Toward a treaty on safety and cost-effectiveness of pharmaceuticals and medical devices: enhancing an endangered global public good

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Faunce Thomas

    2006-03-01

    Full Text Available Abstract • Expert evaluations of the safety, efficacy and cost-effectiveness of pharmaceutical and medical devices, prior to marketing approval or reimbursement listing, collectively represent a globally important public good. The scientific processes involved play a major role in protecting the public from product risks such as unintended or adverse events, sub-standard production and unnecessary burdens on individual and governmental healthcare budgets. • Most States now have an increasing policy interest in this area, though institutional arrangements, particularly in the area of cost-effectiveness analysis of medical devices, are not uniformly advanced and are fragile in the face of opposing multinational industry pressure to recoup investment and maintain profit margins. • This paper examines the possibility, in this context, of States commencing negotiations toward bilateral trade agreement provisions, and ultimately perhaps a multilateral Treaty, on safety, efficacy and cost-effectiveness analysis of pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Such obligations may robustly facilitate a conceptually interlinked, but endangered, global public good, without compromising the capacity of intellectual property laws to facilitate local product innovations.

  18. MDEP Common Position CP-DICWG-07. Common position on selection and use of industrial digital devices of limited functionality

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The nuclear power industry is increasingly interested in using industrial digital devices of limited functionality in systems important to safety, but that have not been developed specifically for use in nuclear power applications. These devices should meet certain specific requirements in order to be selected and used in systems important to safety at nuclear power plants. Typically, some of these devices are found embedded in plant components and actuating devices, e.g. sensing instrumentation, motors, pumps, actuators, breakers. The Digital Instrumentation and Controls Working Group (DICWG) has agreed that a common position on this topic is warranted given the increase of use of Digital I and C in new reactor designs, its safety implications, and the need to develop a common understanding from the perspectives of regulatory authorities. This action follows the DICWG examination of the regulatory requirements of the participating members and of relevant industry standards and IAEA documents. The DICWG proposes a common position based on its recent experience with the new reactor application reviews and operating plant issues

  19. SRV-automatic handling device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamada, Koji

    1987-01-01

    Automatic handling device for the steam relief valves (SRV's) is developed in order to achieve a decrease in exposure of workers, increase in availability factor, improvement in reliability, improvement in safety of operation, and labor saving. A survey is made during a periodical inspection to examine the actual SVR handling operation. An SRV automatic handling device consists of four components: conveyor, armed conveyor, lifting machine, and control/monitoring system. The conveyor is so designed that the existing I-rail installed in the containment vessel can be used without any modification. This is employed for conveying an SRV along the rail. The armed conveyor, designed for a box rail, is used for an SRV installed away from the rail. By using the lifting machine, an SRV installed away from the I-rail is brought to a spot just below the rail so that the SRV can be transferred by the conveyor. The control/monitoring system consists of a control computer, operation panel, TV monitor and annunciator. The SRV handling device is operated by remote control from a control room. A trial equipment is constructed and performance/function testing is carried out using actual SRV's. As a result, is it shown that the SRV handling device requires only two operators to serve satisfactorily. The required time for removal and replacement of one SRV is about 10 minutes. (Nogami, K.)

  20. Economics of the specification 6M safety re-evaluation and regulatory requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hopper, C.M.

    1985-01-01

    The objective of this work was to examine the potential economic impact of the DOT Specification 6M criticality safety re-evaluation and regulatory requirements. The examination was based upon comparative analyses of current authorized fissile material load limits for the 6M, current Federal regulations (and interpretations) limiting the contents of Type B fissile material packages, limiting aggregates of fissile material packages, and recent proposed fissile material mass limits derived from specialized criticality safety analyses of the 6M package. The work examines influences on cost in transportation, handling, and storage of fissile materials. Depending upon facility throughput requirements (and assumed incremental costs of fissile material packaging, storage, and transport), operating, facility storage capacity, and transportation costs can be reduced significantly. As an example of the pricing algorithm application based upon reasonable cost influences, the magnitude of the first year cost reductions could extend beyond four times the cost of the packaging nuclear criticality safety re-evaluation. 1 tab

  1. [Optimal intravascular brachytherapy: safety and radiation protection, reliability and precision guaranteed by guidelines, recommendations and regulatory requirements].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Quast, Ulrich; Kaulich, Theodor W; Lorenz, Joachim

    2002-02-01

    The success of intravascular brachytherapy relies entirely on the interdisciplinary approach. Interventional cardiologists, radiation oncologists and medical physicists must form a team from day 1. All members of the team need special knowledge and regular training in the field of vascular radiation therapy. Optimization of intravascular brachytherapy requires the use of standardized methods of dose specification, recording and reporting. This also implies using standardized methods of source calibration in terms of absorbed dose to water and having methods for simple internal control of the dosimetric quantities of new or replaced sources. Guidance is offered by international recommendations (AAPM TG 60, DGMP Report 16, NCS and EVA GEC-ESTRO). LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION--WHAT'S NEW?: In Europe, new legal requirements on radiation protection issues have to be fulfilled. For Germany, the revised "Strahlenschutzverordnung" has been released recently. Nearly all organizational and medical processes are affected. For intravascular brachytherapy, several changes of requirements have to be considered. However, to follow these requirements does not cause serious problems. DGMP REPORT 16: GUIDELINES FOR MEDICAL PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF INTRAVASCULAR BRACHYTHERAPY: Evaluation of clinical results by comparison of intravascular brachytherapy treatment parameters is possible only if the prescribed dose and the applied dose distribution are reported clearly, completely and uniformly. The DGMP guidelines thus recommend to prescribe the dose to water at the system related reference point PRef at 2 mm radial distance for intracoronary application (and at 5 mm for peripheral vessels). The mean dose at 1 mm tissue depth (respectively at 2 mm) should be reported in addition. To safely define the planning target volume from the injured length, safety margins of at least 5 mm (10 mm) have to be taken into account on both ends. Safety margins have also to be considered for

  2. Criticality Safety Evaluation for the TACS at DAF

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Percher, C. M. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Heinrichs, D. P. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2011-06-10

    Hands-on experimental training in the physical behavior of multiplying systems is one of ten key areas of training required for practitioners to become qualified in the discipline of criticality safety as identified in DOE-STD-1135-99, Guidance for Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer Training and Qualification. This document is a criticality safety evaluation of the training activities and operations associated with HS-3201-P, Nuclear Criticality 4-Day Training Course (Practical). This course was designed to also address the training needs of nuclear criticality safety professionals under the auspices of the NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program1. The hands-on, or laboratory, portion of the course will utilize the Training Assembly for Criticality Safety (TACS) and will be conducted in the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS). The training activities will be conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory following the requirements of an Integrated Work Sheet (IWS) and associated Safety Plan. Students will be allowed to handle the fissile material under the supervision of an LLNL Certified Fissile Material Handler.

  3. Responsibility for the Violation of Ecological Safety Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Selivanovskaya, J. I.; Gilmutdinova, I.

    2018-01-01

    The article deals with the problems of responsibility for the violation of ecological safety requirements from the point of view of sustainable development of the state. Such types of responsibility as property, disciplinary, financial, administrative and criminal responsibility in the area are analysed. Suggestions on the improvement of legislation are put forward. Among other things it is suggested to introduce criminal sanctions against legal bodies (enterprises) for ecological crimes with punishments in the form of fines, suspension or discontinuation of activities.

  4. An experimental study of the flow characteristics of fluidic device in a passive safety injection tank

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cho, Seok; Song, Chul Hwa; Won, Suon Yeon; Min, Kyong Ho; Chung, Moon Ki

    1998-01-01

    It is considered to adopt passive safety injection tank (SIT) as a enhanced safety feature in KNGR. Passive SIT employs a vortex chamber as a fluidic device, which control injection flow rate passively by the variation of flow resistance produced by vortex intensity within the vortex chamber. To investigate the flow characteristics of the vortex chamber many tests have been carried out by using small-scale test facility. In this report the effects of geometric parameters of vortex chamber on discharge flow characteristics and the velocity measurement result of flow field, measured by PIV, are presented and discussed. (author). 25 refs., 11 tabs., 31 figs

  5. Lessons learned - development of the tritium facilities 5480.23 safety analysis report and technical safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.; Bowman, M.E.; Goff, L.

    1997-01-01

    A review was performed which identified open-quotes Lessons Learnedclose quotes from the development of the 5480.23 Tritium Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Tritium Facilities (TF). The open-quotes Lessons Learnedclose quotes were based on an evaluation of the use of the SRS procedures, processes, and work practices which contributed to the success or lack thereof. This review also identified recommendations and suggestions for improving the development of SARs and TSRs at SRS. The 5480.23 SAR describes the site for the TF, the various process systems in the process buildings, a complete hazards and accident analysis of the most significant hazards affecting the nearby offsite population, and the selection of safety systems, structures, and components to protect both the public and site workers. It also provides descriptions of important programs and processes which add defense in depth to public and worker protection

  6. Safety requirements of the BMU to be met in final storage of heat-producing waste: An evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomauske, Bruno

    2009-01-01

    On August 12, 2008, The German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU) published a draft of July 29, 2008 of the ''Safety Requirements to Be Met in Final Storage of Heat-producing Radioactive Waste.'' As announced by the BMU, these safety requirements are to bring up to the state of the art the safety criteria of 1983. Over a couple of years, efforts had been made to adapt the criteria to the internationally accepted standard as demanded by the Advisory Committees on Reactor Safeguards (RSK) and Radiation Protection (SSK). There is no waste management concept underlying the safety requirements. As a consequence, the draft should be withdrawn by the Federal Ministry for the Environment and replaced by a version revised from scratch and offering assured quality. (orig./GL)

  7. Safety requirements for a nuclear power plant electric power system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fouad, L F; Shinaishin, M A

    1988-06-15

    This work aims at identifying the safety requirements for the electric power system in a typical nuclear power plant, in view of the UNSRC and the IAEA. Description of a typical system is provided, followed by a presentation of the scope of the information required for safety evaluation of the system design and performance. The acceptance and design criteria that must be met as being specified by both regulatory systems, are compared. Means of implementation of such criteria as being described in the USNRC regulatory guides and branch technical positions on one hand and in the IAEA safety guides on the other hand are investigated. It is concluded that the IAEA regulations address the problems that may be faced with in countries having varying grid sizes ranging from large stable to small potentially unstable ones; and that they put emphasis on the onsite standby power supply. Also, in this respect the Americans identify the grid as the preferred power supply to the plant auxiliaries, while the IAEA leaves the possibility that the preferred power supply could be either the grid or the unit main generator depending on the reliability of each. Therefore, it is found that it is particularly necessary in this area of electric power supplies to deal with the IAEA and the American sets of regulations as if each complements and not supplements the other. (author)

  8. Seismic analysis, support design and stress calculation of HTR-PM transport and conversion devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Zheyu; Yuan Chaolong; Zhang Haiquan; Nie Junfeng

    2012-01-01

    Background: The transport and conversion devices are important guarantees for normal operation of HTR-PM fuel handling system in normal and fault conditions. Purpose: A conflict of devices' support design needs to be solved. The flexibility of supports is required because of pipe thermal expansion displacement, while the stiffness is also required because of large devices quality and eccentric distance. Methods: In this paper, the numerical simulation was employed to analyze the seismic characteristics and optimize the support program, Under the chosen support program, the stress calculation of platen support bracket was designed by solidworks software. Results: The supports solved the conflict between the flexibility and stiffness requirements. Conclusions: Therefore, it can ensure the safety of transport and conversion devices and the supports in seismic conditions. (authors)

  9. Safety and efficacy of a low-cost glaucoma drainage device for refractory childhood glaucoma.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kaushik, Sushmita; Kataria, Pankaj; Raj, Srishti; Pandav, Surinder Singh; Ram, Jagat

    2017-12-01

    To evaluate the safety and efficacy of a low-cost glaucoma drainage device (GDD), Aurolab aqueous drainage implant (AADI), similar in design to the Baerveldt glaucoma implant (BGI), in refractory childhood glaucoma. This prospective interventional study was conducted in a tertiary care postgraduate teaching institute. Children aged glaucoma valve implant in children. © Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2017. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.

  10. User requirements in the area of safety of innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycle installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuczera, B.; Juhn, P.E.; Fukuda, K.; )

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Against the background of already existing IAEA and INSAC publications in the area of safety, in the framework of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) a set of user requirements for the safety of future nuclear installations has been established. Five top-level requirements are expected to apply to any type of innovative design. They should foster an increased level of safety that is transparent to and fully accepted by the general public. The approach to future reactor safety includes two complementary strategies: increased emphasis on inherent safety characteristics and enhancement of defense in depth. As compared to existing plants, the effectiveness of preventing measures should be highly enhanced, resulting in fewer mitigation measures. The targets and possible approaches of each of the five levels of defense developed for innovative reactor designs are outlined in the paper

  11. Development of fluidic device in SIT for Korean Next Generation Reactor I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cho, Bong Hyun; Lee, Joon; Bae, Yoon Young; Park, Jong Kyun

    1999-07-01

    The KNGR is to install a Fluidic Device at the bottom of the inner space of the SIT (Safety Injection Tank) to control the flow rate of safety injection coolant from SIT during LBLOCA. During the past two years, a scale model test to obtain the required flow characteristics of the device under the KNGR specific conditions has been performed using the experience and existing facility of AEA Technology (UK) with appropriate modifications. The performance verification test is to be performed this year to obtain optimum characteristics and design data of full size fluidic device. The purpose of the model test was to check the feasibility of developing the device and to produce a generic flow characteristic data. The test was performed in approximately 1/7 scale in terms of flow rate with full height and pressure. This report presents the details of system performance requirements for the device, design procedure for the fluidic device to be used, test facility and test method. The time dependent flow, pressure and Euler number are presented as characteristics curves and the most stable and the most effective flow control characteristic parameters were recommended through the evaluation. A method to predict the size of the fluidic device is presented. And a sizing algorithm, which can be used to conveniently determine the major geometric data of the device for various operating conditions, and a FORTRAN program to produce the prediction of performance curves have been developed. (author). 32 refs., 15 tabs., 47 figs

  12. Development of a safety case for the use of current limiting devices to manage short circuit currents on electrical distribution networks. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2004-07-01

    The original objective of this study was to review the safety issues associated with the use of current limiting devices and to write a risk assessment in accordance with good practice. But, when legislative procedures became apparent, the scope was changed to include involvement with the HSE, the DTI and Ofgem. It turned out that it would have been very difficult to write a safety case that would satisfy all of the agencies, or a risk assessment that would cover all applications. The scope of the study was therefore changed to focus on how the existing barriers should be tackled and the implications of the existing legislation. The approach to the study is described; it included reviews of background information and literature, questionnaires to manufacturers, a review of the reliability and hazards of the devices, and a review of UK safety legislation. The Final Report describes all this and includes discussion on the consequences of failure of fault current limiting devices, control measures which could be used to minimise risk, and recommendations for a way forward.

  13. An approach to next step device optimisation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salpietro, E.

    2000-01-01

    The requirements for ITER EDA were to achieve ignition with a good safety margin, and controlled long inductive burn. These requirements lead to a big device, which requested a too ambitious step to be undertaken by the world fusion community. More realistic objectives for a next step device shall be to demonstrate the net production of energy with a high energy gain factor (Q) and a high boot strap current fraction (>60%) which is required for a Fusion Power Plant (FPP). The Next Step Device (NSD) shall also allow operation flexibility in order to explore a large range of plasma parameters to find out the optimum concept for the fusion power plant prototype. These requirements could be too demanding for one single device and could probably be better explored in a strongly integrated world programme. The cost of one or more devices is the decisive factor for the choice of the fusion power development programme strategy. The plasma elongation and triangularity have a strong impact in the cost of the device and are limited by the plasma vertical position control issue. The distance between plasma separatrix and the toroidal field conductor does not vary a lot between devices. It is determined by the sum of the distance between first wall-plasma sepratrix and the thickness of the nuclear shield required to protect the toroidal field coil insultation. The thickness of the TF coil is determined by the allowable stresses and superconducting characteristics. The outer radius of the central solenoid is the result of an optimisation to provide the magnetic flux to inductively drive the plasma. Therefore, in order to achieve the objectives for Q and boot-strap current fractions at the minimum cost, the plasma aspect ratio and magnetic field value shall be determined. The paper will present the critical issues for the next device and will make considerations on the optimal way to proceed towards the realisation of the fusion power plant

  14. 78 FR 42889 - Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Utility LP-Gas and LPG Pipeline Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-18

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part 192 [Docket No. PHMSA-2013-0097] Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Utility LP-Gas and LPG Pipeline Systems AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION...

  15. 40 CFR 63.2251 - What are the requirements for the routine control device maintenance exemption?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 12 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true What are the requirements for the routine control device maintenance exemption? 63.2251 Section 63.2251 Protection of Environment... and Composite Wood Products General Compliance Requirements § 63.2251 What are the requirements for...

  16. Reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Butz, H.P.; Heuser, F.W.; May, H.

    1985-01-01

    The paper comprises an introduction into nuclear physics bases, the safety concept generally speaking, safety devices of pwr type reactors, accident analysis, external influences, probabilistic safety assessment and risk studies. It further describes operational experience, licensing procedures under the Atomic Energy Law, research in reactor safety and the nuclear fuel cycle. (DG) [de

  17. Safety review and approval process for the TFTR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Levine, J.D.; Howe, H.J.; Howe, K.E.

    1983-01-01

    The design, construction, and operation of the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR) has undergone an extensive safety and enviromental analysis involving Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Ebasco/Grumman Industrial Subcontractor Team, and other organizations. This analysis, which is continuing during the TFTR operational phase, has been facilitated by the preparation, review and approval of several documents, including an Environmental Statement (Draft and Final), a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR), a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Operations Safety Requirements (OSRs) and Safety Requirements (SRs), and various Operating and Maintenance Manuals. Through TFTR Safety Group participation in formal system design evaluations, change control boards, and reviews of project procurement and installation documentation, the TFTR Management Configuration Control System assures that all aspects of the project, including proposed design, installation and operational changes, receive prompt and thorough safety analyses. These efforts will continue as the TFTR Program moves into the neutral beam and D-T operational phases. The safety review and approval experience that has been acquired on the TFTR Project should serve as a foundation for similar efforts on future fusion devices

  18. Power source device for thermonuclear device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ozaki, Akira.

    1992-01-01

    The present invention provides a small sized and economical power source device for a thermonuclear device. That is, the device comprises a conversion device having a rated power determined by a power required during a plasma current excitation period and a conversion device having a rated power determined by a power required during a plasma current maintaining period, connected in series to each other. Then, for the former conversion device, power is supplied from an electric power generator and, for the latter, power is supplied from a power system. With such a constitution, during the plasma electric current maintaining period for substantially continuous operation, it is possible to conduct bypassing paired operation for the former conversion device while the electric power generator is put under no load. Further, since a short period rated power may be suffice for the former conversion device and the electric power generator having the great rated power required for the plasma electric current excitation period, they can be reduced in the size and made economical. On the other hand, since the power required for the plasma current maintaining period is relatively small, the capacity of the continuous rated conversion device may be small, and the power can be received from the power system. (I.S.)

  19. Safety research needs for Russian-designed reactors. Requirements situation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, R. Allan; Holmstrom, Heikki; Reocreux, Michel; Schulz, Helmut; Liesch, Klaus; Santarossa, Giampiero; Hayamizu, Yoshitaka; Asmolov, Vladimir; Bolshov, Leonid; Strizhov, Valerii; Bougaenko, Sergei; Nikitin, Yuri N.; Proklov, Vladimir; Potapov, Alexandre; Kinnersly, Stephen R.; Voronin, Leonid M.; Honekamp, John R.; Frescura, Gianni M.; Maki, Nobuo; Reig, Javier; ); Bekjord, Eric S.; Rosinger, Herbert E.

    1998-01-01

    integrity must be verified, and material property data bases extended. - VVER severe accident research should focus on validation of codes for accident management procedures, and on extension and qualification of an appropriate data base for materials properties and their interactions. - RBMK thermal-hydraulic research is needed to improve the technical basis for further development of RBMK safety criteria. - Assessment of the integrity of the RBMK primary coolant circuit, and especially the fuel channel, requires urgent research. Methods of assessing RBMK pressure boundary integrity must be verified, and material property data bases extended. - RBMK severe accident research should focus on prevention of accidents and Accident Management for cases of loss of heat sink and Beyond Design-Basis Loss-of-Coolant Accidents. For these purposes, simple physical models and parametric codes need development and should be systematically used in plant specific analysis. Recommendations; - A Safety Research Strategic Plan should be developed. Such a plan sets goals, defines products, and describes when and how work will be done, including determination of research priorities. - Key players, including regulators, operators, plant designers and researchers should be involved in developing and implementing this plan and its execution and applying the results. - International cooperation in safety research should be encouraged for purposes of improving quality, preventing technical isolation and cost sharing. - New approaches, such as technical fora for specific technical topics, should be established to make safety research information in OECD countries available to researchers working on the safety of Russian-designed reactors

  20. Monitoring readiness of safety relevant devices in nuclear power plants by means of CRT-colour displays

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haubert, R.; Stokke, R.

    1980-01-01

    The development of an information system for monitoring readiness of safety relevant devices is encouraged by the requirements of KTA-rule 3501 (DIN 25434), which states in section 4.9.1.1. 'A display shall be provided for giving a survey of the condition of the components of the reactor protection system and the active engineered safeguards including their energy and auxiliary media supplies'. In the first stage of the development which was reported at the Enlarged Halden Programme Group Meeting in Loen, Norway, 5th-9th June, 1978, only the components of parts of a BWR-protection system were considered and no display was provided. This paper outlines the next step in the development which comprises implementation of the active engineered safeguards into the system and development of a display system based on a colour CRT-screen. A prototype of this computer-based system for monitoring of protection systems has been established, and it is planned to demonstrate this prototype system using the computer equipment at GRS, Garching (orig./HP)

  1. Type testing of devices with inserted radioactive sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rolle, A.; Droste, B.; Dombrowski, H.

    2006-01-01

    In Germany devices with inserted radioactive sources can get a type approval if they comply with specific requirements. Whoever operates a device whose type has been approved in accordance with the German Radiation Protection Ordinance does not need an individual authorization. Such type approvals for free use are granted by the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (B.f.S.) on the basis of type testing performed by the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (P.T.B.), the national metrology institute, and the Bundesanstalt fur Materialforschung und -prufung (B.A.M.), the Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing. Main aspects of the assessment are the activity of the radioactive sources, the dose equivalent rate near the devices, the tamper-proofness and leak-tightness of the sources and the safety of the construction of the devices. With the new Radiation Protection Ordinance in 2001, more stringent requirements for a type approval were established. Experiences with the new regulations and the relevant assessment criteria applied by P.T.B. and B.A.M. will be presented. (authors)

  2. Proposal for basic safety requirements regarding the disposal of high-level radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-04-01

    A working group commissioned to prepare proposals for basic safety requirements for the storage and transport of radioactive waste prepared its report to the Danish Agency of Environmental Protection. The proposals include: radiation protection requirements, requirements concerning the properties of high-level waste units, the geological conditions of the waste disposal location, the supervision of waste disposal areas. The proposed primary requirements for safety evaluation of the disposal of high-level waste in deep geological formations are of a general nature, not being tied to specific assumptions regarding the waste itself, the geological and other conditions at the place of disposal, and the technical methods of disposal. It was impossible to test the proposals for requirements on a working repository. As no country has, to the knowledge of the working group, actually disposed of hifg-level radioactive waste or approved of plans for such disposal. Methods for evaluating the suitability of geological formations for waste disposal, and background material concerning the preparation of these proposals for basic safety requirements relating to radiation, waste handling and geological conditions are reviewed. Appended to the report is a description of the phases of the fuel cycle that are related to the storage of spent fuel and the disposal of high-level reprocessing waste in a salt formation. It should be noted that the proposals of the working group are not limited to the disposal of reprocessed fuel, but also include the direct disposal of spent fuel as well as disposal in geological formations other than salt. (EG)

  3. A Detection Device for the Signs of Human Life in Accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ning, Li; Ruilan, Zhang; Jian, Liu; Ruirui, Cheng; Yuhong, Diao

    2017-12-01

    A detection device for the signs of human life in accidents is a device used in emergency situations, such as the crash site. the scene of natural disasters, the battlefield ruins. it designed to detect the life signs of the distress under the injured ambulance vital signs devices. The device can on human vital signs, including pulse, respiration physiological signals to make rapid and accurate response. After some calculations, and after contrast to normal human physiological parameters given warning signals, in order for them to make timely ambulance judgment. In this case the device is required to do gymnastics convenience, ease of movement, power and detection of small flexible easy realization. This device has the maximum protection of the wounded safety significance.

  4. Medical Devices; General Hospital and Personal Use Devices; Classification of the Ultraviolet Radiation Chamber Disinfection Device. Final order.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-11-20

    The Food and Drug Administration (FDA or the Agency) is classifying the ultraviolet (UV) radiation chamber disinfection device into class II (special controls). The special controls that will apply to the device are identified in this order and will be part of the codified language for the UV radiation chamber disinfection device classification. The Agency is classifying the device into class II (special controls) in order to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness of the device.

  5. Cloud/Fog Computing System Architecture and Key Technologies for South-North Water Transfer Project Safety

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yaoling Fan

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available In view of the real-time and distributed features of Internet of Things (IoT safety system in water conservancy engineering, this study proposed a new safety system architecture for water conservancy engineering based on cloud/fog computing and put forward a method of data reliability detection for the false alarm caused by false abnormal data from the bottom sensors. Designed for the South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP, the architecture integrated project safety, water quality safety, and human safety. Using IoT devices, fog computing layer was constructed between cloud server and safety detection devices in water conservancy projects. Technologies such as real-time sensing, intelligent processing, and information interconnection were developed. Therefore, accurate forecasting, accurate positioning, and efficient management were implemented as required by safety prevention of the SNWTP, and safety protection of water conservancy projects was effectively improved, and intelligential water conservancy engineering was developed.

  6. 40 CFR 63.9525 - What are the installation, operation, and maintenance requirements for my weight measurement device?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... measurement device? (a) If you use a solvent recovery system, you must install, operate, and maintain a weight... solvent mixer. If the weight measurement device cannot reproduce the value of the calibration weight..., and maintenance requirements for my weight measurement device? 63.9525 Section 63.9525 Protection of...

  7. ALARP considerations in criticality safety assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowden, Russell L.; Barnes, Andrew; Thorne, Peter R.; Venner, Jack

    2003-01-01

    Demonstrating that the risk to the public and workers is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) is a fundamental requirement of safety cases for nuclear facilities in the United Kingdom. This is embodied in the Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) published by the Regulator, the essence of which is incorporated within the safety assessment processes of the various nuclear site licensees. The concept of ALARP within criticality safety assessments has taken some time to establish in the United Kingdom. In principle, the licensee is obliged to search for a deterministic criticality safety solution, such as safe geometry vessels and passive control features, rather than placing reliance on active measurement devices and plant administrative controls. This paper presents a consideration of some ALARP issues in relation to the development of criticality safety cases. The paper utilises some idealised examples covering a range of issues facing the criticality safety assessor, including new plant design, operational plant and decommissioning activities. These examples are used to outline the elements of the criticality safety cases and present a discussion of ALARP in the context of criticality safety assessments. (author)

  8. Statement on safety requirements concerning the long-term operation of the Muehleberg nuclear power station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-12-01

    This report published by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI investigates the safety requirements with respect to the long-term operation of the Muehleberg nuclear power station in Switzerland. Relevant international requirements and Swiss legal stipulations concerning the long-term operation of the power station are stated. The management of aging processes is looked at. The regular verification of the integrity of various plant components such as containments, piping, steam generation system, etc. is looked at in detail. The state-of-the-art concerning deterministic accident analyses and refitting technology are discussed, as are automated safety systems. The applicable laws, decrees and guidelines are listed in appendices

  9. Reactor protecting device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ono, Hiroshi; Kasuga, Hajime; Kasuga, Hiroshi.

    1984-01-01

    Purpose: To reduce the recycling flowrate thereby decrease the neutron flux level before the reactor shutdown upon generation of abnormality such as increase in the neutron flux, by setting the safety level lower than the value for generating the reaction scram signal. Constitution: A netron flux safety level setter and an instruction signal generator are disposed between a neutron flux detector and a recycling flowrate control device. A neutron flux safety level lower than the level for generating a reactor scram signal and higher that the level for the ordinary operation is set and, if the detection level for the neutron flux in the reactor core arrives at the safety level, a neutron flux decreasing instruction signal is outputted from the instruction signal generator to the recycling flowrate control device to thereby decrease the recycling flowrate and decrease the neutron flux without reaching the reactor shutdown, whereby the thermal safety of the fuel rod can be maintained and the reactor operation performance can be improved. (Moriyama, K.)

  10. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorizes the Agency to 'establish or adopt... standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property' - standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and sustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA's assistance in their application. The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles, which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its standards. Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety, operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material and safe management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization, regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience and insights to be shared. Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States have decided to adopt the IAEA's standards for use in their national regulations. For parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the

  11. Radiation safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jain, Priyanka

    2014-01-01

    The use of radiation sources is a privilege; in order to retain the privilege, all persons who use sources of radiation must follow policies and procedures for their safe and legal use. The purpose of this poster is to describe the policies and procedures of the Radiation Protection Program. Specific conditions of radiation safety require the establishment of peer committees to evaluate proposals for the use of radionuclides, the appointment of a radiation safety officer, and the implementation of a radiation safety program. In addition, the University and Medical Centre administrations have determined that the use of radiation producing machines and non-ionizing radiation sources shall be included in the radiation safety program. These Radiation Safety policies are intended to ensure that such use is in accordance with applicable State and Federal regulations and accepted standards as directed towards the protection of health and the minimization of hazard to life or property. It is the policy that all activities involving ionizing radiation or radiation emitting devices be conducted so as to keep hazards from radiation to a minimum. Persons involved in these activities are expected to comply fully with the Canadian Nuclear Safety Act and all it. The risk of prosecution by the Department of Health and Community Services exists if compliance with all applicable legislation is not fulfilled. (author)

  12. Implications of safety requirements for the treatment of THMC processes in geological disposal systems for radioactive waste

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Frédéric Bernier

    2017-06-01

    Full Text Available The mission of nuclear safety authorities in national radioactive waste disposal programmes is to ensure that people and the environment are protected against the hazards of ionising radiations emitted by the waste. It implies the establishment of safety requirements and the oversight of the activities of the waste management organisation in charge of implementing the programme. In Belgium, the safety requirements for geological disposal rest on the following principles: defence-in-depth, demonstrability and the radiation protection principles elaborated by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP. Applying these principles requires notably an appropriate identification and characterisation of the processes upon which the safety functions fulfilled by the disposal system rely and of the processes that may affect the system performance. Therefore, research and development (R&D on safety-relevant thermo-hydro-mechanical-chemical (THMC issues is important to build confidence in the safety assessment. This paper points out the key THMC processes that might influence radionuclide transport in a disposal system and its surrounding environment, considering the dynamic nature of these processes. Their nature and significance are expected to change according to prevailing internal and external conditions, which evolve from the repository construction phase to the whole heating–cooling cycle of decaying waste after closure. As these processes have a potential impact on safety, it is essential to identify and to understand them properly when developing a disposal concept to ensure compliance with relevant safety requirements. In particular, the investigation of THMC processes is needed to manage uncertainties. This includes the identification and characterisation of uncertainties as well as for the understanding of their safety-relevance. R&D may also be necessary to reduce uncertainties of which the magnitude does not allow

  13. Operating room fire prevention: creating an electrosurgical unit fire safety device.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Culp, William C; Kimbrough, Bradly A; Luna, Sarah; Maguddayao, Aris J

    2014-08-01

    To reduce the incidence of surgical fires. Operating room fires represent a potentially life-threatening hazard and are triggered by the electrosurgical unit (ESU) pencil. Carbon dioxide is a fire suppressant and is a routinely used medical gas. We hypothesize that a shroud of protective carbon dioxide covering the tip of the ESU pencil displaces oxygen, thereby preventing fire ignition. Using 3-dimensional modeling techniques, a polymer sleeve was created and attached to an ESU pencil. This sleeve was connected to a carbon dioxide source and directed the gas through multiple precisely angled ports, generating a cone of fire-suppressive carbon dioxide surrounding the active pencil tip. This device was evaluated in a flammability test chamber containing 21%, 50%, and 100% oxygen with sustained ESU activation. The sleeve was tested with and without carbon dioxide (control) until a fuel was ignited or 30 seconds elapsed. Time to ignition was measured by high-speed videography. Fires were ignited with each control trial (15/15 trials). The control group median ± SD ignition time in 21% oxygen was 3.0 ± 2.4 seconds, in 50% oxygen was 0.1 ± 1.8 seconds, and in 100% oxygen was 0.03 ± 0.1 seconds. No fire was observed when the fire safety device was used in all concentrations of oxygen (0/15 trials; P fire ignition was 76% to 100%. A sleeve creating a cone of protective carbon dioxide gas enshrouding the sparks from an ESU pencil effectively prevents fire in a high-flammability model. Clinical application of this device may reduce the incidence of operating room fires.

  14. 33 CFR 159.95 - Safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Safety. 159.95 Section 159.95... SANITATION DEVICES Design, Construction, and Testing § 159.95 Safety. (a) Each device must— (1) Be free of... explosion or over pressurization as a result of an accumulation of gases; and (3) Meet all other safety...

  15. Development of safety-related regulatory requirements for nuclear power in developing countries. Key issue paper no. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, K.I.

    2000-01-01

    In implementing a national nuclear power program, balanced regulatory requirements are necessary to ensure nuclear safety and cost competitive nuclear power, and to help gain public acceptance. However, this is difficult due to the technology-intensive nature of the nuclear regulatory requirements, the need to reflect evolving technology and the need for cooperation among multidisciplinary technical groups. This paper suggests approaches to development of balanced nuclear regulatory requirements in developing countries related to nuclear power plant safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management along with key technical regulatory issues. It does not deal with economic or market regulation of electric utilities using nuclear power. It suggests that national regulatory requirements be developed using IAEA safety recommendations as guidelines and safety requirements of the supplier country as a main reference after careful planning, manpower buildup and thorough study of international and supplier country's regulations. Regulation making is not recommended before experienced manpower has been accumulated. With an option that the supplier country's regulations may be used in the interim, the lack of complete national regulatory requirements should not deter introduction of nuclear power in developing countries. (author)

  16. 76 FR 64 - Safety and Health Requirements Related to Camp Cars

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-01-03

    .... Water uses such as personal oral hygiene, drinking, food washing, preparation, cooking, cleaning of the... of Sec. 228.325 to ensure that the food service is safe and sanitary. FRA will hold the railroad... proposed section sets forth requirements regarding the safety of heating, cooking, ventilation, air...

  17. A Review of Safety and Design Requirements of the Artificial Pancreas

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Blauw, Helga; Keith-Hynes, Patrick; Koops, Robin; DeVries, J. Hans

    2016-01-01

    As clinical studies with artificial pancreas systems for automated blood glucose control in patients with type 1 diabetes move to unsupervised real-life settings, product development will be a focus of companies over the coming years. Directions or requirements regarding safety in the design of an

  18. Analysis of solutions for passively activated safety shutdown devices for SFR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burgazzi, Luciano

    2013-01-01

    Highlights: • Innovative systems for emergency shut down of fast reactors are proposed. • The concepts of inherent and passive safety are put forward. • The relative analysis in terms of safety and reliability is presented. • A comparative assessment among the concepts is performed. • Path forward is tracked. -- Abstract: In order to enhance the inherent safety of fast reactors, innovative reactivity control systems have been proposed for intrinsic ultimate shut-down instead of conventional scram rods, to cope with the potential consequences of severe unprotected transient accidents, such as an energetic core disruptive accident, as in case of sodium fast reactors. The passive shut-down systems are designed to shut-down system only by inherent passive reactivity feedback mechanism, under unprotected accident conditions, implying failure of reactor protection system. They are conceived to be self-actuated without any signal elaboration, since the actuation of the system is triggered by the effects induced by the transient like material dilatation, in case of overheating of the coolant for instance, according to fast reactor design to meet the safety requirements. This article looks at different special shutdown systems specifically engineered for prevention of severe accidents, to be implemented on fast reactors, with main focus on the investigation of the performance of the self-actuated shutdown systems in sodium fast reactors

  19. Effects on LOCA mass and energy release of the SIT Fluidic device for SKN 3 and 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, Jeung Hyo; Kim, Tae Yoon; Choi, Han Rim; Choi, Chul Jin; Seo, Jong Tae

    2003-01-01

    A fluidic device is employed for the control of safety injection tank flow during a large break loss of coolant accident in Shin Kori Nuclear power plant Unit 3 and 4. It is installed in the safety injection tank and provides two stages of safety injection tank flow injection, initially high flow injection and then low flow injection after the reactor vessel downcomer annulus full. This allows a more effective use of safety injection tank water inventory during a loss of coolant accident. However, the fluidic device may have an adverse impact on the mass and energy release during the accident. That is, the steam mass and energy release will be increased by a considerable amount because the safety injection tank low flow injection via fluidic device is not credited to condense the steam flows through intact cold legs. The increased mass and energy releases have an impact on the peak pressure and temperature of the containment. This effect of the fluidic device is analyzed on the mass and energy release and the peak pressure and temperature of the containment. The calculation has been done using the CEFLASH-4A, the FLOOD3 with some modifications for the fluidic device and the CONTEMPT-LT code. The results show that the mass and energy release and the peak pressure and temperature were considerably increased when compared with the case without the fluidic device. However, the results satisfy the required design margin

  20. Effects on LOCA mass and energy release of the SIT Fluidic device for SKN 3 and 4

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Song, Jeung Hyo; Kim, Tae Yoon; Choi, Han Rim; Choi, Chul Jin; Seo, Jong Tae [Korea Power Engineering Company, Daejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2003-07-01

    A fluidic device is employed for the control of safety injection tank flow during a large break loss of coolant accident in Shin Kori Nuclear power plant Unit 3 and 4. It is installed in the safety injection tank and provides two stages of safety injection tank flow injection, initially high flow injection and then low flow injection after the reactor vessel downcomer annulus full. This allows a more effective use of safety injection tank water inventory during a loss of coolant accident. However, the fluidic device may have an adverse impact on the mass and energy release during the accident. That is, the steam mass and energy release will be increased by a considerable amount because the safety injection tank low flow injection via fluidic device is not credited to condense the steam flows through intact cold legs. The increased mass and energy releases have an impact on the peak pressure and temperature of the containment. This effect of the fluidic device is analyzed on the mass and energy release and the peak pressure and temperature of the containment. The calculation has been done using the CEFLASH-4A, the FLOOD3 with some modifications for the fluidic device and the CONTEMPT-LT code. The results show that the mass and energy release and the peak pressure and temperature were considerably increased when compared with the case without the fluidic device. However, the results satisfy the required design margin.

  1. Review on conformance of JMTR reactor facility to safety design examination guides for water-cooled reactors for test and research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ide, Hiroshi; Naka, Michihiro; Sakuta, Yoshiyuki; Hori, Naohiko; Matsui, Yoshinori; Miyazawa, Masataka

    2009-03-01

    The safety design examination guides for water-cooled reactors for test and research are formulated as fundamental judgements on the basic design validity for licensing from a viewpoint of the safety. Taking the refurbishment opportunity of the JMTR, the conformance of the JMTR reactor facility to current safety design examination guides was reviewed with licensing documents, annexes and related documents. As a result, it was found that licensing documents fully satisfied the requirements of the current guides. Moreover, it was found that the JMTR reactor facility itself also satisfied the guides requirements as well as the safety performance, since the facility with safety function such as structure, systems, devices had been installed based on the licensing documents under the permission by the regulation authority. Important devices for safety have been produced under authorization of regulating authority. Therefore, it was confirmed that the licensing was conformed to guides, and that the JMTR has enough performance. (author)

  2. Relationship between general safety requirements and safety culture in the improvement of safe operation of I.N.R. TRIGA reactor facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ciocanescu, M.; Preda, M.; Chiritescu, M.; Dumitru, M.

    1996-01-01

    Acquiring of the basic principles of ''safety culture'' by a large number of profesionals in the nuclear field drew the attention of the decision factors in the INR managerial structure, who decided to promote certain practical actions at each level in order to improve nuclear safety. Starting from the ''Republican Standards for Nuclear Safety'' issued by CSEN in 1975, where general safety criteria are defined for nuclear reactors and NPPs, the specialists at the TRIGA reactor originated and implemented a coherent and secure system to ensure nuclear safety over all steps of nuclear activities: research, conception, execution, commissioning and operation. This system has been continuosly corrected so that now it is completely integrated in a modern safety system. The paper presents the way in which a modern system for nuclear safety at the TRIGA reactor has been implemented and developed, in accordance to specific criteria and requirements imposed by related National Regulations and with the principles of safety culture. Starting from the definition of specific responsabilities, there are presented the internal stipulations and practical actions at all levels in order to enhance nuclear safety. (orig.)

  3. 'The Closer'-percutaneous vascular suture device: evaluation of safety and performance in neuroangiography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henk, Christine B.; Grampp, Stephan; Heimberger, Karl; Czerny, Christian; Schindler, Erwin; Mostbeck, Gerhard H.

    2003-01-01

    Objective: To evaluate the use of the suture mediated vascular closure device concerning practicability and safety in clinical angiography practice. Material and methods: One hundred and seventeen patients (59 female, 58 male, mean age 40.9±13.4) underwent percutaneous closure of common femoral arterial puncture sites following diagnostic neuroangiography using the suture device 'the Closer' (Perclose Inc., Redwood City, CA, USA). Primary success, early problems (within 24 h) and late complications were evaluated. Complications were graded as minor and severe with or without need of surgical intervention and categorized by type. Parameters such as age, gender, sheath size and number of previous arterial punctures were evaluated with respect to complications. Results: Percutaneous closure was primary successful in 85% (100/117). The overall complication rate was 32% (28% mild n=35, 4% severe n=6, which needed surgical intervention). All but one problem occurred within the first 24 h after the suture. Additional manual compression was necessary in 32 cases (25%). There was no significant difference in age and gender between the groups with and without complications. Sheath size was significantly larger (P<0.01) and numbers of preceding angiograms were significantly higher (P<0.01) in the complications group compared with uncomplicated cases. Conclusion: The evaluated percutaneous vascular suture device is useful in clinical practice but limitations concerning patient selection seem to emerge in order to avoid complications

  4. Evaluation of safety requirements of erbium laser equipment used in dentistry; Avaliacao de requisitos de seguranca de um equipamento a laser de erbio para fins odontologicos

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Braga, Flavio Hamilton

    2002-07-01

    The erbium laser (Er:YAG) has been used in several therapeutic processes. Erbium lasers, however, operate with energies capable to produce lesions in biological tissues. Aiming the safe use, the commercialization of therapeutic laser equipment is controlled in Brazil, where the equipment should comply with quality and safety requirement prescribed in technical regulations. The objective of this work is to evaluate the quality and safety requirements of a commercial therapeutic erbium laser according to Brazilian regulations, and to discuss a risk control program intended to minimize the accidental exposition at dangerous laser radiation levels. It was verified that the analyzed laser can produce lesions in the skin and eyes, when exposed to laser radiation at distances smaller than 80 cm by 10 s or more. In these conditions, the use of protection glasses is recommended to the personnel that have access to the laser operation ambient. It was verified that the user's training and the presence of a target indicator are fundamental to avoid damages in the skin and buccal cavity. It was also verified that the knowledge and the correct use of the equipment safety devices, and the application of technical and administrative measures is efficient to minimize the risk of dangerous expositions to the laser radiation. (author)

  5. 42 CFR 84.103 - Man tests; performance requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Man tests; performance requirements. 84.103 Section 84.103 Public Health PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH RESEARCH AND RELATED ACTIVITIES APPROVAL OF RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE DEVICES Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus § 84.103 Man tests;...

  6. Development of Necessary Technology for localizing of Nuclear Safety Grade I and C System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwon, Kee Choon; Jang, Tong Il; Kim, Jung Tack

    2010-08-01

    Through KNICS and Nu-Tech 2012, a MMIS(Man-Machine Interface System) package for nuclear plants was localized and is expected to be applied to SUN 1,2 plants. This study is aimed to support the application of the MMIS package including the following technologies that meet strengthened regulation requirements and enhanced utility's performance requirements to nuclear plants. - Dedication to safety-grade computers and real time operating systems - The broadband communication network for safety information - Application of the automatic test for safety systems - Application of programmable logic controllers to nuclear plants - Development strategy for an integrated SW development tool for control device

  7. Safety work with MRI devices in medicine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zivkovic, D.; Hrnjak, M.

    1999-01-01

    This paper gives the basis of biological effects of physical factors which could affect personnel working on MRI devices and patients, and corresponding protection measures. Medical personnel working with MRI devices and patients could be exposed to static magnetic field, time varying fields and radiofrequency radiation, danger from electric current and chemical matters, and there is a high risk from moving metal objects which could wound the persons near-by. The protection from static magnetic field could be ensured by increasing the distance from the source. If MRI device is put in Faradays cage it could be corresponding protection of radiofrequency radiation. (author)

  8. Tracking down a solution: exploring the acceptability and value of wearable GPS devices for older persons, individuals with a disability and their support persons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Williamson, Brittany; Aplin, Tammy; de Jonge, Desleigh; Goyne, Matthew

    2017-11-01

    To explore the acceptability and value of three wearable GPS devices for older persons and individuals with a disability and safety concerns when accessing the community. This pilot study explored six wearers' and their support persons' experience of using three different wearable GPS devices (a pendant, watch, and mini GPS phone), each for a two-week period. Participants identified safety as the main value of using a wearable GPS device. The acceptability and value of these devices was strongly influenced by device features, ease of use, cost, appearance, the reliability of the GPS coordinates, the wearer's health condition and the users familiarity with technology. Overall, participants indicated that they preferred the pendant. Wearable GPS devices are potentially useful in providing individuals who have safety concerns with reassurance and access to assistance as required. To ensure successful utilization, future device design and device selection should consider the user's familiarity with technology and their health condition. This study also revealed that not all wearable GPS devices provide continuous location tracking. It is therefore critical to ensure that the device's location tracking functions address the wearer's requirements and reason for using the device. Implications for Rehabilitation The acceptability and usability of wearable GPS devices is strongly influenced by the device features, ease of use, cost, appearance, the reliability of the device to provide accurate and timely GPS coordinates, as well as the health condition of the wearer and their familiarity with technology. Wearable GPS devices need to be simple to use and support and training is essential to ensure they are successfully utilized. Not all wearable GPS devices provide continuous location tracking and accuracy of location is impacted by line of sight to satellites. Therefore, care needs to be taken when choosing a suitable device, to ensure that the device's location tracking

  9. Eurosafe 2006 radioactive waste management: long term safety requirements and societal expectations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety, to share experiences, exchange technical and scientific opinions, and conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum 2006 focuses on 'Radioactive Waste Management: Long Term Safety Requirements and Societal Expectations' from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry and presents the latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining increasing recognition. This

  10. Eurosafe 2006 radioactive waste management: long term safety requirements and societal expectations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety, to share experiences, exchange technical and scientific opinions, and conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum 2006 focuses on 'Radioactive Waste Management: Long Term Safety Requirements and Societal Expectations' from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry and presents the latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining increasing recognition. This

  11. Eurosafe 2006 radioactive waste management: long term safety requirements and societal expectations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety, to share experiences, exchange technical and scientific opinions, and conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum 2006 focuses on 'Radioactive Waste Management: Long Term Safety Requirements and Societal Expectations' from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry and presents the latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining increasing recognition

  12. Construction products performances and basic requirements for fire safety of facades in energy rehabilitation of buildings

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Laban Mirjana Đ.

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Construction product means any product or kit which is produced and placed on the market for incorporation in a permanent manner in construction works, or parts thereof, and the performance of which has an effect on the performance of the construction works with respect to the basic requirements for construction works. Safety in case of fire and Energy economy and heat retention represent two among seven basic requirements which building has to meet according to contemporary technical rules on planning and construction. Performances of external walls building materials (particularly reaction to fire could significantly affect to fire spread on the façade and other building parts. Therefore, façade shaping and materialization in building renewal process, has to meet the fire safety requirement, as well as the energy requirement. Brief survey of fire protection regulations development in Serbia is presented in the paper. Preventive measures for fire risk reduction in building façade energy renewal are proposed according to contemporary fire safety requirements.

  13. Safety Culture: A Requirement for New Business Models — Lessons Learned from Other High Risk Industries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kecklund, L.

    2016-01-01

    Technical development and changes on global markets affects all high risk industries creating opportunities as well as risks related to the achievement of safety and business goals. Changes in legal and regulatory frameworks as well as in market demands create a need for major changes. Several high risk industries are facing a situation where they have to develop new business models. Within the transportation domain, e.g., aviation and railways, there is a growing concern related to how the new business models may affects safety issues. New business models in aviation and railways include extensive use of outsourcing and subcontractors to reduce costs resulting in, e.g., negative changes in working conditions, work hours, employment conditions and high turnover rates. The energy sector also faces pressures to create new business models for transition to renewable energy production to comply with new legal and regulatory requirements and to make best use of new reactor designs. In addition, large scale phase out and decommissioning of nuclear facilities have to be managed by the nuclear industry. Some negative effects of new business models have already arisen within the transportation domain, e.g., the negative effects of extensive outsourcing and subcontractor use. In the railway domain the infrastructure manager is required by European and national regulations to assure that all subcontractors are working according to the requirements in the infrastructure managers SMS (Safety Management System). More than ten levels of subcontracts can be working in a major infrastructure project making the system highly complex and thus difficult to control. In the aviation domain, tightly coupled interacting computer networks supplying airport services, as well as air traffic control, are managed and maintained by several different companies creating numerous interfaces which must be managed by the SMS. There are examples where a business model with several low

  14. 47 CFR 95.1119 - Specific requirements for wireless medical telemetry devices operating in the 608-614 MHz band.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... devices operating in the 608-614 MHz band. For a wireless medical telemetry device operating within the... 47 Telecommunication 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Specific requirements for wireless medical telemetry devices operating in the 608-614 MHz band. 95.1119 Section 95.1119 Telecommunication FEDERAL...

  15. Fuel requirements for experimental devices in MTR reactors. A perturbation model for reactor core analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beeckmans de West-Meerbeeck, A.

    1991-01-01

    Irradiation in neutron absorbing devices, requiring high fast neutron fluxes in the core or high thermal fluxes in the reflector and flux traps, lead to higher density fuel and larger core dimensions. A perturbation model of the reactor core helps to estimate the fuel requirements. (orig.)

  16. Software Safety Risk in Legacy Safety-Critical Computer Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hill, Janice L.; Baggs, Rhoda

    2007-01-01

    Safety Standards contain technical and process-oriented safety requirements. Technical requirements are those such as "must work" and "must not work" functions in the system. Process-Oriented requirements are software engineering and safety management process requirements. Address the system perspective and some cover just software in the system > NASA-STD-8719.13B Software Safety Standard is the current standard of interest. NASA programs/projects will have their own set of safety requirements derived from the standard. Safety Cases: a) Documented demonstration that a system complies with the specified safety requirements. b) Evidence is gathered on the integrity of the system and put forward as an argued case. [Gardener (ed.)] c) Problems occur when trying to meet safety standards, and thus make retrospective safety cases, in legacy safety-critical computer systems.

  17. Safety of mechanical chest compression devices AutoPulse and LUCAS in cardiac arrest: a randomized clinical trial for non-inferiority

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Koster, Rudolph W.; Beenen, Ludo F.; van der Boom, Esther B.; Spijkerboer, Anje M.; Tepaske, Robert; van der Wal, Allart C.; Beesems, Stefanie G.; Tijssen, Jan G.

    2017-01-01

    Aims Mechanical chest compression (CC) during cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) with AutoPulse or LUCAS devices has not improved survival from cardiac arrest. Cohort studies suggest risk of excess damage. We studied safety of mechanical CC and determined possible excess damage compared with manual

  18. Considerations on the Application of the IAEA Safety Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-05-01

    Revised to take into consideration findings from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, has introduced some new concepts with respect to the earlier safety standard published in the year 2000. The preparation of SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1) was carried out with constant and intense involvement of IAEA Member States, but some new requirements, because of the novelty of the concepts introduced and the complexity of the issues, are not always interpreted in a unique way. The IAEA is confident that a complete clarification and a full understanding of the new requirements will be available when the supporting safety guides for design and safety assessment of nuclear power plants are prepared. The IAEA expects that the effort devoted to the preparation of this publication, which received input and comments from several Member States and experts, will also facilitate and harmonize the preparation or revision of these supporting standards

  19. Modeling the Non-functional Requirements in the Context of Usability, Performance, Safety and Security

    OpenAIRE

    Sadiq, Mazhar

    2007-01-01

    Requirement engineering is the most significant part of the software development life cycle. Until now great emphasis has been put on the maturity of the functional requirements. But with the passage of time it reveals that the success of software development does not only pertain to the functional requirements rather non-functional requirements should also be taken into consideration. Among the non-functional requirements usability, performance, safety and security are considered important. ...

  20. 78 FR 55230 - Safety and Environmental Management System Requirements for Vessels on the U.S. Outer Continental...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-09-10

    ...\\ including the regulation of workplace safety and health.\\2\\ The Coast Guard's regulatory authority extends... 147 [Docket No. USCG-2012-0779] RIN 1625-AC05 Safety and Environmental Management System Requirements... a vessel-specific Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS) that incorporates the management...

  1. Evaluation and qualification of novel control techniques with safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gossner, S.; Wach, D.

    1985-01-01

    The paper discusses the questions related to the assessment and qualification of new I and C-systems. The tasks of nuclear power plant I and Cs as well as the efficiency of the new techniques are reflected. Problems with application of new I and Cs and the state of application in Germany and abroad are addressed. Starting from the essential differencies between conventional and new I and C-systems it is evaluated, if and in which way existing safety requirements can be met and to what extent new requirements need to be formulated. An overall concept has to be developed comprising the definition of graded requirement profiles for design and qualification. Associated qualification procedures and tools have to be adapted, developed and tuned upon each other. (orig./HP) [de

  2. Probabilistic approaches to LCO's and surveillance requirements for standby safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lofgren, E.V.; Varcolik, F.

    1982-11-01

    Results are presented for a comprehensive analysis of risk-based methods for establishing Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and surveillance requirements for on-line test and repair of nuclear power plant safety system components. Limiting Conditions for Operation refers to the legal constraint on safety system component outage times that are imposed by the NRC as part of the reactor operating license. Generally, when a safety system component is removed for repair or test for a period of time there is a period of increased vulnerability concerning the probability that the affected safety system will be available to mitigate an accident. This period of increased vulnerability exists until the component is restored to service. The constraint on the duration of this period, the allowed outage time (AOT), is the aspect of LCOs that is of interest here. In particular, methods are reviewed and developed that relate measures of risk to the AOT. Only by explicitly relating risk to AOT can outage times be constrained by placing limits on risk. Methods developed for relating risk measures to outage times are presented. The review and analysis of risk related methods for establishing LCOs are described

  3. Combined leadless pacemaker and subcutaneous implantable defibrillator therapy: feasibility, safety, and performance

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Tjong, F. V. Y.; Brouwer, T. F.; Smeding, L.; Kooiman, K. M.; de Groot, J. R.; Ligon, D.; Sanghera, R.; Schalij, M. J.; Wilde, A. A. M.; Knops, R. E.

    2016-01-01

    The subcutaneous implantable cardioverter-defibrillator (S-ICD) and leadless pacemaker (LP) are evolving technologies that do not require intracardiac leads. However, interactions between these two devices are unexplored. We investigated the feasibility, safety, and performance of combined LP and

  4. Guideline on evaluation and acceptance of commercial grade digital equipment for nuclear safety applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-10-01

    Nuclear power plants are increasingly upgrading their instrumentation and control (I ampersand C) systems with commercial digital equipment, which allows them to continue meeting safety and reliability requirements while controlling operating costs. However, the use of commercial software-based devices for safety related applications has raised new issues that impact design, procurement, and licensing activities. This guideline describes a consistent, comprehensive approach for the evaluation and acceptance of commercial digital equipment for nuclear safety systems

  5. Identifying environmental safety and health requirements for an Environmental Restoration Management Contractor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beckman, W.H.; Cossel, S.C.; Alhadeff, N.; Lindamood, S.B.; Beers, J.A.

    1993-10-01

    The purpose of the Standards/Requirements Identification Program, developed partially in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-2, was to identify applicable requirements that established the Environmental Restoration Management Contractor's (ERMC) responsibilities and authorities under the Environmental Restoration Management Contract, determine the adequacy of these requirements, ascertain a baseline level of compliance with them, and implement a maintenance program that would keep the program current as requirements or compliance levels change. The resultant Standards/Requirements Identification Documents (S/RIDs) consolidate the applicable requirements. These documents govern the development of procedures and manuals to ensure compliance with the requirements. Twenty-four such documents, corresponding with each functional area identified at the site, are to be issued. These requirements are included in the contractor's management plan

  6. Bioartificial liver assist devices in support of patients with liver failure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Patzer II, John F; Lopez, Roberto C; Zhu, Yue; Wang, Zi-Fa; Mazariegos, George V; Fung, John J

    2002-02-01

    Bioartificial liver assist devices (BALs) offer an opportunity for critical care physicians and transplant surgeons to stabilize patients prior to orthotopic liver transplantation. Such devices may also act as a bridge to transplant, providing liver support to patients awaiting transplant, or as support for patients post living-related donor transplant. Four BAL devices that rely on hepatocytes cultured in hollow fiber membrane cartridges (Circe Biomedical HepatAssist(r), Vitagen ELADTM, Gerlach BELS, and Excorp Medical BLSS) are currently in various stages of clinical evaluation. Comparison of the four devices shows that several unique approaches based upon the same overall system architecture are possible. Preliminary results of the Excorp Medical BLSS Phase I safety evaluation at the University of Pittsburgh, after treating four patients (F, 41, acetominophen-induced, two support periods; M, 50, Wilson's disease, one support period; F, 53, acute alcoholic hepatitis, two support periods; F, 24, chemotherapy-induced, one support period, are presented. All patients presented with hypoglycemia and transient hypotension at the start of extracorporeal perfusion. Hypoglycemia was treated by IV dextrose and the transient hypotension responded positively to IV fluid bolus. Heparin anticoagulation was used only in the second patient. No serious or adverse events were noted in the four patients. Moderate Biochemical response to support was noted in all patients. More complete characterization of the safety of the BLSS requires completion of the Phase I safety evaluation.

  7. Radiation emitting devices act

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    This Act, entitled the Radiation Emitting Devices Act, is concerned with the sale and importation of radiation emitting devices. Laws relating to the sale, lease or import, labelling, advertising, packaging, safety standards and inspection of these devices are listed as well as penalties for any person who is convicted of breaking these laws

  8. Radiation Safety of Electromagnetic Waves

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hussein, A.Z.

    2009-01-01

    The wide spread of Electromagnetic Waves (EMW) through the power lines, multimedia, communications, devices, appliances, etc., are well known. The probable health hazards associated with EMW and the radiation safety criteria are to be reviewed. However, the principles of the regulatory safety are based on radiation protection procedure, intervention to combat the relevant risk and to mitigate consequences. The oscillating electric magnetic fields (EMF) of the electromagnetic radiation (EMR) induce electrical hazards. The extremely high power EMR can cause fire hazards and explosions of pyrotechnic (Rad Haz). Biological hazards of EMF result as dielectric heat, severe burn, as well as the hazards of eyes. Shielding is among the technical protective measures against EMR hazards. Others are limitation of time of exposure and separation distance apart of the EMR source. Understanding and safe handling of the EMR sources are required to feel safety.

  9. Safety catching device for pipe lines in missile shielding cylinders of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hering, S.; Doll, B.

    1975-01-01

    The safety catching device for pipes in the missile shielding cylinders consists of a flexible steel cable surrounding the pipe in a distance in U-shape. The arrester cable - which works as a spring and is freely movable in all directions - is attached to the cylinder wall. For this, the ends of the cable are primarily fastened to anchor boxes which are then inserted in a stay tube with the same axis as the cable ends. The anchor boxes are fastened to the outer wall of the missile shielding cylinder by anchor bolts and holding plates. (DG/AK) [de

  10. Independent V and V for Safety Grade I and C System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jang Soo; Kwon, Kee Choon; Lee, Dong Young

    2010-08-01

    Through KNICS and Nu-Tech 2012, a MMIS(Man-Machine Interface System) package for nuclear plants was localized and is expected to be applied to SUN 1,2 plants. This study is aimed to support the application of the MMIS package including the following technologies that meet strengthened regulation requirements and enhanced utility's performance requirements to nuclear plants. - Dedication to real time operating system for safety-grade computers - V and V of the broadband communication network for safety information - Independent V and V for application of programmable logic controllers to nuclear plants - Development strategy for an integrated SW development tool for control devices

  11. Regulatory Safety Requirements for Operating Nuclear Installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gubela, W.

    2017-01-01

    The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) is established in terms of the National Nuclear Regulator Act (Act No 47 of 1999) and its mandate and authority are conferred through sections 5 and 7 of this Act, setting out the NNR's objectives and functions, which include exercising regulatory control over siting, design, construction etc of nuclear installations through the granting of nuclear authorisations. The NNR's responsibilities embrace all those actions aimed at providing the public with confidence and assurance that the risks arising from the production of nuclear energy remain within acceptable safety limits -> Therefore: Set fundamental safety standards, conducting pro-active safety assessments, determining licence conditions and obtaining assurance of compliance. The promotional aspects of nuclear activities in South Africa are legislated by the Nuclear Energy Act (Act No 46 of 1999). The NNR approach to regulations of nuclear safety and security take into consideration, amongst others, the potential hazards associated with the facility or activity, safety related programmes, the importance of the authorisation holder's safety related processes as well as the need to exercise regulatory control over the technical aspects such as of the design and operation of a nuclear facility in ensuring nuclear safety and security. South Africa does not have national nuclear industry codes and standards. The NNR is therefore non-prescriptive as it comes to the use of industry codes and standards. Regulatory framework (current) provide for the protection of persons, property, and environment against nuclear damage, through Licensing Process: Safety standards; Safety assessment; Authorisation and conditions of authorisation; Public participation process; Compliance assurance; Enforcement

  12. The risk of a safety-critical event associated with mobile device use in specific driving contexts.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fitch, Gregory M; Hanowski, Richard J; Guo, Feng

    2015-01-01

    We explored drivers' mobile device use and its associated risk of a safety-critical event (SCE) in specific driving contexts. Our premise was that the SCE risk associated with mobile device use increases when the driving task becomes demanding. Data from naturalistic driving studies involving commercial motor vehicle drivers and light vehicle drivers were partitioned into subsets representative of specific driving contexts. The subsets were generated using data set attributes that included level of service and relation to junction. These attributes were selected based on exogenous factors known to alter driving task demands. The subsets were analyzed using a case-cohort approach, which was selected to complement previous investigations of mobile device SCE risk using naturalistic driving data. Both commercial motor vehicle and light vehicle drivers varied as to how much they conversed on a mobile device but did not vary their engagement in visual-manual subtasks. Furthermore, commercial motor vehicle drivers conversed less frequently as the driving task demands increased, whereas light vehicle drivers did not. The risk of an SCE associated with mobile device use was dependent on the subtask performed and the driving context. Only visual-manual subtasks were associated with an increased SCE risk, whereas conversing was associated with a decreased risk in some driving contexts. Drivers' engagement in mobile device subtasks varies by driving context. The SCE risk associated with mobile device use is dependent on the types of subtasks performed and the driving context. The findings of this exploratory study can be applied to the design of driver-vehicle interfaces that mitigate distraction by preventing visual-manual subtasks while driving.

  13. CIRSE Vascular Closure Device Registry

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Reekers, Jim A.; Müller-Hülsbeck, Stefan; Libicher, Martin; Atar, Eli; Trentmann, Jens; Goffette, Pierre; Borggrefe, Jan; Zeleňák, Kamil; Hooijboer, Pieter; Belli, Anna-Maria

    2011-01-01

    Vascular closure devices are routinely used after many vascular interventional radiology procedures. However, there have been no major multicenter studies to assess the safety and effectiveness of the routine use of closure devices in interventional radiology. The CIRSE registry of closure devices

  14. Growing a cyber-safety culture amongst school learners in South Africa through gaming

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Elmarie Kritzinger

    2017-10-01

    Full Text Available Virtually all school learners today have access to ICT devices and the internet at home or at school. More and more schools are using ICT devices to improve education in South Africa. ICT devices and internet access have enormous advantages and assist learners in learning and teachers in teaching more successfully. However, with these advantages come numerous ICT and cyber-risks and threats that can harm learners, for example cyber-bullying, identity theft and access to inappropriate material. Currently, South Africa does not have a long-term plan to grow a cyber-safety culture in its schools. This research therefore proposes a short-term initiative in the form of a game-based approach, which will assist school learners in becoming more cyber safe and teach learners about the relevant cyber-related risks and threats. The research is based on a quantitative survey that was conducted among primary school learners to establish if the game-based approach would be a feasible short-term initiative. The aim of the research is to establish if a game based approach can be used to improve cyber-safety awareness. This approach was plotted into the required ICT and cyber-safety policy required by all schools.

  15. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laycak, D.T.

    2010-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2009). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting

  16. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D T

    2008-06-16

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the 'Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities' (DSA) (LLNL 2008). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas

  17. Bipolar sealer device reduces blood loss and transfusion requirements in posterior spinal fusion for adolescent idiopathic scoliosis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gordon, Zachary L; Son-Hing, Jochen P; Poe-Kochert, Connie; Thompson, George H

    2013-01-01

    Reducing perioperative blood loss and transfusion requirements is important in the operative treatment of idiopathic scoliosis. This can be achieved with special frames, cell saver systems, pharmacologic aspects, and other techniques. Recently there has been interest in bipolar sealer devices as an adjunct to traditional monopolar electrocautery. However, there is limited information on this device in pediatric spinal deformity surgery. We reviewed our experience with this device in a setting of a standard institutional operative carepath. Perioperative blood loss and transfusion requirements of 50 consecutive patients with adolescent idiopathic scoliosis undergoing a posterior spinal fusion and segmental spinal instrumentation and who had a bipolar sealer device used during their surgery was compared with a control group of the 50 preceding consecutive patients who did not. Anesthesia, surgical technique, use of intraoperative epsilon aminocaproic acid (Amicar), postoperative protocol, and indications for transfusions (hemoglobin≤7.0 g/dL) were identical in both groups. The preoperative demographics for the patients in both groups were statistically the same. The bipolar sealer group demonstrated a significant reduction in intraoperative estimated blood loss, total perioperative blood loss, volume of blood products transfused, and overall transfusion rate when compared with the control group. When subgroups consisting of only hybrid or all-pedicle screw constructs were considered individually, these findings remained consistent. There were no complications associated with the use of this device. Using the bipolar sealer device is a significant adjunct in decreasing perioperative blood loss and transfusion requirements in patients undergoing surgery for adolescent idiopathic scoliosis. Level III-retrospective comparative study.

  18. 30 CFR 77.506-1 - Electric equipment and circuits; overload and short circuit protection; minimum requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... short circuit protection; minimum requirements. 77.506-1 Section 77.506-1 Mineral Resources MINE SAFETY...-1 Electric equipment and circuits; overload and short circuit protection; minimum requirements. Devices providing either short circuit protection or protection against overload shall conform to the...

  19. Requirements of radiation and safety protection for NORM in petroleum and gas facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Machavane, Edna Felicina Lisboa

    2017-01-01

    The work establishes radiation protection and safety requirements for NORM in oil and gas installations, enabling the National Atomic Energy Agency to draw up regulations on NORM. A bibliographic review and measurement of oil sludge activity concentrations was carried out to reach the objective. Significant amounts of NORM originating from reservoir rock are encountered during production, maintenance and decommissioning. The oil and gas industry operates in all climates and environments including the most arduous conditions and is continually challenged to achieve high operating efficiency while maintaining a high standard of safety and control - this includes the need to maintain control over exposure as well as protecting the public and the environment through the proper management of tailings that may be radiologically and chemically hazardous. The main objective of this work was not only to present the main radiological protection and safety requirements for NORM in oil and gas installations, but also to guide the competent governmental authorities of the Republic of Mozambique, that the installation of a radiometry laboratory and elaboration of NORM regulations involve a great control of radiological safety. The regulatory authority is responsible for authorizing facilities for the storage of radioactive waste, including the storage of contaminated tailings. It is recommended that studies of this kind be made to analyze the concentration of naturally occurring radioisotope activity. (author)

  20. Fast reactor recharging device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Artemiev, L.N.; Kurilkin, V.V.

    1979-01-01

    Disclosure is made of a device for recharging a fast-neutron reactor, intended for the transfer of fuel assemblies and rods of the control and safety system, having profiled heads to be gripped on the outside. The device comprises storage drums whose compartments for rods of the control and safety system are identical to compartments for fuel assemblies. In order to store and transport rods of the control and safety system from the storage drums to the recharging mechanism provision is made for sleeve-type holders. When placed in such a holder, the dimensions of a rod of the control and safety system are equal to those of a fuel assembly. To join a holder to a rod of the control and safety system, on the open end of each holder there is mounted a collet, whereas on the surface of each rod of the control and safety system, close to its head, there is provided an encircling groove to interact with the collet. The grip of the recharging mechanism is provided with a stop interacting with the collet in order to open the latter and withdraw the safety and control system rod from its holder

  1. Traffic sounds and cycling safety : the use of electronic devices by cyclists and the quietness of hybrid and electric cars.

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Stelling-Konczak, A. Hagenzieker, M.P. & Wee, B. van

    2015-01-01

    The growing popularity of electric devices and the increasing number of hybrid and electric cars have recently raised concerns about the use of auditory signals by vulnerable road users. This paper consolidates current knowledge about the two trends in relation to cycling safety. Both a literature

  2. 30 CFR 74.8 - Measurement, accuracy, and reliability requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH COAL MINE DUST SAMPLING DEVICES Requirements for Continuous Personal Dust... miner whose exposure is being monitored. (b) Accuracy. The ability of a CPDM to determine the true... levels tested, 0.2 to 4.0 mg/m3 for an 8-hour sampling period. (f) Testing conditions. Laboratory and...

  3. Posttest analysis of the FFTF inherent safety tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Padilla, A. Jr.; Claybrook, S.W.

    1987-01-01

    Inherent safety tests were performed during 1986 in the 400-MW (thermal) Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) reactor to demonstrate the effectiveness of an inherent shutdown device called the gas expansion module (GEM). The GEM device provided a strong negative reactivity feedback during loss-of-flow conditions by increasing the neutron leakage as a result of an expanding gas bubble. The best-estimate pretest calculations for these tests were performed using the IANUS plant analysis code (Westinghouse Electric Corporation proprietary code) and the MELT/SIEX3 core analysis code. These two codes were also used to perform the required operational safety analyses for the FFTF reactor and plant. Although it was intended to also use the SASSYS systems (core and plant) analysis code, the calibration of the SASSYS code for FFTF core and plant analysis was not completed in time to perform pretest analyses. The purpose of this paper is to present the results of the posttest analysis of the 1986 FFTF inherent safety tests using the SASSYS code

  4. Development of DSRC device and communication system performance measures recommendations for DSRC OBE performance and security requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-05-22

    This report presents recommendations for minimum DSRC device communication performance and security : requirements to ensure effective operation of the DSRC system. The team identified recommended DSRC : communications requirements aligned to use cas...

  5. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6 (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

  6. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6 (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning

  7. The main safety problems encountered at Creys-Malville power station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saitcevsky, Boris

    1980-01-01

    The 1200 MW. Creys-Malville nuclear power station, situated on the upper Rhone river, in the Isere department, is the largest unit in construction of the fast neutrons sodium-cooled reactor channel. Realized within a European framework, this power station of a specific character, requires special safety dispositions, owing to the utilization of sodium. Safety rests on a thorough preventive system, particularly at the level of the sodium circuits, the shut-down system and the devices for the evacuation of residual power [fr

  8. Plant control device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, Masuo; Ono, Makoto.

    1995-01-01

    A plant control device comprises an intellectual instrumentation group for measuring a predetermined process amount, an intellectual equipment group operating in accordance with a self-countermeasure, a system information space for outputting system information, a system level monitoring and diagnosing information generalization section for outputting system information, a system level maintenance information generalization section for outputting information concerning maintenance, a plant level information space and a plant level information generalization section. Each of them determines a state of the plant autonomously, and when abnormality is detected, each of the intellectual instrumentation, equipments and systems exchange information with each other, to conduct required operations including operations of intellectual robots, as required. Appropriate countermeasures for gauges, equipments and systems can be conducted autonomously at a place where operators can not access to improve reliability of complicate operations in the working site, as well as improve plant safety and reliability. (N.H.)

  9. Software safety analysis on the model specified by NuSCR and SMV input language at requirements phase of software development life cycle using SMV

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koh, Kwang Yong; Seong, Poong Hyun

    2005-01-01

    Safety-critical software process is composed of development process, verification and validation (V and V) process and safety analysis process. Safety analysis process has been often treated as an additional process and not found in a conventional software process. But software safety analysis (SSA) is required if software is applied to a safety system, and the SSA shall be performed independently for the safety software through software development life cycle (SDLC). Of all the phases in software development, requirements engineering is generally considered to play the most critical role in determining the overall software quality. NASA data demonstrate that nearly 75% of failures found in operational software were caused by errors in the requirements. The verification process in requirements phase checks the correctness of software requirements specification, and the safety analysis process analyzes the safety-related properties in detail. In this paper, the method for safety analysis at requirements phase of software development life cycle using symbolic model verifier (SMV) is proposed. Hazard is discovered by hazard analysis and in other to use SMV for the safety analysis, the safety-related properties are expressed by computation tree logic (CTL)

  10. International review on safety requirements for the prototype fast breeder reactor “Monju”

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    In response to the lessons learned from the serious nuclear accidents at the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations, an advisory committee, which was set up by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, issued the report “Safety Requirements Expected to the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju” taking into account the SFR specific safety characteristics in July 2014. The report was reviewed by the leading international experts on SFR safety from five countries and one international organization in order to obtain independent and objective evaluation. The international review comments on each subsection were collected and compiled, and then a summary of results was derived through the discussion at the review meeting and individual feedbacks. As a result the basic concept for prevention of severe accidents and mitigation of their consequences of Monju is appropriate in consideration of SFR specific safety characteristics, and is in accordance with international common understanding. (author)

  11. Access Safety Systems – New Concepts from the LHC Experience

    CERN Document Server

    Ladzinski, T; di Luca, S; Hakulinen, T; Hammouti, L; Riesco, T; Nunes, R; Ninin, P; Juget, J-F; Havart, F; Valentini, F; Sanchez-Corral Mena, E

    2011-01-01

    The LHC Access Safety System has introduced a number of new concepts into the domain of personnel protection at CERN. These can be grouped into several categories: organisational, architectural and concerning the end-user experience. By anchoring the project on the solid foundations of the IEC 61508/61511 methodology, the CERN team and its contractors managed to design, develop, test and commission on time a SIL3 safety system. The system uses a successful combination of the latest Siemens redundant safety programmable logic controllers with a traditional relay logic hardwired loop. The external envelope barriers used in the LHC include personnel and material access devices, which are interlocked door-booths introducing increased automation of individual access control, thus removing the strain from the operators. These devices ensure the inviolability of the controlled zones by users not holding the required credentials. To this end they are equipped with personnel presence detectors and th...

  12. Safety requirements and radiological protection for ore installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-06-01

    This norm establishes the safety and radiological protection requirements for mining installations which manipulates, process and storing ores, raw materials, steriles, slags and wastes containing radionuclides of the uranium and thorium natural series, simultaneously or separated, and which can cause undue exposures to the public and workers, at anytime of the functioning or pos operational stage. This norm applies to the mining installations activities, suspended or which have ceased their activities before the issue date of this norm, destined to the mining, physical, chemical and metallurgical processing, and the industrialization of raw materials and residues containing associated radionuclides from the natural series of uranium and thorium, including the stages of implantation, operation and decommissioning of the installation

  13. Sharing data between mobile devices, connected vehicles, and infrastructure task 3: system requirements specifications (SyRS) final.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-07-14

    This report describes the system requirements specifications (SyRS) for the use of mobile devices in a connected vehicle environment. Specifically, it defines the different types of requirements (functional, interface, performance, security, data, an...

  14. 78 FR 47015 - Software Requirement Specifications for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-02

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2012-0195] Software Requirement Specifications for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission... issuing a revised regulatory guide (RG), revision 1 of RG 1.172, ``Software Requirement Specifications for...

  15. 76 FR 58301 - Proposed Extension of Existing Information Collection; Automatic Fire Sensor and Warning Device...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-09-20

    ... Information Collection; Automatic Fire Sensor and Warning Device Systems; Examination and Test Requirements ACTION: Notice of request for public comments. SUMMARY: The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA... public comment version of this information collection package. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Roslyn B...

  16. A user-centred approach to requirements elicitation in medical device development: a case study from an industry perspective.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Martin, Jennifer L; Clark, Daniel J; Morgan, Stephen P; Crowe, John A; Murphy, Elizabeth

    2012-01-01

    The healthcare industry is dependent upon the provision of well designed medical devices. To achieve this it is recommended that user-centred design should begin early, and continue throughout device development. This is a challenge, particularly for smaller companies who may lack the necessary expertise and knowledge. The aim of this study was to conduct a rigorous yet focused investigation into the user requirements for a new medical imaging device. Open-ended semi-structured interviews were conducted with potential clinical users of the device to investigate the clinical need for the device and the potential benefits for patients and clinical users. The study identified a number of new and significant clinical needs that suggested that the concept of the device should be fundamentally changed. The clinical and organisational priorities of the clinical users were identified, as well as a number of factors that would act as barriers to the safe and effective adoption of the device. The developers reported that this focused approach to early requirements elicitation would result in an improved product, reduce the time to market, and save the time and cost of producing and evaluating an inappropriate prototype. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd and The Ergonomics Society. All rights reserved.

  17. [Storage of plant protection products in farms: minimum safety requirements].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dutto, Moreno; Alfonzo, Santo; Rubbiani, Maristella

    2012-01-01

    Failure to comply with requirements for proper storage and use of pesticides in farms can be extremely hazardous and the risk of accidents involving farm workers, other persons and even animals is high. There are still wide differences in the interpretation of the concept of "securing or making safe", by workers in this sector. One of the critical points detected, particularly in the fruit sector, is the establishment of an adequate storage site for plant protection products. The definition of "safe storage of pesticides" is still unclear despite the recent enactment of Legislative Decree 81/2008 regulating health and work safety in Italy. In addition, there are no national guidelines setting clear minimum criteria for storage of plant protection products in farms. The authors, on the basis of their professional experience and through analysis of recent legislation, establish certain minimum safety standards for storage of pesticides in farms.

  18. 10 CFR 34.20 - Performance requirements for industrial radiography equipment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... visible label bearing the— (i) Chemical symbol and mass number of the radionuclide in the device; (ii... not compromise the design safety features of the system. (c) In addition to the requirements specified... the source assembly from water, mud, sand or other foreign matter. (4)(i) Each sealed source or source...

  19. Hydraulic screw fastening devices - design, maintenance, operational experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lachner.

    1976-01-01

    With hydraulic screw fastening devices, pretension values with a maximum deviation of +-2.5% from the rated value can be achieved. This high degree of pretension accuracy is of considerable importance with regard to the safety factor required for the screw connection between reactor vessel head and reactor vessel. The operating rhythm of a nuclear power station with its refuelling art regular intervals makes further demands on the screw fastening device, in particular in connection with the transport of screws and for nuts. The necessary installations extend the screw fastening device into a combination of a high-pressure hydraulic cylinder system with an electrical or pneumoelectrical driving unit and an electrical control unit. Maintenance work is complicated by the large number of identical, highly stressed structural elements in connection with an unfavourable relation operating time/outage time. The problems have been perpetually reduced by close cooperation between the manufacturers and users of screw fastening devices. (orig./AK) [de

  20. Overview of fusion reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cohen, S.; Crocker, J.G.

    1981-01-01

    Use of deuterium-tritium burning fusion reactors requires examination of several major safety and environmental issues: (1) tritium inventory control, (2) neutron activation of structural materials, fluid streams and reactor hall environment, (3) release of radioactivity from energy sources including lithium spill reactions, superconducting magnet stored energy release, and plasma disruptions, (4) high magnetic and electromagnetic fields associated with fusion reactor superconducting magnets and radio frequency heating devices, and (5) handling and disposal of radioactive waste. Early recognition of potential safety problems with fusion reactors provides the opportunity for improvement in design and materials to eliminate or greatly reduce these problems. With an early start in this endeavor, fusion should be among the lower risk technologies for generation of commercial electrical power